CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
The term "just," as used by Aristotle,' has two separate

meanings: in its first meaning it is principally used to describe

a conduct in agreement with the "law". ' a conduct, therefore,

which conforms to an established, authoritative rule of human

conduct; in short, it is used to describe a conduct which

conforms to whatever constitutes an authoritative instrument

of social and moral control. In this sense Justice can be seen as

a "moral disposition which renders men apt to do the right

things and which causes them to act justly and to wish what is

just." 'It refers primarily to the application or observance of

certain authoritative rules of human conduct and should,

consequently, rather be called the virtue of "righteousness" or

of "moral Justice" - a virtue ' displayed towards others, a social

virtue.

Today it is all the rage for political theorists and even

philosophers to have and to expound theories of justice.

Looking back on the history of political thought, we cannot help

noticing that not all philosophers have taken justice and

1
theories of justice so seriously. Among those who did not was

Aristotle. To be sure, he had a theory of justice, and from this

fact we might infer that he thought it necessary to have one.

But the argument that I shall make is that Aristotle thought all

theories of justice, including his own, to be insufficient.

Like Plato, Aristotle (384–322 BCE) believed that people

are separated by dramatic differences in their natural

capacities, so much so that, while some are qualified to rule or

to participate in ruling, others – who comprise the bulk of

humankind – are fit only to be ruled. For him as for Plato, the

right relation between these two categories (the latter,

according to Aristotle, consists of several diverse groups,

including women, children, and people who are naturally suited

to be slaves by virtue of their limited powers of reasoning) is

one of command and obedience. For Aristotle, however,

relations between those who are radically unequal are not the

primary subject of justice. The concept of justice in Aristotle’s

theory applies primarily to a set of relations among men who

are free and relatively equal, relations that play a very slim role

in the argument of the Republic.

2
 The principal source for Aristotle’s theory of justice is Book

V of his Nicomachean Ethics, a book that is a companion to,

and precedes, his Politics in expository order. The Ethics is

essentially an inquiry into the nature of the good human life,

and especially into the virtues that are integral to it. His theory

of justice is couched within this (for him) much larger frame.

At the outset of his account, Aristotle takes pains to

distinguish between “complete” (or “general”) justice and

“partial” (or “particular”) justice. In one sense, he says, “we call

things just which produce and secure happiness or the parts of

happiness for the political community” (1129b). Justice in this

sense is “complete virtue or excellence [...] in relation to one’s

neighbour” (1129b). Here Aristotle quotes the line “in justice is

every virtue summed up” from the poet Theognis. Complete

justice, then, is an attribute of character, the virtue that is

exhibited by human beings in their relations with others insofar

as these interactions promote a good life and lead to happiness

for the members of the political community as a whole.

1.1.1 Historical background of Aristotle

3
The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) made significant

and lasting contributions to nearly every aspect of human

knowledge, from logic to biology to ethics and aesthetics.

Though overshadowed in classical times by the work of his

teacher Plato, from late antiquity through the Enlightenment,

Aristotle’s surviving writings were incredibly influential. In

Arabic philosophy, he was known simply as “The First Teacher”;

in the West, he was “The Philosopher.”

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in Stagira in northern

Greece. Both of his parents were members of traditional

medical families, and his father, Nicomachus, served as court

physician to King Amyntus III of Macedonia. His parents died

while he was young, and he was likely raised at his family’s

home in Stagira. At age 17 he was sent to Athens to enroll

in Plato's Academy. He spent 20 years as a student and teacher

at the school, emerging with both a great respect and a good

deal of criticism for his teacher’s theories. Plato’s own later

writings, in which he softened some earlier positions, likely bear

the mark of repeated discussions with his most gifted student.

1.1.2 Aristotle notion of justice

4
Justice in Greek thinking had mostly been defined as balance,

except that justice in individual means the balance between

ego forces and within society, it means balance among

society's compartments (Bashrieh, 2003). Aristotle stated

justice in two general and strict meaning. Justice in general

sense consists of respect rules and equality of citizens. Justice

in strict sense is divided into two corrective and distributive

types: Justice in strict sense and fair action conforms to it

(distributive justice) influences distribution of honor, money

and other things among citizens who have shares in political

system of the society. Another type of this justice (corrective

justice) plays a correcting role in transactions and relationships

among people in the society. This kind of justice is also of two

types; as some transactions are voluntarily and some are not

(Aristotle, 2007). The relationship between justice and equality

is an important debate by Aristotle about distributive justice. All

believe that justice in distribution should be based on merit, so

justice is to follow proportionality, which treats equalities

equally and inequalities unequally and gifts or facilities are

distributed proportional to the person's equalities or

inequalities. From Aristotle's view also in corrective justice the

5
equality element exists except that in distributive justice

geometric fitness arises but in transactions numerical fitness

(Aristotle, 1999). For instance, when someone damages the

other and according to the corrective justice the judge orders

redress, there is no difference what are the features and

positions of both parties; here the amount of damage should be

redressed exactly. From Aristotle's perspective, as every virtue

is in the middle of two rascalities, one is excess and the other is

wastage. In all instances of justice (particular), we are facing a

phenomenon called average observance. Indeed, a fair person

has followed the middle of two rascalities accurately. Aristotle

defines fortune as ego’s efforts adjusted to the "virtue" and

justice is at the center of the virtues which accomplish human

fortune. He writes: Justice includes all virtues and in the strict

sense, it is perfect virtue, because justice requires the

application of all virtues. In this regard, Justice is perfect virtue

which man can accomplish not only within oneself but also in

his communications. At first, he claimed that by justice people

mean a queen who causes man acquires talent to realize fair

actions and acts justly; Yet justice and injustice have a lot of

meanings. Justice in general sense (general justice) against

6
justice in strict sense (particular justice) points to some of these

meanings. Justice in general sense by Aristotle, who interpreted

it as the whole virtue, means respect laws and follow them. So

all actions adjusted to law are just in general term. Aristotle

denotes general virtue of justice a perfect virtue includes all

virtues predicted as "mother of virtues". Because justice is to

apply all virtues. In addition, a person with this feature both can

apply his virtue to himself and also to his relatives, to the

extent that every action by that person benefits public directly.

Thus, among all virtues, Justice is the only one which isn't good

for others, so justice implies social feature in which all virtues

are diffused. This occurs when particular justice (Justice in

transaction distributions) is just a part of moral virtue and it is

merely a particular feature (Aristotle, 1980). According to

Aristotle the ruling laws, magistrates and governors are law's

servants. While he criticizes public reign in a particular manner

adopts the foundation of sovereignty and preferences in

collective judgment over personal one obviously (Aristotle,

1991). Hence, it can be said that in Aristotle's political thoughts

justice in general sense means virtuous treatment of people in

society and this treatment is determined by government's law.

7
In Aristotelian desirable reign, this law has been legislated in

order to supply supreme good that is the government's

happiness has been established by governors who possess

practical wisdom virtue. Law is wisdom free of fantasies to train

people in society which requires them to the virtuous behavior

and prohibit them from rascalities. In such a reign, a good

citizen just possesses those virtues of a good man. He

possesses justice virtue and follows impartiality to gain social

advantage. In this general term, Justice is the ultimate of the

government and the order of political society and a just citizen

possess all virtues out rightly. He can follow virtues not only in

his loneliness but also in political community towards others.

That is justice is the most perfect virtue because perfect virtue

is implemented within it. Of course, Aristotle knows that

everywhere and, in all cases, laws have not been regulated to

provide people's fortunes and society's Happiness. So, it is

probable that laws are being legislated to benefit some special

groups or royalties. Thus, if any negligence has been occurred

in regulation, it doesn't yield good results. Instead of the

possibility of negligence in legislation, he defines justice in

general sense as respecting laws and enforce them. He

8
considers it as the noblest virtue, this indicates the

presumption that in regulating laws any negligence has not

been occurred and it has been legislated aims at providing

fortunes of people and society where all goodness is visible in

it; since he doesn't consider justice in this regard as a part of

moral virtue rather, he called it "all the virtues" (Caplaston).

After examination of justice in general sense, Aristotle

investigates particular justice. At first, he translates particular

justice into "justly" contrasting his description of general justice

as "lawful"; he describes justly or fairly "proportionally equal"

(World economic journal, 2014). Justice in general sense that is

to obey laws is indivisible; but justice in strict sense that is

"pluralistic" with many different displays of justice virtue, is

divisible. Particular justice and particular injustice, though they

exemplify obeying the law and ignoring law respectively, but

they are not just like that and they have a part and the whole

relationship. Discrimination and equality negligence are

examples of offence and injustice in general sense

acknowledges that; but any offence can't be interpreted as the

discrimination and equality negligence. So, there are numerous

examples of justice and injustice, which shape justice and

9
injustice in particular meaning. Surely all of them are not out of

the two terms general justice and general injustice.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The solution to the issue of justice and equity has always been

desire of all philosophers. Secondly the problems rose by the

concepts of "distributive Justice" and "commutative Justice"

does not originate with the moral virtue of righteousness, but

stem rather from the concept of Equality or "equitable

fairness." To Aristotle, Equality is not only the basic form in

which the authoritative rules of human conduct are unfolded

and made manifest, but constitutes also the main topic of his

investigation into the nature of "legal Justice." The problems of

"distributive Justice" and "commutative Justice" are in fact

incidental to his investigations into the nature of Equality, and

are treated, along with other problems, as arising from that

principle. It is to this regard that study is based on justice and

its primacy in the political philosophy of Aristotle.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THESIS

For the successful completion of the study, the following

research hypotheses were formulated by the researcher;

10
 i. There is no significant Complete (or General Justice)

and Personal (Partial Justice).

1.4 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main aim of the research work is to examine justice and its

primacy in the political philosophy of Aristotle. The specific

objectives of the study are:

1. to examine equity as a form of justice in Aristotle

philosophy

2. to ascertain injustice as the Cause of Revolution in the

state

3. to determine the role of education in the application and

sustenance of Justice in the state.

1.5 Scope of the Study.

This work is limited to the examination of Aristotle’s

Philosophical view of justice and its Primacy in Politics

It discusses his stands, a closer look into the concept of Justice

and Governance. It does not go into such areas as methods of

conflict resolution and arbitration.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

11
The study on justice and its primacy in the political philosophy

of Aristotle will be of immense benefit to philosophers. The

study will look at the notion of the state, justification for

slavery, justice Vis-à-vis types of constitution and aristocracy.

The study will also serve as a repository of information to other

researchers and students that desire to carry out similar

research on the above topic. Finally, the study will contribute to

the body of the existing literature on justice and its primacy in

the political philosophy of Aristotle.

1.7 Methodology of the Study

The methods employed in this work are critical analysis,

conceptual clarification and constructive evaluation. Critical
analysis and conceptual clarification have been used to analyze
the concepts of Epistemology and Peace, while constructive
evaluation has been used to expose the ways in which
Epistemology can serve as a foundation

12
 CHAPTER TWO

2.0 APPLICATION OF JUSTICE IN THE STATE

2.1 JUSTIFICATION OF SLAVERY

The history of mankind has been marked by insecurity and fear.

This state of tension has often resulted in wars, tyranic

government and oppression at varied degrees. Moreover,

some people, races or even families and individuals have often

claimed natural superiority over others. These self-acclaimed

natural superiors regard others as inferiors or sub-humans and

13
therefore subject them to different degrees of inhuman

treatments. Such treatments and notion often end up as

slavery.

The issue of slavery has been a crucial one in the liberative

history of mankind. Hence many great thinkers have tackled

this problem according to the “defacto” situation of their time

or in view of the “de jure” position in the slavery justification or

condemnation. The New Caxton Encyclopedia defines slavery

as: “the condition of being a human chattel, the private

property of his owner to whose will he or she is entirely

subject.” Slavery is also “a system under which an individual is

held as a property of another to be used or disposed of at the

will of the owner or master.” Slavery is the act of depriving one

of his natural rights of liberty, freedom or dignity and thereby

rendering him less a man-reducing him to a mere instrument of

his master, a stopgap.

However, among all living creatures, man is the most unique in

view of his rationality. All men possess the quality of reasoning

though at varied degrees. These degrees in the rational

capacity of man, have often led many to think that those who

have the upper hand in it, coupled with some accidental

14
conditions and positions in life should be the superiors of the

less privileged, whereby the latter naturally become their

slaves. Among philosophers who define slavery is Aristotle.

According to him, a slave is:

…he that can and therefore does belong to

another, and he that participates in the

reasoning faculty so far as to understand

but not so as to possess it.

In this connection, he proceeds to give a philosophic

rationalization and justification of slavery. He made a clear-cut

distinction between natural and conventional slavery.

Conventional slavery is condemned by Aristotle because; it is

acquired under the basis of physical superiority. But this

physical strength is not the best criterion for determining the

quality of man. As a rational being, man can only measure the

extent of his superiority by the degree of his intellectual

capacity. This makes slavery by physical superiority wrong.

Also, conventional slavery cannot be accepted especially when

it results from war. This is because, often, wars are unjust.

According to Aristotle:

15
 Some claim that enslavement in war has

an element of right in it, simply as being

legal. But they do not always say this

since it is quite possible, that the

undertaking of war may have been unjust

in the first place.

This goes further to buttress the fact that conventional slavery is

unjust. Now in our modern societies, the height of injustice

committed under the canopy of physical or economic superiority is

quite alarming. Nations have enslaved others under varied

inhuman torture. Moreover, individuals have thwarted justice in

law courts and other places where justice should obtain, just for the

sake of conventional superiority.

On the other hand, Aristotle condemns conventional slavery in

order to justify natural slavery. For him, the superior-inferior

relationship has a natural background. This kind of relationship

is evidenced in living creatures. For instance, it is natural that

the soul which is the superior component of man should rule

over the body in terms of rationality. However, it is only in

abnormal cases that this order can be contradicted. Also, man

16
is naturally made superior over all irrational beings. In the

words of Aristotle:

…it is clear that it is both natural and

expedient for the body to be ruled by the

mind and for the emotion parts of our

nature to be ruled by that which possesses

reason, our intelligence.

For Aristotle therefore, intelligence, that is the reasoning faculty in

man, is the only criterion for dermining the superiority of one man

to another. It all means that the most intelligent should be superior

and master, while the less intelligent becomes the natural slave.

Therefore:

Where there is the same wide discrepancy

between two sets of human beings or

between man and beast, the inferior of the

two sets, those whose condition is such

that their function is the use of their bodies

and nothing better can be expected of

them, those I say are slaves by nature.

Though it is an individual fact that man is not endowed

naturally with equal intellectual capacity, nevertheless, we

17
cannot affirmatively use it as a paradigm for determining who a

slave or a free born is. However, this is Aristotle’s opinion which

he is entitled to. But whether this opinion gains a universal

acceptance is yet to be considered in our evaluation of this

work. But whichever is the case, Aristotle used the above

illustration to explain the just and unjust form of constitutions

as we have them in the state. This will be the subject of our

next section.

2.2 JUSTICE VIS-À-VIS TYPES OF CONSTITUTION

Constitution in the genetic sense is the general structure of a

thing, the framework by which a thing functions or is made. But

in the political sense of it, it refers to the system in which a

state is governed. For Aristotle, constitution is the citizen-body

and it differs in number and supremacy relative to that of a

particular place.

The constitution of a state is the

organization of the offices and in particular

of the one that is sovereign; the citizen

body is the constitution.

In the bid to find out the justified and practicable constitution,

Aristotle divided it into basic distinction; that whose objective is

18
to seek the common good and that seeks mainly the private

good of the ruler. The former is justified while the latter is not.

It is clear then that those constitution that

aim at common good and right, as being in

accord with absolute justice. While those

which aims only at the good of the rulers

are wrong.

However, the rule in the state must not take the form of “slave-

master rule” where the slave is considered irrational. This is

because in it, the ruler is so supreme that he becomes a

dictator, ruling over others irrespective of what they think or

feel. Such rule seeks after the good of the ruler alone. On the

other hand, the rule in the state should be constitutional, where

the ruler, rules over rational subjects and respects their

feelings as human beings. We now consider some of these

constitutions.

2.2.1 MONARCHY

Monarchy is a rule whereby one man is sovereign in the

authority of the state. He might have other administrative

organs that help in the administration. But these

administrations are entirely subordinate to him at all levels.

19
Under monarchical rule we have kingship and Tyranny. First let

us consider kingship.

2.2.1.1 KINGSHIP

Kingship is a monarchical rule whereby one man who is

outstandingly virtuous among others is sovereign in the

political affairs of the state. He must rule by well-established

laws of which he is a custodian. For Aristotle, kingship is the

best constitution in that it is rid of emotional or selfish

tendencies.

But when it comes to the best type of

constitution, there is a real difficulty, not in

the cases of superiority in the other

goods...but where a man is pre-eminent in

virtue, he will not say that... they ought to

rule over him... he will end up saying, we

will gladly obey him. Thus such men will

be permanent kings in the state.

But the fallible nature of man has made it difficult if not

impossible to have such a man of absolute goodness. For if

such a person is found then, “We may reasonably regard such

20
one as a god among men-which shows clearly that legistilative

too must apply to equals in birth and capacity.”

Absolute kinship for Aristotle represents the well-established

law. It is what Hobbes referred to as the “Leviathan.”

Unfortunately, individuals have often been mistakenly

entrusted with such lofty powers. And here the saying that

“absolute power corrupts absolutely” is always the result.

When this becomes the case, the constitution deteriorates into

Tyranny.

2.2.1.2 TYRANNY

This is a monarchical rule whereby one man autocratically

handles the affairs of the state in such a way as would suit his

personal interest and not the common good. However, it is only

in rare cases that Tyrants are constitutionally elected or

appointed. According to Aristotle, the rule of such tyrants is

relatively justified because it is legally allowed in that

constitution. But it is not in accord with absolute justice,

because such a tyrant is that “... sole ruler who is not required

to give an account of himself, and who rules over all equals or

superiors to him to suit his own interest and not theirs.”

21
Tyranny is evident in such political philosophy where morality is

divorced from politics. For instance in the politics of

Machiavelli, what matters is not common good, but the ability

of the ruler to acquire power and use it for his own personal

good. But since man as a rational being, naturally seeks

freedom, such rule is often full of resentment and grudges. It

does not last, “hence, it is endured unwillingly, for no one

willingly submits to such rule if he is a free man.” Tyranny is

not only unjust, it is illegal. Infact, it is the worst of all

constitutions and therefore ought not to be applied in the state.

2.2.2 ARISTOCRACY

This is the rule, whereby the few virtuous hold the sovereign

power in the state. According to Aristotle, Aristocracy is:

...that constitution which is composed of

those who are without qualification, best in

virtue, not simply of those who are good in

relation to some assumed situation.

So, virtue is the definitive principle in Aristocracy. Virtue in this

context refers to the sincere pursuit of the common good. It is

not just a pretension or “Seeming to be good” kind of virtue as

Machiavelli would solicit. Rather, the rulers should be good in

22
themselves and outstandingly prove themselves to be so. They

should clearly distinguish themselves in their selfless service to

the people and not on the acquisition of wealth.

With these qualities of Aristocracy, Aristotle declares it as the

absolutely ideal and best constitution. So, in as much as it is

the ideally best rule that is in accord with absolute justice, it is

an imaginary constitution of a sort. It is not practicable. This is

because of the moral weakness inherent in man’s nature, so

that it is difficult to find such number of virtuous men in

practice.

2.2.3 OLIGARCHY

This is the constitution where the sovereign authority of the

state is in the hands of the few outstanding wealthy men in the

state. It is a deviation from Aristocracy. While the Aristocrat

bases his personal worth on virtuous life, the Oligarch bases his

on the amount of wealth acquired.

However, since justice is based on the conception of equality,

the Oligarchs hold that those who are unequal in one aspect of

life should be unequal in all other aspects. Aristotle puts this

clearer;

23
 Thus, it is an error when men unequal in

one respect, e.g. many suppose

themselves unequal in one respect. Many

suppose themselves unequal in all...

This conception of justice has often led them, to take more than

they should. Whenever, they are in power, instead of being

generous with their wealth, they rather use it as bait for the

poor. They accumulate and mismanage the common fund:

“They ... plunder and help themselves to the good of the

mass....” Egocentricism is very much pronounced so that there

exists a yawning gap between the living standard of the rich

and that of the poor. Oligarch is not in accord with absolute

justice because it does not take into account the common good.

2.2.4 DEMOCRACY

This is a constitution where the poor but free majority is

sovereign in the state. Here, freedom is the definitive principle

that qualifies one to participate in the government of the state.

According to Aristotle:

A democracy exists whenever those who

are free and are not well-off, being in

24
 majority, are in sovereign control of

government.

For Aristophanes, Democracy was not a good political system.

This is because in the early reforms made in Athens, most of

the “poor citizens paid as jurors, ridiculed the practice of

justice... many unqualified lazy people joined the jury for the

sake of money.”

For Aristotle, the fault with Democracy lies on their wrong

conception of justice as equality for all, regardless of necessary

differences. Stumpf commenting on this says:

Democracy as Aristotle knew it arises, out of the assumption

that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all

respects, because men are equally free; they claim to be

absolutely equal. Stumpf, S., Philosophy History and Problems

U.S.A. McGraw-Hill, 1983. p.103.

The problem with democracy is that it gives offices both to

those who merits it and to those who do not, under the basis

general equality. Secondly, Democracy undermines the

presence and opinion of the minority, so that the decision of

the majority whether right or wrong is best acceptable.

25
Democracy does not seek the common good but only the good

of the majority and as such it is a deviation kind of constitution.

It is not justified.

2.3 THE BEST JUSTIFIABLE AND PRACTICAL

CONSTITUTION

From the ongoing, we have seen that Kingship and Aristocracy

are the best constitutions but they are too utopic to be

practicalised. On the other hand, Democracy and Oligarchy are

very practical but they are at the same time unjust. So, the

task left for us now is to find a constitution that is good or

second best and at the same time practicable.

Nevertheless, in our consideration of these constitutions to find

out the best and most applicable, our sine qua non, according

to Aristotle must be the common good of all: rich and poor,

slave and free alike etc. This is justice. According to Stumpf,

“whatever a government has, it will rest upon some conception

of justice and proportionate equality.” Ibid., P.102. It is not only

that the best constitution will rest on justice, but also the

individuals involved in the rule must be good in themselves.

Now in every state there are basically, two classes of people,

the rich and the poor. These, represent two constitutions-

26
Democracy for the poor and Oligarchy for the rich. In other to

find out the best and most practicable constitution, Aristotle

merged these two practicable constitutions in view of

approximating the ideal-Aristocracy. This will favour the rich

and poor alike. This is what he called “Polity” the middle-class

constitution. In short “...to put it in a word, polity is a mixture

of Oligarchy and Democracy.” Aristotle., Op.cit., p.259

In other word, polity is formed to bridge the gap created by the

two extreme constitutions (Oligarchy and Democracy).

Whereas the unjust act in Oligarchy is arrogance arising from

the feeling of superiority complex that of Democracy is

weakness arising from the feeling of inferiority complex. So,

Aristotle introduced polity here as a solution to the chaotic

state existing between the Oligarchies and the Democrats just

as Hobbes introduced the “social contract” as a solution to the

state of nature, a state of warfare.

Polity therefore is not a deviational nor an ideal constitution. It

is the second best. It is the constitution of the middle class.

They are neither too rich nor too poor; their number is not too

much nor too small. They are a good spread in the state.

Succinctly put by Aristotle; “... the best life must be the middle

27
life, consisting in a mean which is open to men of every kind to

attain.” Ibid., p.266

The middle class is not seggregative. It welcomes all who strive

to like a normal good life required. It is not too idealistic as to

be above human effort to attain. So, when we talk of virtuous

men constitution polity we mean:

...men whose virtue does not rise above that of ordinary

people... and who have not an ideally perfect constitution, but
first a way of living in which as many as possible can join the
compass of the greatest number of states. Ibid, p.267.
So the best constitution, which can easily be applied in the

state, is supposed by Aristotle to be polity-the rule by the

middle class. Their natural structure and condition disposes

them to seek for justice in the state.

28
 CHAPTER THREE

3.0 The Metaphysics of Justice and Revolutionary

Transformation

Having examined the ontological foundations of various

constitutional forms and their teleological justifications within the

state, we must now turn our philosophical gaze to the metaphysical

underpinnings of political transformation and the role of justice—or

its absence—in catalyzing such changes.

3.1 The Dialectical Relationship Between Justice and

Equality

To embark upon this inquiry, we must first disentangle the complex

relationship between justice and equality—two concepts that, while

intimately related, maintain distinct philosophical identities. While

equality in its most fundamental sense refers to "the state of being

equal; likeness in size, number, quantity, value, qualities or

degree" (Lexicon Webster's Dictionary, 1971), justice transcends

mere equivalence to encompass what Aquinas, following Aristotle,

29
termed "the constant and permanent determination of the will to

give each one his due" (Bruehl, 1941, p.151).

As Plato articulates in The Republic, justice operates at both the

individual and societal level as a harmonizing force that assigns to

each element its proper place within the whole (Plato, Republic,

434c-434d). Aristotle builds upon this foundation when he posits

that "all men believe that justice is equality in a sense" (Politics,

III.9, 1280a11). The qualification "in a sense" is crucial, for it points

to the deeper philosophical truth that justice serves as the

metaphysical ground that determines the proper scope and

application of equality.

3.2 The Dialectics of Revolutionary Change

Revolution, understood in its philosophical essence, represents not

merely a change in political structure but a fundamental dialectical

transformation of the state's being. This transformation may

manifest in three distinct modes:

1. A complete metaphysical transformation from one constitutional

form to another

2. A transformation of authority within an existing constitutional

framework

30
3. A synthetic transformation encompassing both officials and

constitutional structure

Drawing from Hegel's concept of dialectical progression, we can

understand revolutionary change as arising from the contradiction

between thesis (existing order) and antithesis (opposing forces),

leading to synthesis (new order). This dialectical movement is

fundamentally driven by what Aristotle identifies as factions—

groups representing different conceptions of justice and equality

(Politics, V.1, 1301a25-35).

The philosophical tension between competing conceptions of

justice creates what Marx would later term "contradictions" within

the social fabric. As Aristotle observes, "Inequality is everywhere at

the bottom of faction, for in general, faction arises from men's

striving for what is equal" (Politics, V.2, 1302a25-28). This

observation reveals the profound paradox that drives revolutionary

change: the very pursuit of equality can lead to its opposite.

3.3 The Epistemological Role of Education in Sustaining

Justice

31
The preservation of justice within the state requires not merely

institutional structures but a profound epistemological foundation—

what Hegel might term the development of ethical consciousness

among citizens. This development necessarily occurs through

education, which Aristotle rightfully identifies as the "prime duty" of

the lawgiver (Politics, VIII.1, 1337a11-12).

The philosophical justification for public education rests on what we

might term, following Rousseau, the necessity of forming the

general will. As Aristotle argues, "Since there is but one aim for the

entire state, it follows that education must be one and the same for

all and that the responsibility for it must be a public one" (Politics,

VIII.1, 1337a21-26).

Contemporary philosopher Michael Sandel's work on justice and

community adds depth to this classical perspective, arguing that

justice requires not just institutional frameworks but the cultivation

of civic virtue and shared understanding of the common good

(Sandel, M., "Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?", 2009).

The modern state's emphasis on moral education through various

institutions and programs reflects this philosophical understanding.

32
However, as Foucault might observe, such educational structures

also serve as mechanisms of power and social control, raising

important questions about the relationship between knowledge,

power, and justice (Foucault, M., "Discipline and Punish", 1975).

The challenge of moral education in the contemporary state lies in

what MacIntyre terms the "crisis of moral education in advanced

modernity" (MacIntyre, A., "After Virtue", 1981). The establishment

of various educational and enlightenment organs—such as

Nigeria's War Against Corruption (W.A.C) and Mass Mobilization for

Social Justice (M.M.S.J)—represents an attempt to address this

crisis, though the philosophical question of whether those who

educate possess the virtues they seek to instill remains pertinent.

In conclusion, the relationship between justice, revolution, and

education in the state represents a complex philosophical nexus

that requires careful analysis of both metaphysical foundations and

practical implementations. The challenge lies in bridging the gap

between theoretical understanding and practical application of

justice in the contemporary state.

33
 CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Having traversed the landscape of Aristotelian political philosophy and its

conception of justice, we must now engage in a critical dialectical analysis that

synthesizes our findings while simultaneously interrogating their philosophical

foundations and contemporary implications.

4.1 Critical Evaluation

4.1.1 The Triumph of Rational Order

Aristotle's profound contribution to political philosophy lies in his revolutionary

introduction of rational order (logos) as the governing principle of political life,

superseding the mere expression of human passion (pathos). This

philosophical breakthrough represents what Heidegger might term a "clearing"

(Lichtung) in political thought—a moment where the possibility of genuine

political justice emerged from the shadows of mere power relations.

By grounding political justice in moral philosophy, Aristotle effectuated what

we might call, borrowing from Husserl, an "eidetic reduction" of political reality

to its essential structure. This philosophical move proved instrumental in

countering what Thrasymachus articulated in Plato's Republic as the reduction

34
of justice to power—the notorious "might makes right" doctrine that would

later find its renaissance in Machiavellian thought.

As Hannah Arendt observes in "The Human Condition" (1958), this Aristotelian

conception of political order as fundamentally moral rather than merely

powerful opened the possibility for genuine political community. The ripple

effects of this philosophical innovation can be traced through various political

thinkers:

1. Aquinas's synthesis of Aristotelian political philosophy with Christian

theology

2. Hobbes's conception of legitimate political authority

3. Locke's theory of natural rights and limited government

4. Rawls's theory of justice as fairness

4.1.2 Philosophical Limitations and Historical Contingencies

The Slavery Question

35
However, Aristotle's political philosophy contains what Hegel would term

internal contradictions. Perhaps the most glaring is his attempt to provide

philosophical justification for slavery. As Copleston notes, "we regret that

Aristotle canonized the contemporary institution of slavery" (History of

Philosophy, p.252). This represents what Marx might term the "ideological

superstructure" reflecting the material base of Greek society.

The philosophical error here lies not in recognizing human difference—what

Charles Taylor terms "the politics of recognition"—but in what Copleston

identifies as "the over-rigid dichotomy between two types as something almost

less than human" (loc. cit.). This raises fundamental questions about the

relationship between universal human dignity and particular human

differences.

Modern philosophical anthropology, as developed by thinkers like Max Scheler

and Helmuth Plessner, provides a more nuanced understanding of human

nature that preserves both unity and difference. As Edward P. argues, "despite

the many points of inequality, all men are alike in possessing reason or some

other essentially human characteristic or a nature by virtue of which they

stand equal" (p.40).

36
The 1776 American Declaration of Independence and the 1949 Universal

Declaration of Human Rights represent the philosophical maturation of this

understanding. As Jürgen Habermas argues in "Between Facts and Norms"

(1992), human rights discourse represents the rationalization of political

legitimacy through universal moral principles.

The Question of Ultimate Ends

Another philosophical limitation in Aristotle's thought is his identification of

the state as man's ultimate end. His assertion that the political association is

"the most sovereign of all goods" (Politics, p.54) reflects what Charles Taylor

might term a "closed immanent frame"—a worldview that unnecessarily

restricts human transcendence.

This philosophical error has had significant historical consequences,

particularly in materialist political philosophies that reject transcendent

sources of meaning and value. As Alasdair MacIntyre argues in "After Virtue"

(1981), the loss of transcendent reference points in political philosophy has

contributed to the moral incoherence of modern political discourse.

37
Aquinas provides a necessary correction when he argues that "God is obviously

the end of all things" (Summa Theologica, 1a p.70). This opens what Karl

Jaspers would term the possibility of "philosophical faith"—a recognition of

transcendent meaning that doesn't negate but rather fulfills political life.

4.2 Philosophical Synthesis and Contemporary Implications

The contemporary crisis in political philosophy—manifested in the widespread

perception of politics as a "dirty game"—represents what Nietzsche might

term a "transvaluation of values." The triumph of what MacIntyre calls

"emotivism" in moral and political discourse has led to the eclipse of genuine

political virtue.

This situation poses what Heidegger would term a "challenge"

(Herausforderung) to contemporary humanity. The task before us is threefold:

1. Recovery of Political Rationality: Following Aristotle's emphasis on reason

(logos) as the distinguishing mark of human nature, we must rebuild political

discourse on rational foundations.

38
2. Reintegration of Morality and Politics: As Bernard Williams argues in "Ethics

and the Limits of Philosophy" (1985), we must reconnect political practice with

substantive moral reflection.

3. Recognition of Transcendent Reference: While maintaining the autonomy of

political life, we must recognize, with Augustine, that political justice ultimately

points beyond itself.

The enduring relevance of Aristotle's political philosophy lies not in its

particular conclusions but in its fundamental insight that justice, grounded in

reason and oriented toward the common good, must serve as the foundation

of legitimate political order. As Charles Taylor argues in "Sources of the Self"

(1989), this recovery of substantive political rationality is essential for

addressing the malaise of modernity.

In our current political moment, characterized by what Zygmunt Bauman terms

"liquid modernity," the challenge is to reconstruct political philosophy on

foundations that are both rational and moral. Only then can we hope to build

what John Rawls calls a "well-ordered society"—one in which justice serves not

merely as a constraint but as the animating principle of political life.

This task requires what Iris Marion Young terms "communicative

democracy"—a political practice that combines rational discourse with

39
recognition of difference. It also demands what Charles Taylor calls a "politics

of recognition" that acknowledges both universal human dignity and particular

human differences.

The contemporary relevance of Aristotelian political philosophy thus lies in its

fundamental insight: that justice, properly understood, provides the only

secure foundation for political community. As we face the challenges of our

own time, this insight remains not merely relevant but essential for the future

of political life.

40
BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPADORAL, A., The substance of Politics (11th edition)

London: Oxford University Press. 1975.

AQUINAS, T., Summa Contra Gentiles Books Part 1

(Trans) Bourke J.U U.S.A Double day and

Co. Inc., 1956.

Summa Theologica Part II Fathers of the

English Dominican Province (Trans).

London: 1967.

ARISTOTLE, The Political T.A Sinclair (Trans) England:

Penguin Books Ltd. 1962.

The Political (Revised Edition) T.A. Sinclair

(Trans).

The Nich Ethics J.A.K. Thompson (trans.)

England: Penguin Books Ltd. 1976.

BOURKER, Ethics: A Test Book in Moral Philosophy Vol.

1. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967.

BRUEHL, P.C., This Way Happiness Milwankee; Bruce

Pub., Co. 1941.

41
COPLESTON, F., History of Philosophy Vol.1 New York:

Image Books Co., Ltd 1985.

EDWARD, P., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vols. III and

IV. London: The Macmillian Pub. And The

free press 1972.

FAGOTHEY, Right and Reason St. Louis: The C.V. Mosby

Co., 1963.

HIGGINS, T.J., Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics.

Milwaukes: The Bruce Pub., Co., 1949.

HOBBES, T., Leviathan Michael Oakeshott. New York:

Macmillian Co. 1962.

IWE, S.S., Christianity, Culture and Colonization in

Africa. Port-Harcourt: R.S.N.C., 1979.

JONES, W.T., Masters of Political Thought (From

Machiavelli to Bentham) London: Oxford

University Pres. 1975.

LOCKE, J., Second Treatise on Governments

Macpherson C.B., Indiana: Hackett. 1980.

42
MARX, K., London, Wage and Capital Selected

Writings Oxford: 1977.

NWOKO, I.M., Basic World Political Theories Owerri:

Claretian Institute of Philosophy.

1988PLATO, The Republic. A.D. Lindsa

(Trans) London: J. M. Dent. Ltd., 1976.

The Republic. Desmond Lee (Trans) (2nd

edition). England: Penguin Book Ltd. 1974.

SABINE, G., A History of Political Theory (4th edition)

Illionis Dryden Press 1977.

STUMPF, S.E., Philosophy: History and Problems (2nd

edition) New York: McGranl-Hill Inc., 177.

MAGAZINES

THE SIGN MAGAZINE VOL. II NO. 5. 1987/88

THE THOMISTIC: A Speculative Quarterly Review.

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 1949.

43