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OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES

General Editors
Gillian Clark Andrew Louth
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THE OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES series includes scholarly volumes on

the thought and history of the early Christian centuries. Covering a wide range of Greek,
Latin, and Oriental sources, the books are of interest to theologians, ancient historians, and
specialists in the classical and Jewish worlds.
Titles in the series include:
Liturgy and Byzantinization in Jerusalem
Daniel Galadza (2017)
The Roman Martyrs
Introduction, Translations, and Commentary
Michael Lapidge (2017)
Philo of Alexandria and the Construction of Jewishness
in Early Christian Writings
Jennifer Otto (2018)
St Theodore the Studite’s Defence of the Icons
Theology and Philosophy in Ninth-Century Byzantium
Torstein Theodor Tollefsen (2018)
Gregory of Nyssa’s Doctrinal Works
A Literary Study
Andrew Radde-Gallwitz (2018)
The Donatist Church in an Apocalyptic Age
Jesse A. Hoover (2018)
The Minor Prophets as Christian Scripture in the Commentaries of
Theodore of Mopsuestia and Cyril of Alexandria
Hauna T. Ondrey (2018)
Preaching Christology in the Roman Near East
A Study of Jacob of Serugh
Philip Michael Forness (2018)
Augustine’s Early Thought on the Redemptive Function of Divine Judgment
Bart van Egmond (2018)
The Idea of Nicaea in the Early Church Councils, AD 431–451
Mark S. Smith (2019)
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God and Christ

in Irenaeus
ANTHONY BRIGGMAN

1
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3
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For Kate
optima puellula in mundo
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Acknowledgments

This book would not have come to be if I had not come to Candler School of
Theology six years ago. So, it is right for me to first thank Jan Love, Candler’s
Dean, for taking a risk and hiring this one-time adjunct professor. Beyond
giving me a chance to prove myself, Jan with Ian McFarland, then Associate
Dean of Faculty and Academic Affairs, approved a Teaching and Research
Grant that funded a portion of the research for Chapter 1. Chapter 5 and a
portion of Chapter 3 were written during a semester’s leave funded by the
Emory University Research Committee. I am grateful for the financial support
of these grants, but also for the encouragement that came with them.
During the course of pursuing this research, I have learned what it means to
be a member of faculty. Beyond the establishment of treasured friendships,
I have been the beneficiary of wise counsel and considerable encouragement.
Candler’s most senior faculty have been unfailingly generous in these ways,
and their words have formed and shaped my thinking on matters too
numerous to mention. I think especially of my emails and conversations
with Carl Holladay, Luke Timothy Johnson, Carol Newsom, David Pacini,
and Philip Reynolds. Two of my colleagues, Philip Reynolds and Jonathan
Strom, left their intellectual fingerprints on this book when they solved a
mystery that had baffled me for well over a year (you can read about it in my
essay on theological speculation in Chapter 1). Colleagues beyond Emory
also read that essay on theological speculation and assured me I had not lost
my mind: I’m grateful for the time (and the psychological support) given by
Mark DelCogliano and Jackson Lashier.
I must thank Tom Perridge at Oxford University Press for first inviting me
to submit a proposal for this book and then for awaiting a good one. Karen
Raith ably managed the production process, kindly kept in touch, and
patiently awaited the receipt of certain very late forms. Christine Ranft’s
copyediting process brought the text into fine form. I am very pleased to
have this study join my first in Oxford Early Christian Studies. Gillian Clark
and Andrew Louth continue to direct the series as well as ever, ensuring its
vitality and continuing significance.
This book is much better—and far more useful—thanks to the diligence of
three of my doctoral students. Grayden McCashen sought out all the refer-
ences in the Index Locorum. Micah Miller spent hours checking and format-
ting the pages that follow, as well as constructing the Bibliography and the
General Index. Amanda Knight saved the day. I am deeply grateful to each
of them.
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viii Acknowledgments
Portions of Chapters 1 and 4 have appeared previously in press, in earlier
forms, as “Irenaeus’ Christology of Mixture,” JTS 64.2 (2013): 516–55;
“Irenaeus on Natural Knowledge,” CHRC 95.2 (2015): 133–54; “Literary
and Rhetorical Theory in Irenaeus, Part 1,” VC 69.5 (2015): 500–27; and
“Theological Speculation in Irenaeus: Perils and Possibilities,” VC 71.2
(2017): 175–98.
Writing a book places particular pressures and stresses upon one’s family.
I’ve found that pressure and stress reveal character, and I am ever grateful to
have married a woman with the character of my wife. Kelly is our family’s
North Star: her ideals and convictions keep us true. I don’t know where I’d be
without her, but I know this book wouldn’t be done. Over the course of writing
this study our daughter, Kate, grew from a precocious four-year-old, who
“graded” papers and read books under my desk, into the most intelligent, kind,
loving, and funny ten-year-old I have ever known. She is the best little girl in
the whole world. This book is dedicated to her.
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Contents

Abbreviations xi

Introduction 1
1. Prolegomena 9
1.1. Rhetorical Education 10
1.1.1. Hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις) 11
1.1.2. Œconomia (οἰκονομία) 23
1.1.3. Fiction (πλάσμα and μῦθος) 29
1.1.4. Section Conclusion 32
1.2. Theological Speculation 33
1.2.1. The Current Narrative 35
1.2.2. Critique and New Reading 39
1.2.3. Section Conclusion 51
1.3. Natural Knowledge 52
1.3.1. Angelic or Angelic and Human Knowledge? 54
1.3.2. Natural Knowing or Knowing Aided by God? 58
1.3.3. Ratio: Natural Reasoning or the Divine Word? 63
1.3.4. Section Conclusion 69
1.4. Chapter Conclusion 69
2. God 71
2.1. God is Infinite 72
2.1.1. Transcendence 79
2.1.2. Incomprehensibility 80
2.1.3. Immanence 87
2.2. God is Simple 90
2.3. God is Spirit 99
2.4. Chapter Conclusion 102
3. Word-Son 104
3.1. Reciprocal Immanence 107
3.2. Logical Foundation of Reciprocal Immanence 115
3.3. Divine Production 121
3.4. Chapter Conclusion 136
4. Christological Union 139
4.1. Stoic Mixture Theory 140
4.2. Appropriation of Mixture Theory in Early Christianity 146
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x Contents
4.3. Mixture in Irenaeus 152
4.3.1. Mixture’s Union 153
4.3.2. Mixture of Body and Soul 155
4.3.3. Mixture Christology 163
4.4. Chapter Conclusion 179
5. Christ and his Work 181
5.1. Security, Incorruptibility, Adoption 181
5.1.1. Section Conclusion 186
5.2. Revelatory Activity 186
5.2.1. Section Conclusion 203
5.3. Chapter Conclusion 204
Conclusion 205

Bibliography 211
Index Locorum 223
Scripture Index 228
General Index 229
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Abbreviations

ACW Ancient Christian Writers

AH Against Heresies
ANF The Ante-Nicene Fathers
ATR Anglican Theological Review
BICS Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London
ETL Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses
FotC The Fathers of the Church
Greg Gregorianum
HTR Harvard Theological Review
JECS Journal of Early Christian Studies
JrnRel Journal of Religion
JTS Journal of Theological Studies
LCL Loeb Classical Library
NRT Nouvelle Revue Théologique
NTS New Testament Studies
NV Nova et Vetera
PA Philosophia Antiqua
PG Patrologia Graeca
PO Patrologia Orientalis
PPS Popular Patristics Series
Prf Proof of the Apostolic Preaching
ProEcc Pro Ecclesia
RevEA Revue des Études Anciennes
RevEAug Revue d’Études Augustiniennes
RevEG Revue des Études Grecques
RevSR Revue des Sciences Religieuses
RevUO Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa
RSR Recherches de Science Religieuse
RTAM Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale
SC Sources Chrétiennes
SLI Studies in the Literary Imagination
SP Studia Patristica
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xii Abbreviations
ST Studia Theologica
VC Vigiliae Christianae
ZAC Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum
ZNW Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und Kunde der Alteren
Kirche
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Now the splendor of God gives life; therefore, those who see God partici-
pate in life. And for this reason the one who is uncontainable and
incomprehensible and invisible renders himself visible and comprehen-
sible and graspable, in order that he may give life to those who grasp and
see him. For just as his greatness is inscrutable, so also is his goodness
ineffable; by which, having been seen, he bestows life on those who see
him. For it is not possible to live without life, and the means of life comes
from participation in God, and participation in God is to see God and to
enjoy his goodness.
Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.20.5
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Introduction

I never planned to write this book. Toward the end of working on my first
book, Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit, I found myself
thinking more and more about Ronald Heine’s seminal article on early
Christology, “The Christology of Callistus.”¹ Heine spends considerable time
analyzing the Roman Monarchian use of Stoic mixture theory—namely,
blending (κρᾶσις)—to explain the union of the divine and human in the
person of Christ. This caught my attention, for Irenaeus too refers to the
Christological union as a mixture, but no one had ever investigated its
significance. So, upon sending to Oxford the proofs of the first book, I began
reading Irenaeus again. I soon decided that I had something to say about
Irenaeus’ Christological appropriation of mixture theory. Still more, my sense
that there was something amiss in scholarly construals of Irenaeus’ doctrine of
God and his understanding of the person of Christ had solidified. Around this
time the exigencies of tenure were made clear to me, and another book on
Irenaeus was born.
When it comes to the history of Christian thought, Irenaeus is most famous
as the greatest opponent of Gnosticism in the early Church. Until the finds of
Nag Hammadi, Irenaeus’ corpus represented the greatest cache of informa-
tion about Gnostic thought we possessed. For that reason his polemic has
received considerable attention and at times his polemical significance has
overshadowed his importance as a theologian. But a focus on his polemical
significance was not the only thing that discouraged nuanced analysis of his
theological account. For his theological ability and even intelligence have been
impugned for generations.
The coherence of Irenaeus’ thought was first questioned by Hans Wendt in
1882.² Wendt argued that Irenaeus maintained two incompatible strains of
thought with regard to the original state of humanity: one that involved
the notion of a continual growth and increase toward perfection in which the
Fall plays a positive role, and another that involved the notion of an original

¹ Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 56–91). ² Wendt (1882).

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2 God and Christ in Irenaeus

perfection lost at the Fall.³ Many have followed Wendt’s evaluation of Irenaeus’
thought, including Adolf von Harnack⁴ and, most importantly, Friedrich
Loofs.⁵ The discernment of incompatible lines of thought in Irenaeus’ work
became the logical grounds for Loofs’ source-critical division of Against Heresies
which led him to regard Irenaeus as a mere compiler of the ideas that came
before him.⁶ Irenaeus, according to Loofs, “was as a theological writer much less
important” than we had supposed.⁷
Loofs’s theory and evaluation did not go unchallenged for long. A few years
later D.B. Reynders wrote, “Adverses haereses is the fruit of a great work . . . If
it lacks a little order and if it repeats itself, it is neither without unity nor
without erudition nor without method . . . Irenaeus has taken a position (on
the problem of God, the world, and knowledge) too firm and too perceptive
to be something other than the spontaneous expression of his psychology.”⁸
Over the succeeding decades other studies followed, each substantiating the
coherence of Irenaeus’ thought and the unity of his work.⁹ Consensus
shifted rapidly, so much so that Aloys Grillmeier could soon write, “Irenaeus
scholarship has once again come back to recognizing the inner unity of the
theology of the Bishop of Lyons.”¹⁰ But it was left to Philippe Bacq to
conclusively establish the unity of Irenaeus’ writing, as well as the harmo-
nious existence of the two debated strains of thought, in his analysis of the
fourth book of Against Heresies.¹¹
Still, the failure to recognize the intellectual unity as well as the plan of
Irenaeus’ polemical and constructive argumentation contributed to a low
regard for his intellectual ability in general.¹² Within three decades of Wendt’s
initial evaluation, Paul Beuzart concluded that Irenaeus “n’est pas de tout
premier rang comme penseur mais dont l’influence a été extrêmement grande

³ Wendt (1882: 21–6, 29). These lines of thought were first raised by L. Duncker, who
discussed the image and likeness of God in Irenaeus, but affirmed the internal consistency of his
logic (1843: 99–104).
⁴ von Harnack (1901, vol. 2: 269–74, esp. 274 n. 1). ⁵ Loofs (1930: 1–4).
⁶ A. Benoît has noted the parallel between the rise of the source-critical and form-critical
treatments of Scripture and the application of these approaches to Irenaeus (1960: 38). Though
Benoît critiqued the merit of Loofs’s approach (1960: 33–5), H.-I. Marrou has shown that Benoît
himself failed to grasp the unity of Irenaeus’ thought (RevEA 65 1963: 452–6).
⁷ Loofs (1930: 432). ⁸ Reynders, RTAM 7 (1935: 5–27, here 26–7).
⁹ F.R.M. Hitchcock soon offered a stringent critique of Loofs’s methodology and conclusions
(JTS 38 1937: 130–9, 255–66). G. Wingren then proposed a harmonious reading of the two lines
of thought previously assessed as irreconcilable (1959: esp. 26–32, 50–4, 52 n. 33, on p. 27 n. 78).
A. Rousseau aligned himself with Wingren and declared, “If one wants to have some chance of
getting back to the thought of a writer, one ought not first seek to discover in him borrowings and
plagiarisms—as if it would suffice to make then a simple subtraction so that the residue thus
obtained represents the contribution belonging to the author!” (SC 152 1969: 190).
¹⁰ Grillmeier (1965; 2nd ed. 1975, vol. 1: 98).
¹¹ Bacq (1978), see esp. his appendix devoted to AH 4.37–9, pp. 363–88, which includes a
discussion of past scholarship on this issue, pp. 364–9.
¹² As may be seen in Loofs’s evaluation, related above.
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Introduction 3
dans l’ordre practique.”¹³ Such opinions took hold quickly. The narrative was
so fixed by the middle of last century that Johannes Quasten wrote in his
standard Patrology, “The whole work suffers from a lack of clear arrangement
and unity of thought. Prolixity and frequent repetition make its perusal
wearisome. . . . Evidently he did not have the ability to shape his materials
into a homogenous whole.”¹⁴ A few years later Philip Hefner wrote, “Irenaeus’
use of terms in this treatise is so fluid, at points even ambiguous, and the man’s
naïveté at times so great, that any interpreter must be cautious in applying
sharp distinctions and sophisticated schematisms to Irenaeus’ theological
work.”¹⁵ More recently, Denis Minns, who stands in this tradition of inter-
pretation, described Irenaeus as “unwitting” and “naïve.”¹⁶
Yet, just as the failure to recognize the intellectual unity and plan of
Irenaeus’ argumentation often led to a low regard for his intellectual ability,
the recognition of its intellectual unity and plan led to a renewed appreciation
for his theological account. So it was that six years after Bacq Hans Urs von
Balthasar said, “Irenaeus’ work marks the birth of Christian theology. With it,
theology merges as a reflection on the world of revealed facts, a reflection
which is not just a tentative, partial approximation but achieves the miracle of
a complete and organized image in the mind of faith.”¹⁷
But while a few undertook nuanced and subtle investigations into aspects of
Irenaeus’ theology,¹⁸ other narratives besetting the scholarly imagination
continued to discourage investigation into the most fundamental of theologic-
al articles. Irenaeus, it was said, strictly opposed theological speculation¹⁹ and
had little interest in philosophical reasoning.²⁰ As a result, scholarship on

¹³ Beuzart (1908: 169). ¹⁴ Quasten (1950, vol.1: 289).

¹⁵ Hefner, JrnRel 44 (1964: 294–309, here 304). ¹⁶ Minns (1994, repr. 2010: xi, 69).
¹⁷ Von Balthasar (1984, vol. 2: 31).
¹⁸ E.g., Fantino (1986) and Fantino (1994), as well as Behr (2000).
¹⁹ Von Harnack (1901, vol. 2: 233 n. 3, 263); Bonwetsch (1925: 62); Audet Traditio 1 (1943:
15–54, esp. 51–3); Grant HTR 42 (1949: 41–51, esp. 46–7); Grant (1952: 79–81); Schoedel, VC 13
(1959: 22–32, esp. 23–4, 30); and Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 31–49). J. Daniélou’s opinion both
instantiated and advanced this narrative: “In this particular sector of theology (viz., the Trini-
tarian relations), however, it must be admitted that the Gnostics, even if they are bad theologians,
are at any rate more of theologians than Irenaeus, who for the most part refuses to step outside
the biblical formulas. It was not here that his interest lay, but in the theology of the Word as
Revealer, the subject of which he is the great Doctor” (1973: 357).
²⁰ Much of the impetus for, and possibly the beginning of, this narrative lies in G. Bardy’s
declaration that Irenaeus is not a philosopher: “[Irenaeus] ne combat pas la sagesse profane; il
se contente de la dédaigner” (1928: 36). The standing of this narrative in the second and
third quarters of the last century may be illustrated by reference to the similar opinions of
W.R. Schoedel and R.M. Grant. According to Schoedel, Irenaeus’ acquaintance with higher
philosophy was confined to doxographical material and possibly a Peripatetic source, conclud-
ing: “But beyond that there seems to have been little or no direct philosophical influence upon
him. In any event Irenaeus was himself conscious of little interest in philosophy” (VC 13 1959:
32). Grant likewise asserts: “Irenaeus’ sole purpose in discussing early Greek philosophy is to
show that Gnostic ideas are derived from it. . . . Only when he does not recognize an idea as
philosophical can he accept it” (1965: 365). Twenty years later Grant’s evaluation of Irenaeus
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4 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Irenaeus’ conceptions of the divine being and the person of Christ is remark-
ably thin for one identified as the “father of western theology.”²¹
Indeed, Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being—his theology proper—has
not a single book devoted to its analysis. Jules Lebreton offered an enduring
discussion in his Histoire du Dogme de la Trinité.²² In the third quarter of the
last century contributions by Robert M. Grant, William Schoedel, Richard
Norris, and W.C. van Unnik illuminated key aspects of Irenaeus’ account.²³
Since that time, substantial treatments can be found only in articles by Richard
Norris and Michel René Barnes, as well as Jackson Lashier’s Irenaeus on the
Trinity.²⁴ No scholar has ever attempted to produce a synthetic analysis that
takes into consideration the themes addressed by each of these studies.
There has, moreover, never been a book in English devoted to Irenaeus’
conception of the person of Christ. The only book in any language that comes
close to having such a focus is Albert Houssiau’s La Christologie de Saint
Irénée.²⁵ Houssiau observed that previous studies of Irenaeus’ Christology
focused upon the problems related to his theology of salvation rather than
Christology proper. His objective was to provide a counterbalance by focusing
his work on Irenaeus’ conception of the person of Christ. He succeeded,
providing the best study of Irenaeus’ Christology to date. But even Houssiau’s
volume spends more than half its pages focusing on the Christological
accounts of Irenaeus’ opponents; as a result many central themes receive
only a cursory examination.
Because of the states of these questions we do not possess a thorough or
even certain understanding of Irenaeus’ doctrines of God and the person of
Christ. Neither are we able to grasp Irenaeus’ account of the standing of the
Word-Son in relation to God the Father, nor fully comprehend his attribution
of divinity to Jesus Christ, nor recognize how central aspects of his account
of the economic activity of Christ are grounded upon his understanding of
the divine being. But that is not all, for Richard Norris’s fears have come to

remained constant: “In his opinion truth is to be found only within the church. An instructive
passage shows his dislike of philosophical learning. In natural science ‘many things escape our
knowledge, and we entrust them to God; for he must excel over all. What if we try to set forth the
cause of the rising of the Nile? We say many things, some perhaps persuasive, others perhaps not
persuasive: what is true and certain and sure lies with God’ [2.28.2]” (Grant with Tracy 1984: 50).
Not all accepted this reading, especially as the century progressed. For instance, C. Stead wrote,
Irenaeus “has, I suspect, more philosophical talent than is easy to detect in his surviving
work . . . But when philosophical methods are used, they are ably handled, and one regrets the
disappearance of other works known to Eusebius, especially the treatise arguing that God is not
the author of evil” (1994: 90).
²¹ Grant (1952: 102). ²² Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 540–75 esp.).
²³ Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 41–51); Schoedel (1972: 88–108); van Unnik (1979: 33–43); Schoedel
(1979: 75–86); and Norris (1979: 87–100).
²⁴ Norris (2009: 9–36); Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 67–106); Lashier (2014: esp. 70–91).
²⁵ Houssiau (1955).
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Introduction 5
pass: the neglect of these matters has allowed “serious distortions” to creep
into contemporary appreciations of these facets of Irenaeus’ theology.²⁶
The most “serious distortion” pervading these discussions of Irenaeus’
theology is the minimization of the metaphysical dimension of his thought.
We see this minimization in descriptions of Irenaeus’ theology as economic or
in characterizations of his theology as unconcerned with the Trinitarian
relations and even modalistic—descriptions which have become so common
within certain scholarly circles as to be banal.²⁷ The most recent, and perhaps
the most direct, example of this minimization of the metaphysical comes from
the pen of Michael Slusser.
Slusser argues that Richard Norris—one of the few to highlight the meta-
physical dimension of Irenaeus’ theology—was incorrect to emphasize the
philosophical basis of Irenaeus’ account of the unity and transcendence of
God. According to Slusser, Norris’s “philosophical angle of approach” suggests
Irenaeus was looking for a “metaphysical solution” in the conflict with his
Gnostic opponents, and thus “obscures Irenaeus’ real agenda, which goes
beyond metaphysics and portrays God in terms of love and will. . . . (Irenaeus)
appeals, rather, to a divine initiative that overrides the insuperable metaphys-
ical obstacle constituted by God’s incomprehensibility and magnitude.”²⁸
Slusser is correct to argue that Irenaeus did not simply author a metaphys-
ical response to his Gnostic opponents.²⁹ But he is incorrect to minimize the
importance of metaphysics to Irenaeus’ response and to characterize meta-
physics as an obstacle that Irenaeus had to overcome by emphasizing the
divine economy.³⁰ Far from being an obstacle that must be overcome by the
economy, metaphysics is the foundation for key elements of Irenaeus’ account
of the divine economy. This is the fundamental insight into Irenaeus’ thought
that lies at the origin of this investigation.
The purpose of this study is to elucidate the metaphysical dimension of
Irenaeus’ thought, namely, his understanding of the divine being, his account
of the standing of the Word-Son in relation to God the Father, his conception
of how the divine Word-Son is united to humanity in the person of Christ
(which ironically depends upon Stoic physics), and the manner in which he
grounds central aspects of his account of the economic activity of Christ upon
his understanding of the divine being and the divinity of the Word-Son.

²⁶ Norris (1979: 89).

²⁷ I document these characterizations of Irenaeus’ theology in Chapter 3, footnotes 2–4.
²⁸ Slusser (2012: 133–9, here 135).
²⁹ This is not to suggest that Norris wholly neglects the economic aspect of Irenaeus’ thought;
he does not.
³⁰ Slusser’s perspective suits the ubiquitous characterization of Irenaeus’ theology as econom-
ic in orientation. The upcoming chapters will challenge that description of Irenaeus’ theology. In
so doing, I agree with Lashier who recently authored his own challenge to this reading of
Irenaeus (2014).
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6 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Each of these subjects has a chapter devoted to its exposition. But before I could
treat these topics, I first had to address the narratives that have hindered and
discouraged previous investigations into these aspects of Irenaeus’ theology.
This I do in Chapter 1.
It is time for a brief summary of what lies ahead. Chapter 1 is best charac-
terized as a substantial prolegomenon that challenges several long-standing
narratives inhibiting the study of Irenaeus. As mentioned above, over the
course of the past century Irenaeus was characterized as incapable of sound
reasoning, not a good thinker, naïve, and unable to construct a sophisticated
theology. He was said to strictly oppose theological speculation. And it was
argued that he had little to no interest in philosophical reasoning. Each of these
narratives in its own way stands opposed to the study of Irenaeus’ understand-
ing of God and its bearing on the divine economy. This chapter consists of three
essays that challenge these narratives, thereby establishing an understanding of
Irenaeus and his theological method that sustains the chapters that follow. The
first essay challenges the narrative that Irenaeus was unintelligent or incompe-
tent by demonstrating his knowledge of literary and rhetorical theory and, thus,
arguing he enjoyed a thorough rhetorical education. The second argues that
he is not strictly opposed to theological speculation. The third shows that he
recognizes a natural knowledge of God which, in turn, establishes a basis for the
theological appropriation of philosophical insights.
Chapter 2 examines Irenaeus’ understanding of the divine being, his the-
ology proper. But since the propositions fundamental to Irenaeus’ doctrine of
God also bear upon his understanding of the relationship of the Word-Son to
the Father and the work of the incarnate Word-Son, Jesus Christ, this chapter
also prepares for the study of these subjects in the chapters to come. To be
specific, this chapter examines the two propositions upon which Irenaeus
founds his conception of the divine being: God is infinite and God is simple.
Both propositions are articulated in Against Heresies 2 and both have philo-
sophical roots. Moreover, these propositions sustain several corollaries that
further define the divine being: transcendence, incomprehensibility, imma-
nence, immateriality, and atemporality. Once I finish addressing these pro-
positions and their corollaries, I briefly discuss Irenaeus’ identification of God
as Spirit, an identification which has a biblical basis as well as a philosophical
one. I conclude by discussing the implications of Irenaeus’ theology proper for
our understanding of his thought more generally as well as the particular
implications for the remaining chapters of this study.
Chapter 3 investigates the standing of the Word-Son in relation to God the
Father. The first section explores the contours of Irenaeus’ doctrine of recip-
rocal immanence and identifies features left unexplained. The second explains
these features by studying the logic that appears in the earlier polemical
arguments of Against Heresies 2. The third section continues examining the
polemical arguments of AH 2, but now with a focus upon the comments
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Introduction 7
Irenaeus makes about the production of a simple, spiritual substance—his
comments about divine production. Taken together these sections further
establish Irenaeus’ understanding of the intra-Trinitarian relationship of the
Word-Son to the Father, including the nature and generation of the Word-
Son. In contrast to characterizations of Irenaeus’ theology as economic or
modalistic, we see that Irenaeus affirmed an eternal and distinct coexistence of
the Word-Son with God the Father as the one God.
Chapters 2 and 3 establish Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being and his
understanding of the Word-Son, especially the nature of the relationship
between the Word-Son and God the Father. The aim of Chapter 4 is to explain
how Irenaeus conceives of the union between the divine Word-Son and
humanity in the person of Jesus Christ, thereby preparing the way for a
study of the work of Christ in the final chapter. To that end, Chapter 4
contends that Irenaeus uses Stoic mixture theory to conceptualize the Christo-
logical union, including the relationship between the human and divine in the
experiences and activities of Christ. In so saying, I challenge Harry Austryn
Wolfson’s position that Irenaeus’ use of mixture language accords with Aris-
totelian mixture theory, and I stand against those, including Wolfson and
Grillmeier, who maintain that Irenaeus’ conception of the person of Christ is
devoid of philosophical reasoning.³¹ After a brief review of Stoic mixture
theory, the chapter begins with a consideration of pertinent scholarship on
the appropriation of Stoic and Aristotelian theories of mixture in the Christol-
ogies of early Christianity, moves to an argument for Irenaeus’ use of Stoic
mixture theory to explain the interaction of the soul and body in human
beings, transitions to my argument for his use of the same theory to explain
the salvific joining of human beings to the Word of God, culminates with my
demonstration of his use of Stoic mixture theory to conceptualize the union of
and interaction between the divine and human in Jesus, and concludes by
highlighting the connection Irenaeus draws between the person of Christ and
the mixed cup of the Eucharist.
Chapters 2 through 4 lead on to Chapter 5. Having established Irenaeus’
understanding of the nature of the divine being, the Word-Son, and the person
of Christ, the task of Chapter 5 is to show that central aspects of Irenaeus’
account of the economic activity of Christ are grounded upon his understand-
ing of God. It constitutes the final movement in my argument that scholars
have underappreciated—or failed to appreciate altogether—the significance
of metaphysics to Irenaeus’ theology. This chapter consists of two sections.

³¹ According to Wolfson, Tertullian is “the first among the Fathers whose discussion of the
unity of the person in Jesus betrays the influence of the philosophic discussion of physical union”
(1964, vol.1: 387). Grillmeier declares, “Non-Christian elements find no place in [Irenaeus’]
understanding of Christ (cf. Adv. Haer. I, 10, 1–3). He is not a philosopher as his master Justin
was, but above all a biblical theologian, ‘the first deliberately biblical theologian of the Christian
church,’ and an interpreter of the traditional creed” (1965, 2nd ed. 1975, vol. 1: 100).
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8 God and Christ in Irenaeus

The first focuses on AH 3.18.7, wherein Irenaeus founds essential features of
the economy of salvation upon the divinity of Christ—namely, the security
of salvation, the reception of incorruptibility, and the adoption as children
of God. The second section shows that Irenaeus’ understanding of the revela-
tory activity of the Word-Son in the Old Testament theophanies and incar-
nation is based upon his conception of the divine being as infinite and
incomprehensible.
These chapters investigate aspects of Irenaeus’ thought that are central to
his argumentation but have long been neglected by the scholarly community.
Taken together they demonstrate the fundamental significance of metaphysics
to Irenaeus’ polemical argument and constructive theology. But perhaps even
more importantly, they offer a new portrait of the bishop of Lyons. Irenaeus
emerges as a subtle and eclectic thinker able to creatively appropriate philo-
sophical and rhetorical positions to his advantage.³²

³² By “eclectic” I do not mean to say that Irenaeus did not fit within the Christian tradition, as
some use the term to indicate that certain philosophers assembled doctrines based on their
personal preferences and so did not fit within a particular school (cf. Dillon, 1996: xiv). Rather,
I mean to say that Irenaeus appropriated ideas, from various systems of thought, which he
believed were suited—either in their original or in an adapted form—to the Christian tradition as
he knew it.
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Prolegomena

“No early Christian writer has deserved better of the whole Church than
Irenaeus.”¹ When Henry Barclay Swete penned these words in 1914 he had
no inkling of the challenges awaiting the bishop of Lyons in what remained of
the twentieth century. Over the next ninety years several tropes concerning
Irenaeus took root in the minds of scholars. Irenaeus—as recounted in the
Introduction—was characterized as incapable of sound reasoning, not a good
thinker, naïve, and unable to construct a sophisticated theology.² He was said
to strictly oppose theological speculation.³ And it was argued that he had little
to no interest in philosophical reasoning.⁴
These are just three of the narratives about Irenaeus that gained currency
amongst scholars. Each has come to function as a presupposition in studies
of Irenaeus’ theology. And each in its own way stands opposed to a study of
Irenaeus’ conception of God and Christ because each fails to accurately or
adequately apprehend Irenaeus or his thought.
The goal of this chapter is to establish an understanding of Irenaeus and his
theological method that prepares the way for as well as sustains the following
investigation. I shall achieve this goal by means of three essays that challenge
the narratives just enumerated. The first challenges the narrative that Irenaeus
was unintelligent or incompetent by demonstrating his knowledge of literary
and rhetorical theory and, thus, arguing he enjoyed a thorough rhetorical
education. The second argues that he is not opposed to theological speculation.

¹ Swete (1914: foreword).

² Amongst others, see: Wendt (1882: 21–6, 29); Beuzart (1908: 169); Loofs (1930: 432);
Quasten (1950, vol. 1: 289); Hefner (JrnRel 44 1964: 294–309, here 304); Daniélou (1973: 357);
Minns (1994, repr. 2010: xi, 69).
³ See, e.g., von Harnack (1901, vol. 2: 233 n. 3, 263); Bonwetsch (1925: 62); Audet, Traditio
1 (1943: 15–54, esp. 51–3); Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 41–51, esp. 46–7); Grant (1952: 79–81); Schoedel,
VC 13 (1959: 22–32, esp. 23–4, 30); Daniélou (1973: 357); Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 31–49).
⁴ Bardy (1928: 36); Schoedel (VC 13 1959: 32); Grant (1965: 365); Grant with Tracy (1984:
50). But not all accepted this reading; see, for instance, Stead (1994: 90). For a detailed discussion
of these sources see, n. 20 of the Introduction.
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10 God and Christ in Irenaeus

The third shows that he recognizes a natural knowledge of God which, in turn,
establishes a basis for the theological appropriation of philosophical insights.

1.1. RHETORICAL EDUCATION

The suggestion that Irenaeus of Lyons drew upon rhetorical theory is not
new. Eighty years ago Bruno Reynders highlighted Irenaeus’ use of the
dilemma, counter question, and ad hominem argument.⁵ The following
decade saw Robert M. Grant demonstrate Irenaeus’ rhetorical training in
his seminal article, “Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture.”⁶ Grant concluded by
famously exhorting scholars to refocus the camera and take again the picture
of Irenaeus.⁷ Ten years later William R. Schoedel argued that the structure of
Against Heresies coincides with rhetorical models and that the method of
Irenaeus’ argumentation corresponds to those advocated in the rhetorical
schools.⁸ But he was tempered in his conclusions: Irenaeus had some
knowledge of Hellenistic rhetoric and had been exposed at some time to
the fundamentals of a Hellenistic education, but Irenaeus’ argumentation
falls short of the rhetorical goal of successfully refuting and supporting a
proposition.⁹
In the years that followed scholars have recognized the importance of
literary and rhetorical theory to Irenaeus’ thought in terms of his use of the
concepts of hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις), œconomia (οἰκονομία), and recapitulation
(ἀνακεφαλαίωσις).¹⁰ Even so, these studies have done little more than note that
Irenaeus’ use of these terms conforms to the literary and rhetorical theory of
his day. They have not established the degree to which these concepts define
his polemic or his constructive thought, and, therefore, have not led to a new
consensus concerning the importance of literary and rhetorical theory to
Irenaeus’ work. It is as if Schoedel’s tempered evaluation still reigns.

⁵ Reynders, RTAM 7 (1935: 5–27, here 8–10).

⁶ Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 41–51, esp. 47–51). ⁷ Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 51).
⁸ Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 22–32, here 27–32).
⁹ Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 31). The following paragraphs indicate that Schoedel is mainly
questioning, in this last point, Irenaeus’ success in supporting a proposition. He writes, for
instance, “Irenaeus’ partial and undeveloped answers are never to be separated from their
polemical framework” (p. 32).
¹⁰ E.g., van Unnik, VC 31 (1977: 196–228, here 206–7); Norris, ATR 76 (1994: 285–95, here
287–90); Grant (1997: 46–53); Blowers, ProEcc 6 (1997: 199–228, here 211–12); and Behr, The
Way to Nicaea (2001: 123–33). In contrast, A. d’Ales suggests over 120 appearances of οἰκονομία
in Irenaeus but fails to identify a single meaning that corresponds to its use in literary and
rhetorical theory in his RevEG 32 (1919: 1–9, esp. 6–7). Fantino, for his part, spends over forty
pages analyzing οἰκονομία but gives barely two to its rhetorical provenance (1994: 84–126,
410–13, here 117–18).
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Prolegomena 11
This essay refocuses the camera and takes the picture of Irenaeus once again.
I argue that aspects of literary and rhetorical theory are of central importance to
Irenaeus’ anti-Gnostic polemic in Against Heresies 1.8.1–10.3 and even feature
in his constructive thought. Irenaeus appears, then, to have enjoyed a more
thorough grammatical and rhetorical education than previously recognized.
I shall proceed by examining Irenaeus’ appropriation of three concepts
belonging to ancient literary and rhetorical theory, though it must be said
that I give a little more attention to their rhetorical provenance. The first
section considers his use of hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις), the second œconomia
(οἰκονομία), and the third fiction (πλάσμα and μῦθος).

1.1.1. Hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις)

The importance of the concept of hypothesis to Irenaeus’ polemical and theo-

logical argumentation has garnered attention since Philip Hefner asserted, “the
one highest authority for Irenaeus is the system, framework, or ‘hypothesis’ of the
Faith.”¹¹ A few years later Robert Wilken added, “it appears that the question of
the hypothesis, the sense, the meaning of the Christian faith is at the very heart of
his theological work.”¹² The most important contributions, however, have come
from the pens of W.C. van Unnik and, much later, Robert M. Grant and Richard
A. Norris. Each sought to establish the particular meaning of the term in
Irenaeus, and each argued that the term is best rendered as “plot” or “argument”
in accordance with its use in ancient literary and rhetorical theory.¹³
Hypothesis stands among the foundational concepts of literary and rhet-
orical theory. Writing toward the end of the second century, Sextus Empiricus
introduced his argument against geometers by defining three principle mean-
ings of the term.¹⁴ Rhetoricians use hypothesis to signify an “investigation of
particulars, in which sense the sophists are wont to say often in their dis-
courses, ‘One must posit the hypothesis.’” Philosophers and scientists “term
the starting point of proofs ‘hypothesis,’ it being the postulating something for
the purpose of proving something.” A third group, including presumably
dramatists and literary critics, use the word to mean:
. . . the peripeteia (or “argument” or “plot”) of a drama, as we say that there is a
tragic or a comic “hypothesis,” and certain “hypotheses” of Dicaearchus of the

¹¹ Hefner, JrnRel 44 (1964: 294–309, here 295).

¹² Wilken, VC 21 (1967: 25–33, here 33).
¹³ van Unnik, VC 31 (1977: 206–7); Norris, ATR 76 (1994: 287–90); and Grant (1997: 47–9).
See also: Blowers, ProEcc 6 (1997: 211–12).
¹⁴ Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 3.3–4. Unless otherwise noted the text and
translation of Sextus comes from Sextus Empiricus in Four Volumes (trans. R.G. Bury; LCL;
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933–59). My presentation of Sextus closely follows
the work of Trimpi, Traditio 2 (1971: 1–78, here 21–2).
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12 God and Christ in Irenaeus

stories of Euripides and Sophocles, meaning by “hypothesis” nothing else than
the peripeteia of the drama.
It is this last meaning of hypothesis (which Sextus actually presents first) that
is most applicable to Irenaeus’ thought. R.M. Grant has illustrated the breadth
of this meaning by highlighting various uses of hypothesis in literary and
rhetorical sources.¹⁵ Hypothesis, he observes, appears in the old grammatical
scholia on the Odyssey with the meaning of plot. At Odyssey 1.328 “the whole
oikonomia (arrangement) of the hypothesis (plot) would have fallen apart” if
the minstrel had sung about Odysseus’ impending return, for Telemachus
would not have left home and Penelope’s suitors would have left.¹⁶ The
historian Polybius refers to his proposed subject as the hypothesis.¹⁷ The
rhetorical analyst Theon refers to the hypotheses of political speeches.¹⁸
And, of particular relevance to Sextus’ definition, Grant points out that
“hypotheses” for plays by Sophocles and Euripides appear in Oxyrhynchus
papyri of the second and third centuries.¹⁹
The meanings of plot, narrative, and subject-matter suit Irenaeus’ use of
ὑπόθεσις, as is most easily seen in AH 1.9.4. In the three sections that precede
1.9.4 Irenaeus argues that his Gnostic opponents offer a distorted reading of
Scripture in order to support an errant hypothesis of Scripture. In AH 1.9.4 he
then illustrates his criticism of their methods of Scriptural interpretation by
appealing to a Homeric cento.²⁰ It is in his commentary surrounding that
cento that his understanding of hypothesis is evident:
Their own hypothesis (ὑπόθεσιν/argumentationem) being fabricated, they then
collect sayings and names scattered here and there and transfer them, as we have
said before, from a natural to a non-natural sense. They (thus) act like those who
propose whatever hypotheses (ὑποθέσεις/controversias) they chance upon, and
then endeavor to deliver them from the poems of Homer, so that the ignorant
believe that Homer composed the poems with that hypothesis (ὑποθέσεως/con-
troversia), which in reality has only recently been constructed . . . Who among the
simple-minded would not be led away by these verses and believe that Homer
composed them in accordance with that hypothesis (ὑποθέσεως/argumento)? But
the one who knows the Homeric writings, will recognize the verses but will not
recognize the hypothesis (ὑπόθεσιν/argumentum), since he knows that some of

¹⁵ Grant (1997: 47–8). For a more thorough sense of the term’s breadth, see: Holwerda (1976:
173-98); Kassel (1985: 53–9); and Meijering (1987: 105–33).
¹⁶ A. Mai and P. Buttmann, Scholia Antiqua in Homeri Odysseam (Berlin: In Libraria
Myliana, 1821: 39); Grant (1997: 47 and 194 n. 8). The translation is Grant’s.
¹⁷ Polybius, Histories 1.2.1; see, Grant (1997: 47). R. Nünlist likewise reminds us that
hypothesis is the most common word for “subject-matter” in ancient literary criticism (2011:
24 n. 5).
¹⁸ Theon, Progymnasmata 1 (Spengel 1854: 2.61.21); see Grant (1997: 48).
¹⁹ Grant (1997: 48); as found in Oxyrhynchus Papyri 52 (Cockle 1984: 3650–3).
²⁰ J. Daniélou ascribed the cento to Valentinus himself (1973: 85–6), but Wilken has since
offered a persuasive argument against that theory (1967).
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Prolegomena 13
them were spoken, indeed, of Ulysses, others of Hercules himself, others of Priam,
and still others of Menelaus and Agamemnon. Moreover, if he takes them and
restores each one to its proper place, he will make (their) hypothesis (ὑπόθεσιν/
argumentum) disappear . . . By restoring each one of the passages to its proper
order and by adapting it to the body of truth, he will lay bare their fiction
(πλάσμα/figmentum) and prove it (to be) without foundation.²¹
According to Irenaeus, the method of Scriptural interpretation used by his
Gnostic opponents is like the method used by those who articulate a hypoth-
esis and then gather unrelated lines from Homer in order to produce a cento
having that hypothesis. Irenaeus states that a person familiar with Homer
would recognize the lines abstracted from Homer’s text but would not recog-
nize the hypothesis fabricated out of those lines. His meaning is clear. The
lines abstracted from Homer remain the same, so they are recognizable, but
the abstraction of those lines from their original context and the arrangement
of them into a new order results in a plot, narrative, or subject-matter which
differs from that of the Illiad or Odyssey.²² In the same way, Irenaeus contends,
his Gnostic opponents abstract verses, names, and expressions from Scripture
and rearrange them such that they support a plot, narrative, or subject-matter
other than that articulated by Scripture.²³ The term he uses to express this
notion of plot, narrative, or subject-matter is ὑπόθεσις.
Irenaeus not only uses the concept of hypothesis to characterize and
critique the system of thought advocated by his Gnostic opponents, but it is
also the term he uses to present his own narrative of Scripture.²⁴ We gain some
insight into Irenaeus’ hypothesis of Scripture from statements that appear in
AH 1.9.2 and 1.10.3:
Manifest, therefore, is the fabrication (the hypothesis of his Gnostic oppo-
nents) of this exegesis. For John, when he proclaims one God Almighty and

²¹ AH 1.9.3–4. Greek and Latin quotations of Against Heresies are taken from Irénée de Lyon,
Contre les Hérésies in 10 volumes (Sources Chrétiennes; ed. A. Rousseau et al.; Paris: Éditions du
Cerf, 1965–82). Armenian quotations of AH 4 and 5 are taken from Irenäus, Gegen die Häretiker.
Ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως, Buch 4 u. 5 in armenischer Version (Arm. by
K. Ter-Mekerttschian; ed. E. Ter-Minassiantz; TU 35.2; ed. A. Harnack and C. Schmidt; Leipzig:
Hinrich, 1910). Unless otherwise noted, translations of AH are mine.
Armenian quotations of Proof of the Apostolic Preaching are taken from Irenaeus, Εἰς ἐπίδειξιν
τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος; The Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, with Seven Fragments (PO
12.5; ed. and Eng. trans. K. Ter-Mekerttschian and S.G. Wilson; Fr. trans. J. Barthoulot; Paris:
Firmin-Didot, 1919). Unless otherwise noted, translations of Prf are from St Irenaeus of Lyons,
On the Apostolic Preaching (trans. J. Behr; New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997).
²² Cf. Norris, ATR 76 (1994: 289).
²³ The idea that a given arrangement of texts supports a given hypothesis reflects the literary
and rhetorical principle of œconomia (οἰκονομία), which I shall discuss in the next section.
²⁴ Irenaeus’ polemical argumentation and constructive thought should not be separated too
strictly. Irenaeus’ presentation of his hypothesis of Scripture is meant to counter the hypothesis of
his Gnostic opponents, but it also plays a central role in the hermeneutical principles articulated in
AH 2.25–7 and, more broadly, is the basis for the constructive thought we find in AH 2.
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14 God and Christ in Irenaeus

one Only-Begotten Christ Jesus, through whom he says all things were made
(Jn 1:3), says this is the Word of God (Jn 1:1), this the Only-Begotten (cf. Jn 1:18), this
the Maker of all things, this the true Light who enlightens every man (Jn 1:9), this the
Maker of the World (Jn 1:10), this the one who came to his own (Jn 1:11), this he that
became flesh and dwelt among us (Jn 1:14).²⁵
Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that some know more or less by
insight²⁶ that they should change the hypothesis itself and invent another God
besides the Creator, and Maker, and Nourisher of this universe—as if he were not
sufficient for us—or another Christ, or another Only-Begotten.²⁷

Each of these passages offers a glimpse of Irenaeus’ hypothesis articulated in

opposition to that of his Gnostic opponents. His most complete and important
statement of his hypothesis, however, has long been misidentified. In AH
1.10.1 he writes:
The Church, although dispersed throughout the whole world, even to the ends
of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples the faith in one
God, the Father Almighty, “who made the heaven and the earth and the sea and
all that are in them;”²⁸ and in one Christ Jesus, the Son of God, who was
incarnated for our salvation; and in one Holy Spirit, who has proclaimed through
the prophets the economies: the coming, the birth from the virgin, the passion,
the resurrection from the dead, and the bodily ascension into the heavens of the
beloved Christ Jesus, our Lord, and his coming from the heavens in the glory of
the Father “to recapitulate all things” (Eph 1:10), and to raise up all flesh of the
whole human race, in order that to Christ Jesus our Lord, and God, and Savior,
and King, according to the good pleasure of the invisible Father, “every knee
should bow, of those in heaven and on the earth and under the earth, and every
tongue confess” (Phil. 2:10–11) him, and that he should render a just judgment
toward all, and, on the one hand, he would send to eternal fire the “spiritual forces
of evil” (Eph 6:12), the angels who transgressed and became apostates, and the
impious, unjust, lawless, and blasphemous among men, but, on the other hand, to
the righteous, and holy, and those who have kept his commandments, and have
persevered in his love—both those who did so from the beginning, and those who
did so after repentance—he would confer, graciously bestowing, life incorrupt-
ible, and lay up eternal glory.
This passage is usually classified as a statement of Irenaeus’ regula (κανών).²⁹
Such a reading is by no means unreasonable. Just a paragraph separates this

²⁵ AH 1.9.2. Irenaeus’ desire in this selection to establish the proper hypothesis of the
Johannine prologue calls attention to the fact that particular sections or episodes of a work
can have their own hypotheses, each subordinate to and in support of the whole.
²⁶ For this rendering of τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον κατὰ σύνεσιν εἰδέναι τινὰς, see: van Unnik, VC
31 (1977: 203).
²⁷ AH 1.10.3. ²⁸ LXX Exod. 20:11; LXX Ps. 145:6; Acts 4:24; 14:15.
²⁹ E.g., van Unnik, VC 31 (1977: 201); Unger (ACW 55 1992: 183 n. 1); Young (1990: 49–51);
Osborn (2001: 149); Ferguson, VC 55.4 (2001: 356–75). According to J. Behr while this text “is
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Prolegomena 15
text, which is introduced as the faith received from the apostles, from Irenaeus’
reference in AH 1.9.4 to the baptismal reception of the Rule of Truth.
Moreover, the structure of this statement corresponds to what one might
expect in an early doctrinal statement such as the regula: it is oriented
around the three fundamental articles of the faith, belief in God, Jesus Christ,
and the Holy Spirit.³⁰ Nevertheless, the reasons for regarding this passage
as a statement of Irenaeus’ hypothesis of Scripture are just as good, indeed,
even better.
While it is true that this passage follows just one paragraph after Irenaeus’
reference to the Rule of Truth and is introduced as the faith received by the
apostles, there is no explicit identification of the text as a statement of the
regula. This runs counter to the pattern we see in Irenaeus’ other substantive
statements of the regula, in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1, which are explicitly intro-
duced as the regula veritatis held by or established in the church. And while it
is true that the structure of this passage, oriented as it is around the three
fundamental articles of faith, is what one might expect to find in an early
doctrinal statement,³¹ neither of the explicitly identified regula statements just
mentioned shares that structure. Indeed, the Rules of Truth in AH 1.22.1 and
3.11.1 differ from the pericope in AH 1.10.1 not only in terms of structure but
also content and form.
In terms of content the regulae in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1 are more limited in
scope. Rather than broadly addressing the creative and redemptive activity of
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as does AH 1.10.1, the regulae in AH 1.22.1
and 3.11.1 narrowly focus on the creative activity of God and his Word.³²
Though the regula articulated in AH 1.22.1 is prolix when compared to that of
3.11.1, they share the same theme.³³ Indeed, the statement at the heart of
the regula in AH 1.22.1, “the Father made all things by him (the Word of the
Lord), whether visible or invisible” (omnia per ipsum fecit Pater, sive visibilia

not formally called a ‘canon of truth,’ this is the fullest such statement given by Irenaeus” (2013:
79). His subsequent comments are mixed, acknowledging Irenaeus’ reference to his passage with
the term “hypothesis” (p. 79), but later referring to it as the Rule of Truth (p. 85). Rousseau is the
notable exception. To my knowledge he does not identify this text as a statement of his regula in
his notes justificatives; he does not refer to this text in his discussion of the regula in SC 210
(1974: 220–1).
³⁰ For the structure of this passage see Rousseau, SC 263 (1979: 133–4).
³¹ So, for instance, van Unnik finds this “Creed . . . remarkable since it is trinitarian”
(1997: 201).
³² The Holy Spirit is the subject of the third article of faith in AH 1.10.1 but does not receive
similar attention in the regulae of AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1. The brief mention of the creative activity
of the Holy Spirit later in AH 1.22.1 is unsupported by a text of Scripture and does not find a
place in 3.11.1. For a reading of the pneumatology of AH 1.22.1, see my Irenaeus on the Holy
Spirit (2012: 32–7).
³³ The variation we see in Irenaeus’ regulae is well explained by Rousseau, when he writes that
the regula is “firm in its content, although relatively supple in its formulation” (SC 210
1974: 221).
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16 God and Christ in Irenaeus

sive invisibilia), is nearly identical to the concise regula offered in AH 3.11.1,
“there is one almighty God, who made all things by his Word, both visible and
invisible” (est unus Deus omnipotens, qui per Verbum suum omnia fecit et
visibilia et invisibilia). As the comparison of these phrases suggests, the regula
statements in these chapters converge to reveal the essence of Irenaeus’ Rule of
Truth as the affirmation that there is one almighty God, who made all things by
his own Word, both visible and invisible.³⁴
The regulae in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1 also differ from the text of AH 1.10.1
in terms of form. Though founded upon and informed by the Scriptures the
regulae in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1 are theological assertions largely abstracted
from the Scriptural narrative. That is to say, these regulae do not constitute
summaries of the Scriptural narrative but rather doctrines that are based
upon and emerge from the Scriptural narrative. On the other hand, the text
of AH 1.10.1 underscores episodes of Scripture in order to summarize the
creative and redemptive activity of God. It is very much a précis or sum-
mative outline of the Scriptural narrative: the hypothesis of ancient literary
and rhetorical theory.³⁵
Understanding the text of AH 1.10.1 as a statement of Irenaeus’ hypothesis
is not only supported by a comparison with the two explicitly identified
regulae in Against Heresies, but also by the paragraphs that follow. At the
end of AH 1.10.2, Irenaeus is in the midst of arguing that the faith articulated
in AH 1.10.1 is preserved throughout the Church Catholic for, he contends,
the most eloquent will not teach something different, nor will the most feeble
in speech diminish that tradition. He continues this line of argumentation in
AH 1.10.3, when he writes that it does not follow from the fact that some know
more or less by insight that the hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις/argumentum) itself
should be changed. In so saying, Irenaeus identifies the statement of faith

³⁴ Rousseau offers a similar summary of the regulae found in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1: “un seul
Dieu tout-puissant qui a créé toutes choses par son propre Verbe” (SC 210 1974: 220). However,
there is no need to de-emphasize the totality of God’s creative activity by not including “visible
and invisible.”
³⁵ The proper identification of Irenaeus’ hypothesis and regula resolve some conflicting
readings of Irenaeus. F. Young (1990) and P. Blowers (ProEcc 6 1997: 199–228) have commented
upon the character of Irenaeus’ regula(e), both in terms of its content and its literary form. Young
contends that, while Irenaeus’ regula statements contain quotations of Scripture and are gener-
ally informed by Scripture, they are not straightforward summaries of the story of Scripture
(pp. 51–2). Irenaeus’ regula(e) should not, she says, be understood as “simply a summary of
Scripture, a résumé of the ‘plot’ ” (p. 49). Rather, we should think of his regula as “an abstract
which focuses on key perspectives” or an “assertion of . . . doctrine” (pp. 51, 52). Blowers insists
that Young overstates the “non-narrative nature” of Irenaeus’ regula (p. 210) and argues the
regula articulates the scriptural narrative and presents its basic “dramatic” structure (p. 202;
see also 210–13, where his notes reveal his focus on AH 1.8.1–10.3). Their conflicting readings
are largely due to their incorrect classification of AH 1.10.1 as Irenaeus’ regula. Young’s
comments correctly characterize the true regula statements in AH 1.22.1 and 3.11.1; Blowers’s
comments correctly characterize the hypothesis in AH 1.10.1.
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Prolegomena 17
articulated in AH 1.10.1, that which was received from the apostles and
preserved by the Church catholic, as the true hypothesis of Scripture.
I would like to draw a few pertinent observations about Irenaeus’ hypothesis
of Scripture from these three passages. To begin with, Irenaeus articulates
detailed statements of his hypothesis. A brief discussion of the function of the
hypothesis in narrative construction will bring to light the significance of this
observation. Wesley Trimpi, in an article yet to be fully mined for its riches,³⁶
approaches this topic by analyzing the seventeenth chapter of Aristotle’s
Poetics. The noun “hypothesis” never occurs in the Poetics, but Trimpi observes
that Aristotle “uses its verbal forms to describe how a subject should be set out
and treated in a drama.”³⁷
According to Aristotle, “The argument of the play should first be drafted in
general terms (ἐκτίθεσθαι καθόλου), then expanded with episodes.”³⁸ The
general outline Aristotle provides of Euripides’ Iphigenia in Tauris illustrates
the way in which an author begins with a more abstract, less particularized,
hypothesis in order to arrive at clarity concerning the general structure of the
plot.³⁹ Once the bare outline of events has been established the author further
particularizes—further hypothesizes—the hypothesis by filling in specific details
such as names and then episodes which comprise the circumstances of the
story. By filling in these additional details the author is able to explain causes
and establish sequential connections, demonstrating the consistency of the
action sketched in the abstract hypothesis. Thus, the process of further
particularization or “hypothesization” is the method by which the author
works to establish the logical unity of the hypothesis, thereby creating a
plausible narrative.⁴⁰ For this reason, the more detailed a hypothesis is, the
more persuasive that hypothesis is.⁴¹
The hypothetical statements that Irenaeus provides above are of the par-
ticularized sort. They are not abstract outlines of the redemptive activity of
God, but rather include the names of the actors and the episodes conveying the
specific circumstances of God’s activity. For example, he names God the
Father, the Almighty, the Creator, Maker, and Nourisher of this universe;
Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Only-Begotten, our Lord, God, Savior, and

³⁶ Trimpi, Traditio 2 (1971: 1–78). ³⁷ Trimpi, Traditio 2 (1971: 43).

³⁸ Aristotle, Poetics 17, 1455a34–b3. Unless otherwise noted, text and translations of Aris-
totle’s Poetics come from G. Else (ed. and trans.), Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1957: here p. 503). For an excellent commentary on this aspect of
Aristotle’s thought, see pp. 504–11 in Else.
³⁹ As Trimpi points out, the verbal forms ἐκτίθεσθαι and ὑποθέντα that appear in Aristotle’s
discussion are related to the same root verb, τίθεσθαι, as ὑπόθεσις (Traditio 2 1971: 44).
⁴⁰ Trimpi, Traditio 2 (1971: 44–5 and 48); see also: Meijering (1987: esp. 164–7).
⁴¹ The more deeply an action is rooted in circumstance, by means of further hypothesization,
the more the initial premise(s) of the hypothesis are intelligible and persuasive. Trimpi, Traditio
2 (1971: 48).
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18 God and Christ in Irenaeus

King; and, finally, he names the Holy Spirit. He speaks of the creation of all
things, the enlightenment of humanity, the revelation of prophets, the coming,
virginal birth, passion, resurrection, and ascension of the Son of God, and the
eschatological judgment—all episodes in his narrative of Scripture.⁴²
This use of detailed hypothetical statements makes polemical and con-
structive sense. These details enable him to accentuate the logical consistency
of his hypothesis, an important move since he argues the hypotheses of his
Gnostic opponents are methodologically unsound.⁴³ The details also ground
some of his central constructive commitments: he proclaims one God, the
Creator of all things, his Only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, the agent of creation,
who took flesh and dwelt among us for the redemption of humanity, and the
Holy Spirit by whom the economy of salvation was proclaimed. Indeed, these
selections reveal that he regarded not only the activity central to the plot but
also the subject of that activity as essential to the hypothesis of Scripture. That
is to say, he is not only interested in the activity of God but the God who acts,
not just the economy but the one who enacts the economy. For Irenaeus a
proper conception of the one who enacts the divine economy is essential to a
proper conception of the divine economy itself. This is because the very
purpose of the divine economy is to establish the participation of human
beings with God, which involves the ever-increasing approximation of created
beings to the uncreated Creator.⁴⁴
Having now identified and discussed the hypothesis Irenaeus articulates in
opposition to his Gnostic opponents, I would like to establish whence his
hypothesis comes. While many who have treated this question note that his
hypothesis is informed by the text of Scripture itself,⁴⁵ all have stated that
Irenaeus’ hypothesis is in some way rooted in the tradition, namely the Rule of
Truth or Faith that he received.⁴⁶ Some go so far as to identify the hypothesis

⁴² J.J. O’Keefe and R.R. Reno (2005: 41) reduce Irenaeus’ hypothesis to Jesus Christ (“Jesus
Christ is the hypothesis”); this paragraph and the next reveal such a reading as unduly simplistic.
⁴³ I will address Irenaeus’ critique of their method in the upcoming sections on œconomia
and fiction.
⁴⁴ Briggman, Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 173–81). Norris approaches this understand-
ing of the relationship of God to his economy when he writes, “There can, it seems, be no ‘going
beyond’ this hypothesis, but only ‘inquiry into the mystery and the economy of God that is’
(2.28.1)” (ATR 76 1994: 294). The implication of this statement is that the mystery of God is the
end of the divine economy articulated in the hypothesis of Scripture.
⁴⁵ E.g., Hefner, who says the “hypothesis is expounded from Scripture that is rightly inter-
preted” (JrnRel 44 1964: 304); Blowers, who argues strongly that the regula (which he seems to
identify with the hypothesis) represents “interpretive canons rooted in scripture” (ProEcc 6 1997:
210–11); and Norris, who argues against the notion that Irenaeus opposed tradition (namely, the
regula which includes the hypothesis) and Scripture (ATR 76 1994: 290).
⁴⁶ E.g., Hefner, JrnRel 44 (1964: 303–4); Norris, ATR 76 (1994: 290); Grant (1997: 49); and
Blowers, ProEcc 6 (1997: 213).
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Prolegomena 19
of Scripture with the regula.⁴⁷ This identification, at times, accompanies the
assertion that Irenaeus needs an extra-Scriptural rule (found in tradition) to
guide the interpretation of Scriptural texts.⁴⁸ The combined effect of these
readings is the minimization of Scriptural texts and the elevation of received
tradition as the source of Irenaeus’ hypothesis.
There is no question, given my argument above, that received tradition was
a source of Irenaeus’ hypothesis. His introduction of the hypothesis in AH
1.10.1 by remarking, “the church . . . has received from the apostles and their
disciples the faith,” eliminates any doubt.⁴⁹ But the source of his hypothesis
should not be restricted to tradition alone, for Irenaeus’ argument of AH
2.27.1 reveals that he understands the texts of Scripture themselves to furnish
the hypothesis. He writes:
The sound mind, and one which avoids danger and is pious, and which loves
the truth, will readily meditate on those things which God has placed within the
power of human beings, and has subjected to our knowledge, and will make
progress in them, daily study making the knowledge of them easy. These are those
things that come before our eyes and those that are, in (their) very modes of
expression, clearly and unambiguously set down in the Scriptures. And, therefore,
parables should not be adapted (non adaptari) to ambiguous (expressions). For,
in this way, the one who interprets (them) interprets without danger, and
parables will receive a like interpretation from all, and the body of truth remains
whole (veritatis corpus integrum),⁵⁰ with a like adaptation of its members (simili

⁴⁷ E.g., Rousseau (SC 293 1982: 297), Norris (ATR 76 1994: 290), and Grant (1997: 49).
Both Blowers and F. Young assume the identification of the hypothesis with the regula.
Blowers when he contends the regula articulated and authenticated “a world-encompassing
story or metanarrative of creation . . . that set[s] forth the basic ‘dramatic’ structure of the
Christian vision of the world,” Young when she criticizes the notion that the regula (canon)
contains “a summary of the story of the scriptures” (Blowers, ProEcc 6 [1997: 202, see also
210–11 and 220]; Young [1990: 47–52]).
⁴⁸ Young (1990: 47–52); Blowers critiques Young’s position (ProEcc 6 1997: 210 and passim).
⁴⁹ It may be that instruction in the hypothesis of Scripture was an aspect of baptismal
catechesis, for Irenaeus states in Proof 7 that baptism takes place through the three articles of
faith concerning the Father, Word-Son, and Holy Spirit (listed in Prf 6).
⁵⁰ Following Rousseau’s emendation of a veritate corpus to veritatis corpus (SC 293 1982:
308–9). Rousseau, however, compares veritatis corpus with veritatis corpusculum (τῷ τῆς
ἀληθείας σοματίῳ), lit. “little body of truth,” in AH 1.9.4 and concludes that if the diminutive
corpusculum (σωμάτιον) refers to the Scriptures then in this text corpus must have a broader
scope, referring to the truth received through the Scriptures as well as the created order (SC 293
1982: 308–9). Rousseau’s interpretation improves upon previous readings, which understood
corpusculum (σωμάτιον) itself as broader than Scripture (e.g., F. Kattenbusch, ZNTW 10 [1909:
331–2]; and Unger [ACW 55 1992: 182–3 n. 24]). But a simple comparison of corpus with
corpusculum (σωμάτιον), which occur almost two books apart, is not a sufficient basis for
determining that veritatis corpus in 2.27.1 must have a broader scope (esp. because σωμάτιον
does not necessarily require a diminutive meaning, since it was also used to speak of a volume,
book, or even the structure of a poem—as Unger already noted in ACW 55 1992: 182 n. 24). It is
better to understand veritatis corpus in 2.27.1 as also referring to the Scriptures since the
“members” harmoniously adapted to each other in order to form a whole body of truth are
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20 God and Christ in Irenaeus

aptatione membrorum) and without conflict (concussione). But to connect
(copulare) those things which have not been clearly expressed or placed before
our eyes with the interpretations of the parables, which each one devises as he
wishes (is absurd). For, in this way, no one will have the hypothesis of truth
(regula veritatis); rather, (for) as many as will interpret the parables, there will be
seen just as many truths mutually clashing (pugnantes . . . invicem) with each
other and doctrines standing contrary (contraria) to one another, as with ques-
tions among Gentile philosophers.
My turn to a passage that deals with the relationship between texts of Scripture
and the regula veritatis may be confusing given my interest in identifying the
source of his hypothesis. The mists should begin to clear, however, when
I point out that the Greek substrate for the term regula veritatis is uncertain.
Rousseau has observed that despite the fact that historians of doctrine read
regula veritatis as rendering ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας (“the canon of truth”) in
Irenaeus’ text the word regula is often used to translate ὑπόθεσις.⁵¹ Rousseau
refuses to offer an opinion about the original substrate in this passage,
reasoning that Irenaeus’ thought remains substantially the same in either
case. But he does not recognize the importance of literary and rhetorical
theory to Irenaeus’ thought. As a result, it is not likely that he grasps the
way in which a substrate of ὑπόθεσις would better suit the broader argument of
which this passage is a part as well as the argument in this passage itself.⁵²
AH 2.27.1 belongs to a line of argumentation that begins two chapters
earlier. In AH 2.25.1 Irenaeus is concerned to establish the proper relationship
between particular things—names, works of the Lord, created things—and
the veritatis argumento. Argumentum must translate, here, ὑπόθεσις. Bruno
Reynders lists ὑπόθεσις as the only Greek term in the extant fragments to be
rendered by argumentum.⁵³ And this particular use in AH 2.25.1 corresponds
to the repeated use of argumentum to translate ὑπόθεσις in AH 1.8.1–10.3,
including the use of veritatis argumento to render τῇ τῆς ἀληθείας ὑποθέσει
in AH 1.10.3.⁵⁴
When, then, in AH 2.27.1 Irenaeus looks to establish the relationship
between clear texts and the regula veritatis he is in fact continuing the
discussion that began in AH 2.25.1 about the relationship of particular things

nothing but the texts of Scripture. Argued from another angle, the true hypothesis, which
Irenaeus is concerned to establish by the adaptation of ambiguous texts to clear ones, is the
hypothesis of Scripture.
⁵¹ Rousseau, SC 293 1982: 310 (p. 267, n. 1, part 2).
⁵² Rousseau’s analysis of the substrate focuses on previous uses of regula veritatis in AH,
mentioning its use at the end of AH 1.9.4 to render κανὼν and in 1.10.3 to render ὑπόθεσις (SC
293 1982: 310). Such an approach, as Rousseau’s conclusion illustrates, is unproductive. Only a
close reading of the argument in which the term appears will indicate the Greek substrate.
⁵³ Reynders (1954, vol. 6.2: 35).
⁵⁴ Following Rousseau’s emendation of τῆς πίστεως to τῆς ἀληθείας (SC 263 1979: 226–7).
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Prolegomena 21
to the hypothesis of truth. For this reason, it makes the most sense to recognize
ἡ ὑπόθεσις τῆς ἀληθείας as the substrate of regula veritatis in AH 2.27.1.⁵⁵
Having established the relevance of this passage to a treatment of Irenaeus’
hypothesis, I turn now to the insight this text grants with regard to the source
of his hypothesis.
Irenaeus contends that interpreting parabolic texts⁵⁶ by adapting them to
ambiguous texts will not lead to the hypothesis of truth but rather to “as many
truths mutually clashing with each other and doctrines standing contrary to
one another” as there are interpreters.⁵⁷ In contrast, those who do not adapt
parabolic texts to ambiguous ones—or put positively, those who adapt para-
bolic texts to clear and unambiguous texts⁵⁸—will interpret parabolic texts
“without danger, and parables will receive a like interpretation from all, and
the body of truth remains whole, with a like adaptation of its members and
without conflict.”
Irenaeus explicitly identifies, therefore, three benefits of adapting parabolic
texts to the clear and unambiguous parts of Scripture. First, the interpreter will
not run the danger of producing an impious interpretation.⁵⁹ Second, rather
than having multiple interpretations emerge from the adaptation of parabolic
texts to ambiguous expressions or texts, adapting them to clear and unam-
biguous things results in “a like interpretation from all.” And, third, the body

⁵⁵ This reading is further supported by the fact that the Latin translator also renders ὑπόθεσις
by regula in AH 2.25.1. Rousseau has observed that the Greek substrate for the two uses of regula
at the end of AH 2.25.1 must be the same term rendered by argumentum throughout that section,
namely, ὑπόθεσις (SC 293 1982: 299).
⁵⁶ Irenaeus’ reference to “parables” (parabolae) in this section, as elsewhere in this discourse
(e.g., AH 2.20.1, 2.27.3, 2.28.3), should not be taken as a reference to the parables of which we
commonly speak, such as the parable of the prodigal son. It is, rather, a more general term
referring to any fact or event in the Scriptures understood as able to make known a more
profound reality than it represents or is supposed to represent (for examples, see AH 2.20.1–4).
See Rousseau’s excellent notes on this topic in SC 293 1982: 226–7 (note justif, p. 87, n. 2),
279–80 (p. 201, n. 1), and 308 (p. 265, n. 2.1).
⁵⁷ Irenaeus reasons that parabolic texts should not be adapted to ambiguous texts because our
understanding of ambiguous texts remains uncertain and, therefore, they make unreliable
interpretive guides. This reasoning builds upon his previous statement in AH 2.10.1, where he
addresses the Gnostic interest in explaining ambiguous texts of Scripture by writing: “But no
question will be resolved by another question; nor, by those with sense, will an ambiguity be
explained by another ambiguity, or enigmas by another greater enigma. But such things receive
their solutions from those which are plain, harmonious, and clear.”
⁵⁸ Irenaeus does not make explicit a comparable positive statement in this pericope but his
logic is clear enough. Instead of adapting texts to ambiguous texts, texts ought to be adapted to
those passages that are clear and unambiguous—those within our purview, those that can be
known by daily study. Or, as he says in AH 2.28.3, where he does offer a positive statement: “all
Scripture, which has been given to us by God will be found by us (to be) harmonious
(consonans); the parables will harmonize (consonabunt) with those (statements) which have
been plainly expressed (manifeste dicta sunt), and the plain expressions (manifeste dicta) will
interpret the parables.”
⁵⁹ Succeeding passages make it clear that this is the danger against which Irenaeus is warning,
see: AH 2.25.4, 2.28.3, and 2.28.7.
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22 God and Christ in Irenaeus

of truth remains entire because its members, the texts, exist in a harmonious
arrangement—they are likewise adapted and do not conflict with one
another.⁶⁰
It is, however, the fourth benefit, implicit but central to Irenaeus’ logic, that
bears on the source of his hypothesis. His logic is straightforward. While the
adaptation of parabolic texts to ambiguous texts will not lead to the hypothesis
of truth but produce mutually clashing truths and contrary doctrines, the
adaptation of parabolic texts to unambiguous texts will produce a “like
adaptation” of texts “without conflict,” and, we must add, lead to the hypoth-
esis of truth. In order to understand how the adaptation of parabolic texts to
unambiguous texts leads to the hypothesis of truth, it is necessary to make
clear Irenaeus’ appropriation of literary and rhetorical theory beyond his use
of the term hypothesis.
The notion of adapting unclear texts to clear ones in order to produce a
body of truth constituted by a harmonious arrangement of texts represents an
engagement with the ancient literary and rhetorical principle of οἰκονομία.⁶¹
As I will explain more thoroughly in the next section, the principle of
οἰκονομία maintains that discrete parts of a literary narrative or rhetorical
discourse are arranged in such a way that they substantiate the plot or
argument of that work. An interpretive corollary follows: since the arrange-
ment of the parts of a discourse or narrative substantiates the intention of
the whole (as found in the hypothesis), the hypothesis is established by the
arrangement of texts and, therefore, may be identified from the arrangement
of texts.⁶²
With this corollary we can make sense of Irenaeus’ reasoning. Interpreting
parabolic texts by adapting them to ambiguous texts will result in a misguided
arrangement of texts that is not consistent with the true hypothesis of Scrip-
ture. Such an arrangement of texts will produce “mutually clashing truths” and

⁶⁰ The selection from AH 2.28.3 quoted in note 56 makes clear that the method of interpret-
ation advocated by Irenaeus in AH 2.27.1 results in a harmonious arrangement of the texts.
⁶¹ Irenaeus’ assertion that a text should be adapted to another discrete text, rather than to the
whole, is unusual and requires explanation. We can make sense of this assertion by seeing in this
passage not just a general engagement with the principle of οἰκονομία but a specific engagement
with Quintilian’s Inst. Ora. 7.10.16–17 (a quotation and detailed discussion of this text appears in
the next section). The parallels between this passage and AH 2.27.1 are striking and the influence
of this text may explain Irenaeus’ unusual assertion. According to Quintilian the totality of an
arranged text should be understood as a united whole characterized by continuity (continua),
rather than an aggregate of parts merely put together (composita). An œconomic reading of a
text may utilize more than one standard as a referent for the whole, one of which may be the
arranged texts themselves, which, as Quintilian establishes, should be taken as a continuous
whole (see: Eden 1997: 29–41). Should Irenaeus have shared such an understanding, it would be
logical for him to regard clear texts as markers that indicate the overall structure or arrangement
of the whole. Such markers would constitute reliable guides for the interpretation of ambiguous
texts, and, conceivably, function as worthy standards to which ambiguous texts may be adapted.
⁶² A detailed discussion of the theoretical basis of this corollary appears in the next section.
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Prolegomena 23
“contrary doctrines,” it will not lead to the hypothesis of truth. On the other
hand, interpreting parabolic texts by adapting them to clear and unambiguous
texts will result in an accurate arrangement of texts—a “like adaptation” of
texts “without conflict”—that is consistent with the true hypothesis of Scrip-
ture. Because such an arrangement of texts is not only consistent with but
even substantiates the true hypothesis, the interpreter is able to discern that
hypothesis from it. That is to say, such an arrangement leads to the hypothesis
of truth. Therefore, according to Irenaeus if one utilizes the proper hermen-
eutical method one may learn the hypothesis from the Scriptural text itself.
To this point we have seen that the ancient literary and rhetorical concept of
ὑπόθεσις features in Irenaeus’ thought. It is central to his polemic with his
Gnostic opponents and his understanding of the faith passed down from the
apostles. The hypothesis Irenaeus affirms, moreover, may be received from
tradition or derived from the Scriptures. Hypothesis, however, is not the only
concept Irenaeus appropriates from literary and rhetorical theory to counter
Gnostic thought. Indeed, as we have just seen, another key element of his
challenge to Gnostic interpretations of Scripture is the appropriation of the
principle οἰκονομία. It is to a more detailed examination of Irenaeus’ use of this
principle that we now turn.

1.1.2. Œconomia (οἰκονομία)

Kathy Eden’s studies have thrown the principle of œconomia into relief.⁶³ The
Greek rhetorician Hermagoras borrowed the term from the domestic arena to
explain various elements of elocutio, or style.⁶⁴ Roman rhetoricians, however,
seemed to understand it as “a principle of composition and reception” that
applied more exclusively to matters of arrangement, or dispositio [Gr. τάξις],
the second of the five rhetorical partes.⁶⁵ Similar to decorum in matters of style,
œconomia is the most important rhetorical principle concerned with the
accommodation of particular cases or circumstances.⁶⁶ This accommodation
of particular cases or circumstances often manifests itself in narrative con-
struction as the rejection of a standard or straightforward presentation of
material—one “that follows the natural order of events or the conventional
order of composition”—in favor of an indirect or artificial organization of
material in order to accommodate the particular case or circumstance at
hand.⁶⁷ So, for instance, Quintilian points to Homer’s practice of beginning

⁶³ Eden (1997: esp. 7–40); and Eden, SLI 28 (1995: 13–26). As the notes indicate, the following
discussion draws heavily upon Eden’s work. However, see also: Meijering (1987: 134–200); and
Nünlist (2011: 24).
⁶⁴ Eden (1997: 27).
⁶⁵ Eden, SLI 28 (1995: 13), for both quotations; see also, Eden (1997: 27–8).
⁶⁶ Eden (1997: 27). ⁶⁷ Eden, SLI 28 (1995: 13–14); see also, Eden (1997: 28–9).
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24 God and Christ in Irenaeus

at times in the middle of a story or even at the end in order to suit the
requirements, or circumstances, of a given story.⁶⁸
This illustration grants some insight into the function of this principle
in narrative construction. Œconomia legislates that discrete parts of a
literary or rhetorical work should be subordinated to the intention of
the whole;⁶⁹ therefore, an œconomic arrangement of material presup-
poses the whole.⁷⁰ Since the intention of a whole literary or rhetorical
work resides in its hypothesis, then an œconomic arrangement presup-
poses the hypothesis—it takes the hypothesis as its starting-place.⁷¹ Thus,
Homer arranges his episodes in order to begin in the middle or the end of
a story because it supports the direction of the hypothesis, with which
he starts, perhaps by establishing purpose or perhaps plausibility.⁷² At the
same time, however, the very sequence of and connections between the
parts of a work that are established by their œconomic arrangement
substantiate the logical unity of the hypothesis. So it is that the arrange-
ment of the parts of a literary narrative or rhetorical discourse substanti-
ates its plot or argument.⁷³
A discourse, however, was not understood as merely an arrangement of
parts (composita) but as whole and complete (continua).⁷⁴ Such is Quintilian’s
contention in his Institutes of Oratory (Inst. Ora.) 7.10.16–17:
And it is not enough merely to arrange (dispositio) the various parts: each
several part has its own internal economy, according to which one thought will
come first, another second, another third, while we must struggle not merely to
place these thoughts in their proper order, but to link them together (vincti)
and give them such cohesion (cohaerentes) that there will be no trace of any
suture: they must form a body, not a congeries of limbs (corpus sit, non
membra). This end will be attained if we note what best suits each position,
and take care that the words which we place together are such as will not clash
(non pugnantia), but will mutually harmonize (invicem complectantur). Thus
different facts will not seem like perfect strangers thrust into uncongenial
company from distant places, but will be united with what precedes and follows
by an intimate bond of union, with the result that our speech will give the

⁶⁸ Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 7.10.11–12 and 7.10.16–17; see, Eden, SLI 28 (1995: 14).
⁶⁹ Eden, SLI 28 (1995: 14). ⁷⁰ Eden (1997: 29).
⁷¹ As discussed in the previous section, the model advocated in literary and rhetorical theory
began with the articulation of the hypothesis, the plot of a narrative or argument of a discourse,
the arrangement of the parts of the narrative or discourse followed and corresponded to the
articulated hypothesis. See: Trimpi, Traditio 2 (1971: 43–6).
⁷² Meijering (1987: 184).
⁷³ Meijering (1987: esp. 164–7, 182–6); and Nünlist (2011: 24). The degree to which οἰκονομία
is essential to the direction of the plot may be illustrated by Nünlist’s observation that οἰκονομία
itself often means plot in scholia and elsewhere.
⁷⁴ Eden (1997: 29).
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Prolegomena 25
impression not merely of having been put together (composita), but of natural
continuity (continua).⁷⁵
The simple arrangement of thoughts, such that one just comes after another, is
insufficient—the thoughts of a discourse must be ordered with care such that
they are linked together and coherent.⁷⁶ Properly arranged thoughts, Quintil-
ian says, will not be a congeries of limbs but will constitute a body, they will
not clash as dissonant notes but will mutually harmonize as notes in a melody,
they will not be as strangers thrust together but will be familiar to or at home
with those around them.⁷⁷ A discourse so arranged will not appear to be a
collection of parts (composita) but continuous (continua) because each part
will be united with what goes before and what comes after.⁷⁸
Because œconomia plays a central role in the construction of a literary
or rhetorical text, it also plays a central role in textual interpretation. Two
interpretive corollaries follow from the relationship of the parts to the
whole established by the principle of œconomia. First, because the arrange-
ment of the parts substantiates the intention of the whole, the hypothesis is
established by the arrangement of texts and, therefore, may be identified
from the arrangement of texts. Second, because the arrangement of the
parts presupposes the intention of the whole, discrete parts find their
meanings in light of the whole and, therefore, should be interpreted in
light of the whole.
With regard to this second corollary, Quintilian, as well as later grammar-
ians such as Servius and Donatus and the rhetorician Sulpitius Victor, iden-
tified episodes of good economy (bona œconomia) in a given work. They
applied “this term to those moments in the narrative or dramatic action that
seem unfitting when read in isolation but entirely appropriate or artistic in the
context of the work as a whole.”⁷⁹ Such an œconomic reading of a text can
utilize more than one standard as a referent for the whole. Since the arranged
texts presuppose the intention of the whole as found in the hypothesis, then a
given text may be read in light of the hypothesis. But a given text may also be
read in light of the arranged texts themselves,⁸⁰ the totality of which—as the

⁷⁵ I will return to this passage from Quintilian when discussing the third hermeneutic
principle of Irenaeus I would like to highlight.
⁷⁶ Of course, the proper arrangement of a work does not stop at the level of its thoughts, but,
Quintilian says, extends to the ordering of each word.
⁷⁷ Eden observes that œconomia “takes social organization, based on the unity of the family,
oikos, (Lat. domus), as the shaping analogy for literary composition” (1997: 30).
⁷⁸ So, we see, again, that the proper arrangement of its parts substantiates the logical unity of a
discourse or a narrative.
⁷⁹ Eden, SLI 28 (1995: 14); and Eden (1997: 42). In the latter work Eden explains that a text
may be read in light of either the historical or textual context (pp. 29–41); this study is primarily
interested in the textual context.
⁸⁰ Eden (1997: 29–41).
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26 God and Christ in Irenaeus

recent selection from Quintilian shows⁸¹—was understood as a united whole
rather than an aggregate of parts.⁸²
Both of these interpretive corollaries feature in Irenaeus’ polemic against his
Gnostic opponents. Against Heresies opens with a recitation of the hypothesis
of his Gnostic opponents.⁸³ Irenaeus soon turns, however, to a short critique of
the interpretive method by which his opponents support their hypothesis. It is
in this critique, which extends from AH 1.8.1–10.3, that we first glimpse the
centrality of the principle of οἰκονομία to Irenaeus’ polemic and hermeneutic.
In AH 1.8.1 Irenaeus reproaches his opponents, writing:
. . . they attempt to adapt (aptare/προσαρμόζειν), in a plausible manner, to their
assertions either the parables of the Lord, the sayings of the prophets, or the
words of the apostles, in order that their fiction (figmentum/πλάσμα) may not
appear to be unattested. They disregard the order (ordinem/τάξιν) and the
connection (textum/εἱρμον) of the Scriptures and, so far as in them lies, disjoint
the members (membra/μέλη) of the truth. Moreover, they transfer and
rearrange (passages), and making one thing out of another, they deceive
many by adapting (aptant/ἐφαρμοζομένων) the words of the Lord to (their)
badly composed fantasy. Indeed, it is as if one would take an accurate image of
a king, which was carefully constructed out of precious stones by a skillful
artist, destroy the existing image of the man, change around and rearrange
those stones, and make the form of a dog or of a fox . . . In the same way these
people cobble together old wives’ fables, and, then, plucking words, sayings, and
parables from here and there, they want to adapt (adaptare/ἐφαρμόζειν) the
words of God to their myths (fabulis/μύθοις).
Irenaeus here levels two charges against his opponents. First, they are mishand-
ling Scriptural texts by adapting (aptare/adaptare/ἐφαρμόζειν) them to their
fantasy. Since the fantasy of which he speaks is the hypothesis he recounted in

⁸¹ Cf. Cicero, De inventione 2.40.117: “if words are to be considered separately by themselves,
every word, or at least many words, would seem ambiguous (ambigua); but it is not right to
regard as ambiguous what becomes plain on consideration of the whole context (ex omni
considerata scriptura)” (trans. H.M. Hubbell; LCL 386; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1949).
⁸² Irenaeus identifies a third standard by which one may arrive at an œconomic reading of
Scripture. At the end of AH 1.9.4 Irenaeus writes that those who remember the Rule (regula/
κανὼν) of Truth received at baptism will both be able to recognize the improper arrangement of
texts, in support of an improper hypothesis, and restore texts to their proper position. This
indicates, given the discussion above, that Irenaeus regards the regula as another referent for the
whole of Scripture.
⁸³ So defined at the beginning of AH 1.8.1: “Such, then, is their hypothesis . . . ” E. Thomassen
has identified the source of the Gnostic hypothesis Irenaeus opposes in AH 1.1–9 as writings
circulated among Valentinians near the Rhône who considered themselves followers of Ptolemy.
The authorship of the writings and their importance to this group of Valentinians, however,
remains unknown (Thomassen 2008: 21). For a concise treatment of this portion of AH see, Behr
(2013: 78–83); Behr follows Thomassen on these matters.
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Prolegomena 27
the chapters prior to this, then the charge really is that his opponents are
adapting Scriptural texts to their (own) hypothesis.⁸⁴ Second, they are mis-
handling Scriptural texts by abstracting them from their original contexts and
rearranging them. He likens this process of disregarding the order (ordinem/
τάξιν) and connection (textum/εἱρμον) of the Scriptural texts—the disjointing
of “the members of the truth” and arranging them anew—to the rearrange-
ment of gems that constitute a mosaic of a king such that they now depict a
fox. Just a few paragraphs later in AH 1.9.4, as discussed above, he also
likens this approach to that used in the construction of a Homeric cento,
according to which lines are abstracted and rearranged so that they substan-
tiate a new hypothesis. In fact, his point is the same here: his Gnostic
opponents are abstracting Scriptural texts from their context and rearranging
them so that they substantiate a new hypothesis, one other than the hypothesis
of Scripture.
In leveling these charges Irenaeus is drawing upon the principle of οἰκονομία.
Both charges are founded upon the œconomic principle that discrete parts
of a discourse or narrative are arranged in a way that presupposes and substan-
tiates the intention of the whole, as found in the hypothesis. Indeed, they reflect
the two interpretive corollaries already identified. Irenaeus’ first charge, that
his Gnostic opponents are adapting texts to their own hypothesis, draws upon
the second corollary. He is contending that they are interpreting discrete texts in
light of the wrong “whole,” the wrong hypothesis, and are therefore distorting
the meaning of those texts.⁸⁵ His second charge, that his opponents are ab-
stracting texts from their original context and rearranging them, draws upon
the first corollary. He is contending that the Gnostics have dissolved the natu-
ral and correct order of the Scriptural texts and arranged them anew in a
deliberate effort to substantiate a hypothesis foreign to Scripture, namely that
which he outlines in the first chapters of AH 1. This is the theoretical point his
references to the rearranged mosaic in AH 1.8.1 and Homeric cento in AH 1.9.4
illustrate.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Irenaeus’ labeling of the Gnostic hypothesis as fictional, by means of the terms πλάσμα and
μῦθος, is itself an engagement with literary theory. I shall discuss this aspect of his polemic in the
final section of this study.
⁸⁵ The idea that texts are distorted when they are read in light of the Gnostic hypothesis
reflects Irenaeus’ characterization of the Gnostic hypothesis as fictional, as verisimilar. As
mentioned in the previous note, the final section of this study contains a more thorough
discussion of this topic.
⁸⁶ His assertion in AH 1.8.1 that his opponents “dissolve the members (membra/μέλη) of the
truth” may be an allusion to Quintilian’s assertion (Inst. Ora. 7.10.16–17) that thoughts should
be arranged so that they constitute a unified whole: “they must form a body, not a congeries of
limbs (corpus sit, non membra).” The hermeneutical principle Irenaeus offers in AH 2.27.1
embodies a more substantial interaction with this passage from Quintilian, as I discuss in my
article, VC 70 (2016: 31–50).
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28 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Indisputable evidence that Irenaeus is here engaging the principle of œco-
nomia appears in the first line of AH 1.8.2 and again in the first lines of AH
1.10.3. In AH 1.8.2 Irenaeus introduces several paragraphs containing illus-
trations of the Gnostic practice of adapting Scripture to their hypothesis,
writing:
As to those things outside their pleroma, the following are examples of how much
they attempt to accommodate (insinuare/προσοικειοῦν) (passages) from the
Scriptures (to their hypothesis).
This sentence summarizes the first charge he levels in AH 1.8.1. Rather than
using προσαρμόζειν or ἐφαρμόζειν (rendered by aptare and adaptare) as he did
in 1.8.1 to speak of the adaptation of Scripture to the Gnostic hypothesis, here
he uses προσοικειοῦν (rendered as insinuare). The term προσοικειοῦν belongs
to the same word family as οἰκονομία. But its use is even more significant
because it corresponds to the use of προοικονομεῖν by the grammarians
commenting on the Homeric scholia, sometimes as a synonym for οἰκονομία,
sometimes with the more specific meaning of arranging action in advance.⁸⁷
Just as the use of προσοικειοῦν establishes Irenaeus’ engagement with
the principle of οἰκονομία toward the beginning of his critique, the use of
συνοικειοῦν in AH 1.10.3 establishes it at the end. In AH 1.10.3 Irenaeus writes
that differing degrees of divine insight do not result in different hypotheses
but rather in different capacities to elucidate parables and “accommodate
(adiungere/συνοικειοῦν) them to the hypothesis of truth.”⁸⁸ Συνοικειοῦν is a
technical term in Stoic hermeneutics by the time of Cicero, who translated it
with accommodare.⁸⁹ A century later Plutarch instructed the young reader to
learn “to adapt (συνοικειοῦν) the usage of words to fit the matter in hand, as the
grammarians teach us to do, taking a word for one signification at one time,
and at another time for another.”⁹⁰ Both uses, Eden explains, instantiate the
principle of οἰκονομία.⁹¹ So too, then, does Irenaeus’.
These uses of προσοικειοῦν and συνοικειοῦν have two important implica-
tions. First, they establish that Irenaeus’ polemic against Gnostic interpretive
method in AH 1.8.1–10.3 utilizes the literary and rhetorical principle of
οἰκονομία. Second, since the use of προσοικειοῦν (insinuare) parallels the use
of προσαρμόζειν and ἐφαρμόζειν (aptare and adaptare) in AH 1.8.1, it estab-
lishes the use of any of these terms in a hermeneutical context as a likely point

⁸⁷ Meijering (1987: 185–6).

⁸⁸ This statement draws upon the second interpretive corollary that follows from the principle
of œconomia, as identified above. Furthermore, I discuss the context of this statement in the
previous section when considering the classification of AH 1.10.1 as a statement of Irenaeus’
hypothesis.
⁸⁹ Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.41.
⁹⁰ Plutarch, Moralia (On How to Study Poetry) 22F. ⁹¹ Eden (1997: 31–2).
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Prolegomena 29
of engagement with the literary and rhetorical principle of οἰκονομία. The
same holds for συνοικειοῦν and adiungere.
The principle of οἰκονομία, therefore, constitutes the logical basis for Ire-
naeus’ polemic against Gnostic interpretations of Scripture. It offers the
hermeneutical method by which he argues that the Gnostic hypothesis is
foreign to the Scriptures and, therefore, misguided. The term he uses to
characterize such a hypothesis also derives from ancient literary theory.
I turn, then, to the final section of this essay, a short discussion of the concept
of fiction in Irenaeus.

1.1.3. Fiction (πλάσμα and μῦθος)

Irenaeus’ critique of the interpretive practices of his Gnostic opponents

includes one final nod toward ancient literary theory. Over the course of AH
1.8.1–9.4 he characterizes Gnostic accounts as “their fiction” (figmentum
illorum / τὸ πλάσμα αὐτῶν), “old-wives’ fables” (anicularum fabulas / γραῶν
μύθους), and “myths” (fabulis/μῦθους) in AH 1.8.1, as “their own fiction”
(finctionem suam / τὸ πλάσμα αὐτῶν) in AH 1.9.1, and “their fiction” (fig-
mentum ipsorum / τὸ πλάσμα αὐτῶν) in AH 1.9.4. In so doing, Irenaeus
incorporates the technical terms πλάσμα (“fiction”) and μῦθος (“myth”),
without differentiating them, in order to label the Gnostic hypothesis as
fictional.
We gain a sense for the place of these terms in literary theory from Against
the Professors 1.263–5, where Sextus Empiricus distinguishes ἱστορία, πλάσμα,
and μῦθος:

Moreover, since of the subjects of history (τῶν ἱστορουμένων) one part is

history (ἱστορία), another legend (μῦθος), another fiction (πλάσμα)—and of
these history (ἱστορία) is the recording of certain things which are true and
have happened (γεγονότων) . . . and fiction (πλάσμα) is the narrating [of] things
whichare not real events but are similar (μὴ γενομένων μὲν ὁμοίως) to real
events in the telling, such as the hypothetical situations in comedies and
mimes; and legend (μῦθος) is the narrating of events which have never
happened (ἀγενήτων) and are false (ψευδῶν) . . . such then being the variety in
histories (ἱστοριῶν), since there exists no art which deals with things false and
unreal (τὰ ψευδῆ καὶ ἀνύπαρκτα), and the legends and fictions (τοὺς μύθους καὶ
τὰ πλάσματα), which form the main subjects of the historical part with which
grammar is concerned, are false and unreal, it will follow that there exists no
art which deals with the historical part of grammar (τὸ ἱστορικὸν μέρος τῆς
γραμματικῆς).

Sextus is here repeating “the Hellenistic distinction between the historical

narrative of true events (ἱστορία), the narration of things like truth (πλάσμα),
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30 God and Christ in Irenaeus

and the legend that has no relation to truth at all (μῦθος).”⁹² Fiction (πλάσμα)
is the realm of the verisimilar, the most historically important type of fictional
narrative.⁹³ Myth (μῦθος) can be distinguished from fiction, as it is here, but its
meaning can also draw very close to that given for fiction.⁹⁴ So D.A. Russell
writes, “the myth-maker (muthopoios), even the maker of what we should call
fantasy, produces a suggestive or distorted image of reality, not a structure that
exists in its own right and for its own sake.”⁹⁵ The following selection from
Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris bears this out:
But the fact is that you yourself detest those persons who hold such abnormal and
outlandish opinions about the gods. That these accounts do not, in the least,
resemble the sort of loose fictions and frivolous fabrications (μυθεύμασιν ἀραιοῖς
καὶ διακένοις πλάσμασιν) which poets and writers of prose evolve from them-
selves, after the manner of spiders, interweaving and extending their unestab-
lished first thoughts . . . Just as the rainbow . . . is the reflection of the sun . . . so the
somewhat fanciful accounts (ὁ μῦθος . . . λόγου) here set down are but reflections
of some true tale which turns back our thoughts to other matters . . . ⁹⁶
This particular combination of μύθευμα and πλάσμα does not suggest a great
distinction between the terms. Even more significant is his description of
ὁ μῦθος . . . λόγου as a reflection of a true tale, a description which clearly
suggests the definition of verisimilar.
We see in the passages of Irenaeus listed above an undifferentiated use of
μῦθος and πλάσμα designed to discredit the hypothesis of his Gnostic oppon-
ents as fictional—as “a narration of things which are not real events but
are similar to real events in the telling.”⁹⁷ That this is Irenaeus’ intent is
clear from AH 1.9.2, in which he writes: “The counterfeit nature (transfinc-
tio/παραποίησις), then, of (the Gnostic) exposition is manifest . . . These men,
by a plausible kind of exposition (verisimile expositionem / τὸ πιθανὸν τὴν
ἐξηγησιν), perverting these statements (of Scripture that substantiate Irenaeus’
hypothesis),” maintain the tenets of their own hypothesis. The Gnostic
hypothesis is a counterfeit (παραποίησις), a fraudulent imitation, which is
persuasive precisely because of the plausibility it garners by being verisimilar.
It is, moreover, the very plausibility garnered by its approximation to the truth
that enables Irenaeus’ opponents to “deceive the ignorant” into thinking that

⁹² Trimpi, Traditio 2 (1971: 22 n. 21). ⁹³ Trimpi, Traditio 2 (1971: 22).

⁹⁴ For a concise summary of the various meanings of μῦθος, see Else (1957: 243 and 243 n. 81).
Else suggests that the dominant connotation in Plato is that the story is not literally true.
Aristotle’s use of the term in his Poetics with the sense of the structure or composition of
events—similar to ὑπόθεσις—is a radical departure from its previous use.
⁹⁵ Russell (1981: 100).
⁹⁶ Plutarch, Moralia 358F–359A (Moralia vol. V; trans. F.C. Babbitt; LCL 306; Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1936, repr. 2003).
⁹⁷ Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 1.263; a longer quotation of this passage appears in
the previous section.
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Prolegomena 31
the likeness of a fox is the image of a king (AH 1.8.1) and to lead the “simple-
minded” into thinking that the cento was composed by Homer (1.9.4).
Those familiar with Plutarch’s thoughts about poetry as a propaedeutic to
philosophy would not have had to read more than a few lines of AH 1.8.1 to
discern this facet of Irenaeus’ argument. Irenaeus writes in those lines:
Citing from non-scriptural texts, they (his Gnostic opponents), as the saying goes,
strive to weave ropes of sand (harena resticulas nectere / ἐξ ἄμμου σχοινία
πλέκειν). They attempt to adapt (aptare/προσαρμόζειν), in a plausible manner
(fide digne / ἀξιοπίστως), to their assertions either the parables of the Lord, the
sayings of the prophets, or the words of the apostles, in order that their fiction
(figmentum/πλάσμα) may not appear to be unattested.
His association of weaving, plausibility, and fiction bears a striking resem-
blance to this selection from Plutarch’s How to Study Poetry (De audiendis
poetis):
For the truth, because it is what actually happens does not deviate from its
course, even though the end be unpleasant; whereas fiction, being a verbal
fabrication (τὸ . . . πλαττόμενον λόγῳ), very readily follows a roundabout route,
and turns aside the painful to what is more pleasant. For not metre nor figure of
speech nor loftiness of diction nor aptness of metaphor nor unity of compos-
ition has so much allurement and charm, as a clever interweaving of fabulous
narrative (εὖ πεπλεγμένη διάθεσις μυθολογίας). But, just as in pictures, colour is
more stimulating than line-drawing because it is life-like, and creates an illu-
sion, so in poetry falsehood combined with plausibility (μεμιγμένον πιθανότητι
ψεῦδος) is more striking, and gives more satisfaction, than the work which is
elaborate in metre and diction, but devoid of myth and fiction (ἀμύθου καὶ
ἀπλάστου).⁹⁸
In addition to the clear parallel constituted by the association of weaving,
plausibility, and fiction, Plutarch’s linking of myth and fiction corresponds to
Irenaeus’ undifferentiated use of μῦθος and πλάσμα, and Plutarch’s assertion
that myth and fiction are desirable (“more striking” and give “more satisfac-
tion”) because of the combination of falsehood and plausibility corresponds
to Irenaeus’ assertion that the Gnostic myth/fiction is persuasive because of
its fraudulent plausibility.⁹⁹ While it is impossible to prove, this level of
agreement between the texts strongly suggests that Irenaeus had this passage
in mind when writing AH 1.8.1. At the very least, it is safe to say that
Irenaeus’ use of weaving as a means to characterize the Gnostic hypothesis
as fictional draws upon the literary theory of his day. And it is likely that
readers familiar with Plutarch’s literary theorizing, or even the connection

⁹⁸ Moralia 16B–C (Moralia vol. I; trans. F.C. Babbitt; LCL 197; London: William Heinemann/
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927, repr. 1986).
⁹⁹ In AH 1.8.1–10.3.
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32 God and Christ in Irenaeus

between weaving and fiction in the Latin tradition,¹⁰⁰ would have easily
perceived Irenaeus’ intent.

1.1.4. Section Conclusion

This first essay has shown that Irenaeus’ polemic against Gnostic interpret-
ations of Scripture in AH 1.8.1–10.3 incorporates concepts belonging to
ancient literary and rhetorical theory. Indeed, incorporate is too weak a
term, the very logic of Irenaeus’ argument is founded upon the concepts of
hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις), œconomia (οἰκονομία), and fiction (πλάσμα and μῦθος).
They are the pillars of his polemic.
Though this essay has focused upon the use of literary and rhetorical
theory in his polemic, Irenaeus also uses concepts belonging to these theories
in his constructive thought. A small indication of this was seen in AH 1.10.1
where he classified the confession of faith passed down from the apostles as
his hypothesis. Another example appears in AH 2.25–7 where the concepts of
hypothesis and œconomia feature in the hermeneutical principles he articu-
lates.¹⁰¹ Taken in conjunction with his polemic against Gnostic hermeneutic
methods, the articulation of these hermeneutical principles reveals, contra
Schoedel, at least one instance in which Irenaeus’ argumentation does not
fall short of the rhetorical goal of successfully refuting and supporting a
position.¹⁰²
The camera has been refocused and the picture taken again. Concepts
belonging to ancient literary and rhetorical theory are not accidental to
Irenaeus’ thought but integral. They define contours of his polemic and even
feature in his constructive thought. Portrayals of Irenaeus as having been
exposed to just the fundamentals of a Hellenistic education and as having
only some knowledge of Hellenistic rhetoric appear ever more distorted. At
the same time, the picture of Irenaeus as a polemicist and theologian who ably
uses tools acquired in a thorough grammatical and rhetorical education
emerges ever more clearly.
This means that we should expect Irenaeus to have known the concepts
and texts featured in a rhetorical education. This point is more consequential
than it once was. The broad reading lists enumerated for rhetoricians—such as
that articulated by Quintilian in 10.1.46–131—have in the past usually been
regarded as ideal, theoretical canons far from the actual reading practices of

¹⁰⁰ Eden (1997: 35 n. 30). With regard to the Latin tradition, Eden highlights the continuing
use of the terms textus, contextus, and integumentum. On integumentum, see Dronke (1974:
esp. 48–52, including the long note on ancient and patristic uses that stretches across 48 and 49,
and 119–22).
¹⁰¹ See my VC 70 (2016: 31–50).
¹⁰² Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 31); as discussed in the introduction to this study.
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Prolegomena 33
those trained in rhetoric.¹⁰³ But Raffaella Cribiore has recently challenged
this usual interpretation, arguing that such reading lists “were more than ideal,
theoretical canons and reflected the breadth of reading with which a first-rate
orator was supposed to have at least some acquaintance.”¹⁰⁴ Therefore, the
possibility of Irenaeus’ exposure to a breadth of literature should not be
dismissed a priori. In fact, evidence from Irenaeus’ writings suggests he was
rather well read. He quotes passages from numerous books throughout the
Iliad and Odyssey, which suggests he had read both works in their entirety. He
also refers to Anaxilas, Hesiod, Pindar, Antiphanes, Menander, Sophocles, and
Stesichorus, amongst others. As Unger states, “Irenaeus knew the classics.” ¹⁰⁵
We may gain a sense for the depth of Irenaeus’ literary knowledge by
comparing it to the knowledge of Homer gained during a grammatical and
rhetorical education. According to Cribiore, Homer’s Iliad enjoyed the
particular attention of grammatical students. However, only advanced gram-
matical students would have read the whole work, the rest would have
focused upon just a few chapters. The Iliad continued to receive attention
by those who continued their studies by pursuing a rhetorical education.
On the other hand, the Odyssey received comparatively little attention
during one’s schooldays.¹⁰⁶ There is no question that Irenaeus was as well
read as the most advanced rhetorical students, and likely much better.
Therefore, Irenaeus’ proficiency in deploying literary and rhetorical theory
as well as the extent of his knowledge of Homer and other authors indicate a
thorough rhetorical education and a continuing interest in literature after
the completion of his studies.

1.2. THEOLOGICAL SPECULATION

The greatest technical justification for the lack of attention paid to Irenaeus’
conception of the divine being and the person of Christ is a reading of
Irenaeus established some decades ago by Thomas-André Audet, Robert
M. Grant, and William R. Schoedel. These scholars authored a series of
studies that presented Irenaeus as uninterested in and even opposed to
theological speculation.¹⁰⁷ At the center of this narrative is a little treatise on
theological method found in Against Heresies 2.25–8. Audet, Grant, and Schoe-
del read these chapters as denouncing causal inquiry—and, thus, theological

¹⁰³ Cribiore (2007: 158–9). ¹⁰⁴ Cribiore (2007: 158).

¹⁰⁵ Unger (ACW 55 1992: 181). ¹⁰⁶ Cribiore (2001: 195–7, 226).
¹⁰⁷ Audet, Traditio 1 (1943: 15–54, esp. 51–3); Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 41–51, esp. 46–7); Grant
(1952: 79–81); Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 22–32, esp. 23–4); Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 31–49).
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34 God and Christ in Irenaeus

speculation—into terrestrial as well as celestial and spiritual matters.¹⁰⁸ This
denunciation of causal inquiry involves, they contend, a disinterest in or even
repudiation of reason, especially Greco-Roman philosophical thought, as a
means of finding solutions to questions raised but not resolved by Scripture.¹⁰⁹
This reading has shaped studies of Irenaeus for over seventy years. During
that time it has received, to my knowledge, just two challenges. Thirty-five
years ago W.C. van Unnik published a critical essay in a Festschrift honoring
Grant.¹¹⁰ Van Unnik’s critique went mainly unheeded by scholars. The little
attention it did receive came in the form of a lengthy rebuttal issued some
years later by Schoedel.¹¹¹ Ten years later Jacques Fantino devoted a few pages
to the opposition of Schoedel’s rebuttal.¹¹² Again scholars paid little atten-
tion.¹¹³ The narrative established by Audet, Grant, and Schoedel remains
dominant.¹¹⁴ This is unfortunate indeed, for van Unnik and Fantino were
largely correct.
Irenaeus’ position on theological speculation is altogether different than
that delineated by Audet, Grant, and Schoedel. The treatise on theological
method that occupies AH 2.25–8 underscores not just the perils of causal
inquiry, as their readings maintain, but also its possibilities. In this section
I contend that Irenaeus argues for a differentiated knowledge of terrestrial and
celestial matters, the material and the spiritual. This differentiation of know-
ledge encompasses questions of causation, such that some things are known

¹⁰⁸ Von Harnack, long before, read these chapters in a similar way, see History of Dogma
(1901, vol. 2: 233 n. 3).
¹⁰⁹ Though the following discussion addresses this point, a concise note may be helpful.
According to Audet, Irenaeus opposed using Scripture as evidence in reasoned argumentation,
reason plays only an “accessory role” in his argumentation, and the times he does attempt to
refute the Gnostics by reasoned argumentation are “rather simplistic” (Traditio 1 1943: 51–3).
Schoedel contended that AH 2.25–8 “is remarkable especially because it discusses in some detail
the limits of reason in theology and significantly restricts the pursuit of metaphysical issues” (JTS
35 1984: 31). Grant’s position is clearest in a later work where he characterizes Irenaeus as “the
father of authoritative exegesis in the church” and then declares: “In his opinion truth is to be
found only within the church. An instructive passage shows his dislike of philosophical learning.
In natural science ‘many things escape our knowledge, and we entrust them to God; for he must
excel over all. What if we try to set forth the cause of the rising of the Nile? We say many things,
some perhaps persuasive, others perhaps not persuasive: what is true and certain and sure lies
with God’ [2.28.2]” (Grant with Tracy 1984: 50).
¹¹⁰ Van Unnik (1979: 33–43).
¹¹¹ This rebuttal is the second article by Schoedel listed just above (n. 107). Schoedel casts his
discussion as an effort to bridge the readings of Grant and van Unnik, but in fact he gives no
ground to van Unnik and ultimately maintains the previous narrative.
¹¹² Fantino (1994: 74–9); pp. 68–73 also bear on the question.
¹¹³ This may be an understatement. I do not know of a single piece of scholarship that has
taken notice of Fantino’s remarks.
¹¹⁴ R.A. Norris (2002: 71–3), for example, recently read AH 2.25–8 in light of Schoedel’s
interpretation.
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Prolegomena 35
while others are not.¹¹⁵ In so saying, I largely support the critiques once offered
by van Unnik and Fantino.¹¹⁶
I shall divide my argument into two parts. The first relates the current
narrative in more detail by summarizing the arguments of Audet, Grant, and
Schoedel. The second criticizes their arguments and proposes a new reading of
AH 2.25–8.

1.2.1. The Current Narrative

Audet was the first to write, offering toward the end of his lengthy article
a characterization of Irenaeus’ theological method that proved influential.
Irenaeus, he argues, imposes limits upon theological speculation:¹¹⁷ one
should not go beyond what is explicitly stated in the Bible, nor should one
speculate on what is implicit or obscure.¹¹⁸ According to Audet, Irenaeus
maintained that even clear passages of Scripture should not be utilized as
evidence in an argument from reason.¹¹⁹ With this reading in place, Audet
concludes that reason plays only “un rôle accessoire” in Irenaeus’ argumen-
tation. Indeed, he finds Irenaeus’ method in Against Heresies 2, the book
he regards as dedicated to refutation of Gnostic thought by reason, to be

¹¹⁵ Van Unnik argued that Irenaeus had in mind a “differentiation in our human knowledge
of physical phenomena: some things are known, other things are not” (1979: 43). My reading is
similar: Irenaeus proposes a differentiation in our human knowledge of physical and spiritual
matters, the terrestrial and celestial.
¹¹⁶ Van Unnik argued that Irenaeus had in mind a “differentiation in our human knowledge
of physical phenomena: some things are known, other things are not” (1979: 43). Fantino offered
a similar statement of Irenaeus’ perspective: “La connaissance humaine est donc partielle. Il y a
bien deux domains de connaissance, l’un consacré aux réalités célestes et spirituelles, l’autre aux
réalités terrestres, mais dans chacun d’eux la connaissance reste partielle” (1994: 76). My reading
is also similar: Irenaeus proposes a differentiation in our human knowledge of physical and
spiritual matters, the terrestrial and celestial.
¹¹⁷ “A côté du programme théologique énoncé plus haut, on pourrait dresser la liste des
reserves et des bornes dépasser qu’Irénée impose à la speculation” (Audet, Traditio 1 1943: 52).
Audet is here referring to AH 2.28.3, where Irenaeus writes: “For example, if someone should ask:
before God made the world, what was he doing? We would say that this answer (to this question)
belongs to God. That this world was made complete by God, receiving a beginning in time, the
Scriptures teach us; however, what God might have done before this no Scripture reveals.
Therefore, this answer belongs to God, and so do not desire to discover the foolish, ignorant,
and blasphemous emissions, and, by supposing that you have found the emission of matter,
reject the very God who made all things.”
¹¹⁸ “Toujours la même norme: ne pas dépasser ce qui est explicite dans la Bible, ne pas
spéculer sur l’implicite ou l’obscur” (Audet, Traditio 1 1943: 52). Audet notes AH 2.28.7 in
support of this statement.
¹¹⁹ “Même sur les passages explicites de l’Ecriture, la raison n’a pas un droit souverain
d’exploitation. Les preuves contenues dans l’Ecriture ne peuvent être démontrées que par
l’Ecriture elle-même” (Audet, Traditio 1 1943: 51–2; noting AH 3.12.9).
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36 God and Christ in Irenaeus

rather simplistic, utilizing ad hominem arguments by way of the dilemma
and counter question.¹²⁰
Grant was the next to write. When later in the same decade he shifted the
discussion to a focus upon Irenaeus’ causal speculation, he notes Audet in
support of his initial depiction of Irenaeus as “stressing the complete adequacy
of scripture and the impiety of looking for solutions of problems not given
there.”¹²¹ Indeed, of the two later authors neither Grant nor Schoedel strays
from the course set by Audet. Both maintain that Irenaeus’ opposition to
reasoned investigation beyond the text of Scripture constitutes a barrier to
theological speculation. It is to their specific arguments concerning Irenaeus’
comments on causal speculation in AH 2.25–8 that I now turn.
Grant’s attention was drawn to a series of questions Irenaeus poses in AH
2.28.2 in order to highlight the inability of human beings to resolve certain
inquiries about the world in which we live, especially those relating to matters
of causality. Grant noticed that the topics invoked by Irenaeus correspond to
headings in the doxography of Pseudo-Plutarch, De placitis philosophorum
(On the Opinions of the Philosophers).¹²² He then judged that in using this
doxography “Irenaeus’ attitude is much like that of the Stoa . . . [who] avoid
inquiring into causes because of their obscurity.”¹²³ An opinion Grant imme-
diately amends, however, by writing: “But Irenaeus inclines toward scepti-
cism . . . With the sceptics he would say that there is no evident criterion of
truth.”¹²⁴
When three years later Grant returned to this topic he reaffirmed
this conclusion, declaring: “The obvious result of the study of such a compen-
dium (the doxography of Aetius as edited by Ps-Plutarch) is complete
scepticism . . . In any event, our earliest witnesses to its use employ it for
sceptical purposes.”¹²⁵ Among these witnesses, he identifies the “case of
Irenaeus” as “perhaps the most interesting because of the sceptical conclusion
he explicitly draws. He is stressing the complete adequacy of scripture and the
impiety of looking for solutions of problems not given there.”¹²⁶ In utilizing
the doxography, “Irenaeus’ method is very simple: he takes the chapter
headings, observes that the authorities cited disagree, and concludes that
certain knowledge is impossible.”¹²⁷

¹²⁰ “Dans le traité d’Irénée, la raison n’a qu’un rôle accessoire de discussion, de refutation . . .
Dans le plan, assez lâche du reste, de l’Adversus Haereses, le deuxième livre est consacré ux
refutations par la raison. Le procédé est plutôt simpliste, arguments ad hominem par voies de
dilemne et de question” (Audet, Traditio 1 1943: 53).
¹²¹ Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 43); referring to Audet, Traditio 1 (1943: 52).
¹²² Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 43–4). In point of fact, F. Feuardent recognized Irenaeus’ reliance on
Ps-Plutarch long before Grant, see: Sancti Irenaei, Lugdunensis episcopi, et matyris, Adversus
Valentini & similium Gnosticorum haereses, libri quinque (Paris, 1639: 204 nn. 5 and 7).
¹²³ Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 46). ¹²⁴ Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 46).
¹²⁵ Grant (1952: 80). ¹²⁶ Grant (1952: 80). ¹²⁷ Grant (1952: 80).
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Prolegomena 37
The key text—the only one to appear in both studies—that Grant cites to
establish this as Irenaeus’ conclusion occurs at the end of AH 2.28.2: In his
omnibus nos quidem loquaces erimus, requirentes causas eorum; qui autem ea
facit solus Deus veridicus est.¹²⁸ Grant provides the same translation in both
studies: “In all these matters we shall not be loquacious in searching for their
causes; God alone who made them is truthful.”¹²⁹
Schoedel first picked up this line of inquiry about seven years later.¹³⁰ His
initial contribution tracked with Grant’s reading closely. Irenaeus, he con-
tends, utilizes doxographical material in AH 2.28.2 to draw the “sceptical
conclusion that there are many scientific matters about which we can know
nothing.”¹³¹ Arguing from the lesser to the greater, Irenaeus contends that one
should not therefore presume to have grasped—as do the Gnostics—“spiritual
matters which are farther beyond us than the things of this world.”¹³² According
to Irenaeus, then, “what Scripture plainly tells us is enough for the Chris-
tian.”¹³³ Schoedel’s one point of departure from Grant is his suggestion that
Irenaeus “goes far beyond the Sceptics in using philosophical doubt as a device
by which to recommend Biblical revelation.”¹³⁴
If Schoedel offered little new at this juncture, he more than made up for it
fifteen years later in a broad-ranging rebuttal to the critical essay of W.C. van
Unnik.¹³⁵ In this, his last word on the subject, Schoedel forged a new
argument in support of the narrative he received from Audet and Grant.
The key text in Irenaeus is no longer the conclusion of AH 2.28.2, prompted
by his doxographical usage, but now AH 2.28.7.¹³⁶ According to Schoedel,
2.28.7 establishes the fundamental epistemological distinction with which
Irenaeus works: it is possible to know that something is so, but not to know
how something is so. For instance, it is possible to say “that” (quoniam) God
produced matter but not “whence” (unde) or “how” (quemadmodum) he did
so. Likewise, one should not investigate the “cause for which” (causam propter

¹²⁸ As I will discuss later, Grant does not provide the Latin, just the translation. The only other
passage from Irenaeus that Grant cites in either of these studies is AH 2.26.3, in “Irenaeus and
Hellenistic Culture” (HTR 42 1949: 46). I discuss AH 2.26.3 toward the end of this section.
¹²⁹ Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 44); Grant (1952: 80). I will address the viability of this translation
later in section 1.2.2.
¹³⁰ Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 22–32).
¹³¹ Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 23); see also pp. 24 and 30.
¹³² Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 23); see p. 30 for the type of argumentation.
¹³³ Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 23). ¹³⁴ Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 24).
¹³⁵ Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 31–49). As mentioned in the introduction to this section, van
Unnik’s critical essay is entitled “Theological Speculation and its Limits,” which he published in a
Festschrift to Grant. As I have already indicated, my argument has much in common with van
Unnik’s, which will receive due attention in the upcoming pages.
¹³⁶ Schoedel insists AH 2.28.7 “must be regarded as the theological climax” of AH 2.25–8 (JTS
35 1984: 31).
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38 God and Christ in Irenaeus

quam) some people no longer submit to their Creator or “of what nature” (cuius
naturae) those people are.¹³⁷
Schoedel found that this endorsement of knowing “that” over knowing
“how,” with knowing “how” addressing questions of causality, parallels two
philosophical positions in antiquity. It corresponds to the position advocates
of Empiric medical theory took against representatives of the Dogmatic
approach,¹³⁸ and it corresponds to the position established by Sceptics against
Dogmatic philosophy in Diogenes Laertius’ account of Pyrrho.¹³⁹ Both the
Empiricists and Sceptics, Schoedel summarizes, “were inclined to deny the
very reality of causes or at least to claim that if causes are real, they are beyond
our knowledge. Irenaeus, then, was not alone in emphasizing the problematic
character of the search for causes.”¹⁴⁰
In this later article, therefore, it is no longer the doxographical engagement
in AH 2.28.2 that drives the association of Irenaeus with Scepticism but rather
the distinction between knowing “that” and knowing “how” in AH 2.28.7.
Indeed, Schoedel’s understanding of AH 2.28.7 now governs his reading of
2.28.2.¹⁴¹ With regard to the created order, we should understand AH 2.28.2 to
mean that the events of nature “have come into our knowledge” while their
causes “are reserved for God.” Likewise, when it comes to the interpretation of

¹³⁷ Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 31–2); the quotations are drawn from AH 2.28.7.
¹³⁸ Against the Dogmatic interest in investigating “how” (πῶς) things came about, which
Galen describes as fussing over causes (ὁ τὰς αἰτίας πολυπραγμονῶν), Empiricists such as Galen
were not concerned with “how each thing becomes systematic knowledge (περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἕκαστον
γίνεται τεχνικὸν) but only that it becomes (ἀλλ’ ὅτι γίνεται μόνον) what we can clearly consider as
agreed upon” [text from R. Walzer (trans.), Galen On Medical Experience (London/New York/
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1944: 113); trans. by Schoedel]. A critic of this approach refers
to Empiricists as “laymen” (ἰδιῶται) who marvel at “what occurs” (τὸ γιγνόμενον) but are
ignorant of “the cause of what occurs” (τοῦ γιγνομένου τὴν αἰτίαν) (Deichgräber 1930: 117,
frag. 35). But, Schoedel contends, this is exactly the approach Irenaeus approves when he writes
that it is better to be “laymen and unlearned” (ἰδιῶται καὶ ὀλιγομαθεῖς) than speciously learned:
“It is therefore better . . . that one should know nothing whatever, not even one cause, as to why a
(single) thing was made of those things which have been made, but should believe in God and
continue in his love” (AH 2.26.1). See: Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 33). I will address Schoedel’s
reading of this passage toward the end of this essay.
¹³⁹ Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 9.102–5. In responding to the charge that
they cannot escape dogmatizing, the Sceptics assert that they suspend judgment about things
that are unclear and confine knowledge to what they experience (Lives 9.103: περὶ τούτων
ἐπέχομεν ὡς ἀδήλων, μόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν). The Sceptics, thus, claim to know the effects
but not the causes: “For we admit that (ὅτι) we see, and we recognize that (ὅτι) we think this or
that, but how (πῶς) we see or how (πῶς) we think we know not” (9.103). Schoedel, moreover,
highlights the use of ἄδηλος in this passage, observing that the term is also used in medical
writings to refer to those hidden processes that the Dogmatists attempt to explain (cf.
Deichgräber 1930: 357). Thus, the Sceptics and Empiricists agreed that such things cannot be
known. See: Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 33–4).
¹⁴⁰ Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 34).
¹⁴¹ Schoedel renders the all-important lines at the end of AH 2.28.2 as, “in all these things we
shall not chatter away seeking their causes” (JTS 35 1984: 34). As with Grant’s translation, I shall
comment on the viability of Schoedel’s shortly.
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Prolegomena 39
Scripture, the contrast is between the assertions of Scripture (that there is one
God who brought forth matter) and speculation about those assertions
(whence or how God brought forth matter).¹⁴²
Schoedel’s reading of AH 2.28.7 enabled him to reaffirm Grant’s reading of
2.28.2 in the face of van Unnik’s critique: Irenaeus regards causal speculation
as inappropriate and impious.¹⁴³ With this reading he also stays on the course
charted by Audet. Indeed, he writes at the outset of his article: “the small
tractate on theological method (Adv. haer. 2.25–8) . . . is remarkable especially
because it discusses in some detail the limits of reason in theology and
significantly restricts the pursuit of metaphysical issues.”¹⁴⁴
The strength of this narrative lies mainly in the discussions of Sceptical
and Empiric thought offered by Grant and Schoedel in order to establish
parallels with passages in Irenaeus. The weakness, on the other hand, is that
neither Audet, Grant, nor Schoedel ever offers a close reading of selections
from AH 2.28.2 and 2.28.7 that takes into account the entirety of Irenaeus’
argument in AH 2.25–8. This weakness constitutes a methodological error
that, as will be seen, undermines the arguments substantiating the narrative,
namely those of Grant and Schoedel. For the failure to give adequate
consideration to Irenaeus’ argument leads both scholars to believe that the
passages upon which they focus correspond to Sceptical and Empiric theory
when in reality they do not.¹⁴⁵

1.2.2. Critique and New Reading

The narrative outlined above presents Irenaeus as authoring an unqualified

denunciation of theological speculation, especially when it comes to questions
of causality. In point of fact, however, Irenaeus never once issues such a
denunciation in the treatise on theological method that occupies AH 2.25–8.
Indeed, his thought in these chapters is of an altogether different nature.
Against the Gnostic presumption of perfect knowledge of celestial (or spirit-
ual) matters,¹⁴⁶ Irenaeus proposes a differentiated knowledge of terrestrial and

¹⁴² Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 35).

¹⁴³ When Schoedel writes that it is unlikely Irenaeus has in mind “merely a distinction
between relatively difficult problems and relatively easy ones in the investigation of nature and
in Scriptural exegesis” (JTS 35 1984: 35), he is arguing against van Unnik’s reading of AH
2.28.2–3 (in 1979: 43).
¹⁴⁴ Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 31).
¹⁴⁵ Fantino comes to the same conclusion by highlighting how Irenaeus differs from Sceptical
and Empiric thought when it comes to the knowledge of causes as well as the basis for the
epistemological limits of human beings (1994: 76–8).
¹⁴⁶ E.g., AH 2.28.9: “If, however, someone who loves conflict becomes an opponent to these
things which have been said by us and these things which have been related by the apostle—that
‘we know in part and prophesy in part’ (1 Cor 13:9)—then he supposes that he had attained, not
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40 God and Christ in Irenaeus

celestial matters, the material and the spiritual. That is to say: some things are
known by human beings, others are not.¹⁴⁷ This differentiation of knowledge
encompasses questions of causation, such that human beings are able to
deduce some causes but not others.
Irenaeus presents this epistemological understanding at the beginning of his
little treatise on theological method, in AH 2.25.2–3, and then again toward
the end, in AH 2.28.2–3. Both passages warrant lengthy quotation. He writes
in the first:
But because various and numerous are those things that have been made, they are
indeed well fitted and adapted to the whole creation; but when considered
individually, are mutually opposite and not harmonious. Just as the sound of
the lyre, by means of the interval that separates each one from the others,
produces one harmonious melody, [but] consists of many and opposite sounds . . .
Truly, those who listen to the melody ought to praise and glorify the artist; to
admire the high pitch of some (notes), to attend to the low pitch of others, to
listen to the middle pitch of still others between them; moreover to consider the
type of some (notes), to what each one refers, and to investigate their cause
(eorum causam inquirere); never changing the rule, nor straying from the Artist,
nor abandoning the faith in the one God who made all things, nor blaspheming
our Creator.
(2.25.3) If, however, anyone does not find the cause of all (those) things which
he is inquiring after (non invenerit causam omnium quae requiruntur), he should
take into consideration that man is infinitely inferior to God (cogitet quia homo
est in infinitum minor Deo), that he has received grace only in part, that he is not
yet equal to or like the Creator; and that he cannot have the experience and
knowledge of all things like God. On the contrary, to the extent that (in quantum)
he who was made but today and received the beginning of his existence is inferior

in part but fully, a complete knowledge of those things which exist. Such a one is like Valentinus,
or Ptolemy, or Basilides, or anyone of them who say that they have themselves inquired into
the depths (altitudinem) of God. He should not boast—decorating himself with vainglory—
that he has discerned more than the rest about those things which are invisible or which
cannot be disclosed; but let him declare to us, thoroughly inquiring into and learning from the
‘Father,’ the causes—which we do not know—of those things which are in this world, such as
the number of hairs on his head and (the number) of sparrows which are daily captured, and
about the rest of which we have not comprehended, so that we may also believe him about the
greater things. If, however, these who are ‘perfect’ do not yet know the very things which are
in their hands and before their feet and in front of their eyes and on the earth and especially
the arrangement of the hairs on their head, how shall we believe them about spiritual and
supercelestial matters and about those things which are above God which they assert with
empty rhetoric.”
¹⁴⁷ As noted in my introductory remarks, van Unnik argued that Irenaeus had in mind a
“differentiation in our human knowledge of physical phenomena: some things are known, other
things are not” (1979: 43). Fantino advanced a similar understanding of Irenaeus’ perspective:
“La connaissance humaine est donc partielle. Il y a bien deux domains de connaissance, l’un
consacré aux réalités célestes et spirituelles, l’autre aux réalités terrestres, mais dans chacun d’eux
la connaissance reste partielle” (1994: 76).
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Prolegomena 41
to him who was not made and who is always the same, to that extent (in tantum)
is he inferior to him who made him with regard to knowledge and to investigating
the causes of all things (secundum scientiam et ad investigandum causas omnium).
For you, O man, are not uncreated, nor did you always coexist with God, as did
his own Word, but because of his preeminent goodness, now, having received the
beginning of your existence, you gradually learn from the Word the economies of
God who made you.¹⁴⁸
It is important to note from the outset that Irenaeus acknowledges and even
encourages investigation into the cause behind the manifold elements of creation.
He does not criticize inquiries into causality, as the previous narrative would have
us expect, but rather stipulates that such investigations should not lead the
inquirer to either cast off their faith in nor blaspheme the one God who created
all things. In fact, Irenaeus’ main interest in raising the matter of causal inquiry is
to offer an explanation for why it is that the causes of some things elude the
investigator—why it is that human beings know some things but not others.¹⁴⁹
His solution lies in the contention that a proportional relationship exists
between ontological status and epistemological capability.¹⁵⁰ To the extent
that created, human beings are inferior to the uncreated, Creator God, to that
extent is human knowledge and the human ability to investigate causes
inferior to God’s own knowledge.¹⁵¹ This, in Irenaeus’ mind, is as it should
be. For just as human nature is characterized by increase and growth so too
should human beings gradually learn from God (namely, the Word) whose
nature and, therefore, knowledge is perfect.¹⁵² But Irenaeus suggests that
nature is not the only factor in this equation, for his reference to the partial
bestowal of grace during this lifetime indicates that from his perspective the
ability to know in this present life is even more encumbered than that of the
next when grace is bestowed in full.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸ AH 2.25.2–3.
¹⁴⁹ The statement, “If, however, anyone does not find the cause of all (those) things which he
is inquiring after,” presumes that some causes are in fact discovered.
¹⁵⁰ Irenaeus’ description of human beings as “infinitely inferior” (in infinitum minor) to God
should not be taken to mean that human beings know nothing at all, for given the proportional
relationship between epistemology and ontology, human beings would then be nothing at all. Its
design, instead, is to emphasize the chasm that separates human and divine knowledge.
¹⁵¹ Likewise, Fantino wrote: “For Sceptics and Empiricists, the limit of human knowledge is
situated in the intelligence of the human being, while for Irenaeus it corresponds to the status of
the creature in relation to his Creator. In the one (first) case it is intrinsic and definitive, in the
other it depends on the relation of the human being to God” (1994: 78).
¹⁵² In Irenaeus’ thought the concept of growth and increase is characteristic of the creature,
distinguishing the creature from the Creator. See: my Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: esp. 38–40
and 173–81), as well as G. Wingren (1959: 32–3, 204, 210); see also the comments on AH 4.11.1–2
by P. Bacq (1978: 94–7, esp. the long n. 2 on 96–7), as well as J. Behr (2000: 37, 116–27).
¹⁵³ On the partial and full bestowal of grace, see esp. AH 5.8.1; for a discussion of Irenaeus’
thought on this matter, see my Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 151, 166–81). Fantino also
recognizes the role of grace in human knowing; see Théologie d’Irénée (1994: 72–3).
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42 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Irenaeus’ thought on these subjects remains consistent throughout AH
2.25–8, as is evident from the second selection mentioned above, AH 2.28.2–3.
Again, a long quotation is necessary in order to fully grasp his argument:
Even if we cannot find solutions for all the things which are sought in the
Scriptures, nevertheless let us not seek after another God beyond him who
exists: for that is the greatest impiety. Moreover, we ought to leave things so
great as these to God who made us, knowing very well that the Scriptures are
indeed perfect, since they were given by the Word of God and his Spirit. We,
moreover, to the degree that we are inferior to and more recent than the Word
of God and his Spirit, to this degree also we lack the knowledge of his
mysteries. And it is not surprising that we endure this (ignorance) with regard
to spiritual and celestial matters and with regard to those things which have to
be revealed, seeing that even among those things which are at our feet—I speak
of those which are a part of this creation, which are touched and seen by us and
are with us—many escape our knowledge and we entrust these very things to
God: for it is fitting that he surpasses all. For what if we try to explain the cause
(causam) of the rise of the Nile? We can certainly say many things, some
perhaps persuasive, others perhaps not (multa quidem dicimus, et fortassis
suasoria, fortassis autem non suasoria); for indeed whatever is true and certain
and firm belongs to God. But even the dwelling place of the birds themselves—
which come to us in springtime but promptly go back in autumn—although it
is in this very world, escapes our knowledge. Again, what can we explain about
the surge and ebb of the ocean, although it is understood to have a certain
cause (certam causam)? Or what can we say about those things which are
beyond it, of what kind are they? What, moreover, can we say about how
the rain, lightning, thunder, the gathering of clouds and fog, and the loosing of
the winds, and similar things are caused (efficiuntur)? Likewise what can we
make known about the storehouses of snow and hail and about those things
which are like them? What about the preparation of the clouds or what about
the nature of the fog? What is the cause (causa est) by which the moon waxes
and wanes, or what is the cause (causa) of the difference among waters, and
metals, and stones, and similar things? On all of these points we will certainly
say much while seeking the causes of them, but the one who causes them, God
alone, is truthful (in his omnibus nos quidem loquaces erimus,requirentes causas
eorum; qui autem ea facit solus Deus veridicus est).
(2.28.3) If, then, even among the things of the created world some are left to
God, but still others come into our knowledge, what harm is there if of those
(questions) which are sought in the Scriptures—writings which are wholly
spiritual—there are some that we resolve by the grace of God but others we
entrust to God, not only in this age but even in the one to come, so that God
should ever teach while man should forever learn from God? As the apostle has
said, when the rest of the partial things have been done away with, these will then
remain: faith, hope, and love (1 Cor 13:9–13).

While the previous selection addressed causal inquiry into questions concern-
ing the terrestrial realm of the created order, this section addresses causal
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Prolegomena 43
inquiry into spiritual and celestial matters, including questions pertaining to
Scripture. As with the first passage, Irenaeus is interested in investigations that
do not arrive at a satisfactory solution. As before, he warns against the impiety
of affirming a god beyond the Creator. And as before, he reasons that the
limited knowledge of divine mysteries available to human beings is in pro-
portion to their inferiority relative to the Word and Holy Spirit.¹⁵⁴
Accordingly, when those investigating divine mysteries “cannot find solu-
tions” to questions, they should be content to “leave things so great as these to
God who made (them).”¹⁵⁵ Indeed, Irenaeus maintains that questions so great
as these will need to be entrusted “to God, not only in this age but even in
the one to come.”¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, he makes it clear in this passage that
the ability to acquire a limited knowledge of divine mysteries means that those
speculating about theological matters will enjoy some success. For just as some
inquiries concerning terrestrial causality may be resolved because the matters
concerned “come into our knowledge,” in the same way some questions
“which are sought in the Scriptures—writings which are wholly spiritual”
may be resolved “by the grace of God.”¹⁵⁷
It is in this context that we find Irenaeus’ appeal to Ps-Plutarch’s doxogra-
phy, and it is in this context that we must understand that appeal. Irenaeus
uses inconclusive doxographical discussions about causal inquiries into ter-
restrial matters to establish the limited knowledge of human beings when it
comes to questions of causality and to emphasize that human beings should
expect even greater limitations when it comes to causal inquiries into spiritual
and celestial matters.¹⁵⁸ Schoedel was correct, then, to state that Irenaeus
utilizes doxographical material to demonstrate “that there are many scientific
matters about which we can know nothing.”¹⁵⁹ But given Irenaeus’ clear
statements that theological investigations can result in a limited knowledge
of causal matters, Schoedel and Grant were incorrect to state that Irenaeus
drew from doxographies the Sceptical or Empirical conclusion that causal
knowledge is impossible.¹⁶⁰
Grant and Schoedel were also incorrect to say the final lines of AH 2.28.2
correspond to this Sceptical and Empirical position. As mentioned above,

¹⁵⁴ AH 2.28.2: “We, moreover, to the degree that we are inferior to and more recent than the
Word of God and his Spirit, to this degree also we lack the knowledge of his mysteries.”
¹⁵⁵ AH 2.28.2. The context of this statement makes it clear that Irenaeus is not declaring that
all questions about causality should be left to God, but just those that cannot be resolved.
¹⁵⁶ AH 2.28.3. ¹⁵⁷ AH 2.28.3.
¹⁵⁸ See van Unnik’s analysis of Irenaeus’ use of ante pedes to establish that human knowledge
is limited (1979: 35–9).
¹⁵⁹ Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 23); see also pp. 24 and 30.
¹⁶⁰ So too Fantino writes, “Irenaeus does not then reject the knowledge of causes, as do the
Empiricists and Sceptics, but remembers the necessarily partial character of our knowledge”
(1994: 77). For the statements of Grant and Schoedel, see Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 46); Grant (1952:
80); Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 23–4, and 30); and Schoedel, JTS 35 (1984: 35).
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44 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Grant renders the relevant text as: “In all these matters we shall not be
loquacious in searching for their causes; God alone who made them is
truthful.”¹⁶¹ He never indicates the Latin text from which he was working.
This is problematic because the critical edition of Irenaeus’ text from Sources
Chrétiennes reads: In his omnibus nos quidem loquaces erimus, requirentes
causas eorum; qui autem ea facit solus Deus veridicus est. The problem is
clear. The Latin lacks the non that should correspond to Grant’s “not” in “we
shall not be loquacious.” It has instead an emphatic nos. Because Grant
did not provide his Latin text it would seem that either he mistakenly read
non for nos or his translation was designed to align the meaning of this
sentence with the sceptical thought he believed Irenaeus to be advancing.
Neither alternative is appealing. Fortunately, Schoedel’s work reveals a third
possibility.
Schoedel offers an even more emphatic translation than Grant’s: “In all
these things we shall not chatter away seeking their causes; only God who
made them is to be believed.” But unlike Grant, Schoedel provides the Latin
text from which he was working. According to Schoedel the Latin for the key
phrase reads, non quidem loquaces erimus requirentes causas eorum.¹⁶² This
text contains a non that justifies Schoedel’s translation and would justify
Grant’s. But that non is, as I have stated, not in the text of Sources Chrétiennes,
nor even noted as a variant in its apparatus. My own research indicates
that the editors of Sources Chrétiennes were correct: non does not appear in
the editions of Erasmus,¹⁶³ Feuardent,¹⁶⁴ Bilius and Feuardent,¹⁶⁵ Grabe,¹⁶⁶
Massuet,¹⁶⁷ Stieren,¹⁶⁸ or Harvey.¹⁶⁹ There is no textual tradition that testifies

¹⁶¹ Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 44); and Grant (1952: 80).

¹⁶² Schoedel gives his translation and text at JTS 35 (1984: 34).
¹⁶³ D. Erasmus (ed.), Opus Eruditissimum, Divi Irenaei episocopi Lugdunensis, in quinque
libros digestum . . . (Basel, 1528: 116B).
¹⁶⁴ F. Feuardent (ed.), Sancti Irenaei, Lugdunensis episcopi, et matyris, Adversus Valentini &
similium Gnosticorum haereses, libri quinque (Paris, 1639: 203B). I am grateful to Christina
Neagu of Christ Church, Oxford for making this volume available to me and also for a delightful
discussion of the library and its holdings.
¹⁶⁵ J. Bilius and F. Feuardent (eds.), Sancti Irenaei, Lugdunensis episcopi & martyris, Adversus
Valentini, & similium Gnosticorum haereses, libri quinque (Paris, 1675: 203B). I am grateful to
Gaye Morgan of All Souls, Oxford for making this volume available to me amidst the tumult of
renovation.
¹⁶⁶ J.E. Grabe (ed.), Sancti Irenaei, episcopi Lugdunensis, Contra omnes haereses libri quinque
(Oxoniae: E. Theatro Sheldoniano, 1702: 147, col. 2, lines 7–8).
¹⁶⁷ R. Massuet (ed.), Sancti Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis et martyris, Detectionis et eversionis
falso cognominatae agnitionis (Paris, 1710/repr. PG 7; Paris: Migne, 1857: col. 805).
¹⁶⁸ A. Stieren (ed.), Sancti Irenaei episcopi lugdunensis Quae supersunt Omnia (Lispiae:
T.O. Weigel, 1853: 1:382).
¹⁶⁹ W.W. Harvey, Sancti Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis libros quinque adversus haereses
(2 vols.; Cantabrigiae, 1857: 1:351).
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Prolegomena 45
to non in this passage. But that is not to say no edition of Irenaeus places non
in this text, for one does, the 1882 edition of Patrologia Graeca, volume 7.¹⁷⁰
The presence of non in the 1882 edition of Patrologia Graeca may at first be
mystifying. After all, non was not in the 1857 edition of Patrologia Graeca in
which Migne reprinted the 1710 edition of Massuet, as noted above. The
mystery may be solved, however, by recalling that Migne’s print shop suffered
a catastrophic fire in the pre-dawn hours of February 12, 1867.¹⁷¹ The fire
melted the lead plates Migne had used to print the Patrologia Graeca and
Latina. This was devastating. But not as devastating as it could have been, for
Migne had nearly finished the complete course of the Patrologia Graeca and
Latina. So, when it came time to resume printing, the previous volumes were
able to serve as templates for almost all of the new volumes. A casual com-
parison of the later editions with the earlier shows the typesetting of the later
editions was indeed patterned upon the earlier.
Where the first edition was used as a paradigm for the second, one would
expect the two editions to be the same. However, and we have now arrived at
my point, they are not. While the 1857 edition of Patrologia Graeca published
by Migne accurately reprints the version of our passage found in Massuet’s
1710 edition, the 1882 edition of Patrologia Graeca published by the Garnier
brothers does not: it substitutes non for nos, thus producing the errant text non
quidem loquaces erimus.¹⁷² It is this errant text that Schoedel must have been
working from, and it is likely the same errant text that underlies Grant’s earlier
translation. It was an errant text, then, that led Grant and Schoedel to
misunderstand the tenor of Irenaeus’ argument in AH 2.28.2 as well as the
nature of his appeal to Ps-Plutarch.
On the other hand, it seems that W.C. van Unnik was working from
an accurate text when he challenged Grant’s interpretation by writing that
Irenaeus “declares we may ‘say a great deal (loquaces) while we search into
their causes.’”¹⁷³ An acceptable rendering of the correct Latin must, as van

¹⁷⁰ Patrologia Graeca 7 (Paris: Apud Garnier Fratres, Editores and J.-P. Migne Successores,
1882: col. 805). I am grateful to my colleague, Jonathan Strom, for calling my attention to the
presence of non in the 1882 PG.
¹⁷¹ Indeed, I was mystified until another colleague, Philip Reynolds, who was present for
Jonathan Strom’s revelation of the text in the 1882 PG, told me about this fire. Those interested
may find an account of the fire and its aftermath in Bloch (1994: esp. 104–10).
¹⁷² It seems that the second edition of Irenaeus is not the only later edition of Patrologia
Graeca to suffer from a higher rate of errors. Mark DelCogliano has observed that the 1886 PG of
Basil of Caesarea is more corrupt than the 1857 edition (DelCogliano, PPS 47 2012: 33). Scholars
should take note that this may be a general problem. If so, the decline in quality may be due to
Migne’s death (in 1875) prior to the publication of the later editions. For this reason it would be
good practice to attribute the 1857 edition of PG to Migne but the later editions to the Garnier
brothers who brought them to publication.
¹⁷³ Van Unnik (1979: 42). Neither van Unnik, nor Schoedel in his response to van Unnik, give
any indication that they realized their conflicting intepretations of AH 2.28.2 were partially based
on their use of conflicting texts.
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46 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Unnik’s does, leave open the possibility that causal inquiries may arrive at a
certain degree of knowledge. Indeed, it should approximate Irenaeus’ state-
ment a few sentences earlier: “We can certainly say many things (in attempts
to explain causes), some perhaps persuasive, others perhaps not (multa qui-
dem dicimus, et fortassis suasoria, fortassis autem non suasoria); for indeed
whatever is true and certain and firm belongs to God.” My translation is very
close to van Unnik’s: “On all of these points we will certainly say much while
seeking the causes of them, but the one who causes them, God alone, is
truthful.”
Van Unnik was not only correct to interpret the final lines of AH 2.28.2 as
he did, he was also correct to conclude that Irenaeus’ “experiment with
doxographical knowledge did not lead to scepticism but to differentiation in
our human knowledge of physical phenomena: some things are known,
others are not.”¹⁷⁴ Even so, his conclusion appears to fall short inasmuch
as it implies that Irenaeus only proposed a differentiated knowledge with
regard to terrestrial matters, “physical phenomena.” At the very least, van
Unnik does not give sufficient attention to the fact that Irenaeus turns to the
doxographial material to support his argument concerning spiritual and
celestial questions.¹⁷⁵ So, while it is true that Irenaeus’ “experiment with
doxographical knowledge” led to a differentiation in “human knowledge
of physical phenomena,” the same must be said about human knowledge of
spiritual and celestial matters, including questions of causality—some things
are known, others are not.¹⁷⁶
Indeed, much of AH 2.28.3–8 is given to illustrating this differentiation of
spiritual and celestial knowledge. Illustrations of what cannot be known
dominate because of Ireneaus’ polemical interest in arguing that entrusting
certain questions to God will keep people from the peril of impious conclu-
sions.¹⁷⁷ Among those causal inquiries that should be left to God, Irenaeus

¹⁷⁴ Van Unnik (1979: 43).

¹⁷⁵ Van Unnik is not as clear as one would like when it comes to stating Irenaeus’ under-
standing of the human ability to know spiritual and celestial causes. He writes, “Let it be
sufficient for the present purpose to state that Irenaeus distinguishes between two levels of
knowledge, namely the spiritual or heavenly and the earthly. In the latter some phenomena can
be known by men and others cannot; about the former, knowledge is found in the clear
statements of Holy Scripture, though there may be difficulties that can either be solved by
starting from what is evident or that must be left in the hands of God” (1979: 43).
¹⁷⁶ As noted above, Fantino offers a similar reading at (1994: 76–7).
¹⁷⁷ E.g., AH 2.28.3: “If then, in accordance with the way that we have spoken, we will entrust
certain questions to God, we shall preserve our faith, and shall remain free from peril, and all
Scripture which has been given to us from God will be found by us (to be) harmonious.” And,
again, AH 2.28.8: “The Father, therefore, has been declared by our Lord as being superior with
respect to knowledge for this reason, so that we too—insofar as we are in the ‘figure of this world’
(1 Cor 7:31)—should concede perfect knowledge and such questions to God, lest by chance,
while seeking to investigate the depths of the Father (Rom 11:33), we fall into so great a danger
that we seek whether beyond God there is another god.”
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Prolegomena 47
lists:¹⁷⁸ what God was doing before the creation of the world;¹⁷⁹ whence or in
what way God produced matter;¹⁸⁰ the cause on account of which certain
people have transgressed and no longer submit to God, while others persevere
in submission to God who made them;¹⁸¹ of what nature are those who
transgress and those who persevere;¹⁸² and the cause of the nature of those
who transgress.¹⁸³
Some of these causal inquiries are introduced by indicating that a related
point can be known. So, for instance, it is possible to know “that God
produced matter” but “whence or in what way he emitted it” should be left
to God. These are the very pairings that led Schoedel to conclude that Irenaeus
believes it is possible to know that something is but not to know how
something is. And it is this conclusion, in turn, that is the basis for his
contention that Irenaeus reserves all causal knowledge for God as well as his
association of Irenaeus with Empiric and Sceptical thought. But both Irenaeus’
broader argument and the more immediate context of these pairings indicate
that the pairings do not serve to establish that no causes can be known but that
some causes cannot be known.
The broader argument, just elucidated, need not be rehearsed in detail.
Suffice it to say that AH 2.25.2–3 and 2.28.2–3 reveal that Irenaeus permitted
causal investigations and affirmed the possibility of acquiring a limited know-
ledge of terrestrial and celestial causality. This being the case, Schoedel’s
reading that these “that/how” pairings indicate that causal matters should be
left to God goes against the general tenor of Irenaeus’ argument. On this basis
alone, his reading should be viewed with circumspection.
But the immediate context of the pairings also stands against Schoedel’s
reading. In the midst of the “that/how” pairings, Irenaeus quotes 1 Cor 12:4
and 13:9 in order to establish the differentiation that characterizes human
knowledge—particularly, given the topics at hand, knowledge of spiritual
matters.¹⁸⁴ He then concludes: “Therefore, inasmuch as we know in part, so

¹⁷⁸ The following list does not include the question that receives the most attention from
Irenaeus: how the generation of the Word-Son by the Father occurred (AH 2.28.4–6). It is often
said that Irenaeus denies to human beings any insight into this matter, but such a simplistic
reading does not accurately represent Irenaeus’ argument. It is true that Irenaeus insists
knowledge of the generation is limited to the Father and Word-Son (AH 2.28.6), but he also
insists that the generation of the Word-Son is atemporal, does not take place according to a
course of production, and does not violate the simplicity of the divine being (e.g., AH 2.13.8,
2.28.4–5). J. Lashier makes many of these points in his recent study of Irenaeus’ Trinitarian
theology, but much remains to be done on this topic (2014: 70–91, 117–48).
¹⁷⁹ AH 2.28.3. ¹⁸⁰ AH 2.28.7. ¹⁸¹ AH 2.28.7. ¹⁸² AH 2.28.7.
¹⁸³ AH 2.28.7.
¹⁸⁴ AH 2.28.7: “yet to us how great ‘are the varieties of knowledge . . . and varieties of
ministries . . . and varieties of activities’ (1 Cor 12:4–6), and on earth, as Paul has also said, ‘For
we know in part and we prophesy in part’ (1 Cor 13:9).”
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48 God and Christ in Irenaeus

also it is necessary to concede all kinds of questions to him who gives to us
grace in part.” The term “all kinds of questions” (universis quaestionibus)
could be understood as excluding causal questions: causal inquiries are those
(kinds of) questions that should be conceded. Such a reading, however, would
miss the connection between this sentence and the sentence at the beginning
of this line of argumentation. Several sections earlier, in AH 2.28.3, Irenaeus
wrote that of those questions sought in the Scriptures, “some . . . we resolve by
the grace of God but others we entrust to God.” The questions Irenaeus has in
mind there, as demonstrated earlier, include causal inquiries into spiritual
matters. His position is that some causal inquiries will enjoy, by the grace of
God, success, resulting in knowledge of causal matters. Other inquiries,
however, should be left to God.
Significant parallels exist between this earlier sentence and the sentence in
the midst of the “that/how” pairings. Both establish the need to leave some
questions to God and both underscore the role of grace in the resolution of
questions. These parallels suggest the second sentence should be understood
in terms of the first. This suggestion is confirmed by the fact that the sentence
in AH 2.28.3 initiates the line of argumentation in which the sentence in AH
2.28.7 occurs. Thus, the second sentence is recalling the first. Therefore, when
Irenaeus writes in AH 2.28.7 that “all kinds of questions” should be conceded
to God, he is not excluding all causal inquiries but rather reminding that some
causal inquiries must be left to God, the implication being that others may be
profitably investigated.¹⁸⁵ As a result, rather than indicating a general disin-
terest in causal investigation, the “that/how” pairings indicate, by way of
illustration, some causal inquiries that should be left to God.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ This reminder should not only recall the statement made in AH 2.28.3 but one made even
earlier in AH 2.25.3: “If, however, anyone does not find the cause of all (those) things which he is
inquiring after, he should take into consideration that man is infinitely inferior to God, that he
has received grace only in part, that he is not yet equal to or like the Creator.” Here too Irenaeus
contends that some causal inquiries should be left to God while underscoring the role of grace in
the successful resolution of causal inquiries. As with AH 2.28.3 and 2.28.7, his point is that some
causal matters can be known, while others cannot.
¹⁸⁶ A statement toward the end of AH 2.28.7 could be read as opposing causal inquiries that
the Scriptures do not answer: “But the cause itself of the nature of those who transgress, neither
has any Scripture related, nor has an apostle told, nor has the Lord taught. It is proper, then, to
leave this knowledge to God, just as the Lord (did with regard to the knowledge) of the hour and
the day (Mt 24:36), and not to endanger ourselves to the extent that we concede nothing to God,
and this when we receive grace (only) in part.” Two points stand against taking this passage as
affirming principled opposition to all such inquiries. First, as already seen, Irenaeus’ repeated
indications that grace is needed to resolve causal inquiries concerning Scriptural matters suggests
that at least some of the inquiries he has in mind do not find a ready answer in the text of
Scripture. Second, when addressing questions concerning the generation of the Word Irenaeus
does not limit himself to the text of Scripture but appeals to a quotation originally from
Xenophanes (e.g., AH 2.28.4), which he recognizes as agreeing with but distinct from Scripture,
in order to argue for a more accurate conception of the divine being. (For more on Irenaeus’ use
of this quotation of Xenophanes, see Chapter 2 of this study.)
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Prolegomena 49
This reading is supported by Irenaeus’ participation in causal speculation
in the very next section. In AH 2.28.8 he wonders about the “cause why the
Father—who has all things in common with the Son—was revealed by the
Lord as alone knowing the hour and the day” of the Son’s return (Mark 13:32;
Mt 24:36). His answer is “that we may learn through him (the Son) that the
Father is above all things.” He then seizes upon the polemical utility of this
causal insight, arguing that the Son’s concession of the Father’s superiority in
knowledge should lead human beings to “concede perfect knowledge and such
questions to God.”¹⁸⁷ The inconsistency of polemically declaring that such a
question should be left to God just after speculating about such questions does
not negate the fact that Irenaeus here pursues and offers a solution to a causal
inquiry concerning Scripture—thus illustrating his understanding that some
causal investigations can be resolved.
To this point, then, I have demonstrated that Irenaeus does not oppose
theological speculation about causality but rather proposes a differentiated
knowledge of terrestrial and celestial causality, such that some things are
known while others are not. I would like to finish this section with a brief
discussion of the theological topics that Irenaeus indicates are open to inves-
tigation, the benefits that attend theological investigation, and the conditions
he places upon such investigations.
Irenaeus offers toward the beginning of AH 2.28.1 a concise statement that
addresses each of these topics:
Having, therefore, the rule itself of truth and the testimony about God having
been placed in the open, we ought not, by the misdirection of questions concern-
ing some things or by confident solutions concerning others, cast out the firm and
true knowledge of God. Instead, however, by guiding the solution of the questions
in this way, it is indeed proper to exercise ourselves by inquiring into the mystery
and economy of God; to be increased in the love of him who has done and is
doing so much on account of us; and, moreover, to never be separated from this
conviction which is most clearly proclaimed that this one alone is truly God and
Father, who has also made this world, formed man, gave growth to his creation,
and calls his own from the least to the greatest who are in his presence.
He begins by establishing that so long as one remains committed to the
doctrine advanced by the Rule of Truth, then it is “proper to exercise ourselves
by inquiring into the mystery and economy (mysterii et dispositionis) of God.”
In so writing he offers his most succinct description of the theological topics
open to investigation. While it is possible to read “mystery and economy” as a
doublet referring to the economic activity of God, Irenaeus’ attention to both
the being and activity of God in Book 2 means that it is more natural to read
them as referring to the mystery of the divine nature on the one hand and the

¹⁸⁷ AH 2.28.7.
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50 God and Christ in Irenaeus

economic activity of God on the other. This being the case, the range of divine
things open to theological investigation is extensive.
The Latin verb used to characterize this theological investigation, exercere
(“to exercise”), is likely a translation of the Greek term ἀσκεῖν.¹⁸⁸ As is well
known, ἀσκέω comes to be used to speak of the exercise or training of soldiers
and athletes and is the verb that lies behind the noun ἄσκησις, which in
religious contexts often carries the basic meaning of “willful, disciplined
religious practice.”¹⁸⁹ In Irenaeus’ mind, then, theological investigation is a
beneficial exercise for Christians to pursue. He does not make his readers wait
long to learn the benefit that accrues by virtue of such exercise: “to be
increased in the love of him who has done and is doing so much on account
of us.” Given this benefit, theological investigation is no frivolous intellectual
pursuit but a practice important to the Christian life.
This does not mean, however, that Irenaeus regards theological inquiry—
especially when concerned with causation—as something to be pursued by all
Christians. He is particularly concerned, as a result of his polemic against
Gnostics and Marcionites, about those causal inquiries that might lead believ-
ers away from faith in the one Creator God. Indeed, these chapters are
peppered with warnings against this peril. The exhortation that appears in
the last lines of the selection above is mild; his strongest declamations occur
toward the beginning of the treatise. In AH 2.26.1, he writes:
It is therefore better and more useful to be unlettered and know very little and
come near to God through love, than, imagining oneself learned and skillful, to be
found among the blasphemers of their own Lord, by fashioning another God the
Father. And for this reason Paul declared, “Knowledge puffs up, but love builds
up” (1 Cor 8:1). Not that he would censure a true knowledge of God, otherwise he
would reprimand himself first, but because he knew that certain ones puffed up
by the pretense of knowledge would fall away from the love of God . . . It is
therefore better, as I have said, that one should know nothing whatever, not
even one cause, as to why a (single) thing was made of those things which have
been made, but should believe in God and continue in his love, than having been
puffed up by knowledge of this kind that one should fall away from the love which
gives life to man. And (it is better) that one should not search after (any) other
knowledge except (that of ) Jesus Christ the Son of God, who was crucified for us,
than through subtle questions and hairsplitting fall into impiety.
Irenaeus leaves no doubt about his stance on the relative value of causal
inquiry. It is better “to be unlettered and know very little” and draw near to
God by love alone, than by intellectual investigation become “puffed up
through knowledge” and fall away from right belief and the love of God.
Causal knowledge is nonessential; love for God and knowledge of Christ and

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Reynders (1954, vol. 6.2: 35).

¹⁸⁹ See, for instance, the excellent study of Fraade (1986: here 256–7).
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Prolegomena 51
his work is essential. In so saying, he is encouraging personal and perhaps even
corporate discernment. Those susceptible to a weakening of their faith or of
their love for God should not engage in theological inquiries that might place
either in jeopardy.¹⁹⁰ Irenaeus emphasizes this warning in the following
sections, AH 2.26.2–3, by means of three illustrations that may best be
classified as cautionary tales. The moral of these stories is found in the
final lines of AH 2.26.3. It is foolish, he writes, to pursue causal inquiry if
such an investigation might lead a person to think of themselves as superior to
God, change (their conception of) God by the “knowledge” they believe they
discovered, or exalt their “own opinion above the greatness of the Creator.”¹⁹¹
The individual who may be susceptible to such errors should refrain from
causal investigation.

1.2.3. Section Conclusion

Rather than opposing causal inquiry Irenaeus proposes in AH 2.25–8 a

differentiated knowledge of terrestrial and celestial matters. This differenti-
ation of knowledge encompasses questions of causation, such that human
beings are able to deduce some causes but not others. Therefore, rather than
speaking only to the perils of causal speculation, the little treatise on theo-
logical method that occupies these chapters also recognizes the possibilities of
causal speculation and, more broadly, theological investigation. W.C. van
Unnik and Jacques Fantino were largely correct.
The previous narrative went far toward justifying the scholarly neglect of
Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being, the Trinitarian relations, and the
person of Christ. This reading, to the contrary, justifies and calls for renewed
attention to each of these elements of Irenaeus’ theology.¹⁹² In so doing it
prepares the way for the next three chapters of this study which investigate in
turn each of these articles of Irenaeus’ theology.

¹⁹⁰ Schoedel found in Irenaeus’ reference to “the simple and unlettered class” another point of
agreement between his thought and the Empiric school (Schoedel, JTS 35 1984: 33). But
Irenaeus’ thought in this pericope conflicts with Empiric theory. As discussed above, he does
not issue an unqualified denunciation of causal inquiry—as would accord with Empiric theory—
but rather warns against the pursuit of causal inquiry by those susceptible to falling away from
the love of God.
¹⁹¹ The realization of these errors would also be a failure to abide by corresponding admon-
itions given by Irenaeus in preceding sections. For such a person would not have recognized the
ontological and epistemological inferiority of created beings to the uncreated Creator (cf. AH
2.25.2); applied the rule of truth, which would have enabled them to preserve right belief in the
one Creator God (cf. AH 2.25.1, 4; 2.26.1); and preserved the proper “order of (their) know-
ledge,” which would have kept them from becoming “puffed up” (cf. AH 2.25.4, 2.26.1).
¹⁹² Lashier addresses Irenaeus’ understanding of the divine being and Trinitarian relations in
his recent study (2014: 70–91, 117–48), but does not provide the justification for his study that
would have come from challenging the readings of Audet, Grant, and Schoedel.
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52 God and Christ in Irenaeus

1.3. NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

The judgment that Irenaeus had little to no interest in philosophical reasoning

has long been an accepted narrative.¹⁹³ At the same time scholars have
observed that aspects of Irenaeus’ thought draw upon philosophical concepts
and reasoning.¹⁹⁴ The points of engagement with ancient philosophy noted by
these studies suggest that Irenaeus was more open to philosophical insights
than usually acknowledged. The question of whether Irenaeus recognized a
natural knowledge of God bears upon the question of his interest in philo-
sophical reasoning because the recognition of a natural knowledge of God
constitutes a logical basis for regarding philosophy as a valid source of
theological insight. For this reason, if Irenaeus affirms a natural knowledge
of God, we should no longer begin with the assumption that he eschews
philosophical thought but rather with the assumption that he regards phil-
osophy as a potential source of theological insight.
Unfortunately, when it comes to the question of whether Irenaeus recog-
nized a natural knowledge of God, more than a century of research has
produced little agreement. The subject received considerable attention between
the third quarter of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth.
While Johannes Kunze did not make clear whether Irenaeus distinguished
between the knowledge of God derived from creation and the revelatory work
of the divine Word,¹⁹⁵ consensus soon seemed to be settled and secure when
Heinrich Ziegler, Albert Dufourcq, F.R. Montgomery Hitchcock, and Jules
Lebreton each maintained that Irenaeus recognized natural knowledge along-
side revealed knowledge.¹⁹⁶ Yet, this consensus was soon challenged by
Louis Escoula, Thomas-Andre Audet, Albert Houssiau, and Juan Ochagavía.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ See n. 4 for bibliographic notes on this reading of Irenaeus.

¹⁹⁴ E.g. Schoedel (1972: 88–108); Schoedel (1979: 75–86); Meijering (1975: 28); Meijering, VC
54 (2000: 1–11, esp. 2–3); and Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 67–106, esp. 78–81). I address Meijering’s
observations at the end of this section, and the work of Schoedel and Barnes in Chapter 2.
¹⁹⁵ Kunze (1891: 51–2).
¹⁹⁶ Ziegler (1871: 157); Dufourq (1905: 91–2); Hitchcock (1914, repr. 2004: 95–105); Lebre-
ton, RSR 16 (1926: 385–406); Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: esp. 527–39); Lebreton and Zeiller (1948,
vol. 2: 50–3).
¹⁹⁷ Escoula argued that Irenaeus has in mind a saving knowledge attained by God’s illumin-
ation of human reason (RevSR 20 1940: 252–70, esp. 255–7). According to Audet, Irenaeus
doubted the ability of human reason. So, while God can be known from creation, that knowledge
comes only by the revelatory work of the Word, who is engaged in the supernatural education of
humanity (Traditio 1 1943: 15–54, esp. 35–9). Houssiau, for his part, identifies natural know-
ledge of God with the revelation of the Word-Son, who, as the divine Logos, is implanted in
minds and is the one in whom reasonable (λογικός) beings participate (ETL 29 1953: 328–54,
here 333–7). Ochagavía’s reading bears a striking similarity to Houssiau’s: the knowledge of God
derived from creation “takes place under the direct and personal influence of the divine Word”
and “deserves truly the name of ‘revelation’ inasmuch as it presupposes an impulse of the
revealing Word on the human mind through the concrete order of providence” (1964: 80, see
also 77–9).
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Prolegomena 53
The pendulum reversed course again two decades later when Antonio Orbe
argued that Irenaeus as well as his Gnostic opponents affirmed the Creator
could be known from creation.¹⁹⁸ In the fifty years since Orbe the question
has, to my knowledge, only been the focus of a long, posthumous note by
Dominic Unger, who argued that Irenaeus recognizes a natural knowledge of
God while at the same time interpreting a key phrase as referring to the divine
Word rather than natural reason.¹⁹⁹
Given the unsettled state of scholarship on this question it is long past time
for a new essay. A new treatment is even more in order because previous
studies did not recognize critical parallels between Irenaeus’ most important
discussion of this matter and Greek philosophical epistemologies. In what
follows, I argue that Irenaeus does indeed recognize a natural knowledge of
God, the product of discursive reasoning about the creation and providence of
God. I shall do so by addressing the interpretive questions surrounding the
passage that has stood at the center of this debate for over seventy-five years,
AH 2.6.1.²⁰⁰ But before I get to those, first the text itself:
How, moreover, were either the angels or the Creator of the world ignorant of the
Supreme God, since they were in his realm, were his creation, and were contained
by him? He could indeed be invisible to them on account of his eminence, but he
could in no way have been unknown (to them) on account of (his) providence.
For though, as they say, they were very much separated from him on account
of their subsequent coming into existence,²⁰¹ nevertheless since his dominion
extends to all, it was necessary for them to know their ruler, and to know this too
that he who created them is the Lord of all. For his invisible essence, since it is
powerful, procures in all a profound mental intuition and perception (magnam
mentis intuitionem et sensibilitatem omnibus praestat) of [his] most powerful,
even omnipotent, eminence. Wherefore, even if “no one knows the Father, except
the Son, nor the Son except the Father, and those to whom the Son may reveal
(them)”²⁰² (Lk 10:22/Mt 11:27), nevertheless all know this one fact—because
reason, implanted in their minds, moves them and reveals it to them (quando

¹⁹⁸ Orbe, Greg 47 (1966: 441–71, 710–47).

¹⁹⁹ Unger (ACW 65 2012: 122–4). The key phrase is ratio mentibus infixa/us, which he
translates as “the Word that is implanted in their minds.”
²⁰⁰ Escoula spends more time on AH 2.6.1 than any other in his argument against finding an
affirmation of a natural knowledge of God in Irenaeus (RevSR 20 1940: 252–8). Audet secured for
it a prominent place in subsequent studies by making an analysis of 2.6.1 the centerpiece of his
denial that Irenaeus affirmed natural knowledge of God while simply dismissing the other texts
Lebreton cites in support (Traditio 1 1943: 35–9).
²⁰¹ On this rendering of per descensionem see Rousseau’s discussion of κατ’ ἐπιγονήν in SC
293 (1982: 218).
²⁰² The object is not given but Rousseau has shown that according to Irenaeus the revelation
of the Son includes the revelation of himself as well as the Father (SC 293 1982: 219 and SC 263
1982: 266–8). In Irenaeus, see esp. AH 4.6.3, 5.
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54 God and Christ in Irenaeus

ratio mentibus infixa/us moveat ea et revelet eis)²⁰³—that there is one God, the
Lord of all.²⁰⁴
Three principal questions have occupied scholars. The first is whether this text
applies only to the knowledge of angelic beings or also addresses the know-
ledge of human beings. Second, if this passage addresses human knowledge,
whether it speaks of a purely natural knowing or a knowing aided by the divine
Word. And third, whether ratio refers to natural reasoning, as I have trans-
lated it, or to the divine Word.²⁰⁵ I shall address these questions in order. For
the sake of convenience and in the interest of not being overly repetitive, my
treatment of the first question will assume the arguments for natural know-
ledge that I make when treating the second and third.

1.3.1. Angelic or Angelic and Human Knowledge?

The question of whether AH 2.6.1 speaks to the knowledge of human or

angelic beings was raised in 1943. In that year Th.-Andre Audet challenged
prior readings, especially that of Jules Lebreton, which understood this passage
as addressing the natural knowledge of God possessed by human beings.²⁰⁶
Audet’s argument featured two contentions. First, that Irenaeus’ comments
pertain to angelic beings alone (“au monde surnaturel des esprits”). And,
second, that the very distinction between natural and supernatural is prema-
ture, such that it is inappropriate to assert Irenaeus affirmed a natural know-
ledge of God.²⁰⁷ Orbe has shown that the second contention cannot be
maintained and no one has attempted to do so since.²⁰⁸ Audet’s first conten-
tion, however, has a basis in the text and merits consideration.
There is no question that Audet was correct to maintain that Irenaeus’
proper subject in this text is the supernatural world of spirits, for the goal of

²⁰³ Orbe is correct to recognize this clause as a parenthetical remark, making quoniam est
unus Deus, omnium Dominus the object of cognosco not revelo (Greg 47 1966: 712–13).
²⁰⁴ AH 2.6.1.
²⁰⁵ Should ratio be taken as referring to the divine Word, an appropriate translation of the
parenthetical remark would be “because the Word, implanted in their minds, moves them and
reveals it to them . . . ”
²⁰⁶ Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 528); Lebreton and Zeiller (1948, vol. 2: 51–2). Among other
scholars Hitchcock, for instance, shared this reading with Lebreton (1914, repr. 2004: 100).
²⁰⁷ Audet, Traditio 1 (1943: 35–9).
²⁰⁸ Ochagavía articulated a similar position to Audet when he questioned the advisability of
speaking of a “supernatural revelation” and “natural knowledge” (1964: 80). Orbe put an end to
this reading by showing that both Gnostics and Irenaeus differentiated knowledge in a manner
equivalent to the modern distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge (Greg 47
1966: see 733–4 for a concise statement). The question was so settled by the time of Unger’s note
that he was largely content to heap ridicule upon Audet’s position, adding only that the
distinction between natural and supernatural orders also occurs in Wisdom and Romans
1 (ACW 65 2012: 122–3).
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Prolegomena 55
Irenaeus’ polemic in AH 2.6.1–3 is to question the Valentinian logic of
characterizing angels and the Demiurge as ignorant of the supreme God.
The rest of his reading is not so sure. Audet argues that because Irenaeus is
addressing a moment in the Gnostic myth prior to creation then the know-
ledge of God possessed by the angelic beings of which he speaks does not
derive from creation.²⁰⁹ Since this angelic knowledge does not derive from
creation, then Irenaeus’ comments cannot pertain to human beings, for whom
the created order is the object of knowledge.²¹⁰ This being the case, Irenaeus’
subsequent appeals to human experience at the end of AH 2.6.1 and through-
out 2.6.2 do not comment on the human situation and are only used to
illustrate the knowledge possessed by angelic beings.²¹¹
Unger challenged this reading some years ago, contending that Irenaeus’
declaration in this passage concerning angelic knowledge “has rightly been
applied as a parallel case to humankind, because if the angels should come to a
knowledge of God through his care of them, then other intelligent beings
should too.”²¹² He supports this reading by stating, “as Irenaeus proceeds, he
speaks of the knowledge of God by all creatures.”²¹³ With this statement Unger
likely has in mind AH 2.6.2, given his subsequent comment that Irenaeus’
“example about the emperor” (which is found in AH 2.6.2) removes all doubt
that Irenaeus is speaking of a natural—as opposed to a revealed or infused—
knowledge of God by human beings.²¹⁴ Beyond this appeal to AH 2.6.2, Unger
provides no substantial treatment of the text in support of his reading. More to
the point, he offers no textual argument against Audet’s opinion that Irenaeus’
comments cannot pertain to human beings because the angelic knowledge of
which he speaks does not derive from creation (as human knowledge would).
A detailed analysis of this aspect of Irenaeus’ argument is, then, still needed.
Irenaeus states in AH 2.6.1 that though the angels “were very much separ-
ated from him on account of their subsequent coming into existence, never-
theless since his dominion extends to all, it was necessary for them to know
their ruler, and to know this too that he who created them is the Lord of all.
For his invisible essence, since it is powerful, procures in all (omnibus) a
profound mental intuition and perception of [his] most powerful, even

²⁰⁹ Audet, Traditio 1 (1943: 35–6).

²¹⁰ Audet, Traditio 1 (1943: 36–8). Audet acknowledges that creation does reveal God but this
revelation is the result of activity of the Word and is part of the supernatural education of human
belongs. Much of his argument is guided by Escoula’s declaration that Irenaeus does not
emphasize the transparency of God to his creatures but rather the incomparable grandeur of
the Creator. The knowledge of God possessed by his creatures, then, always comes through the
revelatory activity of his Word (NRT 66 1939: 551–67, here 559–60). The insufficiency of
Escoula’s account of Irenaeus will become apparent as this section progresses.
²¹¹ This is what Audet means when he writes of Irenaeus resorting to “analogies extrêmes”
(Traditio 1 1943: 35). I shall discuss these analogies shortly.
²¹² Unger, ACW 65 (2012: 122). ²¹³ Unger, ACW 65 (2012: 122).
²¹⁴ Unger, ACW 65 (2012: 122).
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56 God and Christ in Irenaeus

omnipotent, eminence.” When Irenaeus argues in the second of these sentences
that every rational being created by God possesses knowledge of his omnipo-
tent eminence, he transitions from offering specific comments about angelic
beings to comments concerning the entirety (omnis) of the rational created
order.²¹⁵ The sentence that follows these confirms that omnis refers to the
entire rational created order, human and angelic beings, rather than to just the
entirety of the angelic order. There, Irenaeus contrasts the availability of a
personal knowledge of the Father and Son with the availability of this know-
ledge to all: while a personal knowledge of the Father and Son is revealed only
to select human beings, all know that there is one God, Lord of all.²¹⁶ This
contrast holds rhetorical power only if human beings are included on both
sides of the equation—among those few who receive revealed knowledge of the
Father and Son and among all of those who possess natural knowledge of God
as Creator and Lord.²¹⁷
Therefore, the polemical focus of Irenaeus’ argument on angelic knowledge
does not keep this passage from bearing on the natural knowledge of human
beings. Quite the opposite, the very success of his polemical argument con-
cerning the knowledge of angelic beings is founded upon the articulation of a
proposition that holds for the entirety of the rational created order:²¹⁸ in
contrast to a personal knowledge of the Father and Son revealed to some, all
(omnis) rational beings—angelic and human—know there is one God, the
Lord of all.²¹⁹
To corroborate this proposition Irenaeus turns in AH 2.6.2 to human
experience.²²⁰ His citation of the analogy of the great king has garnered the

²¹⁵ Rousseau notes that Irenaeus is not speaking of all created beings but rather all created
beings endowed with reason (SC 293 1982: 219).
²¹⁶ AH 2.6.1: “Wherefore, even if ‘no one knows the Father, except the Son, nor the Son except
the Father, and those to whom the Son may reveal (them)’ [Lk 10:22/Mt 11:27], nevertheless all
know this one fact—because reason, implanted in their minds, moves them and reveals to them—
that there is one God, the Lord of all.”
²¹⁷ Unger also mentions Irenaeus’ quotation of Luke 10:22 in support of interpreting this
passage as speaking of a natural knowledge of human beings (ACW 65 2012: 122), but he does
not explain the function of the quotation in Irenaeus’ argument. I will comment further upon its
function a little later.
²¹⁸ As I noted above, when addressing the concept of hypothesis, Irenaeus’ polemical argu-
mentation and constructive thought should not be separated too strictly. In this passage the
success of Irenaeus’ polemic is founded upon the articulation of a constructive theological
proposition that extends beyond his polemical focus. I am not the first to draw this observation
about Irenaeus’ argumentation. While commenting on the argument of AH 2.1.1, R.A. Norris
observed that Irenaeus “is not dismantling a gnostic position so much as he is back-handedly
asserting or commending his own view of what a real ‘Demiurge’ must be and how such a being
must be related to the created order” (2009: here p. 15).
²¹⁹ Cf. AH 3.24.2–25.1, where Irenaeus makes similar comments about the knowledge of God
that comes by his creative and providential activity.
²²⁰ Contra Audet’s position that Irenaeus’ appeals to human experience in this section offer
no comment on the human situation and are useful only as an illustration of the knowledge
possessed by angelic beings (Traditio 1 1943: 35). Escoula, for his part, argues that Irenaeus is not
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Prolegomena 57
majority of scholarly attention, but in fact the analogy plays a supporting not
the leading role in his argument. Irenaeus’ main point occurs at both the
beginning and end of the section. The human experience of being able to put
to flight evil spirits and demons by invoking the name of the Most High, the
Almighty, apart from the revelation of Christ demonstrates that those angelic
beings know that “he is the God who is above all things.”²²¹ Irenaeus’ argu-
ment is simple: submission indicates knowledge of a higher power. And
the submission of evil angelic beings to the name of God substantiates his
proposition that all rational beings know the power of the Creator God, the
Lord of all.²²²
His reference to the analogy of the Roman emperor is designed to further
support his attribution of this knowledge of God to these angelic beings.²²³ Just
as those who live under the rule of the Roman emperor—though they have
never seen him and are far from him—know who it is that holds the supreme
power in the state, so too do angelic beings know the Almighty God by their
experience of his rule. While the immediate purpose of this analogy is to
validate his attribution of knowledge to angelic beings, according to the
structure of Irenaeus’ argument the human beings under the rule of the
Roman emperor are analogous to “every creature, Principality, Authority,
and every Power” under the rule of God, not just the evil angelic beings put
to flight by the name of God. The support this analogy lends to the knowledge
of angelic beings should not, then, distract the reader from the broader
support it lends to his affirmation that all rational beings know God.
Audet was, then, mistaken to read AH 2.6.1–2 as bearing upon the know-
ledge of angelic beings alone. Irenaeus’ polemical focus, it is true, centers upon
the knowledge of God available to angelic beings. But his very argument rests
upon the proposition that all rational beings, angelic and human included,
know the Creator God as Lord. A proposition he supports by reference to

speaking in AH 2.6.2 of a natural knowledge of God but of a properly religious knowledge. He

bases this reading on Irenaeus’ statement at the beginning of the section that this knowledge
enabled human beings to be saved from wicked spirits and demons when they called out to God
(RevSR 20 1940: 255–6). There is a difference, however, between identifying the religious efficacy
of knowledge and identifying that knowledge as being revealed. Irenaeus is here speaking of the
religious efficacy of natural knowledge.
²²¹ It is possible that Irenaeus is speaking here of Jewish practice, which he explicitly identifies
at the end of AH 2.6.2, but certainty is not possible.
²²² Though Irenaeus’ main line of argumentation concerns the knowledge of God indicated
by the submission of angelic beings, the knowledge required for human beings to even invoke the
name of God should not be overlooked.
²²³ It was commonplace in antiquity to illustrate the knowledge of God from his rule
by reference to the knowledge of a great king that comes from his rule. See, for instance,
Ps-Aristotle, On the Cosmos (De mundo) 5–6, found in Aristotle 396a33–401a12; for a concise
parallel to Irenaeus’ discussion see 399b19–23. Orbe provides an excellent bibliography on this
analogy in Greg 47 (1966: 467 n. 45).
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58 God and Christ in Irenaeus

human experience, including the oft-noted analogy of living under the rule of
the Roman emperor.

1.3.2. Natural Knowing or Knowing Aided by God?

The second interpretive question concerns whether the knowledge of God

attributed to angelic and human beings is the result of natural reason or reason
aided by God. Past arguments have focused upon two clauses later in AH 2.6.1:
magnam mentis intuitionem et sensibilitatem praestat (“procures in all a
profound mental intuition and perception”) and ratio mentibus infixa moveat
ea et revelet eis (“reason, implanted in their minds, moves them and reveals to
them”), with the first used as an interpretive lens for the second. Because AH
2.6.1 contains a sequentially constructed argument, a proper understanding of
these clauses requires a sound understanding of what comes before. For this
reason an even more detailed analysis of the progression of Irenaeus’ argu-
ment is necessary.
Irenaeus begins his argument against the belief of his Gnostic opponents
that angels and the Demiurge are ignorant of the supreme God by introducing
the epistemological significance of the providence of God: “he (the Supreme
God) could in no way have been unknown (to them) on account of his
providence.” The experience of living under the rule of God, Irenaeus con-
tends, yields a certain understanding or knowledge of the God who rules.²²⁴
This being said, Irenaeus anticipates an objection from his opponents: God is
too far removed from the created order to be known through providence.²²⁵
He responds not by challenging the transcendence of God but the notion
that God’s transcendence precludes knowledge of him: “since his dominion
extends to all, it was necessary to know their ruler, and to know this too that he
who created them is the Lord of all.”
This response constitutes the second movement of his argument, which is
essentially an explanatory gloss of the introductory statement that advances
his line of thought. It begins by establishing knowledge of the providential God
(“their ruler”) as a corollary of God’s dominion, making the dominion of God
the ultimate ground for this knowledge. Irenaeus then identifies what can be
known about God on account of his providential rule: that the Creator God is
Lord of all. A variation of this statement appears in the final line of this
section.²²⁶ There, Irenaeus writes that all are able to know that “there is one

²²⁴ As seen in the discussion of the first interpretive question, this point carries all the way
through the illustrations from human experience in AH 2.6.2.
²²⁵ “ . . . [I]t is true, as they declare, that they were very far separated from Him through their
inferiority [of nature].”
²²⁶ Several scholars maintain that Irenaeus does not speak of natural knowledge in this final
line. I disagree with their readings and will address their arguments in the following pages.
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Prolegomena 59
God, Lord of all.”²²⁷ It is not clear if these statements comprise the sum total of
knowledge Irenaeus believed to be accessible as a result of considering God’s
providential rule. The fact that the two statements differ may suggest they
should not be so regarded. On the other hand, there is little difference between
them and they do closely match the important discussion of natural know-
ledge that occurs in AH 3.25.1. It is clear, at least, that human reasoning
cannot deduce from the experience of God’s providential rule a personal
knowledge of God, that having to do with the identity of the divine persons,
for Irenaeus will soon insist this level of knowledge can only be revealed.²²⁸
To this point in his argument there is no reason to think that Irenaeus is
speaking of anything other than discursive reasoning that deduces a certain
understanding of God from the experience of his providential rule. That is to
say, Irenaeus seems to be speaking of a purely natural knowledge. As men-
tioned above, however, the main interpretive questions concern two clauses
found in the latter half of AH 2.6.1, where we find the third and fourth
movements of Irenaeus’ argument.
The third movement follows immediately after the second: “For his invisible
essence, since it is powerful, procures in all a profound mental intuition and
perception (magnam mentis intuitionem et sensibilitatem praestat) of [his] most
powerful, even omnipotent, eminence.” With these words Irenaeus continues to
address the epistemological problem of God’s transcendence—here expressed in
terms of invisibility, which bears the corollary of unknowability—that was
raised in the form of an anticipated question prior to the second movement.
The second movement grounded knowledge of the Creator God as Lord on his
dominion. Founding it now on the powerful invisible essence of God represents
an advance in his argument, for God’s knowability is not just based on an
activity but now also on the very nature of his being. Still yet the largest advance
and the aspect of the third movement that has received the most attention is
Irenaeus’ statement that God in some way “procures in all a profound intuition
and perception” (magnam mentis intuitionem et sensibilitatem praestat) of his
eminence.
Proper interpretation of this clause is complex because one must grapple
with the meaning of the words magnam mentis intuitionem et sensibilitatem
along with the meaning of praesto. I shall consider praesto first. Escoula

²²⁷ The addition of the qualifier “one” (unus) aids Irenaeus’ polemic, for if it is possible to
deduce from the created order that there is only one God then there is no excuse for the belief
of his Gnostic opponents in another God besides the Creator. Such an argument, or a version
of it, would also be effective against Marcionites but they are not the focus of Irenaeus’
attention here.
²²⁸ AH 2.6.1: “Wherefore, even if ‘no one knows the Father, except the Son, nor the Son except
the Father, and those to whom the Son may reveal (them)’ (Lk 10:22/Mt 11:27), nevertheless all
know this one fact—because reason, implanted in their minds, moves them and reveals it to
them—that there is one God, the Lord of all.”
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60 God and Christ in Irenaeus

translated this clause as “communique à tous une vive intuition de l’esprit et le
sentiment.”²²⁹ His determination that praestat should be translated as “com-
municates” is the primary basis for his belief that Irenaeus has in mind a
“reason illuminated” by God, which is precisely how Escoula interprets ratio
in a clause found in the next sentence: ratio mentibus infixa moveat ea et
revelet eis (“reason, implanted in their minds, moves them and reveals it to
them”).²³⁰ But I am not convinced that Irenaeus is speaking of a knowing
aided by God, a special activity by which God grants knowledge of himself to
his creatures. Indeed, two points suggest otherwise.
First, the place of this statement in Irenaeus’ argument weighs against such
a reading. The third movement of his argument, to which praesto belongs, not
only advances the argument but also supports the previous movement. So
much is clear from the presence of the conjugation enim (“for”) at the
beginning (invisibile enim eius) of the sentence which constitutes the third
movement. Since the first two movements speak of a discursive reasoning that
deduces an understanding of God from the experience of his providential rule,
then one would expect praesto to denote an activity that accords with and
supports a natural knowledge of God.
Second, the grammatical objects (magnam mentis intuitionem et sensibili-
tatem) of the term praesto suggest that Irenaeus is speaking of discursive
reasoning, and thus, natural knowledge. Because the Latin terms intuitionem
and sensibilitatem are indistinct it is important to begin any consideration of
these terms by determining the Greek substrate for each. Audet called such an
attempt a hazardous undertaking,²³¹ but Rousseau did not seem to believe the
task was so fraught when he ably suggested the original was μεγάλην ἔννοιάν τε
καὶ αἴσθησιν.²³² I suspect that much of the hazard attending Audet’s attempt
arose from his desire to understand the terms within the context of Gnostic
thought when they more likely come from the domain of philosophical
epistemology. The words ἔννοια and αἴσθησις, as well as terms corresponding
to them, featured prominently in cotemporaneous epistemological debates.
Indeed, epistemology itself—as the category into which dialectic fell—grew
in importance during this time as discussions concerning “the mechanics of
making a judgment . . . [became] in Hellenistic philosophy generally, the

²²⁹ Escoula, RevSR 20 (1940: 257).

²³⁰ Escoula speaks of a “reason éclairée d’en-Haut” (RevSR 20 1940: 257). Orbe observed
long ago that the texts cited in Escoula’s notes do not substantiate his reading of ratio (Greg 47
1966: 713 n. 74), but, more importantly, neither the does the text of AH 2.6.1–2. Above,
I challenge the support for this reading that he derives from praesto. Here I will note that
Escoula also supports his reading of ratio as “illuminated reason” by arguing the term denotes
a “properly religious” or “salutary knowledge” rather than natural knowledge (RevSR 20 1940:
esp. 255–6). But Irenaeus’ ascription of this knowledge to evil spirits in AH 2.6.2 renders this
contention absurd.
²³¹ Audet, Traditio 1 (1943: 35 n. 104). ²³² Rousseau, SC 293 (1982: 218).
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Prolegomena 61
accepted preliminary to any systematic exposition of logical theory.”²³³ An
example of the use of these terms can be seen in Didaskalikos 4.
In this text Alcinous identifies reason as the instrument (ὄργανον) of
judgment “by means of which (δι’ οὗ) the truth is judged” (4.154.20–1).²³⁴
He then proceeds to divide human reasoning (λόγος) into the categories of
ἐπιστημονικός (scientific reason) and δόξαστικός (opinion-based reason),²³⁵
which are concerned with νοητά (objects of intellection) and αἰσθητά (objects
of sensation), respectively (4.154.27–9). The process by which the soul per-
ceives αἰσθητά is called αἴσθησις (sense-perception) (4.154.34–7). The activity
of the intellect (νοῦς) as it contemplates νοητά is differentiated terminologic-
ally to distinguish between the contemplation of primary νοητά prior to the
soul’s embodiment, which is called νόησις (intellection), and its contemplation
of secondary νοητά subsequent to its embodiment, which is called φυσικὴ
ἔννοια (natural conception) (4.155.20–32). The primary νοητά are the tran-
scendent forms or Ideas; the secondary νοητά are the forms immanent in
matter (4.155.39–42).²³⁶ Thus, in the Didaskalikos we have a second century
text in which αἴσθησις and ἔννοια are central terms in an explanation of the
cognitive process by which the embodied soul forms judgments about its
experiences in this world.²³⁷
One can hardly determine from a passage so brief and nondescript as AH
2.6.1 what sources Irenaeus was reading. Nor can one draw a conclusion about
the significance of ἔννοια and αἴσθησις to Irenaeus’ epistemology by a simple
study of the terms themselves, for these words and related terms were used by
a variety of philosophical systems.²³⁸ Therefore, it is impossible to determine

²³³ J. Dillon (trans. and annot.), Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism (Clarendon Later
Ancient Philosophers; ed. J. Barnes and A.A. Long; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993: 61).
²³⁴ Unless otherwise noted, quotations are from Dillon’s translation (1993). The text is from
J. Whittaker (ed.), Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines (trans. P. Louis; Collection de Univer-
sités de France; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1990).
²³⁵ The distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα is Platonic but the use of adjectival forms to
modify λόγος is not. The adjectival forms bear some similarity to Sextus Empiricus’ accounts of
Speusippus and Xenocrates (adv. Math. 7.145–9), but dissimilarities preclude a close connection
to either. Thus, Dillon characterizes the uses of the terms here as “a sort of boiled-down basic
Platonism, owing nothing specific to any individual Platonist,” and compares it to Plutarch, An.
Proc. 1023f–1024a (Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook 1993: 63–4).
²³⁶ For succinct discussions of νόησις and φυσικὴ ἔννοια as well as the primary and secondary
νοητά, see Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook (1993: 66–70); and the seminal and enduring article
by Lloyd, Phronesis 1 (1955: 58–72, esp. 59–64).
²³⁷ Dillon locates the Didaskalikos in the middle of the second century. He gives Plutarch as
the terminus post quem and Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias as the termini ante quem;
suggesting Apuleius, Albinus, Atticus, Numenius, Aspasius, and Maximus of Tyre as approxi-
mate contemporaries (Alcinous: The Handbook 1993: xiii).
²³⁸ For instance, the use of the terms in Didaskalikos 4 draws upon or is influenced by
Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic traditions (Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook 1993: 61–73;
Lloyd, Phronesis 1 1955: 59–64). See also A.A. Long, who notes that many terms belonging to
particular theories of knowledge became common property of all philosophers, making it nearly
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62 God and Christ in Irenaeus

the precise meaning and full significance of these terms in AH 2.6.1. Never-
theless, it seems safe to say that their presence in an argument treating human
judgments concerning experiences of this world indicates that Irenaeus is
drawing upon—even in a vague and imprecise way—epistemological discus-
sions taking place in the philosophical circles of his day. It also seems safe to
say that the presence of these terms indicates that Irenaeus is speaking in this
sentence of a discursive reasoning that deduces a certain understanding of
God from the experience of his providential rule. That is to say, he is speaking
of a purely natural knowledge of God.
But one final question surrounding the proper interpretation of praesto
must still be resolved. I have argued that praesto should be interpreted in a way
that supports Irenaeus’ argument for a natural knowledge of God, but I have
yet to suggest such an interpretation. The challenge is that the idea of God
procuring (praesto) a certain understanding of himself seems to be at odds
with Irenaeus’ argument that human and angelic beings can arrive at an
understanding of God apart from his aid. A later passage, however, suggests
a possible resolution to this apparent conflict. In AH 3.25.1 Irenaeus writes:
God does, however, exercise providence over all things . . . It is unavoidable, then,
that those who are watched over and governed should know their ruler; (those)
which are neither irrational nor vain, but have understanding derived (habent
sensibilitatem perceptam) from the providence of God. And for this reason certain
pagans . . . having been moved by his providence, even if only slightly (providentia
eius moti licet tenuiter), were nevertheless convinced that they should call the
Maker of this universe the Father, who exercises providence over all things, and
disposes the affairs of our world.
The reasoning in this selection closely parallels that found in AH 2.6.1. Human
beings, Irenaeus says here, are able to derive a certain understanding of the
Creator God from their experience of living under his providential rule. Of
particular relevance to the present moment in this study is the phrase “having
been moved by his providence” (providentia eius moti). This phrase seems to
be just another way of expressing the statement in the previous sentence that
human beings derive (percipio) knowledge of God from his providential
activity. But what is significant for our purposes is the particular mode of
expression used: Irenaeus casts God’s providence as engendering this know-
ledge in human beings. This idea that God’s providence moves (moveo)
human beings to know him is nearly identical to the idea in AH 2.6.1 that
God procures (praesto) a natural knowledge of himself. Indeed, I suggest that
this is precisely how we should interpret the praesto clause. According to this
reading, then, Irenaeus is saying in AH 2.6.1 that because the powerful,

impossible to identify a particular writer’s epistemological orientation from a simple study of

terms used (1988: esp. 181–3).
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Prolegomena 63
invisible God acts providentially, human beings can derive by discursive
reasoning a certain understanding of that God.
Going one step farther, it is likely that this mode of expression is ultimately
grounded in Irenaeus’ understanding of the revelatory role of the second
person, the Word-Son. Perhaps the most important passage that discusses
this subject is AH 4.6.6–7. There, Irenaeus states that the Son administers
(administro) all things for the Father and “without him no one can know
God.”²³⁹ The particular context of this statement is the personal revelation of
the Father by the Son, but the propositional nature of this statement indicates
that it applies more broadly. The notion that all knowledge of God is derived
from the activity of the Son suggests that the ministrations of the Son on behalf
of the Father include the creative activity and providential rule of the world
by which rational beings come to know the Creator God as Lord. This reading
is encouraged by the opening lines of the previous paragraph, wherein
Irenaeus states that the Word reveals the Creator God “by means of creation
itself.”²⁴⁰ The creative act is itself revelatory, insofar as the created order, as the
object of reasoned reflection, provides a way for human beings to arrive at a
limited knowledge of God.²⁴¹ This mirrors what Irenaeus says about divine
providence in AH 2.6.1. This being the case, the natural knowledge of God
attainable by human beings is ultimately predicated on the creative
and providential activity of the Word-Son. This, it seems, is the theological
position at the bottom of Irenaeus’ use of the terms praesto in AH 2.6.1 and
moveo in 3.25.1. Therefore, praesto should not be interpreted as indicating
the aid of God when it comes to knowing him, but as denoting the
creative and providential activity of the invisible God, which make possible a
natural knowledge of God because their products are objects of discursive
reasoning.

1.3.3. Ratio: Natural Reasoning or the Divine Word?

The question of whether the term ratio refers to natural reasoning or to the
divine Word has received more attention than any other interpretive issue
concerning AH 2.6.1. The term appears in the last sentence, the fourth and
final movement, of the section. Irenaeus writes: “Wherefore, even if ‘no one
knows the Father, except the Son, nor the Son except the Father, and those to
whom the Son may reveal (them)’ (Lk 10:22/Mt 11:27), nevertheless all know
this one fact—because reason, implanted in their minds, moves them and
reveals it to them (quando ratio mentibus infixa [infixus] moveat ea et revelet

²³⁹ AH 4.6.7. ²⁴⁰ AH 4.6.6.

²⁴¹ Houssiau writes: “la connaissance de Dieu par la providence est en effet révélation (revelet)
par le Fils-Verbe, qui exerce cette providence” (ETL 29 1953: 335).
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64 God and Christ in Irenaeus

eis)—that there is one God, the Lord of all.”²⁴² Three different meanings have
been proposed for ratio: reason illuminated by God,²⁴³ the divine Word,²⁴⁴
and natural reason.²⁴⁵ I discussed the first meaning in the last section, for it
is a corollary of Escoula’s interpretation of praesto. In what follows I shall
explain why I am not persuaded by the arguments for interpreting ratio as
the divine Word. I shall then conclude with my reasons for interpreting ratio
as natural reason.
Interpreting ratio as the divine Word has the support of Houssiau, Ocha-
gavía, and Rousseau.²⁴⁶ Their arguments focus on two aspects of the text: the
presence of the Gospel quotation (Lk 10:22/Mt 11:27) and the existence of
the variant ratio mentibus infixus (as opposed to ratio mentibus infixa). The
Gospel quotation features in the arguments of Ochagavía and Rousseau.
Ochagavía maintains that if ratio indicates human reason, then it is difficult
to explain the presence of a Gospel quotation speaking of special revelation.²⁴⁷
As mentioned in the first section, however, such an explanation is not in fact
so difficult to come by. The Gospel quotation allows Irenaeus to contrast the
personal knowledge of the Father and Son that comes by special revelation to a
few with the natural knowledge of the Creator God as Lord that comes by
discursive reasoning to all. This contrast enhances Irenaeus’ argument by
providing a way for him to emphasize the universality of natural knowledge.
Ultimately, Ochagavía errs by thinking the only way the Gospel quotation
could complement the second half of the sentence is to offer textual support
for it. Rousseau makes a similar mistake when he interprets the second half
of the sentence as a commentary on the Gospel quotation in the first. Though
it is true that the words “ratio . . . revelet” in the second half of the sentence echo
the words “Filius revelaverit” in the Gospel quotation (and this alone explains
the unusual pairing of revelo with ratio), it does not follow that these two

²⁴² As I will soon discuss at length, some manuscripts contain the variant infixus instead of infixa.
²⁴³ Escoula, RevSR 20 (1940: esp. 254–8). Like Escoula, Ochagavía believes that according to
Irenaeus the “knowledge of God achieved through the contemplation of the universe cannot be
dissociated from the personal revealing activity of the divine Word” (1964: 77). In contrast to
Escoula, however, Ochagavía’s understanding is founded upon his interpretation of ratio as the
divine Word. I have, therefore, reserved his argument for the following discussion.
²⁴⁴ Houssiau, ETL 29 (1953: esp. 333–5 and 340–5); Ochagavía (1964: 77–9); and Rousseau,
SC 293 (1982: 220).
²⁴⁵ Hitchcock (1914, repr. 2004: 100); Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 528); Lebreton and Zeiller (1948,
vol. 2: 51–2); and Orbe, Greg 47 (1966: esp. 713–17).
²⁴⁶ See n. 244 for the bibliographic citations for Houssiau, Ochagavía, and Rousseau. Unger
renders ratio as “Word” while also arguing that Irenaeus affirms a natural knowledge of God.
The last lines of his lengthy note on the topic suggest he may have interpreted ratio mentibus
infixus moveat ea et revelet eis as indicating a revelatory knowledge that comes from the Word
through the act of creation, but he is not as clear as one would like (ACW 65 2012: 122–4).
²⁴⁷ “Really, if we translate ratio by ‘human reason’ it is hard to explain why Irenaeus does
bring in the quotation from Luke: a knowledge of God achieved by human reason does not seem
to demand any special revelation like the one mentioned in the text of Luke” (Ochagavía
[1964: 79]).
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Prolegomena 65
clauses must mean the same thing.²⁴⁸ It is just as possible, and indeed I believe
it is the case, that the echo is a rhetorical ploy designed to link the two halves of
the sentence in order to better effect the contrast between the limited revela-
tion of the Son and the unlimited “revelation” of natural reason.
Second, the existence of the variant, ratio mentibus infixus, has also motiv-
ated interpretations of ratio as the divine Word. While the Arundel manu-
script and Erasmus edition have the proper grammatical construction ratio
mentibus infixa (“reason implanted in their minds”), in which the inflection of
infixa agrees with that of ratio, the Clermont and Voss manuscripts read ratio
mentibus infixus.²⁴⁹ Both Ochagavía and Houssiau have found in this variant
reasons to support understanding ratio as the divine Word.²⁵⁰ Ochagavía
argues that the existence of this variant, with the masculine inflection of
infixus, means that ratio must “stand for λόγος,” interpreted as the divine
Word.²⁵¹ But Ochagavía’s contention that the masculine infixus supports a
Greek substrate of λόγος more than it would be supported by the feminine
infixa makes no sense,²⁵² neither does his belief that the mere identification of
λόγος as the substrate of ratio supports the interpretation of ratio as the divine
Word. The question is not what the differing inflections (infixa and infixus)
tell us about the originality of λόγος, which must in either case be the substrate
of ratio, but what the differing inflections tell us about how a Latin translator
or editor interpreted λόγος.
Assuming the original Greek was λόγος τοῖς νοῖς ἔμφυτος, as just noted, the
grammatically correct translation ratio mentibus infixa tells us nothing about
how the Latin translator understood λόγος, for the inflection of infixa simply
corresponds to that of ratio regardless of whether ratio is understood to mean
the divine Word or natural reason. The variant ratio mentibus infixus is
another matter altogether. The grammatically incorrect construction of this
phrase indicates the translator or editor determined the feminine inflection,

²⁴⁸ Rousseau writes, “il saute aux yeux que les mots ‘ . . . Ratio . . . revelet’ font echo aux
mots ‘ . . . Filius revelaverit.’ C’est donc, sans, conteste, du Verbe qu’il s’agit ici” (SC 293
1982: 220).
²⁴⁹ The variations seem to reflect different manuscript families. The masculine construction
appears in the Clermont and Voss manuscripts, which constitute one family, while the feminine
construction appears in the second family, which includes the Arundel, Salamanca, and the four
Vatican manuscripts. The Salamanca and Vatican manuscripts list infixas—feminine plural. For
a concise discussion of the manuscript history of AH, see Unger, ACW 55 (1992: 11–14).
²⁵⁰ Rousseau also sees this variant as indicating ratio should be interpreted as the divine
Word, but his argument largely follows that of Houssiau (SC 293 1982: 220).
²⁵¹ “Besides the codex Claramontanus has ratio . . . infixus, which makes even more plausible
the interpretation here proposed because it shows, through the masculine ending of the parti-
ciple, that ratio stands for λόγος” (Ochagavía 1964: 79; his argument begins on p. 78).
²⁵² If the original Greek was λόγος τοῖς νοῖς ἔμφυτος, as Houssiau has suggested (ETL 29 1953:
335), then the grammatically correct Latin translation would be ratio mentibus infixa because, as
with the proposed Greek substrate, the inflection of the participial ending agrees with the word it
modifies (ratio).
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66 God and Christ in Irenaeus

infixa, was inappropriate—a determination that is hardly explicable if he had
understood λόγος to mean human reason. He must then have understood λόγος
to mean the divine Word.²⁵³ Therefore, at least one translator or editor inter-
preted λόγος as having the divine Word as its referent and took the extraordinary
step of constructing a grammatically incorrect Latin phrase in order to convey
this understanding of ratio to subsequent readers. This is all very well, but it is
not determinative because it tells us nothing about Irenaeus’ own thinking.
The existence of the variant seems to have also provided the initial impetus
for Houssiau’s reading of ratio as the divine Word. Houssiau contends that the
phrase ratio mentibus infixus speaks of the implantation of the divine Logos in
the minds of rational beings, beings whose very rationality is in fact the result
of their participation in the Logos. Irenaeus, he believes, is saying much the
same thing as Justin Martyr, who states that seeds of the Logos are implanted
in all human beings.²⁵⁴ And, Houssiau maintains, Irenaeus is saying it for the
same reason: both are appropriating Stoic thought.²⁵⁵ Even the grammatical
constructs they use to express themselves are similar. Justin writes of the
“implanted seed of the Logos” (τò ἔμφυτον τοῦ λόγου σπέρμα), while Irenaeus
writes of “the Logos implanted in our minds,” for which Houssiau proposes
the original substrate of λόγος τοῖς νοῖς ἔμφυτος.
Houssiau’s reading is clever, but ultimately not persuasive. Unlike Justin,
who speaks of the Logos spermatikos in several places, no other texts in
Irenaeus affirm the implantation of the divine Logos in the minds of rational
beings.²⁵⁶ This should not come as a surprise, for the adoption of this Stoic

²⁵³ Though his attempt must be regarded as a failure, this was the argument Ochagavía was
trying to make (1964: 78–9). The masculine inflection could reflect the gender of λόγος out of
respect for its use as the name of the second person, or it could indicate the translator’s
understanding of the sex of the divine Word, incarnate or not. The particular reasoning is not
important for our present purposes.
²⁵⁴ Houssiau, ETL 29 (1953: esp. 335–7).
²⁵⁵ Ochagavía follows Houssiau in reading ratio infixus as drawing upon Stoic thought (1964:
77–9). For a detailed study arguing this aspect of Justin’s thought is Stoic, see Holte, ST 12 (1958:
109–68, esp. 133–6); for a critical appraisal of this reading and an alternative interpretation of
Justin’s understanding of Logos, see Edwards, JECS 3 (1995: 261–80).
²⁵⁶ Houssiau appeals to AH 4.4.3 and 4.6.1–7.4 for support (ETL 29 1953: 335, 337–44;
Rousseau follows Houssiau in appealing to AH 4.6.5–7, see SC 293 1982: 220). However, AH
4.4.3 states that human beings are like God on account of their rationality; it has nothing to do
with founding human rationality on participation with the divine Logos implanted in the human
mind. In AH 4.6.1–7.4, as mentioned above, Irenaeus establishes that all knowledge of God
comes through the agency of the Word-Son. The closest this passage comes to supporting
Houssiau’s position that the divine Logos is present within the minds of all rational beings is
Irenaeus’ statement in 4.6.7 that “from the beginning the Son is present with his own handiwork”
(ab initio . . . assistens Filius suo plasmati). The dative suo plasmati is best rendered as “with (or
‘to’) his own handiwork” rather than “in his own handiwork.” The notion of the Word-Son being
“with” but not “in” all of his creatures corresponds to Irenaeus’ understanding of the Holy Spirit,
who mediates the presence of the Word-Son, as only dwelling in the people of God (see: my
Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit 2012: esp. 181). It does not, however, support Houssiau’s interpret-
ation of AH 2.6.1 as affirming the implantation of the divine Logos in all rational beings.
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Prolegomena 67
theory would threaten Irenaeus’ firm distinction between the Creator and
creature since it does not sufficiently distinguish between the divine Logos
and human rationality.²⁵⁷ But this is not the only cause for objecting to
Houssiau’s reading. According to Irenaeus’ argument in AH 2.6.1 all rational
beings know that there is one God, the Lord of all, because ratio mentibus
infixa/us moves them and reveals it to them.²⁵⁸ This knowledge is universal—
evil spirits also possess it, as AH 2.6.2 makes clear. If we interpret ratio
mentibus infixus as Houssiau suggests, then the divine Logos would also be
present within evil Spirits and their minds would participate in the divine Logos.
Yet, as I noted above, Irenaeus makes clear elsewhere that the Holy Spirit, who
mediates the presence of the Word-Son, only dwells in the people of God.²⁵⁹
This being the case, the Word-Son can hardly be implanted in the minds
of all rational beings. For these reasons Houssiau’s reading of ratio mentibus
infixus cannot stand. Neither, moreover, should the variant ratio mentibus infixus
be preferred over the proper construction ratio mentibus infixa.
Just as good reasons exist for not reading ratio as the divine Word, good
reasons exist for reading ratio as natural reason.²⁶⁰ Interpreting ratio as “natural
reason” aligns the last sentence of AH 2.6.1 with the overall course of his
argument in 2.6.1–2. For the contrast created between a personal knowledge
of the Father and Son that comes to a few by revelation and a knowledge of the
one God as Lord that comes to all by reason accentuates the availability of
natural knowledge.²⁶¹ So much can be gathered from my argument thus far, but
two additional reasons are worth taking into consideration.
First, while ratio could in theory be used to render λόγος when it refers to
the divine Word, in practice the Latin translator does not do so. According to
Bruno Reynders’s lexicon ratio appears fifty times in Against Heresies, but
excluding this possible use in AH 2.6.1 it is not used a single time to speak of
the divine Word.²⁶² In contrast, the terms verbum and sermo are each used
numerous times.

²⁵⁷ For Irenaeus’ understanding of the distinction between the Creator and creatures, see for
instance AH 2.28.1–2 and 4.11.2.
²⁵⁸ I see no textual basis for Orbe’s contention that moveo refers to a generic knowledge while
revelo refers to a specific knowledge (Greg 47 1966: 715–16).
²⁵⁹ See n. 256 above.
²⁶⁰ Orbe argues that “natural reason” is the “obvious sense of the term” ratio; for his
argument, see esp. Greg 47 (1966: 713–17).
²⁶¹ The contrast Irenaeus draws here between revealed knowledge and natural knowledge is
somewhat similar to the contrast he draws at the end of AH 4.20.7: “For if the revelation of God
which is through creation gives life to all living in the earth, how much more does that
manifestation of the Father which is through the Word give life to those who see God.”
²⁶² Reynders (1954, vol. 6.2: 274). The closest it comes is AH 2.26.3: et esse admirabilem
rationem et vere divinam quae possit huiusmodi et discernere et causas proprias enuntiare.
Rousseau argues that ratio refers here to the Word as the Reason of God by which God conceived
the created order (SC 293 1982: 307), but the passage does not seem to bear such a complex
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68 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Second, as Orbe has noted, the relationship between ratio and mens in the
phrase ratio mentibus infixa seems to correspond to the discussion that
appears in the second half of AH 2.13.7.²⁶³ There, Ireneaus distinguishes the
reasoning process from the mind that directs the process.²⁶⁴ This distinction
has a long tradition in Greek philosophical thought, dating at least to Plato,²⁶⁵
so it should not come as a surprise to find it in Irenaeus. But we may be able to
draw a more precise connection between these particular statements and the
philosophical theories of his day, for they have much in common with the
roughly contemporary epistemological (more properly, dialectical) interest in
identifying the mechanics of making a judgment (the κριτήριον).²⁶⁶ Indeed,
Irenaeus’ reference to the direction of the reasoning process by the mind in
AH 2.13.2 and the clause ratio mentibus infixa moveat ea et revelet eis (“reason,
implanted in their minds, moves them and reveals it to them”) in 2.6.1 may
well reflect contemporary attempts to analyze the κριτήριον in terms of agent,
instrument, and means or mode of application.²⁶⁷
Ptolemy, for instance, identifies the agent of judgment (τὸ κρῖνον) as the
mind (νοῦς) and the means (τὸ ᾧ κρίνεται) as the λόγος,²⁶⁸ which could
correspond to Irenaeus’ statement in AH 2.6.1 that reason, implanted in
minds, reveals to people a knowledge of God. Ptolemy’s identification of the
instrument of judgment (τὸ δι’ οὗ κρίνεται) as sense perception (αἴσθησις)²⁶⁹
could even correspond to Irenaeus’ earlier reference to a “mental intuition and
perception” (mentis intuitionem et sensibilitatem) of God’s eminence, given
the probable substrate ἔννοιάν καὶ αἴσθησιν. Arriving at a specific correlation
between Irenaeus and a particular epistemological theory is, however,
unnecessary. Nor is it possible to achieve with confidence. It is enough for
our purposes to identify an epistemological explanation for the phrase ratio

reading. It is better to understand ratio as simply referring to divine reason without identifying
it with the second person.
²⁶³ Orbe, Greg 47 (1966: 715 n. 81).
²⁶⁴ The reasoning process is expressed by the terms contemplo, cogito, sapio, consilior, and hoc
animo tractat; the direction of the mind is expressed by nus gubernat.
²⁶⁵ For instance, Plato speaks of the “living word” (λόγον ζῶντα) that is “written in the mind”
(γράφεται ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) in Phaedrus 276a, and in Sophist 263e his description of thought (διάνοια)
as “the silent inner dialogue of the mind with itself” (ὁ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ
φωνῆς) leads to the Stoic distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικός (Greek text of
Plato, volumes 1 and 7, LCL 36 and 123). See Lloyd, Phronesis 1 (1955: 60–1).
²⁶⁶ For the contemporary philosophical interest in these matters, see Dillon, Alcinous: The
Handbook (1993: 61).
²⁶⁷ Discussions of the κριτήριον roughly contemporary to Irenaeus occur, for instance, in the
works of Alcinous, Ptolemy, and Sextus Empiricus. See Long, BICS 25 (1978: 35–49, esp. 36);
Long (1988: esp. 180, 186–92); Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook (1993: esp. 61–2).
²⁶⁸ A text and translation of Ptolemy’s Criterion may be found at the end of P. Huby and
G. Neal (eds.), The Criterion of Truth: Essays Written in Honour of George Kerferd Together with
a Text and Translation (with Annotations) of Ptolemy’s On the Kriterion and Hegemonikon
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1989: here pp. 182–3, at 4, lines 2–3, line 5).
²⁶⁹ Ptolemy, On the Criterion (1989: pp. 182–3 at 4, line 2, line 5).
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Prolegomena 69
mentibus infixa that links the final sentence of Irenaeus’ argument with what
comes before and confirms the reading of ratio as natural reason.

1.3.4. Section Conclusion

For over seventy-five years scholars have regarded AH 2.6.1 as the central text
for any study of Irenaeus’ position on a natural knowledge of God. Far from
undermining, other references to natural knowledge that appear throughout
Irenaeus’ corpus,²⁷⁰ as Audet would have had us believe, this passage supports
them. Indeed, an affirmation of natural knowledge plays the leading role in
Irenaeus’ argument in AH 2.6.1. But we should not stop there, for the
proposition that all rational beings know the one God as Lord of all holds
broader significance for his polemical and constructive argumentation.
As I stated at the beginning of this section, the proposition that a natural
knowledge of God is available to all human beings constitutes a logical basis
for regarding philosophy as a valid source of theological insight. Indeed, this
seems to be precisely the logic behind Irenaeus’ argument in AH 3.25.1–5.
After asserting in AH 3.25.1 that pagans (ethnicus) have an understanding of
God derived from his providence, Irenaeus opposes the Marcionite account of
two Gods, one just and one good, by arguing in AH 3.25.5 that Plato under-
stood the same God to be both just and good. But Irenaeus is not alone in
making such an argument, for the Middle Platonist Atticus also uses the same
two quotations from Plato to demonstrate that Plato believes in a divine
Providence.²⁷¹ Therefore, the natural knowledge of God available to pagans is
justification for Irenaeus’ polemical utilization of a particular conception of God
he likely found in a Platonic tradition shared by Atticus.
Irenaeus’ affirmation of a natural knowledge of God should, therefore,
adjust our expectations for his use of ancient philosophical sources. We should
no longer begin with the assumption that he eschews philosophical thought
but rather with the assumption that he regards philosophy as a potential
source of theological insight.

1 . 4 . C H A P T E R CONC LU S I ON

The goal of this chapter was to establish an understanding of Irenaeus and his
theological method that justifies and sustains the following investigation. We

²⁷⁰ E.g., AH 2.9.1 and 2.27.2. Unger provides an excellent, succinct discussion of these and
several other passages in ACW 65 (2012: 122–3).
²⁷¹ Meijering (1975: 28). See also, his VC 54 (2000: 1–11, there 2–3). I am grateful to an
anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to Atticus.
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70 God and Christ in Irenaeus

have seen that Irenaeus enjoyed a thorough rhetorical education and was far
better read than most students of rhetoric. We have seen that he recognized
the validity of and even valued theological speculation. And we have seen that
he affirmed a natural knowledge of God, which establishes a basis for the
theological appropriation of philosophical insights. If these conclusions sketch
a new portrait of Irenaeus that justifies the upcoming chapters, the analyses
and conclusions of the upcoming chapters demonstrate the accuracy of this
portrait. I turn now to the beginning of the investigation proper, an analysis of
Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being.
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God

It has been nearly forty years since Richard Norris penned this call for
attention to Irenaeus’ doctrine of God:
It is difficult . . . not to suppose that for Irenaeus the question of a doctrine of God,
of theology in the strict and narrow sense, is the primary and most crucial issue at
stake in his confrontation with the Gnostics. Yet for all that, his attempts to deal
with this problem have not met with much scholarly attention; and it may be the
case that this neglect of Irenaeus’ central concern has a tendency to introduce a
serious distortion into contemporary appreciations and criticisms of his work.¹
In the years since just three studies have addressed Irenaeus’ theology proper,
with one coming from Norris himself.² These studies have investigated certain
aspects of Irenaeus’ understanding of the divine being, but none have attempted
a comprehensive analysis. Beyond the problem this poses for grasping Irenaeus’
conception of God, the state of this question poses a considerable challenge
to any attempt to comprehend Irenaeus’ ascription of divinity to Jesus. It has
also kept us from recognizing the manner in which Irenaeus’ understanding
of the economy of the Incarnation is founded upon his conception of the
divine being and the person of Christ. As a result, it is necessary to begin this
study with an examination of his conception of God that not only brings
to light this aspect of Irenaeus’ thought but also prepares the way for our
inquiry into his account of the Word-Son and the work of Christ in the
chapters to come.
The following investigation will examine the two propositions upon which
Irenaeus founds his conception of the divine being: God is infinite and God is
simple.³ Both propositions are articulated in Against Heresies 2 and both have

¹ Norris (1979: here 89).

² Norris (2009: 9–36); Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 67–106); Lashier (2014: esp. 70–91).
³ Scholars disagree over what propositions are foundational to Irenaeus’ theology proper.
Norris identifies Irenaeus’ central propositions as “God is one and unique in his majesty and
goodness, and supreme in his power” and “God is without limits” (1965: 69–70). Norris will later
write that AH 2.1.5 identifies “what for Irenaeus are two—I almost said, and half believe, the two—
essential and definitive characteristics of the divine nature: that it ‘contains everything’, and that
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72 God and Christ in Irenaeus

philosophical roots. Once I have finished addressing each proposition, I will
briefly discuss Irenaeus’ identification of God as Spirit, an identification which
has a biblical basis but also a philosophical one. I will conclude by discussing
the implications of Irenaeus’ theology proper for our understanding of his
thought more generally as well as the particular implications for the remaining
chapters of this study.

2.1. GOD I S I NFINITE

In the above quotation Norris rightly identifies Irenaeus’ main polemical

concern as the doctrine of God, theology proper. The particular notion that
captures the majority of Irenaeus’ attention is the division of God espoused in
the hypothesis of the Ptolemaic Gnostics, which he relates in the early chapters
of Against Heresies 1, as well as Marcionite theology.⁴ The main challenge
Irenaeus mounts to this aspect of the Ptolemaic and Marcionite systems
appears in that most neglected of his books, the second of Against Heresies.⁵
Indeed, as Norris observed years ago, “the question of God preoccupies almost
the whole of book 2.”⁶
Irenaeus structures his challenge around the two propositions just men-
tioned: God is infinite and God is simple. He wastes little time introducing the
first, which he offers in support of what he identifies as “the first and greatest
point,” that there is one God, the Creator.⁷ He continues in AH 2.1.2:
For how could there be another Fullness, or Beginning, or Power, or some other
God above this one,⁸ since it is necessary that God—the Fullness of all things—
should enclose all things in his immensity and should be enclosed by nothing
(omnia circumcontinere et circumcontineri a nemine)? Moreover, if there is
anything beyond him, then he is not the Fullness of all things, nor does he
enclose all things. For that which they say is beyond him would be wanting to

it is understood in terms of power” (1979: 94; his discussion reveals this later statement is not far
removed from his earlier one). Barnes contends the fundamental category for Irenaeus’ under-
standing of God is “Spirit,” understood in terms of Stoic philosophy. He maintains that Spirit is
“the single most important concept for understanding his Trinitarian theology,” and that
“Irenaeus’s description of the Father builds from the Father’s existence as Spirit” (NV 7 2009:
76 and 105). Lashier does not adjudicate the relative importance of Irenaeus’ propositions, but he
does emphasize Irenaeus’ arguments for the “oneness or unity” and the absolute transcendence
of God (2014: 70–8 and 78–90, respectively).
⁴ Lashier (2014: 36–8).
⁵ Lashier offers a similar reading: “The scriptural proofs of Haer. 3–5 and Epid., which largely
consist simply of showing the numerous places where the New Testament works identify the
Father of Jesus with the Creator God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, need not detain us because
the crux of the argument . . . lie [sic] in Haer. 2” (2014: 72).
⁶ Norris (1979: 94). ⁷ AH 2.1.1. ⁸ The Creator God spoken of in AH 2.1.1.
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God 73
the Fullness or to that God who is above all things. But that which is wanting and
has been diminished by something, is not the Fullness of all things.
This one, moreover, would have a beginning,⁹ middle, and end with respect to
those things which are beyond him. If he is an end to those which are below, he is
also a beginning to those which are above. Likewise, in relation to the remaining
sides, it is wholly necessary that (that one) experiences the very same thing: he is
enclosed, limited, and confined by those which are outside of (him). For the one
who is the downward end necessarily, in every way, circumscribes and surrounds
that which has its end in him. Therefore,¹⁰ according to them the Father of all
things (namely, the one whom they call First-Being and First-Principle), with
their Fullness, and the good God of Marcion, will be enclosed¹¹ and confined in
some other and surrounded from the outside by another Authority, which must,
of necessity, be greater, since that which encloses is greater than that which is
enclosed.¹² Moreover, that which is greater is also more stable¹³ and is to a greater
degree Lord; and that which is greater, more stable, and to a greater degree Lord,
that one will be God.¹⁴
Irenaeus’ argument revolves around the premise that God is the Fullness who
encloses all things, but is enclosed by nothing.¹⁵ Even so, Irenaeus observes,
the Ptolemaic hypothesis maintains that “there also exists . . . something which
even they say is outside the Fullness.”¹⁶ But if this is the case, he reasons, then
either that which stands outside the Fullness encloses it, which violates his
definition of Fullness as that which encloses but is not enclosed, or the Fullness
and that which stands outside it are separated from each other by an infinite
distance. This second option, he points out, resolves nothing, for it requires a
third existence so immense that it is able to enclose both the Fullness and that
which is separated from the Fullness by an infinite distance. He then concludes

⁹ Lat. terminus. The term may stand for terminus a quo, as Unger suggests (Irenaeus: Against
Heresies 2, 117 n. 4), or may be erroneous, as Rousseau believes (SC 293 1982: 204, where he
suggests initium in its stead). Whatever the case, the meaning must be “beginning.”
¹⁰ Lat. enim, but Rousseau is correct to say this is the sense (SC 293 1982: 205).
¹¹ Following Rousseau, who substitutes contentus for conditus (SC 293 1982: 205).
¹² Cf. Theophilus, Autol. 2.3; also, Teaching of Sylvanus 100.3–4.
¹³ Lat. firmius. Rousseau believes “firmius et magis dominus” is a doublet (SC 293: 205). But
firmius may reflect Aristotle’s reasoning, received by Philo, that God as place, as that which
contains, is that in which something naturally rests (see Wolfson 1947, vol. 1: 250). An even
more relevant tradition may be found in Aristotle’s criticism of Anaxagoras. In Physics 3.5,
205b2–4 Aristotle says Anaxagoras believed that the “unlimited being” (τὸ ἄπειρον) “stabilizes
itself ” or “stands firm” (στηρίζειν) because “nothing encloses” it (οὐδὲν περιέχει). Greek
text taken from Aristotle, The Physics (trans. P.H. Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford; LCL 228;
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929).
¹⁴ AH 2.1.2.
¹⁵ The following discussion of Irenaeus’ argument closely follows that of Norris (2009:
17–18).
¹⁶ AH 2.1.3. For the relevant portion of the Ptolemaic hypothesis, see AH 1.2.1–6. Irenaeus’
subsequent statement of what stands outside the Fullness is also helpful, see esp. AH 1.4.1.
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74 God and Christ in Irenaeus

by noting that if one assumes this third existence is also limited then the
pattern will continue ad infinitum.
Irenaeus is contending that there is nothing in the Ptolemaic hypothesis—
nor in Marcionite theology, which he mentions at the beginning of AH 2.1.4—
that can properly bear the title Fullness and, therefore, nothing that can
properly bear the title God. Neither First-Father, nor the Demiurge, nor
anything else, qualifies. That being the case, their hypotheses should be
regarded as polytheistic because the limits their hypotheses ascribe to their
deities mean that none of those deities can be regarded as enclosing all things,
which in turn means that none of them can be regarded as supreme.¹⁷ Only
the One who encloses all things, including his own creation, can be regarded
as the supreme God. So much is clear from Irenaeus’ summary argument in
AH 2.1.5:
For it is necessary either that there is one who encloses (continet) all and who
made in his own (realm) each one that was made, just as he willed; or, again, (that
there are) many and unending Creators and Gods, which begin with each other
and end at each other in every respect. And it would be necessary to admit that
each of them¹⁸ is enclosed from without by one which is greater, as if each one of
them has been imprisoned and remains in his own (realm). Moreover, not one of
all of these would be God. For each one of them would be found wanting, having
the smallest part in comparison to all of the rest, and the name “Omnipotent”
would be eradicated. Such an opinion would of necessity fall into impiety.
My interest, however, is not so much in the polemical end of this argument as
the means by which he achieves that end. For the means, the logic that sustains
his argumentation, reveals his own understanding of God.¹⁹
Irenaeus opens his argument in AH 2.1.2 with the declaration, “it is
necessary that God—the Fullness of all things—should enclose all things in
his immensity and should be enclosed by nothing.” This is the fundamental
premise of his argument, as just outlined. But the premise also contains a
formula that is fundamental to Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being: God
encloses all things but is enclosed by nothing.²⁰ He clarifies what he means as

¹⁷ I disagree with Norris’s belief that Irenaeus’ mention of the title “Almighty” indicates that
this argument emphasizes the power of God (2009: 18). It is better to regard his mention of the
title “Almighty” as a final rhetorical stroke designed to highlight an implication of the argument
(that a Scriptural title will no longer apply) and, thus, drive home the main argument.
¹⁸ Following Rousseau, who reads illos omnes for alios omnes (SC 293 1982: 206).
¹⁹ Irenaeus’ argument should not be mistaken as mere polemic, for his own views often
emerge during the course of his polemical argumentation. Norris made the same point some
years ago, though with a condescending tone I find misguided: “For once, at any rate, in setting
out this line of argument, Irenaeus is not arguing in a purely negative spirit. He is not
dismantling a gnostic position so much as he is back-handedly asserting or commending his
own view of what a real ‘Demiurge’ must be and how such a being must be related to the created
order” (2009: 15).
²⁰ omnia circumcontinere et circumcontineri a nemine.
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God 75
the paragraph progresses. For God to enclose all things, nothing can be
beyond him (extra illum).²¹ Otherwise God “would have a beginning, middle,
and end with respect to those things which are beyond him.” That is to say,
the God who encloses all things cannot have a nature that is limited by the
existence of something beyond or outside of his being.²² God must be unlim-
ited. For if God were not, then that which limits God would be greater, “since
that which encloses is greater than that which is enclosed.” Moreover, as
Irenaeus makes clear in AH 2.1.5, the notion of a limited God is incompatible
with the Scriptural attribution of omnipotence to God.²³ For God to be all-
powerful he must be unlimited.
Irenaeus’ argument that God encloses all things but is enclosed by nothing
is, therefore, a formulaic way of expressing that God is unlimited. Though
Gregory of Nyssa is often named as the first Christian theologian to charac-
terize the divine being as infinite,²⁴ that term well suits Irenaeus’ understand-
ing of God as unlimited. For when Irenaeus states that God encloses all, even
the entirety of creation, he is saying that God’s unlimited nature is absolute.
Therefore, it is Irenaeus not Gregory who is the first Christian theologian to
make the infinity of God a defining feature of his theology.²⁵ But that is not to
say Irenaeus is the first to think of God in this way. Indeed, as William

²¹ “Moreover, if there is anything beyond him, then he is not the Fullness of all things, nor
does he enclose all things.” AH 2.1.2.
²² W.R. Schoedel notes that in Ps-Aristotle’s On Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias 3, 977b4
having a beginning, middle, and end is the mark of something finite, that is, something with
limits (1979: 79). Schoedel also directs our attention to Melissus, Frgs. 2–4, where the
temporal categories of beginning and end acquire spatial significance (1979: 79; for the
fragments and a concise discussion of this topic, see Kirk, et al. (2007: 393–4). As I will
soon discuss, the parallels between Ireneaus and On Melissus suggest he knew the text (cf.
Schoedel 1979: 79).
²³ Irenaeus may make a similar point at the end of AH 2.1.2, when he writes: “that which is
greater is also more stable (firmius) and is to a greater degree Lord; and that which is greater,
more stable (firmius), and to a greater degree Lord, that one will be God.” The extent to which
this statement addresses the power of God depends on the way in which one interprets firmius
(on firmius, see n. 13 above, esp. with regard to Anaxagoras).
²⁴ As A.-K. Geljon notes, this understanding of Nyssa’s place in Christian history seems to
have its origin in the influential study of E. Mühlenberg, who argued Nyssa was the first to
use the concept of infinity in a positive sense (1966). I will address Mühlenberg’s under-
standing of Irenaeus later in this chapter. For Geljon’s comments, see VC 59 (2005: 152–77,
here 152).
²⁵ W.R. Schoedel recognized years ago that Irenaeus regarded God as infinite long before
Nyssa (1972: 100). More recently, A. Conway-Jones trivialized Irenaeus’ attribution of infinity to
God because of its polemical context in an effort to elevate Nyssa: “For Irenaeus it is a weapon
against Gnostic dualism. It is Gregory of Nyssa who uses it as a clear statement of God’s infinity”
(2014: 106). This reasoning is misguided for at least two reasons. First, it depends on the false
belief that a concept articulated in a polemical context is in some way less valuable or sincere
than a concept articulated in a constructive context. Second, it suggests Gregory’s attribution of
infinity to God has no polemical value of its own, immediately after noting the anti-Eunomian
context of his argument. For more on the polemical context of Gregory’s attribution of infinity,
see Mühlenberg (1966: 111–18).
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76 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Schoedel has shown,²⁶ Irenaeus’ logic and his use of the formula “enclosing,
not enclosed”²⁷ reveal that lengthy philosophical traditions lie behind his
attribution of infinity to God.
The logic of Irenaeus’ argumentation indicates that he was familiar with
the Eleatic arguments against the many in favor of the One as presented in the
Ps-Aristotelian treatise On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias.²⁸ Schoedel has
highlighted several convincing parallels.²⁹ We find in Ps-Aristotle’s discussion
of Xenophanes an antithesis similar to Irenaeus’ “enclosing, not enclosed”
which is also meant to exclude the possibility of there being two or more gods:
to be God means “to rule and not be ruled” (κρατεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι).³⁰
This God must be one, “for if there were two or more, he would no longer be
the most powerful (κράτιστον) and best of all.”³¹ In addition, Ps-Aristotle
represents Melissus as arguing that another could not exist beside the infinite
One, else it would be limited and no longer supreme.³² Xenophanes is
presented as saying the same: nothing can exist alongside the One, else its
supremacy would be negated (though according to Ps-Aristotle Xenophanes

²⁶ Schoedel (1972); and Schoedel (1979). Schoedel drew heavily on H.A. Wolfson’s study of
Philo that identifies and discusses many of the texts central to his own investigation. See Wolfson
(1947: esp. 1:247–51).
²⁷ AH 2.1.1, Irenaeus’ most important discussion of the formula “enclosing, not enclosed,”
uses circumcontineo and contineo which correspond to περιέχω (“enclose”). Both circumcontineo
and contineo are used to translate περιέχω in Irenaeus’ corpus, while contineo is also used to
translate κατέχω, ἐμπεριέχω, and συνέχω (see Reynders 1954: 1:87; 2:52, 68). Περιέχω is the term
used in the prior philosophical tradition, but, as his quotation of Hermas reveals, Irenaeus is also
familiar with the Christian practice of using χωρέω (“hold/contain”) in its stead. Schoedel
maintains that the constructions using these two terms are in practice equivalent, though
χωρέω “suggests more readily that God cannot be grasped with the mind” (1979: 77; also:
Schoedel 1972: 92).
²⁸ Many have regarded this work as a product of the school philosophy of the later ancient
period (Jaeger 1947, pback. 1967: 51). H. Diels dates it to the first century after Christ (1900: 12;
Schoedel follows Diels, see 1979: 78). R.M. Grant drew attention to the work as one of those that
prove philosophical debates about the One continued in the Greco-Roman period (1966: 107).
NB: the thought of Xenophanes and the Eleatic philosophers is muddled in the text (see, e.g.,
Jaeger 1947, pback. 1967: 51–5), but differentiating them is not my concern at this time.
²⁹ For Schoedel’s discussion of these parallels, see 1979: 78–9; and 1972: 100–2.
³⁰ Melissus 3, 977a27 (unless otherwise stated, the Greek text of Melissus comes from
Aristotle, Minor Works [trans. W.S. Hett; LCL 307; Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1955]). This antithesis may be even closer to Irenaeus’ argument than the discussion of
Xenophanes may suggest at first blush. Schoedel has observed that κρατεῖν (to rule) is related
to περιέχειν (to enclose), the likely substrate for Irenaeus’ Latin in AH 2.1.2. For Philo (On the
Eternity of the World 106) says “that which is enclosed and ruled is surely weaker than that which
encloses, by which it is also ruled” (τὸ δὲ περιεχόμενον καὶ κατακρατούμενον ἀσθενέστερον δήπου
τοῦ περιέχοντος, ὑφ’ οὗ καὶ κατακρατεῖται). Schoedel, “Enclosing, not Enclosed,” 101 (Greek text
from Philo, Volume IX [trans. F.H. Colson; LCL 363; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1941, repr. 2001]). Philo’s reasoning is very similar to Irenaeus’ contention at the end of AH 2.1.2
that “that which encloses is greater than that which is enclosed” and “that which is greater is also
more stable and is to a greater degree Lord.”
³¹ Melissus 3, 977a25. ³² Melissus 1, 974a11, see also: Melissus, Frgs. 5–6.
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God 77
maintains that the One is neither limited nor unlimited).³³ Moreover, the
unlimited is regarded as having no beginning, middle, or end, which are
characteristic of that which is limited.³⁴
While each parallel is unremarkable on its own, when considered together
they are striking. Irenaeus shares with Ps-Aristotle: a similar formula; an
appeal to authority and power to establish the one, supreme God; the conten-
tion that the one God must be infinite; and the reference to beginning, middle,
and end as a means of characterizing what is limited in contrast to what is
unlimited. There is little question that Irenaeus drew upon Ps-Aristotle’s
presentation of the Eleatic arguments for one, infinite God in order to
construct the logic sustaining his own argument for and conception of the
one, infinite God.
While the close parallels make it clear that Irenaeus was familiar with the
Eleatic arguments for the One as reported by Ps-Aristotle,³⁵ his antithetical use
of περιέχω (“enclose”) reveals he also drew upon another tradition to support
his attribution of infinity to God. According to Schoedel the manner in which
Irenaeus uses the verb περιέχω to characterize God has two ultimate sources:
the “pre-Socratic description of the originative substance as divine and enclos-
ing all things,” and Aristotle’s discussions of the infinite, of place, and of the
void.³⁶ These traditions are represented in a source much closer in date to
Irenaeus, a source that also exhibits significant parallels with Irenaeus’ use of
περιέχω in its argument. I speak of Philo.
Philo was the first to use περιέχω to construct the formulaic antithesis
“enclosing, not enclosed.” This formula has a polemical edge previously absent
from the pre-Socratic and Aristotelian uses of περιέχω. The addition of the
negation (“not enclosed”) has the basic function of establishing the supreme
God over against lesser entities that are mistakenly confused with the supreme
God, or of establishing the proper way of thinking about the supreme God

³³ Melissus 3, 977b6. In depicting Xenophanes as saying the One is neither limited nor
unlimited Ps-Aristotle conflicts with Aristotle, Metaphysics A 5, 986b18–25, who states Xen-
ophanes neither says the One is limited or unlimited. Jaeger’s solution is to regard Ps-Aristotle as
not having read Xenophanes but as misinterpreting Aristotle and twisting his statement that
Xenophanes said neither that the One was limited or unlimited into the nonsensical declaration
that Xenophanes said that the One was neither limited nor unlimited (1947, pback. 1967: 53).
³⁴ Melissus 3, 977b4; cf. Melissus, Frgs. 2–4, where the temporal categories of beginning and
end acquire spatial significance (as mentioned in n. 22).
³⁵ Again, unlike the student of historical philosophy we are concerned with the tradition
represented by Ps-Aristotle, which groups Xenophanes among the Eleatic philosophers, not in
the historical differentiation of Xenophanes from the Eleatic school.
³⁶ Schoedel (1979: 75). For a longer discussion see Schoedel (1972: 92–6). For the pre-Socratic
descriptions see, Aristotle, Phys. 3.4, 203b7–13; De caelo 3.5, 303b10–304b22; Metaph. 12.8,
1073a14–1074b14. For Aristotle’s own discussion of the infinite, see Phys. 3.4–8, 202b30–208a23;
of place, Phys. 4.1–5, 208a27–213a11; of the void, Phys. 4.6–9, 213a12–217b28.
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78 God and Christ in Irenaeus

over against, for instance, anthropomorphisms of Scripture, which often
involve the suggestion that God is in a “place.”³⁷ Essential to the use of this
formula is the attribution of divine transcendence, which seems to derive from
the biblical emphasis on the transcendence of God over the world as well as
the strict opposition between God and the gods.³⁸
Schoedel categorizes Philo’s uses of the “enclosing, not enclosed” formula as
supporting three separate but related themes: (1) God is immaterial and not in
a place;³⁹ (2) he is unknowable in his essence; and (3) he is the creator of all
things.⁴⁰ A number of Christian writers after Philo but before Irenaeus also
used this formula or variations thereof, including Theophilus of Antioch and
the Ptolemaic Gnostics.⁴¹ Irenaeus even quotes its use in Shepherd of Hermas
(Mand. 1.1).⁴² But no writer’s use of the formula parallels Irenaeus’ as well as
Philo’s.⁴³

³⁷ Schoedel (1972: 94–5). Christian authors use the formula in a similar fashion to establish
the supreme God in opposition to, for example, localized gods of Greek mythology, the dualistic
theology of the Valentinian Gnostics, or the two gods of Marcionite theology (pp. 91–2).
³⁸ Schoedel (1972: 95). Schoedel notes, however, that there is some basis for also seeing a
precedent in philosophical challenges to anthropomorphic conceptions of God or challenges to
polytheistic systems (see pp. 95–6). Wolfson (1947, vol. 1: 248 n. 44) links the formula to the
Rabbinic teaching that God “is the place of the world, but the world is not his place” (Genesis
Rabbah 68.9).
³⁹ Whether Philo identifies God as infinite is debated. For instance, H. Guyot identified Philo
as the first to regard God as infinite (1906: esp. 37–56), but Geljon has since argued it is better to
regard Philo as offering “starting-points for the notion of divine infinity” (VC 59 2005: here 176,
see also 168–75).
⁴⁰ Schoedel (1979: 76). For Philo’s use of the formula to argue that God is immaterial and not in
a place, see Migr. Abr. 182–3 and 192–3, Somn. 1.62–3 and 83–5, Sobr. 63, and Post. Cain. 14–18;
for God as unknowable in his essence: Somn. 1.183–5, Conf. ling. 136–8, and Post. Cain 14–18, 169;
and for God as creator of all things: Leg. Alleg. 3.51 and Migr. Abr. 182–3. Wolfson explored the
significance of many of these texts long before Schoedel (1947, vol. 1: 247–51, 317–22).
⁴¹ Ptolemaic Gnostics maintained that God was ἀχώρητος (AH 1.1.1), which should be
understood as “incomprehensible” according to Sagnard (1947: 330 and 332). The Valentinians
also applied the formula “enclosing, not enclosed” to God (Epiphanius, Panarion 31.5.3).
Sagnard believed a Valentinian use of the formula could also be found in AH 1.15.5, but Schoedel
correctly evaluated that formula as reflecting Irenaeus’ own opinion (see Sagnard 1947: 330; and
Schoedel 1972: 91). For a discussion of the formula in other Christian writers, see Schoedel
(1979: 77); and Schoedel (1972: 91–2, 97–9).
⁴² AH 4.20.2: “Truly, therefore, the writing says, ‘First of all believe that there is one God, who
created and disposed all things, and made all things to be out of what was not, who contains all
things but is alone uncontained (omnium capax et qui a nemine capiatur)’.”
⁴³ Irenaeus uses the formula to substantiate each of these three points made by Philo, though
Irenaeus also uses the quotation from Xenophanes to establish the immateriality of God.
Moreover, Irenaeus, like Philo, uses the philosophical term περιέχειν in his main discussion of
the formula, rather than χωρεῖν which is the standard term used to express the concept of
containing in Christian writings before him (e.g., Hermas, Mand. 1.1, Sim. 9.14.5; Justin, Dial.
127.2; Theophilus, Autol. 2.3 [1.5 uses περιέχειν]; Athenagoras, Emb. 10.1; Kerygma Petrou as
quoted in Clement, Strom. 6.39). When taken together these points argue that Hermas, though
quoted by Irenaeus, is not his sole, or even primary, source of the formula. Neither, then, should
we think that Irenaeus simply regarded the formula as Scriptural—pace, M. Slusser, who
maintains both positions in “The Heart of Irenaeus’s Theology” (2012: here 134).
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God 79
Irenaeus uses the formula to establish the infinity and supremacy of the One
God, as we have seen. But the notion of divine infinity that Irenaeus establishes
by means of the “enclosing, not enclosed” formula sustains several corollaries
that further define the divine being: the transcendence of God, the incompre-
hensibility of God, and the immanence of God. I shall treat these in order.

2.1.1. Transcendence

The affirmation of transcendence is integral to Irenaeus’ declaration that God

encloses but is not enclosed. This should come as no surprise given that each
of the themes sustained by Philo’s use of the formula “presuppose a God who
transcends the cosmos.”⁴⁴ For Irenaeus, as AH 2.1 makes clear, the formula
establishes the one God as other than all else and as set apart from all else. God
is other than all else because that which encloses is other than that which is
enclosed. The former is unlimited, infinite, the latter is limited, finite. The
infinite God who encloses all things cannot be classed among the finite things
that are enclosed. Moreover, God, and God alone, is not a part of the finite
realm—he is set apart from all else.⁴⁵
The divide between infinite and finite is strict. Therefore, the notion of
transcendence that follows from this distinction is equally strict. Or, as Denis
Minns and Jackson Lashier have written, Irenaeus affirms the absolute tran-
scendence of God.⁴⁶ This position is polemically effective because it embodies
a stronger notion of transcendence than the relative transcendence of the
Ptolemaic Gnostics.⁴⁷ According to the Ptolemaic hypothesis, transcendence is
a function of the distance that separates First-Father from the other aeons, the
Demiurge, and the material world.⁴⁸ As a result, the degree to which First-
Father transcends a given object or being corresponds to the proximity of

⁴⁴ Schoedel (1979: 76).

⁴⁵ The restriction of this status to God may be found, for instance, in Irenaeus’ introduction of
the argument in AH 2.1.1, where he writes: “It is proper, then, that we begin with the first and
most important point, with the Creator God . . . there is nothing either above him or after him.”
And, again, in AH 2.30.9 where its connection with the formula is even more immediate: “that
one is found to be the one God . . . he contains (capiens) all things, but he alone can be contained
(capi potest) by no one . . . neither is there anyone beside him, nor above him.”
⁴⁶ The characterization of the Gnostic conception of transcendence as relative and Ireneaeus’
conception as absolute is Minns’s (1994, repr. 2010: 41–2); Lashier follows Minns here (2014:
79–90).
⁴⁷ I stand with those who believe that Irenaeus and his Gnostic opponents hold different
understandings of transcendence (e.g., Fantino 1994: 263; Lashier 2014: 79–90), and against
those who believe they share an understanding of transcendence (e.g., Ochagavía (1964: 21;
Slusser 2012: 133–9).
⁴⁸ For the importance of spatiality to the conception of God found in Gnostic accounts, see
Irenaeus, AH 2.1.4; Schoedel 1972: 88–108; Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 76); and Lashier (2014: 32–6,
79–81).
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80 God and Christ in Irenaeus

the two. This notion of transcendence reflects the Gnostic hypothesis, which
places First-Father, the other aeons, and the material order in the same
continuum. For while it is true that the distances separating aeons from
each other result in their ontological distinction, it is equally true that these
distances unite them in a chain of being that links not only the aeons to each
other but to the material order. Such a spatial conception of the divine Fullness
does not distinguish the divine from the created order as firmly as Irenaeus’
categorical division between the infinite and finite, that which encloses and
that which is enclosed.⁴⁹

2.1.2. Incomprehensibility

Irenaeus’ attribution of infinity to the divine being does not just entail the
transcendence of God but also his incomprehensibility. The most important
discussion of this connection occurs fully two books after he establishes the
importance of infinity to his conception of God. Irenaeus raises the topic in
AH 4.19.1 in order to once again challenge the typological methods that
sustain the hypothesis of his Gnostic opponents.⁵⁰ It is appropriate, he con-
tends, for terrestrial things to be types of the celestial, for God grants insight
into spiritual matters through types such as those. It is inappropriate, however,
to think that supercelestial and spiritual things themselves can be types of
other celestial things, including another Fullness and another Father.⁵¹ To
support this position Irenaeus argues anew that his Gnostic opponents have
no grounds for believing they can conceive of something beyond God.
The logic of Irenaeus’ argument is founded upon his attribution of infinity
to the divine being. However, he begins not by appealing to motifs that
featured in his previous attribution of infinity to God, but by using Isaiah
40:12 to foil the logic of his Gnostic opponents.
You have heard that the heavens have been measured in the palm (of his hand),⁵²
tell me the measure and recount the innumerable multitude of cubits, reveal to
me the fullness, “the width, the length, the height,”⁵³ the beginning and end of the
circumference—things which the human heart will never understand nor grasp.
For the heavenly treasuries are truly great: God is immeasurable in the heart and

⁴⁹ Cf. Lashier (2014: esp. 80–2). Lashier questions (p. 82) why Irenaeus does not simply drop
the concept of divine transcendence. The answer is not just that it features in the tradition
Irenaeus received, but that it attends his attribution of infinity to God and sustains his firm
distinction between the Creator and the created order. The more intriguing question is: How
does Irenaeus account for the Christian need to obtain a saving knowledge of the transcendent
God? The answer, as the upcoming chapters will make clear, is Christological.
⁵⁰ For an analysis of his earlier challenge to their typological method, in AH 2, see my VC 70
(2016: 31–50).
⁵¹ AH 4.19.1. ⁵² Cf. Isa 40:12. ⁵³ Eph 3:18.
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God 81
incomprehensible in the mind—he who holds the earth in his fist. Who would
perceive his measure? Who will know the finger of his right hand? Or who will
understand his hand—that which measures the immeasurable, that which
spreads out in its measure the measure of the heavens, which clasps in (its) fist
the earth with its abysses, which encloses in itself the width, the length, the depth
below, and the height above⁵⁴ of the whole creation (that which is seen, which is
heard and understood, and which is invisible)? . . . But if humanity cannot com-
prehend the fullness and greatness of his hand, how could anyone understand or
know in their heart so great a God?⁵⁵
Working from Isaiah, Irenaeus reasons that it is impossible for human beings
to comprehend the magnitude of the heavens, which though massive are still
finite.⁵⁶ If the greatness of the heavens cannot be measured, then God, who
“holds the earth in the hollow of his hand,”⁵⁷ certainly cannot be measured in
the heart or comprehended in the mind.
Technically, Irenaeus offers here an argument from the lesser to the greater
(an argumentum a minore ad maius) which utilizes the proportional relation-
ship Isaiah establishes between the heavens and God.⁵⁸ If the heavens, which
are lesser, cannot be comprehended, then it stands to reason that God, which
is greater, cannot be comprehended. To be valid such a mode of reasoning
does not require the attribution of infinitude to God, it only requires God to
have a finite magnitude larger than all of creation. Strictly speaking, then, his
argument to this point agrees with the notion of divine infinity—for that
which is infinite would be greater than the largest finite magnitude—but does
not require it. That, however, Irenaeus means to contrast the massive but still
finite creation with the infinite God—and thus found God’s incomprehensi-
bility upon his infinitude—becomes clear as his argument progresses.
The first indication comes in AH 4.19.3 where he once again challenges the
hypothesis of his Gnostic opponents that something exists beyond God.
Irenaeus contends that saying “Father comes to an end at those things
which are beyond the Fullness” or that “the Demiurge does not reach all
the way to the Fullness” results in neither one being perfect or embracing
(comprehendo) all things. For Father would be defective with regard to what

⁵⁴ Cf. Eph 3:18. ⁵⁵ AH 4.19.2–3.

⁵⁶ Irenaeus is not denying the propriety of attributing breadth, length, height, beginning, and
end to the heavens—qualities which pertain to that which is finite—but rather the human ability
to fathom something defined by such massive measurements.
⁵⁷ I disagree with A. Orbe, who reads these references to God’s hand as a reference to the
Word (1958, vol. 1.2: 658 n. 8). Unless we are also to identify a referent for the finger of God’s
right hand, it is better to regard these as Scripturally based metaphors, having no relation to
Irenaeus’ identification of the Son and Holy Spirit as the Hands of God (see Briggman, Irenaeus
on the Holy Spirit 2012: 104–26).
⁵⁸ For an illustration of this argument as well as the argument from the greater to the lesser
(a maiore ad minus) see Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.23.4.
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82 God and Christ in Irenaeus

lies outside the Fullness, while the Demiurge would be defective with regard to
what lies within. And, therefore, neither “will be the God of all.”
This logic mirrors that of AH 2.1.2. God, by definition, must enclose all
things and be enclosed by nothing. God must be unlimited. For if God were
not, then that which limits God would be greater—or, in terms of AH 4.19.3,
God would be defective. This logic appears in adumbrated fashion at the end
of AH 4.19.3: “that (God’s) greatness is not defective, but encloses all things,
and extends all the way to us and is with us, everyone who thinks in a fitting
way about God will admit.” God’s greatness—unlike the Father and Demiurge
of the Ptolemaic hypothesis—is not defective but rather encloses all things.
That is to say, God is not limited but unlimited. God is infinite.
Irenaeus’ appeal to divine infinity in AH 4.19.3 indicates that in 4.19.2
he had in mind a contrast between the massive though finite universe and
the infinite God.⁵⁹ As a result, the incomprehensibility of God he affirmed in
the course of that argument is founded upon God’s infinite character. This
being the case the two clauses in his declaration, “God is immeasurable in the
heart and incomprehensible in the mind,” are intimately related. To be
immeasurable is to be incomprehensible. The infinite cannot be known.
That this is precisely what Irenaeus is arguing is clear from his subsequent
comments in AH 4.20.1–4:
Therefore, it is possible to know God, not according to his greatness (for it is
impossible for the Father to be measured), but according to his love, for this is
what conducts us to God by his Word. Those who obey him always learn that he
is so great a God and that he is the very one who by himself created and made and
adorned and encloses all things. Now [included] among all things are both us and
our world. We too, then, together with these things which are enclosed [by him],
were made by him . . . . (4.20.2) Truly, therefore, the writing says, “First of all believe
that there is one God, who created and disposed all things, and made all things to
be out of what was not, who contains all things but is alone uncon-
tained”⁶⁰. . . . (4.20.4) Therefore, there is one God, who by the Word and Wisdom
made and adapted all things. And this is the Creator (Demiurgus), who also
assigned this world to the human race, and who, as far as his greatness is concerned,
is certainly unknown to all those who were made by him (for no one has searched
out his height, neither those of old nor those of the present), but, as far as his love is
concerned, is known always through him through whom he constituted all things.

⁵⁹ The contrast Irenaeus is here drawing between a massive though finite universe and the
infinite God undermines C. Stead’s opinion that Irenaeus should be classed among those who
have suggested “that God is coextensive with, or surrounds, the universe, sometimes appealing to
Jer. 23:24 (‘Do I not fill heaven and earth?’), sometimes using arguments borrowed from Stoicism
to the effect that there must be only one God since there is no room for any other” (1977: 179).
Stead also, as I have shown, mistook Irenaeus’ argument in AH 2.1.1–2 as Stoic in nature when
Irenaeus was drawing upon Ps-Aristotle’s representation of Eleatic philosophy as well as the
“enclosing/not enclosed” formula as developed by Philo.
⁶⁰ Shepherd of Hermas, Mand. 1.1.
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God 83
The opening lines of this selection summarize the argument made in AH
4.19.2–3. When Irenaeus writes that God cannot be known “according to his
greatness” because “it is impossible for the Father to be measured” he is
making the same point as in 4.19.1: to be immeasurable is to be incompre-
hensible. The infinite cannot be known.
But this selection is not just summative. It confirms and clarifies aspects of
his argument in the previous chapter. First, Irenaeus’ turn to the enclosing/not
enclosed motif in AH 4.20.1–2, including his quotation of the formula as it
appears in Hermas, confirms my reading that divine infinity undergirds his
affirmation of divine incomprehensibility. For though the primary purpose of
his appeal to the motif is to establish the creative activity of God, the rationale
for his appeal to this motif for that purpose comes from his argument in
AH 2.1.5 to 2.2.2 that the infinite God—the one who contains all and is not
contained—must be regarded as the Creator.⁶¹ This being the case, Irenaeus’
argument in AH 4.19.3 through the first part of 4.20.2 is founded upon his
understanding of the divine being as infinite. Indeed, when viewed as a
whole, AH 4.19.3 through the quotation of Hermas in 4.20.2 utilizes much of
the logic as well as the formula Irenaeus used to establish the infinity of God
in AH 2.1–2.
This selection from AH 4.20 also clarifies an aspect of Irenaeus’ argument in
AH 4.19.2–3. While the previous chapter only suggests what it is that human
beings cannot know about God, Irenaeus here makes clear that it is God’s
greatness which remains beyond the reach of the human intellect. He con-
trasts, moreover, the inability to know God’s greatness with the ability to know
God’s love. The same contrast appears in an earlier passage that also addresses
the limits of human knowledge, AH 3.24.2. There, Irenaeus writes that his
opponents:
have dishonored and despised God, holding him of small account, because, by
means of his love and infinite kindness, he has come within reach of human
knowledge. Knowledge, however, not with regard to his greatness (magnitudinem),
or with regard to his essence (substantium)—for no one has measured or handled
it—but after this sort: that we may know that he who made, and formed, and
breathed in them the breath of life, and nourishes us by creation, establishing by
his Word and binding together [by his] Wisdom all things, this is [he] who is
the only true God.

⁶¹ It is unclear if Lashier believes Irenaeus reasons from God’s nature as infinite to his work as
Creator, as I say above, or vice versa. He writes, “absolute transcendence, as Irenaeus conceives,
results in a clear moment of creation attributed only to the power and freedom of the tran-
scendent God.” But just a few sentences later he comments on Irenaeus’ affirmation of creatio ex
nihilo, “This clear moment of creation, which supports the distinction between the Creator and
the created, is the basis for the qualitative distinction in being Irenaeus perceives.” For both
quotations, see Lashier (2014: 84).
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84 God and Christ in Irenaeus

According to this passage, human beings are able to know neither God’s
greatness nor his essence. It is possible, given the grammatical structure of
this pericope, to think Irenaeus regards God’s magnitudo (“greatness”) and his
substantia (“essence”) as two distinct objects of knowledge, both inscrutable.
Such a reading may then be regarded as indicating that Irenaeus conceives of
two distinct grounds for the incomprehensibility of God. Indeed, Norris seems
to be thinking in precisely these terms when he writes that Irenaeus “insists
that God is . . . inexplicable (inenarrabilis: Haer. 4.20.6) and incomprehensible
(ἀκατάληπτος: Haer. 4.20.5), both because of the divine greatness (magnitudo)
and because of the fact that God is without measure or limit.”⁶²
However, there are at least two reasons for regarding such a reading as
misguided. First, as I have already mentioned, and will soon discuss, the
second proposition fundamental to Irenaeus’ theology proper is that God is
simple. The principle of divine simplicity militates against regarding God’s
greatness as an object of knowledge distinct from God himself. Divine sim-
plicity, then, also stands against any attempt to find in the divine being two
distinct grounds for incomprehensibility. The utility of their conceptual dis-
tinction to Irenaeus’ argument cannot be confused with his understanding of
the reality of the divine life, which always requires the qualification of such
distinctions.⁶³
This first reason is supported by the second. It seems best to read
Irenaeus as predicating the unknowability of God’s greatness upon the
unknowability of his infinite essence. In the argument of AH 4.19.2–20.4,
just discussed, Irenaeus founds both the incomprehensibility of God and
God’s greatness upon the inability to measure “God” (in AH 4.19.2), the
impossibility of measuring “the Father” (in AH 4.20.1), and the fact that no
one has searched out the Creator’s height⁶⁴ (in AH 4.20.4). This accords
with what we see in AH 3.24.2. There, the only explanation Irenaeus gives
for why God’s greatness and essence cannot be known pertains to God’s
essence: “for no one has measured or handled it.” Neither of these argu-
ments offers a basis for the incomprehensibility of God’s greatness other
than the inability to measure God’s being.⁶⁵ That is to say, in both passages

⁶² Norris (2009: 22).

⁶³ For a short discussion of the related matter of Irenaeus’ understanding of theological
attribution and its limits, see n. 133 below.
⁶⁴ altitudinem ejus; the antecedent of ejus is Demiurgus.
⁶⁵ Though not mentioned above, Irenaeus makes a similar statement in AH 4.20.5, which is
founded upon the argument that began in AH 4.19.2: “But certainly as far as his greatness and
ineffable glory are concerned ‘no one shall see God and live’ [Exod. 33:20], for the Father is
incomprehensible (incapabilis).” The Greek substrate for incapabilis is not extant, however it is
interesting that in AH 1.2.5 incapabilis translates ἀχώρητος when it is paired with incompre-
hensibilis, which translates ἀκατάληπτος.
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God 85
Irenaeus grounds divine incomprehensibility upon divine infinity and divine
infinity alone.⁶⁶
Though Irenaeus declares the divine essence to be incomprehensible long
before the fourth century, he is in no way the first to identify the infinite or the
infinite God as incomprehensible.⁶⁷ Eduard Norden once contended that the
incomprehensibility of God was an idea adapted by Greek thinkers from
oriental mysticism, but E.R. Dodds and A.J. Festugière have since shown
that the Platonic corpus itself offered a sufficient basis for the development
of the idea and that it is unnecessary to posit an external influence to explain
its presence in the later Platonist tradition.⁶⁸ At the same time, formless matter
was commonly held by Platonists to be incomprehensible as a result of its
infinitude and irrationality.⁶⁹ It was probably the desire not to associate God
with formless matter that precluded the identification of God as incompre-
hensible throughout much of Platonist history.⁷⁰ Indeed, as far as we know the
first to identify God as incomprehensible was Philo.⁷¹
Philo, to be exact, contended that the essence of God is unknowable but
that God can be known through his works.⁷² It did not take long for other
writers to propose their own formulations of the incomprehensibility of God.

⁶⁶ According to Schoedel, “Irenaeus himself takes it for granted (like Philo) that creatures
cannot know God’s essence” (1979: 80). Schoedel’s statement is true insofar as Irenaeus never
considers the possibility of knowing God’s essence, but it is false insofar as it suggests that
Irenaeus does not construct an argument for God’s incomprehensibility.
⁶⁷ The following summary draws heavily upon F.M. Young’s excellent, concise treatment of
the indescribability and incomprehensibility of God in the Greek philosophical tradition (1979:
45–74).
⁶⁸ Norden (1913: e.g., 84 and 109). Dodds (1963: 310–13 [appendix I]). Festugière (1954:
92–140 [ch. 6]).
⁶⁹ E.g., Numenius, Frg. 4a: “If matter is infinite (ἄπειρος), it is unlimited (ἀόριστον); if it is
unlimited, it is irrational (ἄλογος); if it is irrational, it is unknown (ἄγνωστος).” Greek text from:
Numénius, Fragments (ed. É. Des Places; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973: 45).
⁷⁰ Young (1979: 52). Young further notes that for this reason also, “in the case of God . . . there
was usually an appeal to the possibility of intuition by the mind, even when it was admitted that
God’s indescribability implied that he is hard to know and certainly not knowable by the normal
processes of naming, defining, representing or categorising.” See, for example, Alcinous, Did.
10.164.15–17.
⁷¹ Wolfson once argued that the idea of the incomprehensibility of God entered the Platonic
tradition through Philo (1947, vol. 2: 94–164), but J. Dillon has since argued that while Philo
influenced Christian Platonists of Alexandria (namely, Origen and Clement), there is no
evidence that he influenced Middle Platonists or, with the possible exception of Numenius,
later Platonists (1996: 144).
⁷² E.g., Philo, Somn. 1.183–5, Conf. ling. 136–8, and Post. Cain 14–18, 169. Wolfson (1947,
vol. 2: 94–164). See also, Norris (2009: 21); and Young (1979: 57–8). Young notes (p. 58) that
Philo seems to reserve an intuitive knowledge of God for purified intellectual beings (see, e.g.,
Philo, Post. Cain 168–9). J.M. Dillon likewise noted, based on Leg. Gaium 6, that Philo affirms a
kind of mystical vision since God cannot be grasped by reason (1975, repr. 1990: here p. 6).
Schoedel contends that it is Philo’s emphasis on the immateriality of God that allows him to
detach infinitude from the concept of matter and, thus, provide a basis for his attribution of
incomprehensibility to God (1979: 76).
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86 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Affirmations along this line appear in the apologies of both Justin Martyr and
Aristides.⁷³ But, as Young observes, “it is in Gnosticism that extreme emphasis
is placed upon the unknowability of God.”⁷⁴ And, as Norris has pointed out,
the particular Ptolemaic myth that Irenaeus recounts in the first two chapters
of AH 1, maintains that there could be no direct knowledge of the Father.⁷⁵
This is not to suggest that the Ptolemaeans affirmed a substantial indirect
knowledge of the Father, for the mediation of the Only-Begotten Son made
known just that the Father was uncontained (ἀχώρητος/incapabilis) and
incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος/incomprehensibilis).⁷⁶
Irenaeus, for his part, opposes this Gnostic account by “reiterating a form
of the position taken by Philo.”⁷⁷ Indeed, we have seen that Irenaeus also
affirms that the essence of God remains unknown but that it is possible to
know something of God by means of his works. The works of God Irenaeus
has in mind are mainly three: the creative and providential activities of
God, as well as revelation of the Word-Son (especially that which comes by
the incarnation). As discussed in Chapter 1, the creative and providential
activities afford an opportunity for human beings to come to know by discur-
sive reasoning that the one, Creator God is Lord of all.⁷⁸ The revelation of the
Word-Son, on the other hand, allows for a personal knowledge of God, for
the Word-Son makes known both himself and the Father.⁷⁹ It is the economy of

⁷³ Justin, 2 Apol. 6; Aristides, Apol. 1.1 (Syriac).

⁷⁴ Young (1979: 50–1); referring to the Apocryphon of John, the Gospel of Truth, and the
Ptolemaic Gnostics, as reported by Irenaeus (AH 1.1.1, 1.2.2).
⁷⁵ “Father” is just one of several titles used by Irenaeus to speak of the ultimate God of the
Ptolemaic myth (see, e.g., AH 1.1.1), but it seems to hold primacy of place in the passages that
discuss the incomprehensibility of that ultimate God (e.g., AH 1.2.2 and 1.2.5).
⁷⁶ AH 1.2.5. For Norris’s discussion, see (2009: 21).
⁷⁷ Norris (2009: 21). This is not to say that Irenaeus simply reiterates Philo, but rather that
Irenaeus should be regarded as standing in the tradition of thought advanced by Philo. Since the
text above emphasizes the similarities of their thought, a note highlighting a few of their many
differences is worth the while. I shall note just three, drawn from a consideration of Philo’s Post.
Cain 168–9. First, in a move that highlights his Platonist thinking, Philo seems to reserve an
intuitive knowledge of God for purified beings. Irenaeus, on the other hand, betrays no such
interest in an intellectual vision of God (see Chapter 5.2 of this study). Second, Philo maintains
that God acts in the world by means of impersonal powers. Irenaeus attributes the activity of God
in the world to the divine and personal Word-Son and Holy Spirit. Third, Philo preserves
God’s transcendence by means of the activity of the impersonal powers. Irenaeus maintains
God’s transcendence but also affirms God’s immanence by means of the work in this world of the
fully divine Word-Son and Holy Spirit.
⁷⁸ See Chapter 1.3.2–3 for my discussion of Irenaeus’ understanding of the content of natural
knowledge. This notion of natural knowledge is similar to Philo’s declaration in Post. Cain 169
that the powers that attend God “make evident not his essence (οὐσίαν) but his existence
(ὕπαρξιν) from the things he accomplishes.”
⁷⁹ See Chapter 1.3. It is not clear if Irenaeus thinks that one can also come to a personal
knowledge of the Holy Spirit through its economic activity, or if he believes such knowledge can
only be found in the revelation of Scripture. The closest he comes to affirming the former may be
AH 4.20.6.
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God 87
the incarnate Word-Son, especially the revelation that attends this presence
of the divine Word-Son in the epistemic sphere of human beings, that Irenaeus
primarily has in mind when he states that human beings can learn of the love of
God even though the greatness and essence of God remain beyond our ken.⁸⁰
A central purpose of Chapter 5 is to explain how Irenaeus founds the revelatory
capability and activity of Christ upon his identity as God become man—that is,
how Irenaeus’ understanding of Christ’s activity is founded upon Christ’s
person, the divine-man.
We have seen to this point that Irenaeus’ attribution of infinity to God
entails not just his transcendence but the incomprehensibility of the divine
essence. Given these positions, one might expect Irenaeus to be reluctant to
speak of the immanence of God, as is Philo.⁸¹ As the next section shows,
however, no such reticence marks Irenaeus’ acccount.

2.1.3. Immanence

If the attribution of infinity to the divine being sustains for Irenaeus the
transcendence and incomprehensibility of God, so too does it sustain the
immanence and (limited) comprehensibility of God. It is important to grasp
the complexity of his use of the concept of infinity for an accurate under-
standing of Irenaeus’ own thought, but it is just as important for an accurate
understanding of the history of its use in Christian theology. Ekkehard
Mühlenberg, in his influential study of the concept of infinity in Gregory of
Nyssa’s theology, argued Nyssa was the first to use the concept of infinity in a
positive sense.⁸² While he identified Irenaeus’ use of the concept of infinity, he
did not recognize its full importance to Irenaeus’ thought. Irenaeus’ interests,
said Mühlenberg, lie elsewhere: he does not reflect upon the concept of
infinity.⁸³ Schoedel offered qualified support, writing of Mühlenberg’s opinion:
“He rightly points out that Irenaeus does not press the implications of the idea
of God’s infinity (p. 69); but he does not account for its presence in Irenaeus in
the first place and thus misses its importance.”⁸⁴

⁸⁰ I discuss in the Chapter Conclusion how we might rectify Irenaeus’ detailed account of the
divine being with his position that the divine essence cannot be known.
⁸¹ Concerning Philo, C. Stead writes: “Philo’s sense of God’s holiness and transcendence is
coupled with a certain reluctance to speak of God acting directly on the world; he speaks of God
acting through his powers, dunameis. . . . It is often unclear whether these ‘powers’ represent
God’s own action expressed in terms of condescension, or whether they are subsidiary beings
created to serve him and deputize for him” (1994: 58–9).
⁸² Mühlenberg (1966). ⁸³ Mühlenberg (1966: 69). ⁸⁴ Schoedel (1972: 100 n. 1).
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88 God and Christ in Irenaeus

As this chapter indicates, however, Schoedel’s qualification is still too
reserved. Norris, for one, took a stronger line some years ago in a statement
worth quoting in full:
Thus, for Irenaeus as for his opponents, God is infinite, but—and in this he is
something of a revisionist—in his case this epithet has a positive and not merely
negative connotations. It means—and this is a point to which I shall return—that
God’s resources are unlimited and God’s goodness, inexhaustible: or, in other
words, it connotes not merely God’s difference from the finite order but also
God’s effective presence for and in it.⁸⁵
Despite Norris’s promise to further explore the positive aspect of Irenaeus’
attribution of infinity to God, he never addresses how divine infinity “connotes
. . . God’s effective presence for and in” the finite order. That is to say, Norris
does not explain how divine immanence is a corollary of divine infinitude. As a
result, he leaves unexplained an important positive aspect of Irenaeus’ attribu-
tion of infinitude to God. This section looks to remedy this situation.
An investigation into the connection Irenaeus draws between the infinity
and immanence of God sends us back to a passage recently treated at length:
AH 4.19.2–3. As explained in the previous section, Irenaeus argues in 4.19.2
that if the finite though massive universe cannot be comprehended, then
neither can the infinite God be comprehended. He gives the middle of 4.19.2
to supporting this argument by means of a series of rhetorical questions
designed to convince his readers that trying to know an infinite God is
irrational. He then makes the following statement:
And for this reason God is “above all principality, and power, and dominion, and
every name that is named”⁸⁶ of all things which have been made and created. He
it is who fills the heavens,⁸⁷ and observes the abysses, who is also with each one of
us. For, he says, “Am I a God nearby and not a God far away? If a man hides in
secret places, will I not see him?”⁸⁸ For his hand grasps all things, and is itself that
which illumines the heavens, which illumines also those things which are under
heaven, and searches the innermost thoughts and the heart,⁸⁹ and is present in
our hidden and secret (thoughts), and manifestly nourishes and preserves us.
The opening sentence builds upon Irenaeus’ argument for the infinity of God
in order to affirm his transcendence: God is above all things which have been
created. The second sentence, however, suggests that divine infinity is not only
the basis for God’s transcendence but also his immanence. The infinite,
transcendent God is the one who fills the heavens, observes the abysses, and
is present with each human being. The quotation and subsequent gloss of
Jeremiah 23:23 lend support to his contention: God does not just act within

⁸⁵ Norris (2009: 22); the emphasis is original. ⁸⁶ Eph 1:21. ⁸⁷ Cf. Jer 23:24.
⁸⁸ Jer 23:24. ⁸⁹ Cf. Rev 2:23.
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God 89
the heavenly realm, but in the terrestrial realm as well, nourishing and
preserving each person on earth.
A statement which we have already considered furthers our understanding.
Irenaeus writes at the end of AH 4.19.3:
But that no one can express the greatness of God from those things which were
made is a point evident to everyone. And that his greatness is not defective, but
encloses all things (omnia continet) and extends (pervenit) all the way to us and is
with us, everyone who thinks in a fitting way about God will admit.
We again seem to have a connection between the infinity of God and his
immanence. Here, though, the presence of the clause “encloses all things”
suggests that Irenaeus connected the immanence of God—that God “extends
all the way to us and is with us”—not just to the concept of divine infinity but
to the very formula by which he established that concept in AH 2.1.2.
This reading is supported by an argument that appears earlier. In AH 2.13.7
Irenaeus poses two alternatives to his opponents. They must either confess that
the Father of the Ptolemaic hypothesis is “vacuity” (vacuum) or “that everything
is within him” (omne quod est intra eum).⁹⁰ The latter alternative, given the
opening argument of AH 2.1.2 and the use of capio and capabilis in AH 2.13.5,⁹¹
is an obvious reference to Irenaeus’ proposition that God, to be God, must
contain (or enclose)⁹² all things. What he says next is most pertinent to my
present line of inquiry. If everything is within God, if God contains all things,
then “all things will in a like manner partake of Father.”⁹³ He elaborates upon
this statement a few sentences later: “so too those who are within him will in a
like manner partake of Father, ignorance having no place among them.”⁹⁴
Here, then, we have the logic that is suggested but not explicitly stated in the
selections from AH 4.19.2–3. The infinite God, who contains all things, is
present to those things contained by him, such that each of those things may
know and partake of him.⁹⁵ In this way divine infinity is not just grounds for

⁹⁰ For a possible alternative Latin text see Rousseau, SC 293 (1982: 246).
⁹¹ As noted above, incapabilis is used to translate ἀχώρητος in AH 1.2.5.
⁹² The Latin text of Irenaeus tends to use enclosing language (circumcontineo or contineo)
rather than containing language (capio), thus indicating Irenaeus’ preference for περιέχω over
χωρέω. As noted above (n. 27), constructions using these terms are in practice equivalent.
Irenaeus, for his part, never differentiates them. Moreover, he treats them as interchangeable
in AH 4.20.1–2 where he uses contineo (in 4.20.1) to gloss capio—which we know to translate
χωρέω—in the quotation of Hermas (in 4.20.2).
⁹³ AH 2.13.7: omnes similiter participabunt de Patre.
⁹⁴ AH 2.13.7: sic et qui sunt intra eum omnes similiter participabunt de Patre, ignorantia apud
eos locum non habente.
⁹⁵ Slusser was apparently unaware of Irenaeus’ identification of divine infinity as the
basis for the knowledge of God in AH 2.13.7 when he wrote, “When Irenaeus comes to provide
a basis for creaturely knowledge of God, he does not appeal to divine infinity or to limitlessness,
however great a role those concepts played in his fencing with his Gnostic opponents”
(2012: 135).
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90 God and Christ in Irenaeus

the transcendence of God but also his immanence, an immanence which is the
basis for a natural knowledge of God.⁹⁶

2 . 2 . G O D I S S I M P LE

Irenaeus asserts the second proposition fundamental to his understanding of

the divine being in order to oppose the ordered production of aeons pro-
claimed in the Ptolemaic hypothesis.⁹⁷ The principle of divine simplicity
challenges the Gnostic decision to pattern the production of aeons upon the
process of human reasoning. As he writes in AH 2.13.3:
It certainly holds to say these things when it comes to human beings, since they
are compound by nature, consisting of a body and a soul. But those who say that
Thought was emitted from God, and Mind from Thought, and from these, in
turn, Word, should be censured, in the first place because they have improperly
made use of (the order of ) emissions⁹⁸ and then because—in describing the
affections and passions and activities of the human intellect—they also misun-
derstand God. Indeed, they apply to the Father of all—whom they also say is
unknown to all—those things which happen to human beings in order for them
to speak⁹⁹. . . . But if they had learned the Scriptures and been taught by the truth,
they would certainly know that God is not like human beings and that his
thoughts are not like the thoughts of human beings. For the Father of all things
is at a vast distance from those affections and passions which occur in human
beings. He is simple, not compound, like in members, and entirely similar and
equal to himself, since he is all Mind, all Spirit, all Understanding, all Thought, all
Word, all Hearing, all Eye, all Light, the whole Source of all good things—even as
it is permissible for the religious¹⁰⁰ to speak about God.
Likewise, he declares in AH 2.28.4–5:
This blindness and foolish talk then arises in you because you reserve nothing for
God, but even want to announce the birth and emission of God himself and of his
Thought and Word and Life and Christ, not taking these things from any other

⁹⁶ As discussed in Chapter 1, Irenaeus maintains that the basis for a natural knowledge of
God is the creative and providential activity of God in this world. The very fact that God acts in
this world not through an intermediary but directly (see, e.g, the last lines of AH 4.19.2 quoted
just above) makes possible a certain knowledge of him.
⁹⁷ AH 2.13.1.
⁹⁸ Irenaeus’ point in this initial movement of his argument is that it is nonsensical to suggest,
as the Valentinian hypothesis does, that Thought produces Mind. For a fuller discussion of this
point, see AH 2.13.1–2.
⁹⁹ Following Rousseau, SC 293 (1982: 240), who identifies the Greek underlying ad loquen-
dum eos as πρὸς τὸ λαλεῖν αὐτούς.
¹⁰⁰ Rousseau contends religiosis ac piis is a doublet translating τοῖς εὐσεβέσι (SC 293
1982: 241).
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God 91
source but human processes. You do not understand that in the case of a human
being, who is a composite living being, it is conceivable to speak of such things (as
we said above), namely, of the mind of a human being, and the thought of a
human being, and [to say] that thought comes from mind, and from thought
reflection, and from reflection word. For according to the Greeks there is one
ruling principle which thinks, and another instrument by which the word is
uttered. So sometimes, indeed, a human being rests and is silent, but sometimes
he speaks and acts. However, since God is all Mind, all Word, and all operative
Spirit, and all Light, and is always existing the same and alike (this is the way in
which it is profitable for us to think about God and this is what we learn from
the scriptures), no longer should processes and divisions of such a kind be
properly ascribed to him. For the tongue, which is carnal [in nature], is
insufficient to be of service to the swiftness of the human mind on account of
its spiritual [nature]. And, as a result, our word is stifled within us and is not
brought forward all at once, as it was conceived by the mind, but piecemeal as
the tongue is able to supply it.
(2.28.5) But God is all Mind¹⁰¹ and all Word.¹⁰² What he thinks, this also he
speaks, and what he speaks, this also he thinks, for his Mind¹⁰³ is Word, and
Word is Mind, and all-containing Mind is the Father himself. He, therefore, who
speaks of the Mind of God and gives to the Mind its own emission proclaims that
he is composite, as if one is God and another is the ruling Mind.
In each of these passages Irenaeus argues that it is valid to speak of a
process of production—namely, the human process of producing a word—
when considering compound beings, such as human beings who are con-
stituted by body and soul.¹⁰⁴ It is invalid, however, to speak of such a
process of production when considering divine things because God is
simple. For this reason, the Ptolemaic hypothesis errs when it conceives
of the production of aeons in terms of human psychological processes,
because, strictly speaking, no analogy exists between compound human
beings and the simple divine being.¹⁰⁵
Irenaeus offers his initial definition of divine simplicity in the first selection:
God “is simple, not compound, like in members, and entirely similar and
equal to himself ” (simplex et non compositus et similimembrius et totus ipse

¹⁰¹ Throughout AH 2.28.5 “Mind” translates the Latin mens.

¹⁰² Throughout AH 2.28.5 “Word” translates the Latin transliteration logos.
¹⁰³ Following Rousseau, who emends the text by substituting mens for cogitatio (SC 293
1982: 321).
¹⁰⁴ Scholars have debated whether Irenaeus regards the human being as trichotomous or
dichotomous. For a discussion of pertinent literature and an argument for the latter position,
see Briggman, Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 149 n. 4, 164–5).
¹⁰⁵ Lashier too has observed that the analogy of human psychological processes fails in light
of the principles of divine simplicity and atemporality (2014: 86–9, 132–4). However, while he
discusses atemporality in the context of divine simplicity, he does not explicitly identify it as a
corollary.
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92 God and Christ in Irenaeus

sibimetipsi similis et aequalis est).¹⁰⁶ It is noteworthy, given the common
description of Irenaeus as a biblical theologian, that this definition is not
supported by an appeal to Scripture. As with the first proposition concerning
divine infinitude, Irenaeus grounds this one on philosophical theology.¹⁰⁷
The first indication of the philosophical origins of this proposition comes
from an examination of the definition itself. Grant has suggested that simili-
membrius (“like in members”) translates ὁμοιομερής, which is used to charac-
terize Anaxagoras’ physical theories (e.g., Lucretius 1, 830).¹⁰⁸ But Irenaeus’
use of the term to express homogeneity is closer to Aristotle’s τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ,
which he used to speak of natural substances, such as the four elements, every
part of which were exactly like the whole.¹⁰⁹ Whatever source lies behind
Irenaeus’ use of the similimembrius, he appears to be adapting a known
philosophical term to his own system. This is not the only example, however,
of philosophical influence in this definition. Schoedel has observed that
Irenaeus’ description of God as totus ipse sibimetipsi similis (“entirely similar
to himself”) “reflects language characteristic of Eleatic theology.”¹¹⁰ And still
another indication of the philosophical orientation of his thinking on divine
simplicity comes just a few phrases later: the declaration that God is “the
whole Source of all good things” (totus fons omnium bonorum) corresponds to
statements that appear in Platonic and Neopythagorean texts.¹¹¹
The presence of these terms gives the definition an obvious philosophical
cast, but each pales in importance when compared to the quotation which
serves as the foundation for Irenaeus’ conception of divine simplicity. When
Irenaeus follows this definition by writing that God “is all Mind, all Spirit, all
Understanding, all Thought, all Word, all Hearing, all Eye, all Light”¹¹² he
challenges the dualistic and anthropomorphic hypothesis of his Gnostic

¹⁰⁶ AH 2.13.3.
¹⁰⁷ R.M. Grant, commenting on Irenaeus’ use of Xenophanes, similarly writes: “Irenaeus
understands his Bible in the light of philosophical theology and, in part, vice-versa” (1966: 26).
¹⁰⁸ Grant (1965: 22). Rousseau suggests ὁμοιομελής based on the possibility that Irenaeus was
influenced by 1 Cor 12:17 (SC 293 1982: 241–4). But the connections between these passages,
despite Rousseau, are few and insubstantial.
¹⁰⁹ Kirk et al. (2007: 377).
¹¹⁰ Schoedel (1979: 79). Schoedel quotes the text as totus ipse sibimet similis.
¹¹¹ Grant compares the phrase to Timaeus 29E, which Irenaeus quotes in AH 3.25.5 (1965:
377). I am most grateful to Agnès Bastit for sharing with me her unpublished paper “La double
transmission, verbale et nominale, d’une sentence d’Xénophane,” which offers the most detailed
study of this clause. Bastit shows that while this phrase corresponds to ideas expressed
in Platonic texts (e.g., Republic III, 380c) or texts circulating with (and likely understood as)
Platonic texts (Ps-Plato, Letter II, 312e), the phrase itself does not appear in a philosophical text
until Proclus, Comm. on Timaeus 29e. The notion has, of course, a Scriptural basis too. So, for
instance, James 1:17: “every good and perfect gift is from above and comes down from the Father
of lights.”
¹¹² AH 2.13.3. R.M. Grant has observed that the form of the quotation of Xenophanes used by
Irenaeus is akin to a quotation we find in Pliny the Elder, Natural History 2.14 (RevEAug 24
1979: 201–16, here 211–12).
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God 93
opponents by pressing into service the ancient opponent of polytheism and
anthropomorphic depictions of the divine, Xenophanes.¹¹³
Whether Irenaeus knew Xenophanes to be the source of this quotation is
uncertain. Grant has observed that the quotation appears anonymously in
Irenaeus as well as other philosophical and Christian sources roughly con-
temporary to him.¹¹⁴ He reasons, therefore, that Irenaeus “almost certainly did
not know what his source was.”¹¹⁵ But we ought not rush too quickly from a
practice of anonymity to a declaration of ignorance, certainly not when it
comes to Irenaeus who—as is well known—often makes anonymous refer-
ences to known sources.¹¹⁶ This is especially the case when good reasons exist
for thinking that Irenaeus was aware of his source. As already mentioned,
Irenaeus has chosen a quotation authored by a philosopher known for trum-
peting critiques of ancient depictions of God that align with the critique
Irenaeus himself is advancing about the Ptolemaic hypothesis. Moreover, the
probability that Irenaeus knew his source increases when one recalls his
familiarity with the discussion of Xenophanes in the Ps-Aristotelian On
Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias. For we find there a description of Xen-
ophanes’ conception of God that corresponds to the definition of simplicity
and the supporting quotation we see in Irenaeus: “But being one He (God)
must be similar in every direction, both having power to see and to hear and all
the other senses in every part.”¹¹⁷
While Irenaeus’ knowledge of Xenophanes as his source must finally remain
uncertain, there is little question that he recognized the philosophical prov-
enance of the quotation. So much can be gathered from the remarks he
appends to the quotations of Xenophanes in each of the passages above. In
AH 2.13.3 the quotation is followed by the comment, “even as it is permissible
for the religious to speak about God,” while the quotation in AH 2.28.4 is
followed by, “this is the way in which it is profitable for us to think about
God and this is what we learn from the scriptures.” Taken together these
comments portray the quotation of Xenophanes as conveying a commonly, if

¹¹³ C.C.J. Webb, building upon an article by T.B. Allworthy, was the first to identify this
quotation as belonging to Xenophanes (JTS 40 1939: 36–7). Variations of the quotation occur in
AH 1.12.2, 2.13.8, 2.28.4, and 4.11.2. For concise discussions of Xenophanes’ thought, see Jaeger
(1947, pback. 1967: 38–54); and Kirk et al. (2007: 163–80, which includes texts and translations
of fragments). Discussions pertinent to Irenaeus’ and other early Christian uses of Xenophanes
may also be found in Grant (1965: 376–9); Young (1979: 48–50); Schoedel (1972: 101–2); and
Schoedel (1979: 78–9). For a brief discussion of the philosophical debate about anthropomorph-
ism, see Watson (1997: 221–2).
¹¹⁴ Grant (1965: 376–9). Grant notes the presence of the quotation in Sextus Empiricus,
Diogenes Laertius, Pliny the Elder, and Clement of Alexandria.
¹¹⁵ Grant (1965: 379). ¹¹⁶ See, e.g., Hill (2006).
¹¹⁷ Ps-Aristotle, On Melissus 977a 36: ἕνα δ’ ὄντα ὅμοιον εἶναι πάντῃ, ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἀκούειν, τάς τε
ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχοντα πάντῃ. Text and translation from Aristotle, Minor Works (trans.
W.S. Hett; LCL 307; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, repr. 1955: 484–5). Cf.
Schoedel (1979: 78).
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94 God and Christ in Irenaeus

not universally, recognized theological axiom (AH 2.13.3)¹¹⁸ that is distinct from
but agrees with the teaching of the Scriptures (AH 2.28.4).¹¹⁹ Since there is
no indication that Irenaeus regarded the quotation as having a Jewish prov-
enance, the field of knowledge that could produce such an axiom was phil-
osophy.¹²⁰ Indeed, Irenaeus’ reference to “the religious” may well be shorthand
for Gentile philosophers who accurately understand an aspect of God or
his work.¹²¹
Having treated Irenaeus’ recognition of the philosophical provenance of
the quotation, we turn now to its significance. Irenaeus’ use of Xenophanes’
quotation and the argumentation surrounding its use grant insight into his
understanding of divine simplicity. Upon encountering his initial definition
in AH 2.13.3—“simple, not compound, like in members, and entirely similar
and equal to himself ”—one might expect his notion of simplicity to be
fundamentally reductionistic. But such is not the case, because when Ire-
naeus quotes Xenophanes in support of his proposition he establishes divine
simplicity as the sum of all positive attributes: God is “all Mind, all Spirit, all
Understanding, all Thought, all Word, all Hearing, all Eye, all Light.”¹²² This
is not to suggest that his notion of simplicity is really closer to that of an
aggregate, for the divine being may be identified with any one of the positive
attributes and any one of the positive attributes may be identified one with
another. His comments a few sections later are instructive and merit lengthy
quotation:
. . . but in him who is God above all, since he is all Nous, and all Word, as we have
said before, and has in himself nothing more ancient nor more recent, nor

¹¹⁸ According to Grant Irenaeus regards the quotation as “a universally valid axiom of
theology” (1965: 378).
¹¹⁹ Grant’s interpretation of Irenaeus’ remark in AH 2.28.4 appears to change over time. He
first wrote that it “correlates (the quotation of Xenophanes) with biblical doctrine” (1965: 378).
Thirty years later he wrote that what Irenaeus “earlier ascribed to ‘religious men’ he now believes
he finds in the Bible” (1997: 45). But there is no reason to think, as Grant’s later reading suggests,
that a dramatic shift in Irenaeus’ thought takes place in the short span of fifteen chapters. Grant’s
earlier reading is sound: Irenaeus’ remark indicates he considered the quotation of Xenophanes to
be consistent with biblical teaching while recognizing their distinction.
¹²⁰ Moreover, the appearance of these quotations alongside discussions of Greek conceptions
of psychological processes (in AH 2.13.2 and 2.28.4) further encourages the notion that Irenaeus
here knowingly draws upon Greek philosophy.
¹²¹ Cf. AH 3.25.1 and 5 where he praises the Gentiles who recognized the providential activity
of God and then commends Plato as “more religious” than those who affirm the existence of
more than one God. The term used of Plato in AH 3.25.5, religiosior, is the comparative form of
one of the terms used in AH 2.13.3, religiosus.
¹²² Lashier has questioned the importance of Xenophanes’ quotation to Irenaeus’ conception
of divine simplicity, arguing that Jewish monotheism, perhaps as found in Theophilus of
Antioch, is the more likely basis for Irenaeus’ notion of divine simplicity (2014: 87–9). While
there is no question that Irenaeus believes his notion of divine simplicity accords with the
Scriptural account of God, as we see him say in AH 2.28.4, there is also no question that he
founds his particular understanding of simplicity upon the quotation of Xenophanes.
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God 95
anything variant,¹²³ but is always entirely equal and similar and one, then no
emission of such an order will follow.¹²⁴ Just as one does not err who says that
God is all Sight and all Hearing—for in whatever way he sees, in that he also
hears, and in whatever way he hears, in that he also sees—so also one who affirms
that (God is) all Mind and all Word, and that in whatever way he is Mind, in that
he is also Word, and that his Word is this Nous,¹²⁵ will still have an inadequate
conception of the Father of all, but a much more fitting one than those who transfer
the generation of the emitted word of human beings to the eternal Word of God,
assigning a beginning and commencement of emission (to the Word of God), just
as (they do) to their own word. Indeed, in what way would the Word of God—nay,
even God himself, since he is the Word—differ from the word of human beings, if
he has the same order and process of generation?
(2.13.9) They have, moreover, also erred with regard to Life, by saying she was
produced in the sixth place when it was proper (for her) to come before all, since
God is Life and Incorruptibility and Truth. [Attributes] such as these were not
emitted according to a process of development,¹²⁶ but are the names of those
powers (virtutum) which are always with God,¹²⁷ insofar as it is possible and
proper for human beings to hear and to speak about God. For Mind and Word
and Life and Incorruptibility and Truth and Wisdom and Goodness, and all such
[attributes], are heard with the name of God. And neither can anyone say that
Mind is more ancient than Life, for Mind itself is Life, nor that Life is followed by
Mind, lest he who is the Mind of all things, that is God, might sometime be
destitute of Life.¹²⁸
These words reveal that my previous description falls short of an accurate
representation of Irenaeus’ understanding of simplicity. To say that the divine
being, as the sum of all positive attributes, “may be identified with” a given
positive attribute suggests we may distinguish the divine being and that
positive attribute in a way Irenaeus does not allow. It is more accurate to say
Irenaeus considers the divine being, as the sum of all positive attributes, to be

¹²³ The Latin texts have either anterius or alterius. Anterius makes little sense given the
preceding contrast. Grabe suggested the correction alterius (Sancti Irenaei 1702: 138 n. k), which
the Clermont MS supports. Rousseau would delete aut aliud anterius, leaving et neque aliud
antiquius neque aliud posterius (SC 293 1982: 250), but such a radical measure is unnecessary
given the Clermont MS. Cf. Harvey, Sancti Irenaei (1857: vol. 1:285 n. 3).
¹²⁴ Irenaeus is here arguing that the simplicity of the divine being stands against the ordered
succession of aeons envisioned by the Ptolemaic hypothesis.
¹²⁵ In this sentence “Mind” translates Sensus, while “Nous” translates Nus; the presence of hoc
(in the construction hunc Nun—“this Nous”) indicates that the two terms have the same
referent.
¹²⁶ Following Rousseau’s notes and Greek retroversion based on the Armenian text: Καὶ οὐ
κατ’ ἐπιγονὴν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔλαβε τὰς προβολάς (SC 293 1982: 251–2).
¹²⁷ That these powers should be understood as attributes rather than powers that attend the
divine being is indicated by Irenaeus’ identification of these powers with the divine being. For
this reason, both the ANF and ACW translations accurately capture the sense of the term when
they render virtutum as “perfections.”
¹²⁸ AH 2.13.8–9.
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96 God and Christ in Irenaeus

identical with any one of the divine attributes.¹²⁹ This is what he intends to
communicate in AH 2.13.9 when he writes, “God is Life, and Incorruptibility,
and Truth.”¹³⁰ And a sentence later when he makes the same point in a more
concrete fashion, writing: “For Mind and Word and Life and Incorruptibility
and Truth and Wisdom and Goodness, and all such [attributes], are heard
with (coobaudiuntur) the name of God.”¹³¹ Given this understanding, it is
logical for Irenaeus to also affirm that divine attributes are identical, one with
another: “(God is) all Mind and all Word, and that in whatever way he is
Mind, in that he is also Word, and that his Word is this Nous.”¹³²
We need not stop here, for according to Irenaeus these positive attributes,
identical with the divine being and one with another, name “powers which
always exist in God.”¹³³ In so saying he means to establish that no divine

¹²⁹ C. Stead recognized Irenaeus’ thinking on these matters some time ago. He twice
addressed the matter in his Divine Substance (1977), writing on pp. 108–9: “ ‘pure being’ can
be regarded, not just as an abstract term implying a minimum predication, but as an inclusive term
implying the sum of all conceivable perfections, whether moral, aesthetic, or metaphysical. . . . God
is sometimes conceived of as a sum of positive attributes (not positive and negative); but with the
proviso that the divine simplicity is unimpaired, so that verbi gratia at any rate he may be
identified with any one of them taken singly . . . .[This concept] appears in Christian theology at
least as early as Irenaeus (ii.13.3 . . . ).” And then again on p. 163: “if God is simple and
unchanging, how can he be endowed with a variety of attributes, and a varying succession of
actions and relationships? . . . At least two solutions were proposed . . . .[According to one of
them] it was held that the various relationships in which God stands to man arise from
differences and changes in them, not in him . . . .A more challenging form of this solution
suggests that the various divine attributes are in fact identical, not only one with another, but
with their possessor; this view is suggested at least by Irenaeus and Novatian, and was later
adopted by Augustine and passed into the common stock of Christian orthodoxy.”
¹³⁰ A later statement made in a similar context conveys the same point, “For his Thought is
Word, and Word is Mind, and all-containing Mind is the Father himself ” (AH 2.28.5).
¹³¹ Unger offers an excellent note on this sentence, ACW 65 (2012: 132–3). Among other
points he observes that coobaudio occurs only here in extant Latin literature, and that Harvey’s
suggestion of συμφωνήσουσι as the Greek substrate (Sancti Irenaei 1857: vol. 1:285 n. 7) does not
fit the context of the passage, which is meant to convey the identification of the attributes not
their harmonization. Rousseau’s later suggestion of συνακούω seems right (SC 293 1982: 251).
¹³² AH 2.13.8.
¹³³ AH 2.13.9. The qualification attached to this statement—“insofar as it is possible and
proper for human beings to hear and to speak about God”—suggests P. Widdicombe is incorrect
when he says, “Irenaeus does not discuss the question of whether and how language applies to
God.” And incorrect again when he writes, “Irenaeus, however, never makes either the indes-
cribability of, or the grounds for assigning titles to, the divine nature a matter of analysis, nor
does he address the question of the relationship between them” (2012: here 142 and 143). In fact,
Irenaeus raises the matter of theological attribution and its limits several times throughout his
corpus (e.g., AH 2.13.3–4, 4.19.3, 5.17.1, Proof 8, and Prf 53). For instance, in AH 2.13.4 Irenaeus
recognizes that our language is insufficient to the task of describing a transcendent God (the love
versus greatness dichotomy). Indeed, Irenaeus begins 2.13.4 by stating that God is above the
properties enumerated in the Xenophanes quotation of 2.13.3 and therefore indescribable. In so
saying, however, he does not mean that human beings cannot or should not say anything at all,
or even that we should only conceive of God by abstraction (the via negationis). Rather, when he
writes God “may well and properly be called a Mind capable of comprehending all things, but [as
Mind] he is not like the mind of human beings, and he may be most properly called light, but he
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God 97
attribute comes into being over the course of time, nor is any one attribute
older or more recent than any other—as the hypothesis of his Gnostic
opponents suggests. We find the same understanding two books later when
Irenaeus contrasts the nature of the uncreated Creator with that of the created
human being:
And in this respect God differs from a human being: God indeed makes, while a
human being is made. And he who makes is always the same, while that which is
made must receive a beginning, middle, and end¹³⁴. . . . And God is also truly perfect
in all things, (being) himself equal and similar to himself, since he is all Light, all
Mind, all Substance, and the Source of all good things, while a human being receives
progress and growth toward God. For just as God is always the same, so too will a
human being, who has been found in God, always progress toward God.¹³⁵
Irenaeus grounds his argument on a definition of divine simplicity that has much
in common with the one in AH 2.13.3, including the use of the quotation of
Xenophanes. In contrast to human existence, which is characterized by progres-
sion and growth, the divine being is perfect: the nature of the Creator God is
complete, not subject to increase or decrease that takes place over time, and thus,
eternally the same.¹³⁶ If this were not the case, then the divine being would be
potentially subject to accretions or diminutions over the course of time which
would in turn require us to regard the divine nature as not simple but compound.
According to this logic, divine attributes must be eternal and constant.
The connection between divine simplicity and divine perfection in this
passage exemplifies the connection Irenaeus sees between divine simplicity
and divine atemporality. Indeed, though I have not yet highlighted it, the
affirmation of atemporality is an important element of Irenaeus’ argument for
simplicity in AH 2.13.8 and again in AH 2.28.4–5. In AH 2.13.8 Irenaeus writes:
. . . but in him who is God above all, since he is all Nous, and all Word, as we have
said before, and has in himself nothing more ancient nor more recent . . . then no
emission of such an order will follow.

is nothing like our light,” he seems to be utilizing the approach known as the via emenentiae by
which one arrives at an understanding of what is indescribable by recognizing the manner in
which it surpasses known realities or experiences (cf. Alcinous, Didaskalikos 10.165.27–34, and
Dillon’s commentary in Alcinous: The Handbook 1993: 109–10). This approach seems to be
connected to Irenaeus’ repeated affirmation that the work of God in this world is a basis for
theological attribution (AH 5.17.1, Prf 8 and 53; see also the discussion of natural knowledge in
Chapter 1). This affirmation itself has much in common with Justin’s approach to the names or
titles of Christ which M. Miller has shown to be grounded in the philosophical use of names to
indicate the powers of God (SP 93 2017: 155–64).
¹³⁴ Following Rousseau’s preference for the Armenian, which lacks a corresponding term for
the Latin et adjectionem (SC 100 1965: 228).
¹³⁵ AH 4.11.2.
¹³⁶ For a discussion of how Irenaeus applies the language of perfection to human beings and
how that usage corresponds to its application to the divine being, see my Irenaeus on the Holy
Spirit (2012: 173–81).
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98 God and Christ in Irenaeus

This selection establishes that atemporality is more than connected with
simplicity, it is a corollary of simplicity. Because God is all Nous and all
Word—a reference to the quotation of Xenophanes and, thus, to simplicity—
then there is nothing in him “more ancient nor more recent.” Temporality
does not define God’s being. Irenaeus’ point is that the ordered production
affirmed by the hypothesis of his Gnostic opponents does not fit the atemporal
nature of the divine being. He makes the same point toward the end of the
section, this time with a focus on the generation of the Word of God.¹³⁷ There
he writes that those who affirm the tenets of divine simplicity:
will still have an inadequate conception of the Father of all, but a much more
fitting one than those who transfer the generation of the emitted word of human
beings to the eternal Word of God, assigning a beginning and commencement
of emission (to the Word of God), just as (they do) to their own word. Indeed,
in what way would the Word of God—nay, even God himself, since he is the
Word—differ from the word of human beings, if he has the same order and
process of generation?¹³⁸
The assignment of “a beginning and commencement of emission” to the
generation of the divine Word is inappropriate because unlike the production
of a human word the production of the divine Word is not conditioned by
temporality.¹³⁹ Which is to say, the generation of the Word is atemporal. His
turn to the atemporality of the Word’s generation after a discussion of divine
simplicity reflects the logic established earlier in the section: atemporality
follows simplicity.
The subsequent argument in AH 2.28.4–5, quoted earlier in this section,
grants further insight into Irenaeus’ understanding of the atemporality of God.
In a manner similar to AH 2.13.8 Irenaeus argues that the hypothesis of his
Gnostic opponents errs when it models the ordered production of the aeons
on the production of a word by a human being, who is a “composite living
being” (compositum animal). A human word, it is true, is produced when
“thought (ennoea) comes from mind (sensu), and from thought reflection
(enthymesis), and from reflection word (logos).” But, Irenaeus contends, the
quotation of Xenophanes demonstrates that “processes and divisions (adfectus
et divisiones) of such a kind (should no longer) be properly ascribed to [God].”
For while “processes and divisions” characterize the production of a human

¹³⁷ A detailed discussion of Irenaeus’ comments about the generation of the Word in light
of divine simplicity may be found in Chapter 3.
¹³⁸ AH 2.13.8.
¹³⁹ The understanding of the Word-Son’s generation derived from these passages corres-
ponds to Fantino’s reading of AH 3.8.3 which identifies the Father and Word as the uncreated
God which is, in contrast to created things which become (1994: 343). A thorough examin-
ation of Irenaeus’ understanding of divine generation can be found in the next chapter of
this study.
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God 99
word, because the carnality of the tongue prevents it from keeping pace with
the spiritual mind, such “processes and divisions” do not characterize God
who is “all Mind (Mens) and all Word (Logos).” Indeed: “What he thinks, this
also he speaks, and what he speaks, this also he thinks, for his Mind (Mens) is
Word, and Word is Mind, and all-containing Mind is the Father himself.”
Three points from this argument standout. First, Irenaeus clarifies his
opposition to the belief of his Gnostic opponents that the ordered production
of aeons is analogous to the production of a human word by contrasting
the human and divine natures. Because human beings are composite while
divine beings are simple, human experience, strictly speaking, is not analogous
to the divine. Thus, as is alluded in AH 2.13.8 and explicitly stated in
AH 4.11.2, simplicity defines the divine being over against created beings,
such as humans. Second, the “processes and divisions” that Irenaeus insists do
not apply to God are a function of temporality. The reason he stresses the
difference between the composite human being and the simple divine being is
to establish a basis for declaring that temporality does not apply to the divine
being. It is to this end that he contrasts the slowness of the carnal tongue with
the rapidity of the spiritual mind. Since the divine being is not constituted by
two different substances, as are human beings, there is no ontological basis for
thinking that the activity of divine production is conditioned by temporality,
as is the activity of human production. This, of course, further undermines any
attempt to use the production of a human word to explain divine generation.
But it also, third, reveals that Irenaeus does not just regard simplicity as
bearing upon the nature of the divine being but also upon the nature of divine
activity, at least ad intra.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, when he writes, “What he thinks, this
also he speaks, and what he speaks, this also he thinks, for his Mind (Mens) is
Word, and Word is Mind, and all-containing Mind is the Father himself,”
Irenaeus makes clear that when it comes to divine activity ad intra, as is the
case with the divine being, atemporality is a corollary of simplicity.

2 . 3. G O D I S SP I R I T

Having identified and discussed these propositions and corollaries central to

Irenaeus’ understanding of the divine being, I would like to briefly turn to his
understanding of God as Spirit. As I have shown elsewhere, Irenaeus considers

¹⁴⁰ Irenaeus’ argument against the ordered production of the aeons in AH 2.13 and 2.28.4–5
can be classed more generally as an argument about the kind of production or generation that is
proper to attribute to the divine being. This is why he is able to move from statements
concerning the ordered production of aeons to statements concerning the generation of the
Word of God.
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100 God and Christ in Irenaeus

the identification of God as Spirit essential to his argument that one God
created and rules over all things, material and spiritual.¹⁴¹ Previous scholars
have recognized that his understanding of God as Spirit draws upon the Stoic
conception of pneuma as that which pervades all things and spreads through-
out space.¹⁴² So, for instance, we see him write in AH 2.13.7:
If, however, they acknowledge that he (the Father) is vacuity, then they fall into
the greatest blasphemy; they deny his spiritual nature (id quod est spiritale eius).
For how can he be spiritual who cannot fill even those things which are
within him?
While this Stoic influence on Irenaeus has been recognized, scholars have not
appreciated how Irenaeus’ notion of spirit is influenced not just by Stoic
notions of pneuma but also by the two propositions fundamental to his
conception of divine being.¹⁴³ In AH 2.7.6, for instance, he writes:
. . . those things which are corruptible, and earthly, and compound (composita),
and transitory cannot be the images of those which according to them are
spiritual, unless these very things also are admitted to be compound (composita),
circumscribed (circumscriptione), and having a shape (figuratione), and thus no
longer spiritual, and diffusive (effusa),¹⁴⁴ and incomprehensible (incomprehensi-
bilia). For it is necessary that they have a shape and be circumscribed so that they
may be true images, and then it is absolutely certain that they are not spiritual. If,
however, these people maintain that they are spiritual and diffusive and incom-
prehensible, how can those things which have a shape and are circumscribed, be
images of those which do not have a shape and are incomprehensible?
Here Irenaeus defines that which is created in contradistinction to that which
is spiritual. His identification of the spiritual as “diffusive” (effusus) betrays the
influence of Stoic thought. However, other qualities listed reveal the import-
ance of the ideas of infinitude and simplicity to his notion of spirit. His
contention that spirit is not circumscribed (circumscriptio), does not have a
shape (figuratio), and is incomprehensible (incomprehensibilis) means that

¹⁴¹ Briggman, Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 41–4); for Irenaeus’ argument see AH 2.30.
¹⁴² See Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 67–106, esp. 78–81); Lashier follows Barnes (2014: 90). On the
Stoic conception of pneuma, S. Sambursky writes: “We must remember that, although the Stoics
believed in the corporeal nature of the pneuma, they came to regard it as something not akin to
matter, but rather to force. It was their conception of a continuous field of force, interpenetrating
matter and spreading through space, and thus being the cause of physical phenomena, which
formed the central idea of pneuma” (1959: 36).
¹⁴³ For example, Barnes argues that Irenaeus incorporates the Stoic understanding of
pneuma as that which fills and contains all space (NV 7 2009: 78–9), but does not recognize
that Irenaeus’ understanding of God as the divine Spirit which contains all things is also
influenced by his understanding of divine infinity and simplicity and, thus, the philosophical
traditions undergirding those propositions.
¹⁴⁴ Following Rousseau’s suggestion that effusa et locupletia appears to be a doublet (SC 293
1982: 224).
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God 101
spirit should be regarded as infinite.¹⁴⁵ His declaration that spirit is not
compound (compositus) means that spirit should be regarded as simple.
His identification of spirit as that which is infinite and simple is not limited
to this passage. In AH 2.17.2 Irenaeus questions the way in which his Gnostic
opponents think about the production of aeons. At the end of the section he
offers spirit and light as illustrations of things which are simple in contrast to
those which are compound: “And [are the aeons] simple (simplices) and
uniform (uniformes), and in every way equal (aequales) and similar (similes)
among themselves, as spirit and light are emitted, or [are they] composite
(compositi) and different (differentes), dissimilar (dissimiles) in their mem-
bers?” His argument continues into the next section where the contrast he
draws implies that the notion of infinity is essential to his idea of spirit:
Furthermore, according to this reasoning each of them (the aeons) will be
understood (to exist) separately, divided from one another, just as human beings,
not mixed with nor united the one to the other, but in a distinct shape (figuratione
discreta) and with a defined area (circumscriptione definita), each one of them has
been delineated by a magnitude of size (magnitudinis quantitate)—[all of ] which
are characteristic of a body, and not of a spirit.
According to this contrast, spirit does not have a distinct shape, a defined area,
and is not delineated by a magnitude of size. That is to say, spirit is not subject
to limits that characterize finite things such as bodies—spirit is infinite.
Irenaeus is not the first to make the connection between Stoic notions of the
Spirit and infinity or, at least, the idea of “enclosing, not enclosed.”¹⁴⁶ In On
the Giants 27 Philo describes the Spirit of God with the words: “But now, the
Spirit which is upon him is the wise, the divine, the indivisible, the undistri-
butable, the good Spirit, the Spirit which is everywhere diffused, so as to fill the
universe.” While in On the Confusion of Tongues 136 he writes, “God fills all
things, he contains but is not contained.” Once again we see that Irenaeus fits
well in this tradition of thought established by Philo.
The identification of God as Spirit is an important aspect of Irenaeus’
theology proper. Spirit is what God is. The substance of God, the immaterial
divine stuff common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Nonetheless, Ire-
naeus’ comments in AH 2 on spirit are fleeting in comparison to the extended
and repeated arguments by which he establishes the infinity and simplicity of
the divine being. This suggests that spirit is not the fundamental concept for
his thinking about the divine being but is rather a biblical and philosophical
concept that suits his identification of God as infinite and simple.

¹⁴⁵ Many of these qualities are also ascribed to pneuma in Stoic thought, but, as I have shown
in earlier in this chapter, they are integral to Irenaeus’ conception of infinity.
¹⁴⁶ Whether Philo attributed infinitude to God is debated; see n. 39 above.
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102 God and Christ in Irenaeus

2.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter has answered Norris’s call for attention to Irenaeus’ doctrine of
God. In passages across his corpus, but particularly in Against Heresies 2,
Irenaeus presents his understanding of the divine being using Scripture but
especially reason and philosophical theology. God is infinite and simple spirit.
As such, God is transcendent, incomprehensible, immanent, and atemporal.
This definition of God’s nature will, as the upcoming chapters show, loom
large in Irenaeus’ understanding of the relationship of the Word-Son to the
Father, as well as his conception of the person and work of Christ. Indeed, it is
no overstatement to say that his theology proper serves as the foundation for
these articles of faith, which in many ways work out the significance of his
conception of the divine being.
Before leaving this chapter for those investigations, however, it is important
to address a seeming contradiction raised by the material in this chapter.
Irenaeus’ declaration that the divine essence cannot be known appears to be at
odds with the detailed account of the divine being he provides. I believe that
these aspects of his account can be rectified in a way that, if not perfect, is
satisfactory. To review, the following can be said based on the investigations of
these first two chapters. First, Irenaeus maintains that the essence and great-
ness of God are incomprehensible. But, second, he also provides a detailed
account of the divine being and does not hesitate to speak of divine attributes.
Third, this understanding of God’s being involves discursive reasoning that
appropriates revealed and natural knowledge of God, as well as philosophical
theology. Fourth, Irenaeus recognizes that the knowledge arrived at by this
discursive reasoning, about certain matters especially, is inferior to God’s own
knowledge inasmuch as it is less certain and less complete.¹⁴⁷ But, fifth,
Irenaeus does not state how certainly and completely human beings can
know the divine things he investigates.
The key to rectifying these points, I believe, lies in an appreciation of a few
aspects of his thought that have been previously underappreciated or outright
rejected: Irenaeus accepts natural knowledge and, thus, is willing to appropri-
ate philosophical theology, and he regards theological speculation as a valuable
exercise that promises certain insights into divine things. Keeping these in
mind, we may say the following.
Irenaeus maintains that discursive reasoning can lead to the understanding
that there is one, Creator God, who is Lord of all. But in Irenaeus’ mind, as
we have seen, the belief that there is one God involves the understanding
that God is infinite and simple, otherwise there would not be one Creator God.
Irenaeus, then, must think that the propositions concerning divine infinity and

¹⁴⁷ See, e.g., his comments in AH 2.25.2–3 and 2.28.2–3, discussed in Chapter 1.2.2.
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God 103
simplicity, as well as their corollaries, can also be deduced by human reason.
Such being the case, we would expect Irenaeus to found these propositions and
their corollaries upon an appeal to human reason. And this is exactly what we
have seen in this chapter: his propositions concerning divine infinity and
simplicity are founded upon philosophical formulas and reasoning. That is to
say, in Against Heresies 2 Irenaeus offers a philosophical theology that he
believes agrees with the Scriptural hypothesis of God that he articulated in AH
1.10.1 and the more exegetically structured account he will present in Against
Heresies 3–5.
This account of divine things that he constructs throughout his work, but
especially in Against Heresies 2, is less certain and complete than God’s own
knowledge of them. That is to say, Irenaeus’ account of the divine being is the
fruit of theological speculation. Recognizing that Irenaeus acknowledges the
speculative nature of his account makes it possible to harmonize—if not in a
perfect way, at least in a satisfactory way—his declaration that the essence and
greatness of God is incomprehensible with his detailed account of the divine
being: the essence and greatness of God cannot be comprehended, but human
beings may still reason about them (even as that reasoning is uncertain and
incomplete).
At the heart of this solution, then, is the distinction between the specula-
tive nature of human knowledge of certain divine things and the true and
perfect nature of God’s knowledge of divine things. But, as I mentioned above,
while Irenaeus acknowledges this distinction he does not in practice draw the
distinction. Never does he pause to say that he is less certain about a particular
aspect of his account and more certain about others.¹⁴⁸ There is an obvious
polemical reason for this: one does not flag vulnerabilities when arguing. But
it may also be that in practice Irenaeus regards speculative knowledge as
approaching certainty, all the while acknowledging in principle the distinction
between the two.

¹⁴⁸ The closest he comes is, perhaps, in AH 2.13.8 when he says the “one who affirms that
(God is) all Mind and all Word, and that in whatever way he is Mind, in that he is also Word, and
that his Word is this Nous, will still have an inadequate conception of the Father of all, but a
much more fitting one than those who transfer the generation of the emitted word of human
beings to the eternal Word of God.”
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Word-Son

Irenaeus’ account of the standing of the Word or Son of God (the Word-Son)¹
in relation to God the Father has long been the subject of scholarly debate.
Scholars may generally be grouped into three categories. First, those who
maintain that Irenaeus’ theology, or at least aspects of his theological account,
agree with Monarchianism or Monarchian modalism.² According to these
scholars Irenaeus’ account would either not uphold or deny the distinction of
the Father and Word-Son within the Godhead. Second, those who maintain

¹ My use of “Word-Son” is an attempt to find a term that encompasses Irenaeus’ use of both
titles, Word and Son, to refer to the second person of the Trinity prior to the Incarnation. The
best discussion of Irenaeus’ use of such titles, as well as those for Jesus Christ, is offered by
Houssiau (1955: 29–40, 185).
² E.g., R. Seeberg maintained that the fundamental ideas of Irenaeus’ theology are modalistic—
especially his expression that the Father is the invisible of the Son and the Son is the visible of the
Father (AH 4.6.6)—but that Irenaeus still attributed a personal existence to the Logos who is
eternal with the Father (1908, vol. 2: 403–4). Similarly, G.N. Bonwetsch argued that Irenaeus did
not distinguish the Father and his Word, yet despite his modalistic assertions did not want to
deny the distinction between Father and Son (1925: 60–1). W. Bousset maintained that Irenaeus
understood Jesus Christ as God become tangible and visible, such that certain passages yield a
practical modalism (1926: 347, referring to Prf 31). D. Minns reduces the development of early
Trinitarian theology to a fourth-century synthesis of earlier modalist and subordinationist
patterns of thought. Having established these two categories of thought, he struggles to fit
Irenaeus into them. Along the way he depicts Irenaeus’ reservations concerning the human
ability to adequately think and speak about the production of the Word (AH 2.13.8 and 2.28.6) as
indications of his modalism, rather than as cautionary statements concerning the epistemologic-
al limits that govern consideration of a transcendent God (1994, repr. 2010: 55–67). J. Behr has
taken a different approach, regarding monarchian thought as Irenaean, when he contends that
Zephyrinus and Callistus maintained “the style of theology developed by Irenaeus” (The Way to
Nicaea 2001: 141). Behr argues that Zephyrinus and Callistus opposed Logos Christology by
founding their conception of the person of Christ on the history of salvation, rather than on the
history of his nature (p. 145). Insofar as this was their approach, Behr believes Zephyrinus and
Callistus followed Irenaeus, who, he believes, primarily thinks of the distinction between God
and created reality in terms of “their relationship to each other” rather than as “an opposition
between two distinct substances” (p. 125). I have argued elsewhere that Behr is correct to say that
Irenaeus distinguishes between God and humanity by means of their relationship to creative
activity, but that Irenaeus also attaches qualities of being to the Creator and creature which
distinguish the nature of one from the other (e.g., AH 4.11.2 discussed in Chapter 2)—see my
Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 40 n. 25).
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Word-Son 105
that Irenaeus’ Trinitarian theology is economic, such that the distinction
between the Father and Word-Son is not essential (necessary to the divine
being) but exists for the purposes of—and may even be confined to—God’s
activity in relation to the world.³ In an economic understanding of Trinitarian
diversity the pre-existence of the Word-Son is relative rather than absolute
(eternal). When it comes to Irenaeus, these scholars have suggested that he
might regard the generation of the Word-Son as occurring prior to the
creation of the world or even in eternity past, but in either case the Word-
Son’s generation would not be essential to the divine being but for the purpose
of the divine economy.⁴ Third, those who maintain that Irenaeus attributes to
the Word-Son an eternal, distinct existence essential to the divine being.⁵

³ A. von Harnack maintained that it is “absolutely incorrect to attribute modalistic ideas to”
Irenaeus, rather “the Logos is the revelation hypostasis of the Father . . . his very statement that
the Logos has revealed the Father from the beginning shows that his relationship is always within
the sphere of revelation. The Son then exists because he gives a revelation” (1901, vol. 2: 264 n. 1,
264–5). A few pages later he writes: “the eternity of the Son and Spirit is not absolute” (267 n. 2).
P. Beuzart argued that Irenaeus does not articulate a Trinitarian doctrine but makes affirmations
that prepare the way for it. He went further, however, when he maintained that had Irenaeus
“sought to give his thought a more precise form, he would have arrived, like Tertullian, at an
economic Trinity” (1908: 53, 55). Seeberg argued that Irenaeus reasoned from the divine
economy to an understanding of the Word-Son as personally pre-existent, saying Irenaeus
believed nothing could be known about the pre-existent Son than what was revealed by him in
Christ—that he was the Logos or Revealer-God (1908, vol. 2: 404). Bonwetsch contended that
Irenaeus rejected philosophizing speculation about the relationship of the Son to the Father,
concentrating instead on the God revealed in Christ (1925: 62). Loofs maintained we should not
think of Irenaeus as espousing the idea of the Word’s eternal generation (1930: 350–1). A. Orbe
offered the most technical argument when he read Prf 47 as showing that Irenaeus viewed
creation as occurring in two stages between which the Son was generated. He concluded that
Irenaeus insists on the generation of the Son, “but always within a cosmogonic context . . . He
was made a beginning before heaven and earth in order to be the principle of the universe” and,
Orbe later says, to be our knowledge of the Father and to unite us to his Sonship (1958, vol. 1.1:
134–5, 143; trans. from Ochagavía 1964: 102). See also Orbe (1961: 211–13). Grillmeier followed
Orbe (1961 2nd ed. 1975, vol. 1: 112). Ochagavía argued that Irenaeus never considered the
Word in seipso but always in view of his revelatory function. In this way, the very generation of
the Word implies visibility (1964: 92). He then follows Orbe in order to argue that Irenaeus never
considered the eternity and necessity of the generation of the Word (pp. 96–7). Rather, “Irenaeus
envisages the birth from the Father not as the intra-trinitarian procession of the Logos of later
dogma, but as his generation in terms of the economy” (pp. 102–3)—“the Son was generated
before creation (ante tempus) as the first step in view of creation” (p. 104). Minns wrote that
“apart from the divine economy . . . there is no ground for there being an eternal Trinity of
distinct persons,” while at the same time conceding that Irenaeus never makes an explicit
statement that would confirm this reading (1994, repr. 2010: 66). P. Widdicombe became the
latest to maintain this reading when he wrote: “It is with the economic activity of God that
Irenaeus is mainly concerned throughout his theology and there is, accordingly, little sense of an
intimate, immanent life of God into which the believer may be drawn” (2012: here 149).
⁴ See, e.g., Orbe (1958, vol. 1.1: 115–16). Fantino summarizes and engages the readings of
Orbe and Ochagavía in Théologie d’Irénée (1994: 347–8). In what I think is an idiosyncratic
reading, Bonwetsch seems to understand Irenaeus’ references to generation as referring to the
human birth of Christ (1925: 61).
⁵ E.g., Hitchcock (1914, repr. 2004: 122–6, 157); Vernet (1923, vol 7: here 2444); Lebreton
(1928, vol. 2: 543–60, esp. 558–60); Lawson (1948, repr. 2006: 130, 131); P.G. Aeby contends
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106 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Scholars who support this reading usually maintain that Irenaeus regards the
Word-Son as fully divine, that is, as divine as God the Father.⁶
The arguments put forward by this third group of scholars are decisive.⁷
Moreover, when the divinity of the Word-Son, as established by these scholars,
is considered in conjunction with the principle of divine simplicity, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, then the qualities Irenaeus attributes to the divine being
should be regarded as applying equally to the Father and Word-Son.⁸ This
includes invisibility, which has been the subject of some debate.⁹
Previous scholars have treated Irenaeus’ account of the economic activity of
the Word-Son as the primary way to gain insight into his conception of the
relationship of the Word-Son to God the Father.¹⁰ This is understandable, for
Irenaeus dwells at length on the economic activity of the Word-Son while
offering few explicit comments on the intra-Trinitarian relationship of the
Word-Son and Father. Still, the almost complete neglect of Irenaeus’ state-
ments that do refer to or bear directly upon the intra-Trinitarian relations of
the Word-Son and Father is indefensible.¹¹
Of these latter statements, primacy of place should go to those few com-
ments Irenaeus makes about a doctrine long ago named but never explored.
Ninety years ago, Jules Lebreton noticed Irenaeus’ use of the Gospel of John
to affirm that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son. He named
Irenaeus’ version of this teaching “immanence réciproque”—reciprocal

Irenaeus was wrongly accused of modalism and that he affirmed the Word’s eternal generation,
but see the next note (1958: 52, 57); Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 198–201); Rousseau, Le Muséon 84
(1971: 5–42); Fantino (1994: 265–382, esp. 293, 308, 339, 343, 346–56, 377, 381–2); Barnes, NV 7
(2009: 93 n. 87, 104 n. 118); and Lashier (2014: esp. 75, 93, 117–47, 206–12).
⁶ Aeby is the exception that proves the rule. He argues that Irenaeus affirms the eternal
generation of the Word but that there is something in his eternal generation that predisposes the
Word to be the intermediary between God the Father and the world. In this way, the mission of
the Word supposes a certain subordination to the Father (1958: 57).
⁷ As noted above, the most technical and, therefore, compelling challenge to the perspective
of this third group of scholars was articulated by Orbe (and followed by Ochagavía). The
responses, however, of several scholars to the arguments of Orbe and Ochagavía should be
regarded as decisive. See, esp. Rousseau, Le Muséon 84 (1971: 5–42); Fantino (1994: 265–382);
Lashier (2014: esp. 130–47). Though I at times diverge from aspects of the readings of Irenaeus
articulated by Rousseau, Fantino, and Lashier, I regard the general tenor of their arguments to be
sound. Therefore, while I may occasionally note their arguments, I will not reiterate or repeat
them with the exception of when they directly pertain to the goals of this chapter.
⁸ These qualities/characteristics should also be regarded as holding for the Holy Spirit/
Wisdom.
⁹ For a thorough treatment of this debate, as well as my own thoughts, see Chapter 5.2.
¹⁰ Fantino’s study should be regarded as the highest form of this approach, both when it
comes to the breadth and strength of his analysis (1994: 265–382). His approach reflects his
belief that Irenaeus’ own thought moves from a consideration of the divine economy to reflection
on the mystery of God (see pp. 339, 346, 375, 381–2).
¹¹ I am not the first to note the neglect of these statements, Lashier’s focus on the intra-
Trinitarian relations is meant to fill the lacuna that has resulted from this pattern in scholarship
(2014: 189). See, especially, his discussion of Irenaeus’ Logos theology from pp. 130–47.
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Word-Son 107
immanence—but gave less than two pages to its analysis.¹² This is a shame, for
the doctrine of reciprocal immanence and its logical foundation offer unpar-
alleled insight into Irenaeus’ understanding of the intra-Trinitarian relation-
ship of the Word-Son and Father. But if the doctrine of reciprocal immanence
holds primacy of place, Irenaeus’ comments on divine production rank a close
second. These comments reveal Irenaeus’ thinking about how a simple,
spiritual being generates another simple, spiritual being, thereby affording
further insight into his understanding of the relationship between God the
Father and the Word-Son.
This chapter will begin, then, with Irenaeus’ notion of reciprocal imma-
nence. The first section explores the contours of this doctrine and identifies
features left unexplained. The second explains these features by studying the
logic that appears in the earlier polemical arguments of Against Heresies 2. The
third section continues examining the polemical arguments of AH 2, but now
with a focus upon the comments Irenaeus makes about the production of a
simple, spiritual substance—his comments about divine production. Taken
together these sections will further establish Irenaeus’ understanding of the
intra-Trinitarian relationship of the Word-Son to the Father, including the
nature and generation of the Word-Son. Irenaeus, we will see, affirmed an
eternal and distinct coexistence of the Word-Son with God the Father as the
one God.

3.1. RECIPROCAL IMMANENCE

Irenaeus does not mention the reciprocal immanence of the Father and the
Word-Son in the first two books of Against Heresies. He makes repeated
reference to it, however, at the beginning of the third book. We’ll begin with
AH 3.6.2:
Therefore, as I have already stated, no other is named God or called Lord except
that one who is God and Lord of all—who also said to Moses, “I am Who I am,”
and “Thus you shall say to the children of Israel: He Who is has sent me to you”
(Exod. 3:14)—and his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, who makes sons of God those
who believe in his name. And again, when the Son speaks to Moses, he says:
“I have descended to deliver these people” (Exod. 3:8). For it is He who descended
and ascended for the salvation of human beings (Eph 4:10). By the Son, therefore,
who is in the Father and has the Father in himself, has God—He Who Is—been
made known: the Father bearing witness to the Son and the Son announcing the
Father. As also Isaiah said: “I too am witness,” he declared, “says the Lord God,

¹² Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 555–6). Since Lebreton aspects of Irenaeus’ reciprocal immanence
have been explored by both Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 78–81), and Lashier (2014: 142–7).
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108 God and Christ in Irenaeus

and the Son whom I have chosen, that you may know, and believe, and under-
stand that I am” (Isa. 43:10).¹³
This first reference to the reciprocal immanence of the Father and Son occurs
in one of Irenaeus’ strongest declarations of the full divinity of the Word-Son.
Here he identifies the voice from the burning bush as the voice of the Son, for
it is the Son who descends and ascends for the salvation of human beings. The
one who identifies himself as I Am Who I Am is, therefore, the Son. And for
this reason, Irenaeus asserts, it is proper to identify the Son as God and Lord.
The idea of reciprocal immanence is instantiated in Irenaeus’ affirmation
that the Son “is in the Father and has the Father in himself.” This statement
could be taken as an aside, but it should be taken as his explanation for
why the Son is able to reveal the Father. The Son is able to reveal the Father
because the Son is in the Father and has the Father in himself. This identifi-
cation of reciprocal immanence as the basis of the Word-Son’s revelatory
activity finds support a few chapters later, in AH 3.11.5–6:
. . . taking the loaves, which the earth had produced, and giving thanks (Jn. 6:11)—
and again when making water into wine—he satisfied those who were reclining
(at table), and provided drink to those who had been invited to the nuptials.
(Thus,) showing that the God who made the earth and commanded it to bear
fruit, and who established the waters and brought forth the fountains, this one
also gave to humankind by his Son the blessing of food and the favor of drink: the
Incomprehensible (acting) by means of the Comprehensible, and the Invisible by
the Visible¹⁴—since he (the Son) is not outside of him, but is in the bosom of the
Father. (3.11.6) For (John) says: “no one has seen God at any time” unless “the
only-begotten Son of God, who is in the bosom of the Father, has declared (him)”
(Jn. 1:18). Indeed, the Son, he who is in [the Father’s] bosom, declares to all the
Father, who is invisible. On account of this, they know him (the Father), those to
whom the Son has revealed (him); and, again, the Father, by means of the Son,
gives knowledge of his Son to those who love him.¹⁵
In the second half of this selection Irenaeus makes it clear that the Incom-
prehensible, the Invisible, the Father is revealed by the Comprehensible, the
Visible, the incarnate Son. The revelation of God the Father by the incar-
nate Son, Irenaeus explains, is possible because the Son “is not outside of (the
Father), but is in the bosom of the Father.”¹⁶ Here, then, we have an explicit
statement of the logic that was vaguely presented in AH 3.6.2: the revelatory
activity of the Son is based upon the relationship that exists between the Son

¹³ AH 3.6.2.
¹⁴ Following Rousseau, who argues that these adjectives should be taken substantively (SC 210
1974: 282–3).
¹⁵ AH 3.11.5–6.
¹⁶ Lashier’s reading of this text emphasizes the constancy of the relationship between the Son
and the Father: the Son is in the Father both before and after the incarnation (2014: 143).
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Word-Son 109
and the Father.¹⁷ Moreover, Irenaeus now provides in John 1:18 Scriptural
support for two aspects of his reasoning. First, the verse supports the idea that
the revelatory activity of the Son is based upon the relationship of the Son to
the Father. And, second, the verse supports the first half of the doctrine of
reciprocal immanence: the idea of the Son being in the Father is established by
the Gospel’s reference to the “only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the
Father.”
AH 3.11.5–6 advances our understanding of Irenaeus’ doctrine of reciprocal
immanence but also gives rise to several questions. Irenaeus, we have seen,
supports reciprocal immanence by reference to John 1:18. Yet that support is
partial: John 1:18 substantiates his claim that the Son “is in the Father” but not
that the Son “has the Father in himself.” It is not yet clear how Irenaeus
supports the second half of the formula of reciprocal immanence. We have
also seen that in both AH 3.6.2 and 3.11.5–6 Irenaeus posits reciprocal
immanence in order to substantiate the Son’s ability to reveal the Father.
But this raises the question of whether the relationship between the Word-Son
and the Father under discussion in these passages is proper to the divine
economy and does not pertain to the divine life of the Word-Son and Father,
or if it is proper to the divine life of the Word-Son and Father and as such also
pertains to the divine economy. Finally, in AH 3.11.5–6 Irenaeus contrasts
being outside of the Father with being in the bosom of the Father. Since the
latter (being in the bosom of the Father) makes possible the Son’s revelatory
ability, we can deduce that the former (being outside the Father) would
preclude the Son’s revelation of the Father. But Irenaeus offers here no insight
into the nature of the contrast that explains why this is the case. Put another
way, Irenaeus does not explain what it is about being in the Father—as
opposed to being outside the Father—that makes it possible for the Word-
Son to reveal the Father. The first we will address immediately. We will gain
insight into the second from the final passage we consider in this section. The
third must await the next section.
As to the first, the closest Irenaeus comes to providing Scriptural support
for his claim that the Son “has the Father in himself” is in AH 3.13.2. There he
writes:
And the Lord also responded to Philip, who wanted to see the Father, “Have
I been so long a time with you and you have not known me, Philip? He who sees
me, sees also the Father. How can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? For I am in the
Father and the Father in me, and henceforth you do know him and have seen
him.” (Jn. 14:9–10, 7) To these men, therefore, the Lord bore witness that they
had both known and seen the Father in himself—and the Father is truth . . . Just,
then, as “Paul (was) an apostle, not from men, nor by man, but by Jesus Christ

¹⁷ So, too Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 79); Lashier (2014: 144).

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110 God and Christ in Irenaeus

and God the Father” (Gal. 1:1), (so it was with the rest of the apostles), the Son on
the one hand leading them to the Father, the Father indeed revealing to them
the Son.
This passage appears in the course of Irenaeus’ argument that the disciples
rather than his Marcionite and Gnostic opponents knew the truth about
God—namely, that the God of the Jews is the God revealed by Jesus. We
can have confidence, he says, in the accuracy of the disciples’ knowledge
because Jesus himself testified that they “had known and seen the Father in
himself—and the Father is truth.” The question is whether Irenaeus has in
mind the reciprocal immanence of the Father and Son when he speaks of Jesus
revealing “the Father in himself.”
This passage accords with the selections just considered insofar as Irenaeus
is here discussing the revelation of the Father. And we once again see Irenaeus
drawing upon the Gospel of John: the assertion that Jesus revealed “the Father
in himself ” rests on an assemblage of texts from John 14, including the first
part of verse 10 in which Jesus declares, “I am in the Father, and the Father in
me.” This text also accords with the previous selections in its mention of the
revelatory dynamic that exists between the Father and the Son when Irenaeus
concludes: “the Son on the one hand leading them to the Father, the Father
indeed revealing to them the Son.” Previously, Irenaeus associated reciprocal
immanence with this revelatory dynamic when in AH 3.6.2 he referred to “the
Father bearing witness to the Son and the Son announcing the Father,” and in
3.11.6 he wrote, “On account of this, they know him (the Father), those to
whom the Son has revealed (him); and, again, the Father, by means of the Son,
gives knowledge of his Son to those who love him.” When, then, AH 3.13.2
refers to the revelatory dynamic that exists between the Father and the Son, it
further suggests that Irenaeus has reciprocal immanence in mind. It would
seem possible, then, that he viewed John 14:10 as supporting the second half of
the dictum, “the Son has the Father in himself,” and perhaps even the dictum
of reciprocal immanence in its entirety.
But one insurmountable point stands against seeing in this text a reference
to the reciprocal immanence of the Father and Word-Son. While it is true that
this passage is similar to the others, inasmuch as Irenaeus is discussing the
revelation of the Father, Irenaeus’ declaration that Jesus reveals the Father in
himself differs considerably from his other declarations that the Son is able to
reveal the Father because the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son.
Here, the revelation of the Father in Jesus refers to the knowledge of the Father
available to human beings through the incarnation of the Word-Son.¹⁸ On the

¹⁸ Irenaeus’ use of Jn 14:10 to make this point has much in common with his well-known use
of Mt. 11:27 in AH 4.6. For the place of Mt. 11:27 in Irenaeus’ polemic, see Lebreton (1928, vol. 2:
557); Luckhart, RevUO 23 (1953: 65–79); Houssiau, ETL 29 (1953: 328–54).
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Word-Son 111
other hand, the ability of the Son to reveal the Father because the Son is in the
Father and the Father is in the Son founds the revelatory capacity of the Son on
the pre-incarnate relationship that exists between the Father and the Son. The
first identifies a benefit of the divine economy, the second grounds that benefit
of the economy on the nature of the divine life. Therefore, though Irenaeus
could have easily turned to John 14:10 to support the second half of the
formula of reciprocal immanence, he does not do so here, nor does he do so
anywhere else. Strange as this may be, it leaves Irenaeus’ declaration that the
Son “has the Father in himself ” without support and in need of justification.
But that justification will have to await the next section.¹⁹
As I mentioned a page or two ago, the final passage I wish to consider in this
section provides insight into whether reciprocal immanence, heretofore dis-
cussed in the context of the divine economy, is proper to the divine life of the
Word-Son and Father. Irenaeus writes:
But the Word of God—who is perfect from the beginning (for he says, “Before
Abraham was, I am” [Jn 8:58])—did not accept the friendship of Abraham
because he was in need of it but so that he—who is good—might give eternal
life to Abraham himself, seeing that the friendship of God grants incorruptibility²⁰
to those who seize it. (4.14.1) Neither did God in the beginning form Adam as if
he was in need of human beings, but so that he might have [someone] upon
whom to bestow his blessings. For not only before Adam, but also before all
creation did the Word glorify his Father, remaining in him, and he was himself
glorified by the Father, as he himself said, “Father, glorify me with the glory which
I had with you before the world was” (Jn. 17:5).²¹
The pertinent portion of this text is Irenaeus’ reference to the Word “remain-
ing in” the Father, but a sound reading of that phrase depends upon a
thorough understanding of the passage as a whole. Irenaeus is here arguing
that the economic activity of God has as its end not provision for divine need
but provision of human blessing. Both the positive and negative aspects of his
argument rest on the relationship he posits between the divine economy and
the nature of the divine life.
Taking the positive aspect of his argument first, Irenaeus maintains that the
economic activity of God has provision of human blessing as its end. He offers
two examples in support. The Word of God accepted the friendship of
Abraham, “so that he—who is good—might give eternal life to Abraham.”
And God formed Adam in the beginning, “so that he might have [someone]
upon whom to bestow his blessings.” It is in the first that he makes explicit the

¹⁹ It is telling that Lebreton does not include this passage amongst those that refer to the
doctrine of reciprocal immanence (1928, vol. 2: 555–6).
²⁰ Following Rousseau’s belief that ἀφθαρσίας rather than ἀθανασίας underlies immortalitatis
(SC 100 1965: 233).
²¹ AH 4.13.4–4.14.1.
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112 God and Christ in Irenaeus

connection between the divine economy and the nature of the divine life: the
Word of God does not accept the friendship of Abraham because he is in need
of it but because he is good. In other words, the economic activity of God is not
necessitated but emerges freely out of the goodness of God.
Though Irenaeus makes this point explicitly only when speaking of the
first example, he means for it to be supported by both examples. His use
of coordinate grammatical structures in both examples is telling. The first
example initially denies that economic activity has its origin in the neediness
of the Word of God, and then places the reference to the goodness of the Word
in the midst of a subjunctive clause (ut donaret) that indicates the purpose of
the Word’s activity. The use of a coordinate structure in the second example—
another denial followed by another subjunctive clause (ut haberet) indicating
purpose—signals that Irenaeus intends his reader to understand that the
formation of Adam also emerges out of the goodness of God.²² In both
examples, then, the divine economy has as its origin God’s goodness and as
its end human blessing.
In the negative aspect of his argument Irenaeus maintains that the econom-
ic activity of God does not have provision for divine need as its end. This is
evident, he contends, because God has no need of that which results from
his economic activity. Irenaeus substantiates this point by means of two
remarks, each of which—I maintain—concerns the relationship between the
divine economy and the nature of the divine life. In the first remark, he
observes that the Word of God is “perfect from the beginning.” As we saw
in Chapter 2, Irenaeus’ attribution of perfection to God indicates that the
nature of God is complete, not subject to increase or decrease that takes
place over time, and thus, is eternally the same.²³ This attribution of perfection
to the Word of God, then, establishes that the Word, as that which is complete,
is categorically other than that which is in need (of anything). It is for this
reason that the Word of God “did not accept the friendship of Abraham
because he was in need of it.”
In the second remark, Irenaeus declares that the Word and Father glorify
each other. While the glorification of God by created beings, such as Adam, is
right and proper, God is not in need of it because the mutual glorification of
the Word and Father existed “before Adam,” even “before all creation.” Some,
like Antonio Orbe and Juan Ochagavía, would read the phrases “before Adam,
but also before all creation” as denoting not eternity but just a time prior to
creation.²⁴ In connection with this reading, these scholars also believe Irenaeus

²² That is to say, we have here a case of intentional ellipsis.

²³ See Chapter 2.2. For another discussion of the Word’s perfection see pp. 38–40 in my
Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012), and pp. 173–81 for how Irenaeus applies the language of
perfection to human beings and how that usage corresponds to its application to the
divine being.
²⁴ Orbe (1958, vol. 1.1: 125); Ochagavía (1964: 97 n. 62).
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Word-Son 113
understood the generation of the Word-Son as not eternal but just prior to and
for the purpose of creation.²⁵ In this way, the generation of the Word-Son was
not necessary or proper to the divine life but economic in purpose. The mutual
glorification of the Word and Father spoken of here would not, then, be
necessary or proper to the divine life for it would attend the generation of
the Word (which itself was not necessary or proper to the divine life, but
economic in nature). If this were the case, the remark at hand would not
address the relationship between the divine economy and that which is proper
to the divine life. This, however, is not the case.
Later in this chapter I will provide a reading of Irenaeus’ conception of the
Word-Son’s generation that stands not with Orbe and Ochagavía but with
those who read Irenaeus as affirming the eternal generation of the Word-Son.
Yet clarity concerning Irenaeus’ conception of the eternality of the Word-
Son does not need to await other passages, for his attribution of perfection to
the Word in the opening line of this selection entails an affirmation of the
Word-Son’s eternality.²⁶ Irenaeus’ affirmation of the eternality of the Word-
Son in this very text not only means that it is unnecessary to read the words
“before Adam, but also before all creation” as denoting just a time prior to
creation, but even improper.
The logic of the passage is clear and consistent. Each line of argumentation
in this selection utilizes the connection Irenaeus posits between the economic
activity of God and the nature of the divine life. The logic at work in the line
of argumentation that refers to the mutual glorification of the Word and
Father should be regarded no differently than the two that precede it. Whether
goodness, perfection, or mutual glorification, each concerns the nature of the
divine life. We should not, then, interpret this text as do Orbe and Ochagavía,
but rather as speaking of the eternal nature of the mutual glorification between
the Word and Father.²⁷
This determination brings us—at long last—to Irenaeus’ reference to the
Word “remaining in (the Father)” (manens in eo). It is a simple statement.
Other than acknowledging that it posits a relationship between the Word and
the Father, little can be said about the phrase itself. But its significance takes an
added dimension now that it is clear that the phrase belongs to a statement
addressing what is proper to the divine life (the mutual glorification of the
Word and Father). For we must now regard Irenaeus’ reference to the Word
“remaining in (the Father)” as also addressing that which is proper to the
divine life. And given that the notion of the Word “remaining in” the Father

²⁵ For Orbe and Ochagavía see note 3 above. Loofs says this text accords with Theophilus of
Antioch’s Autol. 2.22, thus indicating he believes it represents a logos theology in which the
generation of the Word is not eternal but economic—in Theophilus’ case, for the purpose of
creation (1930: 54 n. 1).
²⁶ For references to discussions of this logic, see n. 23 above.
²⁷ Contra Orbe (1958, vol. 1.1: 125).
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114 God and Christ in Irenaeus

corresponds to the first element of reciprocal immanence, we have in this text
confirmation that Irenaeus regarded reciprocal immanence itself as proper to
the divine life.²⁸ This in turn establishes that the diversity (the distinction of
the Word-Son from God the Father) which is essential to the concept of
reciprocal immanence is also essential to the divine life.
As Robert Murray once said, “[This] investigation has become complicated
and is about to become more so. It is time to take our bearings.”²⁹ This first
section has shown that Irenaeus draws upon the Gospel of John to establish,
what Lebreton named, the reciprocal immanence of the Word-Son and Father.
We have seen that Irenaeus regards their reciprocal immanence as the basis of
the Word-Son’s capacity to reveal the Father. And we have also seen that we
should regard their reciprocal immanence as not just economic but as proper
to the divine life.
At the same time, Irenaeus’ appeal to reciprocal immanence has generated
several questions that remain unresolved. It is true that Irenaeus draws upon
John 1:18 in order to found the Son’s ability to reveal the Father on their
reciprocal immanence. But this verse only serves as a foundation for the
first half of the formula which maintains that the Son “is in the Father.” The
second half of the formula, the Son “has the Father in himself,” does not enjoy
similar Scriptural support in these passages or elsewhere in Irenaeus. But this
is not to say it is wholly unsupported elsewhere. One task of the next section is
to identify the logic that justifies Irenaeus’ affirmation that the Son “has the
Father in himself.”
Another important question, raised earlier, concerns the contrast Irenaeus
draws in AH 3.11.5–6 between being outside of the Father and being in the
bosom of the Father. Since the latter (being in the bosom of the Father) makes
possible the Son’s revelatory ability, we can deduce that the former (being
outside the Father) would preclude the Son’s revelation of the Father. But none
of the texts considered so far explains why this is the case. Another task of the
next section, then, is to identify the logic that explains what it is about being in
the Father—as opposed to being outside the Father—that makes it possible for
the Word-Son to reveal the Father. Such a line of reasoning has the potential
to explain why Irenaeus regards reciprocal immanence as the basis for the
Word-Son’s revelatory ability.
Finally, we have seen that we should regard reciprocal immanence as proper
to the divine life. But we must ask what Irenaeus means when he affirms John’s
statements that the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son. It is not

²⁸ So, too, Lebreton: “this existence of the Son in the Father, of the Father in the Son, is
eternal” (1928, vol. 2: 558). Pace Barnes, who understands there to be a shift from the moment
when the Word-Son is in the Father, prior to the Word-Son’s generation, to a moment when
there is true reciprocal immanence, after the Word-Son’s generation (NV 7 2009: 81).
²⁹ Murray, NTS 21 (1975: 59–80, here 67).
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Word-Son 115
yet clear how Irenaeus conceives of their reciprocal immanence. Nor is it
clear how the reciprocal immanence of the Father and Word-Son harmonizes
with Irenaeus’ understanding of the divine being, discussed in Chapter 2—
especially divine simplicity. The identification of a logic that resolves these
matters is the final task of the upcoming section.
While the passages above do not answer these questions, passages that
precede them in Irenaeus’ corpus do. The resolution of these matters can be
found in the reasoning lodged in the polemic of Against Heresies 2. The
polemical argumentation in AH 2 not only grants insight into these matters
but also into Irenaeus’ conception of divine production. I will reserve, how-
ever, the exploration of some of these latter insights for the third section of
this chapter.

3.2. LOGICAL FOUNDATION OF RECIPROCAL

IMMA NENCE

I am not the first to see a connection between reciprocal immanence and the
argument of Against Heresies 2. Lebreton himself recognized that Irenaeus’
idea of reciprocal immanence bears some relation to the arguments we find in
that earlier book.³⁰ But his comments were made in passing and once again he
left the exploration of matters to others. This was an opportunity missed. For
the passage that attracted Lebreton’s attention contains the logic that resolves
many of the questions raised by Irenaeus’ later appeals to reciprocal imma-
nence. We turn, then, to that passage, AH 2.17.8:
No longer, therefore, [can it be held] as these men teach that Logos, as having
the third rank in generation (of the aeons), was ignorant of Father. For such a
thing might be deemed plausible in the generation of human beings, because they
often do not know their parents, but in Logos of Father it is altogether impossible.
For if, being³¹ in Father, he knows him in whom he is—that is, is not ignorant of
himself—so also those (aeons) which are emitted by him, since they are his
Powers and always attend him, will not be ignorant of him who emitted them,
just as rays [are] not [ignorant of] the sun.
As the last chapter of this study demonstrated, Irenaeus spends considerable
time in AH 2 challenging the Ptolemaic belief in the ordered production of
aeons. He devotes a portion of that argument, as we see here, to attacking the
Ptolemaic assertion that Logos is ignorant of Father because Logos occupies

³⁰ See Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 556), where he briefly discusses AH 2.17.8.

³¹ The Latin is the present participle of exsisto, which likely renders that of ὑπάρχω.
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116 God and Christ in Irenaeus

the third place in the ordered production of the aeons.³² The key movement
of this polemical argument against the Ptolemaic understanding of the
relationship that exists between Logos and Father also provides the logical
key that explains Irenaeus’ constructive understanding of reciprocal imma-
nence as the basis for the Word-Son’s ability to reveal the Father.
Irenaeus contends that it is impossible for Logos to be ignorant of Father,
“For if, being in Father, he knows him in whom he is . . . .” In its abstract
form the logic undergirding this contention is: the one who is in another
knows that one in whom he is. Here we have a logical principle that suits
Irenaeus’ appropriation of the Johannine dictum that the Son is in the Father
and the Father is in the Son, and a logical principle that begins to explain his
contention that being in the bosom of the Father makes possible the Son’s
revelation of the Father while being outside the Father precludes it.³³ For
when translated to the context of reciprocal immanence this principle ex-
plains that the Word-Son is able to reveal the Father because the Word-Son,
who is in the Father, knows the Father. At the same time, according to this
principle, if the Word-Son was outside the Father, he would not know the
Father, and thus could not reveal him.
This reasoning, therefore, makes sense of the contrast Irenaeus drew
between being in the bosom of the Father and being outside the Father in
AH 3.11.5–6 when founding the Word-Son’s revelation of the Father on their
reciprocal immanence. For, when considered in light of this logic, the
reciprocal immanence of the Word-Son and Father entails the knowledge
of the Father by the Word-Son,³⁴ and this knowledge is the principle of the
Word-Son’s revelation of the Father.³⁵ But this insight raises a further
question, because it is not yet clear what it is about the nature of one
“being in” another that entails the knowledge of the other by that one. It is
not clear when it comes to the aeon Logos knowing Father by “being in”
Father, nor is it clear when it comes to the Word-Son knowing the Father by
“being in” the Father. Once again, however, the logic Irenaeus articulates in
his polemic to explain the former also explains the latter.
It is tempting to look for that logic in AH 2.13.6. For there Irenaeus
also argues that aeons such as Logos cannot be ignorant of Father if they

³² See AH 1.1.1, where Irenaeus states that knowledge of First-Father stops with Nous (Mind),
who alone is capable of grasping the greatness of First-Father.
³³ The idea that we identified in the earlier analysis of AH 3.11.5–6.
³⁴ It also entails the knowledge of the Word-Son by the Father which Irenaeus states in AH
4.6.3, where he founds the point on Mt. 11:27.
³⁵ This knowledge is the principle of the Word-Son’s revelation of the Father insofar as it
constitutes the content of that revelation which makes known a portion of that knowledge. But
the ultimate basis for the Word-Son’s revelation of the Father will soon be shown to be divine
simplicity.
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Word-Son 117
are within him.³⁶ The argument in that passage utilizes the logic established in
Chapter 2 in the analysis of AH 2.13.7 and 4.19.2–3. Those passages, when
read together, revealed Irenaeus’ understanding that the infinite God who
encloses all things is present to those things enclosed by him, such that each of
those things may possess a natural knowledge of God. When it comes to the
polemical argument of AH 2.13.6, Irenaeus appropriates this logic in order to
argue that aeons such as Logos cannot be ignorant of Father because they are
within him.
While the polemical goal of AH 2.13.6 is identical to that of 2.17.8, the
earlier passage does not hold the explanation we seek, because unlike AH
2.13.6 the argument of 2.17.8 does not draw on the principle of divine infinity.
So much may be ascertained from careful consideration of the gloss Irenaeus
appends to the key movement of his argument in AH 2.17.8: “that is, is not
ignorant of himself.” This gloss appears in the context of the earlier quotation
as: “For if, being in Father, he knows him in whom he is—that is, is not
ignorant of himself.” According to this gloss, the knowledge Logos has of
Father—as a result of being in him—is knowledge of himself. The principle of
divine infinity, elucidated in Chapter 2, does not explain this reasoning.
However, this equation of Logos’ knowledge of Father with Logos’ knowledge
of himself does make sense if Logos and Father are identified in accordance
with the principle of divine simplicity, also elucidated in Chapter 2 of this
study. That Irenaeus is here thinking in terms of divine simplicity rather than
divine infinity is clear from the discussion that precedes this quotation.
Toward the end of AH 2.17.7, he writes:
For Father of all is not some composite being (who can be) separated from Nous,
as we have already shown, but Nous is Father and Father is Nous. It is necessary,
therefore, that Logos who is from him—nay more, Nous himself, since he is
Logos—is perfect and impassible. And those emissions which are from him, since
they are of the same substance with him, perfect and impassible, should ever
remain similar to him who emitted them.
It is inappropriate, Irenaeus argues, to think of the divine being as compound,
such that Father, Nous, and Logos are regarded as separate entities. The
Ptolemaic hypothesis errs by taking this approach. Rather than compound,
the divine being is simple: Father is Nous, Nous is Logos.
This reasoning should be familiar because it is a simplified form of the
longer arguments Irenaeus presented in AH 2.13.3 (the passage to which he

³⁶ AH 2.13.6: “In the next place, this one (Mind) having been emitted, that Logos who is from
him will be in Father, and the other emissions of Logos will likewise be (in Father). These,
therefore, will not even be ignorant of Father since they are within him. Nor will any one (of the
emissions) know him less on account of the descending order of emission, since they all are
equally surrounded on every side by Father.”
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118 God and Christ in Irenaeus

refers when he writes, “as we have already shown”) and will present again in
AH 2.28.4–5. Both passages, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, feature the
quotation of Xenophanes upon which Irenaeus founds his doctrine of divine
simplicity.³⁷ Moreover, a statement Irenaeus makes in AH 2.28.5, soon after
the quotation of Xenophanes, closely resembles what we find here in 2.17.7.
There he writes:
But God is all Mind (Mens)³⁸ and all Word (Logos).³⁹ What he thinks, this also he
speaks, and what he speaks, this also he thinks, for his Mind (Mens)⁴⁰ is Word,
and Word is Mind, and all-containing Mind is the Father himself. He, therefore,
who speaks of the Mind of God and gives to the Mind its own emission proclaims
that he is composite, as if one is God and another is the ruling Mind.⁴¹
As in AH 2.17.7 we see here that Irenaeus considers the divine being, as the
sum of all positive attributes, to be identical with any one of the divine
attributes and he regards the divine attributes as identical, one with another.⁴²
In addition, both passages reveal that Irenaeus believes the principle of divine
simplicity bears on the question of the emission or production of aeons.⁴³ The
similarity between these passages further confirms that the principle of divine
simplicity undergirds Irenaeus’ reasoning in AH 2.17.7–8.
Now that we have identified divine simplicity as the operative principle in
AH 2.17.8, we are in a position to address what it is about the nature of one
“being in” another that entails the knowledge of the other by that one—the
question that launched this portion of our investigation. Irenaeus writes that
Logos knows Father because he is in Father (“For if, being in Father, he knows

³⁷ AH 2.13.3: “It certainly holds to say these things when it comes to human beings, since they
are compound by nature, consisting of a body and a soul . . . . But if they had learned the
Scriptures and been taught by the truth, they would certainly know that God is not like
human beings . . . (For the Father of all) is simple, not compound, like in members, and entirely
similar and equal to himself, since he is all Mind, all Spirit, all Understanding, all Thought, all
Word, all Hearing, all Eye, all Light, the whole Source of all good things—even as it is permissible
for the religious to speak about God.” And AH 2.28.4–5 reads: “You do not understand that in
the case of a human being, who is a composite living being, it is conceivable to speak of such
things (as we said above), namely, of the mind of a human being, and the thought of a human
being, and [to say] that thought comes from mind, and from thought reflection, and from
reflection word (logos) . . . However, since God is all Mind (Mens), all Word (Ratio), and all
operative Spirit, and all Light, and is always existing the same and alike (this is the way in which it
is profitable for us to think about God and this is what we learn from the scriptures), no longer
should processes and divisions of such a kind be properly ascribed to him.”
³⁸ Throughout AH 2.28.5 “Mind” translates the Latin mens.
³⁹ Throughout AH 2.28.5 “Word” translates the Latin transliteration logos.
⁴⁰ Following Rousseau, who emends the text by substituting mens for cogitatio (SC 293
1982: 321).
⁴¹ AH 2.28.5.
⁴² Chapter 2 of this study addressed this logic more fully in the course of analyzing AH 2.13.3,
8–9—the text to which Irenaeus refers in AH 2.17.7.
⁴³ The connection Irenaeus sees between divine simplicity and divine production will soon be
explored more fully.
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Word-Son 119
him in whom he is—that is, is not ignorant of himself”). But according to the
principle of divine simplicity, upon which Irenaeus insists in AH 2.17.7, Logos
must be identified with Father. This identification of Logos and Father renders
nonsensical a spatially defined conception of Logos “being in” Father.⁴⁴ That is
to say, divine simplicity requires us to understand the idea of “being in” in
something other than spatial terms.⁴⁵
If the principle of divine simplicity makes demands upon our interpretation
of this text, it also provides solutions. Given Irenaeus’ identification of Logos
and Father, in accordance with the principle of divine simplicity, when
Irenaeus speaks of Logos “being in” Father we must understand him to
mean that Logos “is one with” Father. This being the case, when he writes
that Logos knows Father because he is in him, he must mean that Logos knows
Father because he is one with him.⁴⁶ In abstract terms: the one who is in
another knows that one in whom he is because they are one. In terms of his
polemical argument, then, Irenaeus is arguing that the Ptolemaic Gnostics
cannot use the ordered production of the aeons to maintain that Logos is
ignorant of Father. Logos knows Father because Logos is one with Father—
just as he is not ignorant of himself, he is not ignorant of Father.⁴⁷ When
translated into the context of reciprocal immanence, this logic also explains
what it is about “being in” the Father that entails the knowledge of the Father
by the Word-Son. The Word-Son knows the Father because he is one with
the Father.⁴⁸
Therefore, Irenaeus’ reasoning in AH 2.17.8 not only explains that the
Word-Son is able to reveal the Father because “being in” the Father results
in a knowledge of the Father that is the principle of the Word-Son’s revelation,
but also explains that the Word-Son’s knowledge of the Father is founded
upon the Word-Son being one with the Father.⁴⁹ With the identification of
divine simplicity as the operative principle in the latter part of this logic, the

⁴⁴ Here we see that the polemical arguments of AH 2.13.6–7 and 2.17.8 align because the
principles of divine infinity and simplicity both militate against a spatial conception of the divine
being, including the ordered production of aeons affirmed in the Ptolemaic hypothesis.
⁴⁵ Here we also gain insight into Irenaeus’ polemical argumentation, because this logic
challenges the spatial conception of the production of aeons undergirding the Ptolemaic
hypothesis about God. For this spatial conception, see Schoedel (1972: 88–108).
⁴⁶ Lashier draws a similar conclusion, though working from a slightly different reading
(2014: 145).
⁴⁷ Lashier also recognizes the polemical value of divine simplicity for Irenaeus’ argument
against the ordered production of aeons defined by spatial separation (2014: 141–5).
⁴⁸ See also, Barnes, who wrote that the Word-Son’s knowledge of the Father “is the effect of the
Word-Son’s unity with the Father, which Irenaeus describes primarily in terms of the Word-Son’s
‘reciprocal immanance’ with the Father, and secondarily in terms of the Word-Son’s generation
from the Father” (NV 7 2009: 79–80). I address the generation of the Word-Son below.
⁴⁹ This understanding provides depth and nuance to Irenaeus’ statement in AH 4.5.1, “since it
was impossible, without God, to know God, he teaches human beings by his Word to
know God.”
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120 God and Christ in Irenaeus

questions with which we concluded the last section merge and the remaining
questions can now be addressed.
First, I had observed that though Irenaeus’ quotation of John 1:18 supports
the first half of the formula of reciprocal immanence (the Son “is in the Father”),
the second half of the formula (the Son “has the Father in himself ”) did not
receive similar Scriptural support. One task of this section, then, was to identify a
logical argument that justifies Irenaeus’ affirmation that the Son “has the Father
in himself.” The logic of AH 2.17.8, founded as it is on divine simplicity, satisfies
this charge. For it allows us to interpret Irenaeus’ references to the Son being
in the Father and the Son having the Father in himself as meaning that the Son is
one with the Father and the Father is one with the Son. This, in turn, explains
why Irenaeus did not need to quote a text of Scripture, such as John 14:10–11, in
support of the second half of the formula. Because from the standpoint of divine
simplicity Irenaeus only needed to establish the unity of Father and Son from
one point of view (the Son “is in the Father”—meaning, the Son is one with
the Father) for the other point of view to hold (the Son “has the Father in
himself”—meaning, the Father is one with the Son). The grammar of reciprocal
immanence, then, is grounded on the principle of divine simplicity.
The second question posed at the end of the last section can be dealt with in
short order because the substance of the matter has already been addressed. In
AH 3.11.5–6 Irenaeus contended that the Son is able to reveal the Father since
the Son “is not outside of him, but is in the bosom of the Father.” We are now
able to explain why it is that being outside the Father would preclude the Son’s
revelation of the Father. The explanation rests on the recognition that Ire-
naeus’ references to the Word-Son and Father “being in” each other should
be interpreted in light of the principle of divine simplicity, such that they mean
the Word-Son and Father are one with each other. The revelatory ability
of the Word-Son, then, attends the existence of the Word-Son as one with
the Father. This being the case, the Word-Son could not reveal the Father if he
was not one with him—if he was “outside of him.” He can because he is.
The previous section finished with two closely related points of inquiry. The
first wondered what Irenaeus means when he affirms the Gospel’s declaration
that the Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son. This question has
been answered several times over. The logic of AH 2.17.8 allows us to say that
he means the Son is one with the Father and the Father is one with the Son.
The second observed that it was not yet clear how the reciprocal immanence of
the Father and Word-Son harmonizes with Irenaeus’ understanding of the
divine being. Here too the logic of AH 2.17.8 provides an answer, for it allows
us to see the way in which the reciprocal immanence of the Word-Son and
Father is founded upon the simplicity of the divine being.
It is clear that the logic of AH 2.17.8, founded as it is on divine simplicity,
explains much of Irenaeus’ conception of the reciprocal immanence of the
Word-Son and Father. In so doing it grants considerable insight into Irenaeus’
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Word-Son 121
conception of the intra-Trinitarian relationship that exists between the
Word-Son and Father. But we have yet one more line of inquiry to explore.
For Irenaeus’ comments about the production of a simple, spiritual substance—
divine production—provide additional insight into his understanding of
the manner in which the Word-Son is related to God the Father.

3.3. DIVINE PRODUCTION

The suggestion that Irenaeus has something to say about divine production
may come as a surprise to many who have grown accustomed to the scholarly
refrain that he speaks of the generation of the Word-Son but refuses to
comment beyond a simple acknowledgement of it.⁵⁰ But as with other narra-
tives highlighted in this study, this one also fails to fully account for Irenaeus’
thought. The inadequacy of this particular narrative, however, has not gone
unnoticed by every scholar.
Adelin Rousseau may have been the first to make a little headway on this
question when he observed that Irenaeus uses different terms to speak of the
two generations of the Word-Son, the divine and human.⁵¹ Jacques Fantino
then argued that while Justin regards divine generation as providing for
the distinction without separation of Word and Father, Irenaeus adds that
their unity “holds precisely in the generation of the Son by the Father.”⁵²
More recently Jackson Lashier demonstrated that Irenaeus’ polemic reveals
important aspects of his understanding of divine generation.⁵³ Lashier’s
refusal to neglect Irenaeus’ polemical argumentation by limiting his investi-
gation to Irenaeus’ more constructive thought serves him well.⁵⁴ For he, more

⁵⁰ An early version of this refrain may be found in Harnack, who says Irenaeus “refused to
investigate what the divine element in Christ is . . . and declines speculative disquisitions on
principle” (1901, vol. 2: 263). More recently, see, e.g., Daniélou (1973: 357); and Fantino (1994: 374).
This reading of Irenaeus was bolstered by the narrative established by Audet, Grant, and
Schoedel—addressed in Chapter 1—that Irenaeus opposed theological speculation, especially
when it comes to causation. Even Lashier, who alone has offered a substantial argument for
Irenaeus’ conception of the Word-Son’s generation, shows he has not fully escaped this narrative
when he remarks that Irenaeus leaves divine generation a mystery (2014: 130).
⁵¹ Commenting on AH 3.11.8 (SC 210 1974: 285), Rousseau observes that Irenaeus follows
Scripture in using γενεά (Isa. 53:11) to speak of the Word-Son’s divine generation and γέννησις
(e.g., Mt 1:18) to speak of his human generation (his birth as Jesus Christ). He further argues that
this pattern holds throughout Irenaeus’ works. Fantino follows Rousseau (1994: 375–6).
AH 3.19.1 and 3 also preserve this distinction in Greek; 3.19.2 preserves it in Latin (genituram
vs. generatione). NB: the Latin translator uses generatio to render both Greek terms.
⁵² Fantino (1994: 376), commenting on Prf 46–7. ⁵³ Lashier (2014: esp. 136–47).
⁵⁴ Contra Orbe, who “severs the polemic of Haer. 2 from any positive notion of the [Logos’]
generation,” Lashier contends “the presence of such a detailed critique of a theory of emanation
necessitates, in my mind, some base positive understanding from which the alternate can
deviate” (2014: 131 n. 155).
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122 God and Christ in Irenaeus

than any other, recognizes that Irenaeus has something to say about divine
generation.⁵⁵
While no one could say that the generation of the Word-Son is a subject
upon which Irenaeus is effusive, he does say more about divine generation
than is usually recognized.⁵⁶ More even than Fantino and Lashier have
recognized. Indeed, in the course of arguing against the ordered production
of aeons affirmed by the Ptolemaic Gnostics, Irenaeus presents both a measure
of and principles governing divine production that accord with and even
justify some of his more constructive doctrinal statements. These comments,
lodged though they are in his polemic, afford insight into his conception of the
Word-Son and the Word-Son’s relationship to the Father.
The notion, however, that Irenaeus refuses to say anything about the
generation of the Word-Son is so entrenched that it is necessary to enter our
investigation into this aspect of Irenaeus’ thought by way of the readings
that have supported previous narratives. Two readings of Irenaeus have
supported this understanding. The first maintains that Irenaeus opposes
theological speculation and especially causal investigation. But Chapter 1 of
this study detailed the arguments of Audet, Grant, and Schoedel in support of
this reading, showed their arguments to be flawed, and their reading to be
inaccurate.⁵⁷ The second reading concerns the specific question of whether
Irenaeus believes it is possible to comment upon the generation of the Word-
Son. Irenaeus’ statement in AH 2.28.6 has been regarded as an indisputable
denial:
Having been irrationally puffed up (cf. 1 Cor. 4:18), you audaciously assert that
you know the ineffable mysteries of God, whereas even the Lord, the very Son of
God, conceded that the Father alone knows the very day and hour of judgment,
clearly saying: “But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the Son, except
the Father alone” (Mt 24:36). If, then, the Son was not ashamed to refer the
knowledge of that day to the Father, but said what is true, neither should we be
ashamed to reserve for God the greater things which are in question according to
us. No one, after all, is beyond the teacher (cf. Mt 10:4). If, then, someone should
say to us: “In what way, then, is the Son emitted by the Father?” we reply to him
that no one understands this emission, or generation, or calling, or revelation, or
whatever name by which one might have called his ineffable, existing generation—
not Valentinus, nor Marcion, neither Saturninus, nor Basilides, nor angels, nor

⁵⁵ Lashier highlights two points: (1) that “the generation of the Logos from God does not
involve an element of time. Specifically, the Logos’ generation does not equate to a starting point
to his separate, personal existence” (2014: 136), and (2) “that the generation does not imply a
spatial separation, either ontological or epistemological, between God and his Logos” (p. 142).
My reading accords with these insights.
⁵⁶ Lashier writes, “it is not the case, as has been maintained in past scholarship, that Irenaeus
has no conception of the Logos’ generation” (2014: 130).
⁵⁷ See Chapter 1.2.
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Word-Son 123
archangels, nor Principalities, nor Powers [know], but only the Father who has
generated and the Son who was born. Therefore, since his generation is ineffable,
all those who try to declare the generations and emissions are not in their right
mind, since they promise to declare those things which are ineffable.
This declaration appears to be as straightforward as can be. For Irenaeus here
presents inquiry into the generation of the Word-Son as the quintessential
example of a causal inquiry that is beyond the knowledge of human beings. If
read alone, apart from contextualizing statements, there would be no question
that it should be regarded as indisputable. But it should not be read alone, for
other comments by Irenaeus bring it into question.⁵⁸
Indeed, the very argument of which this passage is a part calls into question
Irenaeus’ declaration “that no one understands this emission, or generation, or
calling, or revelation, or whatever name by which one might have called his
ineffable, existing generation.” As discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, Ire-
naeus’ comments in AH 2.28.6 belong to his argument against the ordered
production of aeons affirmed by the Ptolemaic hypothesis. In AH 2.28.4–5 he
argues that the hypothesis of his opponents errs when it models the ordered
production of the aeons on the production of a word by a human being, who is
a “composite living being” (compositum animal).⁵⁹ A human word is pro-
duced when “thought (ennoea) comes from mind (sensu), and from thought
reflection (enthymesis), and from reflection word (logos).” But, Irenaeus con-
tends, the quotation of Xenophanes demonstrates that “processes and divi-
sions (adfectus et divisiones) of such a kind (should no longer) be properly
ascribed to [God].” For while “processes and divisions” characterize the
production of a human word, because the carnality of the tongue prevents it
from keeping pace with the spiritual mind, such “processes and divisions” do
not characterize God who is “all Mind (Mens) and all Word (Logos).” Indeed:
“What [God] thinks, this also he speaks, and what he speaks, this also he
thinks, for his Mind (Mens) is Word, and Word is Mind, and all-containing
Mind is the Father himself.”
Two points I highlighted in Chapter 2’s analysis of this argument are
pertinent at present. First, Irenaeus clarifies his opposition to the belief of
his Gnostic opponents that the ordered production of aeons is analogous to
the production of a human word by contrasting the human and divine
natures. Because human beings are composite while divine beings are simple,
human experience, strictly speaking, is not analogous to the divine. Thus, as
is alluded in AH 2.13.8 and explicitly stated in AH 4.11.2, simplicity defines

⁵⁸ In Prf 70 Irenaeus makes a statement similar to what we see here. In contrast to his
comments in AH 2.28.6, his comments in Prf 70 are brief and lack the contextualizing statements
that complicate (and, I believe, clarify) our reading of AH 2.28.6. For this reason, I take his
comments in AH 2.28.6 as instructive and as an interpretive guide for those he makes in Prf 70.
⁵⁹ A quotation of this passage appears in Chapter 2 at the beginning of Chapter 2.2.
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124 God and Christ in Irenaeus

the divine being over against created beings, such as humans. Second, the
“processes and divisions” that Irenaeus insists do not apply to God are a
function of temporality. The reason he stresses the difference between the
composite human being and the simple divine being is to establish a basis for
declaring that temporality does not apply to the divine being. It is to this end
that he contrasts the slowness of the carnal tongue with the rapidity of the
spiritual mind. Since the divine being is not constituted by two different
substances, as are human beings, there is no ontological basis for thinking
that the activity of divine production is conditioned by temporality, as is the
activity of human production.⁶⁰ This, of course, further undermines any
attempt to use the production of a human word to explain divine generation.
Irenaeus makes this point clear in the second half of AH 2.28.5:
Likewise, with regard to Word, the one who assigns to him the third emission
from Father, because of which [Word] is also ignorant of [Father’s] greatness,
separates Word very far from God. Indeed, the prophets said of him: “Who shall
declare his generation?” (Isa. 53:8) You, however, who are divining his generation
from the Father and transferring the emission of a word of human beings made
by the tongue to the Word of God, you are justly exposed by your own selves as
having known neither human nor divine things.
The focus of this passage shifts in the middle. The first sentence concerns the
generation of the aeon Word, while bearing indirectly on the generation of the
Word-Son of God.⁶¹ With the quotation of Isa. 53:8 Irenaeus begins to directly
address the generation of the Word-Son of God. The final sentence establishes
it is improper to regard the production of a human word as analogous to the
generation of the divine Word-Son. The argument that precedes this selection,
as just explained, makes clear why this is the case: the “processes and divi-
sions” that characterize the production of a human word do not pertain to the
generation of the divine Word-Son. The principle of divine simplicity entails
the corollary of atemporality which precludes any attribution of “processes
and divisions” to divine activity ad intra, specifically divine generation.
In this way, we see that Irenaeus’ declaration in AH 2.28.6—that “no one
understands this emission, or generation, or calling or revelation (of the Word-
Son)”—should not be regarded as an unqualified repudiation of the human
ability to understand and comment upon the generation of the Word-Son. For
just a paragraph before, in AH 2.28.5, Irenaeus’ own polemic is founded upon a

⁶⁰ As noted in Chapter 2, Lashier too has observed that the analogy of human psychological
processes fails in light of the principle of divine simplicity and atemporality (2014: 86–9, 132–4).
However, while he discusses atemporality in the context of divine simplicity, he does not
explicitly identify it as a corollary.
⁶¹ Here, again, we see the polemical value of the principle of divine simplicity. It poses an
effective challenge to the Ptolemaic attribution of ignorance to the Word based on an ontological
status defined by spatial distance (esp. given Irenaeus’ previous comments in AH 2.17).
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Word-Son 125
definite understanding of the Word-Son’s generation: divine generation must
be understood in a way that accords with the principle of divine simplicity and
its corollary of atemporality, such that any conception of the Word-Son’s
generation that is temporally conditioned is inappropriate.⁶² Indeed, as
I briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, this is not the only passage in which Irenaeus
insists on this understanding of divine generation. In fact, the argument we find
here closely follows the argument of AH 2.13.3–8.
AH 2.13.3–8 received considerable attention in Chapter 2 of this study.
Therefore, I will highlight only the most pertinent aspects here and direct
interested readers to the previous discussion. After asserting the principle of
divine simplicity in AH 2.13.3, Irenaeus applies it to the generation of the
Word-Son in AH 2.13.8. He first establishes, as explained in Chapter 2,
atemporality as a corollary of simplicity:
. . . but in him who is God above all, since he is all Nous, and all Word, as we have
said before, and has in himself nothing more ancient nor more recent . . . then no
emission of such an order will follow.⁶³
Temporality does not define God’s being: there is nothing in God “more
ancient nor more recent.” He makes the same point later in this section,
now with a focus on the generation of the Word-Son of God. He writes that
those who affirm the tenets of divine simplicity:
will still have an inadequate conception of the Father of all, but a much more
fitting one than those who transfer the generation of the emitted word of human
beings to the eternal Word of God, assigning a beginning and commencement of
emission (to the Word of God), just as (they do) to their own word. Indeed, in
what way would the Word of God—nay, even God himself, since he is the Word—
differ from the word of human beings, if he has the same order and process of
generation?⁶⁴
As in the later passage of AH 2.28.4–6, just considered, Irenaeus here
addresses the propriety of regarding the production of a human word as
analogous to the production of the divine Word. The assignment of “a
beginning and commencement of emission” to the generation of the divine
Word is inappropriate because, unlike the production of a human word, the
production of the divine Word is not conditioned by temporality. Which is to
say, the generation of the Word is atemporal. His turn to the atemporality of
the Word’s generation after a discussion of divine simplicity reflects the logic
established earlier in the section: atemporality follows simplicity.⁶⁵

⁶² Lashier writes, “it is clear that Irenaeus does not understand the Logos’ generation from the
Father to constitute a temporal beginning of the existence of the Logos” (2014: 134).
⁶³ AH 2.13.8. ⁶⁴ AH 2.13.8.
⁶⁵ For a demonstration of this logic, see Chapter 2.2.
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126 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Therefore, both AH 2.13.8 and 2.28.4–6 disclose that Irenaeus understood
divine simplicity to be the measure of divine generation. Moreover, AH 2.13.8
shows that Irenaeus regarded this understanding to be not only valuable to his
argument against the ordered production of the aeons but to a proper under-
standing of the generation of the Word-Son. It is inappropriate, he insists, to
assign a “a beginning and commencement of emission” to the Word-Son’s
generation. A moment’s reflection draws out the constructive significance of
this statement. If the generation of the Word-Son cannot be said to have a “a
beginning and commencement of emission” because divine simplicity requires
the Word-Son’s generation to be atemporal, then Irenaeus is insisting that the
generation of the Word-Son must be regarded as eternal.⁶⁶ That is to say,
Irenaeus’ determination to measure divine generation by divine simplicity
leads him to declare the eternal generation of the Word-Son. It is clear, then,
that Irenaeus has more to say about the generation of the Word-Son than has
been recognized in the past.⁶⁷
But the constructive significance of this reasoning does not stop here. For
the eternal generation of the Word-Son establishes both the eternal nature of
the Word-Son and—given that the Word-Son was generated by God the
Father—the eternal diversity of the divine being.⁶⁸ Therefore, characteriza-
tions of Irenaeus’ theology as modalistic or as similar to Roman Monarchian-
ism can no longer be regarded as viable.⁶⁹ The same holds for readings that say
Irenaeus believed the Word-Son was generated at a time prior to creation, but
not eternally.⁷⁰ Irenaeus’ understanding of divine generation is considerably
more advanced than the two-stage Logos theology affirmed by his contem-
porary Theophilus of Antioch and even more advanced than what we find in
Tertullian.⁷¹ No longer viable also are more general descriptions of Irenaeus’

⁶⁶ As Wolfson has observed, in arguing that divine generation is not subject to time, Irenaeus’
logic affirms the eternal generation of the Word-Son but not the continuous eternal generation
of the Word affirmed by Origen (1964, vol. 1: 198–202).
⁶⁷ Still, I am not the first to read Irenaeus as affirming the eternal generation of the Word-Son,
see, e.g., Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 555); Aeby (1958: 57; but NB the other aspect of Aeby’s position
given in n. 6 above); Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 198–201); Fantino, who says the generation of the
Son expresses his eternal origin and who further contrasts the Word who is with created things
which become (1994: 377, 343); Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 93); Lashier (2014: 136–42).
⁶⁸ In AH 2.28.6 Irenaeus writes of “the Father who has generated and the Son who was born.”
Irenaeus’ logic in this passage comes very close to a definition of the Father as the one who
generated the Son and of the Son as the one who was generated by the Father.
⁶⁹ For readings of Irenaeus’ thought as modalistic or as similar to that of the Roman
Monarchians, see n. 2 above.
⁷⁰ See nn. 3 and 4 above.
⁷¹ The idea that Irenaeus’ thought is in line with the Apologists may have begun with Harnack
(1901, vol. 2: 237), who said he “only thought with systematic clearness within the scheme of the
Apologists.” Loofs’s source-critical analysis of Against Heresies leads him to regard Irenaeus as a
mere compiler of the ideas that came before him, especially those of Justin Martyr and
Theophilus of Antioch (1930). R.A. Norris argued Irenaeus uses a modified form of the Logos
theology articulated by the Apologists (1965: 70–2). Orbe maintained that Irenaeus’ statements
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Word-Son 127
Trinitarian theology as economic.⁷² For though Irenaeus does not offer an
explicit discussion of the matter, one may easily deduce from the reasoning
found in these passages that the generation of the Word-Son is necessary—
essential to the divine being—and not just for the purpose of the divine
economy.⁷³
To this point we have seen that Irenaeus presents divine simplicity as the
measure of divine generation. This alone is significant. But Irenaeus also
discusses the kind of divine production that he believes satisfies the stan-
dards of divine simplicity. In the course of that discussion he outlines three
principles about the production of a simple, spiritual substance—divine
production—that grant further insight into the manner in which the Word-
Son is related to God the Father. We turn, then, to Irenaeus’ discussion of
these matters in AH 2.17.
In AH 2.17 we once again find Irenaeus criticizing the thinking of his
Gnostic opponents about the production of aeons. Their logic fails, he argues,
because they maintain at one and the same time that a unity of sub-
stance exists between the aeons and their Author or Father (Propator) and
that the aeons are susceptible to passion while their Author or Father is
not. These propositions, Irenaeus maintains, are contradictory. Of the two,
he does not attack the former, but rather uses it to undermine the latter.
His argument is designed to identify the kind of production that is proper to
a “spiritual and divine substance.” The term, “spiritual and divine substance”
appears in Chapter 4, but it accurately captures the subject of AH 2.17 since

about the generation of the Word-Son evoke Justin and Theophilus of Antioch (1958, vol. 1.1:
120, 132). On the other hand, Hitchcock opposed the suggestion that Irenaeus’ understanding of
the Word-Son’s generation would agree with that of Tatian, Theophilus, and Tertullian (1914,
repr. 2004: 122–3). Wolfson argued Irenaeus’ single-stage theory differs from the two-stage
theory of Justin and Tertullian (1964, vol. 1: 198–201). Rousseau eviscerated Orbe’s argument
that Irenaeus’ theology is similar to the apologists (Le Muséon 84 1971: 5–42, esp. 42). Fantino
maintained that Irenaeus differs from his Gnostic opponents and Apologists in that Irenaeus
regards the Word-Son and Spirit as coeternal with the Father and believes Trinitarian diversity to
be independent of the economy (1994: 346). In this way, we see Irenaeus’ understanding of
divine generation has constructive as well as polemical value. But the most extensive criticism of
the suggestion that Irenaeus’ theology aligns with that of the Apologists comes from Lashier,
whose entire study is devoted to challenging this notion (2014).
⁷² See n. 3 above.
⁷³ The polemical argument of AH 2.15.3 also suits this reading (contra Orbe 1958, vol. 1.1:
123–4). There Irenaeus argues that if the Ptolemaic Gnostics argue the Pleroma was produced for
the sake of creation, then the Pleroma can no longer be regarded as formed on its own account
and creation will have greater honor than the Pleroma (given that the Pleroma was produced for
the sake of creation). This argument reveals that Irenaeus understood what was at stake in
attributing a necessary eternal generation to the Word-Son. And when considered together with
Irenaeus’ belief in the preeminence of the Creator God (which he defines as the Father, Word-
Son, and Holy Spirit) over creation (e.g., AH 2.28.1–2, 4.11.2), constitutes an argument of its own
for the eternal generation of the Word-Son.
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128 God and Christ in Irenaeus

the Ptolemaic Gnostics regard the aeons as spiritual and divine.⁷⁴ Irenaeus, for
his part, will further define the spiritual and divine substance as necessarily
simple—a move which flows from and agrees with his arguments before and
after this text.⁷⁵ Taken as a whole, then, Irenaeus’ goal in AH 2.17 is to identify
the kind of production that is proper to a simple spiritual and divine sub-
stance. To identify, that is, the nature of divine production. The questions with
which he begins in AH 2.17.2 introduce the terms of the argument to follow:
It shall be asked, then, how were the rest of the aeons emitted (emissi sunt)? Did
they remain united (uniti) to the one who emitted them, as the rays to the sun, or
(were they emitted) as distinct and separate (efficabiliter et partiliter),⁷⁶ so that
each of them [exists] separately and has its own form (separatim et suam
figurationem), as a human being [comes] from another human being and an
animal from another animal? Or was it in the manner of germination (germina-
tionem), as branches from a tree? And were they of the same substance (eiusdem
substantiae) with those who emitted (emiserunt) them, or did they derive their
substance from some other substance (ex altera quadam substantia substantiam
habentes)?⁷⁷ Also, were they emitted (emissi sunt) at the same time, so that they
are of the same age with each other, or (were they emitted) according to a certain
order, so that some of them were older while others were younger? And [are they]
simple and uniform (simplices et uniformes), and in every way equal and similar
(aequales et similes) among themselves, as spirit and light are emitted, or [are
they] composite and different (compositi et differentes), dissimilar (dissimiles) in
their members?
Irenaeus begins by identifying different kinds of production that might be
attributed to the aeons. The first kind is that in which a product remains
united to its source, such as rays of light to the sun.⁷⁸ The second is that in

⁷⁴ The term appears at the end of AH 2.18.5, where Irenaeus explicitly identifies the debate
concerning the production of aeons as a debate concerning spiritalis et divinae substantiae.
⁷⁵ See, e.g., Chapter 2.2 which begins with his arguments in AH 2.13.3 and 2.28.4–5. The
attribution of simplicity to the substance of the aeons may not owe itself only to Irenaeus’ pen,
for Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora 7.7 identifies the “substance (οὐσία) of the unbegotten Father” as
“simple and uniform” (ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ μονοειδές). (Greek from Quispel, SC 24: 70.) One cannot,
however, be sure that Irenaeus was familiar with the Letter (see: Markschies, ZAC 4 2000:
225–54; Thomassen, 2008: 17–22, 119–29). For a discussion of Ptolemy’s notion of simplicity,
which differs from Irenaeus’, see A. Radde-Gallwitz (2009: 31–7).
⁷⁶ My translation of efficabiliter as “distinct” closely follows Rousseau’s belief that the Greek
substrate is ἀποτελεστικῶς as well as his understanding of the term’s meaning in this context (he
translates it as séparés in 2.17.2 and séparément in 2.17.3). See Rousseau, SC 293 (1982: 267).
⁷⁷ Elsewhere, e.g. in AH 4.11.2 (see Chapter 2.2), substantia appears in a context that identifies
a divine attribute with the divine being (though there the Greek substrate is likely ὑπόστασις).
Here substantia refers to the immaterial divine “stuff” of which aeons are made and which is
common to them.
⁷⁸ Irenaeus first mentions the analogy of a ray from the sun in AH 2.13.2 when attacking the
ordered production of aeons. He then mentions it in 2.13.5 as an alternative to the kind of
production that results in the separation of an aeon from its source. It may be that he does so
because he is aware of Gnostic accounts that use the analogy, but the text is not clear. What is
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which a product is separated from its source, such as in the generation of a
human being or an animal. The third, the germination of branches from a tree,
he later identifies as no different—for the sake of this argument anyway—from
the first kind of production.⁷⁹
The opening lines of this selection identify, then, two contrasting kinds of
production: one in which product and source are united, another in which
product and source are separated. The questions following the identification of
these differing kinds of production reveal lines of inquiry that Irenaeus will
utilize to advance his argument. He asks whether aeons have the same
substance as their source or if they derive their substance from some other
substance. He inquires as to whether or not their production is differentiated
by time. And he questions whether they are simple and uniform like spirit and
light or composite and different.⁸⁰ Having identified the lines of inquiry that
will give structure to his argument, Irenaeus begins its prosecution.
He first addresses whether the kind of production in which a product is
separated from its source—that modeled by the generation of human beings—
suits the spiritual substance of aeons. He writes:
But, if each of them was indeed emitted distinctly and according to its own
generation (efficabiliter et secundum suam genesim), after the likeness of human
beings, then either those generated by the Father will be of the same substance
with him and similar to the one who generated them, or if they appear dissimilar,
then it is necessary to confess them to be of some other substance. And if the
generations of the Father are similar to the one who emitted (them), those which
have been emitted will remain impassible, even as he who emitted them. But if
(they have been emitted) from some other substance, which is capable of passion,
whence (came) this dissimilar substance (which is) within that which is the
Fullness (Pleroma) of incorruptibility? Furthermore, according to this reasoning,

clear is that he opposes any interpretation of the analogy that understands it to suggest a spatially
conceived notion of production (the idea that emission involves spatial location or the spatial
separation of product from source)—a notion that is essential to the Ptolemaic account he is
opposing.
The emission of a ray from the sun as an example of a type of production in which the product
remains united to its source does have a history prior to Irenaeus that seems to be distinct from
any possible Gnostic usage. Several passages in Philo utilize an analogy of the sun and its rays
(On Giants 1.3, On the Special Laws 1.7.40, and On Dreams 1.14.77), but the analogy is not as
close to Irenaeus’ as that found in Justin’s Dial. 128.3. Justin is critical of the analogy, though for
different reasons than Irenaeus offers in 2.13.5. C. Stead suggests that Irenaeus’ “conception of
rays of light proceeding from a source . . . is probably influenced by the Stoic theory which
regards light not as an outgoing current or stream but rather as an extension of its source which
is retracted when the light is cut off ” (1977: 196). This may be, but it should be noted that
Irenaeus never speaks of such a retraction when discussing the generation of the Word-Son.
⁷⁹ See AH 2.17.6.
⁸⁰ Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora 7.7 identifies the substance of Father as simple light (“the
substance of the unbegotten Father of the universe is incorruptibility and self-subsistent light,
simple and uniform”). But, as stated in n. 75 above, it is unclear if Irenaeus was familiar with the
Letter and Ptolemy’s conception of simplicity differs from Irenaeus’.
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130 God and Christ in Irenaeus

each of them will be understood (to exist) separately, divided from one another
(separatim divisus ab altero), just as human beings, not mixed with nor united the
one to the other (non admixtus neque unitus alter altero), but in a distinct form
and with a defined area, each one of them delineated by a magnitude of size—[all
of] which are characteristic of a body, and not of a spirit. Let them, therefore, no
longer speak of the Pleroma as spiritual . . . ⁸¹
The kind of production modeled by human generation suits the production
of aeons in one important way: the separation between the product and its
source that characterizes this model allows an aeon in the chain of production
to be dissimilar from its source. The ability to account for this dissimilarity is
crucial to the Ptolemaic hypothesis which must be able to explain how Sophia
could become impassioned while Father—Sophia’s ultimate source—remains
impassible. This kind of production meets that need. But the Ptolemaic Gnos-
tics needed more. They needed a model that could not just account for the
dissimilarity between Sophia and Father but a model that could also support
their belief that all the aeons possessed the same spiritual substance as Father.
Recognizing the challenge this twofold need posed to the Ptolemaic hypothesis,
Irenaeus seized the polemical advantage by crafting the terms of his argu-
ment in a way that eliminates this model as a viable option. He begins in the
preceding section, AH 2.17.2, by identifying dissimilarity as a characteristic of
that which is composite and different in contrast to that which is simple and
uniform, such as spirit and light. He then declares here that dissimilarity
indicates that the substance of a product differs from that of its source. And
in the final sentences of this selection he asserts that the separation between a
product and its source (entailed in this kind of production) befits material
substance (that which possesses “a distinct form . . . a defined area . . . (and)
delineated by a magnitude of size”).⁸² These terms are designed, if followed, to
make it impossible for his opponents to maintain both that Sophia and Father
are dissimilar and that all aeons possess the same simple, spiritual substance.⁸³
They also establish that the kind of production in which a product is separated
from its source—that modeled by the generation of human beings—is unsuited
to the production of a simple, spiritual substance.⁸⁴
Having declared one kind of production unsuitable, Irenaeus turns to
consider the second: that kind of production in which a product and source
are united. In what follows (AH 2.17.4–7) Irenaeus articulates the aforemen-
tioned three principles that hold for the production of a simple, spiritual

⁸¹ AH 2.17.3. Chapter 4 will further discuss Irenaeus’ reference to mixture in this text.
⁸² For more detailed discussions of the contrast Irenaeus sees between material (or corporeal)
and spiritual substances, see Chapters 2.3 and 4.3.2 of this study.
⁸³ Lashier offers a similar reading of this text but thinks the spiritual nature of God rather than
divine simplicity is central to Irenaeus’ logic (2014: 142).
⁸⁴ AH 2.17.3 and 5 reveal that Ireneaus understands his Gnostic opponents as maintaining
that aeons possess the same spiritual substance.
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Word-Son 131
substance—three principles that hold for divine production.⁸⁵ He begins with
what appears to be his preferred model for this kind of production, the
production of light from light:⁸⁶
If, however, the aeons (were emitted) from Logos, Logos from Nous, and Nous
from Bythus, as lights are kindled from a light—as, for example, a torch from a
torch—then they will perhaps differ from one another in generation and size, but
since they are of the same substance (eiusdem substantiae) with the author
(princepe) of their emission, either they will all remain impasssible, or their Father
will also partake in passions. For the torch which was kindled subsequently will
not have a light other than that which existed before it. For this reason, also, when
their lights are combined into one, they go back to the original unity, since one
light is made—that which has existed even from the beginning. Moreover, it is
possible to determine that one is newer or older, neither with respect to the light
itself, for the whole is one light, nor with respect to that torch which has received
the light, because with respect to the substance of their matter they have the same
age (the material of the torches being one and the same), but only with respect to
when it was kindled (accensionem), since one was kindled a little while ago but
another just now.⁸⁷
The value of this model is founded upon Irenaeus’ earlier identification of the
production of light—along with the production of spirit—as an example of
the production of a simple substance.⁸⁸ Of the three principles that Irenaeus
articulates in AH 2.17.4–7, two appear in connection with this model. As for
the first of these two, Irenaeus argues that while lights produced from a light—
such as torches produced from a torch—may differ “in generation and size,”⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Lashier (2014: 131) argues that while Irenaeus denies the validity of the analogies in AH
2.17 in principle (because it is inappropriate to describe the divine by means of the human), they
still reveal his thoughts about what the nature of divine production would be. Such a reading
suggests Irenaeus’ use of these models is either inconsistent or confused, for Irenaeus would be
saying what he believes while believing it cannot be said. Two points are helpful at this juncture.
First, as we have seen, Irenaeus does not regard these models as equally viable. Second, Irenaeus’
comments in 2.17.2 indicate that he makes the most of the models that deal with the production
of light (rays from the sun and a torch from a torch) because he views the production of light as
especially modeling the production of a simple substance. This being the case, in utilizing models
having to do with light, Irenaeus may be utilizing the approach known as via emenentiae by
which one arrives at an understanding of what is indescribable by recognizing the manner in
which it surpasses known realities or experiences (see Chapter 2, n. 133).
⁸⁶ Light seems to be Irenaeus’ preferred analogy for the divine substance. In AH 2.13.4
Irenaeus writes that God “may be most properly called light, but he is nothing like our light.”
⁸⁷ AH 2.17.4.
⁸⁸ See AH 2.17.2, quoted and discussed above. Both Orbe (1958, vol. 1.2: 651) and Lashier
(2014: 131 n. 154) recognize that Irenaeus never denies the principles he elucidates in connection
with the model of light from light.
⁸⁹ The differences “in generation and size” that characterize the production of torches are
inapplicable to the production of a simple, spiritual substance. The difference in generation—
given his subsequent acknowledgement—likely refers to the fact that the production of a lighted
torch is defined by temporality. In his comments on the production of the Word-Son in AH
2.13.8, Irenaeus has already established that temporality does not define the production of that
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132 God and Christ in Irenaeus

they are of the same substance with that which generated them. A torch that is
kindled does not possess a light different from the light of its source. This is
proven, he says, by the fact that when the lights of two torches—one kindled
from the other—are “combined into one,” they go back to the original unity:
“one light is made—that which has existed even from the beginning.”
We find the reasoning behind this proof a few paragraphs later, in AH
2.18.5. Irenaeus writes:
. . . when that which is similar is [placed] in a similar thing it will not be dissolved
into nothingness, nor will it be in danger of being destroyed, but it will rather
persist and increase, just as fire in fire, and spirit in spirit, and water in water; on
the other hand, those which are contrary to each other suffer and are changed and
are destroyed. And, so, if there had been an emission of light, it would neither
suffer nor incur danger in similar light, but would shine more brightly and
increase, as the day from the sun—since they say that Bythus is the image of
their Father.⁹⁰ Whatever animals are foreign or strange to each other, as well as of
contrary nature, fall into danger (when they come together) and are destroyed (by
each other). On the other hand, those which are accustomed to each other and
related by birth suffer no danger at all when living in the same place, but even
gain health and life from it.
When dissimilar things are combined they undergo change and are destroyed;
similar things, to the contrary, persist and increase. This reasoning seems to be
a corrupted or simplistic representation of Platonic or—what may be more
likely—Aristotelian physics. Both philosophers speculated about what hap-
pens when opposites are brought together. Plato suggested two possibilities,
reasoning that when heat encounters a body’s coldness, then either coldness is
destroyed or it “retreats” and “gets out of the way.”⁹¹ Aristotle accepts the
former of these options: contraries are destroyed when brought together.⁹² At
the same time, Aristotle reasoned, similar things increase when one is added
to another.⁹³

which is simple. With regard to size, Irenaeus has already established in AH 2.7.6 and 2.17.3
(as I discussed in Chapter 2) that a spiritual substance does not have a distinct form, a defined
area, and is not delineated by a magnitude of size. The differences “in generation and size,”
therefore, mark the production of torches as an illustrative model rather than a true analogy.
⁹⁰ On the difficulty of identifying the “Father” to which Irenaeus is referring, see Rousseau,
SC 293 (1982: 271–2).
⁹¹ Plato, Phaedo 102a10–107b10.
⁹² For a succinct discussion of these matters, see Gill (1989: 76–7).
⁹³ See, e.g., Aristotle, Physics 8.7, 260a26–32. Irenaeus’ subsequent appeal in AH 2.18.5 to the
animal kingdom in an effort to further demonstrate his point suggests that the reasoning we see
here may have come to Irenaeus through a Stoic source. For it was common for Stoics to appeal
to such interactions between animals of the same species in order to bolster their criticism of
human interactions (e.g., Seneca, On Anger 2.8; Dio Chrysostom, Oration 40.41 and 48.15).
Similar appeals in Christian writers contemporaneous to Irenaeus are noted by Geffcken (1907:
167–8); and Grant (1952: 100).
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Word-Son 133
When Irenaeus joins his version of this reasoning with his understanding
that similarity indicates sameness of substance and dissimilarity indicates
difference of substance, then any combination of two things which results in
persistence or increase (as opposed to destruction) demonstrates that the
things which were combined are similar, that is, are of the same substance.
Such is the case when fire combines with fire, spirit with spirit, and water with
water. So, too, is this true of a light which has been produced and then placed
“in similar light”: “it would neither suffer nor incur danger . . . but would shine
more brightly and increase.” This is also the point of his appeal in AH 2.17.4 to
the persistence of light when the two torches are blended into one: the two
lights are of the same substance.
The difference between Irenaeus’ appeals to light in AH 2.17.4 and 2.18.5 is
that the example in 2.17.4 explicitly concerns the persistence of light that
results when the light of a torch is combined with the light of the torch that
produced it.⁹⁴ That is to say, in AH 2.17.4 he is making an explicit statement
about the relationship between the substance of a product and the substance of
its source. The persistence of light that results when the light of a torch is
combined with the light of the torch that produced it demonstrates that when
it comes to the production of a simple substance (such as light), the substance
possessed by a source and its product is one and the same.⁹⁵ This is the first
principle Irenaeus articulates concerning the production of a simple, spiritual
substance, that is, concerning divine production: the substance possessed by a
source and its product is one and the same.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ That is to say, in AH 2.17.4 Irenaeus is explicitly concerned with the nature of the light
possessed by a source and its product. Irenaeus is also concerned with this in AH 2.18.5 but his
concern is not so explicit.
⁹⁵ In AH 2.17.2 Irenaeus indicates that the continuity of substance between a simple product
and its source is ultimately grounded in the idea that the substance of the product has its origin in
the substance of the source: “And were they of the same substance (eiusdem substantiae) with
those who emitted (emiserunt) them, or did they derive their substance from some other
substance (ex altera quadam substantia substantiam habentes)?”
⁹⁶ This is not the first time that Irenaeus contends that when it comes to divine production the
substance possessed by a source and its product is one and the same. Irenaeus spends much of
the first three chapters of AH 2 arguing that if one follows the Ptolemaic hypothesis then the
Father of all, also called Bythus, must be regarded as the cause of all things, including the created
world. In AH 2.4.1 he looks to place his opponents firmly on the horns of a dilemma. Either,
Irenaeus argues, the vacuity surrounding the pleroma is produced and Bythus, as well as Sige and
the rest of the aeons also have a vacuous substance, or the vacuity is self-generating and is equal
in honor and eternity to the Father of all, Bythus. Neither option would appeal to his opponents.
The first identifies the nature of the Father of all and the pleroma as vacuous, the second
disparages the Father of all as equal to a vacuum and even calls into question his primacy.
In constructing the first horn of this dilemma Irenaeus defines production in terms of the
relationship that results between a product and its source. That which has been emitted, he
posits, is similar to its source. In the sentence that follows we learn that the similarity between a
product and its source extends to the level of their natures. Sige and the rest of the aeons must
have a vacuous substance because they are products of Bythus, which itself must have a vacuous
substance, because it is the source of vacuity. That is to say, according to Irenaeus’ logic, Bythus
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134 God and Christ in Irenaeus

The second principle Irenaeus offers in connection with the model of light
from light appears toward the end of the selection from AH 2.17.4. For the
sake of convenience, I shall provide it again:
Moreover, it is possible to determine that one is newer or older, neither with
respect to the light itself, for the whole is one light, nor with respect to that torch
which has received the light, because with respect to the substance of their matter
they have the same age (the material of the torches being one and the same), but
only with respect to when it was kindled (accensionem), since one was kindled a
little while ago but another just now.
Irenaeus here addresses the question of whether temporality characterizes the
production of a simple substance. When it comes to the production of light
that takes place when one torch is kindled from another, one cannot say that
the light of either torch is more recent or more ancient than the other. “For,”
he says, “the whole is one light.” In a manner reminiscent of his comments
about the generation of the Word-Son in AH 2.13.8, Irenaeus here states that it
is inappropriate to think that the production of a simple substance results in a
product and source differentiated by temporality.⁹⁷ Such differentiation is
precluded by the simplicity of the substance.⁹⁸
Irenaeus’ second principle, then, is that when it comes to the production of
a simple substance the substance of a product cannot be temporally differen-
tiated from the substance of its source. The light of a torch kindled from the
light of another torch is no more ancient nor recent than that light of the first
torch: it is the same light. Furthermore, the foundation of this principle on the
simplicity of the substance being produced involves a tacit understanding that
must be made explicit. Because the source and product are constituted of the
same simple substance, a substance not subject to temporal differentiation, the
substance of the product cannot be said to come to be in any temporally
defined way. This, again, accords with AH 2.13.8 where Irenaeus’ comments
define the generation of the Word-Son as nothing other than eternal.

must have the same substance—have the same nature (substantia and natura correspond to each
other in AH 2.4.1)—as all of its products, whether vacuity or the aeons of the pleroma. Irenaeus,
then, has defined emission as a kind of production in which the product is similar to its source—
the kind of production in which a product has the same substance or nature as its source. The
reasoning here has much in common with that of AH 2.17.4, for—it must be remembered—the
production of aeons is a question of the production of a simple, spiritual substance. That is to say,
it is a question of divine production.
⁹⁷ Irenaeus here answers one of the questions he articulates in AH 2.17.2: “were they emitted
(emissi sunt) at the same time, so that they are of the same age with each other, or (were they
emitted) according to a certain order, so that some of them were older while others were
younger?” Thus, indicating the immediate polemical end of this statement is to challenge the
very notion of an ordered production of aeons.
⁹⁸ Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 establishes Irenaeus’ understanding of atemporality as a corollary
of simplicity.
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Word-Son 135
The third principle becomes evident several sections later when Irenaeus
finally turns to the first model of production mentioned in AH 2.17.2: rays
produced by the sun. His comments in AH 2.17.7 are brief but their signifi-
cance is manifest when they are considered alongside his earlier comments
about the production of rays from the sun. First, AH 2.17.7, then 2.17.2:
If, moreover, they say that their aeons were emitted in the same manner as rays
from the sun, because all (of them) are of the same substance and from the same
(source) (eiusdem substantiae et de eodem), either all will be capable of passion
along with him who emitted them, or all will remain impassible. For they can no
longer avow that some, from such an emission, are impassible while others are
passible.⁹⁹
It shall be asked, then, how were the rest of the aeons emitted (emissi sunt)? Did
they remain united (uniti) to the one who emitted them, as the rays to the sun, or
(were they emitted) as distinct and separated (efficabiliter et partiliter),¹⁰⁰ so that
each of them [exists] separately and has its own form (separatim et suam
figurationem), as a human being [comes] from another human being and an
animal from another animal?¹⁰¹
Irenaeus’ discussion of the production of rays from the sun in the first
selection (AH 2.17.7) establishes that all of the rays produced by the sun are
of the same substance. But given his argument in the preceding sections of
2.17, the statement that “either all will be capable of passion along with him
who emitted them, or all will remain impassible” also establishes that the rays
are of the same simple substance as the sun. For only in the production of a
simple substance must products share the characteristics of their source.¹⁰²
The emission of rays from the sun, then, models the production of a simple
substance. This being the case, Irenaeus’ initial reference to the emission of
rays from the sun in AH 2.17.2 reveals his third principle about the production
of a simple substance: the product remains united to its source.¹⁰³
Irenaeus’ polemic, therefore, against the ordered production of aeons
affirmed by Ptolemaic Gnostics offers further insight into his thinking about
the production of a simple, spiritual substance—divine production. When it

⁹⁹ AH 2.17.7.
¹⁰⁰ My translation of efficabiliter as “distinct” closely follows Rousseau’s belief that the Greek
substrate is ἀποτελεστικῶς as well as his understanding of the term’s meaning in this context (he
translates it as séparés in 2.17.2 and séparément in 2.17.3). See Rousseau, SC 293 (1982: 267).
¹⁰¹ AH 2.17.2.
¹⁰² See, for instance, AH 2.17.2 where Irenaeus writes of the aeons, “And [are they] simple and
uniform (simplices et uniformes), and in every way equal and similar (aequales et similes) among
themselves, as spirit and light are emitted, or [are they] composite and different (compositi et
differentes), dissimilar (dissimiles) in their members?”
¹⁰³ Bonwetsch was incorrect to mention Irenaeus’ reference to the production of rays from the
sun as support for his modalistic reading of Irenaeus’ theology (1925: 61). The unity of the
product and source conveyed by this model does not entail the loss of their distinction: one may
distinguish between the sun and its rays.
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136 God and Christ in Irenaeus

comes to the production of a simple, spiritual substance, the substance
possessed by a source and its product is one and the same, the substance of a
product cannot be temporally differentiated from the substance of its
source, and the product remains united to its source. These principles explain
how Irenaeus can speak of the generation of the Word-Son—thus distinguish-
ing the Word-Son from God the Father—without jeopardizing the unity of the -
Word-Son and Father that he established by means of divine simplicity.¹⁰⁴ Still
more, these principles explain how Irenaeus can say in Prf 47 that divine
generation is the basis for the unity of the Father and Son as the one God:
Therefore, the Father is Lord and the Son is Lord, and the Father is God and the
Son is God, since He who is born (նծնեալն) of God is God, and in this way,
according to His being and power <and> essence, one God is demonstrated.
This is the strongest formulaic statement of the Word-Son’s divinity that
Irenaeus makes: the Son is Lord and God as the Father is Lord and God
because “He who is born of God is God.”¹⁰⁵ Neither Irenaeus’ comments in Prf
47, nor anywhere else in Proof, justifies this identification of divine generation as
that which secures the divinity of the Word-Son. On the other hand, the
significance he ascribes to divine generation in Prf 47 makes good sense when
this passage is read in light of the principles he articulates in AH 2.17.¹⁰⁶
Moreover, reading these passages together allow us to see that Irenaeus’ con-
ception of divine production secures both the eternal diversity of the divine
being and the unity of the generated Word-Son with the Father who generates.

3.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Far from authoring a modalistic or economic theological account, Irenaeus

affirmed an eternal and distinct coexistence of the Word-Son with God the
Father. This coexistence, moreover, is necessary to the divine life which involves

¹⁰⁴ In a constructive context substantia would speak of the immaterial divine stuff (cf. n. 77
above) that is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Irenaeus does not go so far as to
suggest that the divine substance is nothing other than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit but it
would seem that his comments about divine simplicity fit such an understanding.
¹⁰⁵ So, too, Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 87). Barnes also questions the originality of the phrase
“according to His being and power <and> essence,” suggesting it may be the result of a later
interpolation. But this does not bear directly upon my argument. For a detailed analysis of Prf 47,
see Rousseau, Le Muséon 84 (1971: 5–42), which overturns the reading of Orbe and, by
extension, Ochagavía.
¹⁰⁶ As mentioned above, Fantino recognized that Irenaeus spoke of divine generation as the
basis of the unity between the Father and the Word-Son, even quoting this portion of Prf 47
(1994: 376). But he stopped short of explaining the logic that allowed Irenaeus to regard divine
generation as the basis of their unity.
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Word-Son 137
the mutual glorification of the Father and Word-Son. In addition to not being
modalistic or economic, then, Irenaeus’ theology is not similar to that of the
Roman Monarchians.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, he holds quite a different place in the history of
Christian thought than often depicted. For in arguing that the generation of the
Word-Son is not conditioned by temporality, Irenaeus, and not Origen, is the
first to affirm the eternal generation of the Word-Son. He is, therefore, the first
theologian after the New Testament writings to author a theological account
that affirms both the eternal unity and diversity of the divine being.
This is not to say that his Trinitarian logic is equal to those accounts of the
fourth century and later. Indeed, as has been observed before, the absence of a
term that abstractly speaks of what is diverse in the divine being—such as the
later uses of ὑπόστασις and persona—is a limit upon his logic.¹⁰⁸ But nor
should we expect him to author an account as refined as those that emerge out
of the later debates. Irenaeus articulates a logic that supports his attribution of
eternal unity and diversity to God—a significant accomplishment in any era,
forget at the end of the second century.
Returning to more immediate matters, Irenaeus’ doctrine of reciprocal
immanence and the premises he articulates about divine production—
measured as they are by divine simplicity—establish the equal divinity of the
Word-Son with God the Father. The Word-Son and the Father—along with
the Holy Spirit, whom I discuss elsewhere¹⁰⁹—constitute the one God whose
being is defined in part by the principle of divine simplicity. This understand-
ing manifests itself in Irenaeus’ contention that divine production results in a
product which possesses a substance that is one and the same as that of its
source. When translated to the generation of the Word-Son, this means that
the substance of the Word-Son is one and the same as the substance of God
the Father.¹¹⁰ Since, as Chapter 2 elucidated, Irenaeus considers the divine
being, as the sum of all positive attributes, to be identical with any one of the
divine attributes, then the attributes or qualities that characterize God the
Father must also characterize the Word-Son. Such qualities include invisibil-
ity, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, along with immateriality,
infinitude, simplicity, spirituality, and the rest that Irenaeus mentions—
several of which I discussed in Chapter 2. To say otherwise, would contradict
the principle of divine simplicity and result in a divine being defined by
complexity—a notion which Irenaeus more than once rejects outright.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Following R. Heine’s account of Roman Monarchian theology in JTS 49 (1998: 56–91).
¹⁰⁸ First noted by Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 84) and then Lashier (2014: 146).
¹⁰⁹ See my Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012).
¹¹⁰ Irenaeus does not distinguish between qualities. There is no notion that a quality may be
proper to the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit in a way that it is not proper to another.
¹¹¹ Some scholars have indeed said otherwise, though perhaps unwittingly, when they asserted
that Irenaeus regards the pre-incarnate Word-Son as visible to the intellect and even material in
nature. For a detailed discussion and my rejection of these readings, see Chapter 5.2.
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138 God and Christ in Irenaeus

It also cannot be said that Irenaeus draws his conception of divine produc-
tion from the Ptolemaic hypothesis. Irenaeus’ conception of divine production
is part of his polemical argument in AH 2.17 for the very reason that he
believes it to be incompatible with and destructive to the notion of an ordered
production of aeons central to the Ptolemaic account. To think it comes from
the Ptolemaic Gnostics themselves would be nonsensical.
Irenaeus’ understanding of the Word-Son as equally divine as and one with
God the Father is fundamental to his Christology. Chapter 5 of this study will
show how Irenaeus grounds several features of Christ’s work upon his under-
standing of the divine being and the nature of the Word-Son. But first we must
come to understand how Irenaeus conceives of the union of the divine Word-
Son with humanity in the person of Jesus Christ. We move, then, to Chapter 4.
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Christological Union

Chapters 2 and 3 established Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being and his
understanding of the Word-Son, especially the nature of the relationship
between the Word-Son and God the Father. The aim of this chapter is to
explain how Irenaeus conceives of the union between the divine Word-Son
and humanity in the person of Jesus Christ. Once we have a sense for Irenaeus’
conception of the person of Christ, we will be able to address his understand-
ing of the work of Christ in Chapter 5 of this study.
As should now be clear, the reticence of scholars to study the speculative
aspects of Irenaeus’ theology has resulted in numerous lacunae in our under-
standing of his thought. This is no less the case when it comes to standard
Christological categories, such as the Christological union. Albert Houssiau,
for instance, authored the best study of Irenaeus’ Christology to date.¹ But
even Houssiau missed the fundamental logic that Irenaeus utilizes to explain
the unity of the human and divine in Christ—namely, Stoic mixture theory.
In AH 4.20.4 Irenaeus refers to the Christological union as a “blending”
(commixtio) of the human and divine.² It is the first time he does so, and he
only seems to do so once more in a text that is anything but clear (AH 5.1.3).³
He offers no explanation in AH 4.20.4—our one certain reference—for what, if
anything, the term reveals about his conception of the Christological union.
Neither does he indicate if the concept of blending occupies a place of
significance in his thought more broadly considered.

¹ Houssiau (1955).
² AH 4.20.4: “Now this is his Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, who in the last times was made a
man among men, . . . the prophets . . . proclaimed his advent according to the flesh, by which the
blending (commixtio) and communion of God and man took place.” A more complete quotation
of this passage appears later in this chapter. As I argue later in this chapter, the Greek substrate
for commixtio is probably either ἀνάκρασις or σύγκρασις.
³ J.A. Robinson reads “mixing and blending the Spirit of God the Father with the handiwork
of God” in Prf 97 as a reference to the Incarnation (St. Irenaeus, The Demonstration of the
Apostolic Preaching [tr. J.A. Robinson; London: S.P.C.K., 1920: 64–5]). I have disagreed with this
reading elsewhere, arguing that this text refers to the commixture and union of the soul and body
of the believer with the Holy Spirit (Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit [2012: 188–90]; VC 66 2012:
1–19, here 11–14).
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140 God and Christ in Irenaeus

These observations alone are sufficient to explain the minimal attention
paid to the place of the concept of blending or mixture in Irenaeus’ Christ-
ology. Instead of regarding this description as anomalous, or at least atypical,
and therefore relatively insignificant, it is my belief that his identification of
the Christological union as a blend in these later books reflects an incorpor-
ation of Stoic mixture theory that begins as early as book 2. Moreover, it is my
contention that Irenaeus uses Stoic mixture theory not only to conceptualize
the union of the human and divine in Christ, but also to explain the relation-
ship between the human and divine in the experiences and activities of Christ.
Inasmuch as this is the case, Stoic mixture theory is the logic fundamental to
Irenaeus’ conception of the Christological union.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first offers a brief discussion
of the aspects of Stoic mixture theory most relevant to this investigation. The
second considers pertinent scholarship on the appropriation of Stoic and
Aristotelian mixture theories in the Christologies of early Christianity. The
last argues that Irenaeus incorporated Stoic mixture theory into various
aspects of his theological account, including his Christology.

4.1. STOIC M IXTURE THEORY

In order to recognize the role that the concept of mixture plays in Irenaeus’
thought a basic understanding of Stoic mixture theory (and specifically, the
theory of blending) is necessary. The following overview will focus upon the
aspects of the theory which are most relevant to the succeeding examination. It
will draw primarily from selections taken from Alexander of Aphrodisias and
Arius Didymus, our two most important sources, but will supplement their
accounts with two passages found in Nemesius.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture 3, 216.14–217.2:
Chrysippus’ theory of blending (κράσεως) is as follows: he holds that while the
whole of substance is unified (ἡνῶσθαι) because it is totally pervaded (διήκοντος)
by a pneuma through which the whole is held together (συνέχεταί), is stable
(συμμένει), and is sympathetic (σύμπαθές) with itself, yet some of the mixtures
(μίξεις) of bodies mixed in this substance occur by juxtaposition (παραθέσει) . . .
other mixtures occur by total fusion (συγχύσει) . . . the third type of mixture
(μίξεις) he says occurs through certain substances and their qualities being
mutually coextended (ἀντιπαρεκτεινομένων) in their entirety (δι’ ὅλων) and
preserving (σώζειν) their original substance (οὐσίας) and qualities (ποιότητας)
in such a mixture: this mixture is blending (κρᾶσιν) in the strict sense of the term.
The mutual coextension of some two or even more bodies in their entirety with
one another so that each of them preserves their own substance and its qualities
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Christological Union 141

in such a mixture (μίξει)—this, he says, alone of the mixtures (μίξεων) is blending
(κρᾶσιν); for it is a peculiarity of bodies that have been blended (κεκραμένων) that
they can be separated again from one another, and this only occurs through the
blended bodies (τὰ κεκραμένα) preserving (σώζειν) their own natures (φύσεις) in
the mixture (μίξει).⁴

Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 4, 217.26–36:

. . . they (Stoics) say there is nothing remarkable in the fact that certain bodies
when helped by one another are in this way united together in their entirety
(ἑνοῦσθαι δι’ ὅλων) so that being preserved (σωζόμενα) along with their own
qualities (ποιοτήτων) they have a complete mutual coextension through one
another (παρεκτείνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις δι’ ὅλων ὅλα), even if some of them are
rather small in bulk and in themselves unable both to be spread to such an
extent and to preserve their own qualities; for in this way also the cup of wine
is mixed (κιρνᾶσθαι) with a large amount of water and helped by it to such a
great extension. They employ as clear evidence that this is the case the fact
that the soul which has its own substantiality (ὑπόστασιν), just like the body
that receives it, pervades (διήκειν) the whole of the body while preserving
its own substantiality (οὐσίαν) in the mixture (τῇ μίξει) with it (for there
is nothing in the body possessing the soul that does not partake (ἄμοιρον) of
the soul).⁵

Arius Didymus, fr. 28, ap. Stobaeum Eclogae 1.17.4:

. . . they (Stoics) say that mixture (μῖξιν) is the mutual spreading out along
with each other through and through (ἀντιπαρέκτασιν δι’ ὅλων) of two or
more bodies, with their natural qualities (ποιοτήτων) persisting (ὑπομενουσῶν)
as happens with fire and glowing iron. In their case, the mutual spreading out of
the bodies [fire and iron] along with each other occurs through and through.
And it happens in a similar way too with the souls within us: they are mutually
spread out (ἀντιπαρεκτείνουσιν) along with our bodies through and through
(<δι’> ὅλων). For the Stoics like body to be stretched along through body.
They say that blending (κρᾶσιν) is the mutual spreading out along with each
other through and through (δι’ ὅλων ἀντιπαρέκτασιν) of two or more fluid bodies,
with their qualities persisting (ποιοτήτων ὑπομενουσῶν) . . . because the qualities
of each of the blended fluids show forth together (συνεκφαίνεσθαι) out of the
blend, for example, the qualities of wine, honey, water, vinegar and the like. That
the qualities of the blended ingredients survive (διαμένουσιν) in such blends is
clear from the fact that the ingredients are often separated from each other
(ἀποχωρίζεσθαι) by some device. Certainly, if you dip an oil-drenched sponge

⁴ Text and tr. R.B. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics (PA 28; ed. W.J. Verdenius
and J.H. Waszink; Leiden: Brill, 1976: 114–17). All Greek quotations of Alexander’s On Mixture
(De Mixtione) are taken from Todd.
⁵ Text and tr. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias (1976: 118–19).
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142 God and Christ in Irenaeus

into wine blended with water, you will separate the water from the wine, as the
water runs back into the sponge.⁶
Prior to delving into the details of the Stoic theory of blending it is import-
ant to locate blending within the larger Stoic concern to arrive at a physical
theory that explains how the active principle (God/Pneuma/Logos) and
passive principle (matter) relate to each other.⁷ The narrative construction
of Alexander’s consideration of the Stoic theory of blending in Mixt. reflects
this relationship, for references to the larger Stoic concern frame his analysis
of the theory of blending. Alexander’s discussion of blending in Mixt. 3
begins with Chrysippus’ interest in explaining how the “whole of substance”
(the passive principle) is unified because pneuma (the active principle)
pervades or permeates its entirety, causing it to hold together, be stable,
and interact (“sympathize”/συμπάσχω) with itself.⁸ He then returns to this
fundamental Stoic interest in the active and passive principles at the very
end of his discussion of Stoic mixture theory. In arguing against the theory
of blending, he writes: “the bodies that are being blended with another must
be reciprocally acted on by one another (ἀντιπάσχειν ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων ἀνάγκη)
(that is why neither is destroyed, since the one acted on by the other reacts
in the process of being acted on).”⁹
A distinctive feature of the Stoic attempt to understand the relationship
between the active and passive principles was the belief that the principles
must be corporeal, only bodies can act or be acted on.¹⁰ In the selections above
we see that bodies pervade each other, bodies mutually coextend throughout
one another, and substances and qualities proper to bodies are preserved in a
blend. Richard Sorabji summarizes Stoic materialism well: they “believed that
matter was something real and something acted on, that acting or being acted
on was the criterion for being fully real, and that only body would satisfy this
criterion.”¹¹ The particular theory of mixture proper to the Stoics that they

⁶ Text from H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin: G. Reimeri, 1879: 463.24–464.6);

tr. R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1988: 82–3).
⁷ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 83). For a concise identification of the Stoic belief
in two principles, active and passive, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.134–6.
⁸ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 214–17.
⁹ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 11, 226.30–3; the parenthetical remark would seem to
reflect Alexander’s understanding, but if so, his understanding agrees with Stoic thought.
Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.134; and Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 93–8).
¹⁰ Cicero writes of Varro saying that Zeno, “also differed from the same philosophers
(Platonists and Peripatetics) in thinking that it was totally impossible that something
incorporeal—to which genus Xenocrates and his predecessors too had said the mind
belonged—should be the agent of anything, and that only a body was capable of acting or of
being acted upon” (Acad. 1.39; tr. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, repr. 1997, vol. 1: 272]).
¹¹ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 37).
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Christological Union 143

articulated to explain the relationship between corporeal active and passive
principles is blending.
Blending might be best understood in the light of other theories of ancient
chemistry. Alexander records Chrysippus as identifying mixture as a category
containing three different types of union: juxtaposition (παράθεσις), fusion
(σύγχυσις), and blending (κρᾶσις).¹² In juxtaposition particles of the ingredi-
ents remain unaltered and simply exist alongside each other, such as in a
mixture of beans and wheat.¹³ The Stoics followed Aristotle in rejecting
juxtaposition as not producing a genuine mixture.¹⁴ In fusion both ingredients
are destroyed in the process of forming an entirely new kind of stuff, a
resultant that is a tertium quid.¹⁵ The Stoics did not consider fusion to be
a genuine mixture either,¹⁶ preferring instead the idea of blending (κρᾶσις). In
a blend of two or more ingredients, the ingredients spread out or mutually
coextend (ἀντιπαρεκτείνομαι/ἀντιπαρήκω) through the entirety of one
another. This coextension produces a union in which the active principle
pervades the passive principle, causing it to hold together, be stable, and
interact with (συμπάσχω) itself.¹⁷ Yet, in the resultant produced from blend-
ing, the original substances and qualities proper to each of the constituent
ingredients persist,¹⁸ and the qualities of each show forth (συνεκφαίνω).¹⁹
Thus, constituent ingredients that have been blended together continue to
actually exist; they do not just exist in potential as in Aristotelian mixture
theory.²⁰ Proof of the preservation of each of the original substances and their

¹² Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 216.14–217.2.

¹³ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 216.19–22.
¹⁴ Aristotle believed the simple existence of ingredients alongside of each other, as in
juxtaposition, did not produce a genuine mixture because the ingredients remain unaltered.
Ancient atomism did not include a theory that corresponds to the modern understanding of
molecular bonding. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 66 and 79).
¹⁵ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 216.22–5.
¹⁶ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 80). Aristotle rejected a notion similar to fusion,
in which the minor or weaker ingredient is destroyed, as an inadequate theory of mixture
(Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption [GC] 1.10, 328a23–8; Sorabji, Matter, Space and
Motion [1988: 66–7, 80]).
¹⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 216.14–17.
¹⁸ Each of the three selections quoted above refer to the preservation or persistence of the
substances and/or qualities of the constituent ingredients.
¹⁹ Arius Didymus, fr. 28, Dox. Gr. 464.1–2. Arius’ reference to the “showing forth” of qualities
in a blend occurs in the midst of his differentiation between μῖξις and κρᾶσις, such that the latter
specifically speaks of the type of mixture that occurs between fluid bodies. The more thorough
discussion of Alexander, however, reveals that the Stoics did not delimit κρᾶσις so strictly.
²⁰ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: esp. 67–9); Aristotle, GC 1.10, 327b22–31.
E. Lewis argues that the references to the coextension of bodies in Alexander of Aphrodisias
and Stobaeus are due to an Aristotelian reading of Stoic sources, and that the Stoics did not
maintain that the constituent ingredients themselves were preserved but only the substances and
qualities belonging to them (BICS 34 1987: 84–90, esp. 89). In my judgment Sorabji’s reading
better accounts for the entirety of the extant sources, especially the examples offered by Stoics to
illustrate the theory of blending.
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144 God and Christ in Irenaeus

qualities lies in the ability to separate the constituent ingredients from each
other, such as in Arius Didymus’ example of dipping an oil-drenched sponge
into a blend of water and wine in order to draw out the water.²¹
The Stoics provide three examples from everyday cases that illustrate
blending. The blending of a cup of wine that has been mixed with a lot of
water, of a soul that goes throughout the whole of the body in mixture with it,
and fire that pervades iron.²² As I discuss toward the end of this chapter, the
blending of wine with water is pertinent to other aspects of Irenaeus’ theology.
For now I would like to highlight the blending of the soul and body.²³
As with the constituent ingredients in a blend, the soul pervades the
entirety of the body such that their mutual coextension is complete. As a
result of their mutual coextension every part of the body partakes in the soul
and vice versa.²⁴ This thoroughgoing mutual partaking that occurs between
the ingredients of a blend distinguishes blending from juxtaposition, for it
demonstrates the unity of a product of blending in distinction to the
aggregate nature of a product of juxtaposition in which the ingredients
remain unaltered.²⁵ A portion of Cleanthes’²⁶ thought recorded by Nemesius
further illustrates the mutual partaking of the soul and body using the term
συμπάσχω, which features at the beginning of Alexander’s account of Chry-
sippus’ thought in Mixt. 3.
He [Cleanthes] also says: no incorporeal interacts with a body (ἀσώματον
συμπάσχει σώματι), and no body with an incorporeal, but one body (interacts)
with another body. Now the soul interacts with (συμπάσχει) the body when it is
sick and being cut, and the body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and
fear the body turns red and pale respectively.²⁷

²¹ In a wonderful note, Sorabji tells of proving the truth of this technique by conducting an
experiment in front of witnesses (Matter, Space and Motion 1988: 103 n. 101.)
²² Todd contends that these illustrations are merely fictitious aids to the Stoic argument
but aren’t direct examples of blending (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1976: 45–6), but Sorabji
has persuasively argued that Alexander’s own view was that these illustrations provide “clear
testimony” to persuade and establish “the fact of blending” (Matter, Space and Motion 1988: 84).
²³ The Stoic use of the soul and body to illustrate blending, the theory that explains the
relationship between the corporeal active (God/Pneuma/Logos) and passive principles, is par-
ticularly apt, for according to Stoic logic “the soul simply is pneuma in one of its many guises”
(Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion 1988: 83; for how soul is pneuma see the discussion of the
Stoic theory of categories in pp. 85–93).
²⁴ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 4.217.36.
²⁵ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 217.11–12; cf. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988:
66). Juxtaposition’s production of a resultant that is aggregate in nature bears on its utility for
early Christian Christology, as the next section of this chapter will show.
²⁶ Cleanthes was Chrysippus’ master and predecessor as head of the Stoic school in Athens.
²⁷ Nemesius, On the Nature of Man (de Natura Hominis) 78.7–79.2 (text and tr. Long and
Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers 1987, repr. 1997, vol. 1: 272 and vol. 2: 269; for the whole text, see
Nemesii Emeseni, De Natura Hominis [ed. M. Morani; Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et
Romanorum Teubneriana; Leipzig: BSB B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987: here p. 21]).
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Christological Union 145

The union of two bodies joined to each other, as in a blend, is such that they
interact with (συμπάσχω) each other as do the body and soul. Though the soul
itself is neither sick nor cut it experiences or participates in the sickness or
cutting of the body in some way. Likewise, the body turns red and pale when
the soul feels shame and fear.
Yet, while the interaction or mutual partaking of the body and soul dem-
onstrate their unity, the soul and body preserve the substantiality and qualities
proper to each of them,²⁸ and, as in a blend, their qualities show forth.²⁹ Thus
there is never a question of the soul and body having formed a tertium quid,
for we are always able to distinguish the actual existence of each through the
manifest existence of their proper qualities.³⁰ Proof of the preservation of each
of the original substances and their qualities, as I already mentioned, lies in the
ability to separate the constituent ingredients from each other. The illustration
provided by Arius Didymus is the dipping of an oil-drenched sponge into a
blend of water and wine in order draw out the water, but the body and soul are
also separated from each other at the time of death. As Nemesius writes:
Chrysippus says that death is the separation of soul from body. Now nothing
incorporeal (ἀσώματον) is separated from a body (σώματος). For an incorporeal
does not even make contact with a body. But the soul both makes contact with
and is separated from a body. Therefore the soul is a body.³¹
Though not explicitly mentioned, the ability to separate the body and soul at
the time of death is surely connected to the Stoic understanding of the body
and soul as being blended together. The logic of this selection, though,
provides further insight into Stoic thinking. According to Chrysippus the
separation of the soul from the body is only possible because the soul and
body are both bodies, are both corporeal. His reasoning is straightforward:
separation requires previous contact, but contact can only occur between two
bodies, therefore separation is contingent upon the corporeality of the things
united to each other. Materialism is fundamental to Stoic thought.
According to the Stoics, then, the blending of two bodies explains how the
active principle (God/Pneuma/Logos) and passive principle (matter) relate to
each other. The active principle pervades the passive principle such that both

²⁸ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 4, 217.32–5.

²⁹ Arius Didymus, fr. 28, Dox. Gr. 464.1–2.
³⁰ Every tertium quid is an “entirely new kind of stuff,” but not every system conceived of a
tertium quid in the same way. The resultant of Aristotelian mixture theory was a tertium quid,
but the constituent ingredients were thought to continue to exist in potential, and thus were not
destroyed. According to the Stoics the resultant of fusion was a tertium quid, but the constituent
ingredients were thought to be destroyed in the process of its formation. Sorabji, Matter, Space
and Motion (1988: 67, 80).
³¹ Nemesius, Nat. 81.6–10 (text and tr. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers 1987, repr.
1997, vol. 1: 272 and vol. 2: 270; also, Morani (ed.), Nat. Hom. 1987: 22).
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146 God and Christ in Irenaeus

ingredients in a blend mutually coextend throughout each other.³² The inter-
action or mutual partaking of the ingredients with each other is the result of
their blending, and demonstrates their union. At the same time, ingredients
are not destroyed in a blend, for the substances and qualities proper to them
persist, and their qualities show forth, in the resultant. The actual existence of
constituent ingredients in a blend is corroborated by the possibility of separ-
ating them out from the resultant. All of which is illustrated by the blending of
the soul with the body.
Having arrived at a certain understanding of Stoic mixture theory, in the
next section I shall consider pertinent scholarship on the appropriation
of Stoic and Aristotelian mixture theories in the Christologies of early
Christianity.

4.2. APPROPRIATION OF M IXTURE THEORY

I N E A R L Y CH R I S T I A N ITY

The presence of mixture language in Irenaeus has not gone entirely unnoticed,
at the same time the suggestion that Irenaeus’ mixture language is Stoic in
origin has not always been received positively, or even with equanimity. In his
well-known The Philosophy of the Church Fathers H.A. Wolfson maintains
that Irenaeus’ mixture language accords not with Stoic mixture theory but
Aristotelian conceptions of mixture. To be specific, Wolfson identifies two
passages in Irenaeus (AH 3.19.1 and 4.20.4) which he thinks align with a
category of Aristotelian mixture theory that he identifies as “unions of
predominance.”³³
Wolfson posits that when taken together, Aristotelian and Stoic thought
recognize five possible “kinds of union of physical things.”³⁴ Moreover, he
contends that of these five kinds of union four would not have suited early
Christian conceptions of the unity of the humanity and divinity of Christ.
Early accounts of the unity of Christ could not have drawn upon unions
involving the juxtaposition of ingredients (παράθεσις), unions based upon
either Aristotelian or Stoic conceptions of mixture (μῖξις or κρᾶσις), and still
less unions involving the fusion of ingredients (σύγχυσις).³⁵ According to

³² H.A. Wolfson comments upon the close connection of the pervasion of the passive
principle by the active to the mutual coextension of the two principles in The Philosophy of
the Church Fathers (1964, vol. 1: 419–20).
³³ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 396). ³⁴ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 385).
³⁵ Wolfson prefers to use different titles for some of these unions. He identifies unions
involving juxtaposition as unions of “composition” and unions involving fusion as unions of
“confusion.” His exact words are, “the orthodox Fathers . . . could not use as an analogy [for the
union of the Logos and the man in Jesus] either the union of ‘composition’ (σύνθεσις) or the
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Christological Union 147

Wolfson, unions of juxtaposition and unions of blending (the Stoic conception
of mixture; κρᾶσις) produce resultants that are merely aggregates of the
constituent ingredients—resultants that lack real unity.³⁶ On the other hand,
Wolfson maintains that unions of mixture in the Aristotelian sense and unions
of fusion result in a tertium quid³⁷—their resultants are an entirely new kind
of thing. Having dismissed these four theories as incompatible with early
Christian conceptions of Christ, Wolfson forwards a fifth kind of unity—the
“union of predominance.”³⁸ According to Wolfson, unions of predominance
are not formally distinguished by Aristotle from other conceptions of union
but are a subset of Aristotle’s unions of mixture.³⁹ Mixtures that fall into this
category are those in which “the resultant is one of the two constituents,
the one which happens to be greater or more powerful, and in which
also the smaller is not completely destroyed but is related to the greater as
matter to form.”⁴⁰
Early Christian authors utilized this theory of union, Wolfson believes, in
order to describe the Christological union.⁴¹ Wolfson argues that because “no
special term” for this union of predominance existed in philosophy it was
“loosely described as a ‘mixture’ or as a ‘composition’”—terms utilized in
Aristotle’s discussions of mixture theory. He then claims, “‘mixture’ and
‘composition’ are therefore terms used by the Fathers only in the sense of
‘predominance.’ ”⁴² But this is a logical non sequitur. For even if Wolfson

union of ‘mixture’ (μῖξις or κρᾶσις), whether in its Aristotelian sense or in its Stoic sense, and still
less could they use . . . the union of ‘confusion’ (σύγχυσις)” (Wolfson 1964, vol. 1: 385–6). For the
sake of consistency, I shall continue to speak of unions of juxtaposition and fusion.
³⁶ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 382). The details of Wolfson’s argument appear later in this section.
The reader will soon discover that I believe Sorabji now offers a more nuanced and more
insightful understanding of ancient chemistry and physics than does Wolfson. My discussion
of Stoic mixture theory in the first section of this chapter is deeply indebted to Sorabji’s analysis
in Matter, Space and Motion (1988).
³⁷ For the differences that exist between the tertium quid that results according to the
Aristotelian conception of mixture and that which results according to the Stoic conception of
fusion, see n. 30 in the previous section. For Wolfson’s discussion of these differences, see (1964,
vol. 1: 375–7) for Aristotelian mixture theory; p. 384 for fusion; p. 385 for his summary re: both.
For an extended discussion of Aristotelian mixture theory, see Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion
(1988: 367–72).
³⁸ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 386). ³⁹ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 377).
⁴⁰ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 386). ⁴¹ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 386).
⁴² Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 386). On p. 396 Wolfson issues a slight modification of this claim
after his analysis of passages in Tertullian and Origen that use mixture language. He writes,
“since in all these passages the term ‘mixture’ is definitely used by the orthodox Fathers in the
sense of ‘predominance,’ we have reason to believe that, when in other passages the orthodox
Fathers use the term ‘mixture’ without any clarifying comment, it is also in the sense of
‘predominance’ that it is used by them.” This qualification (“without any clarifying comment”)
is meaningless, for Wolfson never finds passages in any Fathers, “orthodox” or “unorthodox,”
that contain clarifying comments that go against reading mixture language as having a sense
other than predominance when referring to the union of the human and divine in Christ. The
closest he comes is his analysis of Theodoret of Cyrus’ dialogue between a monophysite and
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148 God and Christ in Irenaeus

has correctly identified occasional philosophical uses of “mixture” and
“composition” to express a union of “predominance,” and Sorabji’s study
suggests he has not,⁴³ it is not necessary to conclude that early Christians
understood and used the terms mixture and composition “only in the sense
of ‘predominance.’ ”
It seems to me that Wolfson allows his understanding of the logic of early
Christian Christology to overly influence his analysis of ancient chemical and
physical theory, as well as his conclusions with regard to the usage of those
theories by early Christians. Early in his discussion he writes that when it came
to thinking about the incarnation “the problem before [the Fathers] was to
find an analogy for the belief that two persons, the Logos and the man—for
man ordinarily is a person—in their union, which took place in Jesus, were so
joined together that only the Logos continued to be a person, whereas the man,
though not completely destroyed, was not a person.”⁴⁴ Having established as
his starting place that early Christians actively sought an analogy for a
Christological model of predominance, Wolfson finds what they, and he,

an orthodox believer, in which he recognizes the use of the Stoic conception of mixture by the
orthodox believer but still concludes that it could have been used to forward the position of
“predominance” (pp. 443–8). The only time he finds the use of Stoic mixture theory is in
reference to the exchange of properties belonging to the two natures—perichoresis
(pp. 418–28).
⁴³ Indeed, Sorabji’s more recent work brings into question the very existence of unions of
“predominance” as a subset of Aristotle’s mixture theory. Wolfson offers four examples in
support of his category of predominance. Each example is meant to illustrate that the resultant
is the greater or more powerful ingredient, but in such a way that the smaller or less powerful
ingredient remains in some fashion. His first, third, and fourth examples—(1) a drop of wine
thrown into ten thousand gallons of water—Aristotle, GC 1.10, 328a25–8; (3) the mixture of
wine with a little water—Aristotle, GC 1.5, 321a33–321b2, 322a9–10; and (4) the addition of
wood to a fire already burning—Aristotle, GC 1.5, 322a10–11, 14–16—are meant to show that
what remains of the smaller ingredient is some of its volume or bulk—a quantitative accident
(1964, vol. 1: 377–9). Sorabji’s reading of Aristotle, however, suggests that the increase in volume
or bulk—the quantitative accident—that occurs in these examples cannot be understood to
indicate the continuing existence of the smaller ingredient. According to Sorabji, for example, the
drop of wine thrown into ten thousand gallons of water “could not preserve its form or essential
characteristics, but would be destroyed and simply add to the volume of the water” (Matter,
Space and Motion 1988: 71). It is difficult to see how the smaller ingredient really remains if the
resultant that increases in volume is entirely the larger ingredient. The loss of its form and
essential or defining characteristics means that the wine is utterly destroyed—“obliterated”
(Matter, Space and Motion 1988: 66–7, 71).
Wolfson’s second example is meant to show that what remains of the smaller ingredient is
some of its color, a qualitative accident. He here appeals to the mixture of tin and bronze in
which the tin almost vanishes, imparting to the mixture only its color (Aristotle, GC 1.10,
328b8–14). Sorabji points out, however, that Aristotle recognizes the color imparted to the
mixture by tin to be an inessential quality, along the same lines as the flavor that food leaves in
water (Matter, Space and Motion 1988: 70). Again, then, it is difficult to see how the smaller
ingredient really remains if all that is left of it in the resultant is an inessential quality, a quality
that does not define what it means to be tin, and thus does not necessarily indicate the
presence of tin.
⁴⁴ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 374).
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Christological Union 149

sought in “unions of predominance.” His starting place inordinately affects his
analysis and his conclusion, such that he found what he was looking for and
only what he was looking for.
Two more recent works further expose the inadequacies of Wolfson’s
account. First, Sorabji’s study of ancient chemistry and physics shows that
Wolfson was incorrect to believe that Stoics understood the resultant of
blending as merely an aggregate of its constituent ingredients, the implication
being that blending does not produce a real unity. According to Wolfson,
while it is true that the Stoics deny that blending is a mere juxtaposition they
do not specify whether that denial includes the juxtaposition of imperceptible
parts. This, he believes, leaves open the possibility of interpreting the Stoic
theory of blending as involving the juxtaposition of imperceptible parts, an
interpretive move which he contends was not only made by Nemesius but was
prevalent within early Christianity.⁴⁵
Sorabji, however, points out that the Stoics followed Aristotle in rejecting
juxtaposition as not producing a genuine mixture.⁴⁶ This point is borne out by
the fact that the two most important discussions of Stoic theories of union
articulate their theory of blending (κρᾶσις) in contradistinction to the theory
of juxtaposition (παράθεσις).⁴⁷ More importantly, Sorabji calls attention to
Chrysippus’ explicit denial that “division can reach an infinite limit” because
there is no infinitely small thing to which that division could extend.⁴⁸
Chrysippus’ position goes against Wolfson’s belief that the Stoic denial of
juxtaposition left open the possibility of a juxtaposition of imperceptible
parts,⁴⁹ for the very notion of imperceptible parts is a corollary of the idea
that division can reach an infinite limit (the point at which something
infinitely small exists, and could be juxtaposed with other infinitely small

⁴⁵ Wolfson (1964, vol. 1: 382). Wolfson relies heavily upon Nemesius for his understanding of
Stoic blending as the juxtaposition of imperceptible parts (see esp. pp. 402–3).
⁴⁶ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 66).
⁴⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 216.14–217.2 and Arius Didymus, fr. 28, Dox. Gr.
463.14–464.8.
⁴⁸ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 102); rather than reaching an infinite limit,
Chrysippus maintained that division is “merely for ever capable of being continued.” The
passage under discussion is Diogenes Laertius’ Lives 7.150–1, in which Chrysippus explicitly
denies that mixture is juxtaposition, for in a mixture particles of the substances involved “do not
merely surround those of the other or lie beside them.” The whole passage reads: “Chrysippus
says that the division is not ad infinitum, but itself infinite (ἣν ἄπειρον <οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρόν>); for
there is nothing infinitely small (οὐ γάρ ἐστί τι ἄπειρον) to which the division can extend. But
nevertheless the division goes on without ceasing (ἀκατάληκτός). Hence, again, their explanation
of the mixture of two substances is, according to Chrysippus in the third book of his Physics, that
they permeate each other through and through, and that the particles of the one do not merely
surround those of the other or lie beside them (μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν)” (Lives of
Eminent Philosophers 7.150–1 [tr. R.D. Hicks; LCL 185; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1925, repr. 2005]).
⁴⁹ An important point, since Wolfson notes this very passage (DL, Lives 7.151) concerning
Chrysippus to support his own reading (1964, vol. 1: 382 n. 76).
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150 God and Christ in Irenaeus

things).⁵⁰ Therefore, when Chrysippus disallows the latter he disallows the
possibility of the former.
If, then, it is no longer appropriate for Wolfson to regard Stoic mixture as
juxtaposition, then neither is it appropriate for him to consider the resultant
of a Stoic mixture an aggregate. Even more so given that Alexander of
Aphrodisias—a leading advocate of Aristotelianism, and hence a hostile
witness—understood Stoic mixture theory to assert the production of a
resultant in which the constituent ingredients are “united together in their
entirety (ἑνοῦσθαι δι’ ὅλων) so that being preserved along with their qualities they
have a complete mutual coextension through one another (ἀντιπαρεκτείνεσθαι
ἀλλήλοις δι’ ὅλων ὅλα).”⁵¹ If Wolfson’s contention that ingredients in a Stoic
mixture do not form a real unity is no longer persuasive, then it can no longer be
regarded as a viable basis for excluding the possibility that early Christians
appropriated the Stoic theory of blending to explain the unity of the human
and divine in Jesus.
This brings us to the second work that exposes the inadequacies of
Wolfson’s account: Ronald Heine’s analysis of the Christology of Callistus.⁵²
Callistus was Bishop of Rome and a leading proponent of monarchianism at
the beginning of the third century. Heine demonstrates that Stoic mixture
theory was of critical importance to the Christology of Roman monarchian-
ism, for Roman monarchian theology found in the theory of blending a way to
avoid the charges of patripassianism that had plagued its precursor and
source, the Asian monarchianism of Noetus.⁵³
Roman monarchians identified that which is divine in Jesus as the Father
or Spirit (πνεῦμα) and that which is human as the Son.⁵⁴ The flesh, which is
identified as “Son,” becomes divine when the indwelling Father/Spirit unites it

⁵⁰ Aristotle (GC 1.10, 328a1–5; 15–17) and then Alexander of Aphrodisias (Mixt. 8,
221.25–222.26) attack the notion that mixture could be due to infinite division. In the course
of Alexander’s argument he states that if the Stoics understand mixture to occur by an infinite
division of ingredients, then they would not be speaking of a mixture but of a mere juxtaposition
(221.25–221.34). Sorabji highlights the conditional nature of Alexander’s argument (if the Stoics
understand mixture to occur by division), and proceeds to call into question the very notion that
Stoic mixture theory involved division (“But is there the slightest reason to suppose the Stoics
expected their fluids to blend by any process of division, let alone of infinite division?”). Thus,
Stoic thought would seem to differ from that of Anaxagoras, who may well have envisioned
ingredients as infinitely divided (Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion 1988: 102; see 64 for more on
Anaxagoras).
⁵¹ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 4, 217.27–9; text and tr. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias
(1976: 118–19).
⁵² Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 56–91).
⁵³ For a brief discussion of Noetus’ theology, see Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 78–89); for the attempt
to avoid patripassianism by the Roman monarchians, see pp. 77–8, 89.
⁵⁴ According to Callistus, “the spirit which was made flesh in the virgin is not different
from the Father . . . For that which is seen (1 Jn 1:1), which is man, is the Son, but the Spirit
contained in the Son is the Father.” Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 9.12.17–8 (tr. Heine,
JTS 49 1998: 63, 69).
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Christological Union 151

to himself (Ref. 9.12.18b).⁵⁵ In this way, Callistus could refer to the Son as “one
God” with the Father.⁵⁶ This union of the Father/Spirit with the Son as
“one God” becomes problematic when it comes to the passion of Jesus, for
in order to avoid patripassianism Callistus must be able to say that the Son
suffers while the Father/Spirit does not. This brings us to an important
Christological statement of Callistus:
For I will not, he says, speak of two Gods, Father and Son, but of one. For the
Father who was in him (John 14:10) assumed the flesh and made it God by
uniting it with himself, and made it one, so that Father and Son are designated
one God, and this unity, being a person, cannot be two, and so the Father suffered
with (συμπεπονθέναι) the Son.⁵⁷
In early Christian texts συμπάσχω usually meant “to die with,” often referring to
martyrdom, or “to suffer with or the same as.”⁵⁸ This meaning does not fit this usage
of Callistus, however, for Roman monarchianism denied that the Father died.⁵⁹
Heine argues that we can see how the Roman monarchians avoided patri-
passianism by understanding Callistus’ use of συμπάσχω in terms of its Stoic
usage to explain the interaction of the soul and body in a human being—an
interaction that, the reader will recall, is based on Stoic mixture theory.⁶⁰ As
I discussed in the first section, the Stoics maintained that the soul pervades
(διήκω) the whole human body just as constituent ingredients in a mixture
pervade each other, such that every part of the body partakes of the soul while
both the soul and body maintain their own substantiality (ὑπόστασις/οὐσία).⁶¹
This pervading of the soul through the entirety of the body is the basis for the
mutual interaction of the soul and the body that we saw in Cleanthes: “the soul
interacts with (συμπάσχει) the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body
with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and

The interpretation of Ref 9.12.16–9 is fraught with difficulty, for one must differentiate
between Callistus’ thought and the polemical association of Callistus’ thought with that of
Heraclitus. Heine’s work is of considerable help here; see JTS 49 (1998: 62–71, esp. 69–71),
where he identifies Callistus’ conception of the incarnation apart from the “Heraclitean pack-
aging” of Hippolytus.
The identification of the author of the Refutation is debated; I shall follow Heine in using
“Hippolytus” as an efficient way to refer to the author of this treatise. For a recent discussion of
Hippolytan authorship of various texts, see Heine (2004: 142–51).
⁵⁵ This union results in a divine–human distinction within the Son. Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 71).
⁵⁶ Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 71).
⁵⁷ Hippolytus, Ref 9.12.18; text from Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium (ed.
M. Marcovich; Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986: 354); tr. Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 63).
⁵⁸ Michaelis (1967: 925–6); συμπάσχω seldom means “to sympathize.” See also, Heine, JTS 49
(1998: 75).
⁵⁹ Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 75). Heine refers to Hippolytus’ reports of the teachings of Zephyrinus
and Callistus (Ref 9.11.3 and 9.12.19), as well as Tertullian, Prax 29.
⁶⁰ Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 75–8).
⁶¹ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 4, 217.32–6; Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 76).
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152 God and Christ in Irenaeus

pale respectively.”⁶² By modeling the union of the humanity and divinity of
Christ upon the Stoic understanding of the union of the soul and body in
human beings, the Roman monarchians would have been able to maintain
that the Father/Spirit participated in the experience of the suffering and death
of the Son/flesh while not itself suffering and dying as did the Son/flesh. So,
Heine writes: “Just as the soul, though it interacts (συμπάσχει) with the body
when the latter is cut, does not bleed, so the Roman monarchians could have
thought of the Father’s interaction with the Son in the Son’s suffering.”⁶³
The works of Sorabji and Heine demonstrate that not only is it inappropri-
ate to exclude the possibility that early Christians used Stoic mixture theory to
explain the unity of Christ, but even that the Stoic conception of mixture
played a prominent role in the Christology of some early Christians, namely
the Roman monarchians. The rest of this chapter will demonstrate that the use
of Stoic mixture theory was not limited to the Roman monarchians, for it
featured in Irenaeus’ theology as well.⁶⁴

4.3. MIXTURE IN IRENAEUS

Irenaeus never provides a discussion of his understanding of mixture theory

abstracted from its theological appropriation, nor does he discuss how mixture
theory functions across theological categories. As a result, it is necessary to
read a number of passages together in order to recognize his use of Stoic
mixture theory and in order to understand the role mixture theory plays in
his theology.
Irenaeus’ use of mixture language and his incorporation of concepts
belonging to mixture theory progresses over the course of Against Heresies.
The first indication of his interest in mixture theory occurs in AH 2.17.3 where
he uses mixture language to speak of the union of two things in contrast to the
separation of two things. We next find an unmistakable use of Stoic mixture
theory in his explanation of the mixture of and interaction between the soul
and body in human beings.⁶⁵ The use of concepts belonging to Stoic mixture
theory is discernible in Irenaeus’ discussion of the interaction between the
human and the divine that takes place in AH 3.19.1 and 3, both with regard to

⁶² This quotation of Cleanthes is found in Nemesius, Nat. 78.7–79.2; text and tr. Long and
Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1987, repr. 1997, vol. 1: 272 and vol. 2: 269).
⁶³ Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 78).
⁶⁴ Some scholars have considered aspects of Irenaeus’ theological account to be monarchian
or similar to the theological accounts of those often regarded as monarchian. I disagree with
those readings, as I discuss in Chapter 3 especially.
⁶⁵ AH 2.33.1, 4.
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Christological Union 153

the salvific joining of human beings to the Word of God and with regard to the
interaction between the divine and human in Jesus himself. It is at this point in
the progression that we find his use of mixture language in AH 4.20.4 to
characterize the union of the divine and human in Jesus.⁶⁶ Irenaeus’ second
and last use of mixture language to speak of the Christological union occurs in
AH 5.1.3, where he connects his understanding of the person of Christ with
the mixed cup of the Eucharist. The following examination will generally
follow the progression set out here.

4.3.1. Mixture’s Union

As I explained in the first section of this chapter, the Stoic theory of blending
was regarded as producing a resultant in which the constituent ingredients are
wholly united.⁶⁷ The first step in demonstrating Irenaeus’ appropriation of
mixture theory is to determine whether he recognized mixture as a means
of union. If he did not, then mixture theory would be insufficient for the needs
of his Christological account, for one of Irenaeus’ chief concerns when it comes
to the person of Christ was to establish the unity of the divine and human.⁶⁸
The passage that contains the most straightforward statement of Irenaeus’
thinking is AH 2.17.2–3. As discussed in Chapter 3, in this portion of his work
Irenaeus is criticizing the thinking of his Gnostic opponents about the pro-
duction of the aeons. Their logic fails, he argues, because they maintain at one
and the same time that a unity of substance exists between the aeons and their
Author or Father (Propator) and that the aeons are susceptible to passion
while the Author or Father is not. In the course of his argument he contrasts
things that are “completely separated” with those that are mixed or united:
(2.17.2) It shall be asked, then, how were the rest of the aeons emitted? Did they
remain united (uniti) to the one who emitted them, as the rays to the sun, or

⁶⁶ As I alluded earlier, Irenaeus’ use of the concept of mixture is not restricted to his
Christology. Indeed, his identification of the Christological union as a mixture prepares the
way for his references to the mixed cup of the Eucharist (AH 4.33.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.3), as well as his
references to the mixture and union of the Holy Spirit with the souls and bodies of the perfect
ones (AH 5.6.1, 5.9.2; these discussions are presaged by his reference to the mixture and union of
the Spirit with flesh in the production of “livings sons for the living God” in AH 4.31.2). I address
these aspects of his thought later in this chapter and in Chapter 5.
⁶⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias understood Stoic mixture theory to assert the production of a
resultant in which the constituent ingredients are “united together in their entirety (ἑνοῦσθαι δι’
ὅλων) so that being preserved along with their qualities they have a complete mutual coextension
through one another” (Mixt. 4, 217.27–9).
⁶⁸ This interest manifests itself in various ways and in various contexts and has not gone
unnoticed by scholars in the past. See for instance, Grillmeier (1965, 2nd ed. 1975, vol. 1: 103–4),
and esp., Houssiau (1955: 163–235). What has gone unnoticed is Irenaeus’ use of Stoic mixture
theory to explain this union.
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154 God and Christ in Irenaeus

(were they emitted) as distinct and separated (efficabiliter et partiliter),⁶⁹ so that
each of them [exists] separately and has its own form (separatim et suam
figurationem), as a human being [comes] from another human being and an
animal from another animal? . . . And [are they] simple and uniform, and in every
way equal and similar among themselves, as spirit and light are emitted, or [are
they] composite and different, dissimilar in their members? (2.17.3) But, if each of
them was indeed emitted distinctly and according to its own generation (effic-
abiliter et secundum suam genesim), after the likeness of human beings, then
either those generated by the Father will be of the same substance with him and
similar to the one who generated them, or if they appear dissimilar, then it
is necessary to confess them to be of some other substance . . . Furthermore,
according to this reasoning each of them will be understood (to exist) separately,
divided from one another (separatim divisus ab altero), just as human beings, not
mixed with nor united the one to the other (non admixtus neque unitus alter altero),
but in a distinct form and with a defined area, each one of them has been delineated
by a magnitude of size—[all of] which are characteristic of a body, and not of a spirit.
Let them, therefore, no longer speak of the Pleroma as spiritual . . .
As explained in Chapter 3, Irenaeus builds his argument upon the contrast he
establishes between the kinds of products that result from certain courses of
production. On the one hand there are those products that are “united” with
that which produced them, as rays are united to the sun.⁷⁰ On the other hand,
there are those produced “as distinct and separated” so that they exist “sep-
arately” from that which produced them. Building upon this distinction,
Irenaeus states that if aeons are produced after the manner of men then they
must be regarded as existing “separately, divided from one another, just as
human beings, not mixed with nor united the one to the other.”
Those things that are united (unio) with that which produced them in
2.17.2 correspond to those things that are mixed or united (admisceo/unio)
in 2.17.3. The logic of AH 2.17.2–3 reveals Irenaeus’ understanding of mixture.
He sets that which is “mixed” in opposition to that which exists “separately,
divided from one another,” while also placing that which is “mixed” in the
same category as or identifying it with that which is “united the one to the
other.” Thus, it is clear that Irenaeus conceives of mixture as producing a
unified resultant.
The production of a unified resultant by means of mixture fits the Stoic
theory of blending, but Irenaeus’ discussion also fits Aristotelian mixture
theory. He never specifies whether the constituent ingredients persist in the

⁶⁹ My translation of efficabiliter as “distinct”, both here and in 2.17.3 below, closely follows
Rousseau’s belief that the Greek substrate is ἀποτελεστικῶς as well as his understanding of the
term’s meaning in this context (he translates it as séparés in 2.17.2 and séparément in 2.17.3). See
Rousseau, SC 293 (1982: 267).
⁷⁰ For previous references to the production of rays from the sun in Irenaeus, as well as before
him, see Chapter 3, n. 78.
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Christological Union 155

resultant in actuality or in potentiality, or whether the resultant differs from
the ingredients in kind (i.e., whether it is a tertium quid)—positions that
differentiate the two systems. This ambiguity does not characterize his dis-
cussion of the mixture of the soul with the body in a human being.

4.3.2. Mixture of Body and Soul

Several passages at the end of Against Heresies 2 reveal that Irenaeus’ concep-
tion of the union of the body and soul corresponds to that of the Stoics. We
first encounter signs of Irenaeus’ appropriation of Stoic thought in AH 2.33.1
and 2.33.4, where he constructs an argument against the transmigration of
souls. Some time ago, William Schoedel recognized that Irenaeus’ argument
against Plato in AH 2.33.2–4 incorporates arguments from a peripatetic
philosophical tradition that may be traced back to Strato.⁷¹ Eluding Schoedel,
however, was the recognition that Irenaeus’ argument in AH 2.33.1 and2.33.4
also appropriates the Stoic notion of the mixture of the body and soul.⁷² AH
2.33.1 reads:
Their claim about the transmigration from body to body we may overthrow by
the fact that souls have no recollection at all of previous events . . . For the
admixture (admixtio/προσπλοκὴ) of the body (with the soul) could not altogether
extinguish the memory and contemplation of what they had known beforehand,
precisely because they were coming for that purpose.⁷³ For as at this time when
the body is asleep and at rest, whatever things the soul sees by itself and does in
a vision, many of these it remembers and communicates to the body; and as it
happens that upon waking one relates, even after a long time, what he saw in a
dream, in this way one would remember also those things he did before
coming into the body. For if that which was seen for just a moment of time
or was conceived in a vision by it (the soul) alone while sleeping is remem-
bered after it is blended again (ἀνακραθῆναι/commixta) with the body and is
dispersed (διασπαρῆναι/dispersa) through all the members, it would much

⁷¹ Schoedel, VC 13 (1959: 22–32, here 24–6). Schoedel notes the correspondence between
Irenaeus’ appropriation of peripatetic arguments to the appropriation of similar peripatetic
arguments by Justin and Tertullian, and reasons that this correspondence suggests an uniden-
tifiable “common philosophical tradition as a source” (p. 26).
For a survey of scholarship concerning Irenaeus’ interest in appropriating philosophical and
rhetorical arguments see my VC 65 (2011: 115–24, esp. 115–17).
⁷² I am not the first to argue that the end of AH 2 reveals Stoic influence. In the middle of the
last century, M. Spanneut argued that Irenaeus’ conception of dreams in AH 2.33.3 is Stoic in
origin (1957: 216–17).
⁷³ W.W. Harvey believed that this parenthesis originally belonged after the first sentence, and
at some point fell out of its proper place (Sancti Irenaei 1857, vol. 1: 376 n. 5.). While it is difficult
to see how the parenthesis could have slipped the space of several sentences, the argument does
flow better when it is placed as Harvey suggests.
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156 God and Christ in Irenaeus

more remember those things with which it lived for so long a time, even for the
whole period of a past life.⁷⁴
Irenaeus’ reference to the mixture of the body and soul occurs in the midst of
his argument against the transmigration of souls. There may in fact be two
references but the first is uncertain. In the first he challenges the notion that
souls do not remember events that took place in previous existences by
arguing that the “admixture (admixtio/προσπλοκὴ) of the body” with the
soul could not remove from the soul the memories and contemplation about
the past. It is unclear whether we should follow the Latin text or the later Greek
fragment. If the Latin reflects the primitive text, then the mixture of the body
and soul of which it speaks fits the Stoic theory of blending. Even so, little else
can be said of this first reference. The second reference, however, is more
informative.
Irenaeus argues that because a soul remembers the brief happenings of a
dream once it is blended again with a body, it would surely remember that
which happened throughout the whole course of a past life when blended with
a new body. Of particular interest are the phrases that describe the reunion of
the soul with the body after the completion of the dream: “after it is blended
again (commixta/ἀνακραθῆναι) with the body and is dispersed (dispersa/
διασπαρῆναι) through all the members.” Two aspects of these phrases indicate
Irenaeus’ thought is Stoic in origin. First, a fragment has preserved ἀνακεραννύω
as the term used to speak of the “blending again” of the body and the soul. The
verb belongs to the same word family as does κρᾶσις, the technical term for
the Stoic theory of blending. Second, the notion that this blending involved the
dispersal of the soul through all the members of the body corresponds to the
pervading or mutual coextension of the active principle through the passive
principle that occurs in blending. Both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Arius
Didymus use the soul and body as an example of this mutual coextension.⁷⁵
These observations establish Irenaeus’ understanding of the union of the
body and soul in AH 2.33.1 as Stoic in orientation. A few paragraphs later, in
AH 2.33.4, he further appropriates Stoic thought:
For the body is not more powerful than the soul, since indeed from that one is
(given to the body) breath, and life, and increase, and cohesion, but the soul
possesses and rules over the body. It is certainly retarded in its speed, to the

⁷⁴ AH 2.33.1.
⁷⁵ Alexander of Aphrodisias: the Stoics “employ as clear evidence that this is the case the fact
that the soul which has its own substantiality (ὑπόστασιν), just like the body that receives it,
pervades (διήκειν) the whole of the body while preserving its own substantiality (οὐσίαν) in the
mixture (τῇ μίξει) with it (for there is nothing in the body possessing the soul that does not
partake (ἄμοιρον) of the soul)” (Mixt. 4, 217.32–6); and Arius Didymus: “And it happens in a
similar way too with the souls within us: they are mutually spread out (ἀντιπαρεκτείνουσιν) along
with our bodies through and through (<δι’> ὅλων)” (fr. 28, Dox. Gr. 463.27–8; tr. Sorabji, Matter,
Space and Motion 1988: 82).
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degree in which the body participates in its motion; but it does not lose its own
knowledge. For the body is like an instrument, whereas the soul stands in the
place of the reason of the artist. As, therefore, the artist quickly conceives of
the work in himself, but carries it out slowly by means of an instrument
because of the immobility of what is being acted on, so too the speed of the
mind having been mixed with the slowness of the instrument results in a
temperate operation. So also the soul by participating (participans) with its
body is hindered to a certain degree, its speed being mixed (admixta) with the
slowness of the body. Yet it does not lose altogether its own powers (suas
virtutes): indeed as it is sharing (participans) life with the body, it does not
itself cease to live. Thus, too, when it is communicating other things to the
body, it loses neither the knowledge of them, nor the memory of the things
which have been considered.⁷⁶
This pericope does not explicitly refer to the mixture or blending of the body
and soul, but rather speaks of the participation (participare) of the soul with
the body. The language of participation, however, also fits Stoic thought. In the
selection from Alexander of Aphrodisias provided in note 75 we see that
because the soul pervades the entirety of the body, “there is nothing in the
body possessing the soul that does not partake (ἄμοιρον) of the soul.”⁷⁷ The
blending of two ingredients results in their participation with or partaking of
each other, just as the soul and body partake of each other in their union.
Moreover, this participation, as Alexander indicates prior to the sentence just
quoted, never jeopardizes the continued existence of the substance and qual-
ities proper to each ingredient. These concepts come through in Irenaeus’
description of the mixing of the operations of the soul and body. The mixing
(admiscere) of the rapid operation of the soul with the slower operation of the
body is an aspect of the participation of the soul and body that results from
their blending. Furthermore, the moderation of the soul’s rapidity of operation
does not mean that the soul loses “altogether its own powers (suas virtutes),”
a statement that corresponds well to the preservation of the qualities proper to
constituent ingredients in a blend.
At this point, the fundamental piece of Stoic thought concerning the
blending of the body and soul that we have not discussed with regard to
Irenaeus is the identification of the soul as a body. The impediment of the
soul’s operation by that of the body could, in fact, reflect the conception of
the soul as a body. For the very idea that the motion or speed of the soul may
be subject to resistance suggests the corporeality of the soul, since resistance is
typically construed as belonging to the interaction of material things.⁷⁸ Other

⁷⁶ AH 2.33.4. ⁷⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 4, 217.36, see also 3, 217.10–13.

⁷⁸ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion 1988: 99. Sorabji points out that the resistance that
would occur in blending as one body pervades another would be a function of the different
densities belonging to the two bodies.
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158 God and Christ in Irenaeus

passages, however, more clearly indicate that Irenaeus thinks of the soul as
being corporeal.
The first two passages I would like to highlight occur in the latter half of
Against Heresies 2. In AH 2.19.6 we read:
For he (the aeon Savior) will not have the likeness and appearance (speciem) of
angels, but of those souls in whom also he is formed (formatur)—just as water
when it is poured into a vessel takes the form (formam) of that vessel, and if at
some point it should freeze in it, it will have the shape (speciem) of the vessel in
which it has frozen—since souls themselves possess the figure (figuram) of the
body (in which they dwell), for they themselves have been adapted (adaptatae
sunt) to the vessel, as I have said before.⁷⁹
Massuet remarked long ago that we may infer from this passage that Irenaeus
believed souls to be corporeal, insofar as they possess a circumscribed figure.⁸⁰
The same inference may be drawn from another passage that occurs toward
the end of the book, in AH 2.34.1:
The Lord has taught most clearly that souls not only continue to exist, not passing
from body to body, but also even retain the same form (characterem) of the body
to which they are adapted (adaptantur), and remember those works which they
did in this life and from which they have ceased (doing)—(he has taught this) in
the history of the rich man and Lazarus, that one who found relief in the bosom of
Abraham . . . (by the things in this account) it has been most plainly declared that
souls continue to exist, and do not pass from body to body, and have the figure
(figuram) of a human being, so that they may still be recognized, and they
remember those things which happened in this life . . . ⁸¹
In this selection Irenaeus argues that the rich man is able to recognize Lazarus
and Abraham for several reasons, one of which is that after death the soul
preserves the figure of the body to which it had once been adapted. This logic
follows closely upon that which we saw in AH 2.19.6 and the same inference
may be drawn: the ascription of a circumscribed figure to the soul suggests
Irenaeus believed the soul to be corporeal.⁸²
Understanding Irenaeus’ attribution of figure to the soul as presupposing
the corporeality of the soul garners significant support from a statement he
makes earlier in book 2. In AH 2.7.6 Irenaeus is arguing against the Gnostic
position that created things are the images of the aeons in the pleroma. In the

⁷⁹ AH 2.19.6. ⁸⁰ Massuet, Sancti Irenaei (1710, repr. 1857: col. 774 n. 34).
⁸¹ AH 2.34.1.
⁸² Grabe directs the reader to Tertullian’s argument for the corporeality of the soul in On the
Soul (de Anima) 7 (Sancti Irenaei 1702: 192 n. 2). Interestingly, given his reading of AH 2.19.6,
Massuet argues Irenaeus does not express an opinion like Tertullian, contending that character
refers to individual spiritual properties (Sancti Irenaei 1710, repr. 1857: col. 833–4 n. 93). This
interpretation is unconvincing, however, because the passage is speaking of the physical recog-
nition of Lazarus and Abraham by the rich man.
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Christological Union 159

course of his argument he defines that which is created in contradistinction to
that which is spiritual:
. . . those things which are corruptible (corruptibilia), and earthly (terrena), and
compound (composita), and transitory (praetereuntia) cannot be the images of
those which according to them are spiritual, unless these very things also are
admitted to be compound (composita), circumscribed (circumscriptione), and
having a shape (figuratione), and thus no longer spiritual, and diffusive (effusa),⁸³
and incomprehensible (incomprehensibilia).⁸⁴
The characteristics ascribed to that which is created—being corruptible, earthly,
compound, circumscribed—indicate that by “created” Irenaeus means “mater-
ial.” Included among the characteristics that he ascribes to created, material,
things is figuratio—having a figure or shape. The possession of figure is proper
to that which is material, in contrast to that which is spiritual. That being the
case, Irenaeus’ ascription of figure (figura) to the soul in AH 2.19.6 and 2.34.1
presupposes the materiality or corporeality of the soul.
The final text that bears on this discussion manifests a striking similarity to
Nemesius’ Nat. 81.6–10 inasmuch as it speaks of the soul as corporeal while
also defining death as the departure or separation of the soul from the body.⁸⁵
In AH 5.7.1 Irenaeus writes:
What, then, are mortal bodies? Could they be souls? On the contrary, souls are
incorporeal (incorporales) when put in comparison (quantum ad comparatio-
nem) to mortal bodies (mortalium corporum): for God “breathed into the face” of
man “the breath of life, and man became a living soul” (Gen 2:7). Now the breath
of life is incorporeal (incorporalis). But neither can they call it mortal, since it is
the breath of life. And for this reason David says, “My soul also shall live to Him”
(Ps 21:30, LXX), as much as its substance is immortal. Neither, though, can they
say that the mortal body is spirit. What, then, is there left to call “the mortal
body,” except that which was formed, that is, the flesh, of which it is also said that
God will vivify it? For this it is which dies and is decomposed (moritur et solvitur),
but not the soul nor the spirit. For to die is to lose vital capacity, and then to
become breathless, and inanimate, and devoid of motion, and to dissolve (deper-
ire) into those [elements] from which one has derived the beginning of [one’s]
substance. But this happens neither to the soul, for it is the breath of life, nor to
the Spirit, for uncompounded (incompositus) and simple (simplex) is the Spirit,

⁸³ Following Rousseau’s suggestion that effusa et locupletia appears to be a doublet given the
following sentence that mentions only three of these adjectives: “Si autem illa spiritalia et effusa
et incomprehensibilia dicunt” (SC 293 1982: 224).
⁸⁴ AH 2.7.6.
⁸⁵ Nemesius Nat. 81.6–10: “Chrysippus says that death is the separation of soul from body.
Now nothing incorporeal (ἀσώματον) is separated from a body (σώματος). For an incorporeal
does not even make contact with a body. But the soul both makes contact with and is separated
from a body. Therefore the soul is a body.” Text and tr. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers
(1987, repr. 1997, vol. 1: 272 and vol. 2: 270).
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160 God and Christ in Irenaeus

which cannot be decomposed (resolvi) and is itself the life of those who receive it.
As it stands, then, death is shown to be a matter of the flesh, which, after the soul
has departed, becomes breathless and inanimate, and is decomposed little by little
into the earth from which it was taken. This, then, is what is mortal.
At first glance one might read this passage as standing against my argument
for the soul’s corporeality, for Irenaeus states that the “breath of life”—which
is the soul—“is incorporeal (incorporalis).” Such a reading overlooks, however,
the crucial qualification that occurs in the previous sentence: “souls are
incorporeal when put in comparison to (quantum ad comparationem) mortal
bodies.” Irenaeus does not think of the incorporeality of the soul absolutely but
relatively: the soul is incorporeal when compared to the corporeality of the
body.⁸⁶ The ascription of incorporeality to the soul when considered in
comparison to the body suggests that Irenaeus might consider the soul to be
corporeal when compared to something else, such as the Spirit.⁸⁷
Just such a comparison may take place a few sentences later when Irenaeus
attributes simplicity to the Spirit but not the soul, leaving open the possibility
that the soul is composite. According to Irenaeus, the body is that which dies
and is decomposed (moritur et solvitur), not the soul or the Spirit. To die
would be to lose vital power, to become breathless, inanimate, devoid of
motion, and to dissolve or decompose into a thing’s constituent elements.
The soul, as the breath of life, could not be that which dies because it is not
subject to the loss of vital power, to becoming breathless, inanimate, and
devoid of motion. Indeed, the opposites of these are proper to the soul,⁸⁸
which bestows them upon the body.⁸⁹ The Spirit, as that which is simple

⁸⁶ See B. Bucur (2009: 40–1), for a discussion of the relative corporeality of the entire cosmic
hierarchy in Clement and Origen.
⁸⁷ Over the years scholars have disagreed over whether Irenaeus holds a trichotomous or
dichotomous anthropology. I have argued elsewhere that Irenaeus holds a dichotomous anthro-
pology, in which he identifies the human being as composed of body and soul (Irenaeus on the
Holy Spirit 2012: 149, 165–6).
The reference to the Spirit in AH 5.7.1 refers to the reception of the Holy Spirit by the
perfect human being, who thus possesses the hope of the resurrection, which is the broader
context of this text. E.g., AH 5.6.1, “For by the Hands of the Father, that is, by the Son and the
Holy Spirit, the human being, and not merely a part of the human being, was made in the
likeness of God. Now the soul and Spirit can be a part of the human being, but by no means
the human being; for the perfect (perfectus) human being is the commingling and union of the
soul receiving the Spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that flesh which was formed after
the image of God.” For more on the perfection of human beings, see my Irenaeus on the Holy
Spirit (2012: 173–81).
⁸⁸ Strictly speaking, animation or temporal life is not proper to the soul. The soul possesses
life because it has pleased God to bestow life upon the soul (AH 2.34.4; cf. Briggman, Irenaeus on
the Holy Spirit 2012: 167–73).
⁸⁹ On the soul making the human being animated and rational, see for instance AH 5.1.3: “at
the beginning of our formation, that breath of life which proceeded from God, having been
united to what had been fashioned, animated the man and manifested him as an animal being
endowed with reason (animal rationabile).”
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Christological Union 161

(simplex) and not composite (incompositus), could not be that which dies
because it is not subject to dissolving (deperire) or decomposing (resolvi) into
constituent elements. The attribution of simplicity to the Spirit but not the
soul is not incidental; it accords with Irenaeus’ understanding of the nature of
each. We’ve just seen that Irenaeus regards the nature of the Spirit as being
simple and not composite, while a little earlier we read in AH 2.7.6 that created
beings are composite or compound (composita). Irenaeus connects these two
statements when, in AH 5.12.2, he says that the Holy Spirit creates the soul/
breath of life.⁹⁰ Reading these passages together allows us to see that the
soul, as that which is created, is composite, while the Holy Spirit, as the
uncreated Creator, is simple and not composite.⁹¹
It is clear that whether something is simple or composite differentiates the
uncreated from the created, but I would like to suggest that in Irenaeus’ mind
the degree to which something is composite differentiates created things from
each other.⁹² We could say that the created order is defined by a scale of
complexity. I believe this understanding explains his ascription of relative but
not absolute incorporeality to the soul. The soul is incorporeal when compared
to the body because it is less composite or more simple than the body—the
soul is the breath breathed by God,⁹³ whereas the body is formed from the dust
of the ground.⁹⁴ Differentiating between the complexity of the soul and body is

⁹⁰ AH 5.12.2: “Indeed, he regards the Spirit as belonging in the rank of God, which in the
last times he has poured out on the human race by the adoption of sons, but the breath [he has
given] in common to creatures, and proclaims it a thing made. Now what has been made is
other than the one who has made it. Therefore, the breath is transitory, while the Spirit is
eternal.”
Further agreement between AH 2.7.6 and 5.12.2 can be seen in the identification of the soul or
breath as transitory, praetereuntia in 2.7.6 and temporalis/πρόσκαιρος in 5.12.2.
⁹¹ D. Minns is correct when he writes, “In Irenaeus’ view, only material things are made up of
bits and pieces.” I do not believe, however, that his next sentence represents the thought of
Irenaeus: “Souls are immaterial and therefore simple: they have no parts to come unstuck and
therefore they are incorruptible—they have no innate capacity for corruption as bodies do”
(1994, repr. 2010: 95). Not only is it incorrect to think of the soul as immaterial and simple, as
I have shown above, but it is also wrong to assert that souls do not have an “innate capacity for
corruption,” such that they are incorruptible. Incorruptibility, or immortality, does not belong to
the soul by nature, but comes to human beings who receive power or grace from the Holy Spirit
(e.g., AH 5.8.1–2). This is true of Adam and Even prior to the Fall, who depend upon the power/
grace of the Spirit to sustain eternal life, as well as postlapsarian human beings, who depend upon
the power/grace of the Spirit to restore eternal life (for a more detailed discussion see, Briggman,
Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit 2012: esp. 166–73, 79–80).
⁹² This reading of Irenaeus also has a basis in Stoic thought, which recognized some things to
be more material than others. See, Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 116); Sorabji refers
to Calcidius, in Tim. ch. 289.
⁹³ E.g., AH 5.7.1, which quotes Gen 2:7.
⁹⁴ See, for example, AH 3.21.10. Irenaeus uses plasma language to express the materiality of
human beings and the origin of human substance, its formation from dust by God (Briggman,
Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit 2012: 113–19).
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162 God and Christ in Irenaeus

possible, and only possible, because both the soul and body are created.
Complexity belongs to the created order alone. Uncreated divinity, as has
just been demonstrated with regard to the Holy Spirit, is defined by its
simplicity.⁹⁵ If, then, the soul is incorporeal relative to the body because it is
less composite or more simple than the body, then it would make sense for
Irenaeus to think of the soul as being corporeal relative to the Holy Spirit,
because the soul is composite whereas the Spirit is simple.⁹⁶
As I said at the beginning of my discussion of AH 5.7.1, this text is similar to
Nemesius’ Nat. 81.6–10 because it both speaks of the soul as corporeal while
also defining death as the departure or separation of the soul from the body.⁹⁷
Chrysippus’ explanation that death is due to the departure of a corporeal
soul builds upon the Platonic understanding that death is the separation of
the soul from the body⁹⁸ to arrive at the un-Platonic conclusion that the soul
is corporeal.⁹⁹ Unlike Chrysippus, Irenaeus does not go so far as to say that
two objects must be corporeal in order to conceive of their separation.
Nevertheless, Chrysippus’ explanation of death as the separation of two
corporeal objects, the soul from the body, would seem to fit Irenaeus’ logic
in this passage.¹⁰⁰
To this point I have shown that Irenaeus recognized mixture to produce
a unified resultant such that what is mixed is “united the one to the other”
(AH 2.17.3). Moreover, Irenaeus’ conception of the union of the body and
soul corresponds to the Stoic understanding of the blending of the body and
soul, an understanding that includes the identification of the soul as cor-
poreal. It is clear, then, that Irenaeus incorporates both the language and
the concepts belonging to the Stoic theory of blending into his theological
account. As we have seen, this appropriation of Stoicism appears as early as
Against Heresies 2 and persists at least through the beginning of Against
Heresies 5. Between these two books, in Against Heresies 3 and 4, Irenaeus
uses the Stoic theory of blending to explain the union of the divine and
human in Christ.

⁹⁵ See, also, Chapter 2.2, which discusses Irenaeus’ attribution of simplicity to the divine being.
⁹⁶ Though it would be inappropriate to locate the Holy Spirit—which is simple—on the scale
of complexity, it is proper to say that in terms of complexity the soul occupies an intermediate
position between the more complex body and the simple Holy Spirit.
⁹⁷ AH 5.7.1: “As it stands, then, death is shown to be a matter of the flesh, which, after the
soul has departed, becomes breathless and inanimate, and is decomposed little by little into the
earth from which it was taken.”
⁹⁸ Phaedo 64c, 67c–d.
⁹⁹ Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (1987, repr. 1997, vol. 2: 270).
¹⁰⁰ This is not to say that death—and here I am speaking of the loss of temporal life—is simply
a mechanistic separation of the soul from the body, for that would neglect the will of God in the
bestowal and preservation of that life (AH 2.33.4; see also, 5.12.2).
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Christological Union 163

4.3.3. Mixture Christology

For the character of the mixture involved, one would expect orthodox
believers in two natures to draw on Stoic, rather than Aristotelian theory.
For the ingredients in a Stoic mixture persist actually, not potentially, and
one can be dominant, as the divine nature was supposed to be, without
obliterating the other.
R. Sorabji¹⁰¹
Several passages in Against Heresies 3 and 4 combine to reveal that Irenaeus
utilizes the Stoic theory of blending to explain the manner in which the divine
and human are united in Christ and the manner in which they relate within
that union.¹⁰² My approach of proceeding according to the literary chronology
of Against Heresies will establish the development of Irenaeus’ thought, and,
therefore, the context in which we should read his reference in AH 4.20.4 to
the blending (commixtio) of the human and divine in the Christological union.
The first possible sign in book 3 of a Christological interest in the Stoic
theory of blending occurs in AH 3.16.6:
. . . they wander from the truth, because their thought departs from him who is
truly God, being ignorant that his only-begotten Word, who is always present
with the human race, united to and interspersed in his own formation (unitus et
consparsus suo plasmati), according to the pleasure of the Father, and was made
flesh, is himself Jesus Christ our Lord . . .
Previous consideration of this text has been concerned with two questions:
whether unitus et consparsus suo plasmati refers to the incarnation or the presence
of the Word to his creatures, and what Greek term lies behind consparsus.
As to the first, Albert Houssiau questioned whether unitus et consparsus suo
plasmati refers to the incarnation or the creation of human beings. He
ultimately decided in favor of the incarnation but with the reservation that
the question is difficult to settle.¹⁰³ Neither J. Armitage Robinson nor Aloys
Grillmeier were as troubled over the passage as Houssiau, both reading it as a
reference to the incarnation. Robinson compares the text to Prf 40, where
Irenaeus writes of the Word: “this One came to Judaea engendered of God by
the Holy Spirit, and born of the Virgin Mary.” He observed that the Armenian
term (սերմանել) translated as “engendered” in Prf 40 means “sown,” and
suggested that AH 3.16.6 also refers to “the Word that the Father ‘sows’ by his

¹⁰¹ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 120).

¹⁰² Irenaeus’ application of the Stoic theory of blending to the Christological union does not
involve the attribution of corporeality to the divine Word. As I point out in this chapter’s
conclusion, Irenaeus is not the only one to use Stoic theory while not affirming the Stoic doctrine
of the corporeality of all things.
¹⁰³ Houssiau (1955: 225).
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164 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Holy Spirit.”¹⁰⁴ The fact that Irenaeus’ argument in 3.16.6 has nothing to do
with the Holy Spirit keeps me from following that aspect of Robinson’s
argument. On the other hand, his reference to Prf 40 does reveal that language
similar to consparsus has a place in Irenaeus’ theology of the incarnation.
Grillmeier, for his part, classed this phrase among others that reveal the rich
language Irenaeus uses about the union of God and man in the incarnation.¹⁰⁵
Though I agree with Houssiau that the placement of the phrase between
references to a more general presence of the Word to human beings and
references to his peculiar presence in the incarnation could bring into question
whether the phrase refers to the incarnation, the broader argument of the
passage concerning the unity of Jesus’ person strongly indicates that it has to
do with the union of the Word and humanity in the incarnation. The
decisiveness of Robinson and Grillmeier are instructive.
As for the term that lies behind consparsus, no consensus has emerged.
Suggestions have included πεφυρμένος,¹⁰⁶ συμφυραθεὶς,¹⁰⁷ and συνεσπαρμένος.¹⁰⁸
The first two belong to the same word family and would be translated along
the lines of “mixed or mingled with” and “kneaded or blended together.” The
third would be translated along the lines of “interspersed with” and its presence
would likely entail an allusion to Stoic concept of λόγος σπερματικός. This
concept, however, is foreign to Irenaeus’ thought,¹⁰⁹ rendering the originality
of συνεσπαρμένος highly improbable. Unless we recover the original Greek, no
final determination will be possible. At the same time, it is worth pointing out
that the meanings of each of these terms are compatible with the Stoic theory of
blending, which we have seen Irenaeus use by this point in his writing. When
read in the light of the theory of blending, unitus et consparsus suo plasmati
would refer to the union that results when the Word pervades or extends
throughout (conspargere) the created human substance (plasma). Such a reading
would support Houssiau’s insistence that when speaking of the union of the
Word with his plasma Irenaeus implicitly compares the unity of Christ to the
union of the soul and body in human beings,¹¹⁰ for he would be thinking of both
in terms of the Stoic theory of blending.

¹⁰⁴ Robinson, Demonstration (1920: 65).

¹⁰⁵ Grillmeier (1965, 2nd ed. 1975, vol. 1: 104 n. 230).
¹⁰⁶ Grabe, S. Irenaei (1702: 241 n. 6). Houssiau (1955: 225 n. 2) follows Grabe in proposing
πεφυρμένος, contending the Latin, Syriac, and Armenian terms all suggest it.
¹⁰⁷ Rousseau offers this term in his Greek retroversion (SC 211 1974: 313).
¹⁰⁸ K. Prümm, Scholastik 13 (1938: 206–24, 342–66, here 343). The possibility of this reading
is noted by Grillmeier (1965, 2nd ed. 1975, vol. 1: 104 n. 230), and Houssiau (1955: 225 n. 2).
¹⁰⁹ As discussed in Chapter 1, Houssiau believed that Irenaeus followed Justin Martyr in
appropriating the concept of Λόγος σπερματικός, but this is an erroneous reading of Irenaeus
(see Chapter 1.3.3). Both Behr and Lashier argue that Irenaeus modified Justin’s concept of
Λόγος σπερματικός in order to contend that Christ was disseminated in Scripture: Behr, SP 36
(2001: 163–67, here 164); Lashier (2014: 127–8).
¹¹⁰ Houssiau (1955: 247, see also 205).
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Christological Union 165

If it is correct to read this passage in terms of Stoic mixture theory, then AH
3.16.6 shows the expansion of Irenaeus’ use of the theory of blending. His initial
use of the theory to characterize the union of the soul and body at the end of
Against Heresies 2 has expanded by the middle of book 3 to include an explanation
of the union of the divine and human in Christ. Whatever the case, AH 3.19.1, the
next passage to be examined, does reveal progression in Irenaeus’ thought, for we
find there another development in his appropriation of mixture language—its use
to characterize the salvific union between God and human beings:
But, again, those who assert that he is just a mere man who was begotten by
Joseph remain in the bondage of the old disobedience, and are dying, having not
yet been blended (nondum commixti) with the Word of God the Father, nor
receiving liberty through the Son . . . For it was for this reason that the Word of
God [was made] man, and he who is the Son of God was made the Son of man,
that man, having been blended (commixtus) with the Word of God, and receiving
the adoption, might become the son of God.¹¹¹
Irenaeus twice uses commiscere with reference to the union between human
beings and the Word of God. In the first instance those who have not yet been
blended (nondum commixti) with the Word remain in a state of death, while
in the second instance those who have been blended (commixtus) with the
Word become children of God.¹¹²
The presence of the language of blending or mixture in this text has been the
source of confusion and concern over the years. In fact, Irenaeus’ mixture
language may have been controversial as early as the fifth century. Theodoret
of Cyrus quotes the portion of this passage containing the second use of
commiscere, but the Greek text he provides, τὸν λόγον χωρήσας, does not
correspond to the Latin commixtus verbo.¹¹³ Grabe was the first to offer an
explanation, suggesting that Theodoret altered the Greek word that commixtus

¹¹¹ AH 3.19.1.
¹¹² These words were not always understood to speak of the salvific union. F. Feuardent
interpreted the second use of commiscere (commixtus Verbo) as referring to the Christological
union instead of the salvific union (Feuardent as quoted by A. Stieren, Sancti Irenaei 1853, vol. 2:
903). Massuet spent a lengthy note discussing commiscere in the context of the Christological
union, but never states that he interprets the words in Irenaeus as referring to it (S. Irenaei 1710,
repr. 1857: col. 939–40 n. 55). Harvey’s belief that “commixtus . . . bears taint of Eutychianism”
suggests that he reads the text as referring to the Christological union, which is odd given his
emendation of ut homo (S. Irenaei 1857, vol. 2: 103 n. 4).
The interpretation of these words as referring to the salvific union between God and human
beings began at least as early as Grabe’s edition (S. Irenaei 1702: 249 n. 6). Consensus formed
around this reading at the turn of the twentieth century, as indicated by Hort’s notes and
Hitchcock’s repeated declarations (Hitchcock 1914, repr. 2004: 136 n. 1; and Hitchcock, Irenaeus
of Lugdunum 1916, vol. 1: 133 n. 1; Robinson, JTS 33 1932: 151–66, here 162). Years later
Houssiau also affirmed this reading (1955: 192 n. 3).
¹¹³ Theodoret of Cyrus, Eranistes 1, Flor. 1. The passage can be found in Greek in the critical
text, Theodoret of Cyrus, Eranistes (ed. G.H. Ettlinger; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975: p. 98 line
20), and in translation in Theodoret of Cyrus, Eranistes (tr. G.H. Ettlinger; FotC 106; Washington,
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2003: 71).
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166 God and Christ in Irenaeus

is rendering in an effort to not lend any encouragement to the proponents of
Eutyches’ Christology.¹¹⁴ Massuet disagreed, noting that Theodoret recog-
nized that κρᾶσις can express a union without confusion (σύγχυσις).¹¹⁵ He
then arrived at a more reserved judgment: Theodoret had either worked from
memory or used an interpolated text.¹¹⁶
Whatever the cause of the alteration—about which consensus may
never be possible¹¹⁷—Massuet’s examination led him to identify the word
behind commixtus as either συγκερασθεὶς or συγκεκραμένος.¹¹⁸ Stieren
seems to follow Massuet, listing the same possibilities.¹¹⁹ Hort believed it
was probably συγκεκερασμένοι,¹²⁰ while Hitchcock maintained it was either
συγκραθείς or συγκεκραμένος.¹²¹ More recently, Rousseau gives the original as
συγκραθείς.¹²² Whatever the particular form of the verb, all agree that the
original term Irenaeus used belongs to the same word family as does
κρᾶσις,¹²³ the technical term for the Stoic theory of blending.¹²⁴

¹¹⁴ Grabe, S. Irenaei (1702: 249 n. 6). Feuardent seems to have been the first to notice the
contrast between Theodoret’s Greek and the Latin text of Irenaeus (Feuardent as quoted by
Stieren, S. Irenaei 1853, vol. 2: 903). Grabe’s explanation for the contrast builds upon Feuardent’s
earlier note.
¹¹⁵ Massuet, S. Irenaei (1710, repr. 1857: cols. 939–40 n. 55). Massuet goes on to observe that
commiscere may express union without confusion, quoting a sermon (On the Nativity of Christ)
of Leo I, an opponent of Eutyches (col. 940 n. 55). Hitchcock dismisses Massuet’s observation
regarding Leo’s use of commiscere, on the basis that Leo was speaking of the union of the divine and
human in Christ whereas this passage in Irenaeus is not (Irenaeus of Lugdunum 1914, repr. 2004:
136 n. 1). But Massuet’s reference to Leo is not so unfounded, for Theodoret was concerned with
the Christological union. In any case, Massuet’s argument stands on his observation that Theodoret
recognizes that κρᾶσις can express a union without confusion. Of particular interest to this study is
the fact that Massuet never connects his observations with regard to Theodoret’s understanding of
κρᾶσις or Leo’s use of commiscere to the Stoic theory of blending.
¹¹⁶ Massuet, S. Irenaei (1710, repr. 1857: col. 939–40 n. 55). Grabe, too, admits the possibility
that Theodoret was working from memory but quickly turns to his suggestion of Theodoret’s
polemical alteration of the text behind commixtus (S. Irenaei 1702: 249 n. 6).
¹¹⁷ For instance, over a century later Harvey preferred Theodoret’s χωρήσας to the Latin,
though this is likely due to his refusal to admit the propriety of commiscere (S. Irenaei 1857, vol.
2: 102 n. 5). Still later, Hitchcock preferred Grabe’s explanation of a polemically altered text to
that of Massuet’s reasoning (Irenaeus of Lugdunum 1914, repr. 2004: 136 n. 1). Grabe’s belief that
Theodoret polemically altered the text gained support from P. Nautin’s observations regarding
Theodoret’s alterations of Hippolytus, in which he uses Theodoret’s quotations of Irenaeus as a
control (1953: 29–31). Houssiau, noting Nautin’s study, also believes Theodoret altered the text
(1955: 192 n. 3).
¹¹⁸ Massuet, S. Irenaei (1710, repr. 1857: col. 939 n. 55).
¹¹⁹ Stieren, S. Irenaei (1853, vol. 1: 525 n. 2).
¹²⁰ Robinson, JTS 33 (1932: 162). Hort’s suggestion is printed beside commixti Verbo.
¹²¹ Hitchcock, Irenaeus of Lugdunum (1914, repr. 2004: 136 n. 1).
¹²² Rousseau, SC 210 (1974: 343).
¹²³ Harvey is the sole exception (S. Irenaei 1857, vol. 2: 102 n. 5), but, as I mentioned in n. 117,
his reasoning seems to be driven by his theological predetermination that commixtus is inad-
missable.
¹²⁴ This would also hold for the term behind the earlier use of commiscere in this passage,
since the second usage builds off of the first.
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Christological Union 167

Irenaeus’ discussion of the union between God and human beings continues
at the end of AH 3.19.1, where he bases the benefits of the salvific union upon
the attainments of the Christological union. He writes:
For by no other way could we have received incorruptibility and immortality,
except by having been united (aduniti) to incorruptibility and immortality. But
how could we be united (adunari possemus) to incorruptibility and immortality,
unless, first, incorruptibility and immortality had become that which we also are,
so that the corruptible might be absorbed (absorberetur) by incorruptibility, and
the mortal by immortality, that we might receive (perciperemus) the adoption
of sons?
The union (adunare) to which Irenaeus refers here is the blending (commis-
cere) of the Word and human beings of which he spoke in the first part of AH
3.19.1. We have cause, then, to utilize Stoic mixture theory as an interpretive
lens when considering this discussion of the salvific union. Two features of
Stoic thought are relevant to the interpretation of this text. First, as I have
mentioned, the constituent ingredients in a blend preserve the substances and
qualities proper to them.¹²⁵ The union, then, between human beings and the
divine Word does not jeopardize their distinction: they remain different in
kind, and, therefore always distinguishable when united.¹²⁶ Second, blending
is designed to explain how the active principle (God/Pneuma/Logos) and the
passive principle relate to each other.¹²⁷ The absorption of the corruptibility
and mortality of post-lapsarian human beings by the incorruptibility and
immortality of the divine Word should be recognized as the action of the
divine Word upon the passive human being with whom it is blended.
These two points combine to yield the understanding that the absorption of
corruptibility and mortality by incorruptibility and immortality does not
involve the diminution or transformation of the substance or qualities of the
human being. This corresponds, for instance, to Irenaeus’ conception of
temporal life and eternal life as two modalities of the one physical or biological
life of human beings.¹²⁸ The union of human beings with the incarnate Word
through the Holy Spirit involves the bestowal of additional grace or power

¹²⁵ E.g., Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 214–17.

¹²⁶ Irenaeus is ever concerned to maintain a distinction between the uncreated God and
created beings. For instance, in AH 4.38.1, 3 we see that believers experience an unending ascent
in which, as created beings, they grow increasingly more perfect, every closer to the nature of
God, but never arriving, always limited to an approximation of God, the uncreated One, the
perfect One (Briggman, Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit 2012: 178–9).
¹²⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 216.14–17; Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.134–6.
¹²⁸ Temporal life and eternal life are differentiated by the amount of grace or power given to a
human being by the Holy Spirit. At the Fall human beings lost a certain degree of power/grace,
resulting in the modulation of eternal life to temporal life, which corresponds to the minimal
possession of power/grace by all human beings. The eternal life experienced even now by
believers corresponds to a life empowered/engraced more than temporal life but less than the
eternal life experienced at the resurrection. The eternal life at the resurrection entails the
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168 God and Christ in Irenaeus

upon the believer, resulting in the modulation of temporal life to eternal life.
The eternal life of the believer, characterized by incorruptibility and immor-
tality, is not different in kind from temporal life, characterized by corruptibil-
ity and mortality, but different in strength or order. There is always one and
the same human life, capable of modulation, but ever human.
The Stoic conception of the relationship between the active principle and
passive principle can be recognized not only in aspects of Irenaeus’ conception
of the relationship between God and human beings, but also in the relation-
ship between the divine and human in the person of Christ. Just a paragraph
or two later, in AH 3.19.3, Irenaeus writes:
For just as he was man so that he might be tempted, so also was he the Word so
that he might be glorified: the Word remaining quiescent (requiescente/
ἡσυχάζοντος) in him, on the one hand, when he was tempted, dishonored,
crucified, and put to death; the human nature (homine) in him being absorbed
(absorto),¹²⁹ on the other hand, when he was conquering, and enduring (suffer-
ing), and performing acts of kindness, and rose again, and was taken up (into
heaven). This one, therefore, the Son of God, our Lord, being the Word of the
Father, and the Son of man, because from Mary—who was descended from
human beings and who was herself a human being—he has received a generation
proper to a human being, and was made the Son of man.
Irenaeus takes but a moment to affirm the necessity of both the human and
divine natures to the existence of the incarnate Word,¹³⁰ he then moves to his
primary concern of explaining how the human and divine exist as one.¹³¹
Previous scholars have disregarded the straightforward reading of this text as
referring to a dynamic involving the divine and human natures of Jesus.
According to Loofs the dynamic expressed by the terms ἡσυχάζων and

reception of the “complete grace” or full empowerment. See Briggman, Irenaeus on the Holy
Spirit (2012: esp. 166–73).
¹²⁹ Theodoret has συγγινομένου. Theodoret’s text is followed by Grabe (S. Irenaei 1702: 250 n.a),
Massuet (S. Irenaei 1710, repr. 1857: col. 941 n. 64), and F. Loofs, who suggests the Latin translator
altered the text (1930: 91 n. 1). The Latin is held to be correct by Stieren on the basis of internal
textual comparison (S. Irenaei 1853, vol. 1: 526 n. 6), and Harvey on the basis of sense (S. Irenaei
1857, vol. 2: 104 n. 6). Houssiau follows the Latin, which he sees as translating καταποθέντος, on the
basis of internal textual comparison and Theodoret’s tendency to correct passages that may be read
as a challenge to diophysite Christology (1955: 192–3). According to Rousseau, συγγινομένου
makes little sense and is “without doubt” an accidental corruption of καταπινομένου, which is
well supported by comparison with other passages in Irenaeus (SC 210 1974: 344). It is difficult for
me to see how such a corruption could be accidental; it makes more sense for the alteration to be
the result of Theodoret’s polemic, as Houssiau has suggested. As for the particular form of
καταπίνω, the present tense (καταπινομένου) forms a grammatical parallel with ἡσυχάζοντος and
suits the relational dynamic under discussion better than the aorist (καταποθέντος).
¹³⁰ See Rousseau’s succinct explanation of the first line of this text in SC 210 (1974: 344).
¹³¹ This discussion is an aspect of Irenaeus’ argument for identifying Jesus as the God-man, an
argument that occupies all of AH 3.19.
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Christological Union 169

συγγινομένος¹³² does not indicate a natural union (ἕνωσις φυσική) but an
energetic (“energetische”) union between the Word and his humanity.¹³³
Sagnard maintains that the titles Son of God and Son of man indicate that the
union takes place at a personal rather than natural level.¹³⁴ Houssiau and Rousseau,
for their part, come closest by saying that ἡσυχάζων and καταπινομένος¹³⁵ refer
to a dynamic interaction of the qualities belonging to the human and divine
natures.¹³⁶
A straightforward reading of this passage, however, understands ἡσυχάζων
and καταπινομένος to describe an interaction that takes place within the
Christological union at the level of the two natures: it is the divine Word
who remains quiescent (ἡσυχάζοντος τοῦ Λόγου) and his humanity that is
absorbed or swallowed up by the Word (καταπινομένου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου).¹³⁷ This
interaction is dynamic and according to Irenaeus explains how the two
realities of Jesus Christ are able to exist as one. The Word remains quiescent
when it is necessary for Christ to take part in certain activities or experiences
(being tempted, dishonored, crucified, suffering death), and the Word absorbs
or swallows up his human nature when it is necessary for Christ to take part in
others (conquering, enduring, performing acts of kindness, rising again, being
taken up into heaven).
A cogent interpretation of this passage, then, must explain this dynamic
interaction in terms of Christ’s human and divine natures. It must also,
however, account for a particular aspect of Irenaeus’ logic that is fundamental
to his conception of this dynamic interaction. According to Irenaeus, the
Word alone is the subject of the activity that determines the relationship
between the human and divine in the Christological union.¹³⁸ This restriction
of activity to the Word is evident in the grammatical construction of the text.
The active participle ἡσυχάζοντος indicates the Word is the agent of activity

¹³² Loofs follows Theodoret’s text; see n. 129. ¹³³ Loofs (1930: 91).
¹³⁴ Sagnard, SC 34 (1952: 337 n. 1). The simple distinction between a personal and natural
union does not fit Irenaeus’ thought. Hitchcock was correct long ago to say, “Irenaeus does not
represent the Word or Son of God as taking a second Personality, but a second Nature to
Himself. His manhood had no personality of its own” (Irenaeus of Lugdunum 1916: 154–5). This
taking of human substance by the Word/Son involves a union of the divine and human natures
or substances. As we will see in AH 4.20.4, the incarnation of the Word involves “the blending
and communion of God and man.”
¹³⁵ Houssiau and Rousseau follow the Latin text; see n. 129.
¹³⁶ Rousseau SC 210 (1974: 344–5); Houssiau (1955: 191–5). Houssiau goes so far as to
suggest that Irenaeus is not here concerned with the union between the Word and his humanity,
but just two moments—glorious and inglorious—in the life of Christ (p. 195 n. 2).
¹³⁷ That Irenaeus is speaking of the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ is evident from
the fact that the first sentence of AH 3.19.3 continues the discussion of 3.19.2 in which Irenaeus is
concerned with demonstrating “that (the Word-Son) himself is properly God . . . and that he was
a man lacking beauty and capable of suffering.”
¹³⁸ Houssiau is mistaken when he says this text “furnishes . . . a well equilibrated antithesis” in
which the Word and his humanity are “respectively subjects” (1955: 193).
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170 God and Christ in Irenaeus

when it comes to remaining quiescent, and the passive participle καταπινομένου,
the term likely behind absorto,¹³⁹ indicates that the Word is once again the agent
of activity when it comes to absorbing or swallowing up his humanity.¹⁴⁰ The
Word remains quiescent and the Word absorbs or swallows up his humanity—
his humanity does not act upon the Word.¹⁴¹
In so saying, Irenaeus is not affirming the one reality of the incarnate Word
by identifying the Word as the subject of every activity of Jesus Christ, which
would undermine his commitment to the full humanity of Jesus. Rather,
Irenaeus is here affirming the one reality of the incarnate Word by identifying
the Word as the subject of the activity that takes place between the humanity
and divinity within the union that is the person of Christ. So, it is not the
Word-Son considered in contradistinction to his humanity but Jesus Christ—
the unity that is the incarnate Word, the God-man—who is the subject of
every action ad extra, so to speak.
This account of the person of Jesus Christ presents its own challenges.
Indeed, it appears that a logical dilemma prevents Irenaeus’ portrait of Christ
from adequately accounting for either the distinction of the incarnate
Word’s humanity and divinity or their unity. In order to understand how
the Word can act upon his humanity, it would seem that either the divinity
and humanity of Christ must be separate from each other, thus comprom-
ising his unity, or the incarnate Word must be acting upon himself, thus
compromising the distinction of his humanity and divinity. Either way, it
seems that Irenaeus’ depiction of the interaction between the Word and his
humanity contradicts his goal of safeguarding the unity of Jesus Christ as the
God-man.¹⁴² Recognizing an engagement with the Stoic theory of blending,
however, enables us to see that what appears to be a dilemma for Irenaeus is
in fact only a dilemma in appearance.¹⁴³ Moreover, Stoic mixture theory not

¹³⁹ Some texts, including the 1526 editio princeps of Erasmus, have absorpto (see Grabe,
S. Irenaei 1702: 250 n.a). See n. 129 for my position on καταπινομένου.
¹⁴⁰ Wolfson points out that καταπίνω plays an important role in later monophysite logic, as
represented in Theodoret’s Dialogues, for the monophysites held that Jesus’ humanity was
absorbed by his divinity in the Christological union (1964, vol. 1: 445–6). While Irenaeus also
uses καταπίνω, his logic is not monophysite. Unlike the monophysites, Irenaeus is not speaking
of a constant or absolute absorption which results in the existence of only one nature. Rather, he
is speaking of a dynamic by which the divine nature recedes or advances in accordance with the
particular activity or experience in which Jesus is engaged. This dynamic does not threaten or
jeopardize the existence of the human nature but in fact guarantees it, for the human nature is
always required, even if “only” for Jesus to be seen and heard by earthly, material creatures
(e.g., AH 5.1.1).
¹⁴¹ I believe this reading bears out Hort’s position that “the sense (of this passage) seems to be
that the Word was in active harmony with the Man in these acts or triumphs,” while not
abandoning both the Greek and Latin texts as Hort thinks is necessary (Robinson, JTS 33
1932: 162).
¹⁴² For Irenaeus’ goal of safeguarding the unity of Christ, see Houssiau (1955: 194–5).
¹⁴³ The relational dynamic between the humanity and divinity of Christ in this passage
reminds Grillmeier of Athanasius, about whom he writes, “unlike Irenaeus, we must in his
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Christological Union 171

only enables us to fulfill the interpretive requirement I previously identified,
of explaining this dynamic at the level of Christ’s natures, but also enables us
to explain the place of the qualities belonging to each nature in the experi-
ences and activities of Christ.¹⁴⁴
Three aspects of Stoic thought are recognizable in Irenaeus’ account of the
person of Christ. First, the Stoics understood blending as a union in which the
active principle (God/Pneuma/Logos) acts on the passive principle.¹⁴⁵ In
terms of Irenaeus’ Christology, the Christological union is one in which the
divine Word acts on his humanity but the humanity does not act on the divine
Word. When it is necessary for Jesus to take part in activities or experiences
befitting his human nature, the Word remains quiescent—still—permitting
his humanity and its qualities to come to the fore. When it is necessary for
Jesus to take part in activities or experiences befitting his divine nature, the
Word absorbs or swallows up his human nature in order to come to the fore
with its own qualities.¹⁴⁶
Second, according to Stoic thought, “things that act and are acted upon are
often not separate from each other.”¹⁴⁷ The coextension of the soul throughout
the body on which it acts is an example of this logic.¹⁴⁸ The fundamental role
the Stoics ascribe to the gas called pneuma is an even more important instance
of this thinking.¹⁴⁹ As I pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the theory
of blending develops out of the Stoic interest in explaining how the active
principle (Pneuma/God/Logos) and passive principle (matter) relate to each
other. Pneuma pervades through or permeates the “whole of substance,”
causing it to hold together (συνέχω), be stable (συμμένω), and interact
(συμπάσχω) with itself.¹⁵⁰ The action of the active principle upon the passive
in a blend produces a resultant in which the constituent ingredients are
“united together in their entirety (ἑνοῦσθαι δι’ ὅλων) so that being preserved
along with their qualities they have a complete mutual coextension through

case take Stoic ideas of the work of the Logos into account” (1965, 2nd ed. 1975, vol. 1: 104 n.
231). Grillmeier provides no explanation for why such Stoic ideas should not be taken into
account for Irenaeus.
¹⁴⁴ Reading this passage in terms of the Stoic theory of blending is also encouraged by its
context. For instance, Irenaeus’ appropriation of the theory of blending earlier in this argument,
in AH 3.19.1, as just discussed.
¹⁴⁵ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 216.14–17; Diogenes Laertius, Lives 7.134–6.
¹⁴⁶ Presumably Irenaeus does not mean to suggest that the movement to the fore of one
nature necessarily excludes the involvement of the other nature, but that in certain instances the
emphasis of one nature over the other is a question of causality or primacy. He is not, however, as
clear on this point as one would like.
¹⁴⁷ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 83).
¹⁴⁸ Were this not the case, Sorabji notes, the soul “would alternate with pockets of dead
matter” (Matter, Space and Motion 1988: 83, with reference to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 4,
217.36).
¹⁴⁹ Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (1988: 83).
¹⁵⁰ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 3, 216.14–17.
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172 God and Christ in Irenaeus

one another (ἀντιπαρεκτείνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις δι’ ὅλων ὅλα).”¹⁵¹ Therefore, Stoic
mixture theory enables us to understand how Irenaeus’ interest in maintaining
the unity of Christ is not threatened by his statement that the Word acts upon
his human nature. In terms of Irenaeus’ Christology, not only does the action
of the Word upon his humanity not threaten the unity of the person of Christ,
it is the very action of the divine Word upon his humanity that effects and
guarantees the unity of the person of Christ.
Third, as I have stated several times now, the Stoics believed that blending
produces a union in which the original substances and qualities proper to each
of the constituent ingredients persist¹⁵² and the qualities of each show forth.¹⁵³
In terms of Irenaeus’ Christology, the substances and qualities proper to the
Word and his humanity persist in the union that is the incarnate Word, and
each shows forth when Jesus takes part in activities or experiences proper to
his divinity and his humanity. As a result, understanding the union of the
incarnate Word as a blend not only secures the unity of the incarnate Word as
discussed in the last paragraph, but also secures the distinction of his human-
ity and divinity.¹⁵⁴
Therefore, recognizing the incorporation of concepts belonging to the Stoic
theory of blending enables us to comprehend the dynamic Irenaeus posits to
explain how the humanity and divinity of Christ exist as one.¹⁵⁵ When Jesus
takes part in a given experience or activity the Word either remains quiescent
or absorbs his human nature. A fundamental aspect of this dynamic is the
determination of which of the qualities belonging to Jesus’ natures show forth
at any given moment in his life. When the Word remains quiescent the
qualities belonging to Jesus’ human nature show forth, such as the capacity
to die. When the Word absorbs his humanity the qualities belonging to Jesus’
divine nature show forth, such as the capacity to conquer. This dynamic does
not threaten the unity of Jesus Christ. In fact, the opposite is true. Because it
explains how the qualities belonging to Jesus’ natures come to the fore in order
to enable him to participate in the full spectrum of activities and experiences
belonging to his life and mission, the dynamic provides a logical basis for
understanding how the one incarnate Word, the one God-man, is the subject
of all his experiences and actions.¹⁵⁶ Incorporating Stoic mixture theory, then,

¹⁵¹ Alexander of Aphrodisias, Mixt. 4, 217.27–9; text and tr. Todd, Alexander of Aphrodisias
(1976: 118–19).
¹⁵² Each of the three selections quoted above refer to the preservation or persistence of the
substances and/or qualities of the constituent ingredients.
¹⁵³ Arius Didymus, fr. 28, Dox. Gr. 464.1–2.
¹⁵⁴ See, for instance, Irenaeus’ comments in AH 4.33.11, discussed below.
¹⁵⁵ Contra Sagnard, who asserts that the coexistence of the two natures in Christ, of which this
passage speaks, is not a mixture because of this dynamic (SC 34 1952: 337 n. 1).
¹⁵⁶ In his unpublished dissertation M. Slusser also argues that this passage must be read in
light of Irenaeus’ commitment to the unity of the person of Christ (1975: 154–62).
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Christological Union 173

enables Irenaeus to affirm, at one and the same time, the distinction of the two
natures and their unity.
Though my reading of Irenaeus maintains that his understanding of the
union of Christ’s person is founded upon the Stoic theory of blending by the
end of Against Heresies 3, he does not explicitly identify the Christological
union as a mixture until the middle of book 4. In AH 4.20.4, he writes:
Now this is his Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, who in the last times was made a
man among men, so that (ἵνα/ut) he might join the end to the beginning, that is,
man to God. And on account of this, the prophets, receiving the prophetic gift
from the same Word, proclaimed his advent according to the flesh, by which the
blending and communion (commixtio et communio) of God and man took place
(factus est) according to the good pleasure of the Father, the Word of God
foretelling from the beginning that God would be seen by human beings, and
would dwell with them on the earth, and would talk [with them], and would be
present with his own workmanship, saving it, and becoming capable of being
perceived by it, and “freeing us from the hands of all who hate us” (Lk 1:71),
that is from the whole spirit of transgression, and causing “us to serve Him in
holiness and righteousness all our days” (Lk 1:74–5), in order that (uti) man,
being embraced (complexus) by the Spirit of God, might pass into the glory of
the Father.
I first must note that it is possible to read per quem commixtio et communio
Dei et hominis . . . facta est (“by which the blending and communion of God
and man . . . took place”) as a reference to the salvific union between God and
human beings rather than the Christological union.¹⁵⁷ Such a reading, how-
ever, would go against the basic argument of the passage. As Robinson
identified it long ago: “The general thought here is that the restoration of
man takes place after the pattern of the Incarnation—the intermingling of
human flesh with the Spirit of God.”¹⁵⁸ For this to be the case, the “blending
and communion of God and man” must have as its referent the Christological
union in order for it to be the model of and basis for Irenaeus’ description of
the salvific union as man being embraced by the Spirit of God (complexus
homo Spiritum Dei; “man, being embraced by the Spirit of God”).¹⁵⁹
Support for this reading can be found in the structure of the passage. The
first sentence of the selection introduces and summarizes the thoughts con-
tained in the following discussion. Irenaeus’ thought in the first sentence is
straightforward: the joining of divinity and humanity in the Christological
union makes possible the joining of the divinity and humanity in the salvific

¹⁵⁷ Rousseau does not comment upon this topic, but his translation suggests he reads the text
in this way (SC 100 1965: 635).
¹⁵⁸ Robinson, Demonstration (1920: 64–5).
¹⁵⁹ For my reading of complexus homo Spiritum Dei as referring to the salvific union, see my
Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 188–90), or VC 66 (2012: 11–14).
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174 God and Christ in Irenaeus

union. The sentences that follow expand upon the idea we find in the first
sentence. The question is which of the following sentences have as their
subject the Christological union and which the salvific union. A comparison
of the opening sentence to the following discussion aids in this determination
because the grammatical structure of the first sentence seems to establish the
grammatical structure of the discussion that follows.
The first sentence uses ἵνα/ut to join the clauses referring to the Christo-
logical union to the clauses referring to the salvific union. Uti also occurs in the
midst of the following sentences that elucidate the first. I believe this subse-
quent presence of uti is a deliberate reflection of its presence in the first
sentence and that it should guide our reading of the passage. Just as in the
first sentence the content that comes before ἵνα/ut concerns the Christological
union while the content that comes after it concerns the salvific union, so too
should we discern that in the subsequent discussion the sentences that come
before uti have the Christological union as their subject while the clauses that
come after it have the salvific union as their subject. This being the case, only
the very last portion of the selection has to do with the salvific union: “in order
that (uti) man, being embraced by the Spirit of God, might pass into the glory
of the Father.” The phrase commixtio et communio Dei et hominis occurs prior
to uti, in the midst of those sentences referring to the Christological union.¹⁶⁰
According to this reading, then, Irenaeus uses the language of mixture
(commixtio) to explain the manner in which the divine and human are united
in the person of Jesus Christ. The Greek term behind commixtio is unknown.
The loss of the original text places an increased importance upon reading this
passage in the context of the other statements we find in Irenaeus. I have
shown that by this point in his work Irenaeus was familiar with and had
appropriated Stoic mixture theory in AH 2.33.1 and 2.33.4 to explain the
mixture of and interaction between the soul and body in human beings, in AH
3.19.1 to explain the interaction that takes place between the human and
divine with regard to the salvific joining of human beings to the Word of
God, and, as just discussed, in AH 3.19.3 to explain the interaction that takes
place between the human and divine in Jesus himself. The possibility that
Irenaeus was thinking of the unity of Christ in terms of the Stoic theory of
blending as early as AH 3.16.6 should also be taken into consideration. The
importance of the Stoic theory of blending to Irenaeus’ theology and to his
Christological account in particular makes it all but certain that behind

¹⁶⁰ Commixtio et communio are also read as referring to the Christological union by Grabe,
who connects commixtio in this text with consparsus in AH 3.16.6, seemingly reading both as
referring to Christ (S. Irenaei 1702: 331 n. 5); Robinson, who reads this text together with Prf 97
as referring to the Christological union (Demonstration 1920: 64–5, 149 n. 2; for my disagree-
ment with Robinson’s reading of Prf 97, see n. 3 in this chapter); N. Bonwetsch, who notes the
text with reference to the coming of the Word in visible form (1925: 64 n. 2); Wolfson (1964,
vol. 1: 396); and Orbe, Greg 73 (1992: 205–68, here 231).
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Christological Union 175

commixtio stands either ἀνάκρασις or σύγκρασις, and with either one a patent
connection to the Stoic theory of blending (κρᾶσις). This determination gains
considerable support on the one hand from the use of commixta to translate
ἀνακραθῆναι in AH 2.33.1, and on the other from Adelin Rousseau’s belief in
the originality of σύγκρασις, especially since he did not recognize the pertin-
ence of Stoic theory to this text.¹⁶¹
I would like to call attention to one more passage that encourages this
reading. AH 4.33.11 supports the interpretation of commixtio in AH 4.20.4 as a
reference to Stoic, rather than Aristotelian, mixture theory:
. . . they who proclaimed him Emmanuel, [born] of the Virgin, made known the
union (ἕνωσιν/adunitionem) of the Word of God with his own workmanship,
seeing that (quoniam) the Word will become flesh, and the Son of God the Son
of man . . . and having become this which we also are, he (nevertheless) is the
Mighty God, and has an indescribable generation.¹⁶²
In light of this conception of the Christological union in AH 4.33.11, Irenaeus’
reference in AH 4.20.4 to the mixture of the human and divine in the person of
Christ is best understood as a reference to Stoic theory. For unlike the
Aristotelian theory of mixture, which maintains that constituent ingredients
persist only potentially, not actually, Irenaeus affirms that both the human and
divine persevere in the union of the incarnation.
AH 4.20.4 contains, as I have said, Irenaeus’ first and only explicit identi-
fication of the Christological union as a mixture. But he seems to do so once
more at the beginning of Against Heresies 5, where we also see that Irenaeus’
use of the Stoic theory of blending to conceptualize the Christological union
bears on another aspect of his theological account: his understanding of the
mixed cup of the Eucharist. Prior to turning to AH 5.1.3, however, it will be
helpful to briefly recount Irenaeus’ other comments about the mixed cup.
Irenaeus first speaks of the mixed cup of the Eucharist in AH 4.33.2, where
we find him arguing against the Marcionites that the Father of Christ is not a
second God but the Creator. In support of this argument, Irenaeus contends
that if Christ was from a God other than the Creator, then it would be unjust
for him to commemorate his death with elements taken from creation. For
then he would be appropriating for his own use that which belonged to
another God. He writes:
Moreover, how could the Lord, if he is from another Father, have justly confessed
the bread, which belongs to our creation, to be his body and declared the mixed
cup (temperamentum calicis) his blood?

¹⁶¹ Rousseau suggests this term in his Greek retroversion (SC 100 1965: 635); see also his note
on commixtus in AH 3.19.1 in SC 210 (1974: 343).
¹⁶² AH 4.33.11.
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176 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Since Harvey, at least, Irenaeus’ reference to temperamentum calicis has
been understood as denoting the cup of the Eucharist in which it was a
common practice for the ancient Church to place a mixture of water and
wine—hence, the mixed cup.¹⁶³ Irenaeus again refers to the mixed cup in AH
5.2.3, where he speaks of the mixed cup and the manufactured bread becom-
ing the Eucharist upon the reception of the Word of God.¹⁶⁴
When, therefore, the blended cup (mixtus calix / τὸ κεκραμένον ποτήριον) and the
manufactured bread receives the word of God¹⁶⁵ and becomes the Eucharist, the
blood and body of Christ,¹⁶⁶ from which things the substance of our flesh
increases and is strengthened, how can they say that the flesh is not capable of
receiving the gift of God, which is life eternal, when it is nourished from the blood
and body of the Lord and is a member of him?
Here we see that the Greek term underlying mixtus belongs to the same word
family as κρᾶσις, thus indicating that Irenaeus thinks of the mixture in the
Eucharistic cup as a blend. This may not be much of a surprise given that the
mixture of water and wine was one of the three examples from everyday life
that Stoics used to illustrate the theory of blending.¹⁶⁷ But it is essential for any
connection that Irenaeus might wish to draw between the mixture of water
and wine in the cup and of humanity and divinity in Christ—he considers
both blends.
Having now introduced Irenaeus’ understanding of the mixed cup, we look
just a few paragraphs earlier to the text which reveals the connection he sees
between the blend of the cup and of Christ—AH 5.1.3. After arguing against
the Valentinians, who denied the humanity of Christ, he turns to the Ebio-
nites, who denied the divinity of Christ, writing:
Vain also are the Ebionites, who do not receive by faith into their souls the union
of God and man, but who remain in the old leaven of (their) birth, refusing to
see¹⁶⁸ that the Holy Spirit came upon Mary and the power of the Most High
overshadowed her (Lk 1:35), as a result of which what was born is holy and is the
Son of the Most High God, the Father of all things, who effected the incarnation
of his (Son) and showed forth a new birth,¹⁶⁹ so that just as we have inherited
death by the prior birth, so might we inherit life by this birth. Therefore, they

¹⁶³ Harvey, Sancti Irenaei (1857, vol. 2: 257 n. 2). Harvey proposes τό κρᾶμα τοῦ ποτηρίου as
the Greek substrate, as does Rousseau, SC 100 (1965: 807).
¹⁶⁴ In AH 4.18.5 Irenaeus states that the descent of the Spirit at the epiclesis changes ordinary
bread into bread which is no longer common (non communis panis est / οὐκέτι κοινὸς ἄρτος
ἐστίν) “but the Eucharist, consisting of two realities (rebus/πραγμάτων), the terrestrial and
celestial.”
¹⁶⁵ Following Rousseau (SC 152 1969: 212–13), who argues from AH 4.18.5 that this reception
of the word of God refers to the epiclesis of the Eucharistic celebration.
¹⁶⁶ Following Rousseau, SC 152 (1969: 213). ¹⁶⁷ As observed earlier in this chapter.
¹⁶⁸ neque intellegere volentes.
¹⁶⁹ See Rousseau, who argues this new birth refers to the virginal birth (SC 152 1969: 205).
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Christological Union 177

reject the commixture (commixtionem) of the heavenly wine and want it to be
water of [this] world only, not receiving God in his commixture (non recipientes
Deum ad commixtionem suam),¹⁷⁰ but they remain in that Adam who was
conquered and was expelled from Paradise. They do not consider¹⁷¹ that just as
from the beginning of our formation in Adam that breath of life, having been
united to that which had been formed, animated man and showed (him to be) an
animal being endowed with reason, so too in the end the Word of the Father and
the Spirit of God, having been united with the ancient substance of the formation
of Adam, rendered man living and perfect, capable of grasping the perfect Father,
in order that as in the animal one (Adam) we all have died, so in the spiritual one
we may all be made alive.
The Ebionite rejection of the divinity of Christ means that they reject the
Christological union: they “do not receive by faith into their souls the union of
God and man.” Because of this rejection, Irenaeus says, they also “reject the
commixture of the heavenly wine.”¹⁷² That is to say, the Ebionite rejection of
the Christological union—the blend of the human and divine in Christ—leads
them to reject the blend of water and wine in the Eucharistic cup. The
corollary Irenaeus draws between the Ebionite rejection of the mixed cup
and their rejection of the Christological union reveals that he understands
the blending of the wine and water in the Eucharistic cup to symbolize the
blending of the divine and human in the person of Christ. Only then would the
rejection of the one entail the rejection of the other.
This logic reveals a richness to Irenaeus’ sacramental theology previously
unrecognized. But we should not stop here, because a sentence in the middle
of the above selection teases his readers with additional possibilities. Irenaeus
writes that the Ebionites “reject the commixture (commixtionem) of the
heavenly wine, and want it to be water of [this] world only, not receiving
God in his commixture (non recipientes Deum ad commixtionem suam).” It is
not entirely clear how we should understand the final participial phrase, non
recipientes Deum ad commixtionem suam.¹⁷³ Partly because commixtio could
have one of two referents: the mixed cup or the Christological union. Irenaeus,

¹⁷⁰ Rousseau believes αὐτῶν underlies suam and translates accordingly (SC 153 1969: 27). But
suam agrees with commixtionem, so the emendation is unnecessary. The translation of recipio
with the meaning of “receive” rather than “admit” or another viable term is suggested by the use
of the same term in the opening line of this selection.
¹⁷¹ non contemplantes.
¹⁷² In speaking of the “commixture of the heavenly wine” in the context of the Ebionite
rejection of Christ’s divinity, Irenaeus signals that he regards the wine in the cup as symbolizing
Christ’s divinity and the water as symbolizing his humanity. This being the case, his under-
standing would generally agree with other theologians of the period (see Harvey, Sancti Irenaei
1857, vol. 2: 257 n. 2). Furthermore, his declaration that the Ebionites reject the “heavenly wine”
accords with Epiphanius’ report that Ebionites only placed water in the Eucharistic cup (Panar-
ion 30.16). It should be noted that R. Finn has wondered if Epiphanius relies upon this passage in
Irenaeus (2009: 76), but he offers no substantial support for this speculation.
¹⁷³ See also n. 170 above.
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178 God and Christ in Irenaeus

however, does not refer to the Eucharistic cup as God’s cup in any other text,
so it is unlikely that the expression “his commixture” refers to it here.
Commixtio must then refer to the Christological union. But a full grasp of
his meaning is more complicated still.
As observed earlier, this pericope begins with Irenaeus’ declaration that the
Ebionites “do not receive (non recipientes) by faith into their souls the union of
God and man.” It ends with his declaration that the Ebionites remain in the
old Adam, animated only by the breath of life, and not made alive by union
with the Word of God and Holy Spirit.¹⁷⁴ The beginning leads to the end. But
the connection between the beginning and the end is, I think, forged in the
sentence which occupies us now. When Irenaeus writes that the Ebionites
“reject the commixture (commixtionem) of the heavenly wine, . . . not receiv-
ing God in his commixture” he is saying that the Ebionite refusal of the mixed
cup, which follows from their refusal to believe in the Christological union,
deprives them of the reception of Christ (“God in his commixture”) that
comes from partaking of the mixed cup.
This interpretation is not fully justified by his comments in AH 5.1.3. But it is
justified by ideas we find elsewhere. In AH 5.2.3 Irenaeus says that the elements
of the mixed cup receive (percipio) the Word of God. In Prf 57 he states that
God gladdens those who drink of the blood of the grape—“that is, who receive
his Spirit, [an] <eternal> gladness.”¹⁷⁵ And in AH 3.9.3, 3.17.1, and other texts
we find his understanding that it is the Holy Spirit who brings Jesus Christ—
Salvation—to believers.¹⁷⁶ Considered alongside his comments in AH 5.1.3,
these texts disclose a profound sacramental theology. In contrast to the Ebio-
nites, those who partake of the mixed cup of the Eucharist receive the Holy
Spirit—the Spirit of Christ who brings Christ to believers—and in so doing
receive Christ (“God in his commixture”) himself. This reception of the Spirit
and Christ that comes by the Eucharist is a regular instantiation of that union
with God which renders believers, once dead in Adam, alive in the Spirit.
It is fitting to close this chapter with the consideration of a text that yields not
only a final reference to the blending of the divine and human in Christ—“God
in his commixture”—but also a profound connection between his understanding

¹⁷⁴ The proper subject of AH 5.1.3 is the Christological union. But the perfection and life that
comes to the human nature of Jesus Christ as a result of its union with the Word and anointing
by the Holy Spirit is the basis for the perfection and life that comes to other human beings in the
salvific union. For more on Irenaeus’ understanding of the relationship between the Christo-
logical and salvific unions see Chapter 5.1 of this book, as well as my Ireneaus on the Holy Spirit
(2012: 59–77 and 173–81).
¹⁷⁵ Irenaeus is here commenting upon Gen. 49:10–11, which speaks of the “blood of the
grape.” His exposition is close enough to Justin Martyr’s, albeit more elaborate, exposition of
these verses (1 Apol. 32) to suggest dependence or at least familiarity with the same tradition. It is
interesting that Justin also seems to affirm the tradition of the mixed cup (1 Apol. 67, where he
refers to the bringing of wine and water).
¹⁷⁶ See my Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 59–73).
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Christological Union 179

of the Christological union and the reception of Christ by the mixed cup of
the Eucharist.

4 . 4 . C H A P T E R CONC LU S I ON

Given the reading of Irenaeus offered in this chapter, it remains to explain why
he waits to explicitly identify the union of the human and divine in Jesus as a
blend until the middle of Against Heresies 4 and why he makes that identifi-
cation just twice while liberally using Stoic mixture theory elsewhere.¹⁷⁷
I believe the answer lies in the immediate context of AH 4.20.4. Irenaeus’
comments in 4.20.4 occur just after 4.20.1–3 where he establishes the eternal-
ity and irreducibility of the Son and Spirit by means of their involvement in
creation as the Hands of God. It is in AH 4.20.3 that Irenaeus famously
establishes the eternality and creativity of the Spirit by appropriating three
Wisdom passages from Proverbs.¹⁷⁸ Though prior to this point his logic has
required understanding the Spirit as being eternal, he had not yet offered
explicit comments on the eternality of the Spirit.¹⁷⁹
The significance of this moment in Irenaeus’ pneumatological account
bears upon his determination finally to identify the Christological union as a
blend in AH 4.20.4. Roman monarchianism was essentially a heresy of the
Spirit. Unlike Sabellius, Callistus did not believe that Spirit was one of three
names for the one hypostasis of God; rather he simply identified God as
the Father/Spirit.¹⁸⁰ God is one undifferentiated Spirit, wholly identified with
the Father. It is possible that Irenaeus does not identify the Christological
union as a blend prior to AH 4.20.4 because he does not explicitly affirm the
eternality of the Holy Spirit until AH 4.20.3. His affirmation of the irreduci-
bility of the Holy Spirit in AH 4.20.3 would distance him from Roman
monarchianism,¹⁸¹ creating space for him to speak of the blending of the
human and divine in Christ without the risk of being regarded as articulating
the same Christological account as the Roman monarchians.¹⁸² An interest in

¹⁷⁷ Irenaeus’ description of the Christological union in AH 3.16.6 does not identify the union
as a blend (κρᾶσις), but rather uses language compatible with the Stoic theory of blending.
¹⁷⁸ Prov 3:19–20; 8:22–5; and 8:27–31.
¹⁷⁹ Briggman, Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 129–31).
¹⁸⁰ Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 70–1, 74, 90).
¹⁸¹ To this point, consensus has not existed on whether Irenaeus was aware of the monarchian
controversy brewing in Rome. So, for instance, D. Minns suggests that Irenaeus was not at all
interested in the modalist dispute (1994, repr. 2010: 59), while M.R. Barnes suggests Irenaeus’
“strongest statement of the full divinity of the ‘Son’ ” might be the product of Irenaeus’
interaction with the modalist dispute (NV 7 2009: 87–8).
¹⁸² Some scholars have considered Irenaeus’ theology, or at least aspects of his theological
account, to agree with monarchianism or monarchian modalism, e.g., Bousset (1926: 347).
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180 God and Christ in Irenaeus

avoiding such an association could well explain Irenaeus’ earlier reserve when
it comes to the explicit identification of the Christological union as a blend.
Whatever the explanation, this chapter has shown that Irenaeus’ identifi-
cation in AH 4.20.4 of the Christological union as a blend is not anomalous
and insignificant but rather reflects the incorporation of Stoic language and
theory into his theological account. His initial use of the Stoic theory of
blending to explain the union of the body and soul in human beings in Against
Heresies 2 expands in book 3 to include an explanation of the salvific union
between God and human beings. This expansion is not limited to his concep-
tion of the salvific union, however, for in Against Heresies 3 Irenaeus also uses
Stoic mixture theory to conceptualize the union of the human and divine in
Christ. This development in his thought leads to his identification of the
Christological union as a blend (commixtio) in AH 4.20.4. Stoic mixture
theory, then, is nothing less than fundamental to Irenaeus’ conception of the
Christological union.
I wish to be clear that I am not saying Irenaeus appropriates Stoic thought
wholesale. For instance, his emphasis on the transcendence of God stands at
odds with the Stoic emphasis on the immanence of the divine as the active
principle pervading all things. His differentiation between the Father, Word,
and Holy Spirit radically differs from the Stoic identification of God/Pneuma/
Logos as one undifferentiated active principle. And his understanding of God,
including the divine Word, as immaterial stands in contrast to the Stoic
understanding of pneuma as corporeal.¹⁸³ I am saying that Irenaeus adopts
and adapts Stoic thought to further his own theological agenda and account.
Having identified and explained Irenaeus’ understanding of how the divine
Word is united with humanity in the person of Christ, we turn to Chapter 5 of
this study which demonstrates that key features of Irenaeus’ account of the
divine economy are founded upon his understanding of the divine being and
the divinity of the Word-Son.

More recently, J. Behr has taken a different approach, regarding monarchian thought as
Irenaean, when he contends that Zephyrinus and Callistus maintained “the style of theology
developed by Irenaeus” (The Way to Nicaea 2001: 141). Many have argued against a monar-
chian/modalist reading of Irenaeus, including Vernet (1923, vol. 7: 2394–2535, here 2444);
Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: esp. pp. 558–60); Lawson (1948, repr. 2006: 130, 131); and Barnes, NV
7 (2009: 93 n. 87).
¹⁸³ For Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being as immaterial, see Chapter 2. Irenaeus is not
the only one to use Stoic theory while not affirming the Stoic doctrine of the corporeality of all
things. The approach is common among Middle Platonists (see, e.g., Andresen, ZNW 44 [1953:
157–95, passim]; Holte, ST 17 [1958: 119–68, here e.g. 115–16, 120–1, and 143–7]; Dillon [1996:
45–9]). Such adaptations of Stoic thought may not be so drastic a departure from Stoicism as it
might seem, for, as I noted in Chapter 2, “although the Stoics believed in the corporeal nature of
the pneuma, they came to regard it as something not akin to matter, but rather to force”
(Sambursky 1959: 36).
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Christ and his Work

This chapter does not stand alone and should not be read alone. Chapter 1
prepared the way for those that follow by revising our understanding of
Irenaeus’ approach to theological speculation and his appreciation for a natural
knowledge of God. Chapter 2 established Irenaeus’ understanding of the nature
of the divine being. Chapter 3 explored his conception of the intra-Trinitarian
relationship of the Word-Son with the Father, demonstrating that Irenaeus
regarded the Word-Son as equally divine as and one with God the Father.
Chapter 4 then brought to light the logic Irenaeus used to explain how the divine
Word-Son came to be united with humanity in the person of Jesus Christ.
Having established Irenaeus’ understanding of the nature of the divine
being, the Word-Son, and the person of Christ, the task of this chapter is to
show that central aspects of Irenaeus’ account of the economic activity of
Christ are grounded upon his understanding of the divine being. It constitutes
the final movement in my argument that scholars have underappreciated—or
failed to appreciate altogether—the significance of metaphysics to Irenaeus’
theology. The chapter consists of two sections. The first focuses on AH 3.18.7,
wherein Irenaeus founds key aspects of the economy of salvation upon the
divinity of Christ—namely, security of salvation, the reception of incorrupt-
ibility, and adoption as children of God. The second section shows that
Irenaeus’ understanding of the revelatory activity of the Word-Son in the
Old Testament theophanies and incarnation is based upon his conception of
the divine being as infinite and incomprehensible.

5.1. SECURITY, INCORRUPTIBILITY,

ADOPTION

It is well known that Irenaeus regards the humanity of Jesus Christ as

necessary for the salvation of the human race.¹ Less well known is his

¹ As may be illustrated by the attention paid to his doctrine of recapitulation. Irenaeus’

insistence that the incarnate Word-Son is as human as we are, though without sin, is beyond
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182 God and Christ in Irenaeus

appreciation for the divinity of Jesus Christ which he also regards as necessary
for salvation. This despite the fact that when it comes time for Irenaeus to
explain why the incarnation was necessary, he gives every bit as much
attention to the need for Christ to be divine as human. He writes in AH 3.18.7:
Therefore, he joined and united, as we said before, man to God. For if man could
not defeat the enemy of man, the enemy could not have been justly defeated.
Then again unless God had given salvation, we would not possess it securely. And
unless man had been united with God, he would not have been able to partake of
incorruptibility. For it was necessary for the mediator of both God and man, by
his relationship to both,² to lead each of them back to friendship and concord,
and to make it so that God would take up to himself man and man would give
himself to God. For in what way could we have been partakers of the adoption of
sons, if we had not received from him through the Son that fellowship with
himself, and if his Word, who was made flesh, had not entered into fellowship
with us? This is also why he passed through every stage of life, restoring to
everyone that fellowship which is with God.
Irenaeus begins by emphasizing that Jesus Christ had to be human, for only
then would Satan be justly defeated. He explains later in AH 3.18.7 that since
many were made sinners through the disobedience of one man, it was
necessary for many to be justified and receive salvation through the obedience
of one man. The logic of inversion that is instantiated in this reasoning is
essential to Irenaeus’ understanding of recapitulation.³ So it comes as no
surprise to see him finish 3.18.7 with the statement, “God recapitulated in
himself the ancient formation of man, so that he might kill sin, eradicate
death, and vivify man.” His acknowledgement of the importance of Jesus’
humanity continues when he affirms the need for Christ to be human in order
to establish human participation in incorruptibility. Moreover, Christ’s medi-
atorial role is contingent upon his humanity. He says, even, that Jesus lived
through every stage of human life so that people in every stage of life might
have fellowship with God.
These points are significant and some of them play prominent roles in
Irenaeus’ theology at large, but they should not obscure the equal emphasis he
places on the need for Jesus Christ to be divine. Three points merit comment,
though the extent of that comment will differ for each. First, Irenaeus asserts,
“unless God had given salvation, we would not possess it securely.” He does
not explain his reasoning. Given the identification, that comes just before

dispute and well known. It was, therefore, unnecessary to demonstrate earlier in this study.
Readers interested in the matter may consult, for instance, AH 5.1.1, 5.14.2–3, and 5.21.1.
² Ἔδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος /
Oportuerat enim Mediatorem Dei et hominum per suam ad utrosque domesticatem.
³ For an illustration of the inversion involved in recapitulation, see Irenaeus’ discussion of
Mary and Eve in AH 3.22.4.
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Christ and his Work 183

this selection, of Satan as the strong man bound by Christ, this assertion could
be designed to ground the security of human salvation upon the divine
omnipotence of the Word-Son. That, however, is anything but clear. What
is clear is that according to Irenaeus salvation is secure for human beings
because Jesus Christ is God. Irenaeus’ attribution of divinity to Jesus Christ,
the incarnate Word-Son, is in no way simplistic. For, as Chapter 3 has shown,
his understanding of the divinity of the Word-Son is itself grounded on his
understanding of divine production.
Irenaeus’ second point has to do with the incorruptibility that is available to
human beings as a result of the incarnation. But before we delve into what
Irenaeus says on this subject, I want to mark its importance by highlighting the
central place Irenaeus gives to the acquisition of incorruptibility in his account
of the economy of salvation. As I have explained elsewhere, Irenaeus envi-
sioned the divine economy as a movement from animation of the human
being by the soul to vivification by the Holy Spirit.⁴ An important moment in
this economy of salvation is the baptismal liturgy. Irenaeus seems to have in
mind a two-rite baptismal liturgy in which the first rite, baptism, washes the
neophyte of his or her sins, and the second rite, likely an anointing with
chrism, bestows the Holy Spirit. It is upon this reception of the Holy Spirit that
the believer first receives incorruptibility.⁵
Irenaeus’ belief that the neophyte receives incorruptibility in the post-
baptismal rite should not be taken as indicating that he believed that Christians
become wholly incorrupt at that moment. His comments in AH 5.8.1 reveal
his thinking. The reception of the Spirit, he declares, causes the believer to
become “spiritual even now, the mortal being absorbed by the immortal.” But
at the same time, the reception of the Holy Spirit disposes believers toward
perfection, prepares them for incorruption, and accustoms them little by little
to receive and bear God. The compatibility of these points rests on his
understanding of the Holy Spirit as an “earnest” of the future perfection and
incorruption that the believer will receive in full—as much as it is possible, that
is, for a created being to receive them—at the time of their resurrection.⁶ In
this way the beginning, middle, and end of the Christian life corresponds to
the reception of, growth in, and perfection of incorruptibility.
It is, then, no exaggeration to say that incorruptibility features in—and, in
many ways, defines—Irenaeus’ understanding of the economy of salvation.
But I have not yet pointed out what makes it possible for believers to become

⁴ Briggman, Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 148–81). See also Behr, who first drew
attention to this movement of the economy (2000: 86–115).
⁵ On the two-rite baptismal liturgy and this conferral of incorruptibility, see my Irenaeus on
the Holy Spirit (2012: esp. 78–83).
⁶ For a discussion of the believer’s progress toward the ultimate state of being “perfect,”
“eternal,” and “like” God, see my Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012: 173–81).
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184 God and Christ in Irenaeus

incorruptible in the first place (and now we begin to move back to our text in
AH 3.18.7). Irenaeus addresses this all-important question in AH 3.19.1:
For it was for this reason that the Word of God [was made] man, and he who is
the Son of God was made the Son of Man, that man, having been blended with the
Word of God, and receiving the adoption, might become the son of God. For by
no other way could we have received incorruptibility and immortality, except by
having been united to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we be
united to incorruptibility and immortality, unless, first, incorruptibility and
immortality had become that which we also are, so that the corruptible might
be absorbed by incorruptibility, and the mortal by immortality, “that we might
receive the adoption of sons” (Gal. 4:5)?⁷
According to this passage, post-lapsarian human beings receive incorruptibil-
ity and immortality by becoming united to incorruptibility and immortality.
But the establishment of this salvific union rests on the establishment of a
prior union, that in which incorruptibility and immortality had first become
what human beings are. In so saying Irenaeus grounds the salvific union of
each believer upon the Christological union.⁸ The union of the Word-Son with
his human nature in the incarnation makes possible the reception of incor-
ruptibility and immortality by human beings in salvation. Or, in the manner of
speaking that we see at the beginning of this selection, the Word of God
became man so that human beings might become children of God.
Still, Irenaeus does not clearly state here what it is about the incarnation of
the Word-Son that makes it the moment when incorruptibility and immor-
tality are united with humanity. With this observation we return to AH 3.18.7
for the second point I wish to highlight. In the fourth sentence of the selection
above we learn that human beings “would not have been able to partake of
incorruptibility,” according to Irenaeus, “unless man had been united with
God.” Here we find the point that Irenaeus does not bring out in AH 3.19.1:
the incarnation is the basis for human participation in incorruptibility for the
very reason that the union of the Word-Son with his humanity is the union of
God with humanity.
It is, moreover, this point that allows us to see how Irenaeus’ conception of
the divine being is the ultimate foundation for his understanding of the union
of incorruptibility and immortality with Christ’s humanity, and thus the

⁷ This passage is also considered in Chapter 4.3.3, when considering Irenaeus’ use of the Stoic
theory of blending.
⁸ Y. De Andia argues that the humanity of Jesus progressed in incorruptibility over the course
of his life (1986: 185; for her broader discussion of 3.18.7 and 3.19.1, see 157–78). But as I have
explained elsewhere, Irenaeus never states that Jesus’ humanity received any divine attribute at
any point prior to his death other than when the Word-Son united with his humanity. For this
reason, we should understand Irenaeus to mean that Christ’s humanity received the divine
quality of incorruptibility in full at the moment of the Christological union. See my Irenaeus on
the Holy Spirit (2012: 74–5).
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Christ and his Work 185

ultimate foundation for the participation in that incorruptibility and immor-
tality by other human beings. As I explained in the conclusion of Chapter 3,
because Irenaeus believes the substance of the Word-Son is one and the same
as the substance of God the Father, and because he believes the divine being is
identical with any one of the divine attributes, then the attributes that char-
acterize God the Father also characterize the Word-Son.⁹ This includes incor-
ruptibility which, as we saw in Chapter 2, he identifies as an attribute that
characterizes the divine being.¹⁰
It is the incorruptibility and immortality that characterize the Word-Son, in
accordance with Irenaeus’ conception of divine production and simplicity,
that is united to the humanity of the Word-Son in the Christological union.
And it is the incorruptibility and immortality of Christ’s humanity that, upon
his glorification by the Holy Spirit, is able to be communicated by the Spirit to
human beings as the saving principle of the human race.¹¹ So it is that the
human ability to partake of incorruptibility and immortality in the salvific
union is ultimately founded upon the nature of the Word-Son as the incor-
ruptible and immortal God.
To this point we have seen that Irenaeus grounds both the security of
salvation and the participation in incorruptibility and immortality on his
understanding of the Word-Son’s divinity. I would like to draw attention to
a third point that is founded upon Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being in
AH 3.18.7. Toward the end of the selection he writes:
For it was necessary for the mediator of both God and man, by his relationship to
both,¹² to lead each of them back to friendship and concord, and to make it so
that God would take up to himself man and man would give himself to God. For
in what way could we have been partakers of the adoption of sons, if we had not
received from him through the Son that fellowship with himself, and if his Word,
who was made flesh, had not entered into fellowship with us?
These sentences begin with Irenaeus’ declaration that Christ was able to
mediate between God the Father and human beings because of his relationship
to both. Indeed, he says, adoption as a child of God is possible for the very
reason that the incarnate Word-Son is related to both God the Father and
human beings. What interests me is Irenaeus’ statement, “in what way could
we have been partakers of the adoption of sons, if we had not received from
him through the Son that fellowship with himself.” The protasis in this
statement demonstrates the necessity of the relationship of the Word-Son to

⁹ For it to be otherwise would be a violation of divine simplicity.

¹⁰ See AH 2.13.9, which is discussed in Chapter 2.2.
¹¹ For a detailed explanation of the reasoning in this sentence, see my Irenaeus on the Holy
Spirit (2012: 75–7).
¹² Ἔδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος /
Oportuerat enim Mediatorem Dei et hominum per suam ad utrosque domesticatem.
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186 God and Christ in Irenaeus

the Father for the adoption of children of God. It is for that reason appropriate
to regard the content of the protasis as predicated on that relationship. That
is to say, the fellowship with the Father that comes through the incarnate
Word-Son is predicated on the relationship of the incarnate Word-Son with
the Father.
This observation alone is sufficient to assert that Irenaeus’ understanding of
the adoption of believers as children of God is founded upon his understand-
ing of the Word-Son’s relationship with the Father, that is, upon his concep-
tion of the divine being. But I think a moment of speculation is warranted. For
it seems reasonable to suggest that human beings are able to enter into
fellowship with the Father through the incarnate Word-Son on the same
basis that human beings are able to know the Father through the incarnate
Word-Son—because the Word-Son is one with the Father.¹³ Should this be the
case, then Irenaeus’ understanding of the believer’s adoption as a child of God
is grounded on his understanding of the reciprocal immanence of the Word-
Son and Father, defined as it is by divine simplicity.

5.1.1. Section Conclusion

In this first section we have seen that Irenaeus founds the security of salvation,
participation in incorruptibility, and adoption as a child of God on his
understanding of the Word-Son as God. While this first section explored
one text in order to ascertain the manner in which Irenaeus roots several
aspects of the divine economy in his conception of the divine being, the next
section offers a deeper exploration of just one aspect of the divine economy. Its
subject has received considerable attention over the years: the revelatory
activity of the Word-Son.

5.2. REVELATORY ACTIVITY

As stated in Chapter 1 of this study, Irenaeus regards the Word-Son as the

revelatory agent of God. In AH 4.6.3–7, the locus classicus for this subject, he
says that the Son administers (administro) all things for the Father and
“without him no one can know God.”¹⁴ But the way in which the Word-Son

¹³ See Chapter 3.1–2, which elucidate Irenaeus’ doctrine of reciprocal immanence.

¹⁴ AH 4.6.7. As explained in Chapter 1.3.2, the particular context of this statement is the
personal revelation of the Father by the Son, but the propositional nature of this statement
indicates that it applies more broadly. Other texts identify the Word-Son as the revelatory agent
of God, e.g., AH 2.30.9 and 4.20.5–6.
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Christ and his Work 187

makes known the Father depends upon the form of that revelation. Irenaeus
recognizes at least three different forms of revelation: the creative and provi-
dential activity of the Word-Son, those instances of revelatory activity that
involve the manifestation of the Word-Son prior to the incarnation, and the
revelation that comes through the incarnation of the Word-Son.
As for the first form of revelation, it is technically accurate to regard the
creative and providential activity of the Word-Son as revelatory, insofar as the
created order, as the object of reasoned reflection, provides a way for human
beings to arrive at a limited knowledge of God.¹⁵ As I explained in Chapter 1,
however, the knowledge obtained by means of this reasoned reflection seems
to be limited to the understanding that the Creator God is Lord of all.¹⁶ And
since human beings acquire this knowledge by means of discursive reasoning,
as opposed to a special activity by which God grants knowledge of himself to
his creatures, we are in fact speaking of a natural knowledge of God rather
than revealed knowledge.¹⁷ Thus, the creative and providential activity of the
Word-Son is a form of revelation in only an indirect and qualified way. It is
perhaps for this reason that Irenaeus does not found this form of revelation
upon the nature of the divine being, as he does the other two forms. Whatever
the reason, it is certainly true that this form of revelation does not communi-
cate a personal knowledge of God, nor does it involve a manifestation of the
Word-Son—both points that lead Irenaeus to found the other forms of
revelation upon his understanding of God.
When it comes to the second and third forms of revelation, Irenaeus founds
his conception of the Word-Son’s revelatory activity on his understanding of
the divine being in at least two ways. The first was identified and discussed in
Chapter 3: the Word-Son knows and is able to make known the Father
because he is one with the Father.¹⁸ According to Irenaeus the Word-Son is
able to reveal God the Father in both the Old Testament theophanies and the
incarnation because the Word-Son knows the Father. This knowledge of the
Father is, in turn, predicated upon the Word-Son being one with the Father—
an understanding which itself reflects and is grounded on Irenaeus’ concep-
tion of divine simplicity. Therefore, every revelatory act of the Word-Son is
founded upon the simplicity of the divine being: the Word-Son can reveal God
the Father because he is one with the Father. In this way the revelation of a
personal knowledge of God is founded upon the nature of the divine being.
But there is another way that Irenaeus founds these forms of the Word-
Son’s revelatory activity upon his understanding of the divine being. If the first
way builds upon Irenaeus’ understanding of divine simplicity, the second
builds upon his understanding of divine infinity. For Irenaeus must explain

¹⁵ Houssiau writes, “la connaissance de Dieu par la providence est en effet révélation (revelet)
par le Fils-Verbe, qui exerce cette providence” (ETL 29 1953: 335).
¹⁶ See Chapter 1.3. ¹⁷ See Chapter 1.3.2. ¹⁸ See Chapter 3.2.
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188 God and Christ in Irenaeus

how the infinite and, therefore, incomprehensible Word-Son can function as
a revelatory agent in the Old Testament theophanies and the incarnation.
But I am getting ahead of myself, because scholars have not agreed—and to
some extent still do not agree—that Irenaeus regards the pre-incarnate nature
of the Word-Son as infinite and incomprehensible. So, before we can move
forward, we must look back.
For nearly sixty years scholars have debated whether Irenaeus’ ascription of
revelatory agency to the Word-Son rests upon the attribution of an essential
quality that predisposes the Word-Son to this activity. Prior to the 1950s
scholarly consensus maintained that the Word-Son was invisible by nature,
becoming visible only as a result of the incarnation.¹⁹ In accordance with this
understanding, the revelatory agency of the Word-Son did not rest upon the
possession of an essential quality that predisposed the Word-Son to such
activities.²⁰ Toward the middle of the century, however, Antonio Orbe chal-
lenged this consensus.
Orbe agreed that Irenaeus often regards visibility as a corporeal attribute,
such that the Word-Son is invisible and inaccessible to the senses when it
comes to the divine nature but the incarnate Word-Son—as a result of his
human nature—is visible and accessible.²¹ Against the previous consensus,
however, Orbe contended that on occasion Irenaeus intends the terms “visi-
bility” and “invisibility” as synonyms for “knowability” and “unknowability.”²²
These occasions indicate, Orbe said, that Irenaeus also regarded the divine
nature of the Word-Son as visible or knowable to the intellect.²³
Orbe further argued that this intellectual visibility of the Word-Son both
differentiates the Word-Son from God the Father, whose nature remains
wholly invisible and unintelligible,²⁴ and serves as the basis for the sensible
visibility or knowability of the Word-Son in the incarnation.²⁵ In this way, his

¹⁹ E.g., Kunze (1891: 56); Chaine (1919: 28); Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 558, 596); Houssiau (1955:
55–6, 87–8, 127, 234, 254); Houssiau, ETL 29 (1953: 328–54, here 345); and Aeby (1958: 52–3, 57).
R. Tremblay’s study, though written after Orbe, is best understood as the culmination of the
opinion that preceded Orbe (1978: esp. 71–6, 91–103). Bonwetsch affirms the invisibility of the
Word, though he also argues that Irenaeus did not attribute a distinct existence to the Word
(1925: 62).
²⁰ Aeby’s position is difficult to categorize: he affirmed the natural invisibility of the Word-
Son, but also suggested “there is something in the eternal generation of the Word-Son which
predisposes him to be the universal agent of the Father” (1958: 57). Still, his thinking is far from
the later readings of Orbe, Ochagavía, and Giulea.
²¹ Orbe (1958, vol. 2: 655–6); citing, AH 3.9.1, 3.11.5, 3.16.6, 4.24.2.
²² Orbe (1958, vol. 2: 656–9); citing, esp. AH 4.6.6, also 4.4.2, 4.6.7.
²³ A decade earlier, Audet also seemed to think Irenaeus attributed invisibility to the Father
but not to the Word, who became the visible Christ (Traditio 1 1943: 43–4)—but his position is
not as clear as one would like.
²⁴ Orbe (1958, vol. 2: 655).
²⁵ Orbe (1958, vol. 1: 407 n. 31), “la visibilidad en carne del Verbo, responde a la visibilidad o
cognoscibilidad esencial del mismo en espíritu” (author’s emphasis).
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Christ and his Work 189

reading of these texts aligned with his understanding of the generation of the
Word-Son as not necessary or essential to the Godhead but for the purpose of
the divine economy.²⁶ According to this reading Irenaeus understood the
Word-Son as a mediatorial figure in a similar way to some of the Apologists
of the previous generation of Christian thinkers.²⁷
Some years later, Juan Ochagavía advanced Orbe’s line of thinking when he
argued that Irenaeus thought of the Word-Son as having an external form
(figura) prior to the incarnation.²⁸ Ochagavía argued that some of the Old
Testament theophanies, all of which Irenaeus ascribes to the agency of the
Word-Son, involve a vision of the Word-Son.²⁹ This vision of the Word-Son,
in turn, entails the possession of “that quality of visibility that is required for a
manifestation”—that is to say, a visibility to the intellect anterior to the visibility
of the flesh.³⁰ This prepared the way for his contention that Irenaeus’ identifi-
cation of the Word-Son as the Image of God after whom human beings were
made presupposes the possession of a human form or shape by the Word-Son
prior to the incarnation.³¹ Ochagavía’s comments make it clear that he regards
this pre-incarnate form as the basis of the intellectual visibility of the Word-
Son.³² And, as with Orbe, this reading leads Ochagavía to conclude that Irenaeus
regards the generation of the Word-Son not as eternal or necessary but as
economic in purpose.³³ This, he says, is the import of Irenaeus’ identification
of the Word-Son as the mediator who makes known the invisible and incom-
prehensible supreme God, the Father.³⁴
In the succeeding fifty years, as I will soon relate, scholars dismantled piece
by piece the readings of Orbe and Ochagavía. Still, in recent times Dragos
Giulea argued that Irenaeus did indeed attribute an intelligible form to the
pre-existent Word-Son. Moreover, Giulea contends that Irenaeus attributed a
material substance to the Word-Son in contrast to the perfect immateriality of
God the Father.³⁵ Giulea, however, does not take sufficient account of the
critical scholarship that preceded him.

²⁶ As noted in Chapter 3 of this study. ²⁷ Orbe (1958, vol. 1: 120, 132).

²⁸ For Ochagavía’s reliance on Orbe see Ochagavía (1964: 23 n. 10).
²⁹ See, e.g., Ochagavía (1964: 56).
³⁰ Ochagavía is here closely following Orbe’s understanding of intelligible visibility as the
basis for the Word-Son’s sensible visibility (1964: 89–90, quotation at 89).
³¹ Ochagavía (1964: 90–1). This conclusion is drawn from his reading of AH 5.16.2 in
conjunction with AH 2.7.6–7. By form or shape he means figura, a term which he takes from
AH 2.34.1, where, however, Irenaeus is discussing the soul—which he regards as material (as
I show in Chapter 4.3.2)—rather than the divine spirit.
³² See (1964: 91–2) where Ochagavía uses this pre-incarnate form to makes sense of Irenaeus’
identification of the Son as the manifestatio, agnitio, mensura, and visibile of the Father.
³³ Ochagavía (1964: 118, 122). Ochagavía’s discussion on p. 122 leaves the impression that his
reading of Irenaeus as affirming an economic Trinity may have been influenced by contempor-
ary theological interests.
³⁴ Ochagavía (1964: 21, 43–4).
³⁵ Giulea, HTR 108 (2015: 363–88, esp. 270–4). Giulea prefers the term “noetic form”; his
argument focuses upon AH 4.4.2, 4.6.6, 4.20.9, 5.16.2, Prf 11, 34.
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190 God and Christ in Irenaeus

In the half century prior to Giulea a series of studies called into question
and even directly challenged the readings of Irenaeus offered by Orbe and
Ochagavía. Adelin Rousseau, Jacques Fantino, and Jackson Lashier each
challenged the notion that Irenaeus regarded the Word-Son as less divine
than God the Father. Rousseau showed Orbe’s reading of Prf 47—the foun-
dation of Orbe’s position that Irenaeus affirmed an economic rather than
eternal generation of the Word-Son—to be deeply flawed.³⁶ In a comprehen-
sive study, Fantino demonstrated that Irenaeus’ understanding of the divine
economy requires the identification of the Word-Son, as well as the Father and
Holy Spirit, as the uncreated Creator God.³⁷ Lashier investigated Irenaeus’
conception of God the Father, the Word-Son, and their intra-Trinitarian
relationship, and concluded that Irenaeus’ understanding does not align
with those of the Apologists.³⁸
Other studies by Rousseau and Fantino, together with works by Manuel
Aróztegui Esnaola and Michel René Barnes undermine the suggestion that
Irenaeus attributed an intelligible form or materiality to the pre-incarnate
Word-Son. Rousseau argued that the Armenian phrase ըստ աներեւոյթ
տեսլեանն(“according to the invisible aspect/form”) found in Prf 34 likely
rendered the Greek substrate κατὰ τὸ ἀόρατον (lit. “according to the invis-
ible”).³⁹ Such a substantival use of the adjective ἀόρατος would mean that no
Greek term underlies the Armenian տեսիլ(“aspect/form”)—upon which
Giulea bases his argument—and that both phrases should be treated as an
adverbial locution meaning “invisibly.”⁴⁰ Fantino, for his part, published
what is still the definitive study of Irenaeus’ understanding of the image
and likeness of God.⁴¹ He contended that the image of God manifested by
human beings—the image in which human beings are created and which is
restored through Christ—can only have as its archetype the humanity of the
incarnate Word-Son. The creation of human beings in the image of the
incarnate Word-Son, he argues, was possible because of God’s foreknow-
ledge of both human sinfulness and the redemptive assumption of human
nature by the Word-Son.⁴²

³⁶ Rousseau, Le Muséon 84 (1971: 5–42). ³⁷ Fantino (1994: 265–382).

³⁸ Lashier (2014: esp. 54–148). For more on the apologists understanding of the Word’s
generation, see Chapter 3.3 of this study.
³⁹ Rousseau (1969: 67–82, here 71). Rousseau supports his argument by comparing the
Armenian phrasing of Prf 34 to the Latin secundum invisibilitatem (lit. “according to the
invisible” but meaning “invisibly” or “in an invisible manner”), which occurs in a similar context
in AH 5.18.3.
⁴⁰ Rousseau (1969: 71–2).
⁴¹ Fantino (1986), see, e.g., 104–6, 111–12, 153–6. Fantino’s argument partly rests on the
recognition that the spiritual nature of the Word-Son precludes the identification of the pre-
incarnate Word-Son as the image in which human beings were created.
⁴² Fantino (1986: esp. 156).
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Christ and his Work 191

Some time later, Aróztegui showed that Irenaeus’ conception of the appear-
ance of the Word-Son in Old Testament theophanies may be grounded upon
cotemporaneous understandings of natural phenomena. According to this
reading the Word-Son is visible in theophanies not because the pre-incarnate
nature of the Word-Son is material or defined by an intelligible form, but
because of a metaphysical marvel (“un prodigio metafísico”) by which sensible
qualities adhere to the pneumatic or divine substance of the Word-Son.⁴³
Lastly, Barnes observed that Irenaeus’ definition of the divine nature of the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as Spirit was influenced by Stoic conceptions of
πνεῦμα.⁴⁴ Barnes recognized that Irenaeus’ understanding of the divine nature
as Spirit—which contains all things, penetrates all things, and cannot be
localized or limited—effectively opposes Gnostic topological conceptions of
the divine being because Spirit is not defined by spatiality.⁴⁵ But—though
Barnes does not mention it—this very understanding of the Word-Son as
Spirit also precludes the attribution of form or image (which entail limit or
definition) to the pre-incarnate Word-Son.
These studies discredit the readings of Orbe and Ochagavía. And their
insights should have posed a considerable, even insurmountable obstacle to
Giulea’s recent reading.⁴⁶ They did not. But a consideration of Irenaeus’
understanding of the revelatory agency of the Word-Son that takes into
account the conclusions of the previous chapters of this study will, I hope,
present an insurmountable obstacle to future attempts at reading Irenaeus in a
similar way. And, more to the point for this present chapter, such a consid-
eration will also show that Irenaeus’ understanding of the Word-Son’s revela-
tory activity in the Old Testament theophanies and the incarnation is founded
upon his understanding of the divine being.

⁴³ Aróztegui (2005: 51–8, esp. 57). Aróztegui argues that Ireneaus’ description in AH 5.1.2 of a
prophetic vision as that which appears “while not being what it appears to be” (μὴ ὢν ὅπερ
ἐφαίνετο; non exsistens quod videbatur) and his statement that God, revealing himself through
the Word, appeared to Abraham “as through a ray of light” in Prf 24 draw upon ideas found in
the Aristotelian philosophical tradition. For example, Ps-Aristotle’s On the Cosmos 4, 395a30–2
distinguishes aerial phenomena which are appearances (τὰ κατ’ ἔμφασιν), such as rainbows or a
streak in the sky, from those which are in reality (τὰ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν), such as shooting stars or
comets. In the former the sensible property of luminosity adheres to an insensible substrate
(ὑποκείμενον or ὑπόστασις), while in the latter the sensible property of luminosity adheres to a
sensible substrate. It is the notion of a metaphysical anomaly or marvel of a sensible property
adhering to an insensible substrate that, Aróztegui contends, Irenaeus appropriates in his
explanation of the Old Testament theophanies, which involve the appearances of the Word-
Son, who is by nature incomprehensible divine spirit.
⁴⁴ Barnes, NV 7 (2009: 67–106, esp. 76–81). I discuss this aspect of Irenaeus’ understanding of
the divine being in Chapter 2.3.
⁴⁵ For the topological definition of God by Gnostic theologians, see Schoedel (1972: 89–108).
⁴⁶ Giulea himself notes that the attribution of a noetic form to the Word-Son does not suit the
pro-Nicene emphasis on the equality of Word-Son with the Father (HTR 108 2015: 265, 288),
nor the post-Nicene attribution of infinity to the divine being (pp. 265, 287–8). But Irenaeus too
regards the Word-Son as equal to the Father and infinite in nature.
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192 God and Christ in Irenaeus

As Orbe, Ochagavía, and Giulea recognize, their understanding of Irenaeus’
account of the revelatory agency of the Word-Son involves a particular
understanding of the relationship that exists between the Word-Son and
God the Father. For the revelatory agency of the Word-Son to be founded
upon a quality or form possessed by the Word-Son but not the Father,
Irenaeus’ understanding of the substances of and relationship between the
Word-Son and Father must be one that allows for the attribution of different
substances or different essential qualities to the Word-Son and Father. Giulea
himself recognizes this point when he states that the attribution of noetic form
to the Word-Son is not possible when the divinity of the Word-Son is regarded
as equal to that of God the Father.⁴⁷ What Giulea does not seem to realize is
that this position was not the exclusive provenance of fourth-century pro-
Nicene theology.
As explained in the Conclusion of chapter 3, and mentioned in the first
section of this chapter, since Irenaeus considers the substance of the Word-
Son to be one and the same as the substance of God the Father, and since he
considers the divine being to be identical with any one of the divine attributes,
then the qualities that characterize God the Father also characterize the Word-
Son.⁴⁸ These include infinitude, simplicity, spirituality (the inverse of materi-
ality), and invisibility.⁴⁹ So, too, then must the corollaries that attend these
qualities also characterize the Word-Son—including, atemporality, transcend-
ence, immanence, and incomprehensibility.
This understanding of the divine being and the relationship between the
Word-Son and God the Father precludes the attribution of form or materiality
to the Word-Son. Divine infinity militates against the attribution of an
intelligible form, which entails limit.⁵⁰ Divine simplicity, for its part, does
not allow a quality that defines the substance of the Word-Son but does not
define the substance of the Father. Divine spirituality—given Irenaeus’ under-
standing of divine Spirit as simple—opposes the suggestion that the substance
of the Word-Son is in any way material, which Irenaeus consistently defines as
compound.⁵¹ The atemporality that attends simplicity stands against the
economic generation of the Word-Son “before time,” espoused by Orbe and
Ochagavía. And the incomprehensibility that attends infinitude disallows the

⁴⁷ See, e.g., his comments at HTR 108 (2015: 265, 288).

⁴⁸ For it to be otherwise would be a violation of divine simplicity.
⁴⁹ Though not discussed in Chapter 2, according to Irenaeus spirituality entails invisibility. In
AH 5.1.2 he explicitly states “the Spirit (of God) is invisible,” and in AH 4.19.1 he says that which
is supercelestial and spiritual is invisible to human beings.
⁵⁰ If Philo attributed infinitude to the divine being (see Chapter 2 nn. 39 and 146), then he
may be the exception that makes the rule. For he also attributes invisible form to God (see Giulea,
HTR 108 2015: 268). If such is the case, Irenaeus would here part from Philo, as I explain above.
⁵¹ In addition to the passages and logic discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this study, Irenaeus
identifies the Word-Son as divine Spirit in AH 5.1.2 and Prf 71, which I discuss in Irenaeus on the
Holy Spirit (2012: 190–3).
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Christ and his Work 193

possibility that the Word-Son—prior to the Christological union—is charac-
terized by an intelligible form or even a vague quality of knowability.
But this understanding comes with its own challenge: an invisible and
incomprehensible Word-Son makes a poor revelatory agent.⁵² The manner
in which Irenaeus resolves this challenge depends upon the form of revelation
under consideration. He offers one solution for the Old Testament theopha-
nies and another for the incarnation.
As I mentioned a couple of pages ago, Aróztegui has shown that Irenaeus
seems to understand the appearances of the Word-Son in Old Testament
theophanies in terms of cotemporaneous explanations of natural phenomena.
The Word-Son, like a rainbow or a ray of the sun, becomes visible when—in a
metaphysical marvel or miracle—sensible properties (e.g., visibility, figure,
luminosity) adhere to an insensible substrate.⁵³ The adherence of these sens-
ible properties allows the Word-Son—who remains invisible and incompre-
hensible by nature—to be temporarily grasped by human senses, thus allowing
him to be heard and, in some fashion, seen.⁵⁴
While our understanding of this aspect of Irenaeus’ thinking is limited, a
few points may be made. First, Irenaeus insists that the newness of the
incarnation lies in the personal presence of the Word-Son with human
beings.⁵⁵ This means that while the Word-Son appeared in the Old Testament
theophanies, the Word-Son was not himself present in those appearances.
How Irenaeus understood this to be is not fully clear, but he must have
distinguished the adherence of sensible properties to the spiritual nature of
the Word-Son from the blending of sensible humanity with the spiritual
nature of the Word-Son in the incarnation. This distinction is surely connect-
ed to the distinction Irenaeus draws between the kind of vision of the Word-
Son that came through the Old Testament theophanies and prophecies and
the sight of the Word-Son in the incarnation.⁵⁶ It must also be connected to
his understanding that the visible appearance of the Word-Son in those
theophanies and prophecies was not constant.⁵⁷ But for the purposes of this

⁵² Irenaeus attributes invisibility to the Word-Son more than once (e.g., AH 4.24.2, 5.1.2).
This attribution seems to follow from the identification of the Word-Son as a spiritual being (AH
5.1.2).
⁵³ Aróztegui (2005: 52, 56–8).
⁵⁴ Irenaeus says the witnesses of these theophanies saw that “similitude of the glory of the
Lord (Ezek. 1:28) and prophecies of things to come” (AH 4.20.11) and that patriarchs and
prophets “prophetically” saw the future humanity of the Word-Son (4.7.1; 4.20.8; Prf 44,
speaking of Mamre).
⁵⁵ See AH 4.34.1, where Irenaeus compares the long-anticipated and predicted advent of the
Word-Son with the advent of a king who is announced by servants sent before him. Irenaeus
seems to distinguish the personal presence of the Word-Son in the incarnation from the manner
in which the Word-Son is present with humanity from creation (AH 4.6.7), though the exact
lines of his thinking are not clear.
⁵⁶ See note 54 above.
⁵⁷ For the shifting nature of the pre-incarnate appearance of the Word-Son, see AH 4.20.11.
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194 God and Christ in Irenaeus

study, the chief virtue of Aróztegui’s reading is that it allows for the simul-
taneous affirmation of two positions which have in the past been regarded as
mutually exclusive: Irenaeus’ identification of the Word-Son as incomprehen-
sible divine spirit and his declaration that witnesses of Old Testament the-
ophanies in some way saw the Word-Son.
If Aróztegui’s reading explains Irenaeus’ understanding of the manifest-
ation of the Word-Son prior to the incarnation, Irenaeus’ understanding of
how the incarnation brings the Word-Son into the epistemic field of human
beings has yet to be properly explained. This state of the question is almost
certainly due to the lack of attention paid to Irenaeus’ understanding of the
divine being which has precluded certain readings of texts concerning the
incarnation. In this way Norris’s fear that the scholarly neglect of Irenaeus’
doctrine of God would introduce distortions into contemporary appreciations
and criticisms of his work has come to pass.⁵⁸
Irenaeus’ account of the incarnation is designed, in part, to resolve the
challenge that besets a revelatory agent—the Word-Son—whose nature is
infinite and incomprehensible divine Spirit. He writes in AH 3.16.6:
There is then, as we have shown, one God the Father and one Christ Jesus, our
Lord, who comes through the whole economy and recapitulates all things in
himself. (Included) in “all things” is also man, the formation of God. Man has
then also been recapitulated in him, the invisible being made visible, the incom-
prehensible being made comprehensible (incomprehensibilis factus comprehensi-
bilis), the impassible passible, and the Word man, recapitulating all in himself, so
that as the Word of God has primacy⁵⁹ in the supercelestial and spiritual and
invisible, so also might he have primacy in the visible and corporeal . . .
Here the contrast between the pre-incarnate Word-Son, who is by nature
invisible and incomprehensible, and the incarnate Word-Son, who is visible
and comprehensible, defines the incarnation. The taking of a human nature,
entailed in the recapitulation of humanity, renders the incomprehensible
Word-Son comprehensible. That which was unknown because invisible can
now be known because visible. The incarnation of the Word-Son was an event
of epistemological consequence—the moment when the invisible and incom-
prehensible divine God became visible and comprehensible to human beings.
It is for this reason the revelatory event par excellence.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ For Norris’s fear, see the quotation which begins Chapter 2.

⁵⁹ The Latin translator used princeps est, which calls to mind the Roman use of the term
princeps to speak of certain government offices including that of the emperor, who was
designated Princeps civitatis.
⁶⁰ For the primacy of the revelatory moment of the incarnation, see, for instance, AH 4.20.7:
“For if the manifestation of God through the created order grants life to all who are living on
earth, how much more does the very manifestation of the Father through the Word grant life to
those who see God!” Irenaeus’ comments in 4.20.8 make it clear that the manifestation of the
Father through the Word to which he refers here is the incarnation.
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Christ and his Work 195

Irenaeus elaborates on the epistemological import of the incarnation in
several passages in the latter books of Against Heresies. We find the following
comments in the midst of his well-known discussion of the vision of God in
AH 4.20.5:
For just as those who see light are within the light and participate in its splendor,
so too those who see God are within God and are participating in his splendor.
Now the splendor of God gives life; therefore, those who see God participate in
life. And for this reason the one who is uncontainable and incomprehensible and
invisible renders himself visible and comprehensible and graspable, in order that
he may give life to those who grasp and see him.⁶¹ For just as his greatness is
inscrutable, so also is his goodness ineffable; by which, having been seen, he
bestows life on those who see him. For it is not possible to live without life, and
the means of life comes from participation in God, and participation in God is to
see God and to enjoy his goodness.
This selection follows Irenaeus’ description of the different ways that human
beings see God throughout the divine economy. In the third sentence of this
pericope, however, Irenaeus seems to have in mind the incarnation when he
writes: “the one who is uncontainable and incomprehensible and invisible
renders himself visible and comprehensible and graspable, in order that he
may give life to those who grasp and see him.” It is true that Irenaeus might
have in mind all the moments in which God has manifested himself in a way
that can be grasped by human beings—including the Old Testament theopha-
nies, for instance—but the epistemological transition of which Irenaeus speaks
here has much in common with the epistemological consequence of the
incarnation that we just saw him describe in AH 3.16.6. Assuming this
interpretation is correct, these words describe the transition that takes place
when the uncontainable, incomprehensible, and invisible Word-Son assumes
a human nature and becomes thereby comprehensible and graspable.
This reading is supported by comments in the immediately preceding
paragraph—AH 4.20.4—comments which also hint at the ideas underlying
Irenaeus’ reasoning. He writes:
Therefore, there is one God, who by the Word and Wisdom made and adapted all
things. And this is the Creator, who also assigned this world to the human race,
and who, as far as his greatness is concerned, is certainly unknown to all those
who were made by him (for no one has searched out his height, neither those of
old nor those of the present), but, as far as his love is concerned, is known always
through him through whom he constituted all things. Now this is his Word, our
Lord Jesus Christ, who in the last times was made a man among men, so that he

⁶¹ Et propter hoc incapabilis et incomprehensibilis <et invisibilis> visibilem se et comprehensi-

bilem et capacem hominibus praestat, ut vivificet percipientes et videntes se. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ
ἀχώρητος καὶ ἀκατάληπτος καὶ ἀόρατος ὁρώμενον ἑαυτὸν καὶ καταλαμβανόμενον καὶ χωρούμενον
τοῖς < ἀνθρώποις παρέχει, > ἵνα ζωοποιήσῃ τοὺς χωροῦντας καὶ βλέποντας αὐτόν.
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196 God and Christ in Irenaeus

might join the end to the beginning, that is, man to God. And on account of this,
the prophets, receiving the prophetic gift from the same Word, proclaimed his
advent according to the flesh, by which the blending and communion of God
and man took place according to the good pleasure of the Father, the Word of
God foretelling from the beginning that God would be seen by human beings,
and would dwell with them on the earth (Bar 3:37), and would talk [with them],
and would be present with his own workmanship, saving it, and becoming
capable of being perceived by it (perceptibilis ab eo), and “freeing us from the
hands of all who hate us” (Lk 1:71), that is, from the whole spirit of transgres-
sion, and causing “us to serve Him in holiness and righteousness all our days”
(Lk 1:74–5), in order that man, being embraced by the Spirit of God, might pass
into the glory of the Father.

In the bottom third of this pericope Irenaeus describes the outcome of the
Christological union, the blending of the divine and human discussed in
Chapter 4: “God would be seen by human beings, and would dwell with
them on the earth, and would talk [with them], and would be present with
his own workmanship.” He then lists several benefits that accrue to human
beings as a result of the Word-Son having this kind of presence in the world,
one of which is that God would become “capable of being perceived by” his
own workmanship—by human beings. It seems best to understand Irenaeus
to be speaking here of sensible perception. For it is by the senses that the
Word of God “would be seen by human beings,” it is by the senses that
the Word would be heard when he “would talk [with them],” and it is by the
senses that human beings would discern that God was dwelling on the earth
and present with them.
Taken together, then, these two passages from AH 4.20.4–5 suggest the
revelatory significance of the Word-Son’s incarnation is that it brought the
infinite and incomprehensible God into the epistemic field of the human
senses. As a result of which God was able to be known in ways previously
impossible. If AH 4.20.4–5 suggest—even strongly—that Irenaeus considered
the revelatory importance of the incarnation to be the bringing of God into the
epistemic field of human sensation, AH 4.38.1–2 removes any doubt. The
pertinent comments are interspersed among other points, so a lengthy quota-
tion is necessary:

Those which were created by him, insofar as they have a beginning, would be
necessarily inferior to that one who created them. Indeed, it is impossible for
uncreated things to be those which are recently created. Moreover, because they
are not uncreated, for this reason they fall short of the perfect. Because as they are
newer, so are they infantile, and as they are infantile, so are they unaccustomed to,
and unexercised in perfect discipline. For as a mother is certainly able to give
strong (τέλειον) food to her infant, who is still unable to receive (such) nourish-
ment because of its age, (but she does not do so), so too God himself was able to
give perfection to man from the beginning, but man was not able to receive it, for
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Christ and his Work 197

(man) was an infant. And for this reason our Lord, in the last times, when he
recapitulated in himself all things, came to us, not as he was able (to do), but as we
were able to behold him. For he was certainly able to come to us in his
inexpressible (ἀφράστῳ) glory, but then we would not have been able to bear
the greatness of his glory. Therefore, as to infants, the perfect bread of the Father
gave himself to us as milk, which was his advent as a man, in order that—being
nourished as if by the breast of his flesh and, by such a milk course, becoming
accustomed to eat and drink the Word of God—we may be able to retain the
bread of immortality, which is the Spirit of the Father.
(4.38.2) And this is why Paul said to the Corinthians, “I gave you milk to drink,
not solid food, for you were not yet able to bear it” (1 Cor. 3:2). That is, you have
indeed been taught the advent of the Lord as a man, but the Spirit of the Father
has not yet come to rest on you because of your weakness. “For when jealousy and
strife,” he says, “and dissensions are among you, are you not carnal and do you
not live like men?” (1 Cor. 3:3) That is, that the Spirit of the Father was not yet
with them because of their imperfection and poorness of (their) daily conduct.
As, therefore, the apostle was certainly able to give (solid) food—for those upon
whom the apostles laid hands received the Holy Spirit, who is the bread of life—
but they were not able to receive it because they possessed sentient faculties of the
soul (sensum / τὰ αἰσθητήρια) still weak and unexercised in the practice of things
pertaining to God. So too God was certainly able to give perfection to man in the
beginning, but that one, just created, was not able to receive it, or—upon
receiving it—to grasp it (χωρῆσαι), or—upon grasping it (χωρήσας)—to retain
it. And on account of this the Word of God, being perfect, became an infant with
man, not for himself but because of the infantile state of man, so that he might be
grasped as man was able to grasp him (οὕτω χωρούμενος ὡς ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸν
χωρεῖν ἠδύνατο). Nothing about God, therefore, was incapable or deficient, but
rather about the lately created man: that he was not uncreated.
In these paragraphs, as we have seen elsewhere, Irenaeus ties perfection to
being uncreated.⁶² God is perfect because he is not created, is eternal; human
beings are not perfect because they are created, have a beginning in time. Since
human beings are created and, so to speak, younger than the uncreated God,
they are “unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline.” As a result,
at the time of their creation human beings are not yet able to receive
strong food, substantial nourishment, the bread of immortality, the Holy
Spirit. Human beings must become accustomed to such meaty, spiritual
nourishment—as infants they must begin with milk.
Irenaeus identifies the milk with which human beings must begin as the
incarnate Word-Son. The Word-Son, Irenaeus explains, came not in his
inexpressible glory, which could not have been endured, but as “we were
able to behold Him.” The incarnate Word-Son, unlike the Holy Spirit, made

⁶² See Chapter 2.2, where I discuss AH 4.11.2, and my Irenaeus on the Holy Spirit (2012:
38–40), where I discuss AH 2.28.1–3.
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198 God and Christ in Irenaeus

for a nourishing milk course because the “sentient faculties of the soul
(sensum / τὰ αἰσθητήρια) still weak and unexercised in the practice of things
pertaining to God” were able to receive him. And here we arrive at the point.
Irenaeus is saying that the incarnation of the Word-Son is spiritually signifi-
cant because it is epistemologically significant: “the Word of God, being
perfect, became an infant with man, not for himself but because of the
infantile state of man, so that he might be grasped as man was able to
grasp him.” The incarnation brought the Word-Son into the sphere of
sensible knowing, and the knowledge of the incarnate Word-Son acquired
by the senses serves as the necessary first course to the food of life, the
Holy Spirit.
This emphasis on the epistemological importance of the incarnation carries
over into the final book of Against Heresies, where we find Irenaeus’ pithiest
statement about the need for the Word-Son to enter the sphere of human
sensation. He writes at the beginning of AH 5:
For thus you will both legitimately contradict them, and be prepared to under-
take arguments against them,⁶³ casting away their doctrines as excrement by
means of the celestial faith, while following the only sure and true teacher, the
Word of God, Jesus Christ our Lord, who on account of his surpassing love
was made that which we are, so that he might bring⁶⁴ us to be that which he is
himself.
For in no other way could we have learned the things of God, unless our
teacher, who is the Word, became human. For, in the first place, no other was able
to explain to us the things of the Father, except his own Word. For “who” else
“has known the mind of the Lord? Or who” else “has been his counselor?” (Rom.
11:34) And, in the second place, we could have learned in no other way except by
seeing our teacher and by perceiving his voice with our own ears,⁶⁵ so that, having
become imitators of his works and doers of his words, we might have communion
with him, we—who are lately created—receiving increase from that one who is
perfect and before all creation . . . ⁶⁶
Irenaeus makes several familiar points in this passage. First, as in AH 4.20.4, he
identifies the incarnate presence of the Word-Son as an expression of God’s
love for human beings. Then, he establishes that the Word-Son alone has the
ability to reveal the Father, which we know is the case because the Word-Son is
one with the Father. Finally, like AH 4.38.1–2, he declares that “in no other
way could [human beings] have learned the things of God, unless our teacher,
who is the Word, had become human.” For human beings, lately created,
“could have learned in no other way except by seeing our teacher and by
hearing his voice with our own ears.” Thus, saying once again that the

⁶³ et de praeparato accipies adversus eos contradictiones, which could also be translated “and
be prepared to receive arguments against them.”
⁶⁴ καταρτίζω/perficio. ⁶⁵ per auditum nostrum. ⁶⁶ AH 5.pref—5.1.1.
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Christ and his Work 199

revelatory significance of the incarnation was that it brought the Word-Son
into the epistemic sphere of human sensation.
While the passages I have discussed so far offer the clearest statements
about the epistemic value of the incarnation, numerous other passages should
be read in this light. In AH 4.24.2, for instance, Irenaeus says that the Word-
Son, “invisible by nature, was made palpable and visible among men.” State-
ments that refer to the palpability and especially the visibility of the incarnate
Word-Son frequent Irenaeus’ writings.⁶⁷ Many have an obvious epistemic
overtone. Moreover, some well-known but debated texts may be easily
explained when read in light of Irenaeus’ understanding of the incarnation
as that which renders the incomprehensible God comprehensible to human
sensation. Three stand out.
In AH 4.4.2 Irenaeus writes:
For God does all things with measure and order; with him nothing lacks measure,
because nothing lacks number.⁶⁸ And he spoke well who said the immeasurable
Father has been measured in the Son; for the Son is the measure of the Father,
since he also comprehends him (immensum Patrem in Filio mensuratum: men-
sura enim Patris Filius, quoniam et capit eum).
Irenaeus’ identification of the Son as the measure of the immeasurable Father
has long drawn the attention of scholars.⁶⁹ Past readings have ranged widely,
from that which argues the incarnate Son is the measure of the Father because
he is visible to the senses to that which argues the pre-incarnate Son is the
measure of the Father because he is visible to the intellect.⁷⁰ Perhaps the only
thing that all of these readings has in common is that none of them reads this
passage in light of Irenaeus’ understanding of the infinite nature of the divine
being, nor in light of his understanding of the incarnate Word-Son as the one
who makes known the infinite and incomprehensible Father.⁷¹ But it is exactly
these understandings that make the best sense of Irenaeus’ identification of the
Son as the measure of the immeasurable Father.
Irenaeus’ identification of the Father as immeasurable suits his attribution
of infinitude to the divine being. To say the Father is immeasurable is the same

⁶⁷ E.g., AH 3.9.1, 3.10.2, 3.11.5, 4.6.5–6, 4.7.2, 5.16.2; 5.18.3; 5.25.5; Prf 6, 31, 34, 84, 91.
⁶⁸ Following the fragment from John of Damascus which gives ἀναρίθμητος where the Latin
has incompositus.
⁶⁹ E.g., Harnack (1901, vol. 2: 264 n. 2; Hitchcock (1914, repr. 2004: 117; Bonwetsch (1925:
61); Lebreton (1928, vol. 2: 556–7); Houssiau (1955: 73); Aeby (1958: 52–3); Orbe (1958, vol. 1:
121); Ochagavía (1964: 69); Fantino (1994: 349–50); Behr, The Way to Nicaea (2001: 114).
⁷⁰ The readings of Aeby and Ochagavía, respectively (see the previous note for their loca-
tions).
⁷¹ Behr comes the closest when he writes, “The Father of all is certainly invisible and infinitely
beyond human comprehension, and so, Irenaeus argues, if human beings are to see him and thus
enter into communion with him, rather than simply hear reports about him, a ‘measure’ of the
‘immeasurable Father’ (AH 4.4.2) is needed, and this is the Son, in whose human nature, rather
than behind it, we can see the invisible Father” (The Way to Nicaea 2001: 114).
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200 God and Christ in Irenaeus

as saying the Father is infinite. His statement that the Father has been
measured in the Son suits his understanding that the Father is known and
seen in the incarnate Word-Son, who is measured insofar as his human nature
is limited. To say the Father has been measured in the Son is the same as
saying a knowledge of Father has entered the field of human sensation through
the incarnation of the Word-Son. Finally, Irenaeus’ declaration that “the Son
is the measure of the Father, since he comprehends him” suits his understand-
ing that the revelatory agency of the Word-Son is founded upon his know-
ledge of the Father which is, in turn, founded on their unity as the one God. To
say the Word-Son “is the measure of the Father, since he comprehends him” is
the same as saying the incarnate Word-Son is able to reveal the Father because
the Word-Son knows the Father. Thus, the identification of the Word-Son
as the measure of the immeasurable Father is best explained in terms of
Irenaeus’ understanding of the incarnation of the Word-Son as that which
functions to bring the infinite God into the realm of human sensation so that
both the Father and the Word-Son can be known in new and profound ways.
The second and third well-known passages occur in the sixth chapter of
Against Heresies 4—Irenaeus’ fundamental discussion of the revelatory agency
of the Word-Son. With regard to the first of these two, scholars have long
pondered what Irenaeus means in AH 4.6.3 when he says that “knowledge of
the Father is the manifestation of the Son” (agnitio enim Patris est Filii
manifestatio). Irenaeus writes:
For no one can know the Father without the Word of God, that is, except by the
Son who reveals (him), nor the Son without the good pleasure of the Father.
Moreover, the Son executes the good pleasure of the Father, for the Father sends
while the Son is sent and comes. On the one hand, though the Father is invisible
as far as we are concerned, his own Word knows him and, though he (the Father)
is inexpressible, expresses him to us; while, on the other hand, the Father alone
knows his own Word.⁷² Both these (truths), moreover, the Lord himself has
likewise made known. And on account of this the Son reveals the knowledge of
the Father through his own manifestation. For knowledge of the Father is the
manifestation of the Son, since all things are manifested through the Word.⁷³ In
order, therefore, that we might know that the Son who came is the very one who
produces a knowledge of the Father in those who believe in him, he said to his
disciples: “No one knows the Father except the Son, nor the Son except the
Father, and those to whom the Son will reveal (them)”⁷⁴ (Mt 11:27)—(thus)

⁷² Both the Latin and Armenian texts of this sentence present interpretive challenges. It
should be noted that the Latin manuscript tradition identifies the Father as invisible and
“unlimited” (using at times indeterminabilem and others interminabilem), while the Armenian
lacks a term that corresponds to “unlimited.”
⁷³ Et propter hoc Filius revelat agnitionem Patris per suam manifestationem. Agnitio enim
Patris est Filii manifestatio: omnia enim per Verbum manifestantur.
⁷⁴ As in AH 2.6.1, quoted in Chapter 1, the object is not given, but Rousseau has shown that
according to Irenaeus the revelation of the Son includes the revelation of himself as well as the
Father (SC 293 1982: 219 and SC 263 1979: 266–8).
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Christ and his Work 201

teaching both who he is himself and who is the Father,⁷⁵ so that we do not accept
any other Father, except him who is revealed by the Son.
This passage has much in common with the selection from AH 4.4.2 just
considered. Irenaeus states that God the Father can only be known through
the revelatory agency of the Word-Son. And his subsequent reference to the
invisibility and unlimited nature of the Father both acknowledges the cause of
the Father’s incomprehensibility and explains the need for the agency of the
Word-Son. Since, then, his assertion that “knowledge of the Father is the
manifestation of the Son” follows these statements, as well as references to
the advent of the Word-Son in AH 4.6.2 and 4.6.4, this assertion is best
understood as a reference to the incarnation of the Word-Son which made
known God the Father.⁷⁶
Ochagavía, therefore, was right to say this assertion is “practically equiva-
lent” to Irenaeus’ statement in AH 4.4.2 that the “Son is the measure of the
Father, since he comprehends him.”⁷⁷ But he was wrong to interpret them
as referring to a visibility of the Word-Son beyond the senses—an intelli-
gible visibility. His reading of Irenaeus’ statement in AH 4.6.7 that “know-
ledge of the Father is the Son” (agnitio enim Patris Filius) is likewise
incorrect and this clause should also be understood as a reference to the
work of the Word-Son in making God the Father known in a way that is
comprehensible to the human senses. Though it is clear from the context of
4.6.7 that Irenaeus has in mind here the knowledge of the Father that
comes by the Word-Son throughout the ages, not just that which came by
the incarnation.
The third passage comes from AH 4.6.6, Irenaeus writes:
But by the law and the prophets the Word preached alike both himself and the
Father, and all the people heard alike, but all have not believed alike. And
through the Word himself, who had been made visible and palpable, was the
Father made known. Although not all believed in him alike, all saw the Father
in the Son: for the Father is the invisible of the Son, but the Son is the visible of
the Father. And for this reason, when he was present, everyone said he was the
Christ and named him God. Even the demons, when they saw the Son, said:
“We know who you are, the Holy One of God” (Mark 1:24). And, when he was
tempting, the devil, looking at him, said: “If you are the Son of God” (Mt. 4:3;
Lk. 4:3)—all indeed seeing and naming the Son and the Father, but not all
believing (in them).

⁷⁵ Following Rousseau’s preference for the Armenian (SC 100 1965: 208).
⁷⁶ The basic idea that knowledge of the Father comes through the manifestation of the Word-
Son applies to revelatory events beyond the incarnation, including, for instance, Old Testament
theophanies. But the location of this passage between references to the advent of Christ in AH
4.6.2 and 4.6.4, suggests that Irenaeus is thinking of the incarnation when he speaks of the
manifestation of the Son in 4.6.3.
⁷⁷ Ochagavía (1964: 69).
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202 God and Christ in Irenaeus

For generations scholars have queried Irenaeus’ declaration that “the Father is
the invisible of the Son, but the Son is the visible of the Father.” Toward the
middle of last century Orbe challenged Houssiau’s position that the visibility
of the Son refers to the physical sight of the incarnate Son through which the
Father is made known.⁷⁸ Rather than supporting his challenge by a close
reading of this text, Orbe argued from two broader polemical considerations.
First, Orbe maintained that Irenaeus had no reason to argue for the visibility of
the Son in the incarnation because Ptolemaic and Marcionite theologies also
affirmed the visibility of the incarnate Son. Second, Orbe questioned why
Irenaeus would say knowledge of the Father comes through the visibility of the
Son in the incarnation when he also wants to stress the availability of a
knowledge of the Father prior to the incarnation. The essence of both points
is that an emphasis on the visibility of the Son in the incarnation would make
little polemical sense. Instead, Orbe contended, Irenaeus should be understood
as speaking of the incomprehensibility of God the Father and the natural
comprehensibility of the Word-Son as a result of which the Word-Son can
make known the Father.⁷⁹
But Orbe’s considerations fail to persuade. He does not realize that Ire-
naeus’ need to explain the incarnate visibility of the Word-Son is itself a
working out of his earlier polemical argument concerning the nature of
God. As I explained in Chapter 2, the attribution of infinity to the divine
being is central to Irenaeus’ definition of God over against the definitions of
the Ptolemaeans and Marcionites. For instance, he asserts divine infinitude in
AH 2.1.2 in order to argue that there is nothing in the Ptolemaic hypothesis
nor in Marcionite theology that can properly bear the title God.⁸⁰ But as
discussed earlier in this chapter, the attribution of divine infinity to the divine
being combined with Irenaeus’ understanding of the Word-Son as having
one and the same substance as the Father means that Irenaeus must explain
how the infinite and incomprehensible Word-Son can function as a revela-
tory agent. This explanation, moreover, must account for the revelation of
the Father by the Word-Son over the course of the divine economy, which
was an essential component—as Orbe notes—of Irenaeus’ challenge to the
Ptolemaic and Marcionite positions that the Father was not known until the
advent of Christ.⁸¹
Elsewhere, as we have seen, Irenaeus seems to explain the pre-incarnate
appearances of the Word-Son in the Old Testament theophanies in terms of
cotemporaneous understandings of natural phenomena: sensible qualities
adhered to the spiritual and divine substance of the Word-Son. This para-
graph in AH 4.6.6, on the other hand, is concerned with the incarnation of the

⁷⁸ For Houssiau’s position, see: (1955: 73). ⁷⁹ Orbe (1958, vol. 2: 657–8).
⁸⁰ As I explain in my analysis of this text in Chapter 2.1.
⁸¹ See, e.g., AH 4.6.1, 4.6.6–7, 4.7.1–2.
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Christ and his Work 203

Word-Son. So much is clear from the quotations of Scripture that relate
Christ’s encounters with demons and the devil. This being the case, Irenaeus’
reference to the visibility and palpability of the Word-Son must once again
refer to his understanding that God the Father was made known when the
incarnation brought the Word-Son into the epistemic field of human sensa-
tion. His frequent appeals to encounters utilizing the senses in the surround-
ing sentences—“all the people heard alike,” “all saw the Father in the Son,” the
demons saw the Son, the devil looked at him, and finally, “all thus seeing and
naming the Son and Father”—underscore his point: those who interacted with
the Word-Son at the level of their senses came to know God the Father as well.
There can be little question, then, that Irenaeus’ declaration, “the Father is the
invisible of the Son, but the Son is the visible of the Father,” captures his
understanding of the incarnation as that which makes the invisible, infinite,
and incomprehensible God visible and comprehensible.

5.2.1. Section Conclusion

Irenaeus’ account of the revelatory activity of the Word-Son is designed, in

part, to explain how the infinite and incomprehensible Word-Son can func-
tion as the revelatory agent of God. Irenaeus’ use of cotemporaneous under-
standings of natural phenomena to explain the pre-incarnate appearances of
the Word-Son in Old Testament theophanies allows for the Word-Son to be
naturally invisible and incomprehensible and yet temporarily grasped by
human senses. Likewise, Irenaeus’ account of the incarnation explains how
the invisible and incomprehensible Word-Son could function as the revelatory
agent of God while he dwelt on earth. The union with a finite human nature
allowed the Word-Son to enter the epistemic field of human sensation,
become comprehensible, and make known God the Father. Therefore, Ire-
naeus’ accounts of the pre-incarnate appearances of the Word-Son and the
incarnation of the Word-Son are founded upon his understanding of divine
being insofar as both explain how it is that the infinite and incomprehensible
Word-Son can function as the revelatory agent of God.
I would like to make two final points. First, though it is clear that Irenaeus
prioritizes the epistemological importance of human sensation, it is a fool’s
errand to try to identify his understanding with any one of the philosophical
systems of his day.⁸² Despite his use of particular terms and perhaps even
positions that we find in ancient epistemologies,⁸³ his extant works do not
provide us with sufficient information to connect Irenaeus with any one

⁸² Audet, long ago, suggested his approach seemed Aristotelian (Traditio 1 1943: 26). The fact
that a consensus has not developed in the subsequent years is—in this case—instructive.
⁸³ See Chapter 1.3 for some examples.
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204 God and Christ in Irenaeus

epistemology. If I were to hazard a guess, I would imagine that his approach
is eclectic—choosing what he finds valuable and leaving behind what he does
not—rather than systematic.
Second, I would like to return for a moment to a passage discussed in this
section, AH 4.20.4. Scholars have spilled a good deal of ink discussing Ire-
naeus’ statement that the greatness of the Creator God remains unknown to
creatures, while the love of God is known through his Word by whom all
things are constituted. Some have gone so far as to say that Irenaeus’ insistence
that human beings can know the love of God but not his greatness, reveals that
he is concerned not with metaphysical matters, such as the nature of God’s
being, but just the economic working of God.⁸⁴ Such readings, however, miss
the connection between the incarnation and the nature of the divine being
highlighted in this section. Inasmuch as Irenaeus’ understanding of the rev-
elatory significance of the incarnation—the preeminent way by which human
beings come to know the love of God—is a working out of his understanding
of the nature of God, then the contrast between the unknown greatness and
the known love of God has as much to do with the metaphysical foundation of
his theology (the nature of God) as his understanding of the economy.

5.3. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The first section of this chapter demonstrated that Irenaeus founds the
believer’s security of salvation, participation in incorruptibility, and adoption
as a child of God on his understanding of the Word-Son as God. The second
section, as we just saw, shows that his account of the revelatory activity of
Christ is a working out of the conception of the divine being he articulated in
his polemic against his Ptolemaic and Marcionite opponents. Rather than an
obstacle Irenaeus has to overcome, metaphysics—in this case, his understand-
ing of the divine being and the divinity of the Word-Son—serves as the
cornerstone upon which he constructs essential elements of his account of
the divine economy.

⁸⁴ E.g., M. Slusser, who suggests that approaches to Irenaeus’ understanding of God that
emphasize philosophical influences obscure “Irenaeus’s real agenda, which goes beyond meta-
physics and portrays God in terms of love and will,” and fail to grasp that metaphysics was an
obstacle Irenaeus had to overcome by means of his account of the economy (2012: 135). Far from
being an obstacle that must be overcome by the economy, Irenaeus’ understanding of the
economy is founded upon his metaphysics.
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Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to elucidate the metaphysical dimension of

Irenaeus’ thought, namely, his understanding of the divine being, his account
of the standing of the Word-Son in relation to God the Father, his conception
of how the divine Word-Son is united to humanity in the person of Christ, and
the manner in which he grounds central aspects of his account of the eco-
nomic activity of Christ upon his understanding of the divine being and the
divinity of the Word-Son.
God, according to Irenaeus, is infinite and simple. These are the proposi-
tions fundamental to his theology proper. His understanding of divine infinity
and simplicity has roots in Greek philosophy and the Jewish tradition of Philo,
but he is the first Christian to attribute infinitude to God and possibly the first
to attribute simplicity to God as well—he is certainly the first Christian to
make so much of it.¹ Indeed, in Irenaeus’ mind these propositions sustain
several corollaries that further define the divine being: transcendence, incom-
prehensibility, immanence, immateriality, and atemporality. They also suit
Irenaeus’ identification of God as Spirit, an identification which has a biblical
basis and a philosophical one.
The attribution of simplicity to the divine being is especially important
to Irenaeus’ account of the standing of the Word-Son in relation to God
the Father. Irenaeus’ doctrine of reciprocal immanence and the premises he
articulates about divine production—measured as they are by divine simplicity—
establish the equal divinity of the Word-Son with God the Father. The Word-Son
and the Father—along with the Holy Spirit—constitute the one God whose being
is defined in part by the principle of divine simplicity. This understanding
manifests itself in Irenaeus’ contention that divine production results in a
product which possesses a substance that is one and the same as that of its
source. When translated to the generation of the Word-Son, this means that the
substance of the Word-Son is one and the same as the substance of God the

¹ The identification of Irenaeus as the first Christian to attribute simplicity to God depends on
the dating of AH 2 relative to Athenagoras’ Embassy for the Christians 8, which says God cannot
be divided into parts. It is not possible to know which was written first.
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206 God and Christ in Irenaeus

Father. But divine simplicity bears upon divine generation in another way,
because Irenaeus’ determination to measure divine generation by divine simpli-
city leads him to declare the atemporality of the generation of the Word-Son.
In arguing that the generation of the Word-Son is not conditioned by tempor-
ality, Irenaeus, and not Origen, is the first to affirm the eternal generation of the
Word-Son.
Thus, far from authoring a modalistic or economic theological account,
Irenaeus affirmed an eternal and distinct coexistence of the Word-Son with
God the Father. This coexistence, moreover, is necessary to the divine life
which involves the mutual glorification of the Father and Word-Son. Irenaeus’
theology is, thus, also far from that of the Roman monarchians.² His under-
standing of divine generation is, moreover, considerably more advanced than
the two-stage Logos theology affirmed by his contemporary Theophilus of
Antioch and more advanced even than what we find in Tertullian. Indeed, he
holds quite a different place in the history of Christian thought than often
suggested. He is the first theologian after the New Testament writings to
author a theological account that affirms both the eternal unity and diversity
of the divine being.
According to Irenaeus the divine Word-Son and his humanity are united in
the person of Christ as two ingredients in a blend, the Stoic theory of mixture.
The Stoic theory of blending allows Irenaeus to affirm, at one and the same
time, the distinction and unity of the divine and human natures in Christ.
But it also grants Irenaeus a way of explaining how Christ’s divine and
human natures interact with each other in order for him to act in ways
befitting to each of his natures. When the Word remains quiescent the
qualities belonging to Jesus’ human nature show forth, such as the capacity
to die. When the Word absorbs his humanity the qualities belonging to Jesus’
divine nature show forth, such as the capacity to conquer. This is the earliest
known attempt to understand how the two realities of the incarnate Word
function as one reality.
Key aspects of Irenaeus’ account of the economic activity of the incarnate
Word, the God-man, build upon his understanding of God. Irenaeus grounds
the security of salvation, the reception of incorruptibility, and the adoption as
children of God upon the divinity of Christ. And his understanding of the
revelatory activity of the Word-Son in the Old Testament theophanies and the
incarnation is founded upon his conception of the divine being as infinite and
incomprehensible.
Irenaeus’ conception of the divine being, reciprocal immanence, divine gen-
eration, the union of the divine Word-Son and human nature in Christ, the
revelatory activity of the infinite and incomprehensible Word-Son, amongst

² Following R. Heine’s account of Roman monarchian theology in JTS 49 (1998: 56–91).

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Conclusion 207
other features of his theology detailed in these chapters, are pillars of his
polemical and constructive reasoning. Their removal would result in the crum-
bling of the edifice built upon them. These chapters, therefore, demonstrate the
fundamental significance of metaphysics to Irenaeus’ polemical argumentation
and constructive theology.
But they do even more. They offer insight into the broader history of early
Christian thought and afford a new portrait of Irenaeus. With regard to the
first, in the previous paragraphs I have noted a few times when Irenaeus
crafted theological positions that either become standard articles of later
theological accounts or play prominent roles in important theological tradi-
tions. But the number is far higher than my passing comments indicated.
They include his attribution of infinity and simplicity to the divine being, his
affirmation of the atemporal—that is to say, eternal—generation of the Word-
Son, his assertion of the equal divinity of the Word-Son with God the Father,
his declaration that the nature of divine production requires the Word-Son
to possess one and the same substance as the Father, his affirmation of
both the eternal unity and diversity of the divine being, his proclamation of
the full humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ, and his identification of the
Christological union as a blend. This remarkable list calls for a reevaluation of
current understandings of the complexity of early theological accounts, a
reconsideration of the manner in which certain theological positions grew
and changed over the course of time, and a reappraisal of the extent to which
later contributions were seminal or developmental.
Irenaeus’ identification of the Christological union as a blend calls for an
additional comment. Recognizing the importance of Stoic thought to Irenaeus’
Christology enhances our understanding of the early stages of Christological
development. Namely, we are able to appreciate the fundamental importance
of the Stoic theory of blending to widely divergent Christological accounts.
The theory of blending offers the logic by which Irenaeus establishes the unity
and diversity of the person of Christ, and by which he explains how the two
realities of the incarnate Word function as one reality. The theory of blending
also offers the logic by which Roman monarchians sought to avoid patripas-
sianism.³ It is possible that the theory of blending had a particular currency in
the Roman Church of the second century, for Irenaeus too stayed in Rome for
a time and his interest in the theory could have developed there.⁴ Whatever the
case, it is clear that Stoic thought was extremely important to the Christo-
logical accounts of the late second and early third centuries. It may be that

³ Heine, JTS 49 (1998: 77–8, 89). H. Chadwick has also noted that Origen illustrates the
Christological union by appropriating one of the three Stoic examples of blending, for he says the
unity of the human and divine in Christ is similar to the union of fire with iron that has been
placed in a furnace (JTS 48 1947: 39–40). Chadwick maintains that this use of Stoic thought is
incidental; Stoic thought on providence, alone, having a large influence upon Origen.
⁴ Which is not to suggest it was limited to Roman environs.
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208 God and Christ in Irenaeus

this insight into the earliest strata of Christological reasoning necessitates a
re evaluation of our understanding of subsequent conceptions of the Christo-
logical union as a mixture.
In addition to the insight these chapters offer into the broader history of
early Christian thought, they afford a new portrait of Irenaeus. The bishop of
Lyons emerges as a subtle, eclectic thinker able to creatively appropriate
philosophical and rhetorical ideas in order to substantiate his understanding
of the apostolic tradition and the hypothesis of Scripture.⁵ It can no longer be
maintained, with Wolfson and Grillmeier, that Irenaeus’ conception of the
person of Christ is devoid of philosophical reasoning.⁶ Nor can we continue to
regard as valid more general portrayals of Irenaeus as a biblical theologian or
as generally unacquainted with or indisposed toward using philosophical
concepts.⁷ To the contrary, philosophical thought had a considerable influence
upon him.⁸ Despite past readings to the contrary, in Irenaeus we have an
excellent example of the use of human reason to explain beliefs and theological
tenets in a way that does not jeopardize the Christian faith but strengthens it
by producing a theological account befitting the moment.
For too long certain scholars have been content to portray Irenaeus as
rather stupid,⁹ a well-meaning churchman but incompetent theologian. Such
depictions must be consigned to the dustbin of historiography. The Irenaeus
that emerges from a careful reading of both the polemical and constructive
arguments in his corpus is highly educated, as well read as the most advanced
rhetorical students, and likely much better. In addition to being trained in
the rhetorical arts, he was aware of general philosophical positions, and was

⁵ By “eclectic” I do not mean to say that Irenaeus did not fit within the Christian tradition, as
some use the term to indicate that certain philosophers assembled doctrines based on their
personal preferences and so did not fit within a particular school (cf. Dillon, 1996: xiv). Rather,
I mean to say that Irenaeus appropriated ideas, from various systems of thought, which he
believed were suited—either in their original or in an adapted form—to the Christian tradition as
he knew it.
⁶ According to Wolfson, Tertullian is “the first among the Fathers whose discussion of the
unity of the person in Jesus betrays the influence of the philosophic discussion of physical union”
(1964, vol.1: 387). Grillmeier declares, “Non-Christian elements find no place in [Irenaeus’]
understanding of Christ (cf. Adv. Haer. I, 10, 1–3). He is not a philosopher as his master Justin
was, but above all a biblical theologian, ‘the first deliberately biblical theologian of the Christian
church,’ and an interpreter of the traditional creed” (1965, 2nd ed. 1975, vol. 1: 100).
⁷ The best-known example of a portrayal of Irenaeus as a biblical theologian comes from the
pen of J. Lawson, who fittingly entitled his book The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus (1948,
repr. 2006) For a lengthy note detailing the history of the narrative that Irenaeus had little
interest in philosophical reasoning, see n. 20 of the Introduction.
⁸ This is not the first study to argue for the influence of philosophy upon Irenaeus’ thought.
As noted toward the end of Chapter 1, Meijering has observed that aspects of Irenaeus’
argumentation parallel the Middle Platonist Atticus (1975: 28; see also, his VC 54 2000: 1–11,
there 2–3). Barnes has argued that Stoicism is the basis for Irenaeus’ understanding of God as
Spirit (NV 7 2009: esp. 70, 76–81). For a brief status quaestionis of this topic and a discussion of
the influence of Middle Platonism on Irenaeus, see my VC 65.2 (2011: 115–24).
⁹ Cf. Grant, HTR 42 (1949: 51).
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Conclusion 209
able to use both rhetorical and philosophical theories and methods in his
argumentation.
He was not slavishly dependent upon tradition—a ventriloquist’s dummy
uttering the words of others. Instead, he drew in creative ways upon ideas
found in ancient literary and rhetorical theory, philosophy, and Jewish tradi-
tions to craft complex polemical and constructive arguments that accorded
with his understanding of the apostolic tradition and Scripture. The theologic-
al account laid down by his pen was original and sophisticated, supremely so
for one of the second century. It is no exaggeration to say that aside from
Origen Irenaeus authored the most creative and sophisticated theological
account prior to the fourth century.
The camera has been refocused and the picture taken again.
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Bibliography

Primary Sources
Irenaeus of Lyons
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Against Heresies
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libros digestum . . . Basel, 1528.
Feuardent, F. (ed.), Sancti Irenaei, Lugdunensis episcopi, et matyris, Adversus Valentini
& similium Gnosticorum haereses, libri quinque. Paris, 1639.
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293 & 294, Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982.
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Chrétiennes 152 & 153, Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1969.
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Éditions du Cerf, 1952.
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Lispiae: T.O. Weigel, 1853.
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καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως, Buch 4 u. 5 in armenischer Version. Texte
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212 Bibliography
Proof of the Apostolic Preaching
Ter-Mekerttschian, K., and S.G. Wilson (ed. and Eng. trans.; French trans. J. Barthoulot),
Εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος. The Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, with
Seven Fragments, Patrologia Orientalis 12.5, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1919.
English Translations

Against Heresies
St. Irenaeus of Lyons, The Treatise of Irenaeus of Lugdunum Against the Heresies, tr.
F.R.M. Hitchcock, London: S.P.C.K., 1916.
St. Irenaeus of Lyons, Against the Heresies, Book 1, Ancient Christian Writers 55, tr.
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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/11/2018, SPi

Index Locorum

Irenaeus of Lyons 2.15.3 127n72

Against Heresies 2.17.2 127–8, 135
1.1.1 86n74, 116n32 2.17.2–3 153–5
1.1–9 26n83 2.17.3 129–30, 152–3, 162
1.2.1–6 12n16 2.17.4 131, 134
1.2.2 86n74 2.17.4–7 130–2
1.2.5 84n65, 86n75, 89n91 2.17.5 130n84
1.4.1 73n16 2.17.6 129n79
1.8.1 14–32 2.17.2–4, 7 101, 127–36
1.8.1–9.4 29 2.17.7 135
1.8.1–10.3 11, 13–14, 16n35, 31n99 2.17.7–8 115–21
1.8.2 28 2.18.5 128n74, 132–3
1.9.1 29 2.19.6 158–9
1.9.2 12–14, 30–1 2.20.1 21n56
1.9.3–4 12–13 2.20.1–4 21n56
1.9.4 12–27, 19n50, 26n82, 30–1 2.25.1 13–20, 51n191
1.10.1 12–14, 19–20, 102–3 2.25.2 51n191
1.10.3 12–14, 208n6 2.25.2–3 22–41, 102n147
1.12.2 93n113 2.25.3 48n185
1.15.5 78n41 2.25.4 21n59, 51n191
1.22.1 15–17 2.25–7 13n24, 32
2.1.1 56n218, 72–3, 76n27, 79n45 2.25–8 33–51
2.1.1–2 82n59 2.26.1 50–1
2.1.2 72–5, 76n30, 82, 89, 202 2.26.2–3 50–1
2.1.3 73n16 2.26.3 37n128, 50–1
2.1.4 74 2.27.1 13–20, 22n61, 27n86
2.1.5 71n3, 74–5 2.27.2 69n270
2.1.5–2.2.2 83 2.27.3 21n56
2.4.1 133n96 2.28.1 49–50
2.6.1 31–54, 200n74 2.28.1–2 67n257, 127n72
2.6.1–2 57–8 2.28.1–3 197n62
2.6.1–3 54–5 2.28.2 19–37, 43–6
2.6.2 28–55, 66–7 2.28.2–3 24–42, 102n147
2.7.6 100–1, 131n89, 158–61 2.28.3 21nn.56, 58–9, 22n60, 35n117,
2.7.6–7 189 46n177, 47–8, 47n179
2.9.1 69n270 2.28.3–8 46–7
2.10.1 21n57 2.28.4 48n186, 93–4, 93n113, 94n122,
2.13.1 90 97–8
2.13.2 128n78 2.28.4–5 90–1, 99n140, 117–18, 123,
2.13.3 90–5, 117–18, 118n42, 124–5, 128n75
128n75 2.28.4–6 47n178, 125–6
2.13.3–4 96n133 2.28.5 96n130, 123–5
2.13.4 131n86 2.28.6 47n178, 104n2, 122–5, 126n68
2.13.5 89, 116–17, 128n78 2.28.7 19–20, 21n59, 24–5, 35n118, 47–9
2.13.7 31, 89, 99–100, 116–17 2.28.8 46n177, 49
2.13.8 47n178, 93n113, 97–9, 103n148, 2.28.9 39n146
104n2, 123–6, 131n89, 134 2.30 100n141
2.13.8–9 94–7, 118n42 2.30.9 79n45, 186n14
2.13.9 185n10 2.33.1 152–3, 155–7, 174–5
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224 Index Locorum

Irenaeus of Lyons (cont.) 4.18.5 176n164
2.33.2–4 155–6 4.19.1 80, 83, 192n49
2.33.3 155n72 4.19.2 84–5
2.33.4 152–3, 155–8, 162n100, 174–5 4.19.2–3 80–3, 88–90, 116–17
2.34.1 158–9, 189n31 4.19.3 96n133
2.34.4 160n88 4.20.1 89n92
3.6.2 107–10 4.20.1–3 179
3.8.3 98n139 4.20.1–4 82–4
3.9.1 188n21, 199n67 4.20.2 78n42, 89n92
3.9.3 178 4.20.3 179–80
3.10.2 199n67 4.20.4 139, 146, 152–3, 163, 168–9,
3.11.1 15–17 173–5, 179–80, 195–6, 198–9, 204
3.11.5 188n21, 199n67 4.20.4–5 196–7
3.11.5–6 108–9, 114, 116, 120 4.20.5 84, 195
3.11.6 110 4.20.5–6 186n14
3.11.8 121n51 4.20.6 84, 86n79
3.12.9 35n119 4.20.7 67n261, 194n60
3.13.2 109–10 4.20.8 193n54, 194n60
3.16.6 163–5, 174–5, 174n160, 179n177, 4.20.9 189n35
188n21, 194–5 4.20.11 193–4, 193n54
3.17.1 178 4.24.2 188n21, 193n52, 199
3.18.7 7–8, 181–6 4.31.2 153n66
3.19.1 146, 152–3, 165–8, 171n144, 4.33.2 153n66, 175
174–5, 183–4 4.33.11 172n154, 175
3.19.1–3 121n51 4.34.1 193n55
3.19.2 169n137 4.37–9 2n11
3.19.3 152–3, 168–71, 174–5 4.38.1 167n126
3.21.10 161n94 4.38.1–2 196–9
3.22.4 182n3 4.38.3 167n126
3.24.2 83–5 5.pref–5.1.1 198–9
3.24.2–25.1 9–10, 56n219 5.1.1 170n140, 181n1
3.25.1 29, 31–62, 94n121 5.1.2 191n43, 192nn.49, 51
3.25.1–5 69 5.1.3 139, 152–3, 160n89, 175–8
3.25.5 31, 94n121 5.2.3 153n66, 175–6, 178
4.3.3 184n7 5.6.1 153n66, 160n87
4.4.2 188n22, 189n35, 199–201 5.7.1 159–62, 160n87, 161n93, 162
4.4.3 66n256 5.8.1 41n153, 183
4.5.1 119n49 5.8.1–2 161n91
4.6 110n18 5.9.2 153n66
4.6.1 202n81 5.12.2 160–1, 162n100
4.6.1–7.4 66n256 5.14.2–3 181n1
4.6.2 201 5.16.2 189nn.31, 35, 199n67
4.6.3 116n34, 200–1 5.17.1 96n133
4.6.3–7 186–7 5.18.3 190, 199n67
4.6.4 201 5.21.1 181n1
4.6.5–6 199n67 5.25.5 199n67
4.6.6 104n2, 188n22, 189n35, 201–3
4.6.6–7 31, 202n81 Proof of the Apostolic Preaching
4.6.7 66n256, 186–7, 188n22, 6 19n49, 199n67
193n55, 201 7 19n49
4.7.1 193n54 8 96n133
4.7.1–2 202n81 11 189n35
4.7.2 199n67 24 191n43
4.11.2 67n257, 93n113, 97, 99, 104n2, 31 104n2, 199n67
123–4, 127n72, 128n77, 197n62 34 189n35, 190, 199n67
4.13.4–4.14.1 111–14 40 163–4
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Index Locorum 225

44 193n54 Poetics
47 105n3, 135–6, 190 17, 1455a34–b3 17–18
53 96n133 Rhetoric
57 178 2.23.4 81n58
70 123
71 199n71 Arius Didymus
84 199n67 Fr. 28 141–2
91 199n67 Fr. 28 149n47
97 139n3, 174n160 Fr. 28 156n75
Fr. 28 143n19, 145, 172n153
Alcinous
Didaskalikos Athenagoras
4.154–5 60–2 Embassy for the Christians
10.164.15–17 85n70 8 205n1
10.165.27–34 96n133 10.1 78n43
Alexander of Aphrodisias Calcidius
On Mixture In Tim.
3, 214–17 142–4, 167n125, 171–2 289 161n92
3, 216.19–25 143–4
Cicero
3, 216.14–217.2 140–1, 143n12, 149n47,
Acad.
167n127, 171n145
1.39 142n10
3, 217.10–13 157n77
4, 217.26–36 141 De invention
4, 217.27–9 150, 153n67, 171–2 2.40.117 26n81
4, 217.32–5 145 On the Nature of the Gods
4, 217.32–6 151–2, 156n75 1.41 28
4, 217.36 157, 171n148
8, 221.25–222.26 150n50 Clement of Alexandria
11, 226.30–3 142 Stromaties
6.39 78n43
Aristides
Apology Dio Chrysostom
1.1 85–6 Oration
40.41 132n93
Aristotle
48.15 132n93
Metaphysics
5, 986b18–25 77n33 Diogenes Laertius
12.8, 1073a14–1074b14 77n36 Lives of Eminent Philosophers
On Generation and Corruption 7.134 142n9
1.5, 321a33–321b2 148n43 7.134–6 142n7, 167n127, 171n145
1.5, 322a9–10 148n43 7.150–1 149n48
1.5, 322a10–16 148n43 Epiphanius
1.10, 327b22–31 143n20 Panarion
1.10, 328a1–5 150n50 30.16 177n172
1.10, 328a15–17 150n50 31.5.3 78n41
1.10, 328a23–8 143n16, 148n43
1.10, 328b8–14 148n43 Genesis Rabbah
68.9 78n38
On the Heavens (De Caelo)
3.5, 303b10–304b22 77n36 Hippolytus of Rome
Refutation of All Heresies
Physics
9.11.3 151n59
3.4, 203b7–13 77n36
9.12.16–19 150–1
3.4–8, 202b30–208a23 77n36
9.12.19 151n59
3.5, 205b2–4 73n13
4.1–5, 208a27–213a11 77n36 Homer
4.6–9, 213a12–217b28 77n36 Odyssey
8.7, 260a26–32 132n93 1.328 12
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226 Index Locorum

Justin Martyr Phaedrus
1 Apology 276a 68n265
32 178n175 Republic
67 178n175 3.380c 92n111
2 Apology Sophist 263e 68n265
6 85n72 Pliny the Elder
Dialogue with Trypho Natural History
127.2 78n43 2.14 92n112
128.3 128n78
Plutarch
Nemesius An. Proc.
On the Nature of Man (de Natura Hominis) 1023f–1024a 37n135
78.7–79.2 144n27, 152n62
Moralia (Isis and Osiris)
81.6–10 145n31, 159–60, 162
358F–359A 29–30
Numenius
Frg. 4a 85n69 Moralia (On How to Study Poetry)
16B–C 9–31
Oxyrhynchus Papyri 22F 28
52 12
Polybius
Philo Histories
Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis 1.2.1 12
(Leg. Alleg.)
3.51 78n40 Proclus
Commentary on Timaeus
On the Confusion of Tongues (Conf. ling.) 29e 92n111
136 101
136–8 78n40, 85n72 Pseudo–Aristotle
On the Cosmos (De mundo)
On Dreams (De somnis) 4, 395a30–2 191n43
1.14.77 128n78 5–6, 396a33–401a12 57n223
1.62–3 78n40
1.183–5 78n40, 85n72 On Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias
3, 974a11 76n32
On the Embassy to Gaius (Leg. Gaium)
3, 977a 25 76n31
6 85n72
3, 977a27 76n30
On the Migration of Abraham (Migr. Abr.) 3, 977a36 93n117
182–3 78n40 3, 977b4 77n34
On Sobriety 3, 977b6 77n33
63 78n40 Frgs. 2–4 75n22, 77n34
Frgs. 3–5 76n32
On Special Laws
1.7.40 128n78 Pseudo–Plato
On the Eternity of the World Letter II
106 76n30 312e 92n111
On the Giants Pseudo–Plutarch
1.3 128n78 On the Opinions of the
27 101 Philosophers 36
On the Posterity of Cain (Post. Cain) Ptolemy
14–18 78n40, 85n72 Letter to Flora
168–9 86n77 7.7 128n75, 129n80
169 78n40, 85n72 On the Criterion 68–9
Plato Quintilian
Phaedo Institutes of Oratory
64c 162n98 7.10.11–12 23–4
67c–d 162n98 7.10.16–17 14–25, 22n61, 27n86
102a10–107b10 132 10.1.46–31 19–20
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Index Locorum 227

Seneca Theodoret of Cyrus
On Anger Eranistes
2.8 132n93 1, Flor. 1 165–6
Sextus Empiricus Theon
Against the Professors Progymnasmata
1.263 30n97 1 12
1.263–5 29–30
3.3–4 11–12 Theophilus of Antioch
Adv. Math. To Autolycus (Ad Autolycum)
7.145–9 61n235 1.5 78n43
2.3 73n12, 78n43
Shepherd of Hermas 2.22 113n25
Mandate
1.1 78, 82 Tertullian
Similitude Against Praxeas
9.14.5 78n43 29 151n59
Teaching of Sylvanus On the Soul (de Anima)
100.3–4 73n12 7 158n82
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Scripture Index

Gen 2:7 159–60, 161n93 Jn 1:11 13–14

Gen 49:10–11 178n175 Jn 1:14 13–14
Ex 3:8 107–8 Jn 1:18 12–13, 108–9, 114, 120
Ex 3:14 107–8 Jn 1:71 173, 195–6
Ex 20:11 (LXX) 14n28 Jn 1:74–5 173, 195–6
Ex 33:20 84n65 Jn 8:58 111
Prov 3:19–20 179n178 Jn 14:7–10 109–10
Prov 8:22–5 179n178 Jn 14:10 110–11, 120, 151
Prov 8:27–31 179n178 Jn 17:5 111–14
Ps 21:30 (LXX) 159–60 Acts 4:24 14n28
Ps 145:6 (LXX) 14n28 Acts 14:15 14n28
Isa 40:12 80–1 Rom 11:33 46n177
Isa 43:10 107–8 1 Cor 3:2 197
Isa 53:8 124 1 Cor 3:3 197
Isa 53:11 121n51 1 Cor 4:18 122–3
Jer 23:23 88–9 1 Cor 7:31 46n177
Jer 23:24 82n59, 88 1 Cor 8:1 50
Ezek 1:28 193n54 1 Cor 11:34 198
Bar 3:38 195–6 1 Cor 12:4 47–8
Mt 1:8 121n51 1 Cor 12:4–6 47n184
Mt 4:3 201 1 Cor 12:17 92n108
Mt 11:27 31–64, 56n216, 59n228, 110n18, 1 Cor 13:9 39n146, 47–8
116n34, 200–1 1 Cor 13:9–13 42
Mt 24:36 26, 48n186, 122–3 Gal 1:1 109–10
Mk 1:24 201 Gal 4:5 184
Mk 10:4 122–3 Eph 1:10 14
Mk 13:32 49 Eph 1:21 88
Lk 1:35 176–7 Eph 2:10–11 14
Lk 4:3 201 Eph 3:10 80–1
Lk 10:22 31, 56nn.216, 217, 59n228, Eph 3:18 80–1
64–5 Eph 4:10 107–8
Jn 1:1 13–14 Eph 6:12 14
Jn 1:3 13–14 James 1:17 92n111
Jn 1:9 13–14 1 Jn 1:1 159n84
Jn 1:10 13–14 Rev 2:23 88
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 30/11/2018, SPi

General Index

accustomization 183, 197 Bonwetsch, G.N. 3n19, 9n3, 104n2,

Adam 111–13, 178 105nn.3–4, 174n160, 188n19, 199n69
Aeby, P.G. 105n5, 126n67, 188nn.19–20, Bousset, W. 104n2, 179n182
199nn.69–70 Breath of Life see Soul, as Corporeal
Albinus 61n237 Briggman, A. 18n44, 27n86, 32n101, 41n153,
Alcinous 68n267 80n50, 81n57, 91n104, 97n136, 100n141,
D’Ales, A. 10n10 112n23, 137n109, 139n3, 160nn.87–8,
Alexander of Aphrodisias 61n237, 140 161nn.91, 94, 167n128, 173n159,
Allworthy, T.B. 93n113 178nn.174, 176, 179, 183nn. 4–6, 184n8,
anaxagoras 73n13, 75n23, 92, 150n50 185n11, 192n51, 197n62, 208n8
anaxilas 32–3 Bucur, B. 160n86
Andia, Y. De 184n8 Bury, R.G. 11n14
Andresen, C. 180n183 Buttmann, P. 12n16
angels/angelic beings 29–54, 62
anointing 178n174, 183 Callistus of Rome 104n2, 150–2, 179–80
Antiphanes 32–3 causality 19–50, 122–3
apologists 126–7, 188–90 Chadwick, H. 207n3
Apostolic Tradition 8, 13–19, 208–9 Chaine, J. 188n19
Apuleius 61n237 Christological Union 1, 7, 139–40, 146–53,
Aristotle 30n94, 73n13, 132, 143–4 163–6, 165n112, 167–80, 184–5,
Aristotelian Mixture Theory, see Mixture 192–203, 206–8
Arius Didymus 140, 145 see also mixture
Aróztegui Esnaola, M. 190–1, 193–4 Chrysippus 140–6, 149–50, 162
ascent 167n126 Church 12–13, 175, 207–8
Aspasius 61n237 Cleanthes 144, 151–2
atemporality of God 6, 97–9, 102, 123–6, Clement of Alexandria 85n71, 93n114
192–3, 205 Conway-Jones, A. 75n25
Athanasius of Alexandria 170n143 Cribiore, R. 32–3
Atticus 31, 61n237, 208n8
Audet, T.-A. 3n19, 9n3, 19–54, 53n200, Daniélou, J. 3n19, 9nn.2–3, 12n20, 121n50
56n220, 121n50, 122–3, 188n23, 203n82 DelCogliano, M. 45n172
Augustine of Hippo 96n129 Demiurge 28–9, 56n218, 74, 74n19, 79–82
Dillon, J. 8n32, 61nn.233–6, 68n266,
Bacq, P. 2–3, 41n152 85nn.71–2, 96n133, 180n183, 208n5
Balthasar, H.U. von 3 Diogenes Laertius 38
baptism 12–13, 19n49, 26n82, 183 Divine Attributes 94–7, 102, 118, 128n77,
Bardy, G. 3n20, 9n4 137, 184–5, 184n8, 192
Barnes, M.R. 4, 52n194, 71n3, 100nn.142–3, Divine Being
105n5, 107n12, 109n17, 114n28, atemporality, see atemporality of God
119n48, 126n67, 136n105, 137n108, attributes, see divine attributes
179nn.181–2, 190–1, 208n8 eternality, see atemporality of God
Barthoulot, J. 13n21 Immanence, see Immanence of God
Basilides 39n146 immateriality, see immateriality of God
Bastit, A. 92n111 incomprehensibility, see
Behr, J. 3n18, 10n10, 14n29, 26n83, 41n152, incomprehensibility of God
104n2, 164n109, 179n182, 183n4, infinity, see infinity of God
199nn.69, 71 invisibility, see invisibility of God and
Benoît, A. 2n6 Word-Son, Visibility/Invisibility
Beuzart, P. 2–3, 9n2, 105n3 simplicity, see simplicity of God
Bilius, J. 44–5 Spirit, see Spirit, God as
Bloch, R.H. 45 transcendence, see transcendence of God
Blowers, P. 10n10, 11n13, 18–19 Trinity, see Trinity
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230 General Index

Divine Production Galen 38n138, 61n237
see, Trinity Geffcken, J. 132n93
see, Two-Stage Logos Theory Geljon, A.-K. 75n24, 78n39
Dodds, E.R. 85 generation, see Word-Son, generation of the
Donatus 25–6 Gill, M.L. 132n92
Dronke, P. 32n100 Giulea, D.A. 189–92
Dufourcq, A. 52–3 Gnosticism 1, 3n19, 28, 78, 78n37, 85–6
Duncker, L. 2n3 polemic against the Gnostics 3n20, 5,
11–21, 21n57, 22–58, 72–4, 79–82, 86–7,
Ebionites 176–8 90–3, 96–9, 101, 110, 115–17,
economy 119, 122–5, 127–31, 133n96, 135–6, 138,
Divine Economy 5–8, 12–13, 26, 109–14, 153–4, 158–9, 191, 202, 204
183–4, 186, 195, 202, 204 Grabe 24–5, 158n82, 164n106, 165–6,
economic activity of Christ 4–8, 71, 86–7, 165n112, 174n160
106, 181, 205–6 Grace 23–48, 161n91, 167–8
Irenaeus’s theology as economic 5–7, Grant, R.M. 3nn.19–20, 4, 9nn.3–4, 10, 10n10,
104–6, 126–7, 136–7, 188–90, 192–3, 206 11–12, 18n46, 19n47, 19–43, 92nn.107,
Eden, K. 14–24, 22n61, 32n100 111–12, 93, 93n113, 94n118, 121n50,
Edwards, M.J. 66n255 122–3, 132n93, 208n9
Else, G. 30n94 Gregory of Nyssa 75–6, 87
empiricists 19–21, 24–43, 41n151, 51n190 Grillmeier, A. 2, 7, 105n3, 153n68, 163–4,
enclosing, not enclosed 72–80, 82–3, 164n108, 170–1, 208
89–90, 101 Guyot, H. 78n39
epistemology
Irenaeus’s use of ancient Harnack, A. von 1–2, 3n19, 9n3, 13n21,
epistemologies 203–4 34n108, 105n3, 121n50, 126n71, 199n69
knowledge of the Word-Son see Word-Son, Harvey, W.W. 24–5, 165n112,
Visibility / Invisibility of 166nn.117, 123, 175, 177n172
natural knowledge of God 6, 9–10, 31–52, Hefner, P. 2–3, 9n2, 11, 18nn.45–6
86n78, 89–90, 96n133, 102, 116–17, Heine, R. 1, 137n107, 150–2, 179–80, 207n3
181, 187 Heraclitus 150n54
theological speculation 33–51 Hesiod 32–3
see also, unknowability of God Hill, C.E. 93n116
Escoula, L. 28–9, 53n200, 56n220, Hippolytus of Rome 166n117
64n243 Hitchcock, F.R.M. 2n9, 28, 54n206, 64n245,
eternality 105n5, 126n71, 165–6, 165n112,
see, a temporality of God 169n134, 199n69
see, word-son, eternality Holte, R. 66n255, 180n183
Eucharist 7, 152–3, 175–9 Holwerda, D. 12n15
Euripides 11–12 Holy Spirit 12–18, 19n49, 24–5, 31, 81n57,
Eutyches 165–6 86nn.77, 79, 101, 106n8, 127n73,
evil spirits/demons 29–57, 60n230, 202–3 136n104, 137, 139n3, 153n66, 160–4,
167–8, 178–80, 183, 185, 190–1, 197–8,
Fantino, J. 3n18, 10n10, 19–34, 39n145, 205–6
40n147, 41nn.151, 153, 43n160, 79n47, Homer 12–24, 33
98n139, 105nn.4–5, 106nn.7, 10, 121–3, Hort, F.J.A. 165n112, 166, 170n141
121n50, 126nn.67, 71, 136n106, 190, Houssiau, A. 4, 28, 31–66, 63n241, 64n244,
199n69 104–6, 110n18, 139, 153n68, 163–4,
Ferguson, T.C.K. 14n29 165n112, 168–9, 168n129, 169n138,
Festugière, A.J. 85 170n142, 187n15, 188n19, 199n69, 202
Feuardent, F. 24–5, 36n122, 165n112, Hubbell, H.M. 26n81
166n114 hypothesis 10–14, 16–17, 19–32, 56n218,
fiction 11, 27nn.84–5, 29–32 72–4, 79–82, 89–93, 95n124, 96–9,
Finn, R. 177n172 102–3, 117, 119nn.44–5, 123, 130,
Fraade, S.D. 50n189 133n96, 138, 202, 208
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General Index 231

image of God 2n3, 160n87, 189–90 Massuet, R. 24–5, 158, 158n82, 165–6, 165n112
immanence of God 6, 86n77, 87–90, 180, Maximus of Tyre 61n237
192, 205 medical theory 38
immateriality of God 6, 78, 85n72, 101, Meijering, E.P. 12n15, 23n63, 24nn.72–3,
128n77, 136n104, 137, 180, 189, 205 28n87, 52n194, 69n271, 208n8
Incarnation, see Word-Son, Incarnation Menander 32–3
incomprehensibility of God 5–6, 80–7, 108–9, metaphysics 5–8, 20, 34n109, 181, 204–7
187–9, 192–4, 199–203, 205–6 Michaelis, W. 151
infinity of God 6, 75–85, 87–90, 100–3, 117, Miller, M. 96n133
119n44, 187–8, 191n46, 192–4, 199–200, Minns, D. 2–3, 9n2, 79–80, 104n2, 105n3,
202–3, 205–7 161n91, 179n181
invisibility of God 29, 31–63, 106, 108–9, 137, mixture
188–203 Aristotelian mixture theory 7, 140, 143–4,
see also Word-Son, Visibility / Invisibility 145n30, 146–50, 154–5, 175
Irenaeus’s use of 152–80, 196, 206–8
Jaeger, W. 77n33, 93n113 Stoic mixture theory 1, 5–7, 139–47,
Justin Martyr 7n31, 31, 121–2, 126n71, 149–80, 206
155n71, 208n6 monarchianism 150–2, 179–80, 207–8
Irenaeus’ theology as 104–6, 126–7, 136–7,
Kassel, R. 12n15 152n64, 179n182, 206
Kattenbusch, F. 19n50 Mühlenberg, E. 75nn.24–5, 87
Kirk, G.S. 75n23, 92n109, 93n113 Murray, R. 114
Kunze, J. 28, 188n19 mutual glorification of God, see Trinity

Lashier, J. 5n30, 47n178, 51n192, 71n3, natural phenomena 191, 193, 202–3
72nn.4–5, 79–80, 83n61, 91n105, Nautin, P. 166n117
94n122, 100n142, 105n5, 106nn.7, 11, Nemesius 140, 149n45
107n12, 108n16, 119nn.46–7, 121–2, Noetus 150
121n50, 125n62, 126nn.67, 71, 130n83, Norden, E. 85
131nn.85, 88, 137n108, 164n109, 190 Norris, R. 4–5, 5n29, 10n10, 11, 18nn.44–7,
Lawson, J. 105n5, 179n182, 208n7 34n114, 56n218, 71, 71n3, 72, 73n15,
Lebreton, J. 4, 28, 53n200, 64n245, 105n5, 74nn.17, 19, 84–6, 88, 102, 126n71, 194
106–7, 110n18, 114, 114n28, 115, Novatian 96n129
126n67, 179n182, 188n19, 199n69 Numenius 61n237, 85n71
Leo I 166n115 Nünlist, R. 23n64, 24n73
Lewis, E. 143n20
literary theory 6, 9–14, 13n23, 15–28, Ochagavía, J. 28, 31–65, 54n208,
27n84, 209 64nn.243–4, 66n253, 79n47, 106n7,
see also fiction 112–13, 136n105, 189–90, 192–3,
see also Hypothesis 199nn.69, 70, 201
see also Œconomia Œconomia 10–11, 13n23, 14–24, 18n43, 32
see also rhetoric / rhetorical theory O’Keefe, J.J. 18n42
Lloyd, A.C. 61n236, 68n265 Orbe, A. 28, 31, 54nn.203, 208, 57n223,
Logos; see Word-Son 60n230, 64n245, 67nn.258, 260, 81n57,
Long, A.A. 61n238, 68n267, 162n99 105nn.3–4, 106n7, 112–13, 121n54,
Loofs, F. 1–2, 2n12, 9n2, 105n3, 113n25, 126n71, 127n72, 131n88, 136n105,
126n71, 168–9 174n160, 188–9, 188n19, 190, 192–3,
Luckhart, R. 110n18 199n69, 202
Origen 85n71, 126n66, 136–7, 207n3, 209
Mai, A. 12n16 Osborn, E. 14n29
Marcion 73
Marcionism / Marcionite 26, 31, 59n227, parables/parabolic texts 21–2
72, 74, 78n37, 110, 175–6, 202, 204 perfection 1–2, 96n129, 97–8, 97n136,
Markschies, C. 128n75 112–13, 160n87, 178n174, 183,
Marrou, H.-I. 2n6 196–7
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232 General Index

Philo 73n13, 76n26, 77–8, 82n59, 85–7, Schoedel, W.R. 3nn.19–20, 4, 9nn.3–4, 10,
85n66, 192n50, 205 19–47, 51n190, 52n194, 75–7, 75n22,
philosophy 5, 19–20, 27–8, 30–69, 76–7, 85, 77–80, 85nn.66, 72, 87–8, 92, 93n113,
91–5, 132, 140–6, 155–7, 159–60, 162, 117, 119n45, 121n50, 122–3, 155–6,
191n43, 203–5, 208–9 191n45
Pinder 32–3 Sedley, D.N. 162n99
Plato 30n94, 31, 94n121, 155–6 Seeberg, R. 104n2, 105n3
Pliny the Elder 93n114 Servius 25–6
Plutarch 17, 61n237 Sextus Empiricus 11–12, 68n267, 93n114
providence 28, 31–58, 86–7, 187 simplicity of God 6, 90–103, 117–21, 123–37,
Prümm, K. 164n108 160–2, 185–6, 192–3, 205, 207
Pseudo-Plutarch 19–36, 45 Slusser, M. 5, 78n43, 79n47, 89n95, 204n84
Ptolemy 39n146, 68n267 Son, see Word-Son
Sophocles 11–12, 32–3
Quasten, J. 2–3, 9n2 Sorabji, R. 142–4, 142nn.7, 9, 144n25,
145n30, 147–8, 147nn.36–7, 149–50,
Radde-Gallwitz, A. 128n75 157n78, 161n92, 163, 171–2, 172n156
recapitulation 10, 181n1, 182, 194 soul
Reciprocal Immanence, see Trinity as corporeal 157–62, 189n31
Reno, R.R. 18n42 mixture of soul and body 7, 140–2, 144–6,
revelation, see Word-Son, Revelatory Activity 151–7, 162, 165, 171–2, 174–5, 180
Reynders, D.B. 2, 10, 13–14, 31, 50n188, union of the soul and Holy Spirit 139n3
76n27 Spanneut, M. 155n72
rhetoric / rhetorical theory 6, 8–13, 13n23, Spirit
14–32, 208–9 God as 99–101, 191, 194, 205
see also fiction Stoic pneuma 99–101, 142, 144n23, 145–6,
see also hypothesis 167, 171–2, 180
see also Œconomia Stead, C. 3n20, 9n4, 82n59, 87n81, 96n129,
see also literary theory 128n78
Robinson, J.A. 139n3, 163–4, 165n112, 173, Stieren, A. 24–5, 165n112, 166
174n160 Strato 155–6
Rousseau, A. 2n9, 13–14, 13n21, 14n29, Stesichorus 32–3
15nn.30, 33, 16n34, 19nn.47, 50, 20n54, Stoic
21nn.55–6, 29–31, 53nn.201–2, 56n215, mixture theory, see mixture
64n244, 66n256, 67n262, 73nn.10, 13, pneuma, see Spirit
74n18, 76n29, 105n5, 106n7, 121–2, Sulpitius Victor 25–6
126n71, 132, 136n105, 166, 168–9, Swete, H.B. 9
168n129, 173n157, 174–5, 190,
200n74 Tatian 126n71
Rule of Truth 12–15, 26–49, 26n82, Tertullian 7n31, 126–7, 155n71, 206, 208n6
51n191 Theodoret of Cyrus 147n42, 165–6, 170n140
Russell, D.A. 29–30 Theophany 107–8, 187–9, 191, 193–5,
203, 206
Sabellius 179–80 Theophilus of Antioch 78, 94n122, 126–7, 206
sacramental theology 177–8 Thomassen, E. 26n83, 128n75
Sagnard, F.M.M. 78n41, 168–9, 172n155 Todd, R.B. 144n23
salvation 7–8, 108, 178, 181–2 Tracy, D. 3n20, 9n4, 34n109
adoption 7–8, 185–6, 204, 206 transcendence of God 5–6, 29, 77–80, 180,
incorruptibility 7–8, 183–5, 204, 206 192, 205
security of 7–8, 182–3, 204, 206 Tremblay, R. 188n19
union between God and humans 165–8, Trimpi, W. 11n14, 12–17, 24n71, 29–30
173–4, 180, 184–5 Trinity 5–7, 12–18, 26–7, 71n3, 101, 104–7,
Sambursky, S. 100n142, 180n183 120–1, 126–7, 137, 181, 190, 205–6
Scepticism / Sceptics 19–43, 41n151, 47 divine production 106–7, 121–37, 185,
Schmidt, C. 13n21 205–7
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General Index 233

mutual glorification 112–14, 136–7, 206 146–50, 146n32, 170n140,
reciprocal immanence 106–21, 137, 186, 174n160, 208
205–7 Word-Son 4–7, 86n77
unity and diversity 136–7, 206 as measure 199–201
two-stage Logos theory 126–7, 206 divinity 4–8, 71, 104–6, 108, 136–7, 180–6,
192, 204–7
Unger, D. 9–10, 14n29, 19–20, 19n50, 28–9, eternality 104–6, 112–13, 126–7, 134–6,
56n217, 64n246, 65n249, 69, 96n131 205–7
unity of God see Simplicity of God and generation of the Word 98, 121–36, 205–6
Trinity, Reciprocal Immanence and humanity 181–2
Trinity, Unity and Diversity Incarnation 7–8, 110–11, 148–9, 163–4,
unity and diversity of God, see Trinity 169n134, 173, 175, 181–4, 186–9, 191,
unknowability of God 29, 78, 84–7, 188, 193–204, 206
194, 204 see also Christological Union
see also epistemology knowability of 194–203
Unnik, W.C. van 4, 10n10, 11, 14nn.26, 29, knowledge of the Father 115–19
15n31, 19–45, 40n147, 43n158, 51 revelatory activity 31, 86–7, 107–11,
114–16, 119–20, 186–203, 206–7
Valentinus 12n20, 39n146 unity with the Father 119–20, 135–7,
Varro 142n10 185–7, 192, 198–9, 205–7
Vernet, F. 105n5, 179n182 visibility/invisibility of 188–90, 194–203
visibility/invisibility, see Word-Son, visibility/
invisibility Xenophanes 48n186, 76–7, 77n35, 78n43,
92–5, 92nn.107, 112, 96n133, 98–9,
Watson, G. 93n113 117–18, 123
Webb, C.C.J. 93n113
Wendt, H. 1–3, 9n2 Young, F. 14n29, 16n35, 19nn.47–8, 85–6,
Widdicombe, P. 96n133, 105n3 85nn.67, 70, 93n113
Wilken, R.L. 11, 12n20
Wilson, S.G. 13n21 Zeiller, J. 54n206
Wingren, G. 2n9, 41n152 Zeno 142n10
Wolfson, H.A. 7, 73n13, 76n26, 78n38, Zephyrinus 104n2, 151n59
85nn.71–2, 105n5, 126nn.66–7, 71 Ziegler, H. 28, 64n245