Neuroscience, 1977. Vol. 2, pp. Ml-509 Pergamon Press. Printed in Great Brita,in.

COMMENTARY

EMERGENCE AND THE MIND

M. BUNGE
Foundations and Philosophy of Science Unit, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, H3A lW7

Abstract-This commentary deals with the mind-body problem from the point of view of a general
systems theory. It starts by elucidating the notions of thing, property, state and process. In particular
it shows how the concept of a state space can be used to represent the states and changes of state
of a concrete thing such as the central nervous system. Next the concepts of emergence and of level
are discussed. An emergent property is defined as a property possessed by a system but not by its
components. The notion of level and the peculiar relation existing between levels are clarified, only
to show later on that the mental cannot be regarded as a level on a par with the physical or the
social. The upshot is a rationalist and naturalist pluralism.
The second half of the paper expounds and examines the various versions of psychoneural monism
and dualism. Dualism is found unclear, at variance with the general framework of science, and untes-
table. Eliminative materialism and reductive materialism are rejected for ignoring the peculiar (emer-
gent) properties of the central nervous system. A variety of psychoneural monism called emergentist
materialism is found the most acceptable because of its compatibility with our present knowledge
and because of its heuristic power. However, it is emphasized that emergentist materialism is still
largely a programmatic hypothesis in search of detailed theories, in particular mathematical ones,
of the various emergent functions of the central nervous system and its subsystems.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING mathematical treatment of these concepts see BUNGE,
1977a.)
THIS commentary deals with the so-called mind-body
A thing, or concrete object, may be characterized
problem. This is the set of questions about the nature
as whatever can join (or associate with) another thing
of the mental and its relations to the bodily. For
to form a third thing. On the other hand two concepts
example, are mind and body two separate substances?
cannot always join to form a third concept, e.g. ‘purple
If so, how are they held together in the living
number’ is not a concept although ‘purple’ and
organism? These questions are rather difficult to
‘number’ are. But things have of course many other
answer. However, I submit that the difficulty is not
properties in addition to that of joining to form other
wholly intrinsic but has been compounded by hurdles
things. For instance, they can interact and get
such as the following. Firstly, several doctrines con-
together, forming tightly knit complex things, i.e. sys-
cerning the mind-body problem have some ideologi-
tems; they can move about, change in kind, and so
cal bias or other-and ideologies are not particularly
forth. We may then assume that every thing, no
interested in fostering conceptual clarity and empiri-
matter how simple it may look, has a large number
cal investigation. Secondly, the very formulation of
n of properties. (We are here referring to general
the mind-body problem employs certain concepts,
properties such as that of moving, not to particular
such as those of substance, emergent property, state
properties such as that of moving from here to there
and event, which are far from clear. (These concepts
with such and such an instantaneous velocity relative
occur in all sciences and are therefore elucidated by
to a given frame.)
none: they belong in the branch of philosophy known
Now, every thing property can be conceptualized
as ontology or metaphysics.) In fact it is pointless
as (or represented by) a function in the mathematical
to engage in an argument about whether or not there
sense of the term and, in principle, by a real valued
are mental states that are not brain states, or whether
function. And the n functions representing the proper-
mental events have causal efficacy, unless one can
ties of a concrete thing can be collected together into
make some sense of the very expressions ‘mental state’
a single function in conformity with:
and ‘mental event’, which in turn contain the philo-
sophical concepts of state, event and mind. Let us Definition 1
therefore start by trying to clarify these and a few
Let each of the n properties of a concrete thing
other ontological concepts that occur in the discus-
be represented by a real valued function Fi of time,
sions on the mind-body problem. (For a detailed
with 1 I i I n. Then
(i) IF = ( F1, F1, . . . , F,): T+ IR” is called the state
Abbreviation: CNS, central nervous system. function of the given thing;
501
NSC.
Z/L-a
 (ii) the value .>= IF(t) of IF at time t is called the this. One IS that nlost ratronultst philosoptrc~ ., ,,r_
,stutc’of the given thing at I: radical reductionists and so IKIVL claimed th,li nr2:
(iii) the ordered pair (s. 5’) of values 01‘ IF at times gencc IX it myth. ~\nother I> that JIKN erncl-g:JitI-.i
t and t’ respectively is called an rJw/ occurring in philosopherc are irrationalist~ and so have hclc: th,r:
the thing concerned between t and I’: thcrz is nothing to bc explained: that cmergi7io~ i-1

(iv) the sequence of states joining two states .s and as mysterious 2s it 15 real II third rc;tson 1~ lb.
s’ of a given thing is called the process leading from obscurity of the notion ts that ccienttsts at-c I<lrcv(.i
s to s’. or the history of the thing between t and 1’. trying to explain emergence and. when they ~uc‘c~~d.
give the impression that they have cxplaincd it I\+,I~
Note that we have not been talking about proper-
Rut of course things and their properties. ever: il I-,rti:
ties, states or changes in themselves: every property
caily new. do not go away just bocause Gcnttxt\ <ta
is a property of (possessed by) some thing or other:
teed in understanding them or philosophers pretend
likewise every state is a state of some thing. and every
that they do not exist to begin with. We had therclm~
change of state is a change of or in some thing or
better face the task of clttcidating Hurst the ~:lu<t\~~
other. Thus physical states are states of physical
notion of emergence.
things; chemical states, states of chemical systems:
We shall be conccrncd with complex things. u1 par-
biological states, states of organisms; social states.
ticular with systems. i.e. things the components of
states of social systems; and so on. This manner of
which arc linked or coupled to one another. Ihc
speaking, which is entrenched in modern science and
properties of a complex thing arc called hlrlk or (//O/X!/
which ignores the Platonic forms hovering above
properties because they arc possessed by the thmg
things, will prove of decisive importance rn our dis-
as ;L whole. Now. bulk properties are of two kinds:
cussion of the mind-body problem.
resultant and emergent. Energy is a resultant propcrtk
Now, the state function IF describing the states and
for it is possessed by cvcry part of ;I thing. On the
changes of state of a thing is not o priori: it is deter-
other hand having a certain structure. being shhle.
mined by the laws possessed by the thing. In other
being alive. and thinking are emergent or nonheredi-
words, there are laws that restrict the possible forms
tary propertics for they arc possessed by JIO Ct~lll--
of IF. These laws may take the form of mere restric-
ponent of the whole concerned. More precisely. wc
tions on the range of IF, or of algebraic relations
tnakc :
among the components of IF, or of differential equa-
tions satisfied by them, or what have you. By virtue
of such restrictions, the tip of IF spans not the totality Let P be a property of a complex thing Y other
of its codomain lR” but only a subset of it. This subset than the composition of X. Then
of the set of all logically possible states of the thing (i) P is resultant or Irereditclrr if P is a property
will be called the .staw spuce of the latter or. more of some components of .X:
precisely, its law@! srute space. We designate it S,t,(.u), (ii) otherwise, i.e. if no component of z possesses
where IL is the set of laws possessed (‘obeyed’) by P, P is emergent. collective. sptemic or ~~esfffll~
thing x. (See Fig. I.) (Composition does not count because it is a univer-
So much for the concepts of thing. property, state sal property and because even a mere heap has a
and process. Let us now take a closer look at proper- composition.)
ties of a particular kind. namely emergent properties.
What holds for properties holds also, of course for
They are of special interest to the neuroscientist who.
their carriers. Thus a resultant thing (or just rearhnt)
while acknowledging that feeling, recalling, imagining
is one the properties of which are possessed also by
and reasoning are emergent properties of the brain.
some of its components. And an emergent thing (or
would like to explain them in terms of events occur-
just cmerqent) is one possessing properties that none
ring in certain subsystems of it.
of its components possesses. Note that emergence is
relative. Thus the ability to think is an emergent pro-
RESULTANTS. EMERGENTS AND
perty of the primate brain relative to its component
LEVELS
neurons. but it is a resultant property of the primate
Temperature and entropy are properties of an because it is possessed by one of the latter’s com-
atomic aggregate, not possessed by any of its atomic ponents, namely its brain.
components. Likewise the capacity to self-duplicate Radical monism, in particular mechanism, assumes
is a property of deoxyribonucleic acid molecules that all properties to be resultant or hereditary. hence
none of their components (i.e. the nucleotides) pas- explainable by straight reduction, as happens to be
sesses. These are examples of emergent properties, or the case with the total energy and the tOtd electric
properties characterizing a system as a whole and charge of a body. Radical pluralism, on the other
which the system components do not have. Emer- hand. holds thdt there are emergent properties (an
gence is conspicuous at all levels and u fortiori ontological hypothesis) and moreover that none of
between levels. This much seems clear. these is explainable in terms of the components and
What are not clear at all are the various notions their links (an epistemological hypothesis). We take
of emergence and level. There are several reasons for neither of these stands.
 Emergence and the mind 503

STATE SPACE OF THING

FIG. 1. The states and changes of state of a thing (e.g. neuron, neuronal circuit, subsystem of the
CNS or entire CNS are representable in the state space of the latter, which is the space spanned
by its state function-the ordered n-tuple of functions representing its various properties. (On the
other hand according to eliminative and reductive materialism of the radical sort, i.e. mechanism,
the states of any thing should be representable as points in spacetime.) In the diagram only two
properties, represented by functions F, and F, (or rather their ranges), are shown. Actually any realistic
model of a complex thing will involve a state function with many more components. So, try to imagine
the state of a thing as the tip of a vector in an n-dimensional state space.

We recognize the fact of emergence but assume that being explained. (That no scientific explanation is
every emergent can be accounted for in terms of a likely to be definitive is beside the point.)
system’s components and the couplings among them. The foregoing assumptions can be compressed into
For example, refraction is not a bulk property of two postulates, one ontological or concerning reality,
transparent bodies: it is au emergent property rela- the other epistemological or concerning our knowl-
tive to the atomic (or molecular) components of edge of reality. Here is the emergence postulate:
such bodies, for none of those components possesses Postulate 1. Some of the properties of every system
the property of refrangibility. Yet this emergent pro- are emergent.
perty of the whole is explained by electrodynamics And here is the rationality postulate:
in terms of the electrical properties of atoms (or mol- Postulate 2. Every emergent property of a system
ecules) and light. However, this explanation is not can be explained in terms of properties of its
reductive in a simple sense, as it does not consist components and of the couplings amongst these.
in attributing refrangibility to individual atoms: it is These two postulates constitute the kernel of what
reductive in consisting in the deduction of the formula may be called rational emergentism, a doctrine differ-
for refractive power from premises concerning the in- ing from both the irrationalist emergentism of the
teraction between electromagnetic waves and atomic holists and the rationalist flattening (or leveling) by
lattices. the mechanists, energetists and idealists.
What holds for physical systems holds a jbrtiori The last ontological concept we must handle before
for chemical, biochemical, biological and social sys- turning to the mind-body problem is that of level,
tems. For example, enzymatic catalysis is an emergent particularly in view of the popular assumption that
property of biochemical systems, sexuality an emer- the mental constitutes a higher level than the biologi-
gent property of some biosystems, and social cohesion cal one. First the intuitive idea.
an emergent property of sociosystems. However, these Most biologists seem to agree that things, and in
are not unintelligible properties: they can be and are particular things of concern to biology, are found not
 BIOLOGICAL \
\
/ \

Now. the components of 8 system arc also ilk pie-.

cursors ill an evolutionary process. Thus amino ;tc~ti*
arc at the Same time the components and the precur-
sors of proteins. and cells both compose 4 multiccllil-
PHYSICAL
lar organism and give rise to it. (On the other hand
according to holism the whole precedes its parts and
controls them.) One maq wish to generalize stating
PO.S~U~L~~CJ-t. t<\cr) complex thing bclongmp to ;I
FIG. 2. The pyramid of levels of organization of the world. given level has self-assembled from things of the prc-
Each higher level consists of systems built with com- ceding level.
ponents belonging to the immediately prior level. And each To put it metaphorically: higher levels emcrgc out
level splits into sublevels. For example the biological level of lower ones in a natural process of self-asscmbl!
can be subdivided into the cell. organ, organism, popula-
Consequently radical novelties emerge out of prc-
tion and ecosystem sublevels. The pyramid suggests not
viously existing things. Therefore cmergencc and
subordination or excellence, but only that the higher a
levels. far from forming ;I static order. arc features
level the more dependent and the less populated it is.
of an evolutionary process. .4nd, according to out
assumption, this process IS natural or spontaneous.
pell-me11 but rather in levels, and that these in turn notice the term ‘self’ in Postulate -1.
constitute a sort of pyramid. Thus one speaks of the Postulates 1, 2 and 3 form the nucleus of rationalist
atomic level and the molecular one, of the cellular pluralism. Postulate 3 renders this ontology dynami-
level and the organal one, etc. And one assumes that cist and naturalist (instead of supernaturalist). In fact
the systems at any given higher level are composed the whole thing is a qort of generalization of the
of things belonging to the immediately preceding level theory of evolution.
(see Fig. 2). This suggests making: What has all this to do with the mind--body prob-
lem’! Much. for the mental may be conceived of as
an cmergcnt relative to the physiological. But the
Let L be a family nonempty sets Li of things, with
mind ma) bc so conceived in either of two different
1 5 i s n. Then if Li and L, are members of L,
ways: as an emergent cwil>~ or as an emergent pro-
then Li precedes Lj if and only if each member
pert), of entities of a curtain kind say vcrtebratcs.
of Lj is composed exclusively of things in Li.
Iii the first case one might wish to him that ~~~irrd.s
In symbols:
constitute ;I level of their own: this would be the
Li < Lj = <,,ti.X(.UELj* %(x)c LJ thesis of psychoneural dualism embedded in an over-
all pluralistic ontology. In the second case one would
where % is the composition function. (% maps the certainly hold that orgcmisnls endowed with mental
set of things into the power set of the latter, in such abilities form ;I new level relative to mindless
a way that if x is a thing then %?(x)= the set of organisms: this would be the thesis of psychoneural
parts of x.) In short, (L, < ) is a partially ordered unity embedded in the plurltlistic ontology sketched
set. earlier. Let us look at this problem more closcl~.
Note two points. The first is that a level is not
a thing but a set and therefore a concept, though
certainly not an idle one. (Hence levels cannot act
MONlSM AND DUALISM IN THE
upon one another. In particular the higher levels can-
MATTER OF MIND
not command or even obey the lower ones.) Second,
the relation between levels is neither the part-whole There are two classes of solution to the mind-body
relation nor the set inclusion relation. but a sui problem: psychoneural monism and psychoneural
yeneris relation definable in terms of the composition dualism. And each of these classes contains at least
function, which in turn is definable in terms of the five different doctrines: see Table 1. where ‘cp’ stands
part-whole relation. for body (or tlte oryanic) and ‘$’ for mind (or the men-
The concept of a level occurs in the levels hype- tal). (Cf. ARMSTRONG,1968; BORST, 1970: FEIGL, 1967;
thesis, or FEYERABEND & MAXWELL, 1966; HEBB, 1949; Hooe,
Postulate 3. Every thing belongs to some level or 1960; KOESTLER& SMYTHES, 1969: O’CONNOR. 1969;
other. PLACE, 1956; ROSENBLUF~~.1970: SMART. 1959.1 Let
 Emergence and the mind 505

us examine them briefly, starting with the main var- the general framework of contemporary science unless
ieties of psychoneural dualism. they are construed in neural terms, i.e. as, respectively,
We need not consider the independence thesis Dl, a state of the brain or an event or process in a brain.
as both introspection and neuroscience tell us that This is one of the reasons for dualism’s inability to
the bodily and the mental-whatever the latter may go beyond the stage of verbal and metaphorical for-
be-are interdependent. As for the parallelism or mulations. This is why there is not a single dualistic
synchronization thesis D2, upheld by the Gestalt model-in particular a mathematical model-in
school, it begs the question instead of answering it, physiological psychology.
for what we want to know is precisely the mechanism In short, interactionism is just as imprecise as par-
responsible for the ‘parallel sequences’ of mental and allelism-which is to be expected of a popular, i.e.
physiological states. To say that mental events have nonscientific, view. (Recall that ordinary knowledge
neural ‘correlates’ is fine but not very informative un- is largely popular superstition.) And, not being a pre-
less one states what a mental event is and the nature cise hypothesis, it can hardly be put to empirical tests.
of its ‘correlation’ with its neural ‘correlate’. For these Moreover even if parallelism and interactionism were
reasons D2 is vague to the point of being confirmable to be formulated in a precise manner, it might not
by all possible empirical data. Hence D2 is not a be possible to decide between them on the strength
scientific hypothesis. of empirical data. Indeed, it would seem that every
On the dualist side we are then left with either psychological experience and every psychophysiologi-
of the thesis acknowledging one substance’s acting cal experiment could be interpreted (or misinter-
upon the other. However, in this case too only the preted) either in parallelist or in interactionist terms,
physical is supposed to be knowable, whereas the since neural events are simultaneous with their mental
mental is left in the dark or, at best, in the care of ‘correlates’.
philosophy or even theology. We do indeed under- We are led to the conclusion that the two main
stand what it is for a given neuron, or neuron assem- variants of psychoneural dualism, namely parallelism
bly, to be in such and such a state: a state of a thing and interactionism, though conceptually different, are
is always an ordered n-tuple of the n properties we equally fuzzy and are empirically equivalent in so far
care to assign to it. (Cf. The first section in this com- as they accord (much too easily!) with the same em-
mentary.) And we understand what is a neural event pirical data. For these reasons dualism is not scientti-
or process, namely a change in the state of a neural tally viable. It is barren double talk and, as Spinoza
unit neuron or neuron assembly). Consequently we characterized it, a disguise for our ignorance. We are
know what it is for one neural unit (neuron or neuron then left with psychoneural monism as the only scien-
assembly) to act upon another: A acts on B if the tifically and philosophically viable alternative.
states of B when it is connected with A are not the But, as shown in Table 1, psychoneural monism
same as those of fl when it is not so connected. In is a whole class of doctrines. Let us start with Ml
short we have some idea of neural functions (states, or subjectivism. We can write it off without further
events, processes). Recall Fig. 1. ado because it is incompatible with physics, chemis-
But these ideas-common to all sciences-are not try, molecular biology and social science, all of which
transferable to the mental ‘substance’. If they are, are busy hypothesizing and manipulating unobserv-
nobody has shown how. In particular, attention, ables such as atoms, ecosystems and societies. More-
memory and ideation have not been shown to be over, all of these disciplines are supposed to abide
properties or changes of properties of a mental sub- by the scientific approach, which includes objectivity.
stance (mind, soul or spirit). In sum, the concepts As for neutral monism, it has yet to be formulated
of mental state, event and process do not fit within clearly and in agreement with the natural sciences.

TABLE 1. TEN VIEWS ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

Psychoneural monism Psychoneural dualism

Ml Everything is I(, (phenomenalism, Dl ‘p and $ are independent.
idealism). D2 cp /( $, i.e. cpand $
M2 cpand II, are so many are parallel (psycho-
aspects or manifestations physical parallelism).
of a single entity D3 cp-+ $, i.e. cpaffects
(neutral monism). (or even secretes) $
M3 Nothing is 1(1(eliminative (epiphenomenalism).
materialism). D4 $ + cp, i.e. 1(1affects
M4 I‘h~ mind is corporeal (e.g. controls) cp
(reductive materialism). (mentalism).
M5 $ is a collection of D5 cpt-t $, i.e. cpand $
emergent functions of cp interact (interactionism).
(emergentist materialism).

cp, body (or the organic); $, mind (or the mental).

 Even the least obscure and mystical of its versions. set of H,O molecules IS not to state that [hi I( rmi’~
namely Ostwald’s energetism, is vague. (~orc~~cver is nothing but the I;~ttcr. an! mol-c tit:~n I<) si; 01:;:
it rests on the mistaken reification of energy. which the composition of :I human sncict! i\ :I !xII!~.~:.,:
is actually a property of physical objects not a thing.) persons is to saq that il so&i\ is n0lhrng m<>r. tli;!i:
We may therefore dismiss Ml and M2, and examine the set of its members. And this for the i’ollo~\r~~::
materialism. reasons. First, a thing is not ;I set (which the c(~Ilil~<I~i
WC distinguish three kinds of materialism, to wit. tion of a thing is). Second. ;I bodk 01‘\\;jtcr ik ;I 5: \t<m.
eliminative, reductive and emergent& (Recall Table hence something with :I structure. not only a LOrnp<l
I .) Eliminative materialism holds that there is no such sition. And that structure includes the h)tirogen
thing as the mental: that everything is material. There bonds among HZ0 molecules. The result is ;1 s)atvm
are two different versions of this thesis: the ancient with emergent properties such as tluldtty. vlscosit>.
thesis that all subjective phenomena are composed transparency and others. which its molecuk~r corn--
of particles. and the modern thesis that there are only ponents lack. Surely one can t,hopc to) undcrstai~~i
neural facts (states. events. processes). Neither of these all of these emergent properties in terms oi thtce U!
theses is capable of distinguishing between appear- the water molecules and their interactions. I’ha~ I>.
ance and reality. i.c. between facts as perceived by one can (hope to) ‘reduce‘ the macroscopic propertIes
a sentient being (i.e. phenomena) and facts as they of water to the propcrtics of its microcompcments.
are independently of the organism. Nor does elimina- But such an explanation which has yet to hc prcj\l-
tive materialism distinguish between Nom supirr7.s ded-----does not accompany an untological rcduct~o~~:
and its nearest cousin the amazing chimpanzee. so explained fluidity is still tluidity. Likewise c\plaincti
similar at the cellular level and yet so different at vision is still vision, explained imagination is still im-
the organismic level. In short, eliminative materialism agination. and explained consciousness is <till con-
can be eliminated. sciousness. Thorefore ontological reductionism is just
The thesis of reductive materialism may be formu- as untenahlc in the matter of mind as it u,ih Iound
lated thus: ‘Every mental state (or event or process) to be in the matter of matter. (Cf. The second section
is a state (or event or process) of the central nervous in this comme~ltary.~ This leaves us with ~~sycl~on~ur~i~
system. Therefore the mental is no diRerent from the monism of the emergentist kind. Let us take :I cioser
physical.’ While I have no quarrel with the premise, look at it.
I submit that the conclusion is a uou s+&ur. But
before arguing for emergence let us examine this argu-
EMERQENTIST PSYCHONEURAL MONISM
ment of the reductive materialists. It is an argument
from analogy with other macrofacts rather than an In this section we shall cxaminc the strengths, and
independent examination of the models and the em- the weaknesses of emergentist psychoneural monism.
pirical evidence in physiological psychology. Let us or M5 in Table 1. This view boils down to
dwell on it for a while. Posrulatc 5. (i) All mental states, events and pro-
Reductive materialists claim that the body-mind cesses are states of. or events and processes in. the
relation is just a particular case of the macroscopic- central nervous systems of vertebrates:
atomic relation, and that in both cases it is one of (ii) these states. events and processes are emergent
epistemological urrd ontological reduction. While I relative to those of the cellular components of the
agree with the first contention. 1 disagree with half CNS:
of the second, namely concerning the ontological (iii) the so-called psychophysical relations are inter-
reduction of the mental to the neural, The first thesis actions between different subsystems of the CNS. or
seems rather plausible: however localized some or between them and other components of the organism.
even all mental facts may be. they always involve a The first clause is the thesis of psychoneural
large number of neurons. not to speak of blood cells monism of the materialist kind. The second clause
and other non-neuronal components of the nervous is the emergence thesis. It states that mental facts arc
system. As for the reducibility thesis. let us discuss both organismic or biological, i.e. mvotvo entire
it in the Iight of the stock-in-trade example of the assemblies of interconnected cells. The third clause
reductionists, namely the alleged reduction of water is a monistic version of the parallelist and intcrac-
to water molecules. tionist myths.
The microreductionists claim that water is just If one accepts the above postulate then one can
H,O, which in turn they claim to be nothing but talk about ~~i~t~l ~~~~1~~~~~~~ without jumping out of
an aggregate of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen the biological level: the mentalistic vocabulary ori-
atom. This they take to be a paradigm of microreduc- ginally coined by religion and dualistic philosophies
tion. Epistemologically maybe so. (And I hope so, begins to make, or is hoped to make. neurological
although as a matter of fact there exists no adequate sense. (Equivalently: psychology becomes a neuro-
theory of liquids, and (I ,fbrtiori none has been science.) In particular it now becomes possible to
deduced from quantum mechanics.) But the thesis of speak of purallel sequences of events. e.g. of processes
ontological reduction is obviously false. Indeed, to in the visual system and in the motor system. or in
state that the ccrrllposifion of ;I body of water is a the language system and in the cardiovascular sy\tcm.
 Emergence and the mind 507

FIG. 3. Mental states form a subset of the collection of all btain states, which in turn are included
in the set of possible states of the whole organism. Awareness (or the self) is conjectured to be a
distinguished subset of the mental states and therefore a subset of the totality of organic states. The
arc of curve represents a mental process, such as recollecting an experience, which is partly conscious.
The diagram is programmatic: we still have to identify the properties represented by the blanks F,
and F, in the state function of the CNS.

It also makes good scientific sense to speak of psycho- Emergentist materialism holds then splendid pro-
somatic interactions, because these are now construed mise and moreover has already rendered dis-
as reciprocal actions ~between different subsystems of tinguished service by being the driving force behind
one and the same organism, such as the neocortex physiological psychology. However, it has one impor-
and the sympathetic nervous system. For example, tant shortcoming, namely that it is still immature. In
rather than say that love can color our reasonings, fact emergentist materialism is not a theory proper,
we may say that the right brain hemisphere affects i.e. a hypothetical-deductive system containing pre-
the left one, and that sex hormones can act upon cisely formulated and detailed hypotheses accounting
the cell assemblies that do the thinking. In short, for a wide range of psychoneural facts. It is instead
ironic as it may sound, the dualistic modes of speech, a programmatic hypothesis--one both scientific and
which encapsulate our undigested introspective ex- philosophical-in search of scientific theories embo-
perience and which are but metaphorical and vague dying it. So much so that emergentist materialism can
in the context of psychoneural dualism, become literal be summed up in a single sentence, to wit: Mental
and precise in the context of emergentist materialism. states form a subset (albeit a very distinguished one)
The latter salvages whatever can be salvaged from of brain states (which in turn are a subset of the state
the dualist myth. space of the whole organism). This, however sugges-
Emergentist monism has many attractive features, tive, is so little as to be representable in simple dia-
the most important of which are that (i) it squares gram: see Fig. 3. (Dualism on the other hand cannot
with the natural sciences by postulating that mental be diagrammed at all, except metaphorically, so it
facts, far from being affections of an immaterial sub- is even poorer.)
stance, are states of, or events and processes in, con- What is needed for implementing the program of
crete organisms, whence (ii) they can be investigated emergentist materialism, i.e. for developing it into a
through the normal procedures of science-a feature mature scientific enterprise? Obviously, not more tm-
which turns psychology into a natural science instead digested data. What we do need are two different
of a supernatural one. though complementary batches of theories: (i) ex-
 rrr~nrl~ yrr~tri theories (not just stray hypotheses OI the o~~IJ~sLates that liui to lx \txtcs OI sonic ::$;I+!
programs) of the mental conceived of as ;I collection and mental cvcnts would be the r,~r/l, c\cntz h! l;iii

of functions of the CNS: and (ii) spc~ific~ theories to be changes of state of some thing this being uh~
accounting for the functioning of the various subsys- dualism agrees more closeI! \\ith theology th;ln 8:.11lr
tems of the CNS. science. i
The general theories of psychoneural activity would 4. Unhkc duahsm. cmergentist materialism fo5rc.r\
belong to the intersection of ontology and psy- illtCI.u(.tioll /wtwc~rl p.sJ~chol~~~/y
trrd r/w crth XlCiil’l”.
chology. while the specific theories of the psy- in particular neuroscience, arid this precisely hecausc
choneural would be the exclusive property of physio- it regards mental events as special biological cvcnts.
logical psychology. And all of them should be stated 5. Unlike dualism. which digs an unbridgeable
in precise terms. i.e. should be mathematical in form. chasm between man and beast. emergentist matel~ia-
It may be argued that the preceding plea for inten- lism jibes nith r~~/utior~~~ hioloy~~. which - 1~) c\h-
sifying theoretical work in the fields of psychophiloso- biting the gradual development of the mental Rlcultic:,
phy and physiopsychology are impertinent because along certain lineages refutes the superstition that

there is no dearth of theories in both fields. Let us only Man has been endowed with a mind.
see about that. 6. Unlike dualism, Lj’hich postulates an unchal~ging
Certainly. much has been written about the so- mind, cmergentist materialism LIWOR!.V ~irh tlcr:&~~~-
called idrr~tit~, theor!. over the past two and a half r~r~t(l/ ps~v’holog~ crrltl ~~~~u~~oph~~sio/o~~~.
v hich cshi bit
millenia. But none of the ‘theories’ of the psy- the gradual maturation of the brain.
choneural that agree with the materialist hypothesis None of the rivals of cmcrgentist materialism can
are theories proper, i.e. hypothetical -deductive sys- boast of so many and important supports. direct and
tems, let alone mathematical ones. They are instead indirect. scientific and philosophicaL Therefore it is
single and stray hypotheses. And they are verbal and worth while to try and implement the program of
often verbose. (This may bc one of the reasons that emcrgentist materialism, i.c. to attempt to build theor-
most mathematical psychologists have not been eies of various degrees of generality. mathematical in
attracted to materialism.) In other words we still do form and agreeing with the known facts. that construe
not have a general materialist theory of the mind. the mind as a distinguished subset of the set of neur:tl
As for specific theories in physiological psychology, states and events.
there is no doubt that many have been proposed, par-
ticularly over the past quarter of a century and largely (‘ON<‘LUSION: PSYCHONEUKAL MONISM
thanks to Hebb’s influence (HEBB 1949; MILNER, CUM OVERALL PLURALISM
1970; BINDRA, 1976). However, (a) there are too few The first half of this paper argues for the rcalit!
of them, (b) those which are close to experiment are of emergence and even for the plurality of levels: in
for the most part verbal, and (c) those which are fact it sketches a pluralist ontology. The second halt
mathematical are usually far removed from experi- defends a version of psychoneural monism. Contra-
ment. (Moreover most theories in mathematical psy- diction? Not at all. for we take the mental to occur
chology are either (a) neobehavioristic learning only at the organismic level: we assume that neurons
theories disregarding the CNS or (b) information- are mindless as arc populations. in particular, soci-
theoretic theories regarding the CNS as a computer eties. So we assert that organisms endowed with men-
rather than a biosystem. Both skip chemistry and bio- tal abilities constitute a level of their own. which can
logy.) be called that of psychosystems. But we do not affirm
So much for the shortcomings of emergentist that minds constitute a level of their own---and this
materialism in its infancy. However many and grave simply because there are no disembodied minds. In
these may be, the emergentist materialist philosophy short. in our ontology minds do not constitute a
of mind seems to be the best we have. and this for supraorganic level because they form no level at all.
the following reasons: To repeat the same idea in different words: One
I. Because it eschews the mysterious mental sub- can hold that the mind is emergent rclativc to the
stance without thereby denying the mental, emergen- physical without reifying the former. That is. one cali
tist materialism is cornputihle \~itll the scirntjfic hold that the mind is not a thing composed of lower
approach far more than either dualism or eliminative level things-- let alone a thing composed of no things
and reductive materialism. whatever---but a collection of functions of neuron
2. Emergentist materialism isfieefiom the jii~~iness assemblies, that individual neurons do not possess.
that characterizes dualism with its talk of ‘correla- (The brain and some of its subsystems can mind i.e.
tions’ between the mental and the physical relations be in mental states-- but the mind cannot mind even
that dualists do not care to clarify. perhaps because its own business because it has no more an indepen-
they cannot. dent existence than does mass alongside bodies or
3. Unlike dualism, emergentist materialism is cotl- history separately from people. Only the iunction-
sistent with the general concepts of state und event that ing-minding--~-brain can mind its business.\ And so
can be gleaned from all the sciences. (On the other cmergentist matcriahsm is seen to be compdtihlc with
hand according to dualism mental states would be overall pluralism.
 Emergence and the mind 509

Our espousing emergentist materialism does not is not unique in its being subject to the standard
require affirming that it has in fact solved the mind- canons of scientific research.)
body problem. It has not. But it is working on it: Third and last caveat: To explain the mental in
witness the progress of physiological psychology. terms of the neural is not to rule out that the mental
Moreover we submit that emergentist materialism is is a set of emergent functions of the brain, any more
the only philosophy of mind that enables a break- than explaining the formation of a liquid vortex rules
through in the scientific investigation of the mind- out that it possesses properties beyond the properties
body (or rather brain-rest-of-me-~dy) problem. In of the indi~dual atoms that take part in it. In other
fact it is tbe only one that enjoys the support of all words, the ideal of rationality is consistent with plura-
the life sciences, that does not promote a quixotic lism: to explain is not necessarily to explain away.
reductionism, and that defends neuroscience against Besides, the explanation of emergence is anything but
obstruction by obsolete philosophies and ideologies. straightforward: it is a matter not of deducing conse-
Finally, three caveats are in order. The first is that quences from a theory concerning some lower level,
to espouse emergentist materialism is not to deny but of suitably enriching the latter with new assump
subjective experience or even to disallow employing tions and data. Thus the theory of neurons does not
introspection as a tool in the scientific inv~tigation entail the theory of neuronal circuits, nor does the
of the mental. To espouse emergentist materialism is latter entail the theory of the reticular formation, and
to favor the understanding of subjectivity in neural so on. (For the logic of reduction see BUNGE,197%)
terms, and to encourage the control of subjectivity A psychophysiological theory, though concerned with
instead of allowing the latter to control the course some of the physical or chemical processes in the
of research. (In particular, hunches got by introspec- CNS, deals not just with them but also with a dis-
tion must be regarded not as self-evident but as hy- tinguished subset of biological processes going on in
potheses to be subjected to objective tests.) neural assemblies, namely those processes that are
Second caveat: Emergentist mate~ali~ does not commoniy called mental. To explain the mind in
require one to investigate the mental in exactly the depth is to know it, not to ignore it. And to know
same way as one would investigate earthquakes or something is to have adequate theories about it.
infections. Indeed the psychologist is the luckiest of
scientists in that he can tap ‘a number of sources: Acknowledgements-1 gratefully acknowledge stimulating
he can learn from neurophysiology as it deals with exchanges with Dr BERNARWDUBROVSK~(Allan Memor-
the levels of the neuronal circuit, the brain subsystem ial Institute, McGill University), Professor ROWLFO
(e.g. the brain stem), and the entire CNS; he can learn LLINAS(Department of Physiology and Biophysics, New
York University Medical Center), and Dr RAFAELP&EZ
from introspection and the study of behavior, from
PA.SCUAL(Institute de Fisica, Universidad National
neurosurgery and psychiatry, from com~rative Aut~noma de Mexico). And I am indebted to the Canada
zoology and the study of cultures. He can command, Council for its continued support of my research as well
then, many sources of hypotheses and data and just as to the Humanities Research Grants Subcommittee of
as many ways of checking his hypotheses. In this the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research of McGill
regard, then, the study of the psyche is unique. (It University.

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(Accepted 14 April 1977)