Argument #1

Invalid Identity statement

The trinity vs unitarianism debate is something which has been
debated for centuries, and most christians hold to the model of
God in which he is triune. I shall show how the existence of such a
being is impossible, and that the only conclusion is that a unitarian
God is true. The trinity is a christian doctrine which states that
there are three persons who are distinguished via opposition of
relation, as the father has the constitutive property of paternity
whilst the son has the constitutive property of filiation, hence we
can distinguish these persons in reality via opposition of relation
as this relation can be said to be a real distinction. Now, under
thomism the persons of the trinity are each identical to the essence
insofar as they are not really distinguished from it, meaning a
property is not lacking between essence and persons as we define
a distinction via lack of a property between two things. If this
identity statement between the essence is absolute, then we can
utilize the metaphysical account of LL which states: ∀X ∀Y ∀F(Fx
<—> Fy) —> x=y, meaning if they share all properties, then they are
just identical. Applying this metaphysical account of identity to this
identity statement asserted by the thomists, we can conclude that
by virtue of the persons being identical to the essence, then the
essence must have these intrinsic properties which they have.
Meaning by virtue of being identical the father the essence has the
property of paternity, and by virtue of being identical to the son the
essence has the property of filiation, thus the conclusion is that the
essence has both paternity and filiation, but the son lacks paternity
whilst the father lacks filiation hence the identity statement
between the persons and essence is invalid as a property lacked.
Not all thomists or those who posit an identity statement are
speaking of an absolute statement, rather they posit a relative
identity statement which uses sortals to display an identity
relation. Relative identity avoids the formulation of the
argument I have placed since they deny a metaphysical
account of identity. However, it would appear that an appeal to
RI would be trivial since the theory of RI does not negate that
we can still make real distinction by usage of non-sortal
predicates/attributes, so I can simply assert that the essence
lacks paternity, thus a distinction in reality between essence
and father and the same can be said with the other persons
(essence lacks filiation, hence a distinction in reality between
son and essence).

Disregarding this entire argument I have put forth, there is still

an issue with making an appeal to RI under a synchronic
case. The issue is that the thesis of RI does not give a
metaphysical account of identity, it simply states that things
are identical if they are one and the same which does not give
a reason/metaphysical account as to why they are identical.
So, the conclusion is that an appeal to RI under a synchronic
context is incoherent as it posits a brute fact by virtue of there
being no reason for this identity statement. The only way an
RI theorist can avoid this issue is by applying RI to only
diachronic contexts, whilst disregarding it under synchronic
contexts. Meaning; young aristotle =Φ adult aristotle, where
“Φ” is a sortal “human” thus it can be rewritten like this:
young aristotle =(human) adult aristotle. The explanation for
this relative identity statement would be time as it is under a
diachronic context. The conclusion is now that RI cannot be
used under synchronic contexts, unless the PSR is
dismissed.
Let us hypothetically say that the trinitarian upholds the
minority model of the trinity, in which a real distinction is
asserted between the persons and essence. Well, the
argument I have put forth above would not apply, but a more
enhanced version of Ibn Sina's individuation argument would
when speaking of the persons. Now, since that the persons
are inseparable and under one existence, then Ibn Sina's
argument cannot apply here as there is no multiplicity of
Gods with their own existence. Rather, a more enhanced
version of this argument which can be applied to the trinity is
that the properties of the persons IE that distinguishes them,
are identical to their necessary existence. If we assert the
contrary (that there's a real distinction in their necessary
existence) then polytheism follows, as we have a multiplicity
of necessary existences (both essentially and modally).​So,
since these properties are identical in their necessary
existence but distinguished from each other, then that which
distinguishes them would have to be either possible or
impossible. It obviously cannot be the latter for
self-explanatory reasons, and we cannot ascribe necessity
since they are identical in their existence, thus the only
conclusion is to assert that its possibility, hence contingency
is present. If they ask why necessity cannot be said of these
attributes, then that would assume a distinction in their
necessary existence hence polytheism.
P1: The Trinity doctrine posits three distinct persons within
God, characterized by oppositional relational properties – the
Father's paternity and the Son's filiation.

P2: According to Thomism, the persons of the Trinity are

identical to the essence without any genuine distinctions.

1P: Applying the Logical Law of Identity, if two entities share

all properties, they are identical.

P3: Applying this principle (1P) to Thomism's identity

statement leads to the conclusion that the essence must
possess the intrinsic properties of paternity and filiation.

P4: This leads to a contradiction, as the essence has both

paternity and filiation, while the Father lacks filiation and the
Son lacks paternity.

P5: The criteria outlined in premises 1P and P2, which assert

the application of the Logical Law of Identity, demonstrates
that the Son cannot be identical to the Father due to the
contradiction described in premise P4.

P6: P2 contradicts P5

C: The proposed understanding of the Trinity, as outlined by

Thomism and the presented argument, results in logical
inconsistencies and an invalid identity statement.
Argument #2
Human nature and Divine nature
2.1 God changed yet he is changeless
P1: Originally, God did not possess a human nature.

P2: The Bible asserts that God is unchanging.

P3: Subsequently, God did possess human nature(through Christ who was 100% divine and
100% human in nature).

P4: From P1 and P3, it is inferred that God underwent a change in nature.

P5: P2 contradicts P4 therefore P2 is false therefore God is not changless in Christianity

contradicting its fundamental doctrine.

Conclusion:

C: The portrayal of God in the Bible appears self-contradictory, given the inconsistency
between P2 and P4 and the changing nature of God. ( P2 contradicts P4)

M: Was there a time where God wasn't 100 % human in nature ?

C: Yes!

M: So, how is it possible that God transitioned to being 100% human in nature yet Him being
changeless? This shift from not being a 100% human in nature to suddenly embodying it
represents a change, which appears contradictory given the assertion that God is
unchanging.

2.2 inconsistency between human nature and divine

nature
Can God be 100% human and 100 % God?

It is impossible for a single person to be both fully human and fully divine at once.

👉
Human nature is created, divine nature is uncreated and timeless.
So logically, it is impossible for a single person to be both created and uncreated.

Further, God essentially has attributes that humans cannot have essentially, thus
Christ can't be both divine and human. For example, God is essentially good,
omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, immutable, impassible, timeless, and so on.
According to Christians, necessarily humans do not possess these attributes.

Argument #3
Explaining the Trinity Without Falling into Heresy
All of these are heresies that have been rejected by Christians.
Attempting to explain the Trinity through any of these beliefs would
classify you as a heretic.

Belief

Modalism Heresy

Pantheism Heresy

Arianism Heresy

Partialism Heresy

Docetism Heresy

Tritheism Heresy
But that removes the possibility of explaining the Trinity that “makes sense”.
P1 The Father is God

P2 The Son is God

P3 The Holy Spirit is God

P4 The Father is not the Son

P5 The Father is not the Holy Spirit

P6 The Son is not the Holy Spirit

P7 There is exactly one God

These 7 premises form an inconsistent set. In other words, they cannot all be true. However,
Christian Trinitarianism affirms all 7 premises. What exactly is the problem? The basic
problem is tritheism. If F, S, and HS are God, and not each other, it follows that there are 3
gods.
——

This then calls into question how the statements are to be analyzed. The key debate is over
the phrase "is God" in premises 1 to 3. If "is God" is taken to be an is of identity, then by
classical identity F, S, and HS would be identical to each other, which would entail
modalism.

Modalism is a heresy. That's something Christians will want to avoid. Maybe it's an is of
relative identity? This would mean that 2 things F and S could be identical to God and yet
not identical to each other This violates classical identity and most people are reluctant to do
so.
What about analyzing "is God" in terms of predication? Well, if each person is ascribed the
quality of divinity and they are not each other, then we are back to 3 gods. No matter how
similar they are in terms of their attributes, will, actions, etc. There may be another option.

Maybe each person "is God" in the sense that they are "parts" of God. This is William Lane
Craig's solution in an attempt to avoid tritheism. However, this is clearly unorthodox as none
of the persons is said to possess the divine nature.

What if all 7 premises are true and we accept that true contradictions exist? This has
recently been proposed by JC Beall, but involves denying the law of noncontradiction, which
most people will be
reluctant to do. As most people will not be likely to reject the LNC or identity.

Maybe the 7 premises are all true and they are only apparently contradictory, but not actually
contradictory. Even if we cannot tell you how or why they aren't contradictory. This is a form
of mysterianism, which has been proposed by James Anderson. This isn't technically a
"solution" to the LPT. Rather, it is questioning whether or not a solution is required from an
epistemological standpoint. Are mysteries acceptable in theology and if so when? How do
we determine when something is actually contradictory vs. merely apparently? Questions to
consider.

So, given the brief explanation of the LPT and possible responses, we are left with modalism
or denying classical identity with respect to this problem (is of identity option). Tritheism or
partialism when it comes to the is of predication option. Denying the LNC or affirming a form
of mysterianism and arguing that the LPT may be unsolvable, but Christians are still justified
in affirming the doctrine of the Trinity.

And for those saying there is nothing wrong with God being
contradictory :

1 Corinthians 14:33

“God is not the author of confusion”

Argument #4
Same in essence contradiction
In the concept of the Trinity doctrine, the Father and the Son share a
fundamental essence, meaning they share a core identity but that
would be contradictory:

P1: The Trinity doctrine asserts three distinct persons within the
Godhead: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

P2: These persons are distinguished by their intrinsic properties:

paternity (Father), filiation (Son), and other attributes.

P3: In Thomism, the persons of the Trinity are considered identical to the
essence of God.

P4: If the persons share all properties, they are considered identical
(Leibniz's Law).

P5: Applying this identity to the essence, it implies that the essence must
have paternity and filiation.

P6: The Son lacks paternity, and the Father lacks filiation.

P7: This contradicts the absolute identity between persons and essence,
indicating a real distinction.

C1: The absolute identity assertion between persons and essence is

invalid due to the distinction between their attributes.

C2: Even relative identity statements fail to provide a metaphysical

account of identity, leading to incoherence.
 Argument #5
Qualities or beings?

Credit to Keys to the Unseen

Christians claim that the single God exists as three distinct persons: the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This belief is false because several
absurdities follow from it. In this argument, I will demonstrate one such
absurdity:

—->

Premise 1: If the persons of the Trinity exist, then they would be either
qualities, or beings.

Premise 2: The persons of the Trinity are neither qualities nor beings.

Conclusion: Therefore, the persons of the Trinity do not exist.

As regards to Premise 1 the reason it’s true is because existent

essences either:

* Exist while subsisting within some other essence.

* Exist while not subsisting within some other essence.

The first option is the negation of the second, so they cannot be both
false. And the first case describes a quality, whereas the second case
describes a being. As such, it is impossible for that which exists, to be
neither a quality nor a being.
Given the above, and since the Christian claims that the persons of the
Trinity exist, this means that the persons of the Trinity would have to be
either qualities or beings.

With regards to Premise 2, if the Christian claims: “the persons of the

Trinity are qualities of God, that subsist within His being.”

We respond: “in that case, there would be no reason to limit them to

three persons. If the Christian were consistent, he would have treated
other qualities (such as Power, Will, and Knowledge) as divine ‘persons’
as well.”

Moreover, it is impossible for the qualities of God to separate from Him.

Yet the Christian believes that the Son and the Spirit entered the world.
So how can he then claim that those persons are qualities?

And if the Christian claims: “the persons of the Trinity are each a divine
being, such that each is attributed with all the divine qualities.”

We respond: “this is blatant polytheism. In that case, you would be no

different than the polytheist who believes in a single family of gods,
comprised of a multiplicity of individual deities.”

Since the two premises are true, the conclusion necessarily follows.
Therefore, the persons of the Trinity do not exist.
 Argument #6
Is Christ dependant or independent?

Is The Son dependent on the Father ?

yes -> God is not 100% independent

No -> two independent entities, implying dual deities.

https://youtu.be/oMjmNK2WiTM?si=El0VPgwQdbL6Wuoc

credits:mirko