Supreme Court Upholds Discharge:

Consensual Relationship Predating

Promise Breach, Not Rape Under False
Marriage Pretext
In Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi & Anr., the
Supreme Court overturned the Delhi High Court's order and upheld the
Sessions Court's decision to discharge the Appellant in a case
registered under Sections 376/506 IPC.
The Complainant alleged rape based on the Appellant's false promise
to marry. The Supreme Court, relying on Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT)
of Delhi, distinguished between a false promise made with no
intention to marry from the outset to induce sexual relations, and a
mere breach of a genuine promise.
The Court found that the prolonged consensual relationship, even
while the Complainant was married, indicated a conscious decision,
negating the element of a false promise directly leading to consent.
The absence of dishonest inducement and the Complainant's
awareness were crucial in the apex court's reasoning to uphold the
discharge.
Author: Adv. Sagar Badade (सागर बडदे )
Website: LEGALCELL.org
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2025 INSC 457

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024

JASPAL SINGH KAURAL ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI

& ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Leave granted.
2. The Appellant has approached this Court being aggrieved
by the Impugned Order dt. 03.01.2024 passed by the High Court
of Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition no. 1161/2023, whereby
the Order dt. 08.06.2023 passed by the Ld. Additional Sessions
Signature Not Verified Judge/Spl. FTC Patiala House Courts, New Delhi [“Ld. Sessions
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2025.04.07
17:41:42 IST
Court”] discharging the Appellant in FIR no. 281/2021 dt.
Reason:

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 1 of 12

05.06.2021 registered at PS Sagarpur, U/s 376/506 IPC (“FIR”),
was set aside.
3. The captioned FIR came to be registered at the behest of
the Complainant/Respondent no.2, alleging that the Appellant
had established physical relations with her, with the promise to
marry her, and take care of her two children. The Complaint
reveals, that the Appellant was known to the prosecutrix since
2011, prior to their respective marriages; however, their love re-
kindled in 2016, once their matrimonial lives became unsettled.
4. It is the case of the Complainant/Respondent no.2 that she
was in a relationship with the Appellant since 2016, who was
living in Canada at the time, and had come to India, and met her
for the first time on 05.02.2017. On that day, he had met the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in his brother’s rental house in
Dwarka and established physical relationship with her on the
promise that he will marry her after obtaining divorce from his
first wife. It is alleged that the Appellant harassed the
Complainant into obtaining a divorce from her husband, and had
subsequently, also spoken to & assured the first husband, that he
would marry the Complainant/Respondent no.2 and take good
care of her and her children.
5. The Appellant purportedly lived with the Respondent no. 2
at her house for twenty five days, where he sexually harassed her,
and told her that if she refused to establish physical relations with

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 2 of 12

him, he would not marry her. The Complainant has alleged that
she obtained divorce from her husband in 2019, on the assurance
from the Appellant, that he will marry her; however, on
20.05.2021, the Appellant refused to marry her and even
threatened to kill her children. Subsequently thereof, the FIR no.
281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021 was registered upon the Complaint filed
by the Complainant/Respondent no.2, when the Appellant failed
to appear before the Mahila Police Station for counselling and
mediation.
6. During the investigation, the Appellant admitted to having
physical relations with the Complainant/Respondent no.2, and
paying for the mangalsutra with his initials “Jas” on them. The
investigation finally culminated into a charge-sheet on
15.05.2022, under Sections 376/506 IPC against the Appellant.
7. The Appellant filed an Application under Section 227 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short ‘CrPC’)
seeking discharge, whereby the Ld. Sessions Court vide Order dt.
08.06.2023, was pleased to discharge the Appellant of the
offences under Section 376/506 IPC. It was observed by the Ld.
Sessions Court that consent by prosecutrix was very well
reasoned and was given after understanding the nature and
consequence of sexual indulgence and not out of any
misconception of fact.

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 3 of 12

8. Aggrieved thereby, the Complainant/Respondent no.2 filed
a Criminal Revision Petition no. 1161/2023 before the Hon’ble
Delhi High Court, which was allowed vide Impugned Judgment
dt. 03.01.2024. Vide the Impugned Order dt. 03.01.2024, the High
Court whilst assailing the order on discharge, made specific
observations holding that there is prima-facie material to
establish that the Appellant had indulged in sexual relationship
with the Complainant/Respondent, with the promise to marry her,
and frame charges against the Appellant, for offences under U/s
376/506 IPC in FIR no. 281/2021. The Impugned Order dt.
03.01.2024 is under challenge before this Court.
9. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the
relationship between the Appellant and the
Complainant/Respondent was purely consensual, and there is no
question of an offence either under Section 376 IPC or 506 IPC.
A perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet would establish that
there is no material on record, to establish that the
Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had entered into a relationship
with the Appellant, under coercion or undue influence, or under
the mistaken belief or a false assurance of marriage.
10. It is also argued that the Respondent no.2/Complainant was
very well aware of the consequences, of her actions, and had
reasonably considered them before entering in a relationship with
the Appellant. As a matter of fact, it is the own case of the

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 4 of 12

Respondent no.2/Complainant, that she was in a relationship with
the Appellant since 2016, while both the parties were in subsisting
marriages. Thus, the element of inducement for marriage by the
Appellant is manifestly absent and the criminal proceedings
registered against the Appellant tantamount to a gross abuse of
the process of law.
11. On the other hand, it is argued by the prosecutrix, that she
had entered into a physical relationship with the Appellant solely
for the reason that he had promised to marry her & take care of
her children, and had it not been for the promise of marriage made
by the Appellant she would have never entered into a physical
relationship with him. It was submitted that the Appellant had not
only promised the prosecutrix, but also her family, and her ex-
husband, that that he will marry her and take care of the children.
It was owing to such conduct of the Appellant that the prosecutrix
got divorced from her ex-husband, leaving aside her matrimonial
life for him. It is submitted that the conduct of the Appellant
amounts to a dishonest inducement, and the physical relationship
on a false pretext amounts to rape.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

12. We have heard counsel for both the parties and have
carefully considered the Impugned Order and the material on
record. The intervention of this Hon’ble Court is limited to the

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 5 of 12

question as to whether there was sufficient material on record, for
the Sessions Court to have discharged the Appellant for offences
under section 376 and 506 IPC, arising out of FIR bearing no.
281/2021 dt. 05.06.2021 registered at PS Sagarpur.
13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case of Naim
Ahmed Vs State (NCT) of Delhi1 whereby this Hon’ble Court had
decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the prosecutrix had
also given her consent for a sexual relationship with the
accused/Appellant, upon an assurance to marry. The prosecutrix,
who was herself a married woman having three children, had
continued to have such relationship with the accused Appellant,
at least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In the
conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this Court had
observed as under:
“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the
respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her
consent for sexual relationship under the
misconception of fact, as the accused had given a
false promise to marry her and subsequently he did
not marry, and therefore such consent was no
consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under
Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard,
it is pertinent to note that there is a difference
between giving a false promise and committing
breach of promise by the accused. In case of false
promise, the accused right from the beginning
would not have any intention to marry the

1
[2023] 15 SCC 385

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 6 of 12

 prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the
prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her
only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case
of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility
that the accused might have given a promise with
all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently
might have encountered certain circumstances
unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his
control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise.
So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of
promise to marry as a false promise and to
prosecute a person for the offence under Section
376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon
its proved facts before the court.
22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself
was a married woman having three children, could
not be said to have acted under the alleged false
promise given by the appellant or under the
misconception of fact while giving the consent to
have sexual relationship with the appellant.
Undisputedly, she continued to have such
relationship with him at least for about five years
till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the
allegations made by her in her deposition before the
court, are taken on their face value, then also to
construe such allegations as “rape” by the
appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The
prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother
of three children was mature and intelligent enough
to understand the significance and the
consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act
she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire
conduct during the course of such relationship with
the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had
betrayed her husband and three children by having
relationship with the accused, for whom she had

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 7 of 12

 developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with
him during the subsistence of her marriage with her
husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till
the time she was impregnated by the accused in the
year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child
through the loin of the accused, she did not have any
complaint against the accused of he having given
false promise to marry her or having cheated her.
She also visited the native place of the accused in
the year 2012 and came to know that he was a
married man having children also, still she
continued to live with the accused at another
premises without any grievance. She even obtained
divorce from her husband by mutual consent in
2014, leaving her three children with her husband.
It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes
must have taken place between them, that she filed
the present complaint. The accused in his further
statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC had
stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused
to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case, it could not be said by any stretch of
imagination that the prosecutrix had given her
consent for the sexual relationship with the
appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to
hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape
within the meaning of Section 375 IPC.”

14. The decision in Naim Ahmed (supra) is squarely

applicable to the conspectus of present case. It has been time and
again settled by this Hon’ble Court, that the mere fact that
physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry
will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 8 of 12

375 IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made
by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual
relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from
the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a
direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual
relations.2
15. Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet, the
following facts are clearly established:
(i) The physical relationship between the Appellant and
the Respondent no. 2 was consensual from the very
beginning and cannot be said to be against the will or
without the consent of the prosecutrix. Even if the
case of the prosecutrix is accepted, there is no material
on record to show that there was any dishonest
inducement, or incitement on part of the Appellant.
(ii) There is also no material on record, to establish an
offence of criminal intimidation under section 506
IPC against the Appellant. In-fact, it is apparent from
the conduct of the Appellant, that he was acting in
furtherance of the promise to marry. It is the own
observation of the High Court, that the Appellant had
made a promise to marry the Respondent no.2 and

2
Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3471

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 9 of 12

 was acting accordingly. The Mangalsutra being
prepared with the initials of the name of the
Complainant/Respondent no.2 does reflect his
intention and promise to marry. However, in the
eventuality of a fall-out or split between the parties, it
cannot be said that the promise to marry was false, and
the corresponding conduct dishonest.
(iii) There is also no element of criminality that can be
accrued to the Appellant, insofar as it is the own case
of the prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship with
the Appellant, while being in a subsisting marriage. It
is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix could have
sustained a physical relationship for a prolonged
period of five years3, while being in a subsisting
marriage, and even subsequently obtaining divorce to
sustain the relationship. The prolonged period of the
relationship, during which the sexual relations
continued between the parties, is sufficient to
conclude that there was never an element of force or
deceit in the relationship.4 The prosecutrix was thus,
conscious and cognizant of the consequences of her

3
Prashant Vs State of NCT Delhi 2024 SCC Online SC 3375
4
Mahesh Damu Khare Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr. [2024] SCC Online SC
3471

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 10 of 12

 actions, and had given her consent after an active and
reasoned deliberation.5
16. In view of the aforesaid, we find that there was sufficient
material on record for the Ld. Sessions Court to exercise powers
under section 227 CrPC, and discharge the Appellant. It is trite
law that at the time of framing of charge, a mini trial is not
permissible6 and the Trial Court has to proceed with the material
brought on record by the prosecution and determine whether the
facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose
the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.7
A bare review of the FIR and the charge-sheet and material placed
on record by the prosecution, would clarify that the ingredients of
offences under Section 375/506 IPC are not established.
17. We also find that the High Court has undertaken an
exhaustive analysis of the allegations in the FIR, and the Charge-
sheet, while failing to consider that at the stage of framing of
charges, the court must only adjudicate on the basis of material
on record. It is trite law that the scope of interference and exercise
of revisional jurisdiction is extremely limited and should be
exercised very sparingly, specifically in instances, where the
decision under challenge is grossly erroneous, or there is non-
compliance of the provisions of law, or the finding recorded by

5
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs State of Maharashtra [2019] 9 SCC 608
6
State of Rajasthan vs Ashok Kumar Kashyap [2021] SCC Online SC 314
7
State of Tamil Nadu Vs. N. Suresh Rajan And Others (2014) 11 SCC 709

SLP (Crl.) No. 4007 of 2024 Page 11 of 12

the trial court is based on no evidence, or material evidence is
ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely
by framing the charge. This is certainly not the case in the present
matter insofar as the findings of the Ld. Sessions Court are based
on the material on record.
18. For the reasons stated above, we allow this appeal and set
aside the order of the High Court dated 03.01.2024 and uphold
the Order dt. 08.06.2023 passed by the Sessions Court. At this
stage, we deem it appropriate to terminate the criminal
proceedings arising out of FIR bearing no. 281/2021 dt.
05.06.2021 registered at PS Sagarpur, U/s 376/506 IPC against
the Appellant.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No
order as to costs.

……………………………………J.
[B. V. NAGARATHNA]

……………………………………J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]

New Delhi
April 07, 2025

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