Āryabhavasaṃkrāntināmamahāyānasūtra.

The Noble Sūtra on

the Passage Through Existences

Fernando Tola y Carmen Dragonetti

Editor Notes:

This file was digitalized from the original file published in 1986. The lack of Italics and some
diacritics are due to the well know publishing circumstance of that period and no corrections
have been made. To streamline reading the only modification on the text format has been the
integration of footnotes within the body of the text. For footnotes citation, 1 (13); 2-11 (13-
14); 12-16 (15); 17-23 (16); 24-33 (16-17); 34-36 (17-18).

Published in:

- Tola, F. & Dragonetti, C. (1986), “Āryabhavasaṃkrāntināmamahāyānasūtra. The

Noble Sūtra on the Passage Through Existences”, Buddhist Studies Review, 3 (1): 3-
18.

Sponsored by Fundación Bodhiyana, digitalization done in August 2019.

 ĀRYABHAVASAṂKRĀNTINĀMAMAHĀYĀNASŪTRA.
THE NOBLE SŪTRA ON THE PASSAGE THROUGH
EXISTENCES

Fernando Tola y Carmen Dragonetti

The text of the Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra

The original Sanskrit text of the Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra has not been preserved. There exist
three Chinese translations of it: Taishō 575, 576 and 577 (Nanjio 285, 284 and 526 respectively;
Répertoire, p. 61), which were respectively done by Bodhiruci (who lived in China between 508 and
537), Buddhaśānta (who worked in China between 525 and 539) and I Ching (635-713). There is also
a Tibetan translation, Tōhoku 226, Catalogue 892, due to Jinamitra, Dānaśīla and Ye-śes sde.
Several fragments from the Sanskrit text are extant either in the form of quotations or included
in other texts, in both cases with slightly different readings. See notes 17, 18, 24, 27, 28, 29, 34 and
36.

Modern editions and translations of the Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra

N. Aiyaswami Sastri in Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. V, No. 4, 1931, pp. 246-
60: it contains the edition of the Tibetan text according to the Narthang recension, a reconstruction of
the Sanskrit text on the basis of the Tibetan text and an English translation.
G. Stramiglioli, ‘Bhavasaṅkrānti’ in Rivista degli Studi Orientali, Rome, XVI, 1936, pp. 294-
306: it contains the edition of the Tibetan text from a manuscript from the Toling monastery: this
manuscript dates from the thirteenth or fourteenth century and is probably a copy of an older one
from the tenth-eleventh centuries. Together with the Tibetan text, this article contains an Italian
translation from the Tibetan and another from the Chinese text.
N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Bhavasaṇkrānti Sūtra and Nāgārjuna’s [Página 3] Bhavasaṅkrānti
Śāstra with the Commentary of Maitreyanātha, Madras, 1938 (Adyar Library): it contains a Sanskrit
reconstruction on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese translations, an edition of the Tibetan text
according to the Narthang recension, compared with the Peking one, and an English version of the
Tibetan and Chinese translations.
 C. Dragonetti, Bhavasaṅkrāntisūtra, Buenos Aires, Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas. In
the Series Textos sánskritos, tibetanos y chinos del Budismo Mahāyāna, 1977: it contains the Tibetan
text on the basis of the Stramiglioli’s edition, the text of the Sanskrit quotations and a Spanish
translation of the Tibetan version.
F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, ‘Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra’ in Budismo Mahāyāna, Buenos Aires
(Kier), 1980, pp. 19-36: it contains a new Spanish translation on the basis of Aiyaswami Sastri’s
edition already mentioned.

Form and constitution of the Bhavasaṃkrātisūtra’s text

Under the name of Bhavasaṃkrānti there exists two different Buddhist works: 1. The
Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra, to which we have referred, attributed to the Lord Buddha, and 2. The
Bhavasaṃkrānti, a śāstra attributed to Nāgārjuna1, the original Sanskrit text of which has not been
preserved and which is known only thanks to its three Tibetan versions (Tōhoku 3840, 4162 and
4558, Catalogue 524, 5662 and 5472), and its Chinese version (Taishō 1574, Nanjio 1305, Répertoire,
p. 134).
The Bhavasaṃkrātisūtra contains, in its Tibetan and Chinese versions, a part written in prose
and a part written in verse. The Bhavasaṃkrānti, attributed to Nāgārjuna, is a short treatise of 16, 19
or 21 stanzas according to its different recensions. Both works have in common several of the stanzas:
1 = 11, 2c, d and 4: 12; 5 = 13; 6 = 14; 7 = 15.
How to explain the presence of common stanzas in the Sūtra and in a brief treatise attributed
to Nāgārjuna? We think that the original Sūtra was constituted only by the part in prose, which deals
with the passage form one existence to another. Thus there was perfect agreement between the subject
and the title of the work. Afterwards, to the prose part were added the stanzas that deal with the
“voidness” of everything, which [Página 4] constituted the principal thesis of the Madhyamaka
school. Some of these stanzas were taken from Nāgārjuna’s treatise. This addition was done by some
author of the Madhyamaka school with the desire to establish a closer connection between the Sūtra
and the school. In the same way, another author of the same school replaced the proper beginning and

1
Very probably this treatise was not written by Nāgārjuna. D. Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the
Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Wiesbaden (O. Harrassowitz), 1981, p. 29, n. 64, thinks that it is
probable that this treatise may not be by Nāgārjuna but a later author. Chr. Lindtner, Nagarjuniana, Copenhagen
(Akademisk Forlag), 1982, considers this treatise to be one of the “dubious texts”, “perhaps authentic”.
This treatise was included by N. Aiyaswami Sastri in his edition of the Bhavasaṅkrānti Sūtra already mentioned
(Tib. Text. Skt. Reconstruction and Eng. Trans.). C. Dragonetti, Bhavasaṅkrāntiparikathā de Nāgārjuna,
Buenos Aires (Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas), 1977, edited the Tibetan text with a Spanish translation.
In F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, Budismo Mahāyāna, Estudios y Textos, Buenos Aires (Kier), 1980, pp. 102-23, a
Spanish translation is included.
the end of the ṣālistambasūtra with the Madhyamaka school, transforming it into the Madhyamaka-
Śālistambasūtram.2 This addition obviously took place before 500 A.C., by which date the first
translation into Chinese was made, since the Chinese (and Tibetan) translators knew the Sanskrit text
with its addition, in the same form in which we have received it.
In this way, it is possible to explain the lack of agreement between the title of the Sūtra and
its subject matter and between the prose section and the verse section.

Location of the Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra in Buddhist literature

The title of two of the Chinese versions (Taishō 757, Ta fang têng hsiu to lo wang ching, and
Taishō 577, Ta ch’êng liu chuan chu yu ching) induce us to think that this Sūtra was considered to be
the Mahāyāna sūtra by its Chinese translators. The Tibetan version (Tōhoku 266 and Catalogue 982,
ḥphags-pa srid-pa ḥpho-ba śes-bya-ba theg-pa chen poḥi mdo) considers it also as a sūtra of
Mahāyāna Buddhism. Finally, Mahāyānist authors such as Asaṅga (in Bodhisattvabhūmi),
Candrakīrti (in Prasannapadā and Madhyamakāvartāra), Śāntideva (in Śikṣāsamuccaya),
Prajñākaraamati (in Pañjikā), Haribhadra (in Āloka) and Śāntarakṣita (in Tattvasaṃgraha) quote it in
extenso.3
As it has come down to us, the Bhavasaṃkrānti can in fact be considered as an independent
sūtra of Mahāyāna Buddhism and one of the sūtras that could enjoy preference by the Madhyamaka
school, since in the prose section and especially the verse section the doctrine of emptiness is dealt
with.

Doctrinal contents of the Bhavasaṃkrānti

In relation to its contents, the Bhavasamkrānti comprises [Página 6] two well differentiated
parts. In the first, which corresponds to the prose section, the themes dealt with are, on the one hand,
the reappearance of actions in the mind at the moment of death and, on the other, the passage through
(saṃkrānti) existences (bhava). Of these two themes it is the second one which gives the Sūtra its
title. The theme dealt with in the second part, which corresponds to the verse section, is the theory of
śūnyatā, “emptiness”.4

2
This text has been edited by V. V. Gokhale in P. L. Vaidya (ed.), Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Saṃgraha, Darbhanga
(The Mithila Institute), 1961, pp. 107-16.
3
See notes 17, 18, 24, 27, 28, 34, 36 for these questions.
4
In the last part of the prose section of the text there is a brief reference to the doctrine of voidness.
The reappearance of actions

The question which King Bimbisāra of Magadha puts to the Lord Buddha and which initiates
the dialogue between both is: How do actions, which a man performs during his life and which
disappear as soon as they are performed, manifest themselves again in his mind at the moment of his
death? The Lord Buddha answers that the reappearance of past actions occurs in the same way as the
image of a beautiful woman, whom a man sees in his dreams and who is completely non-existent,
reappears in the mind of that man. Thus the Lord Buddha accepts the reappearance of past actions in
the mind of the dying man and presents as support for its possibility the similar case of the recollection
of a dream. Then the Lord Buddha compares the man who attaches himself to agreeable forms he
perceives to the man who feels love for the beautiful woman he has seen in his dream.
However, the Lord Buddha does not explain the purpose of actions reappearing in the mind
at the moment of death and the reason they do so. We think that the answers to both questions have
to do with the doctrine of karma. Probably past actions (of course as recollections or ideas) reappear
in the mind of dying man in order to determine the new existence, which is about to begin in the series
of rebirths that corresponds to the dying man. This explanation relates to the belief that the last thought
of a dying man are decisive in determining the rebirth he will have after his death. This belief is valid
as much in Hinduism as in Buddhism.5 And actions reappear by virtue of the inherent force of karma.

The mechanism of “transmigration”

Without any doubt this theme constitutes the most interesting [Página 6] of the Sūtra. In the
next paragraphs, we expound the mechanism of “transmigration” or “passing through” according to
the Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra, which is in agreement with general Buddhist doctrine regarding this point.6
There is no entity (soul. Pudgala, spirit, consciousness, dharma) which passes from one
existence to another.7 This is the orthodox position, accepted by the majority of Buddhist schools
with the exception of the Vātsīputrīyas (and other schools which sprang from the Vātsīputrīyas). This

5
See H. von Glasenapp, Immortality and Salvation in Indian Religions, Calcutta (Susil Gupta), 1963, p. 50, and
J. P. McDermott, ‘Karma and Rebirth in Early Buddhism’ in W. D. O’Flaherty, Karma and Rebirth in Classical
Indian Traditions, Delhi (Motilal Banarsidass), 1983, pp. 177-8.
6
In the following exposition, we also take account of the Śālistambasūtra.
7
On the principal that ‘no dharma (see n. 22) passes from this world to another world’, expressed in the
Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra (end of the prose section) and Śālistambasūtra, p. 4 (Skt. reconstruction), and p. 69 (Tib.
Text), ed. N. Aiyaswami Sastri; see also Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā, attributed to Nāgārjuna, st. 5 and
commentary (in Skt. and Tib.) ad locum; Vasubandhu, Abhidarmakośa, III, 18.
school postulated the existence of the pudgala which, based on the skandhas, passed from one
existence to another.8
From the Buddhist point of view, there is no single consciousness which exists during the
whole life but a series of succession of consciousnesses or conscious states that follow one another
related by the law of causality. This “consciousness stream” (vijñānasrotas) which constitutes the
individual comes from beginningless eternity9, and does not stop with death if the individual who dies
has accomplished during his life actions having as a consequence a new rebirth.
In this case, one of those consciousnesses comes to be the “last consciousness” (caramaṃ
vijñānam), not of the series but of a section of that series. That section is conceived as a life or an
existence. The following consciousness, related to the previous one by the law of causality and
belonging to the same consciousnesses series, comes to be the “first consciousness” (prathamaṃ
vijñānam) of a new section of that series. This new section is conceived as a much life or existence.
The cessation of the “last consciousness” and the arising of the “first consciousness” are
simultaneous, like the going up and going down of the arms of a balance. The “last consciousness” is
conceived as death, the “first consciousness” as birth.
The relation between the “first consciousness” of a section (existence) of the series and the
“last consciousness” of the previous section (existence) of the series is the same that exists in any
life’s course, between any conscious state and the next one with the following differences: in the case
of the passage from one section (existence) of the series to the next section (existence) of it, together
with the “last consciousness” there [Página 7] is the destruction of the material component (body)
belonging to the finishing section (existence); and together with the “first consciousness” there is also
the arising of a new material component (body) belonging to the new beginning section (existence).
The “first consciousness”, and those which follow, related to it by the law of causality and all
belonging to the same series, are not accompanied by the memory of experiences undergone in the
previous sections (existences) of the series.10
There is only one consciousnesses series which, as we have already said, comes from eternity
and will flow on until it is cut off by the practice of Buddhist moral and intellectual principles, but

8
On the Vātsīputrīyas, see N. Dutt, Buddhism Sects in India, Calcutta (Mukhopadhyay), 1970, pp. 194-223; A.
Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Saigon (École Francaise d’Extrême Orient), 1955, pp. 114-
26; Thich Thien Chau, ‘The Literature of the Pudgalavādins’ in The Journal of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1984, pp. 7-16.
9
Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, ‘Anāditva or beginninglessness in Indian Philosophy’, in Annals of the
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 51, 1980, pp. 1-20.
10
On the recollection of previous births, cf. P. Demiéville, ‘Sur la mémoire des existences antérieures’ in
Bulletin de l’École Francaise d’Extrême Orient, 27, 1928, pp. 283-98; G. Schopen, ‘The Generalization of an
Old Yoguic Attainment in Medieval Mahāyāna Sūtra Literature: Some notes on Jātismara’ in The Journal of
the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1983, pp. 109-47.
the destruction of material component (body) of each section (existence) of the series and the
disappearance of the memories of experiences undergone in the previous sections (existences) of the
series conceal the series’ continuity and produce the belief in the existence of individuals who are
born without any connection with anybody in the past, without any connection with anybody in the
future. This was not the Lord Buddha’s case.11 He knew, thanks to his great spiritual development, to
which individuals of the past he was related, by the fact that they all belonged to the same
consciousness series –as an old man knows to which child, of sixty or seventy years before, he is
related by the fact that both belong to the same consciousness-series.
In this way, this brief and valuable Sūtra harmonizes two important Buddhist principles, the
“transmigration” and the non-existence of a permanent and eternal ego, giving a simple, subtle and
elegant solution to the paradox of a “transmigration” without a “transmigrator”; and, eliminating an
apparent contradiction, allows a more profound insight into the vast treasure of spiritual riches that is
Buddhism.
As regards the problem of the birth of the body, the present Sūtra affirms only that the first
consciousness of the new existence arises in a new body, which can be that of a god, a man, a demon
or an animal.
It is the Śālistambasūtra12 which explains how the birth of a new body takes place. The body
is not the work of a creator, neither is it due to chance, nor does it come forth out of nothing. [Página
8] The new body, its nature and qualities are the product of the conjunction of a series of causes and
necessary conditions: the union of the father and mother, appropriate womb, opportune moment,
material elements, the first consciousness, previous existences, etc. The new body is produced and
the new consciousness, which participates in its production, arises in it, and not in another body, only
and exclusively because all the factors mentioned determine it to do so. The birth of a new body and
the arising in it of the first consciousness are an example of the prime importance that the concept of
causality has in Buddhism: “everything has a cause”, “everything produces effects”, “when the cause
is eliminated, its effects are also eliminated”.

11
The recollection by the Lord Buddha of his previous existences is referred to for instance in the Jātakas.
12
The original Sanskrit text of this Sūtra, which is lost, has been restored with the help of extensive quotations
by Candrakīrti (Prasannapadā), Prajñākaramati (Pañjikā), Śāntideva (Śikṣāsamuccaya) and Yaśomitra
(Abhidarmakośavyākyā). It is also quoted by Vācapatimiśra (Bhamatī), and Mādhava (Servadarśanasaṃgraha,
Chapter on Buddha’s Doctrine). It was edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin, N. Aiyaswami Sastri and P. L. Vaidya.
C. Dragonetti, Shālistambasūtra, Buenos Aires (Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas), 1977, edited the
Sanskrit text of this Sūtra (as preserved in the quotations) together with a Spanish translation. In F. Tola and C.
Dragonetti, Budismo Mahāyāna (already quoted), pp. 37-62, a Spanish translation is included.
Emptiness13

The last theme dealt with in this Sūtra is the thesis of emptiness or “voidness” (śūnyavāda)
and its implications: all things are “void”, lacking an own being, insubstantial, non-existent in se et
per se; they are only creations of the human mind, products of imagination, and as such they do not
really exist; they are only names conventionally established, behind which there is not the thing they
designate. The same mind, the same imagination, that creates the false empirical reality in which we
move, is also “void”, it does not really exist. The image of empirical reality created by our minds
conceals from us the true nature, the true way of being –voidness, illusion– of empirical reality. So
what we see is called “Conventional Reality” or “Reality of Convention”.

Text employed for the present translation

For the translation we present in this article, we have used the Tibetan text of the Sde-dge
edition (photocopies provided by Harvard Yenching Institute, Harvard University): Bkaḥ-ḥgyur,
Mdo.sde, Dsa. 175 a 6 - 177 a 3.
In some places, which we now indicate, we have adopted a different reading:
175 b 4 (end of the line): chud mi ḥdzaḥ bar ḥdaḥ da: Sastri’s edition: Sde-dge: chab mi
ḥthsal bar gdaḥ.
176 a 3 (middle of the line): ḥgag pa na: Sastri’s and Stramigioli’s [Página 9] editions: Sde-
dge: ḥgag pa ni.
176 b 3 (middle of the line) mṅon pa: our correction; Sde-dge: mṅon paḥi. Cf. 176 a 7
(beginning of the line).

Translation
THE NOBLE SŪTRA OF THE MAHĀYĀNA
DENOMINATED “THE PASSAGE THROUGH EXISTENCES”

(175 A 6) Homage to all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

13
On the concept of emptiness as developed by Nāgārjuna, cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, ‘Nāgārjuna’s
conception of “Voidness” (śūnyatā), in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1981, pp. 273-82; C.
Dragonetti, ‘An Indian Philosophy of Universal Contingency’, in S. R. Bhatt (ed.), Glimpses of Buddhist
Thought and Culture, Key-note Addresses and Papers. First International Conference on Buddhism and
National Cultures, New Delhi, 1984. Both with Bibliography.
 Thus have I heard. Once the Bhagavant stayed in Rājagṛha, in the Bamboo-Forest, in the
place of the kalandakas14, in the company of a group of one thousand two hundred and fifty bhikṣus
and of very numerous great Bodhissattvas. Then, the Bhagavant (175 b), while he was surrounded by
many hundreds of thousands of his followers, looking at them, expounded the Dharma (Doctrine) and
expounded in its integrity the Brahmacārya (Religious Life) beautiful in its beginning, beautiful in its
middle, beautiful in its end, fair in its meaning, fair in its expression, without confusion, completely
fulfilled, completely pure, completely immaculate.
The Śreṇiya Bimbisāra, King of the Magadha country, going out from the great town of
Rājagṛha, with great royal pomp, with a great royal force, went to the Bamboo-Forest where the
Bhagavant was. On arriving, after bowing down at the feet of the Bhagavant and turning (around the
Bhagavant) the right side towards him three times. Śreṇiya Bimbisāra, King of the Magadha country,
spoke thus to the Bhagavant: “O Bhagavant, how do actions, (a long time) after having been done
(and) accumulated15, a long time after having ceased, (re)appear in the mind, on being near the
moment of death? All conditioned things (saṃskāra)16 being void, how do actions pass without being
annihilated?”
So (the King) spoke, and the Bhagavant to Śreṇiya Bimbisāra, King of the Magadha country,
said thus: “O great King17, just as for instance a man, in a dream he has while sleeping, dreams that
he extremely enjoys himself with a beautiful woman of his country and, when he awakes from his
sleep, remembers that beautiful woman of his country (he has seen in his dream) –what do you think,
O great King: does the beautiful woman of the country, [Página 10] (seen) in a dream, (really) exist?”
(The King) said: “O Bhagavant, she does not exist.”

14
According to Pāli sources, this place was called “Kalandakanivāpa” and in it food was given to squirrels. In
the Tibetan text, its name is Kalandaka gnas pa, “the place of the kalandakas” (kalandakanivāsa). Cf. G. P.
Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names, London (P. T. S.), 1960, I, p. 534. According to Tibetan
sources, the word kalantara (for kalandaka) designated some kind of bird. Cf. W. W. Rockhill, The Life of the
Budda, reprint, San Francisco (Chinese Materials Center), 1976, pp. 43-4.
15
Two things happen with actions: 1. After having been performed, they disappear, but remain accumulated in
a latent potential form somewhere (the text does not say where); at the moment of death they reappear in the
mind, i.e. they are remembered (as actually happens with many dying people) and 2. Actions leave behind
themselves the “seeds” (bīja) of good or bad effects; they are the deferred effects of actions, which exist
alongside their immediate effects. These deferred effects remain in a latent, potential form somewhere and are
actualized in a new existence, giving rise to good or bad experiences which are the reward or punishment of the
actions previously performed. See n. 19.
16
Of the several meanings of the word saṃskāra (ḥdu byed in the Tibetan version) we think the most appropriate
in the present context is “conditioned thing”. Actions are “void”, i.e. do not have an own being, do not exist in
se et per se, as they require for their existence the presence of many causes and conditions. And what is
conditioned is unreal; like a mirage, it does not exist.
17
The Tibetan text (175 b 5 middle of the line – 176 b 3 beginning), corresponding to the English translation
from “O great King…” up to “… actions do not perish”, is quoted in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra, pp. 127,
1.17 – 129, 1.17, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin. This last work is extant only in Tibetan. The quoted text is
expressly attributed to the Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra.
 The Bhagavant said: “O great King, what do you think: that man who ardently desires the
beautiful woman of his country, (seen) in his dream –is he a wise man?”
(The King) answered: “O Bhagavant, he is not –if it is asked why, O Bhagavant –because
that beautiful woman of the country, (seen) in the dream, does not exist at all; and (176 a) although
he does not perceive her, (nevertheless) he goes on thinking of enjoying himself extremely with her.
Thus that man, being deprived of her, has a destiny of sorrow.”
The Bhagavant said18: “O great King, in the same way, an ordinary man, foolish, ignorant,
on seeing with his eyes lovely forms, ardently desires those forms which are agreeable to his mind.
While ardently desiring them, he becomes attached to them. On becoming attached to them, he feels
a passion for them. On feeling a passion for them, he performs with his body, speech and mind,
actions that are born out of desire, hatred and error. And those actions, after having been performed,
cease. And after having ceased, (those actions) stay neither in the east nor in the south nor in the west
nor in the north nor up nor down –nor in any region of space. But, at any other time, at the moment
near the instant of death, when the karma19 corresponding (to the life that is being concluded) is
exhausted, at the (very) moment the last consciousness ceases, those actions (re)appear in the mind
(of the dying man) –just as for instance the beautiful woman of the country (in the mind) of the man
that wakes from his sleep. O great King, thus, on the last consciousness ceasing, the first
consciousness, which forms part of the (new) birth, arises either in a god or a man or an aura20 or an
infernal being or an animal or a preta21. O great King, immediately after the first consciousness has
ceased, there arises the series of consciousnesses, which corresponds (to the life that is beginning),
and in which the ripening (of actions previously performed) will be experienced. O great King,
although no element of existence (dharma)22 passes from this world to another world, nevertheless
death and birth take place. O great King, the last consciousness which ceases (16 b) is called “death”;
the first consciousness [Página 11] which arises is called “birth”. O great King, the last consciousness,

18
The original Sanskrit text, corresponding to the Tibetan text 176 a 1 middle – 176 b .3 end, and to the English
translation from “The Bhagavant…” up to “… the ripening (of actions previously done) will be experienced”,
has been preserved in a quotation of Prajñākaramati, Pañjikā, pp. 224, 1. 20 – 225, 1. 8 ed. P. L. Vaidya. The
quoted fragment is attributed to the Pitāputrasamāgamsūtra. It is also quoted by Śāntidebva, Śikṣāsamuccaya,
pp. 252. 1.3 – 253, 1.13 ed. C. Bendall, without any indication of its provenance.
19
The word karma designates here, on the other hand, the totality of actions performed by a man in his present
and past existences and, on the other, more precisely, the totality of deferred effects of those actions. So long
as a man performs actions which leave deferred effects, and so long as deferred effects exist, man has to be
reborn. Buddhism teaches the way of behaving that does not give rise to new deferred effects and destroys
already existing ones. The part of the totality of karma, of the deferred effects to be actualized in any existence,
is the karma corresponding to that existence. See n. 15.
20
Enemy of the gods.
21
Spirit of dead persons.
22
On dharmas, elements or factors of whatever exists, see F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, ‘La doctrina de los
dharmas en el Budismo’ in Yoga y Mística de la India, Buenos Aires (Kier), 1978, pp. 91-121.
at the moment it ceases, does not pass to anywhere; the first consciousness, which forms part of the
(new) birth, at the moment it arises, does not come from anywhere. If it is asked why, (I answer)
because of their lack of an own being. O great King, although the last consciousness is void (of the
own being) of a last consciousness, death is void (of the own being) of death, action is void (of the
own being) of action, the first consciousness is void (of the own being) of a first consciousness, birth
is void (of the own being) of a first consciousness, birth is void (of the own being) of birth,
(nevertheless) actions do not perish. O great King, immediately after the first consciousness, which
forms part of the (new) birth, has ceased, there arises without interruption the series of
consciousnesses, in which the ripening (of actions previously done) will be experienced.”
Thus said the Bhagavant. Having spoken thus, the Master said again in this way:
(176 b 4) 1. “All things are only names23,
they exist only in the mind;
separated from the word
what the word designates does not exist.24

2. Any element of existence (dharma)

can be designated by any name25;
that (= the element of existence)
does not exist in this (= the name)26:
this is the essence (dharmatā)
of the elements of existence (dharma)27.

3. The name is void (of he own being) of a name;

the name as a name does not exist;
all the elements of existence,

23
The thing “car” does not exist; “car” is only a word which designates a conglomerate of pieces (axle, wheels,
steering-wheel, etc.); things, being only words, exist only in the mind.
24
The Sanskrit text of this stanza is quoted by Haribhadra, Āloka, p. 294, lines 23-24, ed. P. L. Vaidya. Cf.
Laṅkāvatārasūtra, III, 78, p. 76, lines 5-6, ed. P. L. Vaidya. In both texts the stanza is quoted without any
indication of its provenance. Besides that, the stanza is partly quoted in the Acintyastava, 35, a hymn attributed
to Nāgārjuna, as having been said by the Lord Buddha. Cf. F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, ‘Nāgārjuna’s Catustava’
in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 13, 1985, p. 17.
25
Any element of existence can be designated by any name, since there is not an essential and permanent
relation between words and the things they designate; words are mere conventional denominations.
26
There is no identity between the word and the thing it designates.
27
Quoted by Asaṅga, Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 33, lines 1-2, ed. N. Dutt, expressly attributed to the
Bhavasaṃkrānrisūtra; by Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha, Vol. I, o, 15, lines 13-14, and Vol. I, p. 339, last two
lines, ed. D. Shastri, Varanasi, 1968, without any indication of provenance.
 lacking (in reality) a name,
have been designated by names28.

4. Since these elements of existence do not exist,

they arise completely from imagination;
the same imagination,
by which they are imagined as void,
does not exist here.29 [Página 12]

5. What a man, who sees correctly, says:

‘The eye sees the forms’30
that, in this world dominated by the evil of error,
has been called ‘Conventional Truth’ (saṃvṛtisatya)31.

6. What the Guide32 has correctly taught:

‘Vision arises by virtue of a conglomerate’33
that by the Wise has been called
‘The ground of access to Supreme Truth’.34

7. The eye sees no form,

28
Quoted by Śāntideva, Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 241, lines 13-14, ed. C. Bendall, attributed to Lokanātha
(Vyākaraṇa)
29
.Quoted by Prajñākaramati, Prañjikā ad IX, 141, p. 267, lines 27-28, ed. P. L. Vaidya, without any indication
of provenance; included in Nāgārjuna’s Acintyastava 36. Cf. Laṅkāvatārasūtra X, 10, p. 107, lines 21-22, ed.
P. L. Vaidya.
30
It is an error to think that the eye sees a form, since the only thing in front of it is a mere conglomerate of
dharmas, parts or atoms, which it erroneously grasp as something unitary and compact. Cf. F. Tola and C.
Dragonetti, ‘Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti’ in Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 10, 1982, 109-110.
31
“Conventional Truth” or “Relative Reality” (saṃvṛtisatya; in Tib. Kun rdsob bden pa) is empirical reality in
its totality. Empirical Reality is only a mere creation of our mind; it is superimposed upon True Reality; it
“Envelops” or “Conceals” True Reality; it is in fact True Reality wrongly perceived or conceived. And in turn,
True Reality is only the true way of being, the nature of empirical reality-voidness.
32
The Lord Buddha.
33
Vision takes place thanks to the cooperation of a series of factors such as the object seen, the light, the eye,
consciousness, etc., and the object is only a conglomerate of dharmas.
34
To know that we have to do only with conglomerates, that these conglomerates do not exist as they appear
before us, that the parts of the conglomerates in their own turn can be analyzed into their sub-parts and so on,
in an analytical and abolishing process that leads us to “voidness” –this knowledge is the means to introduce
ourselves into the Supreme Truth, into the True Reality of things.
Stanza 6 is quoted by Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā ad III, 8, p. 46, lines 12-13, ed. P. L. Vaidya, and attributed to
the Lord Buddha.
 the mind knows no idea (dharma)35
this is the Supreme Truth (paramārthasatya)
into which the world does not penetrate.”36

(177 a 1) The Bhagavant having spoken thus, Śreṇiya Bimbisāra, King of the Magadha
country, and the Bodhisattvas, and bhikṣus, and the world with the gods, men, asuras and heavenly
musicians (gaṇdharva) were pleased and greatly praised what the Bhagavant had said.

(Here) ends the Noble Sūtra of the Mahāyāna denominated: “Passage through existences”.

REFERENCES

Catalogue = The Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Peking Edition), ed. D. T. Suzuki, Catalogue and Indez, Tokyo
(Suzuki Research Foundation), 1962.

Nanjio = A Catalogue of the Cinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, by Bunyiu Nanjio, repr.
San Francisco (Chinese Materials Center), 1975.

Répertoire = Répertoire du Canon Bouddhique Sino-japonais, comp. P. Demiéville, H. Durt, A.

Seidel, Tokyo (Maison Franco-japonaise), 1978.

Taishō = Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (The Tripiṭaka in Chinese), ed. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe,
Tokyo (The Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Kanko Kai), 1960 sq.

Tōhoku = A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkaḥ-ḥgyur and Bstan-ḥygur), ed.
W. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanamura, T. Tada, Sendai (Tōhoku Imperial University – Saitō Gratitude
Foundation), 1934; repr. Delhi (Bibl. Indo-Buddhica, 12), 1983. [Página 18]

35
In truth there is not an eye existing in se et per se, which sees forms existing in se et per se, nor a mind
existing in se et per se, which knows mental creations, ideas existing in se et per se. The only thing we have is
an eye and a mind, conditioned, composed of elements, and as such unreal, which perceived forms and dharmas
which are equally conditioned, composed and unreal.
36
For our translation of dpogs, see Lokesh Chandra, Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary, sub voce.
Stanza 7 is quoted by Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā ad III, 8, p. 46, lines 10-11, ed. P. L. Vaidya, and attributed to
the Lord Buddha.