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Chapter 2 Measuring the Macroeconomy

2.1 Production Possibilities Frontiers and Opportunity Costs

1. Scarcity
A) stems from the incompatibility between limited resources and unlimited wants.
B) can be overcome by discovering new resources.
C) can be eliminated by rationing products.
D) is a bigger problem in market economies than in socialist economies.
Answer: A
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

2. In 2002, BMW made a tactical decision to use a robot to attach the gearbox to the engines of its
vehicles instead of using two workers as it had done previously. The robot method had a higher cost
but installed the gearbox in exactly the right position. In making this decision,
BMW
A) faced no tradeoffs because the robot method increased efficiency.
B) faced a tradeoff between higher cost and lower precision (in installing the gearbox in exactly
the right position)
C) adopted a negative technological change because it replaced workers with robots.
D) eroded some of its competitiveness in the luxury car market because of its increased cost of
production.
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 36/36
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Analytical
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: Chapter Opener: Managers Making Choices at BMW
57
3. The principle of opportunity cost is that
A) in a market economy, taking advantage of profitable opportunities involves some money
cost.
B) the economic cost of using a factor of production is the alternative use of that factor that is
given up.
C) taking advantage of investment opportunities involves costs.
D) the cost of production varies depending on the opportunity for technological
application.
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

4. The production possibilities frontier shows

A) the various products that can be produced now and in the future.
B) the maximum attainable combinations of two products that may be produced in a
particular time period with available resources.
C) what an equitable distribution of products among citizens would be.
D) what people want firms to produce in a particular time period.
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

5. The production possibilities frontier model shows that

A) if consumers decide to buy more of a product its price will increase.
B) a market economy is more efficient in producing goods and services than is a centrally
planned economy.
C) economic growth can only be achieved by free market economies.
D) if all resources are fully and efficiently utilized, more of one good can be produced only
by producing less of another good.
Answer: D
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: None

58
6. The production possibilities frontier model assumes all of the following except
A) labor, capital, land and natural resources are fixed in quantity.
B) the economy produces only two products.
C) any level of the two products that the economy produces is currently possible.
D) the level of technology is fixed and unchanging.
Answer: C
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

7. The attainable production points on a production possibility curve are

A) the horizontal and vertical intercepts.
B) the points along the production possibilities frontier.
C) the points outside the area enclosed by the production possibilities frontier.
D) the points along and inside the production possibility frontier.
Answer: D
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

8. The unattainable points in a production possibilities diagram are

A) the points within the production possibilities frontier.
B) the points along the production possibilities frontier.
C) the points of the horizontal and vertical intercepts.
D) the points outside the production possibilities frontier.
Answer: D
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

59
 Figure 2-1

9. Refer to Figure 2-1. Point A is

A) technically efficient.
B) unattainable with current resources.
C) inefficient in that not all resources are being used.
D) the equilibrium output combination.
Answer: C
Diff: 1 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

10. Refer to Figure 2-1. Point B is

A) technically efficient.
B) unattainable with current resources.
C) inefficient in that not all resources are being used.
D) the equilibrium output combination.
Answer: A
Diff: 1 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

60
11. Refer to Figure 2-1. Point C is
A) technically efficient.
B) unattainable with current resources.
C) inefficient in that not all resources are being used.
D) is the equilibrium output combination.
Answer: B
Diff: 1 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

12. In a production possibilities frontier model, a point inside the frontier is

A) allocatively efficient.
B) productively efficient
C) allocatively inefficient.
D) productively inefficient.
Answer: D
Diff: 1 Type: MC Page Ref: 38/38
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

13. Bella can produce either a combination of 60 silk roses and 80 silk leaves or a combination of 70 silk
roses and 55 silk leaves. If she now produces 60 silk roses and 80 silk leaves, what is the opportunity
cost of producing an additional 10 silk roses?
A) 25 silk leaves.
B) 2.5 silk leaves.
C) 55 silk leaves.
D) 10 silk leaves
Answer: A
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 39/39
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: None

61
 14. If the production possibilities frontier is linear, then
A) opportunity costs are decreasing as more of one good is produced.
B) it is easy to efficiently produce output.
C) opportunity costs are increasing as more of one good is produced.
D) opportunity costs are constant as more of one good is produced.
Answer: D
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 39/39
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

Figure 2-2

Figure 2-2 above shows the production possibilities frontier for Mendonca, an agrarian nation that
produces two goods, meat and vegetables.

15. Refer to Figure 2-2. What is the opportunity cost of one pound of vegetables?
A) 3/4 pounds of meat
B) 1.2 pounds of meat
C) 1 1/3 pounds of meat
D) 12 pounds of meat
Answer: A
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 40/40
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: Solved Problem: Drawing a Production Possibilities Frontier for Rosie's Boston Bakery

62
16. Refer to Figure 2-2. What is the opportunity cost of one pound of meat?
A) 3/4 pounds of vegetables
B) 1.6 pounds of vegetables
C) 1 1/3 pounds of vegetables
D) 16 pounds of vegetables
Answer: C
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 40/40
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: Solved Problem: Drawing a Production Possibilities Frontier for Rosie's Boston Bakery

17. Refer to Figure 2-2. Suppose Mendonca is currently producing 60 pounds of vegetables per period.
How much meat is it also producing, assuming that resources are fully utilized?
A) 45 pounds of meat
B) 75 pounds of meat
C) 80 pounds of meat
D) 100 pounds of meat
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 40/40
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: Solved Problem: Drawing a Production Possibilities Frontier for Rosie's Boston Bakery

18. Refer to Figure 2-2. The linear production possibilities frontier in the figure indicates that
A) Mendonca has a comparative advantage in the production of vegetables.
B) Mendonca has a comparative disadvantage in the production of meat.
C) the tradeoff between meat and vegetables is constant.
D) it is progressively more expensive to produce meat.
Answer: C
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 40/40
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: Solved Problem: Drawing a Production Possibilities Frontier for Rosie's Boston Bakery

63
19. A production possibilities frontier with a bowed outward shape indicates
A) the possibility of inefficient production.
B) constant opportunity costs as more and more of one good is produced.
C) increasing opportunity costs as more and more of one good is produced.
D) decreasing opportunity costs as more and more of one good is produced.
Answer: C
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

20. Increasing opportunity cost along a bowed out production possibilities frontier occurs
because
A) of inefficient production.
B) of ineffective management by entrepreneurs.
C) some factors of production are not equally suited to producing both goods or services.
D) of the scarcity of factors of production.
Answer: C
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

21. The slope of a production possibilities frontier

A) has no economic relevance or meaning.
B) is always constant.
C) is always varying.
D) measures the opportunity cost of producing one more unit of a good.
Answer: D
Diff: 1 Type: MC Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

64
22. Increasing marginal opportunity cost implies that
A) the more resources already devoted to any activity, the payoff from allocating yet more
resources to that activity increases by progressively smaller amounts.
B) the more resources already devoted to any activity, the benefits from allocating yet more
resources to that activity decreases by progressively larger amounts.
C) that rising opportunity costs makes it inefficient to produce beyond a certain quantity.
D) the law of scarcity.
Answer: A
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

23. If opportunity costs are constant, the production possibilities frontier would be graphed as
A) a ray from the origin.
B) a positively sloped straight line.
C) a negatively sloped curve bowed in toward the origin.
D) a negatively sloped straight line.
Answer: D
Diff: 1 Type: MC Page Ref: 40/40
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

65
 Figure 2-3

24. Refer to Figure 2-3. Carlos Vanya grows tomatoes and strawberries on his land. His land is
equally suited for growing either fruit. Which of the graphs in Figure 2-3 represent his production
possibilities frontier?
A) Graph A
B) Graph B
C) Graph C
D) Either Graph A or Graph B
E) Either graph B or Graph C
Answer: A
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 40/40
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

25. Refer to Figure 2-3. Carlos Vanya grows tomatoes and strawberries on his land. A portion of his
land is more suitable for growing tomatoes and the other portion is better suited for strawberry
cultivation. Which of the graphs in Figure 2-3 represent his production possibilities frontier?

A) Graph A
B) Graph B
C) Graph C
D) either Graph A or Graph B
E) either graph B or Graph C
Answer: C
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 42/42
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

66
26. An outward shift of a nation's production possibilities frontier can occur due to
A) a reduction in unemployment.
B) a natural disaster like a hurricane or bad earthquake.
C) a change in the amounts of one good desired.
D) an increase in the labor force.
Answer: D
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

27. An outward shift of a nation's production possibilities frontier represents

A) economic growth.
B) rising prices of the two goods on the production possibilities frontier model.
C) an impossible situation.
D) a situation in which a country produces more of one good and less of another.
Answer: A
Diff: 1 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

28. Economic growth is represented on a production possibilities frontier model by the

production possibility frontier
A) shifting outward.
B) shifting inward.
C) becoming steeper.
D) becoming flatter.
Answer: A
Diff: 1 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

67
29. Without an increase in the supplies of factors of production, how can a nation achieve
economic growth?
A) by producing more high- value goods and less of low-value goods
B) through technological advancement which enables more output with the same
quantity of resources
C) by lowering the prices of factors of production
D) by increasing the prices of factors of production
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Reflective Thinking
Special Feature: None

30. Which of the following would shift a nation's production possibilities frontier inward?
A) discovering a cheap way to convert sunshine into electricity
B) producing more capital equipment
C) an increase in the unemployment rate
D) a law requiring workers to retire at age 50
Answer: D
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: None

68
 Figure 2-4

Figure 2-4 shows various points on three different production possibilities frontiers for a nation.

31. Refer to Figure 2-4. A movement from X to Y

A) could be due to a change in consumers' tastes and preferences.
B) could occur because of an influx of immigrant labor.
C) is the result of advancements in food production technology only, with no change in the
technology for plastic production.
D) is the result of advancements in plastic production technology only, with no change in food
production technology.
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: None

32. Refer to Figure 2-4. A movement from Y to Z

A) represents an increase in the demand for plastic products.
B) could occur because of general technological advancements.
C) is the result of advancements in food production technology.
D) is the result of advancements in plastic production technology.
Answer: D
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: None

33.

69
Refer to
following events:
Figure 2- a. an increase in the unemployment rate

4. b.a decrease in a nation's money supply

Consider c. a war that kills a significant portion of a nation's population the

Which of the events listed above could cause a movement from Y to W ?

A) a, b and c
B) a and b only
C) a and c only
D) a only
E) c only
Answer: E
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: None

34. Refer to Figure 2-4. Consider the following movements:

a. from point V to point W
b. from point W to point Y
c. from point Y to point Z

Which of the movements listed above represents economic growth?

A) a, b, and c
B) b and c only
C) a only
D) b only
Answer: B
Diff: 2 Type: MC Page Ref: 43/43
Topic: Production Possibilities Frontier and Opportunity Costs
Skill: Conceptual
Objective: LO 1: Use a production possibilities frontier to analyze opportunity costs and trade-offs
AACSB Coding: Analytic Skills
Special Feature: None

70
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presentation by the ladies of that city of a stand of colors to a
volunteer regiment in camp there.
On the 4th of July, 1861, the Thirty-seventh Congress met in extra
session, and adjourned on the 6th of August, after having enacted
laws to increase the army and navy, and to provide the means and
authority necessary for the vigorous prosecution of the war. The
scope of the work undertaken by this Congress was far greater than
that of any preceding session. Many of the members had but little
experience in legislative matters, but their patriotism was sincere
and ardent, and their acts embodied the national purpose to
maintain the integrity of the republic at any cost. On the second day
of the session Mr. Chandler said in the Senate:

I desire to give notice that I shall to-morrow or on some

subsequent day introduce a bill to confiscate the property of all
Governors of States, members of the Legislature, Judges of
Courts, and all military officers above the rank of lieutenant who
shall take up arms against the United States, or aid or abet
treason against the government of the United States, and that
said individual shall be forever disqualified from holding any
office of honor, emolument or trust under this government.

This bill was introduced on July 15, and was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary; it reported back a measure of much
narrower scope, which was passed, and is known as the confiscation
act of 1861. The origin of Mr. Chandler's bill was the fact that John Y.
Mason of Virginia, who had been expelled from the Senate for
treason, owned a large amount of property in Pennsylvania, and so
indignant were the people of the county in which it was located at
his treachery, that a guard was kept over it constantly to prevent its
destruction by a mob. Mr. Chandler believed it was important that
the government should be enabled to legally seize for its own use
such property as this; there were also many officers of the army and
navy who were undecided whether to go with the rebellion or
remain at their posts. He wished to add to the penalties of treason
to affect them, as well as those wealthy citizens of Washington and
Maryland who had formerly been in office and who sympathized with
the rebellion and gave the South as much encouragement as they
dared. His proposition proved then too vigorous to obtain the
endorsement of his colleagues, but within a year its principle
received Congressional sanction. During this session (on July 18) Mr.
Chandler said in the Senate with characteristic force:

The Senator from Indiana says there are three parties in the
country. I deny it, sir. There are but two parties, patriots and
traitors—none others in this body nor in the country. I care not
what proposition may be brought up to save the Union, to
preserve its integrity, patriots will vote for it; and I care not
what proposition you may bring up to dissolve the Union, to
break up this government, traitors will vote for that. And those
are the only two parties there are in the Senate or the country.

It is not necessary to add that Mr. Chandler voted at this session for
every measure to organize armies and to raise means for their
maintenance, and that he favored at all times vigorous and summary
measures in dealing with the enemies of the republic.
General McDowell's "invasion of Virginia" on May 23 was followed by
several weeks of military inactivity on the Potomac, broken only by a
dash of the Union cavalry into Fairfax Courthouse and the skirmish
at Vienna, where a regiment of Ohio troops, who were backed on a
railroad train into a rebel ambuscade, lost twenty men. On July 16
the Union army began a forward movement against the rebels who
were found in position about and along a creek known as Bull Run.
After a short and indecisive engagement on that day, General
McDowell commenced to concentrate his forces for an attack on
Beauregard's line, but various delays prevented any definite
movement until Sunday, July 21. On that date was fought the battle
of Bull Run, ending in a complete Union defeat, attended by severe
losses and a panic-stricken retreat by many regiments, and followed
by great national dismay and alarm. An inquiry into the blundering
strategy, political half-heartedness, and poor generalship, which
were the causes of this unnecessary and most serious reverse, are
foreign to the purpose of this work. Mr. Chandler was one of a large
number of members of Congress who joined the army on the eve of
battle, and watched its progress to the final disaster. The First
Michigan was among the regiments engaged in the thickest of the
fight, and the Second and Third were in the brigade of Gen. I. B.
Richardson, which acted as a rear-guard in the retreat of the army
and prevented defeat from becoming a total rout. Mr. Chandler
himself aided in halting and rallying the panic-stricken fugitives,[21]
and reached Washington late at night, covered with mud and
wearied with travel and hunger. He drove at once to the White
House, where he found Mr. Lincoln despondent, exhausted with his
labors, and greatly depressed by the defeat and the loss of life
involved. Mr. Chandler urged upon the President the necessity of
vigorous measures, the wisdom of calling for more troops, and the
certainty that the North would follow the Administration in meeting a
reverse with undismayed and redoubled energies. He asked Mr.
Lincoln to issue an order for the enrolling of 500,000 men at once,
"to show to the country and the rebels that the government was not
discouraged a whit, but was just beginning to get mad." Mr.
Chandler's vitality, the timely vigor of his bold words, and his
overwhelming earnestness acted as a tonic upon the over-burdened
Executive, and he left Mr. Lincoln cheered, encouraged and resolute.
The governors of the loyal States were at once appealed to for more
troops, and the answer of the North to Bull Run was the rush of tens
of thousands of men into camp and the organization of great armies
along the Potomac, the Ohio and the Mississippi. Secretary Stanton,
who knew of this midnight interview, estimated its effect upon the
course of events as of the utmost importance, and repeatedly said
that Mr. Chandler's opportunely-manifested courage and vigor then
saved the Union from a great peril.
In the task of reorganizing the army after Bull Run, of clearing
Washington of fugitives, and of extracting order from chaos, Mr.
Chandler rendered important aid to the authorities, and after the
adjournment returned to Michigan and threw his strong energies
into the work of raising and equipping troops. This letter (which was
not followed by any practical results, owing to various causes) is of
interest as showing the spirit of those days:

Detroit, Aug. 27,

1861.

Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War.

My Dear Cameron: A Colonel Elliott, member of the Canadian
Parliament, is desirous of raising a regiment of Canadian cavalry
for the war against treason. I don't know how the
Administration may look upon this proposition, but there are
many reasons in favor of its acceptance.
1. Colonel Elliott is a brave and experienced officer.
2. He is in favor of the closest union between the Canadas and
the United States, and believes that this fraternal union upon
the battle-field would tend strongly to cement a yet closer
connection.
3. It would satisfy England that hands-off was her best policy.
The moment it is proven that black men are used in the
Southern army against us, I propose to recruit a few regiments
of negroes in Canada myself to meet that enemy, and I think
this would be an opening wedge for the movement of
emancipation.
My colleague will introduce Colonel Elliott to you and explain
more at length. Truly, your friend,
Z. CHANDLER.

To this same period also belongs this characteristic defense of his

State and the Northwest against what Mr. Chandler believed—and
with reason—to be an unjust statement:
To the Editor of the New York World:
My attention has been called to an article in your valuable and
patriotic paper in which you say: "The extreme Northern States,
from Maine to Michigan, have not done their duty, and it is high
time that State pride aroused them to emulate the noble
example of New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island." As I
am sure you would not willingly do injustice to Michigan, I ask
you to state editorially, the population and the number of
regiments in the field for the war from each of the States whose
example is to be emulated. Michigan had at Bull Run one three-
months' regiment (now recruiting and in for the war) and three
regiments for the war, and not a private soldier in camp in the
State. Since that time she has sent seven regiments for the war,
making ten regiments now present in the army, in addition to
which she furnished to other States over 2,000 men, now in the
field, for the reason that the government would accept no more
men from Michigan at that time, and the patriotic ardor of our
citizens could not be restrained. We have now in camp nearly
4,000 men, and shall send two regiments this week and two
more within a few days.
The Northwest has done her whole duty; how is it with the
East? The Northwest has exceeded every call made upon her,
and yet you lack men and are denuding over 2,000 miles of
border territory of troops for the defense of Washington. If New
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the New England States
cannot defend Washington, in God's name what can they do?
The Northwest will defend the lines from the mountains of
Virginia to the Rocky Mountains. She will sweep secession and
treason from the valley of the Mississippi, aye, and will defend
the Potomac, too, if she must. But is not this Union worth as
much to New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts as to the
Northwest? Why, then, so tardy in supplying troops? Had five of
the forty Northwestern regiments now on the Potomac been
with Lyon he would have won the battle and cleared Missouri!
Had five been with Mulligan he would now be in possession of
 Lexington! Could ten of them be sent into Kentucky to-morrow
(in addition to what they have) they would clear the State of
secession in ten days, and threaten Tennessee! Could ten be
sent to Rosecrans he would clear the mountains of Virginia and
threaten the rear of the grand army! But, no; this cannot be
done—because the East will not do her duty. If she does not at
once, the whole world will cry shame. Respectfully, your
obedient servant,
Z. CHANDLER.
Detroit, Sept. 30, 1861.

During the Congressional recess he also sent this letter of

characteristic suggestions to the Secretary of War:

Detroit, Nov. 15,

1861.

Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War.

My Dear Sir: The time for delivering a battle upon the Potomac
has now passed, and something must and can be done. In my
opinion the following plan is still feasible, and will close the war:
Let Rosecrans be ordered immediately to Kentucky with his
army of veteran Northwestern troops. Substitute an equal or
larger number of Eastern troops with an Eastern general, who
will act strictly upon the defensive. Send your Northwestern
troops now upon the Potomac to Cairo at once. Send Pope (if he
is the man) to Missouri with sufficient arms to supply all the
Northwestern regiments in readiness to march on the 1st day of
December. Let an abundance of transports and material be
provided at Cairo and St. Louis, by that date (December 1st).
Give the order, "Forward," and then cut the wires.
Stop all official communication with the Army of the Northwest.
That army, if thus untrammeled, will spend New Year's day in
 New Orleans, via Memphis, and will reach Washington via
Richmond by the 1st of May next.
In the meantime Sherman, Butler, and Burnside can take care of
South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, and North Carolina will
fall of itself with Virginia and the Gulf States.
Is this plan feasible?
None but a traitor will say you Nay, for you and I know that
200,000 Northwestern soldiers, with Rosecrans's and Lyon's
veterans, can and will go wherever they are ordered, and on
time.
As to your Army of the Potomac, select 100,000 men of your
city regiments which look well on parade, and keep them for
reviews. Send the balance to the Gulf States. We want none of
them out West.
We will, by recruiting during the winter, keep our Grand Army up
to 200,000 men, and furnish garrisons as fast as needed for
captured towns. Very truly yours,
Z. CHANDLER.

Congress re-assembled for its regular session in December, 1861,

and Mr. Chandler was called upon (on Jan. 17, 1862) to present the
credentials of the Hon. Jacob M. Howard as his colleague from
Michigan, vice Kinsley S. Bingham, who had died suddenly in the
preceding October. Mr. Howard remained a Senator for ten years,
winning distinction in that position. Throughout his term his relations
with his colleague were intimate and cordial, and the foremost
merchant and the first lawyer of Michigan stood side by side in the
Senate in the support of every important measure which had for its
object the encouragement of loyal sentiment, or the strengthening
of the military and financial arms of the government, or the prompt
suppression of the rebellion.
 FOOTNOTES:
[19] Mr. Clay (C. C. Clay, Jr., of Alabama), chairman of the
Committee on Commerce, drew up in the room of that committee
the original ordinance of secession for the State of Alabama,
while he, a rebel traitor, was drawing the pay of this government.
It was drawn upon government paper, written with government
ink, and copied by a clerk drawing $6 a day from this
government. I found it in that room and I have it now.—Zachariah
Chandler in the Senate, April 12, 1864.
[20] This undoubtedly refers to Lewis Cass.
[21] Whatever credit there was in stopping the rout (at this point)
is due wholly to Senators Chandler and Wade, and
Representatives Blake, Riddle, and Morris. These gentlemen,
armed with Maynard rifles and navy revolvers, sprang from their
carriages some three miles this side of Centreville, and,
presenting their weapons, in loud voices commanded the fugitives
to halt and turn back. Their bold and determined manner brought
most at that point to a stand-still. Many on horseback, who
attempted to dash by them, had their horses seized by the bits.
Some of the fugitives who were armed menaced these
gentlemen. None, however, were permitted to pass until the
arrival of the Second New Jersey Regiment, on its way to the
battle-ground, turned back the flying soldiers and teamsters.—
Washington Intelligencer, July 22, 1861.
 CHAPTER XIII.
THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF
THE WAR.
uring the Congressional recess of the autumn of 1861 gross
mismanagement led to the annihilation at Ball's Bluff of a brigade of
Union troops, led by Senator Edward D. Baker of Oregon. They had
been sent across the Potomac in flat-boats and skiffs, were left
without adequate support, and, being surrounded by a vastly
superior force of rebels, were driven to the edge of the river, and there
either killed, wounded, captured, or driven into hiding places along the
banks. Their commanding officer, who displayed throughout a high order of
personal courage, was shot at the head of his line before the final rout.
General Baker was a man of eloquence and many gallant qualities, and his
death created a profound impression; that he was sacrificed by military
incapacity cannot be doubted.
Congress met on Dec. 2, 1861, and on the first business day of the session
Mr. Chandler offered a motion for the expulsion of John C. Breckenridge,
who had at last joined the rebels, and it was unanimously adopted. On
December 5 he introduced this resolution:

Resolved, That a committee of three be appointed to inquire into the

disasters at Bull Run and Edward's Ferry (subsequently changed to
Ball's Bluff), with power to send for persons and papers.

Mr. Chandler said, in explanation of his motion, that these reverses had
been attributed to politicians, to civilians, to everything but the right cause,
and that it was due to the Senate and to the country that they should be
investigated and that the blame should rest where it belonged. After some
discussion the Senate adopted the resolution with only three dissenting
votes, first amending it by providing for a joint committee of both branches,
and by enlarging the scope of its inquiries so as to include "the conduct of
the war." The House concurred in the action, and the famous "Committee on
the Conduct of the War" was thus created. On December 17, Mr. Chandler
moved that the Vice-President should appoint the Senate members, adding:
"I do not know what the parliamentary usage may be in a case of this kind.
If that usage would give me the position of chairman, I wish to say that,
under the circumstances, I do not wish to accept it." Mr. Chandler had also
privately requested Mr. Hamlin to appoint Senator Wade to the
chairmanship, saying it was important that a lawyer should be given that
place, and his desires were followed in both respects. The first committee,
as announced at that time, consisted of the following Congressmen: On the
part of the Senate, Benjamin F. Wade, Zachariah Chandler and Andrew
Johnson; on the part of the House, Daniel W. Gooch of Massachusetts, John
Covode of Pennsylvania, George W. Julian of Indiana, and Moses F. Odell of
New York. Of the original committee, George W. Julian is the only one who
survived Mr. Chandler. When Andrew Johnson was appointed Military
Governor of Tennessee, he resigned his position upon the committee, and
Senator Joseph A. Wright of Indiana took his place. Mr. Wright served but a
year, and after the expiration of his term the Senate branch of the
committee in the Thirty-seventh Congress consisted of only Mr. Chandler
and Mr. Wade. William Blair Lord, now one of the official reporters of the
House of Representatives, was appointed its clerk and stenographer.
 ZACHARIAH CHANDLER IN 1862.
The tone of the Congressional discussion upon Mr. Chandler's proposition
shows that this was regarded as an exceedingly important step, for the
resolution clothed the committee with powers of very unusual magnitude,
which, if abused, must have seriously embarrassed the Administration. Mr.
Lincoln and Secretary Cameron, as well as General Scott and General
McClellan, opposed its appointment at the outset, but Mr. Chandler took
prompt and successful measures to assure the President that, if the plans of
its projectors were carried out, the committee would be used only to
strengthen the hands of the Executive, and promised that it should be made
a help and not a hindrance to the vigorous prosecution of the war. On this
point the Hon. James M. Edmunds, who was thoroughly informed as to the
secret history of that period, has said:

The writer knows that the Administration was not without fear that this
was an unfriendly measure. A member of the Cabinet expressed such
fears to him, and said that the President had not only expressed doubts
as to the wisdom of the movement, but also fears that the committee
might, by unfriendly action, greatly embarrass the Executive. On being
told by the writer that the measure was not so intended, but, on the
contrary, that it was the intention of the mover to bring the committee
to the aid of the Administration, he expressed much gratification, and
said it was of the utmost importance to bring such purpose to the
knowledge of the President in some authoritative way, and at the
earliest moment possible. This conversation was at once reported to
Senator Chandler, whereupon both he and Senator Wade went
immediately to the President and the Secretary of War, and assured
them that it was their purpose to bring the whole power of the
committee to the aid of the Executive. From this moment the most
cordial relations existed between the committee and the Administration.
[22]

President Lincoln and Secretaries Cameron and Stanton ultimately placed

great reliance upon the committee, and constantly, throughout the war, it
gave them the most valuable assistance. Mr. Wade and Mr. Chandler were
deeper in the confidence of Secretary Stanton, from their connection with it,
than were any other members of Congress, and differences of aim and
opinion between them were exceedingly rare.
Upon organizing for work the committee found itself confronted with an
enormous task, inquiries into every phase of the organization and
management of the Union armies being referred to it for consideration.
"Upon the conduct of the war," to quote from its own report, "depended the
issue of the experiment inaugurated by our fathers, after the expenditure of
so much blood and treasure—the establishment of a nation founded upon
the capacity of man for self-government. The nation was engaged in a
struggle for its existence; a rebellion, unparalleled in history, threatened the
overthrow of our free institutions, and the most prompt and vigorous
measures were demanded by every consideration of honor, patriotism, and a
due regard for the prosperity and happiness of the people." And its sphere
of duty was the constant watching of the details of movements, upon whose
result depended such vast interests, as well as the safety of thousands of
lives. The committee, in laying out its work, followed the suggestion of Mr.
Chandler, which was, first, to obtain such information in respect to the
conduct of the war as would best enable them to point out the mistakes
which had been made in the past, and the course that promised to ensure
the avoidance of their repetition; second, to collect such information as the
many and laborious duties of the President and Secretary of War prevented
them from obtaining, and to lay it before them with those recommendations
and suggestions which the circumstances seemed to demand. Working in
such a field, the committee soon became a second Cabinet council, and its
proceedings were constantly at the President's hand. Its sessions were
nearly perpetual, and almost daily its members were in consultation with the
President or the Secretary of War. Many of its transactions were never
committed to paper, and, as the members were sworn to the strictest
secrecy, will never be revealed. Secretary Stanton was frequently present
while the committee was in session, and its door was always open to him.
There was never any lack of harmony between him and its chief members,
but, on the contrary, the utmost confidence was exchanged, and this
committee was the right arm of the War Department in the darkest days of
the rebellion. Repeatedly, after the examination of some important witness,
did Mr. Chandler or Mr. Wade go at once to the White House with the official
stenographer, when Mr. Stanton would be sent for and the stenographic
notes of the evidence would be read to the President and Secretary of War
for their information and guidance. From such conferences there sprang
many important decisions, and the files and records of the committee were
constantly referred to and relied upon as sources of exceedingly useful
knowledge and hints both at the White House and at the War Department.
Many subjects presented themselves for investigation, any one of which
would, in ordinary times, have required the exclusive attention of a separate
committee, and to follow out every line of inquiry suggested was manifestly
a practical impossibility. Therefore the committee decided not to undertake
any investigations into what might be considered side issues, but to keep
their attention directed entirely to the essential features of the war, so that
they could ascertain and comprehend the necessities of the armies and the
causes of disaster or complaint, and the methods of supplying the one and
remedying the other. Attempts were made repeatedly to use its power to
punish enemies or to avenge private grievances, but its members adhered
resolutely to the straightforward course originally marked out as the path of
its duty.
The first subject which the committee carefully inquired into was the defeat
at Bull Run. Many witnesses were examined, chiefly officers who were
engaged in the battle—Generals Scott, McDowell, Meigs, Heintzelman,
Butterfield, Fitz-John Porter, and others. The testimony was very
voluminous, but the committee reached an early and unanimous opinion as
to the causes of the disaster. Their report, written by Mr. Wade, said: "That
which now appears to have been the great error was the failure to occupy
Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The
position at Manassas controlled the railroad connections in all that section of
the country.... The next cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding
against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was nearly
expired. The enemy were allowed time to collect their forces and strengthen
their position by defensive works.... There had been but little time devoted
to disciplining the troops and instructing them, even in regiments; hardly
any instruction had been given them in brigade movements, and none at all
as divisions." General McDowell prepared a plan of campaign, which was
approved by the Cabinet, and the 9th of July was fixed upon as the day for
the advance; but the movement did not commence until a week later than
the appointed time. Transportation was deficient, and there was much delay
resulting from lack of discipline among the troops, and when the battle
came the Union forces were fatigued and not in good fighting condition.
"But," said the report, "the principal cause of the defeat was the failure of
General Patterson to hold the troops of General Johnston in the valley of the
Shenandoah." Patterson had 23,000 men, while Johnston had but 12,000.
Still, Patterson disobeyed the orders of General Scott, which were to make
offensive demonstrations against General Johnston so as to detain his army
at Winchester, and if he retreated to follow him and keep up the fight.
Those orders were repeated every day for more than a week in the
telegraphic correspondence between Scott and Patterson. Finally, General
Scott heard of a large force moving from Patterson's front, and telegraphed,
"Has not the enemy stolen a march on you?" To this Patterson replied, "The
enemy has stolen no march upon me," while at that very time his large
army was watching an empty camp and Johnston was far on his way to
reinforce the rebels at Manassas. Patterson did not discover that Johnston
had gone until he was miles distant, and the consequence was that
McDowell had both Beauregard and Johnston to fight, while Patterson, with
23,000 men, was lying idle in his camp. This is the substance of the report
of the Committee on the Conduct of the War on the battle of Bull Run, and
was the official announcement to the country of the inefficiency of the
organization and generalship of the Army of the Potomac.
But before the committee was organized the men who were responsible for
this failure had been displaced, and General McClellan had been made the
commander-in-chief. He had taken the reins of authority amid national
acclamations, and was then at the height of a remarkable popularity, which
it is now known was adroitly stimulated for political purposes by the
conservative press. But on the investigation into the second subject taken
up by the committee (the disaster at Edward's Ferry or Ball's Bluff) facts
came to the knowledge of its members which created the suspicion in their
minds that General Stone, who was charged with the blame of that defeat,
and who, as the scape-goat, was arrested and imprisoned in Fort Lafayette,
was not alone responsible for the calamity, but that the real fault would be
found higher up. This suspicion they were never able to substantiate by
absolute proof, and it was not expressed in any of their reports.
The third topic taken up by the committee was the military management of
the Western Department, under General Fremont. This was an inquiry of
special importance, for the reason that that officer, upon taking command at
St. Louis, issued a proclamation declaring free all slaves whose masters
were engaged in rebellion against the United States. This order caused a
great excitement throughout the country, and the Republican party was
widely divided in opinion as to its legality and propriety. President Lincoln
was conservative on the question, and revoked the Fremont order, much to
the disappointment of Mr. Chandler and the other more "advanced"
Republicans. Hence the committee approached the subject with unusual
interest, and, after a thorough investigation, made an elaborate report. That
part of this document which relates to General Fremont's order in regard to
slaves was signed by Messrs. Wade, Chandler, Julian, and Covode, and
showed the ground on which these gentlemen then stood with regard to
emancipation; it was as follows:

But that feature of General Fremont's administration which attracted

the most attention, and which will ever be most prominent among the
many points of interest connected with the history of that department,
is his proclamation of emancipation. Whatever opinion may be
entertained with reference to the time when the policy of emancipation
should be inaugurated, there can be no doubt that General Fremont at
that early day rightly judged in regard to the most effective means of
 subduing this rebellion. In proof of that, it is only necessary to state
that his successor, when transferred to another department, issued a
proclamation embodying the same principle, and the President of the
United States has since applied the same principle to all the rebellious
States; and few will deny that it must be adhered to until the last
vestige of treason and rebellion is destroyed.

The committee heartily endorsed General Fremont's administration,

declaring it to have been "eminently characterized by earnestness, ability,
and the most unquestionable loyalty." They also examined into various
minor military matters and movements, including, particularly, rebel
barbarities and the return of slaves to their masters by the army.
It was as a member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War in the
Thirty-seventh Congress, and from the evidence taken in its inquiries, that
Mr. Chandler obtained the mass of information which enabled him to make
the most important of his war speeches, that of July 16, 1862, in which he
exposed so conclusively General McClellan's utter incompetence. Ample as
was the foundation of facts upon which rested this effective arraignment of
conspicuous incapacity, the attack was one requiring genuine boldness, for it
defiantly invited a storm of denunciation and, if it had failed of justification
by the event, would have certainly ended its maker's political career.
Notwithstanding his tardiness, his timidity, his inefficiency as a commander
in the field, and his political sympathy with the more unpatriotic classes of
the Northern people, General McClellan was still strong with the people and
entrusted with great powers. The Democracy warmly commended his
sentiments and methods, and labored incessantly to prevent any diminution
of his hold upon the public confidence. The Army of the Potomac yet
regarded him as "the young Napoleon," and its corps commanders were,
with but few exceptions, his personal adherents. The long-suffering
President was submitting with patience to his unjust complaints, after
having labored incessantly to stimulate into activity his chronic sluggishness,
fearful, with characteristic over-caution, lest his summary removal should
divide the North and breed a dangerous disaffection in the face of the
enemy among his troops. Many who did not believe in the sincerity or ability
of the man also smothered their distrust, for fear that criticism would only
weaken the common cause and with the hope that even in his nerveless
hands the mighty weapon of the national resources would at last fall—even
if by its own weight only—on the enemy with decisive force. At this juncture,
and under these circumstances, Mr. Chandler, with characteristic vigor of
statement and plainness of speech, placed before the Senate and the
country the demonstration of McClellan's imbecility.
Originally Mr. Chandler believed that McClellan's selection as the practical
successor of General Scott was a wise one, and hoped to see his organizing
capacity in camp supplemented by enterprise and courage in the field.
Distrust first sprang up with the persistent inaction of the Army of the
Potomac throughout the last months of 1861, and it was strengthened by
contact with the man himself and the study of his character and his plans.
An illustration of how this change of opinion was brought about is given in
an incident which occurred in the room of the Committee on the Conduct of
the War. That committee sent for General McClellan as soon as they took up
matters relating to his command, in order to consult with him informally as
to the situation. This was in January, 1861, while he was in Washington
"organizing" his army, and while there was no little impatience felt because
he did not move. He was not formally summoned before the committee
then, but simply called in for general consultation. After the regular business
was finished, Mr. Chandler asked him bluntly why he did not attack the
rebels. General McClellan replied that it was because there were not
sufficient means of communication with Washington; he then called
attention to the fact that there were only two bridges and no other means
of transportation across the Potomac.
Mr. Chandler asked what the number of bridges had to do with an advance
movement, and McClellan explained with much detail that it was one of the
most important features of skillful strategy that a commander should have
plenty of room to retreat before making an attack. To this Mr. Chandler's
response was:
"General McClellan, if I understand you correctly, before you strike at the
rebels you want to be sure of plenty of room so that you can run in case
they strike back!"
"Or in case you get scared," added Senator Wade.
The commander of the Army of the Potomac manifested indignation at this
blunt way of putting the case, and then proceeded at length to explain the
art of war and the science of generalship, laying special stress upon the
necessity of having lines of retreat, as well as lines of communication and
supply, always open. He labored hard to make clear all the methods and
counter-methods upon which campaigns are managed and battles fought,
and, as he was an accomplished master of the theory of war, succeeded in
rendering himself at least interesting. After he had concluded, Mr. Wade
said:
"General, you have all the troops you have called for, and if you haven't
enough, you shall have more. They are well organized and equipped, and
the loyal people of this country expect that you will make a short and
decisive campaign. Is it really necessary for you to have more bridges over
the Potomac before you move?"
"Not that," was the answer, "not that exactly, but we must bear in mind the
necessity of having everything ready in case of a defeat, and keep our lines
of retreat open."
With this remark General McClellan left the room, whereupon Mr. Wade
asked:
"Chandler, what do you think of the science of generalship?"
"I don't know much about war," was the reply, "but it seems to me that this
is infernal, unmitigated cowardice."
The committee, after this interview, made a careful inquiry into the strength
of the rebel forces confronting the elaborate intrenchments about
Washington, and became convinced that the army at and about Manassas
was a handful compared with the magnificent body of troops under
McClellan's command. They submitted these facts to the President and his
Cabinet at a special session held for that purpose, and urged the importance
of an instant advance. With one single exception (a Cabinet officer) the
heads of the departments and the committee agreed that an offensive
movement from the line of the Potomac into Virginia was important and
must be made. General McClellan promised that his army should start, but it
did not. Toward the close of the winter the President ordered a general
advance, but the Army of the Potomac still remained immobile. Finally, on
March 10, under the peremptory orders of the President, it did advance to
Centreville and found there deserted camps, wooden guns, weak
intrenchments, and traces of the retreat of not more than a single full corps
of rebel troops. It was during this most aggravating delay that members of
the committee had another characteristic interview with General McClellan.
On the 19th of February a sub-committee waited upon the Secretary of
War[23] to ask why the army was idle, and why the city of Washington and
the North side of the Potomac river were crowded with troops when the
enemy was all in Virginia. Mr. Wade said that it was a disgrace to the nation
that Washington was thus allowed to remain to all intents and purposes in a
state of siege To this Secretary Stanton replied that the committee could not
feel more keenly upon this subject than did he, that he did not go to bed at
night without his cheek burning with shame at this disgrace, and that the
subject had received his earnest attention, but he had not been able to
change the situation as he wished. General McClellan was then sent for, and
Secretary Stanton stated to him the object of the visit, and repeated the
inquiries as to why an advance movement was not made into Virginia, the
rebels driven away from Washington, and the soldiers who were idle in their
camps in and around the city sent to active duty.
General McClellan answered that he was considering the matter, but that
instant action was impossible, although he hoped that he would soon be
able to decide what ought to be done. The committee asked what time he
would require to reach a decision. He replied that it depended upon
circumstances; that he would not give his consent to have the troops about
Washington sent over to the Virginia side of the Potomac without having
their rear protected more fully, and better lines of retreat open; that he
designed throwing a temporary bridge across the river as soon as possible,
and making a permanent structure of it at his leisure. That would make
three bridges, and then the requisite precautions would be completed.
Mr. Wade replied, with great impatience, that with 150,000 of the best
troops the world ever saw, there was no need of more bridges; that the
rebels were inferior in numbers and condition, and that retreat would be
treason. "These 150,000 men," Mr. Wade said, "could whip the whole
Confederacy if they were given a chance; if I was their commander I would
lead them across the Potomac, and they should not come back until they
had won a victory and the war was ended, or they came in their coffins." Mr.
Wade spoke strongly and plainly throughout the interview, and the
Secretary of War endorsed every word he uttered. The committee had
another conference with Secretary Stanton on the following day at his
residence, at which it was decided that they should co-operate with him in
an effort to persuade President Lincoln either to displace McClellan or to
compel him to commence an active campaign at once. On the 25th of
February this conference with the President was held, and it was followed by
others, Senators Chandler and Wade finally threatening to make the
laggardness of the commander of the Army of the Potomac a subject of
debate in the Senate, and to offer a resolution directing the President to
order an advance forthwith. The first result was what the committee were
so anxious to accomplish. In March, the armies commenced to move, and
McClellan, at last taking the field in person, pushed out to Centreville, and
then followed up this delayed advance by his flank movement to the
Peninsula, driving the rebels out of Yorktown by a month's work with the
shovel, and following General Johnston up to Williamsburg, where a bloody
victory was won, but its fruits were left ungathered. This campaign was
short, bloody, and blundering, ending with the battle of Malvern Hill, which
was also deprived of its proper importance by McClellan's failure to follow up
his advantage with a prompt advance upon Richmond, and which thus in
the end amounted to but little more than another Union reverse. Mr.
Chandler always firmly believed that had McClellan moved toward the rebel
capital and not toward his gunboats after Malvern Hill, the war would have
been shortened by two years.
When it first became evident that General McClellan was, by sullenness and
incapacity, throwing away advantages gained by the heroism of his troops
on the Peninsula, Mr. Chandler determined to denounce him on the floor of
the Senate, but was restrained by Mr. Stanton, who urged that, while the
campaign was still in active progress, there was yet some hope of a change
for the better, and that to destroy confidence in a commanding officer under
such circumstances might injure the army in the field. After Malvern Hill
these reasons ceased to have force, and Mr. Chandler commenced the
careful preparation of his speech. This time the Secretary of War endorsed
the timeliness as well as the truth of the expose, and the Committee on the
Conduct of the War by formal vote authorized the use of the testimony
taken before it and not yet made public. After he had gathered and grouped
the facts which formed the basis of his arraignment, Mr. Chandler submitted
them to a friend upon whose good judgment and sincerity he greatly relied,
and asked:
"Knowing all these facts, as I do, what is my duty?"
The answer was: "Beyond all question, these facts ought to be laid before
the country, for the knowledge of them is essential to its safety. But they will
create a storm that will sweep either you or McClellan from public life, and it
is more than probable that you will be the victim."
Mr. Chandler said: "I did not ask your opinion of the consequences, but of
my duty."
To this it was replied: "The speech ought to be made, and no one else will
make it."
Mr. Chandler simply said: "It will be made to-day; come and hear it." And he
did make it, in the midst of a running discussion on a bill "to provide for the
discharge of state prisoners and others," which was the special order in the
Senate for that day (July 16, 1862).
Mr. Chandler commenced by briefly reciting the history of the appointment
of the committee, and then gave from the evidence taken at its sessions a
compact summary of the causes of the Bull Run disaster, fortifying each
point with citations from the testimony. After closing this part of his speech
he proceeded to review the Ball's Bluff catastrophe, saying:

Were the people discouraged, depressed? Not at all. Untold thousands

rushed into the shattered ranks, eager to wipe out the stain and stigma
of that defeat (Bull Run). From the East, the West, the North, and the
Middle States, thousands and tens of thousands and hundreds of
thousands came pouring in, until the government said, "Hold, enough."
The Army of the Potomac, denuded in August of three-months' men
and scarcely numbering 50,000 efficient men, swelled in September to
over 100,000, in October to 150,000, in November to 175,000 and
upward, until, on the 10th day of December, the morning rolls showed
195,400 men, and thirteen regiments not reported, chiefly intended for
the Burnside expedition, but all under the command of General
McClellan. During the months of October, November, and December, the
weather was delightful and the roads fine. The question began to be
asked in October, when will the advance take place? All had the most
unbounded confidence in the army and its young general, and were
anxiously waiting for a Napoleonic stroke. It came, but such a stroke!
That a general movement was being prepared the whole country had
known for weeks; but when the terrific blow was to be struck no one
knew save the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The nation
believed in its young commander; the President relied upon him, and
all, myself included, had the most unbounded confidence in the result
of the intended movement. It came! On the 21st of October, McCall's
division, 12,000 strong, was ordered to Drainesville upon a
reconnoissance. Smith's division, 12,000 strong, was ordered to support
him. McCall's reconnoissance extended four miles beyond Drainesville,
and to within nine miles of Leesburg. Stone, on Sunday, was informed
of McCall's and Smith's advance, and directed to make a slight
demonstration upon Leesburg. How? He could do it in but one way, and
that was by crossing the river and moving upon it. [Mr. Chandler here
introduced a mass of testimony and official orders to show that Col. E.
D. Baker, whom General Stone sent across the Potomac at Ball's Bluff,
had ample reasons to believe that he would be sustained in that
advance, and reinforced if necessary. He proceeded:] Thus it is shown
that Colonel Baker had reason to expect reinforcements, for the enemy
were to be pushed upon their flank by General Gorman.
At two o'clock on Monday morning Colonel Devens crossed the river
upon a reconnoissance with 400 men at Ball's Bluff, opposite Harrison's
Island, as directed by General Stone. At daylight Colonel Baker was
ordered to cross to the support of Colonel Devens. I have read his
orders. One scow and two small boats were their only means of
transportation. At eight o'clock on Monday morning the fight
commenced by Colonel Devens, and Colonel Baker was placed in
command, as is alleged, with discretionary orders. Colonel Baker knew
that Smith and McCall were at Drainesville, or within striking distance,
that our troops were crossing at Edward's Ferry, or, in other words, that
40,000 effective men were within twelve miles of him, and that at least
30,000 were upon the Virginia side of the Potomac, and that, in the
nature of things, he must be reinforced. He did not know that at half-
past ten A.M., of Monday, or two and one-half hours after Colonel
Devens commenced the fight, the divisions of Smith and McCall
commenced their retreat by the express orders of General McClellan. He
knew that Colonel Devens was contending with greatly superior forces,
and, like a gallant soldier as he was, he hastened to his relief with all
the force he could cross with his inadequate means of transportation.
Colonel Baker has been charged with imprudence and rashness; but
neither the facts nor the testimony support the charge. Instead of
rashly or imprudently advancing into the enemy's lines, as was alleged,
he did not move ten rods from the Bluff, and the only sustaining
witness to this charge was one officer, who swore that he thought
Colonel Baker imprudently exposed himself to the enemy's bullets. This
kind of rashness is usually pardoned after the death of the perpetrator.
At two o'clock P. M. Colonel Baker found himself in command of about
1,800 men upon Ball's Bluff, including Devens's men and three guns,
and the fighting commenced. The alternatives were fight and conquer,
surrender, or be captured. That noble band of heroes and their gallant
commander understood these terrible alternatives as well upon that
bloody field as we do now, and nobly did they vindicate their manhood.
During all those long hours, from two o'clock P. M. until the early dusk
of evening, the gallant Baker continued the unequal contest, when he
fell pierced by three bullets and instantly expired. A council of war was
called (after the frightful death-struggle over his lifeless remains and for
them), and it was decided that the only chance of an escape was by
cutting through the enemy and reaching Edward's Ferry, which was at
once decided upon; but, while forming for the desperate encounter, the
enemy rushed upon our little band of heroes in overpowering numbers,
and the rout was perfect.... How many were killed in battle, how many
drowned in the relentless river, will never be correctly known; suffice it
to say, our little force was destroyed. Why was this little band permitted
to be destroyed by a force little more than double its numbers in
presence of 40,000 splendid troops? Why were McCall and Smith
ordered back at the very moment that Baker was ordered to cross? If
we wanted Leesburg, McCall could have taken it without the loss of a
man, as his movement in mass had already caused its evacuation, and
the enemy did not return in force until after McCall had retreated. If we
did not wish to capture Leesburg, why did we cross at all? Of what use
is "a slight demonstration" even, without results? These are questions
which the people will ask, and no man can satisfactorily answer. Why
were not reinforcements sent from Edward's Ferry to Colonel Baker?
The distance was only three-and-a-half miles. We had 1,500 men
across at two o'clock on Monday, and the universal concurrent
testimony of officers and men is that a reinforcement of even 1,000
men—some say 500, and one gallant captain swears that with 100 men
he could have struck them upon the flank,—would have changed the
result of the day. Why were not reinforcements sent? Stone swears, as
I have already shown, that there were batteries between Edward's
Ferry and Ball's Bluff which would have utterly destroyed any force he
could have sent to Baker's relief, and that Baker knew it. But Stone was
not sustained by a single witness; on the contrary, all swear that there
were not, to their knowledge, and that they did not believe there were
any, and a civilian living upon the spot, and in the habit of passing over
the ground frequently, swears there were none; and again, Stone,
when questioned as to the erection of forts under the range of his guns
upon his second examination, swears positively that there is not a gun
now between Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, and never has been. Why,
then, were not reinforcements sent from Edward's Ferry? Let the men
who executed and planned this horrible slaughter answer to God and
an outraged country. General Banks swears that his orders were such
from General McClellan, that, upon his arrival at Edward's Ferry,
although his judgment was against crossing, he did not feel himself at
 liberty to decline crossing, and he remained upon the Virginia side until
Thursday.... So much for the wholesale murder at Ball's Bluff.

Mr. Chandler next attacked General McClellan's disastrous procrastination.

Describing the lapse of an army of 150,000 men into a state of chronic
inaction in its intrenchments about Washington after the Ball's Bluff disaster,
he laid before the Senate and the country documents which proved these
facts: In October, 1861, the Navy Department requested that 4,000 men
might be detailed to hold Matthias Point on the lower Potomac, after the
gunboats should have shelled out the rebels, who were then in possession,
and thus in control of the navigation of that important river. General
McClellan agreed to furnish the infantry; twice the Navy Department
prepared its vessels for the expedition, but the troops did not report for
duty, so that, finally, the gunboats were necessarily detailed for other
service, and the unnecessary, expensive and humiliating blockade of the
Potomac continued for months. Mr. Chandler then proceeded:

Why was this disgrace so long submitted to? No man knows or

attempts to explain. Month after month one of the most splendid
armies the world had ever seen, of 200,000 men, permitted itself and
the national capital to be besieged by a force never exceeding one-half
its own number.
During the month of December, the nation became impatient. The time
had arrived and passed when we were promised a forward movement.
The roads were good, the weather splendid, the army in high condition,
and eager for the fray. How long the roads and weather would permit
the movement, no man could predict; still there was no movement. The
generals, with great unanimity, declared that the army had reached its
maximum of proficiency as volunteers, but still there was no movement.
Under these circumstances, the Committee on the Conduct of the War
asked an interview with the President and Cabinet, and urged that the
winter should not be permitted to pass without action, as it would lead
to an incalculable loss of life and treasure by forcing our brave troops
into a summer campaign, in a hot and to them inhospitable climate.
The President and Cabinet were united in the desire that an immediate
advance should be made, but it was not made, although we were
assured by General McClellan that it would be very soon, that he had no
intention of going into winter quarters, and he did not! While the
enemy erected comfortable huts at Centreville and Manassas for their
winter quarters, our brave and eager troops spent the most
uncomfortable winter ever known in this climate under canvas, as
thousands and tens of thousands of invalid soldiers throughout the
length and breadth of the land will attest. Why did not the army move
in all December, or why did it not go into winter quarters? No man
knows, nor is any reason assigned.
On the 1st day of January, 1862, and for months previous to that date,
the armies of the republic were occupying a purely defensive position
upon the whole line from Missouri to the Atlantic, until on or about the
27th of January the President and Secretary of War issued the order
forward. Then the brave Foote took the initiative, soliciting 2,000 men
from Halleck to hold Fort Henry after he had captured it with his
gunboats. They were promptly furnished, and Henry fell; then
Donelson, with its 15,000 prisoners; then Newbern, and the country
was electrified. Credit was given where credit was due. Do-nothing
strategy gave way to an "immediate advance upon the enemy's works,"
and the days of spades and pickaxes seemed to be ended. On the 22d
of February a forward movement upon our whole line was ordered, but
did not take place. The Army of the Potomac was not ready; but on the
10th of March it moved, against the protest of the commanding general
and eight out of twelve of the commanders of divisions; but the
President was inexorable, and the movement must be made. It
proceeded to Centreville, and there found deserted huts, wooden
artillery, and intrenchments which could and can be successfully
charged by cavalry. It proceeded to Manassas, and found no
fortifications worthy of the name, a deserted, abandoned camp, and
dead horses for trophies. The enemy, less than 40,000 men, had
leisurely escaped, carrying away all their artillery, baggage, arms, and
stores. Our Army of the Potomac, on that 10th day of March, showed
by its muster-roll a force of 230,000 men. Comment is needless! The
Grand Army of the Potomac proceeded toward Gordonsville, found no
enemy, repaired the railroad, and then marched back again.
Why this Grand Army of the Potomac did not march upon Richmond has
never been satisfactorily explained, and probably never will be. One
reason assigned was lack of transportation; but there were two
railroads, one by way of Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg, the other via
Manassas and Gordonsville, which could have been repaired at the rate
of ten miles per day, and our army was ample to guard it. Had this
overwhelming force proceeded directly to Richmond by these lines, it
would have spent the 1st day of May in Richmond, and ere this the
rebellion would have been ended. This grand army, ably commanded,
was superior to any army the world has seen for five hundred years.
Napoleon I. never fought 130,000 men upon one battle-field. Yet this
noble army was divided and virtually sacrificed by some one. Who is the
culprit?
Before the advance upon Manassas, General McClellan changed his
plans, and demanded to be permitted to leave the enemy intrenched at
Centreville and Manassas; to leave the Potomac blockaded, and to take
his army to Annapolis by land, and there embark them for the rear of
the enemy to surprise him. In the council of war called upon this
proposition, the commanding general and eight out of twelve of the
commanders of divisions (and here permit me to say that I am
informed that seven out of the eight generals were appointed upon the
recommendation of General McClellan) voted that it was not safe to
advance upon the wooden guns of Centreville, and to adopt the new
plan of campaign. The President and the Secretary of War overruled
this pusillanimous decision, and compelled McClellan to "move
immediately upon the enemy's works." He marched, and the trophies of
that memorable campaign are known to the Senate and the country.
At Fairfax, General McClellan changed his plan and decided not to
advance upon the rebels with his whole force, but to return to
Alexandria, divide his army, and embark for Fortress Monroe and
Yorktown. It was decided that 45,000 men should be left for the
defense of the capital, and he was permitted to embark. After much
delay (unavoidable in the movement of so vast a force, with its
enormous material) the general-in-chief himself embarked. Soon after
he sailed it came to the knowledge of the Committee on the Conduct of
the War that the capital, with its vast accumulation of material of war,
had been left by General McClellan virtually without defense, and the
enemy's whole force, large or small, was untouched in front. [Mr.
Chandler here introduced the official testimony to prove that General
McClellan had so denuded Washington as to compel the President to
interpose and detain General McDowell's corps for its adequate
defense. He then said:] The country has been deceived. It has been led
to believe that the Secretary of War or somebody else has interfered
with General McClellan's plans, when he had an army that could have
crushed any other army on the face of the earth. One hundred and
fifty-eight thousand of the best troops that ever stood on God's
footstool were sent down to the Peninsula and placed under command
of General McClellan; and yet the whole treasonable press of the
country has been howling after the Secretary of War because of his
alleged refusal to send reinforcements to General McClellan. As I said
the other day, he has sent every man, every sabre, every bayonet,
every horse, that could be spared from any source whatever to increase
that grand army under General McClellan in front of Richmond. Why did
he not enter Richmond? We shall see.... It is not for me, sir, to state the
strength of McClellan's army at this time; but I know it is 158,000 men,
less the number lost by sickness and casualties. Does any man doubt
that this army, ably handled, was sufficiently strong to have captured
Richmond and crushed the rebel army? I think not, if promptly led
against the enemy; but instead of that, it sat down in malarious
swamps and awaited the drafting, arming, drilling, and making soldiers
of an army to fight it, and in the meantime our own army was rapidly
wasting away. Unwholesome water, inadequate food, overwork, and
sleeping in marshes, were rapidly filling the hospitals, and overloading
the return boats with the sick. Sir, we have lost more men by the spade
than the bullet, five to one, since the army started from Yorktown under
McClellan. Had the soldiers been relieved from digging and menial labor
by the substitution of negro laborers, the Army of the Potomac would
to-day, in my estimation, contain 30,000 more brave and efficient
soldiers than it does. Had it been relieved from guarding the property of
rebels in arms, many valuable lives would have been saved. Yorktown
was evacuated after a sacrifice of more men by sickness than the
enemy had in their works when our army landed at Fortress Monroe.
The battle of Williamsburg was fought by a small fraction of our army,
and the enemy routed. During the battle, General McClellan wrote a
dispatch, miles from the field of battle, saying he should try to "hold
them in check" there.... He would try to "hold them in check!" He could
not hold them. He could not stop his eager troops from chasing them.
After a small fraction of his army had whipped their entire force and
had been chasing them for hours, he penned that dispatch and sent it
to the Secretary of War, and, if I remember aright, it was read in one of
the two houses of Congress. As you may suppose from that dispatch,
there was no great eagerness in following up that victory. Three
Michigan regiments were not only decimated, they were divided in
twain, in that bloody battle at Williamsburg. They fought there all day
without reinforcements. One Michigan regiment went into the trenches
and left sixty-three dead rebels, killed by the bayonet, weltering in their
blood. But who has ever heard, by any official communication from the
head of the army, that a Michigan regiment was in the fight at
Williamsburg? I do not blame him for not giving credit where credit is
due, for I do not believe he knew anything more of that fight than you
or I.
When that battle was fought and won, all the enemy's works were
cleared away, and we had an open road to Richmond. There was not a
single fortification between Richmond and Williamsburg. All we had to
do was to get through those infernal swamps, march up, and take
possession of Richmond. What did we do? We found the worst swamp
there was between Richmond and Williamsburg, and sat right down in
the center of it and went to digging. We sacrificed thousands and tens
of thousands of the bravest troops that ever stood on the face of God's
earth, digging in front of no intrenchments, and before a whipped army
of the enemy. We waited for them to recruit; we waited for them to get
another army. They had a levy en masse. They were taking all the men
and boys between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five, and magnanimously
we waited weeks and weeks and weeks for them to bring these forced
levies into some sort of consistency as an army. The battle of Fair Oaks
was fought. There the enemy found again a little fraction of our army,
very much less than half, and they brought out their entire force. I have
it from the best authority that they had not a solitary regiment in or
about Richmond that was fit to put in front of an enemy that they did
not bring to Fair Oaks and hurl upon our decimated army. Again the
indomitable bravery of our troops (of the men, of private soldiers, the
indomitable energy of Michigan men and New Jersey men—but I will
not particularize, for all the troops fought like lions), and the fighting
capacity of our army not only saved it from being utterly destroyed by
an overwhelming force, but gave us a triumphant victory. The enemy
went back to Richmond pell-mell. I have been informed by a man who
was there at the time, that two brigades of fresh troops could have
chased the whole Confederate army through the city of Richmond and
into the James river, so utter was their rout and confusion.
And what did we do then? We found another big swamp, and we sat
down in the center of it and went to digging. We began to throw up
intrenchments when there were no intrenchments in our front, no
enemy that was not utterly broken. We never took advantage of the
battle of Fair Oaks. Again Michigan soldiers were cut to pieces by
hundreds. Go into the Judiciary square hospital in this city, and you will
find more than half the occupants are Michigan men who were shot at
Fair Oaks and Williamsburg, men who stood until a regiment of 1,000
men was reduced to 105, and even then did not run. Sir, these men
have been sacrificed, uselessly sacrificed. They have been put to hard
digging, and hard fare, and hard sleeping, and if there was any hard
fighting to do they have been put to that; and, besides all this, at night
they have had to guard the property of rebels in arms. They have been
so sacrificed that two or three of the Michigan regiments to-day cannot
bring into the field 250 men each out of 1,000 with whom they started.
Fair Oaks was lost; that is to say, we won a brilliant victory, but it did us
no good; we did not take advantage of it. Of course it would have been
very unfair to take advantage of a routed army [laughter]; it would not
have been according to our "strategy." We magnanimously stopped,
and commenced digging. There was no army in our front, there were
no intrenchments in our front; but we did not know what else to do,
and so we began to dig and ditch, and we kept digging and ditching
until the rebels had impressed and drilled and armed and made soldiers
of their entire population. But that was not enough; they sent Jackson
up on his raid to Winchester, and we waited for him to come back with
his twenty or thirty thousand men. We heard that Corinth was being
evacuated, and of course it would have been very unfair to commence
an attack until they brought their troops from Corinth, and so we
waited for the army at Corinth to get to Richmond. After the rebels had
got all the troops they ever hoped to raise from any source, we did not
attack them, but they attacked us, as we had reason to suppose they
would. They attacked our right wing, and, as I am informed upon what
I must deem reliable authority, they hurled the majority of their entire
force upon our right wing of 30,000 men, and during the whole of that
Thursday our right wing of 30,000 men held their ground, and repulsed
that vast horde of the enemy over and over again, and held their
ground at night. Of course you will say a reinforcement of twenty or
thirty thousand men was sent to these brave troops that they might not
only hold their ground the next day, but send this dastardly army into
Richmond a second time, as at Fair Oaks. No, sir, nothing of the sort
was done.
At night, instead of sending them reinforcements, they were ordered to
retreat. That was "strategy!" The moment they commenced their
retreat, as is said in the dispatches, the enemy fought like demons. Of
course they would. Who ever heard of a retreating army that was not
pursued by the victors like demons, except in the case of rebel retreats?
No other nation but ours was ever guilty of stopping immediately after
a victory. Other armies fight like demons after a victory, and annihilate
the enemy, but we do not. Our left wing and center remained intact. A
feint was made upon the left and center, and I have here, not the
sworn testimony, but the statement of one of the bravest men in the
whole Army of the Potomac—I will not give his name, but a more highly
honorable man lives not—that when his regiment was ordered under
arms, he had no doubt that he was going to march into Richmond. He
believed the whole force of the enemy had attacked our right wing; he
believed there was nothing but a screen of pickets in front; and he
thought that now our great triumph was to come off. His men sprang
into line with avidity, prepared to rush into Richmond and take it at the
point of the bayonet. He never discovered his error until he saw a
million and a half dollars' worth of property burned in front of his
regiment, and then he began to think that an advance upon Richmond
was not intended. And it was not! We had been at work there and had
lost 10,000 men in digging intrenchments; we had spent months in
bringing up siege guns, and we abandoned those intrenchments
without firing one gun. Our army was ordered to advance on the
gunboats instead of on Richmond. This colonel told me that his
regiment fought three days and whipped the enemy each day, and
retreated each night. The left wing and center were untouched until
they were ordered to retreat. No portion of our vast force had been
fought except the right wing under Porter, and they whipped the enemy
the first day.
This is called strategy! Again, sir, I ask, Why was this great Army of the
Potomac of 230,000 men divided? Human ingenuity could not have
devised any other way to defeat that army; Divine wisdom could
scarcely have devised any other way to defeat it than that which was
adopted. There is no army in Europe to-day that could meet the Army
of the Potomac when it was 230,000 strong, the best fighting material
ever put into an army on the face of the earth. Why was that grand
army divided? I simply charge that grave and serious errors have been
committed, and, as I have said, no other way could have been devised
to defeat that army. If the 158,000 men that were sent to General
McClellan had been marched upon the enemy, they could have whipped
all the armies the Confederates have, and all they are likely to have for
 six months. One hundred and fifty-eight thousand men are about as
many as can be fought on any one battle-field. One hundred and fifty-
eight thousand men are a vast army, a great deal larger army than that
with which Napoleon destroyed 600,000 of the Austrians in a single
year. One hundred and fifty-eight thousand men ably handled can
defeat any force the Confederates can raise; and that is the force that
went down to the Peninsula. But, sir, it lay in ditches, digging, drinking
rotten water, and eating bad food, and sleeping in the mud, until it
became greatly reduced in numbers, and of those that were left very
many were injured in health. Still they fought; still they conquered in
every fight, and still they retreated, because they were ordered to
retreat.
Sir, I have deemed it my duty to present this statement of facts to the
Senate and the country. I know that I am to be denounced for so
doing, and I tell you who will denounce me. There are two classes of
men who are sure to denounce me, and no one else, and they are
traitors and fools. The traitors have been denouncing every man who
did not sing pæans to "strategy," when it led to defeat every time. The
traitors North are worse than the traitors South, and sometimes I think
we have as many of them in the aggregate. They are meaner men;
they are men who will come behind you and cut your throat in the dark.
I have great respect for Southern traitors who shoulder their muskets
and come out and take the chances of the bullets and the halter; but I
have the most superlative contempt for the Northern traitors, who,
under the pretended guise of patriotism, are stabbing their country in
the dark.

The effect of this speech was profound. It enraged McClellan's friends to the
highest pitch; it was not supported at the time by any like utterance in
Congress, and at first many who believed it to be true condemned, or at
least deprecated, the fierceness of the attack; but those who knew that "the
young Napoleon" at heart preferred a pro-slavery compromise to the
conquest of a durable and honorable peace, and who had marked with
righteous indignation the attempt of his claquers to make the Secretary of
War the scape-goat for his own blunders, greeted with enthusiasm the
signal courage of the man who, in the face of abuse, prejudice, and popular
blindness, dared to tell with words of rugged force this story of disastrous
imbecility. Mr. Chandler disregarded the remonstrances of weak friends, and
met without quailing the storm of vituperation he had invited. Events made
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