Contemporary Japan

ISSN: 1869-2729 (Print) 1869-2737 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcoj20

Japan imagined: popular culture, soft power,

and Japan's changing image in Northeast and
Southeast Asia

Kadosh Nissim Otmazgin & Nissim Otmazgin

To cite this article: Kadosh Nissim Otmazgin & Nissim Otmazgin (2012) Japan imagined: popular
culture, soft power, and Japan's changing image in Northeast and Southeast Asia, Contemporary
Japan, 24:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1515/cj-2012-0001

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 Japan imagined: popular culture, soft power,
and Japan’s changing image in Northeast
and Southeast Asia*

NISSIM KADOSH OTMAZGIN

Abstract
Over the past two decades, Japan’s popular culture has been massively
disseminated and consumed throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia.
A wide range of products, such as music, animation, comics, television
programs, fashion magazines, and movies, have been endorsed by local
popular culture markets and now constitute an integral part of the cul-
tural lives of many young people in this region. These products not only
introduce a multitude of consumption options, but also have an impact
on the way young urban consumers imagine and think about Japan.
This paper examines the extent to which popular culture can change
the perception of a country abroad. Based on questionnaire surveys con-
ducted with university students from Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Seoul,
it focuses on the appreciation shown to Japan’s popular culture, and how
it shapes young people’s image of the country. The central argument
presented is that exposure to Japanese popular culture disseminates new,
favorable images, which modify the way the country is perceived. These
images arouse feelings of affinity and a sense of proximity, but unlike
the “soft power” argument, they are generational, implicit, inconsistent,
and subject to different interpretations. As such, the practicality of gener-
ating state power in terms of authority or control is doubtful.
Keywords: Japan; popular culture; soft power; cultural consumption; im-
age formation.

Contemporary Japan 24 (2012), 1219 18692729/2012/02420001

DOI 10.1515/cj-2012-0001 © Walter de Gruyter
2 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

想像上の日本： ポピュラー・カルチャー、 ソフトパワー、北東・

東南アジアにおける変わりつつある日本のイメージ
オトマズギン・ニシム

ここ20年ほどの間に日本のポップカルチャーは北東および東南アジア
で広く浸透し、受け入れられるようになった。音楽、アニメ、コミッ
ク、テレビ番組、ファッション誌、映画などおびただしい数の商品が
現地のポップカルチャー市場で提供され、若者の文化生活に不可欠な
要素となっている。これらの商品は多様な消費選択を可能にするだけ
ではなく、都市部の若者が抱く日本のイメージにも影響を及ぼしてい
る。本稿は、ポップカルチャーが他国に対する認識にどのような変化
をもたらすかを検証するものである。香港、バンコックおよびソウル
の大学生を対象としたアンケートをもとに日本のポップカルチャーが
如何に評価され、現地の若者の日本のイメージがどう形成されるかを
調査した。その結果、日本のポップカルチャーに触れた若者の日本に
対するイメージは概して好意的であり、今までの認識を修正した新し
いイメージが広がっている。その新しいイメージは親近感や地理的近
接性に基づくものであるが、いわゆる「ソフトパワー論」とは性格を
異にする。これらのイメージには世代的に差異があり、黙諾的でもあ
る。一貫性がなく多角的な解釈が可能でもあるものに対し当局が取り
締まるとすればその必要性は疑問である。

1. Introduction: Japan’s cultural presence in East Asia

Over the past two decades, Japan’s popular culture has been massively
disseminated and consumed throughout Northeast and Southeast Asia
(hereafter “East Asia”). A wide range of products, such as music, ani-
mation, comics, television programs, fashion magazines, and films, have
been endorsed by local popular culture markets, and they now consti-
tute an integral part of the cultural lives of many young people in this
region.1 The dissemination of Japan’s popular culture has a special sali-
ence in the cultural geography of East Asia. This saliency is expressed
both in the wide spectrum of products offered in the market as well as
in their easy availability. Japanese popular culture products are abun-
dantly offered for sale as CDs, DVDs, and VCDs in stores, sold by
street vendors, heard from music players and on the radio, and seen on
television, advertisement billboards, and in movie theaters. Although it
is possible to find Japanese music, dramas, and fashion in other parts
of the world, outside of East Asia they typically constitute a much
smaller market.
Taking female Japanese pop music artists as an example, female
stars (or rather “idols”) such as Amuro Namie, Utada Hikaru, and
 Popular culture, soft power, and Japan’s changing 3

Hamasaki Ayumi are probably known to the majority of youngsters in

urban East Asia, but not in Europe, South America, and the Middle
East. Japanese television dramas and variety programs have also be-
come an integral part of East Asia’s television scene. Japanese televi-
sion dramas (such as Tokyo Love Story, Long Vacation, and Yamato-
nadeshiko), Japanese variety programs (such as TV Champion), various
cooking shows, and especially Japanese animation (such as Doraemon,
Tiger Mask, and Detective Conan) are regularly broadcast on public
television and cable channels in Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Ma-
laysia, Indonesia, and, more recently, in Taiwan and South Korea.
The acceptance of Japan’s popular culture in East Asia is especially
noteworthy given Japan’s imperialistic past. In spite of the suffering
that Japan inflicted on its neighbors in the decades leading up to the
end of World War II, and its attempts to utilize its culture as a means
of control in its colonies, contemporary Japanese popular culture has
been endorsed by the local cultural markets and affects the cultural
lives of many people in East Asia, especially the young. Although peo-
ple in East Asia today may not be completely ignorant of Japan’s past
wrongdoing and might still be critical of the Japanese government, they
continue to buy animation and comics in their tens of millions, rou-
tinely watch Japanese-made television programs, and often listen to
Japanese pop music.
The result is that in many cities in East Asia, young people are rou-
tinely exposed to images of Japan through cultural consumption.
Through exposure to popular culture, these young people have been
acquiring new images and ideas about Japan and a special fascination
toward certain contemporary aspects of the country, gradually coming
to associate Japan as home to a dynamic and prosperous cultural indus-
try, rather than just an industrial superpower or an ex-military aggres-
sor. This implies that the massive dissemination of popular culture not
only introduces a multitude of consumption options, but has an impact
on the way young urban consumers imagine and think about Japan.
At the same time, it is important to note that the flow of popular
culture in East Asia is not unidirectional. A variety of other popular
culture confluences 2 both global (American) and regional (Chinese,
Korean) 2 have intensified rapidly in recent years, and Japan itself has
become a diligent importer of popular culture from other parts of East
Asia. South Korean television dramas, films, music, and fashions, for
example, have gained immense popularity in Japan and in the wider
East Asia region, creating the Korean Wave, or Hanryū, as it is known
among fans (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008). In this sense, the Japanese case
is not an isolated phenomenon; similar developments are taking place
in other contexts with other popular cultures as well.
4 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

Based on questionnaire surveys completed by undergraduate univer-

sity students from Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Seoul, this study ana-
lyzes the appreciation shown to Japan’s popular culture and the way
it shapes young people’s perceptions of Japan. The central argument
presented is that exposure to and consumption of popular culture mod-
ifies the way Japan is perceived by the dissemination of new, favored
images of the country. These images arouse feelings of affinity toward
Japanese culture and society and create a sense of proximity. However,
these feelings are also generational, implicit, inconsistent, and subject
to different interpretations. As such, the practicality of generating po-
litical capital from them in terms of state authority or control 2 as the
soft power argument implies 2 is limited. In other words, the emotions
and behaviors aroused by the consumption of popular culture tend to
be inconsistent and vary in their intensity so that their meaning cannot
be read in any monolithic way. There is no transformation of national
content, but rather the manifestation of emotions, genres, and repre-
sentations associated with and labeled “Japanese”.
The discussion starts by critically examining the notion of soft power
and questioning its basic theoretical assumptions, as well as its explicit
call for governments to wield culture as a political tool. The paper then
moves on to discuss the results of the questionnaire survey, especially
regarding how exposure to popular culture affects young people’s per-
ception of Japan and its history. The results show that respondents
refuse to see any government or state power “politics” resulting from
their cultural consumption, and that they are able to discern the differ-
ence between their appreciation of Japan’s popular culture and their
view of the politics and history of Japan. Finally, the paper introduces
a more semantically plural approach to the way popular culture shapes
a country’s image abroad, and ends by outlining the implications of this
on the state. It is proposed that emotions and behaviors aroused or
encouraged by popular culture products 2 which cannot be read in any
monolithic way 2 matter more than a straightforward transmission of
national “content”, values, or ideals.

2. Japanese soft power in Asia?

The soft power argument claims that the dissemination of one country’s
culture, ideals, and values into other countries provides the potential
for political power. According to Joseph S. Nye (2004a: 15), who coined
the term, “soft power” lies in the ability of a nation to entice, attract,
and fascinate other countries and societies so that a country “may ob-
tain the outcome it wants in world politics because other countries 2
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of pros-
 Popular culture, soft power, and Japan’s changing 5

perity and openness 2 want to follow it”. Nye first used this concept
to describe America’s capabilities, but later also cited examples from
Europe, Japan, India, and China (2004a: 73298, 2004b).
In recent years, the soft power theory has been echoed by academic
and popular discourses, which are fascinated by the possibilities ema-
nating from the export of Japan’s popular culture. Advocates repeat-
edly emphasize the economic benefits of cultural exports and stress
its possible contribution to the nation’s diplomacy. Governmental and
journalistic reports routinely quote Nye’s concept of soft power to en-
courage the state to intervene. One of the most publicized examples of
the fascination over Japan’s resources of soft power is journalist Doug-
las McGray’s (2002) depiction of Japan’s booming cultural innovation
and lifestyle as “Gross National Cool” (GNC). According to McGray,
Japan should put more emphasis on its cultural production power in
order to boost its economy and increase its influence in the world.
Like Nye’s soft power argument, McGray’s influential article has been
frequently quoted in academic works, governmental reports, and in the
print media 2 including, among others, Aoki (2004), Asahi Shimbun
(1 January 2006), Daliot-Bul (2009), METI (2003), Nikkei Shimbun
(2004), Sugiura (2008), Yamasaki and Tachioka (2006) 2 indicating the
rising importance of popular culture in Japan’s economy and diplo-
macy.
The soft power theory has had its share of criticism, and even Nye
himself admits that he developed this term as a descriptive rather than
an analytical concept (Nye 2008). As Brantly Womack (2005) argues,
the problem with soft power is that it seems to be more of a penumbra
or halo of hard power, rather than a coherent theory. In fact, soft power
does not work in quite the way politicians envisage it. In one of my
own papers (Otmazgin 2008), I argue that the impact of Japan’s popu-
lar culture lies in shaping the region’s cultural markets, but not in exert-
ing local influence or in creating Japanese-dominated “spheres of influ-
ence”. Peng Er Lan (2007) also shows that in spite of the Japanese
government’s attempts to wield the popularity of Japanese culture for
its own diplomatic purposes, the dissemination of Japanese anime is
essentially a market- and consumer-driven process. And Nakano (2008)
observes that Japan, as a nation-state, does not seem to be winning
Chinese consumers’ hearts and minds.
The expansion and acceptance of Japan’s popular culture in East
Asia provides a good case study for critically re-examining the notion
of soft power. Indeed, the dissemination of Japanese popular culture
shows that there is a lot of “power” in the ability of a country’s popular
culture to penetrate nation-state boundaries, even in countries where
there is anger and contempt toward the producing country. Moreover,
6 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

popular culture products endorse certain characteristics that endow

them with greater importance than other consumer products. These
characteristics make the purchase of a piece of furniture, a car, or a
television set, for example, different from buying a music CD, watching
a television drama, or reading a comic book. The difference is in the
way cultural products comprise images that could potentially arouse
strong feelings of proximity or rejection, as well as convey images that
have a higher potential for shaping the “receiver’s” individual and com-
munal identity.
Yet the Japanese case equally suggests that the soft power argument
may not be able to fully capture the dynamics of how people appropri-
ate and conceive imported cultures, and what sort of political impact
the transnational dissemination of popular culture can generate. Specif-
ically, the questionnaire survey, which this study draws upon, contrib-
utes to the debate over soft power by questioning three of the basic
theoretical assumptions of this theory.
First, ideas of soft power imply that images and narratives carry en-
coded meanings that can be read in a certain way; for example, that
people who watch American movies and listen to American pop music
eventually acquire (American) ideas about society, individualism, de-
mocracy, and liberalism through passive consumption (Nye 2004a: 112
15). However, the analysis in this paper shows that people may read
or consume popular culture without acquiring national narratives or
political meanings that are supposedly embodied in the products, but
rather develop their own interpretations of them. This is closely tied
to the point that it is not only the transfer of content and ideas that is
important, but also the emotions, images, and interpretations that arise
from the consumption of popular culture. In other words, cultural com-
modities are likely to express a wide variety of ideas, emotions, and
sensibilities. Their consumption might serve to disseminate images, ar-
ticulate individual and subgroups’ identifications, and introduce new
obtainable lifestyles and aspirations to fulfill a wide range of social and
personal purposes. However, these images tend to diversify through
the process of consumption. They are not necessarily drawn from or
articulated with any dominant ideology, and thus the probability of
extracting political gains from this sort of cultural consumption is
doubtful.
Second, the soft power argument also assumes that people are con-
sistent in their attitude toward a country in the sense that once they
change their attitude or image toward a certain aspect of the country,
it automatically changes their perception of the country as a whole. In
the case of popular culture, the assumption is that once they start to
like a country’s culture and lifestyle, they end up supporting its policy
 Popular culture, soft power, and Japan’s changing 7

and its position in world affairs. For this reason, those who were ex-
posed to American pop culture, according to Nye (2004a: 12), “want
to partake in the good life, American-style”. However, the case in East
Asia shows that people are able to accept contradictory notions and
harbor positive impressions alongside negative ones. Based on ques-
tionnaire surveys, my study reveals that they can accept the notion that
Japan is both “good” and “bad”. Rather than erasing historical memo-
ries and political disputes, young consumers have developed a more
complex view of Japan, harboring positive images alongside negative
historical recollections. As such, popular culture does not completely
emend the appreciation shown to a country and remains limited in
certain aspects.
Third, the soft power theory maintains that changing a country’s im-
age abroad is possible through an explicit, intentional process adminis-
tered by the national government. The soft power theory stresses the
diplomatic and political gains that can be achieved by utilizing a coun-
try’s culture and ideals 2 for example, by constructing institutions that
represent the country’s culture and ideology (such as the Fulbright Pro-
gram or the World Trade Organization in the case of the United
States). According to Nye, soft power essentially reflects the ability of
a country to indirectly frame the preferences of other countries and
societies without firing a shot, as in: “If I can persuade you to want
what I want, then I do not have to force you to act the way I want you
to act.” For this reason, Nye (2004a: 73298, 2004b) calls on govern-
ments to use their soft power resources as an integral part of their
foreign policy. However, as the present analysis shows, the newly
emerging perception of Japan is the result of an unintended, inconsist-
ent, and implicit process, which is also generationally limited. The ad-
miration of contemporary aspects of Japanese society and culture is
not the result of conscientious coercion on the part of the state, but
rather is cultivated through free consumer choice. Consumers are not
being dispossessed of their sense of national identity, and consuming
products from other cultures does not conflict with their identification
of being Korean, Chinese, or Thai. Therefore, the state can offer very
limited guidance on how to interpret the meanings arising from cultural
consumption.
In summary, the case of Japanese popular culture in East Asia under-
lines the problematic nature of the soft power argument and the need
to develop a more nuanced explanation. Japan’s popular culture has
indeed established a footing in the cultural markets of the region, and
is especially visible in urban areas. However, the soft power theory
addresses neither the inclusive way in which imported cultures are be-
ing consumed nor the ability of people to distinguish between their
cultural consumption and their political and historical views.
8 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

3. Survey design and results

3.1. Survey design
This section presents an analysis based on questionnaire surveys con-
ducted among 239 undergraduate university students of social sciences
in Hong Kong (June 2004), Bangkok (February 2005), and Seoul (April
2005).2 The students surveyed did not belong to the Japanese studies
program at their university, nor were they enrolled in courses related
to Japanese history, culture, or language. Given the scale of the ques-
tionnaires (239 respondents), it is obviously not possible to make a
statistical generalization for the vast East Asian region. Instead, the
attempt here is to provide insights into the way youngsters in urban
East Asia appreciate and relate to Japan’s popular culture, and more
particularly to examine the way in which the consumption of popular
culture influences the way they think about Japan.
The surveys were conducted by the author, with the help of local
assistants, at The Chinese University of Hong Kong with 57 students
(31 female, 26 male), Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University with 63 stu-
dents (36 female, 27 male), and in Seoul with 119 students from Korea
University and Sungkonghoe University (60 female, 59 male). The ma-
jority of respondents (185) were either born in the city where the sur-
vey was conducted (Hong Kong/Bangkok/Seoul) or had lived there for
at least 5 years (see Table 1). Most of the students (227) were between
the ages 18 to 22 (the oldest student in the sample was a 25-year-old
male student from Seoul).
Although the questions had a guiding principle, the respondents
were encouraged to define and express their own opinions. The ques-

Table 1. Questionnaire surveys with university students in three cities.

City University Number of Born or living Survey period
interviewees in Hong Kong/
(N = 239) Bangkok/Seoul
(for at least
5 years)
Hong Kong Chinese 57 49 May 2004
University of (31F, 17M)
Hong Kong
Bangkok Chulalongkorn 63 52 January 2005
University (36F, 27M)
Seoul Korean 119 84 April 2005
University, (60F, 59M)
Sungkonghoe
University
 Popular culture, soft power, and Japan’s changing 9

tionnaire included 19 open questions and two multiple-choice parts. It

inquired about the students’ general cultural consumption patterns, and
of Japanese culture in particular, as well as their attitudes and opinions
regarding various aspects of Japan’s society and state. The first part of
the questionnaire included general questions regarding cultural con-
sumption such as: “What kind of music do you listen to?”; “What kind
of television programs do you watch?”; “What kind of films do you
watch?”. The second part specifically inquired about the consumption
and appreciation of Japanese popular culture products, and included
questions such as: “Do you watch Japanese television programs?”; “If
yes, what kind of programs and how often?”; “Do you listen to Japa-
nese music?”. The third part included various questions about Japanese
contemporary culture, society, and state, focusing on the subjective ex-
periences of the interviewees. This part included questions such as:
“How are Japanese popular culture products different from American,
Chinese, or Korean popular culture products?”; “What do you think of
Japan?”; “What kind of country is it?”; “What do you think of Japa-
nese people?”.
Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Seoul were chosen as representatives of
today’s East Asia’s metropolitans. These cities are major junctions
where a considerable amount of wealth is concentrated and where a
diverse flow of culture overlaps with consumerism. Extensive economic
growth during the last two decades has cultivated the emergence of
large middle-class populations, which share employment, education,
and spending characteristics (Funatsu and Torii 2002; Shiraishi 2006).
However, several important differences between these cities exist.
First, there are different levels of economic development in terms of
GDP per capita. In Hong Kong and Seoul the GDP per capita is com-
paratively high 2 in 2004 (at the time of the survey) GDP per capita
was USD 34,200 and USD 19,200, respectively 2 whereas in Bangkok
it was lower, amounting to USD 8,100 in 2004 (CIA World Factbook
2005). This difference is important because the consumption of cultural
commodities is closely tied to the evolution of a consumer society that
stimulates demand for popular culture imports.
Second, there is a difference in how people in these cities view their
historical encounters with Japan. In Hong Kong and Bangkok, histori-
cal animosity plays a very marginal role in contemporary relations with
Japan. This is not the case in Seoul. In South Korea, there is a legacy
of resentment toward Japan emanating from 36 years of Japanese colo-
nization (191021945). This animosity has been kept alive and contin-
ues to sizzle under the country’s education system and mass media.
The Korean government, for its part, banned Japanese culture for most
of the post-World War II period (Kobari 2005: 37241). In this sense,
10 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

Seoul is an important case to test popular culture’s ability to overcome

historical setbacks.
Third, there are communities from different ethnic backgrounds in
these three cities. While in Hong Kong the overall population can be
referred to as Chinese, this is not the case in Seoul and Bangkok (As-
ami 1998: 3132314; Chirot and Reid 1997: 75298). Thus, this study
examines reactions of consumers coming from different ethnic back-
grounds in order to include “ethnicity” as a factor in this survey.

3.2. Inclusive approach to cultural consumption

In the first part of the survey, respondents were asked about their gen-
eral cultural consumption preferences. The results strongly indicate
that an overall majority of the students in Hong Kong, Bangkok, and
Seoul do not maintain a singular cultural preference or possess narrow
cultural consumption patterns. Rather, they hold a variety of different
cultural preferences, simultaneously consuming American, Chinese,
Japanese, Korean, and Thai popular cultures. In other words, there is
no monolithic or dominant flow of popular culture, and youngsters
have diverse preferences, jointly consuming both imported and local
cultural products. This suggests that a confluence of various popular
cultures has been gaining ground among youngsters in these cities, and
that consumers are inclusive in their attitude, not seeing a contradiction
in liking different cultures at the same time.
In the realm of music, for example, 61 of the 63 students in Bangkok
said they listened to more than one type of music, 49 of the 61 students
said they listened to both American and Thai music; and 26 of these
61 students also mentioned they liked to listen to Japanese pop music.
(The remaining two students said they listened to only one type of
music: one said he only listened to American hip-hop music, and the
other said she only listened to Thai pop music.) The same pattern ap-
peared in Seoul and Hong Kong. In Seoul, 114 of the 119 respondents
said they listened to various types of music, comprising mostly Korean
and American pop music, but also Japanese, Chinese, and classical mu-
sic. (Two of the remaining students in Seoul said they only listened to
Korean music, one said he only listened to European electronic music,
one only to American jazz music, and one said he never listened to
music.) And in Hong Kong, 54 of the 57 students said they usually
listened to music from different sources, mostly Chinese, American,
and Japanese. (The remaining three students said they only listened to
Chinese music from Hong Kong or Taiwan.)
As for television, almost all the respondents in these three cities said
that they watched various kinds of television programs, including Japa-
 Popular culture, soft power, and Japan’s changing 11

nese and Korean television dramas, American reality shows, local en-
tertainment shows, Japanese animation, and local news. In Bangkok,
27 of the 63 students said they liked to watch the popular television
program TV Champion, which is a locally produced entertainment
show based on a similar Japanese television program (the respondents
knew that this show originally came from Japan). All of these 27 re-
spondents also said that they liked to watch other television programs,
such as Japanese and American dramas. In Seoul and Hong Kong, 169
of the 176 respondents stated that they watched more than one type of
television program.

3.3. Japan’s “creative” popular culture

The second part of the questionnaire specifically examined the consum-
ers’ appreciation of Japan’s popular culture. The results show that Japa-
nese popular cultural products have come to be widely appreciated.
The respondents emphasized Japanese popular culture’s high quality
and advanced artistic level. Japanese music, television dramas, and ani-
mation were repeatedly described as “creative”, “interesting”, “funny”,
“of high quality”, “artistically stimulating”, and “special” (in compari-
son to American, Korean, or locally made cultural commodities). Many
of the students thought that Japanese popular culture was differenti-
ated from American or locally produced popular culture because it
offered a new and fascinating set of products, which they found easy
to like. According to a young female student from Bangkok, Japanese
pop music melodies are much easier to memorize, and only require the
song to be heard “once or twice”. Another female student from Hong
Kong said that Japanese music artists were much “cooler” and “cuter”
than their Hong Kong counterparts. A male fan from Hong Kong
thought that Japanese television dramas were “much closer to reality
and deal with issues I can identify with, like young romance and aes-
thetics”. Japanese animation was repeatedly described as a powerful
medium that carried viewers away into a new imaginative world. Ac-
cording to a male student from Seoul, Japanese animation was “far
better than any other in the market”. Similarly, Japanese comics were
thought to convey a high level of artistic innovation not found any-
where else.

3.4. Physical similarities

Approximately 20% of respondents in all three cities indicated that it
was much easier for them to become a fan of a Japanese idol than an
American idol, because his or her physical appearance and behavioral
12 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

nuances resembled their own. Physical characteristics that Japanese

and other East Asians share, such as the shape of the head and the
hair type, eye color, height, etc., have made it easier for consumers to
connect to these Asian idols. For example, one female student from
Hong Kong mentioned that she liked Japanese fashion because “it is
more colorful and joyful, and besides, we and the Japanese can share
the same fashion because we have a similar body shape”.
In this regard, physical similarities in the appearance of music and
television artists help East Asians accept Japan’s popular culture. Inter-
estingly, it is physical similarities that create proximity and not any
sort of “Asian” substance that ostensibly resonates with East Asian
consumers. Indeed, when I asked respondents in these three cities to
tell me what was “Asian” in Japanese popular culture, they again em-
phasized physical similarities, such as the eyes, hair, and body size, as
well as familiar behavioral expressions, such as shyness and child-like
excitement. Not a word was said about ostensibly common “Asian”
cultural practices or shared values (such as the perception of the family,
the primacy of the group, etc.). A student from Bangkok explained:
“There must be something appealing in the way a young Japanese pop
diva dresses like a child and not as an American sexy superstar [...]
maybe it is because she has typical Asian hair and a high-pitched
voice.”.
In this sense, there is dialectic between “foreign” and “familiar” in
East Asian people’s understanding of Japanese pop culture. Here, peo-
ple see something “familiar” about Japanese popular culture (physical
resemblance), but at the same time find novelty in the fact that these
products are both new and foreign in origin (and, moreover, “foreign”
signifies products with high amusement value). In this case, it is not
just the “foreignness” that is valued; it is the fact that it is both familiar
and different at the same time.

3.5. Not quite “faceless” pop culture

In the questionnaires, the interviewees were easily able to recognize
Japanese popular culture products and differentiate between them and
others in the market, such as American or local. Many respondents,
for example, were able to name a variety of local television dramas,
animations, and cover songs based on Japanese originals. This suggests
that Japanese popular culture products are not completely non-na-
tional, or “faceless”. Indeed, there is nothing “Japanese” in animated
characters like Hello Kitty, Doraemon, or Pokémon,3 and it is not pos-
sible to recognize any subliminal “Asian” cultural messages embedded
in the products that should supposedly resonate with Asian consumers.
 Popular culture, soft power, and Japan’s changing 13

At the same time, however, consumers are aware that popular culture
products on the market come originally from Japan. Nevertheless, their
“Japanese flavor” lies in the formation of a specific genre explicitly
and implicitly associated with Japan, and which is recognizable and
appreciated by consumers. The appreciation shown to Japanese cultural
products, due to their quality and high artistic level, creates a recogniz-
able genre of products associated with Japan, though consumers do not
recognize any subliminal Japanese cultural messages beyond the similar
physical appearance of music and television idols.

3.6. The image of the Japanese state

The majority of interviewees described Japan in the questionnaires as
a “developed”, “advanced”, and “modern” country. The exposure and
consumption of Japanese popular culture has additionally incited the
interest of the young interviewees in other aspects of Japan. Many of
the interviewees said that they like Japanese food, and almost all said
they would like to visit Japan.
In one of the Hong Kong interviews, a young fan of Japanese pop
music expressed her appreciation of Japan by saying that “we [Hong
Kongers] can never be Americans, but maybe one day we can be like
the Japanese”. Her imagined Japan, as she later explained, was con-
structed through watching Japanese television dramas and Japanese an-
imation movies. In another interview in Bangkok, three young amateur
animators mentioned that they had learnt the Japanese language
through watching animation and they visited Japan at least once a year
to learn about new cultural trends. One of them even announced:
“Tokyo is our cultural capital.”
These responses show that popular culture products can create a
positive perception of a country. Consumers associate popular culture
products, or genres of products, with Japan regardless of where these
products were manufactured, how they got them, or if they really em-
bodied Japanese traditions or values. For example, the animated char-
acters Hello Kitty, Doraemon, and Pokémon do not look Japanese in
any objective way. However, they are identified as Japanese because
they represent a specific genre of animated products associated with
Japan.

3.7. History and popular culture

The responses to the questionnaires provided some interesting insights
into the interviewees’ perceptions of Japan from a historical point of
view. Japan’s occupation period seems to play a very marginal role, if
14 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

any, in the way the youngsters in Hong Kong and Bangkok perceive
Japan. Only 7 out of 120 interviewees in these two cities briefly men-
tioned the war and the occupation period in descriptions of how they
perceived Japan. Even though the invasion of the Japanese army of
Hong Kong in December 1941 resulted in the destruction of large parts
of the city and created approximately 600,000 refugees (i.e., about half
the city’s population) (Snow 2003: 53289), Japan is perceived very
positively. In Thailand, too, Japan’s wartime atrocities are largely over-
looked. According to Ubonrat Siriyuvasak (2004: 184), “if a teenager
were asked about the anti-Japanese goods campaign of 1972, he or she
would probably be unable to answer. Even fewer [older people] would
remember the Japanese imperial military aggression that began on
8 December 1941, in which Japan took over Thailand.”
The results from Seoul, however, were very different. Approximately
two-thirds of the interviewees (61 out of 119) mentioned Japan’s war-
time actions and consequential responsibilities in their descriptions of
Japan. The results from Seoul probably emanate from South Korea’s
trauma of 36 years of Japanese colonization, a trauma that has been
kept alive and nurtured by the country’s education system, mass media,
and successive nationalistic governments. Reminders of the continued
anger toward imperialistic Japan are occasionally displayed in anti-
Japanese demonstrations in South Korea, usually following controver-
sies over visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japan’s leaders, or after the publi-
cation of new history textbooks in Japan (Kobari 2005: 38241).
At the same time, questionnaire responses from Seoul showed that
there is a strong current of ambivalence toward Japan. Most students
chose to describe Japan in both positive and negative terms, differenti-
ating their criticism of the Japanese state from their admiration of con-
temporary aspects of Japanese society and culture. In the multiple-
choice part of the questionnaires, 24 out of 119 interviewees in Seoul
chose to define their attitude toward Japan as both “somehow nega-
tive” and “somehow positive”. One university student explained:
“Most Japanese people are kind, but toward their government I am
very negative [...] their policy toward Korea is very bad.” Another re-
vealed that, “I like Japanese culture and have Japanese friends, but I
hate their right-wing government!” And her friend elaborated: “I like
their fashion, music, and movies, but sometimes they make me mad
because of the way they treat history.”
These responses clearly show that there is a fundamental differentia-
tion between the way these students relate to the Japanese state on the
one hand, and their appreciation of aspects of Japanese society and
culture on the other. In spite of the fact that historical and political
controversies are kept high on the national agenda and continue to
 Popular culture, soft power, and Japan’s changing 15

influence how young people view Japan, they do not influence young
peoples’ attitudes toward Japanese popular culture. It is apparent from
the questionnaires in Seoul that although youngsters might remain po-
liticized by the politics of memory (war, textbooks, etc.), they refuse to
see any state-run politics in their affection for popular culture.
In other words, there is a juxtaposition of positive and negative atti-
tudes toward Japan expressed by the same people on different issues.
This implies that the youngsters in Seoul are able to harbor mixed
feelings of both anger and resentment toward Japan while simulta-
neously liking its culture and expressing admiration for its achieve-
ments. This is why the audience reception of popular culture should
not be seen in any monolithic or essentialist manner. Rather, it is a
complex process of images translating into perceptions and sensibilities
that are open to different readings.

4. Re-imagining the Japanese state

The results of the questionnaire survey strongly indicate that the dis-
semination of popular culture has been changing Japan’s image in East
Asia. For respondents of the survey, Japan is not only an ex-militaristic
aggressor, but also a developed country with a fascinating contempo-
rary culture and lifestyle. These youngsters have come to endorse the
notion of Japan as being a “developed”, “advanced”, and “modern”
country, as well as a producer of high-value cultural products. The con-
sumption of Japanese popular culture does not stimulate allegations of
“cultural imperialism”, allegations that are often leveled at America.4
The appealing power of Japanese culture is seen as the non-nationalis-
tic side of the country, reflecting its positive and friendlier sides.
The results in South Korea are especially noteworthy as they show
that when it comes to history young Koreans might accept the conven-
tional national interpretation provided by the state and the mass media
regarding South Korea’s relations with Japan. However, they develop
their own appreciation when it comes to their personal consumption
of Japan’s contemporary culture and their own attitude toward that cul-
ture.
From a wider theoretical perspective, the survey results support the
argument that popular culture has the potential to shape the perception
of a country abroad by adding new layers to its image. The dissemina-
tion of popular culture creates a variety of new images of the “pro-
ducer”, which the consumer often identifies with. This is similar to the
reflection of America and “the American way of life” in Hollywood-
produced films, which viewers sometimes identify with after watching.
This is because popular culture works as a sort of reporting, providing
16 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin

representations of the country to outside audiences. It is effective in

conveying and transferring images and representations, and in drawing
and constituting people’s private lives in the shape of fantasies, emo-
tions, and lifestyles.
In other words, popular culture evokes an emotional bond or a per-
sonal relationship between the product or the service and the produc-
ing country. In this way, listening to music, watching a film or television
drama, or playing a video game, becomes part of a leisure activity that
might build new circles of allegiance. In the long term, this might en-
courage dialogue and cultivate an atmosphere of affinity among indi-
viduals based on a shared experience of the consumption of the same
genre of popular culture products. Engaging in these practices might
also indicate that there is a conscious attempt to set apart the official
national interpretation provided by the state and develop new percep-
tions and preferences based on cultural consumption.
However, the sense of yearning for a particular country evoked
through the consumption of cultural commodities is not a monolithic
process but one that constructs a complex picture that is open to differ-
ent interpretations. Insofar it is a process that cannot be explicitly
wielded for a generation of support for a certain country. The state
should thus refrain from using business-like methods to promote its
image abroad so that a country can be attributed, or equipped, with
the national qualities and characteristics it desires. The diplomatic
course of cultural exports should be left solely to consumers to deter-
mine, as governmental attempts to wield political benefits often prove
futile, if not harmful. In popular culture, state-run institutions work
much less efficiently than the forces working outside the domain of
centralized control, and market forces are much more powerful in lead-
ing consumers’ tastes and priorities.

Nissim Otmazgin is Lecturer at the Department of East Asian Studies

and Research Fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the
Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His
research interests include cultural industry and cultural policy in Japan
and South Korea as well as popular culture and regionalization in East
and Southeast Asia. He holds a PhD from the Graduate School of
Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University. He is the editor
(together with Eyal Ben-Ari) of “Popular Culture and the State in East
and Southeast Asia” (Routledge 2011) and “Popular Culture Co-pro-
duction and Collaboration in East and Southeast Asia” (National Uni-
versity of Singapore Press, 2012). He has published extensively and
is a member of the Association for Asian Studies and the European
Association for Japanese Studies.
 Popular culture, soft power, and Japan’s changing 17

Notes
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the VFJS Annual Conference
on “Cultural Power Japan”, held at Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany, on
26228 November 2010. The author wishes to thank Axel Klein and two anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1. The proliferation of Japanese popular culture abroad has been well documented
in the available literature, especially in anthropology and cultural studies, though
not in political science and economic studies. Noteworthy studies which provide
substantial testimony for the presence of Japanese popular culture overseas in-
clude Allison (2006), Ishii (2001), Iwabuchi (2002, 2004), Martinez (1998), Mōri
(2004), Ōtake and Hosokawa (1998), Shiraishi (2000), and Treat (1996).
2. The questionnaires were conducted with the help of Dr. Ubonrat Siriyuvasak
(Chulalongkorn University) and Dr. Shin Hyun Joon (Sungkonghoe University).
I am grateful for their assistance.
3. These three characters became extremely successful abroad. Hello Kitty is a cat-
like animated character that drives an empire worth USD 3 billion in global
sales every year. Its revenues all come from licensing other companies (12,0002
15,000 licenses a year) to use Hello Kitty’s likeness. Doraemon is a robot-cat
animated caricature that made its first print appearance in the 1970s and soon
became an all-time hit abroad, especially in East Asia. Royalties connected with
Doraemon merchandizing between 1979 and 1994 totaled USD 153 million. As
of March 2004, Pokémon (poketto monsutā) had generated USD 2.3 trillion in
sales in at least 67 countries worldwide.
4. In short, the cultural imperialism theory argues that there is a domination of
cultural flows carried through media from the west to the rest, resulting in the
destruction of local culture and in cultural homogenization. For the cultural im-
perialism theory and its critics, see Herman and McChensey (1997) and Tomlin-
son (1991).

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