Art.

1157 - How obligations arise

The civil action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on other
sources of obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. Lydia A.
Villegas, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 82562 & 82592, April
11, 1997

In People v. Bayotas, the Court summarized the rules on the effects of the
death of an accused on his liabilities pending review of his conviction as
follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his or her conviction extinguishes

his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his or her criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his [or her]
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during
the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-

1
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
deprivation of right by prescription. (People v. Galang, G.R. No. 257346
(Notice), (07 September 2022))
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability where: (i) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (ii) the court declares that
the liability of the accused is only civil; and (iii) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime in which the
accused is acquitted.
Remarkably, in Balerta v. People, the Suprzeme Court, citing the seminal
case of Manantan v. Court of Appeals, elucidated on the two kinds of
acquittal recognized by law and its corresponding effects on the civil
liability of the accused:

First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for
a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code. (Cheng v. People,
G.R. No. 207373, 23 March 2022; Rogelio Gabucan Y Binayao, Sr.,
Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 263612, July 31, 2023;
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp., et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,
G.R. No. 133347, October 15, 2008; Bladimer Bantigue Y Fernandez,
Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, Respondent, G.R. No. 168700,
August 9, 2023

Art. 1159 - Obligations arising from contracts

2
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself/herself, with respect to the other, to give something or to
render some service. If the contract is reduced into writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and is presumed to set out the true
covenant of the parties. [15] It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of
contracts that "if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control." The process of interpreting a contract requires the court to
make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous.
A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable
alternative interpretations. Where the written terms of the contract are not
ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret the
agreement as a matter of law. As Bautista v. Court of Appeals aptly
discussed:
The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to
extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered
from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently,
where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the
contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to
mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words
used should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for
the parties better or more equitable agreements than they themselves have
been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or
inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party
and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the
parties from terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him
those which he did not. (Heirs of Alforte v. Catarroja, G.R. No. 226455
(Notice), (01 August 2022))
Essentially, a contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby
one binds himself/herself, with respect to the other, to give something or to
render some service. Parties enjoy the freedom to contract, and may
establish such terms and conditions as they deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Likewise, parties are bound by the terms of the contract, and compliance to
its provisions cannot be left to one side's will. Hence, absent the parties'
mutual assent, there can be no contract in its true sense.
Notably, the binding effect of a contract stems from two settled principles: (i) "that
any obligation arising from contract has the force of law between the parties; and

3
[ii] that there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential
equality."
Resultantly, a contract which appears heavily skewed in favor of a party, thereby
leading to an unconscionable result, must be struck down as void. In the same
vein, if compliance to a stipulation depends solely on the will of one of the parties,
then said stipulation must be declared invalid. Concomitantly, any modification in
the contract should be made with the consent of the contracting parties and
mutually agreed upon. The minds of the parties must meet as to the proposed
modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement.
Otherwise, it will have no binding effect.
In relation, stipulations regarding the payment of interest are covered by the
principle of mutuality of contracts. The law ordains that "no interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." Consequently, interest rates
may only be imposed when reduced in writing and agreed upon by the express
stipulation of the parties. Any change to the terms of interest must be mutually
agreed upon, or else, it will have no binding effect. (Gotesco Properties, Inc. v.
Cua, G.R. Nos. 228513 & 228552, (15 February 2023))

There is a distinction in law between termination of a contract and its

rescission.

In Pryce Corporation v. Philippine Amusement Gaming Corporation

(Pryce Corporation), the term rescission was aptly described as follows:
The term "rescission" is found in 1) Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the
general provision on rescission of reciprocal obligations; 2) Article 1659,
which authorizes rescission as an alternative remedy, insofar as the rights
and obligations of the lessor and lessee in contracts of lease are concerned;
and 3) Article 1380, with regard to the rescission of contracts.
Rescission entails declaring a contract void at its inception and putting an
end to it as though it never were. It is not merely to terminate it and release
the parties from further obligations to each other, but to abrogate it from the
beginning and restore the parties to relative positions which they would have
occupied had contract ever been made. On the other hand, termination or
cancellation of a contract entails enforcement of its terms prior to the
declaration of its cancellation.
In Pryce Corporation, The Supreme Court held that, in legal
contemplation, the termination of a contract is not equivalent to its
rescission. When an agreement is rescinded, it is deemed inexistent, and
the parties are returned to their status quo ante. Hence, there is mutual

4
restitution of benefits received. However, when it is terminated, it is
deemed valid at inception. Prior to termination, the contract binds the
parties, who are thus obliged to observe its provisions. The consequences
of termination may be anticipated and provided for by the contract. As long
as the terms of the contract are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy, they shall be respected by the courts.
(Furukawa Sangyo Kaisha (H.K.), Ltd. v. Clark Premiere Industrial,
Inc., G.R. No. 239044 (Notice), (01 March 2023); Phil. Communications
Satellite Corp. vs. Globe Telecom, G.R. Nos. 147324 & 147334, May 25,
2004; Leonardo Chua vs. Mutya B. Victorio, G.R. No. 157568, May 18,
2004

City of Cebu vs. Sps. Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo, G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002

Philippine National Bank vs. Benito C. Se, Jr., G.R. No. 119231, April 18, 1996

Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
72110, November 16, 1990

Alex G. Lee vs. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr., G.R. No. 90926, July 6, 1990

Rosendo Balucanag vs. Alberto J. Francisco, G.R. No. L-33422, May 30, 1983

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Edsel Liga vs. Allegro Resources Corp., G.R. No. 175554, December 23, 2008

Aurora B. Go vs. Teresita C. Remotigue, A.M. No. P-05-1969, June 12, 2008

A contract is the law between the parties.

Dorie Abesa Nicolas vs. Del-Nacia Corp., G.R. No. 158026, April 23, 2008

Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

Prisma Construction & Dev't. Corp., et al. vs. Arthur F. Menchavez, G.R. No. 160545,
March 9, 2010

The law does not relieve a party from the consequences of a contract it
entered into with all the required formalities. Courts have no power to ease

5
the burden of obligations voluntarily assumed by parties, just because things
did not turn out as expected at the inception of the contract.

New World Developers and Management, Inc. v. AMA Computer Learning Center,
Inc., G.R. Nos. 187930 & 188250, February 23, 2015

Art. 1161 - Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability where: (i) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (ii) the court declares that
the liability of the accused is only civil; and (iii) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime in which the
accused is acquitted.
Remarkably, in Balerta v. People, the Supreme Court, citing the seminal
case of Manantan v. Court of Appeals, elucidated on the two kinds of
acquittal recognized by law and its corresponding effects on the civil
liability of the accused:

First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for
a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code. (Cheng v. People,
G.R. No. 207373, 23 March 2022; Rogelio Gabucan Y Binayao, Sr.,
Petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 263612, July 31, 2023;
Sps. Alfredo and Cleopatra Pacis vs. Jerome Jovanne Morales, G.R. No. 169467,
February 25, 2010

Art. 1163 - Every person obliged to give something is also

obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a
family

6
Verily, as public officials, these approving/certifying officers are presumed
to have performed their duties regularly and in good faith. [69] However,
these presumptions of regularity and good faith are negated when it is shown
that the officer did not act with the diligence of a good father of a family.
[70] In which case, he/she shall be liable for all the losses arising out of
his/her negligence or lack of diligence. (Philippine Health Insurance Corp.
v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 250787, (27 September 2022))

Optimum Motor Center Corp. vs. Annie Tan, G.R. No. 170202, July 14, 2008

Art. 1167 - If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the

same shall be executed at his cost
Perla Palma Gil vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127206, September 12, 2003

Art. 1168 - When obligation consists in not doing

Eliseo Fajardo, Jr. vs. Freedom to Build, G.R. No. 134692, August 1, 2000

Juan L. Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107737, October 1, 1999

Art. 1169 - Delay

Ek Lee Steel Works Corp. vs. Manila Castor Oil Corp., et al., G.R. No. 119033, July 9,
2008

Andre T. Almocera vs. Johnny Ong, G.R. No. 170479, February 18, 2008

Commonwealth Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130886, January 29,
2004

Desamparados M. Soliva vs. Intestate Estate of Marcelo M. Villalba, G.R. No. 154017,
December 8, 2003

Aerospace Chemical Industries vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108129, September 23,
1999

Romulo A. Coronel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996

Jesus T. David vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97240, October 16, 1992

Cetus Development Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77647, August 7, 1989

7
A demand is only necessary in order to put an obligor in a due and
demandable obligation in delay.

Autocorp Group, et al. vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corp., et al., G.R. No. 166662, June 27,
2008

"In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that the following
requisites be present: (1) that the obligation be demandable and already
liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and (3) that the creditor
requires the performance judicially and extrajudicially." Default generally
begins from the moment the creditor demands the performance of the
obligation. In this case, demand could be considered to have been made
upon the filing of the complaint on November 19, 1999, and it is only from
this date that the interest should be computed.

Rodolfo G. Cruz, et al. vs. Delfin Gruspe, G.R. No. 191431, March 13, 2013

Filing a case in court is the judicial demand referred to in Article 1169 of the Civil Code,
which would put the obligor in delay.

United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Sps. Samuel and Odette Beluso, G.R. No. 159912,
August 17, 2007

Art. 1169 (last par.)

Phil. Export & Foreign Loan vs. VP Eusebio Construction, G.R. No. 140047, July 13,
2004

Twin Towers Condominium vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, February 27, 2003

The use of a credit card to pay for a purchase is only an offer to the credit
card company to enter a loan agreement with the credit card holder. Before
the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no obligation relating to the loan
agreement exists between them. On the other hand, a demand is defined as
the "assertion of a legal right; . . . an asking with authority, claiming or
challenging as due." A demand presupposes the existence of an obligation
between the parties. Petitioner's act of "insisting on and waiting for the
charge purchases to be approved by AMEX" is not the demand
contemplated by Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

Polo S. Pantaleon vs. American Express International, Inc., G.R. No. 174269, August 25,
2010

8
Art. 1170 - Liability for damages
Joseph Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University, et al., G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008

Manila Electric Company vs. Matilde Macabagdal Ramoy, et al., G.R. No. 158911,
March 4, 2008

Woodchild Holdings vs. Roxas Electric and Const. Co., G.R. No. 140667, August 12,
2004

Alejandro Mirasol vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001

Aerospace Chemical Industries vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108129, September 23,
1999

RCBC vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133107, March 25, 1999

Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96505, July 1, 1993

Juan J. Syquia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993

PNCC vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 81551, April 27, 1989

To put an obligor in a due and demandable obligation in delay is for the

purpose of making the obligor liable for interests or damages for the period
of delay.

Autocorp Group, et al. vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corp., et al., G.R. No. 166662, June 27,
2008

Those who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.

Joseph Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University, et al., G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008

Manila Electric Co. vs. Matilde Macabagdal Ramoy, et al., G.R. No. 158911, March 4,
2008

The Bank incurred a delay in informing petitioners of the checks' dishonor.

The Bank was informed of the dishonor by Equitable-PCI Bank as early as
August 2000 but it was only on 7 March 2001 when the Bank informed
petitioners that it will debit from their account the altered amount. This delay
is tantamount to negligence on the part of the collecting bank which would
entitle petitioners to an award for damages under Article 1170 of the New
Civil Code. . .

9
Areza v. Express Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 176697, September 10, 2014

Breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a complaint for

damages filed pursuant to Article 1170 of the Civil Code.

Spouses Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning, G.R. No. 212690, February
20, 2017

True, breach of contract may give rise to a complaint for specific

performance or rescission of contract. In which case, the subject matter is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, jurisdiction is lodged with
the RTC. However, breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a
complaint for damages. Thus, it is not correct to immediately conclude, as
the CA erroneously did, that since the cause of action is breach of contract,
the case would only either be specific performance or rescission of contract
because it may happen, as in this case, that the complaint is one for
damages.

Spouses Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning, G.R. No. 212690, February
20, 2017

Art. 1172 - Responsibility arising from negligence also

demandable
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138569, September
11, 2003

Art. 1173 - Diligence of a good father of a family

Art. 1173, par. 2 - Diligence of a good father of a family

Osmundo S. Canlas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112160, February 28, 2000

Bernardino Jimenez vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 71049, May 29, 1987

The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which
an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property.

Wildvalley Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119602, October 6, 2000

A good father of a family means a person of ordinary or average diligence.

To determine the prudence and diligence that must be required of all

10
persons, we must use as basis the abstract average standard corresponding to
a normal orderly person. Anyone who uses diligence below this standard is
guilty of negligence.

Philippine Steel Coating Corp. v. Quiñones, G.R. No. 194533, April 19, 2017

Art. 1174 - Responsibility for events which cannot be foreseen

(Caso fortuito)
Phil. Comm. Satellite Corp. vs. Globe Telecom, G.R. No. 147324, May 25, 2004

Fortune Express vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119756, March 18, 1999

Southeastern College vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126389, July 10, 1998

Jacinto Tanguilig vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117190, January 2, 1997

National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103442-45, May 21, 1993

Bachelor Express, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85691, July 31, 1990

Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81100-01, February 7,
1990

"Fortuitous events" defined

Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or

avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.

Roberto C. Sicam, et al. vs. Lulu v. Jorge, et al., G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007

When an act of God or act of man constitutes a fortuitous event.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as that which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Whether an act
of God or an act of man, to constitute a fortuitous event, it must be shown
that: a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the
failure of the obligor to comply with its obligations was independent of
human will; b) it was impossible to foresee the event or, if it could have
been foreseen, to avoid it; c) the occurrence rendered it impossible for the

11
obligor to fulfill its obligations in a normal manner; and d) said obligor was
free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. If the
negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the
fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof,
the fortuitous event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his
negligence.

College Assurance Plan, et al. vs. Belfranlt Development, Inc., G.R. No. 155604,
November 22, 2007

To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it
must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or,
if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must
be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a
normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in
the aggravation of the injury or loss.

Roberto C. Sicam, et al. vs. Lulu v. Jorge, et al., G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007

An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take
steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's
negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and
injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate
cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one
from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's
participation - whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the
whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to
acts of God.

Roberto C. Sicam, et al. vs. Lulu v. Jorge, et al., G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007

In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a

person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary
that the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or
the obligor); (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Lasam v. Smith,

12
45 Phil. 657 [1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29640, June
10, 1971; Estrada v. Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-42926, September 13, 1985; Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-47851, October 3, 1986). Caso fortuito or force
majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable,
events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable.
It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to
foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not
impossibility to foresee the same (Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, G.R. No. L-21749, September 29, 1967).

Franklin G. Gacal vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 55300, March 15, 1990

The 1997 financial crisis that ensued in Asia did not constitute a valid
justification to renege on one's obligations and it is not among the fortuitous
events contemplated under Article 1174 of the New Civil Code.

Duty Paid Import Co., Inc. v. Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 238258, December
10, 2019

Burden of proving loss due to furtuitous event

The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on
him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from
liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct
that may have occasioned the loss.

Roberto C. Sicam, et al. vs. Lulu v. Jorge, et al., G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007

Art. 1176 - Presumption that interest has been paid

Soledad Soco vs. Francis Militante, G.R. No. L-58961, June 28, 1983, 208 Phil 151

Art. 1177 - Rights of creditors

Soledad Soco vs. Francis Militante, G.R. No. L-58961, June 28, 1983, 208 Phil 151

Thus, the following successive measures must be taken by a creditor before

he may bring an action for rescission of an allegedly fraudulent sale: (1)
exhaust the properties of the debtor through levying by attachment and
execution upon all the property of the debtor, except such as are exempt by

13
law from execution; (2) exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor, save
those personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3) seek rescission of the
contracts executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana).

Salvador and Ligaya Adorable. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119466, November 25,
1999

Art. 1178 - Rights acquired in virtue of an obligation are

transmissible
Leonila J. Licuanan vs. Ricardo D. Diaz, G.R. No. 59805, July 21, 1989

Soledad Soco vs. Francis Militante, G.R. No. L-58961, June 28, 1983, 208 Phil 151

Art. 1179 - Demandable obligations

Payroll deduction is merely a convenient mode of payment and not the sole
source of payment for the loans. The creditor never agreed that the loans will
be paid only through salary deductions. Neither did it agree that if the debtor
ceases to be an employee of HSBC, her obligation to pay the loans will be
suspended. The creditor can immediately demand payment of the loans at
anytime because the obligation to pay has no period. HSBC-Staff Retirement
Plan vs. Sps. Bienvenido and Editha Broqueza, G.R. No. 178610, November
17, 2010

14