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VIETNAM
AND THE
SOVIET UNION
About the Book and Author
Examining the long and turbulent relationship between Vietnam
and the Soviet Union, Douglas Pike traces its political, economic, and
diplomatic history from the Bolshevik Revolution to today's deep and
intricate alliance. He not only explores this extraordinary relationship
but also outlines its great geopolitical significance for the entire region.
The current relationship is marked by greed, mistrust, and un-
certainty, with both countries testing the utility of close military and
economic ties. Convinced that the USSR was never adverse to sacrificing
Vietnamese interests for marginal Soviet gains, Hanoi has little sense
of obligation toward Moscow. By contrast, the Soviet Union sees its
relationship with Vietnam as the promising and important exception to
its efforts in Asia, most of which have resulted in only modest returns
for considerable investment. The major determinant of the alliance
continues to be the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Although Vietnam and the USSR are bound by mutual interests,
they share neither common perceptions nor a common heritage. The
forces uniting them seem as strong as the issues that would divide
them. Professor Pike expects this balance to be maintained for the short
term, but he argues that Vietnam's historical inability to sustain successful
external relations may ultimately doom the alliance.
Douglas Pike is director of the Indochina Studies Project at the
University of California, Berkeley. As a U.S. foreign service officer, he
was posted in Saigon, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Taipei, and Washington. He
is the author of five books on Vietnam, the latest of which is PAVN:
People's Army of Vietnam.
VIETNAM
AND THE
SOVIET UNION
Anatomy of an Alliance
Douglas Pike
First published 1987 by Westview Press, Inc.
Published 2019 by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
Copyright © 1987 Taylor & Francis
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any
form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publishers.
Notice:
Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used
only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Pike, Douglas Eugene, 1924-
Vietnam and the Soviet Union.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Vietnam-Relations-Soviet Union. 2. Soviet
Union-Relations-Vietnam. I. Title.
DS556.58.S65P54 1987 327.470597 86-29022
ISBN 13: 978-0-813-30470-0 (hbk)
CONTENTS
Preface xi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xv
Apocryphal Story xvi
Introduction: Soviet Overview of Asia 1
1 The Formative Years: Pretense and Reality 4
Earliest Years 4
Ho in Moscow 9
The Comintem Relationship 14
The Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) 18
Notes 22
2 The Stalin Years: Cruel World of Indifference 26
The Popular Front 27
World War II and Its Aftermath 28
The Viet Minh War 31
Notes 35
3 The Khrushchev Years: Opportunity Versus Caution 37
Geneva, 1954 39
Disengagement 45
Notes 49
4 Zigzag: The Sino-Soviet Dispute 51
Mediation Efforts 53
Exploitation Formula 54
Ideological Intrusion 56
The Dispute and the War 59
vii
viii CONTENTS
The Dispute Today 67
Notes 70
S Hanoi and Moscow at War 72
Turnaround 73
The Year 1965 76
Differing Objectives, Contending Strategies 82
Big-Unit War Years (1966-1973) 89
Political Settlement 93
The End of the War 98
Summing Up 100
Notes 102
6 Soviet-Vietnamese Economic Relations 106
The Viet Minh War 106
Early Economic Aid 109
Military Assistance 116
Postwar Economic Relations 127
Comecon 129
Trade Relations 133
Long-term Plans 137
APPENDIX: USSR FOREIGN AID PROJECT LIST 143
Electric Production 144
Mining 145
Oil and Gas 147
Manufacturing and Industrial Projects 149
Other Industrial Projects 150
Transportation and Communication 150
Agriculture 152
Education and Technical Assistance 153
Notes 156
7 The Subliminal Dimension 162
Culture and Logic 164
Status and Power 171
Doc Lap and Mat Nuoc 172
Oil and Water 176
Notes 178
CONTENTS ix
8 Post-Vietnam War Relations 180
Postwar Years 180
The Treaty 184
Economic Tutelage 188
Military Alliance 191
The Sino-Vietnamese War 201
The Kampuchean War 205
The Diplomatic Front 211
The Ambience Today 214
Notes 218
9 The Evolving Relationship 223
The "All-Around" Relationship 224
Internal Issues: Dependence Versus Influence 232
External Issues: Conflict of Interest 235
U.S. Policy Implications 241
Conclusions 244
Final Thought 246
Notes 247
Selected Bibliography 249
Index 257
PREFACE
THIS BOOK IS a history of relations between Vietnam and the USSR,
beginning in the earliest days when there was neither a Vietnam nor
a USSR as such, and continuing to today's deep and intricate but
uncertain alliance. It is written with primary emphasis on the Vietnam
rather than the USSR perspective, since Vietnam is my professional
field of interest and work; nevertheless, as evidenced below, my cre-
deil.tials as a Kremlinologist are at least respectable.
As Voltaire said, one turns over a library to write a book. In this
endeavor I turned over an archive, the University of California's Indochina
Archive at Berkeley, of whose vast holdings (3 million pages of docu-
mentation; 25,000 books and monographs; 35,000 maps, photographs,
graphics) about 15 percent relate directly to the subject under scrutiny.
In the course of my research I traveled three times to the USSR,
twice for conferences and once as a guest for two weeks of the USSR
Academy of Science's Oriental Institute, during which time I talked with
numerous Soviet specialists on Indochina and explored the Lenin library.
I have also attended several U.S. conferences with Soviet scholars, and
all of these occasions enabled me to develop a number of valuable
professional relationships. Also I have systematically consulted Hanoi
watchers and scholars working on Vietnam in the ASEAN states, Japan,
and China. Finally, I spent a year and a half on sabbatical with the
Congressional Research Service at the Library of Congress, where I
walked the endless stacks examining relevant volumes.
My research uncovered less than one might imagine. I did not,
for instance, find a single English-language full-length history of Soviet-
Vietnamese relations. That fact was the primary reason I wrote this
book. My research took on the character of a jigsaw puzzle, and the
result is a multitude of fragments and piecemeal data assembled into
an admittedly incomplete mosaic.
It is appropriate, and only fair to the reader, to set down my
general view of that vast controversy we call the USSR, so that if there
is bias or unintended prejudice present, it can thus be explained.
xi
xii PREFACE
As an undergraduate at the University of California (Berkeley) in
the early 1950s, I had the ambition to become a Moscow-based foreign
correspondent, one who spoke the language, was well grounded in
Russian history, and knew Soviet government, society, culture, and
ideology. I took all the appropriate courses I could find. For one calendar
year I studied the Russian language full time-five hours a day in class
plus three in the language laboratory, hooked via earphones to a tape
recorder-a time I recall chiefly as the most miserable year of my life.
I remember saying to a fellow student over a beer that I now understood
why the Russians were so hard to get along with; so would anyone
who had to speak that wretched language.
Then, in an irony of wasted effort, I was off to Asia for twenty
years of foreign service assignments, chiefly in Vietnam, during which
I hardly once spoke Russian; by the time I finally made it to the USSR,
two decades later, I had lost most of it.
Yet my education in Soviet studies stood me in good stead. When
assigned to Saigon in 1960 I became at once interested in the newly
formed National Liberation Front (NLF), or Viet Cong, and found that
I could put to good use my knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, particularly
in understanding the organizational structure and mobilizational strategy
of the NLF, which had been heavily influenced by Leninism.
Years passed, the Vietnam War ended, and I was able for the first
time to get to the USSR. It was a singular experience. I arrived with
a great deal of intellectual baggage, but I soon discovered that much
of my knowledge was out of date, that over the years I had assembled
a dutch of stereotypes and misperceptions that were soon shattered. I
found the Soviet Union to be both better and worse than I had imagined
and was left with the conviction that every American, whatever his or
her political outlook, should live for a few weeks in the USSR and
bathe in the reality of the place. Over the years, with subsequent visits,
my sense of the USSR evolved from sinister to sympathetic to respectful
alienation.
Probably the most important fundamental question that can be
asked about the era of history through which we are now passing is:
Whither the USSR? lt is for all of us literally a life or death question,
but as difficult to answer as it is profound.
There are, I would argue, three general perceptions of the USSR
held today by Americans, by West Europeans, and, to a lesser extent,
by Asians-three perspectives that represent neither reality nor falsehood,
since they exist in a dimension beyond factual truth. Actually they are
philosophical categories manifested in the defining process that goes on
in the head of each individual as a flood of information and opinion
about the USSR is translated into a coherent abstraction. The three
PREFACE xiii
perceptions can be found everywhere: in the press, in academia, and
in state policy-making councils.
First is what might be called the Armageddon crowd, who believe
that the USSR's motto is We Will Bury You. Their perception of the
USSR is that it regards itself as history's instrument, with messianic
roots going far back into history, predating even the Czars. Ideologically
driven, the Kremlin leaders view our times as a great global struggle
in which there can ultimately be only one winner, and whatever is
required they mean to be it. The enemy here is seen as the Soviet
system, totalitarian at home and imperial abroad. It cannot be turned,
it cannot be pacified, it can only be defeated.
Second are the Preservationists, who hold that there is but one
immutable law of history-change-and whose slogan is Time Is on
Our Side. They see the USSR as an expended revolutionary force, once
dangerously aggressive, now essentially benign because it is so con-
servative in terms of taking risks, at best only an uncertain bully. The
USSR as a system is weak, living permanently on the edge of crisis
from which it can never escape because the system can never be made
to work well. Its leaders are still traumatized by the destruction of
World War II. They are proud of what they have achieved in a short
time, fearful of losing it, and seek only to protect and build. If the
cause is to be advanced through adventurism it will be by surrogates,
the Cubans or the Vietnamese. So long as opposition, primarily the
United States, remains tough and determined, the USSR will be no
particular threat to world peace. It may be a challenged, but not a true,
enemy, and eventually it will be outlasted.
Third are the lnstitutionalists, who see the essential world condition
as a permanent struggle for power among nations and transnational
institutions. By the very nature of this struggle, none can ever dominate;
thus much of the struggle is self-cancelling. The USSR in fifty years
has moved from a position of inferiority to one of parity, but it can
never go beyond. All reality stems from this present and continuing
nuclear balance of terror. It fixes the limits of all political action. However,
this is a dynamic condition and within its boundaries lie great oppor-
tunities to influence the direction of history, not by war but by deter-
mination, skill, and perseverance. Eventually this struggle will be con-
tained within some supranational institution.
The important point to be made about these competing perceptions
is that they are genuine and valid. We must always bear in mind,
therefore, that everyone does not see the USSR through the same prism.
Yet these three perceptions are also policy-oriented, what might
be called tactical views. There is another perspective, a longer, non-
deterministic one which holds that both the United States and USSR,
xiv PREFACE
indeed all of the world's systems, are confronted by a common chal-
lenge-of an uncontrolled and uncontrollable science and technology-
and that the capacity to adjust to this challenge, not ideology or rhetoric,
will determine not only power and influence in the future but survival
itself.
I am grateful to Robert Scalapino and Allan Cameron for their
valuable comments on this book in manuscript form. And, for her
practical and intellectual assistance, I am indebted to my wife, Myrna.
Douglas Pike
Berkeley, California
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASE AN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Cominform Communist Information Bureau
Comintern predecessor of Cominform
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
ORV Democratic Republic of Vietnam
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCP French Communist party
GRU Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army
GVN Government of Vietnam
ICC International Control Commission
ICP Indochina Communist party
kw kilowatts
kwh kilowatt hours
mt metric tons
NLF National Liberation Front
p/a per annum
PAVN People's Army of Vietnam
PLA Pe'!ple's Liberation Army (China)
PLAF People's Liberation Armed Forces
PRC People's Republic of China
PRG People's Revolutionary Government (South Vietnam)
PRK People's Republic of Kampuchea
RAND Research and Development (Corporation)
SAM surface-to-air missile
SRV Socialist Republic of Vietnam
TASS Soviet news agency
VNA Vietnamese News Agency
VNQDD Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang
xv
APOCRYPHAL STORY
A Vietnamese diplomat is lunching with a Swedish diplomat in
Paris. In the course of the meal, the Swede asks his colleague from Hanoi
whether he is worried about the dangers inherent in his country's inti-
mate embrace of the USSR.
Replies the Vietnamese: We survived French conquest, we survived
American hostility, and we can survive Russian friendship.
xvi
INTRODUCTION
Soviet Overview of Asia
ASIA DURING OUR lifetime has been the scene of nearly constant
political turmoil, social upheaval, economic chaos, and war in several
forms. The pilots of Moscow's ship of state have had to chart a course
through perpetually uncertain waters. Their navigational record overall
is not impressive. Time and again in the past seven decades the USSR
has found itself running against the tide of events, marooned in some
policy backwater or grounded on the shoals of miscalculation. It erred
enormously in handling China and, for years, Vietnam. It failed in
Indonesia under Sukarno and in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge. It
missed enormous opportunities in Japan and probably in Korea as well.
Its efforts to control events and influence decisions in Asian countries
and within local Communist parties have continually been thwarted or
ruined by the native spirit of nationalism. It has been plagued by weak
party-to-party relations, and its influence at the government-to-govern-
ment level generally has been less than elsewhere in the world. Often
it has been obliged to withhold support from a left-wing political
movement, to the detriment of its image, because the movement's coming
to power would serve China more than the USSR. There have been
some successes, most notably in India. But in general the USSR's
experience has been to find itself at something of a strategic and tactical
disadvantage in Asia.
The standard Moscow foreign policy approach has been to search
for soft-spot opportunities and, when found, to exploit them. The rule
seems to be: Push where softness is found, and keep pushing until
resistance hardens. It is a rule that has worked better elsewhere than
in Asia. Further, the dominant characteristic of Soviet behavior in Asia
during the past fifty years has been reaction, not action. The USSR
appears not so much to be operating from some master plan as to be
1
2 INTRODUCTION
moving opportunistically to meet unfolding events. The latter requires
skill in dealing with the subtle Asian mind, but the USSR has seldom
demonstrated much finesse. Its historical record in Asia thus is clear:
Despite considerable input and energy over the years, it has surprisingly
little to show for past efforts. Probably this is why its present efforts
in Vietnam are so important to it.
To what extent is the USSR an Asian nation, as opposed to a
European one? Kremlin leaders warming to the subject stake a claim
to Asian primacy by pointing on a map to the vast expanse of territory
between the Ural Mountains west to the Pacific and from the White
Sea south to the Caspian, noting that two-thirds of the USSR lies in
Asia. But Asian memories are long, and when most Asians think about
the USSR it is imperial Russia that comes to mind. The USSR is seen
as a continuation of empire that enjoyed the benefits of extraterritoriality,
a customs regimen, and residential concessions in Asia. The Czar had
a legation guard in Peking, received a share of the Boxer indemnity
payments, and laid special claims to northern Manchuria and the Chinese
Eastern Railway. The Russians played the Great Game with the British
over control of India's Northwest Frontier Province and took special
interest in Mongolia (having incited a Mongol revolt in 1911). Imperial
Russia had a long history of aggrandizement, fought Asians on many
fronts, seized and held vast territories. Thus many Asians, particularly
the Chinese, see the USSR as the last of the European colonial powers.
What the Kremlin considers an integral part of the Soviet Union Asians
see as subjugated lands and tribes under western-oriented domination.
The USSR's interest in Asia differs from that of other western nations,
however, in that regional developments affect it more. Soviet moves
tend to be more purposeful and clearly defined than those of, say, the
United States, whose interests are more amorphous and actions more
inconstant. In truth, it appears that the USSR is not simply a non-Asian
nation in Asia-as was, say, Great Britain-but neither is it simply a
fellow Asian nation. It is a hybrid, and it does have and will continue
to have peculiar interests in Asia.
Future Soviet behavior in Asia, if we are to use history as our
guide, will be driven by a mission of empire. Moscow's ambitions may
or may not have pre-Communist roots, but the recent record indicates
that what it wants in the region is ideological dominl)nce, to be achieved
without Soviet participation in war. This theme-dominance without
. war-explains much of what the USSR has done in Asia in recent times,
that is, since I<hrushchev. 1 USSR policy in Asia may now be entering
a time of historic change. This possibility has been suggested by some
Kremlinologists speculating on the "revolution" that is being introduced
into the USSR by the new general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev. 2 One
INTRODUCTION 3
of the changes to be effected, according to this speculation, will be the
treatment of Asia less in terms of ideological competition, as in the
past, and more as a matter of strategic concern, as the USSR has always
treated Western Europe. In any event, the question facing the countries
of the Pacific Basin-including Vietnam-is, What are the limits of
Soviet ambition? Is the arrival of Soviet military presence in the region
simply orthodox pursuit of national interest, or is something more sinister
under way-that is, Soviet political maneuvers and cold war actions
that seek to change the fundamental balance of power in Asia?
It is with these grand strategy considerations in mind that we
begin to trace the many-colored threads woven into the fabric of the
relationship between Vietnam and the USSR.
NOTES
1. Western Asia, which borders on the USSR, may be the exception, as
developments in Afghanistan since 1980 certainly suggest.
2. See the important Gorbachev speech made at Vladivostok on July 28,
1986, carried by FBIS Daily Report for the USSR (July 29, 1986), and "News
and Views from the USSR," USSR Embassy Press Release (July 29, 1986).
One
THE FORMATIVE YEARS
Pretense and Reality
THE HISTORY OF Vietnamese-USSR relations until well into the
decisive 1960s was nominal and cursory. There was neither much
intercourse nor emotional attachment for either party. The heritage of
those years, which continues to be influential today, is best expressed
thematically. The earliest years, the 1920s, were an amalgam of pretense
and reality for both Ho Chi Minh's little band of revolutionaries and
the ruling Comintem in Moscow. The Stalin years of the 1930s and
1940s were a time of cruel indifference for Vietnamese radicals seeking
Moscow assistance in ridding their homeland of colonialism. The last
years of this formative period, the time of Nikita .Khrushchev, witnessed
the advent of a deeper and more complex association that left scars of
distrust in Hanoi-scars that still have not disappeared. It is these
themes that we seek to trace in this chapter.
EARLIEST YEARS
The history begins with the initial contact between the fledgling
Indochinese Marxist movement and Moscow after the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution and the start of the slow filtering of Marxist-'Leninist thought
into Indochina. Here there is no large body of early documentation to
be examined, no lengthy histories to be consulted. Rather, the record
is one of scattered references in memoirs and brief passages in historical
accounts devoted to larger events.
Hanoi historians today trace Vietnamese communism's spiritual
roots back to 1903 and the July 30 meeting of the Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party. This, it is held, was "the key turning point
in the history of the revolution of the working class and laboring people
in Russia, and in the world as a whole, including Vietnam . . . that set
4
THE FORMATIVE YEARS 5
the principles of a new proletarian party which later Ho Chi Minh
fostered in founding the Communist Party of Vietnam from which
stemmed the victories of the Vietnamese revolution ... (and) the lines
and orientations for economic development." 1
Actually, there is no evidence that Marxist thought was at all
influential among Vietnamese revolutionaries prior to the Bolshevik
Revolution. According to Truong Chinh, Ho Chi Minh first began reading
Marx (and Lenin) in a systematic and meaningful way in late 1919,
initially in preparation for the December 1920 French Socialist Party
Congress at Tours (which resulted in a French left split and the formation
of the French Communist Party, of which Ho was a charter member). 2
Vietnam's other early great revolutionary figure, Phan Boi Chau, likewise
did not begin studying Marxism until after the Bolshevik Revolution. 3
Vietnamese with revolutionary stirrings in the early days found their
lodestar in the east-in Japan because of its tum of the century victory
over Russia, and in China with Sun Yat Sen's 1912 revolution. If there
was identification with the west among these young proto-Marxists it
was not with Bolshevism but with the radicals of France, in the spirit
of the Paris commune.
Lenin and the other Bolsheviks, prior to their revolution, had been
aware of developments in Indochina, although clearly these were marginal
for them in the general scheme of things. The earliest specific reference
to Indochina the author has been able to find is Lenin's August 1908
article on the "tinderboxes of the world," in which he wrote,
A look at the attitude of the French in Indochina shows that this
time some of those who have taken part in the plundering of the
colony feel uneasy: they helped the "historical government" of
China suppress revolutionaries! They are also fraught with worry
over keeping "their" Asiatic colonies on the edge of China
intact. 4
Much of what Lenin wrote about colonialism-including his im-
portant Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916)-was generally
relevant and did make specific reference to Indochina. A third early
Lenin reference was to "rebellious plots in French-controlled Annam"
in a July 1916 newspaper article on self-determination. 5
The first post-revolutionary official pronouncement out of Moscow
that even remotely could be related to Vietnam came in December 1917,
a month after the Bolsheviks had seized power. It was Lenin's message
to the Moslims in and out of Russia, a general statement that, in effect,
defined the Communist revolution in Asia as liberation from colonialism. 6
6 THE FORMATIVE YEARS
Of course, the Bolshevik Revolution in itself was profoundly mean-
ingful for the revolutionary movement in Indochina. Previously, the
Vietnamese revolutionary impulse that had arisen with the arrival of
the French as colonialists in the 1860s was narrowly structured though
amorphous. The Bolshevik Revolution became a fork in the road for
Indochinese revolutionaries, offering them (or forcing them into) a choice
of revolutionary routes, Communist or non-Communist.
Serious attention by Moscow to issues primarily concerning col-
onized Indochina began in mid-1920, when Lenin sent a draft report
to the Comintern Second Congress that then went to a special commission
and finally emerged as a policy statement titled First Outline of Theses
on the National and Colonial Questions. 7
The document deals with two issues: nationalities or ethnic mi-
norities in the USSR and colonialism. The portion dealing with the
latter is largely an elementary set of instructions on the thinking to be
followed and the pitfalls to be avoided by Communist cadres in their
organizational and operational activities in what today would be called
the Third World. Lenin was apparently primarily concerned with ensuring
that native revolutionary movements were kept under firm party su-
pervision and ideologically uncontaminated by "petty bourgeois na-
tionalism and pacificism." Organizational efforts, of necessity, were to
be centered in the peasantry but would include whatever local proletariat
was available. The party should always be self-contained, Lenin said,
and should eschew the false opportunism represented by broad political
movements such as the Pan Asian and Pan Islamic movements. Organizers
were warned to be particularly wary of bourgeois-democratic tendencies
that could either subvert the revolutionaries' character or co-opt the
revolution. However, temporary relations, even alliances, were sometimes
necessary, and they were permissible as a tactic. The sense of Theses
on the National and Colonial Questions-seems to be that, as most peasants
were tradition bound, parochial in outlook, and stubbornly apolitical,
the peasantry was a very weak reed. Lenin's pessimistic conclusion
seems to be that not much could be created from such unpropitious
material. 8
Even so, the advent of Theses was significant. It raised the status
of Asia and moved it closer to the center of Communist strategic thinking.
No longer was Asia a mere contributor to world revolution. Now it
was a major actor assigned an essential role. Asia, which principally
meant China, was seen as capitalism's vulnerability. If Asian peoples
could be organized and motivated to revolt, an avalanche could be set
in motion. The revolt could best be accomplished by harnessing the
hostile forces latent in the institutions of feudalism, colonialism, im-
perialism, and racism. It became part of a vision of the world transformed:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS 7
Conflagration in the hinterland would cause first crisis and then revolution
in the imperialist citadels-and this could not be done without the
contribution of the peoples of Asia. It was all succinctly expressed in
Grigory Zinoviev's aphorism coined at the 1925 Comintem Plenary
meeting: "The road to World Revolution lies through the East rather
than through the West."9
Much later, Ho Chi Minh said that Lenin's Theses is what drew
him to Marxism-it hit him like a thunderbolt, he told an interviewer.
Truong Chinh describes Ho's encounter with Lenin's Theses on the
National and Colonial Questions: "Sitting alone in his small room at
Number 9, Impasse Compoint (Paris) he was extremely moved. Tears
flowed down his cheeks. He shouted aloud, as if addressing a large
crowd: 'Dear martyrs! Compatriots! This is what we need! This is the
path to our liberation."' 10 Perhaps, as with Chapman looking into Homer,
it was a profoundly moving experience. Or it may simply have been
that Lenin had raised the subject of colonialism to a transcendental
level, something Ho had been attempting to do among the French left,
but without much success. Possibly the legend is simply Ho's gesture
of deference to the fountainhead of communism.
Much later, Vietnamese Communists speaking privately would argue
that Ho Chi Minh at the time was more advanced in his thinking on
the liberation of Asia than was Lenin, that he certainly knew more
about organizing a revolution around the peasantry, and that Lenin's
formula-which called first for ousting the colonial/imperialist power
and then for achieving revolution-was not necessarily correct. Ho
argued the two could be combined11 and that, in any event, they were
intricately linked. This was the burden of Ho's contribution to the debate
at the Comintern's Fifth Congress (Eighth Session, June 3, 1924) in
Moscow:
My purpose in speaking here is to direct the attention of
the delegates to the colonies, which to a large degree will
determine the destiny of the world proletariat. Colonies supply
the food and soldiers for the large imperial countries; if we want
to defeat these countries we must begin by taking away their
colonies....
Apparently you have yet to accept fully the thinking that
the destiny of the international proletariat, especially the
proletariat in countries that send forces to invade and occupy
colonies, is closely linked to the destiny of the oppressed classes
of the colonies. . . .
Why in these matters of revolution have you not
reorganized your tactics and forces? Why do you give no
attention to the forces and the propaganda from the opposition
8 THE FORMATIVE YEARS
you wish to struggle against and topple? Why do you ignore the
colonies when the capitalists use the colonies to defend
themselves and oppose you? . . . It is the colonies that are the
foundation of counter-revolution. Yet when you talk about
revolution you give only slight attention to the colonial
question....
Comrades, forgive my boldness. But I must say as I listen
to the debate by those of you from mother countries, I have the
impression you are trying to kill the snake by hitting it on the
tail, not the head. The venom and vitality of imperialism are in
the colonies, not the mother countries. 12
The Vietnamese colonial complaint, voiced here and elsewhere,
was that while the Bolshevik and Comintem leaders paid lip service
to the liberation of Vietnam and other colonies, their strategic planners
were not acting on the logic of the utility represented by colonies.
Indeed, there was justification for Ho's criticism. Lenin's Imperialism,
The Highest Stage of Capitalism must have greatly disappointed him, for
it made no reference to the idea of revolution in the mother country
via revolution in the colonies. This writing was the logical place for
Lenin to deal with the concept, had he been so inclined. The idea itself
was not new, nor was it unknown in Moscow. Marx, using Ireland as
a model of thought, had seen the vulnerability that colonialism rep-
resented to the colonizing power. He recognized that denying markets
and resources to a European power, by means of revolution in colonial
and semicolonial nations, might well trigger revolution at home. Although
the early Comintem leaders endorsed the idea, they did not share Ho's
preoccupation with it. Or perhaps their attention was elsewhere, focused
on what they perceived as a greater strategic opportunity. As a result,
they treated colonialism in an undifferentiated manner, lumping it under
the rubric of the National Question. They spoke of liberation of the
European colonies, but in the context of the right of self-determination
of the colonial peoples. Most contended that this right would be realized
only as a by-product of revolution in the mother country. Trotsky was
perhaps the most insistent on this point: "The workers and peasants
not only of Annam, Algeria, Bengal but also of Persia and Armenia
will obtain the possibility of independent existence only on the day
when the workers of England and France will have overthrown Lloyd
George and Clemenceau and taken the state power into their hands." 13
The early Comintem statement that most closely approached Ho's
thinking on strategy for Asia is found in the report that emerged from
the Sixth Comintem Congress (1928). It called for the overthrow of
"imperialism, feudalism, and landlord bureaucracy; establishment of
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry on the basis of
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
VI. ATTACK ON SULLIVAN'S
ISLAND.
Invasion of Southern Colonies proposed—Expedition dispatched
—Charleston its first Object—Proceedings of its Citizens—
Sullivan's island Fortified—Arrival of General Lee—His opinion of
Fort Moultrie—British Fleet arrives—Preliminary movements—
Fort Moultrie attacked—Remarkable Defence of it—Action
described—Heroic conduct of Sergeant Jasper—British repulsed
—Respective losses—Liberal conduct of Governor Rutledge—
Mrs. Elliot—Death of Jasper.
The successful defence of Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's island, is justly
considered one of the noblest achievements recorded in the annals
of the Revolution.
The reduction of the southern colonies to obedience, was deemed a
measure of prime importance by the British government, nor was it
considered a project of difficult achievement. Hitherto the principal
theatre of the war had been in the north; and, hence, it was
calculated that preparations for the defence of the southern colonies
had been so much neglected, that little more than a demonstration
in that quarter would be necessary to bring the people to terms.
Early in 1776, an expedition having the above object in view was
devised, the command of which was entrusted to Sir Peter Parker
and Earl Cornwallis. Accordingly, on the 3d of May, Admiral Parker,
with twenty sail, arrived at Cape Fear, with Generals Cornwallis,
Vaughan, and several others.
General Clinton was expected from New York, with another
considerable corps, to cöoperate in the attack. With his troops he
had arrived at the point of destination, even anterior to the naval
armament; and, being the senior general, on the junction of the
forces, assumed the command. The immediate object was the
reduction and possession of Charleston, the capital of South
Carolina; on the fall of which, the subjugation of that and the other
southern provinces would be an easy achievement.
The meditated invasion was not unknown to the Carolinians, who,
being a high-minded and chivalrous people, determined that if their
capital fell, it should be at an expense of a treasure of British blood.
With great activity and energy, therefore, they betook themselves to
the fortification of every assailable point. With patriotic
disinterestedness, the citizens demolished their valuable store-
houses on the wharves to supply materials for defence. Streets were
barricaded, and intrenchments erected along the shore. Even
windows were stripped of their weights, to supply the demand for
bullets. The inhabitants generally came to the work of defence, and
scarcely a man on the ground could be discovered without a spade,
a pickaxe, or other implement of work. Even the blacks from the city,
and for miles in the country, were employed, and seemed animated
with the enthusiasm and zeal of their masters. The commanding
general was Major-general Lee, who, having been appointed by
congress to the command of the southern forces, and possessing
the entire confidence of the troops and of the people, was enabled
to carry to completion the various works of defence, which his
knowledge and skill had decided to be important. Governor
Rutledge, also a man of great influence in the province, cöoperated
with General Lee, in all his measures of defence, and by his example
and exhortations essentially contributed to the happy results which
followed.
At the distance of six miles from the point of land formed by the
confluence of the two rivers, Ashley and Cooper, and on which
Charleston is built, lies Sullivan's island. It commands the channel
which leads to the port. The due fortification of this point was a
matter of great moment. The outline of a fort had already been
marked out, to complete which, Colonel William Moultrie, a
singularly brave and accomplished officer, was dispatched early in
March. Palmetto trees, which from their soft and spongy texture,
were admirably calculated to deprive a ball of its impetus without
causing splinters, had been cut in the forest, and the logs in huge
rafts lay moored to the beach. "Ignorant of gunnery, but confident in
their own resources, and nerved with resolute courage, Moultrie and
his coadjutors, hardy sons of the soil, heaved those huge logs from
the water, and began the work. A square pen was built, with
bastions from each angle, capable of covering a thousand men. The
logs were laid in two parallel rows, and sixteen feet apart; bound
together with cross-timbers dove-tailed and bolted into logs, and the
wide space filled with sand. When completed, it presented the
appearance of a solid wall, sixteen feet wide; but its strength was
yet to be tested. Behind this, Moultrie placed four hundred and
thirty-five men, and thirty-one cannon, some of them twenty-sixes,
some eighteens, and the rest of smaller caliber—throwing in all five
hundred and thirteen pounds.
"It was at this juncture that Lee arrived from the north, and took
command of the troops. When his eye, accustomed to the scientific
structures of Europe, fell on this rudely-built affair, he smiled in
derision, calling it a 'slaughter-pen,' and requested Governor
Rutledge to have it immediately evacuated. But that noble patriot
was made of sterner stuff, and replied, 'that while a soldier remained
alive, he would never give his sanction to such an order.'"
The naval force of the British, consisted of the Bristol and
Experiment, of fifty guns; four frigates, the Active, the Acteon, the
Solebay, and the Syren, of twenty-eight; the Sphynx, of twenty, the
Friendship, of twenty-two, two smaller vessels of eight, and the
Thunder, a bomb-ketch. On reaching the bar, at the entrance of the
channels of Charleston, it was found that the fifty-gun ships could
not pass without being lightened. The removal and rëplacement of
their guns was attended with incredible labor; and although thus
lightened, they struck, and for a time were in danger of bilging.
Meanwhile, General Clinton issued his proclamation, which he
dispatched to the city with a flag, demanding the citizens to lay
down their arms, and to return to their allegiance, on pain of an
immediate attack, and an utter overthrow. To this demand, not even
the civility of a reply was accorded, and the threatened attack, on
the morning of the 28th of June, was commenced.
To the citizens of Charleston those were anxious hours. There was
hope, but more of fear. They filled the wharves, the roofs, and the
steeples—in short, every eminence was black with spectators, gazing
on the exciting scene and the approaching conflict.
It was a calm, bright, beautiful day. The wind being fair, the British
fleet came steadily, proudly, towards the "slaughter-pen," and one
after another took the positions assigned them. The Americans
watched them with intense interest—"Moultrie's eye flashed with
delight." Every gun was loaded—every one was manned—and all
were now anxiously waiting the order to fire. At length, a portion of
the fleet had reached point-blank-shot distance, when Moultrie, who,
like Prescott at the battle of Bunker's hill, had restrained his
anxiously-waiting men, now gave the word of command "Fire!"—And
they did fire—and "the shores shook with the tremendous
explosion."
The fleet continued to advance, a little abreast of the fort, when
letting go their anchors, and clewing up their sails, they opened
upon the fort. More than a hundred cannon!—their blaze, their
smoke, their roar—all in the same instant—it was a terrible
commencement—the stoutest heart palpitated! every one
unconsciously held his breath!
"The battle had now fairly commenced, and the guns were worked
with fearful rapidity. It was one constant peal of thunder, and to the
spectators in Charleston, that low spot, across the bay, looked like a
volcano breaking forth from the sea. Lee stood on Haddrell's point,
watching the effect of the first fire. When the smoke lifted, like the
folds of a vast curtain, he expected to see that 'slaughter-pen' in
fragments; but there still floated the flag of freedom, and beneath it
beat brave hearts, to whom that awful cannonade was but 'a
symphony to the grand march of independence.' When the fight had
fairly begun, they thought no more of those heavy guns than they
did of their rifles. Their coats were hastily flung one side, and their
hats with them—and in their shirt-sleeves, with handkerchiefs about
their heads, they toiled away under the sweltering sun with the
coolness and courage of old soldiers. The fire from those nine
vessels, with their cannon all trained upon that pile of logs, was
terrific, and it trembled like a frightened thing under the shock; but
the good palmettoes closed silently over the balls, as they buried
themselves in the timber and sand, and the work went bravely on.
Thus, hour after hour, did it blaze, and flame, and thunder there on
the sea, while the shots of the Americans told with murderous
effect. At every discharge, those vessels shook as if smitten by a
rock—the planks were ripped up, the splinters hurled through the air,
and the decks strewed with mangled forms. Amid the smoke, bombs
were seen traversing the air, and dropping, in an incessant shower,
within the fort—but a morass in the middle swallowed them up as
fast as they fell. At length, riddled through and through, her beds of
mortar broken up, the bomb-vessel ceased firing. Leaving the
smaller vessels, as unworthy of his attention, Moultrie trained his
guns upon the larger ones, and 'Look to the Commodore! look to the
fifty-gun ship!' passed along the lines, and they did look to the
Commodore in good earnest, sweeping her decks at every discharge
with such fatal fire, that at one time there was scarcely a man left
upon the quarter-deck. The Experiment, too, came in for her share
of consideration—her decks were slippery with blood, and nearly a
hundred of her men were borne below, either killed or wounded. Nor
were the enemy idle, but rained back a perfect tempest of balls; but
that brave garrison had got used to the music of cannon, and the
men, begrimed with powder and smoke, shot with the precision and
steadiness they would have done in firing at a target. As a heavy
ball, in full sweep, touched the top of the works, it took one of the
coats, lying upon the logs, and lodged it in a tree. 'See that coat!
see that coat!' burst in a laugh on every side, as if it had been a
mere plaything that had whistled past their heads. Moultrie, after a
while, took out his pipe, and lighting it, leaned against the logs, and
smoked away with his officers, as if they were out there sunning
themselves, instead of standing within the blaze, and smoke, and
uproar of nearly two hundred cannon. Now and then he would take
the pipe from his mouth to shout 'fire!' or give some order, and then
commence puffing and talking—thus presenting a strange mixture of
the droll and heroic. The hearts of the spectators in the distance,
many of whom had husbands and brothers in the fight, were far
more agitated than they against whom that fearful iron storm was
hailing.
"After the fight had continued for several hours, Lee, seeing that the
'slaughter pen' held out so well, passed over to it in a boat, and
remained for a short time. Accustomed as he was to battle, and to
the disciplined valor of European troops, he still was struck with
astonishment at the scene that presented itself as he approached.
There stood Moultrie, quietly smoking his pipe, while the heavy and
rapid explosions kept up a deafening roar; and there, stooping over
their pieces, were those raw gunners firing with the deadly precision
of practised artillerists. Amazed to find an English fleet, carrying two
hundred and sixty guns, kept at bay by thirty cannon and four
hundred men, he left the fort to its brave commander, and returned
to his old station."[38]
Among the Americans, who were that day in the "slaughter-pen,"
and who were dealing death and destruction without stint, was a
Sergeant Jasper, whose name has since been given to one of the
counties in Georgia, for this and other heroic deeds. In the warmest
of the contest, the flag-staff of the fort was shot away by a cannon-
ball, and fell to the outside of the ramparts on the beach. The
spectators at Charleston saw it fall, and supposing that the fort had
yielded, were filled with consternation and dismay. In the surrender
of the fort, they read the destiny of themselves and city. But what
was their joy to perceive that columns of smoke, from the fort, still
continued to roll up—the blaze and thunder of its cannon continued
to be seen and heard; and presently the folds of the flag again
fluttered in the breeze. Sergeant Jasper was the hero of the
occasion. He had witnessed the fall of the flag—and he saw it
"stretched in dishonor on the sand." It was a perilous attempt, but
he did not hesitate. Leaping the ramparts, he proceeded, amidst a
shower of balls, the entire length of the fort, and, picking up the
flag, tied it to a post, and rëplaced it on a parapet, and there, too,
he himself supported it till another flag-staff could be procured.
Here, once more, it proudly waved—amid the shouts and
congratulations of the now still more courageous in the fort, and to
the joy of still more distant and equally anxious spectators of the
scene.
Sergeant Jasper replanting the Flag at Fort Moultrie.
About this time, another circumstance sent a momentary panic
through the stern hearts of the defenders of the fort. The
ammunition was failing, and a large force, which had effected a
landing, was in rapid march to storm the works. Moultrie instantly
dispatched Marion to a sloop-of-war for a supply, and another
message to Governor Rutledge at Charleston. Both were successful
—both in season. Said the governor, in a note accompanying five
hundred pounds of powder, "Do not make too free with your cannon
—cool, and do mischief."
With this fresh supply of ammunition, the fire, which had been
relaxed, was redoubled. The British were astounded. They had
congratulated themselves, upon the partial suspension of firing, that
the fort was about to yield. But the new fury of the firing, on the
part of the Americans, soon served to convince them of their error.
They also redoubled their efforts, and, for a time, the contest was
more terrible than ever. "Once," it is said, "the broadsides of four
vessels exploded together, and when the balls struck the fort, it
trembled in every timber and throughout its entire extent, and shook
as if about to fall in pieces."
The day was now wearing away, and still the contest was undecided.
The British, reluctant to relinquish an object which in the morning
they imagined so easily won, still continued the heavy cannonade;
while the Americans, gathering strength and courage by what they
had already accomplished, stood firm and undaunted. At length, the
sun went down behind the distant shore, and darkness threw its
ample folds on every object of nature. But now, through the
darkness, flames shot forth and thunders rolled, presenting a scene
of solemn and indescribable grandeur. The inhabitants of Charleston
still lingered on their watchtowers, gazing out through the gloom
towards the spot where the battle was still raging in its fiercest
intensity.
But they were not destined to hope and pray in vain. At about half-
past nine, the fire from the English fleet suddenly ceased. They had
fought long—fought with all the ardor and enthusiasm of friends to
their king and his cause. But they had fought in vain. Victory decided
for Moultrie and his patriot band, and it only remained for the
English to withdraw, as well as they were able, their ships, which
had been nearly disabled, and their crews, which had been
dreadfully reduced.
"The loss of the Americans, in this gallant action," says the writer
whom we have already quoted, "was slight, amounting to only
thirty-six, both killed and wounded, while that of the British,
according to their own accounts, was a hundred and sixty. Double
the number would probably be nearer the truth. The commander
had his arm carried away. One is surprised that so few of the
garrison were killed, when it is remembered that nearly ten
thousand shots and shells were fired by the enemy that day. The
Acteon, during the action, went aground, and the next morning a
few shots were fired at her, when a party was sent to take
possession of her. The crew, however, setting fire to her, pushed off.
When the Americans got on board, they turned two or three of the
guns on the fugitives, but, finding the flames approaching the
magazine, abandoned the vessel. For a short time, she stood a noble
spectacle, with her tall masts wreathed in flame, and black hull
crackling and blazing below. But when the fire reached the powder,
there suddenly shot up a huge column of smoke, spreading like a
tree at the top, under the pressure of the atmosphere—and then the
ill-fated vessel lifted heavily from the water, and fell back in
fragments, with an explosion that was heard for miles around."
A few days following the battle, the fort was visited by Governor
Rutledge and many of the distinguished ladies and gentlemen of
Charleston. They came to see the old "slaughter-pen," which had so
nobly withstood the attack under such long-practiced and
accomplished officers as Parker, Clinton, and Cornwallis. Ample
praises were bestowed upon the "rough-and-ready" soldiers, while
mutual congratulations were exchanged with Moultrie and his brave
associates in command. Nor was the gallant Jasper forgotten. Taking
from his side his sword, Governor Rutledge buckled it on the daring
soldier, as a reward for his noble exploit. Following this, the
accomplished Mrs. Elliot presented a pair of elegant colors to the
regiment under Moultrie and Motte, with the following brief, but
beautiful address: "The gallant behavior in defence of liberty and
your country, entitle you to the highest honor; accept, then, two
standards, as a reward justly due to your regiment; and I make not
the least doubt, under Heaven's protection, you will stand by them
as long as they can wave in the air of liberty."
The colors thus presented to Colonel Moultrie were, at a subsequent
date, carried by him to Savannah, and were displayed during the
assault against that place. Two officers were killed, while attempting
to place them upon the enemy's parapet at the Spring-hill redoubt.
Just before the retreat, Jasper, while endeavoring to rëplace them
upon the works, received a mortal wound. When a retreat was
ordered, he recollected the honorable condition upon which the
donor presented them to his regiment, and among the last acts of
his life, he succeeded in bringing them off.
To Major Horry, who called to see him a little while before his death,
he said: "Major, I have got my furlough. That sword was presented
to me by Governor Rutledge, for my services in defence of Fort
Moultrie; give it to my father, and tell him I have worn it with honor.
If he should weep, tell him his son died in hope of a better life. Tell
Mrs. Elliot that I lost my life supporting the colors which she
presented to our regiment."
Such was the affair at Fort Moultrie—such the patriotic and
chivalrous conduct of men fighting for their altars, their homes, their
wives, their children. Was it strange that, in a good cause, Heaven
should smile on such high and heroic conduct? Was it strange that a
people, so intent on the enjoyment of their just rights, should
accomplish their object?
This repulse of the British, it may be added, was unexpected to
them; and the more so, as they well knew that no systematic
measure of defence had been adopted at the South. The contest
had hitherto been in a different quarter, and no intimations had
transpired of a contemplated change. In addition to this, the British
were profoundly ignorant of the true southern character. They had
learned some lessons in regard to the "Yankees;" and, especially,
that if they were made of "stuff," it was "stern stuff;" but they had
yet to learn, that the same kind of ore abounded south of the
Potomac. The old "slaughter-pen" on Sullivan's Island, enlightened
them, and impressed them as to the fact so fully, that the influence
of the lesson lasted for two years and a half—that being the respite
of the Southern states from the calamities of war, consequent upon
the repulse of the British at Fort Moultrie.
VII. MILITARY REVERSES—LOSS OF
NEW YORK.
British take possession of Staten Island—Strongly rëinforced—
State of the American Army—Occupation of New York and
Brooklyn—Battle of Brooklyn—Americans repulsed—Long Island
abandoned—Remarkable retreat—Gloomy state of the American
Army—Washington retreats to Harlem—Movements of the
British—Washington retires to White Plains—Loss of Fort
Washington—American Army pursued—Retreats successively to
Brunswick, Princeton, and Trenton—Thence to the Pennsylvania
side of the Delaware—British go into Winter-quarters between
the Delaware and Hackensack—Capture of General Lee—
Prevalent Spirit of Despondency.
From the commencement of hostilities to the evacuation of Boston
by the British, the cause of the Americans had appeared to be
specially favored by Heaven. In their several engagements, if they
had not achieved decided victories, the effect of them was such as
to inspire confidence, to diffuse through the colonies an unabated
ardor, and the most lively anticipations of ultimate and not far-
distant triumph. A season of sad reverse, and consequent dejection,
however, was appointed for them, perhaps to teach them more
entire dependence upon Divine Providence, and to enhance the
value of a final conquest, when it should arrive, and which, though
distant, was still in reserve for them.
On the retirement of the British fleet from Boston, Washington was
left to conjecture its destination. Apprehending, however, a hostile
attempt upon New York, he had, before their departure, detached a
considerable force for the protection of that important post. The
main army soon followed, and, on the 14th of April, entered the city.
Measures were immediately adopted to place it in a state of defence.
Contrary to the expectations of Washington, the British fleet, on
leaving the waters of Boston, directed its course to Halifax, at which
place rëinforcements from England were expected by Sir William
Howe. Disappointed, however, in this latter respect, and finding
provisions for his troops scarce, he resolved on sailing for New York.
On the 2d of July, he took possession of Staten Island. The
inhabitants of the island received the English general with great
demonstrations of joy. The soldiers being quartered about in the
villages, found, in abundance, the refreshments of which they were
in the greatest need. Here General Howe was visited by Governor
Tryon, who gave him precise information with respect to the state of
the province, as also with regard to the forces and preparations of
the enemy. Many inhabitants of New Jersey came to offer
themselves to be enrolled for the royal service; even those of Staten
Island were forward to enlist under the English standard; every thing
announced that the army had only to show itself in the provinces to
be assured of a prompt victory. Admiral Howe, after touching at
Halifax, where he found dispatches from his brother, who urged him
to come and join him at New York, made sail again immediately, and
landed, without accident, at Staten Island, the 12th of July. General
Clinton arrived about the same time, with the troops he rëconducted
from the unfortunate expedition against Charleston. Commodore
Hotham also appeared, with the rëinforcements under his escort; so
that in a short time the army amounted to about twenty-four
thousand men—English, Hessians, and Waldekers. Several regiments
of Hessian infantry were expected to arrive shortly, when the army
would be carried to the number of thirty-five thousand combatants,
of the best troops of Europe. America had never seen such a display
of forces.[39]
The Americans, on their part, meanwhile, had made every effort in
their power to resist the danger to their cause, menaced by so
formidable a force. The militia of the neighboring provinces, and a
few regular regiments from Maryland, from Pennsylvania, and New
England, had been called in, by which several augmentations the
American force had been nominally raised to twenty-seven
thousand. One-fourth part of these, however, were disabled by
sickness, and nearly an equal number were destitute of arms,
leaving but about fourteen thousand and five hundred effective men.
Among so heterogeneous a force, collected in a time of danger and
excitement, there existed little opportunity to introduce order and
discipline. To the discerning eye of Washington, grounds of serious
apprehension existed; but, nevertheless, with his usual calmness
and energy, he adopted every measure within his means to sustain
his position, and inspire his soldiers with hope and confidence. In his
energetic proclamations addressed to the army, he exhorted them
"to animate and encourage each other, and show the whole world
that a freeman, contending for liberty on his own ground, is superior
to any slavish mercenary on earth."
As Washington was necessarily ignorant by what route the British
would choose to approach the city, he was reluctantly compelled to
divide his forces. A part were stationed in the city, a part at
Brooklyn, Long Island, and detachments at various other assailable
points.
Thus the armies, more numerous than had hitherto been collected,
were fairly arranged, and every succeeding day was bringing nearer
a contest which might decide the fate of the new republic.
At length, from various indications, the American general was
convinced that the first attack would be upon the forces at Brooklyn.
Accordingly, he rëinforced that point, by a detachment of six
regiments, and placed General Putnam in command.
"On the 22d of August, the British forces were landed on the
opposite side of Long Island. The two armies were now about four
miles asunder, and were separated by a range of hills, over which
passed three main roads. Various circumstances led General Putnam
to suspect that the enemy intended to approach him by the road
leading to his right, which he therefore guarded with most care.
"Very early in the morning of the 26th, his suspicions were
strengthened by the approach upon that road, of a column of British
troops, and upon the center road, of a column of Hessians. To
oppose these, the American troops were mostly drawn from the
camp, and in the engagements which took place, evinced
considerable bravery.
"These movements of the enemy were but feints to divert the
attention of Putnam from the road which led to his left, along which
General Clinton was silently advancing with the main body of the
British army. The report of cannon in that direction, gave the first
intimation of the danger which was approaching. The Americans
endeavored to escape it, by returning with the utmost celerity to
their camp. They were not able to arrive there in time, but were
intercepted by General Clinton, who drove them back upon the
Hessians.
"Attacked thus in front and rear, they fought a succession of
skirmishes, in the course of which many were killed, many were
made prisoners; and several parties, seeing favorable opportunities,
forced their way through the enemy, and regained the camp. A bold
and vigorous charge, made by the American general, Lord Sterling,
at the head of a Maryland regiment, enabled a large body to escape
in this manner. This regiment, fighting with desperate bravery, kept a
force greatly superior engaged, until their comrades had passed by,
when the few who survived, ceasing to resist, surrendered to the
enemy.
"The loss of the Americans in killed, wounded, and taken prisoners,
considerably exceeded a thousand. Among the latter, were Generals
Sullivan, Sterling, and Woodhull. The total loss of the enemy was
less than four hundred."[40]
In the height of the engagement, Washington crossed over to
Brooklyn, and seeing some of his best troops slaughtered or taken,
he uttered, it is said, an exclamation of anguish. He could, if he saw
fit, draw out of their encampment all the troops, and send them to
succor the corps that were engaged with the enemy; he might also
call over all the forces he had in New York, and order them to take
part in the battle. But all these rëinforcements would by no means
have sufficed to render his army equal to that of the English. Victory
having already declared in their favor, the courage with which it
inspired them, and the superiority of their discipline, cut off all hope
of being able to restore the battle. If Washington had engaged all
his troops in the action, it is probable that the entire army would
have been destroyed on this fatal day, and America reduced to
subjection. Great praise, therefore, is due to him for not having
allowed himself, in so grave circumstances, to be transported into an
inconsiderate resolution, and for having preserved himself and his
army for a happier future.
The English were so elated with victory, that eager to profit by their
advantages, they would fain have immediately assaulted the
American camp. But their general manifested more prudence;
whether he believed the intrenchments of the enemy stronger than
they really were, or whether he considered himself already sure of
entering New York, without encountering new perils, he repressed
the ardor of his troops. Afterwards, encamping, in front of the
enemy's lines, in the night of the 28th, he broke ground within six
hundred paces of a bastion upon the left. His intention was to
approach by means of trenches, and to wait till the fleet could
cöoperate with the troops.
The situation of the Americans in their camp became extremely
critical. They had, in front, an enemy superior in number, and who
could attack them at any moment with a new advantage. Their
intrenchments were of little moment, and the English, pushing their
works with ardor, had every possibility of success in their favor.[41]
Added to these unfavorable circumstances, the arms and
ammunition of the soldiers had suffered from a powerful and long-
continued rain. Besides, they were worn out with fatigue, and
discouraged by defeat. Thus environed with difficulty and danger, a
council of war decided that to evacuate their position, and retire to
New York, was the part of wisdom and safety.
The accomplishment of this project, however, was a movement
attended with difficulty, but was effected with great skill and
judgment, and with complete success. The commencement of the
retreat was appointed for eight o'clock on the night of the 29th; but
a strong north-east wind and a rapid tide, caused a delay of several
hours. In this extremity, Heaven remarkably favored the fugitive
army. A south-east wind springing up at eleven, essentially facilitated
its passage from the island to the city; and a thick fog hanging over
Long Island from about two in the morning, concealed its
movements from the enemy, who were so near, that the sound of
their pickaxes and shovels was heard. In about half an hour after,
the fog cleared away, and the enemy were seen taking possession of
the American lines. General Washington, as far as possible,
inspected every thing. From the commencement of the action on the
morning of the 27th, until the troops were safely across the East
river, he never closed his eyes, and was almost constantly on
horseback. His wisdom and vigilance, with the interposing favor of
Divine Providence, saved the army from destruction.[42]
The defeat experienced by the Americans at Brooklyn, spread a deep
gloom through the army; and excited, on that account, no little
anxiety in the bosom of Washington. It was the first serious loss
which they had sustained—the first reverse which essentially shook
their confidence and weakened their courage.
To Washington and his officers, the great defect in the American
army was apparent. It was twofold—first, the employment of by far
too large a proportion of militia, and secondly, the utter
impracticability of introducing among them that discipline and
subordination which could place them on equal footing with the
practised and veteran troops of the enemy. At length, convinced of
the justness of the views of Washington on these points, congress
decided that a regular army should be formed, in which the soldiers
should be enlisted to serve during the present war; and that it
should consist of eighty-eight battalions, to be raised in all the
provinces, according to their respective abilities. A bounty of twenty
dollars, and a grant of land, were offered. At a subsequent date,
soldiers were allowed to enlist for three years; in which case,
however, they were not entitled to the grant of land. Had congress,
at an earlier day, taken this measure to furnish an adequate army for
Washington, both he and the country might have been saved great
anxiety, and a succession of mortifying defeats. And but for the
adoption of the above resolution, it is scarcely possible to predict
what would have been the ultimate fate of the new republic.
Fortunate would it have been for the Americans, had their ill-fortune
terminated in the defeat experienced on Long Island. To other and
not much less mortifying reverses they were destined, ere the
deepest point of depression should be reached.
It was the ardent wish of Washington to retain possession of New
York; but, finding, as he said, in a communication to congress, the
militia "dismayed and intractable," and "leaving the camp in some
instances almost by regiments, by half-ones, and by companies at a
time;" he was compelled to relinquish the place to his enemies, and
to abandon, which he still more regretted, all the heavy artillery, and
a large portion of the baggage, provisions, and military stores. On
leaving the city, the American army took post on Harlem heights.
Here Washington had time to ponder upon his situation, and form
his plan. His army had become seriously reduced, and from the
despondency and dismay which were visible among them, it might
become at anytime still more reduced. On the other hand, the forces
of the enemy were numerous, and withal consisted of regular and
well-disciplined troops. It was futile, therefore, to attempt to
maintain offensive operations against them. Far better in his
judgment to risk no general engagement; but by retiring gradually
before them, to lead them as far as possible from their resources;
and in the mean while to inspire his own troops with courage, by
engaging them in skirmishes, where success was probable. Having
adopted this cautious system, he prepared to put it in practice.
The British army did not long entertain its position on York Island.
The British frigates, having passed up the North river, under a fire
from Fort Washington and the post opposite to it on the Jersey
shore, General Howe embarked a great part of his army in flat-
bottomed boats, and passing through Hurl Gate into the sound,
landed at Frog's neck. The object of the British general was, either
to force Washington out of his present lines, or to inclose him in
them. Aware of this design, General Washington moved a part of his
troops from York island to join those at King's bridge, and detached
some regiments to Westchester. A council of war was now called,
and the system of evacuation and retreating was adopted, with the
exception of Fort Washington, for the defence of which nearly three
thousand men were assigned. After a halt of six days, the royal army
advanced, not without considerable opposition, along the coast of
Long Island sound, by New Rochelle, to White Plains, where the
Americans took a strong position behind intrenchments. This post
was maintained for several days, till the British, having received
considerable rëinforcements, General Washington withdrew to the
heights of North Castle, about five miles from White Plains, where,
whether from the strength of his position, or from the British general
having other objects in view, no attempt at attack was made.
Immediately on leaving White Plains, General Howe directed his
attention to Fort Washington and Fort Lee, as their possession would
secure the navigation of the Hudson, and facilitate the invasion of
New Jersey. On the 15th of November, General Howe, being in
readiness for the assault, summoned the garrison to surrender.
Colonel Magaw the commanding officer, in spirited language, replied,
that he should defend his works to extremity. On the succeeding
morning, the British made the assault in four separate divisions; and,
after a brave and obstinate resistance, surmounted the outworks,
and again summoned the garrison to surrender. His ammunition
being nearly expended, and his force incompetent to repel the
numbers which were ready on every side to assail him, Colonel
Magaw surrendered himself and his garrison, consisting of two
thousand men, prisoners of war. The enemy lost in the assault nearly
eight hundred men, mostly Germans. The conquest of Fort
Washington made the evacuation of Fort Lee necessary. Orders
were, therefore, issued to remove the ammunition and stores in it;
but, before much progress had been made in this business, Lord
Cornwallis crossed the Hudson, with a number of battalions, with the
intention to inclose the garrison between the Hackensack and North
rivers. This movement made a precipitate retreat indispensable,
which was happily effected with little loss of men; but the greater
part of the artillery, stores, and baggage, was left for the enemy.
The loss at Fort Washington was heavy. The regiments captured in it
were some of the best troops in the army. The tents, camp-kettles,
and stores, lost at this place and at Fort Lee, could not, during the
campaign, be rëplaced, and for the want of them the men suffered
extremely. This loss was unnecessarily sustained, as those posts
ought, unquestionably, to have been evacuated before General Howe
was in a situation to invest them; and this event was the more to be
deplored, as the American force was daily diminished by the
expiration of the soldiers' term of enlistment, and by the desertion of
the militia.
These successes encouraged the British to pursue the remaining
American force, with the prospect of annihilating it. General
Washington, who had taken post at Newark, on the south side of the
Passaic, finding himself unable to make any real opposition,
withdrew from that place, as the enemy crossed the Passaic, and
retreated to Brunswick, on the Raritan; and Lord Cornwallis, on the
same day, entered Newark. The retreat was still continued from
Brunswick to Princeton; from Princeton to Trenton; and from Trenton
to the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware. The pursuit was urged
with so much rapidity, that the rear of one army was often within
shot of the van of the other.
The winter being now set in, the British army went into quarters,
between the Delaware and the Hackensack. Trenton, the most
important post and barrier, was occupied by a brigade of Hessians,
under Colonel Rawle. General Howe now issued a proclamation, in
the name of his brother and himself, in which pardon was offered to
all persons who, within the space of sixty days, should take the oath
of allegiance, and submit to the authority of the British government.
The effects of this proclamation were soon apparent. People from
several quarters availed themselves of it, and threw down their
arms. No city or town, indeed, in its corporate capacity, submitted to
the British government, but most of the families of fortune and
influence discovered an inclination to return to their allegiance. Many
of the yeomanry claimed the benefit of the commissioner's
proclamation; and the great body of them were too much taken up
with the security of their families and their property to make any
exertion in the public cause.[43] Another source of mortification to
the Americans, was the capture of General Lee, who had
imprudently ventured to lodge at a house three miles distant from
his corps.[44]
"This was the most gloomy period of the revolutionary war. It was
the crisis of the struggle of the United States for independence. The
American army, reduced in numbers, depressed by defeat, and
exhausted by fatigue, naked, barefoot, and destitute of tents, and
even of utensils with which to dress their scanty provisions, was
fleeing before a triumphant enemy, well-appointed and abundantly
supplied. A general spirit of despondency through New Jersey was
the consequence of this disastrous state of public affairs. But, in this
worst of times, congress stood unmoved; their measures exhibited
no symptoms of confusion or dismay; the public danger only roused
them to more vigorous exertions, that they might give a firmer tone
to the public mind, and animate the citizens of the United America to
a manly defence of their independence. Beneath this cloud of
adversity, too, General Washington shone with a brighter lustre than
in the day of his highest prosperity. Not dismayed by all the
difficulties which encompassed him, he accommodated his measures
to his situation, and still made the good of his country the object of
his unwearied pursuit. He ever wore the countenance of composure
and confidence, and inspired, by his own example, his little band
with firmness to struggle with adverse fortune."[45]
VIII. RETURNING PROSPERITY.
BATTLES OF TRENTON AND PRINCETON.
Reliance of the patriots for success upon God—Public Fast
recommended by Congress—Offensive Operations decided upon
—Battle of Trenton—Washington victorious—Battle of Princeton
—British repulsed—American Army at Morristown—British at
Brunswick—Prospects brightening.
Irrespective of the special blessing of Heaven, the colonies of
America entered upon the revolutionary war with fearful chances
against them. That they well knew, and hence that blessing was
more universally sought than by any other people, in similar
circumstances, since the founding of empires. The cause was
remembered by those who offered the incense of prayer morning
and evening on the family altar. Scarcely a Sabbath occurred, on
which the embassadors of God did not make public mention, in their
addresses to a Throne of grace, of the American cause; and fervent
supplications for Divine aid in supporting that cause, and, carrying it
to a prosperous issue, were to be heard in every church. Nor were
colonial assemblies—nor, after its organization, the continental
congress—backward in recognising the necessity of propitiating the
Divine favor. Not a single instance, it is believed, is on record, and
probably never occurred, in which a legislator in a provincial
assembly attached to the patriotic cause, or a member of congress,
opposed the adoption of any resolution which had for its object the
humiliation of the people in the season of national adversity, or the
rendering of due thanks to God in the day of prosperity. There were
men concerned in conducting the military operations of the
Revolution, and in guiding the counsels of the nation, who were far
from being personally religious; but such was the pervading
influence of piety in the land, that they would have manifested no
open opposition, had they felt it; nor is it to be credited, in the
absence of positive evidence, that such feelings ever existed.
The reverses sustained by the Americans, detailed in the preceding
pages, were most sensibly felt in every portion of the land.
Notwithstanding the knowledge of the superiority of the British, in
regard to numerical force, but much more in respect to munitions of
war, and the disciplined character of their soldiery, the Americans
had cherished the expectation of success. Their confidence at the
commencement of the struggle had been raised, and strengthened
by the issue of the affairs at Lexington, and Bunker's hill, and the
evacuation of Boston. Success thus early was positively essential to
success in the sequel. Had they early met with reverses, such as
were experienced from the discomfiture at Brooklyn to the battle of
Trenton, it is doubtful whether that resolution would not have failed,
and with the failure of that, the contest have been relinquished.
Those reverses, though painful and mortifying, were perhaps even
salutary. A firmer reliance upon Providence was felt to be needful,
and a holier tide of supplication ascended to the Arbiter of the fate
of nations.
The connexion between an acknowledgment of God in his
providence, and his blessing on the common cause, was recognised
by no body with more readiness than by the continental congress.
Although in May, 1776, that body had recommended a public fast, in
view of the gloomy reverses which had attended the American arms,
on the 11th of December, in a resolution, which for the tone of its
piety cannot be too much admired, and which might serve as a
model to future ages, they recommended the observance of a day of
fasting and humiliation: "Whereas the war in which the United States
are engaged with Great Britain, has not only been prolonged, but is
likely to be carried to the greatest extremity; and whereas it
becomes all public bodies, as well as private persons, to reverence
the providence of God, and look up to him as the Supreme Disposer
of all events, and the Arbiter of the fate of nations; therefore
Resolved, that it be recommended to all the United States, as soon
as possible, to appoint a day of solemn fasting and humiliation; to
implore of Almighty God the forgiveness of the many sins prevailing
among all ranks, and to beg the countenance and assistance of his
providence in the prosecution of the present just and necessary war.
The congress do also, in the most solemn manner, recommend to all
the members of the United States, and particularly the officers, civil
and military, under them, the exercise of repentance and
reformation; and, further, require of them the strict observation of
the articles of war, and particularly that part of the said articles
which forbids profane swearing and all immorality, of which all such
officers are desired to take notice."[46]
We left Washington on the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware—his
army greatly reduced by the return of numbers to their homes, and
depressed by a long and disheartening retreat before an exulting
foe. Nor would the Americans have now been permitted to pause in
safety, had the British commander succeeded in procuring the
means necessary to make the passage of the river. Finding his
efforts for this purpose, however, fruitless, he began his preparations
for retiring into winter-quarters. The main body of the army was
therefore cantoned between the Delaware and the Hackensack:
about four thousand men occupied positions between Trenton and
Mount Holly, and strong detachments lay at Princeton, Brunswick,
and Elizabethtown. The object of this dispersion over so wide an
extent of country, was to intimidate the people, and thus prevent the
possibility of recruiting for the continental service; while in the spring
these forces could be immediately concentrated, and it was then
proposed to put an easy conclusion to all rebellious contumacy.
The desperate condition of his country's fortunes now pressed with
saddening weight upon the mind of Washington, and he resolved, if
possible, to retrieve misfortune by some daring enterprise. To such
an enterprise he was the more inclined, since, with the exception of
about fifteen hundred effectives, his whole force would be entitled in
a few days to its discharge. Having formed his plan—an attack upon
the British posts on the Delaware—he proceeded to put it in
execution.
Battle of Trenton.
Early in the morning of the 26th of December, 1776, the main body
of the American army, twenty-four hundred strong, and headed by
Washington in person, crossed the river at M'Konkey's ferry, about
nine miles above Trenton. The night was tempestuous with rain and
sleet, and the river encumbered with quantities of floating ice, so
that the passage, although begun soon after midnight, was not fully
effected until three o'clock, and one hour more elapsed before the
march could be commenced. The Americans moved in two divisions
along the roads leading to the town, and their operations were so
well combined, and executed with such precision, that the two
attacks on the British outposts were made within three minutes of
each other. The pickets attempted resistance, but were almost
immediately driven in upon the main body, which was forming
hurriedly in line. Colonel Rawle, their commander, soon after fell,
mortally wounded; the confusion of the soldiery became
irremediable; and, after a loss of about twenty killed, one thousand
men laid down their arms, and surrendered their munitions and
artillery. On the American side, the loss in battle amounted to only
two killed and four wounded; among the latter, James Monroe,
afterwards president of the United States.
The other parts of this brilliant enterprise were not, however,
executed with the same success. General Irvine had been instructed
to cross at Trenton ferry, and, by securing a bridge below the town,
to cut off the enemy's march along the Bordentown road.
Notwithstanding all his exertions, it was found that the ice had
rendered the passage impracticable; and five hundred fugitives from
the disastrous field of Trenton were thus enabled to escape by a
speedy and well-timed retreat. General Cadwallader was to have
crossed at Drink's ferry, and carried the post at Mount Holly; but the
same impediment prevented this movement also, and he was
compelled to return with a part of his infantry which had effected
the passage. Deprived of this important and expected cöoperation,
Washington had, nevertheless, achieved a most critical and
important triumph; he returned to his former position, charged with
the spoils and trophies of his foes; and from that moment, though
reverses frequently dimmed the brilliancy of the prospect, hope
never again deserted the cause of American independence.
Having secured the Hessian prisoners on the Pennsylvania side of
the Delaware, Washington rëcrossed the river two days after the
action, and took possession of Trenton. Generals Mifflin and
Cadwallader, who lay at Bordentown and Crosswix with three
thousand six hundred militia, were ordered to march up in the night
of the 1st of January, to join the commander-in-chief, whose whole
effective force, including this accession, did not exceed five thousand
men. The detachments of the British army, which had been
distributed over New Jersey, now assembled at Princeton, and were
joined by the army from Brunswick, under Lord Cornwallis. From this
position, the enemy advanced towards Trenton in great force, on the
morning of the 2d of January; and, after some slight skirmishing
with troops detached to harass and delay their march, the van of
their army reached Trenton about four in the afternoon. On their
approach, General Washington retired across the Assumpinck, a
rivulet that runs through the town; and by some field-pieces, posted
on its opposite banks, compelled them, after attempting to cross in
several places, to fall back out of the reach of his guns. The two
armies, kindling their fires, retained their positions on opposite sides
of the rivulet, and kept up a cannonade till night.
The situation of the American general at this moment was extremely
critical. Nothing but a stream, fordable in many places, separated his
army from an enemy, in every respect his superior. If he remained in
his present position, he was certain of being attacked the next
morning, at the hazard of the entire destruction of his little army. If
he should retreat over the Delaware, the ice in that river not being
firm enough to admit a passage upon it, there was danger of great
loss—perhaps of a total defeat: the Jerseys would be in full
possession of the enemy; the public mind would be depressed;
recruiting would be discouraged; and Philadelphia would be within
the reach of General Howe. In this extremity, he boldly determined
to abandon the Delaware; and, by a circuitous march along the left
flank of the enemy, fall into their rear at Princeton, which was known
to be occupied by three British regiments.[47]
About sunrise, at a short distance from the town, they encountered
two of these regiments, marching forward in order to cöoperate in
the expected battle, and a warm engagement immediately
commenced. The American general was well aware that the
existence of his country hung suspended in the scale of victory; and
he exerted himself as one who knew the importance of the object,
and felt that success depended on his efforts. Wherever the fire was
hottest, or the press of battle most fearful, Washington was sure to
be found, guiding the thunders of war, and animating all by his
language and example. At length, the British line was broken, and
the two regiments separated. Colonel Mawhood, with the division in
the van, pushed rapidly forward for the main army; while the fifty-
fifth, cut off from this point of support, fled in confusion across the
fields to Brunswick. The Americans now pressed the remaining
regiment, which at first attempted a defence in the college; but this
was soon abandoned, and those who were not captured, escaped
only by precipitate flight. The British loss amounted to one hundred
killed and three hundred prisoners; the conquerors had to lament
the death of General Mercer, an experienced officer, much respected
by the commander-in-chief.
"The battles of Trenton and Princeton, though similar in their
outlines, were very different in point of conception and execution.
The attack upon Trenton was a blow struck against an enemy in
position, which admitted, therefore, of every advantage of
preparation on the part of the assailants. The battle of Princeton
belonged to a higher and more elaborate order of tactics. The
American forces were already engaged with a superior army,
commanded by an officer of eminent reputation; and the change of
plan was wholly contrived and executed with the enemy in front. It
was entirely due to the prompt genius, and fertile resources of
Washington, that his army was extricated from so perilous an
exposure, and enabled to attack the enemy's rear with such
advantage, as to leave it no choice but surrender or flight. A military
critic, contemplating these inspirations with a soldier's eye, can
easily appreciate the feelings of the great Frederick, when he sent a
sword to the American commander, 'as a gift from the world's oldest
general to its best.'"
As a natural result of these unexpected manœuvres, the British
officers were thrown into a state of uncertainty, which gave to their
subsequent operations an unusual character of timidity. The distant
roll of the American artillery at Princeton, first announced to Lord
Cornwallis the danger of his rear, and the escape of his active
adversary. Alarmed for the safety of his magazines, the British
commander instantly broke up from the Assumpinck, and
commenced a forced march upon New Brunswick; moving with such
celerity as nearly to overtake the American rear at Princeton. On the
other hand, Sir William Howe drew in all his forces, by concentration
in the neighborhood of Amboy and Brunswick, and abandoned all
hope of preventing the recruiting service by overawing the whole
extent of the country. Washington, finding the surprise of the stores
impossible, moved northward into the highlands of Jersey, in order
to afford some relief to the fatigues of his troops; for long and
severe exposure to the inclemencies of the winter, without the usual
protections, had produced sickness, and even complaint. It was
finally considered necessary to abandon offensive operations, and to
put the army under cover at Morristown. Among other prudent
precautions adopted, during this temporary respite, the commander-
in-chief caused the whole army to be innoculated; an operation then
very uncommon in America, but which enabled him thereafter to
defy a disease, which had proved more fatal than the sword of the
enemy.
The situation of American affairs—though far from brilliant—was
much improved by the late successes. The people of Jersey rose
with fresh spirit, and in a number of small skirmishes inflicted loss
upon the enemy, both in men and stores: new hope was made to
animate the public mind; while congress fanned the flame by
judicious and well-timed incitements to vigorous action. Washington
was authorized to raise sixteen regiments, and in further testimony
of the public confidence, he was invested for six months with almost
dictatorial powers in the conduct of the war. It was, however, found
to be impossible to collect a sufficient force for active operations
upon any considerable scale during the winter. All the hopes of the
commander-in-chief were therefore turned to the next campaign;
and in the mean time an active warfare was carried on with small
posts and foraging parties, which greatly annoyed the British army;
while the frequent reports of fresh successes excited the spirit of the
American people. The most earnest applications were made to the
several states, for rëinforcements enlisted upon longer terms; for, as
Washington strongly observed, "to the short engagements of our
troops may be fairly and justly ascribed almost every misfortune that
we have experienced." These representations produced at last their
due impression; and the hope was abandoned of defending the
country by hasty assemblages of militia, and of carrying on a
protracted warfare upon the impulse and mere foundation of
disinterested patriotism.
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