Anas Faisal Siddiqui
IX-K MUN 2022-23 -DISEC
21-025 THE EMERGING US CHINA CONFLICT
UNITED KINGDOM - UK
I n March 2022, delegations from the United States and the United Kingdom met in
London for strategic talks on the Indo-Pacific. The outcome constituted affirmation of the
UK’s “tilt” to the region that it announced in the 2021 comprehensive review of its global
strategy. Considering that the UK considers its bilateral relationship with the U.S. to be
its most important one, the talks on the Indo-Pacific serve as a useful point of departure
for assessing the UK’s approach to the region.
Tilt vs strategy
Among other things, the joint statement on the March consultations emphasizes the
synergy between U.S. President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and the Indo-
Pacific tilt of caretaker Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who resigned on July 7.
There are, indeed, synergies between the two nations’ strategies. They both recognize
the shift in global power to the Indo-Pacific and, within that shift, the central role of
China. Both countries see China as a threat to the international system as well as a
direct security risk to their interests in the region. The UK’s review calls it a “systemic
competitor.”
The tension in U.S.-China relations is an inescapable feature of the Indo-Pacific security
environment, spanning issues from Taiwan to the Pacific Islands to China’s nuclear
weapons capabilities. The U.S. is seeking to manage the range of Chinese challenges
mostly through intensifying diplomatic coordination with allies and partners, but also
through the presence of its forward-deployed military. In this regard, the U.S. has been
particularly active and direct in expressing and rallying support for Taiwan, as well as
providing it arms.
The UK has also been stepping up engagements across the region. Japan is central to
this strategy. In August and September of last year, the UK deployed its new
HMS Queen Elizabeth Strike Group to Japan where it drilled with Japanese, U.S., and
Dutch navies and docked at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka – in what the operation’s
commander called a “signal” of the UK’s new commitment to the region. The UK and
Japan already have a Defense Logistics Treaty from 2017 to assist military-to-military
cooperation and in May 2022 reached an agreement in principle on a reciprocal military
access agreement.
U.S. President Joe Biden speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping virtually in the White House on
November 15, 2021. © Getty Images
Building on this basis, the UK has expressed the intention to permanently deploy a
new frigate to the region in the 2025 time frame – very likely with the U.S. Navy in
Japan. This would supplement two offshore patrol vessels the UK has deployed to
the region for an initial period of five years. These two ships are small and on
rotation, but with missions like delivering emergency aid to Tonga after its January
2022 tsunami, they demonstrate a permanent interest in the region. All of this comes
on top of long-standing British assets in the region, most notably its small naval
presence in Singapore, its jungle warfare school and garrison in Brunei and its
association with the Five Power Defense Arrangement.
Next in line of priority for the British is India. The UK’s shared interest there with the
U.S. has been much noted in the Indian press. And the British have been quite
active, as demonstrated by the agreement with India to pursue a “comprehensive
strategic partnership,” the visit to India of the same carrier strike group that drilled in
Japan and the first tri-service joint exercise between the two militaries. Australia is
also critical to the UK’s regional strategy. Its centerpiece is the Australia-UK-U.S.
Partnership (AUKUS).
The UK’s approach has more room for maneuver. The tilt’s positive reference to UK-
China economic ties was reflected in media reports late last year that Beijing and
London had agreed to restart the UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue, and a
similar report involving the revival of the Joint Economic and Trade Committee. Both
sets of talks had ground to a halt a couple of years ago over differences over the
political situation in Hong Kong. This contradiction at the heart of the UK’s approach
to China has also been on display in the debates over the Chinese attempt to
acquire British semiconductor company Newport Wafer Fab, which was initially
greenlighted by the Johnson government. A similar dynamic is on display over the
Chinese stake in the Sizewell nuclear power project. Prime Minister Boris Johnson
himself, who has well-known family connections to China, had famously declared
himself a “Sinophile” determined to overcome obstacles in the UK-China relationship.
There are few closer relationships in the world than between the U.S. and the UK.
Their capitals work together to develop understandings of their shared interests.
Their political classes interact closely; their policy communities have access to one
another’s policy debates unfettered by language differences. How the UK’s policy in
the Indo-Pacific evolves, however, depends significantly on the direction of U.S.
policy. The UK’s China policy can go in one of two directions.
Based on its own assessment of Chinese power in particular, the UK has decided to
deepen
-U engagement in the region on political and security issues. Continued U.S.-
China tensions put a premium on these efforts. The U.S. will encourage London to do
more. It will welcome ever-tighter integration both at the strategic and tactical level –
up to and including wartime contingency planning. A good indicator here would be for
the UK to follow through by permanently basing a frigate in the region and the near-
term deployment of its second new carrier, the Prince of Wales.
The AUKUS Partnership will continue apace toward the goal of fielding new nuclear-
powered submarines for Australia in 15 to 20 years, as well as jointly developing
other weapons technology, including in artificial intelligence, cyber and hypersonic.
The UK’s security relationship with Japan will also continue to grow, as will the
frequency of UK naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific. These developments will
enhance trilateral military-to-military cooperation among the U.S., Japan and the UK,
and extend further to India and other regional players, and other forums, including the
Quad.
The UK has its own motivation on the issue of Hong Kong, where it has led the world
in the provision of a haven for HongKongers fleeing the mainland’s political
crackdown. This will be supplemented by further cooperation with the U.S. on other
human rights concerns, including the plight of China’s Uighur minority. All of this will
keep UK-China relations in very difficult straits.
In this case, the UK continues its strategic focus on the region and it’s diplomatic and
trade outreach. It reaches trade agreements on a pace similar to the first scenario.
Priority is taken off naval deployments and other demonstrations of tactical
cooperation with the U.S. This eases the UK’s relationship with China, and it opens
the way for the resumption of formal economic talks and, at the outside, formal
agreements. At a practical level, this creates a new context for Chinese investments,
which becomes less sensitive. The talks and individual investment controversies, and
American reaction to them, are signals to watch for that U.S. pressure may be
easing.
