Loh Siew Hong v.

Nagahswaran Muniandy;
Majlis Agama Islam Dan Adat Istiadat Melayu
[2022] 8 CLJ Perlis (MAIPS) (Proposed Intervener) 933

A LOH SIEW HONG v. NAGAHSWARAN MUNIANDY;

MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM DAN ADAT ISTIADAT MELAYU
PERLIS (MAIPS) (PROPOSED INTERVENER)
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
EVROL MARIETTE PETERS J
B [PETITION NO: WA-33-734-12-2019]
18 JULY 2022

Abstract – The proposed intervener’s application for leave to intervene

to vary a custody order involving three children who had been converted
C
from Hinduism to Islam by their father ought not to be allowed as (i) the
conversion, being unilateral, was not valid; and (ii) the proposed
intervener failed to show the nexus between itself and the children and
was therefore not ‘an interested person’. The welfare of the children ought
to be prioritised, and in doing so, the court should be cautious of any such
D
application by any third party that might cause unwanted intrusion to
the children who has been reunited with their mother.

FAMILY LAW: Children – Custody order – Proposed intervener applied for leave
to intervene to vary custody order involving three children of petitioner and
E
respondent – Children converted to Islam by respondent – Whether conversion valid/
illegal – Whether proposed intervener had interest in custody of children – Whether
welfare of children ought to be prioritised – Rules of Court 2012, O. 15 r. 6(2)(b)
– Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976, s. 96

F This was an application by the Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu
Perlis (MAIPS) (‘proposed intervener’) for leave to intervene to vary the
custody order granted by this court in March 2021 which involved three
children (‘children’) of the petitioner wife and the respondent husband. The
petitioner and the respondent were married on 25 May 2008 under the Law
Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (‘Law Reform Act’) and had three
G
children (‘children’) from such union. The marriage deteriorated and in July
2020, without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, the respondent
facilitated the children’s conversion from Hinduism to Islam by the proposed
intervener at the Pejabat Agama Islam Perlis. As a result, a certificate of
conversion into Islam was issued to the children individually. However,
H pursuant to two court orders, an interim ex parte order dated 20 December
2019 and another issued on 31 March 2021, sole custody, care and control
of the children was granted to the petitioner. Despite these orders, the
children eventually found themselves in the care of one Nazirah Nantha
Kumari Abdullah at the Hidayah Centre Foundation. The petitioner claimed
I Nazirah had prevented her from meeting and taking the children into her care
and custody. As a result thereof, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus
application. The High Court allowed the habeas corpus application and the
934 Current Law Journal [2022] 8 CLJ

children were reunited with the petitioner. Hence, this application. The A
issues that arose were (i) whether the proposed intervener had an interest on
the basis that the conversion was not valid/illegal; and (ii) whether this
application should be allowed if this court were to hold that the children
were in fact Muslims, would the proposed intervener have an interest in the
custody of the children. B
Held (dismissing application with costs):
(1) The fact that this was a unilateral conversion had not been disputed by
the proposed intervener. The law, as it stands, is undeniably as that
expounded by the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi v. Pengarah Jabatan
C
Agama Islam Perak (‘Indira Gandhi’), that is, unilateral conversions are
illegal and not valid. As such, this court was judicially bound by Indira
Gandhi, and to depart from it would be inconsistent with the doctrine
of stare decisis which was part and parcel of the administration of justice
in this country. In fact, to depart from the decision of the Federal Court
which expounded the principles of law, would amount to judicial D
infraction. Thus, the conversion of the children, being a unilateral one,
was not valid. (para 17)
(2) This application would still be dismissed, even if the children were
Muslims. This application was premised on O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) of the Rules
E
of Court 2012, which states the words ‘at any stage of the proceedings.’
In the present case, there were no proceedings as such. There was
nothing pending in these divorce proceedings. As such, there was no
room whatsoever for intervention. Further, the whole point of this
application was to vary the custody order granted in March 2021 and,
in doing so, s. 96 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 F
came to the forefront, which provides that the court may vary an order
for custody of the child on the application of any interested person.
Herein, the children did not belong to the community in the state of
Perlis. They resided in Selangor and their connection to Perlis was
fleeting and transitory, that was, when they were taken there to be G
converted. The proposed intervener had failed to show the nexus
between itself and the children. (paras 22-27)
(3) The proposed intervener failed to convince this court if its involvement
was required or even needed considering that the children were not
orphans. The proposed intervener had not proved that the petitioner was H
incapable of bringing up the children as Muslims and there was no
evidence to show that the petitioner had been neglecting her duties in
raising the children in the Muslim faith. The proposed intervener’s
application was premised on the fact that the petitioner had failed to
ensure that the children perform or observe their duties and obligations I
as Muslims. That was premature because there was no proof of such
averment before this court. (paras 28 & 29)
 Loh Siew Hong v. Nagahswaran Muniandy;
Majlis Agama Islam Dan Adat Istiadat Melayu
[2022] 8 CLJ Perlis (MAIPS) (Proposed Intervener) 935

A (4) The conversion of the children from Hinduism to Islam occurred in July
2020, whereas the custody order was granted in March 2021. There was
no material change to warrant an application for variation, let alone
leave to file an application to vary. There was no misrepresentation or
mistake of fact in obtaining the custody order in March 2021. Further,
B the welfare of the children should be viewed holistically. The proposed
intervener was a stranger to the family and had nothing to do with the
children. As such, disallowing this application would, in fact, fortify the
welfare of the children. (paras 32-36)
(5) Despite the low threshold for leave, the proposed intervener had failed
C to meet it. Even if the children are Muslims, this application was
dismissed as the proposed intervener had failed to show that it was an
interested person. The relationship between parent and child is sacred
and should not be subject to intrusion by third parties who have no
interest in their welfare. The petitioner was reunited with the children
D just a few months ago and any unwanted intrusion by a third party would
be most pernicious to their journey which should embody healing and
restoring, rather than scrutiny and surveillance. The proposed
intervener’s intention may be noble but this court has to prioritise the
welfare of the children, and in doing so, should be cautious of any such
E
application by any third party for that matter. (paras 38-41)
Obiter:
(1) The decision of this court was not based on which religion the children
should embrace, or remain in, or should renounce. It was not about
choosing one religion over the other, and it was definitely not about
F which religion should prevail. At the expense of saying this ad nauseam,
the decision of this court must be, and was, about the exercise of the
rights of the children, and as such, the gist of this application was
whether the proposed intervener had the right to be involved in the
children’s lives by intervening to vary the custody order granted by this
G court.
Case(s) referred to:
In Re McGrath (Infants) [1893] 1 Ch 143 (refd)
Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors And Other Appeals
[2018] 3 CLJ 145 FC (refd)
H Kesultanan Pahang v. Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 559 FC (refd)
Loh Siew Hong v. Nazirah Nanthakumar Abdullah & Anor [2022] 4 CLJ 467 HC (refd)
SIS Forum (Malaysia) v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor; Majlis Agama Islam Selangor
(Intervener) [2022] 3 CLJ 339 FC (refd)
Legislation referred to:
Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment 2006, s. 7
I
Federal Constitution, art. 12(4)
Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, s. 3
Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, ss. 3, 96
Rules of Court 2012, O. 15 r. 6(2)(b)
936 Current Law Journal [2022] 8 CLJ

For the petitioner - Srimurugan Alagan, Shamsher Singh & Gunamalar Joorindanjn; A
M/s Gunamalar Law Chambers
For the proposed intervener - Haniff Khatri, Zainul Rijal Abu Bakar, Aidil Khalid
& Danial Farhan Zainul Rijal; M/s Chambers of Zainul Rijal
Reported by Suhainah Wahiduddin
B
JUDGMENT
Evrol Mariette Peters J:
Introduction
[1] This was an application (“the application”) by the Majlis Agama Islam C
Dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Perlis or MAIPs (“the proposed intervener”) for
leave to intervene to vary the custody order granted by this court in March
2021 which involved three children (“the children”) of the petitioner wife
and respondent husband.
The Factual Background D

[2] The petitioner and respondent were married on 25 May 2008 under
the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“the Law Reform Act”)
and had three children (“the children”) from such union.
[3] The marriage had deteriorated and in July 2020, without the consent E
or knowledge of the petitioner, the respondent had facilitated the children’s
conversion from Hinduism to Islam by the proposed intervener at the Pejabat
Agama Islam Perlis. As a result of such conversion, a certificate of
conversion into Islam was issued to the children individually.
[4] However, pursuant to two court orders, an interim ex parte order dated F
20 December 2019, and another issued on 31 March 2021, sole custody, care
and control of the children was granted to the petitioner.
[5] Despite these orders, the children eventually found themselves in the
care of one Nazirah Nantha Kumari Abdullah at the Hidayah Centre
Foundation in Bayan Lepas, Penang. The petitioner claimed that Nazirah G
had prevented her from meeting and taking the children into her care and
custody. As a result thereof, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus application.
[6] In February 2022, the High Court allowed the habeas corpus
application, and the children were reunited with the petitioner. However, on
H
7 March 2022, this application was filed, which was dismissed by this court
for the following reasons.
Contentions, Evaluation, And Findings
[7] At the outset, I am compelled to state that the decision of this court
is not based on which religion the children should embrace, or remain in, I
or should renounce. It is not about choosing one religion over the other, and
it is definitely not about which religion should prevail. At the expense of
 Loh Siew Hong v. Nagahswaran Muniandy;
Majlis Agama Islam Dan Adat Istiadat Melayu
[2022] 8 CLJ Perlis (MAIPS) (Proposed Intervener) 937

A saying this ad nauseam, the decision of this court must be, and is, about the
exercise of the rights of the children, and as such, the gist of this application
was whether the proposed intervener has the right to be involved in the
children’s lives by intervening to vary the custody order granted by this court
in March 2021.
B Whether The Proposed Intervener Is A Muslim
[8] The petitioner resisted this application on the premise that the
proposed intervener was not a ‘person’ within the definition of the Law
Reform Act; and even if it was, it was a Muslim entity and, therefore,
precluded from making this application, by virtue of s. 3 of the Law Reform
C
Act, which reads:
Section 3 – Application
…
(3) This Act shall not apply to a Muslim or to any person who is married
D
under Muslim law and no marriage of one of the parties which professes
the religion of Islam shall be solemnised or registered under this Act; but
nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a court from having exclusive
jurisdiction over the dissolution of a marriage and all matters incidental
thereto including granting a decree of divorce or other orders under Part
VII and Part VIII on a petition for divorce under section 53 where one
E
party converts to Islam after the filing of the petition or after the
pronouncement of a decree, or a petition for divorce under either section
51, 52 or 53 on the petition of either party or both parties to a marriage
where one party has converted to Islam, and such decree and orders made
shall, notwithstanding any other written law to the contrary, be valid
F against the party to the marriage who has so converted to Islam.
(emphasis added)
[9] I had to disagree with the petitioner’s contention for the reason that
although the definition of ‘person’ is not found in the Law Reform Act,
according to s. 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, a ‘person’
G includes a body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, which would
encompass the proposed intervener. In fact, the petitioner conceded that
there was no express provision in the Law Reform Act, that would preclude
the proposed intervener from applying pursuant thereto.
[10] I also found untenable the petitioner’s submission that the proposed
H intervener was disallowed from making this application on the basis that it
professed Islam, and therefore precluded by s. 3 of the Law Reform Act. On
this note, I found instructive the Federal Court cases of Kesultanan Pahang
v. Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 559 and SIS Forum (Malaysia) v.
Kerajaan Negeri Selangor; Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (Intervener) [2022] 3 CLJ
I 339, where in the latter case, it was stated by Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat CJ,
in the following passage:
938 Current Law Journal [2022] 8 CLJ

[89] Further, the word “profess” in its natural and ordinary meaning A
suggests a declaration of faith which is something an artificial or juridical
person is incapable of doing.
[11] As such, I proceeded to hear this application on its merits.
[12] Since a major part of the submissions of parties pivoted on the legality
B
or otherwise of the conversion of the children from Hinduism to Islam, the
grounds of this judgment will be premised on two permutations, namely:
(i) the conversion is illegal; and
(ii) the conversion is in fact legal and valid.
C
Whether The Proposed Intervener Had An Interest On The Basis That The
Conversion Was Not Valid/Illegal
[13] Counsel for the petitioner had argued that the conversion was illegal
on the basis of the Federal Court case of Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Pengarah
Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors And Other Appeals [2018] 3 CLJ 145, and D
had submitted that this court should not ignore such decision.
[14] Counsel for the proposed intervener, on the other hand, offered
another perspective – that is, first, that the issue of conversion was not
relevant and, that at this point in time, the children are in fact Muslims,
having been issued certificates of conversion into Islam. The proposed E
intervener further contended that the decision of the Federal Court case of
Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors And Other
Appeals was per incuriam as it had defined ‘parent’ in the plural, when it
actually appeared in the singular as stipulated in art. 12(4) of the Federal
Constitution, which reads: F
Article 12 – Rights in respect of education
…
(4) For the purposes of Clause (3) the religion of a person under the age
of eighteen years shall be decided by his parent or guardian. G
(emphasis added)
[15] As such, the proposed intervener contended that the consent of one
parent was sufficient to allow the conversion of the children from Hinduism
to Islam.
[16] Although the proposed intervener’s arguments contained novel points H
of law, at this stage, it was my view that pursuant to the agreement of all
parties present, the issue of legality or otherwise of the conversion of the
children was not before this court today. It was a matter that had been fixed
for judicial review at the special powers division.
I
 Loh Siew Hong v. Nagahswaran Muniandy;
Majlis Agama Islam Dan Adat Istiadat Melayu
[2022] 8 CLJ Perlis (MAIPS) (Proposed Intervener) 939

A [17] However, having perused the submissions of parties and being mindful
of the authorities, the law as it stands is undeniably as that expounded by the
Federal Court in Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak
& Ors And Other Appeals, that is, unilateral conversions are illegal and not
valid. Although the proposed intervener submitted that the petitioner had
B waived her consent to the conversion of the children from Hinduism to
Islam, the fact that this was a unilateral conversion had not been disputed by
the proposed intervener. As such, this court was judicially bound by the
decision of the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan
Agama Islam Perak & Ors And Other Appeals, and to depart from it would be
C
inconsistent with the doctrine of stare decisis which is part and parcel of the
administration of justice in this country. In fact, to depart from the decision
of the Federal Court, which expounded trite principles of law, would amount
to judicial infraction.
[18] A valid point raised by the counsel for the petitioner was that although
D the issue of conversion was not before this court, this court nevertheless
should not turn a blind eye to the factual history of this case. In doing so,
learned counsel for the petitioner cited the decision of YA Datuk Collin
Sequerah in the habeas corpus application of Loh Siew Hong v. Nazirah
Nanthakumar Abdullah & Anor [2022] 4 CLJ 467, where His Lordship stated
E
in the following passages:
[73] Although the matter of the unilateral conversion of the children is
not directly in issue in this application, it is best not to mimic Nelson at
the Battle of Copenhagen (where the hero of Trafalgar put the telescope
to his blind eye, suffered during the siege at Calvi, and pretended not to
see the signal ordering a withdrawal of the fleet) and ignore the fact that
F it is undoubtedly connected to the Applicant’s hitherto futile attempts to
locate and reunite with her children, which eventually led to the filing of
the present application.
[74] In legal parlance of the common law variety, the reference to Lord
Nelson’s actions above is referred to as “willful blindness” while the
G Americans call it “contrived ignorance”.
[75] The point must therefore be made that the issue regarding the unilateral
conversion of the three children to the Islamic religion has been resoundingly settled
by the decision of the apex court in Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan
Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals [2018] 3 CLJ 145; [2018] MLJU
H 69, the facts of which are not dissimilar to the instant case. (emphasis added)
[19] I agreed with counsel for the petitioner, that this court cannot adopt
a tunnel vision approach and ignore the factual history of this application.
In fact, to do so would be inequitable and unjust. A peripheral vision is
required to dispense justice in this case, and in adopting such vision, I would
I agree with the views of YA Datuk Collin Sequerah, that the conversion of
the children, being a unilateral one, was not valid.
940 Current Law Journal [2022] 8 CLJ

[20] At this juncture, I also have to remind parties that counsel for A
proposed intervener did agree that if the conversion of the children was
indeed illegal and not valid, the matter would end there, and that the
proposed intervener would have no basis whatsoever to intervene.
Whether The Proposed Intervener Had An Interest On The Basis That The
Conversion Was Valid/Legal B

[21] Having said that, however, I have to also look at this case from the
perspective of the proposed intervener, that is, on the permutation that the
conversion was in fact valid and legal. The question that arose, therefore,
would be whether this application should be allowed if this court were to
C
hold that the children are in fact Muslims. In other words, would the
proposed intervener have an interest in the custody of the children?
[22] The answer to that would still be a resounding NO, that is, that this
application would still be dismissed, even if the children are Muslims. I say
this based on the following reasons: D
[23] The first reason is that this application is premised on O. 15 r. 6(2)(b)
of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”), which reads:
Order 15 – Causes of action, counterclaims and parties
Rule 6 – Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties E
…
(2) Subject to this rule, at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or
matter, the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its
own motion or on application:
F
…
(b) order any of the following persons to be added as a party, namely:
(i) any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose
presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters
in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely G
determined and adjudicated upon; or
(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter
there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or
connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter
which, in the opinion of the Court, would be just and convenient
H
to determine as between him and that party as well as between the
parties to the cause or matter. (emphasis added)
[24] What is crucial to note in O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court are
the words, ‘at any stage of the proceedings …’. In the present case, there were
no proceedings as such. There was nothing pending in these divorce
I
proceedings. As such, there was no room whatsoever for intervention.
 Loh Siew Hong v. Nagahswaran Muniandy;
Majlis Agama Islam Dan Adat Istiadat Melayu
[2022] 8 CLJ Perlis (MAIPS) (Proposed Intervener) 941

A [25] Even if counsel for the proposed intervener had crossed the hurdle in
O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court, the whole point of this application was
to vary the custody order granted in March 2021, and in doing do s. 96 of
the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 came to the forefront,
which provides that the court may vary an order for custody of the child on
B the application of any interested person. Section 96 of the Law Reform Act
reads:
Section 96 – Power for court to vary orders for custody or maintenance
The court may at any time and from time to time vary, or may rescind,
any order for the custody or maintenance of a child on the application
C of any interested person, where it is satisfied that the order was based on
any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any
material change in the circumstances. (emphasis added)
[26] The crucial question here is whether the proposed intervener is an
interested person. Counsel for the proposed intervener drew the court’s
D attention to the Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment 2006 to
explain its powers, duties and obligation, where in s. 7 it is stipulated that
it has a duty to promote, stimulate facilitate and undertake the economic and
social development of the Muslim community in the state of Perlis. Section
7 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam Enactment 2006 reads:
E Section 7. The duty of the Majlis for the economic and social
development of Muslims
(1) It shall be duty of the Majlis to promote, stimulate, facilitate an
undertake the economic and social development of the Muslim
community in the State of Perlis consistent with Hukum Syarak.
F
(2) The Majlis shall have power, for the purpose of the discharge of its
duty under subsection (1):
(a) to carry on all activities, which does not involve any element
which is not approved by the religion of Islam, particularly the
development of commercial and industrial enterprises, the carrying
G on of which appears to the Majlis to be requisite, advantageous or
convenient for or in connection with the discharge of such duty,
including the manufacturing, assembling, processing, packing,
grading and marketing of products;
(b) to promote the carrying on of any such activities by other
H bodies or persons, and for that purpose to establish or expand, or
promote the establishment or expansion, of other bodies to carry
on any such activities either under the control or partial control of
the Majlis or independently, and to give assistance to such bodies
or to other bodies or persons appearing to the Majlis to have the
facilities for the carrying on of any such activities, including the
I giving of financial assistance by way of loan or otherwise;
942 Current Law Journal [2022] 8 CLJ

(c) to carry on any such activities in association with other bodies A

or any person, including the department or authorities of the
Federal Government or the Government of any State or as
managing agent or otherwise on behalf of the State Government
of Perlis;
(d) to invest in any authorised investment as defined by the B
Trustee Act 1949 [Act 208], and to dispose of the investment on
such terms and conditions as the Majlis may determine;
(e) to establish any scheme for the granting of loans from the
Baitulmal to Muslim individuals for higher education;
(f) to establish and maintain Islamic schools and Islamic training C
and research institutions;
(g) to establish, maintain and manage welfare home for orphans;
and
(h) to do such acts as the Majlis considers desirable or expedient.
(emphasis added) D

[27] What is pertinent to note is that the children do not belong to the
community in the State of Perlis. They reside in Selangor and their
connection to Perlis was fleeting and transitory, that is, when they were taken
there to be converted. On this ground alone, this application should not be
E
allowed, as the proposed intervener had failed to show the nexus between
itself and the children.
[28] Furthermore, the proposed intervener had failed to convince this court
if its involvement is required or even needed, considering that the children
are not orphans. Towards that end, two sub-issues arise:
F
(i) has the proposed intervener proved that the petitioner is incapable of
bringing up the children as Muslims; and
(ii) is there any evidence to show that the petitioner has been neglecting her
duties in raising the children in the Muslim faith.
G
[29] The answers to both questions are in the negative. In fact, the
proposed intervener’s application is premised on the fact that the petitioner
had failed to ensure that the children perform or observe their duties and
obligations as Muslims. In my view, that is premature because there is no
proof of such averment before this court.
H
[30] Secondly, we cannot ignore the respondent’s presence. The fact of the
matter is the respondent is alive, albeit in prison. The proposed intervener
had not even alluded to the respondent’s role and his views with regard to
the intervention of the proposed intervener.
[31] A scrutiny of s. 96 of the Law Reform Act will also indicate that I
variation of a custody order must be premised on a material change.
 Loh Siew Hong v. Nagahswaran Muniandy;
Majlis Agama Islam Dan Adat Istiadat Melayu
[2022] 8 CLJ Perlis (MAIPS) (Proposed Intervener) 943

A [32] In the present case, the chronology of events was crucial. The
conversion of the children from Hinduism to Islam occurred in July 2020,
whereas the custody order was granted in March 2021. There was no
material change to warrant an application for variation, let alone leave to file
an application to vary.
B [33] The proposed intervener contended that the custody order was granted
on misrepresentation or mistake of fact, as the court was not apprised of the
fact that the children had been converted from Hinduism to Islam.
[34] I was not convinced that there was a misrepresentation or mistake of
fact in obtaining the custody order in March 2021.
C
[35] The proposed intervener contended that this court should prioritise
the welfare of the children, which should be viewed holistically. In support
of such contention, the proposed intervener relied on the case of In Re
McGrath (Infants) [1893] 1 Ch 143, where it was stated by Lindley LJ:
D The dominant matter for the consideration of the court is the welfare of
the child. But the welfare of a child is not be measured by money only,
nor by physical comfort only. The word ‘welfare’ must be taken in its
widest sense. The moral and religious welfare of the child must be
considered as well as its physical well-being. Nor can the ties of
affection be disregarded. As regards religious education it is settled law
E that the wishes of the father must be regarded by the court, and be
enforced, unless there is some very strong reason for disregarding them.
(emphasis added)
[36] Although I would agree with the proposed intervener that the welfare
of the children should be viewed holistically and should include the
F children’s welfare, the present case, unlike In Re McGrath (Infants), was one
where the proposed intervener was a stranger to the family and had nothing
to do with the children. As such, disallowing this application would, in fact,
fortify the welfare of the children.
[37] The proposed intervener had further urged the court not to consider
G
the actual merits of the variation application at this stage, as the issue before
this court was merely an application for leave to seek a variation of the
custody order, and that the threshold for leave should be lower.
[38] In my view, despite the low threshold for leave, the proposed
H intervener had failed to meet it. I have always maintained that an application
for leave is akin to asking the court, as the dinner host, to unlock the door,
in order for a guest to enter the home, and in this case, to eventually sit at
dinner with the family. The host, in this case, who is the Family Court, has
to be cautious of the guest it invites to dinner, as there are children in the
house who need to be protected. If this court is sure that the guest knocking
I
at the door is not on the guest list for dinner, it is then pointless to unlock
the door or even allowing them to enter at this stage, as that would be a waste
of the time for the guest as well as the host.
944 Current Law Journal [2022] 8 CLJ

[39] In the final analysis, and in a nutshell, my decision is as follows – even A

if the children are Muslims, this application was dismissed as the proposed
intervener had failed to show that it is an interested person.
[40] At this juncture, I am compelled to remind parties that the relationship
between parent and child is sacred and should not be subject to intrusion by
third parties who have no interest in their welfare. In the present case, the B
petitioner was reunited with the children just a few months ago and any
unwanted intrusion by a third party would be most pernicious to their
journey which should embody healing and restoring, rather than scrutiny and
surveillance.
C
[41] The proposed intervener’s intention may be noble but this court has
to prioritise the welfare of the children, and in doing so, should be cautious
of any such application by any third party for that matter.
Conclusion
[42] In the upshot, therefore, and based on the aforesaid reasons, and after D
careful scrutiny and judicious consideration of all the evidence before this
court, including written and oral submissions of both parties, this application
was dismissed, with costs.