Islam and Cultural Change in Papua

New Guinea

Scholars of religion and policy makers may be surprised at the changes

occurring on the second largest island of the world, which straddles one of
the most Christianised and least Christianised areas of the world. This book
provides an accurate and deeper understanding of the nature of Islam in
Papua New Guinea, and determines the causes and processes of recent
growth in the country’s Muslim population.
Combining ethnographic, sociological and historical approaches to
understanding Islam’s growth in Papua New Guinea, the book uses
extensive fieldwork, interviews and archival records to look at the
establishment, institutionalisation and growth of Islam in a country that is
predominantly Christian. It analyses the causes and processes of
conversion, and presents a new analytical approach that could be used as a
basis for analysing Islamic conversions in other parts of the world.
Presenting an interdisciplinary approach to the study of Islamic
conversion through the examination of the causes and process of Islamic
conversion in Papua New Guinea, the book is of interest to students and
scholars of Asian Religion, Islamic Studies and Cultural Studies.

Scott Flower holds a PhD from the Crawford School of Economics and
Government, Australian National University and is an Honorary Fellow at
the University of Melbourne, Australia.

Routledge Studies in Asian Religion and Philosophy

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Socio-cultural perspectives
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Ugo Dessi

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Between mind and body
Geoffrey Samuel and Jay Johnston

9 ‘Yogini’ in South Asia

Interdisciplinary approaches
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10 The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony

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16 Vegetarianism and Animal Ethics in Contemporary Buddhism

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17 Sūtras, Stories and Yoga Philosophy

Narrative and transfiguration
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18 Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will

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Edited by Rick Repetti

19 Islam and Cultural Change in Papua New Guinea

Scott Flower
Islam and Cultural Change in
Papua New Guinea

Scott Flower
First published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge

711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2017 Scott Flower

The right of Scott Flower to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are
used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Names: Flower, Scott, author.
Title: Islam and cultural change in Papua New Guinea / Scott Flower.
Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge studies
in asian religion and philosophy ; v. 19 | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016012533| ISBN 9781138776357 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781315773247 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Islam–Papua New Guinea–History. | Social
change–Papua New Guinea.
Classification: LCC BP63.P36 F46 2016 | DDC 297.09953–dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016012533

ISBN: 978-1-138-77635-7 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-77324-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
Contents

List of illustrations
Preface
Acknowledgements
Glossary of Islamic terms and concepts

Introduction

1 Islam and Papua New Guinea: growth in context

2 The early history and establishment of Islam in Papua New Guinea

3 Seven-stage process of Islamic conversion in Papua New Guinea

4 Globalisation and the limits of Kastom and Christianity

5 Seeking answers: Islamic converts and crises

6 Quest, encounter, and interaction: the journey to Islam

7 Kalima Shahada in Papua New Guinea: commitment and its meaning

Conclusion: prospects of Islam in Papua New Guinea

Bibliography
Index
Illustrations

Figures
3.1 An alternative conceptualisation of Rambo’s process model
5.1 The nature and degree of crises
6.1 Modes of response by Islamic converts in PNG

Tables

1.1 Religious affiliation of PNG citizens, 1966–2000

1.2 Populations of ‘mainline’ and ‘other’ Christian churches, 1966–2000
3.1 Rambo’s seven-stage process model of conversion
4.1 Religious and cultural aspects of congruence
Preface

Since 9/11 there has been a proliferation of books on Islam, Muslims and,
unfortunately, the relationships between Islam, Muslims and violent
conflict. This book’s emphasis is on the historical aspects of Islam in Papua
New Guinea (PNG), the process of conversion to Islam in PNG, and the
effect that Islam is having on the lives of Papua New Guineans who chose
to become Muslim. However, given this book represents the first ever
empirical study of Islam and Muslims in PNG it is my sense that there is
likely to be an implicit expectation from some readers that I at least
tangentially address the potential security implications relating to the
growth of Islam in the country.
I do address security issues in the introduction simply to contextualise the
general milieu within which the recent growth of Islamic conversions in
PNG has occurred. I do not address security concerns directly and it is my
sincere hope that so-called ‘terrorism experts’ do not misinterpret or
misrepresent the data presented. On the contrary, I hope the book reduces
the likelihood that such ‘experts’ will incorrectly deduce threats where they
do not in fact exist.
From the time I commenced research for this book, I never ceased to be
amazed by the dearth of literature on the topic, especially given Islam had
been in PNG for decades and there was a global ‘war on terror’ being
waged. During the period of my research I observed growing claims from
some governments and security agencies that threats from Islamic
extremists existed in Melanesia. I developed a healthy scepticism and
concern over such claims given the obvious lack of data on Muslims in the
region.
I hope the book provides an empirical and realistic basis for
understanding Islam and Muslims in PNG and the wider Pacific region.
Facts play an important role in clarifying tenuous conceptual associations
between terrorism, extremism, Muslims and Islam that are currently present
in the literature. Muslims in PNG are potentially a minority at risk and I
hope the book helps reduce fear and misunderstanding among non-Muslims
in PNG and diminishes the likelihood that violence might evolve as a result
of misunderstandings of Islam and Muslims.
Acknowledgements

There are a number of individuals and organisations that helped me with the
research and writing of this book who deserve thanks. For wise counsel,
support, encouragement and patience I owe the greatest thanks to my wife
Tara. I would like to thank Peter Larmour, Ben Reilly and Satish Chand for
their intellectual contributions and encouragement. Special thanks go to
Rebecca Lawrence and Jillian Morrison from Routledge who supported me
through the publication process.
I would like to thank Shahjahan Khan (Vice President of the Islamic
Council of Queensland) for wise advice on how to approach the Islamic
Society of Papua New Guinea to conduct the fieldwork. Thanks also to:
David Lawrence, Kevin Murphy, Tony Barham and Garrick Hitchcock for
sharing their experiences and knowledge of the Fly-region in Western
province. Their advice allowed me to more accurately interpret the oral
histories that claimed an early Islamic contact and the existence of a Koran
among the Gizra people of the area.
Thanks must also go to the following individuals: Musa Bin Masran, Rali
Pueme and Khaihuddin Barus Shahid for providing insight into the
Ahmadiyyat Muslim groups in Melanesia; Duncan Pfantz from the Summer
Institute of Languages (SIL) for providing a comprehensive bibliography of
Chimbu traditional religion and responding to my questions about Kuman
language and religious beliefs prior to Christianity.
Turning to those who helped me in PNG, I would like to give thanks to:
Philip Gibbs SVD for meeting me in Port Moresby and discussing broader
religious change in PNG and his knowledge of Muslims in the country;
Brother McCallum of the Melanesia Institute (MI) in Goroka for allowing
me access to the MI library; Abraham Mayo (from Vanimo) for providing
valuable logistical and Indonesian language support during my brief visit to
Indonesian Papua; and Rebecca Worner (AusAID) for great company and
conversation in Port Moresby when a sanity break was needed.
I thank the executive committee of the Islamic Society of Papua New
Guinea (ISPNG) who enabled me to access to the large collection of
unpublished documents held by the ISPNG. Without the support of Br.
Abdul Mannan, Br. Yusuf Salmang, and the Imam of PNG, Br Imam
Mikhail Abdul Aziz, I would not have had access to such material. It is
unlikely that much of the detailed history of Islam in PNG contained in
these pages would have ever reached the public record without this timely
access. The vast majority of correspondence, minutes, clippings, and notes
from the early years (1978–1997) were rapidly deteriorating as a result of
tropical humidity and an ant infestation and were only a few years away
from becoming totally illegible or fully consumed. I also enjoyed full
access to the archives at the Post Courier and the National newspapers;
thank you to the archive managers at both papers.
The greatest thanks is reserved for Br. Yaqub Amaki and his wife Sister
Khadija for providing such warm Islamic hospitality by inviting me to stay
with them at their home in Port Moresby when my time living at the
mosque ended. I learned many things about Islam and PNG from Br. Yaqub.
Most of all, Br. Yaqub demonstrated through his example what it means to
be a good practising Muslim. May Allah reward you both for such openness
and generosity. Likewise, the Islamic Society of Papua New Guinea
(ISPNG) was very generous in allowing me to live at the mosque in Port
Moresby, which enabled me to observe daily prayers and other activities.
The society also kindly put me in contact with a number of expatriate
Muslims in PNG who gave great insights into the development of Islam in
PNG and openly discussed why Islam was not growing faster in PNG. Most
notably is Br. Abdur Rahman (currently in Kuala Lumpur) who gave
significant support and encouragement.
Finally, thanks to all of the Muslims belonging to the Islamic
communities of PNG with whom I came into contact. These Muslims taught
me a great deal about their concept of an ‘Islamic community’ and ‘way of
life’ by accepting me into their homes, villages and mosques. Unfortunately,
since 2001, the physical safety of PNG’s Muslim minority has occasionally
been threatened with shootings, arsons, bashings, verbal intimidation and
discrimination. Much of the harsh public treatment is the result of persistent
and biased representations of Islam and Muslims in the media and by
government. It is hoped that this research provides a source of knowledge
that will help many non-Muslims to let go of their unfounded views and
fears of Islam and Muslims.
Glossary of Islamic terms and
concepts

Ada ‘Customary law’ – Islamic religious law accepts the validity of the
customs of a particular region/people as long as customs are not
contrary to the Koran and the Sunnah, which is to say they comply with
the principles of the law (Sharia).
Ahl al-Kitab ‘The people of the book’ or ‘possessors of the scripture’.
This expression from the Koran refers to Christians and Jews (who
although they altered it, are considered to have been the first to have
received the monotheist revelation upon which Islam is founded).
Allah The ‘One’ God or ‘Creator’ of the universe given in the Koran.
Allah has attributes such as ‘powerful’, ‘wise’, ‘merciful’, etc. and is
also known also as ninety-nine beautiful names of god in which
theologians have generally seen the expression of eternal attributes
distinct from the divine entity. Allah revealed the book the Koran to
Muhammad through the angel Jibrail (Gabriel in Christianity).
Da’i (Plural: Da’iyah.) ‘Propagandist’ or ‘missionary’ who practices
da’wah.
Da’wah ‘Politico-religious call; propaganda; mission’, in a general sense
to call for the conversion to Islam. Used to describe Islamic missionary
efforts.
Diin The term most commonly used today to describe the ‘religion’ of
Islam. The ‘religion’ in the eyes of god (Allah) is Islam but it perhaps
corresponds more closely to a phrase such as ‘ideologically founded
way of life’. ‘Way of life’ is a very common English translation among
English-speaking Muslims. The term incorporates custom as well as
belief.
Diya ‘Blood money’ that is to be paid as compensation for offences
committed. With payment of diya the offender is pardoned.
Fitra Fitrah assumes that all humans are born with knowledge of the al-
Tawhid; oneness of Allah and the term is used in philosophical language
to mean ‘natural disposition’ towards Islam. A hadiths states, for
example, that ‘all children are born in accordance with the fitra’, which
is to say God’s plan. Only then, according to theologians, do a child’s
parents make it a Jew, Christian or Zoroastrian, implying that all
children are originally born Muslim.
Halal Legal language meaning ‘permitted’. It is used particularly in
reference to the meat of animals slaughtered according to the religious
rules.
Ibada Ibada is the obedience, submission and devotion to Allah.
Ihsan ‘Living virtuously’. Together with ‘belief’ (iman) and ‘exterior
accomplishment’ of the other various religious observances, it
completes the idea of ‘ibada’.
Imam ‘Guide’ or ‘leader’. In daily life it is applied to the person who
leads ritual salat in front of the niche of the mihrab and whose
movements are copied by the faithful behind him. An Imam can be any
Muslim, although generally it will be an educated man or important
figure who assumes the role for which he normally receives no
payment.
Iman ‘Faith’ or ‘quality of the believer’, consisting of three elements:
interior acceptance of the contents of the profession of faith (shahada);
the verbal expression of this profession of faith; and respect for the
ritual obligations.
Islam ‘Submission to god’ but also ‘religious practice’ required of a
believer along with ‘interior acceptance’ (iman) and ‘living virtuously’
(ihsan).
Janaza Ritual ‘funerary rights’ performed after the death of a Muslim,
and which are performed in a mosque or in an area close to the home of
the deceased. A special prayer (salat al-Janaza), which consists of four
rakas, is performed after the body is cleaned and wrapped in special
cloth.
Janna ‘Garden’ or ‘paradise’. The word is used in the Koran to refer to
the afterlife/heaven.
Jinn Corporeal beings created, according to the Koran, from a flame
without smoke. They may enter paradise but can also be condemned to
hell.
Jihad Original meaning is ‘struggle’. It was first used in the treatise on
religious law (fiqh), to mean the ‘effort of war’ that must be waged
against the infidels (kafirun) in the name of the law (Sharia) to ensure
the triumph of the true religion. From this comes the meaning of a ‘legal
war’, rather than ‘holy war’. A number of writers since the tenth century
have explained the term as being purely defensive in nature or war
against heresy. It is also referred to as ‘greater jihad’ (referring to an
interior struggle within the individual to practise Islam and avoid sin)
and ‘lesser jihad’ (referring to war).
Jummah Congregational prayer held on Friday.
Kafir (Plural: Kafirun, Kuffar, Kaffara.) ‘Infidel, unbeliever, miscreant or
pagan idolater’. The name given to anyone who does not belong to
Islam or who turns away from Islam.
Kalima ‘Word’ (of Islam), meaning the ‘religion of Islam’. Synonymous
with Diin.
Khutbah ‘Ritual address’ given from the minbar on Fridays before the
solemn collective prayer (salat) also known as Jummah salat. It is both a
political speech and a religious sermon.
Mahr ‘Gift’ made by the husband to the wife when a marriage is
concluded – also referred to as sadaq.
Mala’ika ‘Angels’ or spiritual beings referred to in the Koran numerous
times. They are servants of Allah (God). Mala’ika shared with
Christianity include Jibrail (Gabriel) and Mikhail (Michael).
Masjid Literally meaning a ‘place of (sujud) prostration’.
Munafiq ‘Hypocrites’: name used to describe those citizens of Medina
who converted to Islam but who maintained practices of, and social
links with unbelievers.
Qisas ‘Retaliation’ in the language of religious law (fiqh) is a practice of
ancient Arabia that is accepted with some modifications by the Koran.
For example, the representative of the victim has the right to vengeance
(tha’r) as long as it is not extreme. Alternatively, the guilty may pay
blood money (diya) to be pardoned.
Salat Falls into two categories: ritual prayer, which is the obligatory five
times daily prayer (salat) and supplementary prayer (nawafil). The latter
supplications are referred to as ‘Dua’.
Tabligh ‘Transmission of a message’ – this term is used to refer to the
propagation of Islam and, as of the 1920s, formed the name basis of the
 Tablighi Jamaat founded in India to encourage Islamic conversions.
Some extremist defenders of Islam in modern times lay claim to this
name.
Tawhid ‘Oneness of God’, which is a fundamental belief in Islam.
Ummah ‘Community’ or ‘Nation’ and used to refer to the community of
believers (Muslims) and thus both local and global Muslim collectives.
Wudu ‘Ablutions’ necessary to obtain ritual purity prior to every ritual
prayer (salat). Wudu is normally taken in an annexe of the mosque at a
fountain referred to as a mida.
Introduction

The establishment and institutionalisation of Islam in Papua New Guinea

(PNG) and the recent growth of Islamic conversions in the country has been
largely overlooked. This is surprising given PNG borders Indonesia (the
world’s largest Muslim nation) and fact that a long and ongoing interest in
new religious movements in PNG exists. For over 150 years scholars from
around the world working in the fields of Anthropology and Religious
Studies have come to the Pacific region and PNG to study traditional and
Christian religions and the syncretic blending of the two. Yet despite the
relatively large scholarly and general interest in religion in the region and
country the presence and growth of Islam in PNG has gone effectively
unnoticed.
In 1976 when PNG became an independent country, the Muslim
population totalled 120 and, until 1986, consisted exclusively of expatriate
workers from Africa and the Indian subcontinent (Ahmad 1980). By 2009,
one media report claimed the number of indigenous PNG Muslim converts
exceeded 4,500 and appeared to be growing daily (Filali 2009), a growth
estimate that would indicate 500 per cent growth in the last nine years,
albeit from a small base. The time at which the spike in Islamic conversions
in PNG occurred correlates with the terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists
on 11 September 2001 (9/11) (Flower 2007).
This spike in Islamic conversion growth since 9/11 resulting from
seemingly negative media coverage has also been noted in many other
countries including Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and America
(Peek 2005; Zebiri 2008). As can be seen in the following statement by
Zainul a PNG Muslim convert, the media reporting associated with the 9/11
attacks were perhaps paradoxically the greatest missionary event for
promoting Islam in PNG.
Osama is fighting for the rights of all the people of this world, not just fighting for himself. The
media are telling us that he is doing it for all people. So now there is many more [Islamic] centres
in PNG. People became interested after the media. People want to read and learn about Islam in
the newspaper, they really like it.
(Flower 2007)

Yet 9/11 surprisingly did not generate a greater interest within

Anthropology and Religious Studies to explore the presence of Islam in
PNG; rather, it was security analysts who started to hypothesise about the
presence of Islam and the threat it might pose to the region. This resulted in
increased security focus on Muslims, with Muslim minority communities
increasingly considered an area of growing security concern. Islamic
conversion growth is argued to be negative for security because the
conversion of non-Muslims to Islam is a key strategy employed by Islamic
extremists currently engaged in Islamic radicalism and militant jihad across
the globe, and in the last decade the number of converts involved with
radical and militant Islamic networks has noticeably increased (Poston
1992; Roy 2004; Sageman 2008, 2010).
Although this book is not interested in security issues in any way, it is
likely that conversions to Islam in PNG may be of interest to security
analysts looking beyond the narrow scope of terrorism because religion and
religious beliefs are especially powerful drivers of Melanesian social and
political behaviour. Religion is ‘integrally related to war and acts of
violence in Melanesia … and homicide against enemies being in some
sense religious or bound up with worldviews and belief systems normally
graced by the term “religion” ’ (Trompf 1994: xv and 9). Furthermore, the
religious changes occurring in PNG over the last 30 years exhibit a clear
trend towards fundamentalist Christian sects which, although similar to
some degree to Islam, are antagonistic towards Islam and Muslims (Gibbs
2006).
The growth of Islam in PNG, a changed security environment post-9/11,
and statements like those above are likely to raise many new and pertinent
questions regarding the stability and security of PNG and the Pacific region
that, to date, remain unanswered. For example, if Islam continues to grow
rapidly, what might be the effect on politics and security in PNG and the
region? Does an increasing Muslim population in PNG provide a larger
social/religious network for the facilitation of transnational Islamic
extremists and/or the recruitment and radicalisation of local converts?
These complex questions are left unanswered in this volume. The
analysis below examines the more interesting and general issues regarding
conversion growth and how Islamic conversion is related to religious and
cultural change in PNG.
The main aims of the book are to provide an accurate and deeper
understanding of the nature of Islam in PNG and to determine the causes
and processes of recent growth in the country’s Muslim population. I
establish this by presenting three key steps. First, I bring together in one
comprehensive account, the establishment and history of Islam in PNG.
Second, through fieldwork I sought to determine the empirical foundations
of Islam’s growth in PNG by analysing the rate of growth and the causes
and processes of conversion. Third, in undertaking this case study of PNG I
aim to advance a new analytical approach that could be used as a basis for
analysing Islamic conversions elsewhere in Melanesia and in other parts of
the world where Islamic conversion growth is of interest.
This book highlights the benefits of using an interdisciplinary approach
for understanding the causes and processes of Islamic conversion. The
existing literature on religious conversion largely focuses on conversion
within Christianity and fails to apply its knowledge or frameworks to the
study of Islamic conversion. Given the ongoing increase in Islamic
conversions globally, but specifically in the West, this is an important
omission.
The book also taps into broader debates on globalisation and the impact
of globalisation on religious and cultural identities, particularly in the
Pacific. The view that Islamic conversion and conversion to fundamentalist
forms of Christianity is rooted in modern culture and is a by-product of, or
reaction to, globalisation, is widely supported in the literature on
fundamentalism. This phenomenon also intersects with aspects of Islamic
conversion in PNG in that:

Fundamentalism is [possibly] the rational response of traditionally

religious peoples to social, political and economic changes that downgrade
and constrain the role of religion in the public world.
(Bruce 2000, 117)
Huntington showed long before he conceptualised the Clash of Civilizations
(Huntington 1996) that the effect of modernisation and decolonisation after
the Second World War and ‘the breakup of traditional societies may lead to
psychological disintegration and anomie … and conditions that also create
the need for new identities and loyalties’ (Huntington 1968: 37). Fox and
Sandler (2004) have more recently detailed the trends of people seeking
fundamentalist religion, the growing importance people place on their
religious identity and how these trends are linked to the ‘processes that
destroy traditional society and create a vacuum that requires transcendence’
[conversion].
The intrinsic drivers of the trend towards Islam and other more
fundamentalist religions in PNG are Papua New Guineans ‘belief in the
primacy of religion as the ultimate authority in society and politics’ (Gibbs
2005), the desire for religious clarity offered by literal interpretations of
holy texts (Bible/Koran), a worldview based on moral absolutism (good
versus evil), tendencies against the separation of religion and the state, and
stress on the importance of religious legitimacy for political leaders (Eves
2008; Gibbs 2000, 2004b, 2005). These factors carry potential political,
cultural, social and religious implications, making studies of Islamic
conversion particularly important for understanding how changes in belief
might affect attitudes, and behaviour.
There is an almost total lack of research on Islam in PNG, a situation that
is representative of a broader gap in knowledge regarding Islam in all
countries of the Pacific. Even in Fiji, where 7 per cent of the population is
Muslim, the only article on the topic declared ‘a near total absence of
research on Islam or Muslims’ (Ali 2004: 143). One of the more recent
books on religious change in the Pacific reveals a lack of interest in Islam to
the point of being misleading, where it states:

Outside of Fiji the influence of Muslims [in the Pacific] … is rather small
and does not go beyond the minority migrant populations.
(Ernst 2006a: 64)

Such claims seem to inaccurately reflect reality, and are curious in light of
the data on religious populations presented in that book, which show an
increase in the Muslim population of PNG nationals (not migrants) and an
increase in faiths that share theological affinity with Islam in PNG such as
Baha’i. It is therefore not surprising that one leading scholar recently
declared Islam to be ‘an invisible religion’ from an anthropological
perspective (Launay 2006).
Sunni Islam and its indigenous convert followers in PNG are the primary
focus of this book rather than Muslim expatriates and migrants. Although
Muslim expatriates and migrants are discussed, they make up a static
minority group within the Muslims minority of PNG and thus are not the
main focus. Islam officially has 73 sects (Al-Baghdadi 1966) and there are
also a number of religious groups that are derived from Islam or claim to be
part of orthodox Islam. Among these religious groupings only three of these
sects exist in PNG; Sunni, Ahmadiyyat, and Baha’i; the latter two groups
also experiencing recent significant growth through indigenous conversions
in PNG (Gibbs 2006).
This book is structured into seven substantive chapters excluding the
introduction and concluding remarks. The first chapter presents empirical
evidence of the growth of Islam globally, regionally and in PNG, and
includes a brief discussion about the growth of fundamentalist Christian
religions in PNG in order to understand the growth of Islam in the country
in context. The rates of Islamic conversion in PNG have increased most
significantly since 2001 with the Muslim population in PNG increasing
over 500 per cent in 11 years.
The second chapter, on the history and establishment of Islam in PNG, is
broken down into two distinct periods; pre-colonial and colonial, and PNG
post-independence. This chapter shows why Islam did not take root prior to
PNG independence, and details the early spread of Islam in order to closely
examine claims held by many converts in PNG today that they were
Muslim before the arrival of Christian missionaries and Western
colonisation. The PNG post-independence period uses archival records
from the Islamic Society of Papua New Guinea (ISPNG) to provide a
comprehensive account of the institutionalisation of Islam in PNG as a
recognised religion and the early Islamic missionary efforts and the
opposition to such efforts.
The third chapter presents a seven-stage process of Islamic conversion in
PNG through the use of Rambo’s approach to understanding religious
conversion (Rambo 1993). It defines and discusses a concept of Islamic
conversion suitable for PNG and gives an outline of Rambo’s seven-stage
process model.
 The four chapters that follow integrate observations of Islamic
conversion in PNG with Rambo’s seven-stage conversion framework,
which consists of:

Context. The conversion influences that span the macro and micro levels
of analysis labelled as ‘five contours of context’: Religious Sphere, Culture,
Social Milieu, Secular Context and Personal.

Crisis. Examines converts’ perceptions of how the contexts interact with

and cause personal and social crises and how these affect conversion.

Quest, Encounter, and Interaction. Quest describes the search process

indigenous Muslim converts experience prior to encountering Islam as a
religious alternative. Encounter describes the ways in which potential
converts come into contact with Islam. Interaction outlines who the Islamic
missionary advocates are in PNG, the methods and strategies of these
advocates, and why these advocates are influential upon converts’ decision
to become Muslim.

Commitment and Consequences. These last stages of the conversion

process, use interview data to describe aspects of commitment and what
new converts believe is required to become a Muslim in PNG and be
accepted in the local ummah (Islamic community). Included here are both
individual and institutional aspects of the commitment phase and the
consequences of conversion such as behavioural reforms, biographical
reconstructions and depth/strength of in-group identification.

The book concludes by evaluating the prospects of Islam in the future of

PNG.
The analysis of Islamic conversion faces a number of theoretical and
methodological challenges. The causes of the phenomena are complex and
involve numerous levels of analysis (individual and group) across a number
of thematic areas (social, cultural, political, and religious), which means the
phenomenon is best understood through the use of interdisciplinary
qualitative methods of research (Gooren 2007).
Papua New Guinea is ‘renowned for its diverse traditional religious
practices and beliefs but equally as famous for its plethora of new religious
movements’ (Trompf 2000: 103). Many new religious movements start with
a bang and disappear just as quickly, and for this reason the recent spike of
Islamic conversions should be treated with caution as there is insignificant
time to accurately ascertain how persistent the recent trend will be. Thus, I
have had to strike a balance of knowledge and methods to mitigate biases
that can potentially ‘over-exoticize, over-theologize and over-systematize
the examination of “traditional” or emergent religions’ in PNG (Keesing
1992: 232).
The objective analysis of religious conversion is further complicated by
inherent difficulties in understanding the multiple dimensions of a convert’s
psychology, such as imagination, emotion and the subjective nature of
religious experience. Scientific methods utilised in the study of social
science, recent critiques of religion based on scientific principles (Dawkins
2006; Onfray 2007), and ‘the general trend toward relativism and
agnosticism in academia can also potentially be viewed as a complicating
factor’ in understanding Islamic conversion in PNG (Gellner 1992: 40).
Despite the study of religious conversion having a long heritage
stretching back over a century (James 1902), understanding conversion is
complicated by the lack of a clear-cut, single, unified approach. Leading
scholars argue however that this lack of consensus is beneficial rather than
problematic (Buckser and Glazier 2003; Gooren 2007; Hefner 1993; Rambo
1999). Rambo, for example, argues that in order to understand the
‘complexity and variety of processes’ leading to conversion, analyses
should utilise a ‘sophisticated interdisciplinary and comparative approach
drawing on conversion theories from the disciplines of sociology, history,
psychology, religious studies and anthropology’ (Rambo 1999).
In his work Understanding Religious Conversion, Rambo developed a
framework that applies an interdisciplinary approach to research
methodology that draws on a deep research heritage by combining and
integrating conversion research from all disciplines (Rambo 1993). Experts
in the field of conversion studies argue that Rambo’s framework best
captures and combines the most important elements of existing conversion
theories that have been developed and tested to date across multiple
disciplines (Lofland 1994; Maloney 1995; Schoenrade 1994). It is also one
of few approaches to conversion that has received empirical validation
(Kahn and Greene 2004) and is seen as ‘best suited to conversions where
cultural factors play a significant role’ as is the case in PNG (Gooren 2007:
345).
 A review of the conversion literature clearly highlights that the volume of
research on Islamic conversion is dwarfed by research on conversion to
Christianity. This general lack of research regarding Islamic conversion,
especially at the individual level of analysis, has been noted by a number of
key Western scholars of Islam for quite some time (Arnold 1956; Bulliet
1979; Poston 1992). Some researchers have even stated that anthropologists
have avoided researching Islam to the point of declaring it ‘an invisible
religion’ (Launay 2006).
Older studies of Islam tend to use a macro-level historical, and
sociological approach, focusing on the social, political and religious
environments of the time when Islam experienced growth, rather than using
ethnographic methods to understand conversion at the individual level.
Despite the problems with the macro approach, the following list is notable
among the literature for examining the spread of Islam for comparative
purposes: Australia (Bouma 1994, 1997), New Zealand (Bishop 1997),
Malaysia (Hamid 1982), Indonesia and Southeast Asia (Boland and Farjon
1983; Coatalen 1981) India (Dale 2003; Eaton 1985, 1993), Africa (Fisher
1973, 1985; Gellner 1981; Horton 1971). In any case, Rambo’s framework
incorporates macro context as a factor in his framework.
Only since the mid-1990s has there been an increase in ethnographic
research on Islamic conversion that is useful for understanding Islamic
conversion at the individual and group levels (Ahmed 2008a; Al-Qwidi
2002; Hefner 1998; Kaag 2008; Kose 1996; Rambo 1999; Roald 2004;
Wohlrab-Sahr 1999; Zebiri 2008). Key differences between the latter work
and earlier studies are the emphasis on individual converts’ active role in
conversion and their accounts of the conversion experience. Whilst
Rambo’s framework was developed predominantly using theories and
methods applied to the study of Christian conversion it is equally useful for
understanding Islamic conversion. Recent studies of Islamic conversion
applying Rambo’s framework found it the most useful of all approaches
because it is ‘holistic’ and ‘heuristic’ in nature (Al-Qwidi 2002; Roald
2004); others found it useful because it incorporated yet enhanced Lofland
and Skovond’s influential ‘conversion motifs’ model (Al-Qwidi 2002; Kose
and Loewenthal 2000; Lofland and Skonovd 1981).
Rambo’s framework emphasises the need to incorporate historical
analysis as a method of understanding religious change; thus, a history of
Islam in PNG forms part of this book. Historical analyses are effective in
highlighting the distinctive role of religious institutions and the part they
play in the conversion process (Burridge 1991; Hefner 1993). This is
particularly relevant to Islamic conversions as demonstrated in Levtzion’s
work, which highlights the influence of Islamic institutions on the
conversion process (Levtzion 1977).
The lack of research on Islam in the Pacific and PNG specifically is a
consequence of a lack of publicly available information resulting from two
factors. The first factor is the focus by anthropologists on village-based
studies in PNG, which may have unintentionally blinkered the ability to
discover Islam’s growth, given that the cores of Islam’s growth in Pacific
nations are in urban environments such as Port Moresby and not rural
villages.
The second factor is the fact that Muslims in the region deliberately keep
a low profile and talk down the extent of their activities, further limiting the
release of information (Choudry 1982e). For example, in order to be
officially recognised, the founding ISPNG executives made a commitment
to PNG government officials that expatriate Muslims would stay out of the
media and would not actively proselytise to the broader community
(Sandbach 1983). An agreement between ISPNG executives and the
Minister for Justice

made abundantly clear that Muslims (who were all expatriates at the
time) could continue to practice their religion without interference
PROVIDED that NO attempt is made to propagate Islam, to spread the
message of Islam, to engage in any form of activity that could be construed
as political in nature, nor attempt the conversion of PNG subjects nor
educate them in the principles of Islam.
(Sandbach 1983)

The research design applied in this study follows the recommendations of

recent studies regarding Islamic conversion, and draws upon both primary
research and existing literature. The book is based on field research that
included participant observation and structured interviews throughout PNG.
Secondary source materials including ISPNG archival records, books,
journals, newspapers, magazines, television and radio broadcasts, and
internet sources are also referenced.
 No initial hypotheses of conversion were constructed prior to fieldwork;
however, before departing for Papua New Guinea I drew on the literature
covering traditional and Christian religions. Particularly fruitful was the
literature on conversions from traditional to Christian religion in Melanesia,
which enabled me to be attuned to material, theological and missionary
aspects that might be contributing to Islamic conversions. This approach
allowed me to examine converts’ understandings of their own conversion
rather than assuming what the factors might be prior to fieldwork, and
enabled conclusions to be more closely aligned with the lived experiences
of the participants being studied (Ezzy 2002: 45).
Although the concepts of ‘tradition’ and ‘kastom’ are strong themes in
converts’ conversion stories, I actively tried to conduct my fieldwork
without declaring my knowledge of such ‘traditions’ as I had come to
understand from reading about them. I approached the research question by
starting with the fieldwork and working back to traditional situations, as
recommended for studies of religion in PNG (Trompf 1984).
It was necessary to employ grounded theory, an inductive method in
which theory is built from evidence. Conceptualisation and
operationalisation occur simultaneously with data collection and
preliminary data analysis (Neuman 2000: 146–147). There are three reasons
for taking this analytical approach. First, it made the research flexible and
allowed for data and theory to interact. Second, it provided the freedom to
remain open to unexpected findings as a result of having no fixed
hypothesis. Third, it allowed the fieldwork observations to be used as the
foundation for theory and hypothesis development and testing, which
otherwise may have been constrained by using theory from the outset
(Strauss and Corbin 1990: 22). Thus, the conclusions reached by this
research evolved as the data itself evolved (Bryman 2004: 9).
For the purpose of evaluating fieldwork data, I used a combination of
ethnography and ethnomethodology without being bound by either. It is
ethnographic in the sense that the study draws upon detailed stories of
Islamic conversion as the converts sees them. In respect to the ethnographic
study of Muslims, Asad (1993: 47) argues that Islam should be understood
as a constituting activity in the world rather than simply a state of mind
(belief) because the latter raises expectations about the sincerity of religious
believers and about the coherence of their inner thought worlds, which does
not serve enquiry well.
 Asad’s view is noteworthy and further highlights the benefits of taking a
combined approach. Converts’ views of their own conversions and of Islam
are not necessarily ‘as it is’, (objective truth) but rather ‘as they make
sense’ of things (Garfinkel 1967; Schutz 1967, 1970; Tippett 1976). Using a
combined approach enables analysis of each convert’s claims to be treated
on their merits and sceptically. The latter method contains the assumption
that converts actively construct reality, which is important because agency
is a central theme among the theories of religious conversion that are
applied in the chapters on conversion (Gooren 2007; Rambo 1993).
To minimise complications, as a starting point I use ethnography in an
attempt to represent the ideas and behaviours of Muslim converts as
accurately, precisely and organically as possible. Doing so recognises the
converts’ stated claims and beliefs as dimensions that constitute parts of
their lived reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 26–27). I take the converts’
knowledge, language and religious practices seriously because these
dimensions of their stories provide insights into their knowledge of Islam,
how they derived this knowledge and the ways this knowledge affects how
they see themselves (Lattas 1998: xix).
The use of ethnographic methods has enabled a deeper understanding of
the motivations and behaviours of Islamic converts. Through first-hand
discussions with converts, the individual can be seen as a real person in
their everyday community; this provides insight into the views and
motivations of converts.
The ethnographic methods employed enable insights into the meaning of
Islam for converts. Their views and beliefs have developed as a result of an
ongoing experience where they mix old and new knowledge with new
events (local and global). In order to analyse what it means to ‘be’ Muslim
in PNG and how being Muslim informs attitudes and behaviour I have
taken the accounts of individual converts at ‘face value’. Whilst I have
drawn on statements from converts to illustrate certain points, I have also
highlighted many contradicting or shifting statements that they make in
respect to particular topics. By doing so it is possible to assess (to a degree)
a number of issues relating to the research questions, such as the strength
and importance of the converts’ Muslim identity, the extent to which
converts see themselves connected to the global and local Muslim
community, and how they feel toward Muslims abroad and events that
affect this large group of fellow believers.
 The use of ethnomethodology has enabled me to ‘make sense’ of the
perceptions of converts rather than taking converts’ views as reality on their
own. Moving between the two approaches illuminates contradictions
between statements and actual behaviour.
Existing research on religious conversion to Christianity in PNG tends to
favour the use of one of these two predominant methodological approaches.
For example, the research conducted by mission theologists tends to be
ethnomethodological in that it is based on the researchers’ own observations
in conjunction with secondary sources. This is well suited to Mission
theologists’ interest, which is the examination of Christianity’s impact on
Melanesians to determine the degree to which the religious beliefs of
converts have changed (Flannery 1983; Trompf 1984). On the other hand,
anthropologists of religion tend to conduct analysis by focusing on the
gathering of their own empirical evidence in the form of narratives and
statements from indigenous religious believers themselves (Jebens 2005;
Robbins 2004a). For the purpose of this analysis, the combination of both
approaches provides the ability to cross-examine and corroborate evidence,
which is important in determining the degree and depth of religious
conversion being claimed.
The core of this book is based upon observations and interviews
conducted in PNG between April and October 2007, which was
supplemented between February and April 2011. The initial fieldwork
required significant planning and this commenced four months before
departure. Prior to commencing fieldwork, the Muslims of PNG had been
the target of numerous physical and rhetorical attacks since 9/11. I believed
that the local Muslim community would be very wary and suspicious of
outsiders coming to visit. Likewise I was of the view that the governments
of PNG and Australia would probably be interested in my activities.
Therefore, I felt a significant added burden during the ethics application
process to ensure that processes were put in place to guarantee interviewees
anonymity in respect to their stories (pseudonyms are used).
Paperwork was submitted in order to secure a PNG research visa and the
National Research Institute (NRI) of PNG as an institutional sponsor. I
departed for fieldwork without prior experience of living or travelling in
PNG. The only knowledge I had of life and the influence of religion in the
country was from books and other people’s accounts. Prior to fieldwork,
there were no detailed books on Islam or its history in the country upon
which to orientate and organise the research. Upon learning of a connection
between the Muslim communities of PNG and Queensland in the
Queensland Muslim Times newspaper (QMT 2006a) I began talking with
Professor Shahjahan Khan (USQ), Vice President of the Islamic Council of
Queensland. Despite Khan’s initial concerns regarding my true intentions,
he eventually suggested I take a direct approach. Using contact details I had
found for the ISPNG through the internet, I contacted Abdul Mannan, an
expatriate leader of PNG ummah and head of the University of Papua New
Guinea Open College. Via emails I discussed my plan to conduct fieldwork
in PNG. Mannan kindly obtained consent from ISPNG executives to secure
my accommodation at the Islamic Centre in Hohola. Using the centre as a
base, I then travelled to a number of Muslim communities spread across
PNG.
In total, I spent four months among the largest community, which is
based in Port Moresby. Not all of my days were spent at the centre. I did
occasionally leave the mosque to visit the Post Courier and National
newspaper archives to examine their material on Islam and Muslims in
PNG and overseas to gain insights into the local social and political
environment. My time in Port Moresby was split into two periods. I lived at
the mosque for two months and then at the home of Yaqub Amaki (one of
the first PNG nationals to embrace Islam) for two months. In between these
two periods I spent two months travelling to Daru, Alotau, Goroka, seven
villages in Chimbu, Minj and Mt Hagen in the Western Highlands, Wewak,
Vanimo and Jayapura (Indonesia) to conduct interviews and observations.
My focus in each location was to live the everyday life of converts and
conduct as many structured interviews as possible, and observe and
participate in daily religious life.
When travelling around Port Moresby or across the country I was
generally accompanied by a local Muslim or was met by a local Muslim on
arrival, as arranged by somebody in Port Moresby. Although my university
is based in Australia, I am a New Zealand citizen. I travelled to PNG on a
New Zealand passport and introduced myself as a ‘kiwi’. Most Papua New
Guineans appeared to relax and speak easier upon learning this.
Whilst living at the Islamic centre in Port Moresby I took part in most of
the daily activities of the ummah. I observed Arabic classes, lessons in
reciting the Koran, and daily salat (prayer). I attended Tafsir sessions on
Sundays and observed other classes. The benefits of this participant
observation was that I could monitor the numbers attending mosques for
salat, observe converts to establish the degree to which they followed
Islamic religious practice correctly, and listen to the way faith and identity
were communicated and understood between Muslims.
To many, I might have appeared as a Muslim because I had grown a
beard. A beard served numerous purposes: it meant one less morning task
(an issue when rising to observe morning prayers at 5 a.m.); it allowed me
to look older and garner a degree of status from tribal elders during my
travel in the Highlands; and it allowed me to blend in and look poorer to
reduce the likelihood of opportunistic attack/theft. Port Moresby is ranked
as one of the more dangerous cities in the world.
Some Muslims may have thought I was a member of a Tablighi Jamaat
(Islamic missionary group) as some converts actually asked if I was with a
Jamaat, to which I replied by saying that I was not. I told people that I was
conducting university research on Islam and Muslims in PNG in order to
write a book. For all intents and purposes I was probably seen a Muslim and
some researchers of Islamic conversion argue that this is likely to have
supported my research efforts (Ali 2006b; Roald 2004). If I was not seen as
a Muslim, then this may have also been advantageous as non-Muslims can
be seen by converts as less judgemental of their Islamic knowledge or
practice of Islam (Jacobson 1998). Clearly, researchers of Islamic
conversion are divided on this point.
Fortunately, all khutbah (sermons) at jummah on Friday and
communication among Muslims around the mosque were in English.
Prayers were always in Arabic, which is standard practice around the world.
Da’wah (Islamic missionary work) is also conducted in English. Copies of
the Koran and other literature on Islam that are provided to prospective
converts and active Muslims are also written in English.
Broadly speaking, public sentiment among the general PNG population
at the time of the fieldwork contained a degree of anti-Australianism as a
result of souring bilateral relations between PNG and Australia over a
number of issues. The ‘Moti affair’ and the insult caused by Australian
customs officials who demanded PNG Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare
remove his shoes whilst transiting Brisbane airport were among the major
causes of such negative views. Among the Muslim population, this anti-
Australianism was strong. Local Muslims, especially expatriate Muslims,
were generally angry about the (perceived) poor treatment of Muslims in
Australia, Australia’s involvement in the wars in Muslim lands (Iraq and
Afghanistan) and the improper detention of Muhammad Haneef. Travelling
on a New Zealand passport allowed me to circumvent these anti-Australian
sentiments and provided a more open environment in which to conduct
interviews.
The study of conversion centres on the individual and thus greater
understanding can be gained through participant observation and interviews
with converts (Rambo 1993: 18). This book is primarily based upon 52
structured and 13 unstructured interviews with the Muslim converts of
PNG, and over 2000 hours of observations. This approach enables ‘thick
description’ of convert’s experience to be captured for analysis (Geertz
1973: 3). Interviews with converts facilitate the development of a
biographical approach deemed important by recent research on Islamic
conversion (Al-Qwidi 2002; Kose and Loewenthal 2000; Roald 2004;
Wohlrab-Sahr 2006; Zebiri 2008). Furthermore, interviews are the
foundation of ethnography that makes meaningful
ethnomethodological/phenomenological analysis possible; a combined
method that has been deemed essential for establishing an accurate
understanding of Islamic conversion (VanNieuwkerk 2006).
By using participant observation, I was able to gain an ‘insider
understanding’ into the everyday lives of Muslim converts in PNG (Lofland
and Lofland 1995: 61). The approach allowed me to interact with the small
groups, formal organisations and small-scale village societies within which
Muslim converts live. Observation and interviews help understand ‘what
converts do’ or rather the decisions converts might make; the actions they
might take; and how they see their behaviour as unique or distinct relative
to other individuals or groups (e.g. Christians and Christian churches). The
element of personal identity change and its effects on thought and
behaviour is especially relevant to concepts such as in-groups and out-
groups within social identity theory, which in future may be used to
understand the potential for intergroup conflict (David and Turner 1996,
1999; Deschamps 1982; Haslam and Turner 1995, 1998; Turner et al.
1987).
For the duration of my fieldwork I attempted to conduct as many
structured interviews as was possible and kept a daily diary/fieldwork
notebook of my observations. I focused my interview efforts primarily on
the Papua New Guinean converts because my interest is in the conversion
of PNG nationals. However, a number of unstructured interviews were
conducted with expatriate ‘born Muslims’ residing in PNG.
The cohort of informants examined was not selected randomly (non-
probable sample). Informants were selected using the snowballing
technique (chain referral) (Babbie 2001: 180). Snowballing describes a
process whereby an initial contact is used to establish a network of
informants in a cumulative manner. Using this technique I attempted to
obtain a range of informants of different backgrounds. I actively selected
converts who were of different ages, tribal backgrounds, and those who had
been Muslim for a long time as well as more recent converts. Due to the
nature of fieldwork, once selected these informants were interviewed on the
basis of their availability and accessibility.
The way in which interviews were arranged and executed played an
important role in obtaining accurate information. Upon my arrival, I was
introduced to the ummah by the elders and executives of the ISPNG. I then
provided an outline of my research objectives and discussed the interviews I
hoped to conduct. I explained what would happen with the interviews once
complete, and mentioned that each interviewee would receive a transcript of
their interview. Individuals were then invited to make a personal approach
at a time that suited them if they wanted their story recorded. No converts
were compelled or coerced to provide information and, apart from two
interviews, all were conducted in private with each informant.
I used a cassette recorder for all structured interviews and I provided an
ethics briefing to each interviewee prior to commencing an interview. This
briefing began with an outline of the reasons for my research. I explained
that I was conducting interviews in order to write a book about Islam in
PNG. I told interviewees that I was interested in converts’ stories about
how, why and when they ‘embraced’ Islam and became Muslim. I also
mentioned that I was interested in their attitudes and thoughts on Islam and
what their religion meant to them.
I also told interviewees that my book would provide accurate information
on the Muslims of PNG and that I hoped this would help reduce the
confusion and misconceptions many non-Muslim Papua New Guineans
hold about Islam and Muslims. I mentioned that there was no compulsion to
answer all the questions in the interview just as in the Koran, Sura al-
Baqarah (verse 256) says there is ‘no compulsion in religion’ (Dawood
2003).
 The vast majority of interviews were carried out in English. Only two
interviews required partial third-party translation from PNG pidgin, referred
to as Tok Pisin. I embarked on fieldwork with a limited command of Tok
Pisin, however my fluency increased as the months passed. By the end of
the third month I was able to engage in simple communication. This helped
with facilitating travel and it provided a greater ability to make friends and
‘fit in’. I do not believe my inability to conduct interviews in fluent Tok
Pisin influenced or detracted from the quality of data collected.
The interviews generated a large amount of information regarding
converts’ personal backgrounds, conversion experiences, and religious life
and beliefs both before and after becoming Muslim. I enquired about the
depth of their religious knowledge, the strength of their beliefs, and their
worldviews in order to understand how they see themselves as Muslims and
the degree to which they feel connected to other Muslims in the world.
A number of expatriate Muslims were interviewed (un-structured)
because they had a deeper knowledge of the history of the ISPNG and its
institutionalisation and operation. Expatriates also provided interesting
insights into how they saw Islam developing in the country. Incorporating
the views of expatriates to some degree was also important to retain a
balance of views in light of warnings regarding fieldwork within religious
anthropology; particularly regarding the reliability of informants when
discussing traditional religious practices. Lawrence, for example, warns that
‘due to effects of colonial contact, local histories can colour the way
tradition is represented’, with the point being that some people are better
custodians of religious knowledge than others (Lawrence 1971).
The primary focus of data collection (interviews) was people who had
converted to Islam and were still practising Islam at the time of fieldwork. I
did not interview Christian Papua New Guineans or people who had
converted to Islam and returned to Christianity after their Islamic
conversion. This represents a potential bias that I have attempted to mitigate
where possible, using secondary sources including PNG-based print media.
At times, Christianity may appear in this book in a rather caricatured way
from the perspective of Muslim converts. This is done deliberately to
highlight converts’ views and therefore is not intended to be a systematic
comparison of Islam and Christianity or Muslim converts and Christians.
For the purpose of this book, my interest in Islam is as a researcher and
an analyst, not a religious ‘seeker’ or ‘believer’. I am not against any
religion or belief system and I remain agnostic about others’ religious
beliefs. My investigation into Islam in PNG did not attempt to prove or
falsify the existence of God. This philosophical debate has been
substantially attempted to date elsewhere, as already mentioned (Dawkins
2006; Onfray 2007). My interest is in the way religious believers, in this
case converts to Islam in PNG, understand their religion. I sought to
understand how new beliefs and identities impact on converts’ worldview,
historical narrative, personal biography and social behaviour.
In respect of the study of Islam and Muslims, some experts stress that
because many scholars lack a theologian’s appreciation of Islam they face
unique barriers to understanding what it means to be Muslim (Ahmed
1986), which leads to the formulation of incorrect assumptions about the
religious motivations (Jansen 1997: 5).
To counter this potential weakness I completely read the Koran (Ali
2006a; Dawood 2003) and a number of important Hadiths during fieldwork
(Badi 2002). In addition to the specialist literature directly relevant to my
research question (cited throughout the book), I also read the wider
literature on Islam to develop a deeper understanding of the religion. This
research on Islam expanded my existing knowledge of the religion that I
had developed through prior travel to Pakistan and Indonesia. By reading
numerous expert analyses of Islamic theology, legal interpretation and
Islamic traditions (not limited to those cited below), I attained a more
technical understanding of the meanings attached to Islamic beliefs and
social systems (Al-Hashimi 2005; Alghazali 1985; An-Na’im 2002;
Esposito 2005; Nasr 1991; Renard 1996; Schacht 2004). Much of this
research was never cited directly in book yet was important for reflective
purposes in the analysis to avoid bias and blind spots.
For the period of my fieldwork in PNG, I did not present my personal
views on religion. When asked I simply said that I had attended a Catholic
high school, and by default converts may have assumed I was Catholic. I
emphasised to converts that I had travelled to Islamic countries such as
Pakistan and Indonesia and, based on this, stated that I believed Islam was
indeed a ‘true religion’ and a ‘global religion’; beyond this, I did not
express my personal religious beliefs.
There is a gender bias in my sample population of interviewees. This
occurred despite my best attempts to capture the views of Muslim women
(Muslimah) while travelling to the various Muslim communities. In total, I
conducted five structured interviews with Muslim women. Among the
Muslims in rural areas it appeared less appropriate to interview women
directly; however, three unstructured interviews with women took place in
the presence of their husbands. In one case, in Lae, I literally was provided
with a statement handwritten by a woman and delivered by her convert
husband. This woman believed it was important that I took account of her
views after learning that I had interviewed her husband. It is unlikely that I
am in a strong position to generalise about many gender issues based on the
small number of interviews with Muslimah. Despite this, I was able to
capture a unique female perspective of Islam from the conversations with
the five Muslimah and from the observations I made of them participating
in religious life. I have sought to balance the male bias of my analysis
accordingly, where possible, by presenting the views of female converts.
A further potential bias comes from the simple fact that during fieldwork
I was immediately noticeable for my white skin (Caucasian appearance).
There are very few white people travelling independently around PNG and
no Muslims of European origin within the PNG Islamic community. This
made me a novelty to some degree. This fact leads to other biases that come
with being a white traveller. I was probably perceived by many local
Muslims as wealthy and/or powerful and this may have impacted on how
people interacted with me and the responses they provided. For many Papua
New Guineans, whites are also associated with colonialism, missionaries,
administrators and researchers. I was even told by a number of people
during their interview that they initially thought I was an Australian spy
until they got to know me.
While I may have been initially viewed with suspicion, I do not feel as
though this impacted negatively upon my ability to elicit honest responses
to questions in interviews. The secrecy and concealment of truthful
responses that can come with suspicion was generally not apparent in my
interviews, based on body language and level of engagement. There were
only a few times when I felt there was some distrust or reduced openness in
an interview. These generally occurred when I asked questions about
material/monetary issues and the visits by foreign Muslims.
My ‘neutrality’ as a New Zealander was temporarily compromised in
mid-August 2007, when an article entitled ‘Green Moon Rising: Islam is
Spreading in Melanesia’ by Ben Bohane was published in the Pacific
Magazine (Bohane 2007). Bohane’s article drew extensively on a
forthcoming journal article I had written for the Australian Institute of
International Affairs (Flower 2008). Three local Muslims who read
Bohane’s article were concerned that I had been directly involved with
writing it and that I shared Bohane’s sensationalist negative views about
Islam as a danger to PNG and the region. Set among the broader
social/political context of the time, the release of Bohane’s sensationalist
article, whilst unhelpful, did not severely impact on fieldwork.
This research investigates issues that are sensitive in nature. In my
interviews I asked my informants very personal questions about their
beliefs, views and attitudes. As part of conducting interviews I promised to
protect the anonymity of converts, yet in presenting my data I am required
to make reference to my sources. Therefore, in order to protect the identities
of interviewees, pseudonyms are used throughout this book to enable
accurate citation.
Where I have quoted converts directly I have used inverted commas
(‘…’). I have used the words of converts as they were spoken and recorded
exactly, which means many statements contain grammatical errors, missing
words or slang. In these instances I have occasionally added words to
enable the reader to make sense of what the convert has said. Where this is
done I use square brackets […] to denote the addition of my own words.
1
Islam and Papua New Guinea
Growth in context

The development and spread of Islam has been dynamic in nature since its
inception by the prophet Muhammad, and in many respects the religion’s
philosophy and followers have always viewed global growth and eventual
dominance as the religions qadar (destiny) (Arnold 1956; Levtzion 1977).
As a growing global religion, the boundaries of Islam have ‘remained
permeable and have shifted and interacted with other religions over time as
people moved’ (Juergensmeyer 2003: 5). The demographic centre of the
religion has shifted predominantly eastward over the last 1400 years from
its birthplace in Saudi Arabia, with the largest national populations of
Muslims today being in South and Southeast Asia (Coatalen 1981).
The relatively recent growth of Islam in PNG and elsewhere in Melanesia
is part of a global trend of increasing Islamic conversions; a trend described
as ‘striking’ for its scale in attracting ‘millions of converts … in Asia,
Africa, Europe and North America’ (Rambo 2003: 212).
Over the last 20 years, the global ummah (Islamic community) has grown
at rates that exceed the rate of Muslim population growth, which highlights
growth as a result of religious conversions by people of other faiths (Hsu et
al. 2008; Wagner 2004). Although increased conversions are a significant
factor, the bulk of global growth in the Muslim population overall remains
the result of high fertility rates and low contraception use in Muslim
majority countries (Roudi-Fahimi 2004).
In 2007, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ranked Islam
as ‘the fastest growing religion’ on earth, adding that ‘the fast-growing
faiths are upending the old world order’ (FP 2007). The only religious
groups growing as fast as Islam globally are evangelical and Pentecostal
(EP) sects of Christianity, (Robbins 2004b; Wagner 2004). In 2006, ‘for the
first time ever Muslims (19.2 percent) overtook Catholics (17.4 percent) as
the largest religious group in the world’ (Kington 2008).
The growth of Islam in PNG, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands is
different from the growth of Islam in other Melanesian nations because it is
growing through conversions of indigenous citizens and not through
increased migration. In Fiji and New Caledonia, Muslims are almost
exclusively descendants of immigrant labourers. In Fiji, Muslims are
predominantly from the Indian sub-continent (Ali 2004) and in New
Caledonia from Algeria and Java (Zocca 2006b), with growth in both
countries being stable and in line with Muslim birth and mortality rates.
In the Indonesian (yet traditionally Melanesian) province of West Papua,
the growth of the Muslim population has climbed rapidly to over 30 per
cent of the population, however growth is largely due to the deliberate
relocation policies of the Indonesian state, which encourages Javanese
Muslims to migrate (Farhadian 2005: 72–78). PNG, Vanuatu and the
Solomons are therefore quite unique and share similarities with each other
in that there is conversion growth in each country occurring in roughly the
same period of time.
The first Solomon Islander to convert to Islam was Abdus Samad, who
converted in Port Moresby in 1989 (Aziz 1997b: 7). In 1991, Tahir Berg, a
Sunni Muslim expatriate from Fiji based in Honiara, witnessed the first
three conversions of indigenous locals in the Solomons and supported their
endeavours to convert family members and establish the local Muslim
League (Aziz 1997b: 7). It is likely that Berg was also responsible for
requesting the Regional Islamic Da’wah Council for Southeast Asia and the
Pacific (RISEAP) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) to
send Sunni missionaries, which occurred in 1995 when a small Tablighi
Jamaat visited (Sandbach 1997g). When the Head Imam of PNG toured the
Solomon Islands in 1997 he reported there were 143 Muslims in the country
(Aziz 1997b: 5). This number conflicts with official Solomon Islands
government census figures from 1998 which reported only ‘twelve Muslims
to be in the country’ (State 2005: 225).
The organisation representing Sunnis is formally known as the Solomon
Islands Muslim League (SIML) (SIBC 2005) and recently it claimed close
to 2,000 Sunni Muslim converts in the following three main areas: the
Malaitan-dominated area of the capital, Honiara (east and central); the
island of Malaita; and the island of small Malaita (Flower 2008; Wate
2005). Despite the Islamic community increasing tenfold from its very
small population base in 1997, Muslims remain a small minority in a
Christian-dominated country of less than half a million citizens (Ernst
2006b: 172). Interestingly, Baha’ism (an offshoot of Shi’i Islam), has also
taken root in the Solomons with more than 2,300 members, of which 71 per
cent live on Malaita (Ernst 2006b: 197). Clearly Islamic doctrine and
principles are appealing to Malaitans.
Vanuatu has also seen a recent rise in its Muslim population since 2001,
although the growth is much less numerically and at a slower rate than in
the Solomons and PNG. For many years, the population of the Muslim
community in Vanuatu remained static and was based in only the village of
Mele on the Island of Efate. However, increased foreign assistance for
Vanuatu’s Muslim minority over the last eight years has led to a significant
increase in conversions. Sunni Islam in Vanuatu arrived in 1978 with
Hussein (John Henry) Nabanga of Mele village near Vanuatu’s capital, Port
Vila. Nabanga (a Ni-Vanuatu), travelled to India in 1973 to undertake a
course in scriptural translation and after five years there converted to Islam
prior to returning home to Mele (Ahmadu and Shuaibu 2004: 22).
In a short period of time, most of Nabanga’s immediate family also
converted to Islam and by 1987 most of Nabanga’s extended family also
converted (Ahmadu and Shuaibu 2004 22–23). Notwithstanding Nabanga’s
death in 1993, Islam continued to grow in other parts of Vanuatu even
though the Muslim community in Mele remains quite small, with around
120 Muslims (Flower 2007). By 2004, Ahmadu and Shuaibu claim that
Islam had spread to all of Vanuatu’s main islands, although they provide no
exact locations or figures of converts (Ahmadu and Shuaibu 2004: 23).
During fieldwork, I was told by Issa in Port Moresby that there were over
500 Muslims in Vanuatu, with the majority of growth occurring on the
islands of Malekula and Tanna, with followers in Middlebush (Tanna)
numbering over 100. That Islam is taking off in Tanna is interesting, given
that Tanna is the home of the John Frum Movement, which is renowned for
its strong anti-white, anti-Christian sentiment (Zocca 2006a: 256).
Zocca recently mentioned that the major problem in assessing the growth
of Islam in Vanuatu is that non-Christian religions are not being recorded by
the census; however, he mentions that they appear to be growing and
potentially ‘could dramatically change the future picture of the religious
scene in the country’ (Zocca 2006a: 233). Zocca added that Ni-Vanuatu
seem eager to try something new, especially if it brings material benefit. He
also mentions the growth of Baha’ism with over 2,000 followers (Zocca
2006a: 232).
Based on the available statistics, it is clear that Islam is growing globally
and within Melanesia. Although the growth of Islam in Melanesia is
uneven, with growth occurring for different reasons, growth in PNG,
Vanuatu and the Solomons is a result of conversion growth rather than
migration. Of the three countries in the region experiencing growth in
Islamic conversions, PNG has experienced the greatest growth numerically
and in terms of geographical spread. With a shared history of colonialism
and Christianisation, and similarities in culture, the study of Islam in PNG
is potentially a vital test case for understanding how the religion might also
spread in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and further complicate security
environments and assessments.
Based on fieldwork conducted since 2007, ongoing communications with
the ISPNG, and the available data, I estimate the current population of
Muslim converts in PNG in 2011 to be between approximately 4,500–5,000
and growing. In discussing conversion growth, it is essential to clarify the
concept of conversion growth, and the accuracy of statistics on conversion
growth in order to understand the scale of Islamic conversions in PNG over
time and the major features and patterns of growth.
By growth, I am referring to the increasing number of Islamic
conversions by PNG nationals only and not growth in Muslim migration
(immigrant Muslims with PNG residency). In PNG, this population has
been relatively stable over time apart from a recent slight increase in the
number of Muslims arriving in the country as illegal immigrants and
temporary workers, and I estimate between 200–300 exist in Port Moresby
as of 2011 (Flower 2011).
In considering conversion growth I am also excluding growth that is
based on the rate of childbirth, which is referred to as ‘expansion’ (Rambo
1993: 68). Expansion is certainly also occurring in PNG, as evidenced by
four converts (8 per cent) interviewed having children whom they referred
to as ‘born Muslim’. Growth in this book is best understood using Tippet’s
definitions of conversion growth in Melanesia, which divides growth into
the following three types:
 1. Conversion growth: those who convert from either animism or
Christianity (or more likely from a syncretic combination of the two).
In the current case conversion to Islam is represented by the convert
declaring Kalima.
2. Organic growth: when a religious community develops without
external mission support and becomes an indigenous body; and
3. Quality growth: referred to as a deepening of religiosity or ‘growing in
grace’ of the convert.
(Tippett 1967: 30–33) The first two types of growth are captured in this chapter while quality growth
is assessed in Chapter 7, entitled Kalima Shahada in Papua New Guinea: commitment and its
meaning. My estimate of 4,500–5,000 converts includes those who have, to use converts’ words,
‘fallen back’ or ‘backslid’ to Christianity after declaring Kalima. There are no reliable data on the
number of converts in PNG that leave Islam (become apostates), yet based on anecdotal evidence
(interview data and observations in the field) I would estimate that between 10–20 per cent of all
converts ‘fall back’ or ‘back slide’ (Flower 2007). ‘Backsliding’ is a problem long recognised by the
ISPNG who have described the situation previously as ‘the misfortune of new reverts just
disappearing … as an initial result of community pressures’ (ISPNG 1996b: 3).

Completely accurate statistics on the number of indigenous converts are

unavailable. The Head Imam of PNG keeps a formal register of converts,
however it is very unlikely that this register captures all of the conversions
occurring in the rural highland provinces where substantial organic growth
has occurred. There are a number of practical and political reasons why
convert statistics are inaccurate; some of the practical problems are outlined
in the following statement by the late Saddiq Sandbach of the ISPNG:

We do not and cannot keep accurate records. People move from place to
place quite frequently and use a number of different names, often adopting
a new name when they arrive at a new location. Muslim names are accepted
by individuals but rarely used.
(Sandbach 1997a: 1)

Based on my review of the ISPNG archives, the statistics provided by the

ISPNG to foreign Islamic organisations (governments and NGOs) often
appear inflated, potentially for the purposes of obtaining greater outside
support (Flower 2007). When comparing ISPNG archives with PNG news
media archives in Port Moresby (Post Courier and the National
newspapers), it was clear that over time some of the figures given to PNG
media by the ISPNG appear to be deliberately underestimated in order to
minimise disturbing Christian opponents to Islam in the country. Estimates
of annual convert figures are generally reported in the ISPNG annual
general meeting (AGM) minutes; however, there are a number of years that
the ISPNG executive decided not to report the number of converts (ISPNG
1996b: 3).
The following examples represent common inaccuracies in the publicly
available statistics on Islamic conversion in PNG. A report filed with the
International Islamic News Agency by the ISPNG states that the convert
population in PNG had grown to 2,000 in the year 2000 (MPW 2004). A
2005 report on international religious freedom published by the US State
Department (which purports to be citing PNG census data) estimates the
Muslim population of PNG was between 1,000 and 2,000 in the year 2000
(State 2005: 212).
The census conducted by the PNG government in 2000 actually states the
total Muslim population of the country was 756, comprised of 280
expatriate Muslims and 476 Indigenous converts (NSO 2003: 26). In 2004,
an Indonesian media report claimed that ‘over two thousand Papua New
Guineans have reportedly converted to Islam’ (fieldnote) yet a year later,
local PNG media reported only 1,000 members (Orere 2005). The growth
figures clearly demand detailed examination given the extent of erroneous
reporting.
Publicly available statistics on Muslims in PNG are not reliable. The
statistics estimated in this section are predominantly based on the archival
records and correspondence held by the ISPNG in Port Moresby in
conjunction with fieldwork observations and interviews conducted in 2007.
Where possible, other sources such as PNG census data and independent
media reports were used as a cross-reference.
As will be detailed in the history chapter, the Muslim population in PNG
at the time of political independence in 1976 was very small (120) and
consisted exclusively of expatriate workers, and remained relatively stable
for the next ten years (Ahmad 1980). In line with ISPNG records, PNG
census data show that from 1986, when the first conversions of PNG
nationals occurred, through to the year 2000, the number of converts
increased slowly but steadily, so that by the year 2000 there were 280
expatriate ‘born Muslims’ and 476 indigenous converts (Gibbs 2006: 97).
The conversions during the 1986–2000 phase are relatively well
documented by ISPNG annual reports, with the trends within the period
best described in the words of an ISPNG President from that era: growth
started ‘slowly in 1986, gradually gathered momentum, reached a peak six
or seven years later and then faltered … until 1997 when all by itself as it
were, it had taken off again’ (Sandbach 1997a: 1). By the end of 1986,
‘twenty Papua New Guineans, including four families had embraced Islam’
(Yusut 1994: 2), with the population growing to 34 converts (including
women and children) 18 months later (Islam 1988: 2). ISPNG AGM
minutes show that for the years 1990, 1991 and 1992 there were 23, 27 and
31 conversions respectively, bringing the total conversions by 1992 to 115
(ISPNG 1994: 1). This figure is likely to be reliable as it corresponds with
the memoirs of M.A. Choudry who states that ‘on the 20th of April 1992
when I left Papua New Guinea for good, a hundred people belonging to the
local population had reverted to Islam’ (Choudry 2007: 11).
In 1993, 22 people converted to Islam (ISPNG 1994: 1) followed by ‘just
under 10 nationals who embraced Islam’ in 1994 bringing the total that year
to 147 (ISPNG 1995: 2). Given expatriate Muslim numbers remained
relatively static, two separate media reports in 1994 appear to confirm yet
confuse ISPNG figures. On 8 August 1994, a local Muslim convert then
working for the National newspaper claimed 350 Muslims lived in PNG
(Bashir 1994), whilst an editorial a week later stated Islam has ‘300 PNG
citizens as its followers’ (National 1994). It was during 1994 that the first
Highlands conversions occurred with approximately 20 conversions in
Karilmaril in the Chimbu province (Flower 2007).
In the two years that followed (1995 and 1996) ‘about 100 people
embraced Islam in Port Moresby and Chimbu’ with the first conversions in
Waingar taking place in 1996 (ISPNG 1996b: 3), bringing the total number
of converts ‘who have undertaken Islam as their path to salvation to about
200 locals’ (Chowdhury 1996: 1). In line with Sandbach’s observation
mentioned earlier, the period between 1997 and 2000 saw a small growth
spurt. In late 1997 there were 22 conversions in Safia (Oro province) which
were followed by another 140 in 1998 (Flower 2007) with ‘just less [sic]
than 100 reverts … registered’ in Port Moresby between 1999 and 2000
(ISPNG 2000: 2) and 20 conversions in Lae (Saudie 2000: 1). A media
report released in August 2000 was relatively accurate, claiming that the
Muslim population included ‘500 PNG nationals and 400 expatriates’ (Ame
2000). Whilst this media report conflicts with PNG census data of that year
cited earlier, the report’s estimate of PNG converts is only greater by 24
with the larger overestimation (120) being for expatriate ‘born Muslims’.
Since 2001, the rate of conversion growth has increased significantly and
with it has come a reduction in accurate recording. My own estimates from
fieldwork in 2007 are in line with later media reports citing ISPNG sources
that the number of converts exceeded 4,000 by 2008 (Marshall 2008) and
were over 4,500 by 2009 (Filali 2009). Although this equates to more than a
500 per cent increase (albeit from a small base) in eight years, the Muslim
population is still very small relative to the total PNG population, currently
estimated to be more than six and a half million (SPC 2009), of which 96
per cent are Christian (NSO 2003: 26).
Since 2001, conversion growth has also spread geographically. In late
1997, the places of Muslim presence were listed as ‘a core in Port Moresby
and Karilmaril and Waingar (Chimbu)’ with ‘some in Baimaru, Daru,
Marshall Lagoon, Safia in the Musa Valley, with small pockets in New
Britain and New Ireland’ (Sandbach 1997a: 1).
By 2007, a much greater number of Islamic centres had been established
in rural provincial areas to cater for the growing Muslim populations, with
mosque construction and refurbishment work in Waingar and Yobei
(Chimbu), Safia (Oro), and Mendi (Southern Highlands) during 2006–2007
(ISPNG 2007: 4). Close to 2,000 Muslim converts are based in Port
Moresby. Tippet recognised over 40 years ago that detribalised people in
Melanesia’s urban environs are ‘especially predisposed to conversion’
(Tippett 1967: 57).
The names of locations where Islam has spread and the number of
converts in each location are predominantly based on my own observations
in the field. Where possible, other sources (interviews and ISPNG records)
were used as a cross-reference, with independent reports being referenced
where they relate to a specific location. Numbers in parentheses after the
location name indicates the verified number of converts in the specific
location. Where figures were not able to be confirmed by site visit or were
not from a reliable source, the number of converts has not been included.
Approximately 2,179 converts live in Islamic communities of various sizes
in the following provinces and villages:
 Chimbu: Kundiawa (50), Waigar (300), Karilmaril (250), Yobei (200),
Karlmanger (30), Ouna (35) and Ulu (17) (Choudry 2009), Murdomna
(100), Kumbi (150), Wandi (70), Kujip, Mangil, Munma (150), Wara
Simbu, and Gumine (approximate combined provincial total equals
1352).
Western Highlands: Mt Hagen (15), Banz (40), Minj (50), Angar (20),
Dirtywater (20) (approximate combined provincial total equals 145).
Southern Highlands: Mendi was the first to see a rise in conversions in
2005 with more recent conversions in Tari bringing the approximate
combined provincial total to 100 (ISPNG 2006: 2).
Milne Bay: Alotau (6); Western Province: Daru (5).
Oro/Northern: Safia, Musa, Marshall Lagoon and Poppondetta
(approximate combined provincial total equals 500).
East Sepik: Wewak (3); Maprik (near Yongaro) (10).
Lae (50) (Choudry 2009); and Eastern Highlands: Goroka (13).

The two areas of greatest growth are Port Moresby, which is experiencing
rapid urban change/development, and the remote rural Highlands areas of
PNG’s main island; the two shaded areas on Map 1. Growth is almost non-
existent in the southern (Papuan) and northern (New Guinea) coastal areas
of the island, and smaller PNG islands (i.e. New Britain, Manus, and
Bougainville).
Conversion growth in PNG has experienced a kind of ‘multiplier effect’
as a result of familial and tribal power relations. Of the 52 converts
interviewed, 10 (19 per cent) said that all of their immediate family
converted shortly after their own conversion either as a result of their own
proselytising effort or because they were a leader and/or respected in their
family. Group conversions of whole clans or tribes are having an even
greater effect on growth.
Whilst there were only four cases (8 per cent) in which whole clans
converted following the initial conversion of an individual belonging to the
group, the number of conversions following these four individual
conversions had a disproportionally large impact on overall population
growth. The group conversions captured in the data occurred in Karilmaril
and Waingar (Chimbu), Safia in the Musa valley (Oro/Northern province),
and in the town of Minj (Western Highlands Province). For example, in
Safia, 22 family members converted immediately after the first member
converted and in the weeks that followed a further 140 clan members
converted (Flower 2007).
In Minj a leading Muslim stated, ‘My whole extended family, 80 per cent
are Muslim. As we go in the next 30–40 years 100 per cent will be Muslim.
We regard it as our own clans’ religion’ (Mikail AQ). Although the
qualitative nature of group conversion is examined in Chapter 3, Seven-
stage process of Islamic conversion in Papua New Guinea, the implications
of group conversions in PNG for the growth of Islam are significant. Given
the contextual background to these group conversions are reasonably
widespread, this type of conversion is likely to represent a trend that
persists, which will increasingly lead to compound conversion growth over
time.
The data highlight a clear gender bias towards males. Mosque attendance
(jummah and khutbah) in Port Moresby and in Chimbu centres suggests, as
a rough guide, the ratio of male to female converts is at least 20:1, if not
greater, and in the sample of interviewees a slight majority of males were
unmarried. All women converts interviewed did not convert independently
before their husbands, which confirms anecdotal evidence from male
converts that ‘more men have embraced Islam and men embrace first
followed by their women’ (Musinah). In the sample, the average age of
male converts at the time of their conversion is 27 years, while the average
age of female converts at the time of conversion is 31 years.
In respect of conversion growth through marriages, expatriate male
Muslims residing in PNG do marry non-Muslim PNG women, but the
occurrence of these marriages is very limited. During the conduct of this
research, I came across only four confirmed cases in which women
converted to marry and every one of these took place in Port Moresby
(Flower 2007; Mas 2005). I learned that Muslim expatriates occasionally
frequented the Port Moresby netball centre in order to find suitable local
women for proposals, with marriages being conducted by the Imam in
Hohola.
In terms of socio-economic indicators of conversion, fieldwork
observations correlate with the sample of those interviewed in that the
majority of converts have a limited education and are predominantly
unemployed. The educational breakdown of the sample shows that 16
converts (30 per cent) have tertiary or professional qualifications (two
postgraduates, seven undergraduates, and seven trade-skilled), the majority
54 per cent of converts (28) have completed secondary school to year ten
level, and eight (15 per cent) have only completed primary school.
The economic background of converts is best represented by their
employment status at the time of their conversion of which 16 (30 per cent)
had professional or skilled employment, 27 (51 per cent) were unemployed
and nine (17 per cent) were unskilled farmers. Converts attracted to Islam
post-9/11 differ from converts pre-9/11. The post-9/11 cohort generally
have a lower standard of education and are generally unemployed, whereas
the majority of converts in the smaller pre-9/11 cohort are employed and/or
have some form of post-secondary education (vocational or university).
Whilst it is true that Islam has seen rapid conversion growth of some 500
per cent since 2001, one needs to consider Islam’s growth relative to the
growth of other religions in the country to put the growth in perspective.
Over the last 40 years there has been a clear and growing trend of changing
religious affiliation in PNG. As can be seen in Table 1.1, PNG census data
for the years 1966, 1980, 1990 and 2000 show that the growth trend of ‘first
wave’ or ‘mainline’ Christian churches (Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran,
Uniting Churches) has declined in real terms. The four major churches in
this period have been growing between 160–220 per cent over the period,
which equals a rate that is less than the expansion growth/population rate of
their existing congregations (250 per cent).
The Christian sects growing fastest are the more fundamentalist
evangelical and Pentecostal (EP) churches, which are growing more than
twice as fast as population growth (560 per cent). The fastest growth has
been from the strict Salvation Army churches, which are growing at ten
times the population growth (2,490 per cent) and the Seventh Day
Adventists (SDA) with greater than three times the population growth (810
per cent).
Table 1.1 Religious affiliation of PNG citizens, 1966–2000
Relative growth (%)
Populations 1966 1990 2000
(between 1966–2000)

PNG Population 2,078,560 3,582,333 5,171,548 250

Total Christian
1,913,110 3,458,577 4,934,098 260
Population
 Relative growth (%)
Populations 1966 1990 2000
(between 1966–2000)

Anglican 104,336 141,802 166,046 160

Lutheran1 592,936 831,598 1,001,005 170
Catholic 619,814 1,012,091 1,391,033 220
United2 301,897 455,689 591,458 190
Salvation Army 417 7,441 10,377 2,490
Seventh Day
64,545 289,446 520,098 810
Adventist
Other Christian3 229,165 721,230 1,275,222 560
Source: Gibbs (2006: 97).

Notes
1 Includes Evangelical and Gutnius Lutherans
2 Includes Methodists, Papua Ekalesia, and United Church 3 Evangelical Alliance, Baptist,
Pentecostal, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormons, Brethren, Presbyterian

Table 1.2 Populations of ‘mainline’ and ‘other’ Christian churches, 1966–2000

Churches 1966 1980 1990 2000

Mainline (%) 77.8 74.8 68.1 61.2

Other (%) 14.2 18.2 27.8 35
Total percentage of PNG population who claim
92 93 95.9 96.2
Christianity as their religion
Source: Gibbs (2006: 98).

SDA growth is of particular interest as a comparison to Islam, given that,

like Islam, SDA conversion requires converts to abandon pigs and alcohol.
Table 1.2shows that as a percentage of the total PNG population, mainline
church patronage has declined 16.6 per cent from 77.8 per cent in 1966 to
61.2 per cent in the year 2000. On the other hand, over the same period
those belonging to EP Christian churches have increased by 20.8 per cent
from 14.2 per cent in 1966 to 35 per cent of the total population by the year
2000.
Based on my estimates of conversion growth for the Muslim population,
the recent growth of Islam is double that of PNG population growth. The
scale of Islam’s growth is in line with the growth of other popular
fundamentalist Christian religious alternatives (EP sects), with Islam
growing more than three times faster than the four mainline Christian
churches. This trend suggests some degree of disillusionment or
dissatisfaction with the original first churches in PNG, although the Western
influence of individualistic lifestyle choices is believed by Gibbs (a catholic
priest) to be the most likely cause of shifting allegiances (Gibbs 2006: 99).
Importantly, the trend to fundamentalist religions has implications for
security analysis.
In her early research on religious and social change in PNG, Paula Brown
mentioned two key differentiating factors between a short-term ‘cargo cult’
and new religious movement likely to persist. These include the scale and
geographic spread of conversions and whether they persist for more than a
few years (Brown 1966). The concept of the cargo cult and the study of
many varied forms of new religious movements in PNG have a long history
in academic research (Gerritsen et al. 1981; Lattas 1998; Strelan 1977).
Whilst such movements are not of direct interest to this research, cargo
cults were examined to help situate Islamic conversion and religious
change, particularly in relation to potential material dimensions of
conversion.
Given that the number of conversions to Islam has persisted over time,
that growth is organic and that geographic spread of conversion is across
ethnic lines (tribal/clan groups), one can assume that Islam has established
itself in PNG permanently and will grow in the future, although the scale of
future growth is difficult to predict.
Converts’ perspectives on the growth of Islam in the country provide
some insight into the patterns of growth they have observed to date and
what they predict or expect to happen in the future. Of 52 converts
interviewed, 44 per cent (23) believed Islam was growing very fast, as
expressed in the words of the following two converts: ‘Islam is rapidly
growing. Every day we have people coming in two, three, or four coming in
and asking for books’ (Samsudeen); and ‘Alhamdulillah, it’s growing very
fast, I’m seeing it’s growing very fast. In Morobe society it’s been very fast.
Every man’s wife has become Muslim and kids too’ (Hussein).
Ten converts (19 per cent) thought Islam was growing, but slowly and in
a cycle of boom then plateau:

Yes it is growing but I would not say fast. In every development we see
that there is a problem cycle. We do have problems, in some things we are
lacking but generally we are growing and people are accepting Islam and it
will continue to grow. I firmly believe that it will grow. In the Highlands
spreading Islam is easy.
(Muslimhudeen)

Seventeen converts (31 per cent) thought Islam was growing but were
unsure as to how fast, and two converts (4 per cent) said Islam was not
growing: ‘Actually I think Islam is not growing. It’s supposed to grow but
it’s not growing’ (Muhammad).
Interestingly, regardless of converts’ differing perspectives and
observations of growth, to date almost all converts expressed a sense that it
was only a matter of time before Islam would grow significantly. For one
convert, the public perception that Islam was fast growing actually provided
a reason to expect greater growth because to be seen as growing in
popularity encouraged further conversions: ‘Islam is growing in PNG. I
heard the news from other provinces and I hear that Islam is growing in
PNG. People like it because it’s fast growing … so more people will accept
Islam’ (Yusuf).
When asked about how large the PNG Muslim population would become
in the future, converts’ predictions varied; however, most believed that at
some stage Islam would become the religion of at least half the PNG
population. A representative sample of views can be seen in the following
convert statements: ‘In 10 years from now we can have 100,000’ (Umar).
Other converts predict the growth of Islam will be more comprehensive:
‘This country will become Muslim one day’ (Hamida); ‘I think in the future
PNG will become an Islamic State, Inshallah’ (Zainul). In 2008, Isa Teine
(ISPNG General-Secretary) stated his growth prediction to ABC News;
‘once the religion itself spreads I tell you, I’m just predicting in 20, 30
years’ time, all Papua New Guinea will submit to Islam’ (Marshall 2008).
 Given the recent volatility in conversion growth, it is difficult to
accurately predict a specific growth trajectory. What is clear is that
international events and influences play a role in Islamic conversion growth
in PNG and these issues are examined in detail in Chapter 4, Globalisation
and the limits of Kastom and Christianity. Whilst predictions of future
growth by converts themselves would appear ambitious and unlikely based
on current trends, converts’ expectations of growth are interestingly shared
by a number of non-Muslims in PNG.
The following two statements show that a growing number of non-
Muslims in PNG believe that Islam will grow significantly in their country,
to the point of the religion becoming a destabilising influence: ‘I believe
that if the government does not act quickly [to stop the growth of Islam]
there is a threat that in twenty years Muslims will take control of this
nation’ (Kay 2001); and

… our citizens can be easily influenced which increases the probability

of Islam finding many recruits here … Islam does not allow separation of
powers between religion and state therefore if our population of Muslims
were to increase they would begin to demand that we adopt Islamic laws
and progress to Islamic statehood and this will lead to fighting and
bloodshed.
(Birrel 2001)

In 2009, a Seventh Day Adventist Pastor from Enga Province also stated
that: ‘In the next 30 years all of the PNG Highlands will become Muslim
because our culture is Islamic’ (Flower 2009b).
Based on the degree of opposition to Islam in PNG and the current
decrease in external support relative to the growth of the Muslim
population, the reality is that growth rates are more likely to remain at their
current levels. If this conservative estimate is applied, the Muslim
population of PNG is likely to barely exceed 10,000 by 2020.
The growth of Islam in PNG is part of a wider global and regional
phenomenon of Islamic conversion. Despite problems regarding the
accuracy and availability of statistics on growth, the available data clearly
show the growth of Islam began relatively slowly, from the time the religion
arrived in 1976 until 2000. The bulk of growth in this period occurred in
two spurts (1986–1987 and 1997–2000) and averaged 31 conversions a
year. Since 2001, conversion growth has increased significantly by over 500
per cent with a concomitant increase in geographic spread covering two
specific zones, Port Moresby and the Highlands. The impact of group
conversions to Islam in rural areas is significant and these conversions have
a multiplier effect on growth rates. However, the majority of conversions
(particularly in Port Moresby) are individual by nature.
In terms of the implications of this, a number of growth patterns and
trends are particularly noteworthy and important. The growth of Islam in
PNG is not an aberration in terms of the changing religious scene in the
country. The growth of Islam is in line with the growth of other religious
alternatives to mainline churches in PNG, such as the fundamentalist
evangelical and Pentecostal (EP) sects of Christianity. EP sects in PNG are
very vocal and active in their opposition to Islam in PNG and provide a
potential trigger or source of conflict. Among post-9/11 converts, there is a
strong bias towards males with a young average age and low educational
level; with the large proportion of these young male converts being from
rapidly developing urban areas.
2
The early history and establishment of
Islam in Papua New Guinea

Islam was slow to become established and see significant growth in Papua
New Guinea. A major reason for this, since 1975 at least, was that Islam’s
presence was opposed by successive PNG governments on the basis that it
was seen as a threat to security and stability in the country.
The early history and establishment of Islam in PNG provides a detailed
background to contextualise the more recent conversion growth. It
highlights why, despite the relatively low number of conversions in the
period prior to 2001, the organisational capacity and relationships that
developed between 1976 and 1987 played an important role in supporting
later Islamic conversion growth.
The pre-independence history is notable for the shallow penetration of
Islam and possibly new evidence (from fieldwork) of early, yet
unsuccessful, Islamic missionary activity. The post-independence period
(1976–1987) covers the arrival of Muslim expatriates through to the time of
the first conversions of indigenous PNG nationals. The post-independence
period details the process of Islam’s institutionalisation and formal
recognition as a religion despite opposition from PNG political and
religious elites, as a result of the efforts and activities of Islamic groups
(governments and non-government organisations) and individual expatriate
Muslims.
History provides a key analytical dimension for understanding religious
conversion (Rambo 1993). Collating and documenting Islam’s history in
PNG facilitates an understanding of the nature and depth of social and
religious influences and networks that over time have contributed to the
propagation of Islam. Additionally, the history provides the wider context
for analysing the social milieu and linkages to globalisation theories of
religious conversion (Rambo 1993: 26–30). Establishing the empirical basis
of Islam in PNG prior to independence is also essential for testing the
converts’ ‘biographical reconstructions’ postconversion, that their ancestors
were Muslim before Christian missionaries came (Rambo 1993: 137–139).
In comparison with the activities of expatriate Muslims and the resultant
growth of indigenous Muslim communities post-independence, the Muslim
presence in the pre-colonial and colonial period of what is now PNG is
noteworthy for the lack of missionary intent shown by early Muslims, the
lack of organisational and material support, and the limited degree of
proselytisation.
Khan asserts that ‘about five hundred years ago, Muslim navigators came
to Papua New Guinea and settled … reportedly marrying locals and
bringing their children up as Muslims’ and that these Muslims ‘converted
some natives’ who turned to Christianity upon the arrival of Christian
missionaries (Khan 1989: 66). While it is likely that some parts of modern-
day PNG experienced Islamic contact prior to 1975, there is little evidence
in the literature to support Khan’s view. There is no record of any enduring
indigenous conversions during the colonial period or at the time of PNG
political independence in 1975, and no record of the descendants of the
earliest Muslims bringing their children up as Muslims.
Assessing Islam’s early history in the area of modern PNG is difficult
because research on the spread of Islam across Indonesia, ‘whilst being one
of the most significant processes of Indonesian history, remains obscure and
inconclusive’ (Ricklefs 1991: 3). Even the most detailed accounts of Islam’s
growth and spread in the region fail to shed much light on the early Islamic
history on the island of New Guinea (Boland and Farjon 1983; Coatalen
1981; Hamid 1982). There is also only a small amount of work covering the
impacts of Islam in Indonesia’s Papua Province bordering PNG (Farhadian
2005).
The first Islamic contact with PNG is likely to have occurred as part of
the eastward movement of Islam from the western reaches of the Indonesian
archipelago. Extensive Muslim trading networks operated in and around the
island of New Guinea with evidence of Arab trading interests in Jazirat-al-
Mulk (named the Moluccas by the Portuguese) from the early 1500s to the
period of the sultanates ending in the 1800s (Swadling 1996: 23). The
island of New Guinea is likely to have had its initial contact with Islam
between 1645 and 1790 with the arrival of Muslim traders from Serum Laut
in the Banda zone of Indonesia (Ellen 2003).
Serumese Muslims were originally pushed into eastern New Guinea, the
Arafura Sea and the Trans Fly/Torres Strait area as a result of the Dutch
East India Company enforcing a trade monopoly in the Aru Islands after
1645 (Swadling 1996: 137 and 154). The most intense period of contact
with Muslim traders along the southern Trans Fly coast of modern-day PNG
is likely to have endured for the period of Dutch control in Aru ending in
the late 1790s. After that time, the focus of Serumese trade returned to Aru,
making the frequency of trade visits in the Trans Fly more sporadic.
As late as the 1850s, Islam’s eastern-most expansion could really only
claim a few Muslim villages along the Onin coast (the peninsula of modern-
day Fak Fak); however, the reach of Muslim traders into the Trans Fly
region of PNG and the coast of northern Australia remained regular through
to the 1870s (Swadling 1996: 147). The presence of Makassar trading ships
and use of Muslim labour on PNG’s south (whilst under British/Australian
control) and north coasts (under German control) between the 1800s and
early 1900s was also significant (Dutton 1985; Swadling 1996). However,
no scholarship on this period explores the religious practices of these
Muslims or their efforts to propagate Islam among the indigenous people of
PNG at the time. On the south coast of New Guinea, the continuous
presence of Muslim traders over 150 years appears to have led to very little
transfer of religious knowledge or social impact (Knauft 1993: 26).
In the literature, linguistic evidence provides the strongest support for the
view that Makassar Muslim traders were present in the Trans Fly region
prior to Christianity’s arrival. The Gizra, Agob and Idi peoples of the Trans
Fly region claim to have received iron tools from Muslim traders long
before the arrival of the London Missionary Society (LMS) in 1871 (Laba
1996). This view is supported by the testimony of explorer Matthew
Flinders who, on an expedition to the Torres Strait in 1792, observed that
people of the region were demanding iron objects from passing ships, using
words derived from the word turika, a Seramese word for knife (Swadling
1996: 155).
Claims about the extent of Islamic contact in the Trans Fly remain
contested because the archaeological artefacts that confirm Makassar
presence in northern Australia are lacking in PNG (Swadling 1996: 157).
During fieldwork interviews with PNG Muslim converts from the Trans
Fly, I uncovered potentially new evidence to support the case of Islamic
contact prior to colonisation in PNG (Flower 2007). Umar, an elderly
convert in Port Moresby, explained that the Gizra people (his tribe)
previously had regular visits from Malays that pre-dated the arrival of
Europeans and that one Malay (whom Umar believes was an Imam) lived
among the tribe and possessed a book believed to be a Koran. Umar also
claimed his tribe had religious rituals involving this book. The following
excerpts from his account are of particular interest:

Some of the names for things we had were introduced by people from
other places … I remember a time when I was young, an old mother
running towards the sea shouted to her son in our language, ‘Malays are
coming, Malays are coming!’ They must have been there before because
this mother knew …
There is a story that Malays shipwrecked in Kura creek brought this
book. When these men died, the people looked after the book and would go
to the house to touch it. They believed touching the book made harvest
good. I don’t think they knew what the book was about because they could
not read and it was probably Arabic. We did not let women see it, it was
itambu [taboo] but we have songs about it like ‘bookeh Gizra bookeh’ like
this. The book disappeared, probably during the war [Second World War]. I
was told this by the son of the man who looked after the book, he left
Waidoro in 1957 to work with the Australian Petroleum Company.

Umar’s testimony is strengthened by the fact that tribal songs about

encounters with Muslim traders also exist among Australian aboriginal
groups in some parts of the Northern Territory and the far north Queensland
region who reportedly ‘sung songs about Allah’ (McIntosh 1994: 84). For
Umar, his view that many of his traditional customs are the same as Islamic
customs and the oral histories of his tribe confirmed to him that his tribe
were Muslims before the arrival of Christianity. This makes his relatively
recent ‘reversion’ to Islam easier and legitimises his religious conversion.
Thirteen other converts claimed during their interview that their ancestors
were Muslim prior to European contact and, given the consistency of
converts’ stories that perceived Islamic ancestry played a role in their
conversion process, I decided to investigate their claims in detail. This
chain of inquiry led me to travel to Daru in the Trans Fly. On arriving in
Daru I asked locals to introduce me to Muslims living in the area. In a
meeting with one of the female converts (Nadia) I received the following
confirmation of Umar’s story:

You see there was a book, it was a thick book and it had all this strange
writings on it. Some believe it was a Koran. We don’t know a lot about this
book but we know the name of the man who came – his name was Muyam,
today we think he was a Muslim and they kept him there with that thick
book. Women were not allowed to go they were telling us but they told us
he was wearing a white dress. It was between one hundred and one hundred
and fifty years ago. The ship will tell you, the one in Kura creek. Also
Muyam was in Mabudawan.
My mother’s father was the one that Muyam left the book to look after.
They kept it in a small house and they worshipped that book. Nobody could
enter the house unless my mother’s father, Minagu was his name, was there.
But when the whites came they thought these people didn’t have a religion.
They took the book, the LMS (London Missionary Society) took the book
with them. Later on the old man realised they had stole it and the old man
was crying for that book. He would cry out, ‘those people have taken my
book, what will I tell my people when they come back from the war’. When
the war finished he started telling them – OK – white people came and got
our book. They stole it.
(Nadia)

The Muslim trader practice of giving documents to key villagers who

facilitated trade could potentially explain the presence of a book. There are
reports that among the Mimika people (of Indonesian Papua) that these
books were called surat (Swadling 1996: 158). Surat is Malay for letter, and
although they had an administrative purpose for the Muslim traders, they
may have had other more special meaning for the locals that came to
possess them (Swadling 1996: 158). There is also strong evidence of
Muslim contact in the Torres Straits prior to European colonisation as a
result of the pearling industry (Ganter 1994).
The accounts of Umar and Nadia are supported by a separate and
independent account from a non-Muslim Gizra elder. Murray Gizapram
confirmed the presence of a book and a man called Muyam in an interview
in Daru. These stories are in line with another separate account of Islamic
contact in the area, which was collected by Kevin Murphy, who conducted
fieldwork for two years in the Torres Strait. Murphy received a
comprehensive account of Malay traders setting up a camp at Mabudawan
with a person referred to as an ‘Imam’ who lived away from the women and
wore a flowing white gown (Murphy 2008: 2). Murphy’s account also
mentions the presence of a book that went missing some time around the
Second World War (Murphy 2008: 3). Muyam is also mentioned in oral
histories compiled by Lawrence (Lawrence 1989, 1994); however, the
consensus among anthropologists is that such accounts are ‘hero stories’ or
stories of explanation rather than fact (Knauft 1993; Goldman and Ballard
1998; Wagner 2004).
The new accounts presented above further suggest that ‘hero stories’ may
be more factual than initially thought. Even if this new evidence of limited
Islamic contact in PNG is correct, the fact remains that Islam and the
practice of it did not persist over time in the pre-independence period, even
if it did exist at one point in one very small part of PNG.
Khan’s assertion that Islamic conversion of locals occurred during the
British colonial period appears dubious in light of fieldwork findings and
the existing literature, particularly research by Dutton, who mentions the
role of 25 Malays in establishing the Papuan constabulary in Port Moresby
(circa 1880s). Unfortunately, Dutton does not detail the religious lives of
these men, who include Sarip Mohammed Ali (known as Jimmy Malay),
Charlie Malay, Said, Umra, Kassman, Bakara and Sariman (Dutton 1985:
48–55 and 151–185). These early Muslim settlers from the 1880s have
descendants in Port Moresby today, but my fieldwork was unable to
discover any effort to bring progeny up as Muslims and there is no trace of
Islam among these descendants today. However, one descendent I
interviewed (Mrs Ali) recalled that her Muslim ancestor (Sarip Mohammed
Ali) had remained devoted to Islam and practised the religion in Port
Moresby until his death.
Testimony from Mrs Ali (a Catholic) who is the great-great-
granddaughter of Sarip Mohammed Ali/Jimmy Malay confirms parts of
Dutton’s history and contradicts Khan’s claims. Mrs Ali said that ‘Jimmy
started working in Kwikilla in the Port Moresby area around 1885’ (Flower
2007). Mrs Ali could not explain exactly how Jimmy came to PNG;
however, she stated:
 I know he stayed a Muslim, but he became a Catholic just to have his
children go to school. His name became Peter-Paul Ali. My Father named
his own grandson Peter-Paul. However, now my son calls himself
Muhammad and he is the only one in the family to carry the name. But we
are all Catholics now.
(Flower 2007)

The only other notable reference to the group of Muslims in PNG during
the colonial period exists in an account gathered by Williams, who recorded
what may have been the earliest religious violence in the country between
Muslims and Christians (Williams 1939). Jimmy Malay (then resident of
Hanuabada) was reported to have fought with a sailor belonging to a
visiting man-o’-war boat (naval vessel) and was subsequently set upon by
the rest of the sailor’s friends who ‘took him out the back of a church and
tied him to a tree where he was watched as ants crawled all over his body’
leaving Malay to ‘cry out aloud’ (Williams 1939: 34). Evidence in the
literature and interview data show that although Muslims were present in
PNG during the pre-colonial and colonial periods, they remained a very
small minority who lacked external support, which made practicing, let
alone propagating Islam extremely difficult. This status quo only changed
with the increase in migration, and primarily resulted from Muslims who
were committed to their faith and supported by significant political and
material resources from foreign Muslim individuals and organisations.
The history of the pre-independence period shows that although there
was very limited Muslim contact, there is no clear evidence that Muslim
missionaries converted locals to Islam. Claims to prior Islamic ancestry by
contemporary Muslim converts from the Trans Fly area are only weakly
supported, whilst the same claims by converts from Chimbu and other
Highlands provinces are falsified by the available evidence.
Large numbers of Australian workers began to depart PNG between 1970
and 1974 as the country headed towards independence. To ensure national
development continued, the interim PNG government sought to replace this
loss of skilled workers with other skilled migrants (Johnson 1983). The first
significant wave of Muslims to PNG were unskilled contract labourers
arriving in 1972 to build facilities for foreign embassies (MPW 2004).
Political independence brought a number of Muslim families and consular
staff and paved the way for the establishment of Islam in PNG; the majority
of expatriate Muslims were skilled, and filled public sector roles in tertiary
institutions, public works departments and in the bureaucratic
administration, with most coming from the Indian subcontinent (Premdas
1981: 66–68).
In 1976, the number of Muslims in PNG was very small, with an
estimated population of 120 (Ahmad 1980). For the first 10 years in the
newly independent country, the permanent resident population remained
relatively stable and consisted exclusively of expatriate workers from Africa
and the Indian subcontinent with a high percentage of Muslims as a
proportion of the Indian migrant population (Premdas 1981: 67). The bulk
of the population consisted of seven families in Port Moresby, five in Lae
and two in Rabaul (Choudry 1982k: 3), complemented by a ‘steady and
increasing stream of Muslim visitors’ coming to PNG ‘for business
purposes, either private or governmental’ (Choudry 1982l: 2).
One of the first indigenous Papua New Guineans to convert to Islam
described the Muslim expatriate workers in PNG (in the early years) as
having had a ‘Eurocentric education and appeared to have known only the
basics about Islam themselves’ (Islam 1988: 1). This observation is
interesting, given the efforts early expatriate Muslims would go through to
establish Islam in PNG. Despite PNG’s expatriate Muslim population
initially lacking deep religious knowledge, being a member of a religious
minority in PNG may have strengthened their interest in their religious
identity. There is evidence that suggests ‘migratory experiences can
reinforce an individual’s and group’s attachment to their faith’ (Moghissi
2006), and this catalytic effect may have been a factor that led members of
the Muslim diaspora in PNG to greater religious activism.
In these early days, Muslims faced considerable difficulties in practising
their religion. For most Muslims, daily salat was conducted alone or with
their families, despite the Sunnah encouraging Muslims to pray in jummah.
The lack of a mosque to facilitate jummah prayers was not the only
challenge facing early Muslims. Adhering to Muslim dietary laws was
difficult as halal meat and poultry were not generally available in Papua
New Guinea. Until the end of 1980, Muslims purchased meat/poultry from
Christian-run shops. Around the end of 1980, the Muslims of Port Moresby
started buying live chickens and butchering them in the backyards of their
homes to provide halal meat (Flower 2007).
 Practising other Islamic rituals was also difficult because the Muslim
community was so small. Many years passed before the first Qurbani
(sacrifice) to celebrate the occasion of Eid-ul-Adha occurred. In 1981, for
the first time, five Muslim families in Port Moresby decided they would
contribute towards sharing the costs to enable the sacrificial slaughter of a
cow (Choudry 2007: 12). In the same year, expatriates started driving for
hours to villages around the national capital in search of goats to
supplement their more easily sourced diet of chickens. Muslims were
transporting goats to the city in car boots until 1983, when goat stocks in
the villages had finally been drained by over-consumption (Choudry 2007:
12).
Although most Muslims lived in Port Moresby during the early post-
independence period, it was a smaller group of Muslims in Lae that
established the first informal Islamic group in 1978, under the title of the
Islamic Society of Papua New Guinea (ISPNG) (Khan 1989: 66). Its
founders, all of whom worked at the Lae Unitech, were Dr Qazi Ashfaq
Ahmad (Professor of Mechanical Engineering from India), Dr Abdullah
Gurnah (Zanzibar) and an Arab whose name remains unknown (Khan 1989:
66). At about the same time (1977–1978), five Muslims in Port Moresby
who worked for the PNG government, statutory bodies and the University
of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) decided to meet at least once a week. They
regularly performed Maghreb salat on Fridays in jummah at the UPNG
campus, rotating between one another’s homes as a venue (Choudry 2007:
1).
In September 1980, Dr Ahmad wrote on ISPNG letterhead to Shafiqur
Rahman Khan Abdullah, head of the Da’wah department of Saudi Arabia,
requesting support for the Muslims of PNG and the propagation of Islam in
the country (Ahmad 1980). Dr Ahmad requested that the letter and the
attached briefing paper, entitled ‘PNG and the Muslim World’ (which gave
a précis of PNG history, politics, religion and economics) be circulated to
other relevant Islamic organisations (Ahmad 1980: 5). It is likely that this
communication led to PNG becoming a founding member of the Regional
Islamic Da’wah Council of South East Asia and Pacific (RISEAP) when it
formed on 11 November 1980 with Dr Ahmad as one of its Vice-Presidents
(RISEAP 2008).
Papua New Guinea, along with New Caledonia and Fiji were among the
founding Melanesian member organisations of RISEAP, which included 14
other countries (RISEAP 2008). Malaysia’s first Prime Minister, Tunku
Abdur Rahman Putra al-Haj, was the first RISEAP president and
‘established RISEAP to bring together the Muslim-minority countries in
Southeast Asia and the Pacific in order to pursue the collective ambitions,
and to remain fired with enthusiasm of the Islamic cause’ (RISEAP 1996:
3).
In March 1981, Dr Ahmad asked the Muslim brothers in Port Moresby to
take on the running of the ISPNG because the group in Lae was not active
enough. Muhammad Afzal Choudry (UPNG), Aitiqaad Hussain (UNDP)
and Tawwakul Hussain (all three from Pakistan), Noorul Amin
(Bangladesh), Ilteja Hussain and Shaukat Noor Khan (both from India),
Badawi (Sudan) and Umar (Egypt) took on the responsibility. These men
met consistently for salat and shared a concern about their own children’s
Islamic education. The men needed to purchase teaching materials
including books to improve their own understanding of their faith. They
decided to formalise the ISPNG as a recognised society/association to
pursue this goal, believing that doing so would allow the group to seek and
spend funds in a transparent and accountable manner (Choudry 2007: 1).
At Dr Ahmad’s request, the Port Moresby group drafted a constitution
and voted on it at the first general meeting held in March 1981. Elected to
founding executive roles were Badawi (President), Noorul Amin (Vice
President), Muhammad Afzal Choudry (General-Secretary), and Shoukat
Noor Khan (Treasurer). On 12 May 1981, the ISPNG sent a request to the
Registrar for Companies asking permission to advertise their intention to
incorporate as an association (Choudry 1981c). The request was approved
on 11 June 1981 (Choudry 1981b), which enabled the delivery of public
notices (as was required) in the Post Courier newspaper and on radio on 24
June 1981 (Kirke 1981).
Not long after public notices were issued, the group in Port Moresby
received a request from the Indonesian Ambassador, Buseri (later the
Governor of Irian Jaya), to shift Friday prayer to his residence. Buseri was
unable to attend jummah at the University at that time because of poor
relations between the countries (Choudry 2007: 2). After the jummah
location changed, the usual leader of jummah, Brother Hussein, left PNG as
his contract with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
finished (Choudry 2007: 2). Choudry volunteered to act as Imam despite
personally feeling his knowledge of Islam was lacking for the role; he took
responsibility for distributing salat timings and copies of the Friday
Khutbah (Choudry 2007: 2).
It was during June 1981 that retired British Army Colonel and Scottish
expatriate Sandy Sandbach (a nominal Christian at the time) recommenced
work at UPNG and met Choudry. Sandbach (now deceased) came to PNG
in 1947 and was described as ‘a very intelligent and motivated man’
(Flower 2007).
Choudry and Sandbach shared numerous discussions about Islam and the
affairs of the ISPNG and discussed the problems facing ISPNG
incorporation. Choudry would not have known at that time, but these
discussions would lead Sandbach to convert in October that year and
become one of PNG’s most committed Muslims, a leading advocate for the
ISPNG, and an early leader of the Islamic missionary effort.
There are few details about public objections to the notices published by
the ISPNG to incorporate. No media reports or official records are available
for the period up to the end of July 1981 that discuss any public opposition.
The only objection to the ISPNG association was a formal response from
the then Minister for Justice, Mr Paul Torato MP (Torato 1981).
Interestingly, the Registrar accepted Mr Torato’s objection, dated 23 July
1981, despite the objection being lodged after the one-month deadline for
objections had passed as per the relevant Associations Act (1966).
Torato failed to outline whether his objection was based on government
policy or submitted as a private citizen, and simply outlined sections of the
Associations Act that he believed the ISPNG was in prima facie
contravention of, namely:

1. that the association has not the prescribed qualifications for

incorporation;
2. that the association was formed or is carried on, or is proposed to be
incorporated for an immoral or illegal purpose contrary to public
policy;
3. that the rules of the association do not comply with the provisions of
the Associations Incorporation Act 1966;
4. that the name of the association is a name by which the association
should not be incorporated without contravention of section 10 of the
Associations Incorporation Act 1966;
 5. that notice of intention to apply for the incorporation was not duly
published under section 4 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1966.

At this stage, ISPNG members held the view that government resistance to
incorporation might be stronger than anticipated. The ISPNG began to see
the confrontation in a broader context, ‘that it [was] is vital to the interests
of Islam present and future, not only in PNG but throughout Oceania and
the Pacific that this battle be won’ (Choudry 1981e: 2). Members agreed ‘to
fight to the limit of [their] utmost powers’ against the government while
recognising that they were short-term contract employees, many of whom
were government employees (Kirke 1981: 1–3). Furthermore, ISPNG
members held a positive view that ‘through the struggle [to incorporate]
many people in PNG would be introduced to Islam irrespective of the final
result’ (Choudry 1981a) and thus a full legal challenge was mounted.
Apart from legal proceedings in the PNG courts, the major strategy was
political in nature and sought to draw support from the international Muslim
ummah. The ISPNG asked for financial or material assistance from 36
prominent Islamic organisations and individuals, and specifically sought the
provision of appropriate responses to the PNG government objections
(Choudry 1981e). The letter requesting help began by stating:
There can be no doubt that the leaders of this country under the guidance of their Australian
mentors and the Christian missionaries are not only unaware of the meaning of Islam, but are as
apprehensive of Islam as they are of Communism. Nevertheless we believe that the current
vacuum of any valid moral philosophy which is sending this country rapidly down into the arms
of a joyful Satan could be filled by Islam were the people only allowed to come into contact with
its teachings. Weak and powerless though we may be, no Muslim can deny that we should
continue in our efforts to bring Islam to Papua New Guinea (PNG). To accomplish this we must
first win recognition from the Government to allow the people to make the choice.
(Choudry 1982i)

Furthermore, the ISPNG saw that the government opposition to Islam in

PNG meant

we (Muslims of PNG) are facing a threat to Islam which could spread

throughout Oceania and the Pacific – a threat which if not defeated now
will limit or deny the introduction or spread of the true way of Allah (SWT)
in these regions.
 (Choudry 1982i)

The instigation of formal legal proceedings by the ISPNG is likely to

have been the cause of a strong Christian backlash against Islam within the
government cabinet of the day and may have contributed to the decision by
Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan to speak publicly against Islam in a national
radio broadcast on 1 February 1982. Chan stated that his government
‘would never allow a Muslim church to be built in PNG’, and that he
personally ‘would not like to see Islam established in PNG’ (Choudry
1982f). Chan’s media officer, Mr Robin Osbourne, in response to the
ensuing ISPNG complaint, requested a telephone meeting be arranged, and
that the meeting should be ‘informal, confidential, outside of parliament
offices, and preferably outside office hours’ (Choudry 1982b).
On 15 March 1982, Osbourne met ISPNG executives ‘in a personal
capacity’ (Choudry 1982b). Osbourne ‘was unsure of what prompted the
Prime Minister to make the announcement he did’ and ‘admitted to having
written a report on Islam only two weeks earlier after overhearing the Prime
Minister in discussions with Cabinet members’ (some of whom were
Christian priests) say ‘he thought Islam was a branch of Hinduism’
(Choudry 1982b). Osbourne also asked Choudry if he ‘was aware the CID
[police] were following him and that all his mail was scanned’, to which
Choudry responded ‘no’ (Choudry 2007: 3–4). Osbourne said, ‘the
government was fearful of Muslims and considered them the agents of
Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya’ (Choudry
2007: 3–4).
Osbourne ‘asked pointedly whether the society intended to erect a
mosque and particularly wanted to know whether overseas financial aid was
being obtained and if so from which particular countries or organisations’
(Choudry 1982b). ISPNG executives explained the objectives of the society,
and reiterated that their main aim was to ‘practice Islam among
[themselves] ourselves and educate [their] our children’, stating that they
‘[did] do not intend to propagate Islam amongst PNG nationals’ (Choudry
1982b: 1). The later claim appears somewhat dishonest in light of numerous
ISPNG documents showing that privately the ISPNG and its members
retained an interest in proselytising activities: ‘the society believes Islam is
a vibrant and active religion and that every Muslim is commanded to spread
the truth and light of Islam so that it may embrace all peoples’ (Choudry
1982i).
Osbourne encouraged the ISPNG to form a trust in order to conduct their
activities as this removed the decision from the Registrar of Companies. He
also informed the ISPNG that the government was responding to a letter
from RISEAP. The response would state that, ‘the PNG government will
not obstruct moderate adherence to the Islamic faith by individuals already
resident in PNG as long as there is no active promotion’ (Osbourne 1982:
1–2). Furthermore, RISEAP ‘will be asked to advise its members to
maintain a low, moderate profile and keep proselytizing to a minimum’, to
which Osbourne added ‘the PNG government would unlikely view the
building of a mosque as keeping a low profile’ (Osbourne 1982: 2).
On 19 March 1982, the ISPNG formally rejected Osbourne’s
recommendation to use a trust structure because ‘other government
authorities and Christian organisations’ might view it as a ‘back-door
approach, and given most religious organisations in PNG were incorporated
there was no reason why Islam should not have the same rights’ (Choudry
1982h).
In June 1982, Saddiq Sandbach represented PNG at the Annual
Conference of RISEAP. ISPNG executives thought sending a recent ‘revert’
(convert) would leave a good impression on participants and present the
ISPNG case in the best possible way. Conference participants became
sympathetic towards the ISPNG plight, and made numerous offers of
support, among which included some from Libyan Embassy staff. Sandbach
informed the Libyans that the PNG government already considered the
ISPNG agents of Muammar Gaddafi and Ayatollah Khomeini and that the
ISPNG would prefer not to bring Libya or Iran into the picture. Despite this,
the Libyans insisted they wanted to help. Sandbach suggested they could
send an electronic typewriter and a photocopying machine, but only through
RISEAP. They agreed and gave Sandbach US$3,000 in cash (Choudry
2007: 5).
By 30 July 1982, the Registrar had still not complied with the court
ruling to provide the ISPNG with reasons for the objection (Choudry
1982a). Interestingly though, the Government Information Department
(GID) had approached the ISPNG in July asking them to respond to a
detailed questionnaire. Mr Coady advised the ISPNG to ‘decline the GID
request politely’ as it was ‘improper at this stage for any member of the
society to give any information to the press or government as the society
was passing through a delicate phase and careless talk might be
contemptuous’; a court case was underway appealing the refusal of
incorporation (Choudry 1982a).
On 2 August 1982, the Chan government collapsed and with it the
ISPNG finally received the Registrar’s reasons for objection. The ISPNG
immediately had discussions with their lawyers to plan a response against
claims that ‘the constitution stated PNG was a Christian country making
Islam illegal, and that Islam was a threat to political stability’ (Choudry
1982d; Kirke 1982). The ISPNG also decided to send copies of the reasons
for objection to the same Muslims/Islamic organisations that they had
corresponded with in late 1981.
The ISPNG requested that Islamic organisations provide rebuttals to
support an appeal. The ISPNG requests for support highlighted that the
‘tiny Muslim community lacks in-depth knowledge of Islam and therefore
is unable to formulate any effective counter arguments as our solicitor is
also non-Muslim’ (Choudry 1982j). The main ISPNG argument focused on
how the Registrar’s decision was in opposition to provisions of Section 45
of the PNG Constitution that guaranteed ‘freedom of religion to all persons’
(Blaustein and Flanz 1985; Kirke 1982). Coady also recommended that it
would now be beneficial to ‘present a Roman Catholic clergyman from
Australia (resident in PNG) to the court to testify … to the tenets of the
religion [Islam]’ (Kirke 1982: 2).
The ISPNG followed this advice and made a formal request to Australian
Catholic Archbishop and Apostolic Pro-Nuncio, L. Barbarito, for support,
requesting he submit a statement supporting the view that Islam be
officially recognised in PNG (Barbarito 1982).
The collapse of the Chan government occurred at an opportune time
because the ISPNG had just started receiving assistance from the
international Islamic community as the new Somare government took
office. After passing a resolution at its annual meeting in June, RISEAP
began delivering support in August. RISEAP provided support for
Abdurrahman Linzag (Philippines) and Abdul Rahim Rashid (New
Zealand) to commence study of the legal issues; both were lawyers and
prominent Muslims in their respective countries (Choudry 1982i).
The ‘Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) and the Libyan
Call Society gave generous financial assistance to cover legal costs incurred
in PNG’, and the World Association for Muslim Youth (WAMY) wrote in
support of ISPNG actions (Choudry 1982i: 3–4). Linzag eventually
submitted a comprehensive 23 page legal rebuttal to the Registrar’s reasons
for objection, (Linzag 1983) and RISEAP also arranged for a lawyer and
recent Australian Muslim convert (Mohammed Salih) from Melbourne to
assist, although it is unclear whether a letter from Salih was ever received
(Choudry 1982g).
The first month of the new Somare government saw a significant increase
in diplomatic exchanges with Malaysian officials in respect to the ISPNG
situation. This became formal with a letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman
Putra Al-Haj (founding Prime Minister of Malaysia) to Prime Minister
Somare. Tunku requested Somare to give the ISPNG issue his ‘personal and
urgent attention’ and ensure the ‘appropriate authorities review the ISPNG
decision and allow Muslims to build a mosque’ (Al-Haj 1982).
It is likely that the informal dialogue with the Malaysians led to a review
of the case on 7 September, when the new Minister for Justice, Mr Tony
Bais MP, met ISPNG executives in a ‘friendly environment’ (Choudry
1982e). The ISPNG executives briefed the Minister on the problems faced
to date, and explained the intentions and aims of the society. Bias ‘promised
to reconsider the ISPNG application justly and asked the ISPNG to write to
him officially mentioning the meeting’ (Choudry 1982e: 2). ISPNG
President Shokat Noor Khan sent a letter the following week reiterating the
objectives of the society. He re-affirmed the ISPNG was ‘not a political
body’, and left the option open to ‘amend the ISPNG constitution if the
government had concerns that the society posed a threat to security or law
and order’ (Khan 1982).
Political pressure continued to increase on 20 October, when Malaysian
Prime Minister, Mahathir Muhammad visited Papua New Guinea for one
day on his return from the Commonwealth Head of States meeting in Fiji.
Mahathir personally raised the issue with the new PNG Prime Minister,
Michael Somare, which was in line with Malaysian foreign policy of 1970s
and 1980s to actively promote Islam and support Muslims in Asia-Pacific
(Nair 1997).
Mahathir met Choudry and explained he was just returning from the
office of Somare. Mahathir said they discussed the ISPNG matter at the
request of Brother Tunku Abdur Rahman (then President of RISEAP).
Mahathir advised the ISPNG to avoid confronting the government, as this
was not the way to achieve success, and advised the ISPNG to keep a low
profile and wait for the right time for registration. He added that Somare
had promised the registration ‘once the priests of his cabinet had calmed
down’ (Choudry 1982c). Mahathir also recommended the ‘ISPNG make
clear that it is a welfare organisation, and that it avoid any propagation
against the will of the government’ (Choudry 1982c).
ISPNG records shed little light on the 12 months of appeal activity after
Mahathir’s visit. The only ISPNG action of note in the period was a visit by
Muhammad Saddiq in June 1983, sent to personally represent Habib Chatti,
General-Secretary of the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) and
make representations to the PNG government. Also around this time,
Shafiqur Rahman Khan Abdullah of Darul Iftar in Saudi Arabia visited
PNG (Choudry 2007: 3). On 30 August 1983, a preliminary meeting
occurred between Bias and the Malaysian High Commissioner, which led to
another meeting held by Mr Lucas, acting Assistant Secretary for Justice,
and the ISPNG on 10 November 1983 ‘to seek a way out of the impasse
that currently existed’ (Lucas 1983).
In a telephone conversation on 9 November 1983 to arrange the 10
November meeting, Lucas mentioned to Choudry that Somare planned a
State Visit to Malaysia in four days and that he wished ‘to meet urgently to
finalise the matter of ISPNG incorporation’ before Somare’s departure
because Somare had ‘asked the Registrar for a quick decision, whether it
was a registration or a rejection, but not without valid reasons’ (Lucas
1983). In that conversation, Lucas revealed that the previous Prime
Minister, Julius Chan, had received a letter from RISEAP on 5 February
1982 requesting the ISPNG be allowed to incorporate. Chan had responded
on 26 February 1982 stating his ‘government will not accept the Muslim
religion’ adding ‘that Islam had caused unrest and political infighting
amongst many other countries’ (Lucas 1983: 2).
ISPNG executives, Kere Moi (Registrar of Companies), and Stephen Igo
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) attended the meeting and
reviewed the entire matter. The minutes of the meeting show the Registrar’s
position on the matter had changed. Moi now claimed the only limitation on
ISPNG incorporation related to a section of its constitution dealing with the
winding-up of the society (Lucas 1983: 2). Moi’s only concern now related
to a part of the ISPNG constitution that stated that, upon dissolution, the
society would transfer surplus funds to AFIC in Melbourne.
 Moi recommended that the ISPNG be incorporated as a foreign company
as a way around this, yet the ISPNG objected, claiming ‘the society is not a
business’ (Lucas 1983: 2). Instead, it was agreed that the ISPNG change its
constitution to state that any surplus funds would go to a charity based in
PNG upon windingup. Doing so would ensure that the ISPNG would not
fall in breach of Section 35 of the Associations Act 1966 (Lucas 1983: 4).
Prior to incorporation, some ISPNG members expressed disappointment
that the Malaysian government, without ISPNG agreement, had accepted
conditions on ISPNG incorporation from the PNG government that would
constrain ISPNG missionary activities (Sandbach 1983). Based on activities
after incorporation, it appears that these members put such concerns aside
to obtain the approvals.
On 11 November 1983, the PNG government recognised the ISPNG by
incorporating it as an association (Companies 1983). The executive
committee of the ISPNG notified (in writing) all members of the PNG
ummah and those overseas whom had helped win the struggle (Choudry
1983). Local Muslims responded with celebrations, and Islamic
organisations abroad wrote back offering their congratulations, promising to
keep in touch with a view to offering further support in the future (Khan
1983). At this point, no indigenous Papua New Guinean had converted.
Once incorporated, the ISPNG began limited proselytism discretely at the
UPNG campus, despite its private agreement with the government. Da’wah
initially focused only on raising awareness of Islam and led to no
conversions between 1984 and 1986 (Choudry 2007). However, the
activities of the society during this time laid the foundations for the first
conversions of PNG nationals.
The early da’wah effort mostly took place within the UPNG. The arrival
in PNG of three particularly devout Muslims in 1984 reinvigorated the
missionary spirit of the small ummah. The new expatriates had an in-depth
knowledge of Islam and were experienced Da’iyah. These men were
Eltayyeb from Sudan, who worked as Commissioner for Refugees with the
UNDP, Azeemullah from Fiji, who was an engineer with Shell Oil, and
Shahul Hameed, who worked as an accountant in a private retail company
(Choudry 2007: 5).
In 1984, the ISPNG began producing a magazine, entitled Al-Islam, as
the main form of outreach, distributing it at the UPNG. Expatriate Muslims
also approached local newspaper reporters to write stories about Islam and
whilst most were not obliging, one article appeared in 1984 entitled ‘The
Islamic “answer” to PNG’s Problems’ (Kouza 1984). For at least the next
eight years the ISPNG paid for intermittent advertisements promoting free
lectures on Islam at the UPNG campus and free video evenings about Islam
in the Post Courier newspaper and on EMTV (the national television
broadcaster) (Choudry 1984; ISPNG 1992).
The ISPNG focus on the UPNG meant that the first converts were
graduates and professionals with a number of them eventually taking on
leadership roles within the PNG ummah as part of the localisation process.
In 1985, impressed by an Al-Islam article on the prohibition of alcoholic
drinks and the eating of pork, Alexander Dawia (in his honours year in
history at UPNG) contacted Choudry for more information and the two met
to discuss Islam. Choudry loaned Ahmad Deedat videos to Dawia, who
watched the first video titled What the Bible says about Muhammad? at
Choudry’s UPNG residence (Choudry 2007: 6).
In November, Dawia travelled to Australia to research Black Theology.
Dr Ahmad (previously of Lae Unitech) arranged with mosques from Cairns
to Canberra to accommodate Dawia so that he could learn more about Islam
and in January 1986, Dawia arrived in Canberra as a guest at Ahmad’s own
residence (Choudry 2007: 6).
On 17 January, Dawia telephoned Choudry saying he had decided to
become a Muslim and was taking the Muslim name of Bilal because he was
very dark (being from Bougainville), like the Bilal who was a companion of
the Prophet Muhammad. Dawia declared Shahada on 18 January 1986 at
the Jamia mosque in Canberra (Sandbach 1986: 1). Back in Port Moresby,
Sandbach had been discussing Islam with Lavi (his adopted son) when Lavi
learned about Dawia’s decision. Dawia’s declaration led Lavi to pronounce
the Shahada on the same day, becoming Lavi-Ali (Choudry 2007: 6).
Given the agreement with the PNG government about converting PNG
nationals, there was discussion among ISPNG members about whether to
keep quiet about the two conversions, however this was decided against at
the Fifth Annual General Meeting of the ISPNG (Sandbach 1986). When
Bilal returned to PNG in February, he stayed at the home of Ajeemullah
because Bilal’s family were strongly Christian and he felt uncomfortable
staying with them; Ajeemullah helped Bilal memorise salat within a few
days (Choudry 2007: 6).
 Later in 1986, Bilal attended a RISEAP conference, and made headlines
in Malaysian newspapers as the first Muslim of Papua New Guinea
(Choudry 2007: 6). On his return, another opportunity arose at the Islamic
University of Islamabad (Pakistan) for the training of new Imams and Bilal
attended. There he met a representative from Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), who
provided a tour of TJ headquarters in Raywind, Lahore. Through TJ, Bilal
visited India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in the six months that followed.
After obtaining his degree, he found a job in Australia and settled in Cairns
after marrying an English woman. Thus, Bilal did not actively contribute to
converting locals (Flower 2007).
The next significant conversion was that of UPNG librarian Barrah Nuli.
Nuli made inquiries about Al-Islam and Choudry took the opportunity to
deliver him a copy, taking Bilal along to introduce him as a new Muslim. It
was at this time that Barrah is said to have mentioned that he and his wife (a
bank employee) were very interested in Islam. Choudry introduced Nuli to
Ajeemullah, who started taking Nuli’s family to his house on weekends to
share knowledge, show videos and discuss Islam (Flower 2007). Towards
the end of 1986, Barrah and his family embraced Islam. His wife Fatima
was the first Papua New Guinean woman to embrace Islam and his
daughter Hajira the first child (Choudry 2007: 8).
Following Nuli’s conversion a number of other important conversions
occurred. The following small group of early converts would become the
key leaders of the ISPNG in the years that followed and are worthy of
mention. Barrah’s friend Otto Salmang became a Muslim in early 1987
(becoming Yusuf), with his wife and children also embracing Islam. In mid-
1987, Sau (Umar) Nabae, another librarian at the UPNG library, and his
family embraced. In late 1987, Yaqub Amaki, wife Khadija and son Ishaq
embraced (Flower 2007). This chapter has shown that conversion growth
over the next ten years until 1997 was quite limited. This is not surprising,
based on AGM minutes and annual financial accounts that show the ISPNG
suffered a decrease in foreign support and loss of motivation (and activity)
by local Muslims after winning the battle with the government.
The early history of Islam in PNG provides support for the general theory
in the conversion literature that increasing forces of globalisation
(migration, telecommunications, and international travel) facilitate the
spread of monotheistic religions.
 Although Muslims were present in PNG during the pre-colonial and
colonial periods, they remained an exceptionally small minority who lacked
external support, which made practising let alone propagating Islam
extremely difficult. Islam was only able to establish a presence and its first
conversions of PNG nationals after an increase in migration of Muslims
(post-independence), and support from foreign Muslim individuals and
organisations. Contrary to assertions by Khan, the pre-independence history
also shows that although there was very limited Muslim contact, locals are
unlikely to have converted to Islam despite claims to Islamic ancestry by
contemporary Muslim converts.
The history shows in detail that whilst the founders of Islam in PNG
initially sought to establish and institutionalise Islam to support their own
practice of the religion they also intended to proselytise their religion to
PNG nationals. Expatriate Muslims in PNG had no political aspirations for
the ISPNG and since its establishment it has remained a co-religionist
organisation in a secular society under PNG law. The establishment of
Islam in PNG should not be surprising, given the increased migration of
foreign labour from countries where Islam is endemic.
Initial PNG Government opposition meant that the ISPNG did not
engage in proselytising activities between 1976 and 1983 while awaiting
incorporation. The founders, however, privately hoped that the society
would become active in missionary efforts over time, and inform PNG
nationals about Islam with the objective that they would become Muslim.
This objective, although somewhat delayed by initial PNG government
constraints, appears to have been achieved to some degree given the recent
surge in conversions since 2001.
Overcoming government opposition was accomplished by a small group
of determined Muslims, in conjunction with the political and financial
support of Muslims and Islamic organisations from around the world
(particularly Malaysia). It is likely that Islamic contact with PNG before
and during European colonisation failed to establish the religion due to this
lack of substantial financial, material, political and missionary support.
The establishment of formally structured national Islamic organisations is
widely regarded as being very important by most Muslims for the
successful sustenance and propagation of Islam in every country (WAMY
1982). The incorporation and recognition of the ISPNG was important
because it meant that the ISPNG was eligible for income tax exemption
under sections 25 and 27 of the PNG Income Tax Act (ISPNG 1989: 5).
More importantly, it provided a formal structure to propagate and manage
Islam within PNG and, in the eyes of Islam’s expatriate founders, provided
a vital test case in support of the future growth of Islam throughout the
Pacific. While support for domestic Islamic societies appears to be a
necessary requirement for growth, it is not sufficient by itself as an
explanation for the spike in Muslim conversions in PNG since 2001.
It is likely that numerous other factors have contributed to Islam’s recent
growth, including increased media reporting on Islam and Muslims, and
spiritual, moral and developmental considerations. It is these drivers of
religious conversion to Islam that attract the detailed analysis in the coming
chapters.
3
Seven-stage process of Islamic
conversion in Papua New Guinea

There are currently no detailed studies of Islamic conversion in any other

Melanesian country to inform this book. The only work available for
comparative analysis is a recent but very brief conference paper on Islam in
the Solomon Islands (McDougall 2007). Even the slightly larger body of
work on Muslims in Fiji (Ali 2004; Hock 2006) does not examine the issue
of Islamic conversion by indigenous Melanesians (Fijians).
To cope with the lack, sources and comparative data approaches from the
wider literature on religious conversion are vital to conceptualise Islamic
conversion in Papua New Guinea. This book uses Lewis Rambo’s
framework, detailed in Understanding Religious Conversion (Rambo 1993),
which draws on the full research heritage of conversion studies. A
comprehensive review of Rambo’s approach can be obtained from Rambo’s
work directly, so this chapter provides a simplified overview of Rambo’s
seven-stage process relevant for considering conversions to Islam in PNG.
Definitions of religious conversion are available in the literature and a
number of these are useful for describing the multifaceted nature of Islamic
conversion in PNG. A multi-dimensional definition is necessary because no
technical definition of conversion to Islam can be found in the Koran or
within wider Islamic scholarship.
The Koran most commonly uses the Arabic word ‘aslama’ to denote
becoming Muslim, which translates literally as ‘submission’ to Allah (Ali
2006a; Dutton 1999; Wehr 1994). However, the word submission fails to
adequately define conversion to Islam and what conversion to Islam means
to converts in PNG. Following the prescription of Snow and Machalek
(1984: 171), ‘empirical indicators of conversion’ can be used to help
contextualise a definition of aslama. Conversion to Islam is empirically
observable on two levels. The first is verbal and based on an individual
declaration and institutional/communal recognition of this declaration. The
second indicator is the practical application of Islamic religious principles
by a convert, such as choosing and using a Muslim name, wearing Islamic
dress (Sunnah clothing), and practising Islam in accordance with the
Sharia.
The formal and official way to become a Muslim in PNG is the same as
becoming a Muslim in any other part of the world. Converts are required to
make a single verbal declaration of the Kalima Shahada in the company of
other Muslims. This ritual marker is referred to by PNG converts as Kalima,
Shahada, or Kalima Shahada and represents their submission, surrender
and acceptance of the oneness of Allah (God) known in Arabic as Tawhid,
and the divine laws established in the Koran. Converts recite the following
statement in Arabic:

Ashadu al la ilaha illa llah, wa ashadu anna muhammadar rasulu ilah.

(Transliterated from Arabic) I witness that there is no god but Allah and that
Muhammad is his messenger and servant. (Translated from Arabic)
(Ali 2006a)

Prior to reciting the Shahada, PNG converts must be ritually cleansed. In

the city this means taking ablutions in a specifically dedicated shower block
at the Islamic centre, whilst in the Highlands the washing place is simply in
a creek. After declaring the Shahada, converts are warmly welcomed as a
Muslim by the other Muslims present with physical embraces and greetings
of Assalamu Alikom (peace be with you). For converts in Port Moresby, the
declaration is formally recognised by the Imam who presents the convert
with a certificate on behalf of the ISPNG and a small booklet that covers
the basics of Islam.
Prior to declaring Shahada, converts are reminded by a senior Muslim or
Imam of the solemnity and seriousness of becoming a Muslim and are
informed about the aqidah and the five pillars of Islam (Flower 2007). The
aqidah represent the six articles of belief in Islam and are referred to in
Hadiths by Sahih Muslim and Sahih Bukhari as: belief in Allah as the one
and only God; belief in the prophets (nabi) and messengers (rusul) sent by
God; belief in angels (malaika); belief in the books sent by God (e.g. the
Torah and Koran); belief in the day of judgement (qiyama) and the
resurrection (life after death) and belief in fate/destiny (qadar) (Esposito
2005; Nasr 1991).
The practical duties of every Muslim are referred to as the five pillars of
faith, which technically all converts should practice. These are Shahada,
salat (ritual prayer that is undertaken at the specific set times of the day and
offered in the direction of the Qibla in Mecca, Saudi Arabia), Zakat
(compulsory alms giving), Sawm (fasting during Ramadan), and Hajj
(pilgrimage to Mecca, an obligation on every able-bodied Muslim if they
can afford it) (Renard 1996: 5). These practical obligations were
emphasised as an important contributing factor of conversion by most PNG
converts and are best represented by the following statement by Yusuf:
Being a Muslim is not like Catholic where you are baptised and then you
are a Catholic. No. To be Muslim you have to behave like a Muslim.

The emphasis on practice comes from the principle of Ihsan, which means
in order to attain salvation a Muslim must combine faith and action, belief
and practice to show one’s iman (faith) in both deed and action (Esposito
2005; Nasr 1991; Renard 1996).
The two indicators of conversion provided above still do not express the
depth and breadth of what conversion to Islam means for many PNG
converts, thus supplementary definitions from the conversion literature have
also been incorporated to gain a complete definition.
In synthesising a definition of Islamic conversion in PNG it is worth
remembering that the concept of conversion is in itself salient to different
degrees in different cultures. In some cultures, the act of conversion itself is
important (Harris 2006), while in other cultures it can be forgettable (Gow
2006). For those Papua New Guineans switching to more fundamentalist
strains of Christianity, conversion is particularly distinguished by a
rejection of the converts’ past (traditional) religion, which is seen as pagan
or false (Jebens 2005; Robbins 2004a). Converts to Islam in PNG are
diametrically opposite this trend and see their conversion as a reversion to
their old religion rather than a release from it.
Rambo broadly defines five types of conversion, and of these ‘tradition
transition’ best describes conversions to Islam in PNG (Rambo 1993: 38–
39). Conversion in this sense from Rambo’s perspective is a complete
change to a new religious tradition and religious identity, rather than a shift
to a new denomination within a specific religious tradition (e.g. a shift from
Catholicism to a Protestant form of Christianity). As one Muslim convert
explained, ‘Islam is not like being in any other denomination of
Christianity’ (Kauthar).
Prior to the arrival of Islam, tradition transition conversions were
extensive in PNG. During the period of British, German and Australian
colonisation, religious belief and identity shifted from traditional religions
to Christianity (from one tradition to another). This first wave of
conversions was to predominantly Catholic, Lutheran and Anglican
denominations (Gibbs 2006). Tradition transition differs from the more
recent conversion trend in PNG to fundamentalist evangelical and
Pentecostal Christian sects described by Robbins as ‘second wave’
conversions (Robbins 2001a, 2004a). Second wave conversions fit the
category of ‘institutional transition’ in Rambo’s conversion typology
(Rambo 1993: 39).
A central theme of the religious conversion literature is that the core of
conversion experiences are associated with radical personal change
theologically, ideologically, and socially (Gooren 2007; Snow and
Machalek 1984) and that radical change is ‘ubiquitous … in all areas of a
convert’s life’ (Travisano 1970: 605). In respect of tradition transitions,
some argue that conversion involves ‘a rejection of one normative system
with the attribution of legitimacy to some other set of associations and
norms’ (Parucci 1968: 149). It is a ‘turning away’ from the old ways toward
new ways and

a basic reorientation in premises and goals and a wholehearted

acceptance of a new set of values affecting the convert and his social group
– day in, day out – 24 hours a day in practically every sphere of life
(economic, political, social and religious).
(Luzbetak 1963: 6)

As will be shown in the following chapters, conversion to Islam in PNG

for converts varies in the extent to which the act of conversion is a life-
changing experience that encompasses every element of life, character and
beliefs. For converts to Islam the following definitions of conversion are
also applicable:
 to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain
assurance, are among so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or
sudden, by which a self hitherto divided and consciously wrong, inferior
and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy, in
consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities.
(James 1902: 160)

and

‘A change in character, nature, form, or function … of any one over to a

specified religious faith … that one regards as true, from what is regarded
as falsehood or error’. This includes ‘the action of converting or fact of
being converted, to some opinion or belief’. In theological terms conversion
is defined as: ‘the turning of sinners to God; a spiritual change from
sinfulness, ungodliness, or worldliness to love of God and pursuit of
holiness’.
(OED 2004)

Of the 52 converts interviewed, all of them claimed conversion brought

changes to their character and/or beliefs. Thirty-six converts (62 per cent)
also mentioned that they had left sinful ways and found the ‘right path’, the
‘way of life’ or ‘the straight path’ away from sinfulness. Twenty-three (44
per cent) added that when they discovered Islam they found the ‘truth’
juxtaposed against error and falsehood felt in their previous Christian
beliefs.
Each of the definitions of conversion provided above capture a different
dimension of Islamic conversion in PNG from both convert and social
scientist perspectives. Whilst these definitions are suitable for the majority
of converts they are complicated by the occurrence of group conversions,
and because the majority of converts interviewed expressed that by
‘embracing Islam’ they are reverting (returning to their old religion) rather
than converting to a new religion.
The conversion of whole groups following the conversion of one member
of their group partly explains the recent surge in conversion growth in PNG.
Whilst the impact of mass conversions on growth was discussed earlier, the
conversion of whole groups deserves definitional clarification because they
differ substantively in nature to conversions occurring through personal
conviction as defined above.
Group conversions are a well-known phenomenon in Melanesia and the
nature of them runs contrary to the generally held Western concept of
conversion being an individual phenomenon. Interestingly, in the colonial
period, some of the early Christian churches in Melanesia had a deliberate
strategy of converting whole groups of natives in order to manage their
heathen lifestyles away from the control mechanisms of previous religious
traditions (Keysser 1980; Smith 1979).
Islamic proselytism in Africa also focused on converting the leaders of
tribes and clans so that conversions of leaders would lead to mass
conversions of the rest of the tribe/clan. For example, villagers in Malawi
were regularly reported to have been heard saying ‘the chief is very
favourable that we should become Muslim as we have become Christian’
(Sicard 2000: 296).
Nock (1998: 6–7) differentiates between individual and group
conversions by claiming conversion is best defined as ‘a reorientation of the
soul … a turning which implies a consciousness that a great change is
involved’ (i.e. personal conviction), whilst the term adhesion is a better
term for referring to group conversions that involve ‘no crossing of
religious frontiers’ and which involve the acceptance of a new religion as a
‘useful supplement and not a substitute’.
Dutton is the only researcher to have recently applied a refined version of
Nock’s definitions to her own study of Muslim converts, labelling
conversion the ‘way of light’ and adhesion ‘the way of power’, with the
latter being for motives other than personal conviction, such as following
tribal leadership or for personal financial gain (Dutton 1999: 156–157). In
his landmark study of conversion in Melanesia, Tippet acknowledges the
prevalence of group religious conversion and defines it as:

The process of multi-individual experience and action of a group through

its competent authority, whereby the group changes from one behavioural
context to another. Conversion occurs within the operations of its own
structure and decision-making mechanisms regardless of whether or not the
external environment changes.
(Tippett 1976: 4)
Conversions of families or even whole clans and tribes are likely to be the
result of internal and tribal power structures (Tippett 1967; Trompf 1991).
As Mohammad explained, his direct family converted after he told his
sisters and brothers, ‘you guys have to join me because I am the oldest in
the family and I can make my own decision about our religion’. The way in
which tribal power structures influence group conversion to Islam was
described by Qasim: My father’s father is a chief. When my father goes
back to the village the whole village will embrace because the people
respect the chief. It will happen through da’wah as they will listen carefully
to him. People can still choose but many will change.

Although the different definitions of individual and group conversion are

useful for understanding the nature of a particular conversion, it is
important to recognise that group conversion can change over time. Nock’s
adhesion defines the type of conversion (at the time group conversion
occurs) but it does not preclude a convert from experiencing their new
religion through personal conviction at a later time as a result of learning
more about the new religion.
One final problem regarding an appropriate and complete definition of
Islamic conversion in PNG relates to the term most converts use to refer to
their own conversion. Seventy-six per cent (40) of all converts interviewed
preferred to use the terms ‘reversion’ and ‘revert’ to describe becoming
Muslim (Flower 2007) and the ISPNG itself refers to indigenous converts
as ‘reverts’ (ISPNG 1998c). The terms ‘revert’ and ‘reversion’ are related to
the Islamic concept of Fitra, which is a core Islamic philosophical belief
that refers to the ‘innate nature’ or ‘primordial nature’ in which Allah
creates all people inherently good, believing in tawhid (one god) and
endowed with the ability to differentiate between right and wrong (Esposito
2003).
Revert and reversion are also terms widely used to describe Islamic
conversion among Muslim communities in Australia, Britain, Western
Europe and America (Mustapha 2005; Zebiri 2008). The concept of
reversion is likely to be prevalent among PNG converts because prior to, or
upon, converting they are told by Islamic missionaries about fitra, the term
reversion/revert, and the similarities of Islamic customs and their traditional
ways. The following statement by a PNG convert conveys the sense of what
reversion is and how it is understood by converts themselves:
 To become Muslim is not new to me. I feel like I’m coming back to my
original religion rather than coming to a new religion. The Christian way
was and is strange to me. We believe all Christians will become Muslims.
All of them will revert to their original religion in Islam.
(Ibrahim)

Based on a comparison of the available data (Poston 1992; Zebiri 2008), it

is clear that PNG converts generally possess a stronger sense of reversion
than their Western counterparts. Of the 40 converts who described their
conversion as reversion, all justified using the term based on the perceived
similarities between Islam and their traditional religion (Kastom). Each
convert in this group provided at least two examples of such similarities,
which when combined totalled more than 25 rituals or beliefs that are
similar between the two. Furthermore, 35 converts out of this 40 claimed
that the similarity between Islam and their Kastom was a major reason for
their conversion. This influence is clearly important as a cause of
conversion; however, the narrative that converts were Muslims ‘before’
only becomes part of a convert’s biographical reconstruction after his or her
encounter and interaction with advocates of Islam (missionaries or
practising Muslims).
Reversion rather than conversion was particularly strong for 13 converts
(all from the Highlands) who actually believed their ancestors were
Muslims before European colonialism, and these converts had detailed
myths to support their belief. The evidence provided in the preceding
chapter clearly shows Islam failed to penetrate the PNG Highlands, which
falsifies converts’ claims to Islamic ancestry empirically. I did not assess
whether the provision of such facts to converts would reduce the influence
of such myths.
Further to Nock’s distinction between conversion and adhesion, the claim
by many converts that they believe they are returning to their original
religion is striking, given the findings of research by both Pieris and Dorr
who claim that primal cultures (such as those of the indigenous people of
PNG) do not actually give away their traditional religion to convert to
world religions such as Christianity or Islam (Dorr 2000; Pieris 1988,
1997). Pieris and Dorr add that primal people in fact cannot give up their
traditional religion completely by converting to a world religion because
their ‘cosmic spirituality’ is so deeply ingrained that it remains an
underlying dimension of their religious ontology and epistemology. If true,
it begs the question of why Christianity in PNG appears to have been taken
up so readily.
Pieris’s ‘helicopter theory’ of religious conversion provides a useful
explanation of both Christian and Muslim conversions in PNG and
complicates the formulation of a strict definition of conversion (Pieris 1997:
66). Pieris argues that the nature of the traditional religion (beliefs, values
and symbols) will determine the degree to which conversions to a world
religion occur. To Pieris, ‘cosmic religions’ (primal/traditional religions) are
primarily concerned with sacred earthly matters, whilst ‘metacosmic
religions’ such as Christianity and Islam are concerned with transcendent
otherworldly realities (Pieris 1997). This means if a new religion appears
and shares a degree of similarity with old beliefs then the new religion will
be readily adopted. It is in this sense that cosmic (primal) religions provide
a landing pad for metacosmic religions to land like a ‘helicopter’ (Pieris
1988: 7).
If a new religion were to clash too much with the existing religious
cosmology and values, conversion to the new religion would be unlikely to
occur as it would defy the comprehension or understanding of the
indigenous people. A widely shared view espoused by Trompf argues that a
major reason why Christianity was received in PNG with enthusiasm was
because the religion was seen by many indigenous converts as a name for
the religion they already knew (Trompf 1987), which makes Nock’s
adhesion model an important part of considering any definition of Islamic
conversion. The mixing of religions as part of the conversion process
(mentioned by Trompf and Nock) is referred to as syncretism.1
The definitional problems dealt with thus far have led some researchers
to despair, with one declaring that problems of syncretism in conversion
mean that conversion cannot be ‘a significant analytical category in its own
right’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 250–251) whilst another argues that ‘
“conversion” generally deserves to be treated sceptically (hence the
inverted commas) because where there is no radical change in cosmology,
its appropriateness is at best doubtful’ (Horton 1975b: 394). Although
conversion to Islam in PNG brings observable differences, as the following
chapters show, these are also related to traditional religious backgrounds of
converts, and the influence of converts’ prior cosmological beliefs is
recognised by Pieris as an important factor of conversion.
 Pieris argues that:

mass conversions from one soteriology to another [e.g. from Christianity

to Islam and vice versa] are rare if not impossible … but a change over
from a tribal religion to a metacosmic soteriology (i.e. Judaism, Islam or
Christianity) is a spontaneous process in which the former, without
sacrificing its own character provides a popular base for the later.
(Pieris 1988: 99)2

Whilst it is too early to definitively reject Pieris’ claim, it is clear given

recent conversions (or adhesion) to Islam in PNG that conversions from one
soteriology to another are certainly possible if the beliefs, values, rituals and
symbols of the later arriving religion (Islam) are seen by indigenous
Papuans as more closely aligned with their traditional religion than the
existing/first arriving soteriology (Christianity).3 In this sense, the majority
of the PNG population is Christian today but equally could have easily been
Muslim if Islam had arrived more comprehensively prior to European
colonialism.4
Rambo’s framework is unique as a way of studying religious conversion
because it examines the process of conversion and not simply the causes.
Among the literature there are five general causal explanations for
conversions to Islam, which include: the appeal of Islam as a movement for
liberation (e.g. Islamic conversions in India) (Robinson 2003), conversion
as a way of obtaining political and/or material benefits (Griffel 2001), the
influence of trade (Coatalen 1981; Horton 1975a, 1975b), the appeal of
strict monotheism among ‘primal religions’ (Horton 1975a; Pieris 1997),
and the conversion to Islam by ‘force’ or by the ‘sword’ (Arnold 1956)
which Robinson (2003) has shown to be exaggerated. In reality, existing
theories about the causes of Islamic conversion overlap and intersect but
most importantly the causes are linked to and dependent upon the process
of conversion itself (Gooren 2007; Rambo 1993).
All of the causes of conversion mentioned above (except for conversion
by force) are present to varying degrees in conversions to Islam in PNG.
However, these explanations fail to provide a clear understanding of
conversion from the convert’s perspective and thus are ineffective for
enhancing our knowledge of conversion. Unlike Rambo’s approach, these
general explanations of Islamic conversion lack utility because they fail to
capture how conversion affects beliefs, worldviews, motivations, attitudes
and behaviours of converts.
Rambo’s seven-stage process model of conversion (Table 3.1) captures
key elements of the process of religious conversion under the headings:
Context, Crisis; Quest, Encounter, Interaction, Commitment, and
Consequences (Rambo 1993). Human religious experience is rarely simple
or consistent. For the Muslim converts in PNG this diversity of religious
experience was evident in the data, which made Rambo’s framework
attractive because it provides an effective way to manage the diverse and
complex data for analysis.
Context is more than simply the first of seven stages. It is the total
environment or ‘dynamic ecology’ within which Islamic conversion occurs
(Rambo and Farhadian 1999: 24). Importantly, the influencing dimensions
of context remain present throughout the conversion process and act to
constrain or facilitate conversions. The crisis stage represents a breakdown
of an individual’s personal or social world that leads the individual to
undertake a quest in which they actively seek ways of responding to their
crisis. The quest generally but not always leads to some form of encounter
with the new religious alternative, sometimes through media but mostly
through personal contact with an advocate of the new religious option. The
personal encounter leads to more intensive interaction between potential
convert and advocate where information, feelings and actions about the new
option are shared. If interaction is successful then there is a commitment to
the new faith, which results in a number of consequences such as a change
in the convert’s views, attitudes and behaviours.
Table 3.1 Rambo’s seven-stage process model of conversion
Stage 1 CONTEXT
Stage 2 CRISIS
Stage 3 QUEST
Stage 4 ENCOUNTER
Stage 5 INTERACTION
Stage 6 COMMITMENT
Stage 7 CONSEQUENCES
Source: based on Rambo (1993: 17).
 Rambo’s model presented above appears to be a linear process. However,
the stages are not meant to be sequential or fixed, just as conversion itself is
not necessarily permanent or fixed.
For Muslim converts in PNG, some elements of the seven stages are
more closely related and linked to other stages in the process. These related
stages can be visualised together to emphasise the interrelationships
between the concepts and stages and their degree of importance in terms of
causality. On this basis the following three clusters derived from the data
and Rambo’s seven stages are: Context and Crisis; Quest, Encounter and
Interaction; and Commitment and Consequences. Expressed
diagrammatically, the re-organisation of Rambo’s process model that
provides the writing structure is best conceptualised as a bullseye with the
Context and Crisis stages being background factors with the act of
conversion itself at the centre (Commitment and Consequences) (Figure
3.1).
The stages are interactive and iterative and the nature and degree of
intensity of each stage of the conversion process is also variable with the
impacts being different among both individuals and groups. For example,
for almost all Muslim converts, the path to conversion began with an
encounter or stemmed from a sense of crisis, whilst for three converts it
began with commitment itself after following the decision of a tribal leader
(adhesion). Rambo’s framework is best understood and used as a ‘heuristic
guide’ that provides a systematic way of organising the complex data on
conversion (Rambo and Farhadian 1999: 259).
Figure 3.1 An alternative conceptualisation of Rambo’s process model.

Context and Crisis are stages that are necessary but not sufficient as
causes of Islamic conversion in PNG. Although the two stages are presented
as separate chapters they should be considered as closely interrelated. Both
stages are background factors that resemble earlier conversion research on
‘predisposing factors’ by Lofland and Stark, which were used by Rambo to
construct his more detailed approach (Lofland and Stark 1965; Snow and
Phillips 1980). These stages are not sufficient as a cause of conversion
because an individual’s context or crisis may lead them on a quest to seek a
new religion, but without an encounter and subsequent interaction with
Islamic literature or a Muslim, no Islamic conversion will occur. In this
narrow sense, conversion to Islam may simply result from the fact that a
growing number of Papua New Guineans are searching for a new religion
and, by chance, come across Islam rather than deliberately seeking it.
Research clearly shows that Papua New Guineans have a high
predisposition for religious change and innovation, making conversion to
new religions somewhat dependent on the availability of different types of
religions of interest (Goddard and VanHeekeren 2003; Goldman and
Ballard 1998; Jebens 2005; Robbins 2004a; Trompf 2006; Weiner and
Glaskin 2006). In this sense, switching to a new religion is anomalous with
the consumer behaviour of switching products, an understanding outlined in
the religious market model of conversion (Gartrell and Shannon 1985;
Gooren 2006; Stark and Finke 2000). Horton’s description of conversions to
Islam and Christianity in Africa as catalysts for change ‘already in the air’
best reflects this point, in that the desire for change is likely to be already
present in a given society with people effectively waiting for the right
religion to come along (Horton 1971, 1975a, 1975b).
Twenty-two of the Muslim converts interviewed (42 per cent) had
belonged to at least two other Christian sects prior to converting to Islam,
suggesting that people in PNG are open to switching, and do switch
religions. To date there is no detailed research on patterns of religious
switching in PNG despite evidence presented here that it is a common
phenomenon.
The high prevalence of switching religions in PNG means that the
concept of the ‘conversion career’ used to describe ‘multiple event
conversions’ (where people try a series of religious alternatives) is worth
considering in respect to convert behaviour in the context, crisis and quest
stages (Richardson 1978, 1985).
Context consists of two interconnected spheres called the ‘macrocontext’
and ‘microcontext’ (Rambo 1993: 20–23). The macrocontext captures
contributing factors of conversion across the broad areas of culture, religion
and religious organisation, political and economic systems and social
milieu. Globalisation and secularisation are two specific areas within the
social milieu that receive detailed attention.
The microcontext encapsulates the personal dimensions of a convert’s
conversion experience in respect of change in the macrocontext.
Microcontext involves their family, friends or other aspects of personal life
that affect their thoughts, attitudes or behaviours to the new religion. This
aspect of the framework is based on psychological research on conversion,
which specifically examines the interrelationships between the micro and
the macro spheres.
An individual’s or group’s experience/perception of personal or social
crisis is widely acknowledged by most scholars as a contributing factor of
conversion (Rambo 1993: 44). Crises may be cultural, religious, political or
psychological and they are a function of a disturbance or change within the
contextual realm. Crises generally operate in two ways: they can be a
spontaneous/shock event that raises doubts of a fundamental nature in an
individual’s mind such as clarity about their ‘root reality’ (Heirich 1977:
674), or they can be a series of mild, progressive and cumulative problems
across numerous contexts that cannot be solved within a person’s current
(religious) perspective (Greil 1977).
Drawing on the conversion literature, crisis is conceptualised as five
factors, each on a continuum, of which the following four are relevant to
Islamic conversion in PNG. Intensity (mild to severe), duration (brief to
prolonged), scope (limited to extensive), and source (internal to external)
are the elements of crisis present in PNG (Rambo 1993: 47). The most
common crisis types among Muslim converts in PNG ranked in order were,
‘external and internal crises, desire for transcendence, illness and healing,
protean selfhood, apostasy and near-death experience’ (Rambo 1993: 48–
55). The remaining types of crises include ‘mystical experiences, altered
states of consciousness and pathology’ however these were not present in
the data (Rambo 1993: 48–55).
The degree to which crisis is a contributing factor in conversions has
been questioned by Heirich’s control group experiments, which found that
converts and non-converts suffered stress and tension (crisis) equally,
suggesting that crisis alone does not explain why people convert (Heirich
1977: 664). Heirich’s findings on Christian conversion are unlikely to apply
in PNG, due to the fact that the data on Islamic conversion in PNG finds
every one of the 52 converts interviewed explicitly mentioned either
personal or social crisis as a contributing factor in their conversion.
The quest stage covers the ways in which converts have responded to
their actual or perceived crises. In line with the literature, the degree of
agency or ‘response style’ of a convert varies between ‘passive’ and ‘active’
and that variation in agency is linked to individuals’ motivations and
availability (Rambo 1993: 56–65).
This stage assumes that, in general, people seek meaning and purpose in
life and that under crisis situations the need to undertake a quest becomes
more persuasive to attain a resolution, meaning and/or a satisfying identity.
Only three of the PNG converts in my sample appear to have converted
passively; however, the phenomenon of group conversion outlined above
provides evidence that there is a significant percentage of conversion
growth that is adhesion and thus a passive form of conversion (Tippett
1967; Trompf 1991; Whiteman 1983).
The quest stage conceptualises potential converts as free and active
seekers of religious alternatives through social networks, chance
encounters, the mass media, and so on, looking for leads to perspective
means of help. The degree of a convert’s agency and its effect on
conversion is directly dependent on a convert’s degree of availability
(structural, religious, and intellectual) and motivations (Rambo 1993: 60–
63).
Structural availability looks at elements of converts’ lives that can
discourage or prevent conversion by limiting the freedom of the convert to
explore the new religious option, such as availability of time, family,
friendships, employment or religious organisation. In some cases
conversion may actually be an effort to sever or reduce the burden of
undesired familial ties/obligations and this is also examined (Rambo 1993:
60). Intellectual and religious availability relates to the person’s previous
cognitive and spiritual viewpoints, and the degree to which they can relate
to the new option can influence the individual’s conversion.
A wide range of motivating factors can influence the nature of a convert’s
quest and determine their degree of commitment and consequences (Rambo
1993: 63–65). The desire for material benefits and opportunities and the
needs to enhance self-esteem and/or establish and maintain relationships are
key factors in Islamic conversion that are explored. For example, a person
with a deep need to understand themselves or the world may convert
because the new religion provides a convincing and coherent conceptual
system. A person who is disconnected from their traditional tribal/ethnic
social networks through urban migration might convert to find a sense of
community when they move to a new town. A person denied the
opportunity of salvation in one faith might be motivated to seek a religion
that provides transcendental security. Importantly, conversion is likely to
occur because of a number of motivations interacting at the same time.
The encounter and interaction stages explore the relationship between the
convert and the advocate/proselytiser/missionary. An encounter can occur
before the crisis or quest stage and can actually precipitate a crisis and
foster a desire or interest in the potential convert that leads them on a quest.
These stages focus on the nature and function of the advocate(s) and the
reaction and expectations of potential converts to the advocate and the
advocate’s message (Rambo 1993: 66–101).
The concepts of encounter and interaction are important because
‘immediate personal influences have more impact than … one’s
psychological state or prior socialisation’, which makes the encounter of
particular importance to conversion research (Heirich 1977: 669). A recent
empirical test of Rambo’s framework by Kahn and Greene (2004) questions
the importance of the encounter stage as a standalone factor, and although
the evidence from PNG supports Rambo’s view that encounter is an
essential element of conversion, it also shows that the interaction that
develops as a result of encounter is much more important.
Understanding the nature and role of the advocate is essential as
proselytisation is generally a frequent precursor to conversion (Isser and
Schwartz 1988: 17), and because missionaries and missionary organisations
represent agents of change (Beidelman 1974; Burridge 1991). The
interaction stage addresses who the advocates in PNG are, describes their
personal/organisational backgrounds and the degree to which conversion is
central to their mission. It also describes the advocates’ strategies and
degree and style of proselytising, and modes of contact (e.g. personal or
public) (Rambo 1993: 68–86). Also captured in this stage is the reaction and
expectations of potential converts to the advocate, and advocates’ messages
and the degree of benefit that the Islamic community provides to the
convert, such as an ideology or way of life. The four categories relevant to
the PNG case include ‘a system of meaning, emotional gratification,
techniques for living, and power’ (Rambo 1993: 81–86).
Based on the sample of PNG converts, the interaction stage can vary in
duration from one week to three years. The interaction stage represents the
period after the initial encounter whereby the individual or group chooses to
continue contact with the advocate. This stage is notable for the increased
intensity of learning about the new religion; its tenets, lifestyle and
expectations prior to making the commitment to convert (Rambo 1993:
102–123). The agency (passivity and activity) of both advocate and
potential convert play out in this stage with the advocate working to sustain
the interaction to enhance the possibility of persuading the individual/group
to convert (Rambo 1993: 102–123).
The features of interaction are broken into four spheres by Rambo, of
which only relationships, ritual, and rhetoric are relevant to Islamic
conversion in PNG (Rambo 1993: 107–123). The development of personal
relationships with Muslims (e.g. family, friends, teachers or strangers) is
influential upon conversion, with evidence showing that conversion is more
likely when close relationships exist between convert and advocate (Rambo
and Farhadian 1999: 31).
 Ritual is crucial in several ways. Most importantly ‘it offers a form of
knowledge that is distinctive from, but as important as, cognitive
knowledge’ (Rambo and Farhadian 1999: 114). As already mentioned, 35
converts claimed that similarities between their Kastom and Islam was a
major reason for their conversion. Rhetoric refers to the language people
learn and use as part of the conversion process, which ‘is informed by a
formal theology’ (Rambo 1993: 118–121). Interaction is iterative and
ongoing until the dynamic process either culminates in the commitment
stage or results in the potential convert walking away from the religion.
The commitment stage represents the decision threshold that the convert
reaches when they finally decide to switch religious affiliation and convert
(Rambo 1993: 124–141). For conversion to Islam, commitment involves a
variety of observable behaviour of the type discussed in the definition of
conversion above (declaration, institutional recognition and behavioural
change). By making the commitment, converts are likely to experience
feelings of relief or liberation and a change in behaviour, attitudes and
worldview. The degree of commitment will determine the range of
consequences resulting from the conversion.
The consequences or effects of conversion ‘depend in part on how many
aspects of the convert’s life are affected and how comprehensive these
changes are’ (Rambo and Farhadian 1999: 32). ‘The impact of individual
and group religious change can foment profound change within social and
political arenas’ (Rambo and Farhadian 1999: 32).
The definition of conversion used in this book is multifaceted because
conversion means different things to each convert. For some, conversion to
Islam is a radical change, yet for others (especially those who feel strongly
about reversion) conversion brings only minor changes to belief and
worldview compared with the religion they previously adhered to
(Christianity) or fully believed in (Christianity or traditional religion). For
analytical purposes the most important aspect of these definitions of
conversion is that regardless of type (conversion or adhesion), converting to
Islam and becoming Muslim is a self-ascribed state.
By converting to Islam, converts not only experience a range of
emotional and ideological changes, but most importantly they identify
themselves as Muslims through a process of ‘self-categorisation’ (David
1996, 1999; Turner 1987). The self-categorisation process helps determine
their degree of positive or negative sentiment towards both other Muslims
and non-Muslims. These sentiments can affect the process each individual
convert goes through and the influence, and intensity of each stage shapes
the strength and value of their Muslim identity.

Notes
1 The degree of syncretism in PNG is difficult to determine due to the complex interrelationships
between old and new religions, which makes it difficult to determine distinctions of influence of
one on the other, thus making any such distinctions artificial (Jebens 2005: xv). Tradition and
traditional religion are also widely viewed as problematic concepts in the literature on cultural
change because they are not static constructs, see (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Keesing 1982;
Otto and Borsboom 1997; Otto and Pedersen 2005b; Stewart and Shaw 1994).
2 Soteriology is the branch of theology that deals with salvation and the term refers to any kind of
religion regardless of whether it has a saviour figure or not. Christian soteriology is based on the
belief in Jesus as the saviour who saves people from sin as a result of his resurrection after death
on the cross, while Islamic soteriology is based on the belief that a person must repent and atone
for their sins in their mortal life through good deeds in order to attain salvation.
3 Whilst there are many similarities between the three Abrahamic monotheistic religions (Judaism,
Christianity and Islam) there are also large differences regarding doctrinal matters such as
salvation, rituals and the symbols and values of each faith. It is the differences and similarities
between the three religions to which Muslim converts refer, and cite as a reason for their
conversion. A recent examination of the religious studies literature by Dodds (2009) shows that
most scholars of religion argue that although commonality exists it is in large measure peripheral
to each religion’s respective beliefs, especially when comparing faiths. For example, the core
Christian beliefs of holy trinity, incarnation and Jesus’ resurrection (for people’s atonement) are
categorically denied by Judaism and Islam. On the other hand there are key beliefs in both Islam
and Judaism that are not shared by Christianity, and so on. Thus, commonality is present but it
hides crucial differences.
4 The point that all Papua New Guineans could have been Muslim if only Muslims had arrived
before Europeans was mentioned in the PNG Parliament by Daniel Kapi MP who said, ‘You are
not Muslims because they did not come to PNG first. If they were here before the Christians then
you will be Muslims too’ (Hansard 2001).
4
Globalisation and the limits of Kastom
and Christianity

Papua New Guinea is, in some respects, a country ideally suited to

conversion movements. Changes in social, political, economic and cultural
contexts have combined to significantly destabilise individuals and their
understanding of the world and are influencing Papua New Guineans to
convert to Islam. The causes of conversions to Islam stem from a wide-
ranging and complex set of factors that evolve from within a changing
social, cultural and religious context. This widespread contextual change
stimulates a number of crises (personal/social) for potential converts
(individuals and groups), thus this chapter and the following chapter are
closely interlinked.
The following four primary contextual themes present in PNG can be
extrapolated: globalisation and secularisation, material dimensions,
congruence, and resistance and rejection. These concepts reflect the major
themes in the conversion environment and the opinions and thoughts of
converts.
‘Context’ and ‘Crisis’ are the words used to describe the first two stages
of conversion and the complex environment that effectively primes
potential converts for conversion. The Context stage is more than simply
the first stage of the conversion process; it is the total environment from
which conversion emerges, and its extensive influence persists throughout
each of the other conversion stages (Rambo 1993: 20). In PNG, specific
contextual themes both facilitate and impede Islamic conversion. These
include religion, culture, society, politics and economics, and are
inextricably linked and intertwined.
 Although I have teased Context and Crisis stages apart and presented the
stages separately, they are very closely interrelated and connected in a
symbiotic, rather than linear fashion. In line with earlier work (Trompf
1990; 1991), it became clear during fieldwork in PNG that the rapid state of
change in contextual elements is creating a number of social and personal
crises for converts, and those who experience higher levels of crisis
undertake a more rigorous Quest for a solution, which can take the form of
an alternative religion.
Three broad hypotheses explaining conversions became apparent through
convert interviews. The first hypothesis is based around the receptiveness of
individuals or groups when they are affected by widespread contextual
change, which can marginalise their position in society. Whilst marginality
may have a number of sources, each form relates to being disconnected to
particular sources of power and support (i.e. traditional culture, religious
and/or political power). Thus, in general, the more marginalised the
individual or group feels, the more likely they are to convert.
The second hypothesis highlights the role of crisis in conversions.
Indigenous cultures in crisis have more potential converts than stable
societies, and the likelihood of conversion increases if the duration,
intensity and scope of crises increase. During severe crises, the deficiencies
of culture become obvious to many, thus stimulating interest in religious
alternatives. The patterns of conversion vary depending on whether the
crisis is internally or externally stimulated.
The third hypothesis is based on the congruence between cultural and/or
religious systems and the similarities or differences between culture and
religion. The greater the congruence between cultural/religious systems (in
the context of cultural contact), and value and symbols between religious
cultures, the more likely it is that conversion will transpire. This dimension
has clear linkages with, and implications for, the helicopter theory of
conversion.
These three hypotheses accurately capture the context surrounding
conversions to Islam in PNG when tested using convert statements and
evidence from the conversion literature.
Many scholars of religion and religious change in the Pacific argue that
dramatic religious changes in PNG are underway partly in response to
globalisation (Crick 1997; Ernst 1994; Ernst 2006a; Trompf 2006). Gibbs
asserts that this general view does not apply to PNG because there is little
evidence to suggest a connection between globalising forces and a change
in religious allegiance (Gibbs 2006: 148). Yet Gibbs’ assertion is surprising
given the existence of three recent PNG-focused ethnographic studies that
found that a push back to tradition and the accommodation of new forms of
religion are the dominant trends among the many varied responses to
globalising forces (Crick 1997). Certainly, the evidence from Islamic
conversions suggests that contextual change resulting from globalisation is
a major influence on conversion.
The impact of globalisation on Islamic conversions must, however be
viewed in light of the wider religious context in PNG, which is in a state of
flux. PNG is famous for its proliferating new religious movements (NRMs)
that are ‘transitional in nature’ and often referred to as ‘cargoist,
revitalising, nativist or just plain new’ (Trompf 2006: 32). The statistics
previously presented on religious affiliation show that on a daily basis,
many Papua New Guineans are leaving mainline churches that were
popular in the colonial period, and either converting to evangelical,
Pentecostal or charismatic Christian sects (Robbins 2004a), or are
converting to other revivalist forms of traditional religion in the form of
cargo cults (Lattas 1998). Conversion to Islam is part of this wider trend.
Traditional tribal societies in PNG have undergone a large yet
incalculable degree of cultural, social, political and religious change as a
result of colonisation, decolonisation and modernity. In the pre-colonial
societies of PNG, religion was an integral and unifying dimension of an
indigenous person’s society and life, and ‘culture was virtually
indistinguishable from religion’ (Geertz 1973: 89). The foundations of
‘belief’, ‘social order’ and ‘knowledge’ in traditional PNG tribal societies
have been severely affected by these forces of globalisation.
For the purpose of this book, globalisation is defined as a historical
process of change and ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations
[over time] which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings
are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (Giddens
1991: 64).
Traditional foundations became devalued and begun to disappear as a
result of a number of the twin invasion forces of Christianity (spiritual) and
Western modernity (material, ideological) (Trompf 1991). Factors include
the influence of Christian missions, Western education and loss of
traditional knowledge, urban migration to towns that has weakened pre-
existing social bonds, changes to women’s traditional roles (emancipation),
and traditional wealth and exchange systems giving way to a monetised
economy (Trompf 1991). Inevitably, tensions have arisen from the
processes of colonisation and Christianisation and led to a clash between
traditional and modern value systems (Trompf 1986). This, in turn, has
created opportunities for religions that offer an alternative to dominant
colonial religions to become more established.
PNG is often publicly declared a ‘Christian country’ by Papua New
Guineans, which seems reasonable as the available statistics show over 96
per cent of the total population is affiliated with a Christian sect (NSO
2003). This background effectively pits Christianity against any other
religion or Christian sect that people may consider converting to.
Globalisation theories of religious conversion are useful for
understanding religious change in PNG (Huntington 1996; Metcalf 1994;
Poewe 1994). They clearly illustrate a widespread global trend that links
local factors to the growth in conversions to new religious movements.
Globalisation theories focus on fundamentalist Christian groups (Brouwer
et al. 1996; Buckser and Glazier 2003; Ernst 1994, 2006a; Robbins 2004b)
and Islamic revivalist movements such as the Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-
Tahrir (Metcalf 2003; Wagner 2004), as these are seeing the most
significant growth.
The literature in this category provides numerous examples of how
colonisation and decolonisation, international migration, improved
communications and travel have stimulated religious revival and facilitated
the spread of Islam and Christianity to new locations. The establishment
and growth of Islam in PNG is related to contextual dimensions of
globalisation that have played a direct role in alerting PNG nationals to new
religious options.
A key assumption of globalisation theories of conversion relevant to
Islamic conversions in PNG is that converts are attracted to a different
religion because they view it as modern or new. This factor is even more
appealing if the new religion possesses a narrative suited to people who see
themselves as dispossessed, displaced, or are searching for spiritual renewal
(Hefner 1998; Kaplan 1995; Van Der Veer 1996). Post-colonial theorists
have added a deeper understanding of the context around conversions of
this nature (Kaplan 1995; Rafael 1988; Viswanathan 1998), arguing that
conversions to Christianity and Islam in Africa, Asia and North and South
America were a colonisation of people’s spirituality by force rather than by
choice on the part of converts (Kaplan 1995; Rafael 1988; Viswanathan
1998). Indeed Christianity was ‘installed at the national level in PNG … as
a traditionalized state religion by a departing colonial power and local elites
under colonial influence’, even though Christianity today is ‘often used as a
key vehicle for the expression of individual and collective identity and
indigenous spirituality’ (Douglas 2001: 618–621).
From this perspective, change to the religion instilled through
colonisation or a syncretic blend of old and new, can be anticipated as a
form of indigenous resistance and innovation.
It is worth noting here that the contemporary global revival in Islam is
‘targeting societies more than the state and calling to the individuals’
spiritual needs’, with the resultant growth in conversions ‘illustrating
multiform expressions of religious practice and discourse that links
individuals and groups to larger social movements’ (Roy 2004: 3). Convert
sentiment expressed in interviews aligns with Roy’s observation, and Islam
does appear to appeal to converts as a means of identifying with larger
social movements.
Globalisation literature and post-colonial theorists seem to downplay the
agency of converts in the initial conversion process, presenting converts as
submissive and passive actors at the mercy of proselytes of the new
religious alternatives. Yet Horton’s microcosm/macrocosm framework
(embedded in Rambo’s conversion framework) refutes aspects of
globalisation and post-colonial theories of conversion. His case studies of
conversion in Africa offer a nuanced and balanced understanding of the
complex interaction and agency of both proselytes and converts. In PNG
today, conversions occur because individuals actively seek to understand,
control and predict their everyday world. Horton’s work shows that as
globalisation brought greater outside interaction and mobility, the
traditional microcosms of small African communities expanded. Local
understandings of the wider world were understood through the expansion
of existing myths, symbols and rituals to align the local realities with global
events and knowledge (Horton 1971, 1975a, 1975b).
The growing body of research that applies globalisation theory to the
growth of fundamentalist Christianity in PNG (Ernst 2006a; Eves 2008;
Robbins 2004b) suggests that conversions to new religious alternatives is
occurring as a result of individuals’ efforts to understand and explain
globalisation and modern concepts (Eves 2000, 2003). These PNG studies
align with Horton’s theory describing how converts attempt to reconcile
local and global knowledge in a two-way process that allows them to attach
local significance to global events and vice versa.
Based on the data, it appears that in PNG the single biggest effect of
globalisation has been secularisation. Secularisation has pierced ‘the sacred
canopy’ of religion that was previously the central dimension of social life,
and has resulted in religious culture becoming more diverse and religion
losing its social authority (Berger 1967).
Despite the influences of globalisation and secularisation, many people in
PNG today still see religion as an essential part of an integrated cultural
system (Geertz 1966; Trompf 1991). Papua New Guinean philosopher and
politician Bernard Narokobi once explained this dominant local perspective,
claiming that people in PNG still do not differentiate between religious and
non-religious experience and have a total and living encounter with the
universe (Narokobi 1980, 1985). This view that human life is a unified
spiritual and material world is shared globally by all Muslims, and
interestingly, prior to the reformation, Christianity also shared such a view
(Asad 1993). Many contemporary academics agree with Narokobi’s
perspective and point out that the integrated worldview held by most people
in PNG is at odds with Christianity and Western science (Gibbs 2006;
Trompf 1991).
The response to secularisation in PNG has been similar to that in most
other parts of the world, with a rise in conversions to fundamentalist
religions, particularly Christian and Islamic forms, which paradoxically
contributes to even greater secularisation (Appleby et al. 2003; Bruce 2000;
Emerson and Hartmann 2006; Marty and Appleby 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995;
Riesebrodt 2000). Over the last 40 years in PNG there has been a
proliferation in the number of new Christian sects, with the number
currently exceeding 200 (Gibbs 2006). Where it was previously usual for
communities to have only one church, ‘today it is quite common for people
even of villages in remote areas with populations of fewer than 500 souls to
be co-existing with a variety’ of new religious groups and churches (Ernst
2006a: 5).
This situation has led to the development of a commonly held view
among many people that ‘Christianity in PNG is characterised by disunity,
bitter interdenominational conflicts, and the endless intrusion of man-made
customs in the praise and veneration of the almighty’ and that, ‘in the hands
of feeble men Christianity has become fragmented into a thousand shards,
like remnants of a shattered stained glass cathedral window’ (National
2003).
‘Splitting’ and sectarianism is dividing tribes, clans and families and even
erupting into violent conflict at times involving arson, assaults and murder
(De’Ath 1981; Pamba 2002a; Wakefield 2001). In the past, some analysts
argued that Christian churches provided the basis for national unity in PNG
(Douglas 2002; Trompf 1991), however it is hard to see unity on the basis
of religion against a background of increasingly complex sectarian
divisions. A number of PNG Christian leaders have spoken about this issue
publicly, highlighting disunity and growing secularisation as a major
problem with Christianity in PNG and stating ‘churches are highly
suspicious of each other and can only find unity in matters that are of no
importance one way or another’ (Trompf 1991; Sasere 2003).
There are numerous examples of the sectarianism problem and as many
reasons for why it is occurring (Alphonse 2007). The most common
disputes appear to be over resources, internal religious institutional politics
and theological issues. Some PNG church leaders claim sectarianism is
increasing because Christian churches are corrupt (Walters 2007a, 2007b),
whilst others go so far as to assert that Christianity should be ‘put on trial’
because ‘many who go to church also drink, smoke, and [have] immoral
relationships’ (Kolma 2002a).
Theological causes of splitting are also evident and often stem from
conflicting interpretations of the Bible, which have even split some of the
stronger Christian sects in PNG such as the Seventh-day Adventists
(Hriehwazi 2002). This trend occurs in PNG because of the growing
importance of the Bible among people. PNG shares features of
fundamentalist Pentecostal, evangelical and charismatic Christians globally
in this respect, in that there is an emphasis on the Bible as the highest
religious authority and followers read it in literal terms (Robbins 2004b:
120). This tendency of Papua New Guineans to take the Bible literally is
also highlighted by Knauft (2002: 162) who quotes fundamentalist
Christian converts as saying ‘the Bible is not just the talk of the church
leaders, but the talk of God himself. You must read the Bible in order to
understand’.
 In Ernst’s view, the trend towards sectarianism and the resultant
proliferation of fundamentalist Christian churches in Melanesia may be
based on their adherence to ‘strict laws that promise individual certainty’ or
provide a ‘shortcut to certainty’ (Ernst 2006a: 731). Knauft (2002: 172) has
also noted that fundamentalist Christian religions appeal to many in PNG
because of their reactionary proclamations regarding the global rise of
immorality and excessive wealth and greed, and the call for personal
suffering and abnegation of new ways, which for all intents and purposes
are best described as ‘anti-modern rather than modern’. Robbins (2001a)
and Jebens (2005) also support Ernst’s view and argue that fundamentalist
churches in PNG are notable for their emphasis on self-control and support
for certain limited forms of gender equality and a very firm rejection of
indigenous religious traditions.
My fieldwork interviews and reviews of news media in PNG support
Ernst’s view, suggesting that Islam is appealing and growing at a similar
rate to fundamentalist churches for similar reasons. Forty-one converts (78
per cent) claimed to have converted to Islam based on its strict rules, and
they highlighted a desire for widespread conversion to Islam, which they
saw as a means of bringing peace, stability and greater law and order.
Like many fundamentalist sects in PNG, Islam has strict laws such as
prohibitions on alcohol, tobacco, betel nut, and diet (no meat/pork), as well
as strong ingroup norm expectations around worship, (Koran) study
programs, Koranic interpretation (in a literal way) and fasting (Kapi 2002).
These strict laws appeal on the basis that they provide a sense of clarity and
security in a changing social environment. In this sense, Islam is similar to
fundamentalist churches, as these churches are seen as actually practising
religion rather than merely possessing acceptable religious beliefs. Mikail
explained this pattern of religious change, saying: They leave [mainline
churches] because they think Pentecostals will avoid them from things like
playing cards, drinking and these sorts of things, not because of the belief,
because the belief is the same … the trinity and all that. They go [and
convert to Pentecostalism] because they practice their principles and are
more strict than Catholic and that’s why they leave [Catholicism].

Muslims in PNG are widely perceived as morally strict and devoutly

religious to the point where even the Secretary of the PNG Council of
Churches has said that ‘Christians have much to learn from their Muslim
brothers and sisters who display conviction in their faith and an enthusiasm
for practicing it’ (National 2000b).
The sectarianism and fundamentalist trend within the PNG context finds
wider support in the literature, which suggests that when existing religious
institutions ‘have symptoms of decadence, the growth [through conversion]
of strong fundamentalist churches indicates the rejection of a society-wide
set of beliefs in favour of group particularism’ (Spickard 2001: 110).
Iannaccone draws a conclusion that the increasing presence of
fundamentalist churches reflects the inability of mainline Christian religions
to provide unity and satisfy adherents’ religious needs (Iannaccone 1994).
This appears to be the case among Christian sects in PNG.
This state of flux in the religious context flows through to other aspects
of life in modern PNG society, such as significant political, economic and
social instability (Baker 2005). The flux in religion can be seen as
intertwined with contextual change in these other aspects of PNG life.
Problems regarding the analysis of religious change in PNG previously
existed because ‘religion … was predominantly compartmentalised … into
a separate domain’ (Douglas 2001: 617). Fortunately, the pervasive
influence of religion in community life generally, including the political
sphere, is more widely recognised today as a major factor of political and
social change (Stewart and Strathern 1998, 2001b), particularly in the
Highlands region of PNG where spheres of religion and politics cannot
arguably be separated (Clark 1997; Gibbs 2005; Stewart and Strathern
2000). This point is particularly important given the surging popularity of
fundamentalist religions in PNG and the fact that most resurgent
fundamentalist religions aim to reshape their political environment along
religious lines as part of their reaction to modernity/secularisation (Appleby
et al. 2003; Marty and Appleby 1993, 1995).
Political instability in PNG today stems from differences between
traditional political systems that were based on small and stateless ethnic
groupings, and the colonially installed, centralised, bureaucratic structure of
government (Chowning 1977; Langness 1972; Larmour 1995). There are a
number of seemingly intractable and long-running problems resulting from
the differences between old and new political systems. This has led some
analysts to question whether PNG is ‘viable’ as a nation-state (Gosarevski
2004), despite others arguing that electoral participation, and smooth
transfers of power mean that the country has a robust and viable democracy
(Reilly 2000). Whilst it may be technically accurate to claim the PNG
political system is a relative success on electoral measures, most Papua
New Guineans criticise the performance of the country’s systems of
governance, which they see as not delivering (Standish 2007).
The view held by many PNG citizens that their governance is ineffective
and corrupt is well-founded, based on available data (May and Aiyus 2007).
PNG currently ranks the lowest of all countries in the Pacific region on
Transparency International’s corruption index with indicators showing that
the general trend is getting worse (Larmour 2009: 147). Throughout much
of PNG, the capacity of government to provide essential services is over-
stretched, and the quality of education, healthcare, road infrastructure and
other basic services is deteriorating, while crime rates are increasing. The
failure of political governance is relevant to Islamic conversions because it
is a source of crisis leading to conversion. The ‘impotent influence of a
weak state has led many Papua New Guineans (particularly in the
Highlands) to turn to religion and ritual to seek security and identity’
(Stewart and Strathern 1998: 133). In this vein, PNG Pentecostal leader
Pastor Godfrey Wippon has argued that, ‘the Muslim faith is simply filling
a spiritual void created as a result of Christian churches being too deeply
involved with politics and business ventures’ (Kapi 2000).
Pastor Wippon’s comment refers to a significant and complicating
dimension of the political scene wherein the increasing incidence of
Christian church leaders entering into politics has developed because Papua
New Guineans increasingly seek to elect ‘God-fearing leaders’ in an attempt
to bring order and stability to the country (Gibbs 2005). Somewhat
paradoxically, however, the growing involvement of ‘Christian’ candidates
appears to be reducing the legitimacy of Christianity, due to the endemic
corruption of the political system and the association of Christianity with
this system (Gibbs 2000, 2004b).
Initially, mainline church clergy became involved in politics as there was
a widely held view in PNG that people need to vote for members possessing
the qualities mentioned in the Bible (Gibbs 2005). Many in PNG perceived
political leaders to be ‘morally unstable, politically and socially
unpredictable and corrupt and lack biblical direction and principles’ (Peni
2002), a situation that led some commentators to recommend that people
should ‘vote like you worship’ (Pamba 2002b).
 Despite the increased involvement of mainline religious leaders in
politics the political and social situation has not improved. Given that Papua
New Guineans view religion as integral to their lives (including the political
system), it may be that many see the failure of mainline church leaders to
improve society as a signal that these shortcomings are grounded in the
religion itself. The growing association between corruption in politics and
religious leaders is becoming increasingly obvious, especially with the rise
of situations in which religious political candidates conduct electioneering
by ‘touring with a Bible in one hand whilst distributing money to voters
with the other hand’ (Kolma 2002b).
The involvement of older churches in politics without a corresponding
reduction in corruption is creating space for newer, stricter churches to enter
the political arena. The new religious parties aim to attract votes on the
basis that their stricter policies can fix the nation’s problems. The recent
increase in the number of religious leaders from newer fundamentalist sects
engaging in politics represents a growing public sentiment that stronger
religious powers are needed to control the increasing threats of political
corruption and social violence (Gibbs 2005: 9), a view publicly supported
by an increasing number of journalists and religious leaders (Orere 2007;
Pake 2007; Walters 2002).
Interestingly, a pattern of voting behaviour on the basis of religion
became obvious in 2002 when ‘a record breaking 43 political parties’
participating in the national elections claimed to be ‘pursuing politics with
the teachings of Christianity guiding them or being part of their policies’
(Pamba 2002b). This trend persisted in the 2007 election, which saw the
greatest number of electoral candidates from mainline churches and
fundamentalist sects ever fielded with some parties, such as the PNG
Revival Party, being made up of a loose coalition of independent
Pentecostal churches (Post Courier 2007; Kolma 2002b; Pundari 2002).
Economic factors in PNG are important in regard to religious conversion
because ‘in the absence of economic development, spiritual development in
one form or another becomes an even stronger imperative’ (Knauft 2002:
173). Since independence in 1975 the PNG economy has experienced
significant economic difficulty, despite economists declaring that the
country has performed well once the resources boom commenced in 2002
(Batten et al. 2009). An uncritical view of gross domestic product (GDP)
data for PNG might lead one to conclude that the country has performed
well since 2002. However, PNG GDP data masks the growing polarisation
of wealth and the fact that the average person is not improving in socio-
economic terms. The polarisation of wealth is problematic because
economically and socially a form of egalitarianism traditionally existed
among many PNG societies (for men. That is – women, however, were
treated more as property) (Strathern 1982). Most people in PNG remain
poor and many are getting poorer with the number facing chronic poverty
increasing daily (Cammack 2007).
Colonisation and the continuing influence of Western ways and Christian
values have had a particularly large effect on the pre-colonial social fabric,
especially in areas such as law and justice, gender relations and family. This
has had numerous negative side effects, especially when compared with
traditional societies and their systems of justice, which were very strict
(Bergmann 1971; Trompf 1991, 1994; Williams 1939). For example, in
coastal PNG societies that are often viewed as moderate, there was a sense
of ‘balance’ in punishments for wrong acts; ‘one would spear if they had
been speared, hit if they had been hit’ (Williams 1939: 18), whereas in the
Highlands the punishment for adultery or stealing a fellow tribesman’s wife
was death (Bergman 1971: Vol. 3, 138–152).
The justice system is failing to enforce law in PNG and this is having a
significant impact (and leading to social crises). It is clear from published
research that Papua New Guineans are unique in the strict way that they
‘interpret the vicissitudes of life in terms of requital or retributive
principles’ (Trompf 1994: 2). This is
not to say that forms of payback are necessarily uniquely Melanesian, rather revenge is
approached differently by different religions, with revenge in PNG having specific features that
allow the forms of retribution present there to be categorized as distinct from most other societies.
(Trompf 1994: 14)

Tippett warned long ago that

if the Western judicial system is seen to fail in righting wrongs then there
will be a call for payback which represents a deep cry for justice on the
grounds that such wrongs left without retribution threaten the cohesion of
the kin unit and social structure.
(Tippett 1967: 273)
 The way justice (reward and punishment) is understood in PNG societies
today is compromised and caught between two systems that are both failing
(Dinnen 1997; Robbins 2004a; Trompf 1994). Old laws and values clash
with the modern laws and values that make up the contemporary legal
system, leaving both systems ineffectual and unable to enforce either code
of law with the result being a relative form of anarchy (Trompf 1994: 51).
It is in this environment that the culture of payback (positive gift
exchange and negative payback – killings and compensation) continues to
prevail as a distinctive element permeating PNG social life. Taking revenge
is of religious importance and those who do not take revenge will feel a
special sense of guilt (Irwin 1972). Negative payback such as the use of
physical violence (retaliation) or the payment of blood money
(compensation) persists as a central mechanism of conflict management and
conflict resolution (National 2007b). This behaviour has persisted despite
the efforts of Christian missionaries to promote a ‘turn the other cheek’
approach (Ketan 2004: 160).
Widespread change regarding gender and family relations is also having
a significant impact on the social fabric (Kewa 2007). Although there is still
serious inequality between men and women in PNG today (Douglas 2000:
273), modern laws have led women to a degree of emancipation when
compared with the pre-colonial period, during which they had no political
power and were almost completely submissive to men (Knauft 1993;
Trompf 1991). Modern law has made illegal the once widespread practice
of polygamy (where a man has multiple wives), and supported women’s
rights to freely choose a mate, and made it illegal to treat women as
chattels.1 Traditionally, marriage in most PNG societies was permitted only
by the agreement of marriage payment and other arrangements set by the
families and kin groups concerned (Brown 1995: 182).
The more subtle influence of Christian morals and education has made
polygamy a sin punishable by excommunication and the denial of salvation.
The church emphasis on equality has also led to a reduction in female
sexual and menstrual taboos, and a reduction in widespread gender
segregation practices, even though some of these are still practised in rural
PNG (Knauft 1993; Trompf 1991).
The weakening of gender segregation and laws on sexuality are argued
by some to have caused increases in the incidence of adultery and divorce,
prostitution, homosexuality and the transmission of sexual diseases.
Certainly the evidence suggests that prior to colonisation adultery, sexual
disease and divorce were practically unheard of in traditional societies
because they had a rigid cultural dichotomy of sexes (Meggitt 1964).
Prior to colonialism and the introduction of a cash economy in PNG,
there was no such thing as commercial sex in the strict sense of the term.
For most ethnic groups, extra-marital sex and even pre-marital promiscuity
were strongly disapproved of, and often violently punished (Stewart 2006:
2). Homosexuality was limited to ritualised fertility practices among a few
south-coast PNG societies, and this practice among a small number of tribes
contrasts strongly with the majority of societies, especially societies in the
Highlands where sexual mores were stricter and focused on managing
purely heterosexual relations. However, the perception today that
homosexuality is increasing in PNG society is based more on public
hysteria than on evidence (Knauft 1993; Stewart 2006).
The worsening gender relations and increase in domestic violence is
argued by some to be the result of the shift in power relations between men
and women and the introduction of alcohol during Australian colonial rule
(Trompf 1991: 343). A primary cause of this shift has been the active
promotion of equality between the sexes by Christian churches, a shift that
Papua New Guinean men are actively opposing and resisting with violence
(Douglas 2001; Stewart and Strathern 1998; Tuzin 1997). There is a trend
globally for more women than men to join and stay with fundamentalist
churches (Pentecostal and evangelical) and for women to also be more
active in these churches than men on the basis such churches tend to
enhance ‘women’s autonomy and equality’ (Martin 2001: 54).
The contextual overview described thus far provides a general backdrop
of religious, cultural, and social change in PNG. It is within this context that
the themes of material dimensions, ‘congruence’ and ‘resistance and
rejection’, exist and varieties of crises evolve and contribute to Islamic
conversion.
When Europeans arrived in PNG displaying material and technological
wealth, many Papua New Guineans either believed the new arrivals were
their dead ancestors, or that they were people who had special religious
beliefs and practices, which were responsible for white people’s goods and
power. Conversions in PNG at this time primarily occurred as a result of
people’s search for material equality (Burridge 1969; De’Ath 1981; Trompf
1991). For almost the entire period of colonial occupation of Papua New
Guinea by the Germans, the British and Australians, it was through the
presence of Christian missionaries that people came into contact with the
forces of modernity through their provision of schools, hospitals and
churches (Biskup et al. 1970).
Accordingly, some argue that PNG locals viewed conversion to
Christianity simply as the rot bilong kago (road to the cargo) (Lawrence
1964), and converted for practical purposes and not strictly for theological
reasons (Ernst 1994; Pouwer 1999). This influence on Christian conversions
during the period of global colonisation is not unique to PNG and
Melanesia; the pattern of ‘missions and money’ has also been identified as a
cause of conversions in much of Africa and Southeast Asia (Keane 1996;
Summers 2003). Although material aspects of conversions in PNG are
influential it is incorrect to conclude that conversions to Christianity and
now Islam are superficial, and simply the result of opportunistic attempts to
obtain cargo rather than being genuine spiritual transformations. Indeed for
many years, anthropologists have emphasised that new religious
movements are not always or only ‘cargo-cultist’ (Loeliger and Trompf
1985).
The material influences of conversion should not be viewed
simplistically as fetishism, even though material aspects of life hold an
‘especially great attraction’ for Papua New Guineans (Trompf 1991: 167).2
The relationship between material wealth and religion is embedded in
Papua New Guineans’ traditional religious ontology, which sees religion as
a unified and integral part of life with no partition between the material and
spiritual. Traditional life emphasised the importance of religious belief and
practice ‘to deliver people from personal and social troubles’ and provide
success, wealth and health ‘in the present [emphasis added] as well as in the
hereafter [life after death]’ (Strelan 1977: 13).
Consequently, many argue that new religious movements (NRMs) in
PNG should be seen as salvation movements that are a direct result of the
reaction of existing traditional religious sentiments in traditional cultures to
the changing social, cultural and/or religious environment (Strathern and
Stewart 2009; Strelan 1977; Trompf 1991). In PNG in particular,
conversion to Islam must be examined from both material and spiritual
dimensions.
Christian churches provide most of the social welfare services in PNG,
thus it is reasonable to assume that it would be difficult for people to leave
Christianity if these services are only accessible to Christians. The influence
of materials as an incentive to convert to a new religion continues today in
much of Melanesia and is not an artefact of earlier times. Jebens claims that
the Seventh-day Adventist sect is the fastest growing in PNG today because
it draws in converts by ‘promising or giving them clothing and money’
(Jebens 2005: 173). However, over the last 20 years there has been a
breakdown in the provision of government subsidies to churches for the
delivery of welfare. This has resulted in a significant contraction, and in
some cases closures of Christian-operated social welfare services,
particularly among some of the provinces in which Islam is seeing the
strongest growth (Chimbu and Oro) (Gerawa 1997; Setepano 1997).
This reduction of services (kago) has occurred within the broader context
of cutbacks on welfare expenditure by the PNG government from the late
1990s into early 2000 (Meava 1999). This coincides with the period leading
up to the surge in Islamic conversions, which commenced in late 2001.
Given this situation one can hypothesise that if Islamic groups provide
social welfare as part of their proselytising strategy, then conversions to
Islam may be likely. The issue of what kago is provided, by whom, and
how, is addressed in Chapter 6. However, the range of goods needs to be
briefly mentioned here in order to situate the ethnographic data below and
help estimate how important this contextual factor is to Islamic conversion.
Based on the extant literature, some degree of material influence should
be expected in all conversions. Certainly the rise in popularity of
Pentecostal churches in PNG today is related in part to their focus on
material wealth and preaching of the prosperity gospel (Ernst 2006a). My
observation of converts’ socio-economic position confirms that, at least
initially, material influences are present.
The range of welfare items converts seek and receive (to a limited
degree) includes short-term accommodation, food, cash, subsidised school
fees, potential to travel overseas for Islamic education or attending
conferences, and limited healthcare assistance. When converts were asked
whether they were converting to Islam for kago, most denied converting for
material reasons even though comments they made during the course of
their interview (combined with socio-economic backgrounds) reveal the
likelihood of material aspects in their own conversion. However, in every
case, where material motivations were present, spiritual and cultural aspects
of conversion were also in effect. Twenty-three converts (44 per cent) said
that this might be a reason why some people convert.
All converts gave the impression that conversions based on material
desires carried negative connotations. Surprisingly, three converts (5 per
cent) were honest enough to confess they had personally converted to Islam
for material things, two doing so for the benefits of food and a place to
sleep, and the other for education. Interestingly, each of these converts said
that once they converted they realised that material opportunities were
limited and decided to remain Muslim because of the religious teachings
and doctrines. This is aligned with the view of some PNG converts that the
material and spiritual aspects of present life are united.
The family and tribesmen of those who have converted are reportedly
intrigued by material aspects and often ask converts what material things
Islam provides. During an informal discussion with a group of female
converts in Karilmaril I was told that social welfare and the provision of it
by the ISPNG was an element needed (although not yet provided) in order
for converts to effectively practice their diin (religion).
Despite the initial importance of material factors in most Islamic
conversions, for most converts interviewed this motivation declined over
time and gave way to an interesting paradox. Islam appears to become a
coping strategy for many converts through its promotion of material
simplicity, economic independence and self-sufficiency, a theme that
resonated particularly strongly with those converts disappointed in the
ability of Christianity to meet their material (and spiritual) expectations.
This anti-materialist paradox shared among many converts is clearly seen in
the following words of convert Assad: I want to live a simple life, just stay
simple and do my salat. I must work hard and struggle in order to live. In
the hadiths it says you do not stay for nothing. One of the Shahabas told a
story about a poor man. The Prophet Muhammad gave him money and said
buy an axe. When he did the man started chopping firewood and made
money which shows we must do whatever we can. We can’t rely on other
people and expect things to come, like waiting for kago. We need to work
and be independent. That’s how I am different as a Muslim.

Clearly, material dimensions are important to Islamic conversion, however

this aspect should not be viewed as the single most significant variable but
rather a factor working in conjunction with the other themes influencing
conversion. The material factors in particular appear to be a small part of
the overall context when compared with spiritual and cultural factors
(described below under congruence) and are difficult to disentangle and
isolate as a cause for conversion.
‘Congruence’ refers to those elements shared by religious cultures that
enable a new religion to mesh with the ‘existing macro and micro
contextual factors’ of older/pre-existing religious traditions (Rambo 1993:
37–38). Congruence helps determine whether conversion will occur. It is an
extremely important contextual element, playing a major role in conversion
to Islam in PNG with all converts mentioning that similarities between
Islam and their traditional kastom influenced them to become Muslim.
Clashes between Christianity and traditional religion are a source of
crisis for many Papua New Guineans, thus the closer congruence of Islam
with traditional religions appears to resolve a number of the crises
experienced by converts. Congruence is also important because of the scope
it provides advocates to proselytise.
Congruence of beliefs, values, symbols and rituals in the context of
traditional religions were important for facilitating Papua New Guineans
conversion to Christianity, suggesting that congruence may be a major
factor facilitating Islamic conversions today. This view rests on the
assumption that religious concepts and emotions are more difficult to relate
to when a convert comes from outside a specific religious tradition or lacks
prior cultural conditioning (Asad 1993: 134).
A Muslim convert’s knowledge of Christianity and comparisons they
make between traditional religion, Christianity and Islam help facilitate
conversion (Salzman 1953). The use of holy books, the presence of the
same prophets and similar religious messages in both Christianity and Islam
play a key role. Islam shares a relatively common historical narrative with
the Christian narrative already known by Papua New Guineans, a narrative
that includes the messages promoted by a line of prophets, from Adam,
Noah, Abraham, Moses, through to Jesus. In PNG, a strong correlation
exists whereby a convert’s greater familiarity with Christian religious
concepts is more likely to facilitate their conversion to Islam. This finding
should not be surprising given converts to fundamentalist Christian sects in
Melanesia often have good knowledge of the Christian Bible, with many
people able to cite numerous passages directly, (Tippett 1967: 79).
 These factors give immediate legitimacy to Islam as a possible
alternative and provide a pre-existing body of knowledge that facilitates
understanding. However, unlike mainline Christianity in PNG, Islam has
clear and explicit rules for living (social practices) similar to traditional
religion and culture, and it is congruence in these aspects that are
particularly important influences.
There are similarities in each of the three religions being considered here,
(traditional, Christianity and Islam); however, the way Islam and traditional
religions deal with ‘matters concerned with a systematic ordering of power
and the discovery, identification, and moral relevance of power in an
attempt to manage both beneficial and dangerous aspects of human life’
appears more closely related between Islam and traditional religions in
PNG than between Christianity and traditional religions in PNG (Burridge
1969: 3).
Islamic conversion in PNG involves people from particular antecedent
‘religious cultures’ thinking about imported ideas that a new religion such
as Islam brings (Geertz 1966: 2). Horton has comprehensively
demonstrated that conversions occur within a dynamic contextual
superstructure of religious change that can only be understood in terms of
existing tendencies in a specific changing society. Horton’s work shows that
the common theme in millions of conversions in Africa to both Christianity
and Islam is linked to a continuity between African traditional religions and
the newly arriving global monotheisms (Horton 1971, 1975a, 1975b).
Bulliet also claims that Islamic converts’ expectations of their new
religion will parallel the expectations of their old religion (Bulliet 1979).
Bulliet’s point is also aligned with the helicopter theory of conversion
discussed in the previous chapter, and which, when considered in light of
the following convert’s statement, highlights the relevance of congruence to
the PNG case:
The difference is that Islam brings us back to our traditional values like
our forefathers and they practice with respect for customs and traditions and
this is what makes me become Muslim.
(Imran)

Whilst the importance of religious and cultural congruence as an influence

on Islamic conversions cannot be over-emphasised, a degree of caution
must be exercised in generalising about the variety of religious beliefs and
cultural practices referred to in PNG as kastom.
Religious and cultural beliefs and practices are deeply ingrained in PNG
societies through the process of orally transmitted tradition (kastom), which
shapes religious meanings, rituals, and conversion. Norris details that many
researchers argue conversion to a new religion will not occur unless it
‘corresponds with the convert’s pre-existing ideas about truth or meaning’,
with new beliefs being ‘understood through the old’ (Norris 2003: 171,
179). In this sense, continuity is a central referent of tradition, which means
a new religion is likely to attract followers based on how similar or
congruent a new religion is with elements of the pre-existing culture that
has been passed from one generation to another (Otto and Pedersen 2005a).
The issue of continuity in religion and of religious practice is under
theorised in respect to Christianity while on the other hand, the importance
of tradition and the emphasis on continuity of practice referred to as Sunnah
is much stronger in Islam and this is reflected in the greater volume of
research on traditions within Islam (Robbins 2007).
The body of literature on religion and culture in PNG is large, diverse
and highly complex, and retrospective analyses of kastom run the risk of
presenting a romanticised notion of the traditional past (Timmer 2000: 3).
Without descending into a comprehensive treatment of religion and culture
in PNG, I narrow the scope of generalisations by examining only those
elements of congruence in the religious and cultural literature relevant to
understanding Islamic conversion.3
Brunton argues that for many years anthropologists and missionaries in
PNG initially constructed an ‘ideal type’ of traditional religion that failed to
represent the real diversity in religious practice and beliefs at the time of
colonisation (Brunton 1980). Despite recognising irregularities in the
patterns of religion in PNG, Brunton himself mentions that many ritual
forms such as strict relational prohibitions (men/women, kin, marriage,
etc.), funerary practices, and behavioural regulations (food, hunting, and
other social mores) are consistently present throughout most of PNG.
Although changes to traditional religions occurred prior to colonisation,
the more distinctive features of the existing traditional religions in PNG
persist (Trompf 1991). Recent research continues to show that there are
many common themes shared across tribal religions in PNG including the
existence of some aspects of tribal law, presence of initiatory rituals and
annual or cyclical celebrations (Gorman 2006). It is these general features
that are more congruent with Islam than with Christianity and this appears
to be facilitating contemporary conversions to Islam.
The view that traditional religion ‘changed its outward appearance under
the influence of Christianity but by adaptation and transformation retained
many of its original beliefs’ is shared by many (Otto and Borsboom 1997:
7). Even though the practice of most traditional rituals ceased with the
arrival of Christianity and some new beliefs were adopted, most analysts
see the underlying spirituality of Christianity as rooted in the primal
cosmology closely associated with traditional religion in PNG (Brunton
1980; Gibbs 2004a; Lawrence and Meggitt 1965). Cosmology here is
defined as ‘a theory or conception of the nature of the universe and its
workings, and of the place of human beings and other creatures within that
order’ (Bowie 2006: 108). Cosmologies ‘are not pulled out of the air to suit
the convenience of the communities to which they are attached’ but rather
‘the cosmology of a given community is conditioned by a unique history of
social and psychological dimensions’ (Mathews 1994: 13).
To understand this situation and why Islam is attracting converts, one
must examine the way Christianity was taken up by locals and the way
Christianity was promoted by the Christian missionaries.
Apart from the material influences already mentioned, Christianity was
received with enthusiasm in PNG societies because the religion was seen by
many indigenous converts as a name for the religion they already knew
(Trompf 1987). People also viewed Christian knowledge as having
belonged to their own ancient traditions that were handed down before the
arrival of Europeans (Barker 1990).
The colonisation of PNG, although confronting for locals, was
reasonably limited rather than massive in scale. Colonial rule took several
decades to establish itself and, importantly, the Highlands, unlike the
coastal areas, were only incorporated in the 1930s and 1940s (Wolfers
1975). Christian missionaries were not in a position to, and did not aim to
remove or destroy the entire traditional religious culture, but rather endow
‘pre-existing [religious] traditions with Christian meaning’ colloquially
referred to as ‘grafting the new vine to old well established roots and
stumps’ (Trompf 1991: 262–264).
Christian churches simultaneously and deliberately stopped many
religious rituals at the same time as leveraging traditional religious beliefs
as a way of evangelising, particularly among highland cultures (Smith
1979). The most successful Christian missionaries drew heavily on the Old
Testament in conjunction with traditional beliefs to get locals to adopt the
new faith (Keysser 1980). The practice of integrating Christian beliefs into
traditional cosmologies is still used by missionaries in Melanesia today
(Bubandt 2005; Dabrowski 1991), who continue to promote their beliefs
based on metaphysical similarities between Christianity and traditional
religions (Robin 1982). Christian missionaries were even to ‘make greater
use of the Old Testament’ as it is ‘more relevant to the cycle of Melanesian
harvests and seasons’. ‘Melanesians as people live close to the soil like the
Hebrew, should make greater use of the Old Testament, with its relevance to
the cycle of Melanesian harvests and seasons’ (Tippett 1967: 79).
Islam is being promoted in a way reminiscent of the Christian approach.
Although many of Islam’s religious beliefs are similar to Christianity (belief
in God, heaven and hell, millenarian belief, etc.) they differ on crucial
doctrinal issues. Islam is seen by converts as having greater congruence
with traditional social and religious practices/rituals, especially given its
requirement for active daily practice of Islamic customs and rituals rather
than simply belief. This makes Islam particularly attractive in the context of
widespread confusion about religion and social chaos.
The concerns of traditional religions were not centred on esoteric issues
such as how to come to come to terms with the sinful nature of human
beings. Rather, salvation was seen as fulfilment in every aspect of life, be it
health, success, fertility, respect, honour or influence over others and
ultimately it was the absence of negative forces in life including sickness,
death, defeat, infertility or poverty (Gibbs 2006: 91). In Islam (more so than
in Christianity), ‘the quality of the relationship with God depends on
fulfilment of duties by the follower, and the practice of ritual, the following
of Islamic custom, and the observance of Islamic law (Sharia)’ (Ruel 2008).
If, in the future, Christianity continues its perceived failure to deliver social
order, the greater congruence of Islam with kastom in relation to the
observance of strict laws and customs in daily life is likely to lead to
ongoing conversions to Islam.
Although many aspects of congruence between Islam and the pre-
existing kastom of Papua New Guineans were mentioned by converts
interviewed, three aspects were strongly evident; belief in a monotheistic
God; religion as an integrated element of life (which includes religion,
politics, culture and socio-economic elements); and strict rules of law and
justice. The most overarching similarity mentioned was that Islam, like their
kastom, was a ‘complete way of life’ with detailed rules that governed
religious and social conduct and maintained order.
Islam gives perfect guidelines for life like if I want to get married and how I should raise my kids
up. Everything is there; it’s like a manual to human beings. All that we need is there in Islam.
(Saeed)

I have verified the similarities claimed to exist between Islam and kastom
by consulting Islamic scholarship and the Koran (Al-Hashimi 2005;
Alghazali 1985; Ali 2006a; An-Na’im 2002; Dawood 2003). The aspects of
religious and cultural practices listed in order of most frequent mention in
Table 4.1, represent the range of congruencies converts mentioned as being
closer to Islam, and/or not promoted, accepted or approved by Christianity
or Western ways.
The single most important dimension of congruence influencing Islamic
conversions is the belief in an omnipotent, omnipresent God or Supreme
Being. The concept and belief in the existence of an omnipotent,
omnipresent god or ‘high God’ was common all over Melanesia including
PNG despite the presence of lesser gods, spirits and ghosts (Trompf 1987;
Tippett 1967). Belief in such a god among traditional tribal societies is not
unique to PNG, many areas of Africa with little or no exposure to Muslim
or Christian influence had a ‘cult of the supreme being’ and this pre-existing
cosmological knowledge helped the later arriving monotheisms establish
themselves (Horton 1975a: 223).
Table 4.1 Religious and cultural aspects of congruence
Tawhid (belief in one God)
Strict laws on punishment, conflict (i.e. ‘payback’)
Food, fasting, feasts, and sacrifices
Rules of gender segregation, marriage (including polygamy)
Worship and prayer
Status symbols such as beards, circumcision
Familial dimensions (roles, responsibilities, and respect for family, parents,
elders, clan)
 In the Trans Fly region people knew only ‘one great spirit’ who was a
‘sky-dweller’, whilst in the Sepik region and central Highlands the presence
of a ‘great sky god’ was personified by the ‘sun and moon’ (Trompf 1991:
13). In the Papuan coastal areas near Port Moresby a form of monotheism
existed (Williams 1939), and there is evidence of 37 PNG ethnic groups
having a supreme, omnipotent God (Beier and Chakravarti 1974). There are
other detailed accounts of highland tribes having a ‘high God’ or form of
‘primitive monotheism’, which sat above the lesser spirits in indigenous
cosmologies (Aerts 1998; Jensen 1963; Jensen et al. 1965). Jebens also
provides an account of an omnipresent, omnipotent, and transcendental Yaki
in the Southern Highlands province that pre-dates the arrival of Christianity,
which is ‘the same one that everyone calls God today’ (Jebens 2005: 50).
The Asabano claim to have worshipped imeledu ideledu (great creator)
prior to contact with whites in 1963, and now call the Christian God by the
same name (Lohmann 2005: 195). Clans around the town of Minj in the
Western Highlands called God, Gosner, as Mikail describes: Before
Christians we knew there was one God. When we were trying to give new
names to baby we would wait for the sun to set we would call out to the
creator ‘oh Gosner oh Gosner’ we would call out the name of the baby and
say to the creator take it with you.

Among tribes in Chimbu the sun was referred to as Andeyagle who was
prayed to and called on for help (Nilles 1987: 4, 76). The influence of this
pre-existing cosmological belief on Islamic conversion is evident in the
following comment:
‘Tawhid, the oneness of god, this was practised by our fore-parents in
Chimbu. For example in Chimbu we would say Andeyagle which means
sun being [Ande = sun; yagle = man]. There is a being there and he takes
control because the sun shines on everything therefore they believed there
was a super being up there watching. In Chimbu Andeyagle was the only
Supreme Being so if they want to pray they pray to Andeyagle. There is no
difference when we see Andeyagle is Allah. As I have said, my parents were
converted, but the rituals within our culture and stories talk of the oneness
of god, I believe in the oneness of god before I was Christian and confused
by the trinity, which even prophet Isa [Jesus] does not talk about and is not
even in the Bible itself. The word trinity is never there, it came along long
after Jesus death.’
 (Muslimhudeen)

A very important factor of congruence influencing Islamic conversions is

the religious aspects of justice, which is related to the strictness of
traditional societies mentioned above. Islam has a system of retributive
justice that is more closely aligned to traditional practice in PNG than the
‘turn the other cheek’ approach promoted by Christianity and this attracts
potential converts because it legitimises the values embedded in traditional
ways (also associated with a more stable period in time).4 This is
particularly important given the relative resilience of ‘payback’ as a
traditional form of justice. Islamic doctrines share an affinity with
traditional kastom in that retribution and the use of blood money5 are
morally and ethically acceptable.6 This aspect of congruence (that justifies
killing under certain conditions) flows into other important aspects of social
life in PNG, such as the defence of tribal land and retribution for deaths in
tribal conflict. Twenty-three (44 per cent) converts said that what is allowed
or disallowed in conflict in the Koran was also similar to their kastom:
If people come from far away we are friends but if they attack us then we
defend ourselves, this is very Islamic.
(Nazmudeen)
Kastom is like Islam [here in that] in the Koran if there is a tribal conflict it is the job of every
male to go to fight in defence. This is still practised today.
(Mikail)

The central and unified nature of traditional religion meant that social acts,
behaviours and rules were imbued with sacred qualities, a characteristic
shared with Islam. At the lowest level, elements of kastom, such as growing
a beard or circumcision, become important shared symbols, for in Islam
such acts are seen as holy, as they are practices of the Prophet Muhammad
called Sunnah.7 Further influential congruencies relate to law and justice,
social structure and ritual, particularly regarding gender and familial
relations, forms of worship, ceremony, and social interaction (i.e. food,
fasting, sacrifices).
Traditional religions in PNG possessed hundreds of different types of
prayers said before particular activities were conducted, such as the killing
of animals or other sacred acts, such as planting crops or clearing forest
(Aerts 1998). Many traditional religions also held concepts of blessings
(Trompf 1991: 73–74) and a belief in life after death (Bergmann 1971:
209). The presence of prophets (spokespersons of the divine using verbal
claims and premonitions) was also common throughout PNG traditional
societies (Carley 1986; Trompf 1991). For converts, each of these elements
resonate with Islamic doctrine, with the latter feature highlighted in Islamic
doctrine, which claims that people of all nations and tribes received Islamic
revelation from prophets (Ali 2006a: 239).8
A major religious point of difference between Islam and Christianity in
PNG is the position of traditional religious understandings of the spirit
world. Christian missionaries worked hard to remove beliefs in spirits from
traditional religion because they viewed them as pagan (Trompf 1991). In
Islam however, spirits (jinns) are accepted as a metaphysical reality
described as ‘unseen beings of a luminous and spiritual substance that act as
intermediaries between God and the visible world’ (Murata 1991: 324). In
interviews, a number of converts explained that, unlike Christianity, Islam
accepted that spirits were real, a congruence that helped legitimise Islam as
a ‘true religion’:
When clearing bushes to build house before [in the past] they believed
jinns were there and we had to say something [pray] before cutting. Islam
believes in jinns, so now we say bismillah to remove the jinns today and
this is the same as past life where we had Masarlai, bad spirits and good
spirits.
(Maryam)

The acceptance of spirits as a legitimate aspect of indigenous cosmologies

by Islam is another reason why converts see Islam as a ‘true religion’. I had
one particularly long discussion (over an hour) with five converts regarding
Jinns and how they understood Islam’s view that spirits exist. Converts
claimed that there were numerous spirits in this world, some in the rivers or
in the sky, while some are keepers of gold, while some protect the land.
These converts used the word jinn when discussing their cosmological
views on spirits and all claimed to believe in these spirits, pointing out that
it is not un-Islamic because the Koran supports the view that spirits do
exist. One added that, ‘Allah created all the jinns’, and indeed there are
many Koranic sura addressing the concept (Ali 2006a: 525–526).
 Gender segregation in traditional societies was very strict and the
division of the sexes was maintained by strong kastom. Colonisation has
eroded these rules of social interaction. Twenty-five converts (48 per cent)
specifically mentioned that Islam appealed to them on the grounds that
segregation was important, and Islam promoted a more defined and
constrained role for women in society and in religion. In light of the fact
that many more men than women are converting to Islam in PNG, the
following comments highlight this powerful gender influence on
conversion:
In my society women are regarded as not to stand in front of men and
speak in front of men. That is not allowed in my tradition. The same
tradition applies here [in Islam] women are not allowed to stand in front of
men and they are kept within their premises.
(Mohammad)
During the time of my ancestors houses were built especially for men to sit, they don’t stay with
the women they are separate. In Islam its same, women have their own separate meeting place in
the mosque.
(Abdul)

‘Traditional religion in most of PNG enforced male superiority of power

(over women) especially in respect to many ritual practices which were
reserved exclusively for men’, and this created clear gendered social
divisions and numerous female taboos (Jebens 2005: 68). This dimension of
kastom is similar to Islam in many respects (Badawi 1997), with both
appearing to ‘originate in cultural notions of patriarchy and honour’ (An-
Na’im 2002: 96).
Marriages in kastom and in Islam are also similar in a number of ways
that resonate with converts and legitimise Islam as a worthy religious
alternative. For example, marriages are normally arranged between parents.
This is important because although people from other clans are traditionally
enemies, marriages between clans/tribes can be used to create alliances that
are particularly useful in conflict (Brown 1964). Similarly, in both kastom
and Islam sex before marriage is strictly forbidden and the payment of a
dowry to the woman is compulsory.9
Our kastom’s arrangement of marriage is more Islamic, and marriage is negotiated like this and is
still going on today. The bride groom pays bride price before marriage, during the marriage the
 bride price is repaid and the woman becomes property of the man, you see this is our culture.
(Abdullah)

The clearly defined social structures and sense of family and responsibility
to kin were very strong in traditional PNG societies. These are still present,
although weaker, today and are referred to as wontokism. In this aspect,
Islam supports and encourages a sense of social order (through its strong
emphasis on family roles and responsibilities), which to some extent has
been lost through the breakdown in PNG societies, and is a form of crisis
that leads to conversion. The congruence between kastom and Islam here
was noted as particularly strong by the converts interviewed.
Other examples of specific social habits consistent between kastom and
Islam outlined by converts include personal ablutions,10 menstrual taboos,11
hospitality and helping travellers12 and funerary rites.13 Economic
similarities such as the emphasis on a degree of equality and fairness in
economic matters were also mentioned.14 The common themes of family
ties and equality are also linked to social rituals associated with food,
including feasts and fasting, which were important in PNG.
In most of the Highlands and some coastal societies ‘great feasts’ were of
major religious and social significance ‘with the timing of such events
dependent on factors such as the position of the moon, the state of animals
and other ritual obligations’ (Trompf 1991: 63–65, 199). Many societies
also traditionally burned crops or animals as part of a sacrifice (Loeliger
and Trompf 1985: 37), with the food being shared equally among the
community (Bergmann 1971: 72). Islam has similar sacred feasts and
sacrifices such as Qurbani, Eid-ul-Adha and Eid-ul-Fitri, the timing of
which depends on the lunar cycle.
We have so many things in common like with the Eid festivals. These were practiced by our
ancestors with big feasts and are common to us.
(Ahmed)

Rituals for the preparation and consumption of food show strong parallels
between kastom and Islam and throughout PNG it was generally traditional
practice to eat using only the right hand and also to share meals together as
a group, along gender lines (Loeliger and Trompf 1985; Trompf 1991).
Likewise, ‘The custom at the time of the Prophet Muhammad was for all
present to eat from one dish or platter with the right hand, which remains
the custom in Muslim countries’ (Al-Hashimi 2005: 340). A common
tradition of fasting is also more congruent with Islam than Christianity
(Bergmann 1971: 56).
In kastom young boys and girls before they become an adult they have to go through a process of
initiation in order to declare that they are entering adulthood. This is a disciplinary time when the
elders give guidance – in our vernacular called ‘Kindine’. It is a kind of revelation … that is
passed on and at this time they withhold food and water. Fasting is still practised today and it’s an
obligation to the community.
(Muslimhudeen)

The evidence on religious change in PNG shows that the original

conversions to Christianity were by no means permanent or absolute.
Although previous religious culture has been severely affected it has not
been totally destroyed. Throughout PNG, but particularly in the Highlands
(where the degree of Christian penetration was more limited and shorter in
duration), some degree of traditional culture still guides daily life today
(Jebens 2005: 90). It is in an environment where traditional religion is not
completely discarded that themes of resistance and rejection exist most
obviously, and in this respect PNG is not unique. Case studies from Africa
demonstrate how conversions to Islam are facilitated by the presence of
congruent elements of traditional tribal religions that remain after an initial
conversion to Christianity (Olupona 2004: 4).
Many studies of Christian conversion (including those in PNG) fail to
provide detailed accounts of local resistance and rejection of Christianity,
despite a nuanced reading of the literature showing that colonised people
often reject or resist new religions (Rambo 1993: 35). In accordance with
the views of postcolonial theorists mentioned earlier, resistance and
rejection are powerful contextual dimensions of conversion to Islam in
PNG as Islam provides a comprehensive and distinctly different religious
alternative for those seeking to resist or reject the religion associated with
colonisers (Christianity). To detail this set of influences, I have created five
categories based on the most common patterns in the data: disillusionment
and dissatisfaction, the destruction of kastom, the church and money, the
hypocrisy of Christianity, and racial and religious discrimination.
In PNG, every convert (100 per cent) mentioned at least one aspect of
how Western ways or Christianity were responsible for the ‘wrecking’ or
‘destroying’ of their traditional religion and kastom. Thirty-two converts (61
per cent) specifically mentioned a form of disillusionment and/or
dissatisfaction with Christianity and/or Western values and influences.
Twenty-nine (55 per cent) converts saw Christianity as a hypocritical
religion. Eighteen (34 per cent) resented the Christian churches making
money whilst 13 converts (25 per cent) mentioned some form of racial
discrimination as a contributing factor for their conversion to Islam.
Thirty-two converts (61 per cent) mentioned specific forms of
disillusionment and dissatisfaction as a reason for their conversion. In line
with globalisation and post-colonial theories of conversion, these
motivating factors also led many converts to Christianity in Africa (from
tribal religions) to later switch to Islam (Sicard 2000). The same sources of
disillusionment and dissatisfaction are a major cause of Islamic conversion
in Western societies (Al-Qwidi 2002; Gerholm and Lithman 1988; Roald
2004; Zebiri 2008). By converting to Islam and following its tenets, the
convert may find moral and psychological support to abstain from activities
seen as immoral, such as drinking and being in the company of women
(including pre-marital sex). In this way converts can be seen as taking a
stand against the negative behaviour and values they see as prevalent in
PNG.
Conversion here becomes a form of active resistance against a general
social trend (perceived as being caused by Christianity) that has led to
greater individual freedom of choice, promiscuity, permissiveness and
decreased family and social obligations. The view of most PNG converts is
that by becoming Muslim they are ‘reverting’ back to the original religion
that they followed prior to white colonisation.
The arrival of Christian missionaries in PNG heralded the humiliation
and demise of many previous religious beliefs and practices, particularly
aspects such as spirit, idol and ancestor worship, widow strangling,
cannibalism and similar pagan practices (Robbins and Wardlow 2005;
Trompf 1991). Much of the anthropological literature shows that the
majority of Papua New Guineans believed the acceptance of Christianity
(as it was promoted by Christian churches), required a breaking away from
traditional beliefs and practices because customary life was the wrong way
of living.
Ideologically it was often useful for Christian missionaries to view
traditional religions as anti-Christian because doctrinally it fits with the
New Testament, which speaks of a newness of life, and ipso facto the
abandonment of old ways (beliefs and practices). Most Christian
missionaries, including the more moderate Catholics, preached the message
that conversion to Christianity meant to ‘give up everything’ (Jebens 2005:
82). More specifically it has been ‘Protestant/Lutheran churches [which]
have in most respects condemned traditional rites, beliefs and practices’
(Brown 1995: 120).
Many missionaries failed to make clear which parts of traditional
religion/culture were ‘bad’ and which parts were ‘good’ (Tepahae 1997: 2).
As a result, Christianity has effectively been a form of moral order that has
colonised people’s moral ontology and emphasised the goodness of the
colonising culture (Comaroff 1985; Douglas 2001; Tuzin 1997).
This sense of breaking with the past is today ‘seen as part of being
Christian’, yet at the same time it sets up the dynamic of ‘Christianity
versus tradition’ (Gibbs 2004a: 137). Philip Gibbs (a Catholic priest living
in PNG) laments this situation and blames the ‘modern western worldview
and impact of fundamentalist missions for the devaluation of traditional
values and beliefs’ (Gibbs 2004a: 137), rather than seeing mainline church
complicity (whether deliberate or unintentional) in criticising and
destroying traditional religion. Manfred Ernst, another Christian minister
also understates the negative impact of mainline churches’ involvement in
destroying elements of traditional religions/cultures. Ernst argues that
globalisation and the rising interest in conservative Christianity is
undermining the older ‘beliefs and the solidarities of village and kin in
exchange for the uncertainties of western modernity (capitalism,
democracy, and western cultural imperialism)’ (Ernst 2006a: 77).
Although there were waves of Christian conversions in PNG during the
colonial period there was also significant resistance in the form of new
religious movements referred to as cargo cults (Trompf 1991; Lawrence
1964). Resistance and rejection behaviour arguably continues today with
many arguing that the trend away from mainline Christianity to
fundamentalist sects and cargo cults is a form of resistance and rejection,
which can be explained by reference to a general dissatisfaction felt by
people with these churches (Clark 1992; Jebens 2004, 2005; Josephides
1990; Kahn 1983; Lawrence 1964; MacDonald 1991; Robin 1982; Smith
1990; Trompf 1991, 1994).
 Muslim converts globally and in PNG see Islam as a global religion that
is powerful enough to stand in opposition to Christianity and Western
modernity (Ahmed 2007; MWL N.D.). This should not be surprising,
particularly in PNG where for ‘almost a century people have attributed
social problems, illness and depopulation (in earlier times) to the rejection
of their old religion for Christianity’ (Tippett 1967: 27). For converts, Islam
provides a way of protecting valuable aspects of traditional culture
(kastom).15 This is particularly relevant given Islam is free from any
association with negative colonial and racial legacies and is a global
religion equal to Christianity in its nature (monotheistic, adherent
population and geographic reach).
Since the colonial period in Melanesia began there has been a long
history of social movements that have evolved in defence of traditional
kastom, with such movements referred to as neo-traditional, anti-Christian
and anti-colonial (Keesing and Tonkinson 1982). Observations of Muslim
converts in PNG aligns with the wider literature that suggests local
resistance to and rejection of Christianity in PNG is related to the clash
between traditional culture and Western, Christian, secular ways. This leads
many Papua New Guineans to search for new models of religion and
theological understandings of morality and divinity. It is in this general
context that the attractiveness of ideas embedded in Islam and the political
attraction of Islam evolves as a potentially effective means of resistance and
rejection. Examining the archives of PNG’s Post-Courier newspaper (1995
to 2005) I found 937 letters to the editor which I suggest are indicative of a
persistent pattern of widespread negative public sentiment (among Muslims
and non-Muslims) regarding the impact of Western ways on local culture,
for example:
Australianization of PNG ways in entertainment, sport, TV, gambling.
We are being brainwashed by foreign culture and teaching our children
white man’s ways.
(Nox 2001)

This sentiment reflects a desire for an anti-establishment type of identity

which is not only shared by Muslim converts in PNG, but also many recent
Muslim converts in other parts of the world (de Montclos 2008). In line
with the view above, all converts described the impacts of lost kastom
resulting from contextual change in similar ways:
The introduction of movies, videos, and music has spoiled people’s minds
from thinking straight. Before there was initiation and they were taught to
live as men in their life and they followed those laws and if they went away
from them then society would reject them and so forth. Leaving the old
ways has made them weaker and now there is gambling, raping, and
stealing.
(Muzamil)

Eighteen converts (34 per cent) mentioned that they saw Christian churches
had become money-making ventures rather than moral institutions and this
was an influence on their conversion to Islam. This aspect of
disillusionment with Christianity also appears reasonably widespread
among PNG Christians who feel a degree of disgruntlement and resentment
based on a perception that Christian churches, and some church leaders, are
wealthy and not sharing this wealth with the wider community. This
sentiment is likely to be compounded by people’s observations of
increasing polarisation in the distribution of wealth.
The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer and Islam is the only religion that says
you must pay Zakat and this will help bring people up. In Christianity people give offerings and
nobody knows what happens with it. PNG has been a Christian country for so many years but
they have done nothing for the country.
(Wahid)

In reviewing the ‘faith pages’ and ‘letters to the editor’ in both the PNG
Post-Courier and The National newspapers for the years 1997–2007, I
noticed a general resentment directed at Christian churches for being ‘big
businesses’ that make significant amounts of money. A typical example of
this disillusionment was raised by one Christian who claimed, ‘the church
came with the Bible and we accepted it with closed eyes while the church
makes millions [from] owning sawmills, logging operations, shares in
mining companies, canneries and trade stores’ (Samaritan 2001). This
general view is also shared by Muslim converts and reflected in the
following statement:
It’s a pity, Christian missionaries brought good things like education and
health but at the same time they ripped us off. They established themselves
and went into all kinds of business. They took the big land and paid little
with kina shell or bush knife and that was it. When independence came they
kept all of this land and all the houses. We thought they had come to teach
us about god and not to make money. On the right hand they gave us the
Bible and with the other they ripped us off. That’s a bad impact. It’s still the
same they are still running big business. The Bible says to give 10 per cent
to the poor but with these pastors the 10 per cent goes to them. Pastors are
not giving to poor just accumulating wealth and drive fancy cars. The more
people they attract the more money they make.
(Mikail K)

The tithing of church followers mentioned by Mikail K is a growing

practice in PNG, particularly among newer fundamentalist sects (Hawigen
2007). There has even been a call by some Pentecostal political leaders who
are national Members of Parliament to tithe the government, with the
honourable Mr Yama MP claiming that if re-elected ‘[he] will ensure that
10 per cent of the annual national budget is given to God’ (Niesi 2001).
Tithing of followers seems to be increasing resentment toward Christian
churches and leading some to become Muslim. The ISPNG and its smaller
branches do not charge tithes. Nine converts said that part of their own
conversion was to escape this financial burden.
Another major aspect of disillusionment leading to resistance and
rejection is the view that Christianity is perceived to be a hypocritical
religion by many in PNG. This view is leading many non-Muslims to
declare that PNG is ‘not really a Christian country’ (Kewa 2001; Pareapo
2002); a view shared by 55 per cent of those interviewed. Many non-
Muslim citizens also write in the media that this hypocrisy is the source of
the country’s social and political problems (Kewa 2001; Pareapo 2002). As
the following comments demonstrate, Papua New Guineans, ranging from
the educated elite through to villagers, feel that people do not actually
practice Christianity because it is weak, which is why there is ‘so much
sin’:
Papua New Guinea has a lot of churches and religious groups apart from
the mainline churches … but in fact, many of us are hypocrites and false
Christians (PNG Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare, in).
(Hansard 2003)
‘We just talk but we don’t do anything. We have to change individually and personally change
our lives, one of the things that we have to do in this country. Our Constitution declares that we
 are a Christian country, but a lot of us are not Christian. That’s one of the biggest reasons why our
country is failing. That’s why we are corrupt. We have become devils ourselves even though we
say we are Christians.’ Isaac Taitibe MP.
(Hansard 2006)

One of the many Christians I informally interviewed at the Boroko markets

in Port Moresby mentioned that, in her opinion, many see this hypocrisy
beginning with Christian churches, saying ‘the devil is working in the
Christian churches; ministers are flirting with young girls, drinking, having
sex with them, making money. People are not Christian in PNG, only 20 per
cent might be practising the actual religion’ (fieldwork notebook, 30 August
2007). The sense of hypocrisy that comes from not practising religion was
often seen in the following comparative terms by converts:
I read the Koran and the Bible and I found little was different. What I did I find out is, what the
Bible says, it is the Muslims who practise it and the Christians don’t practise it. Isa [Jesus] used
to fast for 30 days, Muslims do this, and Christians do not. The washing of face and legs and
body [before prayer] is talked about by Christians but it is the Muslims who are practising it. The
greeting of salaam when you walk around, it is the Christians who are talking about it [in the
Bible] but don’t practise it. It is Muslims practising this.
(Khalid)

Of the converts interviewed, 14 (27 per cent) mentioned some form of

racial and/or religious discrimination as a contributing factor for their
conversion to Islam. As a result of colonisation and Christianisation
occurring at the same time, converts view the two forms of discrimination
as inextricably intertwined. From a local perspective, racial segregation
between foreign missionaries and locals was a common feature of Christian
missions in the past and an aspect of religious interaction that continues to a
lesser degree today. In the past, missionaries lived in relatively fancy
Western-style houses with beautiful gardens (compared with the straw or
mud huts of locals) and rarely shared the few modern luxuries they
possessed (Trompf 1991).
Discrimination of this type persists today in many areas, with
missionaries living in secure/segregated/modern housing, eating different
foods, and sitting in special parts of the church (Flower 2007; Trompf
1991). Research shows that the racial attitudes of indigenous people
towards white people are related to various dimensions of intergroup
contact experiences, and suggests that initial negative experiences are likely
to entrench negative attitudes toward white people and their culture and
yield negative repercussions for future interracial contact (Shelton and
Richeson 2006: 161). Interestingly, most converts who mention racial
discrimination as a cause of their conversion hold the view that Islam is the
only non-racist religion, a view that increases as a result of their
experiences with other Muslims following their conversion. Converts
express the discrimination they experienced as an influence in their
conversion to Islam in the following ways:
People can see that whites think they are superior, but only God is
superior. Regardless of the colour of our skin we are all equal and that is
what Islam is saying. White missionaries even today think that they are
superior. If you go to Catholic Church, my own old religion, the expatriates
have special places for sitting down and worshipping and other Papua New
Guineans fill the other places. So you see there is discrimination not only in
the Catholic Church but in all the other denominations. When they painted
the picture of Jesus they painted him like a Caucasian, a white. So you see
God the son is a white man so god the father must also be a white man, the
spirit must also be a white man. So we black people and brown people, we
are inferior. That is the impression but people still go there [to Christian
churches] because they don’t use their brain. Their brains been programmed
by Westerners to hate Islam and Muslims.
(Mikail K)

In PNG there is also a connection between race and socio-economic class

that acts as an influence on conversion. Large-scale Islamic conversions
occurred in India because of similar ethnic/socio-economic factors (Dale
2003: 60) and in this sense Islam has shown it can unify otherwise disparate
groups of people on the basis of shared political and economic
disenfranchisement.
Some of the missionaries, especially the American missionaries they look at their colour and
think they are more superior than the black race, they don’t eat together, they don’t walk around
together, they don’t talk together they don’t get close. So there is a big gap between the followers
of Christianity, but everybody is equal in Islam not like in Christianity.
(Mikail N)

Whilst only 27 per cent of converts mentioned racism as a causal element of

their conversion, it was clear based on comments in most interviews, that
the majority of converts see Islam as a religion that practices racial equality.
That the ‘believers are but a single brotherhood’ is a widely held view of
Islam, and the Koran asserts that Islam is the only religion for universal
brotherhood, free from divisions of race, colour or language (Al-Hashimi
2005: 159). As a final point, it should be remembered that conversion to
Islam as a means of opposing or rejecting racism is also common to many
black converts living in Western developed nations and parts of Africa
(Dannin 2002; Kerbaj 2006).
The context stage of Rambo’s conversion framework is closely linked to,
and is a pre-disposing factor of, crises that potential converts may
experience. Convert statements illustrate how cultural dimensions and the
greater congruence between Islam and traditional religions in PNG are
facilitating conversions. Conversion literature highlights contextual change
as a source of many crises, which have a number of sources that relate to a
sense of disconnection from a particular source of power, support or
identity (i.e. traditional culture, religious and/or political power). Evidence
from PNG also supports the view that the more marginalised an individual
or group feels, the more likely they are to convert.
Conversions to Islam in PNG seem to appeal on the grounds that ‘in
Islam, and only in Islam, purification/modernization on the one hand, and
the reaffirmation of a putative old local identity on the other, can be done in
one and the same language and set of symbols’ (Gellner 1981, 1992: 5).
From an overall perspective, the relationships between the growth of Islam
in PNG and the influence of globalisation/modernisation appear causally
linked to secularisation.
With this contextual background it is worth remembering Gellner’s point
that Islam will survive the juggernaut of secularisation because it has a
historical tradition of religious laws and symbols that provide a type of
religious nationhood (Hefner 1998).

Notes
1 Only in 1991 were laws changed regarding polygamy and bride price (which are typically argued
as discriminatory to women), and new laws introduced overriding traditional PNG customary
practice of bride price and ownership of women. In the Re Kaka Ruk and the Constitution section
42 (5) (1991), the judge commented that the case showed that ‘people in PNG must come to
 terms with the law that women are not chattels that can be bought and thus bonded forever’
(Jessep 1992: 410).
2 Compared with ‘primal religions’ in other parts of the world, a large volume of research shows
that Melanesian religions had a ‘relatively stronger preoccupation with wealth and prosperity as
compared to the focus on health in African primal religions, which explains why cargo cult
phenomena are more intense in Melanesia than anywhere else in the world’ (Trompf 2006: 32).
3 I do not assume that traditional religions or traditional societies in PNG were static or unchanging
prior to the arrival of Western missionaries; such a view of traditional life is wrong and
misleading. Traditional religions in PNG were open to experimentation and adaptation. The
initiation of religious change and the determination of what was ‘right practice’ could occur
through an individual’s revelation (dreams, etc.) or through group consensus and this was
possible because traditional religions, while strict in the application of lore, lacked the strictness
of religious hierarchies and orders such as lay priests, priests, bishops (Trompf 2006: 5).
4 Although Islam did not initiate the law of capital punishment (established in the Old Testament), it
did add the concept of blood money, a practice of the Arabs before the Koran was revealed. For
example, the punishment for homicide in Islam can be either qisas (retaliation) or payment of
diya (blood money).
5 Payback includes reciprocal physical violence and the payment of money/material wealth. The
use of ‘blood money’ in PNG as compensation resulting from conflict was a late colonial
adaptation. On closer examination of the traditional situation one finds that paying compensation
to enemies for the taking of life was rare; rather, compensation was given to allies who gave
support in conflicts. It was colonial and post-colonial modifications that led to current legal
provisions for paying enemies blood money (Gordon 1981).
6 Koranic sura 5, verse 45 states,

and we prescribe for them therein the life for a life, the eye for the eye, the nose for the nose, the ear
for the ear, the tooth for the tooth, and for wounds of retaliation. But whosoever forgives it (in the
way of charity) it shall be expiation for him.
(Ali 2006a: 154)

7 In the past when kastom was stronger, beards and circumcision were symbols of prestige and
status. Beards were linked to age, wisdom and thus respect, whilst in Islam growing a beard is an
act of holiness that also carries similar status because it is practising the Sunnah of the Prophet
Muhammad. Circumcision is an initiatory rite common among many Melanesian cultures that has
been notable elsewhere for fusing Islam with local traditions by mediating intergroup relations
(Silverman 2004: 421).
8 Imam Ahmad bi Hanbal mentioned in ahadith number 21257, that Allah sent 124,000 Anbiya
(Prophets). Sura 16 verse 36 says, ‘For we assuredly sent amongst every people a messenger with
the command, serve Allah and eschew evil’; Sura 35 verse 24 says, ‘Lo we have sent thee with
the truth, a bearer of glad tidings and a warner; and there is not a nation that a warner hath not
passed among them’.
9 The Koranic sura 4, verse 24 mentions that a man must give his wife a marriage gift of some sort
(money, property, or other type of gift) which is hers by right (a dowry known as mehr in Arabic).
10 ‘It’s clear what’s bad what’s good, this is haram I must not touch this or that. Manners are clear,
what we use to stay clean with toilet, cleaning mouth and these things’ (Gaffar);
 Kastom taught us don’t ever use your left hand because this left hand is for rubbing your backside
and if you use this hand it will show you are cross with someone. When I read the Koran I see
this is in there.
(Abdul Moshin)

11 ‘Like with females when they have their period they are not allowed to cook for the family or also
go to the garden.’ (Abdul Qadir).
12

We have a sense of hospitality that is very strong. We keep our family and tribesman well. If they
have problems we come together and support each other. It is a very big thing that we support
each other whether he is big or small. Brotherhood in Islam says a lot about this.
(Saeed)

13 ‘The burial of the dead we bury them like Muslims do, we don’t have a box or anything we just
cover the head and lay them on the ground and bury them’ (Umar A). Funerary processes such as
body cleansing and burial was mentioned by 12 converts as a similarity, and this has been noted
among anthropologists as a relatively common aspect of traditional religions (Nilles 1950: 39).
14 ‘Equality is in Islamic tradition and custom and it when we look at it this was already in our
traditional custom. Whatever surplus you have you must give’ (Kauther). The most widely
distributed book among Muslims in PNG is entitled ‘The Ideal Muslim’ and it states that ‘the
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few is abhorred by Islam because it means many others
in society are deprived of that wealth’ (Al-Hashimi 2005: 317).
15 The term kastom is the Tok Pisin word for ‘tradition’ widely used in the literature to refer to the
integrated religious/cultural traditions or way of life of indigenous Papua New Guineans (Keesing
1982; Tonkinson 1982). The word kastom itself is a construct developed since colonisation to
represent a body of past traditions that are to be revitalised as part of anti-colonial struggle and
offer an alternative apparatus for social organisation (access to resources and status) in opposition
to the Christian churches and the Western form of government. In this sense, kastom is a resource
strategically employed by individuals and groups to obtain personal and collective goals (Larcom
1982; Filer 2006; Otto 1992; Tonkinson 1993, 2000).
5
Seeking answers
Islamic converts and crises

The wide-ranging and complex set of factors discussed thus far is leading
Papua New Guineans (individuals and groups) to experience a number of
crises, personally and/or socially that demand resolution. In seeking to find
answers to these multiple crises, religion can offer structure, order and a
sense of belonging that is lacking. The contextual influences and the
resultant crises experienced by Papua New Guineans provide insight into
why Islam is an attractive alternative religion.
A crisis is best thought of as a disrupting experience that challenges a
person’s or a group’s understanding of the world, a reality that prior to the
crises may have been taken for granted or assumed permanent or natural.
Crises can be personal or collective and, in the case of converts
interviewed, were most frequently triggered by a number of concurrent
contextual influences. I highlight the range and nature of crises experience
by converts under three broad categories: Religious Crises; Social, Cultural,
and Political Crises; and Personal Crises.
Most scholars agree that some form of crisis precedes religious
conversion, and that crises may be singular or multiple, social and/or
personal, and spontaneous or cumulative (Rambo 1993: 44–47). In the
Papua New Guinea case, every convert interviewed either perceived and/or
experienced one or more forms of crisis prior to converting to a religious
alternative. In some way their quest and subsequent conversion brought
relief from their crisis.
Six specific crisis types appear among Muslim converts in PNG:
Externally Stimulated Crises, Desire for Transcendence, Protean Selfhood,
Apostasy, Illness and Healing, and Near-Death Experiences.1 The most
significant crisis type present among Muslim converts in PNG is Externally
Stimulated Crises (present in 100 per cent of converts interviewed). This
form of crisis was described by converts interviewed as being related to the
external influences of colonial contact, pressures of Western modernity and
Christian religion. Rambo’s other crisis types were present, although in
more limited cases.
Of the other crisis types among Muslim converts interviewed Apostasy,
Desire for Transcendence, Illness and Healing, and Protean Selfhood were
experienced by a limited number of converts. Near-Death Experiences were
very limited, with only two converts expressing this as a catalyst for
conversion. Only two Muslim converts (Abdul and Assad) claimed a near-
death experience (NDE) was one of the triggers that led them to embark on
a religious quest that ended with conversion to Islam.2 The varying nature
of crises can be understood through ‘contours of crisis’ which positions
crises along a number of continua. The crises continua relevant to PNG
include Intensity, Duration, Scope and Source, as detailed in Figure 5.1. In
general, Muslim converts interviewed appeared to have experienced crises
on the more extreme end of each of these continua. The greater the
intensity, duration and scope of crises experienced, the more open a
potential convert is likely to be to religious alternatives that may have
previously been unknown, ignored or rejected.
It has been observed that the collective memory of converts to
fundamentalist Christian sects in PNG generally exhibits a sense of
‘entropy’, or recent history as ‘things fall apart’ or ‘growing disorder’
(Dalton 2001: 106). A sense that the broader PNG population perceives a
general social crisis partly explains the large-scale changes in religious
affiliation that are underway in PNG towards fundamentalist Christianity.
As described by Laitin (1986: 36–38), conversions to stricter religions are
likely to occur if a new religion ‘provides answers to a problem of meaning
that the earlier religion did not, or where the new religion covers more
ground or provides better answers than the old religion’.
The assumption underlying the conversion process in PNG therefore is,
those experiencing more intense levels of crisis were more likely to move
away from their current religion (most frequently Christianity) and commit
to Islam on the grounds that Islam’s narratives, beliefs, symbols, and values
provide practical methods for resolving crises. The nature of these beliefs,
symbols, and values are significantly congruent with traditional PNG
kastom, which converts associate with the more stable environment that
existed prior to the period of rapid change caused by colonial contact. Thus,
conversions occur as part of converts’ longing for the perceived stability
and security of the past.
The most interesting aspect of crises among PNG converts is that even
non-religious types of crisis are seen by converts to be causally related to
religion. Converts who did not directly express their personal experience of
a religious crisis made mention of the social, cultural, and political crises
they had experienced, and their view that these were caused by the negative
impact of new religions in the country.

Figure 5.1 The nature and degree of crises (source: adapted from Rambo 1993: 47).

This strong pattern in converts’ responses may be due to the traditional

PNG view of religion as a central aspect of life. From this perspective,
instability in life or society could be seen as the result of deficiencies within
the form of religion being practised. In this way, Westernisation,
Christianisation and secularisation as a source of religious crises can cause
other crisis types (social, cultural, political, and personal). This was made
especially clear by Muslim convert Abu Bakr: Oh Christians they do a lot of
damage to our traditions and their version of religion is too bad for us. You
know its watch TV then go to sleep and become Westernised and the way I
see it the Westernisation taking place here, there is no morality. The
problem as our brother in Egypt said, Al-Banna said that when corruption
comes to a country or crisis comes into a country, whether it’s social
corruption, economic crisis or whatever crisis, there is no morality in that
country. So crisis comes. If we have morality we will not have political
crisis or economic crisis.
Trompf claims that conversions to fundamentalist religions in PNG are
occurring as a result of widespread and deep social change that is leading
people to engage in a ‘complex transfer from one species of retributive
logic to another’, involving a shift from ‘more ritually-oriented to more
morally-oriented notions about the consequences of one’s actions’ (Trompf
1991: 251). My evidence supports Trompf’s view. Converts interviewed
mention the appeal of Islam based on the clear and strict moral rules for
daily life within a unified religious worldview. Islam also appears attractive
to people as the religion has many complex religious rituals (such as
traditional religions and unlike Christianity) which link to this unified moral
worldview.
This perspective on crisis is also in line with more recent research
showing conversions to fundamentalist Christian sects in PNG are the result
of individuals’ interest in ‘ideas about moral change’ and ‘a set of
arguments for why people need to overthrow an inadequate … moral
system for a new one’ (Robbins 2004a: 319). The view that ideas about
moral change and renewal are causes of second wave conversions in PNG
is shared by Errington and Gewertz (1996: 114–126).
The conceptualisation of Rambo’s category of apostasy is problematic for
the analysis of religious conversion in PNG. Rambo claims apostasy is a
cause or catalyst of crisis (Rambo 1993: 53); however, the PNG data show
that apostasy is caused by crises rather than being a cause of crisis. Given
the high rates of conversion to fundamentalist Christian sects from mainline
churches in PNG, levels of apostasy appear to be high within the Christian
faith tradition throughout the country. There is evidence of this type of
intra-faith apostasy among those going on to become Muslim. Twenty-two
of the Muslim converts interviewed (42 per cent) had belonged to at least
two other Christian sects prior to converting to Islam.
In the broadest sense, all of the converts interviewed are apostates of
Christianity; however, only two converts declared that they had ‘given up’
Christianity entirely for a long period of time prior to converting to Islam.
These two converts claimed to still believe in God, but had given up
Christianity as a way of being close to God.
The high levels of apostasy in PNG are most probably symptomatic of
the general dissatisfaction with mainline forms of Christianity in PNG.
High levels of dissatisfaction are likely to partly explain the high rates of
switching behaviour across Christian sects and religious experimentation.
Trompf has commented on this general malaise as a source of crisis among
PNG Christians, describing how ‘experiences with Christianity has led
many indigenous Christians to claim a lack of satisfaction with the religion
or, “no gat satisfakshan” or “i gat bel hevi” ’ that can lead to conversion
(Trompf 1991: 349). Christian leaders in PNG have noticed this problem
specifically in relation to conversions from Christianity to Islam, with some
claiming ‘Christian churches are not satisfying the spiritual needs of their
people, which leads Christians to take an interest in Islam’ (Sasere 2003).
Thirty-five Muslim converts directly mentioned this form of crisis with
Christianity and expressed the sentiment in the following ways:

I was Lutheran but I didn’t take it seriously and accept the religion, I was
born into a Christian family but I was not really satisfied.
(Abdul G)
When I was Christian I didn’t feel anything in my heart.
(Ruqayyiah)

In total, 38 converts (73 per cent) directly mentioned one or more specific
forms of religious crisis as a major contributing factor for why they
converted to Islam. These crises varied significantly in nature and were
particular to the individual. Fieldwork data on Muslim converts in PNG
suggest that the severity of a convert’s particular religious crisis is related to
the extent of a convert’s knowledge of Christian theology and doctrine.
Generally, those converts with a greater knowledge of Christianity had a
higher likelihood of conceiving a theological problem that the religion was
unable to resolve.
I have defined the following five main types of religious crisis that
appear to be most influential in contributing to Islamic conversion in PNG.
The most common religious crises among converts were related to the
Christian concept of the holy trinity (versus a monotheistic/unitary god,
referred to in Islam as tawhid), contradictions in the Bible and illogical
Christian doctrine, the Christian doctrines of sin and atonement, growing
sectarianism and the nature of Christian worship. There was also a
widespread view among the general Muslim convert population that
Christianity had been unable to deliver on its promises or serve a practical
purpose, with some converts implying that Christianity is fraudulent and
that the faith appears to not meet its own claims. The following comments
are representative of this general sentiment among converts:

Christians in 2000 said the end of the world was coming but it didn’t.
(Zainul)
Every time people say Jesus will come back, Jesus will come back hallelujah hallelujah and run
around all over the place but he never comes back when they say he will. Nothing has happened.
They say the same thing but no changes.
(Mikail S)

Thirty-eight converts (73 per cent) claimed that they found the doctrine of
the holy trinity to be a problematic concept that was difficult to understand.
From a convert’s perspective, the nature of this crisis stems from the
illogical proposition that the Trinitarian Godhead (the Father, the Son and
The Holy Spirit) equals belief in one God. This can contribute to
conversions because it leads converts to doubt the trustworthiness and
truthfulness of Christian doctrine as a way to attain salvation. This crisis is
compounded by a number of facts within Christian theology. As Khalid put
it, ‘the word “trinity” is not even in the Bible, people just talk about it.’
Many other converts mentioned the Ten Commandments, which do not
describe a belief in a son or a holy spirit in addition to the one God:

I looked back through the Old Testament and I was thinking. Islam is saying
this, that there is one true God and nobody can be a partner to God, this is
the greatest sin that people do this. A human or anything else should not get
the same respect as God himself … it’s the greatest sin but people say Jesus
is the one. God gave the Ten Commandments and said put no other gods
before me as the first one. If there was meant to be other gods then he
would have mentioned it in the Ten Commandments, but there is nothing
else.
(Yaqub)

Crises regarding the trinity appear to be exacerbated where converts had a

pre-existing cosmological belief in the existence of a single supreme being.
This influence on conversions in PNG might be somewhat surprising if it
were not for the fact that ‘the fastest growing and largest of the Pentecostal
churches in PNG belong to the non-trinitarian “oneness movement” ’ (Ernst
2006a: 11).
The increasing division of Christian sects in PNG is creating disunity and
social conflict, another influencing factor in Islamic conversions. This is not
to say that Islam has no sectarian divisions, however they are arguably less
important in Islam than in Christianity. For example, the fundamental
religious beliefs in the Koran and the other foundational elements of the
religion are the same across sects (Al-Baghdadi 1966). Twenty-eight
converts (53 per cent) said that, unlike joining new sects of Christianity,
becoming Muslim gave them the potential to unite their family and clan,
and even potentially the whole of PNG. The nature of this crisis is outlined
by Bilal: You see Islam is one, we don’t have any denominations in Islam.
But Christianity, some of my family goes to different churches. Before one
went to AoG [Assembly of God], one went to Catholic and one went to
Lutheran so we all had different views, different opinions and went to
different places. But in Islam there is one. You go to Indonesia, you go to
Australia, there is Muslims and they are one. A mosque is a mosque. You
can go and pray there regardless of whether you are Sunni or Shia. But here
(in PNG) if you are Catholic you can’t go to AoG church. That is how my
family was disorientated you see. But in Islam we come to one common
place. We always share everything, we do the same thing. You see the
difference, we’re all together now.

Without additional questioning or prompting, 20 of 28 converts explained

along similar lines to that below why they believed Islam would not splinter
as Christianity had:

In Islam there is no division. In here (ISPNG) there is no division. People in

their identity – they know they belong to that tribe or that clan but when
they come to Islam everyone is under the banner of Laillahillallah. In here,
we come together as one, we are proud to be one. I don’t think Muslims
will innovate because it is against the Koran the hadiths and Sunnah.
(Samsudeen)

Based on trends in the religious and political environment, anthropologists

have previously noted (as early as the 1960s) that in the future ‘the time
will be ripe for unification movements’ based on ‘people’s natural urge for
unity’ (Tippett 1967: 98). Although it is currently too early to tell, religions
such as Islam offer this potential as they explicitly emphasise unity.
Thirty-seven converts (71 per cent) saw the Christian doctrine of sin and
atonement as a cause of crises. These converts argued that the doctrine
makes salvation in the hereafter unlikely and that the doctrine means that
people in the present will continue to engage in immoral and unjust
activities because they are guaranteed forgiveness and salvation.
Forgiveness and salvation in Christianity are provided as a result of
believing in Christ’s death as a means of atonement and salvation. Unlike
Christianity, ‘Islam does not conceive of man as “a sinful being” that
required a son of God to be sent to heal the wound of original sin’ (Nasr
1991: 315). According to the Koran, God created man in the best stature
with an intelligence capable of knowing God. Salvation according to Islam
is dependent on actively remembering the religion and applying it to
everyday life in order to have a moral and stable existence (Al-Hashimi
2005; Alghazali 1985). The appeal of Islam as a resolution to these crises
was commonly reflected in converts’ statements:

Christians say believe in the name Jesus and your sins are forgiven. But
Christians today are becoming smart, Christians can keep on sinning up till
the point of death as long as they confess before death and ask please
forgive me. Forgiveness in Christendom is cheap. So there is a problem in
there on judgement according to what they believe. From my point of view
it will never work, Christendom will never work because of this, and our
problems will never be solved because they have that mentality. We
Muslims have fear that judgement is there, whereas Christians believe that
in the last minute if they confess, heaven is theirs.
(Bilal G)

The Islamic view that salvation is dependent on the actual practice of

religion is aligned with, and deeply connected to the concept of reciprocity
or ‘payback’ as highlighted by the following convert:

I love Islam because it says that if you do little bad deeds and many good
deeds you will go to Al-Jannah [heaven]. Christians say you can be
forgiven, but we cannot be very holy like the prophets and if we do sin the
important thing is we do more good than bad – it’s common sense. A child
is born innocent but there are many types of sin: major sin, minor sin,
intentional and unintentional sin we can commit all because we are not
angels we are human beings. So I believe Islam because it says do more
good than bad.
(Muzamil)

Twenty-four (46 per cent) of converts also expressed the view that only
Islam can provide the path to salvation. Only one convert thought (with a
caveat) that Christianity could also lead to salvation. The means of
obtaining salvation in Islam are more directly related to god, rather than the
representatives of the religion (i.e. priests). This is an added source of crisis
as outlined in the following convert statement:

They also go and do bad things and make confessions for this and that and
they do sin again. In the Bible you see it says you should ask god for
forgiveness so you shouldn’t be asking the priest for forgiveness, it’s not
right – for me it’s not right. We don’t know if the priest is holy, no one in
this world is perfect, only Allah is perfect. Priest is just a man. In Islam I
pray directly to God, God knows my intention.
(Musa)

Thirty converts (57 per cent) claimed that contradictions in the Bible led
them to experience a degree of religious crisis whilst they were a Christian
and this crisis contributed to their conversion to Islam. This type of crisis is
a connection to the wider trend associated with fundamentalist religions in
PNG. As shown by Klass, Christian fundamentalism makes extensive use of
the Bible as a means to ‘search for dependable, accurate information on the
universe’ (Klass 1995: 156). On this basis, one can hypothesise that people
belonging to fundamentalist churches might leave those churches if they
become disorientated when strict interpretations of the Bible appear to be
contradictory.
In the views of Muslim converts interviewed, contradictions in the Bible
are numerous in variety and stem from the New Testament having multiple
authors (i.e. Mark, Luke, et al.) rather than having a single divine source as
with the Koran, which is claimed as coming direct from Allah through the
angel Jibrail to Muhammad (Renard 1996). The following statements
highlight why converts see the source of problems in Christianity today
(including sectarianism, corruption, and social decay) as stemming from
biblical contradictions.
For the 30 converts experiencing this crisis type prior to the encounter
stage, this crisis increased in intensity upon interaction with advocates of
Islam. For every convert who did not experience this crisis type prior to
their encounter with an advocate, contradictions in the Bible became a crisis
for them as a result of interaction with the advocate who told them about
these contradictions, which facilitated conversion. Advocates in PNG
encourage potential converts to compare the Koran with the Bible to
examine the differences between the two holy books, a situation described
by Khalid: ‘I had Bible on one side and the Koran on one side and I
promised myself I would find the truth.’ Many statements illustrated
converts’ view that contradictions are the result of the imperfections of man,
specifically the men who authored the New Testament and the Christians
who interpret the Bible today:

I embraced Islam because my mind was always telling me that there was
contradiction in the Bible. I thought that if it is really God’s word there
should be no contradiction in the Bible. For example, I was arguing with a
family member who is SDA [Seventh-day Adventist]. In the Bible it says
that everything created by God is acceptable to eat when you pray to God
before you eat. Then there is a prohibition of pork in the Bible. Everyone
else was SDA but my family was Lutheran so we always argued about this
contradiction before I became Muslim because of this contradiction. There
was a break in the logic so I just totally gave up Christianity in life.
(Gaffar)

The crises caused by contradictions in the Bible are resolved for converts
through their conversion to Islam on the basis that ‘everything that comes
from the Koran is perceived as true, divine and not contradictory’ (Hakim)
and that if followed strictly will ameliorate all other problems in life and
society.
PNG converts are also experiencing religious crises as a result of
confusing or illogical Christian doctrines. Eighteen converts (34 per cent)
experienced a variety of crises based on problems of logic in regards to
Jesus and his position in Christianity, as captured by convert Hamida
below: The gospel that Christianity is holding onto says Jesus was crucified
and died and was put under the tomb. If he [Jesus] is God how can he be
killed and who is ruling the universe during the time he is in the tomb? That
is the question I had. If he is God and that God is dead then who is
controlling the universe? Here I see big differences between Christians and
Muslims.

Eighteen converts (34 per cent) experienced a crisis regarding Jesus’ role as
the Son of God before having any encounter with Muslims/Muslim
missionaries, and a further 22 converts mentioned that they experienced this
type of crisis after their encounters with advocates of Islam who told them
Jesus is not God, or the Son of God. Although this later group did not
experience this type of crisis prior to their encounters, they still bring the
total number of converts experiencing this crisis type to 42 (80 per cent).
This suggests that whilst pre-encounter beliefs are influential, the encounter
is more influential with this crisis type as it can crystallise a new crisis in a
potential convert’s mind.
The desire for transcendence as a catalyst in conversion is well
understood (Paloutzian and Park 2005; Rambo 1999) and in PNG 22
converts (42 per cent) mentioned that Christian ways of worshipping God
has caused a form of crisis. Converts see ‘proper’ and regular ritual
practices as an important way of achieving security and prosperity in the
present and in the afterlife. This aspect of crisis relates to the ‘Desire for
Transcendence’, which is based on the view that people desire to experience
God in order to seek meaning and purpose in life beyond themselves so as
to enrich and expand their lives (Rambo 1993: 50).
Converts to Islam in PNG have a strong emotional and spiritual attraction
to aspects of Islamic worship that is unique, such as ritual ablutions (wudu),
prostration and ibada and jikr (alternative forms of daily worship). The
wider literature mentions the global appeal of Islamic rituals of worship as
among the more common reasons for why people ‘embrace’ Islam (Renard
1996).
Rituals practised by rapidly growing Pentecostal churches include talking
in tongues, singing and dancing, the use of loud speakers and guitars, and
even rap groups to preach the gospel. Many non-Muslims in PNG argue
such practices are ‘demeaning to God’ and show that there is ‘no sign of
Christianity in such groups’ (Kadam 2001). Many Muslim converts share
this sentiment and find new ritual practices disrespectful to God,
meaningless and even terrifying:
The Pentecostal churches have changed things. They speak in tongues. For us we recite sura, we
speak in another language [Arabic] but we know the meaning. I say to them, do you know what
you are saying when you say things like shubabab bezulbub shubababa.
(Musinah)

Allah doesn’t like noisy he likes people to concentrate on their worship.

(Kauthar)

For these Muslim converts, the irreverence of some Christian forms of

worship becomes a crisis that leads them on a quest for more
comprehensive or acceptable forms of religious practice. It should not be
surprising that the nature of worship is an influence on conversion given
almost all people in PNG see the performance of ‘proper ritual actions as
vital to attaining the benefits of wealth, health and fertility’ (Strathern and
Stewart 2009: 12).
Islam resolves the worship crises of converts for a number of reasons
including the regularity, quality and effects of worship. In Islam, converts
are expected to pray five times a day and when possible in groups (every
day), in addition to attending jummah, which differs from Christianity
where most worship on Sunday only. Muslim converts also practise
additional forms of worship and are taught that the whole Islamic way of
life is a form of ongoing worship. The regularity of Islamic worship is
appealing on the grounds that converts feel closer to God:

You can’t do what you want to do like just worship on Sunday and come
out and do whatever you want to do, it’s not like that. I tell them every day
you have to live with God so it’s more special than Christianity. You have to
keep your prayer so you stay close to God and this helps the angels guide
us. In Islam you feel close to the creator because you are doing your salat
and it lightens the heart every time one worships.
(Abdul Aziz)

The quality of worship is another influential dimension attracting converts.

Islamic ritual is perceived as more sacred and respectful (i.e. prostrating,
washing before prayer,3 and removing of shoes) than Christian worship and
Islamic worship is offered directly and only to God.
Difference between Christians and Muslims is when they go to church – some step outside and
stay outside and don’t listen to the pastor. Muslims take their shoes off and make invocations and
wash. They have this respect for where they worship Allah. Christians wear shoes in their church
and they sing, it’s a big difference. Muslims are doing it right – right culture. They follow prophet
Musa. When he wanted to talk to god he had to take his shoes off. It makes sense you know.
(Wahid)

Most importantly, Islamic worship is seen to be effective not only because it

is seen as ‘proper and regular’ (resolves the crisis of worship) but because
its regularity helps remove the temptation of committing sinful acts and in
so doing creates greater stability for the individual (and thus society):

The difference is we Muslims we remember God our creator every time in

everyday life and we do not commit any sin. What Christians do is that just
think about god on a Sunday so then they commit sin all the rest of the time.
We think about Allah and we pray all the time. We Muslims remember god
every day all the time. We pray five times a day and when we walk we do
Jikr, so I think Islam is better than other religions.
(Ibrahim)

A view held by all Muslim converts in my sample and many non-Muslims

in PNG (evidenced in print media) is that religious crisis is causally related
to other types of crisis, and that the resolution of all types of crises is only
possible through religion.
So that is about our problems … we have a lot of problems, personal problems the national or
international problem it is just because we have no proper guidance from above, the creator, the
super being so if all the people in this world want peace and avoid these problems there is no
choice … Islam is the solution. I think my country needs Islam, my people need Islam and the
world needs Islam. This is how I feel. The corruption in politics and business, the problems of the
world, any problem you can name Islam is the solution. Islam is the salvation for the humanity of
this world. Islam will guide people to a peaceful life more than any other religion. We know
Islam in Arabic means peace and truly it is peace … my country needs peace, my people need
peace, I need peace and this is Islam.
(Muslimhudeen)
Every convert interviewed mentioned at least one example of a significant
crisis affecting PNG society, and in every case these crises were seen by
converts to be the result of external influences and contributed to their
conversion to Islam. Crises were generally discussed by converts using the
dialectic of ‘before and after’ colonisation, as illustrated by the following
quote:

Actually, previously people were disciplined. We had strong discipline there

were clear rules and we had to obey and with Islam this practice can be
maintained.
(Ahmed)

Cultural studies of PNG have tended to emphasise a ‘great narrative of

entropy and loss’ which is linked to the rise of new religious movements
(Clifford 1988: 14). All 52 converts interviewed perceived a significant
degree of social crisis in PNG, which may be explained in part by how the
‘rapid transition from communal oriented societies to cash oriented
societies has contributed to the constant decay of traditional social
structures and patterns that for centuries had provided basic security and
stability for everybody’ (Ernst 2006a: 76).
Relevant here is the concept described as protean selfhood,4 which is
evident in PNG and possibly a result of the broad social, cultural and
political crises the country has experienced over a long period. Converts
interviewed hold a view that many of the negative changes they are
experiencing are caused by the modern world. In the traditional world,
kastom provided explanations for turbulence experienced by Papua New
Guineans in their daily lives. The absence of satisfactory explanations for
contemporary crises provided by Christianity and Western modernity seems
to lead converts to a ‘new experience of transformation and a refuge from
constant change … and in certain forms of conversion they seek a core or
centre that will provide stability in the midst of chaos’ (Rambo 1993: 51).
In the view of many converts interviewed, Islam was seen as a stabilising
factor and a solution to the many crises they were experiencing. This may
be due in part to the strict nature of Islam being promoted in PNG and its
requirement that converts follow well-defined laws that govern behaviour.
 Muslim law is very strong and strict, not soft law. PNG needs hard law and must get advice from
Muslim countries. Christian laws are dying out.
(Qassim)

The rules of religion before was very strong. I like this living under strong rules to guide me so
my faith will be strong, but Christianity is not like this. Islam will be different, it is really
different and it’s really strict. What religion is practised in the country matters because if we are
not following Allah’s command like they [Christians] are doing it’s the wrong thing and doesn’t
help the country be run well. Only if we turn back and follow the religion that Allah himself
sorted for us will things improve.
(Abdul Qadir)

History provides numerous examples of how religion can influence

members of a society to adhere to values, principles and rules deemed
appropriate for a specific social entity (Raven 1999). Furthermore, in
societies where religion and culture are more unified, evidence suggests that
criminal and deviant behaviour is significantly lower despite (in many
cases) a lack of ‘Western institutions’ such as police and courts (Adler
1983). In this sense, PNG converts’ belief that conversion to a strong
religion such as Islam is a means of returning to previous religious values
and attaining order appears rational and logical.
Importantly, research has shown that ‘Papua New Guineans don’t
necessarily want a merciful god … they want a powerful god who has the
power to secure happiness for the follower on earth’ (Hayward 1983: 16).
Indeed, Islam possesses a defined and strict approach to life in this regard
and promotes compulsory five times daily salat to ‘prevent the commitment
of evil’, ‘prohibit obscenity, wickedness and evil’ and help followers ‘be
free from all diseases’ and make them ‘healthy and strong’ (Alghazali 1985:
2). Converts appear to be supported in their view to a degree by empirical
evidence that suggests rates of crime and violent crime are lower where
larger proportions of the population are actively religious, (practising) and
applying religious moral values that deter followers from engaging in
deviant behaviour (Lee 2006).
The crisis of weak laws and more specifically the weak enforcement of
law in PNG is stimulating widespread public demands for the introduction
of stricter and stronger laws that have more severe punishment in order to
deter immoral behaviour (Darius 2007b). In PNG, this sentiment is based
on the tradition of ‘payback’ and retribution and is even leading many non-
Muslims in PNG to call for Islamic law.5
PNG newspapers occasionally run stories on Islamic punishments meted
out in Muslim countries for serious offences (National 2007c, 2007d),
including social ills such as prostitution (National 2002b). Awareness of the
strictness of Islamic laws and support for introducing them in PNG also
appears reasonably widespread among both Muslims and non-Muslims,
based on numerous letters to editors of the national newspapers (Jen 2001;
Kami 2001; Lagili 2002; Nason 2001; Ngava 2002; Pareapo 2002; Songro
2002).
Some specifically request ‘laws like those of Moses, which are
straightforward and tough, demanding compliance (Boa 2002), while others
call for ‘strict Islamic Sharia to be brought into PNG’, adding that ‘six
Saudis should be brought to PNG to mete out the punishments’ (Songro
2002). This general view was shared by most Muslim converts interviewed
and is an added factor influencing their conversions:

In PNG the law is very weak. Killing is there, raping is there, adultery is
there but they don’t impose the laws. Under Islamic law you know
everything will improve. The country will be peaceful because if somebody
steals they cut off his hand. The people will know that if I steal I will lose
my hand so the stealing will stop.
(Yusuf A)

Another form of social crisis associated with the loss of strict laws and
kastom is the loss of respect for parents and older people (National 2009).
For many years, tribal ‘elders have spoken of the loss of cooperation and
social control of youth’ (Brown 1995: 254). Islam has very strict rules on
how one should treat parents, elders and distinguished people, kinsmen, and
even non-Muslims (Al-Hashimi 2005). As mentioned by Saeed: In The
Ideal Muslim it makes clear that your neighbour has rights over you, you
wife (has rights over you), your kinsman (has rights over you), you have to
balance this in life.

The perceived degradation of traditional ways of living was also apparent

with regard to gender equality. Christian churches’ promotion of women’s
equality (i.e. changes to marriage law, polygamy, and gender segregation)
has disoriented traditional PNG gender relations and is seen by many
converts as a major cause of social problems such as increased promiscuity,
pre-marital sex, rape, increased spread of sexual disease and domestic
violence.
In our kastom the girl stays with the parents and family and we give them a man to marry. They
don’t go to disco or public places and that’s why our traditional customs are important. Before a
woman had to be a virgin before she got married but today this doesn’t happen. It’s a sad story.
Now we have babies with no father, unmarried sex and an AIDS epidemic because we have been
weakened by the Western missionaries.
(Mikail N)

For all female converts interviewed the removal of gender segregation is

also seen as a negative effect of Christianity and Western values. For female
converts, Islam provides the means to redress this perceived problem, for
example:

Wearing hijab can protect women. From my point of view women’s body is
sensitive to men. If men get bad thoughts of woman because of their
dressing then it’s not good.
(Musinah)

The promotion of women’s active involvement in religion and participation

in religious rituals (particularly among fundamentalist churches) is also
accentuating this gender crisis, which exists for both male and female
converts.
I see the job of a woman is different from the men. It’s washing clothes and cooking food and
sweeping and cleaning the house, nursing children. These are all a woman’s job. I cannot go and
do man’s work like breaking firewood or building a house or digging a drain, cutting bushes or
building house. All these are a man’s job. So I can tell the Muslim life and Christian life. In
traditional life it was the same.
(Nadia)

The Christian emphasis on monogamy has also damaged the traditional

practice of polygamy in PNG,6 and 26 converts (50 per cent) viewed this as
a form of crisis.7 Most churches (but particularly Pentecostals, evangelicals,
and Seventh-day Adventists)8 insist that only monogamists can join and
attend church although some have a policy of accepting those who already
have multiple wives with the caveat that such members cannot progress to
baptism (Brown 1995; Stewart and Strathern 2001a).9 Despite Christian
opposition, polygamy has continued to increase in the Highlands (especially
among tribal/clan leaders), and is claimed by highlanders to ‘be the way of
Highlands big-men’ (Ketan 2004: 77).
Christian opposition to polygamy and the associated guilt and
stigmatisation causes crisis on a number of fronts. Denying multiple wives
limits the ability of men to improve their political and economic position
and by denying people baptism they are effectively denying followers a
path to salvation. In addition, banning polygamy brings negative social
impacts when second, third or fourth wives are returned to their kin
sometimes with demands that bride price be repaid (which has implications
for land ownership) (Brown 1995; Stewart and Strathern 2001a). These
crises were clearly expressed during interviews:

The Christian principle is one to one so they can have no more than one
and they oppose polygamy. As I have said, this is a problem to us because
when you see some places women outnumbered the men and it’s a problem.
Nowadays we realise that when Christians avoid women from getting
married in polygamy, these women go out and become sexual objects with
money, becoming prostitute and lots of problems are related to this.
Actually polygamy was already practised by our ancestors and was a very
important part of society. Sexual relations is a right given by almighty God,
and our ancestors were well organised and they knew the importance of this
by controlling marriage and having polygamy in society it was very
peaceful. Sex is a desire like eating drinking or sleeping. Sex for every adult
is a must that needs to be fulfilled so it’s no problem [in Islam] … so when
the Christians say you can only marry one wife. Lots of problems come
now.
(Wassim)

Even though polygamy is rare in Muslim countries it is legal and moral to

have more than one wife (An-Na’im 2002; Saeed and Akbarzadeh 2001).
Thus, converts resolve these gender crises through converting to Islam and
following a stricter interpretation on women’s role and place in society
(Azeem N.D.; Badawi 1997).
 There is a clear trend in PNG toward both fundamentalist religions and
political parties associated with fundamentalist religions. This phenomenon
may represent efforts to resolve political crises afflicting Papua New
Guineans. Fourteen converts (27 per cent) made specific reference to
political crisis and claimed that this partially influenced their decision to
convert. Political corruption was the main source of crisis and the link to
religion here was clear in each convert’s testimony, represented by Saeed:
Corruption in government, Christianity has done nothing, they have failed
greatly. Only Islam can change this.

On this point, Abu Bakr most clearly expressed the link between political
crises as a result of external influences and the need for religion to resolve
this crisis:

Australia came here and brought their law, the law was written by Australia
themselves because at the time we didn’t have any lawyers at that moment.
They came in and said Somare you’re going to be signing and be the first
Prime Minister. Our laws were designed by somebody from outside so we
have problems. I look at Islamic Sharia and as I studied Sharia and looked
at Muslim countries and I discovered that it’s different. For example here in
PNG, we have the political integrity bill but this doesn’t really work it just
protects the interests of political leaders. Sharia will not just protect the
interests of any leader. Everybody whether you are a subject or you an
object you are equal in Sharia. It is the lawful court of Allah himself.
Because when people make laws for the country they do it in the interests
of their leader.
(Abu Bakr)

Personal crises are also significant as a factor of conversion among Muslim

converts. This finding is in line with the general view in the literature that
most individuals experience some type of personal turmoil prior to religious
conversion (Lofland and Skonovd 1981; Rambo 1993; Ullman 1989). Each
form of personal crisis was related in some way to the wider context
addressed in the previous chapter and appeared to be exacerbated for urban
converts in Port Moresby and Lae. For the PNG converts interviewed,
conversion to Islam helps relieve or manage these personal crises in a way
that corresponds with Rambo’s crisis type ‘Illness and Healing’ (Rambo
1993: 49).10
Sixty-nine per cent of Muslim converts (two women and 34 men)
experienced one or more types of personal crisis prior to their conversion,
and crises involving alcohol, drugs and violence were the most common.
I was involved with alcohol and gambling and womanising and this creates a lot of problems that
I don’t want. This is one reason why I become Muslim.
(Ali)

I was into alcohol and drugs, mostly marijuana. I would stop cars and pull the drivers out. I used
to get guns and do bad things.
(Hussein)

Less common but equally as influential were factors including experiencing

weakness/loss of familial bonds (urban migration, disunity, or in two cases
being orphaned), experiencing general hardship and going to prison.
This chapter has highlighted the importance of crisis in the conversion
process and through the words of the converts themselves has sought to
provide insights into why Islam is chosen as an alternative religion. The
indigenous cultures of PNG are experiencing a range of crises that have
been long in duration, high in intensity and wide in scope. This is creating a
large pool of potential converts, more so than in stable societies. Converts
are aware of the deficiencies of culture as a result of external influences and
this is further stimulating interest in religious alternatives.

Notes
1 The types of crises mentioned by Rambo that were not evident in PNG were Mystical
Experiences, Altered States of Consciousness, and Pathology (Rambo 2003: 48–55).
2 There is little direct research on NDE as a cause of conversion, one of the few comprehensive
works is by Fox (2003). NDE conversions normally occur after an individual personally
experiences a traumatic event (e.g. near-fatal accident, risky surgery). The experience appears to
lead people to believe that there must be a reason for their survival or why an event occurred and
they attribute this to a higher power that is beyond people’s normal reality. Conversions occur as
a result of a profound spiritual awakening and belief that survival was due to the direct
involvement of God. Abduls’ NDE involved the near-drowning of him and his ship’s crew in the
 Gulf of Papua when the ship sunk after being caught in a cyclone. Assad’s NDE occurred after
surviving a brutal physical assault.
3 Ritual washing is a factor in conversions to another fast-growing religion in PNG, Seventh-day
Adventism (SDA). Jebens has noted that cleanliness in particular is one factor why Papua New
Guineans are converting to SDA on the basis that a clean body corresponds to the cleanliness of
an individual’s soul. SDAs wash themselves regularly and must dress in clean clothes and in
‘doing so they show a true way of life’ because ‘God isn’t with dirty people’ (Jebens 2005: 174).
4 Protean selfhood refers to the way individuals attempt to seek meaning in life in order to cope
with cultural change caused by modernity (Lifton 1968).
5 Former PNG Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare even stated in Parliament that

law and order problems are rapidly increasing. Our societies are now deteriorating and attitudes of
the people are changing. For those people who pack rape, we should bring in the legislation to
impose mandatory corporal punishment of public flogging. Muslims are doing it and it works. We
pretend to go for church services with our Bibles but we still tell lies. I think it is time we got
tough. Capital punishment and public flogging should be exercised now or we should give life
sentences to serious law breakers. Thieves should have their hands chopped off.
(Hansard 1993)

and in 2006, politician Don Polye called for Islamic punishments such as
stoning, public floggings and the cutting off of limbs for crimes such as
murder, rape, drug smuggling and theft, claiming law should be ‘a tooth for
a tooth and an eye for an eye’ (Nicholas 2006).
6 In PNG, leaders and ordinary men marry more than one wife for the following reasons: ‘cheap
labour, extending exchange networks, strengthening alliances between groups, raising a number
of sons to replace them, grow the population, and for social status’ (Ketan 2004: 78). The practice
is widespread in the Highlands with Ketan showing that even today in the Western Highlands
province over 50 per cent of all men are polygamists.
7 The topic of polygamy is contested regularly in the PNG media (see Noeman 2002). Many Papua
New Guineans argue polygamy is legal on the basis it is traditional custom (Kanawi 2001). On
the other hand, foreign governments and Christian organisations (not the PNG Government) are
pushing against the practice (Darius 2005; National 2000a; Peter 2005).
8

Actually I know through my involvement that the church tried their best to separate the second
wife from the first … but certainly the Pentecostals they suspend them and others stop those
involved in polygamous marriages to participate in certain rituals in their church … the Catholics
they stop them from holy communion or baptism and any children from their second wife they
don’t allow them in the church … these sort of things – penalising the follower.
(Muslimhudeen)

9 Abdul described the Christian churches’ view on this, saying,

They say in the Bible it’s one wife. Some I’ve seen when they repent and get rid of their wife but
then go away and get more wives but they kick them out again. They say you are stealing
 someone’s wife if you have more than one. Sometimes you are banned and others you can go but
not participate in ceremonies.

10 Research on this aspect of conversion has grown (see Frank and Frank 1993; Pargament 1997;
Pargament et al. 2000).
6
Quest, encounter, and interaction
The journey to Islam

The Quest, Encounter, and Interaction stages represent the bridging or

facilitating stages that make conversion to Islam in Papua New Guinea
possible. The quest stage covers the ways in which converts have responded
to their actual or perceived crises, and the encounter and interaction stages
explore the relationship between the convert and the new religion.
Although Papua New Guineans’ quest for a new religion is caused by
context and crisis, conversions to Islam would not occur unless a subsequent
encounter and then further direct or indirect interaction with Islam or
Muslims follows. These bridging stages help describe and explain how and
why Papua New Guineans make the commitment to become Muslim, and
also inform their understanding of what Islam is and how it impacts on their
identity, their attachment to their faith and their interaction with other
Muslims.
Contrary to what some of the literature suggests, in PNG many
conversions to Islam may simply result from the fact that a growing number
of Papua New Guineans are searching for a new stricter/fundamentalist form
of religion and come across Islam by chance rather than deliberately
‘seeking’ it (Lofland and Stark 1965; Warburg 2001).
The time at which the growth of Islam rapidly increased correlates with
the spike in media reporting on Islam and Muslims following the attacks in
America on 11 September 2001 (9/11) (Flower 2007).
Whilst the media coverage appears to have had an evangelising effect, it is
also likely that the increase in conversions is related to the expansion of
missionary activity around the same period. This missionary effort is very
influential on potential converts during the interaction stage, and it is the
combination of Islamic literature and relationships developed during this
stage that convinces many potential converts to embrace Islam.
The Quest, Encounter and Interaction stages are based on the assumption
that all humans are constantly and actively engaged in a process of world
construction (and reconstruction) to give their life meaning, purpose and
continuity (Berger and Luckmann 1966), and ‘erase ignorance, and resolve
inconsistency’ (Rambo 1993: 56). The quest stage of conversion becomes
more compelling as crisis conditions increase and a heightened sense of
crisis sharpens problems in potential converts’ minds and intensifies their
need to ‘fill the void, solve the problem, or enrich life’ by ‘looking for
resources that offer growth and development’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966).
In PNG, the wider trend for people to seek (quest) fundamentalist
religions represents a reaction against the process of modernity, which has
led to the relative demise of the social importance of religion (Fox and
Sandler 2004; Marty and Appleby 1991, 1995).1 The preceding chapter
details the many factors that have undermined the authority of religion in
PNG. The quest for and conversion to fundamentalist religions can be seen
as an effort by individuals or groups to counteract or resist the influence of
modernity to preserve what is left of their religious/cultural values, identities
and communities. The interactions between potential Muslim converts in
PNG and Islam/Muslims provides a potential means of coping that fits an
existing global narrative within local conditions.
There are a number of influences that shape convert responses to the
predisposing factors of Context and Crisis and the nature of individuals’
quests can be evaluated against five response types on a continuum, ranging
from passive to active as depicted in Figure 6.1. The vast majority of
Muslim converts in PNG (94 per cent) were closer to the active end of this
continuum, and were receptive to a new religion or played an active role in
their own conversion rather than being passive individuals who were
effectively ‘brainwashed’.2
In the PNG sample, 52 per cent of converts (27) described their
conversion to Islam in a way that indicates a ‘receptive’ response style.
There were slight variations in agency depending on differences in
individual motivations and availability, however converts in this majority
group claimed to be uneasy or unsure about their faith at the time of
encounter. Forty-two per cent of Muslim converts (22) engaged in an active
quest and had belonged to at least two other Christian sects prior to
converting to Islam.

Figure 6.1 Modes of response by Islamic converts in PNG (source: adapted from Rambo 1993: 59).

In line with the pattern of changing religious affiliation in PNG, there is a

trend among this group of Muslim converts away from ‘mainline churches’
toward fundamentalist religions. Out of this group of 22 converts with active
response styles, six of the group had tried two different sects of Christianity
(prior to Islam), nine had tried three sects prior, four had tried four sects
prior, two had tried five sects prior and one had tried 12 different sects
before finding Islam.
This trend increases the likelihood that people in PNG might convert to
Islam, as they are seeking a stricter religion that addresses their context and
crisis conditions. Only 6 per cent of PNG converts (three) are categorised as
converting passively and each of these individuals was classified as ‘passive’
on the grounds that they were aged 15 or less when they converted, and are
likely to have converted as a result of parental/peer influence and not
necessarily because they were psychologically weak and fragile.
My findings are consistent with research on the topic of convert agency in
PNG, which shows a shift away from the general consensus in the literature
pre-1982 that saw conversions to Christianity as ‘coercion – not a free
choice’, to a more complex view of indigenous engagement and
appropriation of global monotheisms (Douglas 2001: 620).
A major finding of this research also confirms Rambo’s claim that the
process flow of his conversion framework is not always linear in nature and
that quest can follow encounter rather than preceding it. Among converts
who converted before 9/11, 18 in the sample had a personal encounter with a
Muslim in the course of their daily life which triggered their quest, as
explained by the following convert:

In 1993 I bumped into our Imam from Nigeria in the post office with
another brother. He was dressed like a religious person. I went up to two
mile hill and got books off the Imam and got very interested. I got more and
more books. It took me a year, but eventually in 1994 I embraced.
(Mohd Islam)

Chance encounters and mass media are important as a source of conversion

leads, because such encounters provide a prospective ‘means of help’ and
thus a pathway to conversion (Straus 1979: 162). However, although
personal encounters with Muslims had a strong impact on conversions pre-
9/11, there has been a shift away from personal encounters towards
impersonal mass media encounters as a major cause of quest. This media
effect is essentially ‘scaling up’ the public promotion of Islam and is having
a major impact on the rate of Islamic conversions as a result. This ‘multiplier
effect’ on Islamic conversion from the media coverage of 9/11 in PNG
should not be that surprising, given that the proliferation and worldwide
distribution of religious information and ideas is recognised as a key driving
force in the globalisation of Christianity in the Pacific (Ernst 2006a).
Twenty-two converts (42 per cent) who converted post-9/11 initially
encountered Islam as a result of the media, and based on this encounter alone
started their quest for more information about Islam. The quests of this
group led them to further investigate Islam in books and/or by visiting a
mosque (Flower 2007).
The effect of the media on the development of religious and cultural
identities is well understood. Newspaper, radio and television facilitate
Islamic conversion in PNG by linking ‘distant localities in such a way that
local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice
versa’ in a reflexive process (Giddens 1990: 64). Mass media in this instance

does not merely reflect the social world, but rather the information and
ideas presented by it contribute to the shaping of religious choices … by
propagating a range of lifestyles or ideals, that are broader than those we
would expect to just ‘bump into’ in everyday life.
(Gauntlett 2002: 112)

An example of the 9/11 event as a media encounter (cause of quest) in

PNG and a contributing factor to Islamic conversion is explained by convert
Abdul Q: Well it was in 2001 that I heard about the attack on the towers in
America on the radio and about Osama Bin Laden, that’s how I first heard
about Islam. So you know I take my time to know about this. What are these
people doing, and what is the mentality of Islam? Then I collected
information bit by bit in the paper. I tried to get close to Muslims but never
got to meet one on the street. So I said one day I will go the mosque and ask
what they were doing.

In PNG there are two primary themes that help explain the seemingly
contradictory relationship between media negativity about Islam and the
increased number of individuals seeking Islam. These hypotheses relate to
other research, which suggests that in societies where Islam is generally
viewed negatively conversion can sometimes be an act of ‘rebellion’ against
wider society (see Roald 2004).
The first hypothesis (weakly supported) is that individuals were attracted
to Islam on ideological grounds following the events of 9/11, as it
represented an attack on the West. Converts of this type in the sample were
attracted to Islam because they perceived it as a powerful religion due to its
ability to inspire Muslims to commit such spectacular violence.
The second hypothesis, more strongly supported by the data, is that the
negative representation of Islam and Muslims in the PNG media post-9/11
(as violent, dangerous, irrational, immoral, or idol worshippers) created a
situation in which converts could easily falsify media reports after personally
coming into contact with Muslims and Islamic teachings (theology, customs,
behaviour, etc.). Based on their own observations of the behaviour of local
Muslims and their study of Islamic doctrines, potential converts came to
believe that the media was misrepresenting the religion. These influencing
themes as a cause of conversions were described by a number of converts:
Before 9/11 not many people knew about Islam, but now because of the media people are thinking
‘what is this new religion?’ Now you see three rows over there (in the mosque) but before 9/11 we
were only one row. I ask myself, where did these people come from? For example at times before
 [9/11] after jummah salat there was 10–15 of us, and now sometimes three rows are full, well over
200 Muslims now at khutbah. You see most of them came to find out what are these people up to,
what is the truth about the Muslims and then they come to understand the truth after listening to
other people’s falsehoods and become Muslims. So some of the best advertising and propagating
of Islam happens through the people who are against Islam, because people come in and see if
what they hear is true or false. So the latest groups of people coming to the diin of Islam are from
this.
(Khalid, Deputy Imam of Port Moresby)

There are two separate yet complementary ways of understanding the active
and receptive response styles that are prevalent amongst PNG Muslim
converts. The ‘availability’ and ‘motivation’ of potential converts are factors
of the quest stage that extend all the way through the encounter and
interaction stages and ultimately culminate in commitment to Islam.
Availability refers to a potential convert’s ‘structural, emotional,
intellectual and religious availability’ (Rambo 1993: 60–63). Availability
references the features of Muslim converts’ quests, which either facilitate or
impede their ability to search for a new religion and to leave their existing
religion and move to another faith. A wide variety of factors were evident in
the data in this respect and the quests varied at an individual level; a
discussion of the major facilitating and constraining aspects is outlined
below.
The primary facilitating aspects included a prior knowledge of
Christianity, the degree of time available to search for a new religion, and
the role of social networks. Converts’ prior knowledge of Christianity was
by far the largest factor facilitating Islamic conversion in PNG. A detailed
knowledge of Christian theology, doctrine and the Bible meant converts
interviewed already had a conceptual framework for understanding Islam,
which they drew upon when encountering Islamic literature or interacting
with Muslims.
This influence of religious knowledge upon Islamic conversion was
greatest among the nine Muslim converts who had received formal religious
training from Christian churches as lay priests or priests. For these converts
it appears that having deeper or more detailed knowledge of Christianity
heightened their concern and anxiety about Christianity and enabled them to
see more contradictions or illogical doctrines, further reducing their belief
that Christianity was the ‘true religion’.
There are many similarities between the Koran and the Bible, such as the
line of prophets, the Old Testament, and religious values and principles.
Converts’ prior knowledge of Christianity and the agency of individuals
converged in the quest stage and appeared to amplify converts’ pre-existing
crises regarding Christianity. This seemed to occur because, as converts
engaged more deeply in their quest, they discovered more problems with
Christianity than they had originally been aware of, a situation described by
the following convert:

When I was young I was an SDA. I learned a lot about the Bible,
everything SDAs do Bible comes first … When I looked back through the
Old Testament I was thinking, Islam is saying this, that there is one true God
and nobody can be a partner to God. This is the greatest sin that people do
this. A human or anything else should not get the same respect as God
himself … it’s the greatest sin but people say Jesus is the one. So I read
many books and found out that Islam is true. God gave the Ten
Commandments and said put no other god before me as the first one and if
there was meant to be other gods then he would have mentioned it in the Ten
Commandments, but there is nothing else.
(Ibrahim)

The second most significant factor was related to the structural availability
of converts. Among the sample population, 67 per cent of converts were
either unemployed (20) or under-employed (14) at the time of their
conversion, which means many had free time to pursue a new religious
option.
A final prominent factor of availability for PNG Muslim converts is the
role and influence of existing social networks (family and friends) as a
means of encounter and recruitment. Thirty-one per cent of converts (16) in
the sample mentioned that family and friends who were Muslim converts
had influenced their quest. This finding correlates with the conversion
literature that suggests social networks are a major contributing factor in
religious conversion (Snow et al. 1980; Warburg 2001).
Paradoxically, in PNG social networks act as both a facilitating and a
constraining factor in conversions to Islam. The major constraining aspects
included influences of family, church, spouse and friends. The combination
of emotional and structural factors mentioned by converts as constraining
their search and switch to a new religion were family (42 per cent), church
(23 per cent), spouse (12 per cent), and friends (10 per cent).
 Given the importance of family structures in PNG it is not surprising that
family was the largest constraining factor for converts considering a change
to a new religion. Rambo claims that some converts can convert to another
religion on the grounds that they wish to sever ‘undesired family ties’,
however this was not a factor for any Muslim convert in the sample (Rambo
1993: 60). Although families are a constraint, they are not a strong enough
constraint to stop conversion once an individual is convinced that Islam
resolves their crises. In some instances, the families of converts responded
negatively to their interest in becoming Muslim in a range of ways that
varied from threats of death to verbal abuse, as shown in the following
statements:

I had a problem with my mother, father and relatives because they are
from a very strong Christian background (Catholics who became
Pentecostals). They argued that I shouldn’t be wearing Sunnah, that I
shouldn’t be another Osama. They argued with me and every time they saw
me they would run away from me thinking I was carrying a bomb.
(Mikail)
I had hard time from older brother because he was committed United Church member and he and
my family told me to take off my hijab.
(Musinah)

Resistance from a convert’s church group to their interest in Islam was less
reported as a constraint; however, converts reporting this type of constraint
generally described a Christian church’s negative response as more active
than the family’s response in trying to bring the follower back to
Christianity:

I went to my church and told them I was leaving and they thought I was
demonically possessed or something like that. They said you are crazy we
will have to pray for you. I told them don’t pray for me pray for yourself and
then I left. They tried to force me back to the church. They would send
members over to talk to me, send ministers over to talk with me, and so I
started debating with them on this and finally they let me go.
(Issa)
At the time of embracing Islam, 37 per cent of converts were members of the
Catholic faith, 25 per cent belonged to Pentecostal sects, 17 per cent were
Lutheran, 11 per cent were Seventh-day Adventist, and 6 per cent were
Uniting Church. The remaining 4 per cent were under 18 years old and not
included. The Catholic Church appears disproportionately represented as the
major faith converts are leaving yet it is not entirely clear why this is the
case. One possibility is that Catholicism is strongly represented in the rural
highland areas, the same areas that are the focus of Islamic missionary
activities. Additionally, Catholicism is more focused on the Holy Trinity (a
common cause of crisis) and Catholic areas have been less impacted by
missionary efforts (shorter duration) and, as a result, individuals in these
areas may be more open to other religious options.
Indeed, the ISPNG da’wah co-ordinator Sandy Sandbach believed

the inhabitants of the comparatively populous Highlands, many of whom

are still tribal and spiritualistic in outlook are much more receptive to the
idea of social change than those in the poorer lowland areas. It is in the
Highlands that we see tremendous potential for Islam, with its integrated
approach to cultural, economic and spiritual development.
(Sandbach 1997b)

One final point regarding convert availability for which there was
conflicting evidence relates to intellectual availability and its impact on the
likelihood of people being attracted to Islam. Some converts interviewed
argued that people do not necessarily need to be literate to become Muslim.
Converts holding this view believed Islam was easy to understand because it
is a way of life based on rituals and clear simple doctrines, which made
conversion attractive to many in PNG. However, equal numbers of converts
argued that part of the reason why more people had not converted to Islam
was because prayers were in Arabic and many people were illiterate in
English, thus the requirement to understand Arabic in order to practise the
faith and read the Koran presented a barrier to conversion.
Converts who felt higher education was an important facilitator of
conversion did so on the basis of intellectual, rational understanding. Their
reasoning was that those who were more educated were more rational and
logical and would find Islam more logical and clear, as opposed to
Christianity, once such people were ‘alerted’ to the inconsistencies and
contradictions of Christianity. The view that literacy was vital to conversion
efforts is more prominent among pre-9/11 converts;3 this may be the result
of the more recent impact of the mass media disseminating messages, thus
removing the barriers of literacy.
The motivations that lead individuals to embark on a religious quest are
multiple, cumulative, and interrelated, and can be seen to discourage or
prevent conversion to Islam in PNG. Motivation can be segmented into four
key factors including:

the need to enhance self-esteem;

the need for a sound conceptual system;
the need to experience pleasure and avoid pain; and
the need to establish and maintain relationships.
(Rambo 1993: 63–65) These four factors of quest, which are present among PNG converts, stem from
the experiences converts are undergoing. A trend common to all converts was the need to enhance
personal self-esteem. For converts this was accomplished by leaving the religion they saw as the
oppressive legacy of colonialism. The need to improve self-image was particularly heightened for
urban converts and those who had experienced problems of domestic violence, alcohol or drug abuse.

Islam is similar to fundamentalist Christian sects in that it has strict rules

and prohibitions and provides a supportive social environment for converts
seeking to improve their self-esteem in these areas of crisis. This aspect of
motivation appears to be closely interrelated to the relationship between self-
image and social status, and ten converts anticipated that their social
standing would improve as a result of changes in their behaviour, driven by
the requirements of the new strict regime of Islam. This aligns with Bulliet’s
assertion that people only willingly convert to Islam if, by converting, their
social status is improved (Bulliet 1979).
Converts were looking to explain the inconsistencies in their
understanding of Christianity and found Islam to be a more convincing and
coherent conceptual system. This aspect of quest is linked to the range of
crises involving converts’ understanding and experience of Christianity. All
converts interviewed felt a need to understand themselves or the world and
sought in Islam a sense of meaning, purpose, and continuity to fill a void,
solve a problem or enrich their lives. This type of quest is best understood as
a ‘search for significance’ and is also strongly supported as a major
motivating factor of conversion (Pargament et al. 2005).
 In the PNG case, particularly in the Highlands, kastom continues to be a
strong influence on Papua New Guineans regardless of which religion they
subscribe. Congruency between their religion and their culture (kastom) not
only aids in conversion by making the transition easy but provides a natural
bond between the two, as described in Pieris’ helicopter theory (Pieris 1988).
The link between a coherent conceptual system of religion and the
importance of culture was shared among 48 converts (92 per cent) and is
encapsulated simply by Muzamil: ‘For my religion there must be a link to
my culture’.
The motivational category of ‘experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain’ is
best considered in terms of the acquisition of material benefits in PNG. As
mentioned in Context and Crisis, a significant number of converts’ quests are
initially motivated by a search for material gain. ISPNG archival records
contain a number of handwritten notes from converts demanding that they be
paid small amounts of cash ($100–500 kina) for the setting up of businesses
or for services rendered to the Society (Benny 1997; Sine 1998).
The expectation of material benefits that feature in some converts’ quests
and the failure of the ISPNG to meet such expectations have led to
significant problems for the ISPNG in the past. For example, the ISPNG
executive committee stated in 1996 that ‘the mentality of a few Muslims to
demand funds from the Society must change, instead we should ask
ourselves what we can do to help the Society to promote the spread of Islam’
(ISPNG 1996a: 1). The most significant incident of convert disgruntlement
over material benefits involved a group of converts from Chimbu who
squatted at the Islamic centre in Port Moresby for a number of months and
refused to leave on the grounds that they felt entitled to full and free access
to the centre. The ISPNG eventually called in the police to forcibly evict
these converts, which led the convert squatters to destroy the facility in
payback for their disappointment (Flower 2007).
A final motivation evident among PNG converts’ quests is their effort to
find a new religion as a way of seeking and maintaining relationships. Both
the Context and Crisis chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) outline how converts seek
in Islam a means of unifying family, tribe and nation. For urban converts
who are more distant from their traditional social relationships, Islamic
communities in urban centres can provide a strong sense of community and
communal identity and support.
The Koran provides a theological and doctrinal basis for all Muslims to
undertake activist Islamic missionary efforts (Dawood 2003: 123). It is a
religious obligation for all followers of Islam to be advocates of their
religion and proclaim Islam’s principles to non-Muslims in the hope that
non-Muslims will become Muslim (Al-Faruqi 1986; Esposito 2005; Yakan
1985).4 The ways in which these advocates combine and interact with
potential converts influences the conversion process. Therefore, the
relationships between advocates and converts, the details of advocates’
personal and organisational backgrounds, and the methods and strategies
used to convert Papua New Guineans are all important.
Although a significant body of research on Christian missiology in PNG
exists (Trompf 2006) there is currently no research on Islamic missionary
efforts or Islamic missionary methods used in PNG. In one of the few books
mentioning Islam in the Pacific, Crocombe draws an interesting parallel
between the first noticeable rise in Islamic proselytism in the 1980s and
1990s and the history of Christian missions in the Pacific. He claims that the
growth in petro-dollars (since the first oil shock in 1973) has funded the
Islamic missionary effort, much like the industrial revolution in Europe
generated surplus funds for Christian missionaries in the Pacific (Crocombe
2001: 233).
Crocombe’s view appears correct in light of the evidence presented in this
book using ISPNG archival records, which show that the timing of outside
support for Islam in PNG correlates with the period of the first and second
oil shocks in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. ISPNG archival records show
that Islam in PNG has received significant financial support from individuals
and organisations belonging to oil-rich Arab countries, particularly Saudi
Arabia, which is the largest major financier of Islamic proselytism in the
Pacific region. The financial and ideological influences that supported Islam
in PNG have also been significant to the expansion of the Islamic missionary
effort globally (Yergin 2008).
From the outset, expatriate Muslims believed that PNG would be a
difficult place to propagate Islam; however, there was also recognition that
Islam could provide a solution to the many challenges being experienced by
the people of PNG. This sentiment is outlined in the following statement by
the ISPNG to a RISEAP conference in 1983:

It is our opinion that this country is at a decisive crossroad in its

development … managed by a semi-literate elite guided by strong
materialistic influences of Australia. With youth depressed by the failure of
‘Christian’ religion to provide answers to the increasing problems brought by
independence in a still largely tribal country … with a rising tide of urban
unemployment which has led to increasing lawlessness and frequent stories
of corruption and moral disintegration … with government officials sinking
into the escapism of alcoholism, drugs, gambling, permissive sex, theft,
murder, and hooliganism … to the casual observer it appears that this
country may look like the Arabia of pre-Islamic days.
(Choudry 1982i: 4)

The increase of Islamic missionary activity in PNG is aligned with the

current emphasis of the global Islamic revival movement on da’wah within
Muslim minority countries (Murad 1986; Yakan 1985; Zin 1991). Da’wah
literally means ‘to call’ or ‘to invite’; in operational terms it means to share a
meal, prayer, invocation, vow and appeal. Da’wah has three prioritised
levels in the Hadith in the following descending order: Jihad (physical
struggle), da’wah (communication) and hijra (migration) (Masud 2000: xxi).
The global da’wah movement aims to ‘reach out to and revitalise the faith
of existing Muslims as much as it seeks to call new souls to the fold of
Islam’ (WAMY 1982: 2). The growth of Islam in PNG that has occurred,
particularly since 1997, is thus not the result of random or passive
missionary efforts but part of a more activist and global approach to Islamic
propagation that has developed within the global Muslim ummah since the
1970s.
This activist emphasis has been operationalised by organisations such as
the Tablighi Jamaat, based on ideological inspiration from individuals such
as Muhammad Khurshid, Abdullah Mawdudi and Khurram Murad, who see
da’wah as active, dynamic and progressive (Khurshid n.d.; Mawdudi 1984;
Murad 1981, 1986). The active promotion of Islam by individuals and the
evolution of Islamic organisations in support of propagation efforts are based
on the grounds that:

The truth of Islam is not, or not chiefly, a theoretical truth but also and
prevalently law and customs felt as given by god and obviously cannot be
spread through personal conversion alone but only through physical
conquest of the region to be converted.
(Poston 1992: 52)
Many advocates of Islam in PNG are not solely focused on the propagation
of Islam; rather, the majority of missionary work is conducted by people
who usually have other employment or are self-funded volunteers (local and
foreign). These individuals are often supported in material ways by foreign
individuals and organisations whose sole focus is Islamic propagation. The
evolution of professional full-time Islamic missionaries is a very recent
phenomenon and in PNG is limited to the Head Imam, a few PNG converts
casually employed as da’wah workers, and rare visits by professional
foreign missionaries.
Previously, the ‘soldier and trader’ were considered the most important
agents of Islamisation (Rambo 1993: 70). Yet in PNG today a combination
of Muslim expatriates (working as businessmen, PNG public servants, and
foreign diplomatic staff), foreign volunteer Tablighi Jamaat members, and a
small group of dedicated PNG converts are the driving force behind local
missionary efforts leading to the increase in Islamic conversions since the
mid-1980s. These advocates of Islam in PNG are successful in achieving
conversions because they address the four factors Rambo defined as key
criteria that advocates must address in order for conversion to occur. The
four factors incorporated into advocates’ representation of Islam include
Islam as: ‘a system of meaning; a source of emotional gratification; a “way
of life” or techniques for living; and a source of power (personal and social)’
(Rambo 1993: 81–86).
The tribal heritage of PNG is evident in the structure of society today and
PNG effectively comprises a number of traditional ‘societies’ that still
operate within their traditional societal structures. Islamic doctrine provides
clear directions for those conducting da’wah in places such as in PNG: as
outlined by the Prophet Muhammad in the hadiths and in the holy Koran, a
two-pronged approach should be taken, focusing on ‘chiefs’ (al-Mala) and
‘common people’. The chiefs are important because they have influence and
power in their societies and could lead to mass conversions. However, the
holy Koran also explains to da’wah groups that resistance to da’wah by
chiefs is likely to occur due to vanity, a desire to rule (accepting the rule of
god reduces their own status and power) and ignorance (ignorance of the
knowledge of god) (Zin 1991: 34–45).
In situations where community leaders resist Islam, Zin suggests da’wah
should focus on the common people who are more inclined to accept da’wah
on the basis they are generally weak and poor, ‘and have no reason to reject
da’wah as they have no power or glory to lose, and no personal benefit in
ignoring the message’ (Zin 1991: 39).
Islam has a clear philosophy regarding primordial (primal) religions
encapsulated in the concept of diin-al-fitrah. As mentioned earlier, this
concept aids in conversions by acknowledging the positive qualities of the
convert’s traditional (primal) religion and highlighting the similarities
between the traditional religion (Kastom) and Islam. In some interviews,
converts mentioned that they were explicitly told by advocates that they
were Muslims before Christian colonisation.
Additionally, in every interview converts highlighted that advocates had
mentioned the similarities of spiritual beliefs and social customs to
legitimise and enhance the value of Islam over Christianity. Islamic concepts
of Ada and Fitra provide potential converts with a further guarantee of
Islam’s authenticity (Eaton 1991). As described in the context stage,
Christian missionaries promoted Christianity in PNG using a similar
method; however, kastom for converts is seen as more closely in line with
Islam than Christianity and thus seen as more legitimate.
Some converts are so strongly convinced of the links between kastom and
Islam, and the potential that they were Muslim before colonisation, that they
use this to proselytise in their local communities:
I speak to them about the Islam way of life and I tell them that our ancestors were Muslim before.
(Sulemain)

This strategy of conversion is underpinned by a personalised missionary

approach outlined in Islamic doctrines and reiterated by the intellectuals
behind the global da’wah resurgence who assert that ‘non-Muslims who
observe the life of a devout Muslim will be powerfully attracted’ and be
‘tantalized’ on the basis of a Muslim’s lifestyle (Al-Faruqi 1986; Masud
2000; Yakan 1985).
A central element of conversions in PNG, especially among the expatriate
Muslim population, is a belief that the best form of da’wah is to live an
exemplary life as a Muslim. This is seen by Muslims as the best form of
proselytising because, when Muslims exhibit a particular quality of character
and behaviour, non-Muslims will notice Muslims as different from others
and inquire about their religion.
A necessary step in turning potential converts’ general quests for a new
religion into a specific quest towards Islam involves an initial encounter with
Islam through media or personal contact with a Muslim. The PNG case
confirms that encounter alone is not sufficient for enabling a commitment to
Islam and shows that conversions only occur after a complex process of
intensifying interactions between potential converts and advocates. This
interactive step was experienced by 100 per cent of converts interviewed.
The duration of the interaction stage varied significantly from person to
person, with the average period of interaction (based on the sample) being
approximately three months and ranging between one week to three years.
The most influential interactions with advocates cited by converts as
facilitating Islamic conversion were:

experiences with the Head Imam – 81 per cent (42);

interactions with the Tablighi Jamaat – 75 per cent (39);
interactions with local Muslims (converts and expatriates) – 50 per cent
(26); and
Islamic books and literature – 73 per cent (38).

The range of individuals and organisations that act as advocates of Islam and
contribute to da’wah in PNG includes individual converts and expatriate
Muslims based in PNG (including the ISPNG), foreign individuals and
organisations based outside PNG that have formal local representatives or
make regular visits, and foreign individuals and Islamic organisations based
outside PNG with no permanent local representative.
Fieldwork data show that although a number of different advocates are
active in PNG, there are similarities in the way advocates operate,
particularly with regard to the prescriptions of the Koran around forcibly
converting people to Islam. All advocates of Islam in PNG strongly believe
that there should be no compulsion in religion. Advocates also generally
believe that Papua New Guineans will convert to Islam at the time and in the
way Allah has chosen. Local and foreign advocates are generally devout
Muslims or organisations committed to promoting the conservative practice
of Islam and, in line with stricter Koranic injunctions, these advocates do not
attempt to judge the depth of a convert’s conversion.
An Imam plays a special role within a new or growing Muslim minority
because religious knowledge transfer is more dependent on religiously
trained leaders than via cultural or religious immersion, as in Muslim
majority countries (Poston 1992). This is certainly the case in PNG, with the
Head Imam providing spiritual and religious leadership and advice and
coordinating missionary activities. The Head Imam is an expatriate of
Nigeria who arrived in PNG on 2 June 1989 as a graduate of the Islamic
University in Medina, Saudi Arabia. In 2006, his wife moved to be with him
from Nigeria. Since he migrated to PNG he has always lived and worked at
the Islamic centre in Hohola. In line with the ISPNG constitution, the
Imam’s role focuses on ‘leading prayers, delivering khutbah for jummah
prayers on Fridays, teaching Arabic and Koranic recitation to children and
adults and providing consultation on Islamic matters to members of the
Islamic community and the general non-Muslim public’ (ISPNG 1990: 4).
Officially, there is no hierarchical priesthood or clergy in Islam (Esposito
2005); however, the ISPNG constitution shows that a hierarchy of religious
leadership exists in PNG with the Port Moresby-based Imam ultimately
being in charge of religious affairs (ISPNG 1981).
PNG’s Head Imam conducts weekly adult and children’s classes in
reading Arabic and Koranic recitation, which have run since his arrival in
1989 (Flower 2007). In 2007, whilst conducting fieldwork, I observed that
local converts who had received training in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia were
supporting the Imam in this task. Although the coordination of da’wah is
supposed to be managed by the ISPNG, archival documents and interviews
clearly show that missionary activities are generally managed by the Head
Imam. In this respect, whilst the Imam is not an active manager of ISPNG
affairs, he is the single most influential person within Islam in PNG in terms
of coordinating international da’wah resources. For this reason the Head
Imam is often described as ‘the backbone da’wah itself’, travelling to new
Muslim communities three times a year (Gaffar). Thirty-one per cent of
converts (16) mentioned that Islam would be growing much faster if there
was a greater number of trained Imams to live with people in the rural areas
(Flower 2007). In 1999, as part of efforts to fix the shortage of qualified
Imams, the ISPNG advertised in Fiji for an Imam to be based in the
Highlands, who would be funded by one of the expatriate Muslims (ISPNG
1999). Converts see the problem of a lack qualified imam’s in the following
way:

The potential for growing Islam in PNG is very promising, we just need
more Imam’s from Malaysia, Pakistan and Saudi who are trained in da’wah.
(Mikail)
Whilst the Head Imam generally stays out of the internal politics and
management of the ISPNG he has been integral to securing funds from
international providers which are deposited into ISPNG accounts.
Expatriate Muslims in PNG are predominantly Bangladeshi, Indian,
Indonesian, and Malaysian, with smaller numbers of Pakistanis, Turkish,
Nigerian, Sri Lankan, and Singaporean Muslims. These expatriates share the
management of the ISPNG with local converts and provide donations at
Friday khutbah for the operation and maintenance of the mosque. The role of
the expatriate Muslims in PNG has changed in recent years. Prior to 9/11,
expatriates were more heavily engaged in propagating Islam. However, since
that time these expatriates have dedicated less of their time to da’wah as
expressed by Yaqub below: Mostly they were expatriate Muslims who were
professionals. Today the expatriates are less skilled and run food shops and
this kind of thing. The expatriates of that (earlier) time had a lot of time for
Islam and were very committed. They realised the religion was in an
important stage of development and were very generous with their time. The
expatriate Muslims today are more interested in business so you don’t see
that now.

A number of foreign advocates for Islam are active in PNG. The advocates
that have either a nominated local representative or members who regularly
visit the country include the diplomatic staff of foreign governments,
members of the Tablighi Jamaat movement, the Regional Islamic Da’wah
Council for Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP), Muslim World League
(MWL, also known as Rabita), World Association for Muslim Youth
(WAMY), and Islamic Development Bank (IDB).
Since 2000/2001 the main advocates of Islam in PNG have been members
of Tablighi Jamaat (TJ). The TJ are viewed by a growing number of analysts
as belonging to the same ‘neo-fundamentalist movement’ as the Wahhabist
movement (Roy 2004: 235); however, the evidence of TJ activities in PNG
do not support this emerging view.
The first recorded visit to PNG by a TJ group occurred in early 1988 when
a group of three Muslims from Western Australia came to Port Moresby
(ISPNG 1988: 2). This was followed by two other Jamaats in the same year
from Pakistan and Fiji, with the Fijian Jamaat mentioned as being
particularly ‘well organised and effective’ (ISPNG 1988: 2). Since the late
1990s, between two and four of these groups have made regular visits to
PNG each year.
 Members of TJ groups are known as Da’iyah, they fund themselves and
organise their own mission groups without the prior approval of the TJ
organisation, yet they do use the missionary techniques and methods of the
TJ (Flower 2007). Members of the TJ active in PNG predominantly come
from Sydney and Melbourne, Australia. Although the Da’iyah are generally
citizens/residents of Australia, ethnically and parochially Da’iyah are
generally of South Asian descent (Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi
Muslims), which aligns with global trends in the ethnicity of the TJ (Masud
2000: 30).
The general literature on the TJ claims it does ‘not aim to convert non-
Muslims but rather transform nominal Muslims to become real and better
Muslims’ (Ali 2000). Metcalf has added that the Tablighi Jamaat is ‘an
apolitical, quietist movement of internal grassroots missionary renewal’ and
compares its activities to the efforts to reshape individual lives by Alcoholics
Anonymous (Metcalf 2003: 2). This is aligned to Ali’s views that the TJ has
‘a total aversion to politics and indifference to socio-political issues’ adding
further that ‘in fact its members refuse to even make a comment on the
worldly issues affecting humanity’ (Ali 2000: 22).
Contrary to the views presented in the literature (mentioned above), in
PNG the TJ are much more proactive in their missionary efforts. As in other
parts of the world, in PNG the TJ are ‘innovative and expansive and do not
hesitate to confront new social and geographical areas’ (Dassetto 1988: 163).
In PNG, the TJ target specific themes including social problems, and address
issues relating to the number of crises experienced by potential converts. In
this respect they follow the da’wah ideology and operate in a more active
and political manner, and do aim to convert non-Muslims. As part of this
more activist approach, the visiting TJ appear to follow the form of da’wah
prescribed by Murad in that da’wah should emphasise Islam as relevant to
the concerns of locals and linked to local issues, and be concerned with
unemployment and other social issues and public policy and morality
(Murad 1986: 23).
Murad’s view is that proponents of da’wah should engage in all public
policy issues and Murad emphasises the revolutionary aspect of missionary
work, defining it as ‘an organised struggle to change the existing society into
an Islamic society based on the Koran and the Sunnah to make Islam, (which
is a code for entire life) supreme and dominant, especially in socio-political
spheres’ (Murad 1981: 3). The visiting TJ ‘aim to create “mobile madrasas”
in order to teach mainly poor or uneducated and less educated’ (Dassetto
1988: 160).
TJ groups visit local communities with one of the group being selected to
be the leader (Amir) or speaker (Mutakallim), who talks directly with people
in the community about the life of the prophet Muhammad and how
following him is the only way to solve the world’s problems. The speaker
then invites the person to a central place of worship (mosque or temporary
building used as a mosque) (Flower 2007). In addition to religious activities
TJ also provides ‘self-help, social and cultural activities and teaching of
Arabic’ (Dassetto 1988: 165).
The TJ are having a significant influence on conversions in PNG, with 19
converts (37 per cent) mentioning that TJ was the most influential factor in
their decision to convert. There are two key reasons that TJ are effectively
driving conversions in PNG: the first is that the religious message they bring
appeals to potential converts who are living in conditions, and experiencing
a range of crises as outlined in the previous chapters. However, the focus of
the TJ in PNG is on the conversion and Islamic education of men and not
women. This is the cause of some resentment among some females who also
convert, as described by Maryam: We do not get the same opportunity to get
knowledge from the visiting Tablighi when they come. We appeal to the
society and Tablighi that there is opportunity for expatriate sisters to visit the
regional sisters. We are worried we are not learning enough about Islam
because the Muslim brothers from the Tablighi cannot talk to the Muslim
women in detail about Islam.

The TJ and other Muslim advocates are using an approach common to other
modern Islamic fundamentalists and are reusing the traditional religious
polemics from the Middle Ages in booklets that critique the Bible to show
how Christian clerics have distorted the ‘true’ message and to explain how
Islam is more coherent and correct than Christianity (Roy 2004: 115); this
fits well with pre-existing crises converts had, particularly regarding the
contradictions in Christianity.
The methods employed by the TJ to disseminate Islam also demonstrate to
potential converts their own commitment to the Islamic faith, which is
contrasted with the way locals observe Christian missionaries. White
missionaries in PNG often conducted themselves in a way that implied
dominance and breached their claims of brotherhood by eating by
themselves and refusing to share wealth (Burridge 1969). Furthermore,
missionaries often ‘live in houses of relative architectural splendour
detached from the village societies they serve, refusing to enter smoked
filled huts or share their own private spaces leading to a form of
psychological apartheid’ (Trompf 1991: 253). Muslim converts see this
positively and numerous converts highlighted the direct contrast between the
TJ and Christian missionaries:

They were more loving, they had their hearts opened, they were not racist,
they eat simple food like us, they drink from nearby creeks, their life was
simplicity and that life made us realise that you can’t see colour – that he
was a brother and there was nothing that can separate you. The thing that is
quite different from a Christian missionary is they come in with big
wardrobes; they come in and sit in a big golden chair or something, up in a
place where people can see and respect. They are in a way that people look
up they are placed higher and separate themselves from the people.
(Osman)
Christian missionaries operate very differently from Tablighi. They came to build the houses on
the hills and best locations away from the communities. They don’t go and eat with people in the
villages. People are surprised because Tablighi make sacrifices, leaving the comfort of their homes
and wives and companions and families, coming to where god only knows what will happen to
them. People are surprised to see that they share a pot of kaukau or banana or local food. It has an
impact on them and they say what kind of people are these, maybe this kind of simplicity is what
the religion Islam is all about?
(Yusuf)

Since the 1980s, diplomatic staffs of foreign governments and global and
regional Islamic NGOs have provided material support to PNG Muslims.
These contributions are often not regular or centrally coordinated by the
ISPNG but rather the contributions are generally made on an ad hoc basis in
consultation with the Head Imam.
Foreign Muslims and religious institutions support religious activism in
PNG by providing knowledgeable religious cadre, organisational resources
and social networks for mobilisation (Fox 1999; Silberman et al. 2005).
Recent Islamic conversion growth in Asia and Africa correlates with
increased missionary activity, and within this movement has been a
widespread trend for Islamic missionary organisations to deliver material aid
to conduct da’wah (Aglionby 2007; Ahmed 2008b; Casey 2008; Horstmann
2007; Marloes 2005). These organisations usually function as vehicles to
influence and improve people’s material and moral wellbeing and are
competing with Western missionaries who use the same approach, by
promoting a fundamentalist strain of Islam that links poverty to the failure of
capitalism as a base for the politicisation of Islam (Ahmed 2008b; Haynes
1996; Kaag 2008).
The use of economic and financial incentives in support of Islamic
da’wah was a method used even in the time of the prophet Muhammad, and
the use of material incentives to support the propagation of Islam is therefore
legitimate although not seen as preferable. For example, the early Bedouin
converts to Islam were in need of financial help so that they might not be
disheartened by the difficulties faced as a consequence of embracing Islam
(Alghazali 1985: 100).
Likewise, early conversions to Islam, Iran, Syria, Egypt and Iraq, occurred
in order to obtain economic advantages. In those cases newly converted
Muslims also continued to practice their pre-Islamic religions in secret while
publicly professing Islam, with this type of convert referred to in Islam as
‘Munafiq’ (Griffel 2001). Although not detectable as a pattern in PNG, a
similar situation could be occurring whereby converts are actually Munafiqs
that outwardly give the impression that they accept Islam, but in actual fact
they do not. Even so, the persistence of Islam in other countries where
material incentives occurred highlight that, over time, Islam can become
more deeply entrenched and less materially oriented.
The provision of food, financial support for education, support in the
paying of bills, provision or subsidy of health care and commercial training
are examples of the types of public goods provided by Islamic da’wah
groups in PNG. Foreign da’wah contributors also run intensive
courses/camps with one such camp run in 2006 focusing on Janaza
management, individual and congregational prayers, Islamic dress code,
halal cooking, reading and writing Arabic, reciting and memorizing the
Koran and teaching entrepreneurship to women engaging in small business
(QMT 2006b).
The Saudi Arabian Government via its embassy in Canberra and other
organisations provides financial and logistical support for PNG converts
including supporting PNG converts to go on Hajj, and facilitates PNG
converts to study at Medina University in Saudi Arabia (ISPNG 1993). The
Saudi Arabian Department of Religious Affairs has also sent representatives
a number of times, with Zaid-al-Dakkan (who is based in Sydney, Australia)
being the most regular (Sandbach 1998c).
The Muslim World League (MWL) has also provided support for Islam in
PNG, primarily through the provision of financial aid to the ISPNG and
literature, which is used as part of the da’wah effort by the Imam, ISPNG
and visiting TJ. MWL representatives visit every two to three years and in
1996 the ISPNG became an associate member of the World Assembly of
Muslim Youth (WAMY) (ISPNG 1996a; Sandbach 1998a, 1997c; Yusut
1994). Both WAMY and the MWL are funded by Saudi Arabia, and
representatives of both organisations are based in Australia (ABR 2002).
The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, has appointed a PNG expatriate Muslim as its representative for
PNG. The IDB purchased the land and paid for the first stage of the
construction project of the new mosque in Hohola (Haq 1994). The IDB also
plans to support the building of a vocational training centre in Port Moresby
(Sandbach 1997f), and sponsor PNG converts to study abroad on IDB
scholarships under the development programme for non-IDB member
Muslim minority countries (IDB 1999, 2006). IDB also provides a small
amount of non-specific funding for the Head Imam to distribute on small
projects as it sees fit.
In addition to Saudi Arabia, Malaysians are among the primary supporters
of Islam in PNG and are involved at the state, NGO, business and individual
levels. Local converts expressed their desire and expectation that Muslim
countries would continue to support the propagation of Islam in PNG.
Sixteen converts expressed the sentiment that Muslim countries and Islamic
NGOs should be providing greater support for Islamic propagation in PNG:

I think that the bigger Muslim countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and
Saudi they should help us because we are small but we are growing, Islam is
germinating but we need their help. They can build us Madrassah schools
and small schools and aid posts and can send people who are more
knowledgeable in hadiths and Koran to teach us Islamic law. From there the
Muslim population will grow very fast. Because we currently lack these
things we can’t really grow up so fast.
(Abdul Sallam)
ISPNG archival records show that since PNG independence in 1975,
Malaysia has used its significant and influential commercial, political and
diplomatic relationships with consecutive PNG governments to support
Islam’s presence and propagation in the country. Malaysia is also the second-
largest foreign investor in the country after Australia and is the largest
investor from Asia, with investments totalling approximately $2 billion PNG
kina (Faiparik 2007). Whilst Malaysian Government support for Islam in
PNG is active, it is generally very low-key and informal (Choudry 1984).
As mentioned previously, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammed played a personal and influential role in establishing the ISPNG.
Malaysian support today includes the provision of cash, food, educational
assistance, and the distribution of Islamic missionary booklets to potential
converts and interested non-Muslims (Flower 2007). Surprisingly, whilst
conducting fieldwork I came across a package of MWL material that was
sent from the Malaysian High Commission to a potential convert. Whilst this
action could represent Malaysian government sponsorship for promoting the
growth of Islam in PNG it is important not to attach too much significance to
this event as it may also have been the act of an individual without formal
approval or direction from government policy.
RISEAP, a Malaysian organisation based in Kuala Lumpur, helped
provide early support for the establishment of the ISPNG (as detailed in the
History chapter), and continues to provide valuable political and
organisational support for the ISPNG. Currently, RISEAP funds between
two to three PNG converts a year to travel to Malaysia to undertake short-
term intensive religious training courses of three to six months duration.
These courses deliver training in Islamic practice and doctrine, da’wah and
women’s courses. PNG converts are also sponsored by RISEAP to attend
regional Islamic conferences (Flower 2007; ISPNG 1993). The influence and
support of RISEAP is more broadly felt through the quarterly production and
distribution of the Al-Nahdah magazine (Mamat 1993).
Foreign individuals and organisations with no local presence or
representation have contributed to the ISPNG and appear to have played a
somewhat significant role in influencing conversion to Islam in PNG. This
may be due to the scale of their contribution, or to the nature of the
incentives they have provided, which are aligned to the quests of potential
converts and thus can be seen to have influenced conversions.
In the last 40 years Saudi Arabia has increased its support for the export of
Wahhabi Islam, using the apparatus of state- and government-sponsored
Islamic non-government organisations (see Esposito 2005: 261). Within
PNG, key examples of Saudi-funded Islamic assistance include the use of
development aid, the building of mosques, libraries and, in some instances,
Imams have been funded to establish and preach fundamentalist forms of
Islam and Salafi or Wahhabi culture (Esposito 2005).
In PNG, the Saudi-trained and remunerated Imam personally holds and
promotes a conservative version of Islam, but through interviews and
observations I found no evidence of him openly supporting radical or
militant political ideas.
The greatest financial supporter of the Head Imam in PNG was Ahmad
Totonji. Totonji was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood founded by
Hasan al-Banna and moved to America in the 1960s where he founded the
Islamic Society of North America, and for a number of years in the late
1970s and early 1980s he was Assistant-Secretary-General for World
Assembly of Muslim Youth (Poston 1992: 79).
Totonji became involved with the efforts of the ISPNG in 1981 (Choudry
1981d), and personally provided funds to support ISPNG objectives and the
religious education of converts (Islam 1990). Totonji’s decision to support
the ISPNG in July 1987 occurred after ‘one of his friends’ was sent to PNG
‘to verify the ISPNG claims and needs for an Islamic centre’ (Islam 1988: 2).
Totonji also ‘agreed to pay the salary of up to $1,000 US dollars a month’ for
an Imam if the ISPNG ‘desired to appoint one’ (Islam 1988: 2). For the first
seven years, Totonji personally sponsored the Head Imam and after 1995
arranged for others to sponsor the Imam in conjunction with his own
finances (Totonji 1995). Totonji provided contact details for a number of
wealthy Muslims including the Saudi billionaire Sheikh Abdul Rahman
Abdullah Al-Rajhi (Aziz 1997a; Sandbach 1997e).
Intellectuals leading the international Islamic revivalist da’wah movement
believe that the objective of da’wah ‘shall not be realised unless the struggle
is made by the locals, for it is only they who have the power to change the
society into an Islamic one’ (Mawdudi 1984: 36). The localisation of da’wah
(missionary) efforts and the opening up of executive power in the ISPNG to
local converts has benefited the growth of Islam in PNG among nationals
because it has reduced perceptions that Islam is a ‘foreign religion’ and has
provided new social opportunities (Poston 1992; Zebiri 2008). Importantly,
the localisation of the management of the ISPNG also reduced the
organisation’s dependency on expatriate Muslims, which was problematic
because these Muslims generally only stayed in PNG for a few years
(ISPNG 1992).
Organic conversion growth has increased in PNG since 2001. The
majority of this growth is being driven by the da’wah efforts of local
converts on the basis of their sincere commitment to Islam and the
requirement to act as advocates of Islam and engage in da’wah.
Well it is all Muslims’ duty but doing da’wah also strengthens my Iman so that I can do better in
my own area. The beauty of PNG is that it’s easy to do da’wah. When you talk they listen they
won’t say oh I’m busy. It’s not like when I went to New Zealand or Australia, it’s very hard and
difficult. There when you get up to talk about Allah only Muslims will listen and non-Muslims will
walk away, but here no. Everybody will listen if you go to a gathering and talk about it.
(Issa)

Local converts expressed their interest in advocating Islam to others as a

means of resolving the crises others experience. An important element of
early efforts to localise Islam in PNG involved the religious training of new
PNG converts. This was important because conversions became more
difficult as the immediate family were exhausted as a source of converts and
because of strong social opposition. In interviews, local converts highlighted
a particular need to focus on those experiencing a heightened level of crisis,
such as the poor and disaffected youths.
Islam will grow and be established here in PNG. To my experience the big people don’t
understand Islam but the poor ones they are the ones who are alert to hearing the reasoning but the
ones who are educated and think they are special they are ignorant. The poor ones on the street
they are more open hearted but it will take time for them to become Muslim because we can’t be
forcing them it’s against Islam.
(Abdul Aziz)

Twenty-eight converts (54 per cent) said they were happy to proselytise to
the family and friends while nine (17 per cent) said they were happy to
proselytise publicly. The following convert statements illustrate sentiments
from both these perspectives and highlight the degree of commitment
converts have for propagating Islam:

Propagating the Diin of Islam in this country is a responsibility but it’s

one I am happy to take. I ask others to help me and they help, I like leading.
(Khalid G)
 We will have the best impact through our example and how we wear our clothes. We are not
allowed as women can we tell them about Islam. We are not allowed to go out to the community
and talk with people.
(Hamida)

I only talk when asked. I go about daily life but once they ask me questions I tell them about the
Islamic way of living.
(Imran)

In addition to the growth of Islam being driven through da’wah by both

locals and foreigners, da’wah efforts have been aided by the increased
availability of media to provide an additional source of interactions, which
lead to conversions. The influence of printed material and Islamic media is
influential on potential converts because it clearly explains how and why
Islam provides a solution to the variety of crises they may be experiencing.
Furthermore, for those converts eager to conduct da’wah but who lack
detailed knowledge of Islam, pamphlets are available for them to distribute
and these assist in facilitating the interaction between potential converts and
Islamic ideology. As highlighted by Geertz, ‘Islam is simple and easily
marketed as a religious package’ (Geertz 1960: 123), and the provision of
Islamic media is one of the key ways the Saudi religious institutions and
Islamic NGOs support the da’wah effort in PNG.
The emergence of a vast market of inexpensive Islamic books,
newspapers and pamphlets began in the late 1980s and early 1990s and some
of these have reached PNG (Atiyeh 1995; Eickelman 1993; Hefner 1997). In
1988, the ISPNG began showing videos on Islam to interested non-Muslims
as part of da’wah efforts; however, these efforts were short-lived and
resulted in only a handful of conversions (Flower 2007). The expatriate
Muslim founders of the ISPNG were very conscious of the importance of
such literature for proselytism and the proper practice of Islam in the
country. Today, in Port Moresby, there is a substantial collection of Islamic
literature held at the Islamic centre and the University of Papua New Guinea
(UPNG) library.
Somewhat surprisingly, the UPNG collection blossomed as an indirect
result of the ISPNG battle for official recognition from the PNG government
in 1981. At that time, the ISPNG became aware of a poorly researched
Justice Department report on Islam based solely on the Encyclopaedia
Britannica, which was the basis for refusing ISPNG incorporation (Choudry
2007: 2). Expatriate Muslim Ahmad Badawi, who was an acquisition
librarian at the UPNG Library at the time of the government dispute, started
buying credible books on Islam to obtain correct material upon which to
build a legal challenge (Choudry 2007: 2).
On 12 July 2007, I worked with a UPNG librarian to discover that Badawi
purchased and/or requested 267 books and pamphlets on Islam during his
time at the UPNG library. UPNG records show that Badawi purchased all
books between call numbers C297.A135.1 and C297.822 F917.
Based on an examination of the loan cards, the most popular book
borrowed was Race and Colour in Islam (Lewis 1971), which is interesting
given racism is a causal factor of conversion among converts interviewed.
The UPNG collection covers a wide range of subjects such as economic
justice in Islam, Islam and politics, Islam and power, Islam and the State,
Islam in Africa, and Islam, Religion and Society (Flower 2007).
As with the UPNG collection, the literature at the Islamic centre in Port
Moresby and in the small libraries of the regional Islamic centres have
predominantly been requested, purchased or supplied by Muslim expatriates.
It is predominantly Australian Muslims and Islamic organisations that
distribute the publications, often using Air Niugini to freight packages to
Port Moresby, which are picked up by an ISPNG member and given out at
the mosque (ISPNG 1998b: 2). These books are produced by a wide range of
Islamic organisations from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Saudi Arabia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, the United States of America, Egypt, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, Bangladesh and Kuwait (Flower 2007).
All of the literature in PNG designed for proselytism is written in English,
with the exception of one pamphlet I came across written in Pidgin (Tok
Pisin). The two most widely distributed Islamic books in PNG are What a
Muslim is Required to Know About His Religion, produced by the Muslim
World League (MWL 1982), and Lotu Islam, produced by the ISPNG
(ISPNG 1998a).
The core focus of these two books is a detailed explanation of the five
pillars of Islam with an emphasis on salat, and these books are the most
widely distributed Islamic literature in PNG. Among the convert population,
these books significantly outnumber copies of the Koran (which are
normally held at mosques rather than privately owned), and there is a
significant stock of these two books held at the Islamic centre in Port
Moresby and in regional centres of Chimbu and in Lae.
 I personally saw approximately 1,000 of the Lotu Islam books in storage
while living at the mosque. Most converts receive a copy of one or the other
of the books pictured above either at the time they convert or before
conversion. In addition to these two books there are a number of smaller
pamphlets circulating among the different mosques of PNG. The most
common are small but comprehensive guides that help converts prepare and
conduct specific and important Islamic rituals such as their salat (prayers)
(Majori N.D.), Ramadan (fast) (MAA 1998), and Qurbani (Eid-ul-Adha
sacrifice) (Singapura 1991).
The specific books that are most popular among converts outline in great
detail what a Muslim’s character should be like and how, if people practice
Islam, they will live a life of internal (personal) peace that will contribute to
an overall improvement in the general condition of society. The following
three titles are amongst the most popular: Muslim’s Character (Alghazali
1985), Islam in Focus (Abdalati 1982), and The Ideal Muslim (Al-Hashimi
2005).
These books are used for jummah/khutbah each Friday in the regional
centres, or used to supplement readings from the Koran and Hadiths when
discussing Islamic topics at tafsir (dialogue) on Sunday in both Port
Moresby and in regional centres. In conversations with converts, many
mentioned that the pamphlets they liked best are the ones containing stories
about the Prophet Muhammad and the Sahabas (Companions of the Prophet
Muhammad) contained in the Hadiths; or other books that highlight that
Muhammad’s advent was prophesised in the Christian New Testament (Al-
Sheha 2005; Cave 1995).
PNG-based expatriates also produced three books in the 1990s to support
their da’wah efforts, and these were entitled Islam and Papua New Guinea
(Choudry 1991b), What Islam Is All About (Sandbach 1991), and
Christianity: An All Loving Religion? (Choudry 1991a). The three books
clearly highlight the strategic approach used by advocates in PNG to
promote Islam and show the ways in which advocates focus on the issues of
congruence (culture), resistance to Western values, and the range of crises in
PNG to convince Papua New Guineans to convert. Interestingly, these books
were not widely distributed among the Muslim communities I visited during
fieldwork and the extent of their influence was not mentioned by any convert
interviewed.
The bridging stages of conversion discussed in this chapter are important
because they highlight that Muslim converts in PNG are seeking and finding
a strong fundamentalist religion (Islam) and religious identity. Papua New
Guineans’ primary identity has traditionally been the clan and tribe (Standish
1994); however, colonisation and modernity have diminished cultural and
social identities embodied in kastom, which previously provided a sense of
self and order. The appeal of Islam lies not only in the broader context and
crises converts have experienced, it is also upheld through contact and
interaction with Muslims and Islam. The range of Islamic advocates
operating in PNG present a variety of ideological and material attractions
that assist in facilitating conversions.

Notes
1 Marty and Appleby have conducted the most extensive research of fundamentalism to date and
they define fundamentalism as:

a tendency, a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in
certain representative individuals and movements, which manifests itself as a strategy, or set of
strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinct identity as a people or
group. Feeling this identity to be at risk in the contemporary era, they fortify it by a selective
retrieval of doctrines, beliefs and practices from a sacred past. These retrieved ‘fundamentals’ are
refined, modified and sanctioned in a spirit of shrewd pragmatism: they are to serve as a bulwark
against the encroachment of outsiders who threaten to draw the believers into a syncretistic,
areligious or irreligious cultural milieu. Moreover these fundamentals are accompanied in the new
religious portfolio by unprecedented claims and doctrinal innovations. By the strength of these
innovations and new supporting doctrines the retrieved and updated fundamentals are meant to
regain the same charismatic intensity today by which they originally forged the communal identity
from the revelatory religious experiences long ago.
(Marty and Appleby 1991: 3)

2 Methods of coercive persuasion as a means of affecting religious conversion are commonly

referred to as brainwashing; however, recent research discredits this as an influence of religious
conversion (Bromley and Melton 2002; Zablocki 2001).
3 During the early days of the ISPNG there was regular discussion at ISPNG meetings (evident in
meeting minutes) on the importance of literacy. The importance of literacy as a factor of
conversion was even raised by ISPNG representatives at regional Islamic conferences as a lever to
garner greater material support from majority Muslim nations, particularly in the form of Islamic
books (Islam 1988).
4 On the other hand, Poston claims that Muslims are restrained to some degree from proselytising by
the Koranic decree in Sura 2, Verse 256 that says there can be ‘no compulsion in religion’.
Furthermore, Islam gives special treatment to Christians and Jews as ahl-al-kitab in respect to
protection regarding their beliefs and traditionally does not require Muslims to target these faiths
for missionary activity and conversion (see Poston 1992: 4).
7
Kalima Shahada in Papua New Guinea
Commitment and its meaning

Commitment to Islam is encapsulated by the declaration of the Kalima

Shahada; however, the process of converting to Islam is a continuum with
influences which build upon, and interrelate throughout each of Rambo’s
stages of conversion. As such, the commitment stage comprises key
influences from each of the stages of conversion discussed in prior chapters.
The Consequences stage considers the effect of conversion on behaviour,
attitudes and beliefs as converts practice their newly adopted faith. In
making a commitment to Islam, converts are likely to experience feelings of
relief or liberation and a change in behaviour, attitudes and worldview. The
degree of a convert’s commitment to Islam will also determine the range of
consequences resulting from conversion. A description of what Muslims in
general are required to believe or do is dealt with comprehensively in the
literature on Islam (Esposito 2005; Renard 1996; Robinson 1997);
therefore, this chapter focuses on how influences presented in the earlier
stages impact on what Islam means to converts, the degree of their
commitment and the impact becoming a Muslim has on their identity.
A convert’s commitment essentially represents the acceptance of Islam as
a genuine means of resolving the range of crises they perceive as affecting
their personal and social worlds, with commitment referring to a number of
facets of convert behaviour.1 For Muslim converts in Papua New Guinea,
the commitment stage represents a choice or turning point at which they are
confronted with a decision about whether to officially become Muslim by
declaring the Kalima Shahada.
 The commitment stage represents the decision threshold or ‘fulcrum of
change’ that converts reach when they finally decide to switch religious
affiliation to Islam (Rambo 1993: 124). Islamic conversions in PNG
correlate with four of the interconnected dimensions in the commitment
stage, which are: Decision Making; Rituals; Surrender; and Testimony
(Rambo 1993: 124–141).
Decision making is an integral part of the commitment stage and can
often be an intense and confrontational period for the convert because he or
she is vacillating between two religious worlds. Given the active role
converts play in their own conversion it is not surprising that the decision to
commit is based on a logical and rational decision-making process.
Although there were differences in perspectives, all converts interviewed
described a rational and logical process behind their decision to convert to
Islam and this was explained most succinctly by Abdul Aziz: To us Islam is
a religion of reasoning. We found that in Christianity what we were
worshiping was unreasonable.

The decision to commit to Islam is shaped by the evaluation of religious

alternatives (benefits and disadvantages) and the weighing of desires for the
new religion and fears about leaving the old. All of the converts interviewed
claimed to have gone through this practical evaluation prior to their
conversion and although they expressed this in different ways, the comment
by Issa below is representative of this aspect of commitment:
I was thinking that if this is no good then I risk myself going to that religion. I took it very
seriously. I thought maybe this is not true but then realised it was. It was a struggle but then I was
sure I was doing the right thing.

When converts were asked to describe their new religion and explain what
they had committed to, responses varied yet all converts used similar
emotive descriptive terms that highlighted the benefits of the religion, for
example:
When I embraced Islam I found peace.
(Ruqayyiah)

Islam is a religion of peace, humbleness, patience, and you understand what life is, what the
purpose of this world is and what we are meant to do.
(Assad)
Converts frequently described their conversion in comparative ways,
highlighting the differences between their previous Christian religions and
Islam with the later seen as more acceptable by converts.
Most scholars of religion argue that although commonality exists
between monotheisms these are in large measure peripheral to each
religions’ respective beliefs, especially when comparing faiths (Dodds
2009). For example, the core Christian beliefs of holy trinity, incarnation
and Jesus’ resurrection (for people’s atonement) are categorically denied by
Judaism and Islam. On the other hand there are key beliefs in both Islam
and Judaism that are not shared by Christianity, and so on. Thus, whilst
commonality is present it hides crucial differences as the evidence from
converts in PNG confirms.
In most instances converts interviewed appeared to be trying to ‘escape’
from associations with Christianity (based on issues of congruence,
resistance and rejection, and crises) and sought to highlight the differences
they perceived between the two religions as the major factor for their
decision to commit. This sentiment is highlighted in the convert statements
below:

People say they are Christians but they are not believers, they just go to
church on Sunday and when they come out they do bad things. You look at
Gordons market. During the week people are doing all sorts of things but
then on Sunday you find these people in church. People are not serious
about religion … Islam will be different, it is really different and it’s really
strict.
(Bilal)

As described in detail in the previous chapters, potential converts must be

prepared to face a number of barriers that affect the way they live in order
to commit to Islam and become a Muslim. These factors influence both the
time taken by potential converts to reach the point of commitment, and the
way they interpret their faith subsequent to conversion. These changes are
also perceived both positively and negatively by potential converts, and
serve both as a barrier to commitment as well as an incentive to commit.
Potential converts understand that becoming Muslim will bring about
changes not only to everyday life, but to their sense of self and their place
in the world:
 With our diet, we are not eating pig. Then there is the clothes that we wear, its Sunnah. Christian
ladies dress very fancy unlike our ladies who are very modest. This makes us different. So we
think and behave quite differently from the Christians. We believe that everything that happens
under the sun is decreed by Allah but the Christians believe other ways like by sanguma [black
magic]. We are following what has been planned by Allah.
(Mikail Abdul Qadir)

Another factor that influences a potential convert’s decision to commit is

the understanding and awareness of Islam as a minority religion in PNG.
Advocates of Islam in PNG are aware of the barriers to conversion
associated with Islam’s minority status and actively use tactics to counter
this. The ISPNG has been aware of these barriers to conversion for many
years as captured by ISPNG minutes which state: ‘While embracing Islam
seems not that difficult, it is extremely difficult to follow it and carry out its
teachings with PNG converts having to undergo tremendous tests, struggle,
frustration and difficulty in order to adjust’ (ISPNG 1991: 2). In order to
sustain converts’ commitment, advocates emphasise the rewards they will
receive in the hereafter, telling converts Allah acknowledges the challenges
they face (Flower 2007):

To be Muslim in PNG is very lucky because unlike if you practice in Saudi

or somewhere like that, if you practice Islam here it is more reward because
we are in a Christian country and it makes it more difficult to practice this
religion. So if you practice here, Imam says you will get more rewards than
Muslims in a Muslim country.
(Ahmed)

Forty-four per cent of converts (23) claimed that the major reason for their
decision to commit to Islam was based on the grounds that in Islam they
had ‘found the truth’, which related to their experience of Islam as a
resolution to the crises they were experiencing. Converts in this group all
expressed the sentiment that discovering the truth had set them on the ‘right
path’ in a religious and social sense. Additionally, and as discussed in the
previous chapter, discovering the truth for many post-9/11 converts
involved the discovery of a religious truth but also a social/political truth
that contributed to them making a commitment.
One final aspect of decision making worthy of mention relates to female
converts. First, some male converts believe that Islam is best for PNG as it
protects a woman’s modesty. This view was shared among 17 male converts
with the following comments representative of male views on women’s
clothing:

Christian’s believe in removing all the clothes. In Islam more clothes

preserve the beauty of a woman.
(Muhammad)

Whilst this may appear sexist, female converts appear to agree and, in fact,
are committing to Islam on this basis. Although only five female converts
undertook a fully structured interview, two clear patterns appeared common
to all the women’s decisions to convert: the conservative dress code for
women in Islam, and a clear set of strict rules regarding gender relations.
Women in PNG suffer regular verbal, physical and sexual abuse.
Converting to Islam afforded the five female converts interviewed a degree
of protection because religion provides them with a legitimate reason for
covering their bodies, which they view as in opposition to provocative
Western fashion. A general fear of Muslims as violent in PNG also means
that non-Muslim men appear to give Muslim women greater respect or are
too scared to harass a Muslim woman.
One thing that convinced me about Islam first of all was its dressing code for the sisters. It
protects a woman’s self-respect and also her pride of her beauty which I saw as a real problem in
this country, where women are dressing in the western style revealing sacred parts of their body
without fear or shame all in the name of modernisation.
(Ruqayyiah)

What I found out most from men is that before lots of men would look at me differently, they
would make signs and talk to me about sex and be nasty. But now I dress up like this, I walk on
the street and everybody respects me, they respect me so much and I’m very proud to be a
Muslim and I’m very happy. I didn’t find it difficult.
(Hamida)

Ritual in the commitment stage has two different aspects. The first
addresses the rituals required to make the commitment, such as the taking
of a Muslim name, abandoning the consumption of alcohol and pork, and
adopting halal forms of clothing. The second aspect of ritual refers to the
ritual aspects that form the basis of potential converts’ decisions to commit
to Islam, such as the nature of worship and comprehensive religious rules
for living (i.e. gender regulations, menstruation taboos, and so on).
When converts make a commitment and declare Kalima, the initiation
ritual requires them to take a Muslim name. In PNG, some converts choose
their own name if they have a preference, whilst in many cases converts are
given an Islamic name by the head Imam or by a visiting Tablighi member
(Flower 2007). As described in above, the ritual involved in becoming a
Muslim in PNG is brief, relatively informal and is consistent with Islamic
practice globally. The ritual of declaring Kalima in PNG is generally
performed in the company of other Muslims of the ummah, which helps
cement an individual’s commitment in the eyes of other Muslims and
provides a sense of immediate brotherhood and sets expectations of
continued Islamic behaviour.
Islam is significantly different to the Christian sects that most converts
have experience of in PNG, in the significance and number of rituals
associated with practising the faith. Islamic rituals and codes of behaviour
are much more elaborate and strict (demanding complete submission) and
govern the daily life of a Muslim. Many converts interviewed saw this as a
sign that Islam was a better religion than their previous religion (in all cases
Christianity), and these aspects of commitment to Islam appeared to resolve
their crises:

We Muslims worship almighty god and we know that god is so great that
we have to bow down, prostrate and be humbled. We have to humble
ourselves and talk to god directly, there is no intermediary.
(Mikail)

Surrender is the ‘inner process of commitment and is one of the most

difficult aspects of conversion to understand’ because it is difficult to
observe and is the hardest aspect of conversion for a convert to achieve in
any lasting pervasive sense (Rambo 1993: 132). Surrender (as Rambo terms
it) or submission to Islam is a process whereby the convert disconnects
themselves from old beliefs and ways and is eventually able to consolidate
a new life and a firmer religious commitment. The period of time it takes a
convert to move through the previous stages of conversion to the point of
commitment varies considerably. However, common to all converts
interviewed is their declared intention to remain Muslim for the rest of their
life, despite the fact that many of them have changed religion multiple times
prior to converting to Islam. This aspect appears to align with the Islamic
conversion literature in that Islam appears to be the religion people are least
likely to leave once they have converted (Zebiri 2008: 42).
The reality is that very few Muslim converts in PNG experience
surrender as a final endpoint without reservations or falling back to old
ways of some kind. The converts interviewed were aware of the challenges
associated with committing to life as a Muslim and sustaining their
submission to Allah and Islamic practice:
It’s not easy to become Muslim because in Islam it’s like the knowledge in there is like an ocean
you know and to actually follow the Sunnah, Koran and Hadiths it’s not an easy thing. The
moment you come in is the moment you leave all these dunya things and you see the rules. It’s
not easy because it is a very hard life and you have to struggle for the hereafter (akhira). We have
to fall and get up and fall and get up.
(Samsudeen)

Although the majority of converts experience a degree of what converts

refer to as ‘slipping’, this does not necessarily mean that the majority of
conversions are ‘shallow and temporary’ or that converts will leave Islam
(Lamb and Bryant 1999: 17). Rather, slipping occurs for many reasons
relating to social and economic circumstances, as the following statement
by the Deputy Imam of Port Moresby (a convert) illustrates:

The number of Muslims here is increasing daily, on a daily basis it is

increasing but it is continuity that is lacking on their part. Maybe it’s not
because they are too tired to come or they can’t afford it because they are
poor but because it’s [the mosque] a long way from the bigger residential
areas. Sometimes this happens because they are still living in the same
community with the same people who they used to go with to church and
they talk about the same things and what they think is right and this puts
confusion into them, which is why we like to keep them at the centre for a
while until they understand the difference between the teachings of this
religion [Islam] and the teachings of the Christian religion.
(Khalid A)

Fifty-four per cent of converts (28) interviewed said that they initially
worried that their decision to convert would be difficult because they
thought they might continue to be plagued by old temptations or doubts, yet
despite this situation they converted and have remained Muslim to the time
at which they were interviewed, as described by Yusuf:
One has to be prepared to experience certain difficulties and hardships. Being a Muslim, a very
committed one, is not so easy here in PNG. Christianity is already accepted here because of the
flexibility and freedom you get from it. If you do this or that, who is going to complain? There
are no sleepless nights. However being a Muslim we have to build a new disciplined way of life
and it is not easy, for example, stopping drinking. Since becoming a Muslim I have become a
stronger person through my iman. I always had faith in Allah but I’m talking about my
commitment to the principles. It’s not easy to be straight all the time because of the social
environment.

The growth of Islam in PNG clearly shows that while most converts remain
committed to their new faith (which is why the religion is growing), the
reality is that some converts do ‘fall back’ to Christianity and the ISPNG
raised this concern privately in the early 1990s. I only interviewed converts
who were practising Muslims at the time and I was not able to talk with
people who had converted to Islam and then left the religion. Among those
interviewed some mentioned that a small number of converts left Islam. A
possible factor influencing converts’ continued commitment to Islam is that
it is difficult for converts to return to Christianity on the basis that the crises
that drove them to Islam in the first place continue to be unresolved by that
Christianity.
For Rambo, testimony is a manifestation of language transformation and
biographical reconstruction (Rambo 1993: 137–139). Testimony in the PNG
case refers to the way in which a convert’s degree of commitment is visible.
Commitment is visible through converts’ knowledge of Islam, through
changed language, and in the active creation of their own conversion stories
(biographical reconstructions) as a means of affirming their decision to
commit to Islam.
Converts in PNG express their consciousness of the presence and
importance of God (in their new religion) in their daily lives in a number of
ways. The language used by converts is one of the most important
dimensions of expressing commitment because it expresses the
‘transformation of one’s consciousness and perception of the world’
(Rambo 1993: 137). Muslim converts who appeared to be more committed
to their faith not only attended the mosque more regularly, they also tended
to incorporate religion into aspects of everyday living, particularly their
speech.
The most prominent examples of this involved the use of Islamic terms
or phrases in everyday speech: popular sayings used regularly by converts
include: Bismillah (when starting to do something such as eating or some
otherwise seemingly mundane action); Inshallah (when intending to do
something or hoping for some course of action); Subhaanallah (when
praising something it is done in the name of Allah); Yaa’Allah (when in
pain or distress); Marsh’Allah (when expressing appreciation);
Jazaak’Allah (when thanking someone); and Alayhis’Salaam ([peace be
upon him] when mentioning Islamic prophets). And when referencing the
prophet Muhammad converts say sallAllahu alayhi wa sallam.
The degree of language transformation is limited by converts’ knowledge
of Arabic. For example, converts can recite suras for salat yet they have no
comprehension of the meaning of the words, rather they are reciting from
phonetic memory. The number of suras converts in the sample could recite
varied widely. Ahmed knew the least; he was able to recite six short suras.
Abdul Sallam could recite 25 suras, the most out of all converts
interviewed.
Advocates of Islam in PNG tell converts that it doesn’t matter that they
do not understand the prayers they recite, and that the mere act of reciting is
recognised as worship and will bring them reward from Allah.
One of the most significant outcomes of commitment experienced by
Muslim converts in PNG is the way in which culture and myth appear to
interact with the formulation of their new religious identity in the
bibliographical reconstructions describing their commitment post-
conversion. A belief commonly expressed by many converts in the sample
was the view that members of their families (ancestors) were possibly
Muslim prior to European colonisation. Converts in this group believe that
their traditional societies and customs were Islamic due to the similarities
between many customary practices and Islam, as highlighted by the
following convert:
To become Muslim is not new to me. I feel like I’m coming back to my original religion rather
than coming to a new religion. The Christian way was and is strange to me.
(Ibrahim)
The history of Islam in PNG detailed in Chapter 2 highlights that there is
little evidence of traditional societies in PNG actually having contact with
Muslims or Islam prior to PNG independence in 1975. Nonetheless,
converts’ claims to an authentic Islamic ancestry as a reason for their
conversion are interesting from an identity perspective because these beliefs
(which strengthen commitment) potentially develop as a result of the
fragility of a convert’s new religious identity. This tenuous aspect of
contemporary Islamic conversion described by Roy is relevant here:

Ethnicity and religion are being marshalled to draw new borders between
groups whose identity relies on a performative definition: we are what we
say we are, or what others say we are. These new ethnic and religious
borders do not correspond with a specific territory but work in minds,
attitudes and discourses. They are more vocal than territorial, but all the
more eagerly endorsed and defended because they have to be invented and
because they remain fragile and transitory.
(Roy 2004: 20)

Twenty-five per cent of converts interviewed (13) had created detailed

myths that present their ancestors as Muslim; this mythology created a deep
commitment to Islam and strengthened links to their own history. A further
67 per cent of converts interviewed (35) did not have detailed myths, yet
they did mention that it was likely their ancestors had been Muslim, based
on elements of congruence already detailed in Chapter 6 and reiterated in
the following words:

My father said we were Muslims before. Whatever happened in the past we

were Muslims before based on our traditions and customs.
(Umar)

The logic of culture and myth in converts’ biographical reconstructions

appears to be a very powerful factor of commitment. The reasons for this
appear to be linked to efforts by the converts to revive their kastom (albeit
in a new religious form), and efforts to resist and reject the outside
influences they perceived to have damaged their society, as outlined by
Khalid: I agree that most of our kastoms are disappearing but as I said in the
beginning, Islam is actually our kastom and if Islam can take root here it
will reactivate that kastom. There will be no big deal to us because Islam is
our kastom. Not necessarily practised the old way, but they will see that
what Islam teaches is actually their kastom because they will see that like
they practised kastom they can practise Islam.

The evolution of this aspect of Muslim converts’ testimony is similar to

other revivalist movements in PNG in the past, with conversion to Islam in
PNG appearing to be a revival of tradition rather than an invention, in that it
is the rituals and customs that are already a lived practice that are being
revived (Hojbjerg 2005: 109).
Many PNG Muslim converts believe that by returning to the practice of
their traditional kastom (albeit through conversion to Islam) they will
restore justice and order in their society, a society they currently see as
chaotic, immoral and unjust due to Western colonial influence. This
perspective appears to have developed both individually within the converts
interviewed, but also as a result of interaction with Islamic advocates who
combine targeted use of anti-Western sentiment in propagating Islam.
When dealing with whole groups of people who have converted from one
religion to another, the structure of the individual conversion narrative often
comes to shape individual accounts of their collective history (Robbins
2007: 11).2 Hayward has argued that an ‘essential element’ of new religious
movements in PNG is the dependency on myth or historical tradition to
validate the movement and this appears as a trend with Islamic conversions
(Hayward 1983: 16). Whilst it is not accurate to claim that every new
religious movement in PNG is driven by a myth, in most cases myths do
regularly appear to underlie and legitimise such movements (Godschalk
1983: 73).
In PNG, myths evolve in order to fit in and account for new realities, and
to date these have taken both a Christian and cargo-cultist form (Flannery
1979, 1983). Myths represent an important aspect of understanding Islamic
conversion stories because they provide a resource in the articulation of
identity in the present and future, which represents not so much a ‘return to
roots’ (literally) but rather a ‘coming to terms with our routes’ (Hall 1997:
4).
The fluidity of myths in PNG tribal society is well detailed (Goldman
and Ballard 1998), and has resulted in an ‘authenticity problem’ whereby
outsiders (Western academics) tend to be sceptical of indigenous claims of
the authenticity of a myth due to the creativity and innovation in passing on
local mythologies (Otto and Pedersen 2005b: 308). Yet in PNG, myth
represents a valid mode of present knowledge (Clifford 1982: 7).
In the past, myths in PNG were commonly traded, thus making it difficult
to interpret them for their basis in fact, which is why Trompf warns scholars
that it is incautious to interpret myths as facts that make up part of the
‘meaning world’ in any tribe, especially given the problematic nature of
testing claims involving myths of identity and tradition (Trompf 1997: 145).
However, globalisation increases the likelihood that myths and traditions
may be borrowed or exchanged on a global scale, and there are examples of
such globalised interactions powerfully stimulating ‘both localisation and
heritage in all parts of the world’ (Kolig 2005: 335).
The growing body of literature on cultural change and the ‘invention of
tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) argues ‘that traditions can be
newly constructed’ to ‘serve political and social functions’ and that this
phenomenon is ‘similar [to processes] all over the world’ (Otto and
Pedersen 2005b: 11). The idea that traditions can be reconstructed to serve
political and social functions is not new and has been the focus of much
work by political scientists, historians, and anthropologists (Anderson 1983;
Briggs 1996; Errington 1989; Errington and Gewertz 1996; Gewertz and
Errington 1993; Lindstrom and White 1994; Otto and Borsboom 1997).
Muslim converts appear to be reinventing tradition in the process of
constructing their bibliographical conversion stories. This process of
formalising and ritualising specific values and beliefs ‘is likely to occur in
times of rapid social change when old forms of legitimacy and social
solidarity are weakened and destroyed’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983: 4–5).
This tendency of people to use myth as a means of seeking order when
they perceive growing social disarray is discussed by Levi-Strauss (1970),
who argues that myths enable an expansion of ‘meaning structures’ that
facilitate the re-envisioning of values and that provide a basis for imagining
the ideal ordered future.
For Muslim converts in PNG (as for Levi-Strauss) myths that inspire
regret (over the loss of a previous order) create a sense that ‘if only we had
understood at the time’ (that we were Muslim) perhaps we would not have
become Christian and thus become corrupted and in disorder: a theme
common to political Islam and Islamic extremists (Levi-Strauss 1970).
 Returning to the ‘old ways’ in terms of norms embodied in religion
therefore becomes a means of obtaining the previous order, albeit in a new
modern form; through conversion to Islam, converts gain a religion of
global reach but rooted in local values and beliefs.
The consequences of Islamic conversion in PNG are multifaceted and
complex and involve specific socio-cultural, psychological and theological
consequences for individual converts and the Muslim minority in PNG as a
group. The consequences of conversion ‘depend in part on how many
aspects of the convert’s life is affected and how comprehensive these
changes are’ with ‘the impact of individual and group religious change
potentially fomenting profound change within (wider) social and political
arenas’ (Rambo and Farhadian 1999: 32). A discussion of the consequences
wrought by conversion incorporates descriptive and normative dimensions.
A focus here on the most interesting and noteworthy issues include
personal, attitudinal and behavioural changes and effects on individual and
group identities.
Conversion to Islam in PNG instigates a wide variety of personal
consequences. The most significant of which is a switch in the personal
behaviour of converts from ‘evil to good’; a dimension of religious
conversion that has been noted since the first comprehensive research on
conversion (James 1902). A range of behavioural changes are evident in
PNG converts’ accounts, which relate directly to the rituals and laws
prescribed by Islamic law and doctrine (Sharia). These personal changes
are felt deeply by most converts but are also noticed by other non-Muslim
family members, which in some cases has contributed to family members
converting to Islam:

I feel different since becoming Muslim because totally my life has

changed. I must follow what Islam is saying. The way I am presenting
myself I must follow what Islam is saying, it’s the want to do things
according to the Koran, the Sunnah and the Hadith. I don’t want to go back
to the way I was before – the way of non-Muslims because I feel sad that
more people are not in the religion.
(Samsudeen)

Conversion can have a number of positive impacts on daily life, such as

resolving addictions, calming domestic violence, and diminishing other
sources of crisis that converts experience. Interview data and fieldwork
observations confirm that consequences for converts in PNG include
positive lifestyle changes that improve health and hygiene, improve
management of personal finances, and enhance familial relations.
Furthermore, conversion to Islam has also affected aspects of daily life and
rituals or customs, including the way food is handled, the way converts are
buried and the support of male circumcision. In some instances it has also
led converts to withdraw from participating in Christian festivals and
celebrations, (i.e. Christmas and Easter) which can have a significant
impact on life, as Christianity in PNG is very prevalent.
Sixty-seven per cent of converts interviewed (35) mentioned that they
were very happy to be a Muslim, more contented as a Muslim, or proud to
be Muslim.
Conversion to Islam and the adherence to Islamic rules have facilitated
improved self-esteem for converts interviewed in a number of ways. Daily
prayers and Islamic clothing appear to strengthen converts’ resolve to avoid
haram activities, as some of these can contribute to the moral crises that
converts have faced. The requirement for converts to pray five times a day
appears to act as an internal mechanism of self-control and the regular
performance of salat is seen by most converts as a means to avoid
‘slipping’:

Before, I used to go around doing criminal activities and all this but since
becoming Muslim and praying regularly I realised all these bad things have
gone away.
(Sulemain)

Eighty per cent of converts (42) interviewed mentioned that dressing in

Islamic clothing, and (in the case of men) growing a beard, represented a
very significant consequence of becoming Muslim. Dressing in Islamic
style provides converts with a way of declaring their religious difference,
enhancing status/self-esteem and resisting slipping. This should not be
surprising as ‘the versatility of clothing makes it a preferred means for
constructing and negotiating’ individual and collective identities’ (Bayart
1996: 196).
For PNG converts, wearing Sunnah publicly shows their degree of
commitment to their new religion and tests the strength of their iman.
 When my wife who always wears Hijab goes to market people are saying Osama, Osama, and if I
wear Sunnah to work people try to make comments.
(Issa)

Clothes are important to new Muslims for a range of reasons. In the eyes of
the convert, clothes act as a personal reminder of their attempt to be more
holy, and also allow them to appear more holy in the eyes of non-Muslims
that see them dressed in this way. By dressing Islamically, converts
represent the Islamic values of modesty, cleanliness and hygiene but also
‘signal their transformation of religious and political identity’ (Bowie 2006:
63).
Wearing Islamic clothing appears to be one way for converts to express
their Islamic identity in opposition to Western influences. Wearing Sunnah
(for men) or hijab (for women) sends a visible message to the public about
who they are and what they believe. In the same way that teenagers in
Western countries might use outrageous fashion as a sign of independence
(that they have shifted out of their parent’s control), so it is that converts’
decision to wear Islamic dress can be seen as more than just a symbolic
shift from the Western styles of dressing. Rather, dressing Islamically is a
statement that they are no longer following the norms of Western cultural
authority. Even by growing a beard male converts appear to be symbolically
rejecting Western/Christian influence, and at the same time reconnecting
them to traditional kastom:

Our beard is part of being a man, in the Highlands it’s custom to leave
your beard and if you shave it off you are seen as a woman. This is Sunnah,
every man has to have beard but Western culture is coming in and changing
this.
(Gaffar)

Over the course of history, beards have often represented a form of

resistance and opposition. For example, Peter the Great in Russia cut off the
beards of religious men because they were seen as emulating the image of
god, whilst in Algeria during the 1990s growing a beard was a symbol of
political opposition to a perceived illegitimate government and support for
the Islamic Salvation Front (Bayart 1996: 186–188).
 Whilst the majority of converts interviewed claimed that clothing was
important to their Islamic identity, not all converts wear Sunnah. A small
group of converts, mostly in Port Moresby, were very cautious about
walking around in Islamic dress (salwar kameez and cap [called topi in
Urdu or taqiyah in Arabic]).
I noticed that it was the younger converts in Port Moresby who wore
Sunnah the least and only ‘dressed up’ for jummah (Flower 2007). This
behaviour is perceived by many senior converts as indicative of younger
convert’s weak iman. Wearing Sunnah was also mentioned by converts as a
means to help them stop engaging in immoral activities and separating
themselves from non-Muslims engaging in immoral activities, and to assist
them to propagate Islam through da’wah.
One final personal consequence of committing to Islam for converts in
PNG is the banning of keeping, handling, or eating of pigs on religious
grounds (pig is haram). Pigs are extremely important and valuable in PNG
society (especially in the Highlands) and the growth of a religion that
spurns any association with the animal is somewhat surprising (Mantovani
1986).3 Despite most converts’ commitment to Islam, some cannot easily
escape the expectations from wider society to abandon pigs completely,
with the consequence of this being a limited ongoing involvement with the
pig economy.
My wife questions me, how will you maintain reputation in the community if you say take pig
away. How can you not look after pigs? I sold them all except for a handful and my wife (who is
non-Muslim) is taking care of those pigs on separate land. I look after chicken as it’s a better
source of protein. We can also substitute pig with goat.
(Abdullah)

Eighty-three per cent of converts (43) said that they had not eaten pork
since converting and the remainder who said that they had eaten pork said it
was only on rare occasions when no other meat was available. Rural
converts, who are more dependent on pork in their diet, are also more likely
to still be keeping pigs (nine converts) even if they were not eating them.
The PNG-based advocates of Islam have adapted to this constraint by
giving local converts some leniency on this issue. As female convert
Hamida mentioned, ‘Imam Aziz says as long as we don’t eat pig you can
own them and give away … when we get stronger we will just leave pig.’
This aligns with observations of indigenous Melanesian converts to Islam in
Indonesian West Papua who have been ‘given a special dispensation
permitting them to eat pork’ with the intention that the ‘following
generations after education’ in pesantrens (Islamic schools) would consider
pork haram (Farhadian 2005: 81). The Tablighi Jamaat in PNG however
remains staunchly opposed to any such concessions.
Tablighi Jamaat says that it is totally against the Koran and Hadiths to eat pig and it is haram. So
when Jamaat comes here they tell us you can’t have any pigs because Allah will not accept our
salat.
(Muhammad)

The changes to personal identity outlined above highlight the depth of

commitment by converts to their new religious identity. These
consequences of commitment also have a direct impact on the way converts
relate to Muslims in other parts of the world based on their new shared
identity as part of a global Islamic community. Many converts, and
especially those who are disconnected from familial networks and live in
urban areas, appear to have a strong personal connection and preference for
relationships with other Muslims over and above non-Muslim citizens of
PNG, and in some cases above their own clan or tribe, as expressed by
Yusuf of Karilmaril village:
I give more respect to my religion Islam than the community. My personal priority is my religion
than my community.

Twenty-one converts (40 per cent) said they saw themselves as part of the
global Muslim ummah, with positive sentiments for this group mostly
related to converts’ personal experience of the Tablighi Jamaat:

Islam is a global religion and I am part and parcel of the Muslim ummah. I
am one of 1.5 billion Muslims. I’m not an isolated member like to my tribe
or PNG no no no I belong to the ummah of the whole world. I feel proud to
be a Muslim.
(Abdul W)

Forty-four per cent of converts (23) said they felt they belonged to both the
PNG and global ummah, and 16 per cent of converts (8) saw themselves as
local Muslims only. The reasons why converts in PNG appear to feel so
strongly about their relationship with other Muslims may be related to the
appeal of the Islamic concepts of brotherhood and community. The sense of
brotherhood and commitment to other Muslims generally appeared high for
all converts; however, it was heightened further among those converts who
had travelled overseas. Contextual aspects converge here as highlighted by
Yusuf: What they get out of being a Muslim is security, maybe they get
material benefit but really it’s helping each other.

The fact that converts from a minority group strongly value their
relationships with other Muslims is not surprising. Similarities among
individual members of groups such as the personal importance of group
membership, the sharing of common goals and a common fate, and a high
degree of interaction among members is more strongly correlated with high
levels of group bonding (Hamilton et al. 2002: 143). In contrast, and
particularly relevant for the ummah in PNG, group size, length of group
history, and the permeability of group boundaries are essentially
uncorrelated with the degree of group closeness (Hamilton 2002: 143). This
sense of shared identity contributes to the defensive response of converts in
support of other Muslims when Muslims in PNG or overseas are under
rhetorical or physical attack:

If people say bad things about Muslims then they are saying something bad
about me.
(Zainul)

Commitment to Islam by the majority of converts in the sample appears to

be genuine, on the basis that most converts practise their new religion as the
religion requires. The degree of commitment for many converts varies over
time, but growth statistics available up until 2010 suggest the majority
remain committed to Islam and remain Muslim after converting. As
highlighted through convert statements in this and preceding chapters, the
stage of Commitment occurs because Islam appears to resolve many or all
of the crises experienced personally by converts.
There are significant and sometimes challenging impacts of conversion
(consequences) on converts’ beliefs, attitudes, behaviour, worldviews and
daily life. The most significant consequence associated with conversion that
was highlighted by converts in the sample appeared to be a deep sense of
Muslim identity, which appeared to strengthen emotional and psychological
affinity to other Muslims. Converts’ sense of identity appears to be
reinforced by their new-found minority status and anxiety about
discrimination in a kind of positive feedback loop.
When considered in relation to the preceding stages of conversion, with
their interrelated influencing factors and the environment in which PNG
converts exist, commitment to Islam appears to foster an increased sense of
wellbeing for those who convert.
The journey converts go through as they convert, and the influences they
come under during their progression through the stages of conversion, also
influence the intensity of their beliefs, affect their attitudes and behaviours
and influence their propensity to propagate Islam.

Notes
1 Measuring the extent of these factors on a convert’s commitment to Islam from a psychological
perspective is a difficult task that has only just begun to be addressed (Raiya et al. 2009).
2 ‘Representations of individual and collective identity are never invented in the sense of fictions
crafted ex nihilo, rather there is always a prior collective context of meanings and significance’
(Linnekin 2004: 246).
3 Keane (1996: 149) has shown that people generally find it difficult to convert to a faith that
requires the abandonment of a particular type of meat and its sacrificial killing and feasting when
that meat is part of cultural tradition, because ‘as a medium of social feasting, it is difficult for
people to escape the practices in which it plays a role.’
Conclusion
Prospects of Islam in Papua New Guinea

This book provides a comprehensive examination of the causes and

processes of Islamic conversion growth in Papua New Guinea, and situates
this phenomenon in a globalising context that is stimulating cultural and
religious change.
The growth of Islam in PNG is generally consistent with global growth
trends, which show Islam to be one of the world’s fastest growing religions.
It is clear that many complex interconnected factors are driving growth;
however, the two major reasons for Islamic conversion growth in PNG are
the effect of media coverage of the 9/11 attacks in America, and the
increasing missionary activity of foreign Muslims who visit with Tablighi
Jamaat groups.
Only time will tell whether Islam will become a larger religion in PNG
and the wider Pacific or whether the growth of conversions will taper or
collapse entirely. Whilst it would be reasonable to assume that the
phenomenon documented in this work is related to similar events in other
island nation-states of the Pacific, further research on Islam in the Pacific
region over a longer period is required to confirm this.
Papua New Guinea is in an interesting geographic position, given that the
island of New Guinea represented the outer limit of Islam’s spread across
the Indonesian archipelago. Today, Indonesia – which borders PNG – has
the largest Muslim population on earth. Interestingly, there has been a lack
of support for the spread of Islam in PNG from the Indonesian state and
Indonesian Muslims. This is surprising given the scale of the internal
migration of Javanese into Indonesian Papua and West Papua provinces
over the last 40 years. Despite Muslim missionary groups being active
there, Tablighi groups do not seem to be travelling into PNG, and
Indonesian diplomatic staff are disengaged to the point of being invisible at
the mosque in Port Moresby.
A plausible hypothesis for the lack of Indonesian engagement could be
concern from Indonesia about the response of Australian policy makers. In
a country traditionally viewed as in Australia’s sphere of influence and of
high strategic value, more activist missionary effort from Indonesia could
lead to the perception that Indonesia is interfering and attempting to
destabilise the country. Perhaps Indonesian policy-makers feel that
Australian officials, who are already concerned about Islamic extremism
and terrorism in the region, might be alarmed at any overt Indonesian
involvement in Islamic proselytisation.
Additionally, the succession of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999 and
the ongoing separatist movement in Papua/West Papua is likely to mean
that Indonesian officials do not want to be seen as promoting Islam in any
way because of the risk that such a perception might stimulate a response
from Australia. This hypothesis is possible on the grounds that Indonesian
Government officials remain acutely concerned about the territorial
integrity of their State. If this hypothesis is correct, one should not expect
Indonesia to become a proactive party to the missionary effort in PNG.
The only other country in close proximity to PNG with a significant
Muslim majority population is Malaysia. In contrast to Indonesia, Malaysia
and Malay citizens in PNG are actively engaged in Islamic proselytism.
Given Malaysia is PNG’s second largest trading partner it will be
interesting to see what impact this will have and what response it will draw
internally, within PNG’s political and religious groups, and outside of PNG
with neighbouring countries in the region.
The PNG case proved an effective test of Rambo’s conversion framework
and a useful structure for understanding Islamic conversion because it
captures the diverse range of dynamic factors that contribute to conversion.
In this sense, the book has theoretical implications for how the study of
Islamic conversion is undertaken in other countries. Further use of Rambo’s
approach will enable the examination of cultural variations that will help
determine whether the drivers of conversion in PNG are sui generis or
similar to the causes of conversion in other countries where the media and
increasing Islamic missionary activity are also playing a role in conversions
to Islam since 9/11.
For the rest of Melanesia, the PNG case study is important because PNG
is the largest nation state in the region. It is possible that the PNG situation
may be indicative of the drivers of growth, and the scale and pace of growth
possible in other Melanesian countries. Future comparative case studies
should also more closely examine the role of Muslim expatriates in order to
widen our knowledge of the Islamisation processes in the Pacific. Such
work will assist comparisons between the ways in which the presence of
foreigners supported the Islamisation process in South-East Asia.
If Islam continues to grow in the Pacific region, there will be many
important questions to examine more closely, particularly regarding the
response of the many Christian sects in the region given the intense
religious competition. If the Muslim minority continues to grow rapidly,
will religious competition stimulate political or violent activism, as it has in
the not-so-distant parts of Indonesia such as Ambon and the Moluccas? Will
such growth lead to a response from neighbouring countries, such as
Australia, to stem the growth by making it more difficult for Australian
Tablighi Jamaat groups to travel to PNG?
Important facts for the contemporary security debate were uncovered in
the historical account with regard to fears about Islamic terrorism in the
Pacific. History shows that the nature of foreign Islamic organisations and
Muslim individuals necessary in order to establish and propagate Islam in
Papua New Guinea, post-PNG Independence, was seen as a negative risk.
Christian churches and members of the PNG political elite were clearly
worried about the security implications of Islam growing in PNG from the
time of the ISPNG’s inception and this fear has remained over time, as
evidenced through different forms of opposition despite there being a lack
of any evidence for such security concerns.
The influence of globalisation and secularisation are clearly related to the
appeal of fundamentalist religions in traditional societies and this is
reflected in the major trend of religious change in PNG. Within the context
of this religious change, Islamic ideology (like fundamentalist Christianity)
appears as one specific means of resistance to the forces that are
destabilising pre-existing social, cultural and political ways of life.
Regardless of whether the religious landscape continues to change, what is
clear for the new Muslims of Papua New Guinea is that Islam represents a
suitable explanation for the state of their contemporary personal and social
world, and offers a special sense of meaning and a means of coping with or
resisting social, cultural and political change.
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Index

Page numbers in italics denote tables, those in bold denote figures.

9/11 attacks 1–2, 108, 110, 111–112

Abdullah, Shafiqur Rahman Khan 34, 40

adhesion model 49, 51
AFIC see Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC)
Africa 49, 54, 63, 70, 74, 77, 82, 88
agency of converts 56, 57, 63, 109–110, 109
Ahmad, Qazi Ashfaq 34, 35, 42
Ahmadiyyat 4
Ahmadu, M.L. 17, 18
Algeria 144
Ali, A. 122
Ali, Sarip Mohammed (Jimmy Malay) 32–33
Al-Islam magazine 41, 42
Al-Nahdah magazine 127
Amaki, Yaqub 10, 42
Amin, Noorul 35
Anglican Church 24, 24, 47
anti-Australianism 11
apostasy 91, 93–94
Appleby, R.S. 131n1
aqidah 46
Asad, T. 8
aslama 45
Associations Incorporation Act (1966) 36, 41
atonement and sin 96–97
Australia 11, 30, 148, 149
Australian aboriginal groups 30
Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) 39
availability of converts 56, 112–115

Badawi, Ahmad 35, 129

Baha’ism 4, 17, 18
Bais, Tony 39, 40
baptism 104
Barbarito, L. 39
barriers to conversion 113–115, 135
Bayart, J-F. 144
beards 79, 89n7, 144
Bedouin 125
Berg, Tahir 17
Bible: compared with Koran 86, 98, 112; contradictions in 97–98, 123; literal reading of 65, 97–98;
and sectarianism 65
biographical reconstructions 139–142
blood money 78, 89n4, 89n5
Bohane, Ben 15
books and literature 129–131
Borsboom, A. 75
Bowie, F. 75, 144
brainwashing 109, 131n2
bride price 69, 80, 88n1, 89n9, 104
brotherhood, sense of 146
Brown, Paula 25, 83, 103
Bruce, S. 3
Brunton, R. 75
Bulliet, R.W. 74, 115
Buseri 35

cargo cults 25, 61, 83, 88n2

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 16
Catholic Church 24, 24, 47, 83, 114
causes of conversion 52, 54; see alsocontext stage of conversion
Chan, Sir Julius 37, 40
Chan government 37–39
Chatti, Habib 40
Choudry, Muhammad Afzal 21, 33, 35, 36–40, 41, 42, 117, 131
Christian missionaries 29, 70, 75–76, 79, 87–88, 117, 123–124
Christianity 13, 24–25, 24, 62–63; biblical contradictions 97–98, 123; congruence with Islam 73;
conversion to in colonial period 32–33, 47, 48–49, 62–63, 70, 83; converts returning to 19, 139;
differences between monotheistic religions 59n3, 134–135; disillusionment and dissatisfaction
with 82, 84–86, 94; existing research on conversion to 6, 7, 9; holy trinity doctrine 78, 95, 114,
134; hypocrisy in 82, 86; illogical doctrines 98–99; knowledge of 73, 94, 112–113; and money
82, 84–85; political involvement of churches 67–68; and polygamy 104–105; and racial
discrimination 82, 86–88; resistance and rejection of 82–88; salvation 96–97; sectarianism 64–65,
95–96; sin and atonement 96–97; soteriology 58n2; and traditional religions 75–76, 79, 83;
worship 99–100; see alsofundamentalist Christian sects
circumcision 79, 89n7
clothing, Islamic 136, 143–145
coherent conceptual systems 115–116
colonial period 32–33, 47, 48–49, 62–63, 70, 75–76, 83
Comaroff, Jean 51
Comaroff, John 51
commitment stage of conversion 53, 58, 133–142; decision making 133–136; rituals 136–137;
surrender 137–139; testimony 139–142
communal recognition of conversion declaration 45–46, 137
congruence between religions 61, 73–81, 77, 119
consequences stage of conversion 53, 58, 133, 142–147
Constitution, Papua New Guinea 38–39
constraining factors seebarriers to conversion
context stage of conversion 52–53, 54, 55, 60–88; congruence between religions 73–81, 77;
economic factors 68; fundamentalism 65–66; globalisation 61–63; justice system 68–69, 78,
89n4, 89n5, 89n6; material dimensions 70–73; political systems 66–68; resistance and rejection
82–88; sectarianism 64–65; secularisation 63–64
conversion seeIslamic conversion; religious conversion
conversion career concept 55
conversion growth 19; see alsoIslamic conversion growth
conversion motifs model 7
conversion stories 139–142
corruption 66–67, 105
corruption index 66–67
cosmic religions 51
cosmological beliefs 51, 75, 76, 77–78, 79, 95
crisis stage of conversion 53, 54, 55–56, 60, 61, 91–106; apostasy 91, 93–94; biblical contradictions
97–98, 123; desire for transcendence 91, 99; holy trinity doctrine 95; illness and healing 91, 106;
nature and degree of crises 92, 92; near-death experiences 91–92, 106n2; personal crises 105–
106; political crises 105; protean selfhood 91, 101–102, 107n4; religious crises 94–101;
sectarianism 95–96; sin and atonement 96–97; social crises 92–93, 101–105; types of crises 91;
worship 99–100
Crocombe, R.G. 117

Dalton, D. 92
Dassetto, F. 122, 123
da’wah see missionary activity, Muslim
Dawia, Alexander 42
decision making 133–136
declaration of conversion 45–46, 133, 137
democracy 66
desire for transcendence 91, 99
dietary laws 34, 145, 147n3
disillusionment and dissatisfaction with Christianity 82, 84–86, 94
Dodds, A. 59n3
domestic violence 69
Dorr, D. 51
Douglas, B. 63, 66
dowries 69, 80, 88n1, 89n9, 104
dress code, Islamic 136, 143–145
Dutch East India Company 29
Dutton, T. 32
Dutton, Y. 49

East Timor 149

economic factors of conversion 68
economic indicators of Islamic conversion 23
education, and Islamic conversion 23
egalitarianism 68
Eid-ul-Adha 34, 81
Eid-ul-Fitri 81
elders, respect for 103
employment status, and Islamic conversion 23
encounter stage of conversion 53, 56–58, 99, 108, 110, 119–120
EP sects seeevangelical and Pentecostal (EP) sects
equality 68, 90n14; gender 69–70, 103; racial 88
Ernst, Manfred 3, 64, 65, 83, 95
ethnographic research 6, 8–9, 12
ethnomethodology 8, 9, 12
evangelical and Pentecostal (EP) sects: conversion to 16, 24, 24, 25, 47, 71; literal reading of Bible
65, 97–98; oneness of God 95; political involvement of 68; tithing 85; worship 99
expansion 18–19
expatriate Muslims 4, 7, 13, 18; Fiji and New Caledonia 16–17; founding and incorporation of
ISPNG 34, 35–41, 44; missionary activity by 117, 119, 121; post-independence period 33–43

falling back 19, 139

family 80–81, 113–114
family conversions seegroup conversions
Farhadian, C.E. 53, 57, 58
fasting 81
female converts 14–15, 23, 123, 136
Fiji 3, 16–17, 34, 45
financial incentives 125
fitra 50
five pillars of Islam 46–47
Flinders, Matthew 30
food: dietary laws 34, 145, 147n3; rituals 81
forgiveness and salvation 96–97
Fox, J. 3
fundamentalism 3, 65–66, 131n1
fundamentalist Christian sects: conversion to 2, 3, 16, 24, 24, 25, 47, 63, 71, 83, 92, 93; gender
equality 70; literal reading of Bible 65, 97–98; numbers of 64; oneness of God 95; political
involvement of 67, 68; and social crises 92, 93; tithing 85; worship 99
funerary rites 81, 90n13

Gauntlett, D. 111
GDP seegross domestic product (GDP)
Geertz, C. 61, 129
Gellner, E. 5, 88
gender differences, in Islamic conversion 14–15, 23
gender equality 69–70, 103
gender relations 69–70, 88n1
gender segregation 69, 80, 103–104
Gibbs, Philip 3, 61, 83
Giddens, A. 62, 111
Gizapram, Murray 31
Gizra people 30–31
global ummah16, 146; see alsointernational Islamic community
globalisation 3, 43, 55, 61–63, 141–142
globalisation theories of religious conversion 62, 63, 82
goats 34
government, and incorporation of ISPNG 35–41
Government Information Department (GID) 38
Greene, A.L. 57
gross domestic product (GDP) 68
grounded theory 8
group conversions: and conversion growth 22–23; definitions of 48–50
growth of Islam: expansion 18–19; global 16; types 19; see alsoIslamic conversion growth
Gurnah, Abdullah 34

Hadiths 46, 118

al-Haj, Tunku Abdur Rahman Putra 34–35, 39, 40
Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) 35, 125
halal meat 34, 145
Al-Hashimi, M.A. 81, 88, 90n14, 103
Hayward, D. 102, 141
Head Imam 120–121, 127
Heirich, M. 55–56, 57
helicopter theory of religious conversion 51, 61, 74
hero stories 32
historical analysis 7
history and establishment of Islam in Papua New Guinea 28–44; first converts 41–43; founding and
incorporation of ISPNG 34, 35–41, 44; post-independence period 33–43; pre-colonial and
colonial period 28–33
Hobsbawm, E. 142
holy trinity doctrine 78, 95, 114, 134
homosexuality 69, 70
Horton, R. 54, 63, 74
hospitality 81, 89n12
Huntington, S.P. 3
hypocrisy 82, 86

Iannaccone, L.R. 66
IDB seeIslamic Development Bank (IDB)
Igo, Stephen 40
Ihsan 46–47
illness and healing 91, 106
Imams 120–121, 127
income tax 44
India 87
indicators of Islamic conversion 23, 45–47
individual declaration of conversion 45–46, 133, 137
Indonesia 17, 29, 145, 148–149
institutional transition conversions 47
intellectual availability of converts 56, 114–115
interaction stage of conversion 53, 56–58, 108, 120–131; books and literature 129–131; foreign
advocates 122–127; Head Imam 120–121; local advocates 121, 127–129
international Islamic community: assistance to ISPNG 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 125, 126, 127; being part of
146; growth of 16; missionary activity by 117–118, 122–127
International Islamic News Agency 20
interviews 9, 11–13
Islam 59n3; aqidah46; five pillars of 46–47; soteriology 58n2
Islam, B. 33
Islamic conversion: barriers to 113–115, 135; definitions of 45–52; indicators of 23, 45–47; no
compulsion in 120, 132n4; reversion concept 50–51; types of 47; see alsoseven-stage process
model of conversion
Islamic conversion growth 1–2, 18–27; and 9/11 attacks 1, 108, 110, 111–112; converts leaving Islam
19, 139; converts’ perspectives on 25–26; gender differences 14–15, 23; and globalisation 3;
group conversions 22–23; post-independence period 41–43; socio-economic indicators of 23;
Solomon Islands 16, 17; through marriages 23; Vanuatu 16, 17–18
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 125–126
Islamic extremism 1–2, 148
Islamic law 102–103, 107n5, 143
Islamic Society of Papua New Guinea (ISPNG) 4, 7, 10, 19–21, 135; founding 34; Head Imam 120–
121, 127; incorporation 35–41, 44; international support 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 125, 126, 127;
missionary activity by 37–38, 41–43, 117
Islamic terms and phrases 139
ISPNG seeIslamic Society of Papua New Guinea (ISPNG)

James, W. 48
Jebens, H. 65, 71, 77, 80, 106n3
Jessep, O. 88n1
Jesus 78, 95, 98–99, 134
jinns (spirits) 79
John Frum Movement 18
Judaism 59n3, 134
Juergensmeyer, M. 16
jummah 34, 35, 100
justice system 68–69, 78, 89n4, 89n5, 89n6, 102–103

kago 71–72
Kahn, P.J. 57
Kalima Shahada 45–46, 133, 137
Kapi, Daniel 59n4
Kapi, L. 67
kastom 90n15, 116, 140–141; and Christianity 75–76, 79, 83; congruence with Islam 73–81, 77, 119
Keane, W. 147n3
Ketan, J. 69, 107n6
Khan, M.H. 29, 32
Khan, Shahjahan 10
Khan, Shoukat Noor 35, 39–40
Khurshid, Muhammad 118
Klass, M. 97
Knauft, B.M. 65, 68
knowledge of Christianity 73, 94, 112–113
Kolig, E. 142
Kolma, E. 67
Koran 46, 78, 96, 130; aslama45; compared with Bible 86, 98, 112; dowries 89n9; missionary
activity 116, 118–119, 120, 132n4; retributive justice 89n6; spirits (jinns) 79

Laitin, D.D. 92
language transformation 139
Lawrence, David 32
Lawrence, P. 13
legal system 68–69, 102–103, 107n5
Levi-Strauss, C. 142
Levtzion, N. 7
Libya 38
Linnekin, J. 147n2
Linzag, Abdurrahman 39
literacy 114–115, 132n3
literature 129–131
Lofland, J. 6–7
Lucas, L. 40
Lutheran Church 24, 24, 47, 83
Luzbetak, L. 47

Machalek, R. 45
macrocontext of conversion 55
Makassar Muslim traders 29–30
Malawi 49
Malay, Jimmy 32–33
Malaysia 39, 40, 126, 149
Mannan, Abdul 10
marginality, and conversion 60–61
marriage 69, 80; conversion through 23; dowries 69, 80, 88n1, 89n9, 104; polygamy 69, 88n1, 104–
105, 107n6, 107n7
Marty, M.E. 131n1
mass media seemedia encounters
material benefits 116
material dimensions of conversion 70–73
material incentives 125
Mathews, F. 75
Mawdudi, Abdullah 118, 127
meat 34, 145, 147n3
media encounters 108, 110–112, 115
Medina University, Saudi Arabia 125
menstrual taboos 69, 81, 89n11
metacosmic religions 51
Metcalf, B.D. 122
microcontext of conversion 55
migrants seeexpatriate Muslims
missionaries, Christian 29, 70, 75–76, 79, 87–88, 117, 123–124
missionary activity, Muslim 17, 56–58, 108, 116–131; books and literature 129–131; existing
research on 116–117; by expatriate Muslims 117, 119, 121; and group conversions 49; by Head
 Imam 120–121; by international Islamic community 117–118, 122–127; by ISPNG 37–38, 41–
43, 117; by local converts 127–129; material incentives 125; no compulsion in 120, 132n4; pre-
independence period 28, 33; Tablighi Jamaat11, 17, 42, 118, 120, 122–124, 145
Moi, Kere 40–41
money: blood money 78, 89n4, 89n5; and Christian church 82, 84–85; dowries 69, 80, 88n1, 89n9,
104; see alsowealth
monogamy 104–105
monotheistic God, belief in 46, 77–78, 95
monotheistic religions, differences between 59n3, 134–135
Moti affair 11
motivations 56, 115–116
Muhammad, Mahathir 40, 126
multiple event conversions 55, 109–110
Munafiqs 125
Murad, Khurram 118, 122–123
Murata, S. 79
Murphy, Kevin 31–32
Muslim expatriates and migrants seeexpatriate Muslims
Muslim traders 29–30, 31–32
Muslim World League (MWL) 125
myths 139–142

Nabae, Sau 42
Nabanga, Hussein (John Henry) 17–18
names, taking Muslim 137
Narokobi, Bernard 64
near-death experiences 91–92, 106n2
negative representation of Islam 111–112
New Caledonia 16, 17, 34
new religious movements 5, 25, 61, 71, 83, 141
Nock, A.D. 49, 51
Norris, R.S. 74
Nuli, Barrah 42

OIC seeOrganization of Islamic Conferences (OIC)

Old Testament 76, 95
oneness of God (tawhid) 46, 77–78, 95
oral histories 30–31
organic growth 19
Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) 40
Osbourne, Robin 37–38
Otto, T. 75, 142

Pacific Magazine 15
Pamba, K. 67, 68
parents, respect for 103
participant observation 10, 11, 12
Parucci, D.J. 47
passive conversion 56, 109, 109, 110
payback culture 68–69, 78, 89n4, 89n5, 89n6, 102–103
Pedersen, P. 142
Peni, E. 67
Pentecostal sects seeevangelical and Pentecostal (EP) sects
personal ablutions 81, 89n10, 100, 106n3
personal crises 105–106
Pieris, A.S.J. 51–52
pigs 145
PNG Revival Party 68
political corruption 66–67, 105
political crises 105
political systems 66–68
Polye, Don 107n5
polygamy 69, 88n1, 104–105, 107n6, 107n7
pork 145
post-colonial theories of religious conversion 62–63, 82
Poston, L. 118, 132n4
poverty 68
practice of religion 65–66, 71, 76–77; and commitment 136–137; obligations of Muslims 45, 46–47;
and salvation 96, 97
prayers: reciting suras 139; salat (daily prayer) 34, 35, 46, 100, 102, 139, 143; traditional religions 79
printed material 129–131
process of conversion seeseven-stage process model of conversion
prophets 79, 89n8
proselytisation seemissionary activity, Muslim
protean selfhood 91, 101–102, 107n4
punishment 68–69, 89n4, 102–103, 107n5

quality growth 19
quest stage of conversion 53, 56, 108–116, 109
Qurbani (sacrifice) 34, 81

racial discrimination 82, 86–88

racial equality 88
Rambo, Lewis R. 5–7, 16, 28, 45, 52–58, 53, 54, 73, 93, 101–102, 110, 112, 113, 133, 137, 139, 149
Ranger, T. 142
Rashid, Abdul Rahim 39
Regional Islamic Da’wah Council for Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) 17, 34–35, 38, 39,
40, 117, 126–127
relationships, and conversion 57, 116
religious availability of converts 56
religious conversion: availability 56, 112–115; barriers to 113–115, 135; causes of 52, 54; definitions
of 45–52; existing research on 2–3, 5–8, 9, 45; to fundamentalist Christian sects 2, 3, 16, 24, 24,
25, 47, 63, 71, 83, 92, 93; globalisation theories of 62, 63, 82; helicopter theory of 51, 61, 74;
institutional transition 47; motivations 56, 115–116; post-colonial theories of 62–63, 82; tradition
transition 47; and traditional religions 50, 51–52, 119; types of 47; see alsoIslamic conversion;
Islamic conversion growth; seven-stage process model of conversion
religious crises 94–101
religious market model of conversion 54
religious switching 55
research design 7–15
resistance and rejection 82–88
response styles seeagency of converts
retributive justice 68–69, 78, 89n4, 89n5, 89n6, 102–103
revenge seeretributive justice
reversion concept 50–51
rhetoric, and conversion 57–58
Ricklefs, M.C. 29
right path, discovering 48, 136
RISEAP seeRegional Islamic Da’wah Council for Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP)
ritual, and conversion 57, 136–137
Robbins, J. 47, 65, 93
Roy, O. 63, 140
Ruel, M. 76
Russia 144

sacrifice (Qurbani) 34, 81

Saddiq, Muhammad 40
salat (daily prayer) 34, 35, 46, 100, 102, 139, 143
Salmang, Otto 42
salvation 46–47, 59n2, 96–97
Salvation Army 24, 24
Samad, Abdus 17
Sandbach, Saddiq 7, 19, 35, 38, 42, 114, 131
Sandler, S. 3
Saudi Arabia 117, 125–126, 127
Sawm (fasting during Ramadan) 35
second wave conversions 47, 93
sectarianism 64–65, 95–96
sects seefundamentalist Christian sects
secularisation 55, 63–64
security concerns 2
self-categorisation process 58
self-esteem 115, 143
seven-stage process model of conversion 45, 52–58, 53, 54; consequences stage 53, 58, 133, 142–
147; encounter stage 53, 56–58, 99, 108, 110, 119–120; quest stage 53, 56, 108–116, 109; see
alsocommitment stage of conversion; context stage of conversion; crisis stage of conversion;
interaction stage of conversion
Seventh Day Adventists 24, 24, 65, 71, 106n3
sexuality 69–70
Shahada see Kalima Shahada
Sharia see Islamic law
shoes, removal of 100
Shuaibu, Z.M. 17, 18
Sicard, S.V. 49
sin and atonement 96–97
Skonovd, N. 6–7
slipping 138, 143
Snow, D.A. 45
snowballing technique 12
social crises 92–93, 101–105
social movements 84
social networks 113–114
social status 115
social welfare services 71–72
socio-economic indicators of Islamic conversion 23
Solomon Islands 16, 17, 45
Solomon Islands Muslim League (SIML) 17
Somare, Sir Michael 11, 40, 86, 107n5
Somare government 39–40
soteriology 52, 58n2
Spickard, J.V. 66
spirits (jinns) 79
Stewart, P.J. 67, 100
Strathern, A. 67, 100
Strelan, J.G. 71
strict moral rules 65–66, 76, 93, 102–103, 115, 137
structural availability of converts 56, 113
Sunnah 74, 79, 89n7, 143–145
Sunni Islam 4
surrender 137–139
syncretism 51, 58n1

Tablighi Jamaat 11, 17, 42, 118, 120, 122–124, 145

Taitibe, Isaac 86
tawhid (oneness of God) 46, 77–78, 95
Ten Commandments 95
terrorism 1
testimony 139–142
Tippett, A.R. 19, 22, 49, 69, 76, 84, 96
tithing 85
Tok Pisin 13, 130
Torato, Paul 36
Torres Straits 29–30, 31
Totonji, Ahmad 127
tradition transition conversions 47
traditional religions 5; and Christianity 75–76, 79, 83; congruence with Islam 73–81, 77, 119; and
conversion 50, 51–52, 119
Trans Fly region 29–30, 31
transcendence, desire for 91, 99
Transparency International 66–67
Travisano, R.V. 47
tribal power 49
trinity seeholy trinity doctrine
Trompf, G.W. 2, 5, 51, 68, 69, 71, 76, 77, 81, 88n2, 93, 94, 124, 141
truth, discovering 48, 136

Uniting Church 24, 24

University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) 34, 41, 129
Vanuatu 16, 17–18

WAMY seeWorld Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

washing, ritual 81, 89n10, 100, 106n3
wealth 90n14; and Christian church 82, 84–85; polarisation of 68, 85
West Papua 17, 145, 148, 149
Williams, F.E. 32–33
Wippon, Godfrey 67
women: clothing 136; female converts 14–15, 23, 123, 136; roles in traditional religions and Islam
80, 103–104
women’s rights 69, 88n1, 103
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) 17, 39, 125
worship 99–100

Zakat (compulsory alms giving) 35

Zocca, F. 18