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 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–1.

The A992 steel rod is subjected to the loading shown. If the

cross-sectional area of the rod is 80 mm2, determine the D
displacement of B and A. Neglect the size of the couplings
at B and C. 0.75 m
C
45 45

1.50 m
Solution 6 kN 6 kN

Normal Force And Stress: For segments AB, BC and CD, referring to the FBDs of
B
the lower segments shown in Fig. a, b and c, respectively,
5 5
4
+ c ΣFy = 0; PAB - 10 = 0 PAB = 10.0 kN 4
3 3 1m
4 5 kN 5 kN
+ c ΣFy = 0; PBC - 2c 5a b d - 10 = 0 PBC = 18.0 kN
5
A
4
+ c ΣFy = 0; PCD - 2(6 sin 45°) - 2c 5a b d - 10 = 0 PCD = 26.485 kN
5
10 kN
Since the rod has a constant cross-section and segment CD is subjected to the
greatest normal force, this segment will develop the greatest average normal stress.
NCD 26.485 ( 103 )
smax = sCD = = = 331.07 ( 106 ) Pa = 331.07 MPa
A 80 ( 10-6 )
Displacement: For A992 steel, sy = 345 MPa and E = 200 GPa. Since smax 6 sy,

NL 1 1
dB = Σ = (P L + PCDLCD) = [18.0 ( 103 ) (1.5)
AE AE BC BC 80 ( 10 ) [200 ( 109 ) ]
-6

+ 26.485 ( 103 ) (0.75)]

= 0.002929 m = 2.93 mm T  Ans.

PABLAB 10.0 ( 103 ) (1)

dA = + dB = + 0.002929
AE 80 ( 10-6 ) [200 ( 109 ) ]
= 0.003554 m = 3.55 mm T  Ans.

Ans:
dB = 2.93 mm T ,
dA = 3.55 mm T

610
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–2.

The copper shaft is subjected to the axial loads shown. 80 in. 150 in. 100 in.
Determine the displacement of end A with respect to end D if 5 kip 2 kip
8 kip 6 kip
the diameters of each segment are dAB = 0.75 in., dBC = 1 in.,
and dCD = 0.5 in. Take Ecu = 18(103) ksi. A 5 kip B C 2 kip
D

Solution
PL - 8(80) 2(150) 6(100)
dA>D = Σ = + +
AE p 2 3 p 2 3 p
(0.75) (18)(10 ) (1) (18)(10 ) (0.5)2(18)(103)
4 4 4

= 0.111 in. Ans.

The positive sign indicates that end A moves away from end D.

Ans:
dA>D = 0.111 in. away from end D

611
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–3.

The composite shaft, consisting of aluminum, copper, and Aluminum Copper Steel
steel sections, is subjected to the loading shown. Determine Eal = 10(103 ) ksi Ecu = 18(103 ) ksi Est = 29(103 ) ksi
the displacement of end A with respect to end D and the AAB = 0.09 in2 ABC = 0.12 in2 ACD = 0.06 in2
normal stress in each section. The cross-sectional area and
modulus of elasticity for each section are shown in the 3.50 kip 1.75 kip
figure. Neglect the size of the collars at B and C. 2.00 kip 1.50 kip

A B C D
3.50 kip 1.75 kip
Solution 18 in. 12 in. 16 in.
PAB 2
sAB = = = 22.2 ksi (T) Ans.
AAB 0.09
PBC -5
sBC = = = - 41.7 ksi (C) Ans.
ABC 0.12
PBC - 1.5
sCD = = = - 25.0 ksi (C) Ans.
ABC 0.06

PL 2(18) ( -5)(12) ( - 1.5)(16)

dAD = Σ = 3
+ 3
+
AE (0.09)(10)(10 ) (0.12)(18)(10 ) (0.06)(29)(103)
= -0.00157 in. Ans.

The negative sign indicates end A moves towards end D.

Ans:
sAB = 22.2 ksi (T), sBC = 41.7 ksi (C),
sCD = 25.0 ksi (C),
dA>D = 0.00157 in. towards end D

612
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

*9–4.

The composite shaft, consisting of aluminum, copper, and steel Aluminum Copper Steel
sections, is subjected to the loading shown. Determine the Eal = 10(103 ) ksi Ecu = 18(103 ) ksi Est = 29(103 ) ksi
displacement of B with respect to C. The cross-sectional area AAB = 0.09 in2 ABC = 0.12 in2 ACD = 0.06 in2
and modulus of elasticity for each section are shown in the
figure. Neglect the size of the collars at B and C. 3.50 kip 1.75 kip
2.00 kip 1.50 kip

A B C D
3.50 kip 1.75 kip
Solution 18 in. 12 in. 16 in.

PL ( -5)(12)
dB>C = = = - 0.0278 in. Ans.
AE (0.12)(18)(103)
The negative sign indicates end B moves towards end C.

Ans:
dB>C = -0.0278 in. B moves towards end C

613
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–5.

The 2014-T6 aluminum rod has a diameter of 30 mm and A B C D

8 kN E
supports the load shown. Determine the displacement of
end A with respect to end E. Neglect the size of the couplings. 4 kN 6 kN 2 kN

4m 2m 2m 2m

Solution
PL 1
dA>E = Σ = [8(4) + 4(2) - 2(2) + 0(2)] ( 103 )
AE AE
36 ( 103 )
= = 0.697 ( 10 - 3 ) = 0.697 mm Ans.
p
(0.03)2(73.1) ( 109 )
4

Ans:
dA>E = 0.697 mm

614
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–6.

The A-36 steel drill shaft of an oil well extends 12 000 ft

into the ground. Assuming that the pipe used to drill the well
is suspended freely from the derrick at A, determine the A
maximum average normal stress in each pipe string and the AAB = 2.50 in.2 5000 ft
elongation of its end D with respect to the fixed end wAB = 3.2 lb/ft
at A. The shaft consists of three different sizes of pipe, AB, B
BC, and CD, each having the length, weight per unit length,
and cross-sectional area indicated. ABC = 1.75 in.2
wBC = 2.8 lb/ft 5000 ft

C
ACD = 1.25 in.2 2000 ft
Solution wCD = 2.0 lb/ft D
P 3.2 (5000) + 18000
sA = = = 13.6 ksi  Ans.
A 2.5
P 2.8 (5000) + 4000
sB = = = 10.3 ksi  Ans.
A 1.75
P 2 (2000)
sC = = = 3.2 ksi  Ans.
A 1.25
5000
P(x) dx 2000 (2.8x + 4000)dx
L A(x) E L0 L0
2x dx
dD = Σ = +
(1.25)(29) ( 10
6
) (1.75)(29) ( 106 )
5000
(3.2x + 18000)dx
L0
+
(2.5)(29) ( 106 )

= 2.99 ft Ans.

Ans:
sA = 13.6 ksi, sB = 10.3 ksi,
sC = 3.2 ksi, dD = 2.99 ft

615
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–7.

The truss is made of three A-36 steel members, each having P

a cross-sectional area of 400 mm2. Determine the horizontal
displacement of the roller at C when P = 8 kN.
B
5 kN

0.8 m

Solution
A C
By observation the horizontal displacement of roller C is equal to the displacement
of point C obtained from member AC.
0.8 m 0.6 m
FCA = 5.571 kN

FCAL 5.571 ( 103 ) (1.40)

dC = = = 0.0975 mm S  Ans.
AE (400) ( 10 - 6 ) (200) ( 106 )

Ans:
dC = 0.0975 mm S

616
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

*9–8.

The truss is made of three A-36 steel members, each having P

a cross-sectional area of 400 mm2. Determine the magnitude
P required to displace the roller to the right 0.2 mm.
B
5 kN

0.8 m

Solution
A C
a+ MA = 0;   - P(0.8) - 5(0.8) + Cy(1.4) = 0
Cy = 0.5714 P + 2.857 0.8 m 0.6 m

4
+ c ΣFy =     C
0; y - FBC a b = 0
5
FBC = 1.25 Cy

+ ΣFx = 0;  
S - FAC + 1.25 Cy (0.6) = 0
FAC = 0.75 Cy = 0.4286 P + 2.14286

Require
(0.4286 P + 2.14286) ( 103 ) (1.4)
dCA = 0.0002 =
(400) ( 10-6 ) (200) ( 109 )

P = 21.7 kN Ans.

Ans:
P = 21.7 kN

617
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–9.

The assembly consists of two 10-mm diameter red brass 300 mm 450 mm
C83400 copper rods AB and CD, a 15-mm diameter 304
stainless steel rod EF, and a rigid bar G. If P = 5 kN, A B P
determine the horizontal displacement of end F of rod EF.
E 4P
F

C DG P

Solution
Internal Loading: The normal forces developed in rods EF, AB, and CD are shown
on the free-body diagrams in Figs. a and b.

p
Displacement: The cross-sectional areas of rods EF and AB are AEF = (0.0152) =
4
p
56.25(10 - 6)p m2 and AAB = (0.012) = 25(10 - 6)p m2.
4

PL PEF LEF PAB LAB

dF = Σ = +
AE AEF Est AAB Ebr
20(103)(450) 5(103)(300)
= +
56.25(10 - 6)p(193)(109) 25 ( 10 - 6)p(101)(109)
= 0.453 mm Ans.

The positive sign indicates that end F moves away from the fixed end.

Ans:
dF = 0.453 mm

618
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–10.

The assembly consists of two 10-mm diameter red brass 300 mm 450 mm
C83400 copper rods AB and CD, a 15-mm diameter 304
stainless steel rod EF, and a rigid bar G. If the horizontal A B P
displacement of end F of rod EF is 0.45 mm, determine the
E 4P
magnitude of P.
F

C DG P

Solution
Internal Loading: The normal forces developed in rods EF, AB, and CD are shown
on the free-body diagrams in Figs. a and b.

p
Displacement: The cross-sectional areas of rods EF and AB are AEF = (0.0152) =
4
56.25(10 - 6 )p m2 and

p
AAB = (0.012 ) = 25(10 - 6 )p m2.
4

PL PEF LEF PAB LAB

dF = Σ = +
AE AEF Est AAB Ebr
4P(450) P(300)
0.45 = -6 9
+ -6
56.25(10 )p(193)(10 ) 25(10 )p(101)(109)
P = 4967 N = 4.97 kN Ans.

Ans:
P = 4.97 kN

619
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 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–11.

The load is supported by the four 304 stainless steel wires E F G

that are connected to the rigid members AB and DC.
Determine the vertical displacement of the 500-lb load if
the members were originally horizontal when the load was
applied. Each wire has a cross-sectional area of 0.025 in2.
3 ft

5 ft
H
D C
Solution 1 ft 2 ft
Internal Forces in the wires: 1.8 ft
I
FBD (b): A B
3 ft 1 ft
a+ ΣMA = 0; FBC(4) - 500(3) = 0 FBC = 375.0 lb
500 lb
+ c ΣFy = 0; FAH + 375.0 - 500 = 0 FAH = 125.0 lb

FBD (a):

a+ ΣMD = 0; FCF(3) - 125.0(1) = 0 FCF = 41.67 lb

+ c ΣFy = 0; FDE + 41.67 - 125.0 = 0 FDE = 83.33 lb

Displacement:
FDELDE 83.33(3)(12)
dD = = = 0.0042857 in.
ADEE 0.025(28.0)(106)
FCFLCF 41.67(3)(12)
dC = = = 0.0021429 in.
ACFE 0.025(28.0)(106)
=
dH 0.0021429 =
= ; dH = 0.0014286 in.
2 3

dH = 0.0014286 + 0.0021429 = 0.0035714 in.

FAHLAH 125.0(1.8)(12)
dA>H = = = 0.0038571 in.
AAHE 0.025(28.0)(106)
dA = dH + dA>H = 0.0035714 + 0.0038571 = 0.0074286 in.
FBGLBG 375.0(5)(12)
dB = = = 0.0321428 in.
ABGE 0.025(28.0)(106)
d l= 0.0247143
= ; d l= = 0.0185357 in.
3 4

dl = 0.0074286 + 0.0185357 = 0.0260 in. Ans.

Ans:
dl = 0.0260 in.

620
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

*9–12.

The load is supported by the four 304 stainless steel wires E F G

that are connected to the rigid members AB and DC.
Determine the angle of tilt of each member after the 500-lb
load is applied. The members were originally horizontal,
and each wire has a cross-sectional area of 0.025 in2.
3 ft

5 ft
H
D C
Solution 1 ft 2 ft
1.8 ft
Internal Forces in the wires:
I
FBD (b): A B
3 ft 1 ft
a+ ΣMA = 0; FBG(4) - 500(3) = 0 FBG = 375.0 lb
500 lb
+ c ΣFy = 0; FAH + 375.0 - 500 = 0 FAH = 125.0 lb

FBD (a):

a+ ΣMD = 0; FCF(3) - 125.0(1) = 0 FCF = 41.67 lb

+ c ΣFy = 0; FDE + 41.67 - 125.0 = 0 FDE = 83.33 lb

Displacement:
FDELDE 83.33(3)(12)
dD = = = 0.0042857 in.
ADEE 0.025(28.0)(106)
FCFLCF 41.67(3)(12)
dC = = = 0.0021429 in.
ACFE 0.025(28.0)(106)
=
dH 0.0021429 =
= ; dH = 0.0014286 in.
2 3
=
dH = d H + dC = 0.0014286 + 0.0021429 = 0.0035714 in.

0.0021429
tan a = ; a = 0.00341° Ans.
36
FAHLAH 125.0(1.8)(12)
dA>H = = = 0.0038571 in.
AAHE 0.025(28.0)(106)
dA = dH + dA>H = 0.0035714 + 0.0038571 = 0.0074286 in.
FBGLBG 375.0(5)(12)
dB = = = 0.0321428 in.
ABGE 0.025(28.0)(106)
0.0247143
tan b = ; b = 0.0295° Ans.
48

Ans:
a = 0.00341°,
b = 0.0295°

621
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–13.

The rigid bar is supported by the pin-connected rod CB that

has a cross-sectional area of 14 mm2 and is made from C
6061-T6 aluminum. Determine the vertical deflection of the
300 N/m
bar at D when the distributed load is applied.
1.5 m

D
A B
2m 2m

Solution
a+ ΣMA = 0; 1200(2) - TCB(0.6)(2) = 0

TCB = 2000 N

PL (2000)(2.5)
dB>C = = = 0.0051835
AE 14(10 - 6)(68.9)(109)
(2.5051835)2 = (1.5)2 + (2)2 - 2(1.5)(2) cos u

u = 90.248°
u = 90.248° - 90° = 0.2478° = 0.004324 rad

dD = u r = 0.004324(4000) = 17.3 mm Ans.

Ans:
dD = 17.3 mm

622
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–14.

The post is made of Douglas fir and has a diameter of 20 kN

100 mm. If it is subjected to the load of 20 kN and the soil
provides a frictional resistance distributed around the post
A
that is triangular along its sides; that is, it varies from w = 0
at y = 0 to w = 12 kN>m at y = 2 m, determine the y
force F at its bottom needed for equilibrium. Also, what is w
the displacement of the top of the post A with respect to its 2m
bottom B? Neglect the weight of the post.

12 kN/m
B
Solution
F
Equation of Equilibrium: Referring to the FBD of the entire post, Fig. a,

1
+ c ΣFy = 0; F + (12)(2) - 20 = 0 F = 8.00 kN Ans.
2

Normal Force: Referring to the FBD of the upper segment of the post sectioned at
arbitrary distance y, Fig. b,

1
+ c ΣFy = 0; (6y)(y) - 20 - P(y) = 0 Py = ( 3y2 - 20 ) kN
2

Displacement: For Douglas Fir, E = 13.1 GPa.

L 2 meters
N(y)dy
L0 A(y)E AE L0
1
dA>B = = ( 3y2 - 20 ) dy
2 meters
1
= ( y3 - 20y ) `
AE 0

32 kN # m
= -
AE
32 ( 103 )
= -
p
( 0.12 ) [13.1 ( 109 ) ]
4

= - 0.3110 ( 10-3 ) m = - 0.311 mm Ans.

The sign indicates that end A moves toward end B.

Ans:
F = 8.00 kN,
dA>B = - 0.311 mm

623
 © 2017 Pearson Education, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. All rights reserved. This material is protected under all copyright laws as they currently exist.
No portion of this material may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher.

9–15.

The post is made of Douglas fir and has a diameter of 20 kN

100 mm. If it is subjected to the load of 20 kN and the soil
provides a frictional resistance that is distributed along
A
its length and varies linearly from w = 4 kN>m at y = 0 to
w = 12 kN>m at y = 2 m, determine the force F at its y
bottom needed for equilibrium. Also, what is the displacement w
of the top of the post A with respect to its bottom B? Neglect 2m
the weight of the post.

12 kN/m
B
Solution
F
Equation of Equilibrium: Referring to the FBD of the entire post, Fig. a,

1
+ c ΣFy = 0; F + (4 + 12)(2) - 20 = 0 F = 4.00 kN Ans.
2

Normal Force: Referring to the FBD of the upper segment of the post sectioned at
arbitrary distance y, Fig. b,

+ c ΣFy = 0; (4 + 2y)y - 20 - P(y) = 0 P(y) = ( 2y2 + 4y - 20 ) kN

Displacement: For Douglas Fir, E = 13.1 GPa.

L 2m
N(y)dy
L0 A(y)E AE L0
1
dA>B = = ( 2y2 + 4y - 20 ) dy
2m
1 2 3
= a y + 2y2 - 20yb `
AE 3 0

80 kN # m
= -
3 AE
80(103)
= -
p
3c ( 0.12 ) d [13.1 ( 109 ) ]
4
= - 0.2592 ( 10-3 ) m = - 0.259 mm Ans.

Ans:
F = 4.00 kN,
dA>B = -0.259 mm

624
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which dealt with the situation, it reached its destination after the
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worked may suffice. Masséna started Foy for Paris, with his great
report on the state of the Army of Portugal, on October 29. Foy
reached Paris and saw the Emperor on November 22 and the
succeeding days. The detailed dispatches to Masséna and Soult,
consequent on Foy’s report, were not sent off till December 4. On
January 22nd Soult acknowledges the receipt of the dispatch of that
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December 10, all of which arrived together, because the guerrilleros
of La Mancha had stopped the posts between Madrid and Seville for
a full fortnight after the New Year[44]. Of what value to Soult on
January 22 could be orders based on the condition and projects of
Masséna on October 29? The data at the base of the orders were
three months old—while Soult had been already for more than a
month engaged on a campaign undertaken on his own responsibility,
without any knowledge of the exact requirements of Masséna, or of
the intentions of the Emperor.
The Estremaduran expedition of January-March 1811, therefore,
must be looked upon as the private scheme of the Duke of
Dalmatia[45], undertaken with the general object of giving indirect
assistance to Masséna, because the last orders that he had received
from Paris (those of October 26), telling him to give direct
assistance, by sending Mortier to the Tagus, were impossible of
execution[46]. Soult had two leading ideas in his mind when he
planned out his campaign. The first was that he was going into a
country thickly set with fortresses; the second was that, when once
the skirts of the Sierra Morena have been passed, Estremadura is a
‘cavalry country,’ a land of heaths and of unenclosed tillage-fields of
vast area. Accordingly he intended to march with a very large force
of cavalry, and with a heavy siege-train. At Seville he had at his
disposition the greatest arsenal of Spain; but for many months all
that it produced had been going forward to Cadiz: no less than 290
pieces had been sent to arm the vast lines in front of the blockaded
city. Accordingly it took some time to get ready the heavy guns, and
to manufacture the ammunition required for such a big business as
the siege of the six fortresses, small and great, into whose midst he
was about to thrust himself. The personnel for the siege-train had
also to be collected: requisitions were sent, both to Victor at Cadiz
and to Sebastiani at Granada, to detach and send into Seville nearly
all their sappers, and the men of several companies of artillery. They
were also to send to the expeditionary force many regiments of
cavalry. Mortier had only two (10th Hussars and 21st Chasseurs),
which had sufficed when he was engaged in the heights of the Sierra
Morena, but were insufficient when he was about to descend into
the plain of the Guadiana. Accordingly half the cavalry of Victor’s 1st
Corps was called up—four regiments (4th, 14th, 26th Dragoons, 2nd
Hussars), while Sebastiani gave up one (27th Chasseurs); to these
was added an experimental Spanish cavalry regiment of
‘Juramentados’ recently organized at Seville. Only one infantry
regiment was requisitioned, the 63rd Line, from Victor’s 3rd Division.
The putting together of these resources gave a force in which the
proportions of the arms were very peculiar—4,000 cavalry, 2,000
artillery and sappers, to only 13,500 infantry; the last, all save the
above-mentioned 63rd regiment, drawn from Mortier’s 5th Corps.
The orders for the concentration of the troops were issued early in
December, but owing to the time required for drawing in units from
Granada and Cadiz, and for the preparation of the siege-train, it was
not till the last day of the old year that the Marshal took his
departure from Seville.
The collection of a field army of 20,000 men, which was to cut
itself loose from Andalusia for a time, imposed some tiresome
problems on Soult. Since he had resolved not to evacuate Granada
or Malaga on the one hand, nor the posts west of the Guadalquivir
on the other, and since he was drawing off the 5th Corps, which had
hitherto provided for the safety of Seville and found detachments for
the Condado de Niebla, he had to make provision for the filling of
the gap left behind him. Hence we find him calling upon Victor to
spare men from in front of Cadiz—a demand which the Duke of
Belluno took very ill—since he truly declared that he had no more
troops in the 1st Corps than sufficed to man the lines and to keep
posts of observation in his rear. The garrison of Cadiz was always
increasing, and included a strong nucleus of British troops. How
could he face sorties, or disembarkations in his rear, if he was cut
down to a mere 18,000 men in place of the 24,000 on which he had
hitherto reckoned? Nevertheless, he was forced to provide a
detachment to hold Xeres, as a half-way house to Seville, and to
send out a cavalry regiment (9th Dragoons) and one battalion west
of the Guadalquivir. Similarly, the brigade of Godinot in the kingdom
of Cordova[47] was required to find a skeleton garrison for Seville,
which was raised to a somewhat higher figure, in appearance, by the
doubtful aid of some ‘juramentado’ companies of Spaniards, and of
the dépôts and convalescents of the 5th Corps. The great city, with a
turbulent population of 100,000 souls, which formed the centre of
his viceroyalty, became at this time Soult’s weakest point—he left it
so inadequately held that it was at the mercy of any considerable
hostile force which might approach it—and such a force was ere
long, as we shall see, to make its appearance. Godinot had also to
look after the insurgent bands of the central Sierra Morena, who
often blocked the post road to Madrid. Sebastiani (save for the
cavalry and artillery borrowed from him) was left with his 4th Corps
intact, and his duty was unchanged—to watch the Spanish army of
Murcia, and to suppress the guerrilleros of the Sierra de Ronda and
the eastern coast—an unending task from which Soult thought that
he ought not to be distracted. Napoleon, wise after the event, wrote
in March that Soult should have left no more than the Polish division
of the 4th Corps in the direction of Granada, and have brought the
remainder of it to strengthen or support the troops at Seville and in
the lines before Cadiz. In that case the Poles would certainly have
had to move westward also ere long, since there were but 5,000 of
them, and all Eastern Andalusia would have had to be evacuated.
But this idea had never struck Soult as practicable, and Sebastiani’s
whole corps was left in its old posts in the kingdom of Granada.
The invasion of Estremadura was carried out in two columns of
about equal strength, which used the two main passes between
Western Andalusia and the valley of the Guadiana. The right column
under Latour-Maubourg took the route by Guadalcanal, Llerena, and
Usagre; it was composed of his own regiments of dragoons from the
1st Corps, and of Girard’s infantry division of the 5th Corps, which
latter had been cantoned in Llerena since the autumn, and was now
picked up and taken forward by the cavalry. The left column, which
was accompanied both by Soult and by Mortier, was composed of
Briche’s light cavalry and Gazan’s division of the 5th Corps. It had to
escort the slowly moving siege-train of 34 guns, which (with the
60,000 kilos of powder belonging to it) was drawn by 2,500 draught
oxen, requisitioned along with their drivers from the province of
Seville. This column took the route Ronquillo, Sta Olalla, Monasterio,
which, if less steep and better made than the Llerena-Guadalcanal
road, is longer, and passes through an even more desolate and
resourceless country. It was intended that the two columns should
join at Los Santos or Almendralejo, in the Estremaduran plain, and
lay siege at once to Badajoz, the enemy’s most formidable
stronghold. Its fall, so Soult hoped, would lead to the easy conquest
of the minor fortresses.
But the two columns did not meet with equal fortune. That
commanded by Latour-Maubourg met practically no resistance in its
first stages. On arriving at Usagre on January 3, it found in its front
almost the whole of the allied cavalry in Estremadura—Butron with
1,500 Spaniards, Madden with nearly 1,000 Portuguese. But this was
merely a screen thrown out to cover the retreat beyond the
Guadiana of Mendizabal and the division of Spanish infantry which
had been cantoned in this region. That officer had been ordered by
his chief, La Romana, to break the bridge of Merida, after retiring
over it, and then to attempt to hold the line of the Guadiana. He did
neither; precipitately marching on Merida, he passed through it in
great haste, but forgot to see that the bridge was duly destroyed,
and then retired along the north bank of the Guadiana to Badajoz.
Latour-Maubourg, according to his directions, did not cross the river,
but halted near Almendralejo, to wait for the other column, which
was not forthcoming. Only Soult himself and Briche’s light cavalry
appeared at Zafra on the 5th, and joined Latour-Maubourg on the
6th of January. Gazan’s infantry and the siege-train were far away,
and unavailable for many a day. The plans of the left invading
column had miscarried. For when its head reached Monasterio, at
the summit of the long pass, its tail, the siege-train, was dragging
far behind. In the desolate stages about Ronquillo and Sta Olalla it
had met with tempestuous rains, as might have been expected at
the season. Many of the oxen died, the unwilling Spanish drivers
deserted wholesale, and there was much delay and considerable loss
of vehicles. The train and its small escort got completely separated
from Gazan’s infantry. At this moment Soult’s cavalry reported to him
that a formidable column of hostile infantry was lying a few miles to
the west of Monasterio, on the bad cross-road to Calera, and was
apparently moving round his flank, either to fall upon the belated
convoy or perhaps to make a dash at Seville.
This column was the 5,000 infantry of Ballasteros, who, as it
chanced, had begun to march southward at the same moment that
Soult had started northward. The Spanish general had just received
orders from Cadiz bidding him cut himself loose from the
Estremaduran army, and move into the Condado de Niebla, where
he was to unite with the local levies under Copons, drive out the
weak French detachment there stationed, and threaten Seville from
the west if it should be practicable. These orders had been given, of
course, before Soult’s plan for invading Estremadura was suspected
at Cadiz. But though unwise in themselves—it was not the time to
deplete Estremadura of troops—they had the effect of bringing
Soult’s great manœuvre to a standstill for some weeks. The Marshal
determined that he must free his flank from this threatening force
before continuing his march, and ordered Mortier to attack
Ballasteros without delay. This was done, but the Spaniard, after a
running fight of two hours, retired to Fregenal, fifteen miles further
west, without suffering any serious harm (January 4th). He was still
in a position to threaten the rear of the convoy, or to slip round the
flank of the French column towards Seville. Soult therefore resolved
to go on with his cavalry and join Latour-Maubourg, but to drop
Gazan’s infantry in the passes, with the order to head off Ballasteros
at all costs, and to cover the siege-train in its journey across the
mountains. Gazan therefore took post at Fuentes de Leon, but soon
heard that Ballasteros had moved south again from Fregenal
towards the Chanza river, and was apparently trying to get round his
flank. Leaving a detachment to help the convoy on its slow and
toilsome route, Gazan resolved to pursue the Spanish column and
destroy it at all costs. This determination led him into three weeks of
desperate mountain-marching and semi-starvation, at the worst
season of the year. For Ballasteros, who showed considerable skill in
drawing his enemy on, moved ever south and west towards the
lower Guadiana, and picked up Copons’s levies by the way. He at last
turned to fight at Villanueva de los Castillejos on January 24th.
Gazan, who had been joined meanwhile by the small French
detachment in the Condado de Niebla, brought his enemy to action
on the 25th. The Asturian battalions which formed Ballasteros’s
division made a creditable resistance, and when evicted from their
position retired across the Guadiana to Alcoutim in Portugal, without
having suffered any overwhelming loss[48]. Gazan therefore resolved
to pursue them no further—indeed he had been drawn down into
one of the remotest corners of Spain to little profit, and realized that
Soult must be brought to a standstill one hundred miles away, for
want of the 6,000 infantry who had now been executing their
toilsome excursion in the mountains for three weeks.
Accordingly, the French general bade Remond, the commander of
the Niebla detachment, watch Ballasteros, and himself returned to
Estremadura by a most painful march through Puebla de Guzman, El
Cerro, Fregenal, and Xeres de los Caballeros. He reported his return
to Soult at Valverde on February 3rd. His services had been lost to
his chief for a month all but two days, a fact which had the gravest
results on the general course of the campaign of Estremadura[49].
For the Duke of Dalmatia, when he had joined Latour-Maubourg
on January 6th, found that he had at his disposition 4,000 cavalry
but only the 6,000 infantry of Girard, while the siege-train was still
blocked in the passes by Monasterio. With such a force he did not
like to beleaguer a place so large and so heavily garrisoned as
Badajoz. Accordingly, he was forced to abandon his original intention
of forming its siege, and to think of some lesser enterprise, more
suited to his strength. After some hesitation, he determined to
attack the weak and old-fashioned fortress of Olivenza, the
southernmost of all the fortified places on the Spanish-Portuguese
frontier. To cover his movement he sent Briche’s cavalry to Merida,
which they occupied on January 7th, almost without resistance,
finding the bridge intact. From thence they sought for Mendizabal on
the north side of the Guadiana, and discovered that he had
withdrawn to Albuquerque, twenty miles north of Badajoz.
Meanwhile Latour-Maubourg with four dragoon regiments took post
at Albuera to watch the garrison of Badajoz, while Soult marched
with Girard’s infantry and one cavalry regiment to attack Olivenza,
before whose walls he appeared on January 11th, 1811.
Olivenza ought never to have been defended. For since its
cession by Portugal to Spain after Godoy’s futile ‘War of the Oranges’
in 1801, it had been systematically neglected. The breach made by
the Spaniards at its siege ten years before had never been properly
repaired—only one-third of the masonry had been replaced, and the
rest of the gap had been merely stopped with earth. Its one outlying
work, a lunette 300 yards only from its southern point, was lying in
ruins and unoccupied. The circuit of its walls was about a mile, but
there were only eighteen guns[50] to guard them. The garrison down
to the 5th of January had consisted of a single battalion left there by
La Romana, when he marched for Portugal in October. But
Mendizabal, apparently in inexcusable ignorance of the condition of
the place, had ordered a whole brigade of his infantry to throw
themselves into it when Soult began to press forward. He sacrificed,
in fact, 2,400 out of the 6,000 bayonets of his division by bidding
them shut themselves up in an utterly untenable fortress[51]. The
governor, General Manuel Herck—an old Swiss officer—was ailing
and quite incapable; a man of resources might have done something
with the heavy garrison placed under his orders, even though the
walls were weak and artillery almost non-existent; but Herck
disgraced himself.
When Soult arrived in front of Olivenza on January 11th, his
engineers informed him that the place, weak as it was, was too
strong to take by escalade, but that a very few days of regular
battering would suffice to ruin it. Unfortunately for him, there was as
yet no heavy artillery at his disposition, but only the divisional
batteries of Girard’s two brigades; the siege-train was still stuck in
the passes. However, the outlying lunette opposite the south front
was at once seized, and turned into a battery for four field-guns,
which opened their fire on the next day. The old Spanish breach of
1801, obviously ready to fall in on account of its rickety repairs, was
visible in the north-west front, the bastion of San Pedro. Opposite
this sites for two more batteries were planned, and a first parallel
opened. The trench-work went on almost unhindered by the
Spaniards, who showed but few guns and shot very badly, but under
considerable difficulties from the rainy weather, which was
perpetually flooding the lower parts of the lines. But in ten days
approaches were pushed right up to the edge of the counterscarp,
and mines prepared to blow it in. The siege artillery began to arrive
on the 19th, in detachments, and continued to drop in for several
days. On the 21st the batteries, being completed, were armed with
the first 12-pounders that came up. On the 22nd the fire began, and
at once proved most effective: the bastion of San Pedro began to
crumble in, and the old breach of 1801 revealed itself, by the falling
away of the rammed earth which alone stopped it up. The
arrangements for a storm had not yet been commenced when the
garrison hoisted the white flag. Mortier refused all negotiations and
demanded a surrender at discretion. This the old governor hastened
to concede, coming out in person at one of the gates, and putting
the place at the disposition of the French without further argument.
[52]
Soult and Mortier entered next day, and 4,161 Spanish troops
marched out and laid down their arms before the 6,000 infantry of
Girard, who had formed the sole besieging force. The total loss of
the French during the siege was 15 killed and 40 wounded—that of
the besieged about 200. The figures are a sufficient evidence of the
disgraceful weakness of the defence.
When one reflects what was done to hold the unfortified town of
Saragossa, and the mediaeval enceinte of Gerona, it is impossible
not to reflect what a determined governor might have accomplished
at Olivenza. The place was short of guns, no doubt—but the enemy
was worse off till the last days of the siege, since he had nothing but
twelve light field-pieces until the siege-train began to arrive. General
Herck made no sorties to disturb the works—though he had a
superabundant garrison; he made no serious attempt to retrench the
breach, and he surrendered actually ere the first summons had been
sent in before the storm. At the worst he might have tried to cut his
way out between the French camps, which were scattered far from
each other, owing to the extremely small numbers of the besieging
army, who only counted three men to the defenders’ two. Altogether
it was a disgraceful business. The place, no doubt, ought never to
have been held; but if held it might at least have been defended—
which it practically was not.
Soult was placed in a new difficulty by the surrender of Olivenza.
Though his siege-train had begun to come up, he had no news of
Gazan, and his infantry was still no more than a single division. He
had to spare two battalions to escort the 4,000 prisoners to Seville,
and to put another in Olivenza as garrison[53]. This left him only
eleven battalions—5,435 bayonets, to continue the campaign,
though he had the enormous force of 4,000 cavalry at his
disposition, and a siege-train that was growing every day, as more
belated pieces came up from the rear. He might probably have
waited for Gazan, for whom messages had been vainly sent, if he
had not received, on the day that Olivenza fell, one more of
Berthier’s peremptory letters, dated 22 December, in which he was
told (as usual) to send the 5th Corps to join Masséna on the Tagus
without delay. This letter came at an even more inappropriate
moment than usual, as Gazan, with half that corps, was lost to sight
in the mountain of the Condado de Niebla, more than a hundred and
twenty miles away. But it was clear that something immediate must
be done, or the Emperor would be more discontented than before;
accordingly Soult resolved to take the very hazardous step of laying
siege to Badajoz at once with the small infantry force at his
disposition. For this move would undoubtedly provoke alarm at
Lisbon, and lead Wellington to send off La Romana’s army to succour
it, and perhaps some Anglo-Portuguese troops also, so that the mass
opposed to Masséna would be more or less weakened.
Accordingly on the 26th of January Soult marched against
Badajoz, which is only twelve miles north-west of Olivenza, with
under 6,000 infantry, ten companies of artillery, and seven of
sappers, to invest the southern side of Badajoz, while Latour-
Maubourg, with six regiments of cavalry, crossed the Guadiana by a
ford, and went to blockade the place on its northern front.
Badajoz, though owning some defects, was still a stronghold of
the first class, in far better order than most of the Peninsular
fortresses. It belonged to that order of places whose topography
forces a besieger to divide his army by a dangerous obstacle, since it
lies on a broad river, with the town on one side and a formidable
outwork on the other. Indeed the most striking feature of Badajoz,
whether the traveller approaches it from the east or the west, is the
towering height of San Cristobal, crowned by its fort, lying above the
transpontine suburb and dominating the whole city. Any enemy who
begins operations against the place must take measures to blockade
or to attack this high-lying fort, which completely covers the bridge
and its tête-du-pont, and effectively protects ingress or egress to or
from the place. But San Cristobal is not easy to blockade, since it is
the end-bluff of a very steep narrow range of hills, which run for
many miles to the north, and divide the country-side beyond the
Guadiana into two separate valleys, those of the Gebora and the
Caya, which are completely invisible from each other.
The city of Badajoz is built on an inclined plane, sloping down
from the Castle, which stands on a lofty hill with almost precipitous
grass slopes, at the north-east end of the place, down to the river on
the north and the plain on the south and west. The castle-hill and
San Cristobal between them form a sort of gorge, through which the
Guadiana, narrowed for a space, forces its way, to broaden out again
at the immensely long bridge with its thirty-two arches and 640
yards of roadway. Below the castle the Rivillas, a stagnant brook
with hardly any current,—the home of frogs and the hunting-ground
of the city storks,—coasts around the walls, and finally dribbles into
the river. The front of the place from the river to the castle was
composed of eight regular bastions; along the river edge there lies
nothing more than a single solid wall without relief or indentations:
but this side of the place is wholly inaccessible owing to the water.
There are two outlying works, which cover heights so close into the
place that it is necessary to hold them, lest the enemy should
establish himself too near the enceinte. These are the Picurina
lunette beyond the Rivillas, and the much larger Pardaleras fort, a
‘half-crown-work,’ opposite the south point of the city, which covers
a well-marked hill that commands that low-lying part of the place,
and is a position impossible to concede to the besieger, since it is
only 250 yards from the nearest bastion. It was ill-designed, having
a very shallow ditch, and being incompletely closed at its gorge by a
mere palisade.
The eight bastions which form the attackable part of the enceinte
of Badajoz have (they remain to-day just as they were in 1811, for
the place has never been modernized) a height of about thirty
feet[54] from the bottom of the ditch to the rampart, while the
curtains between them are somewhat lower, about twenty-two feet
only. The ditch was broad, with a good counterscarp in masonry
seven feet high; beyond it each bastion was protected in front by a
rather low and weak demi-lune.
The garrison, not more than enough for such an extensive place,
consisted at the New Year of 4,100 men; but Mendizabal threw in
two battalions more (1st and 2nd of the Second Regiment of Seville)
before he retired to the borders of Portugal, so that the figure had
risen to 5,000 before Soult appeared in front of the walls. The
governor was a very distinguished soldier, General Rafael Menacho,
who had served through the old French war of 1792-5, and had
commanded a regiment at Baylen. He was in the full vigour of
middle age (forty-four years old) and abounding in spirit, resolution,
and initiative, as all his movements showed down to the unhappy
day of his death.
Soult’s engineers, after surveying the situation of Badajoz,
reported that under ordinary circumstances the most profitable front
to attack would certainly be the western—that between the
Pardaleras fort and the river; but at the same time they decided that
it had better be left alone. For the army was so weak that it could
not properly invest the whole city, and if the north bank of the
Guadiana were left practically unoccupied, as must necessarily be
the case, the Spaniards would be able to seize the ground beyond
the bridge-head, and establish batteries there, which would
effectually enfilade the trenches which would have to be constructed
for approaching the west side of the place. The castle and the north-
east angle of the town were too high-lying to be chosen as the point
of attack, and the Rivillas and its boggy banks were better avoided.
They therefore advised that the south front should be chosen as the
objective, and that the first operation taken in hand should be the
capture of the Pardaleras fort, for that work appeared weak and ill-
planned, while its site would make the most advantageous of
starting-points for breaching the enceinte of the town itself. It was
the most commanding ground close in to the walls which could be
discovered. Soult and Mortier concurred, and placed the army in the
best position for utilizing this method of attack. The camps of
Girard’s division were placed on and around two low hills, the Cerro
de San Miguel on the right of the Rivillas, and the Cerro del Viento
on its left. On the former height, about 1,800 yards from the town,
nothing was done save the construction of a rough entrenchment—
to face the Picurina and restrict possible sallies—in which three small
batteries were afterwards inserted. The Cerro del Viento, which is
about 1,200 yards from the Pardaleras, was to be the real starting-
point of the attack, and under its side the siege-park and engineers’
camp were established. Two batteries in front of it were marked out
and begun on the first night of ‘open trenches’ (January 28-9), but it
was not till the third night (January 30-1) that the first parallel was
commenced, on the undulating ground to the west of the Rivillas.
When the work became visible next day, the governor directed a
vigorous sortie against it, composed of 800 men. The trenches were
occupied for a moment, but soon recovered by the French supports.
A small body of Spanish cavalry which had taken part in the sally
rode right round the rear of the camp, and sabred the chef-de-
bataillon Cazin, the chief engineer, and a dozen of his sappers on the
Cerro del Viento. But the total loss of the besiegers was only about
seventy killed and wounded, while the men of the sortie suffered
much more heavily, while they were being driven back across the
open ground towards the city. Their commander, a Colonel
Bassecourt of the 1st Regiment of Seville—the corps which furnished
the sallying force—was killed. Next day the siege-works were so little
injured that the artillery was able to put guns into the first batteries
that had been marked out. On the first three days of February
incessant and torrential rains stopped further work—the whole of the
first parallel was inundated, and the flying bridge by which alone
Soult could communicate with Latour-Maubourg on the other side of
the Guadiana was washed away.
But despite of the rain February 3 was a day of joy for the
French, for on its morning Gazan reported his arrival at Valverde, ten
miles away, and at 3 o’clock his division of 6,000 men marched into
camp and doubled the force of the besieging army. Their arrival was
a piece of cruel ill-luck for the Spaniards, for on that same
afternoon, at dusk, Menacho sent out a formidable sortie of 1,500
men—all that he could safely spare from the ramparts—who came
out of the river-side gate (Puerto de las Palmas) and stormed the
first parallel, driving out the workers and the three companies of
their covering party. The Spaniards had already filled up a
considerable section of the trench, when they were charged by two
battalions of Gazan’s newly-arrived troops, and driven out again,
before they had finished their task. The serious nature of the attack
may be judged from the fact that the French lost 188 killed and
wounded—including eight officers—in repelling it. If only one brigade
of Girard had been in the Cerro del Viento camps, instead of Gazan’s
entire division, it is probable that the whole first parallel and the
batteries behind it would have been destroyed. While the damage
was being repaired, on February 4, Soult began to bombard the
town from these batteries, but with no good effect. The result,
indeed, was rather to the profit of the Spaniards, for a great portion
of the civil population fled at the first sign of bombardment, and
escaped by night down the Guadiana bank towards Elvas. The
provisions left in their deserted houses added appreciably to
Menacho’s stores.
The work of extending the first parallel diagonally toward the
Pardaleras was still going on, when, on February 5th, the whole
situation before Badajoz was changed by the appearance in the
neighbourhood of a Spanish army of succour. Even before Soult had
started from Seville at the New Year, Wellington had been aware of
the imminence of the invasion of Estremadura, and had been
consulting with his colleague La Romana as to the measures that it
would be necessary to take[55]. As early as the 2nd of January La
Romana had sent orders to Mendizabal, to tell him that if the French
should cross the Sierra Morena in force, he was to evacuate
Southern Estremadura, break the bridges of Medellin and Merida,
and endeavour to defend the line of the Guadiana[56]. By later
instructions (January 8) Mendizabal was directed to retire into the
Sierra de San Mamed if the enemy crossed the river above Badajoz,
but to throw himself upon their rear, and to hang on to them, if they
crossed below, and seemed to be making for Elvas and Portugal. On
the 12th, Wellington, hearing that Soult seemed to be heading
towards Olivenza rather than Merida, conceived doubts as to
whether he might not be intending to abandon his communications
with Seville, to leave the fortresses behind him, and to march to the
Tagus to co-operate with Masséna upon the Alemtejo bank of that
river. On the 14th arrived the more comfortable news that the
French had sat down to beleaguer Olivenza, a sure sign that they did
not propose to cut themselves loose from their base and to join
Masséna as a flying column. As a matter of fact, as we have seen,
Soult, having been deprived of Gazan’s assistance, was too weak at
this moment to dream of an incursion into Portugal, and had
attacked Olivenza because he could find nothing else to do for the
present.
Accordingly, since the enemy had apparently settled down to
besiege the Estremaduran fortresses, Wellington and La Romana
determined to reinforce Mendizabal up to a strength which would
enable him to act as a serious check upon Soult, probably even to
foil him completely. On January 14th La Romana ordered Carlos de
España and his brigade of some 1,500 or 1,800 men, from opposite
Abrantes, to join the small existing remnant of the Army of
Estremadura[57]. On the 19th[58], the more important resolve was
taken of sending the remainder of the Spanish troops from the
Lisbon lines on the same errand—they amounted to about 6,000
men, the rest of La Carrera’s division, and the whole of that of
Charles O’Donnell. Starting on the 20th they reached Montemor o
Novo on the 24th—where they heard of the disgraceful capitulation
of Olivenza,—and Elvas on the 29th. To the same point came in
Mendizabal, who, with the remains of his own infantry division—
something over 3,000 men, and Butron’s cavalry, had moved from
his original post at Albuquerque to Portalegre on the Portuguese
border, and had there been joined by Carlos de España’s brigade.
Madden’s Portuguese cavalry had already moved back to Campo
Mayor and Elvas when Soult first undertook the siege of Olivenza. By
the accumulation of all these forces an army of about 11,000
infantry and over 3,000 cavalry was put together[59].
La Romana himself had intended to take charge of the
expedition, which under his prudent leadership would probably have
achieved its desired end, and have held Soult completely in check.
But he was prevented from starting with his troops on the 20th by
an indisposition which was not judged to be serious—a ‘spasm in the
chest[60],’ apparently a preliminary attack of angina pectoris. He
appeared convalescent on the 22nd, but died suddenly of a
recurrence of the complaint early on the afternoon of the 23rd, after
he had already sent forward his secretary and staff to prepare
quarters for him on the way towards the army. His death was a real
disaster to the cause of the allies, for two main reasons. The first
was that, unlike most of his contemporaries in the Spanish service,
he was a very cautious general, who avoided risks and preferred to
manœuvre rather than to fight, unless he had a good chance of
success. His long marches and many retreats had won him the
punning nickname of the ‘Marqués de las Romerías’—the Marquis of
Pilgrimages: but even a long ‘pilgrimage’ is better than a defeat, and
he had never destroyed an army, like Cuesta, Blake, or Areizaga. The
other reason which made him valuable to the allied cause was that,
being a man of great tact and obliging manners, he had won
Wellington’s personal regard, and always lived on the best terms
with him. Indeed, the Marquis was the only Spanish general, save
Castaños, who never had any difficulties with his English colleague;
and it may be added that Wellington thought much more of his
capacity than of that of Castaños, whom he regarded as well-
meaning but weak. He wrote of him, in words that may be regarded
as entirely genuine and heartfelt, and which were not intended for
Spanish eyes, that he was the brightest ornament of the Spanish
army, an upright patriot, a strenuous and zealous defender of the
cause of European liberty, a loyal colleague, a useful councillor[61].
That the Marquis was not a man of brilliant genius, nor a general
of the first rank, is sufficiently evident from the account of his
campaigns, duly detailed in the first three volumes of this work. But
he had a very high and meritorious record; of all the old nobles of
Spain he was the one who served his country best in the day of her
distress. His energy and determination were displayed in his
romantic escape from Denmark in 1808[62]. Having once unsheathed
his sword in the national cause, he never faltered or despaired even
in the day of the worst disaster. If his life had been spared he would
have fought on undismayed to the end of the war. Though he
became involved in the unhappy disputes which preceded the fall of
the Supreme Junta, in the winter of 1809-10[63], and did not disdain
to accept a command from the illegal Seville government in the
January of the latter year[64], he was neither a self-seeker nor a
frondeur. If his words or acts sometimes appeared factious, they
were inspired by a genuine discontent at the incapacity of the ruling
powers, not by a desire for self-advancement; and there seems to be
no evidence to connect him with the unwise and autocratic
proceedings of his brother José Caro in Valencia. During the last year
of his life he was discharging a very invidious task while he
commanded in Estremadura under the control of the last regency,
which treated him with neglect and regarded him with suspicion. His
death is said to have been hastened by scurrilous accusations made
against his loyalty in pamphlets and newspapers published at
Cadiz[65], which drove him to distraction, for he was a man of a
sensitive disposition, keenly affected by any criticism. Albuquerque,
it will be remembered, is said to have been helped towards his grave
by similar means[66].
The death of La Romana, and the transfer at this same date of
Charles O’Donnell to another sphere of operations, caused a general
rearrangement of the commands in the Army of Estremadura.
Mendizabal, as the sole Lieutenant-General in the province,
succeeded to the place and responsibilities of the Marquis, but only
as a provisional chief; the Regency, justly doubting his abilities,
nominated Castaños as Captain-General. Unfortunately, as we shall
see, the victor of Baylen reached Estremadura just in time to hear
that his locum tenens had destroyed the army, and left hardly a
wreck of it behind him. Meanwhile Mendizabal made over his own
old division to a Major-General Garcia, while that of Charles
O’Donnell fell to another officer new to us, Major-General José
Virues. La Carrera became chief of the staff, or practically second in
command, and his ‘vanguard division’ passed to his old brigadier
Carlos de España.
As early as January 28th Soult had directed Latour-Maubourg
with four regiments of light cavalry to make a reconnaissance in the
direction of the Portuguese frontier, and by this movement had
become aware that Mendizabal was at Portalegre, with his own
infantry and Butron’s cavalry. It was no surprise to the Marshal,
therefore, to find, a week later, that a considerable force was
pressing in his posts on the north of the Guadiana. The presence of
Madden’s Portuguese dragoons in the advanced guard showed that
the enemy had been reinforced. Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry-screen
was driven in without much fighting, and the French general retired
to Montijo, nine miles up the river (February 5th-6th). That night
Mendizabal’s army, nearly 15,000 strong, camped on the heights of
San Cristobal, and communicated with Badajoz freely, the blockade
being broken so far as the northern bank of the Guadiana was
concerned.
Wellington and La Romana, when the return of the Spanish
troops from Lisbon to Estremadura was ordered, had settled upon a
regular plan of campaign[67], which had been communicated to
Mendizabal. It required some slight modification when the fall of
Olivenza became known, and when Soult’s intention to besiege
Badajoz declared itself. But in its essentials it was well applicable to
the situation of affairs upon February 6th. After a solemn warning to
the Spanish generals that the Army of Estremadura is ‘the last body
of troops which their country possesses,’ and must not be risked in
dangerous operations, the memorandum suggests (1) that an
entrenched camp capable of holding the entire army should be
prepared on the heights which lie between Campo Mayor and
Badajoz, and which end in the high bluff of San Cristobal above the
latter town. (2) That if possible an attempt should be made to break
the bridges of Medellin and Merida, so as to restrict the French to
the southern bank of the Guadiana. (3) That the Regency should be
asked to send back Ballasteros’s division to join the Army of
Estremadura, and (4) that the bridge of boats in store at Badajoz
should, if possible, be floated down to Jerumenha, to give the
Portuguese garrison of Elvas the power of crossing the Guadiana
below Badajoz. The last suggestion was impracticable, because the
French, when the dispatch reached Mendizabal, were so close to the
river that the bridge could not have been transferred. The other
three suggestions were all valuable, but none of them were carried
out—least of all the most important of them, that which prescribed
the entrenching of the San Cristobal heights, and their occupation by
the whole of the Spanish army.
Mendizabal had a plan of his own—he resolved not to fortify
himself on the heights beyond the river, as Wellington suggested,
but to throw a great part of his infantry into Badajoz, and make with
them a grand sortie against the French lines. The bulk of his cavalry
remained below San Cristobal, and had a skirmish of evil omen with
Latour-Maubourg, who drove them in with ease, and pursued them
beyond the Gebora to the foot of the heights. But Madden’s
Portuguese horse filed into town across the bridge, to join in the
sally of the infantry.
 At three o’clock on the afternoon of the 7th of February the sortie
was made. While Madden’s dragoons and a small infantry support
threatened the left of the French lines, without closing, a large force
composed of all Carlos de España’s ‘vanguard division,’ with picked
battalions from the others, delivered a vigorous—indeed a desperate
—assault upon Soult’s right, the entrenchments on the hill of San
Miguel. There were apparently four columns, each of two battalions,
and making 5,000 men: they came out from the Trinidad gate, drew
up under the wing of the Picurina lunette, and then marched straight
at the French camp. They pierced the line of entrenchments in their
first rush, swept away the guard of the trenches, carried the three
batteries which were inserted in them, and then became engaged in
a fierce fight with Phillipon’s brigade of Girard’s division, the troops
encamped behind this part of the lines. Mortier, who was on the
other flank, detecting that the movements in front of him were only
a demonstration, promptly sent several battalions eastward to
succour the threatened point. These fell upon the Spaniards’ flank,
and threatened to cut them off from their retreat into the fortress,
whereupon Carlos de España, who was slightly wounded, ordered a
retreat, finding that forces equal to his own had now been
concentrated against him[68]. His troops suffered severely in fighting
their way back into Badajoz—their loss was about 650 men; that of
the French, whose front line had been very severely handled, came
to about 400. But the besieged could spare the larger number better
than the besiegers the smaller, since they had the whole army of
succour to draw upon, while Soult had no reserves nearer than
Seville. It is hard to see why Mendizabal, if he was resolved upon a
sortie, did not double the force engaged in it, as he might easily
have done without depleting any part of the enceinte. For, counting
the garrison, he had 15,000 infantry—a larger number than the
French could dispose of. To send out 5,000 only seems to have been
a half-measure, which ensured ultimate failure when the besiegers
should have drawn together[69]. The fighting of Carlos de España’s
men was most creditable, but there were not enough of them.
 On the next day but one Mendizabal withdrew from Badajoz the
divisions of Carlos de España and Virues, and part of that of
Garcia[70], leaving the original garrison strengthened by the
remainder of the last-named unit up to a force of 7,000 men. The
field army retired across the river, and encamped on the strong
position of the heights of San Cristobal, its right wing resting on the
fort, while the remainder of its camps lay along the reverse slope of
the range for a distance of a mile and a half. There were some 9,000
infantry on the position, and the 3,000 horse of Butron and Madden
were encamped behind it in the plain of the Caya. By some
inconceivable folly Mendizabal made no attempt to use this large
force of cavalry, which he should have sent forward to seize and hold
the valley of the Gebora, in front of his position. All beyond that
stream, which flows at the very foot of the San Cristobal heights,
was abandoned to Latour-Maubourg. It seems certain that the
French cavalry general could have been driven to a respectful
distance if a force of all arms had been sent against him, for he had
on the north of the Guadiana only five regiments of horse and not a
single battalion of infantry. But the Spaniard allowed himself to be
cooped up on the hill, and kept no guard of cavalry far out in the
plain to shield his front and report the motions of the enemy. What
was worse, he made no attempt to entrench the long hillside,
though this was a point on which Wellington and La Romana had
given very clear and definite instructions. The position was strong,
but as no care was taken to keep the enemy at a distance, it was
always possible that he might make a sudden dash at it, and the
Spanish army—scattered in its camps—would require time to take up
its ground and form its fighting-line.
For some days after the sortie, however, Soult paid little attention
to Mendizabal, and concentrated all his efforts against the fortress.
Having completed the first parallel, and established several new
batteries in it, he proceeded with his operations against the
Pardaleras fort. His plan was very daring—not to say hazardous—for
on the afternoon of the 11th of February, when the work was much
battered but still quite defensible, he determined to try to capture it
by escalade. At dusk two columns, making about 500 men, issued
from the trenches and dashed at the Pardaleras: the left-hand
column coasting round its flank made for the gorge, which was only
defended by a row of palisades. These were so weak that they were
broken down or hewn to pieces by the assailants without much
difficulty. At the same time the right column, which had entered the
ditch, found an open postern into which it made its way. Attacked on
two sides, the garrison evacuated the work, and fled into the city,
leaving 60 men killed or prisoners behind them. The French, who
had lost only 4 killed and 32 wounded in this reckless venture,
established themselves in the Pardaleras. But the governor turned
against the fort all the guns of the next two bastions, and the
captors had to burrow and lie low, till on the night of the 12th-13th a
trench was run out from the first parallel, which gave safe ingress
and egress. During the intervening day the besiegers lost more men
in holding the work than they had in storming it[71], and the
Pardaleras, close though it was to the walls, proved to be ground
from which it was most difficult to push forward while the artillery
fire of the town was unsubdued. To transform the open gorge in its
rear into a base for new approaches was a slow and expensive
business, and the siege made a much less rapid progress than had
been hoped.
Meanwhile Soult resolved to make a blow at Mendizabal and his
field army, which was visible day after day encamped on the San
Cristobal heights, in a position imposing but unfortified and ill-
watched. The Marshal had intended to cross the Guadiana and
deliver his attack even before the Pardaleras was taken, but much
rain was falling, and the river had overflowed its banks, so that
access to the point where the French flying-bridge had been
established, a mile above Badajoz, was difficult. Moreover the
Gebora was also in flood, and reported to be unfordable, though
usually a slender stream. The only thing which the Marshal was able
to do between the 11th and the 18th of February was to shell the
nearer end of the heights of San Cristobal from the batteries in his
right attack, with the object of inducing the Spanish battalions there
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