SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Saturday, March 15, 2025

Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844

In the Supreme Court of India

(BEFORE J.B. PARDIWALA AND R. MAHADEVAN, JJ.)

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others … Appellant

(s);
Versus
Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh
Maharaj Bhonsle and Another … Respondent(s).
Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 18977
of 2016)
Decided on December 20, 2024
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Amar Dave, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Parimal Shroff, Adv.
Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv.
Mr. Ankur Saigal, Adv.
Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Adv.
Ms. Nidhi, Adv.
Mr. E.C. Agrawala, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Sunil Fernandes, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Nupur Kumar, AOR
Ms. Diksha Dadu, Adv.
Mr. Sachin Patil, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.
Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR
Mr. Geo Joseph, Adv.
Mr. Durgesh Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Risvi Muhammed, Adv.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. MAHADEVAN, J.:— Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the Defendant No. 1 viz., Shri Mukund
th
Bhavan Trust and its trustees, against the Order dated 26 April 2016
1
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in the Civil Revision
Application No. 904 of 2014, whereby the High Court dismissed the
said application preferred by the appellants challenging the Order dated
th th
29 April 2009 passed by the 7 Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division,
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 2 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pune2. By the said order, the trial Court rejected the application filed by
the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code,
3
1908 for rejection of plaint being barred by limitation.
3. The Respondent No. 1/plaintiff filed a Special Civil Suit No. 133 of
2009 against the appellants and the State of Maharashtra, inter alia for
the following reliefs:
(a) to declare that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit lands
more particularly described in schedule of the plaint;
(b) to declare that other than the Plaintiff, no other person is entitled
to deal with, alienate and create any third-party interest in
respect of suit lands;
(c) to restrain the appellants/defendants permanently, from in any
manner holding themselves as owners or representing themselves
as owners of the said suit lands;
(d) to declare that the compromise decrees passed in Special Civil
Suit Nos. 152/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil Appeal No.
787/2001, Pune, are void ab-initio, null and void and to set aside
the same;
(e) to direct the appellants/defendants to vacate and hand over the
possession of the suit lands to the Plaintiff.
4. Pending the aforesaid suit, the appellants took out an application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC r/w Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, seeking rejection of the plaint as the reliefs
sought in the suit were barred by limitation. The said application was
seriously resisted by the Respondent No. 1/plaintiff by stating inter alia
that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law and it
has to be adjudicated only in the trial.
5. The trial Court by order dated 12.10.2009, rejected the aforesaid
application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
Aggrieved by the same, the appellants preferred Civil Revision
Application No. 731 of 2009 before the High Court, which set aside the
order dated 12.10.2009 and remanded the matter to the trial Court for
considering the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC
afresh.
6. After remand, the trial Court vide order dated 29.04.2014,
rejected the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11
(d) of CPC, observing inter alia that the issue of limitation is a mixed
question of law and facts, for which, the parties will have to lead
evidence. Challenging the same, the appellants preferred Civil Revision
Application No. 904 of 2014, which was dismissed by the High Court,
by order dated 26.04.2016 impugned in this appeal.
7. The learned counsel for the appellants, at the outset, submitted
that on a bare perusal of the averments made in the plaint disclosed
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 3 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

that the reliefs sought in the plaint were barred by limitation. However,
the High Court erroneously dismissed the Civil Revision Application on
the ground that the question of whether the suit is barred by limitation
is for the trial Court to independently decide considering the evidence
led before it by the parties as the limitation is a mixed question of law
and facts which cannot be decided based on the pleadings alone.
Adding further, it is submitted that the High Court could have
examined the maintainability and sustainability of the revision
proceedings initiated by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
CPC.
7.1. Elaborating further, on facts, the learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the Defendant No. 1 - Trust had purchased
th
3/4 share of the suit lands mentioned in the Schedule in an auction
sale conducted by the Civil Court, Pune, in the year 1938 from the
previous Inamdar Gosavis family and the same was duly registered;
and they had also purchased the remaining 1/4th share in the suit lands
in the year 1952 by another registered sale deed. Till then, the subject
lands were in possession of the Government. Thereafter, the Defendant
No. 1 Trust became entitled to the suit lands in pursuance of the
compromise decree dated 05.01.1990 passed in Civil Suit No. 1622 of
1988, and they entered into several agreements with third parties, who
constructed buildings in the suit lands. While so, without any right, title
and interest, the Respondent No. 1 preferred Special Civil Suit No. 133
of 2009 claiming declaration and possession over the suit lands.
According to the learned counsel, the Respondent No. 1 by filing the
said suit, has attempted to question the correctness of various orders
passed by several Courts including the order passed by this Court.
These orders date back to the year 1953. Further, this exercise is done
with an oblique motive to set at naught the orders which have attained
finality decades ago and the respondent No. 1/Plaintiff and its
predecessors having slept over the orders which conclusively affirmed
the title and ownership of the appellant Trust over the suit lands,
cannot now suddenly come up with a suit to overturn the effect of the
orders in the guise of there being a fresh cause of action.
7.2. Drawing our attention to paragraphs 34 and 53 of the plaint
filed by the Respondent No. 1, the learned counsel for the appellants
submitted that the Respondent No. 1 attempted to create an illusion of
a cause of action by erroneously stating that the cause of action to file
the suit arose on 02.03.2007 when he came to know that his rights
over the suit properties have been affected by the proceedings between
the defendants and another. Further, the Respondent No. 1 relied on
the pleadings stated in the writ petition filed by one Dr. F. Wadia, who
claims to be in possession of a portion of the subject lands. The
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 4 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Respondent No. 1, in paragraph 34 of the plaint stated that “…. One

Advocate Shri Godge had appeared in the said matter. The said
Advocate is well acquainted with the plaintiff. The said Advocate, after
reading all the necessary related proceedings, informed the plaintiff of
the mischief committed by the Defendants. The plaintiff thereafter
collected all the necessary information and documents. The plaintiff
then instructed his Advocates to file the present suit”. However, there
is no averment as to when the Respondent No. 1 was intimated by Mr.
Godge. Thus, the cause of action alleged by the Respondent No. 1 is
purely illusory and has been stated with a view to get over the bar
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC.
7.3. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants
that the limitation period for seeking cancellation of an instrument as
per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is 3 years from the date
when the existence of document first becomes known to the plaintiff. In
case of registered document, the date of registration becomes the date
of deemed knowledge. Accordingly, the Respondent No. 1 and his
predecessors are deemed to have implied notice of the contents of the
registered sale deeds and as per Article 58, the period of limitation to
obtain any declaration in the suit commences within 3 years from the
date when right to sue accrues. However, the Respondent No. 1 by
clever drafting, attempted to circumvent the provisions of the
Limitation Act. That means, the Respondent No. 1 knowing fully well
that a challenge to the registered sale deeds of the years 1938 and
1952 in and by which the Defendant No. 1 Trust acquired the title over
the subject lands, would be hopelessly barred by limitation, has
attempted to question the title of the Defendant No. 1 Trust by
inventing an imaginary cause of action to sustain his suit.
7.4. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that
according to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the right to possess
immovable property or any interest therein, based on title, must be
asserted within twelve years from the date, when the possession of the
defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Admittedly, the
Respondent No. 1 did not assert any right over the subject lands prior
to the year 2008 or 2009. Consequently, the relief sought for
possession is also barred by the law of limitation. Ultimately, it is
submitted that the Respondent No. 1 being stranger, has no locus
standi to seek a declaration that compromise decrees passed in Special
Civil Suit Nos. 152/1951 and 1622/1988 and Civil appeal No. 787/2001
are void ab initio, null and void and be set aside.
7.5. Without properly appreciating all these aspects, the trial Court
erred in rejecting the application filed by the appellants under Order
VII Rule 11(d) of CPC and the same was also affirmed by the High
Court, by the order impugned herein, which will have to be set aside,
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 5 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

according to the learned counsel for the appellants.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1
submitted that in the year 1710, Raja Shahu Chhatrapati, the ancestor
of the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff gave a sanad to Guru Shree Jadhavgir
Gosavi of all the lands mentioned in the Sanad. The said Sanad gave
rights of revenue grant which was hereditary. The said grant did not
confer any titular rights over the land to the Gosavi family. The
descendants of the Gosavi family though not empowered to create third
party rights and interests, created third party rights. Thus, the said
Gosavis who only had Inam grant in their favour entitling them only to
the revenue from the land, had overstepped their authority and had
parted the suit properties to the Defendant No. 1 Trust, when they
absolutely had no right to sell the suit properties. It is further
submitted that the Defendant No. 1 filed Special Civil Suit No.
152/1951 against the State of Bombay and one Sukramgir Chimangir
Gosavi in relation to the lands in village Yerawada, Taluka Haveli. The
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 entered into compromise and it was agreed
between them that the Yerawada Inam Village was a grant of soil and
the Defendant No. 1 was Nivval Dhumaldars of the village to the extent
of 12 anna share. The Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff was not a party to the
said suit and without his knowledge, the consent decree was obtained
clandestinely. Therefore, the said sale deeds and compromise are not
binding on the Respondent No. 1. It is also contended that the parties
cannot be permitted to construct and improve the terms of sanad of the
year 1710 in 1950s to their whims and fancies. In any event, the Court
had not given a determinative finding after adjudication, and hence,
the compromise decree of the Court cannot be put against it.
8.1. Continuing further, the learned counsel for the Respondent No.
1 submitted that the Respondent No. 1 specifically stated in paragraph
39 of the Plaint that the defendants have played systematic fraud on
various courts and without any judicial pronouncements have usurped
the lands under suspicious compromises arrived at before the Court.
Moreover, in paragraph 44 of the Plaint, the Respondent No. 1 stated
that the compromise arrived at in the suits filed in District Court, Pune,
appears to be clearly an attempt to deprive the legal rights of the
Plaintiff in respect of the said suit lands.
8.2. It is also submitted that whether the Respondent No. 1 is
entitled to declaration as sought for in the Plaint is a matter of trial and
that cannot be gone into at the stage of deciding the application under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The Respondent No. 1 in paragraph 53 of
the Plaint clearly stated that he had come to know about the
proceedings on 2nd March 2007 only when he was informed about Civil
Application No. 1562/2006 in Writ Petition No. 3813 of 1996 filed by
Dr. F Wadia. The knowledge of the fact that the Respondent's right in
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 6 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

the suit property has been affected by the proceedings between the
nd
Defendants and another on 2 March 2007 is the crucial date from
which the clock starts ticking to determine limitation. Thus, well within
the period of limitation, he preferred the Special civil suit against the
appellants and another for declaration and possession of the suit
properties.
8.3. That apart, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the
Respondent No. 1 that when an issue requires an inquiry into the facts,
it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. To buttress the same, he
placed reliance on the decision in Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Pillayar
Temple v. M. Sankuntala4, wherein, it was held that ‘the court has no
jurisdiction to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a
preliminary issue’.
8.4. Referring to the decision in Sajjan Sikaria v. Shakuntala Devi
Mishra5, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.
1 that while dealing with an application under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC, there is no requirement to consider the written statement filed by
6
the defendant. That apart, in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra , it
was held by this Court that ‘a perusal of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC
makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for
deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint; the
pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage; and therefore, a direction to file the written
statement without deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC cannot be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial Court’.
8.5. Considering all these factors, the High Court rightly dismissed
the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
CPC, by observing that the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold,
as the issue of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law for which
the parties will have to lead evidence. Thus, according to the learned
counsel, there is no requirement to interfere with the order impugned
herein and the appeal filed by the appellants is liable to be dismissed.
9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
appearing for both sides and perused the materials available on record.
10. The subject matter of the present proceedings is qua lands in S.
Nos. 14A/1A/1, 144, 145, 95, 90, 129, 191A (part), 160 (Part), 191
(part), 20, 103(part), 120(part), 141, 233, 94(part), 104 and 105
situated in Yerawada, Taluka Haveli, District Pune. The Respondent No.
1/plaintiff preferred Special Civil Suit No. 133 of 2009, for declaration
of his ownership and possession in respect of the suit properties.
Seeking rejecting of the said plaint, the appellants filed an application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC on the ground that the reliefs sought
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 7 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

in the suit were clearly barred by limitation. The trial Court rejected the
application filed by the appellants stating that the issue of limitation is
a mixed question of facts and law, for which, the parties will have to
lead evidence. The revision application filed by the appellants against
the said order of the trial Court, was also rejected by the High Court, by
observing that (i) the plaintiff has specifically asserted that Gosavis
family had no authority to create third party rights and they were only
entitled to revenue grant; (ii) whether the Plaintiff is entitled to
declaration in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b) in view of the sale
deeds executed in favour of Defendant No. 1, is a matter of trial and
that cannot be gone into at the stage of deciding the application under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC; and (iii) the defendants played a
systematic fraud on various courts and without any judicial
pronouncements, usurped the suit lands under suspicious compromise
arrived at before the Court. Feeling aggrieved and being dissatisfied
with the rejection orders of the Courts below, the appellants are before
us with the present appeal.
11. The law applicable for deciding an application filed under Order
7
VII Rule 11 of CPC was outlined by this Court in the decision in
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) dead through legal
representatives8 and the same read as follows:
“23.1 …
23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and
special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily
dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record
evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence
adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any
of the grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11(a) is that if in a
suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by
limitation under Rule 11(d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff
to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case,
it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that
further judicial time is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi9 this Court held that the
whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to
ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove
abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court,
in the following words : (SCC p.324, para 12)
“12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to
ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove
abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court,
and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 8 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without

point or purpose. Even if an ordinary civil litigation, the Court
readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not
disclose any cause of action.”
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action
is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order
VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to
determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by
10
scrutinizing the averments in the plaint read in conjunction with
the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents,
on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as
under:
“14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.- (1)
Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in
his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such
documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is
presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document
and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
(2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of
the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession
or power it is.
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the
plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to
be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered
accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in
evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
(4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the
cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a
witness merely to refresh his memory.”
(emphasis supplied)
23.8. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents
filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration
for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11(a). When a
document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it
should be treated as a part of the plaint.
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would
determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to
statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for
rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 9 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the

merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into
consideration11.
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11
is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in
conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result
in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool &
London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I which reads as :
(SCC p.562, para 139)
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is
essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not
must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said
purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must
be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments
made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a
decree would be passed.”
12
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. the Court further
held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage,
and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the
form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as
it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations
in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot
embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D.
Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman13
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the
suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not
disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the
power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
23.14. The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised
by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the
plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before
conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of
Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra14. The plea that once issues are
framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this
Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).
23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature.
It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds
specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the
plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred
by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.
24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary
for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 10 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are

necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the
reliefs claimed in the suit.
15
24.1. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam this
Court held:
“24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an order
to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it
is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them
gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must
include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of
such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not
limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but
includes all the material facts on which it is founded”
(emphasis supplied)
24.2. In T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal16 this Court held that
while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is
required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of
action, or something purely illusory, in the following words : (SCC p.
470, para 5)
“5. …The learned Munsif must remember that if on a
meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear
right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule
11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is
fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause
of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …”
(emphasis supplied)
24.3. Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate
17
Tribunal this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting
which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a
clear right must be made out in the plaint.
24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created
the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri
18
Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal held that it should be nipped in
the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The
Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and
determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of
the process of the court.
25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the
institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines
the expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 11 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section

3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period,
shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up
as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it
would fall within the residuary article.
26. Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe
the period of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought,
or cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which
reads as under:
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which
period begins to run
58. To obtain any Three years When the right to sue
other declaration first accrues
59. To cancel or set Three years When the facts
aside an instrument or entitling the plaintiff
decree or for the to have the
rescission of a contract instrument or decree
cancelled or set aside
or the contract
rescinded first
become known to
him.
The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the
1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the
right to sue first accrues.
19
27. In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India this Court held
that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’ and
‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of
action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when
the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive
violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of
action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the
period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first
accrued.
28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v.
Gurdev Singh20 held that the Court must examine the plaint and
determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and
whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words
“right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal
proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action
arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the
suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to
infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 12 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

instituted. Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears
from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint
shall be rejected.”
12. As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed,
the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith
alone are germane. The averments in the application can be taken into
account only to consider whether the case falls within any of the sub-
rules of Order VII Rule 11 by considering the averments in the plaint.
The Court cannot look into the written statement or the documents filed
by the defendants. The Civil Courts including this Court cannot go into
the rival contentions at that stage. Keeping in mind the legal position,
let us examine whether the suit filed by the Respondent No. 1 is barred
by limitation, in the light of the averments contained in the plaint filed
by him.
13. The Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff claimed title, right and interest
over the suit properties, stating that he is the direct descendent of
Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj from the Bhonsale Dynasty and he has
inherited the vast lands all over Maharashtra from his ancestors. He
further stated in his plaint that Raja Shahu Chhatrapati gave only the
rights of revenue grant to Guru Shree Jadhavgir Gosavi and the said
grant did not give any rights in the lands to the Gosavi family and
hence, they had no right to sell the suit properties to the Defendant No.
1. Though the Respondent No. 1 relied on the report of the Inam
Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Act XI, 1852,
which stated that the grant enjoyed by the Respondent No. 1's
ancestors was only a revenue grant and stated that Gosavis family had
no authority to create third party rights in the suit lands, the same was
not substantiated with proper pleadings and documents. It was further
stated by the Respondent No. 1 that by order dated 17.02.1980, the
Government of Maharashtra was pleased to direct that the Satara
Saranjam (Jagir/grant of land) shall be continued in the name of the
Respondent No. 1/plaintiff, but, at that time, he was a minor. That
apart, the Friendship Treaty was continued by the Government of
Maharashtra vide its resolution dated 28.02.1980 and on attaining the
age of majority by the plaintiff, the Maharashtra Government by
resolution dated 01.09.1984 continued the said Saranjam upon the
plaintiff. Hence, the Respondent No. 1 continues to be the owner of the
suit properties. We are unable to accept these statements. The
averments in the plaint disclose that even prior to the alleged
th
Resolution dated 28.02.1980, a major portion of the property (3/4
share) has been conveyed as early as in 1938 through Court auction
and the remaining portion (1/4th share) in 1952. The plaintiff was a
minor in 1980 and by 01.09.1984, he claims to have become a major.
However, he has not stated as to when he was born. From the
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 13 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

averments, it can be presumed that the plaintiff must have born in

1965/1966 considering the fact that he was declared as a major in
1984. The above statements in the plaint imply that the plaintiff was
not even born when the property was sold. What also remains
undisputed is the fact that the plaintiff's predecessors had not
challenged the sale in 1938 and 1952. By the time, the alleged
resolution was passed, the property had already been conveyed. The
resolution can convey any right only over the properties which have not
been conveyed. The plaintiff though has annexed a Family Tree chart
along with the plaint, he has not produced any other documentary
evidence to the various claims which he has made. In paragraph 10 of
the plaint, the plaintiff claims that the estate was attached as there
were no natural heirs. He has narrated many facts in the plaint from
paragraphs 11 to 32, which are adverse to his claim of title. The
averments in the plaint relating to grant of Sanad are vague without
any reference to specific date. They, according to us, are baseless and
vague statements, cleverly crafted to create a cause of action. The
plaintiff himself avers in paragraph 25 that a suit was filed by the
st
appellant/1 defendant claiming his title based on the auction purchase
against the Government. The averment does not even disclose that it
has come to his knowledge only recently. We feel it strange for the
plaintiff to even plead in paragraph 26 that he was not impleaded as a
party in the 1951 suit, compromised in 1953, when he was not even
born.
14. The plaintiff, in our wisdom, cannot assert or deny something
which was whether within the knowledge of his predecessor or not,
when he was not even born. Irrespective of the above, the fact that the
predecessors of the Respondent No. 1/plaintiff, never challenged the
sale of property to the Defendant No. 1/appellant by court auction and
the subsequent registration of the deeds, despite constructive notice,
would imply that they had acceded to the title of the appellant, which
cannot now be questioned by the plaintiff after such long time. There is
also a presumption in law that a registered document is validly
executed and is valid until it is declared as illegal. In this regard, this
Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal21, held as under:
“27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly
executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be
valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads
evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent
1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.”
15. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to relevant portion
of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads as
under:
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 14 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

“3. Interpretation clause…… ……

“a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows
that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or
search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would
have known it.
Explanation I.—Where any transaction relating to immoveable
property is required by law to be and has been effected by a
registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any
part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to
have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or,
where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where
the registered instrument has been registered under sub-section (2)
of section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from
the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered
instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose sub-
district any part of the property which is being acquired, or of the
property wherein a share or interest is being acquired, is situated:
Provided that—(1) the instrument has been registered and its
registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder,
(2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed,
as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that Act, and
(3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument
relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section
55 of that Act.
Explanation II.—Any person acquiring any immovable property or
any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have
notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in
actual possession thereof.
Explanation III.—A person shall be deemed to have had notice of
any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his
behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material:
Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the
principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any
person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.”
16. When a portion of the property has been conveyed by court
auction and registered in the first instance and when another portion
has been conveyed by a registered sale deed in 1952, there is a
constructive notice from the date of registration and the presumption
under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, comes into operation.
The possession, in the present case, also has been rested with the
appellant before several decades, which operates as notice of title. This
Court in R.K. Mohd. Ubaidullah v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab22, held as
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 15 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

follows:
“15. Notice is defined in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.
It may be actual where the party has actual knowledge of the fact or
constructive. “A person is said to have notice” of a fact when he
actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an
inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence,
he would have known it. Explanation II of said Section 3 reads:
“Explanation II.—Any person acquiring any immovable property
or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to
have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time
being in actual possession thereof.”
Section 3 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1929 in
relation to the definition of “notice”. The definition has been
amended and supplemented by three explanations, which settle the
law in several matters of great importance. For the immediate
purpose Explanation II is relevant. It states that actual possession is
notice of the title of the person in possession. Prior to the
amendment there had been some uncertainty because of divergent
views expressed by various High Courts in relation to the actual
possession as notice of title. A person may enter the property in one
capacity and having a kind of interest. But subsequently while
continuing in possession of the property his capacity or interest may
change. A person entering the property as tenant later may become
usufructuary mortgagee or may be agreement holder to purchase the
same property or may be some other interest is created in his favour
subsequently. Hence with reference to subsequent purchaser it is
essential that he should make an inquiry as to the title or interest of
the person in actual possession as on the date when the sale
transaction was made in his favour. The actual possession of a
person itself is deemed or constructive notice of the title if any, of a
person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof. A
subsequent purchaser has to make inquiry as to further interest,
nature of possession and title under which the person was continuing
in possession on the date of purchase of the property. In the case on
hand Defendants 2 to 4 contended that they were already aware of
the nature of possession of the plaintiff over the suit property as a
tenant and as such there was no need to make any inquiry. At one
stage they also contended that they purchased the property after
contacting the plaintiff, of course, which contention was negatived
by the learned trial court as well as the High Court. Even otherwise
the said contention is self-contradictory. In view of Section 19(b) of
the Specific Relief Act and definition of “notice” given in Section 3 of
the Transfer of Property Act read along with Explanation II, it is
rightly held by the trial court as well as by the High Court that
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 16 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Defendants 2 to 5 were not bona fide purchasers in good faith for

value without notice of the original contract.”
17. The next aspect to be considered herein is the cause of action
arose for filing the suit by the Respondent No. 1. In this regard, we
may quote the following paragraphs of the plaint:
“34. The Plaintiff says that in Writ Petition No. 3813 of 1996 a
Civil Application No. 1562 of 2006 came to be filed. One Advocate
Shri. Godge had appeared in the said matter. The said Advocate is
well acquainted with the Plaintiff. The said Advocate, after reading all
the necessary related proceedings, informed the Plaintiff of the
mischief committed by the Defendants. The Plaintiff thereafter
collected all the necessary information and documents. The Plaintiff
then instructed his Advocates to file the present suit.
35. The Plaintiff says that the present suit has been filed on the
latest information received by the Plaintiff in respect of the lands in
possession with the Defendants. The Plaintiff has accordingly
described the suit properties in the schedule annexed as Exhibit “B”
hereto. The Plaintiff craves leave of the Hon'ble Court to amend the
plaint in the event any other lands of the Plaintiff are detected and
are found. The Plaintiff may also be permitted to amend the plaint
and bring on record the parties in whose favour the Defendants may
have created third party rights.
53. The Plaintiff states and submits that he got the knowledge of
the proceedings on 2nd March 2007 only when he was informed
about the Civil Application No. 1562 of 2006 in Writ Petition No.
3813 of 1996 filed by Dr. F. Wadia. The said knowledge gives cause
of action for the Plaintiff to file suit. The knowledge that the Plaintiffs
right in the suit Property have been affected by the proceedings
nd
between the Defendants and another the said day i.e. 2 March
2007 is the date as prescribed by law for the limitation to start, as
he first got the knowledge then. The Plaintiff has thereafter collected
all the information and approached this Hon'ble Court as soon as
possible. There is much more information that the Plaintiff awaits in
respect of the land in Village Yerwada. The Plaintiff is also filing• a
separate application under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code
reserving right to seek other additional reliefs against the
Defendants”.
On a reading of the plaint averments, it is clear that the plaintiff was
well acquainted with the counsel Mr. Godge. If the plaintiff was already
acquainted with Mr. Godge, whom upon verification of the records from
the status of the suit, we find to have entered appearance in the suit
th
for the 20 Respondent on 21.07.2005 itself, would have acquired
knowledge much prior to 2nd March 2007. We also find that Civil
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 17 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Application No 1562 of 2006 was not filed by Mr. Godge. Therefore, it is

a clear case where the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean
nd
hands. We have no hesitation to hold that the 2 March 2007, is a
fictional date, created only for the purpose of this suit. As such, the
judgment in T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal23 squarely becomes
applicable.
18. Continuing further with the plea of limitation, the Courts below
have held that the question of the suit being barred by limitation can
be decided at the time of trial as the question of limitation is a mixed
question of law and facts. Though the question of limitation generally is
mixed question of law and facts, when upon meaningful reading of the
plaint, the court can come to a conclusion that under the given
circumstances, after dissecting the vices of clever drafting creating an
illusion of cause of action, the suit is hopelessly barred and the plaint
can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. In the present case, we have
already held that 02.03.2007 is a fictional date. It is not a case where a
fraudulent document was created by the appellant or his predecessors.
The title of the suit property as observed by us earlier was conveyed in
1938 and 1952, and what transpired later by way of compromise was
only an affirmative assertion by the State. While so, the prayer (a)
made in the suit relates to declaration to the effect that the Respondent
No. 1 is the owner of the suit properties.
19. As per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a declaration
to adjudge the documents as void or voidable must be sought if it
causes a serious injury. In the present case, the sale deeds
undisputably stand adverse to the interest and right of the plaintiff and
hence, a relief to declare them as invalid must have been sought.
Though the plaintiff has pleaded the documents to be void and sought
to ignore the documents, we do not think that the document is void,
but rather, according to us, it can only be treated as voidable. The
claim of the plaintiff that the grant is only a revenue grant and not a
soil grant, has not been accepted by the State which entered into a
compromise. In paragraph 14 of the plaint, there is an averment that
the original sanad was lost and a new sanad was given to the effect
that the inam was a revenue grant based on the report of the Inam
Commissioner. Again, specific dates are not mentioned in the plaint. In
paragraph 25, the plaintiff alleges that third party rights were created
by the Gosavi family without any right. Here also, the details are vague.
It can be inferred that such rights ultimately culminated into court
auction, in which, the property was sold to the appellant. Since the
original Sanad was lost, the plaintiff had initiated a suit against the
State which was compromised. It is not in dispute that there was a
grant. There is only a dispute with regard to the contents of the Sanad,
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 18 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

which was lost. In the absence of the original Sanad, it is not possible
for any court to determine the contents of the same. The alleged
misrepresentation is neither to the character nor is there any allegation
of forgery or fabrication. It is also settled law that a document is void
only if there is a misrepresentation on its character and when there is a
misrepresentation in the contents, it is only voidable. In the present
case, the averments in the plaint make out only a case for voidabale
transaction and not a void transaction. Fraud is merely pleaded without
any specific attributes but based on surmises and conjectures. It will be
useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Ningawwa v. Byrappa
Shiddappa Hireknrabar24, wherein it was held as under:
“5. The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent
misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but
as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between
fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document
and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With
reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void,
while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable. In Foster v.
Mackinon [(1869) 4 CP 704] the action was by the endorsee of a bill
of exchange. The defendant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a
fraudulent representation by the acceptor that he was signing a
guarantee. In holding that such a plea was admissible, the Court
observed:
“It (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud,
where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer
did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never
intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did
sign, the contract to which his name is appended…. The defendant
never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He
never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was
or thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not
merely as to the legal effect, but as to the ‘actual contents’ of the
instrument.”
This decision has been followed by the Indian courts Sanni Bibi v.
Siddik Hossain [AIR 1919 Cal 728], and Brindaban v. Dhurba Charan
[AIR 1929 Cal 606]. It is not the contention of the appellant in the
present case that there was any fraudulent misrepresentation as to
the character of the gift deed but Shiddappa fraudulently included in
the gift deed plots 91 and 92 of Lingadahalli village without her
knowledge. We are accordingly of the opinion that the transaction of
gift was voidable and not void and the suit must be brought within
the time prescribed under Article 95 of the Limitation Act.”
19.1. In the present case, the right to sue had first accrued to the
predecessors of the plaintiff, when the properties were brought for sale
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 19 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

by the court. No challenge was made to the court auction or to the

conveyance in 1952. At this length of time, we can only assume that
the predecessors of the Plaintiff had not initiated any proceedings as
according to them, either it was a grant of soil or during that period,
the rights had not resumed. The plaintiff had become a major by 1984.
By virtue of Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the plaintiff has a
right to seek a declaration that the alienation of a property in which he
had a right, was void within 3 years. Though the Article prima facie
looks to be applicable only to cases, where there was an alienation by
the guardian, we feel that the period of limitation would be applicable
even when a third party had alienated the share or property of a minor.
Even otherwise, Article 58 would come into operation and the plaintiff
ought to have filed the suit within three years from the date when he
became a major to seek any declaratory relief, as it is the date on which
his right to sue first is deemed to have been accrued. The plaintiff has
asserted that by government resolutions in 1980 and 1984 he has
acquired the title over the properties. Therefore, as a prudent man, he
ought to have initiated necessary steps to protect his interest. Having
failed to do so and created a fictional date for cause of action, the
plaintiff is liable to be non-suited on the ground of limitation.
20. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, the court auction was
held in 1938 and sale deed was registered in the year 1952 in favour of
the Defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit properties, whereas, the suit
was filed only in the year 2008, though the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff
and his predecessors were aware of the existence of the said registered
sale deed of the suit properties. In fact, there is no averment in the
plaint to the effect that the predecessors were not aware of the
transactions. The limitation period for setting aside the sale deed would
start running from the date of registration of the same and as per
Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, after three years of the
registration, the Plaintiff is barred from seeking cancellation of the said
registered sale deed or the decree that was passed before 50 years and
the consequential judgments. We have already referred to Section 3 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The plaintiff, in our view, has miserably
failed to ascertain the existence of the fact by being diligent. The
question as to when a period of limitation would commence in respect
of a registered document is no longer res integra. In this regard, this
Court in Dilboo v. Dhanraji25, held as follows:
“20…… Whenever a document is registered the date of
registration becomes the date of deemed knowledge. In other cases
where a fact could be discovered by due diligence then deemed
knowledge would be attributed to the plaintiff because a party
cannot be allowed to extend the period of limitation by merely
claiming that he had no knowledge”
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 20 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21. It will also be useful to refer to the judgment of this court in

26
Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa , wherein the effect of willful
abstention from making enquires was laid down and the following
paragraphs are relevant:
“5. Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 regulates
rights and liabilities of the buyer and seller. The seller is bound to
disclose to the buyer any material defect in the property or in the
seller's title thereto of which the seller is, and the buyer is not,
aware, and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover.
The seller is to answer, to the best of his information, all relevant
questions put to him by the buyer in respect of the property or the
title thereto. The seller shall be deemed to contract with the buyer
that the interest which the seller professes to transfer to the buyer
subsists and that he has power to transfer the same. Section 3
provides that “a person is said to have a notice of a fact when he
actually knows the fact, or when but for wilful abstention from an
enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence,
he would have known it”. Explanation II amplifies that “any person
acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any
such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of
any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof”.
Constructive notice in equity treats a man who ought to have known
a fact, as if he actually knows it. Generally speaking, constructive
notice may not be inferred unless some specific circumstances can
be shown as a starting point of enquiry which if pursued would have
led to the discovery of the fact. As a fact it is found that Rafique filed
the sale deed dated 1-12-1959 executed in his favour by Mahangu,
in Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 for which the petitioner claims to have
derivative title through Rafique. Rafique had full knowledge that
despite the purported sale, Bibi Raifunnisa got the preliminary
decree passed in 1973 and in 1974 under the final decree the right,
title and interest in the suit property passed on to her. Under Section
55 when second sale deed dated 6-9-1980 was got executed by the
petitioner from Rafique, it is imputable that Rafique had conveyed all
the knowledge of the defects in title and he no longer had title to the
property. It is also a finding of fact recorded by the appellate court
and affirmed by the High Court that the petitioner was in know of full
facts of the preliminary decree and the final decree passed and
execution thereof. In other words, the finding is that he had full
knowledge, from the inception of Title Suit No. 220 of 1969 from his
benamidar. Having had that knowledge, he got the second sale deed
executed and registered on 6-9-1980. Oblivious to these facts, he
did not produce the second original sale deed nor is an attempt
made to produce secondary evidence on proof of the loss of original
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 21 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

sale deed.
6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article
113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to the facts in this case.
Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided
inter alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fraud. There was
no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In such
a case, the residuary Article 120 in Schedule III was attracted. The
present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act will govern any suit to
set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. Therefore,
Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set aside a decree either
on fraud or any other ground. It is true that Article 59 would be
applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree or an instrument
or a contract. There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set
aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se
parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming title
through the party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge
of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the
decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets attracted?
As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set
aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground
of fraud, Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the
date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the plaintiff seeks to
establish his title to the property which cannot be established
without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an
insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him,
though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration
and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside
or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates
suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any
person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and
who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left
outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it
adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so
adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled. It would thus be
clear that the word ‘person’ in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is
wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his
seller. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the
instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the
decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit
within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff
to have the decree set aside, first became known to him.
7. The question, therefore, is as to when the facts of granting
preliminary and final decrees touching upon the suit land first
became known to him. As seen, when he claimed title to the
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 22 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

property as owner and Rafique to be his benamidar, as admitted by

Rafique, the title deed dated 1-12-1959 was filed in Title Suit No.
220 of 1969. Thereby Rafique had first known about the passing of
the preliminary decree in 1973 and final decree in 1974 as referred
to earlier. Under all these circumstances, Article 113 is inapplicable
to the facts on hand. Since the petitioner claimed derivative title
from him but for his wilful abstention from making enquiry or his
omission to file the second sale deed dated 6-9-1980, an irresistible
inference was rightly drawn by the courts below that the petitioner
had full knowledge of the fact right from the beginning; in other
words right from the date when title deed was filed in Title Suit No.
220 of 1969 and preliminary decree was passed on 2-1-1973 and
final decree was passed on 5-2-1974. Admittedly, the suit was filed
in 1981 beyond three years from the date of knowledge. Thereby,
the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. The decree of the
appellate court and the order of the High Court, therefore, are not
illegal warranting interference.”
22. It will also be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in
Prem Singh v. Birbal27, where the scope of the Limitation Act, 1963 and
Article 59 was discussed and held as under:
“11. Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a remedy,
but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said rule
is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which
provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby,
limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any
property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.
12. An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of
the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of
suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by
the articles, provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the
institution of a suit will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act
provides that irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set
out or is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit is found
to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and
every application made after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed.
13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief
is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses
within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable
transactions.
14. A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the provisions
of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:
“31. When cancellation may be ordered.—(1) Any person
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 23 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who

has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left
outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it
adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so
adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a
copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has
been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the
instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.”
15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both
void and voidable documents. It provides for a discretionary relief.
16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its
cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting
aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the
eye of the law, as it would be a nullity.
17. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a
transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. Even if Article 59 is
not attracted, the residuary article would be.
18. Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence,
misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts is required to be
proved. Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It
would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It
would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid.
(See Unni v. Kunchi Amma [ILR (1891) 14 Mad 26] and Sheo
Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri [ILR (1897) 24 Cal 77].)
19. It is not in dispute that by reason of Article 59 of the
Limitation Act, the scope has been enlarged from the old Article 91
of the 1908 Act. By reason of Article 59, the provisions contained in
Articles 91 and 114 of the 1908 Act had been combined.
20. If the plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may file a suit
for declaration that the deed is not binding upon him but if he is not
in possession thereof, even under a void transaction, the right by
way of adverse possession may be claimed. Thus, it is not correct to
contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no
application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void.
21. Respondent 1 has not alleged that fraudulent
misrepresentation was made to him as regards the character of the
document. According to him, there had been a fraudulent
misrepresentation as regards its contents.
22. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa [(1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC
956] this Court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation as
regards character of a document is void but fraudulent
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 24 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

misrepresentation as regards contents of a document is voidable

stating : (SCR p. 801 C-D)
“The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent
misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document
but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction
between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the
document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents
thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the
transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely
voidable.”
In that case, a fraud was found to have been played and it was
held that as the suit was instituted within a few days after the
appellant therein came to know of the fraud practised on her, the
same was void. It was, however, held : (SCR p. 803 B-E)
“Article 91 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit to set aside
an instrument not otherwise provided for (and no other provision
of the Act applies to the circumstances of the case) shall be
subject to a three years' limitation which begins to run when the
facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set
aside are known to him. In the present case, the trial court has
found, upon examination of the evidence, that at the very time of
the execution of the gift deed, Ext. 45 the appellant knew that her
husband prevailed upon her to convey Surveys Plots Nos. 407/1
and 409/1 of Tadavalga village to him by undue influence. The
finding of the trial court is based upon the admission of the
appellant herself in the course of her evidence. In view of this
finding of the trial court it is manifest that the suit of the
appellant is barred under Article 91 of the Limitation Act so far as
Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village are concerned.”
………
28. If a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor
and it was void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property
purportedly conveyed thereunder. He could either file the suit within
12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Here,
the plaintiff did not either sue within 12 years of the deed or within 3
years of attaining majority. Therefore, the suit was rightly held to be
barred by limitation by the trial court.”
23. Further, in the aforesaid suit, the Respondent No. 1 also sought
possession of the suit properties based on title. As per Article 65 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, the possession of immovable property or any
interest therein, based on title can be sought within twelve years. From
the records, it is evident that the possession of the subject properties
was initially with the Government of Maharashtra, then with the
Gonsavis and thereafter with the Defendant No. 1 and it can be safely
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 25 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

said that at least for a century, the Respondent No. 1 nor his
predecessors have been in possession of the properties after the grant
of Inam. The plaintiff has failed to sue the appellant/defendant or the
State for possession within twelve years. We have already held that the
title claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation and therefore, the claim
for possession is also barred and consequently, the relief of recovery of
possession is also hopelessly barred by limitation.
24. Moreover, the Plaintiff has not produced any documentary
evidence to show that he is entitled for the relief of declaration of
ownership of the suit properties except by way of reliance of the
resolutions of the government, which has lost its force in view of the
decree of the Civil Court and subsequent compromise decrees. The
decrees had also attained finality as the neither the plaintiff nor his
ancestors have challenged the same in time. It is also evident on the
face of record that the Plaintiff is a stranger to the suit properties; on
the contrary, the Defendants are the owners of the suit properties. It is
a settled principle of law that the owners cannot be restrained from
dealing with their own properties at the instance of a stranger. The said
relief is again a consequential relief to the claim of title, which has been
non-suited on the ground of limitation. Hence, the prayer (c) made in
the plaint is not maintainable.
25. Regarding the averments made in the plaint relating to fraud
played on the plaintiff by the defendants in relation to the compromise
decrees obtained in their favour, we are of the view that they are vague
and general, besides baseless and unsubstantiated. Rather, no case can
be culled out from the averments made in the plaint in this regard. The
plea of fraud is intrinsically connected with the nature of Inam. We
have already discussed the plea of fraud in the preceding paragraphs.
We are also of the view that the plea has been raised only to overcome
the period of limitation. Admittedly the Plaintiff is a stranger to the
suits which ended in compromise. Therefore, in view of the direct bar
under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC, he cannot seek a declaration ‘that
the compromise decrees passed in Spl. Civil Suit Nos. 152/1951 and
1622/1988 and Civil Appeal No. 787/2001, Pune are void ab initio, null
and void and the same are liable to be set aside’. The law on this point
is also already settled by this Court in Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh
Singh28. The bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A of CPC is applicable to third
parties as well and the only remedy available to them would be to
approach the same court. In the present case, such an exercise is also
not possible in view of the bar of limitation. Hence, we find the suit to
be unsustainable.
26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful
of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 26 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided
after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this,
where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly
barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the
relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court. We again place it on
record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is
committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff.
Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to
assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also
found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously
dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule
11(d) of CPC. The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping
the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after
considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the
core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No. 1
in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC. The spirit
and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to
nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of
process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the
defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence.
Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the
threshold.
27. In fine, this appeal stands allowed by setting aside the orders so
passed by the Courts below and the application filed by the appellants
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC is allowed by rejecting the plaint in
Special Civil Suit No. 133 of 2009 filed by the Respondent No. 1.
However, there is no order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any,
shall stand disposed of.
———
1
Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”

2
Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”

3
For short, “the CPC”

4
(2015) 5 SCC 674

5
(2005) 13 SCC 687

6
(2003) 1 SCC 557

7
“11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases—

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 27 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper
insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the
requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:

Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of
the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be
recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for
correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within
the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice
to the plaintiff.”

8
(2020) 7 SCC 366

9
1986 Supp SCC 315. Followed in Manvendrasinhji Ranjitsinhji Jadeja v. Vijaykunverba, 1998
SCC OnLine Guj 281 : (1998) 2 GLH 823

10
Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512

11
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137

12
(2007) 5 SCC 614

13
(1999) 3 SCC 267

14
(2003) 1 SCC 557

15
(2005) 10 SCC 51

16
(1977) 4 SCC 467

17
(1998) 2 SCC 70

18
(2017) 13 SCC 174

19
(2011) 9 SCC 126

20
(1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082

21
(2006) 5 SCC 353

22
(2000) 6 SCC 402 at page 410
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 28 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23
(1977) 4 SCC 467

24
1968 SCC OnLine SC 206 : (1968) 2 SCR 797 : (1968) 2 SCJ 555 : AIR 1968 SC 956

25
(2000) 7 SCC 702

26
(1996) 7 SCC 767

27
(2006) 5 SCC 353

28
(2020) 6 SCC 629 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 732

Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/
regulation/ circular/ notification is being circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be
liable in any manner by reason of any mistake or omission or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice
rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification. All
disputes will be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and forums at Lucknow only. The authenticity of
this text must be verified from the original source.
 MANU/SC/0197/1999
Equivalent/Neutral Citation: AIR1999SC 2044, 1999 INSC 123, JT1999(2)SC 347, 1999(2)KLT18(SC ), 1999(2)SC ALE222, (1999)3SC C 737,
[1999]2SC R99, 1999(1)UJ621

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1808 of 1997
Decided On: 22.03.1999
V.S. Achuthanandan Vs. P.J. Francis and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. A.S. Anand, CJI., M. Srinivasan and R.P. Sethi, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Abhishek Manu Singhvi, K. Sudhakaran, Malini Poduval,
P.K. Bansal, R. Sathish and Kamini Jaiswal, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: Ram Kumar, Roy Abraham and Baby Krishnan, Advs.
Case Note:
Election - petition - Section 133 of CPC, 1908 - Trial Judge rejected election
petition on ground that it did not disclose 'material facts and full particulars'
of corrupt practice alleged - evident that Trial Judge did not distinguish
between 'material facts' and 'material particulars' as defined under Section
133 - Trial Judge not justified in rejecting petition at initial stage without
affording appellant opportunity to prove existence of circumstances prima
facie justifying existence of grounds requiring recount - case remitted back to
High Court for trial on merits - appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT
R.P. Sethi, J.
1. The appellant a candidate of the C.P.I. (M) party contested and lost election from No.
99 Mararikulam Legislative Assembly Constituency in the State of Kerala by a margin of
1965 votes. The successful candidate was the respondent No. 1 belonging to the Indian
National Congress. Not satisfied with the result of the election, the appellant filed
Election Petition No. 11/1996 in the High Court of Kerala mainly on the grounds of
corrupt practices and illegalities in the counting of ballot papers. He prayed for
declaration that the election of the 1st respondent was void and that he was duly
elected. Instead of filling any written statement, the respondent No. 1 filed preliminary
objections which were made the basis of framing the following issues :
1 . Whether the petition has been presented in compliance with the provisions
of the Representation of the People Act?
2. Whether the absence of an affidavit in support of the allegations of corrupt
practices in the petition is fatal to the maintainability of the petition?
3 . Whether there is a proper affidavit under Rule 94-A of the Conduct of
Election Rules?

12-03-2025 (Page 1 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma

 4. Whether the allegations make out a cause of action at all warranting trial of
the election petition?
5 . Whether the allegations for recount are sufficient to hold a trial on that
issue?
6 . Whether the failure to attest as true copy of the annexure produced along
with the election petition is fatal?
7. Whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed as not properly framed
and filed?
2. Issues No. 1 and 4 were decided against the appellant holding that allegations made
in paragraphs 11(E), (F), (H), (J), (K), (M), and (P) lacked material facts and
particulars and being vague and ambiguous required no trial. Issues No. 2, 3, and 6
were decided in favour of the appellant. Issue No. 5 was decided against the appellant
holding that he had failed to establish that there existed a case where the recounting
could be ordered. Ultimately, the election petition was rejected under Section 83 of the
Representation of People Act read with Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC with costs
assessed Rs. 1,500. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellant
has preferred this appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
3 . Assailing the judgment impugned in this appeal, the learned Counsel appearing for
the appellant has vehemently argued that the High Court has adopted hypertechnical
approach in the matter and that the election petition has been dismissed finally on
merits without affording the appellant any opportunity to prove his case. It is contended
that the issues decided in fact did not arise and that the High Court did not properly
appreciate the difference between the 'material facts' and the material particulars' as
referred to in Section 123 of the Act. It is contended that there were sufficient facts
brought on record for proving the corrupt practices by way of evidence and that the
circumstances existed which justified re-count in the case under the provisions of the
Act. It is further submitted that the provisions of Section 83 of the Act and Order VII
Rule 11 of the CPC have wrongly been relied upon for rejecting the election petition, as
according to the learned Counsel for the appellant, none of those provisions was
applicable in the instant case. It is contended that the High Court committed a mistake
of law by holding that the process of election ended on the date of the poll and any
illegality or mal-practices committed after the date of the poll but before the declaration
of the result was not a mal practice or corrupt practice. It is submitted that election
process continues till the result is declared and that action of the parties to an election
is relevant from the date of the commencement of the election till the declaration of the
result. The High Court is alleged to have not taken note of its own verdict in C.M.P. No.
2867/96 by which amendment was allowed for correcting the Section of the Act under
which the allegations of corrupt practices already made in the petition were to fit in.
4 . Supporting the impugned judgment, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 has
submitted that in the absence of material facts and details of corrupt practices, the High
Court was justified in holding that as no cause of action is disclosed, the election
petition deserved dismissal under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. He has contended that
the appellant had failed to place on record sufficient material justifying the recount.
Relying upon the observations of this Court in Dharamvir v. Amar Singh and Ors.
MANU/SC/0589/1996 : [1996]2SCR156 it has been contended that Sections 123(2)
and 123(7) of the Act deal with corrupt practices indulged at a stage prior to the casting

12-03-2025 (Page 2 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma

of votes and not thereafter and as the appellant had referred to the alleged corrupt
practices after the date of poll, but before the date of declaration of the result, no cause
existed for the trial of the case.
5. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties it has
to be kept in mind that free fair, fearless and impartial elections are the guarantee of a
democratic policy. Effective mechanism is the basic requirement for having such
elections. For conducting, holding and completing the democratic process, a potential
law based upon requirements of the society tested on the touchstone of the experience
of times is concededly of paramount importance. A balanced judicial approach in
implementing the laws relating to franchise is the mandate of this Court. Law relating to
the accomplishment of the democratic process by holding the elections is not required
to be so liberally construed as to frustrate the will of the people expressed at the
elections and not too rigidly applied which may result in shaking the confidence of the
common man in the institution entrusted with the noble task of establishment of the
rule of law. It has always to be kept in mind that the law relating to elections is the
creation of the statute which has to be given effect to strictly in accordance with the will
of the Legislature.
6 . It may further be noticed, as observed by this Court in Raj Narain v. Smt. Indira
Nehru Gandhi and Anr. MANU/SC/0366/1972 : [1972]3SCR841 that rules of pleadings,
are intended as aids for a fair trial and for reaching a just decision. An action at law
should not be equated to a game of chess. Provisions of law are not mere formulae to
be observed as rituals. Beneath the words of a provision of law, generally speaking,
there lies a juristic principle. It is the duty of the court to ascertain that principle and
implement it. The purpose of Section 86 of the Act is to ensure that every charge of
corrupt practice is brought before the Court within the prescribed period of limitation
and not thereafter, so that the trial of the case is not converted into a persecution by
adding more and more charges or by converting one charge into another as the trial
proceeds.
7. It is also necessary to have in mind some of provisions of the laws relevant for the
purpose of deciding this appeal.
8 . The Act was enacted to provide for the conduct of elections to the Houses of
Parliament and to the House or Houses of the Legislature of each State, the qualification
and disqualifications for membership of those Houses, the corrupt practices and other
offences at or in connection with such elections and the decision of doubts and disputes
arising out of or in connection with such elections. Part II of the Act provides for
qualifications and disqualifications for membership of Parliament and the State
Legislatures. Part IV provides for the administrative machinery for the conduct of
elections and part IV-A deals with the registration of political parties. Under Section 30
the Election Commission is obliged to appoint last date for making nomination after the
notification calling upon a constituency to elect a member is issued.
On the issue of a notification under Section 30, the Returning Officer is under statutory
duty to give public notice of the intended election in such form and manner as may be
prescribed notifying nominations of candidates for such election and specify the place,
and date where nominations papers are to be delivered. Scrutiny of nominations is
conducted under Section 36 and list of contesting candidates is issued under Section 38
of the Act. Procedure at election is provided under Chapter III and Chapter IV deals
with, the Poll. Section 64 provides that at every election where a poll is taken, vote
shall be counted, by or under the supervision and direction of, the Returning Officer and

12-03-2025 (Page 3 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma

each contesting candidate, his election agent and his counting agent shall have a right
to be present at the time of counting. Result of the election is declared under Section 66
of the Act. Part VI deals with the disputes regarding elections. No election can be called
in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provision of
Part IV which shall be tried by the High Court having jurisdiction in the area where the
election is held. An election petition calling in question any election has to be presented
on one or more of the grounds specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section
101 to the High Court by any candidates at such election or any elector within 45 days
from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate or if there are
more than one returned candidate at the election and dates of their elections are
different, the later of those two dates. Section 83 provides what the contents of an
election petition should be. An election petition is required to set forth full particulars of
any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges including as full a statement as possible
of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the
date and place of commission of each of such practice which is required to be signed by
the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the CPC for verification of the
pleadings. The petition based upon corrupt practices is required to be accompanied by
an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegations of such practice and the
particulars thereof. Any schedule or annexure to the petition is required to be signed by
the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. Chapter III of Part VI
deals with the trial of election petitions. Section 87 provides that subject to the
provisions of the Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be
tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure
applicable under the CPC for the trial of suits.
Section 100 of the Act provides :
Grounds for declaring election to be void.--(1) Subject to the provisions of
Sub-section (2) if the High Court is of opinion-
(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not
qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under the
Constitution or this Act {or the Government of Union Territories Act,
1963 (20 of 1963)}; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned
candidates or his election agent or by any other person with the
consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; or
(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected ;
(d) or that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned
candidates, has been materially affected -
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or
(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the
returned candidate, [by an agent other than his election agent],
or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote
or the reception of any vote which is void, or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the

12-03-2025 (Page 4 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma

 Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under
this Act, [the High Court shall declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void.]
(2) If in the opinion of the High Court a returned candidate has been guilty by
an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but[the High
Court] is satisfied -
(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the
candidate or his election agent and every such corrupt practice was
committed contrary to the orders, and of the candidate of his election
agent ;
(c) that the candidate and his election agent took all reasonable means
for preventing the commission of corrupt practice at the election, and
(d) that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt
practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agents, then [the
High Court] may decide that the election of the returned candidate is
not void.
9. Similarly Section 101 of the Act provides :
Grounds for which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be
declared to have been elected. If any person who has lodged a petition in
addition to calling in question the election of the returned candidate, claimed a
declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected and
the High Court is of opinion-
(a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a
majority of the valid votes; or
(b) that but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate by corrupt
practices the petitioner or such other candidate would have obtained a
majority of the valid votes, [the High Court] shall after declaring the
election of the returned candidate to be void declare the petitioner or
such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected.
10. At the time of presenting an election petition, if the petitioner fails to deposit in the
High Court the sum of security of costs as quantified under Section 117 of the Act, the
[election petition is liable to be dismissed Section 123 specifies] the corrupt practices
for the purposes of elections. Chapter III of Part VI deals with other electoral offences.
11. Issues are framed under Order XIV of the CPC when a material proposition of a fact
or law is affirmed by one party and denied by another. Material propositions are such
proposition of law or fact which the plaintiff must allege in order to show the right to
sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. There is no dispute
that issues are framed on the basis of the pleadings which according to Order VI Rule 1,
CPC include plaint or written statement. Pleadings can be struck out under Rule 16 of
Order VI which are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend
to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the petition or which is otherwise an
abuse of the process of the court. The plaint or the petition can also be rejected in the
following cases:

12-03-2025 (Page 5 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma

 (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required
by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails
to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is . written upon
paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to
supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to
do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any
law :
12. There is no gain-saying that the powers of superintendence, direction and control
of election vests in the Election Commission under Part XV of the Constitution of India.
The orders of the Election Commission are however subject to judicial review where
they are found to be contrary to the law enacted under Article 327 or are otherwise
arbitrary, mala fide or unfair. The High Court may also exercise the power of judicial
review if it is found that the orders of the Election Commission were in excess of its
jurisdiction, being contrary to any electoral law or rule made thereunder by the
competent legislature or any provision of the Constitution itself. However, no court is
entitled to entertain the questions coming under Articles 327 and 328 of the
Constitution or orders made by the Election Commission and the matters which may be
the subject of an election petition. Article 329(b) provides that no election to either
House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall
be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in
such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate
Legislature. Election as mentioned in Article 329(b) of the Constitution has been
interpreted to mean the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected
and not confined to the final result. Such an interpretation is inconsonance with the
provision of the Act as contained in Part V thereof particularly Section 30, dealing with
the appointment of date for nominations and Section 66 dealing with the declaration of
the result.
1 3 . In the instant case, as noted earlier, the election petition has been rejected by
invoking the powers of Section 83 of the Act read with Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC.
After referring to some judgments, the learned trial Judge of the High Court has
concluded :
Read as a whole, the averments contained in the Election Petition do not satisfy
the requirements of Section 83 of the Act. No prima face case is made out to
hold that the first respondent has committed corrupt practices or that it is a fit
case where recounting is to be ordered. On a perusal of the Election petition, it
is seen that the petitioner has not pleaded the material facts with necessary
particulars which would enable the Court to grant the prayer made in the
petition. Pleadings in the Election Petition do not make out a cause of action for
ordering recount, as prayed for in the petition. So, the Election Petition is liable
to be rejected under Section 83 of the Act read with order 7 Rule 11(a) C.P.C.
14. It would, thus appear, that the election petition was rejected mainly on the ground
that it did not disclose the cause of action as according to the learned trial Judge the
allegations regarding corrupt practice were vague and did not disclose "material facts
and full particulars" of the corrupt practice alleged. It is evident that the learned trial
12-03-2025 (Page 6 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma
Judge did not distinguish between the 'material facts' and 'material particulars' of
allegations regarding corrupt practices as defined under Section 123 of the Act. The Law
on the point is well-settled which appears to have not been taken note of by the learned
trial Judge. After referring to various pronouncements of this Court including cases in
Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors. MANU/SC/0192/1960 : [1960]3SCR91
,Samant N. Balakrishna and Anr. v. George Fernandez and Ors. MANU/SC/0270/1969 :
[1969]3SCR603 . Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jajiwan and Ors. [1973] 1 SCC 826, Shri
Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia MANU/SC/0302/1975 : [1976]2SCR246 , F.A.
Sapa and Ors. v. Singera and Ors. and Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and Anr. v. Dattaji
Raghobaji Meghe and Ors. MANU/SC/0455/1995 : AIR1995SC2284 and host of other
authorities, this Court in L.R. Shivaramagowda etc. v. T.M. Chandrashekar etc.
MANU/SC/0756/1998 : AIR1999SC252 held that while failure to plead 'material facts'
is fatal to the election petition and no amendment of the pleading is permissible to
introduce such material facts after the time limit prescribed for filing the election
petition, the absence of 'material particulars' can be cured at a later stage by an
appropriate amendment. An election petition was not liable to be dismissed is limine
merely because full particulars of corrupt practice alleged were not set out. It is,
therefore, evident that material facts are such primary facts which must be proved at the
trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action. Whether in an election
petition a particular fact is material fact or not, and as such, required to be pleaded is a
question which depends on the nature of the charge leveled, the ground relied upon,
and in the light of the special circumstances of the case.
In Udhav Singh case (supra) the Court held :
In short all those facts which are essential to clothe the petitioner with a
complete cause of action are "material facts" which must be pleaded, and
failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the
mandate of Section 83(1)(a).
"Particulars" on the other hand are " details of the case set up by the party".
"Material particulars" within contemplation of Clause (b) of Section 83(1) would
therefore mean all the details which are necessary to amplify, refine and
embellish. The material facts already pleaded in the petition in compliance with
the requirements of Clause (a). 'Particulars' serve the purpose of finishing
touches to the basic contours of a picture already drawn, to make it full, more
detailed and more informative.
15. The appellant had specified the alleged corrupt practices in paragraphs 11(E), (F),
(H), (J), (K), (M) and (P). It was alleged that Sri Ayyappan Pillai, the Election Tehsildar
of the Constituency was close associate and friend of the 1st respondent who played a
pivotal role in the manoeuvring relating to ballot papers which were not distributed to
the polling stations and ultimately used for the benefit of the successful candidate. He
was alleged to have been helping the 1st respondent in violation of the provisions of
the Act, the Rules, Orders and instructions issued thereunder. He was admittedly a
gazetted officer who was alleged to have acted as an agent of the 1st respondent. The
trial Judge found that allegations made in paragraphs 11(E), (F), (H), (J), (K), (M) and
(P) of the election petition were vague in nature and did not set forth full particulars of
any corrupt practice. Lacking of full particulars could not be made a basis for rejecting
the election petition as the appellant had the right to amend the pleadings. The Trial
judge found that, "details of corrupt practice are wanting in the election petition," The
absence of the details appears to have persuaded the learned Judge to reject the
election petition apparently under a misconception of the legal position regarding the
12-03-2025 (Page 7 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma
difference between the 'material facts' and 'material particulars'. The learned trial Judge
rejected the election petition on his being satisfied that :
Though as per the amended affidavit, the corrupt practice will attract Section
123(7) of the Act, it is not stated in the Election Petition that either the
candidate or his agent or any other person with the consent of the candidate or
his election agent, obtained, procured, abetted or attempted to obtain or
procure the service of any person under the Government for the furtherance of
the prospects of the candidate's election. Though it is stated that Sri Ayyappan
Pillai is a gazetted Officer, it is not stated anywhere in the petition that the first
respondent or his agent directly or by any other person with his consent or that
of his election agent obtained or procured the assistance of a gazetted officer.
16. It appears that he lost sight of allegations of the petitioner made in paragraph 9 of
the election petition wherein it was stated :
The result of election, in so far as it concerns the returned candidate, the 1st
respondent in this case, has been materially affected by (i) corrupt practice
committed in the interest of the returned candidates by his agents, election
agent and the returned candidate (ii) by the improper reception of votes which
is void and (iii) by the non-compliance with the provision of the Constitution
and the provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1951 as also rules and
orders made under the Act.
17. It was, therefore, wrongly, found that in the absence of specific pleading and full
particulars of corrupt practices, the election petition deserved rejection as it allegedly
did not disclose any cause of action. The trial Judge appears to have equated the cause
of action with proof and thus committed an illegality of law requiring interference by us.
1 8 . This Court in Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba @ Dadasheb and Ors.
MANU/SC/0637/1994 : (1994)2SCC392 held that a reasonable cause of action is said
to mean a cause of action with some chances of success when only the allegations in
the pleadings are considered. So long as the claim discloses some cause of action or
raises some questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak
and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. The implications of the liability
of the pleadings to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of
action are generally more know than clearly understood. It was further held that the
failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable cause of action is distinct from the
absence of full particulars. The distinctions among the ideas of the "grounds" in Section
81(1); of "material facts" in Section 83(1)(a) and of "full particulars" in Section 83(1)
(b) are obvious. The provisions of Section 83(1)(a) and (b) are in the familiar pattern
of Order VI Rules 2 and 4 and Order 7, Rule l(e) CPC. There is a distinction amongst the
'grounds' in Section 81(1); the 'material facts' in Section 83(1)(a) and "full particulars"
in Section 83(1)(b).
1 9 . The Court approved the observations of Jacob in "The Present Importance of
Pleadings" (1960) Current Legal Problems at pp 175-176:
Pleadings do not only define the issues between the parties for the final
decision of the Court at the trial, they manifest and exert their importance
throughout the whole process of the litigation.... They show on their face
whether a reasonable cause of action or defence is disclosed. They provide a
guide for the proper mode of trial and particularly for the trial of preliminary
issues of law or fact. They demonstrate upon which party the burden of proof
12-03-2025 (Page 8 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma
 lies, and who has the right to open the case. They act as a measure for
comparing the evidence of a party with the case which he was pleaded. They
determine the range of the admissible evidence which the parties should be
prepared to adduce at the trial. They delimit the relief which the court can
award....
20. Looking at the averments made in the election petition, it cannot be said that it
suffered from lack of disclosure of material facts. The absence of material particulars, if
any, could be rectified by resort to amendment of the pleadings in terms of Order VI
Rule 17 of the C.P.C.
21. The reliance of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 on the observations of this
Court in Dharamvir v. Amar Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0589/1996 : [1996]2SCR156
(supra) is also of no help to him for the purpose of upholding the judgment of the High
Court. The observations in that case, that the corrupt practices mentioned in Sections
123(2) and (7) referred to only such practices done for furtherance of the election only
to pre-voting stage and not post voting stage cannot be termed to be the verdict of this
Court inasmuch as the Bench itself observed, "prima facie these two Sub-sections will
apply only to pre-voting stage and not post-voting stage." (underlined by us). The
aforesaid observations were neither relevant nor necessary for the disposal of
Dharamvir Case and appear to have been made without noticing the earlier judgment of
this Court wherein it was held that the election process ended with the declaration of
the result of the candidates and not only after the voting.
22. The corrupt practices referred to in the aforesaid two Sub-sections are deemed to
be corrupt practices if such practices are committed, "for the furtherance of the
prospects of that candidate's election," The word 'election' cannot be restricted only to
the electoral process which commences with the issuance of the notification and ends
with the casting of votes at the Polls. The word 'election' as used in the Representation
of the People Act has been interpreted by this Court to mean "that every stage from the
time the notification calling for elections is issued till the declaration of the result."
23. Relying upon the judgment of this Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer,
Namakkal MANU/SC/0049/1952 : [1952]1SCR218 , the Allahabad High Court in Ashraf
Ali Khan v. Tika Ram and Ors. 20 E.L.R. 470 rightly explained the position of law in this
behalf as under :
The question is when does an election begin and end ?
24. Now, it has been held in Yeshavantrao Balwantrao Chavan v. K.T. Mangalmurti and
Anr. that-
In the case of an election there are certain steps to be taken until poll is taken.
In the first place, there is an announcement about the holding of an election.
This is followed by nomination of candidates. After the nominations are made, a
scrutiny of the nominations is held. After the nominations are scrutinized a list
of validity nominated candidates is prepared. After the list of validly nominated
candidates is prepared, there is a stage of withdrawal enabling a candidate to
withdraw his candidature. After the withdrawal, if any a candidate may retire
from contest, and finally, there is the poll, indeed, an election is one
continuous process involving these steps. In this connection. I may refer to
what has been pointed out in the case of Shankar v. Returning Officer, Kolaba.
With regard to the express 'election,' it was stated as follows :

12-03-2025 (Page 9 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma

 The expression 'election' in Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India
bears a wider meaning than the very limited restricted meaning of the
result of an election or the counting of votes. "Election" has the same
meaning as the expression used in Articles 327 and 328 viz., matters
relating to or in connection with election. Therefore, nomination of
candidates, scrutinizing of nominations, and decisions as to whether a
nomination paper is valid or not, are all part and parcel of an election,
'Election' is not merely the ultimate decision or the ultimate result.
'Election is every stage from the time the notification is issued till the
result is declared, and even perhaps if there is an election petition, till
the decision of the Election Tribunal. It is one whole continuous
integrated proceeding and every aspect of it and every stage of it and
every step taken in it is a part of the election, and what is prohibited by
Article 329(b) is calling in question any one aspect or stage of the
election. The expression 'except by an election petition' in the article
does not point to the period when it can be called in question; it rather
points to the manner and the mode in which it can be called in
question; and Article 329(b) provides that the only way any matter
relating to or in connection with an election can be called in question is
by an election petition, which could be presented to such authority and
in such manner as may be provided for by law passed by the
appropriate Legislature.
It may be observed that in this cited case the court was considering
Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India. But, in our view, what has
been stated in that case with regard to the wide meaning of the term
"election" may be also applied to an election contemplated under the
Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 2(i)(d) of the Act
defines election as "an election to fill a seat or seats in inter alia either
House or the Legislature of a State.
We may also on this point refer to two Supreme Court rulings-N.P.
Pommuswami v. Returning Officer, Namkkal and Hari Vishnu Kamath v.
Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., on which the aforesaid Bombay ruling is
based.
25. The position of law on this point was again reiterated in Mohinder Singh Gill and
Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner and Ors. MANU/SC/0209/1977 :
[1978]2SCR272 holding :
As already pointed out, it is well settled that election covers the entire process
from the issue of the notification under Section 14, to the declaration of the
result under Section 66 of the Act. When a poll that has already taken place has
been cancelled and a fresh poll has been ordered, the order therefore, with
amended date, is passed as an integral part of the electoral process.
and further approved in The Election Commission of India v. Shivaji and Ors.
MANU/SC/0379/1987 : [1988]1SCR878 .
26. It appears that while interpreting the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and
Section 83 read with Section 123 of the Act, the learned trial Judge has taken a
hypertechnical view in the matter which if approved would frustrate the purpose of the
purity of the elections which has been held to be mechanism devised to ascertain the
12-03-2025 (Page 10 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma
true wishes and will of the people in the matter of choosing their political leaders in a
democratic system.
27. Similarly the learned trial Judge was not justified in rejecting the election petition
without affording the appellant opportunity to place on record the circumstances
justifying the recount as prayed for by him. It is true that on vague and ambiguous
evidence no court can direct recount. But it is equally true that the doors of justice
cannot be shut for a person seeking recount without affording him an opportunity of
proving the circumstances justifying a recount. In his petition the appellant had given
details of the alleged illegalities and irregularities committed by the respondent No. 1
which according to him justified the holding of a recount. The learned trial Judge relied
upon some judgments where recount was not allowed after trial and wrongly dismissed
the election petition filed by the appellant without affording him the opportunity to
substantiate the allegations made in the petition or to bring on record the evidence
justifying a recount. It is settled position of law that the court trying an election petition
can direct inspection and recount of votes if the material facts and particulars are
pleaded and proved for directing such recount in the interest of justice. In doing so, the
provisions of Section 94 of the Act have to be kept in mind and given due weight before
directing inspection and recount. In M.R. Gopalkrishnan v. Thachady Prabhakaran and
Ors. MANU/SC/0991/1995 : 1994(5)SCALE192 it was held :
After a cursory glance of the relevant provisions discussed above it is thus
abundantly clear that the rules provides adequate opportunity to a candidate,
his election agent and counting agent to have a watch over the counting
process before the result is declared and if they raise any objection as to the
validity or otherwise or any ballot paper and if the said objection is improperly
rejected the candidate, his counting and election agent are well informed of the
nature of the objection that was raised with regard to the ballot papers and
make a concise statement of material facts in the election petition in relation
thereto. It is for these reasons that this Court has repeatedly held that the
secrecy of the vote has to be maintained and a demand of recount should not
ordinarily be granted unless the election petitioner makes out a prima facie case
with regard to the errors in the counting and is able to show that the errors are
of such magnitude that the result of the election of the returned candidate is
materially affected. The election petitioner, in order to seek an order of recount,
has to place material and make out a prima facie case on the threshold and
before an order of recount is actually made. The demand of a defeated
candidate for recount of votes has to be considered keeping in view that
secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct in a democracy, and, therefore, unless the
election petitioner is able not only to plead and disclose the martial facts but
also substantiate the same by means of evidence of reliable character that there
existed a prima facie case for the recount, no tribunal or court would be
justified in directing the recount.
This Court in Bhabi v. Sheo Govind MANU/SC/0281/1975 : AIR1975SC2117
while dealing with the question of direction for inspection and recount, on a
close and careful consideration of various authorities of this Court laid down
certain guidelines and conditions which are imperative before a court can grant
inspection of the ballot papers. The said conditions and guidelines are set out
below : [SCC pp. 693-694, para 15]
(1) That it is important to maintain the secrecy of the ballot which is
sacrosanct and should not be allowed to be violated on frivolous, vague
12-03-2025 (Page 11 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma
 and indefinite allegations;
(2) That before inspection is allowed the allegations made against the
elected candidate must be clear and specific and must be supported by
adequate statements of material facts :
(3) the court must be prima facie satisfied on the materials produced
before the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a
recount;
(4) That the court must come to the conclusion that in order to grant
prayer for inspection it is necessary and imperative to do full justice
between the parties;
(5) That the discretion conferred on the court should not be exercised
in such a way so as to enable the applicant to indulge in a roving
inquiry with a view to fish materials for declaring the election to be
void; and
(6) That on the special facts of a given case sample inspection may be
ordered to lend further assurance to the prima facie satisfaction of the
Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount, and not
for the purpose of fishing out materials.
In a recent decision in Satyanarain Dudhari v. Uday Kumar Singh
MANU/SC/0654/1993 : AIR1993SC367this Court again reiterated the similar
view by observing that the secrecy of the ballot papers cannot be permitted to
be tinkered with lightly and an order of recount cannot be granted as a matter
of course. It is only when the High Court is satisfied on the basis of material
facts pleaded in the petition and supported by the contemporaneous evidence
that recount can be ordered. When there is no contemporaneous evidence to
show any irregularity or illegality in the counting, ordinarily it would not be
proper to order recount on the basis of bare allegations in the election petition.
28. Without commenting upon the merits of the case, lest it may prejudice the rights of
the parties we feel that the trial Judge was not justified in rejecting the election petition
at the initial stage without affording the appellant an opportunity to prove the existence
of circumstances prima facie justifying the existence of grounds requiring recount,
29. In the light of what has been noticed hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the
judgment impugned is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, this appeal is
allowed by setting aside the judgment impugned and remitting the case back to the
High Court for trial of the same on merits after affording the respondent No. 1 to file his
detailed written statement and the parties an opportunity to lead evidence. The High
Court is requested to finally dispose of the election petition expeditiously preferably
within a period of one year, The appellant is also held entitled to costs which are
directed to be paid by respondent No. 1 and assessed at Rs. 10,000/-
© Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd.

12-03-2025 (Page 12 of 12) www.manupatra.com Pragyan Pradip Sharma

SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2023 SCC OnLine SC 573

In the Supreme Court of India

(BEFORE AJAY RASTOGI AND BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No …. of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 28241

of 2019)
Kanimozhi Karunanidhi … Appellant;
Versus
A. Santhana Kumar and Others … Respondents.
With
Civil Appeal No …. of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 28242
of 2019)
Kanimozhi Karunanidhi … Appellant;
Versus
A. Santhana Kumar and Others … Respondents.
Civil Appeal No …. of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition (C) No. 28241
of 2019) and Civil Appeal No …. of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition
(C) No. 28242 of 2019)
Decided on May 4, 2023
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For Petitioner(s): Mr. P. Wilson, Sr. Adv;
Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Adv;
Mr. Richardson Wilson, Adv;
Mr. Apoorv Malhotra, Adv;
Mrs. Sapna I Pillai, Adv;
Ms. Aishwarya Mishra, Adv;
Ms. Priya Aristotle, AOR.
For Respondent(s): Mr. S. Makesh, Adv;
Mr. N.I. Ramachandran, Adv;
Mr. L.R. Venkatesan, Adv;
Mr. Anoop Prakash Awasthi, AOR;
Mr. Amit Sharma, AOR;
Mr. Dipesh Sinha, Adv;
Ms. Pallavi Barua, Adv;
Ms. Aparna Singh, Adv;
Ms. Sakshi Upadhyay, Adv.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.:— Leave granted.
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 2 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The appellant in both the appeals (hereinafter referred to as the

returned candidate) has challenged the legality of the impugned
common order dated 19.11.2019 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Madras in Original Application Nos. 929/2019 and
930/2019 filed by the appellant in Election Petition No. 3/2019,
whereby the High Court has dismissed both the said applications.
Factual matrix:
3. The factual matrix giving rise to the present appeals are that on
19.03.2019, the nominations were invited pursuant to the notification
th
issued by the Chief Election Commissioner for the elections to the 17
Lok Sabha, scheduled to be held on 18.04.2019. The appellant filed her
nomination from No. 36-Thoothukudy Lok Sabha Constituency, along
with the affidavit in Form No. 26 as per Rule 4A of the Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules). The
scrutiny of nomination papers was held by the Returning Officer on
27.03.2019. The elections were held on 18.04.2019 as scheduled, and
the appellant was declared elected from the said No. 36 Thoothukudy
Lok Sabha Constituency with a margin of 3,47,209 votes on
23.05.2019.
4. The Election petitioner/respondent no. 1 herein claiming to be a
voter, has filed the Election Petition being no. 3/2019 before the High
Court under Section 80, 80A, 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the
People's Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the RP Act) seeking
declaration that the election of the returned candidate, i.e., the
appellant herein, from No. 36, Thoothukudy Lok Sabha Constituency, in
the Lok Sabha election conducted pursuant to the notification of the
Chief Election Commissioner dated 19.03.2019 was void and liable to
be set aside, on the ground that the information sought by the Election
Commission of India in regard to the payment of income tax of her
spouse was not provided by her in the affidavit - Form no. 26
submitted along with the nomination papers, and thus had intentionally
suppressed and not disclosed the same to the electors.
5. The precise allegations made in para 5 to 9 of the Election petition
read as under:
“5. The petitioner humbly submits that upon perusal of the
nomination paper submitted by the 2nd respondent, the returned
candidate herein, under Rule 4 of the conduct of election rules,
1961, after the dissemination of the same to the public under the
Representation of the People Act, it is noticed manifestly that she
had failed to furnish the details of the payment of the income tax of
her spouse mention in the Tamil language as “THUNAIVAR” namely
Aravindan, Citizen of Singapore, in the column requiring to provide
the PAN number, the last financial year of filing the Income Tax
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 3 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Return and the total income shown in the income tax return for the
past five financial years, for each year in Rupees, in the affidavit
FORM 26, under Part A, No. 4 S. No. 2, by mentioning in Tamil
language “PORUTHATHU” which information is to be mandatory
furnished by the returned candidate in adherence to the information
sought by the Election Commission of India in exercise of the
statutory powers, conferred under Article 324 of the Constitution of
India and suppression of the same by the returned candidate in non-
compliance with the provisions of the Constitution of India, the
result of the election is materially affected.
6. The petitioner humbly submits that in S. No. 3 of Part-B in the
nd
affidavit Form 26 the 2 respondent had provided the information in
regard to the constituency Number, name and State as No. 36,
Thoothukudi, Tamilnadu, but whereas in Part A No. 2, she mentioned
that her electoral constituency is No. 19 CHEPAUK, Tamil Nadu,
exposes the improper submission of nomination form.
7. The petitioner humbly submits that having aggrieved against
nd
the unconstitutional act of the 2 respondent the returned
candidate, inasmuch as of which the electors of the constituency are
unable to have information regarding the income of the spouse of
the returned candidate disclosed in the income tax return,
consequently as the result is materially affected he is before this
Hon'ble Court praying to declare the election of the returned
candidate, the 2nd respondent herein, from No. 36, Thoothukudi
Constituency as void and set aside the same.
8. The petitioner respectfully submits that the nomination paper,
the affidavit FORM 26 is without particulars of the payment of
amount of income tax of her spouse (Thunaivar) namely Mr.
Arvindan, Citizen of Singapore though the information in regard to
the payment of the amount of income tax is sought by the election
commission of India in exercise of their statutory powers under
Article 324 of the Constitution of India in view of providing
information to the public under the Representation of People Act.
Besides, it is pertinent to state here that the income from the foreign
countries is subject to income tax under the Singapore Income Tax
Act and each income tax payer is provided the Income Tax Reference
Number by the authority.
9. The petitioner humbly submits that the suppression of
nd
information by the returned candidate the 2 respondent herein in
regard to the payment of income tax of her spouse herein in regard
to the payment of income tax of her spouse (Thunaivar) debar the
electors of the constituency to get complete information of the
payment of income tax to the income tax authority in Singapore and
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 4 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

lead to filing false affidavit in on adherence of the rules.”

6. In the said Election petition, the appellant/returned candidate had
filed OA No. 929/2019 praying to strike off paragraphs 5 to 17 of the
Election petition and had filed OA No. 930/2019 praying to reject the
Election petition in limine on the ground inter alia that the averments
and allegations contained in the Election petition were wholly vague
and bereft of material facts, and therefore did not meet with the
requirements of Section 81, 83, 86 and 100 of the said Act. It was also
averred that the paragraph nos. 5 to 17 of the Election petition were
bereft of material facts and did not disclose any cause of action. The
High Court vide the impugned common order dismissed both the
Original Applications filed by the appellant/returned candidate.
Submissions by the Learned Counsels for the Parties:
7. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. P. Wilson for the appellant made
the following submissions:
(i) Section 83(1)(a) the said Act makes it mandatory for all election
petitions to contain a concise statement of material facts on which
petitioner relies, however in the present case the respondent-
election petitioner has failed to plead the material facts and
therefore the Election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine.
(ii) Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in case of Ram
1
Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal , and in case of Hari Shanker Jain v.
Sonia Gandhi2, he submitted that the material facts would include
positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative
fact, if necessary, and that in absence thereof, the Election
petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.
3
(iii) Relying upon Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez , he
submitted that failure to plead even a single material fact leads to
an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim
becomes bad.
(iv) In the instant case, though the respondent-election petitioner
has alleged that the appellant has suppressed facts in the Form
No. 26 Affidavit, he has failed to state as to which facts were
suppressed, and how there was non-compliance of the provisions
of the Constitution or of the Act or the rules made thereunder,
which had materially affected the result of the election.
(v) The entire Election petition filed by the respondent is based on
vague and bald assumptions, presumptions and conjectures
without stating the material facts more particularly the material
facts in support of the ground contained in Section 100(1)(d)(iv)
of the said Act.
(vi) Lastly, he submitted that though the candidates are required to
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 5 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

disclose their status of Income tax, of the assets and liabilities as

well as their spouses' assets and liabilities, if the columns in this
regard are not applicable in the fact situation, it could not amount
to suppression of facts.
8. The learned Advocate Mr. Mukesh S. for respondent no. 1 made
the following submissions:
(i) The appellant has violated the law laid down by this Court in
Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms4, wherein the
Court had directed the Election Commission to get the details of
assets and liabilities of the candidates and their family members,
without differentiating the status of citizenship.
(ii) The appellant, in response to the query regarding income tax
dues of her spouse, had mentioned “NO”. The appellant had failed
to disclose the status of filing of income tax return of her spouse
in foreign country, as required to be disclosed in the Form No. 26.
The appellant had simply stated in the said Form that her spouse
was a foreign citizen without disclosing the status of filing of
income tax return and the income tax reference number provided
in Singapore.
(iii) The appellant was bound to disclose the details of status of
filing of income tax return by her spouse in the foreign country
and non-disclosure of the same tantamounted to the suppression
of facts and non-compliance of the statutory rules framed under
the said Act.
(iv) By not disclosing the financial status of her family, the appellant
had deprived the opportunity to the voters to decide about the
casting of votes.
(v) Lack of transparency and non-disclosure of facts in the Form No.
26 had materially affected the result of the election.
Relevant Provisions of the Constitution of India and of the R.P.
Act, 1951:
9. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the learned
counsel for the parties, it would be beneficial to refer to some of the
relevant provisions contained in the Constitution of India as also the
R.P. Act, 1951.
10. Part-XV of the Constitution of India deals with the Elections. The
superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the
electoral rolls for, and the conduct of all elections to the Parliament and
to the legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of
President and Vice-President held under the Constitution have been
vested in the Election Commission under Article 324 of the Constitution
of India. Article 325 provides that there shall be one general electoral
roll for every territorial constituency and that no person shall be
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 6 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ineligible for inclusion in such rolls on the grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex or any of them. Article 326 provides that elections to the
House of people and to the legislative assemblies of States shall be on
the basis of adult franchise. Article 327 enables Parliament to make
laws with respect to all matters relating to elections to either House of
Parliament or to the Houses of the legislature of a State. Article 328
enables the legislature of a State, if Parliament has not made such
legislation, to make laws with respect to all matters relating to elections
to the Houses of legislature of the State. Article 329 bars interference
by courts in electoral matters and clause (b) in particular provides that
no election to the either House of Parliament or to the House or either
House of the legislature of a State shall be called in question except by
an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as
may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate
legislature.
11. So far as the R.P Act, 1951, is concerned, its object as is
reflected in its short title is to provide for the conduct of elections of the
Houses of Parliament and to the House or Houses of the legislature of
each State, the qualifications and the disqualifications for membership
of those Houses, the corrupt practices and other offences at or in
connection with such elections and the decision of doubts and disputes
arising out of or in connection with such elections. Part-VI of the R.P.
Act, 1951 deals with the disputes regarding Elections, and Chapter II
thereof deals with the presentation of the Election petitions to the High
Court. Section 80 thereof states that no election shall be called in
question except by an election petition presented in accordance with
the provisions of Part-VI.
12. Section 80A confers jurisdiction on the High Court to try election
petitions. Section 81 deals with the presentation of petitions which
reads as under:
“Section 81. Presentation of Petitions- (1) An election petition
calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of
the grounds specified in [sub-section (1)] of Section 100 and
Section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at such election or
any elector [within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date
of election of the returned candidate or if there are more than one
returned candidate at the election and dates of their election are
different, the later of those two dates].
Explanation. —In this sub-section, “elector” means a person who
was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition
relates, whether he has voted at such election or not.
(2) [***]
[(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many
copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 7 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his
own signature to be a true copy of the petition.]
13. Section 82 mandates as to who shall be the parties to the
Election petition. Section 83 pertains to the contents of the petition,
which reads as under:—
83. Contents of petition- (1) An election petition—
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on
which the petitioner relies;
(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the
petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of
the names of the parties alleged to have committed such
corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of
each such practice; and
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner
laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the
verification of pleadings:
[Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice,
the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the
prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice
and the particulars thereof.]
(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed
by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition.]
14. As per Section 86, the High Court is empowered to dismiss an
election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section
81 or Section 82 or Section 117. Section 87 deals with the procedure to
be followed by the High Court which reads as under:
“87. Procedure before the High Court.—
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made
thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High
Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure
applicable under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of 1908) to
the trial of suits:
Provided that the High Court shall have the discretion to
refuse, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to examine any
witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion that the evidence of
such witness or witnesses is not material for the decision of the
petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses
is doing so on frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the
proceedings.
(2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),
shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to apply
in all respects to the trial of an election petition.”
15. The grounds on which the High Court could declare the election
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 8 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

of the returned candidate to be void are enumerated in Section 100

which reads as under:—
100. Grounds for declaring election to be void. - (1) Subject
to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of opinion-
(a) —
(b) —
(c) —
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a
returned candidate, has been materially affected-
(i) —
(ii) —
(iii) —
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the
Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made
under this Act, the High Court shall declare the election of
the returned candidate to be void.”
16. In the instant case, the respondent-election petitioner has
challenged the election of the appellant on the ground that the result of
the election, insofar as it concerned the appellant, was materially
affected by non-compliance with Article 324 of the Constitution and by
non-compliance with Rule-4A of the said Rules read with Section 33 of
the Act. It may be noted that Section 33 of the Act pertains to the
presentation of nomination paper and the requirements for a valid
nomination. Section 36 pertains to the scrutiny of nominations by the
Returning Officer. Sub-section(2) thereof empowers the Returning
Officer, either on the objections made to any nomination or on his own
motion, to reject any nomination on the grounds mentioned therein.
One of the grounds to reject the nomination is, when there has been
failure to comply with any of the provisions of Section 33. Sub-section
(4) of Section 36 states that the Returning Officer shall not reject any
nomination paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a
substantial character.
17. Part-II of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 deals with the
General Provisions. Rule-4 and Rule-4A which pertain to the submission
of nomination paper and the Form of affidavit to be filed at the time of
delivering nomination paper read as under:—
“4. Nomination paper- Every nomination paper presented under
sub-section (i) of section 33 shall be completed in such one of the
Forms 2A to 2E as may be appropriate:
Provided that a failure to complete or defect in completing, the
declaration as to symbols in a nomination paper in Form 2A or Form
2B shall not be deemed to be a defect of a substantial character
within the meaning of sub-section
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 9 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(4) of section 36.

4A. Form of affidavit to be filed at the time of delivering
nomination paper- The candidate or his proposer, as the case may
be, shall, at the time of delivering to the returning officer the
nomination paper under sub-section (1) of section 33 of the Act, also
deliver to him an affidavit sworn by the candidate before a
Magistrate of the first class or a Notary in Form 26.”
Legal position:
18. The scheme of the Constitutional and statutory provisions
contained in the R.P. Act in relation to the nature of the right to elect,
the right to be elected and the right to dispute an election have been
explained and interpreted by various Constitutional Benches since
1952. To cite a few are N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal
Constituency5, in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh6, in Bhikji Keshao Joshi
7
v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani , in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v.
Roop Singh Rathore8 etc.
19. What has been gleaned from the said authorities may be
summed up by stating that a right to elect, though fundamental it is to
democracy, is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is
purely a statutory right. Similarly, right to be elected and the right to
dispute an election are also statutory rights. Since they are statutory
creations, they are subject to statutory limitations. An Election petition
is not an action at common law, nor in equity. It is a special jurisdiction
to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. The concept
familiar to common law and equity must remain strangers to election
law unless statutorily embodied. Thus, the entire election process
commencing from the issuance from the notification calling upon a
constituency to elect a member or members right upto the final
resolution of the dispute, concerning the election is regulated by the
Representation of People Act, 1951. The said R.P. Act therefore has
been held to be a complete and self-contained code within which must
be found any rights claimed in relation to an election dispute.
20. In a very interesting and important decision in case of Union of
India v. Association for Democratic Reforms9, a three-judge Bench of
this Court raising a question - in a nation wedded to republican and
democratic form of government, whether before casting votes, the
voters have a right to know relevant particulars of their candidates
contesting election to the Parliament or to the legislature of States,
deliberated on the powers of the Election Commission under Article 324
of the Constitution, and observed as under:—
“46. To sum up the legal and constitutional position which
emerges from the aforesaid discussion, it can be stated that:
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 10 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. The jurisdiction of the Election Commission is wide enough to

include all powers necessary for smooth conduct of elections
and the word “elections” is used in a wide sense to include the
entire process of election which consists of several stages and
embraces many steps.
2. The limitation on plenary character of power is when Parliament
or State Legislature has made a valid law relating to or in
connection with elections, the Commission is required to act in
conformity with the said provisions. In case where law is silent,
Article 324 is a reservoir of power to act for the avowed
purpose of having free and fair election. The Constitution has
taken care of leaving scope for exercise of residuary power by
the Commission in its own right as a creature of the
Constitution in the infinite variety of situations that may
emerge from time to time in a large democracy, as every
contingency could not be foreseen or anticipated by the
enacted laws or the rules. By issuing necessary directions, the
Commission can fill the vacuum till there is legislation on the
subject. In Kanhiya Lal Omar case [(1985) 4 SCC 628] the
Court construed the expression “superintendence, direction and
control” in Article 324(1) and held that a direction may mean
an order issued to a particular individual or a precept which
many may have to follow and it may be a specific or a general
order and such phrase should be construed liberally
empowering the Election Commission to issue such orders.
3. ….
4. To maintain the purity of elections and in particular to bring
transparency in the process of election, the Commission can
ask the candidates about the expenditure incurred by the
political parties and this transparency in the process of election
would include transparency of a candidate who seeks election
or re-election. In a democracy, the electoral process has a
strategic role. The little man of this country would have basic
elementary right to know full particulars of a candidate who is
to represent him in Parliament where laws to bind his liberty
and property may be enacted.”
21. It is also pertinent to note that the insertion of Rule-4A and
Form-26 appended to the said Rules is also culmination of the said
observations made this Court in the aforesaid case, which require the
candidate to disclose the information and particulars in the form of
affidavit to be submitted along with the nomination paper.
22. The respondent-Election petitioner in this case has challenged
election of the appellant-returned candidate under Section 100(1)(d)
(iv) on the ground of non-compliance of the said Rule-4A and the Form
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 11 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-26. However, the appellant had filed the applications seeking dismissal
of the Election petition in limine, for the non-compliance of the
provisions of Section 83(1)(a) of the said Act, read with Order VII, Rule
11 of CPC.
23. The law so far developed and settled by this Court with regard to
the non-compliance of the requirement of Section 83(1)(a) of the EP
Act, namely - “an Election petition must contain a concise statement of
material facts on which the petitioner relies”, is that such non-
compliance of Section 83(1)(a) read with Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, may
entail dismissal of the Election Petition right at the threshold. “Material
facts” are facts which if established would give the petitioner the relief
asked for. The test required to be answered is whether the court could
have given a direct verdict in favour of the election petitioner in case
the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the Election
petition on the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition. They must be
such facts as would afford a basis for the allegations made in the
petition and would constitute the cause of action as understood in the
Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Material facts would include positive
statement of facts as also positive statement of a negative fact.
24. A Three-Judge Bench in Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi
(supra) had an occasion to deal with Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act and
the Court dismissed the Election petition holding that the bald and
vague averments made in the election petitions do not satisfy the
requirements of pleading “material facts” within the meaning of Section
83(1)(a) of the RP Act read with the requirements of Order VII Rule 11
CPC. It was observed in para 23 and 24 as under:—
“23. Section 83(1)(a) of RPA, 1951 mandates that an election
petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on
which the petitioner relies. By a series of decisions of this Court, it is
well settled that the material facts required to be stated are those
facts which can be considered as materials supporting the
allegations made. In other words, they must be such facts as would
afford a basis for the allegations made in the petition and would
constitute the cause of action as understood in the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908. The expression “cause of action” has been
compendiously defined to mean every fact which it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support
his right to the judgment of court. Omission of a single material fact
leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim
becomes bad. The function of the party is to present as full a picture
of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to
make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet.
(See Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez [(1969) 3 SCC
238 : (1969) 3 SCR 603], Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Krishna Behari
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 12 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[(1969) 2 SCC 433].) Merely quoting the words of the section like
chanting of a mantra does not amount to stating material facts.
Material facts would include positive statement of facts as also
positive averment of a negative fact, if necessary. In V.S.
Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis [(1999) 3 SCC 737] this Court has
held, on a conspectus of a series of decisions of this Court, that
material facts are such preliminary facts which must be proved at
the trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action. Failure
to plead “material facts” is fatal to the election petition and no
amendment of the pleadings is permissible to introduce such
material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election
petition.
24. It is the duty of the court to examine the petition irrespective
of any written statement or denial and reject the petition if it does
not disclose a cause of action. To enable a court to reject a plaint on
the ground that it does not disclose a cause of action, it should look
at the plaint and nothing else. Courts have always frowned upon
vague pleadings which leave a wide scope to adduce any evidence.
No amount of evidence can cure basic defect in the pleadings.”
25. In case of Mahadeorao Sukaji Shivankar v. Ramaratan Bapu10, a
Three-Judge Bench of this Court again had an occasion to deal with the
issues as to what would constitute “material facts” and what would be
the consequences of not stating the “material facts” in the Election
petition, as contemplated in Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act, and the
Court observed as under:
“6. Now, it is no doubt true that all material facts have to be set
out in an election petition. If material facts are not stated in a plaint
or a petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone
as the case would be covered by clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of
the Code. The question, however, is as to whether the petitioner had
set out material facts in the election petition. The expression
“material facts” has neither been defined in the Act nor in the Code.
It may be stated that the material facts are those facts upon which a
party relies for his claim or defence. In other words, material facts
are facts upon which the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's
defence depends. What particulars could be said to be material facts
would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal
application can be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that
all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the
party to establish existence of cause of action or defence are material
facts and must be stated in the pleading of the party.
7. But, it is equally well settled that there is distinction between
“material facts” and “particulars”. Material facts are primary or basic
facts which must be pleaded by the petitioner in support of the case
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 13 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

set up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence.

Particulars, on the other hand, are details in support of material facts
pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material
facts by giving finishing touch to the basic contours of a picture
already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative.
Particulars ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the
opposite party by surprise.”
11
26. In Anil Vasudev Salgaonkar v. Naresh Kushali Shigaonkar , this
Court has discussed number of earlier decisions on the issue as to when
the Election petition could be dismissed summarily if it does not furnish
the cause of action in exercise of powers under the Code of Civil
Procedure read with Section 83 of the R.P. Act.
“50. The position is well settled that an election petition can be
summarily dismissed if it does not furnish the cause of action in
exercise of the power under the Code of Civil Procedure. Appropriate
orders in exercise of powers under the Code can be passed if the
mandatory requirements enjoined by Section 83 of the Act to
incorporate the material facts in the election petition are not
complied with.
51. This Court in Samant N. Balkrishna case [(1969) 3 SCC 238]
has expressed itself in no uncertain terms that the omission of a
single material fact would lead to an incomplete cause of action and
that an election petition without the material facts relating to a
corrupt practice is not an election petition at all. In Udhav Singh v.
Madhav Rao Scindia [(1977) 1 SCC 511] the law has been
enunciated that all the primary facts which must be proved by a
party to establish a cause of action or his defence are material facts.
In the context of a charge of corrupt practice it would mean that the
basic facts which constitute the ingredients of the particular corrupt
practice alleged by the petitioner must be specified in order to
succeed on the charge. Whether in an election petition a particular
fact is material or not and as such required to be pleaded is
dependent on the nature of the charge levelled and the
circumstances of the case. All the facts which are essential to clothe
the petition with complete cause of action must be pleaded and
failure to plead even a single material fact would amount to
disobedience of the mandate of Section 83(1)(a). An election
petition therefore can be and must be dismissed if it suffers from
any such vice. The first ground of challenge must therefore fail.
52. In V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu [(2000) 2
SCC 294] this Court reiterated the legal position that an election
petition is liable to be dismissed if it lacks in material facts. In L.R.
Shivaramagowda v. T.M. Chandrashekar [(1999) 1 SCC 666] this
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 14 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Court again considered the importance of pleadings in an election

petition alleging corrupt practice falling within the scope of Section
123 of the Act and observed as under : (SCC p. 677, para 11)
“11. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
pleadings in an election petition and pointed out the difference
between ‘material facts’ and ‘material particulars’. While the
failure to plead material facts is fatal to the election petition and
no amendment of the pleading could be allowed to introduce such
material facts after the time-limit prescribed for filing the election
petition, the absence of material particulars can be cured at a
later stage by an appropriate amendment.”
53. In Udhav Singh case [(1977) 1 SCC 511] this Court observed
as under : (SCC pp. 522-23, para 41)
“41. Like the Code of Civil Procedure, this section also
envisages a distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘material
particulars’. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) corresponds to Order 6
Rule 2, while clause (b) is analogous to Order 6 Rules 4 and 6 of
the Code. The distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘material
particulars’ is important because different consequences may flow
from a deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleading.
Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete
cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a charge are
liable to be struck off under Order 6 Rule 16, Code of Civil
Procedure. If the petition is based solely on those allegations
which suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be
summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. In the case of a
petition suffering from a deficiency of material particulars, the
court has a discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the
required particulars even after the expiry of limitation.”
54. In H.D. Revanna case [(1999) 2 SCC 217] the appeal was
filed by the candidate who had succeeded in the election and whose
application for dismissal of the election petition in limine was
rejected by the High Court. This Court noticed that it has been laid
down by this Court that non-compliance with the provisions of
Section 83 may lead to dismissal of the petition if the matter falls
within the scope of Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. In Harmohinder Singh Pradhan v. Ranjeet Singh
Talwandi [(2005) 5 SCC 46] this Court observed thus : (SCC p. 51,
para 14)
“14. Necessary averment of facts constituting an appeal on the
ground of ‘his religion’ to vote or to refrain from voting would be
material facts within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-section (1)
of Section 83 of the Act. If such material facts are missing, they
cannot be supplied later on, after the expiry of period of limitation
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 15 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

for filing the election petition and the plea being deficient, can be
directed to be struck down under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 and if such plea be the sole ground of filing
an election petition, the petition itself can be rejected as not
disclosing a cause of action under clause (a) of Rule 11, Order 7 of
the Code.”
55. In Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh [(2005) 13 SCC 511] this
Court again reiterated the distinction between “material facts” and
“material particulars” and observed as under : (SCC p. 527, paras 51
-52)
“51. A distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘particulars’,
however, must not be overlooked. ‘Material facts’ are primary or
basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the
defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his
cause of action or defence. ‘Particulars’, on the other hand, are
details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They
amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive
touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to
make it full, more clear and more informative. ‘Particulars’ thus
ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party
by surprise.
52. All ‘material facts’ must be pleaded by the party in support
of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to
enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with,
in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead
evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will
entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other
hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence
a party would be leading at the time of trial.”
56. In Sudarsha Avasthi v. Shiv Pal Singh [(2008) 7 SCC 604]
this Court observed as under : (SCC p. 612, para 20) “20. The
election petition is a serious matter and it cannot be treated lightly
or in a fanciful manner nor is it given to a person who uses this as a
handle for vexatious purpose.”
57. It is settled legal position that all “material facts” must be
pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him within the
period of limitation. Since the object and purpose is to enable the
opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence
of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to
state even a single material fact will entail dismissal of the election
petition. The election petition must contain a concise statement of
“material facts” on which the petitioner relies.
58. There is no definition of “material facts” either in the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 nor in the Code of Civil
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 16 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Procedure. In a series of judgments, this Court has laid down that all
facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action should be
termed as “material facts”. All basic and primary facts which must
be proved by a party to establish the existence of cause of action or
defence are material facts. “Material facts” in other words mean the
entire bundle of facts which would constitute a complete cause of
action. This Court in Harkirat Singh case [(2005) 13 SCC 511] tried
to give various meanings of “material facts”. The relevant para 48 of
the said judgment is reproduced as under : (SCC pp. 526-27)
“48. The expression ‘material facts’ has neither been defined in
the Act nor in the Code. According to the dictionary meaning,
‘material’ means ‘fundamental’, ‘vital’, ‘basic’, ‘cardinal’, ‘central’,
‘crucial’, ‘decisive’, ‘essential’, ‘pivotal’, ‘indispensable’,
‘elementary’ or ‘primary’. [Burton's Legal Thesaurus (3rd Edn.), p.
349.] The phrase ‘material facts’, therefore, may be said to be
those facts upon which a party relies for its claim or defence. In
other words, ‘material facts’ are facts upon which the plaintiff's
cause of action or the defendant's defence depends. What
particulars could be said to be ‘material facts’ would depend upon
the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be
laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that all basic and
primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to
establish the existence of a cause of action or defence are material
facts and must be stated in the pleading by the party.”
27. In Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal (supra), this Court again while
examining the maintainability of Election petition filed under Section
100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, elaborately considered the earlier decisions
and observed that it was necessary for the election petitioner to aver
specifically in what manner the result of the election in so far as it
concerned the returned candidate was materially affected due to
omission on the part of the Returning Officer. The Court in the said case
having found that such averments being missing in the Election
petition, upheld the judgment of the High Court/Election Tribunal
rejecting the Election petition at the threshold. The Court observed in
para 14 to 21 as under:—
“14. The requirement in an election petition as to the statement
of material facts and the consequences of lack of such disclosure
with reference to Sections 81, 83 and 86 of the Act came up for
consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Samant N.
Balkrishna v. George Fernandez [(1969) 3 SCC 238]. Speaking for
the three-Judge Bench, M. Hidayatullah, C.J., inter alia, laid down
that:
(i) Section 83 of the Act is mandatory and requires first a concise
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 17 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

statement of material facts and then the fullest possible

particulars;
(ii) omission of even a single material fact leads to an incomplete
cause of action and statement of claim becomes bad;
(iii) the function of particulars is to present in full a picture of the
cause of action and to make the opposite party understand the
case he will have to meet;
(iv) material facts and particulars are distinct matters— material
facts will mention statements of fact and particulars will set out
the names of persons with date, time and place; and
(v.) in stating the material facts it will not do merely to quote the
words of the section because then the efficacy of the material
facts will be lost.
15. At this juncture, in order to appreciate the real object and
purport of the phrase “material facts”, particularly with reference to
election law, it would be appropriate to notice the distinction
between the phrases “material facts” as appearing in clause (a) and
“particulars” as appearing in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section
83. As stated above, “material facts” are primary or basic facts which
have to be pleaded by the petitioner to prove his cause of action and
by the defendant to prove his defence. “Particulars”, on the other
hand, are details in support of the material facts, pleaded by the
parties. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving
distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so
as to make it full, more clear and more informative. Unlike “material
facts” which provide the basic foundation on which the entire edifice
of the election petition is built, “particulars” are to be stated to
ensure that the opposite party is not taken by surprise.
16. The distinction between “material facts” and “particulars” and
their requirement in an election petition was succinctly brought out
by this Court in Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh [(2007) 3
SCC 617] wherein C.K. Thakker, J., stated thus : (SCC pp. 631-32,
para 50)
“50. There is distinction between facta probanda (the facts
required to be proved i.e. material facts) and facta probantia (the
facts by means of which they are proved i.e. particulars or
evidence). It is settled law that pleadings must contain only facta
probanda and not facta probantia. The material facts on which the
party relies for his claim are called facta probanda and they must
be stated in the pleadings. But the facts or facts by means of
which facta probanda (material facts) are proved and which are in
the nature of facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be
set out in the pleadings. They are not facts in issue, but only
relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 18 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

establish the fact in issue.”

17. Now, before examining the rival submissions in the light of
the aforestated legal position, it would be expedient to deal with
another submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the
High Court should not have exercised its power either under Order 6
Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code to reject the election petition
at the threshold. The argument is twofold viz.:
(i) that even if the election petition was liable to be dismissed
ultimately, it should have been dismissed only after affording
an opportunity to the election petitioner to adduce evidence in
support of his allegation in the petition, and
(ii) since Section 83 does not find a place in Section 86 of the Act,
rejection of the petition at the threshold would amount to
reading into sub-section (1) of Section 86 an additional
ground.
In our opinion, both the contentions are misconceived and
untenable.
18. Undoubtedly, by virtue of Section 87 of the Act, the provisions
of the Code apply to the trial of an election petition and, therefore, in
the absence of anything to the contrary in the Act, the court trying
an election petition can act in exercise of its power under the Code,
including Order 6 Rule 16 and Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. The
object of both the provisions is to ensure that meaningless litigation,
which is otherwise bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted
to occupy the judicial time of the courts. If that is so in matters
pertaining to ordinary civil litigation, it must apply with greater
vigour in election matters where the pendency of an election petition
is likely to inhibit the elected representative of the people in the
discharge of his public duties for which the electorate have reposed
confidence in him. The submission, therefore, must fail.
19. Coming to the second limb of the argument viz. absence of
Section 83 in Section 86 of the Act, which specifically provides for
dismissal of an election petition which does not comply with certain
provisions of the Act, in our view, the issue is no longer res integra.
A similar plea was negatived by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh [(1972) 1 SCC 214], wherein speaking
for the Bench, A.N. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was) said : (SCC p.
221, para 23)
“23. Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that an
election petition could not be dismissed by reason of want of
material facts because Section 86 of the Act conferred power on
the High Court to dismiss the election petition which did not
comply with the provisions of Section 81, or Section 82 or Section
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 19 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

117 of the Act. It was emphasised that Section 83 did not find
place in Section 86. Under Section 87 of the Act every election
petition shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in
accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908, to the trial of suits. A suit which does not
furnish cause of action can be dismissed.”
20. The issue was again dealt with by this Court in Azhar Hussain
v. Rajiv Gandhi [1986 Supp SCC 315]. Referring to earlier
pronouncements of this Court in Samant N. Balkrishna [(1969) 3
SCC 238] and Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia [(1977) 1 SCC
511] wherein it was observed that the omission of a single material
fact would lead to incomplete cause of action and that an election
petition without the material facts is not an election petition at all,
the Bench in Azhar Hussain case [1986 Supp SCC 315] held that all
the facts which are essential to clothe the petition with complete
cause of action must be pleaded and omission of even a single
material fact would amount to disobedience of the mandate of
Section 83(1)(a) of the Act and an election petition can be and must
be dismissed if it suffers from any such vice.
21. We may now advert to the facts at hand to examine whether
the election petition suffered from the vice of non-disclosure of
material facts as stipulated in Section 83(1)(a) of the Act. As already
stated the case of the election petitioner is confined to the alleged
violation of Section 100(1)(d)(iv). For the sake of ready reference,
the said provision is extracted below:
“100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.—
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
(2) if the High Court is of opinion—
***
(d) that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns a returned
candidate, has been materially affected—
***
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution
or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act, the High
Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.”
It is plain that in order to get an election declared as void under
the said provision, the election petitioner must aver that on account
of non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this
Act or of any rules or orders made under the Act, the result of the
election, insofar as it concerned the returned candidate, was
materially affected.”
28. The legal position enunciated in afore-stated cases may be
summed up as under:—
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 20 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act, 1951 mandates that an Election

petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on
which the petitioner relies. If material facts are not stated in an
Election petition, the same is liable to be dismissed on that
ground alone, as the case would be covered by Clause (a) of Rule
11 of Order 7 of the Code.
ii. The material facts must be such facts as would afford a basis for
the allegations made in the petition and would constitute the
cause of action, that is every fact which it would be necessary for
the plaintiff/petitioner to prove, if traversed in order to support his
right to the judgment of court. Omission of a single material fact
would lead to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of
plaint would become bad.
iii. Material facts mean the entire bundle of facts which would
constitute a complete cause of action. Material facts would include
positive statement of facts as also positive averment of a negative
fact, if necessary.
iv. In order to get an election declared as void under Section 100(1)
(d)(iv) of the RP Act, the Election petitioner must aver that on
account of non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution
or of the Act or any rules or orders made under the Act, the result
of the election, in so far as it concerned the returned candidate,
was materially affected.
v. The Election petition is a serious matter and it cannot be treated
lightly or in a fanciful manner nor is it given to a person who uses
it as a handle for vexatious purpose.
vi. An Election petition can be summarily dismissed on the omission
of a single material fact leading to an incomplete cause of action,
or omission to contain a concise statement of material facts on
which the petitioner relies for establishing a cause of action, in
exercise of the powers under Clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order VII
CPC read with the mandatory requirements enjoined by Section
83 of the RP Act.
Conclusion:
29. In the light of the afore-stated legal position, let us see whether
the respondent/election petitioner had complied with the requirements
of Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act, by stating “material facts” in the
Election petition, constituting cause of action and the ground as
contemplated in Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, for declaring the
election of the Appellant-returned candidate to be void. The bone of
contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
election petitioner is that the Election Commission of India had called
for the information prescribing the Form 26 in regard to status of filing
of income tax return of candidates and their family members by
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 21 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

exercising powers under Article 324 of the Constitution of India and in

that the petitioner had provided information that her spouse was
working as consultant at foreign country and earning salary against the
column No. 8, Serial No. 9(b) and 9A(b), respectively under Part A of
Form 26. Besides, she had mentioned “No” to the query regarding
Income tax dues of her spouse, (mentioned as “Ethumilai” in Tamil
language). She had further stated that her spouse had bank accounts
in Singapore with deposit of dollars against column No. 7 Serial No. (ii)
of column in Part A of Form 26 but had failed to disclose the status of
filing income tax return of her spouse in the foreign country. He
therefore submitted that these material facts which have already been
stated in the Election petition, were sufficient to constitute cause of
action for filing Election petition under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP
Act.
30. It may be noted the precise allegations made by the respondent
-election petitioner in para 5 to 9 of his Election petition have already
been reproduced hereinbefore, from which it clearly transpires that the
election petitioner i.e., the respondent has made very bald and vague
allegations without stating the material facts as to how there was non-
compliance of any of the provisions of the Constitution of India or of the
RP Act or of the rules made thereunder. If the averments made in the
Election petition are read in juxtaposition to the information furnished
by the appellant-returned candidate in Form No. 26, it clearly emerges
that against the information sought about the PAN number of the
spouse of the appellant, it has been stated that “No PAN No.”, “Spouse
K. Aravindhan Foreign Citizenship”. Against the information sought with
regard to “The financial year for which the last income tax return has
been filed”, the information supplied by the appellant about her spouse
is “Not applicable”. The appellant has filled in all the columns of Form
No. 26 by furnishing the information with regard to her Permanent
Account Number and status of filing of income tax return etc. and of
her husband wherever applicable. If according to the respondent-
election petitioner, the appellant-returned candidate had suppressed
the Permanent Account Number of her spouse and also about the non-
payment of income tax of her spouse in the foreign country, it was
obligatory on the part of the Election petitioner to state in the Election
petition as to what was the Permanent Account Number of the spouse
of the returned candidate in India which was suppressed by her and
how the other details furnished about her husband in the said Form No.
26 were incomplete or false.
31. Mere bald and vague allegations without any basis would not be
sufficient compliance of the requirement of stating material facts in the
Election Petition. As well settled not only positive statement of facts,
even a positive statement of negative fact is also required to be stated,
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 22 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

as it would be a material fact constituting a cause of action. The

material facts which are primary and basic facts have to be pleaded by
the Election petitioner in support of the case set up by him to show his
cause of action and omission of a single material fact would lead to an
incomplete cause of action, entitling the returned candidate to pray for
dismissal of Election petition under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC read with
Section 83(1)(a) of the RP Act.
32. It is also significant to note that an affidavit in Form 26 along
with the nomination paper, is required to be furnished by the candidate
as per Rule 4A of the said Rules read with Section 33 of the said Act.
The Returning Officer is empowered either on the objections made to
any nomination or on his own motion, to reject any nomination on the
grounds mentioned in Section 36(2), including on the ground that
there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions of Section
33 of the Act. However, at the time of scrutiny of the nomination paper
and the affidavit in the Form 26 furnished by the Appellant-returned
candidate, neither any objection was raised, nor the Returning Officer
had found any lapse or non-compliance of Section 33 or Rule 4A of the
Rules. Assuming that the election petitioner did not have the
opportunity to see the Form No. 26 filled in by the Appellant-returned
candidate, when she submitted the same to the Returning Officer, and
assuming that the Returning Officer had not properly scrutinized the
nomination paper of the appellant, and assuming that the election
petitioner had a right to question the same by filing the Election
petition under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the said Act, then also there are
no material facts stated in the petition constituting cause of action
under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act. In absence of material facts
constituting cause of action for filing Election petition under Section
100(1)(d)(iv) of the said Act, the Election petition is required to be
dismissed under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC read with Section 13(1)(a)
of the RP Act.
33. As elaborately discussed earlier, Section 83(1)(a) of RP Act
mandates that an Election petition shall contain a concise statement of
material facts on which petitioner relies, and which facts constitute a
cause of action. Such facts would include positive statement of facts as
also positive averment of negative fact. Omission of a singular fact
would lead to incomplete cause of action. So far as the present petition
is concerned, there is no averment made as to how there was non-
compliance with provisions of the Constitution or of RP Act or of the
Rules or Order made thereunder and as to how such non-compliance
had materially affected the result of the election, so as to attract the
ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the RP Act, for declaring the
election to be void. The omission to state such vital and basic facts has
rendered the petition liable to be dismissed under Order VII, Rule 11(a)
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 23 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CPC read with Section 83(i)(a) of the RP Act, 1951.

34. In that view of the matter, Election petition being no. 3/2019
filed by the respondent-election petitioner deserves to be dismissed,
and is accordingly dismissed.
35. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The
appeals stand allowed accordingly.
———
1
(2009) 10 SCC 541

2
(2001) 8 SCC 233

3
(1969) 3 SCC 238

4
(2002) 5 SCC 294

5
(1952) 1 SCC 94

6
AIR 1954 SC 210

7
AIR 1955 SC 610

8
AIR 1964 SC 1545

9
(2002) 5 SCC 294

10
(2004) 7 SCC 181

11
(2009) 9 SCC 310

Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/
regulation/ circular/ notification is being circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be
liable in any manner by reason of any mistake or omission or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice
rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification. All
disputes will be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and forums at Lucknow only. The authenticity of
this text must be verified from the original source.
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 2 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 3 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 4 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 5 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 6 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 2 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 3 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 4 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 5 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 6 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 7 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 8 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 9 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 10 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 11 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 12 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 13 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 14 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 15 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 16 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 17 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 2 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 3 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 4 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 5 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 6 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 7 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 8 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 [2024] 4 S.C.R. 394 : 2024 INSC 289

Karikho Kri
v.
Nuney Tayang and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023)
09 April 2024
[Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

In the year 2019, appellant-KK an independent candidate emerged
victorious in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 44 Tezu
(ST) Assembly Constituency. The issue arising for consideration
is as to the validity of the High Court’s findings that grounds u/ss.
100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 were established, warranting invalidation of
the election of KK.

Headnotes
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss. 100(1)(b), 100(1)
(d)(i), 123 – Election – Filing of nomination – Submission of
material particulars – Non-disclosure of three vehicles – High
Court held non-disclosure of vehicles as corrupt practice –
Correctness:
Held: The High Court was of opinion that appellant’s failure
to disclose the three vehicles (two scooty and van), that stood
registered in the names of his dependent family members, amounted
to a corrupt practice – The High Court assumed that the non-
disclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or
his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute
undue influence – One scooty was in name of wife of the appellant,
DW5 deposed that he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold
it to DW6 – DW6 confirmed the same – In relation to other two
vehicles in question, there were actual documents of conveyance
and also proof of the requisite forms prescribed under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 being duly filled in by wife and son of appellant
– Form No. 29, relating to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle
by the registered owner, viz., the transferor, was issued in respect
of each of these vehicles but despite the same, the transferees
did not do the needful to get their own names registered as the
owners – Once it is accepted that the three vehicles in question
* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  395

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

were either gifted or sold before the filing of the nomination by

KK, the said vehicles cannot be considered to be still owned by
KK’s wife and son for purposes other than those covered by the
Act of 1988 – However, the High Court did not take note of this
distinguishing factor in the case on hand – The vehicles were
not owned and possessed in praesenti by the dependent family
members of KK at the time of the filing of his nomination – Non-
disclosure of three vehicles cannot be held against KK – Such
non-disclosure cannot be treated as an attempt on his part to
unduly influence the voters, thereby inviting the wrath of Section
123(2) of the Act of 1951. [Paras 20,21,22,25,27,28]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing of
nomination – Non-disclosure of three vehicles – Vehicles sold/
gifted – The High Court was of the opinion that, notwithstanding
vehicles were sold/gifted, these vehicles continued to stand
in the names of the dependent wife and son of KK – In
consequence, upon considering the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 and the decision of the Supreme Court in
Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2 SCR 572,
it was held that vehicles were owned by the dependent wife
and son of KK but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit in
Form No. 26 filed by him – Correctness:
Held: The High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment
(Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others) was rendered in the
context of and for the purposes of the Act of 1988 and not for
general application – The judgment itself made it clear that despite
the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a claimant or claimants
should not be made to run from pillar to post to find out who was
the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the accident, if the
sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by the authorities
concerned by registering the name of the subsequent owner, be
it for whatever reason – Further, vehicles being goods, their sale
would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
and the same make it clear that conveyance of ownership of the
vehicle would stand concluded upon execution of the document of
sale/transfer and registration of the new owner by the authorities
concerned would be a post-sale event – Mere failure to get
registered the name of the new owner of an already registered
vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would stand
invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed
over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
396 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

treated as still being in the possession and control of the former

owner.[Paras 23, 27]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss. 100(1)(b), 100(d)
(i) – Election – Filing of nomination – Submission of material
particulars – Non-submission of the ‘No Dues Certificate’
in respect of the Government accommodation occupied by
appellant during his earlier tenure as an MLA was held against
him – High Court held that his nomination was defective and
in consequence, the acceptance by the Returning Officer was
improper – Correctness:
Held: In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that there were
no actual outstanding dues payable by KK in relation to the
government accommodation occupied by him earlier – His failure
in disclosing the fact that he had occupied such accommodation
and in filing the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in that regard, with his
nomination form, cannot be said to be a defect of any real import
– More so, as he did submit the relevant documents of 2014
after an objection was raised before the Returning Officer – His
explanation that he submitted such Certificates in the year 2014
when he stood for re-election as an MLA is logical and worthy
of acceptance – The most important aspect to be noted is that
there were no actual dues and the failure of KK to disclose that
he had been in occupation of government accommodation during
the years 2009 to 2014 cannot be treated as a defect that is of
substantial character so as to taint his nomination and render its
acceptance improper. [Para 42]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing of
nomination – Non-disclosure of taxes due – The High Court
held that non-disclosure of the taxes due and payable by KK
and his wife was a defect of substantial character and the
same tainted his nomination:
Held: The failure on the part of KK to disclose the dues of municipal/
property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same cannot be
held to be a non-disclosure, inasmuch as he did disclose the
particulars of such dues in one part of his Affidavit but did not do
so in another part. [Para 49]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing
of nomination – Whether every defect in the nomination can
straightaway termed to be of such character as to render its
acceptance improper:
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  397

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Held: Every defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed

to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and
each case would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar
as that aspect is concerned – This Court has always drawn a
distinction between non-disclosure of substantial issues as opposed
to insubstantial issues, which may not impact one’s candidature or
the result of an election – The very fact that Section 36(4) of the Act
of 1951 speaks of the Returning Officer not rejecting a nomination
unless he is of the opinion that the defect is of a substantial nature
demonstrates that this distinction must always be kept in mind and
there is no absolute mandate that every non-disclosure, irrespective
of its gravity and impact, would automatically amount to a defect
of substantial nature, thereby materially affecting the result of the
election or amounting to ‘undue influence’ so as to qualify as a
corrupt practice. [Para 40]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Voter’s right to know
– Absolute or not:
Held: A blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay
his life out threadbare for examination by the electorate is not
accepted – His ‘right to privacy’ would still survive as regards
matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to
his candidature for public office – In that respect, non-disclosure of
each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to
a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial character – It is not
necessary that a candidate declare every item of movable property
that he or his dependent family members owns, unless the same
is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect
upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be
disclosed – Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities
and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when
the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate
would amount to a defect of a substantial character. [Para 44]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – s.100(1)(d)(iv) –
Election invalidation under:
Held: In the instant case, the High Court linked all the non-
disclosures attributed to KK to s.100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 but
ultimately concluded that his election stood invalidated u/s. 100(1)
(d)(iv) thereof – There is no discussion whatsoever on what were
the violations which qualified as non-compliance with the provisions
of either the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or the rules and orders
398 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

framed thereunder, for the purposes of s.100(1)(d)(iv), and as to

how the same materially affected the result of the election – For
the election petitioner to succeed on such ground, viz., s.100 (1)(d)
(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the breach but also show
that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the returned
candidate, has been materially affected thereby – Though there
are some general references to non-compliance with particular
provisions of the Act of 1951 and the rules made thereunder, there
are neither adequate pleadings nor proof to substantiate and satisfy
the requirements of s.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 – Therefore,
it is clear that NT (unsuccessful candidate) tied up the improper
acceptance of KK nomination, relatable to s.100(1)(d)(i) of the
Act of 1951, with the non-compliance relatable to s.100(1)(d)(iv)
thereof and he did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach
or how it materially affected the result of the election, in so far as
it concerned the returned candidate, KK – It was not open to NT
to link up separate issues and fail to plead in detail and adduce
sufficient evidence in relation to the non-compliance that would
attract s.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 – The finding of the High
Court in that regard is equally bereft of rhyme and reason and
cannot be sustained. [Paras 45, 46, 48]

Case Law Cited

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others
[1955] 1 SCR 1104 : (1954) 2 SCC 881; Association for
Democratic Reforms and another v. Union of India and
others [2024] 3 SCR 417 : WP (C) No. 880 of 2017,
decided on 15.02.2024 – followed.
Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2
SCR 572 : (2018) 3 SCC 1; Santosh Yadav v. Narender
Singh [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160;
Harsh Kumar v. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat and others
(2003) 7 SCC 709; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala v. K.T.C. Automobiles
[2016] 1 SCR 994 : (2016) 4 SCC 82; Surendra Kumar
Bhilawe v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2020] 7 SCR
39 : (2020) 18 SCC 224; Kisan Shankar Kathore v. Arun
Dattatray Sawant and others [2014] 7 SCR 258 : (2014)
14 SCC 162; Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra
and others [1955] 1 SCR 509 : (1954) 2 SCC 32; Kamta
Prasad Upadhyaya v. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari and others
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  399

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

(1969) 3 SCC 622; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash

Kushanrao Gorantyal and others [2020] 7 SCR 180 :
(2020) 7 SCC 1; Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju v.
Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy and others [2018]
9 SCR 164 : (2018) 14 SCC 1; Resurgence India v.
Election Commission of India and another [2013] 9 SCR
360 : (2014) 14 SCC 189; Union of India v. Association
for Democratic Reforms and another [2002] 3 SCR 696 :
(2002) 5 SCC 294; Lok Prahari through its General
Secretary S.N. Shukla v. Union of India and others [2018]
2 SCR 892 : (2018) 4 SCC 699; S. Rukmini Madegowda
v State Election Commission and others [2022] 12 SCR
1 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1218; Mairembam Prithviraj
alias Prithviraj Singh v. Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh
[2016] 9 SCR 687 : (2017) 2 SCC 487; People’s Union
for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and another v. Union of India
and another [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399;
Sambhu Prasad Sharma v. Charandas Mahant [2012]
6 SCR 356 : (2012) 11 SCC 390; Mangani Lal Mandal
v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari [2012] 1 SCR 527 : (2012) 3
SCC 314; L.R. Shivaramagowda and others v. T.M.
Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs and others [1998] Supp.
3 SCR 241 : (1999) 1 SCC 666 – referred to.

List of Acts
Representation of the People Act, 1951; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Election; Nomination; Disclosure of material particulars; Disclosure
of vehicles; Ownership transfer of vehicle; Corrupt practice; Undue
influence; Government accommodation; Non-due certificate;
Defective nomination; Dues of municipal/property taxes; Improper
acceptance; Election invalidation; Voter’s right to know.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2023 of the Gauhati High
Court at Itanagar Bench in Election Petition No. 01 (AP) of 2019
With
Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023
400 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Appearances for Parties

C.A. Sundaram, Arunabh Chowdhury, Sr. Advs., Simranjeet Singh,
Pulkit Gupta, Gautam Talukdar, Raushal Kumar, Ms. Apurbaa Dutta,
Lovenish Jagdhane, Zafar Inayat, Amol Chitale, Mrs. Pragya Baghel,
Mrs. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Vishal Banshal, Karma Dorjee, Abhishek
Roy, Dechen W Lachungpa, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Sushil Balwada, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, Ms. Tatini Basu, Boboy
Potsangbam, Gamso Billai, Kumar Shashank, Byrapaneni Suyodhan,
Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Sanjay Kumar, J
1. In the year 2019, Karikho Kri, an independent candidate, Dr.
Mohesh Chai, candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party, and Nuney
Tayang, candidate of the Indian National Congress, contested
the election to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from
44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency. The election was held on
11.04.2019 and Karikho Kri emerged victorious with 7538 votes,
while Dr. Mohesh Chai secured 7383 votes and Nuney Tayang
secured 1088 votes.
2. Nuney Tayang filed Election Petition No. 01(AP) of 2019 before the
Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram
and Arunachal Pradesh, seeking a declaration that the election of
Karikho Kri was void on the grounds mentioned in Sections 100(1)
(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1951’). He also sought a
consequential declaration that he stood duly elected from the said
constituency.
3. By judgment and order dated 17.07.2023, a learned Judge of the
Itanagar Bench of the High Court allowed the election petition in
part, declaring the election of Karikho Kri void under Sections 100(1)
(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951, but rejecting
the prayer of Nuney Tayang to declare him duly elected, as he
had not led any evidence to prove the allegations levelled by him
against Dr. Mohesh Chai, the candidate with the second highest
number of votes.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  401

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

4. Aggrieved thereby, Karikho Kri filed Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023
before this Court and Nuney Tayang filed Civil Appeal No. 4716 of
2023. These appeals were filed under Section 116A of the Act of 1951
5. While ordering notice in both the appeals on 31.07.2023, in exercise
of power under Section 116B(2) of the Act of 1951, this Court directed
that an election should not be held for the subject Constituency
which was represented by Karikho Kri and permitted him to enjoy
all the privileges as a Member of the House and of the constituted
committees but restrained him from casting his vote on the floor of
the House or in any of the committees wherein he participated as
an MLA.
6. Thereafter, during the course of the hearing of these appeals, Karikho
Kri filed I.A. No. 73161 of 2024, as a fresh schedule for election to
the Legislative Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh was
notified on 16.03.2024 and he wished to contest in the election that
is proposed to be held on 19.04.2024. He sought leave to contest
as a candidate in the upcoming assembly election in the State of
Arunachal Pradesh during the pendency of this appeal. By order
dated 20.03.2024, this Court opined that a strong prima facie case
had been made out by him and, in the light of the said fact, stayed
the operation of the impugned judgment. This Court also made it
clear that any steps taken by Karikho Kri in view of the stay order
would be subject to the final decision that would be taken upon
conclusion of the hearing of these appeals.
7. In his election petition, Nuney Tayang claimed that the nomination
submitted by Karikho Kri was improperly accepted by the Returning
Officer, Tezu, as he did not disclose material particulars in his Affidavit
filed in Form No.26 appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules,
1961. The High Court framed nine issues for determination in the
election petition and ultimately held against Karikho Kri on Issue
Nos. 1 (in part), 4, 5, 6 (in part), 7 and 8. Issue No.9 pertained to the
relief claimed by Nuney Tayang. The relevant ‘Issues’ read as under:
‘1. Whether there has been a non-disclosure of
ownership of Hero Honda CD Dawn Motorcycle
owned by the returned candidate, Shri Karikho
Kri bearing registration No. AR-11-2446; Kinetic
Zing Scooty owned by the wife of the returned
candidate, Smti. Bagilu Kri bearing registration No.
402 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

AR-11-4474; Van, Maruti Omni Ambulance owned

by the wife of the returned candidate, Smti. Bagilu
Kri bearing registration No. AR-11A-3100 and TVS
Star City Motorcycle owned by Shri Goshinso Kri,
the son of the returned candidate Shri Karikho Kri
bearing registration No. AR- 11-6581, as is required
to be disclosed under Clause 7(vi) of the Conduct
of Election Rules, 1961, rendering the nomination of
the returned candidate invalid?
4. Whether there has been a non-submission of no
dues certificate with regard to Electricity Charges
required to be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(b) of
Form No. 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961,
as the respondent No. 1 was in occupation of MLA
Cottage No. 1 at ‘E’ Sector, Itanagar, from the year,
2009- 2014, while the respondent No. 1 was an MLA
of Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency during the year,
2009-2014?
5. Whether the statements made by the respondent No.
1 about the liability of himself and his wife in respect
of Municipal Tax, Property Tax, due and grand total of
all govt. dues against Serial No. 6 & 8 of the table in
Para-8(A) of the affidavit in Form No. 26 appended
to the nomination paper of the respondent No. 1
has rendered the nomination of respondent No. 1,
defective?
6. Whether the non-disclosure of assets both movable
and immovable belonging to the respondent No. 1,
his wife, his mother and his two sons in the affidavit
in Form No. 26 appended to the nomination paper
amounted to commission of corrupt practice of undue
influence within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951?
7. Whether the election of respondent No. 1 to the
44- Tezu(ST) Assembly Constituency is liable to
be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951?
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  403

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

8. Whether the nature of non-disclosure alleged by the

Election petitioner is of a substantial nature effecting
the election of the returned candidate/respondent
No. 1?
9. What consequential relief the petitioner is entitled
to, if any?’
8. Nuney Tayang examined 7 witnesses, including himself as PW7.
Karikho Kri examined 39 witnesses, including himself as DW1A. Dr.
Mohesh Chai did not choose to contest the case before the High Court,
despite service of notice. Before us, however, he is duly represented
by learned counsel and also filed his replies in both the appeals.
9. The High Court held against Karikho Kri on Issue No 1, in relation to
three out of the four vehicles, viz., the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing
No. AR-11/4474 and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100,
both registered in the name of Bagilu Kri, his wife, and the TVS Star
City Motorcycle bearing No. AR-11/6851, registered in the name of
Goshinso Kri, his second son. The High Court was of the opinion that,
notwithstanding the sale of the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing No. AR-
11/4474 in 2009 and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100
in the year 2017 and the gifting of the TVS Star City Motorcycle
bearing No. AR-11/6851 in 2014, these vehicles continued to stand
in the names of Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri, the dependent wife
and son of Karikho Kri, on the relevant date. Upon considering the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, ‘the Act of
1988’) and the decision of this Court in Naveen Kumar vs. Vijay
Kumar and others1, the High Court concluded that the person in
whose name the motor vehicle stood registered should be treated as
the owner thereof. In consequence, it was held that, as on the date
of presentation of his nomination on 22.03.2019 and its scrutiny on
26.03.2019, the above three vehicles were owned by the dependent
wife and son of Karikho Kri but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit
in Form No. 26 filed by him.
10. On Issue No. 4 with regard to non-submission of a ‘No Dues
Certificate’ in the context of electricity and water charges, etc., that
was required to be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(B) of Form No. 26,

1 [2018] 2 SCR 572 : (2018) 3 SCC 1

404 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

the High Court noted that Karikho Kri had occupied government
accommodation in MLA Cottage No.1 at ‘E’ Sector, Itanagar, from
2009 to 2014, as the MLA of Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency during
those years. According to Karikho Kri, he lost the election in 2014
and vacated the said accommodation. He claimed that when he
filed his nomination for the Assembly Election in 2014, he obtained
a ‘No Dues Certificate’ after clearing the dues and submitted it. As
there were no outstanding dues thereafter and he did not occupy
government accommodation, he stated that he did not disclose the
same. As Karikho Kri admitted such non-disclosure in his Affidavit in
Form No. 26, the High Court held against him on this count.
11. As regards Issue No. 5, pertaining to the liability of Karikho Kri and
his wife in respect of their dues of municipal and property taxes,
the High Court found that Karikho Kri had disclosed the taxes due
and payable by him and his wife in one part of the Affidavit in Form
No.26 submitted by him, but failed to do so in another part thereof.
He disclosed the dues in Part A, Clause 8 (vi) and (viii), but failed to
disclose it in Clause 9 in Part B. Though the High Court held against
Karikho Kri even on this count, Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, learned
senior counsel, appearing for Nuney Tayang, fairly stated that he
would not be pressing this ground as there was disclosure of the
dues at least in one part of the Affidavit in Form No. 26.
12. As regards Issue No. 6, i.e., whether non-disclosure of the three
vehicles, registered in the names of his dependent wife and second
son, by Karikho Kri in his Affidavit in Form No. 26 amounted to
commission of a corrupt practice as per Section 123(2) of the Act
of 1951, the High Court referred to case law and held that such
non-disclosure amounted to a corrupt practice within the meaning
of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951.
13. The High Court then considered Issue No. 7, i.e., whether the election
of Karikho Kri was liable to be declared void under Section 100(1)
(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 and opined that when the nomination of the
returned candidate was shown to have been improperly accepted
by the Returning Officer, there is no necessity to further prove that
the election was ‘materially affected’. As the High Court was of the
opinion that the nomination of Karikho Kri had, in fact, been improperly
accepted by the Returning Officer, Tezu, his election was held liable
to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  405

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

14. On Issue No. 8 - as to whether the non-disclosures by Karikho Kri were

of a substantial nature affecting his election, the High Court observed
that disclosure of information as per Form No. 26 of the Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961, was fundamental to the concept of free and fair
elections and, therefore, the solemnity thereof could not be ridiculed
by offering incomplete information or suppressing material information,
resulting in disinformation and misinformation to the voters.
15. Coming to Issue No. 9, i.e., as to what consequential relief Nuney
Tayang would be entitled to, if any, the High Court noted that Nuney
Tayang had secured the least number of votes out of the three
candidates and though he made allegations to the effect that Dr.
Mohesh Chai had failed to disclose the properties belonging to his
mother in his Affidavit in Form No. 26, the High Court found that Nuney
Tayang had failed to lead any evidence in proof of this statement
and, as such, there was no material to hold that Dr. Mohesh Chai’s
mother was even his dependent. On that basis, the High Court held
that no judgment could be pronounced against Dr. Mohesh Chai,
solely on the basis of the pleadings and allegations made by Nuney
Tayang in his election petition. In consequence, Nuney Tayang was
held disentitled to relief by way of a declaration that he had been
duly elected from 44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency.
16. It is well-settled that the success of a winning candidate at an
election should not be lightly interfered with (See Santosh Yadav
vs. Narender Singh2 and Harsh Kumar vs. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat
and others3). The issue before us presently is as to the validity of
the High Court’s findings that the grounds under Sections 100(1)(b),
100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 were established,
warranting invalidation of the election of Karikho Kri. Further, the
finding of the High Court on Issue No. 6, that Karikho Kri committed
a ‘corrupt practice’ within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the Act
of 1951 also requires to be examined.
17. Section 33 of the Act of 1951 deals with ‘presentation of nomination
papers and the requirements for a valid nomination’. Scrutiny of such
nominations is undertaken by the Returning Officers under Section 36
of the Act of 1951. To the extent relevant, Section 36 reads as under:

2 [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160

3 (2003) 7 SCC 709
406 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

‘36. Scrutiny of nomination:-

‘1. On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under
section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one
proposer of each candidate, and one other person duly
authorised in writing by each candidate but no other person,
may attend at such time and place as the returning officer
may appoint; and the returning officer shall give them all
reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers
of all candidates which have been delivered within the time
and in the manner laid down in section 33.
2. The returning officer shall then examine the nomination
papers and shall decide all objections which may be made
to any nomination and may, either on such objection or
on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as
he thinks necessary, reject any nomination on any of the
following grounds:—
(a) ….. or
(b) ….. or
(c) …..
3 .…..
4. The returning officer shall not reject any nomination
paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a
substantial character.
5. …..
6 The returning officer shall endorse on each nomination
paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same and, if
the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in writing a
brief statement of his reasons for such rejection.
7. …..
8. Immediately after all the nomination papers have been
scrutinized and decisions accepting or rejecting the same
have been recorded, the returning officer shall prepare a list
of validly nominated candidates, that is to say, candidates
whose nominations have been found valid, and affix it to
his notice board.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  407

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

18. In terms of Section 36(4) above, a Returning Officer is under a

mandate not to reject a nomination paper for a defect unless it is of
substantial character. Significantly, Nuney Tayang raised objections
to the candidature of Karikho Kri by way of his written representation
dated 26.03.2019. Therein, he raised the issue of non-submission of
a ‘No Dues Certificate’ in respect of the government accommodation
occupied by Karikho Kri during his tenure as an MLA from 2009 to
2014. He also raised the issue of non-disclosure of the vehicles,
mentioned in Issue No. 1. By his reply dated 26.03.2019, Karikho
Kri informed the Returning Officer, Tezu, that the vehicles, viz., the
Kinetic Zing Scooty and the Maruti Omni Van standing in the name
of his wife had already been disposed of as was the TVS Star City
Motorcycle standing in the name of his dependent second son, which
had been gifted away. As regards the non-submission of a ‘No Dues
Certificate’, Karikho Kri asserted that there were no outstanding
dues against any government accommodation in his name. Karikho
Kri submitted documents with his explanation, including those
pertaining to the transfer of the vehicles in question as well as the
‘No Dues Certificates’ of 2014. Thereafter, Karikho Kri filed before
the High Court, Certificates issued in 2019 by the Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Limited; the Department of Power, Government of Arunachal
Pradesh; and the Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Arunachal
Pradesh, confirming that there were no outstanding dues. In effect
and in fact, there were no dues payable by Karikho Kri in relation to
the Government accommodation occupied by him earlier.
19. In any event, it appears that the Returning Officer concerned, being
satisfied with the explanation and documents submitted by Karikho
Kri, accepted his nomination. No doubt, this preliminary exercise on
the part of the Returning Officer did not preclude the Election Tribunal,
viz., the High Court, from examining as to whether the acceptance
of Karikho Kri’s nomination was improper and, in consequence,
whether it would have an impact on his election under the relevant
provisions of the Act of 1951. Section 100(1) thereof enumerates
the grounds on which an election can be invalidated. To the extent
relevant, it reads as under:
‘100. Grounds for declaring election to be void:-
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High
Court is of opinion—
408 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(a) …..; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a
returned candidate or his election agent or by any other
person with the consent of a returned candidate or his
election agent; or
(c)…..; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns
a returned candidate, has been materially affected—
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination,
or
(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests
of the returned candidate by an agent other than
his election agent, or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection
of any vote or the reception of any vote which
is void, or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of
the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or
orders made under this Act, the High Court shall
declare the election of the returned candidate
to be void.’
20. The High Court held against Karikho Kri not only under Sections
100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) but also under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act of
1951, as it was of the opinion that his failure to disclose the three
vehicles, that still stood registered in the names of his dependent
family members, amounted to a corrupt practice. Insofar as Section
100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951 is concerned, the requirement thereof
for the purpose of invalidating the election of the returned candidate
is that the High Court must form an opinion that a ‘corrupt practice’
was committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or any
other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election
agent. Section 123 of the Act of 1951 inclusively defines ‘corrupt
practices’, by stating that what have been enumerated thereunder
shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of the Act
of 1951. Insofar as the present case is concerned, Section 123(2)
of the Act of 1951 is of relevance. This provision reads as under:
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  409

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

‘123. Corrupt practices.—

The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for
the purposes of this Act:—
……
(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect
interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the
candidate or his agent, or of any other person with the
consent of the candidate or his election agent, with the
free exercise of any electoral right:
……’
21. The High Court opined that non-disclosure of the Kinetic Zing
Scooty and the Maruti Omni Van that had belonged to Bagilu Kri
and the TVS Star City Motorcycle that had belonged to Goshinso
Kri, the dependent wife and son of Krikho Kri, was sufficient in itself
to constitute ‘undue influence’, thereby attracting Section 123(2) of
the Act of 1951. However, what is of significance is that the High
Court did not doubt that these vehicles had been sold or gifted long
before the submission of the nomination by Karikho Kri in 2019.
This is clear from the observations in Para 13 (xiii) of the judgment,
wherein the High Court observed: ‘….at the time of presentation of
nomination paper of respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of
the nomination paper on 26.03.2019, notwithstanding the aforesaid
vehicles were gifted/sold to other persons by Smti. Bagilu Kri, wife of
respondent No. 1 as well as Shri. Goshinso Kri, son of respondent No.
1; it has now become imperative to decide as to who was the owner
of the aforesaid vehicles at the time presentation of the nomination
paper by the respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of the
nomination paper on 26.03.2019’. This finding of the High Court has
attained finality as Nuney Tayang did not choose to challenge the
same before this Court.
22. Though it appears that the three vehicles in question still remained
registered in the names of the wife and son of Karikho Kri, the question
that arises is as to whether non-disclosure of such vehicles justified
the attributing of a corrupt practice to Karikho Kri and the negating
of his election on that ground. The High Court assumed that the
non-disclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or
his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute
410 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

undue influence. In this context, the High Court placed reliance on

the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the decision of this Court in
Naveen Kumar (supra). Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988 defines
the owner of a vehicle as under:
‘ “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle
stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the
guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle
which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an
agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the
person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;’
In Naveen Kumar (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court was
dealing with the issue as to who would be the owner of an offending
vehicle in the context of the Act of 1988 when a claim arises from
an accident involving the said vehicle. ‘Owner’, as defined under
Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, was considered and it was opined
that the person in whose name a vehicle stands registered would
be the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act. Reference
was made to Section 50 of the Act of 1988, which deals with transfer
of ownership, and to various earlier decisions in that regard and it
was observed thus:
‘13. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges
from the above decisions is that in view of the definition
of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30), it is the person
in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who,
for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the
“owner”..……In a situation such as the present where the
registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but
continues to be reflected in the records of the Registering
Authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand
absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced
the definition of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30),
making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in
the earlier 1939 Act. The principle underlying the provisions
of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in
the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim
should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for
compensation ought not to be burdened with following
a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  411

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

with the Registering Authority. To hold otherwise would

be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act.
Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the
fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the
first respondent was the “owner” of the vehicle involved
in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The
liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him.
Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured.’
(emphasis is ours)
23. Notably, the High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment
was rendered in the context of and for the purposes of the Act of
1988 and not for general application. The judgment itself made
it clear that despite the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a
claimant or claimants should not be made to run from pillar to post
to find out who was the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the
accident, if the sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by
the authorities concerned by registering the name of the subsequent
owner, be it for whatever reason. Further, vehicles being goods,
their sale would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods
Act, 1930 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1930’), and the same make it clear
that conveyance of ownership of the vehicle would stand concluded
upon execution of the document of sale/transfer and registration of
the new owner by the authorities concerned would be a post-sale
event. Section 2(7) of the Act of 1930 defines goods, inter alia, to
mean every kind of movable property, other than actionable claims
and money. Chapter III of the Act of 1930 is titled ‘Effects of the
Contract’ and ‘Transfer of property as between seller and buyer’.
Section 18 therein states that where there is a contract for the sale
of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is transferred to
the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. Section 19,
however, states that the property passes when intended to pass and
elaborates that, where there is a contract for the sale of specific or
ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer
at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.
24. In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Thiruvananthapuram,
Kerala vs. K.T.C. Automobiles4, this Court observed that registration

4 [2016] 1 SCR 994 : (2016) 4 SCC 82

412 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

of a motor vehicle is a post-sale event but the question would arise

as to when the property in the motor vehicle actually passed to the
buyer. That was a case involving the first sale of a motor vehicle by
the dealer to the first owner and is, therefore, distinguishable from
the subsequent sale of a vehicle, as in the case on hand. It was
observed therein that registration of a motor vehicle is a post-sale
event but only after obtaining valid registration under the Act of 1988,
a purchaser would get entitlement to use the vehicle in a public
place. It was observed that the purchaser, as an owner under the Act
of 1988, was obliged to obtain the certificate of registration, which
alone would entitle him to enjoy the possession of the vehicle by
using it in public places after meeting the other statutory obligations
of insurance, etc. This Court rejected the contention that motor
vehicles would be ‘unascertained goods’ till their engine number or
chassis number is entered in the Certificate of Registration, as the
sale invoice itself would disclose such particulars, so that the owner
of the vehicle may apply for registration of that specific vehicle in
his name. However, owing to the statutory provisions governing
motor vehicles, this Court held that an intending owner or buyer of
a motor vehicle cannot ascertain the particulars of the vehicle for
appropriating it to the contract of sale till its possession is handed
over to him after observing the requirements of the Act of 1988 and
the rules framed thereunder and such possession can be given
only at the registration office immediately preceding the registration.
Owing to the aforestated legal position, this Court held that, prior
to getting possession of the motor vehicle, the intending purchaser/
owner would not have a claim over any ‘ascertained motor vehicle’.
The observations in this judgment would, however, have to be
understood in the context of the first sale of a vehicle by the dealer,
i.e., where such vehicle has no registration whatsoever as opposed
to the subsequent sale of a registered vehicle.
25. Presently, insofar as the Scooty bearing No. AR-11/4474 is concerned,
it stood in the name of Bagilu Kri but Md. Nizammudin (DW5)
deposed that he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold it as such
to Promod Prasad (DW6). In turn, Promod Prasad (DW6) confirmed
that he bought the Scooty as scrap from Md. Nizammudin (DW5).
During their cross-examination, nothing was elicited from these
witnesses to doubt their claims. However, letter dated 20.09.2019
addressed by the District Transport Officer, Lohit District, Tezu,
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  413

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

to Bagilu Kri, manifests that the registration of the Scooty in her

name stood cancelled only at that time. The taxes in respect of this
Scooty were paid till 26.03.2022, as borne out by Treasury Challan
No. 4806 dated 30.08.2019. Though much was argued about this
payment of taxes and the fact that the receipt was issued in the
name of Bagilu Kri, we are not inclined to give any weightage to
it. The payment was made after the filing of the election petition
and any person could have done so. The receipt therefor would
automatically be generated in the name of the registered owner. We
may also note that in relation to the other two vehicles in question,
there were actual documents of conveyance and also proof of the
requisite forms prescribed under the Act of 1988 being duly filled in
and issued by Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri. Form No. 29, relating
to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle by the registered owner,
viz., the transferor, was issued in respect of each of these vehicles
but despite the same, the transferees did not do the needful to get
their own names registered as the owners.
26. In Surendra Kumar Bhilawe vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.5,
the issue before this Court was as to whether an insurance company
would be liable to cover the claim arising out of an accident on the
ground that the vehicle was sold to another long before the date of
the accident but the insured continued to be the registered owner
of the vehicle. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Naveen
Kumar (supra), it was observed that the policy of insurance was a
comprehensive policy which covered third-party risks as well and,
therefore, the insurer could not repudiate one part of the policy with
regard to reimbursing the owner for losses when it could not evade
liability to third parties under the same contract of insurance. In view
of the definition of ‘owner’ in Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, this
Court observed that the registered owner of the truck, on the date
of the accident, was the insured and, therefore, the insurer could not
avoid its liability for the losses suffered by the owner, on the ground
of transfer of ownership. This Court held that it is difficult to accept
that a person who transferred the ownership of a goods vehicle, on
receipt of consideration, would not report the transfer or apply for
transfer of registration and thereby continue to incur the risks and
liabilities of ownership of the said vehicle under the provisions of law,

5 [2020] 7 SCR 39 : (2020) 18 SCC 224

414 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

including the Act of 1988. This Court further observed that it is equally
incredible that an owner of a vehicle who has paid consideration
to acquire it would not insist on transfer of the permit and thereby
expose himself to the penal consequences of operating a goods
vehicle without a valid permit. This Court, accordingly, held that
the registered owner continues to remain the owner and when the
vehicle is insured in the name of such registered owner, the insurer
would remain liable notwithstanding the transfer. This judgment is
clearly inapplicable to the case on hand as it dealt with the liability of
an insurer in the event of an accident involving the vehicle. Further,
as already noted, the vehicles in question were transferred and
the requisite forms, insofar as the transferor was concerned, were
filled up and issued but it was the transferees who failed to get the
vehicles transferred in their own names.
27. Mere failure to get registered the name of the new owner of an already
registered vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would
stand invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed
over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated
as still being in the possession and control of the former owner. Once
it is accepted that the three vehicles in question were either gifted or
sold before the filing of the nomination by Karikho Kri, the said vehicles
cannot be considered to be still owned by Karikho Kri’s wife and son
for purposes other than those covered by the Act of 1988. However,
the High Court did not take note of this distinguishing factor in the case
on hand. In Kisan Shankar Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant and
others6, the vehicle, details of which had been suppressed by the
returned candidate, was actually owned and possessed by his wife
and such suppression was, accordingly, held against him. Presently,
the High Court itself concluded that the three vehicles in question were
transferred, be it by way of sale or gift. The vehicles were, therefore, not
owned and possessed in praesenti by the dependent family members
of Karikho Kri at the time of the filing of his nomination. This point of
distinction was completely lost sight of by the High Court but, in our
considered opinion, it made all the difference.
28. Therefore, non-disclosure of the three vehicles in question could not
be held against Karikho Kri in the light of the aforestated analysis.

6 [2014] 7 SCR 258 : (2014) 14 SCC 162

[2024] 4 S.C.R.  415

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Such non-disclosure cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated

as an attempt on his part to unduly influence the voters, thereby
inviting the wrath of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951. We may note
that Karikho Kri had declared the value of the movable assets of
his dependent family members and himself as ₹8,41,87,815/-. The
value of the three vehicles in question, by comparison, would be a
mere miniscule of this figure. In any event, suppression of the value
of these three vehicles would have no impact on the declaration of
wealth by Karikho Kri and such non-disclosure could not be said to
amount to ‘undue influence’.
29. Coming to the next ground, if the acceptance of a nomination is found
to be improper and it materially affects the result of the election in
so far as the returned candidate is concerned, Section 100(1)(d)(i)
of the Act of 1951 would come into play. It would be appropriate and
apposite at this stage for us to take note of precedential law on this
point. In Vashist Narain Sharma vs. Dev Chandra and others7, a
3-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the burden of proving that
the improper acceptance of a nomination has materially affected the
result of an election would arise in one of three ways: (i) where the
candidate whose nomination was improperly accepted had secured
less votes than the difference between the returned candidate and
the candidate securing the next highest number of votes, (ii) where
the person referred to above secured more votes, or (iii) where
the person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is the
returned candidate himself. It was held that in the first case the
result of the election would not be materially affected because if all
the wasted votes were added to the votes of the candidate securing
the next highest votes, it would make no difference to the result and
the returned candidate would retain the seat. However, in the other
two cases, the result may be materially affected and insofar as the
third case is concerned, it may be readily conceded that such would
be the conclusion.
30. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others8,
a Constitution Bench of 7 Judges considered the scope of enquiry
under Section 100(1)(d) of the Act of 1951. It was observed that the

7 [1955] 1 SCR 509 : (1954) 2 SCC 32

8 [1955] 1 SCR 1104 (1954) 2 SCC 881
416 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

said provision required, before an order setting aside an election

could be made, that two conditions be satisfied. It must, firstly, be
shown that there has been improper reception or refusal of a vote
or reception of any vote which is void, or non-compliance with the
provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951, or any rules or
orders made thereunder, relating to the election or any mistake in
the use of the prescribed form and it must further be shown that, as
a consequence thereof, the result of the election has been materially
affected. The Bench observed that the two conditions are cumulative
and must both be established. It was further observed that the burden
of establishing them is on the person who seeks to have the election
set aside. Reference was also made to Vashist Narain (supra).
31. In Kamta Prasad Upadhyaya vs. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari and others9,
another 3-Judge Bench of this Court affirmed the legal position settled
by Vashist Narain (supra). Again, in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs.
Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others10, a 3-Judge Bench of
this Court affirmed the view taken in Vashist Narain (supra) that,
where a person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is
the returned candidate himself, it may be readily conceded that the
conclusion has to be that the result of the election was ‘materially
affected’ without their being any necessity to plead and prove the
same.
32. In Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra
Reddy and others11, another 3-Judge Bench of this Court affirmed
that if there are more than two candidates and if the nomination of
one of the defeated candidates has been improperly accepted, a
question might arise as to whether the result of the election of the
returned candidate has been materially affected by such improper
reception but that would not be so in the case of challenge to the
election of the returned candidate himself on the ground of improper
acceptance of his nomination.
33. Ergo, if acceptance of the nomination of the returned candidate is
shown to be improper, it would automatically mean that the same
materially affected the result of the election and nothing more needs

9 (1969) 3 SCC 622

10 [2020] 7 SCR 180 : (2020) 7 SCC 1
11 [2018] 9 SCR 164 : (2018) 14 SCC 1
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  417

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

to be pleaded or proved. However, whether acceptance of the

nomination of Karikho Kri was actually improper is the main issue
that requires to be addressed by us.
34. We may also take note of curial wisdom on the issue as to what
would be the defects that would taint a nomination to the extent of
rendering its acceptance improper. In Resurgence India vs. Election
Commission of India and another12, a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court observed that if the Election Commission accepts nomination
papers in spite of blank particulars therein, it would directly violate
the fundamental right of the citizen to know the criminal antecedents,
assets, liabilities and educational qualifications of the candidate. It was
observed that accepting an affidavit with such blanks would rescind the
verdict in Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms
and another13. In effect, the Bench held that filing of an affidavit
with blank particulars would render the affidavit nugatory. In Kisan
Shankar Kathore (supra), the issue before this Court was whether
non-disclosure of certain government dues in the nomination would
amount to a material lapse impacting the election of the returned
candidate. On facts, this Court found that the non-disclosure of
electricity and municipal dues was not a serious lapse as there was
a dispute raised in the context thereof. Having said so, this Court
clarified that it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case as to whether such non-disclosure would amount to a
material lapse or not. This Court, however, found that there were,
in fact, material lapses by the returned candidate, inasmuch as he
had failed to disclose the bungalow standing in the name of his
wife and also a vehicle owned by her. Further, he had also failed to
disclose his interest/share in a partnership firm which amounted to a
very serious and major lapse. The observations of this Court, in the
context of improper acceptance of his nomination, are of relevance:
‘43.When the information is given by a candidate in
the affidavit filed along with the nomination paper and
objections are raised thereto questioning the correctness
of the information or alleging that there is non-disclosure
of certain important information, it may not be possible

12 [2013] 9 SCR 360 : (2014) 14 SCC 189

13 [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294
418 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

for the Returning Officer at that time to conduct a detailed

examination. Summary enquiry may not suffice. The present
case is itself an example which loudly demonstrates this. At
the same time, it would not be possible for the Returning
Officer to reject the nomination for want of verification about
the allegations made by the objector. In such a case, when
ultimately it is proved that it was a case of non-disclosure
and either the affidavit was false or it did not contain
complete information leading to suppression, it can be held
at that stage that the nomination was improperly accepted.
Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Election Commission, rightly argued that such an
enquiry can be only at a later stage and the appropriate
stage would be in an election petition as in the instant
case, when the election is challenged. The grounds stated
in Section 36(2) are those which can be examined there
and then and on that basis the Returning Officer would be
in a position to reject the nomination. Likewise, where the
blanks are left in an affidavit, nomination can be rejected
there and then. In other cases where detailed enquiry is
needed, it would depend upon the outcome thereof, in an
election petition, as to whether the nomination was properly
accepted or it was a case of improper acceptance. Once it
is found that it was a case of improper acceptance, as there
was misinformation or suppression of material i`nformation,
one can state that question of rejection in such a case was
only deferred to a later date. When the Court gives such a
finding, which would have resulted in rejection, the effect
would be same, namely, such a candidate was not entitled
to contest and the election is void. Otherwise, it would be an
anomalous situation that even when criminal proceedings
under Section 125-A of the Act can be initiated and the
selected candidate is criminally prosecuted and convicted,
but the result of his election cannot be questioned. This
cannot be countenanced.’
35. In Lok Prahari through its General Secretary S.N. Shukla vs.
Union of India and others14, this Court observed that non-disclosure

14 [2018] 2 SCR 892 : (2018) 4 SCC 699

[2024] 4 S.C.R.  419

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

of assets and sources of income of candidates and their associates

would constitute a corrupt practice falling under the heading ‘undue
influence’, as defined under Section 123 (2) of the Act of 1951. In
S. Rukmini Madegowda vs. State Election Commission and
others15, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that a false
declaration with regard to the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse
or dependents, would constitute a corrupt practice irrespective of its
impact on the election of the candidate as it may be presumed that
a false declaration would impact the election.
36. In Mairembam Prithviraj alias Prithviraj Singh vs. Pukhrem
Sharatchandra Singh16, this Court noted that there is a difference
between improper acceptance of the nomination of a returned
candidate as opposed to improper acceptance of the nomination of
any other candidate. It was observed that a mere finding that there
has been an improper acceptance of a nomination would not be
sufficient for a declaration that the election is void under Section
100(1)(d)(i) and there has to be further pleading and proof that
the result of the election of the returned candidate was materially
affected, but there would be no necessity of any such proof in the
event of the nomination of the returned candidate being declared as
having been improperly accepted, especially in a case where there
are only two candidates in the fray.
37. In Association for Democratic Reforms and another vs. Union
of India and others17, a Constitution Bench affirmed that, in terms
of the earlier judgments in Association for Democratic Reforms
and another (supra) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties
(PUCL) and another vs. Union of India and another18, the right
of voters to information, which is traceable to Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, is built upon the jurisprudence that information which
furthers democratic participation must be provided to citizens and
voters have a right to information which would enable them to cast
their votes rationally and intelligently because voting is one of the
foremost forms of democratic participation. It was further observed

15 [2022] 12 SCR 1 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1218

16 [2016] 9 SCR 687 : (2017) 2 SCC 487
17 [2024] 3 SCR 417 : W.P. (C) No. 880 of 2017, decided on 15.02.2024
18 [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399
420 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

that voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is

‘essential’ for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast.
38. In his Affidavit in Form No. 26, Karikho Kri was required to state as
to whether he had been in occupation of accommodation provided by
the Government at any time during the last 10 years before the date
of notification of the current election and, if so, he was to furnish a
declaration to the effect that there were no dues payable in respect
of the said accommodation in relation to rent, electricity charges,
water charges and telephone charges. Karikho Kri, however, failed
to disclose the fact that he had been in occupation of government
accommodation during his tenure as an MLA between 2009 and 2014.
He stated ‘Not applicable’. However, with regard to the declaration
as to there being no dues, he mentioned the date ‘22.03.2019’ and
stated that the dues in respect of rent, electricity charges, water
charges and telephone charges were ‘Nil’. After Nuney Tayang raised
an objection to his candidature on this ground, Karikho Kri filed the
requisite ‘No Due Certificates’ of 2014.
39. However, the High Court was of the opinion that the failure of
Karikho Kri to disclose the factum of his occupying government
accommodation from 2009 to 2014 and his failure to submit the ‘No
Dues Certificate’ in relation to such government accommodation was
sufficient, in itself, to infer that his nomination was defective and,
in consequence, the acceptance thereof by the Returning Officer,
Tezu, was improper.
40. Having considered the issue, we are of the firm view that every
defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of
such character as to render its acceptance improper and each case
would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar as that aspect
is concerned. The case law on the subject also manifests that this
Court has always drawn a distinction between non-disclosure of
substantial issues as opposed to insubstantial issues, which may
not impact one’s candidature or the result of an election. The very
fact that Section 36(4) of the Act of 1951 speaks of the Returning
Officer not rejecting a nomination unless he is of the opinion that the
defect is of a substantial nature demonstrates that this distinction
must always be kept in mind and there is no absolute mandate that
every non-disclosure, irrespective of its gravity and impact, would
automatically amount to a defect of substantial nature, thereby
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  421

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

materially affecting the result of the election or amounting to ‘undue

influence’ so as to qualify as a corrupt practice.
41. The decision of this Court in Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra), also
demonstrates this principle, as this Court undertook examination of
several individual defects in the nomination of the returned candidate
and found that some of them were actually insubstantial in character.
This Court noted that two facets required consideration – Whether
there is substantial compliance in disclosing requisite information
in the affidavits filed along with the nomination and whether non-
disclosure of information on identified aspects materially affected
the result of the election. This Court observed, on facts, that non-
disclosure of the electricity dues in that case was not a serious
lapse, despite the fact that there were dues outstanding, as there
was a bonafide dispute about the same. Similar was the observation
in relation to non-disclosure of municipal dues, where there was
a genuine dispute as to re-valuation and re-assessment for the
purpose of tax assessment. Earlier, in Sambhu Prasad Sharma
vs. Charandas Mahant19, this Court observed that the form of
the nomination paper is not considered sacrosanct and what is
to be seen is whether there is substantial compliance with the
requirement as to form and every departure from the prescribed
format cannot, therefore, be made a ground for the rejection of the
nomination paper.
42. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that there were no actual
outstanding dues payable by Karikho Kri in relation to the government
accommodation occupied by him earlier. His failure in disclosing
the fact that he had occupied such accommodation and in filing
the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in that regard, with his nomination form,
cannot be said to be a defect of any real import. More so, as he did
submit the relevant documents of 2014 after Nuney Tayang raised
an objection before the Returning Officer. His explanation that he
submitted such Certificates in the year 2014 when he stood for re-
election as an MLA is logical and worthy of acceptance. The most
important aspect to be noted is that there were no actual dues and
the failure of Karikho Kri to disclose that he had been in occupation
of government accommodation during the years 2009 to 2014 cannot

19 [2012] 6 SCR 356 : (2012) 11 SCC 390

422 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

be treated as a defect that is of substantial character so as to taint

his nomination and render its acceptance improper.
43. The High Court opined that the nomination of Karikho Kri was
improperly accepted by the Returning Officer as he had failed
to disclose the three vehicles in question, which continued to be
registered in the name of his dependent family members. Non-
submission of the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in respect of the government
accommodation occupied by him during his earlier tenure as an MLA
was also held to weigh against him. Lastly, the High Court held that
non-disclosure of the taxes due and payable by Karikho Kri and
his wife was a defect of substantial character and the same tainted
his nomination. In consequence, the High Court concluded that the
acceptance of Karikho Kri’s nomination by the Returning Officer was
improper and as he was the returned candidate, the question of
pleading and proving that such improper acceptance of his nomination
materially affected the result of the election did not arise.
44. Though it has been strenuously contended before us that the voter’s
‘right to know’ is absolute and a candidate contesting the election must
be forthright about all his particulars, we are not inclined to accept
the blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay his life out
threadbare for examination by the electorate. His ‘right to privacy’
would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to
the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. In that
respect, non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate
would not amount to a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial
character. It is not necessary that a candidate declare every item of
movable property that he or his dependent family members owns,
such as, clothing, shoes, crockery, stationery and furniture, etc., unless
the same is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or
reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to
be disclosed. Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities
and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when
the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate
would amount to a defect of a substantial character. For example, a
candidate and his family who own several high-priced watches, which
would aggregate to a huge figure in terms of monetary value, would
obviously have to disclose the same as they constitute an asset of
high value and also reflect upon his lavish lifestyle. Suppression of
the same would constitute ‘undue influence’ upon the voter as that
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  423

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

relevant information about the candidate is being kept away from the
voter. However, if a candidate and his family members each own a
simple watch, which is not highly priced, suppression of the value of
such watches may not amount to a defect at all. Each case would,
therefore, have to be judged on its own facts.
45. So far as the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 is
concerned, the provision requires that the established non-compliance
with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or any rules
or orders made thereunder necessarily has to be shown to have
materially affected the result of the election insofar as it concerns
the returned candidate. Significantly, the High Court linked all the
non-disclosures attributed to Karikho Kri to Section 100(1)(d)(i) of
the Act of 1951 but ultimately concluded that his election stood
invalidated under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) thereof. Surprisingly, there is
no discussion whatsoever on what were the violations which qualified
as non-compliance with the provisions of either the Constitution or
the Act of 1951 or the rules and orders framed thereunder, for the
purposes of Section 100(1)(d)(iv), and as to how the same materially
affected the result of the election.
46. In Mangani Lal Mandal vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari20, this Court held
that where a returned candidate is alleged to be guilty of non-compliance
with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or any rules
or orders made thereunder and his election is sought to be declared
void on that ground, it is essential for the election petitioner to aver,
by pleading material facts, that the result of the election insofar as
it concerned the returned candidate has been materially affected by
such breach or non-observance. It was further held that it is only on
the basis of such pleading and proof that the Court would be in a
position to form an opinion and record a finding that such breach or
non-compliance has materially affected the result of the election before
election of the returned candidate could be declared void. It was further
observed that mere non-compliance or breach of the Constitution or the
statutory provisions, as stated above, would not result in invalidating
the election of the returned candidate under Section 100 (1)(d)(iv) as
the sine qua non for declaring the election of a returned candidate to
be void on that ground under clause (iv) of Section 100 (1)(d) is further

20 [2012] 1 SCR 527 : (2012) 3 SCC 314

424 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

proof of the fact that such breach or non-observance has resulted

in materially affecting the election of the returned candidate. For the
election petitioner to succeed on such ground, viz., Section 100 (1)
(d)(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the breach but also show
that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the returned
candidate, has been materially affected thereby.
47. In L.R. Shivaramagowda and others vs. T.M. Chandrashekar
(Dead) by LRs and others21, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court pointed
out that in order to declare an election void under Section 100(1)
(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951, it is absolutely necessary for the election
petitioner to plead that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned
the returned candidate, has been materially affected by the alleged
non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of
1951 or the rules or orders made thereunder and the failure to plead
such material facts would be fatal to the election petition.
48. However, perusal of the election petition filed by Nuney Tayang
reflects that the only statement made by him in this regard is in
Paragraph 21 and it reads as follows:
‘……Hence, his nomination papers suffer from substantial
and material defects. As such, the result of the election,
insofar as the respondent No.1 is concerned, is materially
affected by the improper acceptance of his nomination
as well as by the non-compliance with the provisions of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the rules
and orders made thereunder, including Section 33(1) of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Rule 4A of
the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and the orders made
thereunder…...’
Again, in his ‘Ground No. (ii)’, Nuney Tayang stated as under:
‘…….As such, the nomination papers of the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 were improperly accepted by the Returning
Officer and the result of the election in question, insofar as
it concerns the respondent No.1 the return candidate, as
well as the respondent No.2, has been materially affected
by such improper acceptance of their nominations……’

21 [1998] Supp. 3 SCR 241 : (1999) 1 SCC 666

[2024] 4 S.C.R.  425

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Though there are some general references to non-compliance with

particular provisions of the Act of 1951 and the rules made thereunder,
we do not find adequate pleadings or proof to substantiate and satisfy
the requirements of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951. Therefore,
it is clear that Nuney Tayang tied up the improper acceptance of
Karikho Kri’s nomination, relatable to Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act
of 1951, with the non-compliance relatable to Section 100(1)(d)(iv)
thereof and he did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach
or how it materially affected the result of the election, in so far as it
concerned the returned candidate, Karikho Kri. It was not open to
Nuney Tayang to link up separate issues and fail to plead in detail
and adduce sufficient evidence in relation to the non-compliance that
would attract Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951. The finding of
the High Court in that regard is equally bereft of rhyme and reason
and cannot be sustained.
49. As regards the failure on the part of Karikho Kri to disclose the dues
of municipal/property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same
cannot be held to be a non-disclosure at all, inasmuch as he did
disclose the particulars of such dues in one part of his Affidavit but did
not do so in another part. In any event, as Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury,
learned senior counsel, fairly stated that he would not be pressing
this ground, we need not labour further upon this point.
50. On the above analysis, we hold that the High Court was in error in
concluding that sufficient grounds were made out under Sections
100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 to invalidate
the election of Karikho Kri and, further, in holding that non-disclosure
of the three vehicles, that still remained registered in the names of
his wife and son as on the date of filing of his nomination, amounted
to a ‘corrupt practice’ under Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951. In
consequence, we find no necessity to independently deal with Civil
Appeal No. 4716 of 2023 filed by Nuney Tayang, in the context of
denial of relief to him by the High Court, or the issues raised by Dr.
Mohesh Chai in the replies filed by him.
51. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023 filed by Karikho Kri is
allowed, setting aside the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2023
passed by the Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland,
Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh in Election Petition No.01(AP) of
2019. In consequence, the election of Karikho Kri as the returned
426 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

candidate from 44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency of the State of

Arunachal Pradesh is upheld.
As a corollary, Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023, filed by Nuney Tayang,
shall stand dismissed.
Pending applications in both the appeals, if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
This decision shall be intimated to the Election Commission of India
and to the Chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the State of
Arunachal Pradesh forthwith, as required by Section 116C(2) of the
Act of 1951.
An authenticated copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Election
Commission of India forthwith.
Parties shall bear their own costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals disposed of.
 [2024] 4 S.C.R. 394 : 2024 INSC 289

Karikho Kri
v.
Nuney Tayang and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023)
09 April 2024
[Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

In the year 2019, appellant-KK an independent candidate emerged
victorious in Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from 44 Tezu
(ST) Assembly Constituency. The issue arising for consideration
is as to the validity of the High Court’s findings that grounds u/ss.
100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 were established, warranting invalidation of
the election of KK.

Headnotes
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss. 100(1)(b), 100(1)
(d)(i), 123 – Election – Filing of nomination – Submission of
material particulars – Non-disclosure of three vehicles – High
Court held non-disclosure of vehicles as corrupt practice –
Correctness:
Held: The High Court was of opinion that appellant’s failure
to disclose the three vehicles (two scooty and van), that stood
registered in the names of his dependent family members, amounted
to a corrupt practice – The High Court assumed that the non-
disclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or
his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute
undue influence – One scooty was in name of wife of the appellant,
DW5 deposed that he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold
it to DW6 – DW6 confirmed the same – In relation to other two
vehicles in question, there were actual documents of conveyance
and also proof of the requisite forms prescribed under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 being duly filled in by wife and son of appellant
– Form No. 29, relating to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle
by the registered owner, viz., the transferor, was issued in respect
of each of these vehicles but despite the same, the transferees
did not do the needful to get their own names registered as the
owners – Once it is accepted that the three vehicles in question
* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  395

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

were either gifted or sold before the filing of the nomination by

KK, the said vehicles cannot be considered to be still owned by
KK’s wife and son for purposes other than those covered by the
Act of 1988 – However, the High Court did not take note of this
distinguishing factor in the case on hand – The vehicles were
not owned and possessed in praesenti by the dependent family
members of KK at the time of the filing of his nomination – Non-
disclosure of three vehicles cannot be held against KK – Such
non-disclosure cannot be treated as an attempt on his part to
unduly influence the voters, thereby inviting the wrath of Section
123(2) of the Act of 1951. [Paras 20,21,22,25,27,28]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing of
nomination – Non-disclosure of three vehicles – Vehicles sold/
gifted – The High Court was of the opinion that, notwithstanding
vehicles were sold/gifted, these vehicles continued to stand
in the names of the dependent wife and son of KK – In
consequence, upon considering the provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 and the decision of the Supreme Court in
Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2 SCR 572,
it was held that vehicles were owned by the dependent wife
and son of KK but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit in
Form No. 26 filed by him – Correctness:
Held: The High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment
(Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others) was rendered in the
context of and for the purposes of the Act of 1988 and not for
general application – The judgment itself made it clear that despite
the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a claimant or claimants
should not be made to run from pillar to post to find out who was
the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the accident, if the
sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by the authorities
concerned by registering the name of the subsequent owner, be
it for whatever reason – Further, vehicles being goods, their sale
would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930,
and the same make it clear that conveyance of ownership of the
vehicle would stand concluded upon execution of the document of
sale/transfer and registration of the new owner by the authorities
concerned would be a post-sale event – Mere failure to get
registered the name of the new owner of an already registered
vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would stand
invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed
over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
396 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

treated as still being in the possession and control of the former

owner.[Paras 23, 27]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss. 100(1)(b), 100(d)
(i) – Election – Filing of nomination – Submission of material
particulars – Non-submission of the ‘No Dues Certificate’
in respect of the Government accommodation occupied by
appellant during his earlier tenure as an MLA was held against
him – High Court held that his nomination was defective and
in consequence, the acceptance by the Returning Officer was
improper – Correctness:
Held: In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that there were
no actual outstanding dues payable by KK in relation to the
government accommodation occupied by him earlier – His failure
in disclosing the fact that he had occupied such accommodation
and in filing the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in that regard, with his
nomination form, cannot be said to be a defect of any real import
– More so, as he did submit the relevant documents of 2014
after an objection was raised before the Returning Officer – His
explanation that he submitted such Certificates in the year 2014
when he stood for re-election as an MLA is logical and worthy
of acceptance – The most important aspect to be noted is that
there were no actual dues and the failure of KK to disclose that
he had been in occupation of government accommodation during
the years 2009 to 2014 cannot be treated as a defect that is of
substantial character so as to taint his nomination and render its
acceptance improper. [Para 42]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing of
nomination – Non-disclosure of taxes due – The High Court
held that non-disclosure of the taxes due and payable by KK
and his wife was a defect of substantial character and the
same tainted his nomination:
Held: The failure on the part of KK to disclose the dues of municipal/
property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same cannot be
held to be a non-disclosure, inasmuch as he did disclose the
particulars of such dues in one part of his Affidavit but did not do
so in another part. [Para 49]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Election – Filing
of nomination – Whether every defect in the nomination can
straightaway termed to be of such character as to render its
acceptance improper:
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  397

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Held: Every defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed

to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and
each case would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar
as that aspect is concerned – This Court has always drawn a
distinction between non-disclosure of substantial issues as opposed
to insubstantial issues, which may not impact one’s candidature or
the result of an election – The very fact that Section 36(4) of the Act
of 1951 speaks of the Returning Officer not rejecting a nomination
unless he is of the opinion that the defect is of a substantial nature
demonstrates that this distinction must always be kept in mind and
there is no absolute mandate that every non-disclosure, irrespective
of its gravity and impact, would automatically amount to a defect
of substantial nature, thereby materially affecting the result of the
election or amounting to ‘undue influence’ so as to qualify as a
corrupt practice. [Para 40]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Voter’s right to know
– Absolute or not:
Held: A blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay
his life out threadbare for examination by the electorate is not
accepted – His ‘right to privacy’ would still survive as regards
matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to
his candidature for public office – In that respect, non-disclosure of
each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to
a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial character – It is not
necessary that a candidate declare every item of movable property
that he or his dependent family members owns, unless the same
is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect
upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be
disclosed – Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities
and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when
the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate
would amount to a defect of a substantial character. [Para 44]
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – s.100(1)(d)(iv) –
Election invalidation under:
Held: In the instant case, the High Court linked all the non-
disclosures attributed to KK to s.100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 but
ultimately concluded that his election stood invalidated u/s. 100(1)
(d)(iv) thereof – There is no discussion whatsoever on what were
the violations which qualified as non-compliance with the provisions
of either the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or the rules and orders
398 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

framed thereunder, for the purposes of s.100(1)(d)(iv), and as to

how the same materially affected the result of the election – For
the election petitioner to succeed on such ground, viz., s.100 (1)(d)
(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the breach but also show
that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the returned
candidate, has been materially affected thereby – Though there
are some general references to non-compliance with particular
provisions of the Act of 1951 and the rules made thereunder, there
are neither adequate pleadings nor proof to substantiate and satisfy
the requirements of s.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 – Therefore,
it is clear that NT (unsuccessful candidate) tied up the improper
acceptance of KK nomination, relatable to s.100(1)(d)(i) of the
Act of 1951, with the non-compliance relatable to s.100(1)(d)(iv)
thereof and he did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach
or how it materially affected the result of the election, in so far as
it concerned the returned candidate, KK – It was not open to NT
to link up separate issues and fail to plead in detail and adduce
sufficient evidence in relation to the non-compliance that would
attract s.100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 – The finding of the High
Court in that regard is equally bereft of rhyme and reason and
cannot be sustained. [Paras 45, 46, 48]

Case Law Cited

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others
[1955] 1 SCR 1104 : (1954) 2 SCC 881; Association for
Democratic Reforms and another v. Union of India and
others [2024] 3 SCR 417 : WP (C) No. 880 of 2017,
decided on 15.02.2024 – followed.
Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and others [2018] 2
SCR 572 : (2018) 3 SCC 1; Santosh Yadav v. Narender
Singh [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160;
Harsh Kumar v. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat and others
(2003) 7 SCC 709; Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala v. K.T.C. Automobiles
[2016] 1 SCR 994 : (2016) 4 SCC 82; Surendra Kumar
Bhilawe v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2020] 7 SCR
39 : (2020) 18 SCC 224; Kisan Shankar Kathore v. Arun
Dattatray Sawant and others [2014] 7 SCR 258 : (2014)
14 SCC 162; Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra
and others [1955] 1 SCR 509 : (1954) 2 SCC 32; Kamta
Prasad Upadhyaya v. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari and others
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  399

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

(1969) 3 SCC 622; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash

Kushanrao Gorantyal and others [2020] 7 SCR 180 :
(2020) 7 SCC 1; Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju v.
Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy and others [2018]
9 SCR 164 : (2018) 14 SCC 1; Resurgence India v.
Election Commission of India and another [2013] 9 SCR
360 : (2014) 14 SCC 189; Union of India v. Association
for Democratic Reforms and another [2002] 3 SCR 696 :
(2002) 5 SCC 294; Lok Prahari through its General
Secretary S.N. Shukla v. Union of India and others [2018]
2 SCR 892 : (2018) 4 SCC 699; S. Rukmini Madegowda
v State Election Commission and others [2022] 12 SCR
1 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1218; Mairembam Prithviraj
alias Prithviraj Singh v. Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh
[2016] 9 SCR 687 : (2017) 2 SCC 487; People’s Union
for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and another v. Union of India
and another [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399;
Sambhu Prasad Sharma v. Charandas Mahant [2012]
6 SCR 356 : (2012) 11 SCC 390; Mangani Lal Mandal
v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari [2012] 1 SCR 527 : (2012) 3
SCC 314; L.R. Shivaramagowda and others v. T.M.
Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs and others [1998] Supp.
3 SCR 241 : (1999) 1 SCC 666 – referred to.

List of Acts
Representation of the People Act, 1951; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Election; Nomination; Disclosure of material particulars; Disclosure
of vehicles; Ownership transfer of vehicle; Corrupt practice; Undue
influence; Government accommodation; Non-due certificate;
Defective nomination; Dues of municipal/property taxes; Improper
acceptance; Election invalidation; Voter’s right to know.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2023 of the Gauhati High
Court at Itanagar Bench in Election Petition No. 01 (AP) of 2019
With
Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023
400 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Appearances for Parties

C.A. Sundaram, Arunabh Chowdhury, Sr. Advs., Simranjeet Singh,
Pulkit Gupta, Gautam Talukdar, Raushal Kumar, Ms. Apurbaa Dutta,
Lovenish Jagdhane, Zafar Inayat, Amol Chitale, Mrs. Pragya Baghel,
Mrs. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Vishal Banshal, Karma Dorjee, Abhishek
Roy, Dechen W Lachungpa, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Sushil Balwada, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, Ms. Tatini Basu, Boboy
Potsangbam, Gamso Billai, Kumar Shashank, Byrapaneni Suyodhan,
Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Sanjay Kumar, J
1. In the year 2019, Karikho Kri, an independent candidate, Dr.
Mohesh Chai, candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party, and Nuney
Tayang, candidate of the Indian National Congress, contested
the election to the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from
44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency. The election was held on
11.04.2019 and Karikho Kri emerged victorious with 7538 votes,
while Dr. Mohesh Chai secured 7383 votes and Nuney Tayang
secured 1088 votes.
2. Nuney Tayang filed Election Petition No. 01(AP) of 2019 before the
Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram
and Arunachal Pradesh, seeking a declaration that the election of
Karikho Kri was void on the grounds mentioned in Sections 100(1)
(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1951’). He also sought a
consequential declaration that he stood duly elected from the said
constituency.
3. By judgment and order dated 17.07.2023, a learned Judge of the
Itanagar Bench of the High Court allowed the election petition in
part, declaring the election of Karikho Kri void under Sections 100(1)
(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951, but rejecting
the prayer of Nuney Tayang to declare him duly elected, as he
had not led any evidence to prove the allegations levelled by him
against Dr. Mohesh Chai, the candidate with the second highest
number of votes.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  401

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

4. Aggrieved thereby, Karikho Kri filed Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023
before this Court and Nuney Tayang filed Civil Appeal No. 4716 of
2023. These appeals were filed under Section 116A of the Act of 1951
5. While ordering notice in both the appeals on 31.07.2023, in exercise
of power under Section 116B(2) of the Act of 1951, this Court directed
that an election should not be held for the subject Constituency
which was represented by Karikho Kri and permitted him to enjoy
all the privileges as a Member of the House and of the constituted
committees but restrained him from casting his vote on the floor of
the House or in any of the committees wherein he participated as
an MLA.
6. Thereafter, during the course of the hearing of these appeals, Karikho
Kri filed I.A. No. 73161 of 2024, as a fresh schedule for election to
the Legislative Assembly of the State of Arunachal Pradesh was
notified on 16.03.2024 and he wished to contest in the election that
is proposed to be held on 19.04.2024. He sought leave to contest
as a candidate in the upcoming assembly election in the State of
Arunachal Pradesh during the pendency of this appeal. By order
dated 20.03.2024, this Court opined that a strong prima facie case
had been made out by him and, in the light of the said fact, stayed
the operation of the impugned judgment. This Court also made it
clear that any steps taken by Karikho Kri in view of the stay order
would be subject to the final decision that would be taken upon
conclusion of the hearing of these appeals.
7. In his election petition, Nuney Tayang claimed that the nomination
submitted by Karikho Kri was improperly accepted by the Returning
Officer, Tezu, as he did not disclose material particulars in his Affidavit
filed in Form No.26 appended to the Conduct of Elections Rules,
1961. The High Court framed nine issues for determination in the
election petition and ultimately held against Karikho Kri on Issue
Nos. 1 (in part), 4, 5, 6 (in part), 7 and 8. Issue No.9 pertained to the
relief claimed by Nuney Tayang. The relevant ‘Issues’ read as under:
‘1. Whether there has been a non-disclosure of
ownership of Hero Honda CD Dawn Motorcycle
owned by the returned candidate, Shri Karikho
Kri bearing registration No. AR-11-2446; Kinetic
Zing Scooty owned by the wife of the returned
candidate, Smti. Bagilu Kri bearing registration No.
402 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

AR-11-4474; Van, Maruti Omni Ambulance owned

by the wife of the returned candidate, Smti. Bagilu
Kri bearing registration No. AR-11A-3100 and TVS
Star City Motorcycle owned by Shri Goshinso Kri,
the son of the returned candidate Shri Karikho Kri
bearing registration No. AR- 11-6581, as is required
to be disclosed under Clause 7(vi) of the Conduct
of Election Rules, 1961, rendering the nomination of
the returned candidate invalid?
4. Whether there has been a non-submission of no
dues certificate with regard to Electricity Charges
required to be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(b) of
Form No. 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961,
as the respondent No. 1 was in occupation of MLA
Cottage No. 1 at ‘E’ Sector, Itanagar, from the year,
2009- 2014, while the respondent No. 1 was an MLA
of Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency during the year,
2009-2014?
5. Whether the statements made by the respondent No.
1 about the liability of himself and his wife in respect
of Municipal Tax, Property Tax, due and grand total of
all govt. dues against Serial No. 6 & 8 of the table in
Para-8(A) of the affidavit in Form No. 26 appended
to the nomination paper of the respondent No. 1
has rendered the nomination of respondent No. 1,
defective?
6. Whether the non-disclosure of assets both movable
and immovable belonging to the respondent No. 1,
his wife, his mother and his two sons in the affidavit
in Form No. 26 appended to the nomination paper
amounted to commission of corrupt practice of undue
influence within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951?
7. Whether the election of respondent No. 1 to the
44- Tezu(ST) Assembly Constituency is liable to
be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951?
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  403

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

8. Whether the nature of non-disclosure alleged by the

Election petitioner is of a substantial nature effecting
the election of the returned candidate/respondent
No. 1?
9. What consequential relief the petitioner is entitled
to, if any?’
8. Nuney Tayang examined 7 witnesses, including himself as PW7.
Karikho Kri examined 39 witnesses, including himself as DW1A. Dr.
Mohesh Chai did not choose to contest the case before the High Court,
despite service of notice. Before us, however, he is duly represented
by learned counsel and also filed his replies in both the appeals.
9. The High Court held against Karikho Kri on Issue No 1, in relation to
three out of the four vehicles, viz., the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing
No. AR-11/4474 and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100,
both registered in the name of Bagilu Kri, his wife, and the TVS Star
City Motorcycle bearing No. AR-11/6851, registered in the name of
Goshinso Kri, his second son. The High Court was of the opinion that,
notwithstanding the sale of the Kinetic Zing Scooty bearing No. AR-
11/4474 in 2009 and the Maruti Omni Van bearing No. AR-11A/3100
in the year 2017 and the gifting of the TVS Star City Motorcycle
bearing No. AR-11/6851 in 2014, these vehicles continued to stand
in the names of Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri, the dependent wife
and son of Karikho Kri, on the relevant date. Upon considering the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, ‘the Act of
1988’) and the decision of this Court in Naveen Kumar vs. Vijay
Kumar and others1, the High Court concluded that the person in
whose name the motor vehicle stood registered should be treated as
the owner thereof. In consequence, it was held that, as on the date
of presentation of his nomination on 22.03.2019 and its scrutiny on
26.03.2019, the above three vehicles were owned by the dependent
wife and son of Karikho Kri but they were not disclosed in the Affidavit
in Form No. 26 filed by him.
10. On Issue No. 4 with regard to non-submission of a ‘No Dues
Certificate’ in the context of electricity and water charges, etc., that
was required to be submitted under Clause 8(ii)(B) of Form No. 26,

1 [2018] 2 SCR 572 : (2018) 3 SCC 1

404 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

the High Court noted that Karikho Kri had occupied government
accommodation in MLA Cottage No.1 at ‘E’ Sector, Itanagar, from
2009 to 2014, as the MLA of Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency during
those years. According to Karikho Kri, he lost the election in 2014
and vacated the said accommodation. He claimed that when he
filed his nomination for the Assembly Election in 2014, he obtained
a ‘No Dues Certificate’ after clearing the dues and submitted it. As
there were no outstanding dues thereafter and he did not occupy
government accommodation, he stated that he did not disclose the
same. As Karikho Kri admitted such non-disclosure in his Affidavit in
Form No. 26, the High Court held against him on this count.
11. As regards Issue No. 5, pertaining to the liability of Karikho Kri and
his wife in respect of their dues of municipal and property taxes,
the High Court found that Karikho Kri had disclosed the taxes due
and payable by him and his wife in one part of the Affidavit in Form
No.26 submitted by him, but failed to do so in another part thereof.
He disclosed the dues in Part A, Clause 8 (vi) and (viii), but failed to
disclose it in Clause 9 in Part B. Though the High Court held against
Karikho Kri even on this count, Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, learned
senior counsel, appearing for Nuney Tayang, fairly stated that he
would not be pressing this ground as there was disclosure of the
dues at least in one part of the Affidavit in Form No. 26.
12. As regards Issue No. 6, i.e., whether non-disclosure of the three
vehicles, registered in the names of his dependent wife and second
son, by Karikho Kri in his Affidavit in Form No. 26 amounted to
commission of a corrupt practice as per Section 123(2) of the Act
of 1951, the High Court referred to case law and held that such
non-disclosure amounted to a corrupt practice within the meaning
of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951.
13. The High Court then considered Issue No. 7, i.e., whether the election
of Karikho Kri was liable to be declared void under Section 100(1)
(d)(i) of the Act of 1951 and opined that when the nomination of the
returned candidate was shown to have been improperly accepted
by the Returning Officer, there is no necessity to further prove that
the election was ‘materially affected’. As the High Court was of the
opinion that the nomination of Karikho Kri had, in fact, been improperly
accepted by the Returning Officer, Tezu, his election was held liable
to be declared void under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1951.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  405

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

14. On Issue No. 8 - as to whether the non-disclosures by Karikho Kri were

of a substantial nature affecting his election, the High Court observed
that disclosure of information as per Form No. 26 of the Conduct of
Election Rules, 1961, was fundamental to the concept of free and fair
elections and, therefore, the solemnity thereof could not be ridiculed
by offering incomplete information or suppressing material information,
resulting in disinformation and misinformation to the voters.
15. Coming to Issue No. 9, i.e., as to what consequential relief Nuney
Tayang would be entitled to, if any, the High Court noted that Nuney
Tayang had secured the least number of votes out of the three
candidates and though he made allegations to the effect that Dr.
Mohesh Chai had failed to disclose the properties belonging to his
mother in his Affidavit in Form No. 26, the High Court found that Nuney
Tayang had failed to lead any evidence in proof of this statement
and, as such, there was no material to hold that Dr. Mohesh Chai’s
mother was even his dependent. On that basis, the High Court held
that no judgment could be pronounced against Dr. Mohesh Chai,
solely on the basis of the pleadings and allegations made by Nuney
Tayang in his election petition. In consequence, Nuney Tayang was
held disentitled to relief by way of a declaration that he had been
duly elected from 44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency.
16. It is well-settled that the success of a winning candidate at an
election should not be lightly interfered with (See Santosh Yadav
vs. Narender Singh2 and Harsh Kumar vs. Bhagwan Sahai Rawat
and others3). The issue before us presently is as to the validity of
the High Court’s findings that the grounds under Sections 100(1)(b),
100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 were established,
warranting invalidation of the election of Karikho Kri. Further, the
finding of the High Court on Issue No. 6, that Karikho Kri committed
a ‘corrupt practice’ within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the Act
of 1951 also requires to be examined.
17. Section 33 of the Act of 1951 deals with ‘presentation of nomination
papers and the requirements for a valid nomination’. Scrutiny of such
nominations is undertaken by the Returning Officers under Section 36
of the Act of 1951. To the extent relevant, Section 36 reads as under:

2 [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 545 : (2002) 1 SCC 160

3 (2003) 7 SCC 709
406 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

‘36. Scrutiny of nomination:-

‘1. On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations under
section 30, the candidates, their election agents, one
proposer of each candidate, and one other person duly
authorised in writing by each candidate but no other person,
may attend at such time and place as the returning officer
may appoint; and the returning officer shall give them all
reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers
of all candidates which have been delivered within the time
and in the manner laid down in section 33.
2. The returning officer shall then examine the nomination
papers and shall decide all objections which may be made
to any nomination and may, either on such objection or
on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as
he thinks necessary, reject any nomination on any of the
following grounds:—
(a) ….. or
(b) ….. or
(c) …..
3 .…..
4. The returning officer shall not reject any nomination
paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a
substantial character.
5. …..
6 The returning officer shall endorse on each nomination
paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same and, if
the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in writing a
brief statement of his reasons for such rejection.
7. …..
8. Immediately after all the nomination papers have been
scrutinized and decisions accepting or rejecting the same
have been recorded, the returning officer shall prepare a list
of validly nominated candidates, that is to say, candidates
whose nominations have been found valid, and affix it to
his notice board.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  407

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

18. In terms of Section 36(4) above, a Returning Officer is under a

mandate not to reject a nomination paper for a defect unless it is of
substantial character. Significantly, Nuney Tayang raised objections
to the candidature of Karikho Kri by way of his written representation
dated 26.03.2019. Therein, he raised the issue of non-submission of
a ‘No Dues Certificate’ in respect of the government accommodation
occupied by Karikho Kri during his tenure as an MLA from 2009 to
2014. He also raised the issue of non-disclosure of the vehicles,
mentioned in Issue No. 1. By his reply dated 26.03.2019, Karikho
Kri informed the Returning Officer, Tezu, that the vehicles, viz., the
Kinetic Zing Scooty and the Maruti Omni Van standing in the name
of his wife had already been disposed of as was the TVS Star City
Motorcycle standing in the name of his dependent second son, which
had been gifted away. As regards the non-submission of a ‘No Dues
Certificate’, Karikho Kri asserted that there were no outstanding
dues against any government accommodation in his name. Karikho
Kri submitted documents with his explanation, including those
pertaining to the transfer of the vehicles in question as well as the
‘No Dues Certificates’ of 2014. Thereafter, Karikho Kri filed before
the High Court, Certificates issued in 2019 by the Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Limited; the Department of Power, Government of Arunachal
Pradesh; and the Legislative Assembly Secretariat, Arunachal
Pradesh, confirming that there were no outstanding dues. In effect
and in fact, there were no dues payable by Karikho Kri in relation to
the Government accommodation occupied by him earlier.
19. In any event, it appears that the Returning Officer concerned, being
satisfied with the explanation and documents submitted by Karikho
Kri, accepted his nomination. No doubt, this preliminary exercise on
the part of the Returning Officer did not preclude the Election Tribunal,
viz., the High Court, from examining as to whether the acceptance
of Karikho Kri’s nomination was improper and, in consequence,
whether it would have an impact on his election under the relevant
provisions of the Act of 1951. Section 100(1) thereof enumerates
the grounds on which an election can be invalidated. To the extent
relevant, it reads as under:
‘100. Grounds for declaring election to be void:-
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High
Court is of opinion—
408 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

(a) …..; or
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a
returned candidate or his election agent or by any other
person with the consent of a returned candidate or his
election agent; or
(c)…..; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns
a returned candidate, has been materially affected—
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination,
or
(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests
of the returned candidate by an agent other than
his election agent, or
(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection
of any vote or the reception of any vote which
is void, or
(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of
the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or
orders made under this Act, the High Court shall
declare the election of the returned candidate
to be void.’
20. The High Court held against Karikho Kri not only under Sections
100(1)(d)(i) and (iv) but also under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act of
1951, as it was of the opinion that his failure to disclose the three
vehicles, that still stood registered in the names of his dependent
family members, amounted to a corrupt practice. Insofar as Section
100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951 is concerned, the requirement thereof
for the purpose of invalidating the election of the returned candidate
is that the High Court must form an opinion that a ‘corrupt practice’
was committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or any
other person with the consent of the returned candidate or his election
agent. Section 123 of the Act of 1951 inclusively defines ‘corrupt
practices’, by stating that what have been enumerated thereunder
shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of the Act
of 1951. Insofar as the present case is concerned, Section 123(2)
of the Act of 1951 is of relevance. This provision reads as under:
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  409

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

‘123. Corrupt practices.—

The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for
the purposes of this Act:—
……
(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect
interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the
candidate or his agent, or of any other person with the
consent of the candidate or his election agent, with the
free exercise of any electoral right:
……’
21. The High Court opined that non-disclosure of the Kinetic Zing
Scooty and the Maruti Omni Van that had belonged to Bagilu Kri
and the TVS Star City Motorcycle that had belonged to Goshinso
Kri, the dependent wife and son of Krikho Kri, was sufficient in itself
to constitute ‘undue influence’, thereby attracting Section 123(2) of
the Act of 1951. However, what is of significance is that the High
Court did not doubt that these vehicles had been sold or gifted long
before the submission of the nomination by Karikho Kri in 2019.
This is clear from the observations in Para 13 (xiii) of the judgment,
wherein the High Court observed: ‘….at the time of presentation of
nomination paper of respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of
the nomination paper on 26.03.2019, notwithstanding the aforesaid
vehicles were gifted/sold to other persons by Smti. Bagilu Kri, wife of
respondent No. 1 as well as Shri. Goshinso Kri, son of respondent No.
1; it has now become imperative to decide as to who was the owner
of the aforesaid vehicles at the time presentation of the nomination
paper by the respondent No. 1, and on the date of scrutiny of the
nomination paper on 26.03.2019’. This finding of the High Court has
attained finality as Nuney Tayang did not choose to challenge the
same before this Court.
22. Though it appears that the three vehicles in question still remained
registered in the names of the wife and son of Karikho Kri, the question
that arises is as to whether non-disclosure of such vehicles justified
the attributing of a corrupt practice to Karikho Kri and the negating
of his election on that ground. The High Court assumed that the
non-disclosure of a vehicle registered in the name of a candidate or
his dependent family members was sufficient in itself to constitute
410 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

undue influence. In this context, the High Court placed reliance on

the provisions of the Act of 1988 and the decision of this Court in
Naveen Kumar (supra). Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988 defines
the owner of a vehicle as under:
‘ “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle
stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the
guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle
which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an
agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the
person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;’
In Naveen Kumar (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court was
dealing with the issue as to who would be the owner of an offending
vehicle in the context of the Act of 1988 when a claim arises from
an accident involving the said vehicle. ‘Owner’, as defined under
Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, was considered and it was opined
that the person in whose name a vehicle stands registered would
be the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act. Reference
was made to Section 50 of the Act of 1988, which deals with transfer
of ownership, and to various earlier decisions in that regard and it
was observed thus:
‘13. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges
from the above decisions is that in view of the definition
of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30), it is the person
in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who,
for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the
“owner”..……In a situation such as the present where the
registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but
continues to be reflected in the records of the Registering
Authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand
absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced
the definition of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30),
making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in
the earlier 1939 Act. The principle underlying the provisions
of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in
the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim
should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for
compensation ought not to be burdened with following
a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  411

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

with the Registering Authority. To hold otherwise would

be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act.
Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the
fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the
first respondent was the “owner” of the vehicle involved
in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The
liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him.
Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured.’
(emphasis is ours)
23. Notably, the High Court overlooked the fact that the above judgment
was rendered in the context of and for the purposes of the Act of
1988 and not for general application. The judgment itself made
it clear that despite the sale/transfer of the vehicle in question, a
claimant or claimants should not be made to run from pillar to post
to find out who was the owner of the vehicle as on the date of the
accident, if the sale/transfer was not carried out in their books by
the authorities concerned by registering the name of the subsequent
owner, be it for whatever reason. Further, vehicles being goods,
their sale would be covered by the provisions of the Sale of Goods
Act, 1930 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1930’), and the same make it clear
that conveyance of ownership of the vehicle would stand concluded
upon execution of the document of sale/transfer and registration of
the new owner by the authorities concerned would be a post-sale
event. Section 2(7) of the Act of 1930 defines goods, inter alia, to
mean every kind of movable property, other than actionable claims
and money. Chapter III of the Act of 1930 is titled ‘Effects of the
Contract’ and ‘Transfer of property as between seller and buyer’.
Section 18 therein states that where there is a contract for the sale
of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is transferred to
the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. Section 19,
however, states that the property passes when intended to pass and
elaborates that, where there is a contract for the sale of specific or
ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer
at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.
24. In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Thiruvananthapuram,
Kerala vs. K.T.C. Automobiles4, this Court observed that registration

4 [2016] 1 SCR 994 : (2016) 4 SCC 82

412 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

of a motor vehicle is a post-sale event but the question would arise

as to when the property in the motor vehicle actually passed to the
buyer. That was a case involving the first sale of a motor vehicle by
the dealer to the first owner and is, therefore, distinguishable from
the subsequent sale of a vehicle, as in the case on hand. It was
observed therein that registration of a motor vehicle is a post-sale
event but only after obtaining valid registration under the Act of 1988,
a purchaser would get entitlement to use the vehicle in a public
place. It was observed that the purchaser, as an owner under the Act
of 1988, was obliged to obtain the certificate of registration, which
alone would entitle him to enjoy the possession of the vehicle by
using it in public places after meeting the other statutory obligations
of insurance, etc. This Court rejected the contention that motor
vehicles would be ‘unascertained goods’ till their engine number or
chassis number is entered in the Certificate of Registration, as the
sale invoice itself would disclose such particulars, so that the owner
of the vehicle may apply for registration of that specific vehicle in
his name. However, owing to the statutory provisions governing
motor vehicles, this Court held that an intending owner or buyer of
a motor vehicle cannot ascertain the particulars of the vehicle for
appropriating it to the contract of sale till its possession is handed
over to him after observing the requirements of the Act of 1988 and
the rules framed thereunder and such possession can be given
only at the registration office immediately preceding the registration.
Owing to the aforestated legal position, this Court held that, prior
to getting possession of the motor vehicle, the intending purchaser/
owner would not have a claim over any ‘ascertained motor vehicle’.
The observations in this judgment would, however, have to be
understood in the context of the first sale of a vehicle by the dealer,
i.e., where such vehicle has no registration whatsoever as opposed
to the subsequent sale of a registered vehicle.
25. Presently, insofar as the Scooty bearing No. AR-11/4474 is concerned,
it stood in the name of Bagilu Kri but Md. Nizammudin (DW5)
deposed that he had taken this vehicle as scrap and sold it as such
to Promod Prasad (DW6). In turn, Promod Prasad (DW6) confirmed
that he bought the Scooty as scrap from Md. Nizammudin (DW5).
During their cross-examination, nothing was elicited from these
witnesses to doubt their claims. However, letter dated 20.09.2019
addressed by the District Transport Officer, Lohit District, Tezu,
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  413

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

to Bagilu Kri, manifests that the registration of the Scooty in her

name stood cancelled only at that time. The taxes in respect of this
Scooty were paid till 26.03.2022, as borne out by Treasury Challan
No. 4806 dated 30.08.2019. Though much was argued about this
payment of taxes and the fact that the receipt was issued in the
name of Bagilu Kri, we are not inclined to give any weightage to
it. The payment was made after the filing of the election petition
and any person could have done so. The receipt therefor would
automatically be generated in the name of the registered owner. We
may also note that in relation to the other two vehicles in question,
there were actual documents of conveyance and also proof of the
requisite forms prescribed under the Act of 1988 being duly filled in
and issued by Bagilu Kri and Goshinso Kri. Form No. 29, relating
to notice of ownership transfer of a vehicle by the registered owner,
viz., the transferor, was issued in respect of each of these vehicles
but despite the same, the transferees did not do the needful to get
their own names registered as the owners.
26. In Surendra Kumar Bhilawe vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.5,
the issue before this Court was as to whether an insurance company
would be liable to cover the claim arising out of an accident on the
ground that the vehicle was sold to another long before the date of
the accident but the insured continued to be the registered owner
of the vehicle. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Naveen
Kumar (supra), it was observed that the policy of insurance was a
comprehensive policy which covered third-party risks as well and,
therefore, the insurer could not repudiate one part of the policy with
regard to reimbursing the owner for losses when it could not evade
liability to third parties under the same contract of insurance. In view
of the definition of ‘owner’ in Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, this
Court observed that the registered owner of the truck, on the date
of the accident, was the insured and, therefore, the insurer could not
avoid its liability for the losses suffered by the owner, on the ground
of transfer of ownership. This Court held that it is difficult to accept
that a person who transferred the ownership of a goods vehicle, on
receipt of consideration, would not report the transfer or apply for
transfer of registration and thereby continue to incur the risks and
liabilities of ownership of the said vehicle under the provisions of law,

5 [2020] 7 SCR 39 : (2020) 18 SCC 224

414 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

including the Act of 1988. This Court further observed that it is equally
incredible that an owner of a vehicle who has paid consideration
to acquire it would not insist on transfer of the permit and thereby
expose himself to the penal consequences of operating a goods
vehicle without a valid permit. This Court, accordingly, held that
the registered owner continues to remain the owner and when the
vehicle is insured in the name of such registered owner, the insurer
would remain liable notwithstanding the transfer. This judgment is
clearly inapplicable to the case on hand as it dealt with the liability of
an insurer in the event of an accident involving the vehicle. Further,
as already noted, the vehicles in question were transferred and
the requisite forms, insofar as the transferor was concerned, were
filled up and issued but it was the transferees who failed to get the
vehicles transferred in their own names.
27. Mere failure to get registered the name of the new owner of an already
registered vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would
stand invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed
over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated
as still being in the possession and control of the former owner. Once
it is accepted that the three vehicles in question were either gifted or
sold before the filing of the nomination by Karikho Kri, the said vehicles
cannot be considered to be still owned by Karikho Kri’s wife and son
for purposes other than those covered by the Act of 1988. However,
the High Court did not take note of this distinguishing factor in the case
on hand. In Kisan Shankar Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant and
others6, the vehicle, details of which had been suppressed by the
returned candidate, was actually owned and possessed by his wife
and such suppression was, accordingly, held against him. Presently,
the High Court itself concluded that the three vehicles in question were
transferred, be it by way of sale or gift. The vehicles were, therefore, not
owned and possessed in praesenti by the dependent family members
of Karikho Kri at the time of the filing of his nomination. This point of
distinction was completely lost sight of by the High Court but, in our
considered opinion, it made all the difference.
28. Therefore, non-disclosure of the three vehicles in question could not
be held against Karikho Kri in the light of the aforestated analysis.

6 [2014] 7 SCR 258 : (2014) 14 SCC 162

[2024] 4 S.C.R.  415

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Such non-disclosure cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated

as an attempt on his part to unduly influence the voters, thereby
inviting the wrath of Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951. We may note
that Karikho Kri had declared the value of the movable assets of
his dependent family members and himself as ₹8,41,87,815/-. The
value of the three vehicles in question, by comparison, would be a
mere miniscule of this figure. In any event, suppression of the value
of these three vehicles would have no impact on the declaration of
wealth by Karikho Kri and such non-disclosure could not be said to
amount to ‘undue influence’.
29. Coming to the next ground, if the acceptance of a nomination is found
to be improper and it materially affects the result of the election in
so far as the returned candidate is concerned, Section 100(1)(d)(i)
of the Act of 1951 would come into play. It would be appropriate and
apposite at this stage for us to take note of precedential law on this
point. In Vashist Narain Sharma vs. Dev Chandra and others7, a
3-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the burden of proving that
the improper acceptance of a nomination has materially affected the
result of an election would arise in one of three ways: (i) where the
candidate whose nomination was improperly accepted had secured
less votes than the difference between the returned candidate and
the candidate securing the next highest number of votes, (ii) where
the person referred to above secured more votes, or (iii) where
the person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is the
returned candidate himself. It was held that in the first case the
result of the election would not be materially affected because if all
the wasted votes were added to the votes of the candidate securing
the next highest votes, it would make no difference to the result and
the returned candidate would retain the seat. However, in the other
two cases, the result may be materially affected and insofar as the
third case is concerned, it may be readily conceded that such would
be the conclusion.
30. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others8,
a Constitution Bench of 7 Judges considered the scope of enquiry
under Section 100(1)(d) of the Act of 1951. It was observed that the

7 [1955] 1 SCR 509 : (1954) 2 SCC 32

8 [1955] 1 SCR 1104 (1954) 2 SCC 881
416 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

said provision required, before an order setting aside an election

could be made, that two conditions be satisfied. It must, firstly, be
shown that there has been improper reception or refusal of a vote
or reception of any vote which is void, or non-compliance with the
provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951, or any rules or
orders made thereunder, relating to the election or any mistake in
the use of the prescribed form and it must further be shown that, as
a consequence thereof, the result of the election has been materially
affected. The Bench observed that the two conditions are cumulative
and must both be established. It was further observed that the burden
of establishing them is on the person who seeks to have the election
set aside. Reference was also made to Vashist Narain (supra).
31. In Kamta Prasad Upadhyaya vs. Sarjoo Prasad Tiwari and others9,
another 3-Judge Bench of this Court affirmed the legal position settled
by Vashist Narain (supra). Again, in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs.
Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others10, a 3-Judge Bench of
this Court affirmed the view taken in Vashist Narain (supra) that,
where a person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is
the returned candidate himself, it may be readily conceded that the
conclusion has to be that the result of the election was ‘materially
affected’ without their being any necessity to plead and prove the
same.
32. In Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra
Reddy and others11, another 3-Judge Bench of this Court affirmed
that if there are more than two candidates and if the nomination of
one of the defeated candidates has been improperly accepted, a
question might arise as to whether the result of the election of the
returned candidate has been materially affected by such improper
reception but that would not be so in the case of challenge to the
election of the returned candidate himself on the ground of improper
acceptance of his nomination.
33. Ergo, if acceptance of the nomination of the returned candidate is
shown to be improper, it would automatically mean that the same
materially affected the result of the election and nothing more needs

9 (1969) 3 SCC 622

10 [2020] 7 SCR 180 : (2020) 7 SCC 1
11 [2018] 9 SCR 164 : (2018) 14 SCC 1
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  417

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

to be pleaded or proved. However, whether acceptance of the

nomination of Karikho Kri was actually improper is the main issue
that requires to be addressed by us.
34. We may also take note of curial wisdom on the issue as to what
would be the defects that would taint a nomination to the extent of
rendering its acceptance improper. In Resurgence India vs. Election
Commission of India and another12, a 3-Judge Bench of this
Court observed that if the Election Commission accepts nomination
papers in spite of blank particulars therein, it would directly violate
the fundamental right of the citizen to know the criminal antecedents,
assets, liabilities and educational qualifications of the candidate. It was
observed that accepting an affidavit with such blanks would rescind the
verdict in Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms
and another13. In effect, the Bench held that filing of an affidavit
with blank particulars would render the affidavit nugatory. In Kisan
Shankar Kathore (supra), the issue before this Court was whether
non-disclosure of certain government dues in the nomination would
amount to a material lapse impacting the election of the returned
candidate. On facts, this Court found that the non-disclosure of
electricity and municipal dues was not a serious lapse as there was
a dispute raised in the context thereof. Having said so, this Court
clarified that it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case as to whether such non-disclosure would amount to a
material lapse or not. This Court, however, found that there were,
in fact, material lapses by the returned candidate, inasmuch as he
had failed to disclose the bungalow standing in the name of his
wife and also a vehicle owned by her. Further, he had also failed to
disclose his interest/share in a partnership firm which amounted to a
very serious and major lapse. The observations of this Court, in the
context of improper acceptance of his nomination, are of relevance:
‘43.When the information is given by a candidate in
the affidavit filed along with the nomination paper and
objections are raised thereto questioning the correctness
of the information or alleging that there is non-disclosure
of certain important information, it may not be possible

12 [2013] 9 SCR 360 : (2014) 14 SCC 189

13 [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294
418 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

for the Returning Officer at that time to conduct a detailed

examination. Summary enquiry may not suffice. The present
case is itself an example which loudly demonstrates this. At
the same time, it would not be possible for the Returning
Officer to reject the nomination for want of verification about
the allegations made by the objector. In such a case, when
ultimately it is proved that it was a case of non-disclosure
and either the affidavit was false or it did not contain
complete information leading to suppression, it can be held
at that stage that the nomination was improperly accepted.
Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Election Commission, rightly argued that such an
enquiry can be only at a later stage and the appropriate
stage would be in an election petition as in the instant
case, when the election is challenged. The grounds stated
in Section 36(2) are those which can be examined there
and then and on that basis the Returning Officer would be
in a position to reject the nomination. Likewise, where the
blanks are left in an affidavit, nomination can be rejected
there and then. In other cases where detailed enquiry is
needed, it would depend upon the outcome thereof, in an
election petition, as to whether the nomination was properly
accepted or it was a case of improper acceptance. Once it
is found that it was a case of improper acceptance, as there
was misinformation or suppression of material i`nformation,
one can state that question of rejection in such a case was
only deferred to a later date. When the Court gives such a
finding, which would have resulted in rejection, the effect
would be same, namely, such a candidate was not entitled
to contest and the election is void. Otherwise, it would be an
anomalous situation that even when criminal proceedings
under Section 125-A of the Act can be initiated and the
selected candidate is criminally prosecuted and convicted,
but the result of his election cannot be questioned. This
cannot be countenanced.’
35. In Lok Prahari through its General Secretary S.N. Shukla vs.
Union of India and others14, this Court observed that non-disclosure

14 [2018] 2 SCR 892 : (2018) 4 SCC 699

[2024] 4 S.C.R.  419

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

of assets and sources of income of candidates and their associates

would constitute a corrupt practice falling under the heading ‘undue
influence’, as defined under Section 123 (2) of the Act of 1951. In
S. Rukmini Madegowda vs. State Election Commission and
others15, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that a false
declaration with regard to the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse
or dependents, would constitute a corrupt practice irrespective of its
impact on the election of the candidate as it may be presumed that
a false declaration would impact the election.
36. In Mairembam Prithviraj alias Prithviraj Singh vs. Pukhrem
Sharatchandra Singh16, this Court noted that there is a difference
between improper acceptance of the nomination of a returned
candidate as opposed to improper acceptance of the nomination of
any other candidate. It was observed that a mere finding that there
has been an improper acceptance of a nomination would not be
sufficient for a declaration that the election is void under Section
100(1)(d)(i) and there has to be further pleading and proof that
the result of the election of the returned candidate was materially
affected, but there would be no necessity of any such proof in the
event of the nomination of the returned candidate being declared as
having been improperly accepted, especially in a case where there
are only two candidates in the fray.
37. In Association for Democratic Reforms and another vs. Union
of India and others17, a Constitution Bench affirmed that, in terms
of the earlier judgments in Association for Democratic Reforms
and another (supra) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties
(PUCL) and another vs. Union of India and another18, the right
of voters to information, which is traceable to Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, is built upon the jurisprudence that information which
furthers democratic participation must be provided to citizens and
voters have a right to information which would enable them to cast
their votes rationally and intelligently because voting is one of the
foremost forms of democratic participation. It was further observed

15 [2022] 12 SCR 1 : (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1218

16 [2016] 9 SCR 687 : (2017) 2 SCC 487
17 [2024] 3 SCR 417 : W.P. (C) No. 880 of 2017, decided on 15.02.2024
18 [2003] 2 SCR 1136 : (2003) 4 SCC 399
420 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

that voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is

‘essential’ for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast.
38. In his Affidavit in Form No. 26, Karikho Kri was required to state as
to whether he had been in occupation of accommodation provided by
the Government at any time during the last 10 years before the date
of notification of the current election and, if so, he was to furnish a
declaration to the effect that there were no dues payable in respect
of the said accommodation in relation to rent, electricity charges,
water charges and telephone charges. Karikho Kri, however, failed
to disclose the fact that he had been in occupation of government
accommodation during his tenure as an MLA between 2009 and 2014.
He stated ‘Not applicable’. However, with regard to the declaration
as to there being no dues, he mentioned the date ‘22.03.2019’ and
stated that the dues in respect of rent, electricity charges, water
charges and telephone charges were ‘Nil’. After Nuney Tayang raised
an objection to his candidature on this ground, Karikho Kri filed the
requisite ‘No Due Certificates’ of 2014.
39. However, the High Court was of the opinion that the failure of
Karikho Kri to disclose the factum of his occupying government
accommodation from 2009 to 2014 and his failure to submit the ‘No
Dues Certificate’ in relation to such government accommodation was
sufficient, in itself, to infer that his nomination was defective and,
in consequence, the acceptance thereof by the Returning Officer,
Tezu, was improper.
40. Having considered the issue, we are of the firm view that every
defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of
such character as to render its acceptance improper and each case
would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar as that aspect
is concerned. The case law on the subject also manifests that this
Court has always drawn a distinction between non-disclosure of
substantial issues as opposed to insubstantial issues, which may
not impact one’s candidature or the result of an election. The very
fact that Section 36(4) of the Act of 1951 speaks of the Returning
Officer not rejecting a nomination unless he is of the opinion that the
defect is of a substantial nature demonstrates that this distinction
must always be kept in mind and there is no absolute mandate that
every non-disclosure, irrespective of its gravity and impact, would
automatically amount to a defect of substantial nature, thereby
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  421

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

materially affecting the result of the election or amounting to ‘undue

influence’ so as to qualify as a corrupt practice.
41. The decision of this Court in Kisan Shankar Kathore (supra), also
demonstrates this principle, as this Court undertook examination of
several individual defects in the nomination of the returned candidate
and found that some of them were actually insubstantial in character.
This Court noted that two facets required consideration – Whether
there is substantial compliance in disclosing requisite information
in the affidavits filed along with the nomination and whether non-
disclosure of information on identified aspects materially affected
the result of the election. This Court observed, on facts, that non-
disclosure of the electricity dues in that case was not a serious
lapse, despite the fact that there were dues outstanding, as there
was a bonafide dispute about the same. Similar was the observation
in relation to non-disclosure of municipal dues, where there was
a genuine dispute as to re-valuation and re-assessment for the
purpose of tax assessment. Earlier, in Sambhu Prasad Sharma
vs. Charandas Mahant19, this Court observed that the form of
the nomination paper is not considered sacrosanct and what is
to be seen is whether there is substantial compliance with the
requirement as to form and every departure from the prescribed
format cannot, therefore, be made a ground for the rejection of the
nomination paper.
42. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that there were no actual
outstanding dues payable by Karikho Kri in relation to the government
accommodation occupied by him earlier. His failure in disclosing
the fact that he had occupied such accommodation and in filing
the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in that regard, with his nomination form,
cannot be said to be a defect of any real import. More so, as he did
submit the relevant documents of 2014 after Nuney Tayang raised
an objection before the Returning Officer. His explanation that he
submitted such Certificates in the year 2014 when he stood for re-
election as an MLA is logical and worthy of acceptance. The most
important aspect to be noted is that there were no actual dues and
the failure of Karikho Kri to disclose that he had been in occupation
of government accommodation during the years 2009 to 2014 cannot

19 [2012] 6 SCR 356 : (2012) 11 SCC 390

422 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

be treated as a defect that is of substantial character so as to taint

his nomination and render its acceptance improper.
43. The High Court opined that the nomination of Karikho Kri was
improperly accepted by the Returning Officer as he had failed
to disclose the three vehicles in question, which continued to be
registered in the name of his dependent family members. Non-
submission of the ‘No Dues Certificate’ in respect of the government
accommodation occupied by him during his earlier tenure as an MLA
was also held to weigh against him. Lastly, the High Court held that
non-disclosure of the taxes due and payable by Karikho Kri and
his wife was a defect of substantial character and the same tainted
his nomination. In consequence, the High Court concluded that the
acceptance of Karikho Kri’s nomination by the Returning Officer was
improper and as he was the returned candidate, the question of
pleading and proving that such improper acceptance of his nomination
materially affected the result of the election did not arise.
44. Though it has been strenuously contended before us that the voter’s
‘right to know’ is absolute and a candidate contesting the election must
be forthright about all his particulars, we are not inclined to accept
the blanket proposition that a candidate is required to lay his life out
threadbare for examination by the electorate. His ‘right to privacy’
would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to
the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. In that
respect, non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate
would not amount to a defect, much less, a defect of a substantial
character. It is not necessary that a candidate declare every item of
movable property that he or his dependent family members owns,
such as, clothing, shoes, crockery, stationery and furniture, etc., unless
the same is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or
reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to
be disclosed. Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities
and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when
the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate
would amount to a defect of a substantial character. For example, a
candidate and his family who own several high-priced watches, which
would aggregate to a huge figure in terms of monetary value, would
obviously have to disclose the same as they constitute an asset of
high value and also reflect upon his lavish lifestyle. Suppression of
the same would constitute ‘undue influence’ upon the voter as that
[2024] 4 S.C.R.  423

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

relevant information about the candidate is being kept away from the
voter. However, if a candidate and his family members each own a
simple watch, which is not highly priced, suppression of the value of
such watches may not amount to a defect at all. Each case would,
therefore, have to be judged on its own facts.
45. So far as the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 is
concerned, the provision requires that the established non-compliance
with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or any rules
or orders made thereunder necessarily has to be shown to have
materially affected the result of the election insofar as it concerns
the returned candidate. Significantly, the High Court linked all the
non-disclosures attributed to Karikho Kri to Section 100(1)(d)(i) of
the Act of 1951 but ultimately concluded that his election stood
invalidated under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) thereof. Surprisingly, there is
no discussion whatsoever on what were the violations which qualified
as non-compliance with the provisions of either the Constitution or
the Act of 1951 or the rules and orders framed thereunder, for the
purposes of Section 100(1)(d)(iv), and as to how the same materially
affected the result of the election.
46. In Mangani Lal Mandal vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari20, this Court held
that where a returned candidate is alleged to be guilty of non-compliance
with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of 1951 or any rules
or orders made thereunder and his election is sought to be declared
void on that ground, it is essential for the election petitioner to aver,
by pleading material facts, that the result of the election insofar as
it concerned the returned candidate has been materially affected by
such breach or non-observance. It was further held that it is only on
the basis of such pleading and proof that the Court would be in a
position to form an opinion and record a finding that such breach or
non-compliance has materially affected the result of the election before
election of the returned candidate could be declared void. It was further
observed that mere non-compliance or breach of the Constitution or the
statutory provisions, as stated above, would not result in invalidating
the election of the returned candidate under Section 100 (1)(d)(iv) as
the sine qua non for declaring the election of a returned candidate to
be void on that ground under clause (iv) of Section 100 (1)(d) is further

20 [2012] 1 SCR 527 : (2012) 3 SCC 314

424 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

proof of the fact that such breach or non-observance has resulted

in materially affecting the election of the returned candidate. For the
election petitioner to succeed on such ground, viz., Section 100 (1)
(d)(iv), he has not only to plead and prove the breach but also show
that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned the returned
candidate, has been materially affected thereby.
47. In L.R. Shivaramagowda and others vs. T.M. Chandrashekar
(Dead) by LRs and others21, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court pointed
out that in order to declare an election void under Section 100(1)
(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951, it is absolutely necessary for the election
petitioner to plead that the result of the election, insofar as it concerned
the returned candidate, has been materially affected by the alleged
non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of
1951 or the rules or orders made thereunder and the failure to plead
such material facts would be fatal to the election petition.
48. However, perusal of the election petition filed by Nuney Tayang
reflects that the only statement made by him in this regard is in
Paragraph 21 and it reads as follows:
‘……Hence, his nomination papers suffer from substantial
and material defects. As such, the result of the election,
insofar as the respondent No.1 is concerned, is materially
affected by the improper acceptance of his nomination
as well as by the non-compliance with the provisions of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the rules
and orders made thereunder, including Section 33(1) of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Rule 4A of
the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and the orders made
thereunder…...’
Again, in his ‘Ground No. (ii)’, Nuney Tayang stated as under:
‘…….As such, the nomination papers of the respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 were improperly accepted by the Returning
Officer and the result of the election in question, insofar as
it concerns the respondent No.1 the return candidate, as
well as the respondent No.2, has been materially affected
by such improper acceptance of their nominations……’

21 [1998] Supp. 3 SCR 241 : (1999) 1 SCC 666

[2024] 4 S.C.R.  425

Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang and Another

Though there are some general references to non-compliance with

particular provisions of the Act of 1951 and the rules made thereunder,
we do not find adequate pleadings or proof to substantiate and satisfy
the requirements of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951. Therefore,
it is clear that Nuney Tayang tied up the improper acceptance of
Karikho Kri’s nomination, relatable to Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the Act
of 1951, with the non-compliance relatable to Section 100(1)(d)(iv)
thereof and he did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach
or how it materially affected the result of the election, in so far as it
concerned the returned candidate, Karikho Kri. It was not open to
Nuney Tayang to link up separate issues and fail to plead in detail
and adduce sufficient evidence in relation to the non-compliance that
would attract Section 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951. The finding of
the High Court in that regard is equally bereft of rhyme and reason
and cannot be sustained.
49. As regards the failure on the part of Karikho Kri to disclose the dues
of municipal/property taxes payable by him and his wife, the same
cannot be held to be a non-disclosure at all, inasmuch as he did
disclose the particulars of such dues in one part of his Affidavit but did
not do so in another part. In any event, as Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury,
learned senior counsel, fairly stated that he would not be pressing
this ground, we need not labour further upon this point.
50. On the above analysis, we hold that the High Court was in error in
concluding that sufficient grounds were made out under Sections
100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i) and 100(1)(d)(iv) of the Act of 1951 to invalidate
the election of Karikho Kri and, further, in holding that non-disclosure
of the three vehicles, that still remained registered in the names of
his wife and son as on the date of filing of his nomination, amounted
to a ‘corrupt practice’ under Section 123(2) of the Act of 1951. In
consequence, we find no necessity to independently deal with Civil
Appeal No. 4716 of 2023 filed by Nuney Tayang, in the context of
denial of relief to him by the High Court, or the issues raised by Dr.
Mohesh Chai in the replies filed by him.
51. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 4615 of 2023 filed by Karikho Kri is
allowed, setting aside the Judgment and Order dated 17.07.2023
passed by the Itanagar Bench of the High Court of Assam, Nagaland,
Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh in Election Petition No.01(AP) of
2019. In consequence, the election of Karikho Kri as the returned
426 [2024] 4 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

candidate from 44 Tezu (ST) Assembly Constituency of the State of

Arunachal Pradesh is upheld.
As a corollary, Civil Appeal No. 4716 of 2023, filed by Nuney Tayang,
shall stand dismissed.
Pending applications in both the appeals, if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
This decision shall be intimated to the Election Commission of India
and to the Chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the State of
Arunachal Pradesh forthwith, as required by Section 116C(2) of the
Act of 1951.
An authenticated copy of this judgment shall be sent to the Election
Commission of India forthwith.
Parties shall bear their own costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals disposed of.
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 2 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 3 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 4 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 2 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 3 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 4 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 5 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 6 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 7 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 8 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 9 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 10 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 11 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 12 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 13 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 14 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 15 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 16 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 17 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 18 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 19 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 20 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 21 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 22 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 23 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 24 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 25 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 26 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2025 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 27 Saturday, March 15, 2025
Printed For: Mr. Pulkit Prakash
SCC Online Web Edition: https://www.scconline.com
© 2025 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------