VASUBANDHU'S

VIJNAPTI - MÄTRATÄ - SIDDHI

{ With Sthiramati's Commentary )

[ TEXT WITH ENGUSH TRANSLATION ]

Dr. K. N. Chatterjee
Reader in Sanskrit
Department of Sanskrit and Pali
B. H. U.

KISHOR VIDYA NIKETAN

BHADAINI, VARANASI
India
Publisher :
Kishor Vidya Niketan
B-2/236-A, Bhadaini
Varanasi-221001.

A athor

First Edition 1980

Price R«. 4 5 - 0 0

Printed at :
Van! Vihar Frees
Golghar, Varanasi.
Dedicated to the sacred memory of my late
lamented teacher, Dr. P. C Bagchi
and'to Prof. Wang-shen tien
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD By Dr. S. Bhattacharya

PREFACE i—iii

INTRODUCTION v—xxxxii

VIMSATIKÄ - KÄRIKÄ & VRTTI :

(Text & translation) 1—26

TRIMSIKÄ - KÄRIKÄ & BHÄSYA :

(Text & translation) 27-134

NOTES 135-157

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 158

 FOREWORD

Indian Buddhism is ordinarily categorized into the

Lower Vehicle (Hina-yäna) and the Greater Vehicle
(mahä-yäna). Lower Vehicle stands for early Buddhism
based on Pali Tripitaka, the original scripture of Buddhism.
With emphasis on spiritual life, it admits reality of matter.
The Greater Vehicle, claims its origin from Sanskrit
Tripitaka. But the emphasis is shifted from refinement of
life to intellectual crystallization resulting in denying
of matter.

The two sub-schools of the Lower Vehicle—Vaibhäsika

and the Sautrantika agree that matter exists but disagree as
to its cognition. The Vaibhäsika perceives matter but the
Sautrantika only infers it. The two sub-schools of the
Greater Vehicle- the Yogäcära and the Mädhyamika agree
that matter does not exist but disagree as to its conception.
For the Yogäcära, matter is only a projection (äkära) of
consciousness (Vijnäna). For the Mädhyamika, matter
eludes all definition (nirupäkhya). Hence the four sub-
schools have differed from one another on the issue viz?
the nature of matter.
Of the four sub-schools, the Yogäcära, gained pro-
minence, thanks to the two pioneers, Asarijga and Vasu-
bandhu, the two brothers. While Asamga's approach was
saintly, Vasubandhu's intellectual.
The Vijftapti-mätratä-siddhi of Vasubandhu is the
first systemization of the Doctrine of Consciousness (üijnäna-
väda). It consists of two parts. The first part is made
up of twenty verses (kärikä) and so called ''Viras-itikä"
while the second part is of thirty verses (kärikä) and so called
£<
Trimsika/\ Vasubandhu wrote a short commentatry (ufttt)
on the first part. But it is not known whether he wrote
on the second part as well. But the second part has as
many as ten commentaries {tikä) of which that by
Sthiramati is available in Sanskrit.

Dr. K. N. Chatterjee has carefully edited the Kärikäs,

the Vrtti and the Tikä of Sthiramati. To introduce it to
the English-knowing scholars, he has translated all the
three in English which is as lucid as faithful to the ori-
ginal. The work is balanced by a historical Introduction
at the beginning and critical notes at the end. The Intro-
duction presents a total perspective of Buddhism while the
Notes unravel the intricacies of Buddhist concepts. The
work is a glowing tribute to his two great teachers in this
field-one Indian and the other, Chinese, to whom it is
dedicated.
I have no doubt Dr. Chatterjee's venture will be hailed
as a contribution to Buddhism in general and the Doctrine
of Consciousness (Vijnäna-Väda) in particular. I wish it all
success.

1 8 80 S. Bhattacharya
 PREFACE

Long twenty-five years have passed since I had the

unique privilege to sit at the feet of Dr. P* C Bagchi, to
get myself initiated to the field of research on Indological
studies and Buddhism. It is because of his desire that I
had the opportunity to visit China in the late fifties to
learn Chinese and study Buddhism. There also I had the
fortune to have a teacher like Prof. Wang-Shen-T'ien.
He was kind enough to read to me the whole text of the
vijüapti-mätratä-siddhi as translated by Hsiian Chuang
into Chinese. My head bends down with respect and
veneration for these two great masters of Buddhism.
Vijflapti-mätrata-siddjbi comprises of two sets of kärikäs
namely the Vimsatikä-kärikä and the Trimsikä-kärikä
composed by Vasubandhu. On the Vimsatikä»kärikä, Vasubandhu
himself wrote a Commentary (vrtti) and on the Trixhsikä-
kärikä) ten Commentries are said to have been written.
All these ten Commentries were translated by Hsiian
Cnuang into Chinese and are still preserved in the form
of a book entitled ''Che'ng wei shih lün". Scores of
Commentaries were written on this text in Chinese. The
Vimsatikä'kärikä also was put into Chinese translation by
four different scholars — Gunaratna, Prabhäkara, Hsüan Chuang
and I-Tsing. The oimsatikd-kärikä as translated by Hsiian
Chuang has been translated intp English by Hamilton
and the rest of the three other translations are yet to be
introduced to the English knowing people. The Trimsikä-
kankä and the Commentaries thereon as translated by
 (Ü-)

Hslian Ghuang have been translated into French by Prof»

Poussin, The English-knowing people are still not favoured
with an English translation of such an important text.

Apart from the translation work of Hsuan Ghuang,

there is a Sanskrit text, discovered by Piof. Levi,
comprising of the two kärikäs, the vrtti of Vasubandhu on the
vim'satikä-kärikä and the Commentary on the Trimsikä-
kärihä written by sthxramati.

The present work is a translation of this text into

English, accompanied with a long introduction and
critical notes.. The introduction seeks to present Buddhism
in its historical perspective and with all its philosophical
impact on the later Indian thinkers. The Togäcära or the
vijnänaväda schoolr of which the present text is held to be
a representative one has been critically analysed. The
critical notes at the fag end of the work is intended to
throw light on the obscure aspects of Buddhism or of the
school concerned. Care has been taken to make the notes
authentic and meaningful as far as possible. The Chinese
sources too, at times, have been taken into consideration*

Before I conclude, I take the privilege of once more

offering salutation & the best of my regards for my teachers
I have referred to earlier. I also remember in this context,
some of my teachers who have all the time inspired me to
take an academic life and they are Late Surendra Nath
Bhattacharya, Sri Haripada Chakravarty, Prof. Rama
Ranjan Mukherjee, Prof. Krisna Gopal Goswami, Prof,
Satkari Mukherjee and Dr. Amarasvar Thakur.
I must in the long run, express my deep sense of gratitude
and respect to Dr, Siddheswar Bhattacharya, ex-Mayurbanj
 (iii)

Professor, B. H. U. with whom I have the privilege of

reading a few texts on Indian philosophy. Dr. Siddheswar
Bhattacharya has all along been a guide-star in my life and
he with all love and affection has sought to endow me
with the treasure of Sanskrit learning. His blessings, I
always crave.
I also express my sense of obligation to Sri Nanda-
Kishore Diksit, Who has shown an academic intersest in
getting the present work published and has made me
indebted to him.

B. H. U. Krishnanath Chatterjee
1975.
 INTRODUCTION

The origin of Buddhism is not very clear. The idea

that Buddihsm originated by way of a reaction against
the slaughter of animals in sacrifies is only a myth. The
biographies of Buddha as given in the Laiitavistara, the
Buddha-Mahävastu-avadäna or in the Buddha-carit do not
mention any such thing as the reason of origin and growth
of Buddhism. Non-violence too was nothing new as a
doctrine since of the upanisads had already provided for it.
Jalnism also, is claimed to have had talked of it earlier
than Buddhism.
The idea that Buddhism has its roots in the concept
of non-duality of the upanisads is equally wrong since the
concept of non-duality was to be formed as yet# The older
upanisads were composed as so many parts of the Brämanas
that were employed in sacrifices« Vedänta as a system was
yet to take a shape. Buddhism was also not non-dualistic
in the beginning, it became so only with the appearance of
Mahayana.
Buddhism, therefore must have had its origin in the Säm-
khya system. The two preceptors of Buddha-Ädara Kälam
and Udraka were the two masters of the Samkhya school of
thought. Both were of the opinion that 'mukti' or salvation
meant that the soul should be releived of all its association
with the world of things, i»e. it should be 'kevalV. Buddha
resisted such an opinion. The soul, if it ever exist, in his
opinion, must exist only as related to the world, it does not
have the prospect of being left alone.
 ( vi )

Kautilya has referred to only three sytems of philosophy—

Samkhya, Yoga and the Lokäyata. Yoga is an ofF-shoot
of the Samkhya and both were dualistic. The available
literature on them are all late in composition. The Kärikä
of Isvarakrsna is the oldest available text on Samkhya.
Isvarakisna belonged to 500 A.D. But Samkhya as a
school must have been much older than that. The com-
mentary on Yoga has quoted a few texts of Pailicasikha»
Äsuri was known to the Jainas. In the Mahäbhärata,
Äsuri and Pafiicasikha are spoken of. Pafiicasikha is said
to have been in Mithila—the Capital of Janaka. Kapilas-
text is not found. The twenty-two sütras that go by his
name do not seem to have been that old. They are possibly
composed on the basis of Isvarakrsna's Kärikä. But the
Samkhya as a system must be very old as spoken of by
Kautilya. Asvaghosa also has referred to Kapila.

The most distinctive feature of Buddhism is that of

the Sangha order of, life. The vedic society had its.
emphasis on the house-hold order of life and was patriar-
chal. Patriarchy involves hierarchy and in every sphere
of life, such a hierarchy was apparent. The vama-system
is possibly the most absorbing one. Values were also-
created in favour of such a social order« The father or
the patriarch became the man of highest worldly authority
and on that very pattern, a supreme authority was conceived
of. Mother and matennity came to be looked down upon.
The body that is directly born of the mother was discounted
and the myth of the soul was put forward. Creation-myths
were narrated and ultimately there was established an
immutable essence wherefrom the world of creation was
held to have emanated.
 Buddhism was a challege to such a society and the
underlying social order. The Vanga-Bagadha-Cera people
were possibly the adherents of matriarchy and were against
all sorts of social hierarchy. The Sangha order of life
was definitely a negation of hierarchy and a challenge to
the Aryan household order based on hierarchy« The system
of heaving heads cleanly shaved was also a revolt against
the idea of identifying oneself with the patriarchal 'prauaras1
that the Aryans had been insisting upon. Violation of
'Sagotra' rules in marriage also went against the Aryan
concept of family. It is obvious that Buddhism that had
started as a system of ethics could not have overlooked the
social needs of the day. As a matter of fact, any system
of philosophy, worth its name} must have its roots in the
society and as a matter of course, serve the cause of the
society. Buddhism sought to preserve the nature of the
society of its own origin as against the invading Aryans.
Not only that. Buddhism sought to address itself to
the outside world also,. As agaginst the immutable Brahman
or soul, therefore, it postulated the concept of eternal
flux; as against permanence, impermanence per se. The
psychological background of the society had to be moulded
so that the society could accomodate change in its
nomenclature.
As a matter of fact, the family, has been a controversial
issue in the scheme of the society and even today the world
has been divided into diverse political camps in which the
idea of family or family pattern is an important issue of
conflict. Family involves hierarchy and individuality
that breeds 'self and egoism which stands in direct con-
frontation with the notion of equality. Hierarchy
ultimately brings in the concept of control and gyvernment
that militates against the idea of 'free humanity*.

Buddhism, therefore, could hardly accomodate hierarchy

and for that it had to disavow family and family life.
Family has its roots in patriarchy and patriarchy in the
concept of the immutable soul. Buddhism, therefore, on
the metaphysical plane, thought it wise to proclaim the
doctrine of impermanence or momentariness.

HlJNYAiNA and MAHÄYÄNA

Broadly speaking Buddhism is divided into two schools

Hlnyäna & Mahäyäna. In early Buddhism, there was no such
school as Hlnayäna. It .is the Mahayänists who branded
the earlier school as Hlnayäna. There was obviously an
attitude of supremacy underlying such a classification. In
the begining, there were two Yänas-Pratyeka-buddhayäna
or Pratyekayäna and srävakayäna. Pratyeka-buddhas are
they who had no opportunity to personally listen to the
religious discourses given by the Buddhas and who, there-
fore, by their own efforts attained salvation. They, however,
were unable to liberate others. Srävakas, on the other
hand, are those who got the opportunity of listening to the
religious discourses given by the Buddhas and attained
salvation. Initially, they are known as Srävakas, and
then they become Bhiksus when they live in 'viharas\
After having stayed in a c vihara ; , a 'srävaka* becomes a
c
srotäpanna\ After that, he attains to the stages on
'Sakrdägäml' and 'anägäml1 gradually and reaches to the
stage of 'Arhat' in the long run. They also attain salvation
personally and can liberate others. According to the
Mahäyäna view, these two Yänas are Hlnayäna in-as-much-
as their outlook is selfish. They were concerned only
with personal liberation. To the Mahäyänists, personal
liberation was not of much concern. It is so said that
when Avaiokitesvara was about to attain salvation, he was
approached by all and they enquired of him as to what
whould happen to them in case he would not be there to
liberate them. At this, Avaiokitesvara took the resolve
that he would not seek for salvation till everybody else was
liberated. This concept of universal 'Karunä* gave
Mahäyäna its glory.
The Mahäyäna also developed its Tripitaka. They
had hundreds of sütras to their credit and the Prajftä-
päramitä was the most representative of these sütras. So
-also #Bodhi-sattva-Vinaya* developed. The sole aim of
'Vinaya', according to them, was to eradicate all 'klesas
or afflictions. All are but 'Vikalpa' or the result of sub-
jective construction. With the growth of indererminate
.knowledge, 'Vikalpa' dies out; as for abhidharma, the
Mahäyanists spoke of canuttara-samyak-sambodhi !

In 'Sravakayana', trisarana-gamana, and the acceptance

of 'Paficasila' were common to the Bhilksus and the house-
holder disciples alike. In addition to these five sllas, three
more were prescribed for the advanced house-holder
disciples. These were 'to give up garlands & other luxurious
things/ 'to desist from using harsh language' and 'not to
indulge in music, dance and the like'. Two more sllas
were prescribed for the Bhiksus only and they were 'to giwQ
<up the habit of using elevated seats or beadsteads' and 'not
to touch gold or other coins.' In addition to these, the
Srävakayäna insisted on one more ritual known as 'Posadha-
*vrata' or the ritual of fasting. They undertook fasting
 ( O

on two cas£aml tithis', two 'caturdasls*, purnimä and

amävasyä. On these days, all the disciples-Bhiksus and
householders alike, were to assemble in Vihäras and listen
to religious discourses.
The'Mahäyäna also speaks of 'trisarana and of Silas.
But 'Posadhavrata' is not much heard of. Immediately
after the acceptance of 'trisarana, they were allowed to seek
for 'Bodhijnäna'. This stage was called 'Bcdhicittotpäda*
or 'Cittotpada' merely. After this, they had to cross two
more stages—'Päpadesanä* or discourses on sins and
'punyänumodanä' or longing for merit, after which they
would attain the stage, *Satpäramitä\
'Virya', is one of the Mahäyänipäramitäas. The
Mahäyänists* or Bodhisattvas aim was to attain the stage
of excellence in maintaining the Silas and help others to
maintain them. To the Hinayanists religion was somewhat
the cultivation of some negative virtues, not to do this ,
'not to do that' and the like. 'VIrya'j therefore, was-
reasonably unknown^ to them. The Mahayanists, on the
other hand, were rather more assertive and thus full of
vitality and energy.
The Srävaka-yäna spoke of^few 'dhyänas only—the first
one is marked with conjecture, the second with love, the
the third with pleasure and the fourth with none. After
having undergone these four 'dhyänas, one attains the
stages of srotäpanna, *sakrdägänjl' and 'anägäml and Arhat
gradually. The Mahäyäna also speaks of 'dhyänas' and
'samädhis in connection of which, these four 'dhyänas SLISO
are spoken of. The Mahäyäna does not speak of 'Srotäpanna,
Sakrdagämlj Anägäml or Arhat\ On the contrary, it
speaks of 'dasa bodhisattvabhümi \ The Bodhisattva has»
 (xi)

to cross the bhümis before he can qualify himself for the

attainment of Nirvana and Karuna is the most prominent
characteristic of his citta in an ascending order in con-
formity with the * bhümis.

The Prajfiaparamita speaks of two kinds of truth—

'samrvrta* and 'paramärtha'—conventional and Absolute*
All that we see around is false although from the worldly
point of view; they are taken as truth. Their truth is
relative. The other kind of truth is a truth, independent
of all other considerations. The Mahayanists call it
sünya.

The trisarana in Hlnayäna meant Buddha, Dharma,.

and Samgha while in Mahäyäna it meant Dharma,
Buddha and Samgha. Budha was relegated to the second
position. Goutama was only an incarnation of Buddha,
and he was designated the seventh position. The Mahayana.
held that Goutama Buddha had merely made a compilation,
of the 'Right Law'. His position was almost like that of
'Vyasadeva' in Hinduism. Dhyanl-buddha, according to>
the Mahäyäna, was the ideal Buddha and five such DhyänI-
buddhas ( Amitäbha and Vairocana and the like ) are
admitted of. Goutama was assigned the position of a mere
Mvärapäla' of these c DhaanIbuddas'.

In the Mahäyäna, *dharma* is of worthier consideration

than the Buddha and by *dharma' is meant the 'stüpa or
'Gaitya 5 . Beside the 'caitya* again stands the temple of
five Dhyänlbuddhas.

Gradually in place of Dharma, Buddha and Samgha,

Prajflä, Upäya and Bodhisattva developed as the 'trisarana*
with the Mahäyänisits. The Mahayanists were fcjfiana~
 (xii)

vädins' and as such it was felt reasonable that Dharma

should make room for Prajflä as their ideal. Salvation,
to them, was knowledge in essence. Buddha was, there-
fore, considered the means of attaining Prajfiä and since
Dharma and Buddha were identified with Prajfia and
Upäya, Samgha turned to be Bodhisattva.

After about one hundred years of Buddha's Nirväna,

there arose serious difference of opinion amongst his
followers and this difference of opinion centred round
•chiefly ten things called 'dasavatthu* (dasavastu).

1. The Bhiksus were prohibited from hoarding any

food-stuff. Collection of alms were their only source
of living. It is presumable that they received
cooked food from house-holders. Such food was
perhaps cooked without salt. Whatever might have
been the reason, food, cooked with salt was not
served or accepted—a practice still not unknown in
India. The Bhiksus, therefore, slowly got into the
habit of having salt for their own use and they
procured it in the hollowed horns of dead animals.
To this, the elders objected, as it involved the
practice of hoarding things.

2. The Vinaya insisted upon the idea that Bhiksus

must have their daily meal before 12 O'clock noon
and after that nobody must take any solid food.
But the bhiksus had to collect cooked food. It was
probable that sometimes to avoid forced fasting, they
did not mind to have the meal even if their own
shadow have gone say by an inch beyond its noon-
time size. The elders objected.
3, The bhiksus were asked to beg alms in one village
only in a day and they must not go to any other
village for alms the same day. If however, they
have any invitation in any other village> they must
leave the village scheduled for begging for that day
without asking for any alms and without food to
attend the invitation. But the bhiksus, sometimes,
were declined to do so. To this, elders objected.

4. Bhiksus residing in a particular hall or a locality

were to undergo fast (uposatha) and listen to
religious discourses together on astaml, amaväsya
and purnimä days. Many bhiksus, sometimes,
disliked this idea; they were in favour of an option
in regard to this community fasting; the elders
objected.
/
5# Generally the bhiksus of a particular vihära used to
take a collective decision in regard to their works«
But sometimes, some of them might happen to be
absent and in that case convention developed that
subject to their concurrence, the works would be
performed. Some objected to this to the effect that
why should it be so presumed that the absentee
members would concur to their opinion. To this?
the eiders held that it could not be helped, the
works of the vihära cannot suffer because of theif
absence.

6. Sometimes some bhiksus used to resort to certain

practices incidentally initiated by their own personal
'gurus'. Such practices, sometimis, being directly
in contradiction with what Buddha had said9 the
 ( xiv )

elders sought to impress upon the bhiksus not to

undertake such practices«
7. Bhiksus were not to take their-daily meal beyond
12 o'clock noon and if needed thep could drink only
liquids; so the bhiksus, sometimes, used to drink
buttermilk. But some of the bhiksus would not
allow the curd to be churned and pour water into it
and would feign to consider it buttermilk to which
the elders objected.
8. Bhiksus used to drink punjent juice although not
fermented as yet. The elders held that it was
virtually a kind of wine.

9. The bhiksus were ordained not to take an elevated

seat or bed and as such seats, with their fringes cut
off were also prohibited for their use. The neo-
buddhists contended that it did not involve violation
of the Buddha's advice, while the elders thought that
it did.
10# Bhiksus were not allowed to accept or even touch
gold or silver, But the bhiksus of Vaisäll did not
abide by this provision* They used to provide for a
disc full of water in the hall of community fastings
(Uposatha-sälä) and asked the upäsakas to offer
c
KärsäpanaJ or cKähäpanaJ in that disc The elders
objected to such a practice.

The bhiksus of Vaisäll sought to introduce these ten

practices after about one hundred years had passed after
the death of Goutama. At that time, one some bhiksu Yasa
by name came to Vaisäll and he found that the 'upasakas'
were offering 'Karsäpana', He forbade* them to do so, at
 ( xv)

which the bhiksus of Vaisäli became annoyed and tried to

oppress him. He left for Kausambl and from there, he
sent for the bhiksus living in Päva and Avantl. Ultimately,
he went to the Ahoganga mountain where Sambhüta
SonaväsX used to live. Unto him, he narrated the whole
story. Gradually sixty bhiksus from Pävä and eighty other
bhiksus from Avantl arrived. It was finally agreed upon
that they should seek the advice of Revata who was the
oldest of all and the most learned. He used to stay at
Taxila. They all met him at a place called Sahajati near
Taxila and on hearing from themj he said that all those
ten practices were against the religion of Buddha and they
must be put an end to it. The bhiksus of Vaisali tried
in every possible way to win Revata to their side. But
all to no effect. They ultimately sought refuge with the
king of Pätaliputra, but that too did not prove to be of any
success. Revata ultimately came down to Vaisäli and
gave the proposal that an Uvvähikä (council) be formed for
the purpose. The Uwähikä was formed of eight most
venerable and learned bhiksus. They all gave their
opinion against these practices. Those who accepted their
opinion were known as Sthaviravadins and those who did
not were known as Mahäsämghikas..
According to cylonese tradition Goutama Buddha
attained 'pannirväna in the year 543 B. G. The Chinese
record reveals that Buddha attained Nirvana in the year
486 B. C. In the city, Canton, an wooden plank was
discovered with certain marks on it. The Nirvana
anniversary day was observed with great pomp & grandeur
by the bhikjus there- & each such day was marked on it. In
all, there were 975 such sectarian marks on it and such a
mark was given on 489 A. D. So the date of Nirvana
 should be 973-489 = 486 B. C. The European scholars
are of the opinion that the date should be 483 B. C. The
Buddhists, therefore, were divided into different camps in
about 383 B, C. after about one hundred years after the
death of Buddha.
It is however, not to be presumed that till they w e re
divided into so many camps, everything was alright with
them. Immediately after the death of Buddha, some
Bhik/us were about to violate the Vinaya rules of whom
some Subhanga is said to be most outspoken. So the elders-
met in a Sanglti in the Saptaparni cave of Rajagrha and
made a compromise. The chief disciple of Buddha-
Mahäkäsyapa was appointed the Sanghathera who was to»
mitigate all religious disputes. Since then, the appoint-
" ment of a Sanghathera became a convention with the
Buddhist Sangha. In the year 383 A, D. when the problem
dasavattu cropped up, 'Sarvakämi5 was the Samghathera»
It is in his time that that Buddhism was divided into two'
camps—Mthaviravädins and Mahasarhghikas.
The Mahasrhghikas were more in numerical strength'
and /were comparatively young in age and so were more
energetic. They were 'Lokottaravadins1 from the very
beginning« In their opionion, Buddha was no mortal'
being, he possessed supernatural powers and so even if he
died he pervades the whole universe. He possesses a-
supersensuos and in-explicable essence of existence. Because
of being oppressed by the Sthaviravädins the Mahäsanghikas
came closer to the Hindus. They became more philossophi-
cally oriented and declared Buddha as Mahävastu. It is-
possibly they who for the first time erected a statue of"
Buddha in their vihäras. They wrote their scriptures in,
Sanskrit.
 ( xvii )

The sthaviravädinsj on the contrary, laid their sole

emphasis on the Vinaya rules. Abiding by Vinaya rules
would enable the bhiksus, they held, to attain the stage of
'srotapatti* or going along the course of the current that
leads to 'Nirvana'. Gradually they reach a stage called
'Sakrdägaml' that is to say they would have to come only
once to get anal deliverance and ahead of that, is the stage
of 'AnägamP on the attainment of which one does not
have to undergo the cycle of the birth andhdeath any longer.
After this, the stage of an 'Arhat' is attained. 'Arhat'
docs not get his final release till a Buddha is born to
release him from 'samsara'. He gets the deliverance by
virtue of his own deeds. The Mahäsänghikas did not lay
that much of emphasis on the Vinaya rules. They insisted
upon the attainment of 'jftana\

In the begining, a dispute arose as to whether Buddha

was a human being or a superhuman personality. The
Sthaviravädins considered him a human being? while
according to the Mahäsänghikas, he a was lokottara being*
So the Mahäsänghikas were otherwise known as
Lokottravädins,

In regard to Buddha-nidänas also they differed« The

Sthaviravädins spoke of 24 Buddhas i.e. (i) DTpankara,
(ii) 'Kondinya* (iii) Mangala (iv) Sumanasa (v) Rcvata
(vi) Sobhita (vii) Anomadarsin (viii) Padma (ix) Närada
(x) Padmottara (xi) Sumedhä (xii) Sujäta (xiii) Priyadarsin
(xiv) Arthadarsin (xv) Dharmadarsin (xvi) Siddhärtha
(xvii) Tisya (xviii) Pusya (xix) Vipasyl (xx) &khl
(xxi) Visvabhü (xxiij Krakucchanda (xxiii) Kanakmuni
(xxiv) Käsyapa.
 ( xviii )

According to the Mahäsähghikas the Buddha-nidana,

is somewhat different. They hold that Bodhisattva has
to undergo four caryäs and each of them involve hundred»
of births What the Sthaviravädins have said pertain
only to the last part of the last caryä according to them.
The four Caryäs are (i) Prakrti-Caryä (ii) Pranidhana
Caryä (iii) Anuloma-Caryä (iv) Anivartana-Carya.

(i) Prakrti-Caryä :

In this 'Caryä', a Bodhisattva is devoted to his

parents, the Sramanas and Brahmans, obedient to the
elders and a traveller of the path of ten 'kusalakarmas.
He at this stage makes gifts to others, gives religious
discourses and worships the Buddas. But his mind is not
yet ripe enough to espirc after Bodhi#

(ii) Pranidhäna Caryä :

In this 'Caryä he must take the resolve that he must

be a Buddha. It has five parts called 'pranidhis (i) He
must take a resolve to the effect "I shall be a Buddha1'
(ii) He must take into account "I made a lot of gifts to
the Buddhas" (iii) So alfo he must resolve "whatever tiire
it may take I must be a Buddha'* (iv) He must say to
himself 4<I will make the gift of caves and vihäras for the
Buddha and the Sanigha" (v) Ultimately he must realize
"the world is anitya."

Then follows the anuloma-Caryä where whatever is

favourable to the pranidhäna-carya are to be performed.
Then comes the fourth stage—or the stage of anivartana-
carya. At this stage, one has to be intent on attaining *bodhi\
Here at this stage, lotne Buddha for casts as to who of his
 *( x « )

Bodhisattva disciples will be the next Buddha. This is techni-

cally called 'Vyakarana\ The nidäna of the Sthaviravädins
proceeds from such a stage like this. The nidäna of the
Mahä-Sanghikas on the other hand, is like this. In the
prakrticaryä, Säkyasimha was aparimita-dhvaja and at
that time Säkyamuni was said to have been a Ghakravarty
King only and he came unto the Lord and took to the
path of law. In the Pranidhana Caryä, Säkyamuni was
Säkyamunf Buddha. Säkyamuni, at , this stage, was a
trader. He came to Lord Buddha and took the resolve
that one day he would also be a Buddha and that he would
tc born in Kapilabastu. In the anulomacaryä, Säkyamuni
was a Chakravarty king. In the anivartana caryä, Dipankara
made the forecast (Vyäkarana) that Säkyamuni will be a
Buddha. After Dipankara, many other Buddhas had
echoed it (anuvyäkarana).

The Sthaviravädins are content with the twenty-four

and two more (Säkyasimha and Maitreya) Buddhas and they
just say 'Buddhayanamah'. But the Mahäsanghikas would
say 'om namah Srfmahäbuddhäyätltänägata-pratyutpanne-
bhyah' and they arc not content evea with hundreds of
crores of Buddhas.

This way the gulf of difference between the two schools

became wide. Even at the time of Asoka, when a
conference of the Buddhists were held at Pataliputra, the
Mahäsanghikas had no place and they did not recognise
it to be a conference at all. Asoka was a patron of the
Sthaviravädins, and the religion that was preached at
Gylone was Sthaviravada. The Mahäsanghikas, however,
got their strong bases in Ayodhyä, Mathurä and the Punjab
beyond the frontiers of Asoka's Kingdom«
 Gradually, however, both the camps were further
sub-divided into many more schools. The Sthaviravadins
were initially divided into two schools-Mahlsäsaka and
Vajjiputtaka. Mahisäsaka again was further sub-divided into
two-savvathavädl ( Sarvästivädins ) and Dharmaguptika,
Savvathavadls again were furthermore sub-divided into
Käsyaplya, Samkäntika and Suttaväda. The Vajjiputtakas
were divided into four school s-Dhammatthanlya, Chandägä-
rika, Bhaddajänlka and Sammatltya,

The Mahäsanghikas were divided into two-Gokulika

and Ekavyokarika. The Gokuhka were divided again into
three-Pannatthivada, Bahulika and Cetryavada, Added
to these, there were few other Local schools-Hemavanta,
Rajagiriya, Siddhatthaka, Pürvasellya, Aparaseliya and
Vajiriya.
With about forty to fifty years from now, Pusyamitra
(Püspamitra Sunga) invaded Asok"a*s kingdom and established
a new empire. Pusyamitra was of the Brahmanical faith
and thus out of revenge against Asoka, he performed an
'Asvamedha' sacrifice at Pataliputra. He sought to
annihilate the Bauddhas. Asoka was a patron of the
Sthaviravadins and as such they became Pusyämatra's
target of attack. The Mahäsanghikas, however, escaped
his anger and as they mainly lived in in the Punjab or
or elsewhere beyond the frontiers of his kingdom, they
were not much affected.

In any case, the Buddhists, already a divided house,

became much the more weakened due to the oppression
made by king Pusyamitra. But fortunately for the
Mahäsanghikas that on the western—most parts of India
at that time, sakas, yavanas and Pahllavas had established
 (xxi )

their kingdoms* The Mahäsanghikas tried to influence

them and it took them about two hundred years to get
their purpose served. The Mahäsanghikas held a conference
at Jalandhar during the reign of Kaniska and they got
their school of thought duly established. King Kaniska
was a great patron of Mahäyäna Buddhism and it is but
reasonable that this conference played a historicel role
towards the evolution of Buddhism. Herein possibly the
Mahäsanghikas evolved as Mahäyänists and the chief
characteristics of the Mahäsanghikas namely the attainment
of Buddhahood, the ten bhuumis of esoteric exercises were
accepted by the Mahäyänists. The Mahäyäna concept
of Bodhisattvahood and that of 'Karunä' were still to
grow*

The Mahäsanghikas were 'lokottaravadins' as is said

in the Mahävastu-avadäna — "Äryamahasanghikanäm
iokottaravädinäm ". The ' ten btiumis of esoteric
exercises and Buddhahood aie spoken of in it. After
Mahävastu-avadäna, the 'Lankavatärasütra' was composed
and the concept of Bhodisattvahcod had fts root in it and
was developed upon by Asvaghosa. The Lanka vatära-
sütra again for the first time raised the qnestion as to
whether the cTathägaUf is immutable or not ?

The Mahäyäna brought an end to all storts of mutual-

rifts amongst the Mahäsanghikas.

Nägärjuna, the great Mahäyäna philosopher carried

the Mahäyäna to its metaphysical finish. But, for a
proper ' understanding of the Nägärjuna ( or the
Mahäyäna ) philosophy and the historical development of
Buddhism both1 rfinayana and Mahäyana, it is essential
 ( xxü )

to know of the further development of 'Sarvastivada', a

Hinayäna school into vaibhasika and sautrantika schools.
The sarvastivada has seven treatises on 'Abhidharma' to
its credit. They are jftäna-Prasthäna, Dharmaskandha,
Sangltiparyäya, Vijüaptiväda, Prakaranapäda, Prajftaptisara
and Dhätukäyapadasastra. They arc again regarded as
the Abhidharma treatises of the Vaibhätikas also. Jfiäna-
prasthanasatra was composed by Katyayaniputra in about
2nd cont B. G. Vasubandhu wrote a commentary on it in
4th cent, A. D. known as the Abhi-dharmakosa. The
commentaries that were written on the Abhidharma
treatises of the Sarvastivada school wetc called Vibhäsa
and the vaibha§ika school was thus so called. It can well
be said therefore that the Vaibhäsika school originated
round about 1st or 2nd cent A. D.

The Sautrantika came a bit later, possibly at 3rd cent

A. D. Kumäraläta ( or Kumärarata ) and his disciple
Harivarman were possibly the founders of this new school.
They did not give much credit to the Abhidharma or
Vibha§a treatises and laid much emphasis on the sütras
which alone retained Buddha's own sayings, they said, on
the contrary. Works of Kumäraläta arc yet to be dis-
covered, although the Chinese translation of Satyasiddi-
sastra, a treatise composed by Harivarma has been known
to exist. The translation is supposed to have been done by
the first half of the fifth century A . D .

The Vaibhäsikas were realists in a sense« The believed

that Nirvana was a realc blissful existence although they
did not believe in the existence of any soul or individuality.
They also accepted the relative existence of the five
fkandhas and the , 'dharmas1 or the entities of «ensuoui
 ( xxiii )

perception and essential reality of things in which they

fundamentally differed from the ageold foundation of
Buddhism.

By 'dharma', the vaibhäsikas might be held to have

meant phenomenon. That which is endowed with
'Svalaksana' is called 'dharma'. Dharma is what is grasped
by the senses and it is by the particular activities of the
respective senses that the paiticular characteristics
(Svalak/ana) are grasped and until they are dully grasped,
liberation is not possible. Vasubandhu said :

dharmänäm pravicayam antarena nasti/

Kiesänäm yata upasantaye abhyupäyah//
Abhidharmakosa« I. 21. 3»

(without real and due knowledge of the essence of the

entities, klesas cannot be done away with and without the
anihilation of the klesas, Nirvana remains a far cry).

The vaibhäsikas, with, a view to analysing the essential

distinction of the entities of sensuous perception have
spoken of the seventy-five reals which again can be sub-
divided into two categories-säsrava and anäsrava or defiled
and pure.

By Säsrava are meant those (entities) that are other-

wise, known as 'Samskrtä' and by samskrtä dharmas are
meant 'Samskrtä dharma rupadiskandhapancakam or the five
skandhas e, g. Rupa, Vedana, Samjna, Saöiskära, Vijnäna
and all those entities that are essentially of the nature of
the five skandhas, Samskrta dharmas or entities are the
entities of cnditional orgination. Each and every such
entity is born of the plurality of cauief.
 ( xxrv }

On the contrary, whatevcrc is not born of causes ire^

whatever is of unconditioned origination is called anäsrava
or asamskrtä dharma or entity. The Sarväsüväda spoke
of seventy-two kinds of Samskrta dharma and three only of
asarbkrta d harm as.

These seventy-two samskrta element» have agarn bee»

classified into four categories—rupar cittar caiua and eitta*
v prayukta. They all, arc rooted ir> the Paficaskandhas«
(rupa, vedanä3 SamjfLäy Samskära an<$ Vijnäna). The
rüpadhaimas and the Citta d harm as are born of rüpaskandha
and the Vijüäna-skandha respectively. The Caitta-dharma
(mental entities) and the Citta-Viprayukta dharmas are
rooted in vedanaskandha? ^amjnä-skandha and samskära«
skandha.
Rüpa comprises of eleven entities—the 6ve indriyas*
their respective five objects' and avijfiapti. By 'avijflapti
is meant the 'serial continuity' of the good or bad entity.
When the mind is in a disarray or when in Samadhi and
the cause of its origination are the four mahäbhütas of :
Viksiptacittakasyäpi yonnvandhah subhäsubhah/
Mahäbhütänyupädäya sä hyavijflaptirucyatc//
Abhidharma kosa (ibid 11)

Gittadharma arc six in number-the five pravrttivijflanas

and manovijfläna. Really speaking the five pravrttijnanas
and manovijüäna are the limbs, so to say of the citta
which can be designated as 'sensesorium commune' :
§annäm anantarätlm vijftänam yaddhi tanmanah (Abhi-
dharmakosa). All entities emanate from manah, it is said
in the Dhammapäda 'Mano puvvangamä dhatnmä mano
set{a manomaya« .
 («XV)

The caitta-dharmas are forty-six and ace classified into

six categories»
(a) Citta-mahäbhümika dharma—(ten in number)
(i) Vcdana (ii) Samjüä ^iii) cctana
(iv) sparsa (v) chanda (vi) zftati
(vii) smrti (viii) manaskara (ix) adhimukti
(x) Samädhi.
(b) Kusalamahäbhümikadharmas (ten in number)
(i) 6raddhä (ii) apramäda
* (iii) furasrabdlfi (iv) upeksa
(v) hrl (vx) apatrapä
(vii) alobba (viii) a^dycsa
1
(ix) ahirbsä (x) vlrya.

(c) Klesabhumika-dharma (six in number)

(i) moha (ii) Pramäda
. (iiji) S^im^ya (iv) astlddhya
(?) Styana (vi) auddhatya.

(d) , Akusalamahabhumika-dhaxma (two j n number)

(i) .Ährftatä (ii) anapatrapä.

(e) upaklesabhumika-dharma (ten in-number)

(i) JKrociha (ii). mraksa t

(iii^matsarya (iv) Ir§ya

(v) Pradäsa (vi) Vihimsa
(vii) Upanaha (viii) mSya -
(i'x) sSthya (x) mada.
 ( xxvi )

(f) Aniyatabhümika-dharma (eight in number)

(i) Vitarka (ii) vicara
(iii) Kaukrtya (iv) raga
" (v) mäna (vi) Vicikitsä
(vii)'dvcsa (vnij Middha (nidra).

It has already been said that that the Gaittas and

Cittaviprayukta dharmas are rooted in Vedana, Samjfia and
Samskära—the three skandhas. Vsdana may be either
good or bad or it may be completely indifferent by nature
and Samjfia^ determines the particular essence of the
dharmas. (Samjfiä nimittodgrahanätmikä). Samskära«
skandha, on the country, is rooted in the four other skandhas
(Samskärä'Skandhascaturbhyo'nye Samskäräh). It is well
explained how the five kinds of the above mentioned
Cittadharma are rooted in these
The word, 'bhumi' means the source of origination and
Citta is the mahäbhümi in-as-much-as everything emanates
from that,- The dharmas that pertain^to* all the modes of
the Citta are called Mahäbhümika^dharma. Those that
originate in a Citta when it is in a favourable ( Kusala )
condition4are called^usatabhüm^Ka^ana^liose thar are of
counter-origin are known as akusaläbftüttn&a and Klesabhü-
mika dharmas. The upaklesabhlimika dharmas like the
akusalabhQmika dharmas originate when the Citta is in an
unfavourable condition. The * aniyaftabhümika» may
originate even .when the Citta Js-in 1 either of the two
conditions« 4 . . .CI
There is another category of th$ Samskrtadhanna
known as 'Citta-Viprayukta Samskära, It, as its name
sugg sts, has no association with either rüpa or the Citta«
 ( xxvu)

The Citta-viprayuktk dharmas emanate fro

skandha and they are präpti, apräpti, sai>Mga*H, asamjftika,
Samapatti, J[Ivita, Jarä, Sthiti, anityata (these four gö by
the name laksanä), namakaya, padakäya, and Vyafljac*ak5ya*
These dharmas have no substantiality (VastutVa) nor afce
they Ca>tta by nature although very similar to the Caittas
in essence.

Präpti is of two kinds—läbha and rsamanvaya or

acquisition and possession« By präpti is meant the act
of acquisition or of possession of dharma, äsraya, skandha,
äyatana and the like.

Sabhägatä or nikäya-sabhägatä signifies' t i e idea of

sameness or similarity amongst elements.*

Asamjflika-Samskära bungs, about the extirpation of. the

flow either of the citta or of the Caitta elements ^

When the flow of Gitta and" of elements are thus

checked, there arises a stage of perfect mental balance
where the mahäbhütas stand ~ on par (mahäbhüta«samatä-
pädänam). This is called samapatti and it is of two
kinds—äsmjiiika-Samäpatti and nirodha-Samapatth
Jlvita is a synonym of äyus ( or life-force ) .and it
determines the existence -,of elements,, This as the Ipcus
so to say of (body) heat and conciousness (ädhära usnavi-
jftanayoh). * v , n , f n t t^m , r

By Maksana* are meant jati, jarä, sthhhi antf anityata

of wnich eacn one is considered an individual element«
% jqthera e# g. namakaya, padakäya and
vyafijanaj:ay§.%or^inate from Samjilä» Väkya and aksaia
respectively. ^ ^^
 ( xxviii )

The asaitafcrtÄ or the unconditioned elements i, e. which\

are not to Be grasped bythe senses areoniythree-äkäsa,
and the two Äirodhfcs-—<fäkäsa& dvau nirodhfcu ca'f. By
two nirodhas are meanVthe pratisamkhyä-nirodha and the
apr at isamkhyä-nif ödha*,

That which does not cover up matter or is not covered

up by matter is äkäsa and the two kinds of nirodhas are
only the twa aspects of nirvana-. 38y. cpratisa«mkhya-ntfotlhaf
is? meant the extirpation of all individual 'säsrava' d harm as
severally-''Visamyogah prthak prthak*\ Such Vfsariiyogas
are each an entity (dharma), since they exist by them-
selves. Pratisamkyä-niradha, signifies Prajaä and the
knowledge by such prajfiä, of the nature and essence of
these säsrava elements. Apratisamkyä-nirodha, on the
other hahdf ineafis the"t?ultimate' extirpation* of the^ very
causes that go to originate the ehtities'(Utpädatyantavi-
ghnah pratyaya-vaikalyät).
jAplraitismkhyä-nirodha, therefore, is the ultimate aim of
tb* Vaibhasikas because according to them., this very
oirodha leads one to absolute Nirvana«

The anaylysis of the entities as given has clearly

demonstrated that they are realists. They contend that
matter (or form) and the paramänu' are real'. It should
Be realised, however, that by paramänu, they Understand
the minutest possible stage of an aggregate of matter and
not the atom or monad (dravy a paramänu) of the Vaiscsikas.
The Paramänus of, the Vaibhasikas have no substantiality
(dravyatya;. The *paramanu' or the minutest possible jiUge
of an aggreegate of matter is not devoid ol us svalak*
sanas' an3 its svalaksahaa are eight in tJumBcr—-Vlicr four
mahäbhutas and the four corresponding thing's bbrn ot
 ( xxix )

these mahäbhütas (ksiti, ap, tcja, VSyu and tüpa* rasa,

gandha and sparsa). Hence, it ha« no 'ultimate simplicity1.
The paramanu cf the Vaisesikas does not die out - it is
eternal, while that of the vaibhä§ikas is only* temporary
since it involve» an aggregate of matter only. On the expiry
of the previous 'paramanu9 (aggregate), m new one steps in.
The birth, existence and decay of every paramänu is
determined of causally«
The *Citta' and Gaittadharmas or the mind and the
mental phenomena also have no inbe[tendenf existence.
The mind exists Because of consciousness. Consciousness
also is temporary. On the decay of the series of one conciöus-
ness* the series of another consciousness come in.. The
consciousness of the previous moment serves, as the locus of
the consciousness that immediately follows. p Citta comes in
association of the Caittas.
No dharma whatsoever is ever born of a sigular cause
(ekahetusambhüta) and each dharma functions as a cause
(Käranahetu) of each other dharma. Causality is, there-
fore, beset with both—sequence and coexistence* The
Sautrantikas, however, differed with the vaibhäsikas on this
score in-as-much-as they did not admit of the co-existence
of dharmas. Another fundamental difference between the
Vaibhäsikas and the Sautrantikas is that to the Vaibhäsikas,
the tlftec unconditioned elements were positive by nature
while negative to the sautfäntrkas. According to Jthe
SauträntikdS, äkäsa meant the absence of the things of
tactile perception and nirvana meant the absence of the
origination and growth Nirvana, t&eifefore, it* ^their
opinion is something unreal whüef in the opinion of the
Vaibhäsikas, it is real, pure (anasrava) and blissful by
nature.
 In regard tQ 'Pudgala' or ät;tnä'f the Vaibhasikas* view
is very dear* According to them« 'Jivas* are born of the
combination of the,formed ,(Rupi), and the fom less, (arüpi),
the skandhas[<and the mahabhu^as. ,Jvvatis an aggregate
of elements ..only, as. the,, army, 4«-of individual#0 141 ers-.
There is no permanent link between them conprwngithe
army,, So^ajsp is the case wjjh, the stream of a river whrch
is nothing but the serial flow of a temporary nature of so
many water-atoms« There are, there/ore, only elements—
skandhas, äyatanas, dhätus and the like and no ätmä or
pudgala. ^The Vaibfyäsikas? therefore, came very close to
the Sünyavädins in denying the existence of pudgala.

The Vaibhäsika, however, believed in the relative

existence of dliärmas^ arid * that they (clharmas) abided by
the past, the present and the future. The present element
is only an offshoot of an aggregate of elements of the past
ami i t tfie^same time tlic cause' of a similar Aggregate to
come to exist'in the futtfre. To the Sautrantikas, dharmas
has no 'such^fristoricityV * They proclaimed both pudgala-
sünyatä a%3 dliarmasunyatäi "3 To 'them, a ^jiva^is like an
empty pitcher containing no ätm^'or ^pudgala1, while a
is only Vnamc (Samjfta). --

To the /S^utrantikasf truth i

(Samvrti) and absolute (paramärtha). £,n entity is,
tional truths it has no reaL essence; it is only .momentary, it
did not exist in the past, nor will it exist m the future. If is
undergoing^erpeUial^change at every moment^ It is a conti-
nuous phenomeapn only and there xs nothing that abides in
tf>9 series as, therc^ is n^ne m the series of ants. The cause-
effect relation ^supposed f to be x subsisttng in the discrete
elements in a series is only a mental deation. So elements
 (xxxi)

are only a scries of ima§|||Ldirectiy perceptible. The

Vaibhäsikas thought that tnc elements arc a matter of
direct perception while to the* sauträntikas, they are deduc-
tive. The sautrantikas contended ihat dharmas exist only
in our streams of consciousness; they are objectively unreal.
The Vaibhäsikas, ön the contrary, believed in the essence
and reality of elements aha* so tliey^cqulct advance the
theory of direct perception of themT

The Sautrantikas differed front the Vaibhäsikas in one

more fundamental point. ^ They" contended that an element
gets destroyed the moment it has >come to exists The
Vaibhäsikas/ though they believed in the impartment
nature of things, assumed that an element has tfour
stages or the stages of growth, ^istence, decay and death.
It does not die the moment it if born - it has a sequence.

The vleWof the Vaibhafcikasinay, therefore/be equated

with'what is known as" the7 doctrine'of eternktity and"that
of the fSautrantika* to that of extermination1.11 'the Madhya-
m&a; rejected .J>oth of these jVAews and topfe to -a/middle
course for which it.,was knpwn a3 ,thc„ ^pd^yamika.
]Nägäruna.,taught that ^bsqlutc. truth cannot? be expressed
m termer of ? what^ conveyed,fey casUV flästi^nitya^ anjltya,
atmä; orcanatmätm3as|^icsafea^gräiionr«ä^^yuc^hedadar-
sanam / .Sasvatocchedanirmufe^m i^tattvam .saugata^am-
matam f/ ., ^ » I « -j * *
i * *» i if ' n\ i „. -j
According to the Vaibhäsikas and the Sautrantikas, the
pratyayas *are~ the causes of origin' of an element i.e. a
posterior element comes to exist by way of an effect of a
previous element. Nägarjuna Kefo11 tKat no element ever
originates or is ever äeströyccJr 'Tn'e'previous element that-
 (xxxii)

is supposed to be the cause of a posterior one, does not

contain the essence of it (the posterior element, its effect).
They ase essentially different from each other — milk is
milk and curd is^purd A dissimilar element cannot
function as the cause, of another dissimilar clement. No
element,, therefore,*can cause to originate another element
and as nothing o^gmatesj nothing is destroyed. This
of course docs not mean that entities are eternal in-as-much-
as impermanence is the key-note of Buddhism — the sprout
is only"a parinima of an'earlier' stage — the seed. Neither
the seed, nor .the -sprout .tare static > since they are in an
eternal'flux. The-seed is not destroyed on its so-called
destruction-and the iprout comes to exist« The flux is not a
real flux since? that is limited to its own kind«
In *case~ elements "We supposed to undergo the stages
of ^origination, existence and decay, time also must be taken
to be | divided into thrce^atages-- past, present and future.
Such a,division involvca,movecicnt and in case, movement
, ia **ot admitted ,of, the .ebneept of time has xo be discarded.
"^Nagar^una does not accept the rdca of any such movement,
in^äs-mach-as that which is past does Hot move or that
which if t become in future lias not - gathered any movement
-a*'yet, ' A»d if. past and future are not within one's
pervicW/the question of the present time does not arise at
-All. Timei -thei^forc, i*««ording to Nägärjuna is without
any movement» Time has neither any beginning nor any
end. f „Time is neither stationary nor dynamic since with-
in i : , ^ j i » »»•** i *
out the idea of movement, one cannot conceive of what is
without movement,
Nägärjuna also has dicarded the idea of reality ascribed
to the five skandhas or lix, ayatanas. The Hinayänists
 (xxxiii)

conceived of the six 'dhätus' as the root of one's individu-

ality and the six dhätus are said to be the four mahäbhüt i5s
äkäU and vijfiäna. In the opinion of Nägärjuni, these dhä-
tus can neither be said to be existing nor not existing. They
are neither . conditioned not unconditioned» They are
'sünya .
According to the Vaibhasikas and the Sauträntikas, an
element undergoes the three stages of origination, existence'
and decay and these are the characteristics (laksana) of an
element. Nägärjuna branded them as nonsubtantial since
one can conceive of them neither wholly nor severally,
they are not conceived of wholly because they do not occur
in any given moment or in any given time. They are not
conceived severally because they do not occur independent
of rach other. Light, for example, can not be said to origi-
nate in tim^ since light exists only in conjuction of what is
enlightened One cannot conceive of any stage when light
enlightenes itself only. If it be so said that light expels
darkness, then there would arise a question when does it do
so ? The origination of light and the expulsion of darknt ss
simultaneously happen. It cannot be held that one origina-
tes because of the other. So light cannot be held to originate
and only this much can be said that at a given moment
light exists. It may again be argued that 'light exists,
involves a tempural sequence. According to Nagarjuna,
no such sequence is possible in-as-much-as t h e m j m m t
light is seen to exist, its manifestation (of existence^ is
complete. As time has no sequence, licjht also cannot have
an) temporal sequence either. So it h<is only 'existence' in
the present. But nothing can exist without change since
Ghange is the sine-qua-non of the very existence. So 'light
exists' is also equally.untrue. If light does not originate
 ( xxxiv }

nor does it exist, it cannot be held to undergo decay.

Moreover, if what has decayed cannot undergo any further
decay or what is yet to be decayed cannot decay, decay
as such, happening in the present is inconceivable.
There is no sequence in origination or in decay. In reality,
nothing can decay since that would involve one to conceive
of a stage where existence and decay should simultaneously
occur. So Nägärjuna says that there is no such stage as
that of origination, of existence or of decay. The world
is on[y a dream born of mere casuality,

Hinayana did not admit of the soul or pudgala but it

did not deny the existence and reality of dharma or
elements. There is no actor, action exists although« The
Vedanta held that there is no action though the actor is
there. Nägärajuna denied both the alternatives. If there is
no 'grahaka', grähya cannot be contemplated of and if
there is no grähya, there cannot be any grähaka. Really
speaking, there is neither 'Käraka' nor Karma, neither the
Creator nor the Creation. Both are untrue. The world
is only a representation (abhösa) born of causes and eondi-
tions. This representation again exists only relatively and
from the absolute point of view, all are without any
essence; everything is only Sünya.

What is cSamsära, then ? It also does not exist, since

it has no beginning and thus no end and if it has none,
it cannot exist—there is no birth, decay and death. So
'dunkha' also does not exist and therefore, karma or the
retribution thereof, purity, impurity, rüpa, rasa, gandha
'sparsa% grähya or grähaka—nothing exists. The äryasat-
yas, however, will have their utility, for those who are
still in the 'Sädhanamärga' will find their full worth. But
 ( XXXV )

for those who have much advanced and have developed a

metaphysical mammy, these are only conventional. In
the absolute sense, these are only sünya. Nirvana,
therefore- is only a stage—a stage of supraphenomental
existence. Nirvana is neither positive nor negative in
essence since in case it were positive it must change and
in case it were negative it cannot exist. It is a stage
when elements are beyond origination, existence or decay,
when the flow of elements (dharmasantäna) has ceased to
flow. The Sarbsara, when it assumes the stage of un-
conditiQnedness or the stage of non-essentialness (Saväbhava-
sünyatä), it transforms into Nirvana«
Close to its heels, there arose the Yogäcära school of
Buddhism otherwise known as Vijfianavada Asanga and
Vasubandhu are the two great teachers of this school
They possibly flourished in the fourth or the fifth
century A. D. The school found by Asanga was
known as Yogäcära and Vasubandhu gave it the name,
'Vijüänaväda' or Vijflaptimätratäväda. The esoteric
aspect of it justified the name, Yogäcära^ while its
metaphysical aspect, *Vijnänaväda\ Asanga was more
after its esoteric aspect while vasubandhu, the metaphysical
one. The school might have had its roots even earlier
than Asanga. He is said to have been initiated by
Maitreya and this Maitr'eya has been identified by the
Japanese scholars with Mai trey anätha—the author of
'Mahäyäna-Uttaratantra', and 'Dharmatävibhanga' avail-
able in Tibetan translation only. Asanga has two treatises
to his credit—'Mahäyäna-SütrSlärbkära' and 'Mahäyäna-
Samparigrahasästra'. The first one is available in Sanskrit
and the Second one is Chinese translation only. As
'Maitreya' is not finally identified, Asanga is regarded as«
the founder of this school and his brother Vasubandhu is
 ( xxxvi )

the second in command. Vasubandhu has to his credit

also three treaties of the Vijfiänaväda metaphysics—the
Viriisatika, the trirLisikä and the Madhyänta-Vibhanga-
sastra. After Vasubandhu, to name other äcäryas of^this
school, one has to refer to Dinnäga, Sthiramati and
Dharmapäla. Sthiramati wrote an elaborate commenta y
on the Trimsikä. Dharmapäla was a scholar attached to
'Nälandämahäbihära'* Sllabhadra was his disciple with
whom the great Chinese scholar 'Hsüan Chuang' studied
Buddhism. Hsiian Chuang also might be considered as
one of the great teachers of this school since he composed
an independent treatise known as the Vijflapatimätratä-
siddhi recentty translated into french by Prof. Poussin.
In this treatise alone, are given the opinions of the different
teachers of this school in a chronological order. It is the
type of a commentary on the Trimsikä-kärikä« The
Virhsatikä-kärika' has also been translated into Chinese by
Hsiianchuang Two other translations are also available-one
by prajfläruci and the other by paramartha. An independent
commentary was written on the Virhsatikä-karikä by
Dharmapäla and translated into Chinese by 'I-Tsiug, known
as *ChJeng-Wei-Shih-pao-Sheng-lUn\
The Yogäcära school fully endorsed the view of the
Mädhyamikas. Asanga and Vasubandhu, both admitted of
the unreal nature of elements; the idea of their birth,
existence, d^cay or death is false. But at the same time,
they declared that by this, they did not advocate nihilism.
To them, all were but Vijfiana or Citta only ('Vijnapti-
mätf aoievedamasadarthavabhasanat') and Vasubandhu with
the view to supporting his views quoted Lord Buddha's saying
Gittamätram bho jinaputrä Yaduta traidhätukamiti'. They
thus added a new meaning to the doctrine of unreality of
elements. The concept of *äün>atä' of Nagärjuna had the
 ( xxxvii ) ,

risk of being misinterpreted as nihilism. The concept of

Vijfiana as the absolute principle did away with such a
risk* Vijflanavada reestablished Buddhism in the domain
of spiritual thought; the World of bliss that people were
hankering after for long.

The paramartha according to Asanga neither exists nor

does not exist nor is it somewhat other than these two. It
neither originates nor decays; it neither develops nor gets
purified nor does not get purified and so on : cX
na sanna Gasanna taths na Canyathä
na Jay ate Vyeti na Cävahiyate /
na Vardhate näpi Visudhyate punar—
Visudhyate, tatparamaithalaksanam // (SütrSlamkära vi)
Vijflänaväda, therefore, in regard to its idea of the
paramartha is in no way different from the Madhyamikas.
Similarly, when Asanga (Sutralamkara vi) said that there is
no ätma involved in ätmadrsti, nor are there anything like
the paflcaskandhas existing in reality, he almost echoed
the views of Nägärjuna. Everything is a mere conjecture
he said, and when one trancends it, dne attains Nirvana.
Birth and cessation of birth know no difference; Sarhsära
itself attains to the stage of Nirväna : c.f.
na Cätmadrsti Svayamatrnalaksana
na cäpi duhsamsthitata vilaksana /
dvayanna cänyad bhrama esa tadita—
statasca moksö bhrama-rnätra-Sarbksayah //
(Süträlarbkära vi)

The Vijnänaväda, however, differed from the Mädhya-

mika in advancing the theory of Vijfiäna as the sole
 ( xxxviii )

reality, Assanga said that when one realises that an entity

is unreal and that the world is only a fiction, one rests in
Citta or Vijftäna orly This Gitta or Vijfiäna is the
dharmadhätu or the ultimate reality of all entities and
when one realises it9 one transcends the sense of duality
and attains the knowledge of nonduality : c f.
arthan sa vijfiäya ca Jalpamaträn
Santisthate trannibhacittam5tre /
Pratyaksatämeti ca dharmadhätu—
Stasmädviyukto dvayalaksanena // (ibid)

When again one realises that other than Gitta' all are
unreal, one gradually understands that 'Citta' also is
unreal; and with the extirpation of the knowledge of
construction, one rests in 'dharmd.dhätu*; c.f.

Nästlti cittamtatparametya buddhyä

Cittasya nastitvamupaiti tasmät /
dvayasya nästitvamupetya dhlmän
Santisthate atadgatidhramadhätau // (ibid)
Asanga was not a mere philosopher, he was at the same
time a great 'sadhaka*. He, therefore, hinted at the various
stages of sädhanä. There are four such stages according to
him. In the first stage5 one realises that the subject-object
relation does not exist in reality All is citta only.
Gitta alone functions in a dicotomy-both as subject and
as object. In the second stage, the Citta is non-dual. One
at this stage transcends the notion of subject -object duality.
Then in the third stage one realises that Cittamätratä also
is a fiction since when there is no object (grahya),
there cannot be any subject (grahaka). Should then the,
absoluute' be all vaccum ? Asanga says 'no', it is not all
 ( xxxix )

vaccum One at the fourth stage, therefore, realises the *dhhr-

rnadhätu' which may be equated with the 'idealistic world
of phenomenon'. So what it boils down to, is that the
Vijftaptimatratä is the only truth and how do the elements
emanate from this vijftaptimatratä is given in the
Trimsikä-kärrikä of vasubandhu. Vasubandhu says that the
ätmä, dharma and the like are but 'parinäma, of Vijnana'
only. Parinäma is three-fold-älayavijfiäna, alambana and
Visaya-Vijfläpti.
The Älaya-Vijnäna is the seed of all dharmas sot to say,
the repository of all elemental konwledge. The Älaya is so
called in-as-much-as it retains the seed of all sämklesika
dharmas that are the root of the phenomenal world-
'Sarvasämklcsikadharmavljasthänatvädälayah. The Älaya
manifests (parinamate) as the subject and as the object.
It's subjective parinäma is otherwise knon as upädän-
avijflapti since herein is contained the potency to grasp the
knowledge of all elements. Its objective parinäma comprises
the rest
The upädanavijfiaptx again manifest into three 5-
(i) parikalpita svabhSvßbhinvesaväsanä or the Vasan3-Vija
from which the idea of construction arises (ii) the indriyas
and the indriya-sthanas from which the knowledge of
'rüpa' arises; and (iii) 'n3ma J or the kind of knowledge
that determines the *SamjfL3.
Sparsa, manaskära, vedanä, Samjfta and Cetanä, therefore,
are the c parinäma'of the Älaya-vijfläna. From these five
alone, the knowledge of all elements arises. *Sparsa* is
born of the conjunction of the triad (trika-Sannipata)—the
indriya, the Visaya and the Vijftana. cSparsa', therefore, is
only a transformation of the indriya, Manaskära signifies
the onward move of the citta towards the object—Getasa
 ( xxxx )

äbhoga', Vedanä means feeling and this feeling is of three

kinds—Sukha, duhkha and aduhkhia-asukha. Samjflä means
the determination of object-Visayanirnittodgrahanam, while
catana signifies mental efforts-Manasah cestä The elements
that ari^e because of the parinäma of älaya-Vijüäna are only
impermanent, everchanging. Vasubandhu compares them
with the current of a river (Srotasaughavat). ihe
elemental world is only an unceasing a flow of cause and
effect and as in the case of a river, one cannot trace its
beginning or end so also in the flov^of this elemental world,
there is no beginning nor any end, The flow of the Älaya
carries with it, the. vasana of 'punya' and 'apunya' that are
collected by sparsa, rnanaskara and the like just as the flow
of a river rarries with it all those that come in contact with
it. This is Sarhsara and its extirpation means 'arhattva*
The second parinäma of VijfLäna is that of the
fc
5lambana of which Vasubandhu says
tadäsritya pravartate
tadälambam mano nama vijfianam mananätmakam.
: - . Trimsikä-kärikä 5

The 'alambana' arises being based on älaya-Vijfiäna.

It is of the nature of 'mentation 9 and so it is called mano-
vijnana. Because of the 'parinäma' of this 'alambana',
four fold 'klesas' or affliction arises They are ätmadrsti,
ätmamoba> äti, amäna and ätmasneha.
The third 'parinäma' is the Visaya-Vijtlapti, Visaya is
of six kinds—rupa; rasa, sabda, gandha, sparsa and dharma
and because of this parinäma, the elements come to exist.
The dharmas again have been classified into six kinds of
Citta-dharmas namely (i) Citta mahäbhümika, (ü) Kusala,
(in) Klesa (iv) akusala (v) upaklesa (vi) aniyatabuümika.
 II ? II

M ^ it

viMSATiKÄ
In the Mahayäna, the three worlds (Kämadhätu, Rüpa-
dhauij and Arüpadhätu ) are said to be vijftapti only.
There is a sütra : 'oh Jinaputra ! what is perceived as the
three worlds, are only Citta.' Citta, manah ; Vijnana and
Vijnäpti are synonymous. The ( word ), Gitta, here, is
inclusive of its associates too. The word, 'matra' is used
to exclude matter. So it is said :
'It is all mere ideation because the non-existing things
appear as seemingly external objects as persons having bad
eyes see non-real hair, texture and the like* (l)
'If consciousness ( is the only truth ) without the exter-
nal objects ( then ) their spatial and temporal determination
 %feT5X[?I I

The word, 'puyanadx' means river full with filth ( the

compound being ) as (in) the word, 'ghrtaghata' ( the jar
full with 'ghee5 or butter ). The ghosts having the same
antecedents maturing into retribution, all perceive the
river full with filth and such a perception is not confined
to any single individual. ( T h e words in the 'Kärikä)'
mean that as the river full of filth is perceived3 so is
perceived a river full with urine and stool ( and the hell )
inhabited by persons holding staves and swords as well.
This way, the indetermination of the streams of conscious-
ness gets established even without admitting the existence
of the external objects.
'The usefulness (of the apprehended objects held unreal)
is explained on the analogy of a sinful action in a dream«'
As in dream, even without the real union of a man and
woman, there occurrs a sin of the nature of discharging
semen. In this way, by many other similar illustrations^ the
fourfold maxim-the spatial and temporal determinations
and the like get established.
'On the analogy of hell again5
all are establised. The word, 'narakavat' means as it
happens in a hell. ( naraka ) How are they establisned ?
( if asked ), it is said.
c
On seeing the hell-guards ( narakapälas ) and in view
of the fact of their keeping others in subjugation,'(4)
 ; 1 ?r f?

The fact that persons living in hells perceive the hell-

guards, is due to the rule of spatial and temporal determina-
tions. (The word 'ädi' in the Kärikä (narakapälädij signifies)
the coming and going of dogs, crows, and of the mountain
made of iron ( supposed to be in a hell ). Here such a
perception happens to all and not to any single individual.
The fact that they are again subjugated to various tortures
by these very guards indicate that even if the hell-guards
were not there,they would suffer the same fate by virtue
of their having the same moral antecedents. In thersame way,
it is to be understood that the rules like that of spatial and
temporal determinations-the fourfold maxim is established.
What reason is there that the hell-guards, the dogs, the
crows—these creatures are not treated as those who have
been condemned to a hell ( although they are found to be
living in a hell ) ? They cannot be treated as having been
condemned to a hell because they do not have the feeling
of pains in a hell. Had it been so that those who are in
hell, torture each other by turn, then there would not have
been some such arrangement that so and so are to be
condemned to hell and so and so are the hell-guards. Had it
again been so that all are of equal size and of equal strength,
then they while torturing each other there would not
arouse a sense of any such fear in any boyd's mind. More-
over, how is it possible that one would torture others with-
out himself undergoing it while being on the same ground
 H M I

1 ^f^Tivr ftresat ^nr^r 5 ^ TTPT äerRTi 1 &qrt

1

f% f%5TR^f ^f^ h ^ U

of iron ablaze ? How is it also that those who are not be

condemned to a hell ever be in a hell ?
How do animals again go to heaven ? This way do the
individul hell-guards, animals, and ghosts go to hell.
As the animals are born in heaven, so not in a hell
( surely ) are the ghosts, ( the hell-guards ) in as-much-as
they do not undergo the torture therein.( 5)
The animals that are born in heaven are born by virtue
of their having performed the deeds that could accrue the
merit of attaining the pleasure of such a region and they
do enjoy such pleasures. The hell-guards are not so; they
do not undergo the tortures of a hell. So it is not reasonable
to hold that (such) animals and ghosts are born in a hell.
Then it must be admitted that because of the deeds of
those who are in hell, a certain class of creatures are born
who are of different size and of different strength and it is
they who earn the title^ *hell-guards\ They, with a view to
arousing fear ( in the mind of the those who are in htll )
bring about such a change in themselves as they are found to
perform various actions like stretching out their hands and
the like. ( It so happens that ) mountains of the size of a
lamb go and come or the thorns in a silk-cotton tree ii,ade
of iron go downwards and upwards, at times and it is not
that such things do not happen. If by virtue of their own
deeds, the birth of such creatures is possible and the mani-
festation thereof is thought of (in so many ways ) then how
is it that such manifestation of consciousness is not thought of ?
Why not is it so assumed that such are the manifesta-
tions of consciousness alone through deeds thereof and why
are externals imagined ( to be existing in reality ) ?
Moreover,
'The väsanä of karma and the retribution thereof are
imagined to be in two different subsratums and (could you)
account for as to why (retribution pertains) not to the same
substratum where väsanä inheres ?(7)
 The väsanä of the very (moral)deeds by reasons of which,
such ( abovementioned ) origin of those who are in hell is
contemplated and the ( different ) manifestations thereof
inheres in the very streams of consciousness of them and
not to any one else. Then how is it that it is not so contem-
plated that the retribution and ( the above mentioned )
manifestation of consciousness pertain to them where
Väsanä inheres in ? ( And ) what is the reason to think
that retribution is there where väsanä does not exist ?
Ägama ( sästras ) are the reasons ( for such an imagina-
tion ). If consciousness alone manifests itself as colour and
the like and it is not that colour etc. are so many external
reals th:n the Lord would not have said that colour etc. are
of the nature of 'ayatanas' only.
This is unreasonable in as-much-as-'It is with a definite
purpose in view that the disciples have been instructed to
the effect that the colour etc. are of the nature of 'äyatana'
as in the case the *upapadaka} creatures.'(8)
As with particular purpose in view, the Lord has said
that the upapädaka creatures do axist; so also with a view
 ? ^rfcPTTsr

ä I
:u

to assert that in future too the stream of a citta does not

cease to exist ( he has said such things ).
( That the world is only an ideation ) is also proved on
the basis of ( the Lord's ) saying-there is no individual nor
any soul and all things are only causally determined/
Similarly, the Lord while keeping in view the disciples that
were to be instructed this particular doctrine said that
colour etc. are äyatanas in essence. So the aforesaid state-
ment is made with a particular idea in view»
What is that which is in view ?
'The seed of its own from which conciousness proceeds
and in the form it manifests—these two are described by
the Lord as of the nature of äyatana.' (9)
What does it mean ?
The seed of its own that is to say the particular stage
of modification whence proceeds the consciousness in the
form of colour and the like and the form by which it
( consciousness ) manifests -these two are both spoken of by
the Lord as of the nature of Cakjurayatana and rüpayatana
respectively. In the same way, the seed of its own that is to
say the particular stage of modification whence proceeds the
-consciousness of touch and the form by which it manifests-
 sgrfer

3RRT

these two are both spoken of by the Lord as of the nature

Käya-äyatana' and sparsäyatana respectively and this is«
what he had in view.

What is the use of having instructed ( his desciples )*

keeping this in view ?

( The result is this that ; by such an instruction, one

gets initiated to ( the doctrine of) pudgala-naiiätmya„
Having been to instructed, one gets initiated to(the doctrine
of) pudgala-nairätmya. The six kinds of knowledge
proceed from the two kinds ( of äyatanas )• There is neither
any one who sees ( nor anything that is seen in the case of
visual knovvledge)and similarly there is neither any one who
thinks (nor is there any thing that is thought of); those who
know thus are fit to be instructed the doctrince of pudgalar
nairatmya and they get initiated in it.

And by a different kind of instruction again, one gets

intiated in the doctrine of dharma-nairatmya. Different kind
( of instruction ) means the instruction on the doctrine
of (that the three worlds are) consciousness only. How does.
 it ST^PT!«rt n
«ft fsraf ftw *% i tpf

^^f^Tt qr*Tc«rsr%5ft

one get initiated in the doctrine of 'Dharmanairätmaya' ?

(Whatever manifests itself in the form of colour and the like
is conciousness °nly, there is no essence or the nature of
colour and the like. Knowing thus one gets initiated in
the doctrine of cdharma—nairätyma ')
If it be so that nothing exists, then 'conciousn^ss
alone' too should not exist and how is it that it is said to be
existing ? (You see ) it is not that initiation in dharma—
nairatmya means admitting that nothing exists. But it means
that 'Nothing exists in the manner it is constructed.' (10)
The non-existence of things ( dharma—nairätmya )
signifies that the way they are consttucted in the subject-
object forms by the uninstructed ( persons ) is wrong fcand it
does not mean that things in their essence which is beyond
all linguistic description and which can be perceived by
Buddhas alone, do not exist.
So even 'consciousness alone' that is of the nature of
construction of some other consciousness ( knowledge ) is
 II?? II

3T ar ^ q-^^T^^: i

-non-essential and having acquired such a knowledge, the

-doctrine of no essance cannot be realised; having realised that
subject-object nature of a knowledge is only a matter of con-
struction and thus consciousness alone''is the only truth, one
understands the non-essential nature of all things and not
by way of denying the existence thereof. Otherwise, one
consciousness being the object of another consciousness,
( the doctrine of ) consciousness alone* would not have been
established since in that case; consciousness would have
to admitted as having of content.
How are we to understand that the Lord with this in
view, had said of the existence of colour and the like other
ayatanas ? ( Why should we not surmise that ) those which
severally form the object of the consciousness of colour and
the like are existing reals ? (We must not <ver surmise so)
because "That (the object) is neither one (as avayavin) nor
many in the form of so many atoms. It cannot either be
the conglomeration of atoms since atoms do not exist/'(* 1)
What is meant thereby ?
Colour and the similar other äyatanas that severally form
the contents of eye-eonsciousness and the like5 should either
be one in the form of an 'avayavin' as conjectured by the
vaiscsikas or it may be many as so many atoms or it may
merely be a conglomeration of atoms
It cannot be one (avayavin) in as-much-as apart from the-
parts, nothing is perceptible as a whole. Nor can it be many,,
since atoms are not perceived severally. Nor do they form
the object in a conglomeration, since atom is not established
as a substance. Why is it not so established ? Because
'When six atoms ( from six different directions ) simul-
taneously come into contact with a single atom, then that
single atom must be said to have six spatial dimensions/
(If a conglomeration of atoms is to be admitted at alt
then) as and when an atom is admitted to be simultaneously
coming in contact with six other atoms from six different
directions, it is but obvious that six spatial dimensions of a
single atom have to be admitted since the space occupied
by one cannot accomodate another.
'And if they are said to be occupying one single space
then the ( so called ) conglomeration remains of the size of
an atom only ? (12)
If it is so said that the very space that the single atom,
occupies also can accomodate the six other atoms ( coming
from six different directions ), then all of them being in the
same space, the whole mass becomes of the same size of an
 \
:1

:\

atom only and since in that case, they afford no mutual

separation, no mass would ever by perceptible i.e. they cannot
form any mass of themselves ). Moreover, atoms being part-
lessf ( as you hold), cannot come into mutual contact.
No, there cannot be any blemish here. The Käsmlra-
Vaibhäsikas who hold that when incodglomexation, they (the
atoms ) come into mutual contact are reminded ib&X what is
claimed to be the conglomeration of atoms is, in reality,
not anything different from them ( its component parts )
'If atoms do not unite, how could they unite then even
in a conglomeration ?;

Here (to complete the sentence) the word, *union' has to

be inserted. 'And not (merely) because of its being partless,
union therewith does not stand/ (13)
Now,if it so happens that atoms although they form into
conglomeration cannot mutually unite, then of course,
it must not be claimed that the atoms cannot unite because
of partlessness in as-much—as even if the conglomeration
were of those that have parts ( i.e. even if atoms were
said to have parts ), unity thereof would not necessarily
ensue ( in its logical course ). Hence an atom does not exist
qua substance; (and) whether or not unity could be ascribed
to an atom.
 1 ? R
n ft^fcr, sfe ^ Timm:

% «TTTToft: ^ft^^T^ft ^T^^rfe^T^ ffir

*That which has spatial division ( dimension ) cannot

logically be one'and when it is so obvions that an atom is
admitted to have spatial divisions like the fore part or the
lower part how could an atom of that nature could be
established as one ( substance ) ?

'How could also atom shadow or shield ( other objects

from our view in c*se it's spatial divisions were not
admitted ) ?'

If spatial divisions of each single atom were not

admitted, then how could on sun-rise, there would be an
interplay of shadow and light. (Had it been a single object),
it cannot have any region where there should be no »light.
And if spatial divisions of atoms are not admitted, then
<;ould one atom be shielded by another ? There is ( surely )
no rear part of an atom where another atom comes to»unite
50 that a resistance could grow and in the absence of any
such resistence, all ( atoms ) being of the same spatial
dimension, any conglomeration thereof would be of the
size of an atom as it has already been discussed.

Why don't you think that shadow and shielding pertains

to the mass and not to the atoms ?
 «TWlt: «TOTT^^t zrfö f^RTW^r Start I

??

(If you say so; then in reply we would ask) is there any-
mass independent of the atoms that these two could ever be
ascribed to ? And we believe not ( it does not exist ).
'And if there be no mass ( independent of atoms ) then>
these two can not be ascribed to it.' (14)
If it is admitted that there is no mass independent of
the atoms, it becomes patent that these two cannot be
ascribed to it. Whether it is only atoms or a conglomeration
thereof, all such conjectures pertain only to the externals of
the problems and as such what is the use of all such conject-
ures, if the very essence of things-colour and the tike can-
not be disproved ? What is their essence ? Obviously, their
being the object of eye ( consciousness ) and the like and of
the quality, 'blue' and the like.
The thing that is to be discussed here is this : whether
objects of eye ( consciousness ) and the like that are (of the
quality of) blue and the like are unitary substances or many?
What does it matter ?
The blemishes that accrue to them in case they are
many are already spoken of (and)
 r % cT^fir firs*

srfirftr«rär i ft s^rawr er^tf ^rarerftfiroraf «fterr-

1 ft? ^Tcr: ?

c
If it is one ( unitary incharater ) then no gradual
movement is possible for it cannot be that one is assailed
and not asailed at the same time. (At the same time) many
objects that are so different from each other could not be
held to be existing in the same locus or could the minute
ones be not perceived by us/ (15)

If however3 what is non-discrete and not many only

that can form the object of the eye (conciousness) and
therefore, such a thing is taken to be unitary, then there
would be no scope for any grudual movement on the earth
since one single footsteq would mean covering the whole
earth» It cannot be that the front part is covered and the
rear one not, at the same time, in as-much-as what (is held
one and unitary) cannot be covered and not-covered at
the same time. What are discrete and many that is to say
 an elephant, a horse and the like cannot be in different
locuses (for the earth, you consider to be one and unitary)
and thus whereever one exists there you must say
exists another and how could discreteness thereof in
that case3 be admitted ? How also could that be one (and
unitary) since between what is occupied and what is not,
there is another region which is perceived as void. The
minute worms born in water that are of the same essence
of gross animals (because they are unitary) would not be
beyond perception. If (however), it is thought that it is the
difference of essence that brings about a difference of
substance and not otherwise then this difference must be
based on atoms and that is not esablished as unitary. That
being not thus established, colour etc. cease to be regarded
as the objects of eye (consciousness) and the like and as such .
consciousness alone becomes the only truth.
Existence cr non-existence is determined on the basis
of the means of valid knowledge and of all the means of
valid knowledge, perception is the strongest, and if any
external object does not exist then how is it that there is
perception of it ?
'Perception happens as in a dream and the like'. It has
already been stated that'such perception occurs even without
the support of any external object.
 ?
\

Cf
And when that (Perception) occurs, the content thereof
is not perceived, and how can you claim that perception
has occurred."(16)
And when such perception to the effect that <6I perceive
this" occurs, the content thereof is no longer perceived,
perception is determined by the manovijfiäna and the
eye-consciousness at that time, must have ceased. In that
case? how could you call it a (case of) perception at all ?
Colour, taste and the like of an everchanging object do cease
(at that time i.e. when such perception occurs).
Whatever is not known, cannot be recollected by the
manovijfiäna and as such (If it is so recollected), it must
have been known (earler) and such knowledge in that caser
must be eye-perception; and thus colour and the like
other objects are considered to the contents of perception.
(But) it is not correct to say that whatever is recollected
is known in as-much-as—
*It has already been demonstrated that consciousness with
an image thereof does occur (without even that object
existing in reality) 9 As without the objects, even conscious-
ness of the kind of eye-consciousness bearing the image of
an object occurs (and this has already been discussed) and
so it is said :
 fir^ftr^T

"Recollection proceeds from that"

From such consciousness, therefore, the manovijfläpti bearii.g
that very image in association with recollection, comes into
being and it is of the nature of construction of colour and
the like and as such it does not stand that since there is a
recollection, there must have been knowledge of the
object too«
(You may say that) if knowledge at the waking stage is also
possible without any reference to its object as in the case
of a dream, then people should equally feel the negation
thereof. But this does not happen. All knowledge of
objects, therefore, are not without reference to objects as in
a dream. This is not proper in as-much-as :
''The negation of perceived objects in a dream is not knovvn
till one awakes from sleep".
In the same manner, the biotic force (Väsanä) born of
a -(long persistent) habit of making wrong constructions,
lulls people into a slumber, as it were, as. in the case
of a dream, they also perceive things not existing in reality
and till they are awake (from such a sleep) do not realise
the exact nature of things. But when they get awake
after having attained the supersensuous inderminate
 5

knowledge which is just the opposite of that (afore-

said stage of slumber i e. which contradicts false knowledge
born of wrong construction) and on the heel of it (or
having attained such a stage) they develop a pure (though)
mundane knwoledge and by virtue of that, they realise
properly the negation of objects (and therefore), it is equal
(to a dream). If it be so that all knowledges representing
the images of external objects proceed from the parinäma
of its own series, and not caused by external objects then
how could the fact that as a rule, knowledges vary with the
conditions varying as when one comes in contact with a
sinner or with a Kalyänamitra (a Mahayana teacher — a
friend guiding along the path of welfare) or when one
happens to listen to the noble religion (religious discourses)
or to an ignoble one, be explained in as-much-as (in your
opinion) there exists no such thing as relation with the
good or with the bad or the instructions thereof,
(in answer to this, it may be said)

'That Knowledges get conditioned by each other due

to their mutual predominence\
 f ^rr^Tcftsfqr

As knowledges of all persons have a mutual predominence,

these get conditioned by each other as and when called
for. The word 'mithah' (in the Kärikä) means mutually.
Therefore, from particular consciousness of an individual,
a particular consciousness develops in another individual
and not from an external object.

If as in a dream, knowledge in the waking stage also

proceeds without (any reference to) any external object
then how is it that the same result-good or bad does not
accure, in future, to both the persons^ one who is sleeping
and one who is awake, when they both come in contact
with the good or with the bad ?
(it does not happen) because
In a dream the 'citta' becomes 'blinded' with tne
'sloth' (of sleep) and so the result is different" (18)
(And) this is the reason and not the existence of any
external object.
If everything is but consciousness only and none
possesses any body or speech, then how is it that sheep and
other animals when slaughtered by a shepherd and others
meet death ? If it be otherwise how they get themselves
associated with the sin due to killing sheep and the
like ?
*'Death is ( the name of) change (only) - an effect of
the consciousness of another as loss of memory and the like
are caused by the minds of goblins'7 (l 9)
As due to the mentations of goblins and others, loss of
memory, dreaming and obsession of spirits and evil impact
of planets occur, so also due to the mentations of those who
possess supernatural power; as (for an example) Ärya
Mahäkätyäyana had directed 'Särana' to the incident of
dream (to occur) or 'Vemacitra's defeat was caused by the
sinful mental attitue of the äranyaka the sage. Similarly,due
to the predominece of consciousness of other (individuals),
there arises some change in another, antagonistic to his
own li^e - energies, by virtue of which we should know
that death occurs or that is to say Sabhäga-series (sabhäga-
Santati) disintegrate,
"How again was the dandäkäranya destroyed due the
wrath of the sages ?fj
 ? ^H5r:SRtgJTT^aT cfT^Tcff

If you do not presume that animals die due to the

predominence of other's consciousness, then how would
you explain as to why did the Lord with a view to demonst-
rating that mental violence involves enormous sins, ask
Grhapati upäli 'oh grhapati ! have you ever heard as to
who had completely, destroyed the dandakäranyas, the
mätangaranyas and the kalingaranyas?' To this he replied
"I have heard, oh Goutama ! that these woods were
destroyed because of the evil designs of the sages.7'
(if you do not admit that death is caused by the
consciousness of others' then) how is the extremely sinful
nature of mental voiolence ever proved/ 1
If it be so imagined that the animals other than human
beings who loved to live there, annihilated those ^human
beings) who lived there and the mental sin of the
 :i

sages is not responsible for their death, then by

such activities how is the mind conceived to be the most
sinful in comprison to body and speech ? Because the
very sin of their mind have finally caused the death of
so many lives ;
If everything is but consciousness alone, then do the readers
of others' minds (in your opinion) can ever read the minds
of others or not ? What comes out of this ? (you
may ask), (We beg to say that) in case they don't, why are
they called readers of others9 minds ? And if they can
read, then (we beg to say)
*cThe k. owledge of the readers of others' minds is imper-
fect, (you may ask how ? to which our reply is that) just
imperfect as our knowledge is1'
HJW is that too imperfect ?
c
'Because of ignorance (reading others7 mind is not as perfect
as) the knowledge of the Buddha" (21)
As the knowledge of Buddha is essentially indiscrib-
-able, so is not theirs, both of them (the knowledge of
the mind of one's own and that of others) are imperfect in
as-much-as due to wrongly representing the constructions
the subject and the object still persists.
 ST

Vijflaptimätratä being very deep in essence and it is of a

different nature because of the innumerable 'Vini'scayas5*
involved in it.
^Vijflaptimätratä is explained by me to the extent of
my capacity but with this alone, you can't compprehend it
in full1'; persons like me cannot comprehend each and
every aspect of it, in as-much-as it is not a matter of logic.
Who else then comprehend it in full (if you ask) we say
This (can be) comprehended by Buddha (alone) (22)
It is comprehened by the Buddhas in all its aspects since
in them does exist the power to know everything in all its
forms.
 J?T: ^Srsnf HT-

if

i if^T^t^jTPr
i f ^ ?TT?rs(|fe5rf^^^^^ft^g:R?rHTr i ^rf^FsrgW ^T^T^T^: i f

: i sr^^r fein^feif^TfT
RT^; feifT^ fsrirRTftr sfffacr ^ q* «rorrftr

i 3TTC^TT

«mer,
 snrfi% «ft: 1

T I Cpf

I f ^ TOW,
5 T^^IH

i q;
 I

: i

^ c t sr^ft 5 ^ TTCcSte i

win

:I

The treatise in thiity Kärikas' on the doctrine of

'vijftaptimätratä' aims at giving a correct exposition of the
non-substantiality of the individual (pudgala-nairatmya) 1
 fcf I

)) ^ I!

^ : i

i ftrsrRTcftßr f^H^r \
: 1 ^ « n f ^ f P W c ^ t ^ ^ R W 1 vfk

and the non-substantiality of the elements (dharma-

nairätmya) 2 for (the sake of) those who have not an
adequate understandsng or have misunderstanding with
regard to these (two kinds of non-substantiality), The
exposition of the non-substantiality of the individual and
of the elements is meant for the termination of 'klesas9
{causes of affliction) and jneyävarana (obstacles that cover
 FT

1^
1

up the object of knowledge). The 'klesas' are 'räga' or

attachment and the like that proceed from the (false) view
of the self (self taken to be a substantial entity). Since the
apprehension of the non-substantiality of the individual
stands directly opposed to the false view of the self, one
who aims at terminating that (the false view of the self)
abandons all the *klesas\ By the realisation of the non-
substantiality of the elements, one removes the obstacle
which screens the object of knowledge, because this realisa-
 I M II

: i

:1

tion is opposed to it. The removal of these t*o kinds of

obstructions is again meant for attaining liberation
(nirvana) and omniscience (sarvajüatva).3 The 'klesas' are
the obstacles to the attainment of freedom and so when they
are rooted out, freedom is realised. The 'jfieyävarana' is
non-afflictive ignorance which is an impediment to the rise
of (right) knowledge of all that is knowable. When this is
lifted off, consciousness of all forms of things proceeds
unabated without any attachment (to any object in parti-
cular) and as such omniscience is attained. Or, it
may also be said that, because those who are deeply
engrossed in the reality of the individual and the
elements cannot realise the sole reality of canscipusness
in its true nature, this treatise has been composed in order
to reveal the non-substantiality of the individual and of the
elements so that they may gradually enter into the accomp-
lished truth of consciousness alone4- (or consciousness as
the only reality). Or, (it may be said that since) some 5
(sarvastivädins) hold that like cognition, the object of
cognition is also substantially (real), while some others
(M^dhyamika) rhold8 that like its object of cognition, it
itself is also only a phenomenal (relative) appearance and
not an absolute reality, the treatise aims at rejecting these
tw.o kinds of extreme views.
Kärikä—ätma-dharmopacäro hi vividho yah pravartate
vijfiäna-parinamo' sau.
The various constructions (or impositions) as the
soul or the elements (which are) prevalent, amongst
the people and in the sastras are hut the develop*
m e a t of vijftana or consciousness»
Bhäsya—The word^ 'ätma-dharmopaeära* (in the verse),
is syntactically connected with vijnänaparinäma. Ätmadhar-
mopaeära means that the ätman or the soul and 'dharma or
elements are superimposed. This again means (preverted)
apprehension of the self and the elements (as substantial
entities). The word 'vividha' (in the kärikä) means various
kindsj (of constructions), 'ätmopaeära' stands for imposed
constructions like ätma or soul,* jiva or the living being,
jantu or animal, manuja or manava or human beings and
the like. 'Dharmopacara' means constructions like the
'skandhas', the Mhatus', the 'äyatanas', ('rüpa* 'vedana'j
saibjnä, samskaraj vijfläna) and the like. Both these two
kinds of constructions are superimposed on the development
of consciousness, and not on real soul or real elements in
 their primary senses. Why so? Because the soul or the elements
have no existence independent ot the development of cons-
ciousness. What is this development ? Development means
being otherwise, the emergence of the effect as distinct from
the causal moment, but simultaneous with the cessation
of the causal moment.7 Configurations like soul and matter
proceed from the Älaya-Consciousness that sustains a
natural constructive capacity ( vikalpa-väsanä ) in regard
to soul or matter. Assuming such mental reflexes as soul
and matter to be external to this configuration ( vikalpa )9
the age-old super impositions of soul and matter have pro-
ceeded even without any soul or matter (existing) apart,
a« . for, an example, the false impositions of hair-webs
made by a man with diseased eyes,- -Imposition means
ascribing a thing to where it does not exist 8 , as when a
bull ls^ascriBed to the man of the vähika country. Thus
vijfiana being (the only reality)Und there bcing'nö soul or
dharma external (to it), the soul or the dharmas (elements)*
are only constructed and are not fundamentally real,' there-
fore, the extremist view that like conciousness the cognised
also arc (a reality) should not to be entertained. Upacära
being impossible without (there being) a substratum, the
transformation of conciousness has to be regarded as a
reality on which soul or elements are superimposed. There-
for ci1- the * argument that* the consciousness also like the
congnised is only a relative existence and not a transcen-
dental reality is not logically tenable. Since a groundless
(phenomenal) appearance is unintelligible that would have
led to the impossibility of conciousness itself even as an
appearance. .Thus these two kinds of extreme views should
be rejected because of illogicality, so says the Master.
Thus no object of cognition exists as reality because it
is a constructed phenomenon; conciousness, on the contrary
lias to be considered as substantially real by virtue of its
having dependent origination. The dependent origination
of conciousness again is expressed by the word, parinäma.

(But) how is it tenable that even without an external

object, conciousness having the image of an external
-object, arises ?
An external object is regarded as the object-cause of
consciousness by virtue of its effecting *an impression, having
an image of itself, and not by virtue of its causal efficiency
in general, because (in that case) there should not have
bqen other causal subdivisions f like the homogeneous cause
and the like.
The five (varieties of) sensuous „conciousness have their
objects in their collective forms (only) in-as-much-as they
{the five sense-impressions) correspond to the images thereof
(of the objects in collective7forms.) But there is no collec-
tive form apart, from the' collocation of its (constituent)
parts, because if the parts are .excluded, there can be no
consciousness, corresponding to the collective *- form. Thus
«ven without an external object, consciousness, corresponding
to the image of the collective form arises.9 Nor is it
tenable that the very atoms, being collocated together form
the object of it ( consciousness ), because these do not
correspond to the image in consciousness,10 Nor do the
atoms, whea collocated assume any additional ~ excellence
{in regard to themselves),over the atoms when these are not
•so collocated. Therefore, the,atoms, when collocated cannot
be the object of cognition, as when theydare not collocated.
^ Others 11 however contend that atoms in single and
(thus) independent of each other are imperceptible, while
in many and (thus) dependent on each other, these are
perceptible by the sense-organs. But there being ; no
 excellence in themselves with the difference of the two
different stages of their being dependent or independent^
these should be either absolutely perceptible or absolutely-
imperceptible by the sense-organs. Even if the atoms
when dependent on each other (when in conjunction with-
each other) form the object of consciousness, then in that
case, in consciousness, there should not have been differen-
ces in the image of a pitcher or of a w,all and the like in-
as-much-as atoms never correspond to such images. Nor
is it reasonable (to hold) that a consciousness, embracing
something should correspond to the form of something:
else as that involves an unwarrantable over-extension.
Nor are the atoms, like a pillar, basically real
in-as-much-as these ( too *) * have converse, central and
obverse parts, ^If that is not admitted,.atoms should not
have the spatial divisions- like eastern, isouthetn, western*
and northern sides and so on. Lt »would, therefore, mean?
that like consciousness, atoms ^are »without shape and that
these have no 'Spatial dimension. Thus there being nc*
external object, consciousness itself appears as (manifold
external) object (artha) and corresponds to -the form of
itself (äkära) like a dream-consciousness. The past or the
future Vedana and the like "(other skandhas) do not produce-
any consciousness corresponding to the forms of themselves-
of the past or of the future, because these have been either
ceased to function or have not yet come to exist. Nor do-
the present ones produce any (consciousness corresponding
to the forms of themselves) of the present, because these do*
not (logically) exist during (the process of) growth; (and)
when grown, consciousness itself having grown correspond-
ing to the image thereof, nothing else is left to be done;
the manovijnäna, (sixth consciousness) therefore, also grow*
without an objective basis.
 * Others, however, say (that) there being no primary soul
or any (primary) substance, tfupac5ra* (or any fancied
identification, founded on resemblance i.e , construction)
as not posible. 'Upacäta' is possible only when three
«lenients are present i e. the primary stibstanee, an object
similar to it and the1 attribute, identical to both of them;
{and) not in cafce where any of them is wanting. As for
an example, when there is the primary substance1, the
fire, and the object similärto it, iHd boy, and the quality,
identical to both1 of them, irascibility or redne<&; there is
t h e 'upacara* (or fancied identification), 'agnirmanstvaka'
or the boy is fire,
(But the question is as-to whether)^ here the 'upacara'
is of the 'jäti', universal or of the 'dravya* or, ^individual.
In none of these two cases, isx the 'upaeära' possible A
^jäti' or genus does not possess any\ quality like 'tiksnatva*
or 'kapilatva' identically present in another object. 12 Nor
without any suchitjuality^ commonly shared (by both)* can
there be any upacara of genus? in-as-much-as that would
involve an unwarranted widening-of the scope. 13
Though fire as a universal is not a property of the boy,
there is the possibility of 'jätyupacära' on the *manavaka' or
the boy due to the inseparable association of 'tiksnatva*
and 'kapilatva' with the *jati 14 (of fire)».— (says the

(The siddhänta-paksa replies)f: (Tjhis is not tenable

because ) any such inseparable association cannot be
logically established in-as-riiubh-as 'ttksnatva* or kapilatva
is found to be existing in the* boy even Without the universal
of fire.15 (And) if any such inseparable assbciaHon is
tenable at all, then there need' njot be} anf *upacara!;r
äbecause in that case, the cjatf is equally present in the
 as in fire.16 There can, therefore, be no 'jätjtupacärä' on
the boy. Nor is there (the possibility of) 'dravyopaeära*
because ( in that case ) there is no common attribute
(idendical to both), (it can not be held that) the same
quality of irascibility or redness which is present in the
fire is present in the boy. 17 What is it then ? The
quality, possessed by the boy is something different from
that of the fire, because the uniqueness is limited to its own.
locus. (So) there should not be any upacara of agni on.
mänavaka without the quality of the fire (being present in
the boy). .

(if you say that) due to the similarity of the quality

of fire (with that of the boy, upacara) is possible« In that
case, clue to the similarity of 'ttksnatva* or 'kapihttva- the*
quality of fire, with that of the boy, there should be the*
upacara of tlksnatva or kapilatva — the quality of fire on?
the quality (tlksnatva or kapilatva) subsisting in the boy,,
and not of fire on the boy* because (the two substrata*
remain) unrelated through similarity of attributes. Thus*
even 'dravyopaeära* is not possible, * "*
Even the primary substance does not exist in-as-much-as
niether thought nor language can make its essence an object
of reference. Thought and language in regard to the
primary substance proceed only by way of its qualities
in-as-much-as they cannot contact its essences, for there is no
co-relation with its essence 1 9 Otherwise, the attributes
become futile., Nor, is, there any means ottier^tha,^thought or
language to comprehend the essence of a meaning (padärtha,
entity); (and) as there is no conceptual understanding or
any judgement in regard to the object (in the form of)
the essence of.the,primary substance, it is to be understood
that. there is no such,, primary substance. There beinj
therefore, no co-relation with the relevant word
there is no concept or name, corresponding thereto
and there being no denotation and the denotated, there is
no primary substance.20 Everything is but non-essential
( in nature ) and there is no primary substance. CN< n-
essential' means what proceeds in the form of a synthetical
construction upon something objectively unreal. All
words represent the qualities (thai are) imagined to be
subsisting in the 'pradhana'.21 Thus the primary substance
does not exist. Therefore, what has been said that 'there
being no primary pervading substance and ( ultimate)
elements, construction (or imposition) is not possible* is
not logical.

It is not known as to how many kinds of developments

of Snjftana* are there, (and) as such with a view to showing
the varieties, thereof, it is said
7
Parinamah sa ca triähä. (1)
development (of vijfiäna is threefold) on which ätmä and
the like 2 2 or Soul & dharmas are imposed (or constructed).
It (such a development) may function as a cause or as an
effect. Of these, the development functioning as a cause
means the reimbursment of the Biotic force (väsanä) of
either of 'vipaka* and 'nisyanda,3'23 The development,
functioning as an effect means the proceeding of the- Älaya-
vijfiana towards 'nikäya-sabhäga'2 * (uniform course) as a
result of the 'Vipäkaväsanä', having assumed its function-
ing and^ with the, completion of what is called for by
previous deeds (moral antecedents), as also, on the nisyanda-
väsanä having assumed its functioning, the manifestation
of the six Pravftti-vijftänas and of the afflicted manas from
the Älaya-vijnäna. The pravftti-vijnänas' both good and
evil (where efforts are implied) holds the vipaka-vasanä
and the nisyanda-väsana on to the Älaya-vijüäna. The
manas whether afflicted or indifferent (avyäkrta i.e. neither
good nor evil; klista in the case of an ordinary man and
avyäkrta in the case of a holy man) holds only the nisyanda-
vasanä. What has been spoken of thle threefold parinama
is not (well) understood either. Thus to specify them, it
is said

Vipäko mananäkhyasca vijüaptirvisayasya ca.

This threefold (parinäma) is called, vipäka, manana and
visayavijfiapti. Of these, vipäka means the accomplish-
ment of maturation as the natural outcome of the Biotic
force of good or evil deeds (moral antecedents) as fore-
shadowed (by the antecedents). The afflicted (or defiled)
'manas' is called 'manana' or intellection (of the notion of
self-consciousness) because of its perpetual reflection. The
eye-consciousness and the like, each having the specific
appearance of 'rüpa' and the like are categorised as visaya-
vijfiapti, and these are of Yix varieties. But for the
specific indication of the essence of each' (ofHhe three kind's
of parinama), these are not'(well) under-stood and so with
a view to indicating their particular essence chronologically,
it is said.

taträlayäkhyam vijßänam vipäkah sarvavljakam. (2)

The word, 'tatra* means of what has been just said that
paf lnama* is threefold; 'älayäkhya' means the consciousness,
called alayavijfiän*—the consciousness^wfiich is ajpä!rinäma
of moral causation, (vipäka). It is (called) *alaya' because
it (functions as) the store-house of the* seeds of all dharmas
or entities< imbued with the* rtaturd* of* restlessness (to
manifest). Älaya and Sthafra' or store^ou'se arer 'but
synonyms, (or Älaya is such); Wfiere- alf tffe elements
(ideas^as manifestations (earlier1) reside antf are orgariised
 fa^rr *refir i g^r f:<rr

or are held together for future growth, or that (älaya) as

an impelling (or actuating) principle in regard to all
elements holds them together. (At the same time) Älaya
is a consciousness in-as-much-as it apprehends25. It is (also
called) 'vipäka' because of its maturing influence of good
•or bad (moral) antecedents in regard to all cdhatuss, 'gatis',
4
yonis* and 'j*tis* It is (also called) Sarva-vljaka because
of its functioning as the store-house of the seeds of all
•elements (ideas).

In casej there* be an 'älaya-vSjfiana' asr apart'from the

'rjravrttivijnänas', then its external support and form have
to be ascertained. /There canJnot be a» consciousness inde-
pendent of its object* aitdf form.

(Actually So). It is neither sought to be held as

independent of its object and form. What (is) then (sought
after) ? (It is sought) that its object and form are (never)
distinct. What is the reason (thereof) ? Because, Älaya-
Oonsciousness proceeds in a dichotomy. One is internal
by virtue of its apprehending (its own) substrate (upädana)
(and the other is) external by virtue of its apprehending
the (unreal) external world of indistinct form. Of these,
the internal substrates are the Biotic force of attachment
for the constructed (world), the sensation in conformity
with the senses and a name that have their locations (in the
Biotic force). And due the extreme subtleness of its
objective aspect (it is said)
'asamvid'itakopätfi-sthänavijflaptikam ca tat',
4
tnat is the'consciousness irr which* 'üpädV (the substfäte)
5:<smpr: i
f$T«TTJ^raf-

and sthana (avasthäna«bhäjana-the external world) are

indistinctly apprehended.
'asamividitakopädisthänavijfiaptika' means the älays-
vijnäna in which the upadi is indistinctly apprehended and
the cognition of the world of experience is indistinct as
well. Upadi means upadana or the snbstratc which is but
the innate constructive capacity of (the construction of)
ätnjä and the like and of the dharmas like 'rüpa' and the
likd^&. Due to the functioning of that (vikalpa-väsanä) the
älaya-vijftäna pushes the constructive thought of Soul and
the like as also that of rupa and the like as efficient exist-
ence and thus such a vasana or the innate constructive
capacity is designated as upadi or substrate of the constru-
ctive thought of Soul and the like and of rupa and1 the like. 2 7
It is called as having an in distinct substrate in-as-much-as
it (upädi) is not felt as in a direct cognition like cit is here^
'it is that' and the like. Upadi also means the substrate
{upädaüa)of 'asraya',äsraya means'selfbeing'(ätmabhävah),2 s
the sensation in conformity with the senses and mentations
having their location (in the vasana). 29 The substrate-cause
of that (asraya) again or the knowledge of one unified whole
is called the upadi. *In the 'Kamadhatu' and in the
*rüpa-ähätu' 'näma' and *rüpa* function as* the* substrate-
cause. In the arüpa-dhatu, rüpa having been disinclined
for, and thus there having been^ no scope for rüpa to
(undergo the) ' maturing (influence- of moral antecedents)
nama alone (functions SLS} the substrate cause. But (the
 v?

ftrarö'fa^n:: i ere

element ofy colour is there (in the arüpa-dhätu) in the

Biotic force but not (having the potentiality) to mature-
That substrate, however, being incapable of being cognised
as a reality (idatntaya) is called asamvidita.

Sthana vijfiäpti means the cognition that is directly-

intent upon (cognising) the world of experience. Ti at also
is called 'assamividita' in-as-much-as that functions with~
no distinct älambana or äkära.
How can a vijflana , (which should mean a distinct-
knowledge) correspond to an indistinct object (or objective-
aspect) and an indistinct form (or image) ? (Why not ?)»
It is just the same as what the other vijüxna-vädins hold 3 0
in regard to nirodha-samapatti31 and the like other stages^
and it is not that in nirodha-samäpatti and the similar other~
stages, «that 'vijüäna* is not there and so it can not be
flouted (outright). Because it is opposed to reason and the
'Sutras'.

What is called Älaya is (but) a vijflana—it has beerr

so said; (as) a vijflana must be associated with caitta or
mental dharmas and as such it must be enumerated as to*
with which and with how many mental dharmas, ft is
universally associated. Is it that it is always associated
with them or not ? So (in order to asscertain) it is said.
*Sadä sparsa-manaskära-vit-sarbjflä-cetanänvitam'. (3)
{It is also associated with sensation (sparsa »contact bet—
ween object3 sense organ and conciousness), attention
(manaskara), faculty of feeling (vit — vedana), concepts
(Sarhjfiä = capable of coalescing with a word) and will
(cetana = concious efforts). The. word5 cSada* means as
long as the Älaya-vijnana functions, it is associated* with
Sparsa, manaskara, vit, samjflä and cetana — these five
'Sarvatraga' or universal dharmas or (mental) phenomena»
Vit means 'vedana9. Here sparsa means the decisive
^understanding (born of) the transformation of the sense-
organ due to trika-sannipäta or the tripartite conjuction
(content cognised, instrument of congnition and the congis-
ing consciousness); and it provides the support to feeling.
The sense-organ, the sense-object and consciousness—thdse
three only are (meant by the word), trika or the' triad5 and
'trika-sannipata 1 means functional interdependence of that
(triad). That hieing there, the contemporaneous trans-
formation of the sense-organ toward the feeling of pleasure
-and pain and in co-ordination with such transformation,
the decisive understanding of the object (sense-data) cor-
responding to the image of what is (liable to be) felt as
pleasure and the like is called sensation (or sparsa). 32 The
distinction(visesa) by reason of which the sensa-organ assumes
the function of pleasure, pain and the like is its transforma-
tion. Sparsa is so called because it touches the sense-organ
in co-ordination with the transformation of the,sense-organ
or is touched by the sense-organ. The decisive under-
standing (born^ of the transformation of the object is also
called as (what is born) of the transformation of the sense-
organ. Its function is to provide support to (the rise'.of)
feeling. It has thus been said in the 'Sutra* that what,
felt as pleasure—originates depending on a sensation
gives the feeliug of pleasure.

Manaskara is the satiety (äbhoga) of the mind. Äbhoga

means enjoyment or äbhujana. It is an element by virtue-
of which the mind is tended toward the object (of experi-
ence). It is of the nature of holding the mind on the
object. Holding the mind means directing the mind again
and again to tjie object (fixing the attention on the object).
This operation is in reference to the manaskära in which
as a rule, a series of mentations in regard to the abject
(moment) isithe support and not (in the sense) that each
consciousness-moment has its efficiency limited to jLtself
(that particular moment) and not (extended to) arry other
moment. 33

Vedana or feeling is experience in its essence. It is

again of three kinds by reason of the perception of what
is agreeable, disagreeable in essence and something distinct
from Doth—pleasure, pain and neither pleasure nor pain^
Others however think thus : (It is called) anubhava-
by reason of its functional essence in regard to the resulting
event of moral or immoral anteceds. Of these? the
anubhava, of pleasure is the effect produced by the matur-
ing influence of moral deeds, of immoral ones, is pain and
of both (in common, indifferent) is neither pain nor
pleasure. Here the 'Älaya-vijüäna' alone i3 the 'maturing
influence* (viplka) of the moral and immoral antecedents.
Upeksä or equanimity associated with it (älaya) by itself
 is the resulting of event of moral or immoral antecedents. 34
(The sense of) Vipaka is superimposed on pleasure and
pain because they are the consequences of good and bad
deeds (vipakaja). The 'anubhava* of pleasure means
which being there, there is no desire to part with it, and
which being extinct, there arises the desire of contact again.
The 'anubbava* of pain means which being there, there
is the desire to part with it and which being extinct there
is the lack of desire of contact with it for a second time.
Ttfeither-pain-nor-pleasure means which arising or being
extinct, none of them arise.
SamjÄä or concepts are the determination (udgrahana)
of the tspecific characteristics of the (individual) object;
«object means the support of cognition. (The word), nimitta
means the specific characteristics thereof-the critaria of
discrimination in regard to the object of cognition as/ nlla'
and 'pita'. The determination thereof or the definite represen-
tation (of colour) as that it is 'nlla' and not pita (is Sarhjftä)*

Cetanä or will is the mental effort that conditions

(re-arranges) the mind; which being there, the mind flows
in a stream towards the object (of cognition) as does iron
towards the mass of a magnet. 3 6
Vedanä is of three kinds-pleasure, pain and neither-
pleasure-nor-pam. Dharmas are of four kinds—Kusala,
{favourable), akusala (unfavourable) anivrta-avyakrta (un-
obscuiea-in-different) and nivrtaavyäkrta (obscured-in-
 cWT

different), with the Alaya-consciousness, 6vit* is (said to be

associated) by a general statement (because it is of universal
association) (and as such) it is not (definitely) known as to
which one of the three kinds of 'vedanäs (is associated with
it). So also it is not known a& to whether it (älaya) is
Jcusala, akusala, anivrta-avyäkrta or nivrta avyäktta. So it
is said :
/
'Upcksä vcdanä tatranivrta-avyakrtaöca tat" . ,
(^Upeksa* is the 'vedanä' in it and that is also anivrta-
avyäkrta (by nature)«
(The word), 'tatra* (in the Kärikä) refers to the Älaya-
consciousness only because that is the subject of discussion
here. 'Upeksa* is always the vedanä in the Älaya-conscious-
ness and neither pleasure nor pain in-as-much-as these two
(have to) correspond to the image of distinctly manifest
objects; as also these two have ipassion (love) and hatred.
That is also 'anivrta-avyäkrta*. ' (The word), 'tat*
(in the Kärikä) means the *Alaya vijnaria*—the context
(here) The word, 'anivrta' is used to exclude 'nivrta' and
the word, avyäkrta is used to exclude kusala and akusala
(dharmas). It ,is anivrta or unobscured because it is. not
obscured by the non-essential vicious elements of limited
 , ere

occurance based on the manas. It being of the nature of

the maturing influence of moral antecedents does not appear
as good or bad in relation to the resulting event and a s
such it is called avyakrta or (morally) indifferent.
'tathä sparsadayah\

(So are sparsa or sensation ^and the like).

As the Älaya-consciousness is absolutely a 'maturing
influence* and cocresponds to the image of an indistinct
object (aspect) and associated with sensation and the like;
and equanimity is »the onLy feeling there and itself is
unobscured and indifferent; so are sensation and the like
absolutely of the nature of a maturing influence and corres-
ponds to the image of an indistinct object- (aspect). These
each are associated with the rest of the four other than
itself and with the Älaya-conci-ousness and equanimity is
the only feeling in these and these are indifferent like the
Älayaconciousness What is universally associated with
what is of a maturing influence by nature cannot possess
the element of 'non-maturing influence1 nor what corresponds
to th« image of an indistinct object (aspect) can ever corres-
pond to the image of a distinct one. So is to be understood
elsewhere (with the rest of the elements).

Does that Älaya-consciousness persist on as one, self-

contained (unit) through the whole mundane existence
(till liberation) or flow in a stream ?
 It persists on not as one, self-contained (unit) because
of its momentariness. 88 How then ?
'tacca vartate srotasaughavat.'
(That also exists (flows) like the flow of a stream).
The word 'tacca* ( that also ) refers to the Älaya-
consciousness. The word *Srota5 (stream) means the
uninterrupted progress of cause and effect (functional
interdependence). The word, 'ogha9 (flow) means the
unbroken flowing of the waters without any interval between
the anterior and posterior divisions thereof« As the flow of
waters drags with it the straws, woods, cow-dung and the
like, so also the Älaya-consciousness in comformity with the
Biotic force of good, bad and neutral antecedents (karma)
continues unabated in a stream draging on sparia, manaskära
and the like till the end of (one's mundane existence.)
When does this (Älaya) that so proceeds in a flow, turn
back (towards cessation) ? It is so said I
'tasya vyavrttirarhatve.'
 ft»

*TC*T f^5fFT 'RHTc'WnT II K II

'It turns back when (one is) at the stage of an arhat.*

What again is the stage of an arhat ? It is said (to
bexa stage) by the attainment of which, one is called an
*arhat\ The attainment of what again makes one (known
as) an arhat ? With the attainment of the knowledge of
cessation8,9 and of (the knowledge) of the undivided
(vijflapatimätratä) (one is called an arhat). At that stage,
because of eradication of grossness supported by the Älaya-
consciousness, without any residue, the Älaya-consciousness
turns back (towards cessation). That very stage is (called)
the stage of an 'arhat.'
Vipäka-parinäma with all its manifestations is explai-
ned (so far). Now the second 'parinama' called the
'manana' is being discussed : that 'it proceeds on, being
based on that* and so on. So far as the visual consciousness
and the like (other consciousnesses) are concerned, the eye
and the like are commonly known as the äsraya or bases
and the rupa or colour and the like (are commonly known)
as the älambana or object of such consciousness. But in
regard to the afflicted manas, there is no such äsraya or
alambana of common experience. It is, however, not logical
(to hold) that a consciousness is independent of its äiraya
and älambana, and as such with a view to determine the
äsraya and the älambana of the afflicted manas, and to give
a correct definition thereof (of the manas) it is so said :
tadasrxtya pravartate.
tadalambarh mano nama vijftanam mananätmakarb, 5
(It proceeds on, being based upon that. It has that
(alaya) as its älambana and is itself called the 'manas* and
is of the nature of cogitation).

The word 'tat 3 in the' kärikä, 'tadäsritya pravartate'

refers to the älaya-consciousness. The älaya-consciousness
is the äsraya or the support (base) of the Biotic force of it
(manas) and thus (it is so said that), being based upon that
(alaya) it proceeds on or flows on i a a stream (of personal
life). Or ^it may also mean) that in whatever dhätu or
bhümi the alaya-consciousnesss (functions *as) the maturing
influence, the manas afso pertains to" tHat very dhätu and
bhümi, and thus tlie functioning of the manas being bound
\ip with that (älayiy fit is said that) it5proceeds 'on/^being
based on*that? " IOG ' ' '' ^ '3l ' 'J
 *nvt ^ T*T

(The words that) *it has that as its alambana or object

(mean that) it has always the älaya consciousness as its
älambana or object, because of its (älaya's) universal associa-
tion with the Satkäyadrsti or the false notion of the self
and the like in-as-much-as the älaya-consciousness functions
as the älambana or object of the consciousness of T and
'mine* and the like.

How is it that the very citta or consciousness be

regarded as the älambana from which (alone) i t (manas)
springs up (into existance) ?
(Because) as (in case) when (even) what one does not
like (to associate with) at a certain time 4 0 , the manovijftana
arises having the very citta or consciousness as its älambana
or object from which it comes to exist. 4 1
The words *mano näma vijflänam* (are to be explained
now)", mana means a consciousness that is called mana;
(and) that proceeeds on being based on (or supported by)
älaya-consciousness (such is the construction of the sentence);
and by the words/tadälambam mano näma'^it is distinguised
from the älays-consciousness and the pravitti-consciousness.

In answer to the^uery as to what again is its nature,

it is said : 'manai*ätmakam' or that (consistant) cogitation
is its nature (or essence). By reason of (its) such cogitation,
or 'manana* it is called *mana' in accordance to the rules
of etymology. Being essentially a consciousness, it must,
 iH

of necessity, be associated with caittas or mental dharmas.

It is however not (precisely) known as to with which ones
•of the mental dharmas, with how many of them and for
how long it is associated and so it is said': -
'Klesaiscaturbhih sahitam nivrtävyakrtaih sadä'
(it is always associated with the four of the klesas and
that are obscured-indifferent (in nature).
Mental phenomena are of two kinds—the klesas and the
rest. (The kärilkä), in order to distinguish (them) from
the rest, says 'klesaih*. Klesas again are of six kinds. (The
manas) does not (universally) associate with all the six (of
them) and that is why it is said 'with four*. The word,
'sahitam' means (universally) associated. The klesas again
are divided under two categories (by nature) akusalä or bad
and nivrtävyäkrtä or obscured-indifferent. In order to single
out from the *akiisalas% • it is said ^obscured-indifferent*.
With a consciousness that is obscured (by nature), the
(mental phenomena that are) bad can never (universally)
associate. They (the klesas) are (said to be) nivrta or
obscured because they are afflicted. They are (said to be)
(morally) indifferent in-as-much-as they are not manifest
(as >et) as good or bad. The word/sada' means always i e. so
 faStwt

33FPRTci*sfg: HcspT^fefe^^: I

:I

long it proceeds on, it proceeds on as associated with

these (klesas).
The kärikä makes only a general statement and it is not
specifically known (as to which these klesas are) and as such
it is being specifically mentioned (thus) :
*ätma-drstyätma-mohätma-mänätma-snehasan)jfiitaih/6
(It is associated) with ätma-drsti, atma-moha, atma-
mana and atma-sneha);
f
t
To view the 'elements attached to life' (upädäna-
skandhas) as the soul is (called) ätmadrsti meaning
satkäyarsti or the false view of self. cMoha' means ignorance;
the ignorance in regard to the* self' is called ätmamoha.
The sense of *ego' in regard to the self is (called) ätma-
mäna meaning asmimana. Love for the self means ätma-
sneha meaning atma-prema» (To explain it further) : being
ignorant of the essence of the alaya-conciousness, one nurture»
the false view of the cselP in regard to the alaya conscious-
neas. Due to such a false view of the 'self (what emerges
as) the feeling of elevation (or pride) in one's mind is
(called) asmimäna. These .three elements being there, the
 I STTc^r^^r^T^IT f^Tff^ftwfif: *ftsfe*WH: I

1!

attachment to the object viewed with the sense of I or

mine is (called) atmasneha. It is also said :
The manas that has cognition as its functioning is
always afflicted with these four klesas, namely avidya or
ignorance, ätmadrsti or the false view of the cself1,asmimäna
the sense of ego or pride, "and trsna or thirst. This afflicted
manas is the root of all mistakes and is always the source
of all egoity in regard to kusala or good and avyäkrta or
(morally) indifferent mind (personal life).
s
These again :
atma-mohädayah klesah manovannavabhümikah.
(atma-moha and the like other klesas pertain to all the nine
bhumis like manas).
This also being a general statement, it is not under-
stood, as to whether the manas is associated with the klesa s
 i ft*

that pertain to the same bhümi as the manas or with those

that pertain to other bhurnis as well; so it is said :
'yatrajastanmayaih*
(It is associated with only those that pertain to where it
is born).

The word, 'yatraja' means where it is born. The word,

'tantnayaih' means with those that pertain to the dhätus or
bhümis in which ('dhatu or bhümi') it is born, it is associa-
ted; (and) not with those that pertain to other dhätus or
bhümi s.

(In aswer to the query as to) whether it is associated

only with these four klesas; it is said that not (merely with
these four but)
*anyaih spariadyaiica.'
(also with others—sparia and the like).
The context, here, is that(the manas)is associated (with
these). The word 'ca' (in the karika) gives the sense of
collectiveness. The word, csparSadyaih means sparsa,
manaskära, vedana, samjfia and cetana. These five (mental)
phenomena by virtue of their being universal are associated
with all kinds of conciousness. Of these again, it is associa-
ted only will those that pertain to the dhätus or bhumis,
where it is born and not with those that pertain to other
dhätus or bhümis. Or the word, 'anyaih1 in the karika is
 5 *Frftr w^fkfr^icrTsirTff^T: i

1 3rf?rf # ^ crf?JT?f ?r>

used to distinguish them as apart from those that are

associated with the mülavijüäna (or älaya-conciousness).
In the mülavijöäna, sparsa and the other klesas are anivrtä-
vyäkrta or unobscured-indifferent. But ^n the Klista manas,
however, they are obscured-indifferent as in the sixth mana.
Now if the aflBicted manas proceeds on indiscriminately
in kusala, akusala and avyäkrta stages, then it should have
no cessation. (And) in case ft has no cessation, where is
liberation then ? And thus (in answer to the query >as to)
why should it not involve the negation of liberation, it
is said
"arhato na tat.
na nirodha-samäpattu marge lokottare na ca.; (7)
The arhat does not have it. Not in the stage of nirodha-
samäpatti (a force stopping conciousness and producing the
highest semiconcious dreamy trance), nor in the lokottara
marga (or transcendental stage) (is it ever present).
 The carhat'Jby reason of his completely doing away with
all the klesas gets rid of the afflicted manas. It dies out
by virtue of the (influence of the) anantarya-märga that
comes immediately with the attainment of the stage of the
'arhat* like (any other) 'klesas' that are liable to be destro-
yed by the repeated cultivation (bhavanä) by the topmost
of all beings (bhavägrika). It like other 'klesas' does
not exist at the stage of the *arhat\ It is destroyed in regard
to the 'anägämin' or one, devoid of any desire when at the
stage of äkiflcanyätana (non-clinging to anything specific
(or) when he has attained the stage of 'nirodha samapatti',
it is destroyed alongwith the märgas through which nirodha-
samäpatti is likely to be attained. When he rises from the
*nirodha'(i.e. when he comes back to the world of determin-
ates), it (again) proceeds from the älaya consciousness. Nor
(does it exist) in the transcendental marga. The word,
lokottara (in the kärikä) is used in order to eliminate the
laukika or worldly margas; because in the *laukika znarga*
the afflicted manas persists on.

(The klista means)(right) becomes incapable to proceed

on in the 'lokottara-märga1 in-as-much-as the false view of
the self stands in direct confrontation with the cognition of
non-self. Due to the non-simultaneousness of two directly
opposites), it dies out in the 'lokottara-marga\ But in casa
 f%

of one who comes back (to the woild of the determinates)^

it again proceeds on from the älaya-consciousness.
dvitlyah parinamo'yam.
(This the second kind of parinäma)

It signifies that (which"was) intended (to be explained)£

& has also been set forth. After the second kind of parinama
(having been explained) the third kind of parinäma should,
be explained and so it is said :
'tiltya sadvidhasya yä
visayasyopalabdhih sä'
The third kind (of parinama) is what is the perception
of the six kinds of objects (of congition).
t ^"
The syntactical arrangement of the kärika is that *sa.
trtlyo vijfiänaparinama1—that is the third kind of
parinäma. The word, 'sadvidhasya' means the precept ion-
or grasping or the definite cognition of the six kinds of
 *3f STATTET

\\%\\

objects viz. rupa (visual sense-data^, sabdha ^auditory sense-

data) gandha (olfactory sense-data) rasa (taste-sense-data)
sprastavya (tactile sense-data) and dharma (non-sensuous),
(in answer to the question as to) whether this again is
good or bad or indifferent it is said :

'Kusalä akuslä-advayä/ (8)

(It is) good) bad and neither of two meaning indifferent.
When it is associated with alobha or absence of love or
advesa or absence of hatred and amoha or absence of
ignorance, it is kusala or good. When associated with
lobha or love, dvesa or hatred and moha or ignorance, it
is akusala or bad. When it is associated with neither
good nor bad it is indifferent. (In answer to the question
as to) what kind of mental phenomena, it is associated with
and how many are such mental phenomena, it is said .
Sarvatragairviniyataih Kusalaiscaitasairasau
. Samprayuktä tathä kleiairupakleiaistrivedana. (9)
It is associated with the Sarvatraga (or those that are
universally associated and viniyata (or those that are of
limited association), with the kuiala or good mental forces
and with kleias or afflictions and with upaklesas (or the
vicious elements of limited occurance) and it has all the
-three kinds of feelings.
 \

T 9 ^ «nrf: *r*f f ^ T R ^ n ^ ^ f i f ^^^TT: \

: i

What again is meant by 'Saivatraga* is not known and

as such with a view to signify them, it is said :
ädyäh sparsädayah .
(The foremost are sparsa and others)

They are called the foremost because they have been so-
stated at the beginning, meaning thereby the sarvatraga :
They as are (in the kärikä)
'sada sparsa-manaskära-vit- samjftä-cetanänvitam'.
have been set forth earlier: 'Sparsa' is the foremost
amongst them and as such they are spoken of as 'sparsa
and others'. They again9 sparsa, monaskära and the like-
these five elements are associated with every kind of con-
sciousness and that is why they are designated as sarvatraga
(or universals). To explain it further, they are associated
with the Älaya-vijfläna, the klista manas and the (six)
pravrtti-vijiianas without any discrimination. In regard to
the Viniyata (mental forces) it is said :

Chandadhimoksasmrtayah saha Samadhlbhyam niyatäh

(The faculties of desire, inclination, memory, along with
concentration' and understanding (discrimination) are the
niyata (viniyata = mental forces of limited association.)
These are called Viniyata or limited because of their
being tied to a particular (consciouness). They are called
viniyata because their objects (of association) are specified
^and not universal Of these, 'chanda 9 means 'desire* for
the object intended. As it means desire for the object
intended, it signifies that its object is self-governed (specified)
in-as-much-as there is no desire for what is not intended.
'Intended' means what is agreeable by virtue of its being an
object of visual or auditory or the Jlke other functions.
With regard to such (an object), the seeking of a sight or
hearing thereof is chanda. It functions in the form of
providing the necessary basis for efficiency and effort (to
gratify such a seeking;.
<l
Adhimoksa' or inclination means determining a thing
in the manner it has been determined (earlier). Here the
word, 'determined* (earlier) is useä to exclude what is not
so determined. Adhimoksa means the retention of the
thing and the disposition thereof in the form of anitya (or
 i ^rftr:

i srr

a changing entity) or duhkha (or misery) in the form as it

was determined earlier without any doubt either by way
of reasoning or on the testimony of authority. It functions
in the form of what affords non-destructibility (of impres-
sions). One being primarily based on 'inclination' can
not be swayed* away from his own convictions by the dis-
courses or others
Smrti means the indelibility (of the mind) in regard
to the appreciated object—the articulation of the mind.
The appreciated object means what has been experienced
earlier. The indelibility is due to (such an object) being
the means to the negation of the loss of the impression of the
thing as the object of cogniion. The repeated recollection
in the form of an object of what has been experienced earlier
is artculation. Articulation is speaking out. 4 2 It functions
in the form of doing away with confusion. It functions in
the form of doing away with confusion in the sense that
there being an articulation (concept) of the object/there
is no scope left for the citta to move unto another object or
form and as such there is no confusion.
 :!

: i g%f^zrr?TurfH5:cfmq>: i smfasft irrasrnro: i

Samädhi means the concentration of the mind on the

object of investigation. The object of investigation is in-
reference either to its merits or demerits. Concentration
means (to have) one and the same object (in mind). It
functions in the form of providing the basis of knowledge
in-as-much-as it is (only) for the concentrated mind that
right knowledge is possible.
*DhIf means understanding (discrimination); That also-
is but the discriminating knowledge only with regard to
the object of investigation either in accordance with reason
(Yoga) or not-reason (ayoga) or otherwise* Discriminating
knowledge means what Descriminates. It is discriminating-
understanding of what may be true or false or mixed in
regard to entities both particular and general.

Yoga means reason. It again is of three kinds-testimony

of the authority, inference and perception. In accordance
with reason (Yoga-vihita) means what is bruoght about in.
accordance with these three kinds of reason. This again is
of three kinds—srutamaya, cintämaya, and bhävanämaya.
Of these, the understanding based on testimony of the autho-
rity is srutamaya. 'Cintamaya' means what is brought
about by the employment of reason. 'Bhävanämaya' means
what is experienced in Samädhi or concentration.
firaronnfefe i cpr ff w «Rfc rare ^fefr^rfq- srerefö i

: 1 T^^YSETfc^reir f ^TT

«nrf
i srftr

Ä
Ayoga* means the testimony of the positively untrust-
worthy persons, (positively) false inference and falsely
applied samädhi and what is caused by such 'ayoga' (non-
reason) is designated as 'ayogavihita/ What abuses (all)
reasoning (but) which gives rise to a conventional under-
standing is neither Yoga-vihita nor ayoga-vihita (neither
true in the absolute sense nor is it entirely false). This
functions in the form of removing doubts (and) removal of
doubts (is possible) by way of investigating the entities by
proper understanding and thus having discriminated them«
These üve entities proceed even independent of each
other* Thus where there is 'adhimoksa', there need not
be the other entities. This also is to be understood in
regard to all (the other forces). The Viniyatas' are thus
explained. Then of what has been mentioned (earlier)
the kuialas are to be explained and so it is said :
Sraddhätha hrirapatrapä. 10
alobhäditrayam vlryam prairabdhih säpramädikä.
atiimsä kuialäh.
(Sraddha or the faculty of belief in retribution, the purity
of mind being the reverse of passion), hri or humility
 ssfteftfir %?*r: snare ^JRT • ST j

(feeling shy in reference to oneself), apatrapä or aversion

to things objectionable, alobha or absence of love (desire),
advesa or absence of hatred and amoha or absence of
ignorance (alobhädi-traya), Vlrya or courage in good
actions, prairabdhi or mental dexterity, sapramadika or
equanimity(upeksä) > apramada meaning acquiring & preserv-
ing good qualities and ahimsä or causing no injury are the
(eleven) kuiala or universally good moral forces (present in
every favourable moment of consciousness)*

These eleven entities (are universally good mental

forces)—such is th: syntactical arrangement of the sentence.
Of these, iraddha means the well-grounded belief in the law
of moral causation (karma),truth (äryasatyas) and the ratnas
(Buddha, dharma & samgha—the tri-ratna); it is the clarity
(of the mind) and the desire of the mind. Sraddha proceeds
in three ways-(one) in the form of belief in the things that
are real, the virtuous (beneficial) and the non-virtuous. (The
other) in the form of the purity (clarity of the mind) in
regard to the real and the virtuous (The third) in the form
of desire for what is possible to obtain or to cultivate in
regard to the real and the virtuous. (To explain) the purity
of thernind. äraddhä by virtue of 3 its being opposed to
 « t 5ft*ft ^TTT ??% ^rsfttRn^ ^r snwftfv: srpf^r ^

:1

:1

(or curative to) the impurity (restlessness) of the mind and

as such by way of application (association)thereof, the mind
having been free from klesa or the elements of moral defile-
ment, upaklesa or the vicious elements of limited occurr-
ence, mala or impurities, kälusya or excitement (restlessness)
realises sraddha and thus gets purified and as such it is
called the purity of the mind. This functions in the form
of providing the (necessary) basis for chanda or desire. H n
means the element of shyness in reference to oneself
and the elements (that refer to oneself) by reason of thesr
being disagreeable (m being so referred to). Disagreeable
means what is sinful by reason of being censuied by the
good And bearing undesirable results (by way of moral
retribution). The element of shyness or feeling humiliated
by reason of such disagreeable acts whether performed
or not performed ( by oneself, even hearing thereof,
constitutes sin) is hi I. It functions by way of providing the
necessary basis for (one's) refraining from bad conduct
(performing evil deeds).
 Apatrapya means aversion (to things objectionable) by
virtue of (their) disagrecableness in reference to the world
at large. One feels averse to (these) for fear of infame to
the effect that this is censured by the people (world at
large) and thus knowing me as one having performed this
act will condemn me (in the like manner). This also
functions by way of providing the necessary basis for (one's)
refraining from bad conduct«

Alobha is what is opposed to lobha or love (greed),

Lobha means attachment to and desire for the mundane
life and the accesories thereof* What is opposed to it is
alobha—disinterestedness or disinclination to the mundane
life and the accessories thereof. This also functions
in the form of providing the necessary basis for (one's)
disinclination to bad conduct.
Advesa is what is opposed to dvesa or what is maitri or
benevolence. 'Dve^a* means injury inflicted on living beings
causing actual pain or contributing to its possible sources
(potential pain). Adve§a, by reason to its being opposed
to dve§a is non-injury to living beings, thus not causing
actual pain or contributing to its possible sources (potential
pain). This also functions in the form of providing the
necessary basis for (one's) disclination to bad conduce.
'Amoha* is what is opposed to 'moha'. *Moha* mean»
improper understanding, (It means) ignorance m regard
 ^fir

to the law of moral causation (karmaphala), truth (aryasatya)

and the ratnas. By reason of its being opposed to 'moha*
or ignorance, 'amoha1 is the right understanding in
regard to the law of moral causation, truth and the ratnai.
This also functions in the form of providing the necessary
basis for (one's) disinclination to bad conduct,
'Virya* is opposed - to 'kausldya' or langour (laek of
enthusiasm bordering on laziness). (It means) the element
of endeavour (or application of efforts) in regard to what
is kusala or good and not in regard to what is defiled. The
application of efforts in regard to what is defiled is langour
by reason of vilcness. This also functions by way of pro-
viding the necessary basis for the fulfilment of the group
(paksa) of kusala entities.
'Prasrabdhi* is dexterity of body and mind (and) ig
opposed to grossness (sources of langour and lassitude).
Grossness means indexterity of body and mind and it forms
the seeds of the mental states imbued with affliction, which
being extinct, 'prasrabdhi' arises. Of these, the dexterity
of the body means the feeling of lightness of body and
the sense of urgency ( up and doing ) in regard to bodily
functions«
The dexterity of the mind is a differ et kind of mental
dharma or phenomenon (as opposed to Samklesikadharma,
that has been spoken of earlier) which is the source of joy
and lightness (of the mind) well-harnessed by the faculty
 : i

3ffec3T

of will (or determination) by virtue of which the mind

proceeds on to its älambana or object—(aspect) and hence
it is called mental dexterity. The dexterity of the body
again is to be understood only when the favourable (good)
tactile sense-data is brought about with delight 43 in-as-
much-as it is so said in the Sutras that body of one attaints
dexterity in case of one having delight in mind. It func-
tions in the form of drawing away (destroying)^the entire
'Klesavarna' by way of äsraya-parävrtti or retracing of the
Älaya-Consciousness44 under the influence thereof ( kaya-
citta-karmanyatä).
Säpramädikä means what exists with carefulness (care-
fully conforming to the standard of keeping within limits »
not going astray). What is it again ? (It is) upeksä or
equanimity. Why so ? Because it is a universal good
moral force and because it has the claim of being pointed
to as an indispensible condition of all 'kusala* entities and
becauie it has not been enumerated as a specific element
like 'sradha' and because no element of kusala is ever pos-
' sible without any reference to it, upeksa is to be understood
here (in the kärikä, by the word, säpramädikä)» The word,
'apramäda, means what is opposed to 'pramäda'—or the
faculty of carelessness. 'Pramäda* stands for the elements
 I ^TT

:I

beginning from alobha right upto virya ^exclusive).

'Apramäda* means alobha and the like other elements
by virtue of which one relinquishes the akusala elements
and tak<*s to what is opposed to them—the kusala elements.
Thus it is known as what is opposed to pramäda—pramada
being just the contradictory element thereto. It functions
as the fulfilment of the attainment of mundane and super-
mundane virtues.

Upek^ä or equanimity means cittasamatä or calmness

of the mind, citt-prasatthatä or the faculty of preserving
the state of mental calmness and citta-anäbhogata or the
mental state unyielding to the attraction of any object.
By these three words, the three-fold stages of equanimity
is implied. To explain, the mind when it is obsessed with
( something ) and is ( thus ) lost with such obsession
(way-wardness = auddhatya) and said to be self-possessed
(disturbed = vaisamya). At the first sta^e (of equanimity)
when there is no such obsession or loss of mental balance,
there exists mental calmness Then the (easy) flow of the
mind that is well-composed (self-contained) and whose
calmness (is maintained) with perseverance, without any
preparation (anabhisarhskara) or effort (prayatna) (to that
effect i.e. flows spontaneously) is called 'cittaprasathata/
This (particular; stage3 however, pervades (anugata)
with the apprehension of obsession and the consequent loss
of mental balance because of its transitoriness. 45 Then after
 : II

• having reached the summit of meditation and (thus) having

done away with the elements that are opposed to it
^(equanimity) and (therefore) there being no further appre-
hension of falling back (again) and (thus) because of not
having yielded to the (repeated) attraction of the condition«
favouring obsession and the consequent loss of mental
balance (auddhatya = waywardness) (the mind reaches) a
state, free from attraction (of object) and this is called the
mental state unyielding to the attractions of objects. This
functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for
the annihilation of ail klesas and upakleSas.

'Avihimsa* or absence of injury is what is opposed to

*Vihimsa' or injury. (Avihimsä) means not to injure the
living beings by means of killing them or tying them up. It
means compassion (karuna) for all beings. 'Käruriä' means
what obstructs the scope of 'kam*. 'Kam' stands for sukha
or (personal) pleasure or happiness and thus what obstructs
(personal),pleasure or happiness is called i karuna' or com-
passion, A compassionate person feels pained at the-pain
of others. This functions in the form of non-injury. The
eleven kusala-dharmas are thus explained and after that,
the 'Klesas* are intended (to be explained) and thus bearing
upon them, it is said :
'Klesä räga-pratigha-müdhayah' (li)
 w fafe*T?r i srfere;

^fir

män&-drgvicikitsä*ca.
(Räga or attachment> *pratigha' or animosity, müdhi or
ignorance, (stupor), mäna or pride, drk or the five kinds of
false constructions, and vicikitsa or the wrong interpretation
of the law of moral causationj ot truth (aryasatya) and of
theratnasf are the 'kieias').
The (compounded) word, 'räga-pratigha-müdhayah in
the kärikä stands for *raga\ pratigba, and müdhi. Of these,
'räga' means absorption in and seeking for existence
(mundane life) and enjoyment thereof, It functions in the
form of tying up with duhkha or unrest (that brings about
suffering). 'Unrest* here means the elements of attachment to
life; in-as-much-as they emerge under the sway of the thirst
for the sensuous plane of existence (käma-dhätu), the world
of reduced matter (rüpa-dhatu) and the immaterial worlds
(arüpadhätu). Hence it is said that attachment functions
in the form of tying up with unrest.

'Pratigha' or animosity means injury to living being»

and harshmindedness to (the living beings), being possessed
 :\

: I

by which one thinks in terms of evil acts like killing or

tying up of animals. It funciions in the form of providing
the necessary basis for evil deeds not associated (aipariavi-
hära). The word 'sparia' here stands for happiness and
the word 'spariavihara* means associated with happiness
and thus 'aspariavihära* means not associated with happi-
ness that is to say associated with pain.

The mind under irritation invariably displays evil-

mindedness and as such the mind undergoes pain. The
body also being, as a rule, in obedience to the mind
obviously undergoes pain and thus in all levels and modes
of being (Tryapathesu) one is with pain, bitterness and non-
association of pleasure. To mind, having bitterness (towards
living beings), no evil deed is ever far off and, therefore,'
animosity is said to be functioning as providing the
necessary basis for evil deed and non-association with
pleasure.

Moha or stupor means the faculty of ignorance in regard

to evils, the 'sugata*, the Nirvana and the coditions that
establish one in those stages and the true (aviparlta =
undistorted) cause-effect relation ( between them ) This
also functions in the form of providing the necessary basis
for the emergence of passions (sarbklesa). Samklesa or
passion is threefold—the elements of moral difilement, the
elements of antecedents (good or bad instincts) and life
(various conscious activities). The emergence thereof
(samklesa) means the being of the successive (moments)
samklesa due to each preceding (moment of) samklesa.
The function of providing the necessary basis for the
emergence ( as has been spoken of ) ( means that );
it is only the ignorant who proceed on to false
understanding, doubt (in regard to the noble truths and
the like), attachment and similar other elements oi moral
defilement, the elements of moral antecedents and life (or
various conscious activities) and not those who are not
ignorant or wise. J
 5

Manah : Mäna or pride means what being based on

the false view of the self proceeds. It is characterised by
the false sense of elevation of the citta (stream of personal
life). To explain it further, having imposed the sense of
l
V and 'mine' on the 'Skandhas* (the five elements of life)
(and considering them) as this is 'I' and this is 'mine* and
in this way one elevates oneself or considers on«self as
superior to others. It functions in the form of providing
the necssary basis for the emergence of inglorification and
pain, 'Inglorification' means indiflerece to the persons
(streams of personal life) who are respectable and virtuous
(and thus) not being humble in words and deeds (towards
them) and emergence of pain means the emergence of
(the commotion of) the world-process (arising again in
the limited state of being).

Although in essence* it is one as elevation of the citta

(«elf or stream of personal life) but as there is difference
in manner thereof, it is sub-divided into seven (varieties),
like mäna, 'atimäna* and the like.
The elevation of the 'citta* because of pedigree, know-
ledge and wealth as when one thinks in relation to one's
inferior as 'I am superior to him by virtue of pedigree,
knowledge and wealth* or as when one considers oneself
 FT fest ^r STST

in relation to one's equal as fI am equal to him by virtue of

pedigree and the like' is called *mäna'.

'Atimänah' (pride that excels pride) t Atimäna means

the elevation of the self as when one thiks that *I am by
virtue of sacrifice, morality and manliness, superior to one
who is equal to me in respect of pedigree, knowledge and
wealth or (when one thinks that) 'I am by virture of
knowledge and wealth equal to one who is superir in
respect of pedigree*.
'I alone am by virtue of pedigree, knowledge and
wealth, superior to one who is superior to others in respect
of pedigree, knowledge and wealth'—such an elevation of
citta is called cpride that excels pride exceeding pride'
(manEtimäna).

'Asmimänah' 1 Asmimäna is the elevation of the citta

born of the intentness (clinging) of 'V and 'mine' on 10 the
five elements of attachment to life which are devoid of (the
senge of) 'V and *mine\
The elevation of one's mind (self) as when one in
relation to (the objects of) special achievements which are
(still) beyond and not achieved (as yet) thinks 'I have
attained it' is called abhimäna or a false pride (superiority-
complex -= Doastfuiness).
Ünamäna : (or the pride in feeling oneself slightly
inferior) : The elevation of one's mind (self) in relation
 :i

to one who is much superior by reason of pedigree, learning

etc. when one thinks 'I am slightly inferior (to him) by
reason of pedgree, learning etc/ is called unamana.
Mithyamana or false pride (empty pride) : The complex
of the mind to the effect that *I am virtuous in relation to
the vicious is called *Mithyämäna' or false pride. Bad
conduct and the like are the vices and who possesses such
vices is called a vicious (man). Therefore when (in relation
to such a man) one thinks that 'I am virtuous', it aa appears
that even without (having the virtue of) sacrifice and good
conduct, and as such bereft of any substantiality (such
boasting) is called mithyamana or false pride.

Drk of false view : Although it is a general statement

but still as the topic under discussion is an element of
moral defilement, all the five defiled views like the false
view of self and the like are meant, and not the 'uninflu-
enced' (anäsrava) right mundane view. Amongst them,
although in principle there is no difference in regard to
their all being defiled judgements but still as there is
difference in regard to the different aspects they conform
with, they differ from each other. Of these, the false view
of the self (satkayadrsti) is the view of 'I' and -mine* in
regard to the five elements of attachment to life.

The false view of nihilism or eternalism in regard to

what has been viewed as *If and 'mine' with regard to these
five elements of attachment to life is called antargrähadrsti
(false view of siezing the extremes).
 1

Mithyädrstih or false view : ( It is a view ) by reason

of which false view (one) refutes the cause (moral antece-
dents or the effect or action (the law of moral Causation)
or denies (the existence Qf) what exists in reality (a thing«
itself). It is called 'mithyadrsti' in-as much-as it soils
(falsifies) every kind of right view.

Drstiparämariah or siezing the false view : (It means)

the view in relation to the five elements of attachment to
life (i.e. the soul) as the ultimate, unique, the most premi-
nent and the excellent (truth).

Sllavrata-parämarsah : ( or clinging to the sllas or

customs and vrata or rituals as the final truth) : (It means)
the false view in regard to the five elements of attachment
to life as of being pure, free and transcending the spheres
of limited existence. 46

Vicikitsä (or the wrong interpretation of the moral law

of causation) : (It means) the mental state of unsettledness
in regard to the moral antecedents, the retribution (thereof)
the truths (noble truths) and the c ratnas\ The mental
state of unsettledness means cherising different kinds of
view—whether 'it' exists or does not exist and the like.
It is said to be essentially different from prajiia or right
understanding (wisdom of the highest order).

The six kinds of klesas or the elements of moral defile-

ment ( thus ) explained and ( now ) of what have been
 W&QÄ H^ «lUWI II ^ II
SHEET ^ t ßrffRIT ST^h^qT *rHMlj4c|: I

: J

*t

enumerated (in the kärikä) i.e. upakiesas are to be explained

and so it is «aid :
Krodhopanahane punah
Mraksah pradäsa Irsyätha mätsaryam saha mayaya (12)
Säjhyam mado vihimsä ahrlratrapa styänamuddhavah
Äsraddhyamatha kausldyam pramädo musitä smrtih( 13)
Viksepo samprajanyam Ca kaukrtyam middhameva Ga
Vitarkasca vicarascetyupaklesa dvaye dvidhä {14)

The faculty of anger (violence—krodha)f of breaking

friendship (upanäha), of hypocrisy (deceit«mraksa), of
harshness of words (pradasa), of jealousy (Irsya), uf envy
(matsarya), of deceit (rnäyä), of perfidy (trikery = säthya),
 \

of complacency (self-admiration = mada), of causing harm

(menacing = vihimsa), not feeling indignant at the offences
done of oneself (ahri), of not feeling indignant to others at
offences r done (atrapä), of indolence (sloth = styäna), of
being addicted to pleasure and sports (uddhave = auddhatya
•asanguine temperament)3 of disturbed mind (asraddham)
of mental heaviness (kausidya), of carelessness (pramada),
of eclipsed memory (musitä smrti), of distraction (viksepa),
of lacking in comprehension (asaibprajanya), of repenting,
(kaukrtya), absentmindedness (middha), of a searching state
of mind (vitarka), of a fixing state of mind (vicara), these
are the upaklesas or the vicious elements of limited occurr-
ence; of these» the two pairs (kaukrtya-middha, and vitarka-
vicara) are two-fold each (good and bad i. e., neither
definitely good not definitely bad elements).
Of these, 4krodha* or the faculty of anger means the
mental violence in reference to an injury persently infflicted.
It being essentially violence, does not .differ from pratigha
or animosity. But it being an appellation to a specific
 TO
i
: i

state of animosity it is only, an aspect (form) of animosity»

(Thus) the mental violence in reference to an injury
presently inflicted, directed towards sentient and insentient
being and which functions as providing the necessary basis
for inflicting punishment and the like is designated as
kroTdha or the faculty of anger.

Upanäha or the faculty of breaking friendship means

what is a corrolary to (consequence of) animosity. In
succession to anger, one remorses (to the effect that) 'this
one did harm to me* ^and such a) lack of forbearance
imbued with animosity when proceeding in contiguity is
called upanäha. It functions in the form of providing
the necessary basis for the lack of forgiveness. Lack of
forgiveness means (passionate) intolerance at offences (done
to one) and the design for counter-violence (or revenge). It
is also like 'krodha' but a name given to a specific condition
of pradvesa. Thus it has to be understood existing only
 up m&i

Mraksa means the faculty of concealing one's offences.

At the timely allegation made by a well-wisher and an
inspirer of beings who has subdued 'chandas', dve§a, bhaya
and the like against one to the effect that cyou have com-
mitted such and such (offences)', the deceitful attempt of
one to conceal one's offences is called mraksa. Mraksa
being of the nature of hiding is (said to be) deceiful. This
functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for
repentance and pain. It is quite natural that attempts of
concealing offences would cause repentance; and because of
repentance it has to be associated with mental pain (sorrow
»affliction) and thus it is said to be painful. Pradasa
means the faculty of biting by harsh words. Harsh words
involve enormous violence. By striking at the vitals of the
heart, it is (held to be) biting by nature and so (it is)
designated as what bites and tne functioning thereof is
called 'biting* (by harsh words). The affix (tä) used in
the cbhävaväcyar conveys the sense of the base itself (and
nothing more). Thus (the faculty of) biting by harsh
words means what bites by means of harsh words» This
also emerges in succession to 'anger' and ^breaking of
friendship1 and by nature, it is a mental violence and as
such it is a mere aspect of animosity from which it does not
differ in substance (it is a mere designation). It functions
in the form of giving rise to vocal misbehaviour & involves
pain in«as-such-as the person yielding to it falls a victim
to suffering.
 zft

i artf ^ ^ F ^ ^ T ^ W ^ S ^ O ^ ^ : I

Irsya or the faculty of jealousy is one's all-encompassing

(absorbing) mental wrath (intolerance) at the attainment
of others; one having attempted to attain position and gain
for oneself (but having, failed) when finds that others have
attained gain, position, familial distinction, learning and
the like other virtues feels an all-encompassing mental
wrath (intolerance) born of anger imbued with animosity
(which) is termed Irsyä. It is (called) all-encompassing
wrath in-as-much-as it pervades one's whole being. It
being inseparably associated with evil disposition (and)) as
it emerges in succession to it and as it involves (mental)
pain, it is said to be functioning in the form of a mental
affliction and causing pain.
Matsaryam or the faculty of envy means the (passionate)
attachment (to things) of the mind as opposed to (the virtue
of) sacrifice. Things obtained are either of spiritual
welfare or of physical enjoyment by way of which one out
of respect (for others) or out of desire to do favour (to
others) makes a gift unto one, whether seeking or not is
(called) sacrifice. That (mätsarya) being there9 there is na
scope (left) for sacrifice and as such it is said to be opposed
to sacrifice. (Thus) the passionate attachment or lack of
desire to part with the elements of livelihood on the part
of one having fixed all his attention on gain and position
(estimation) is called matsarya. It functions in the form
of providing the necessary basis for *asamlekhas. Asalmekha
means the (undue) accucnlation of the elements ^of liveli-
hood) even not coming under the perview of matsarya.

'Maya* or the faculty of deceit means deceiving others

by way of displaying things not corresponding with facts
It mean^ the display of /ilia* and the like other moral
precepts in an inconsistent manner by one devoted to
worldly gain and (social) estimation with a view to deceive
others. It displays the qualities not existing in reality
( and is ) prompted by 'räga' ( attachment ) and moha
( ignorance ) both functioning together ( and ) ; it is a
name given to these two emerging in consonance and as
such it exists only^ in name as krodha and the like and not
in substance. ^ It functions in the form of providing the
necessay basis for the actions of one indulging in falsehood
( m i t hy ajlva).4 8

Säthya or the faculty of perfidy means the crookedness

of the mind resorted to as a measure' to cover up one*s
defects. r (The undertaking of) the measures to cover up
one's defects means bewildering (deceiving)1 others.' This
again means confusing (others) by way of replacing some-
thing for something else," or it involves ambiguity. Säthya,
 : I

therefore, differs from 'mraksha' in-as-much as it (mraksha)

clearly conceals (things) and not by way of artifice (or
skilfully hiding things). It also proceeds to deceive others
with a view to covering up one's defects prompted by 'raga*
and 'moha' - the two-fold means resorted to by one devoted
to (the attainment of) worldly gain and (social) estimation.
It is an appelatiori to these two (functioning) together. It
functions in the form of an obstruction to the attainmet
of lfight confidence (or) it stands in the * way of natural
(human) attention (or disposition) as derived from right
confidence,
Mada or the faculty of complacency (or self-admiration)
means what seizes the mind—the great delight of oneself
devoted to self-attainment. Self-attainment means attain-
ments of excellence in regard to lineage, health, youth,
strength, beauty, wealth, talent and intellect. Great delight
means joyful exaltation by virtue of which the mind loses
its self-containedness and thus that ( th^e mind ) being
seized up by it (delight), is called what seizes the mind. It
functions in the form of providing the necessary basis for
all the elements of moral defilement and the vicious element»
of limited occurance as well. v
 I
I
1ansr^srnrcir f ^^sr^n^^^^T^T^Tc^t^hr^Pr^r^H^^c^ t

4 Ä f f t ^ ^ ? : \

ET 1

: 1 t TTrc>'fttf?sRt
^ ^ 1
5r$rr 1 ^H f

Vihimsa or the faculty of causing harm is what causes

harm to all living beings. It_ means injury (inflicted on)
beings by way of killing them, tieing them up, beating
them, or b^ frightening them. It is <t harm to all living
beings in-as-much-as all of them are injured by it by
reason of the fact that they undergo suffering (physical)
and mental pain because of their being killed or tied up.
This again is unkindhess to all beings—the harshness
of the mind, imbued with animosity and it functions in the
form of causing harm to living beings and as such it is
called vihismä»
Ahrl or the faculty of not feeling indignant at the
offences done by oneself means not feeling indignant to one-
self at the*offences committed by oneself. The lack of the
feelings of indignance at the offences (done by oneself)
even considering oneself unfit for that act is called ahrl—as
opposed to bxj QT the faculty of shamefulness.
 cc

^TT

Anapaträpya is the faculty of not feeling ashamed to

others of the offences (done by oneself) means lack of any
fear of calumny by others for having committed offences.
One's feeling not indignant at the sinful act committed by
oneself even fully knowing that such an act is against all
public opinion and all scriptural injunctions is called
'anapatrapya' as opposed to 'apatrapya' or the faculty of
aversion to things objectionable. These two also function
in the form7 of providing assistance to the emergence of
ail the elements of moral defilement and the vicious elements
of limited occurrance* It is a name' given to 'simultaneous
interaction of 'räga', Mvesa', *moha* and the like other
elements that are (said'to be)1'the source of all evil acts,
as called for, (even) though ~cräga' * and dvesa' may not
always simultaneously interact and it has no independent
status.
c
Styana' or the faculty of indolence means the lack of
mental dexterity or the state of inertia (inactive tempera-
ment). »The state ,of an inert is called intertia, by-the
association of which the mind loses all animation and
becomes inert and shows no endeavour to ccgnise its
content It also functions in the form of providing assistance
(to the emergence) of all the elements of moral defilement
 :i

:\

i IT*
:i

and the vicious elements of limited occurrance as well.

It is a name given to an aspect of 'moha' and thus it
exists as an aspect of 'moha' and has no independent
-existence» ^ /*

Auddhatya or the faculty of being addicted to sports

and pleasure means the lack of mental calmness
(inquietude). Mental calmness means absence of passion
(tranquility); what is opposed to it is called inquietude.
This again is the source of (all) mental roughness"(disorder)
- » 4~ »JI ^J msjnit, c< v s / T ? { M . •* *i^ sä
in case of r one recollecting the previous occasion of joyt
^ r if ^t ^s uoo. « / - ^ """ r *^°/ t 1
pleasure and sports"" and the like, that favour (the emer-
gence of) all passions and it functions in the form of
y
t JS *. ra <; o o »
functioning counter to mental quietude.
* > iI
Äsraddhya or the faculty of disturbed mind meaas the
unsettled belief in the law of moral causation (karma-
phala), the truth (the four noble truths) and in the ^ratnas'
(the three-fold ratnas—the Buddha, the dharma and the
samgha) as opposed to sraddha or the faculty of settled
mind. *Sraddha^means -the settled^belief in the reality
(of mcral causation), the clarity of understanding (unstained
 fas" fa^nsftrerft ^ 1 tT?r ^ ^C^TTTT «R?

attitude) in regard to the effectiveness (of the four Noble

truths) and longing for the accessibility (of the there ratnas}*
'Asraddha' being opposed to that means non-belief in the
reality^ (of moral causation) non-clarity of attitude to the
effectiveness of the truths and non-desire for the accessibility
(of the ratnas). It functions in the form of provididg scope
for langour (kausidya). It is said to be providing scope
for langour in the sense that one lacking in 'sraddha has
no determination to employ oneself in action. Langour
(mental heaviness) is opposed to endeavour (courage in
good actions ~ virya) (and) it means lack of enthusiasm in
regard to (the application of efforts in) good actions. The
lack of endeavour? in the case of one, given to pleasure, to
sloth and to satisfaction of the senses, in regard to good
actions—physical, mental or vocal ( is called langour },
Thisjunctions'in the form of an impediment to the appii-
tion of oneself on to the direction of good actions. Pramada
or the faculty of carelessness (inadvertance) means that by
reason of which one does not guard one's mind against
rägat dvesa, moha and the like other elements of moral
defilement, born of 'lobha* dvesa, moha and kausidya and
(by raason of which one) does not contemplate of kusala
elements that axe opposed to these (elements of moral
defilement). Pramad^ is a name assigned ta these, lobha,
dve^a,, moha and kausidya. This functions in the form of
providing for the augmentation of defilement and decline
of moral forces.
 ^ i

Musita smrti or the faculty of eclipsed memory means

afflicted memory ( stained by elements of defilement )„
'Afflicted' means what is universally associated with the
forces of moral defilement. It functions in the form of
providing scope for distraction (or wavering)* Distraction
means the scattering or spreading about of the mind imbued
with räga, dvesa and moha. It is called distraction because
the 'mind gets thrown into various directions by reason of
it. 'Distraction9 is an appellation to 'räga*, 'dvesa' and
'moha1 in accordance with the circumstances (as emphasis
is laid on any one of them) by virtue of which the mind
is thrown out of the object of concentration. It functions
in the form of an impediment to one's being free from
passion.
Asamprajanya or the faculty of lacking in comprehension
means understanding vitiated by passion (or affliction), by
reason of which the course of conduct—'physical, vocal
and mental' is not well comprehended and thus it (the
course of conduct) proceeds beyond limits (or digresses)
because there is the lack of understanding as to what is to
be done or what is not be done. It functions in the form
of providing the necessary basis for obstruction (to right
knowledge).
^ Kaukrtyä möantf the* mental faculty öf repöntance.
Kaukitya means the mode of kukrta or the evil that is
done. In this context, however, Kaukrtya as it is (used)
 :\

with reference to a mental state, means the scraping of the

mind. It functions in the form of an obstruction to the
stability of the mind.
Middha or the faculty of absent-mindedness means the
lack of self-willed function—withholding the mind. Function
means the (mind) proceeding toward its object; (and) due
to what the mind loses its self-will-(-ed function) is called
middha or the faculty of^ absent-mindedness ( sloth or
indolence). Middha means the particular mental state
which fails to maintain the physical and mental (balance)
and (thus) due to which the mind loses its self-willingness.
The withholding of the mind means the mind not pro-
ceeding by way of the sense-organs like the eye and the
like. It is an aspect of 'moha' or ignorance in-as*much-as
it haf reference to cmoha* and? Jit functions in the form of
providing the necessary basis for the transgression of what
ought to be doneTJ r ** aJ
-*

Vitarka or the faculty of a searching state of mind

means an 'indistinct murmur of the mind (manoialpa)
(which is) searching (paryesaka) (after, its object). It is a
'move of will1 (cetana-visesa) and a certain. thought praifiä-
visesa) (as well), 4 9

Manojalpa or the indistinct murmur of the mind

means speaking inarticulately. It is called jalpa or speech
in-as-much-as it has the likeness .of a speech« Jalpa means
 1

talking (defining) things. (The idea that) it is a move of

will and a certain thought as well is being explained now.
It is a move of will jn the sense that it involves mental
activity and 'will' is of the nature of mental activity,
(And) it is a certain thought in the sense that the mind
proceeds in accordance with prajiia which is of the nature
of discrimination of good and evil ^ qualities). Sometimes
the name, 'vitarka' is assigned to; the mind and to the will
and sometimes to thought and the mind in reference to the
stages of reasoning (conscious plane) , and non-reasoning
(initial stage) respectively thereof or £ the namp, vitarka is
assigned to both, will and a certain thought in-as:much-as
the mind proceeds in accordance with that.
This is the coarseness (audärikatä) of the mind«; Coarse-
ness means grossness in-as-much-as3 it is. of the form of
merely searching-after its object. This principle,, is also
applicable to vicara or the faculty of a fixing state of the
mind. \^£c^ra ^ ^ *s a mo Y e ; ° f j ^ ^ , a ? 4 i a c e / t a i n thought
(as well) r itjs(also) an indistinct,murmur of the mind but
it attempts to Jbc (pratyavek§akaL its • object in-as-much-as
it involvs t ascertainment like 'this is-Zthat* of what was
understood jearlier^So it is, (held to be) characterised ^by the
refinement (süksmatä) in the form of providing the necessary
basis for what is agreeable to senses and, otherwise (pleasure
and pain). These -two are differentiated from each other
by virtue of their being severally designated as gross and
 t fe

subtle (respectively). (The words), 'dvaye dvidha' (the

two pairs are two-fold each) (are being explained now).
The two pairs (dvaye) means two and two—kaukrtya,
middha, vitarka and vicara. These four elements are
two-fold each—afflicted and non-afflicted. The scraping
(repentance) of the mind at not having performed evil
(deeds) or at having performed good (deeds) is called
afflicted kaukrtya. The scraping of the mind again at not
having performed good ( *deeds ) is called non-inflicted
kaukrtya. 'Middha' also when pervaded by an afflicted mind
is afflicted by virtue of its association with the afflicted
mind and non-afflicted when pervaded by a non-afflicted
mind and thus associated with a non-afflieted mind. Desire,
malice and injury and such other vitarkas are afflicted«51
Non-attachment and the like other vitarkas are non-afflicted
ones. Similarly, the means ~ (resorted to) for injurying
others is a vicara afflicted; (while) the means of favouring
others is a vicara non-afflicted. Of the Kaukrtya, middha,
vitarka and vicara that are afflicted, only those are regarded
as upaklesa or vicious elements of limited occurance and
not others. As the apprehension of rüpa or colour, sabda
or sound and the like—six-fold in all, each of which is
invariably associated with all its respective mental elements
and all the Sarvatraga, viniyata kusala elements," the klesas
and upaklesas as well. So also it is associated witn all the
three-fold feeling — pleasure, pain, and non-pain—non-
pleasure. It (apprehension) is also kusala, akusala and
avyäkrata in-as-much-as such an apprenhension arises in
 regard to colour and the like that are suitable to (the
rise of) agreeable, non-agreeable and indifferent (equani-
mity) feelings The Älaya consciousness is invariably
associated only with the five 'sarvatraga' elements and with
none else and the feeling there is only equanimity and
it is anivrta or unobscured and avyäkrta or ( morally )
indifferent.
The Klista 'afflicted) manas is invariably associated
with the five *sarvatraga* (mental) elements, and the four
Sdeias like atmamoha and like. The feeling there is
equanimity and it is nivrta or obscured and ( morally )
indifferent (by nature). Now it has tö be investigated upon
as to whether five pravrtti-vijflanas having their älambana-
pratyayas ( object-cause \ simulaneously * present, appear
severaly or dually or Collectively. Some people thinks that
they^ appear neither dually nor collectively in-as-niuch-as
{even though alambana-pratyayaS appear simultaneously) all
the samanantarapratyayas (causa materiahs) or the homo-
geneous causes cannot simultaneously function & there arises
one single vijfiana at a particular time. One single cons-
ciousness cannot play the part qf the samanantara-
pratyayas t of two or of many. Qr~ (as against this view)-
should we contemplate (that) disregarding any such fixed
principle, whenever there accurs the appearance of (a par$i-<
cular set of) pratyayas of a particular consciousness, there
originates' a particular CQn$ciou5ness (ajuj) when of two»
two and when of many many with a view to explaining that
it is said.
Paficanäm mülavijftäne yathapratyamudbhava
VijfLananäm saha na vä taranganam yatha jafe (15)
-in
The five cognitions (based) on the root consciousness
make their appearance collectively or severally as„callled
for by the presence of the causes as the waves ( rise ) in
water. * ^ * ?

The word,'^ 'paiicanam* ( in the kärika i) means ( the

appearance) of the five cognitions, the ocular and the like
accompanied by theiiruniversally concomitant consciousness
called the *manovijfiana\ The 'Älayavijöana^ is designated
as the 'mülavijnana* (in the kärika) in view of its being the
storehouse of the seeds of the ocular and the like other five
cognitions and because of their manifestation therefrom as
also because of its functioning as the substrate (upädäna)
of life ( arising in contiguity ) to another. The word»
^yathapratyamudbhava1 (in the kärika) mean»' the appear*-
ance in contiguity of each (of the cognitions)^Htn accornance
with the presence of their respective causes^pratyayas). (The
words)r*saha na vä' mean collectively or^ severally;? (The
 : n

clause) ctarangänäm yatha jale' serves as an illustration o£

the appearance of the five pravrttivijnanas collectively or
severeally from the Alaya-vijnana
So it is said (in the Sandhivinirmocana sutra 5.5) t6So
oh ! of supreme intelligence if there is the cause for the
appearance of a single wave in a massive flow of water,
then a »ingle wave appears. If of two or of three or of
many, then all appear at once. (But even then) the water
flowing in a stream does not get extinct (does not cease to
exist as apart-from the waves) (but that) it (simply) has no
utility (is not so perceived)
Like this, oh ! one of supreme intelligence, based on the
waterlike 'Alaya-vijnana', if there is the single cause of a
single cognition, a single cognition arises. Thus a single
ocular cognition arises. If of two or of three or of all the
five (on the other-hand) then all the five cognitions arise*
There is a gäthä (in this context) :
Like a mass of water, the ädäna-vijnäna, deep and
subtle—the seed-house of all that proceeds. The ignorant
 re«tö" I

I ft *R\fa5rR ^^afeft^TTt: ^ f SR^fct

till it is not clear to them, due to ignorance, consider it the

soul.

The Samanantara-pratyaya or the substrate-cause3 how-

everj is not as existing counter to a cognition as the
älambana-pratyaya in-as-much-as in relation to the rise of
a cognition, the cognition itself admittedly functions as
the substrate-cause. There being, therefore, the (necessary)
älambana-pratyaya or the object-causes, there is no bar to
the two or more sensations proceeding from one and the
same samanantara pratyaya (manas or intellect). What is
the reason here that there being no samanantara-pratyaya,
counter-existing to a cognition there should arise only one
cognition or all the five (even) if the älambana-pratyayas
of (all) the five cognitions are simultaneously present ?
(i.e? there is no reason whatsoever). Thus it must be
admitted that all the five cognitions arise in case the
älambana-pratyayas are there. Now it has to be discussed
as to whether the manovjuana operates along with ocular
and the (similar) other cognitions or without them or
whether it at all operares or not. So it is said :
 TFHT

fw^rr %cw i

aft

Manovijflanasambhütih sarvadasamjöikadrte
Samäpattidvayanmiddhänmürcchanadapyacittakät (16)
The manovijaäna .operates all the time except with the
notvattached and barring the two-fold concentration and'
also when one is intensely devoid of consciousness or when
one undergoes the stupefying stage of insensibility.
The word, sarvadä in the kärikä means always i.e.,
along with the ocular and the (similar) after eognition and
without them as well. As an exception to this general
statement, it is said asamjm'kadrte samäpattidvayanmid-
dhänmürcchanädapyacittakät.' The word, 'äsiftjnika' means,
the cessation of the mind and the mental entities in a
state of the mental life of those who are in the realm of
'asamjfiika'-sattva' or where the consciousness of the 'self
is lost. 5 2 The word, c samapattidvaya ; means the asamjfiika-
san.apatti (or a force that makes one lose the consciousness
of the self) and the nirodha-samäpatti (or a force that
stops the consciousness and produces the highest.semi
conscious-dreamy trance). Of these, the 'äsamjfüka-sarnäpatti5
means the cessation of (the flow of) the manovijfiana and
 : i

*r?ret xft Mtar: i

its concomitant mental entities of one who has given up

all attachment pertaining only upto the third stage of
meditation but still having the will that has its accomany-
ing element (of desire) of going beyond (to the other stage
above the third). *Nirodha' (samäpatti) (or a force of
suppression) is so called because one suppresses (the con-
sciousness of the self) by the virtue of it. This again is a
particular stage of the 'äsraya' (or the substratum, the älaya)
that puts a stop to the functioning of the manovijnäna
with all its associates. It is called *s>amapatti' or attain-
ment, because one after having attained the mental state
attainable in it gets on to the state of asraya or the sub-
stratum that works counter to the rise of any other state
of mind. c Nirodha-samäpatti J means the cessation of (the
flow of) the manovijiiäna with all its associates and the
afflicted 'manas* in regard to one who has reached on to
the stage of 'akincanyäyatana* (non-clinging to anything
specific i.e., when thought of anything specific or even of
äkäsa is transcended) and who has taken the resolve of
dwelling in a peaceful state (of existence). It is also (con-
ventionally) known to be a particular stage of the äsrays
(älaya) like the 'äsamjnikasamäpaiti'. lAcittikam middham'
(in the Kärika) or sloth or indolence devoid of conscious-
 *Rtfa*rT% fires*

ness means that when at the stage of intense sloth, the

äsraya is impaired and the manovijfiäna stops flowing (and)
as such it is called acittaka or devoid of consciousness
'acittikä mürcha' (or the stupefying stage of insensibility
means that ) the loss of balance in the äsarya due to
accidental imbalance in the three humours of the body —
the wind, the bile and phelegm—is counter to the rise of
*manovijfiäna\ On this (loss of balance in äsraya) is
constructed (fancied indetification founded on resemblance)
the acittikä mürchä(or the stupefying stage of insensibility).
Leaving as de these five states, it is to be understood that
manovijfiäna functions in all other conditions«
(it may be argued that) how does the 'manovijfiäna'
having been ceased to function in the aforesaid states of
'asamjfiika' and like starts functioning again with the
removal of such conditions ? (The answer is that) in-as-
much-as it did not have total extinction, it again springs
up into existence from the käiaya-vijfiäna\ That one
(älaya) is the seed of all consciousness. Upon this 'vijftäna-
parinäma'j are conttructed the soul & the various substances*
With a view to illustrating the three-fold nature of this
( Vijnäna-prinäma )t all the three kinds have been duly
explained. Now with a view to explaining that there is no
soul or substance apart from the development of vijftana
(vijftänaiparinäma) and that what is ascribed to be soul or
substance is but essentially the development of vijfiana
itself as it has been stated earlier, it is said :
Vijfiana parinamo'yam vikalpo yadvikalpyatc
tena tannästi tenedani sarvam vijfiaptimätrakam (17)

All constructions by reason of their being constructed

are but the development of vijfiana and thus (tena) that
(what is constructed) does not exist and therefore (tena) all
this is but consciousness alone»
What is called the Vijfiänaparinäma and what has
been later stated as of being three-fold in kind is what is
known as construction. Construction means the mind and
the mental states belonging to the three worlds on which
are superimposed3 the various objects and the forms
thereof. As it is said (in the Madhyäntavibhangasästra) :
The mind and the mental states of the three worlds are
but the constructions of the (essentially) non-existent.
 1
: i f^r^rr^f

f f : I ?T

In-as-much-as what is constructed as the objective

world, the soul, the skandhas, the dhatus, the äyatanas,
rüpa (or matter), sabda and the like other things by virtue
of the three-fold construction of the nature of the älaya-
vijfläna, the afflicted manas, and the (six) pravrttivijfianas
with their associates, do not (essentially) exist, the develop-
ment of vijftana is also but construction; because it has no
real object-cause. (It may be argued that) how is it known
that the object-cause is not real ? (Because) whatever is
the cause of something must be invariably functioning and
in full and only then that 'something9 comes into being
and not otherwise. But vijftäna or consciousness arises
even without any (real) object-cause as in the cases of an
illusioury city of the Gandharvas or of dreams, or of one
having ocular defects. If the rise of consciousness was
ever invariably bound up with any (real) object-cause,
then no consciousness would ever arise in an illusion and
the like other circumstances, because there is no (real)
object. Consciousness therefore, appears contignously
with the (elements of) the consciousness of the same clay
that got extinct in the previous moment (but functioning
as the substrate-cause) and not from any external object
in-as-mcch-as it (consciousness) appears even wsthout them-.
Moreover, it is well-known that in regard to one and the
single object, amongst different observers, mutually con-
tradicting consciousnesses arise. One and the same (object)
cannot logically be of tne nature of (giving rise to) mani-
fold (consciousness) contradicting each other. Thus in
view of its nature of superimposition, the object-cause of
a construction has to be deemed unreal.

Thus far (an attempt is made) to refute (the validity)

of superimposition and with a view to avoiding any wrong
imputation, it is said (in the Kärikä)

'therefore all this is but consciousness alone'

The word, 'tena', in the 'Kärikä' means therefore' i e.,

in-as-much-as by reason of its being constructed by 'vikalpa'
of the nature 'parinama' or development of vijnäna, it
(what is constructed) does not exist Therefore, there being
no object, all is but consciousness. The word, 'sarva' (in
the kärikä) means all belonging to the three worlds includ-
ing the 'asarbskrta* entities also. The word, c matra' aims
at precluding things other than it. The suffix, c ka' (i n
matraka m ) is only an expletive. If everything is but
consciousness alone and there is no such entities like the
agent or the instrument, then how are such constructions
 5\
: i f
:\

ff

made, the mulavijflana having no directing agency nor

there being any instrumental cause thereto ? In answer
(to this apprehension), it is said :
Sarvavijam hi vijflanam parinamastathätathä
Yätyanyonyavasäd yena vikalphah sa sa jäyate (18)
The (Älaya)-consciousness is the seed of all and
development (thereof) appears contemporaneously (with the
previous moment of sensation ( vikalpa ) in-as-much-as
sensations appear mutually depending on each other.

The word, 'sarvavijam' is used to signify its capability

of bringing into appearance all elements (of existence).
The word, vijfiänam means the Älaya-vijfiänam. It is said
to be 'sarvavijam' to signify that there is a consciousness
as (distinctly) different from the kind of (ordinary) cons-
ciousness not functioning as the seed of all appearances«
The word, 'vijfianam' is used because some people conceive
of 'pradhana* as distinct from 'vijnana' as the rcot of all
appearances. Or even it there be transgression in regard
 fkf^^q: % ST

to a single word (if a word is used in excess) there need

not be any blemish in-as-much-as it could be justified on
the ground of its being related to other words as the
qualifier or the qualified. The experession, 'parinäma-
astathä tathä yätyanyongavasat* or that the development
accordingly appears mutually depending on each other
means as follows. Parinäma or development means tians-
formation as distinct from the pievious state of being.
The words, 'tathä tathä' mean that a particular mental
sensation matures upto a stage capable of giving further
rise to the same constructed image. The word, 'anyonya-
vasäd' means that the eye-consciousnesss and the like while
engaged in the act of nourishment of its own potency
functions as a cause to the development of the potentially
efficient Älaya-consciousness as also the Älaya-consciousness
becomes a cause to the rise of the eye-consoousnf ss and
the like* 53 In this manner, being mutually dependent on
each other, these two kinds'of consciousness appear. Thus
from the Älaya-conciousness ( even ) having no other
directing agency, different kinds of cognitions appear.

It is well illustrated as to how in the present life the

pravrtti-vijilänas proceed from the Älaya-vijfläna. Now it
is being explained as to how after this present life which
is but consciousness alone being extinct, the -future life
would be linked up with the present.
 srfa-

: i cr^ ft?rr^?T sr^ir^ fqrfrTT& «RRT ^ftr ^ftszf fronr:

i
5TfrTRt ^T^Tft?# srftpT^ I

Karmano vasanä grahadvayavasanaya saha

Kslne püravipäke anyadvipäkam janayanti tat (19)

The vasanä or the the biotic force of deeds (moral

antecedends) alongwith the two-fold gräha-väsanä or the
biotic force inherent in the two-fold aspect of a self-
conscious idea, give rise to the vipäka or the accomplish
ment of maturation, the previous one having been worn
away.
Deeds are of three-fold nature — good, bad, and
indifferent. Such deeds (as moral antecedents) deposit
their potency on the Älaya-vijfläna for the rise of the
future life. This is called c Karmaväsanä\ The two-
fold 'graha* means the object-aspect and subject-aspect (of
a self-conscious idea). 5 4 The apprehension of an object
 sftä

i ggr q^rq; i

is falsely attributed to its parallel duration as something

independent of consciousness. (And) the seit conscious
distinct idea that it is consciousness that perceives or knows
or grasps is the subject-aspect. 'Gräha-dvaya-väsanä* means
the seed (or force) deposited (in the Älaya) by the object
and subject (subject-object aspect of a self-conscious idea)
that had risen earlier and is capable of giving rise to the
yet-to-be similar subject-object aspect(of self-conscious idea).
Origination differ in accordance with the difference of karma-
väsanä and of the cgatis* of life, as sprouts differ with the
difference of seeds. The 'grähadvaya-väsanä* functions only
as an accessary (force at work) in the process of the mani-
festation of future life as foreshadowed by the biotic force
inherent in the moral antecedents like water and the like
 5 ^ f 5fftncftfa

in the growth of sprouts. Thus it boils down to this, that

the biotic force inherent in the moral antendedents alone
unassisted 55 by the Biotic force inherent in the two-fold
aspects of a self-conscious idea is incapable of giving rise
to vipäka or the accomplishment of maturation as the
natural outcome (of the- biotic force of good and evil deeds).
(And) so it is said (in the kärikä) 'grähadvayaväsanayä
saha* or assisted by the 'grähadvayaväsanä'.

Now to explain 'kslne pürvavipäke anyadvipäkam

janayanti tat' or the previous maturation having been worn
away (they) give rise. The accomplishment of maturation
that had taken shape as a result of ( moral ) deeds
accumulated in the previous life having worn away (and)
when at the completion of the cycle (of birth and death)
a further maturation is at the offing, the biotic force
inherent in the moral deeds (in this life), to the best of its
potency, in association with biotic force inherent in the
 : asftreife ^T^r^f^^fT^ sF*»resrc*PJ
i

1 i" f? sr%<T$TT3;

two-fold aspects of a self-concious idea, proceeding from the

previously enjoyed state of fruition (vipäka) gives rise to the
same 'Älaya-vijfiäna' imbued with a different state of frui-
tion in-as much-as anything other than the Älaya-vijüäna is
incapable of maturing up to a fruition. With a view to avoid-
ing the idea of an immutable eternal ultimate reality, the
express ion-* the previous maturation having been worn away'
is used, and the expression, 'give rise to another state of
fruition9 is used to combat the extreme view of utter annihi-
lation. There is the Älaya-vijfiäna as distinguished from the
eye-consciousness and ttie like (and) that one is the 'root of
all' and not the eye-consciousness and the like. Why so ?
Because (such an idea is based on) the scriptures and on
reason. So the Lord has said in the Abhidharmasütra :
Eternal is the consciousness, 56 the source of all entities.
With this (functioning), (are attained) the stages, the
Nirvana or the knowledge.
 I ?r ff

Had there been no 'Älaya-vijnana', neither attachment

nor non-attachment to the worldly life could be explained.
Attachment to the worldly life means (that the Vijßäna
impregnated with 'Sarhskaras' is) tied to another complex
of the 'skandhas' (for the sake of a fresh embodidiment);
while non-attachment means 'Nirvana —a state of mental
life either absolutely exempting from the circle of trans-
migration or (as absolute immorortality through absorption
of the self into itself but) peeserving individuality as yet. 5 7
No other consciousness than the Älaya is there that has
Sarhskära as its propelling force. (And) there cannot be
any attachment to worldly life unless that has 'samskära*
as its propelling force. 58 In case the Älaya-vijnäna9 is
not admitted, the vijfiäna or consciousness-in-transition
must be assumed as a force propelled into action by
*samskära* ( as its subsititute ) or the six vijfläna-käyas
(themselves) perfumed with sa^skaara or impression. Hence
the samskaaras or impressions that are imagined as a
force propelling the rise of a consciousness-in-transition
cannot (logically) have any causality in-as-much-as they
are but mere discrete elements in view of their being
extinct since they are (subject to) extinction for good. 58
Nor can the consciousness in-transition be ever conceived
of as a sarhskara-pratyaya (or propelled into action by
samskara) in-as-much-as consciousness-in-transition is also
marked with näma-rüpa or name and form and it is not a
pure consciousness.
 ftntf ^srrg: i

Now a question may be asked that how is it that

vijfläna alone is csamskara-pratyaya' (or propelled action
by samskäar) and not the 'Näma-rüpas ?; What is the
reason thereof ? ( obviously there is no reason ) ( and }
therefore näma-rüpasr ( also ) are sa^skara-pratyaya 9 and
not the vijfiana (only) (says the opponent). Which näma-
rüpa has vijüäna as the propelling force ? (asks the
siddhäntin). If it is held that the näma-rüpa of a temporally
posterior stage of life has vijfläna as the propelling force,
while the näma-rüpa of the moment of transition has
samskara as its piopellirg force, then it has to be asked
as to what addition is there to the *näma-iüpas' of vijnäna-
in-transition, so that it has to be regarded as having
vijfläna as the propelling force and not the former one (or
the näma-rüpa) of vgnana-in-transition and the previous
one having the impression (as the propelling force) and
not the latter. Thus let näma-rüpa' qua substance be
accepted as a 'samskara-pratyaya* or impression as its
propelling force and what is the use in imagining of its
(näma.rupa) further sub-division as 'näma-rüpa1 of vijfläna-
in-transition ? Thus, the vijnäna-in-transition cannot be
assumed as of having samskära as its propelling force.
Nor are the six 'vijüäna-käyas' perfumed with impressions
capable of having been propelled to action by such a force,
in-as-much-as a vijfiana (a pravrtti-vij^ana) can not have
 srfa

sarbskara or impression*(as its propelling force). What is the

reason thereof ? (if asked). (We reply) Because a (pravrtti-
vijftäna) cannot hold in itself the maturing influence of
moral antecedents (vipäkaväsanä) of of homogeneous pro-
duction (nisyanda-väsanä)50 because~it is in itself opposed
to-any causal efficiency, and in regard^to its future exist-
ence, it may well be said, that it has not yet come into being
and what is yet to be does not well^exist and in regard to
what existed before, it may be said that it has already
ceased to exist. Thus after having undergone the
state (of mental existence) or the^ state "of 'nirodhasamäpatti',
the 'citta'r perfumed with 'samskära* cannot come' back "to
existence (in case the Älaya is not admitted). Nor would
there be any cnämarr5p&'" ,(t^ at ^ a s "tcrrfe?J conditioned~^By
yijüäna^ v So „ the" -*sacjayatanas' ^cannot be said to lexisfc
In this way, beginning from 'jäti' till jara or old age and
decay— everything^ (ia the cyqle) t^mains - uriestablished»
As 'a^.resuftj there*won't l>e^any attachment to worldly
-life. So* »the 'Safiiskaras' are rooted^ JLin ^cavidya^-the
cause ^„hereof^and vthe\*A laya-vijfiana' ^is perfumed with
them |samskaca) is the - consciousness ^propelled to action^
by *samskäras' and the 'näma-rüpa* of the Vonsciousness-
in-transition' ^comes «into existence as conditioned by the
(Älaya-vjjnana.)—such a principle (of the twelve nidänas)
is faultless.^ So also *non attachment As, not possible tin
case * the 'Alaya-vijfiäna* is not admitted. Attachment
to worldly life is caused by (moral) ~deeds and~;afficitions;
of whom the^ afflictions are the predominant!^ causes )i
 Deeds in conjunction with afflictions functioning as the
predominant cause (adhipati-pratyaya) can call for a future
-life and not otherwise. So also the deeds that have called
Tor-a new birth can again call for a future life only under
the influence of affliction functioning as the predominant
cause. Thus the afflictions are the roots of attachment to*
worldly life in view of the predominance. Thus, only if
these are put an end to, the extinction of the impressions
(samskäras) is possible and not otherwise. In -case the
'Alaya-vijflana* is not admitted, these ( the afflictions )
cannot be put an end to. (if asked) why not ? Afflictions
can be put an end to either only when these are fully opera-
tive or when these are in the form of seeds. The view
that these are put an end to when these are* fully operative
is not tenable. Because even when one proceeds along the
path of 'prahana' or extinguishing the^ afflictions, the
afflictions in the form of seeds would still persist [in that
case ) fn-as-much-as, in this case apart from 'what is
opposed9 (to affliction) nothing else is admitted. 6 0 Where-
as affliction in seed—forms arc well estibUshed, (and so)>the
extinction thereof should (logically) be (held) possible
(only) by what is directly opposed to it.
- The affliction in the form of seeds should adhere to
the consciousness opposed to thenKand/not that the cons-*
. ciousness adhcreing to the afflictions in the form of seeds
could be opposed to them. Nor is non-attachment to
worldly life possible in case of those who have not put an
end to the seeds of afflictions as yet. Therefore, co-exis.tm^
 : i^ f

with other vijfianas, the Alaya^vijnän'äT as determined 61

by the 'klesa and upaklesa* has to be admitted in view of
its functioning as the ground for bringing up to maturation
the respective seeds of each of these states (contained in
the Älaya that accomodates the seeds of klesa and klesa-
pratipaksa). In regard to those klesas and upaklesas that
proceed on to function as a continuous development of the
(afflicted) mind as and when „the biotic force (thereof)
matures up to action, (it is to be said that) the seed thereof
^enduring in the 'Älaya9 is done away with by (proceeding
on) the path opposed to it simulaneously functioning.
This being done away with, the klesas cannot arise (afresh)
enduring in the aforesaid support (alaya), (and thus) is
-attained the nirvana state of mental life still preserving
individuality. (And) in case, on the extinction of the life
determined by previous moral antecedents, there is no more
«emergence of a new life therefrom, the highest state of
spiritual life (ts attained).
In case the klesas are rooted out, the moral antecedents,
for lack of its 'sahakäri-karana' or auxiliary cause are
incapable of accomplishing a new state of existence. This
way, the Älaya-vijfiäna being there (admitted) the attach-
ment and the non-attachment to worldly life (can be
explained). Not otherwise and thus the Äiaya-vijfüna
as distinct from the eye-consciousness and the like (has to
be admitted). This one alone is imbued with the seeds
of all deeds and not the eye-cdnsciousness and the like,
( such a position has to be agreed upon ). More detailed
 treatment of it is to be found in the treatise named
'paficaskandhaka5.
If everything is but consciousness then how is it that
such a view is not (regarded as) a contradiction of the-
Sütras ? In the 'Sutras 1 , three essences are spoken of—the
constructed, the dependent, and the absolute. (The answer*
is being given), (No), there, is no such contradiction
in-as-much-as the three essences can be established only
if the theory of 'consciousness alone' is admitted. Why so >
(if asked); it is said (in answer) :
Yena yena vikalpena yadyad vastu vikalpyate
Parikalpita eväsau svabhävo, na sa, vidyate//20
AH things that are constructed by various kinds of imagina«
tion are 'parikalpita' in essence (in-as-much-as) they do not
(essentially exist).

With a view to showing the endlessness of things that

are constructed whether mentally or materially, the
expression, 'yena yena vikalpena* is used* The expressionr
'Yad yad vastu prakalpyate (vikalpyate ?)' means both the
mental and the material things or even the 'Buddha-
dharmas' to say of the extreme ones of such things* All
these are 'parikalpita' or constructed in essence. To speak-
 sfir i

I 5T

-of the reasons thereof—fna sa vidyate5 or that they do not

essentially exrst. cYadvastuJ means the thing of construc-
tion— such a thing does not exist in-as-much-as it has no
.essence of being Because of this, this thing is 'parikalpita'
in essence. Such a thing cannot be regarded as having
the nature of what exists as a result of the cause and
effect relation. (Because) in regard to a single (such)
entity or in regard to non-substantiality thereof, numerous
constructions, contradictory to each other are even seen*
Nor could such a single entity or the non-substantiality
thereof, ever logically be of diverse nature (as conceived
of)« Therefore, all such things are constructions only, in-
as-much-as - the forms thereof are only parikalpita or
imagined. So also is said in the 'Sutras' : <oh ! good soul,
the states of entities^ do not so exist as what the ignorant
or the commoners hold to be.l
After having explained the 'parikalpita', the c paratantra-
svabhäva' has to be discussed uponf and so*It said 7
paratantrasvabhävastu vikalfiah pratyayodbhavah/
'The paratantra nature means 'the constructions born
£o cause and "conditions •
 Here the word, fcvikalpa' signifies the essence o r
*paratantra\ By the expression, 'born of cause and condi-
tions', the reason of using the term, 'paratantra' is signified.-
Parikalpa or construction ( paratantra-svabhäva^) means-
the mind and the mental states pertaining to all the three-
worlds that are many and diverse—good, evil, and neutral.
So also it is said (in the madhyänta-vibhanga) :
-"The mind and the mental states of the three worlds*
are but the constructions of the unreal 1 '.
That which is controlled* (tantrayate) oj originated (brought-
into existence) by others—the causes and conditions (is-
called paratantra). It amounts to saying that their self-
being is conditioned by the hetu-pratyaya which are
distinctly different from itself, Paratantra is spoken of.
What about 'parinispanna ? (in answer) it is said :
Nispannastasya purvena sada rahitata tu ya/21
The state of 'paratantra' ever being free from the?
previous (parikalpita-svabhäva) is called 'parinispanna/ 6 2
 \

f ircT 3 fofa qfosflf?q?ta *ar*TT%T «TTcT'^W TOT

ir^qfq

It is 'parinispanna* in*as-much-as it reveals the un-

disorted nature ( of things ). The word, 'tasya' in the
'kärikä' means 'of the paratantra* and the word, 'pürvena'
means 'from the parikalpita'. In that (construction i e.,
^paratantra), the perceiver and the perceived are imagined.
To explain it further, in such a construction, the perceiver
and the perceived—the enties that are solely non-existent
are imagined and that is why it is that these are but
imagined« The c paratantra ; , 7 therefore, if ever free form
this notion of the perceiver and the perceived becomes
'parinlspaana* by nature 6 3

Ata eva sa naivänyo nananyah paratantratah (22)

It is, therefore, neither different nor identical with the
fc
paratantra\ The expression, 'it is, therefore, neither'etc.
signifies that the c parinis£anna' means the state of cpara-
tantra' as free from the elements that arc imaginary by
nature* This freedom is the true nature (of the paratantra)
and the idea of the nature of elements being neither
different nor Identical with the elements is but reasonable. 64
The c prinispanna' is 'paratantra-dharmatä or paratantra
 5% sriwSrc: i

qua substance; and therefore, it is to be undersood that the

'parinispanna' is neither different nor identical with the
'paratantra\ If the 'parinispanna' were different from the
'paratantra' then the 'paratantra* could not ever be
conceived of as free from the 'parikalpita 1 . If (on the
contrary )t the 'parinispanna 5 were identical with the
paratantra' then it could not be conceived of as having a
pure 'älambana' in-as-much-as it would.have been of the
nature of affliction like the 'paratantra'. Or otherwise,
the 'paratantra' would not be of the nature of affliction as
'parinispanna' because of its being identical with
'p^rinispanna'.

Anityadivad vacyo

It should not be held like *anityatä\ The remaining

portion of the sentence is *nänya nänanya' or neither
different -not identical (like anityatä). It could not be
held like 'anityata', 'duhkhata' or canatmata5, to be neither
different from nor identical with the samskaras^ aid the
like. If 'anityatä 1 were different from the 'samskaras* then
the 's^niskäras' would have been the elements whose nature
would have been extinct 6 5 like 'anityatä'. So also would
have been the case with 'duhkhatä' and the like. 6 6
 fTO^f II

If ^paratantra1 is of the nature of being free from (all

notion of) the perceiver and the perceived then how is it
itself perceived and in case it is not perceived, how is it
known to be existing ?. it said :
Nadrste'smin sa drsyate (22;
tf
This not being perceived, that (one), is not perceived.'
*This not being perceived' 'means that the 'parinispanna-
svabhäva' not being perceived and 'that ( one) is not
perceived' means the 'paratantra' is not perceived. If the
'pannispanna' which is perceivable by an indeterminate
supramundane knowledge is not perceived, the 'paratantra*
also is not known (in that case) by such knowledge because
the 'paratantra* is perceived by pure mundane knowledge
that arises after that (interminate knowledge). Thus when
ths 'parinispanna9 is not perceived, the 'paratantra' also
is not perceived. Nor is it (right to say) that it is not
perceived by the (mundane) knowledge that arises after the
supermundane knwoledge (had dawned upon). So - it is
said in the f dharani s called the 'Nirvikalpapravesa' that by
'means- of the 'after-knowledge' one equally perceives-all
such entities as an illusionary image, a mirage^ an object
of dream, a reverbation, a reflected moon and a nirmana-
kaya* 67 Here the word, 'dharma* means the entities
 i ?rqr p^rrösiro T ^ ^ g f T

: 1 qftfa*l*OT*FTO^ q^PW STT^f

.TOT?*:
i

tromtat öftren ft:

that are read in »the list of the 'paratantra' dharmas or

entities. The 'parinispanna' is a homogeneous (object
o.f) consciousness like 'akasa' (i.e,, asamskrta) and as has-
^ been said earlier that by virtue of indeterminate knowledge
one cognises all elements in what is of the nature like
'äkäsa\ It means that* the 'paratantra-dharmas' are per-
ceived in the 'Tathatä' only. ,
r
If 'paratantra* are the entities qua substance only then
how is it that in the 'sutra', it is so said that all elements
are without any essence, without any origin and without
any decay. (Even then) there is no such contradiction (as
apprehended) because—
Trividhasya svabhavasya trividham nihsvabhävatam/
Sandhaya sarvadharmanam desitä nihsvabhävata// 23
'of three essences, having seen three-fold non-essence Non-
essence of all elements has been ordained'.
 IR 3

s t r e s s ST TOT ftr:^nnwT at
: \
\\ ^ II

. The number (three-fold) has been mentioned with a

view to signifying that the essence is only three-fold and
there is no fourth one—(and) each one exists by virtue of
its own characteristic. Three-fold non-essence is non-
essence in regard to the characteristic, non-essence in
regard to origination and non-essence in regard to the
ultimate state of being. All elements are of the nature of
(either) 'parikalpita* (or) 'paratantra' (or) 'parinispanna\
Now to show the respective non-essence of the three-fold^
essence, it is said :
Prathamo laksanenaiva nihsvabhävo'parah punah/
Na svayarhbhäva etasyetyaparä nihsvabhävatäf/ 24
Dharmänam paramarthasca sa yatastathätapi saK/
'The first is non-essence by its characteristics alone and~
that which exists not by itself is another kind of non-
essence, Absolute of all elements is that since *Tathata* is-
that. The first means the cparikalpita-svabhava'. This
is a non-essence by its characteristics alone (on the sccre
of its characteristics being non-essential), because its
characteristics are a matter of imagination—as crupaJ is
 am:
:i

what is characterised by früpa' (form) and cvedanaT is

what is characterised by 'anubhava* or feeling and so on.
Thus because of having no essence in itself, it is (called)
a non-essence by its own, like the sky-flower. The other
one is the, 'paratantra-svabhäva'. It exists (but) not by
• itself, because it comes into being by causes and conditions
other than itself as in the case of an illusion. Therefore,
as it's appearance does not conform to its origination, it is
called a non-essence on the score of ^ts origination. (To
explain the expression that) the Absolute of all elements
is that since 'Tathatä 5 is that etc. (it is to say) : 'paramam'
means the supramundane knowledge, there being nothing
beyond that and the content of such knowledge is called
'paramarthah* or the Absolute. « Or in other words, the
4
parinjspanna-svabhäva' is called 'paramärtha' because of
its purity remaining ever impolluted and ever homogeneous
or uniform like c äkäsa\ Since it is 'parinispanna-svabhäva'
and as it is the ultimate truth of all 'paratantra' elements—
the 'dharmata* thereof; the parinispanna-svabhava* is the
non-essence in regard to 'paratantia 5 in-as-much-as the
'parinispanna 1 is. cabhäva' m its essence. Is 'parinispanna'
to be understood by the vvoid, £ paramärtha ? (In ans»Aer)
it is said, *no\ Why then is it so said that 'Tathata*
also is that ? (in answer, it is said that) the word, 'api 1
(i.e. also) in the 'kärika' signifies that it is aoi expi ssed
 i *r

ft? cr%

i ft J.

by the word, 'Tathatä' alone. Is it then that it is expressed

by all the synonyms of the wtordj c dharma-dhatu ?' (So it
said) :
Sarvakälarh—tathäbhävät, ".
*That being uniform all through',
(is) 'Tathata*. To explain it further; in all circumstances^
whether in the 'saflcsya' or 'asaiksya' stages of the people at
large, it remains the same and not otherwise and therefore
is called 'Tathata* or suchness. What again is the
*TathataJ or suchness—is 'parinispanna' itself, pure con-
sciousness or is pure consciousness somewhat distinct from
it ? (In answer it is said) :

Saiva vijflapti-mätrata// 25
*That alone is consciousness pure*
in-as-much-as it imparts knowledge of the qualities that are
perfectly pure. As it is so said :
 fogfe ü f e t * 3?T cT^'Pftrei^ I .

That consciousness exits ouly in name because that

alone is experienced
And that consciousness transcends all names, all
senses and all cognitions
Consciousness äs associated with the vital Energy
then transcends all the worlds
(And) attains freedom from all obstructions and takes
to all-pervasiveness
The expression, 'saiva yijfiaptimatrata' speakes of
'abhisamaya'.
If everything is (reducible) to consciousness, then how
is it that, colour, sound, smell, taste and touch are per-
ceived by the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue an i the
organ of touch ? (In answer) it-is said :
Yävad%vjjfiapti-natratve vijftanafh navatisthate/
Giahadvayasyanusayasiavanna vinivartate// 26
 consciousness till it permeats in the consciousness pure,

The close" attachment of the two-fold grasping does not

cease to exist'.
Or since what has been said earlier «that the
4
väsanä' of moral antecedents in. conjunction with the
'väsanä* of two-fold grasping give rise to- another 'vipäka'
at the waning of the previous 'vipaka', what then does
'extinction' or non-extinction mean ? (In answer) it is
said : 'till the consciousness does not permeat in the con-
sciousness pure' and so dh, (To explain it), till the con-
sciousness permeats in the 'citta-dharmatä' (or the ultimate
state of consciousness'), designated as 'vijüapatimätratä'
(or pure consciousness) and on the contrary it still moves
in the process of the cognition of the 'grähyä' and the
*grakaka* (or the subject-object duality). The two-fold,
grasping means the grasping of the object and of the
subject—the close attachment thereof by which the seed
(thereof) is deposited in the *Alaya-consciousness' for the
rise of the future two-fold grasping, Till the conscious-
ness of the 'Yogins* is established in the 'Vijfiaptimätratä*
marked- by the non-duality; the close attachment cf the
subject and -the object does not cease to exist— docs not
die out. Here it is well demonstrated that without having
rooted out tHe grasping^pf the external objects; the grasp-
ing of the internal (mental) ones cannot be rooted out
 1 i^ft^Tsff ^ H ?% a m

n ^va n

Now it has to be discussed as to whether in view of the

consciousness transcending its content, the *Citta5harmatäf
or the Gitta or mind par excellence exists (in reality) t o
which the answer is *no\ What then ?
Vijflapti-mätramevedamityapi hyupalambhatah/
Sthäpayannagratah kinicit tanmätre nävatisthate// 27
'As 'consciousnes alone' is also (born) of cognition (in case
of one) keeping in view something else, he does not rest
on it alone*. .
To explain it further : 'as consciobsness alone is also
born of cognition5.is said with a view to discouraging the
stand taken by those who refer everything to one's self, purely
from the puritanic knowledge of the scriptures and think
6
l have attained the stage of the vijflaptimätratä'. 'Con-
sciousness alone' (is the reality) means that everything is
devoid of (external) objectivity that is to say having (fully)
grasped or cognised or realised that no external object
(ever) exists, (and) 'forward' (or agratah in the kärikä)
means 'as heard of by the mind'. The word, 'Kimcid' is*.
 i
? i

snrfFcf

used to signify the variety of the 'alambanas' according

to the 'Yogäcära*—as for example the piled up bones, the
blue, the pus, the 'Vipadumaka and the 'Vyädmätaka and
the like. 'He does not rest on it alone'—this expression
is used to mean that consciousness has not transcended the
(two-fold) grasping as yet.
When then does consciousness transcend the (two-fold)1
grasping (i.e., duality) and the mind par excellence rests
on (its ultimate nature) ? (In answer) it is said ;
Yada tvälambanam jfiänarh naivopalabhate tadä/
Sthito vijfiänamätratve grahyabhäve tadägrähat// 28
'Consciousness when no longer cognises the object of
cognition
Attains to the state of consciousness pure, there being
no object for not cognising it'.
When consciousness no longer sees or cognises or clings to
common esperince born of the object of- instruction or of
 sfa

: u

love (support) or of colour, sound and the like (and) in

case it (consciousness) really can cognise the ultimate
truth and not as one born blind, then (and then only) the
(concept of) duality in consciousness being transcended,
consciousness rests on the ultimate nature of consciousness
or consciousness par excellence. The reason thereof is
stated thus : there being no object and thus for not having
cognised it. (And) only if the object exists, the subject
would exist and not in case the object ceases to exist.
Thus in case there is no object, the subject also does not
exist and it does not merely signify the non-existence of
the object. This way totally disregarding any object
( caube ), the indeterminate supramundane consciousness
arises. All attachment to the concept of subject-object
duality dies out and consciousness rests on its own ultimate
nature.

If consciousness thms rests on 'Vijfrapti-mätratä' then

how is it ever described, (in answer), it is said;
Acitto'nupalambho J sau jftanani lokottaram ca tat/
Äsrayasya paravrttirdvidhä dausthul'yhänitahf/ 29
 : \
: n 3© u

r: i

irnf

Sa evänäsravo dhaturacintyah kusalo dhruvah/

Sukho vimuktikäyo'sau dharmakyo*yaiii mahämuneh//30
*Non-cognition, non-perception, supramundane is such
consciousness/
(And) the substratum tracks back in two ways when
the dausthulyas wave away//
Such unimaginable 'dlritu' is faultless, good and
unchangable/
( It is ) happiness, 'nirvänakäya', called the dharma of
the great sage1//
By these two verses is explained the accomplish-
ment of fruit attainable in the stages beginning from
the 'darsanamarga' onwards by those saints who entered
(the realm of the concept of) 'Vijüapti mätrata', there
being no perceiving mind nor any external object4 of
perception. It is called 'supramundane consciousness* in
view of (the fact that) there is no more affliction (left)
and thus no manifestation thereof in * the world of beings
and also (in view of the fact that) it i£ indeterminate and
beyond all worldly perception. The immediate substratum
of such consciousness tracks back and to state this, it is
said ( in the karikä )—'äsrayasya parävrtti' etc. The
 <FT?ftrftfcr i

, are arr^ fe^r ^ s ^ r f a c r : i

substratum, here, refers to the Älaya-consciousness—the

seed (house) of all. It tracks back in the sense that there
being no seed of grossness of two-fold Vipaka* (visaya-
vijflapti and manovijfiapti), it develops the knowledge of the
non-duality (of subject & object) and of the 'Dharma-kaya'
by virtue of its (positive) activity (inherent in itself). 6 8
On what being rooted out, does this substratum track back.
(With a view to explaining that) it is said : Mvidha
dausthlyahanitah'. The word, Mvidha7 signifies the grossenss
of *klesävaranaf and of 'jfieyavarana* and by *grossnessJ is
meant inactiveness of the *asraya\ That again is the root
of 'klesavarana' and of 'jflcyavarana'« The tracking back
of the substratum again is achieved by virtue of rooting
out the (aforesaid) grossness in the sravaka's (mind).
(And) what has been said by the word, *vimukti-kaya' is
that (the tracking back of the substratum) is achieved by
virtue of rooting out the (aforesaid) grossness in the mind
of the Bodhisattva. (And) what is (meant to be) said (by)
'dharmäfchyo'pi mahamunch' etc. (is this) : reason of root-
ing out two-fold 'avaranas', the tracking back of the 'asraya*
is also two-fold—the higher (gottara) and the highest
(»irutt&ra). So saya a 'gäthä' :
 i

:\

ädäna-vijflana is characterised by the duality

of affliction
The seed of all, the seed of affliction, both these
two are (also) checked therein in regard to both',
(in regard to both) means in regard to both the 'sravaka*
and the 'Bodhisattva'. In regard to the first one, the seed
of affliction and in regard to the other, the seed of both
the types of obstructions are uprooted, and their 'sarvajfiata
or omniscience dawns upon. The expression, 'so cva
anäsravo dhätu* etc. means the state of the tracking back
of the substratum which is a 'world', devoid of affliction.
The word, 'dhatu* is used in view of its being devoid
of affliction.
It is 'acintya* or unimaginbaie in-as-much-as it is
not comprehended by any argument, known only by the
pure mind and has no parallel thereof. It is 'kusala' or
good because it suspends on something pure, because it is
beneficial and because it is a faultless entity. It is
Mhruva' or unchangeable because it is internal in-as-much-
as it undegoes no decay. (And) because of its being
 n i

U f^fef^T^fH^TKT e^IRH U

enternal, it is 'happiness' in view of (the fact that) what-

ever is changeable is 'dukhah' or unhappiness, and this is
changeless and therefore, ;sukha% or happiness. It is the
'vimuktikaya' in regard to the 'iravkas' since the 'kleiavar-
anas' are all rooted out. This is also called Mharma*
characterised by the tracking back of the substratum. In
case of a great sage, because of his having rooted out both
the types> of c avaranas' as a result of his mediations on
the 'bhutnis' and 'päramitäs' and thus having developed
the full knowledge of the tracking back of the substratum,
it is called 'dharmakäya'. cDharma-käya, is called because
of its going beyond the world of men, because of its being
uninflicted and because of its being all-pervasive. The
word, 'mahämuneh' in the 'kärikä', refers to Lord Bhudha
who is called 'mahämuni' (or a great sage) in view of his
having taken a great vow.
 NOTES

Pudgala-nairätmya :
The doctrine that maintains the reality of a self,
corresponding to the psycho-physical individual is
called ätma-väda, whereas, the view, approaching
the doctrine of a permanent soul is 'pudgala-väda',
All Buddhists rejected the 'atma-väda', since Buddh-
ism, philosopically means nothing else than
'dharmata', the theory of dharmas, which is but
another name for anätmatä or nairatmya. But there
are two schools,—the vätsiputriyas and the sammittl-
yas—which are nevertheless, adherents of the pudgala-
väda. According to the exposition of vasubandhu,
this means that the internal skandhas, at a given
moment, constitute a certain unity which is related
to them as fire to fuel. It doe snot have the absolute
reality of a dharma nor is it included in the list
of dharma, but nevertheless, it is not quite unreal.
This pudgala is also regarded as surviving, since
it is maintained that it assumes new elements at
birth and throws them off at, death For all other
schools of Budhism, pudgala is but another name of
ätman. That the position of the vätslpatriyas is
wrong i.e , not in strict conformity w.th the dharma-
theory is evident since this /theory admits no real
unity whatsoever between separate elements. There-
fore, self, soul, personality, individual, living being,
 NOTES

human being—all theso conceptions do no aswer

to ultimate realities; they are but names for some
combinations of dharmas i.e., formulas of elements,
(vide The Central Conception of Buddhism p. 58-59)

In the beginning, by pudgala was meant only

the 'ego'—the self, behind mental states or skandhas,
held to be discrete. The skandhas were taken to be
real. Unity behind them was held to be mere con-
struction and the unity was not that of a substance.
The continuity of a stream, undergoing incesscnt
change was mistaken as unity. This logic was extended
Jo all the wholes. The whole is only a construction,
it was said. This construction is called satkäyadristi.
The 'dharmas' that are real are constructed to have
a cpudgala\ (vide The Yogacara Idealism p. 3)

2. dharma-nairatmya
In early Buddhism, difference, change and parti-
cularity were objectively real while only one
aspect of experience was subjective. The early
docrine, therefore, receives the name of 'No-Soul*
and 'No-Substance' doctrine. The Mädhyamikas,
repudiated, for the first time, the reality of experi-
ence as such« The whole is unreal, they argued. The
discrete and momentary elements, that the whole
was supposed to rest on, were, also equally unreal.
The Yogäcära also resorted to the subjective analysis
of experince made by early schools of Buddhism.
The acceptance the objective existence of dharmas
appeared to the yogacara, illogical. The number
of €real' dharmas originally held by sarvästiväda was
 NOTES

seventy-five. The sauträntikas reduced it to fort-three.

The whole thing was relegated to the realm of the
subjective at the hands of 'yogäcära. The new
doctiine, therefare, receives the name of 'No-Element'
(dharma-nairätmya) doctrine, (vide The Yogäcära
Idealism p. 14—15).

Sarvjflatva—'universality of consciousness', or omni-

sience. 'The Buddhist saint, the Ärya, the Bodhx-
sattva, is credited with the faculty of apprehending
the universe sub spacie alternitaties* The Buddha
alone possibly intuits the undifferentiated Absolute,
the ordinary yogins can intuit only its subject*
object aspect. When he has reached the drstimarga,
all his habits of thought are changed and he
directly intuits by mystic intuition (yogi-pratyaksa)
that condition of the world, which reveals itself to
the monistic philosopher« This is called omniscience
"( sarva-äkära-jüatä, sarvajflatä ) ' \ Vide Buddhist
Logic, vol. II. p. 56, 32, fm.

Yogäcära, though it accepted the Mädhyamika doctrine

that experience is entjrely subjective! could not
reject it as illusory. To the Mädhyamika, subjectivity
breeds unreality and itself too is unreal. To the
Yogäcräa, on the otherhead, subjectivity is real.
Unlike the Mädhyamika, it sought to establish that
phenomena is rooted in some reality. A groundless
appearance is unintelligible, holds the yogäcära.
But this ground cannot be objective as that has been
successfully demolished by Mädhyamika and
Sauträntika. The only alternative left to the Yogäcära
\16 NOTES

was, therefore, to urge that subjectivity is in itself

real and that only its objective projections are
unreal Consciousness is the only reality and every-
thing else that appears in experience is within
experience, it concludes. (vide The Yogäcära
Idealism p. 14-16).

5. The subject is supposed to be the cause (älambana-

pratyays) of its knowledge and causality implies a
determinate temporal sequence. The object—the
cause, thetefore, must precede what it stands in
causal relation t o J —its cognition, (pv. II. 247).
But as everything is but momentary, it perishes by
the time its cognition is effected (Abhikosa 2.43)*
As such, it cannot be perceived by knowledge
9 (ksanasya jnänena präpayitumasakyatvät. Nyayabin-
dutlkä. p. 16). In knowledge, therefore, something
appears which is no longer existent (na avid\ amänasya
svarupen* darsanam, hetutvena ca jfiänät pürvatvanu
Pürvatve ca ksanikatayä na jfiänakäle äsit, P. V,
p. 108).
The Sarvästiväda anticipated these difficulties,
and so according to it, the object is the cause of
cognition in the ordinary sense of the term. There is
no determinate temperal sequence in the cause-effect
relation of an object and it$ cognition. They flash
together. An object and its cognition live at the same
moment. A moment of consciousness and a moment
of an objective dharma ( älambana ) emerge in
knowledge. Knowledge does not cognise a dead
.antecedent, (vide The Yogäcära Idealism p. 22»
p. 24, p. 55).
 NGTES

6. The Madhyamika repudiates the doctrine of reality

of experience. The whole being unreal, the discrete
elements too are unreal. Everything is but subjective
or in other words, relative; everything is known as
related to something else than that. Nothing is
known in isolation. Appearance is only phenomenal
(samvrti) and not absolute (paramartha).

7. Four distinct theories of parinama or chage were

sponsered by different teachers of the Sarvästiväda
school of 'early Buddhism. Bhadanta Dharmaträta
explained change as trasformation of modes (bhäväny-
thätva). A dharma or element remains identical
in its essence qua substance throughout (past, present
and future) but its bhäva or modes—its form and
and quality change. (atltänagata-pratyutpannasya
bhävasya'nyathätvam bhavati na dravyasyä'nyathät-
vam. Sphutärtha V. 26 a~b. Vide also Sarvästi-
väda. p. 9).

Vasubandhu has characterised this theory of

Dharmaträta as identical with the doctrine of
parinama of the Sankhya School 'which explains
continuity ( santati ) as the manifestation in the
constant substance, of another dharma on the dis-
appearance of any other dharma' (ka ce'yarh santa-
tiriti ? Kim yathä sämkhyänäm avast hi ta-dravyasya
dharmäntara-nivrttau dharmäntara-prädurbhävah ?
sphutärthah II. 36. Vide also Sarvästiväda p. 11).
This is known as 'dharmaparinäma in Yoga school
of philosophy ( Yogasütra III. 13 ). The idea is
that one dharma gives- place to another dharma in.
 NOTES

the dharmin—the common substratum of both that

remains constant and unchanged.
It has to be borne in mind however, that
Dharmaträta, as a teacher of Buddhism, could not
possibly have had the Sämkhya-yoga concept of
change. To him, dharmas are discrete essences that
are conditioned (samskrtaj—subject to orignation,
decay, continuity and impermamence but which
never turn to non-being. The dharma, therefore,
*has two-fold function. It functions as the sub-
stratum of itself in its aspect of continuity and it
is 'bhava* in its aspect of change*. The relation
between substance and mode is, therefore, is one of
identity-in-d inference ( anekänta or bhedabheda )«
The sauträntika does not admit the possibility of
any such relation subsisting between substance and
mode« According to him, there is no substance apart
from the 'transitory modes'. Feeling of continuity
is only an illusion because of similarity« (vide
•Sarvstivada p. 13-14).

Bhadanta Ghosaka characterised change or

parinäma as the transformation of one, temporal
phase to another (laksanänyathätva). He meant to
.say that dharma, as essence, remains the same while
the temporal phases thereof change by virtue of
-which the dharma is characterised as past, present
and future« (Vide sputartha V. 26 a-b, Vide also
sarvastivada p. 14). 'A dharma passing through
the times, is vested with a phase called 'past' when
it is past and yet is not exclusive of its future and
-present phases' (pravartamäno 'tlto'tlta-laksanayuktah
 NOTES ?Y?

anägatapratyutpannäbhyäm laksanäbhyäm aviyuktah..

AKB V. 26 a-b. Vide also sarvastiväda p. 14) and
so also is the case with the present and future
phases.
Vasubandhu criticises this theory on the ground
that it involves an apparent confusion in the sense-
that each dharma is supposed to posses three
temporal phases, (adhvasamkarah prapnoti, sarvasya.
sarvalaksanayogät AKB. V. 26 a-b. Vide also
Sarvastiväda p. 15).
Bdadanta Vasumitra characterises change as
'variation of states, (avasthänyathätva). A dharma,
according to him, is designated as possessed of a.
temporal phase (past, present or future) by virtue
of the variation of the states of its causal function,
( käritra ) and not of essence, (avasthäntarato na.
dravyäntaratä hi. sphutärtha V. 26. Vide also»
Sarvästiväda p. 1 9).

' Vasubandhu approves this theory of change in-

as-much-as it seeks to determine the three times by
means of Käritra or causal function, (te bhavalak-
sanävsthänyathänyathikasamjaitäh/ tritlyah sobhano*
dhvänah käritrelia vyavasthitäh// AK. V. 26. Vide
also Sarvastiväda p 19).

Bhadanta Buddhadeva conceives change as

'temporal relativity' (anyathänyathätva), A dharma^
according to him, is differently designated as past or
present or future only in reference to each other
(purvaparmapeksyä'nyonya ueyate. AKB. 26, Vide
also Sarvästiväda p. 22).
 NOTES

Vasubandhu levels the same charges of in-

compatibilty of coincidence of the three times in one
time as he did in case of Ghosaka (ekasmin evädh-
vani trayo'dhvänah präpnuvanti iti A KB« V. 26
Vide also Sarvästiväda p 22).
To -Yogväcarä, duration obviously meant
motion and causal connection exists between
moments only,every existence being a flow of discrete
moments. Entities disapear as soon as they appear.
'Constant destruction or renovation is inherent in
every existence which is really a compact series
of ever new moments' (Budhist Eogic Vol. II p. 93).
Any discussion on the theory of change entails a
discussion on the doctrine of pratltya-Samutpada or
the theory of dependent origination. It is a theory
of causation originally confined to the moral aspect
only. This theory, at the beginning, sought to
explain that all the elements (or nidänas) in the
wheel of existance beginning with Avidya and ending
with jarämarana were causally conditioned.
With the shift of emphasis from ethics to logic
in Buddism, the theory of dharmas (dharma-samketa)
and that of momentariness (ksarukatva) were put
foward. The theory of dependent origination, was
applied to the realm of dharma too as a law of
causatiou. In Budtusm, nothing is admitted to be
qua snbstance* Continuity between one dharma and
another, could not, therefore, be explained in the
ordinary sense of causation. » The cause is only an
occasion by virtue of which the effect is conceived to
appear (asmm sati idam bhavati).
 NOTES

The Mädhyamika found fault with this view of

causation» Causality cannot function but for a real
relation between the related phenomena. It explained
that since an effect is but dependent upon its cause
for its appareincc, it cannot be real (qua substance).
Everything being dependent on everything else
nothing is intrinsically real ( pratltya yad yad
bhavati na hi tävat tad eva tat ). The law of
pratltyasamutapada, therefore, according to it, does
not signify temporal sequence of things but 'essential
dependence of things (parasparäpeksatva) and 'con-
sequently their unreality'.

The Yogäcära admits of the reality of conscious-

ness. It, therefore^ sought to intrepret the law of
dependent origination as involving the idea of temporal
sequence. But this law of causation, according to
it, is not applicable to the world of objective dharmas
but to the moments of consciousness alone. Synchr-
onisingly with the decay of one moment of cons-
ciousness, i t argues, another moment thereof emerges
notwithstanding the fact that there is no real con-
tinuity. (Vide Yogäcära Idealism p. 30).

Upacära means 'calling a thing by a name which

does not proper Jy belong to it "or attributing to an
object a property which does not belong to it5. It is
practically something as laksanä. (vide kvacit täd-
arthyädupacärah* K. P. II. p. 53 ). Mammatha
again, however, uses the word, upacara in another
sense when he says 'ubhaya-rupä ceyam suddhä/
upacärenämisritätvät// (K. P. II. p. 46).. Here he
uses the'word, in a sense similar to' that' of 'sahitya-
 NOTES

darpana' (uapcärä hi namätyantam viskalalitayoh

sädrsyätisayamahim na bheda-pratitisthaganamätrarb.
S. D. Kärikä 14. p. 47). üpacära or metaphor
consists in simply concealing the apprhension of
difference between two things which are altogether
distinct, on the strength of extreme likeness of the
two; as that of fire and , a boy called 'manavaka'*
This second meaning is used in a 'päribhäsika*
sense peculiar to the alarhkära-sästra. The 'Nyay-
avärtika' on N. S. II. 63 says 'atacchabdasya tac-
chabdenäbhidhänamupacarah; yathä yasthikä-sabdena
dravyaviseso'bhidhlyate iti; yasthikä-sabdät tu
punah söhacaryöd brahmana-viseso'bhidhiyate;
yathö yasthikäh pravesayeti. Abhinavagupta in
Locana (p. 51) says ^upacöro gunavrttirlaksanä'»
According to Mallinatha it means 'atattvasya
tattvena vyapade's^h' (S. D. P. 59-60). The Abhi-
dhämätrkö' explains it as 'yatra vastvantaramupa-
caryatc yatha gaurvähika iti (k3 2).

9. The aggregate does not exist qua substance apart

from its parts and thus is not capable of being the
object of the cause of the perception which appears
as if it is the aggregate itself. Thus for the thesis
of aggregate, though there is form, there is no
causality.

10. For thesis of the atoms on the contrary, though there

is causality, there is no form.

11. According to Vinltadeva, Vögbhata is an advocate

of such an opinion, (vide Alamvanaparlks3. p. 97).
 NOTES ?v^

According to Ku'ichi, this was the thesis of sanghab-

hadra too (vide Pussion's siddhi p. 52, Paramänunä-
mavicchinadesänäm sajätiyanäm yugapadgrahane
sthüla iti mänaso vibhramo bhavati, Älamvana«
parlksä p. 97) The early sarvästivädin also might
have been the advocates of it. Vide Tattwasarbgraha:
'tathä nairantaryasthitänekasüksmatattatpadärtha-
samvedanato' yamekatvavibhramah ityadosah. vide A,
Parlksa. p. 97).
12. Because, qualities inhere in 'dravya* only
1 3. There might have been the 'upacara' of fire in water.
14. 'Jäti' is 'guna-nistha' and as sneh 'gunas' are in-
separably associated with 'Jäti'. ^Tiksnatva* and
'kapilatva', therefore, are inseparably associated
with the 'agnijati' or the genus of fire. There is
thus the aforesaid upacära of the jäti of fire on the
boy.

15. Tlkmatva or kapilatva is found in the toy and not

confined to the jäti of fire. It is at the same time,
found in the boy and not in all boys or in all men.
It is found in animals that are other than man.
Even in the same boy or in the same man again, it
is sometimes present and not always.

16. If 'tlksnatva' or 'kapilatva' is inseparably associated

with the 'agnijäti' and at the same time, it is equally
present in the boy, then logically, the jäti of fire,
should be present in the boy too.

1 7. Because, the substratums being difFerent? the oualities

can not be identical to each other.
 NOTES

18. It refers to the doctrine of adrsya-anupalabdhi of

the Sankhyas that maintain that Matter (pradhäna)
and souls (purusa) are not sensibilia-not individually
distinct. They are only metaphysical (süksma-
atlndriya). Their non-perception alone (anupalabdhi-
pratyaksa-nivrtti-matram) does not entail apodictic-
negative judgement (abhäva-niscaya) : They are
cognised by sämanyatodrsta-anumäna. Buddhist
Legic. Vol. II p. 78
19. The reality of a substance being denied, any differ-
ence between the categories of substance and quality
is also denied. Theie is no inherence of qualities in
substance. Both sänkhya and Buddhism share in
common a tendency to push the analysis of Existence
up to its minutest last elements which are imagined,
as absolute qualities', Buddhist Legic vol. I. p. 19.
20. The Buddhist theory of Negation is a direct conse-
quence of the Buddhist theory of judgement. The
fundamental form of the judgement, is the perceptial
judgement or what is the same-the name-giving
judgement, of the pattern-this is a jar. Such a
judgement is contained in every conception referred
to objective reality and in this sense conception and
judgement became convertible terms. Negation
consists, therefore, in repelling an attempted percep-
tive judgement and for this reason every negation is
a negation of sensibilia, of such objects which can
be imagined as present. The negation of the presence
of an invisible ghost is just only a negation of its
presence i. e., of its visible form. But the Realists
and Rationalists, the vaiiesikas and the Sänkhya*
 NOTES

speak of supersensuous objects, objects which are

invisible by their nature, objects which can never
be present to the senses, which are non-sensibilia.
The negation or non-perception of such objects is a
non-perception of the unperceivable. Non-perception
of imagined sensibilia is a source of right knowledge,
because it leads on to successful action. But the
non-perception or negation of objects whose presence
to the senses can not be imagined is not a source of
knowledge, since it cannot lead to successful action.
There is no knowledge, neither direct nor indirect
about metaphysical objects* There are only problems
i.e., questions. Matapuysical objects are non-objects,
metaphysical concepts are non-concepts, and meta-
physical judgements are non-judgements.';

Buddhist Logic Vol. I. p. 384-38 5.

21. In the Sänkhya system, the objective reality of the

categories of substance and quality and the relation
of inherence uniting them as well is admitted of. It
admits of no separate existence of qualities. Qualities
are but particular manifestations of a subtle entity.
'To every new unit of quality corresponds a subtle
quantum of matter which is called 'guna' or quality,
but represents a subtle substantive entity'. Ibid
Vol. I. p. 19. Vide also. S. N. Das Gupta. History
of Indian Philosophy, p. 243.

:22. Here the word, c adi 1 possibly means to include the

synonyms of ätmä i. e«, pudgala and the like

23. Vipäka means the maturing influence of moral antece-

dents, while 'nisyanda' means that 'obeying solely
 I** NOTES

the law of uniformity or homogenous production*

(sabhägaja)—the next moment follows automatically
(nisyanda) on the former one1, (central Conception of
Buddhism p. 23).

24. 'Generality, general ideas, are also conceived of as a

kind of force, and it is christened by the name of
'nikäya-sabhägatä, a conception intended to replace
by a 'force' the substantial reality of the 'sämänya*'
of other systems 1 Ibid. p. 20. Vide also Ab-k.II 4 1 .

25. Älaya is not simply what accumulates, it is also self-

conscious. However, it is not self-contained as that
would involve its being independent of other vijfiänas
and its being an ultimate truth.

26. "For the Buddhist, for whom there is no soul, and'

no substance altogether, the impressions become
autonomous, they then receive the name of väsana
which is sometimes explained as pürvarh jnänam,
sometimes as Sämarthyarh i. eM a force, or the force,
the force par excellence, which creates the world as
it appears to naive realism; vikalpa-väsanä can thus
be compared to reason when it is charged with the
task of an autonomous creation of the categories of
our understanding. It is clear from the context that
much of the business which in realistic systems
devolves on the soul, is in Buddhism entrusted to
väsana or vikalpa väsana. J
Buddhist Logic. Vol. II. p. 293-294.
27. In later Buddhism, there being no external world
and no cognition to apprehend it, a cognition intro-
spective by nature apprehending its own self was
 NOTES

put forward as a theory. The 'universe was assumed

to consist of an infinity of possible ideas which lay
dormant in a storehouse of consciousness. Reality
becomes cogitability and the universe is only the
maximum of compossible reality. A Biotie Force
was assumed as a necessary complement to the stored
consciousness, a foice which pushes into efficient
existence the series of facts constituting actual
reality."

Ibid. Vol. L p. 13
28. Ätmabhäva-self-being or attainment of completeness
of a cognition that requires three things (i) element
of rüpa ( ii ) its conformity with the indriya ( iii )
mentation.

J29. Sädhisthänam Indriya^rüpam näma ca. Perception

is explained as an inter-dependent appearance of
three elements-one element of colour, one element of
the sense-organ and one element of mentation that
have their support in the Älaya (or the Biotie force
in the Älaya).

30, Vijflänavädins are held to be divided into two diffe-

rent camps as säkäravädins, and Niräkära-vadins#
Vide Advaya-Vajra-Sarhgraha.

3 1. There are two forces that are supposed to be active in

producing the highest degrees of trance, the uncons-
cious trance ( asanjfii-samäpatti ) and the cessation-
trance ( nirodha-samäpatti ) or catalapsy. (Vide«,
Abh. K. II. 46. Vide -also Central Conception of
Buddhism, p. 20.
 n° NOTES

32. The Buddhists propound the functional interdepend-

ence of the sense, the sensibilia and the images and
do not admit of any Ego or 'any instrumentality of
the senses or any grasping of the object. There is
no fetching of the form and no delivering of it to
the Soul. There are sensations and there are concept
tions and there is a co-ordination a kind of harmony
between them. Go-ordination of the object with its
image and the image itself are not two different
things, they are the same thing differently viewed/'"
Buddhist Logic. Vol. II. p. 68.

33. 'because, the object upon which it is intent, is the

second moment of the external object, this second
moment of the object being the product of its preced-
ing first moment and the first moment is the object
grasped by pure sensation." Buddhist Logic Vol. II.
p. 319-20.
34. 'The resulting event is always indifferent in the~
moral sense, because it is the natural outflow of a
previous cause, and is supposed not to be produced
voluntarily/' (Central conception of Buddhism, p.27).
35. " T o the early Buddhistic schools, Samjflä meant
'ideas as that are defined as operations of abstract
thought, as that which abstracts ( udgrahana ) a
common characteristic sign ( nimitta ) from the
individual objects. Even the definite representation
of a colour is brought under this head. It is exactly
what in later Indian philosophy> Buddhist as well as
Brahmanical, was understood by 'definite3 ( sva-
vikalpa ) cognition. Dignäga and Dharma-klrti
introduced into Indian Logic the distinction between-«
 NOTES ?*?

pure sense-knowledge, free from any operation of

abstract thought(kalpanäpodha) and definite cognition
(savikalpa). It was then adopted by Udyotkara and
the whole of Nyäya-vaiiesika school. It now appears
that Dignäga was not the originater'of this doctrine,
he only adopted it to his system. From the very
beginning Buddhism had established this difference.
Vijfiäna and its synonyms-citta, manah represent
pure sensation, the same as Kalpanäpodha pratyksa
of Dignäga and Sanjfiä corresponds to definite ideas.
Eveiy construction ( kalpanä ) every abstraction
(udgrahana), every definite representation, such as
blue and yellow, long and short, male and female,
friend and enemy, happy and miserable-this is all
brought under the head of ideas (satnjüä) as distingui-
shed from Vijfiäna or pure sensation.1'
(Central Conception of Buddhism p 1 5-1 6)

36. Cetana is a mental effort that preceeds action It is

an element or force 'that enters in the composition of
a personal life.' But there being no 'personal will»
in Buddhism, 'cetana' is supposed to be an element
or force that arranges the Element in streams accord-
ing to certain laws« (ibid p. 16)
3 7. These are present in a latent form, they stick to the
elements of pleasure and pain and bring them into a
state of commotion and prevent them comming down
to rest.
38. Every existence according to the Yogäcära, without
exception is split into discreie moments. Every
stability, every duration is a construction, an integra-
tion of moments (ksana-santäna). Elements have no
 NOTES

duration, every moment represents a separate element;

thought is evanescent, there are no moving bodies,
but consecutive appearances, flashings of new elements
in new places' Vide Central Conception of Buddhism
p. 6 1 . as also Buddhist Logic, p. 121,

39. Cessation of the factors that make for pravrtti or

proceeding in the life of limitation fraught with
sukha, duhka, punya and apnnya. It might also
mean the knowledge of impermanence of the entities
that are misconceived as permanent,

40. As when one says 6l am ashamed of myself' one dist-

inguishes between *F and 'myself' and this CT is
singled out of myself.

41. Non-sensuous consciousness arising not from an organ

of sense but from consciousness itsclf-from its preced-
ing moment; when the preceding moment takes the
place of a support or an organ for a non-sensuous
idea.

42. In this case, it may not be spoken out as such, but

still within the mind iiself, at such a stage, one
speaks to oneself.

4 3. The word, sprastavya might have a wider implication

meaning all the object of cognition-visaya in general.
It should be also noted that the reading 'sprasta-
vyavisese eva pratyährte' (nominative absolute) would
have been better and more Cogent.

44* Vide Kärikä 2 9.

45. This stage unless well-culivated and till one reaches
Buddha-hood, cannot be acquired.
 NOTES

46. To consider that the soul by means of having

attained purity through the performance of rituals
and customs would achieve freedom and transcend
this world of existence.
4 7# It has no independent existence as an entity by
itself—it only exists as a mere state of difference.
48. Mithyajiva-en, Vide Kosa. IV. pp. 165. 18 9.
c
49. In the initial stage (anatyuha-avasthäyäm) it is
simply a move of will^ when emerging into the
conscious plane (atyuha-avasthäyam) it becomes a
certain thought7. Vide. The Central Conception
of Buddhism, p. 8 7.

.50. ^Vitarka and vicara are sub-conscious operations of

the mind. Vitarka is an indistinct murmur of the
mind which is searching after its object. In this
initial stage it is simply a move of will; when
emerging into the conscious plane, it becomes a
certain thought. Vicära is also an indistinct
murmur of the mind, but it is attempting to fix its
object; it has the same two stages; it is also
characterised as a refinement of the coarser vitarka«
Since both these functions are associated with sense-
consciousnes, they very nearly approach the Kantian
doctrine of synthesis of apprehension preceded by
the mind running through a variety of sense-impres-
sions, so far as they are sub-conscious operations of
the mind preceeding a definite sense-perception.
The Vaibhäsikas maintain that there is some vitarka
in every movement of consciousness; they then call
it svabhäva-vikalpa; but vasubandhu seems to admit
 NOTES

'pure sensation' without any participation of dis-

cursive thought" Vide Ibid. p. 87-88. Vide also
Abh. Kosa I. 30. II. 33)
51. The reading in Sylvan Levi's text is 'Kämavyäpära-
davihirhsä' which seems to be misleading. It should
be cKämavyäpädavihiriisaJ as read in the text
published by the c Gita-dharma ; Press, Varanasi.
51. (a) Every samanantara-pratyaya is limited to its own
stream.
52. Manovijnäna has two-fold function (i) perceiving
the perception (ii) having the sense of the subject—
the self.
53. Vide illustration Buddhist Logic II. p. p. 31 1-12.
54. Vide Ibid. p. 50.
55. It should read-—'Väsanänanugrhlta* as otherwise it
becomes meaningless.
56. According to Abhidharma, consciousness is imagined
as a separate element of pure consciousness which
accompanies every cognition. Buddhist Logic II»
p. 20. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 16.
57. The popular exoteric systems agree in defining
'Nirvana' negatively as a state of absolute exemption
from the circle of transmigration, as a state of entire
freedom from all forms of existence—a state of
indefference to all sensibility. Positively, they define
'Nirvana' as the highest state df spiritual bliss, as
absolute immortality through absorption of the soul
into itself, but preserving individuality, so that
Buddhas after entiring Nirvana may reappear on
earth.
 NOTES

58. The twelve links indicate that Vijüäna has sariiskära.

as its pratyaya while the sadvijflänakäyas have
nämadhätu as their pratyayas.

51 • (a) Because in that case, the vijfiänas should in all

logical sense be discrete elements—e. g. A > A 1 J
A 1 > A 2 . If in these stages, the moment of new
birth at every stage has a vijüäna that is suppsed to
have sarhskära, then for the reason of having con-
tinuity—these vijnänas are discrete elements and
so also are the sarhskäras and thus once they are
extinct, they are extinct for good. It leads to
niranvaya-vinäsa.

59. Because it is single discrete element and not a flux.

60. Klesa-prahana is meaningful only when you admit
Klesa and Klesa-pratipaksa dharmas. But those-
who admit only Klesa-prahäna and nothing like
klesa apart from its pratipaksa it is admitted by
them in-as-much-as there cannot be any klesa in the
seed-form in case there is no älaya. Possibly it
refers to some klesa-vada school. Vide Astadasa-
nikäya-sastra.

61. Klesas and upaklesas are the csahabhiis of the 'klista-

citta\

62. The unconditioned nature of paratantra is parinis-

panna.
63. Parikalpita means an imagined externality indepen-
dent cf 'vijnäna*.
Paratantra means what is conditioned origination*
but it does not extened to vijflär a.
 Parinispanna means the unconditioned nature
of 'paratantra' free from all imaginary instruction
(i.e. the ultimate nature of elements). The Vijnäna-
vädins do not deny the existence of the elements
that actuate construction (i.e., the citta and the
caitasikas) but what they deny is but the externality
thereof,
64. The Sarvästivada hold a different view.
65. Because they would cease to be concrete elements
and would become abstract like 'anityatä*.

66. Anityatä Utpäda

According to the 'sarvästiväda', when the element

of 'Jati' functions in favour of a5 a comes into being,
and when the element 'utpada' functions in favour
of a, a grows. Thus, the element of 'Jati' is
different from ihe element of 'utpäda5 and each of
them is different from a. The element and the
functioning thereof is also different. Such a view is
not tenable according to the 'vijfiänaväda.
 NOTES t w

67. Hsüan Chuang mentions them as follows :

an illusory image, an mirage, an object of dream y
an image reflected on a mirror, a shadow, a rever-
bation, a reflected moon and a 'nirmänakäya'. These
eight dharmas are alsG referred to in the Madhyanta-
vibhanga sästra. Vide K'ui c hi, 17.51. p. 3 k
The cnirmana-käya* is a liberated soul but appears
to be subject to human love and affection. The
subject object duality is there.
68. Taravrtti' is not a mere negative idea. It is also*
a positive one in the sense that it has activity too.

-to:—
SELECT BIBLIGRAPHY

1« Vijnaptimätratä-siddhi with sthiramati's commentary

on it,
2. Älambana-panksä. Edited. A. sästri.

3. Madhyamaka-kärikä. Nagarjuna.
4. Mahayäna sütralamkära Asanga.
5. Abhidharmakosa. Vasubandhu.
6. Buddha-carita. Asvaghosa.
7« Gh'eng wei shih llin. Hsiian, chunag.
8. K'ui chi's commentary on ch'eng wei shih llin.
9. The central conception of Buddhism, stchervntsky.
10. Buddhist Logic, stchervatsky.

1 1. India and China. Dr. P. G. Bagchi.

12. The system of Buddhist thought. Yamakami Sogan.

13. Hlnayana and Mahäyan. N. Dutta.
14. Hinduism and Buddhism, Charles Elliot.
15. Baudhadharma. Haraprasad sastri.
16. Yogacara Iealism. Ashoke Chatterji.