1

TUTORIAL FIRST
NAME: - MARIA UZMA ANSARI
State in Medieval India 2
ENROLLMENT NO: - 20/61/HH/026
COURSE COORDINATOR: - Dr. Ranjeeta Dutta
 2

On the basis of your knowledge of Medieval Indian history, how do you understand a

medieval Indian state?

The understanding of the word ‘Medieval’ in terms of Indian History is very rudimentary in

the common consciousness. In the simplest imagination what ushers in the Medieval in

Indian History is the ‘invasion’ of the Turks, beginning with Muhammad Ghuri. The

weakening of the Gupta Empire—projected as a pan-Indian centralized empire during the

Golden Age of India and its gradual withering away after the Huna invasion in the 6 th century

is said to have plunged India into an era of darkness. Until, the establishment of the Delhi

Sultanate in the early 13th century which is said to have ‘marked a very clear break with the

region’s (subcontinent’s) political past’1.

This type of demarcation presents us with a gray area in Indian History. The post-classical 2

period of Indian History has often been characterized by a ‘decline syndrome’ 3 as

propounded by the school of Marxist historians. The decline of urban centers like

Pataliputra, Vaishali, Shravasti4 corroborated by foreign traveler accounts, the decline in

urban crafts and intra-country trade evidenced by the paucity of metallic money 5 and

international trade with the Roman Empire6 due to the onslaught of the Germanic tribes,

proliferation of land grants7, decline in urban crafts as evidenced by a group of silk weavers

migrating from Mandasor8 and taking up other occupations; as well as the ruralisation of the

economy are generally taken as confirmations of the Marxist argument.

1
Tapan Raychaudhari and Irfan Habib. 1984. The Cambridge Economic History of India vol I: c-1200— c.1750.
Hyderabad. as cited in B.D. Chattopadhyay. 2012. The Making of Early Medieval India. Delhi:OUP, p. xxxiii
2
B.D. Chattopadhyay. 2012. p.xxviii
3
Ibid., p.xxviii
4
R.S. Sharma. 2009. India’s Ancient Past. Delhi: OUP, p. 346. ePub ISBN-13: 978-0-19-908786-0
5
Ibid., p.346
6
Ibid., p.345
7
Ibid., p.344
8
Ibid., p.366
 3

While these arguments may certainly be true for Northern India, in the case of Southern India

& areas that lay outside the Gupta Empire— Orissa & Kamarupa, where little state formation

had taken place, State formation in the post-classical period, is said to have been taking shape

through a process of ‘agrarian expansion and territorial integration’ 9. With regards to

Southern India, the incipient beginnings for the process of state formation are unduly traced

as a result of Mauryan contact through the Dakshinapatha10. It is not a stretch to claim that

while the external forces of commercial and cultural contact may have given an impetus in

order to speed up the process of State formation in South India, the state in its nascent stages

was already present in the South, as is evident from Sangam literature and Ashokan

inscriptions.

Secondly, in regards to long-distance trade, Arabs in India continued to act as middlemen for

the trade between the Sassanid & the Byzantine Empire, as well as Southeast Asia and China

even after the decline of the Western Roman Empire. Hence, there is no reason to believe that

there had been any halt in long-distance trade. Although, there was flow of precious metals

into India, it is wholly unclear as to why this gold was being hoarded, being preserved in

temples and not being put into circulation.11

The Tamil Epic Silapattikaram, dated not before the 5th or 6th century CE shows that the

importance of trade was already well established by this period. 12 Several indigenous

merchant guilds like the manigiramam— whose first mention dates back to a 5 th century

inscription & the ainurruvar were involved in extensive maritime trade. 13 Their inscriptions

are found as early as the 9 th century AD.14 We also hear of nagarams— commercial towns

9
Hermann Kulke. 1982. ‘Fragmentation and Segmentation versus Integration? Reflections on the Concepts of
Indian Feudalism and the Segmentary State in Indian History’, Studies in History. 4:2. pp.237-263
10
R. S. Sharma. 2009. pp 246-48
11
Satish Chandra. 2019. History of Medieval India. Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, p.36
12
Class lecture dated 16 February 2021.
13
Noboru Karashima. 2014. ‘Maritime Trade…’, in idem, ed. A concise history of South India: issues and
interpretations. Delhi: OUP, p.139
14
Ibid, pp.139
 4

like Kanchipuram and erivirappattanas— protected mercantile towns that emerged as

important centers of trade. We also hear of a different kind of town, characteristic of

Southern India, during this period i.e., the temple towns of Tanjore etc. another kind of town

— temple towns like Tanjore, that are characteristic of Southern India.

All these developments point toward the fact that in order to not classify India as an

‘economy of decline’ in the Medieval period preceding the incoming of the Turks, one has to

merely shift their perspective to a different region of study from Northern India. While much

has been written about this period in History in terms of ‘dark age’ or ‘golden age’,

prosperity & decline, chaos or order; and in terms of the ‘structural model’ of these kingdoms

— there may be no consensus in these respects, nevertheless what can be agreed upon is that

State formation in this period acted as one of the drivers of social change. 15 This paper

primarily concerns itself with the study of the commonalities of the medieval states and how

this period provided for the genesis of several regional powers who later interacted with and

at times contested imperial authority.

The first of these features are ‘political decentralization, the emergence of landed

intermediaries & peasantisation/ruralisation’16. D.D. Kosambi in what he calls ‘feudalism

from below’ locates the political decentralization going on in this period in the rising power

of the samantas. R.S. Sharma though labels such decentralisation as a state-initiated process.

According to him, the disappearance of a pan-Indian empire and the disruption of

communication and trade channels, gave rise to a self-sufficiency in village settlements and a

subsistence economy17 causing a region to look inwards. The proliferating land grants in this

period he argues creates a priestly class, to whom the state voluntarily resigns control of its

15
B.D. Chattopadhyay, 2012. p.35
16
Ibid., p.80
17
R.S. Sharma. 2009. p.346
 5

territory and its rights of taxation. This is said to have alienated the peasant from his control

on the land he cultivates and devoid him of his customary rights18

However, this interpretation is rejected by Harbans Mukhia with the reasoning that “with a

high quantum of agrarian surplus available in the form of land revenue and cesses etc to the

state— which formed the chief instrument of exploitation— because of high fertility of land

and low subsistence level of the peasant, a kind of equilibrium existed which facilitated the

state’s appropriation of the peasant’s surplus on conditions of relative stability”19

There was also a continuing effort on part of the new states coming up in Medieval India—

the Pallavas, Chalukyas and the Pandyas to bring as much area as possible under cultivation

and this is evidenced by the many copperplate inscriptions that record their grant of villages

to Brahmans20 and reference to water tanks in inscriptions. 21 These new medieval states

cleared forests and extended land grants to Brahmanas, with the responsibility of settling new

villages. The Brahmanas wherever they went, carried along with them their knowledge of

cultivation and irrigation. During the Pallava period, the water management for cultivation in

Brahmana villages is seen to have been well-developed & this knowledge soon spread to non-

Brahmana villages too.22

This process of clearing of forests for cultivation and settling of new villages must have

started a period of ‘territorial integration’23. This encroachment of the state into previously

unchartered territory seems to have brought it into confrontation with hill tribes, who went on

18
R.S. Sharma. (n.a.) Indian Feudalism. c.300-1200. as cited in Hermann Kulke. 1982. ‘Fragmentation and
Segmentation versus Integration? Reflections on the Concepts of Indian Feudalism and the Segmentary State
in Indian History’, Studies in History. 4:2, p.240
19
Harbans Mukhia, ‘Was there Feudalism in Indian History’, Presidential Address, Section Medieval India,
Indian History Congress Session XL, Waltair Dec. 1979 as quoted in Hermann Kulke. 1982. ‘Fragmentation and
Segmentation versus Integration? Reflections on the Concepts of Indian Feudalism and the Segmentary State
in Indian History’, Studies in History. 4:2, p. 242
20
Noboru Karashima. 2014.p.92
21
Ibid., p.93
22
Ibid., p.97
23
Op.cit. 1982. p.255
 6

to serve as labor for the expansion of agrarian activities in South India. Overtime the state’s

efforts of expanding cultivation must have yielded an agrarian surplus— large enough to

support the flourishing of large urban centers, port towns, urban crafts, traders & seafarers.

Since the regions where the expansion of the land grant economy was taking place were only

at the peripheries of the regions entrenched by Brahmanism, the concept of the varna system

would have barely taken shape in this region in the 3rd-4th century CE. Although, the

Satavahana kings as early as the first century BCE and the Pallavas in the 3 rd century24 were

already seen performing vedic rituals, the Chalukyas and the Pallavas in the 6th-9th century

are seen extending land grants to Brahmanas probably in the hopes that the brahmans with

their monopolistic knowledge of the sastras, would enable the rulers of these new kingdoms

to perform elaborate rituals, thereby distinguishing themselves from their tribal brethren.

What has often been termed as the ‘Aryanisation of the South’ and the ‘‘march of triumphant

Brahmanism’25 was actually an effort by the ruling class to appropriate Brahmanical religion

in order to legitimize one’s rule. This was often done by conferring upon the ruling elite

‘brahma-kshatra’ status, by preparing royal genealogies that connected them to either a

mythical ancestor or gave them north Indian ancestry as seen in the case of the Chalukyas of

Vatapi & the Ikshvakus of eastern peninsula. These rulers were making an attempt to emulate

‘royal paraphernalia’— whose symbolisms were taken from Brahmanism. In this context, it

would not be inappropriate to invoke the words of Marx, ‘In any epoch the ruling ideology is

the ideology of the ruling class.’

The growth of regionalism is also seen as characteristic of this period. This development is

often explained by the fact that the ‘lack of communication between the people of various

regions, promoted the growth of regional languages’26 but another important aspect in the

24
Noboru Karashima. 2014. p.89
25
R.S.Sharma. 2019. p.320
26
Ibid., p.348
 7

growth of regional identities is the understanding that integration is never a one-way ally.

Territorial integration must be followed by cultural integration 27 in order to appeal to the

mass folk. This must have meant that the local deities of the hill tribes, elements of animism

from folk religion must have also been integrated into the Brahmanical pantheon, even as the

state itself tried to ‘impose’ Brahmanical culture— through the priestly class that also

controlled much of the land around temples. In this light, we see the Devaraja cult garner

acceptance as explained by Hermann Kulke ‘these new temples built by the raja housed a

deity, that did not lose its importance at any given time and this was true of the new raja as

well.’28 The term ‘kovil’ was used for both the temple, as well as for the king’s residence.29

The early medieval is often marked as a period of ‘moral degeneration’ and ‘moral decline’.

The varna structure which up until the 3 rd-4th century seemed to have held up well, is said to

have broken down during this period. Historians put the onus for this moral crisis and social

upheaval on the handing out of land grant, which is said to have diminished the status of the

free peasant— the Vaishya & is said to have elevated the status of the Shudra. The adoption

of titles like dharma-maharaja by the southern kings, the precarious position of the peasantry

and the Kalabhara revolt against the Cholas and the Kaivarta revolt against the Palas, have

been interpreted as rebellions against such intense subjugation. The social classes are said to

have discarded their functions & varna barriers were broken leading to intermixing and

varnasamkara marriages, which is cited as the most common reason for the proliferation of

jatis, during this period30. However, D.N. Jha has pointed out that the land grant economy

first made its appearance in the areas that were at the periphery of the Brahmanical order and

hence, have nothing to do with the Kalyuga crisis.31

27
Op.cit, 1982. p.260
28
Hermann Kulke. 1995. ‘Introduction: The Study of the State in pre-modern India’, in idem, The State in India
1000-1700. Delhi as quoted in B.D. Chattopadhyay. 2012. p.31
29
Ibid., p.30
30
R.S. Sharma. 2009. p.347
31
D.N. Jha. ‘Early Indian Feudalism: A Historiographical Critique’ Presidential Address, Section Ancient India,
Indian History Congress XL Session, Waltair, 1979, as quoted in Hermann Kulke. 1982. p.241
 8

The proliferation of jatis in this period can be seen as a case of state formation driving social

change because while sub-castes may have been created due to intermarriages, they were also

created due to the integration of the people living in the peripheral areas into the realms of the

state. Another reason for the proliferation of jatis would also be the conciliation of the

yavanas within the caste system.

Lately, the period between the 6th to the 13th century has received attention in its own right,

instead of being studied as a transition period between two large dynastic successions. In the

backdrop of this, we can highlight the limitations of Marxist historiography which due to its

excessive materialism, at times disregards cultural and social factors. This also calls for a

productive discussion on the arbitrary nature of historical periodisation, which though has

been retained due to its convenience, there is a requirement to reconsider what is meant by

‘early medieval’ or ‘medieval’ in its own right and not just as a period that comes after a

flourishing antiquity; is dominated by religion & is devoid of landmark technological

innovations.

Such an impulse can be traced back to the academic instinct of trying to mark out certain

features characteristic of the middle ages in order to treat the medieval times as a monolithic

block, right from Western Europe to the subcontinent, by equating temple towns with

cathedral towns, samantas with feudal lords etc. B.D.Chattopadhyay calls this the ‘spectre of

European Historiography’ and warns against the ‘confusion of comparison with

identification’.

Lastly, it is only fair that the paper be concluded with a discussion on what is meant by a

medieval state. Humans have a tendency of projecting their modern sensibilities onto periods

in antiquity in order to look for their identities. But, in the sense that the concept of ‘justice’

has evolved since medieval times, the very concept of what is meant by ‘State’ has also been
 9

transformed since medieval times. Therefore, to use present day political terminology, such

as words like ‘invasion’ in order to imply a breach of natural frontiers by ‘foreigners’ appears

incorrect. Surely, the concept of securing frontiers— as done by Balban against the Mongols

and as is evident from Mughal records, existed even during the medieval era. Nevertheless,

we have reason to believe that the boundaries of a medieval Indian state weren’t as rigid as

those present in modern nation-states. The breach of territorial integrity may have led to

warfare but political control is said to have faded at the peripheries of an empire. Also, when

we talk about ‘foreign invasions’ we project onto the past the geopolitical realities of today

and instead ignore the trade and cultural relations India shared with the other regions in the

subcontinent and Central Asia.32

Bibliography
Asher, Catherine B and Cynthia Talbot. 2007. India Before Europe. UK: Cambridge
University Press
Chandra, Satish. 2019. History of Medieval India. Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan
Chattopadhyay, B.D. 2012. The Making of Early Medieval India. Delhi: OUP
Karashima, Noboru. 2014. A concise history of South India: issues and interpretations. Delhi:
OUP
Kulke, Hermann. 1982. ‘Fragmentation and Segmentation versus Integration? Reflections on
the Concepts of Indian Feudalism and the Segmentary State in Indian History’, Studies in
History. 4:2.
Sharma, R.S. 2009. India’s Ancient Past. Delhi: OUP. ePub ISBN-13: 978-0-19-908786-0

32
Catherine B. Asher and Cynthia Talbot. 2007. India Before Europe. UK: Cambridge University Press, pp-24-26