Tailings

Management

Good Practice Guide

Updated February 2025

Acknowledgements

The development of this publication would not have Brant Whiting (Freeport McMoRan), Ian Gordon (Newcrest),
been possible without the input and support of the Briana Gunn, John Lupo and Kim Morrison (Newmont),
individuals below. ICMM gratefully acknowledges the Imran Gillani (Rio Tinto), Greg Puro (Vale).
following contributions:
Member representatives
Writing team Representatives of the ICMM Council Tailings Subgroup and
Unusually for an ICMM publication, no external consultant Tailings Working Group provided valuable direction, input,
was contracted to support the report writing process. In and feedback on iterative drafts and updates to the guide.
practice, this meant that the writing team solely comprised They included: Nerine Botes, Pule Soaisa (African Rainbow
representatives of member companies or associations. Minerals), Matthew Cox, Roy Harvey, Paul Smithall (Alcoa),
Some of these individuals invested very significant Caius Priscu (Anglo American), Joseph Chihota, Roger Welff
amounts of time and energy to ensuring the delivery of a (AngloGold Ashanti), Ivan Arriagada, Jorge Troncoso Boys
high-quality product that was responsive to the views and (Antofagasta Minerals SA), Grant Beringer, Allison Brown,
perspectives of other members. ICMM is indebted to them Bassam El Husseini (Barrick), Matthew Currie, Michal
for their exceptional contributions and service. Kozikowski, Rebecca Getty, Chad Le Poudre (BHP), Magnus
The report was drafted by a writing team led by Tamara Bergknut (Boliden), Rene Orellana (Codelco), Ivan
Johndrow (Freeport-McMoRan) and Charles Dumaresq Glasenberg (Glencore), Richard Adkerson, Thomas Calhoun,
(Mining Association of Canada (MAC)). Their commitment Sheila Deely, Tamara Johndrow, Kanyembo Katapa, Katie
to this work represented a significant investment on their Kruger, Teresa Speigl (Freeport McMoRan), Aaron Chapple
part as well as a substantial in-kind contribution from their (Glencore), Johan Boshoff, Nosimo Macatsha (Gold Fields),
respective employers, which ICMM greatly appreciates. Breno de Matos Castiho, Paschoal Cataldi (Hydro), Shigeru
Oi, Koichiro Tsuchiya (JX Nippon), Mario Velasco (Minera San
Extensive drafting and editing support was provided Cristobal), Nikisi Lesufi, Stephanie Mudau (Minerals Council
by Michael Davies (Teck) and David Machin (MMG). South Africa), Harry Silva (Minsur), Jonathon Crosbie (MMG),
Jo Heyes (Greenroad Group – Mine Closure Management) Veronica Shime (National Mining Association), Ian Gordon
provided expert review and editing support to the 2025 (Newcrest), Brett Byler, Rynhard Kok, John Lupo, Kim
updates made to the good practice guide. Morrison, Kristen Pouw (Newmont), Simon Nouis, Philippe
Crochon, Abdoulaziz Chaibou (Orano), Pavel Grachev, Pavel
Special advisor
Shevelenko (Polyus), Laila Burger, Imran Gillani, J.S. Jacques,
Professor Norbert Morgenstern provided invaluable
Fernanda Maluly Kemeid, John Mulcahy, Marnie Pascoe,
guidance throughout the drafting process providing
Malcolm Talmage (Rio Tinto), Ross Copper, Grant Stuart,
content, collaborating closely with the writing team and
Matt Wolfe (Sibanye Stillwater), Lis Boczek, Matt Lord, Dave
content contributors. Professor Morgenstern’s
Luppnow, Rowena Smith (South32), Marcia Smith, Björn
contributions to the tailings field has been immeasurable
Weeks (Teck), Breno Castilho, Rafael Bittar, Luis Cervantes
over the decades and ICMM deeply appreciates his views.
and Greg Puro, (Vale).
His selfless contribution of expertise and time along with
his patience throughout the development process was ICMM team
crucial to the completion and quality of this Guide. Aidan Davy and Diane Tang-Lee led the process to develop
this guide, with input and support from Hideo Aoyama, Alice
Content contributors
Evans and Kira Scharwey. Sally Innis, Jessica Nicholls and
A number of tailings experts and environment specialists in
Emma Gagen contributed to the 2025 update.
the ICMM membership provided substantial technical
content for the writing team to integrate into the drafts. Alice and Will Beaven (Positive 2), Nic Benton and Ella Yarrow
They included the following: (ICMM) provided creative design support.

Caius Priscu (Anglo American), Chad LePoudre (BHP),

Ranjiv Gupta, David Jensen, Georgia Lysay and

ICMM 2
Contents

Foreword 4
01 Overview  7
1.1 Introduction  8

1.2 Overview of the Guide 12

1.3 R
 elationship to the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management,
the ICMM Conformance Protocols and the ICMM Tailings Governance Framework 19

02 Governance of Tailings Management 24

2.1 Overview  25

2.2 Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 26

2.3 Tailings Management Systems 40

2.4 Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 50

2.5 Managing Information 60

2.6 Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 64

2.7 Emergency Preparedness and Response 72

03 Implementation of Good Engineering

Practices for Tailings Management  78
3.1 Overview  79

3.2 Overarching Engineering Concepts 80

3.3 Project Conception 92

3.4 Design 99

3.5 Construction 118

3.6 Operations 122

3.7 Closure and Post-Closure 131

Glossary 140
List of Acronyms 146

Tailings Management Contents 3

 Professor (Emeritus)
Foreword Norbert R Morgenstern

‘Tailings dams are complex systems that Assuring safety or otherwise is not achieved by a set of
calculations alone or by observations alone, unless they
have evolved over the years. They are reveal that performance as flawed, or by adopting a
also unforgiving systems, in terms of pre-conceived list of safety indicators that reduces the
the number of things that have to go confirmation of safety to checking the items off in a box.
As revealed by the quotation above, the construction
right. Their reliability is contingent on
and operation of a tailings storage facility incorporating
consistently flawless execution in a dam, is a highly dynamic process, more so than is
planning, in subsurface investigation, common for water dams where there is usually a clearer
in analysis, in construction quality in separation between the Design and Construction
phases and the Operations phase. Therefore, reliable
operational diligence, in monitoring, confirmation of safety requires an equally dynamic
in regulatory action, and in risk process applied to the full lifecycle of the facility so that
management at every level. All of these it can, in turn, reassure all stakeholders.
activities are subject to human error.’ Progress in this regard has already been made by the
publication of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings
Mount Polley Independent Expert Engineering
Management, and its recommendations will be
Investigation and Review Panel (2015)
integrated into ICMM’s industry member commitments.
The Standard makes recommendations both with
regard to Environmental, Social and Governance issues
and technical issues. The Standard might be regarded
as requirements of what has to be done. ICMM has
developed this Guide, which is aligned with the
Standard, but focuses primarily on technical issues and
recommends good practice for design, construction,
operation and closure.

ICMM Foreword 4
From my perspective, this Guide is built upon the — Adopt the technical recommendations put forward
following core elements: for the safe design, construction, operation, and
closure of tailings storage facilities. This should
— Of overarching significance is the safety culture
recognise the enhanced responsibilities of the
expressed by the Operator. It is common to declare a
Engineer of Record for declaring design criteria as
goal of zero fatalities, occupational disease and
opposed to relying on prescriptive values. Where
catastrophic events. Hence, a common denominator
conditions are complex, recognize the value of
for all Operators that share this goal is that tailings
adopting performance-based design. Always
facilities should be designed, constructed, operated
respect regulatory requirements as a minimum.
and closed to such high standards that ‘failure is not
an option’. — Maintain comprehensive documentation of
construction and quality assurance through all
— A governance framework to support the aspirational
phases of the lifecycle, with special emphasis on
goals of the safety culture is recommended,
confirming or adjusting the site characterisation
incorporating roles and responsibilities from the
model as new information is obtained.
Board of Directors to the Engineer of Record and the
Design Team. — As part of the Tailings Management System,
determine what documentation related to safety
— In recognition of the phases associated with tailings
could enter the public domain in order to enhance
management, from Project Conception through to
transparency and trust.
Design, Construction, Operations, Closure and
Post-Closure, ensure that tailings management is While the task of determining the cause of failure is
continually integrated within a sitewide integrated simpler after the event, I have evaluated this Guide in
mine, tailings, water and closure plan. terms of my experience with a significant number of
tailings dam failures and related serious incidents and
— Informed by the integrated planning, develop a
concluded that had this Guide been available and
tailings management system.
adopted, these incidents should not have occurred.
— Engage external Independent Review for technical
Norbert R Morgenstern
matters early in the lifecycle and throughout all of its
Distinguished University Professor (Emeritus),
phases.
University of Alberta (Canada) and Consulting Engineer
— Manage uncertainty through all phases of the
lifecycle by risk-informed decision-making that
assesses uncertainty, conducts risk assessments at
appropriate stages, and carries a risk register
throughout the lifecycle of the facility.

Tailings Management Foreword 5

 Richard C Adkerson
Foreword

The ICMM Tailings Management: ICMM served as the industry representative in the
development of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings
Good Practice Guide represents the Management, a multi-stakeholder effort designed to
culmination of years of work by ICMM elevate the standard of practice for tailings storage
member companies and external facilities worldwide. ICMM is committed to leading the
mining industry in the safe and responsible design,
experts to develop guidance for safely
construction, operation and closure of tailings facilities.
and responsibly constructing and This is a critical issue at every mine, which must be
managing mine tailings facilities. viewed as such by every mine operator.
Inspired by the pathbreaking work of Dr In the Good Practice Guide, ICMM member company
Norbert R Morgenstern, as set forth in experts build on the Standard promulgated by the
the Sixth Victor de Mello Lecture in 2018, multi-stakeholder initiative. The Good Practice Guide
supports the requirements of the Standard and
ICMM embarked on an undertaking to provides guidance on good governance and
improve safety and management of engineering practices.
tailings storage facilities. The Good Practice Guide is important in achieving
the aspirational goal of eliminating fatalities and
catastrophic failures at tailings facilities. We strongly
encourage all mining companies worldwide, whether
or not they are ICMM members, to incorporate the
Standard and Good Practice Guide into their practices
to improve mine tailings facility performance and to
achieve these safety goals.

Richard C Adkerson
Chairman of the Board, and Chief Executive Officer
Freeport-McMoRan and Chair of ICMM

ICMM Foreword 6
Part 1: Overview

Tailings Management Part 1: Overview 7

Introduction 1.1

1.1.1 Context A systematic, comprehensive approach to tailings

management, with checks and balances, helps to
Tailings are a by-product of mining, consisting of the
reduce the risk that the human element can ultimately
processed rock or soil left over from the separation of
lead to ineffective tailings management, or worse, the
the commodities of value from the rock or soil within
failure of a tailings facility. The implementation of a
which they occur. If they are not managed in a safe,
systematic approach will help to prevent human error.
responsible manner, tailings can pose risks to the
environment, human health and infrastructure.
1.1.2 Mining Industry Safety Culture
In cases where tailings are managed in purpose built
(ie engineered) facilities, management of the integrity Protecting the health and safety of employees,
of these facilities is critically important. The failures that contractors and communities has become ingrained in
have occurred over the last 30 to 40 years illustrate the mining industry’s culture. Mining operations, like all
these potential risks. These failures have included types of heavy industry, can pose many health and
fatalities, displacement of communities, damage to safety hazards, and the adoption of a safety culture
infrastructure, and loss of ecosystems and habitat. was in response to the high numbers of fatalities
They have cost the mining industry billions of dollars. and injuries.

Most tailings facilities are planned, designed, As stated on the ICMM website:
constructed, operated and closed in a safe and
‘Responsible mining companies have an unwavering
responsible manner. However, as recent failure incidents
commitment to the health and safety of workers and
clearly indicate, the physical stability of tailings facilities
their families, local communities and wider society.
has not been universal. Global performance needs
Health and safety has to be at the heart of all operations
to improve.
and processes. Mining presents various hazards that
This guidance is intended to facilitate continual can be of significant consequence, but through
improvement across the global mining sector, leading effective risk management strategies neither safety
to the safe, responsible management of tailings incidents nor the onset of occupational diseases are
worldwide. The guidance presents a comprehensive, inevitable. ICMM members are progressing towards a
holistic approach to tailings management that goal of zero fatalities, occupational disease and
describes good engineering practices and is informed catastrophic events. People have a right to go home
by lessons learned from past failures. It is intended to safe and healthy to their families and their communities
improve performance across all the aspects that at the end of every day.’
underpin safe tailings management. While no guidance
However, the failures of tailings facilities around the
document is perfect, this Guide is intended to be
world, resulting in hundreds of fatalities over the last
part of the continual improvement process of the
three decades, point to the imperative that the mining
mining industry.
industry’s safety culture be applied to tailings
The guidance is ultimately aimed at mitigating what can management.
perhaps be the greatest risk factor: the human element.
Beyond driving improvements in practice, the guidance
Individuals, however professional and qualified, make
is aimed at fostering and strengthening the safety
judgements and decisions based on their own
culture associated with tailings management and
experiences and biases. Embedded ignorance, which
provides a roadmap to the continual improvement of
we all have, results from a lack of knowledge, or a failure
tailings safety at both new and existing facilities. To be
to recognise internal weaknesses or limitations.
consistent with this safety culture, tailings facilities
Complacency, over-confidence, competing priorities
should be designed, constructed, operated and closed
and the loss of corporate knowledge over time can be
to such high standards that the goal of eliminating
compounding factors.
fatalities and catastrophic events is achieved.

ICMM Introduction 8
Although regulators, investors, communities and others — Should not be used to assess conformance against
have a role in this cultural shift, the responsibility resides the Standard, which is the purpose of the
primarily with the Operators of mines and the Conformance Protocols. Some examples in the
associated tailings facilities. Conformance Protocols draw upon and refer to
related sections of the Guide.
1.1.3 Objectives
In keeping with these objectives, the Guide presents
This Guide is intended to support the safe and recommendations, not requirements. The use of the
responsible management of tailings across the global word ‘should’ is intended to mean ‘recommended’
mining industry, with the ultimate goal of eliminating not ‘must’.
fatalities and catastrophic events.
1.1.4 Scope of Application of the Guide
It provides guidance on good governance and good
engineering practices that will support continual The Guide describes good governance and good
improvement in the management of tailings facilities and engineering practices for tailings management and may
help to foster and strengthen a corporate safety culture. be applied to:

The Guide: — The management of tailings facilities worldwide,

including those operated or maintained by State
— Is informed by the requirements of the Global
agencies.
Industry Standard on Tailings Management (the
Standard) and the commitments in ICMM’s Tailings — New and existing tailings facilities throughout all
Governance Framework Position Statement. It will phases and activities of the lifecycle (Section 1.2.1),
help Operators work through how to integrate from the Project Conception phase for future tailings
these into their own programmes. facilities, to facilities that have been inactive for many
years, and to those which have been closed.
— Promotes good engineering practices for tailings
management, including a performance-based While the objective is focused primarily on preventing
approach where appropriate. catastrophic failures, the guidance is equally applicable
to a wide range of other potential risks associated with
— Provides an overview of good practices and, as
the management of tailings facilities.
such, does not generate additional requirements
beyond those within the Standard.

Tailings Management Introduction 9

 — Consultants and others providing services (eg
tailings facility design) to Operators related to tailings
management.

— Investors, insurers and others with the ability to

In Detail directly influence improved industry performance
through access to funding or other means.
A tailings facility is a facility that is designed and
managed to contain the tailings produced by a This Guide may also be of interest to community
mine. A tailings facility includes the collective organisations, non-government organisations and other
engineered structures, components and stakeholders that may be affected by tailings
equipment involved in the management of tailings management, providing them with information on
solids, other mine waste managed with tailings (eg leading practices in tailings management so that they
waste rock, water treatment residues), and any are better informed in their engagement with Operators.
water managed in the facility, including pore fluid, This guidance does not replace professional expertise
any ponds, and surface water inflows and or jurisdictionally specific legal requirements. Operators
discharges. should obtain qualified professional advice throughout
The guidance is applicable to tailings facilities as a the lifecycle to be sure that each tailings facility’s
whole, not just tailings embankments, excluding specific conditions are understood and addressed, and
riverine systems and other types of facilities such that the facility is planned, designed, constructed,
as fresh and process water dams, stockpiles, etc. operated and closed in a safe and responsible manner.
This distinction is important because while the
design, construction and operation of 1.1.6 Basis for the Guide
embankments is a very important factor in In 2016, ICMM released a Position Statement on
influencing the safety of tailings facilities, it is not Preventing Catastrophic Failure of Tailings Storage
the only factor. For example, aspects related to Facilities that included a Tailings Governance
water management (eg seepage, surface water) Framework (the Framework). The Position Statement
can be very important in ensuring safe tailings committed ICMM members to implement practices
management. consistent with the Framework.

The Framework focuses on six elements of tailings

management and governance that are key to
1.1.5 Intended Audience minimising the likelihood of a catastrophic tailings
The audience for the Guide is broad, in keeping with failure happening:
the breadth of the objective and scope of application 1. Accountability, Responsibility and Competency.
of the Guide.
2. Planning and Resourcing.
As a document prepared by ICMM, the primary
audience of the Guide is ICMM member companies. 3. Risk Management.
However, this Guide is intended to facilitate safe 4. Change Management.
tailings management worldwide. Thus, it is intended
to support all Operators in improving their practices 5. Emergency Preparedness and Response.
to meet the goal of eliminating fatalities and 6. Review and Assurance.
catastrophic events.
While this guidance builds upon the Framework it is
In addition to ICMM member companies, and more comprehensive in scope and is intended to be
consistent with the Standard, the audience includes: applied site-specifically. In developing this guidance,
— Operators of all tailings facilities, including non- ICMM used existing, well-established external
ICMM Operators, and their employees and resources as a starting point. Thus, while this Guide
contractors across the organisation with roles and represents a new level of detail for guidance prepared
responsibilities related to tailings management, by ICMM, it reflects more than 20 years of experience in
from senior management/board level leadership to the development and implementation of other external
personnel at the site level. resources to support tailings management (eg Mining
Association of Canada (MAC)).

ICMM Introduction 10
The Tailings Governance Framework and existing
guidance from MAC are focused primarily on tailings
management governance and do not address design
and other technical elements related to tailings
management. Technical resources for tailings facilities
are available from several sources (eg International
Commission on Large Dams, Canadian Dam
Association, Australian National Committee on Large
Dams).

In delivering the Sixth Victor de Mello Lecture, in Brazil in

2018, Prof Norbert Morgenstern, a highly esteemed
expert on tailings facility safety, identified significant
shortcomings in current practices related to tailings
management. While he identified good practices related
to the governance of tailings management (ie MAC
guidance), he identified an urgent need for improved
technical and engineering practice, integrated with
stronger governance, in order to improve tailings safety
across the industry. A key component of his lecture was
an outline of a tailings management system (TMS) for
Performance-Based Risk-Informed, Safe Design,
Construction, Operation and Closure of tailings facilities
(PBRISD). He recommended that ‘ICMM support the
tailings management system based on PBRISD, as
outlined here, and fund the development and
publication of a guidance document that would
facilitate its adoption in mining practice’.

Tailings Management Introduction 11

Overview of the Guide 1.2

1.2.1 Tailings Management Lifecycle Tailings management does not occur in isolation from
the other activities that occur at mine sites. Tailings
Having a common understanding of the lifecycle of
production is ‘downstream’ of many steps in the mining
tailings management is important for applying this
process and a wide range of decisions related to the
guidance and the requirements of the Standard.
overall process that can impact tailings management
The lifecycle of a tailings facility encompasses all the
are often made without sufficient consideration of those
activities across the life of a tailings facility, from the
potential impacts. For example, decisions about waste
earliest stages of the Project Conception phase
rock management, ore processing and water
through to the Closure and Post-Closure phases. It is
management often have significant implications for
determined on a site-specific basis by a wide range of
tailings management. Similarly, decisions related to
factors and is always subject to change. The lifecycle
tailings management are sometimes taken without
consists of six phases or activities:
adequate consideration of other plans. A failure to
1. Project Conception1 recognise these relationships and potential impacts and
to plan accordingly can compromise the objective of
2. Design
safe tailings management.
3. Construction
Throughout the lifecycle, an integrated approach to
4. Operations mine planning is essential to safe tailings
management. This involves integrating the planning of
5. Closure
all aspects of the mine that can impact tailings
6. Post-Closure. management (Section 3.2.2), such as ore extraction
and processing, sitewide water management and the
The relationship between these phases or activities is
management of waste rock. For new tailings facilities
dynamic and rarely linear. In addition, the lifecycle of a
and proposed mine life extensions, this includes
tailings facility can last for many decades to reach the
integrating planning for tailings management into the
end of the Operating phase, and centuries beyond for
development of Pre-Scoping, Scoping, Pre-Feasibility
the Post-Closure phase.
and Feasibility Studies.
Throughout the lifecycle, change can be a key source of
Such an integrated approach should be adopted for
risk for tailings facilities and needs to be effectively
both new facilities and existing facilities, to help to
managed (Section 2.3.2). Consequently, it is important
ensure that decisions are aligned with the short-,
that Operators recognise and plan for a dynamic
medium- and long-term objectives of tailings
lifecycle and implement a TMS throughout the lifecycle
management.
(Sections 1.2.2.1 and 2.3).

1. For new tailings facilities, the Project Conception and Design phases encompass key steps in the mine planning process: Pre-Scoping Study, Scoping Study, Pre-Feasibility Study,
and Feasibility. Thus, just as conceptual mine planning begins at the pre-scoping and scoping steps, planning for tailings management should also begin at these steps. However, for
Project Conception and Design activities related to proposed material changes or closure planning, there may not be corresponding Pre-Scoping, Scoping, Pre-Feasibility and
Feasibility studies for the broader mine planning process.

ICMM Overview of the Guide 12

 Operations: The period in the lifecycle when tailings
are transported to and deposited in the tailings
facility, inclusive of any periods of inactivity prior to
the commencement of implementation of the closure
In Detail
plan. Construction is typically ongoing throughout the
Project Conception: A recurring lifecycle activity that Operations phase. In addition, progressive
is the first step in the planning and design of: reclamation in preparation for closure and consistent
with the closure plan may occur during the
— Construction and Operations phases of new
Operations phase. In some cases, after the end of the
tailings facilities.
active deposition of tailings, tailings may be removed
— Closure and Post-Closure phases of tailings from the tailings facility for reprocessing or other
facilities. uses. Such activity would also be considered
Operations.
— Any material changes to the design or operation
of tailings facilities. Temporary suspension of mine operations: A period
in the lifecycle when mine operations have been
— Re-commissioning of an existing tailings facility
suspended and tailings are not being deposited into
for a mine re-opening.
the tailings facility. The suspension may be short-
Project Conception consists of the analysis of a term (eg temporary suspension due to wildfires,
range of alternatives (eg location of a new tailings labour disruption) or of a longer, indeterminate
facility, technologies to be applied) to select a duration (eg due to low commodity prices).
preferred alternative to advance to the Design phase.
During temporary suspension, maintenance and
Lifecycle cost estimates are developed as per the
surveillance continue and some operation activities (eg
Operator’s corporate guidelines.
active water management) may also continue. The
Design: A recurring lifecycle activity that builds upon closure plan is not implemented. However, temporary
the decisions made during the Project Conception suspension may lead to closure in some cases.
phase. Once a preferred alternative has been
Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when deposition
selected, all aspects of that alternative are designed
of tailings into the tailings facility ceases permanently
in detail, based on the design intent and defined
and the closure plan is implemented, including:
performance objectives. More detailed lifecycle cost
estimates are developed as per the Operator’s — Transitioning from the Operations phase to the
corporate guidelines. Closure phase and the Post-Closure phase.

Construction: A recurring lifecycle activity that — Removal of infrastructure such as pipelines.

includes:
— Changes to water management or treatment.
— Initial construction prior to the start-up of a new
— Construction of covers, recontouring or
tailings facility (eg starter embankment, pipelines
revegetation of tailings and any embankments or
for tailings transport, water management
other structural elements.
infrastructure).
— Other reclamation and decommissioning activities.
— Ongoing construction through the Operations
phase to increase the capacity of the tailings While Closure is a discrete lifecycle phase, closure
facility (eg facility raises). planning is part of an integrated approach to mine
planning. It is a lifecycle activity that should begin as
Construction may also include:
early as possible and be conducted iteratively
— Construction for any material changes (eg throughout the lifecycle. The project conception and
increase capacity beyond original design intent, design process should be used to develop the
buttress to strengthen an embankment). closure plan and an executable design for closure.

— C
 onstruction during the Closure phase (eg Post-Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when the
installation of covers, water management closure plan has been implemented and the tailings
infrastructure). facility has transitioned to long-term maintenance
and surveillance. The Post-Closure phase has to

Tailings Management Overview of the Guide 13

 address all the aspects of safety and environmental used for other purposes (eg construction material).
compliance related to long-term stability and legal
In some jurisdictions, during the Post-Closure phase,
requirements.
responsibility for a tailings facility may transfer from
During the Closure or Post-Closure phases, tailings the Operator to jurisdictional control.
facilities could return to the Operations phase. In
The tailings management lifecycle is illustrated in
addition, tailings could be removed for reprocessing
Figure 1.
to recover additional commodities of value, or to be

Figure 1: The tailings management lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Temporary Suspension

Project Design Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure

Conception

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

1.2.2 Core Elements of Safe Tailings These elements are equally vital to the safe and
Management responsible management of tailings and should be
implemented together in a fully integrated manner
A comprehensive, holistic approach is needed across
throughout all the phases of the lifecycle. They each
the lifecycle for the safe and responsible management
fulfil a different but essential role:
of tailings. This encompasses two inter-related core
elements: — Effective governance of tailings management
ensures accountability for decisions, provides a
— Governance of tailings management (further
management structure with checks and balances
described in Part 2).
for decision-making, provides the means to
— Implementation of good engineering practices for effectively manage tailings on a day-to-day basis,
tailings management across the lifecycle (further and provides input to mechanisms to respond
described in Part 3). effectively if an emergency occurs.

ICMM Overview of the Guide 14

— Good engineering practices, including a risk- commensurate to their level of accountability and
informed approach throughout the lifecycle, are responsibility.
needed to improve the safety of tailings facilities. In
Corporate policy on tailings management: Operators
some cases, improvement can be achieved
should develop a corporate policy on tailings
through enhancing current practices. In other
management that is aligned with the declaration of a
cases, the adoption of a performance-based
corporate safety culture, providing a basis and overall
approach will provide a more rigorous technical
direction for safe tailings management (Section 2.2.3).
basis for decision-making across the lifecycle.
Recognising that safe tailings management is a core
Implementing these elements together helps to business function, the planning of which should be
achieve the best outcomes for tailings management closely integrated with related activities such as ore
and helps to ensure effective communication. Most extraction and processing, the corporate policy on
importantly, this approach helps to mitigate the human tailings management should be recognised in the overall
element in tailings management and reduce the business case for the mine and integrated into sitewide
likelihood that human error will lead to ineffective policies, objectives and plans.
tailings management, or worse, the failure of a tailings
Tailings Management System (TMS): Operators should
facility.
develop and implement site-specific TMSs and apply
them across the lifecycle (Section 2.3). Based on the
1.2.2.1 Governance of Tailings Management
Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle of management systems, a
Governance of tailings management refers to the TMS is a comprehensive framework to integrate the
organisational structures, processes, procedures and people, resources, processes and practices related to
communication channels that a company puts in tailings management to help Operators achieve their
place to ensure the effective management, oversight performance objectives, manage risk and ensure safe,
and accountability for tailings. responsible management of tailings. The TMS should be
aligned and integrated with other relevant site-level
Effective governance provides an essential foundation
systems, such as a sitewide environmental and social
for all activities and decisions related to tailings
management system (ESMS) and systems related to
management, and ultimately for managing risk.
water management.
Governance of tailings management is inclusive of the
A TMS:
following elements:
— Encompasses governance and decision-making
Accountability and responsibility: Operators should
related to tailings management.
assign and deliver on accountability and responsibility
for tailings management to provide the foundation for — Provides a mechanism to systematically and rigorously
good governance and decision-making (Section 2.2.2). implement the other elements described in this
The Operator should designate one or more guidance to implement good engineering practice.
Accountable Executive(s) who is/are directly
Operation, maintenance and surveillance (OMS)
answerable to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
activities are essential to the day-to-day implementation
communicate(s) with the Board of Directors (BoD), and
of the TMS and engineering practices for safe tailings
who is/are accountable for the safety of tailings
management (Section 2.4). Without OMS, an Operator
facilities and for minimising the social and
has no effective control of tailings management.
environmental consequences of a potential tailings
facility failure. The Accountable Executive(s) may Managing information: Good information is essential to
delegate responsibilities but not accountability. good governance and decision-making (Section 2.5).
Conversely, delegation of responsibility to competent Preparing, maintaining and updating documentation of
personnel is essential to the effective delivery of all information on all aspects of tailings management is
tasks and activities related to tailings management. critical to providing a basis for current and future
Personnel with accountability, responsibility or decisions, managing change, and for fully understanding
authority related to tailings management should have and effectively managing risks. This includes
the necessary competencies and experience, documentation describing key aspects related to:

Tailings Management Overview of the Guide 15

— Tailings management governance. first used to identify and describe the risks (risk
identification) and estimate the magnitude of the risks to
— Planning, design, construction, operation and
individuals or populations, property or the environment
closure of a tailings facility.
(risk analysis). The acceptability of the risks is then
Programme for reviewing tailings safety: Operators evaluated considering the potential consequences for
should implement a programme for reviewing the health and safety, social, environmental, financial and
safety of tailings facilities that provides expert other factors that may occur (risk evaluation). Once the
oversight of tailings management activities and the risks have been assessed, risk management plans are
safety of a tailings facility (Section 2.6). Such a developed to eliminate, reduce or mitigate, and
programme, including Independent Review, should be communicate the risks.
applied throughout the lifecycle.
Uncertainty is inherent in the analysis and evaluation of
Emergency preparedness: Notwithstanding the risks related to tailings facilities. Uncertainty may be
obligation to design and operate safe tailings facilities, related to many factors, such as the natural variability of
Operators need to be prepared in the event that an the foundation and construction materials for a
emergency occurs related to tailings management. As proposed tailings facility, design parameters, the
part of sitewide plans for emergency preparedness, accuracy of predictions of future climate conditions,
Operators should develop and test plans for potential and the challenge of estimating the likelihood of highly
emergencies related to tailings to help to ensure a improbable events. As tailings facilities are reliant on
timely and effective response if an emergency occurs natural materials and processes, uncertainty in risk
(Section 2.7). assessment may be greater than in other sectors (eg
chemical industry) for which the variability and
1.2.2.2 Implementation of Good Engineering uncertainty regarding feedstock materials may be
Practices for Tailings Management significantly less.

There are many facets to engineering practices An essential characteristic of managing risk is
related to tailings management, including: recognising and acknowledging uncertainty, managing
risk within the limitations of that uncertainty and
— Recognising and managing uncertainty.
working to reduce uncertainty. Implementing a risk-
— Project conception and design. informed approach is key to managing this uncertainty.

— Integrated mine planning. A risk-informed approach involves planning, designing,

operating and closing tailings facilities in a manner
— Designing and operating for closure.
that is:

Recognising and Managing Uncertainty — Informed by the results of the risk assessment.
Understanding and managing risk is fundamental to Potential risks and related uncertainties associated
the safe management of tailings but subject to with tailings management are identified, analysed
significant uncertainty. and evaluated during the Project Conception phase,
re-assessed during the Design phase, and re-
Risk is a frequently used but often misunderstood
assessed periodically throughout the lifecycle.
concept. It is important to emphasise that assessing
risk involves the consideration of both the potential — Intended to prevent or eliminate risks to the extent
consequences of an event and the probability or possible and to effectively manage those risks that
likelihood of that event occurring. Risk should not be remain by developing a robust tailings facility design
confused with consequence, nor should these terms with less uncertainty in design criteria.
be used interchangeably.
— Informed by improved site characterisation, the
Risk assessment involves a process of risk identification, results of surveillance, input from the programme for
risk analysis and risk evaluation. Available information is reviewing facility safety (Section 2.6), and updates to

ICMM Overview of the Guide 16

 the risk assessment process, all of which help to new tailings facilities, this would include the alternative
reduce uncertainty. Site-specific surveillance locations for a tailings facility and the alternative
programmes should be designed and implemented technologies to be used. Both the location and the
(Section 2.4.3.4) to provide the information (eg data, technology selected can have a strong influence on the
observations, results of inspections) needed to risks that will need to be managed. Thus, decisions
accurately assess on an ongoing basis whether the made during the Project Conception phase may prove
risk management plan is effective. Results from to be some of the most important in the entire lifecycle
surveillance and input from reviews, together with of a tailings facility. The importance of this phase
updates to the risk assessment process, should be cannot be overstated.
used to identify: The preferred alternative is then designed in detail,
- Variances from performance criteria indicative of taking into account factors including:
potential upset or emergency conditions. — Site-specifically appropriate design criteria (Section
- Deficiencies in performance or practice that should 3.4.3).
be addressed.
— Site-specific performance objectives and indicators
- Opportunities for continual improvement.
(Section 3.3.3).
A risk-informed approach may include the use of:
— Credible failure modes identified through the risk
— Surveillance results to verify whether the tailings assessment process and means to address those
facility is behaving as per the design and adjusting failure modes in the design (Section 3.4.3.10).
accordingly.
— Continued improvements in site characterisation
— Numerical models of tailings facility performance information and models.
based on surveillance and site characterisation data
— Where appropriate, the application of a
to validate assumptions about the facility design and
performance-based approach to design that uses
predict future performance. Outputs from these
the results of numerical modelling of various aspects
models can be used to inform changes to the design
of the tailings facility performance to inform and
or operating practices to improve performance and
refine the design (Section 3.4.3.6).
reduce risk.
— Refinements to the risk assessment, including
Project Conception and Design of Tailings Facilities reducing uncertainty associated with the risk
The project conception and design of new tailings assessment (Section 3.4.2).
facilities, material changes, and the closure of tailings
facilities build upon a risk-informed approach (Sections Designing and Operating for Closure
3.3 and 3.4). For new facilities, the Project Conception Tailings facilities may continue to pose risks long
phase is the first stage in the lifecycle for the potential after the Operations phase has ended, and after the
elimination of risks. Once a tailings facility has been closure plan has been implemented. The development
designed and built, it may be much more difficult to and implementation of closure plans is critical to
eliminate the risks that exist, than if they had been mitigating these risks. However, relying solely on the
avoided in the Project Conception phase. implementation of the closure plan to achieve closure
objectives may limit the capacity to reduce long-term
During the Project Conception phase, site
risks and liabilities in the Closure and Post-Closure
characterisation (Section 3.3.2) and risk assessment
phases.
are used to inform a process of identifying potential
alternatives for the conceptual design of a tailings Alternatively, designing tailings facilities with the
facility, and rigorously evaluate those alternatives (eg objectives of closure in mind from the outset, and
using multiple accounts analysis (MAA)) to select the incorporating those objectives in the performance
preferred alternative (Section 3.3.4). For example, for objectives for the tailings facility, can help to reduce

Tailings Management Overview of the Guide 17

long-term risks and reduce the liabilities associated with Designing for closure builds upon integrated mine
closure. This includes designing, operating and closing planning, as a holistic approach to mine planning,
tailings facilities in a manner that results in them design and operation may be needed to achieve the
becoming engineered landforms – structures that objectives of designing for closure. This should be
mimic natural landforms – to increase their long-term recognised early in the Project Conception phase.
stability and make them more resilient not only to the
For existing tailings facilities that were not originally
risk of failure, but also more resilient to gradual
designed with closure in mind, Operators may consider
deterioration due to erosion. An engineered landform
changes to the design or practices that can be
also has much lower long-term maintenance and
implemented during the Operations phase to reduce
surveillance requirements.
risk and better position the tailings facility for closure.

ICMM Overview of the Guide 18

Relationship to the Global Industry 1.3
Standard on Tailings Management,
the Conformance Protocols and
the Tailings Governance Framework

1.3.1 Relationship to the Global Industry For example, Principle 1 of the Standard includes
Standard on Tailings Management and requirements relating to: respect for human rights and
ICMM Conformance Protocols for the Global related due diligence; working to obtain and maintain
Industry Standard on Tailings Management the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of
indigenous or tribal peoples; meaningful engagement of
As noted earlier (Section 1.1.3), this Guide has been project-affected peoples; and the establishment of
informed by the Standard and will help Operators to work effective grievance mechanisms to address the
through how to integrate the related requirements or complaints and grievances of project-affected people.
commitments into their own programmes. The Guide All of these are adequately covered by existing sources
should not be used to assess conformance against the of ICMM guidance.
Standard, which is the purpose of the ICMM
Conformance Protocols for the Global Industry Standard Two principles from the Standard that require some
on Tailings Management (The Conformance Protocols). further explanation are Principles 2 and 3 that deal with
the development and use of an integrated knowledge
The Conformance Protocols have been developed to base. The concept of a ‘knowledge base’ is addressed
enable conformance to be assessed and to support in ICMM’s Integrated Mine Closure: Good Practice Guide
the integration of the Standard into ICMM’s existing (2025), and the basic approach is transferrable to
assurance processes for its member commitments. tailings management. It involves developing,
The Conformance Protocols support either self- documenting and periodically updating information
assessments or independent third-party assessments about the social, environmental and local economic
of progress with implementing the Standard and context of the tailings facility, to support informed
ultimately conformance. It details clearly and concisely decision-making across the tailings facility lifecycle.
criteria that assessors expect to see evidenced for This should be undertaken using approaches aligned
conformance to be assessed, with illustrative examples with international good practice and designed to
of evidence and explanatory notes as appropriate. It is capture uncertainties due to climate change. In terms of
available to be used by company members (or non- updating the knowledge base, this should be revisited
members) or suitably qualified independent third parties at least every five years, and whenever there is a
and maps to the Standard and its 77 requirements. material change to the tailings facility or to the social,
environmental and local economic context.
The social and environmental requirements of the
Standard are referred to within this Guide, but the Other aspects of the knowledge base such as
intention is that these are largely addressed by reference developing, documenting and updating detailed site
to existing guidance from ICMM. Where appropriate, characterisations of tailings facility sites for a range of
these other sources of guidance are referred to within criteria or the conduct and periodic updating of breach
this Guide and within the Conformance Protocols. analysis are addressed in this Guide.

Relationship to the Global Industry Standard on

Tailings Management, the Conformance Protocols
Tailings Management and the Tailings Governance Framework 19
1.3.2 Implementation of the ICMM Tailings Statement commits members to implement practices
Governance Framework consistent with the Framework, which consists of six
elements of tailings management and governance.
This Guide builds upon the ICMM Tailings Governance These elements are described below, together with
Framework Position Statement (the Framework) and will corresponding sections of the Guide that support
support implementation of the Framework. The Position implementation.

ICMM Tailings Governance Framework Corresponding Sections in the ICMM Good

Practice Guide

Accountability, Responsibility and Competency: Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility

Accountabilities, responsibilities and associated competencies are
Section 2.2.4: Competency and Promoting Continual Learning
defined to support appropriate identification and management of
tailings facility risks. Section 2.2.6: Communication

— A
 ccountability for the overall governance of tailings facilities Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
resides with the owners and operators.*
Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
— O
 rganisational structures and roles are established to support
management of tailings facility risks and governance
accountability.

— C
 ommunication processes are maintained to ensure that
personnel understand their responsibilities. Training is conducted
to maintain currency of knowledge and skills.

— R
 ole competency and experience requirements are defined for
critical roles within the established organisational structures.

* The ICMM Position Statement uses the terms owners and

operators. This Guide uses the term Operators. As defined in the
Glossary, Operators is inclusive of owners and operators as
described in the Position Statement.

Planning and Resourcing: Section 2.2.3: Corporate Policy on Tailings Management

The financial and human resources needed to support continued
Section 2.3.2.3: Resources
tailings facility management and governance are maintained
throughout a facility’s lifecycle.

— T
 ailings facility operating and capital costs, and human resource
needs, are included in relevant business planning processes.

— R
 esources necessary to implement and maintain activities within
this governance Framework are provided.

Risk Management: Section 1.2.2: Core Elements of Safe Tailings Management

Risk management associated with tailings facilities includes risk
Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility
identification, an appropriate control regime and the verification of
control performance. Section 2.2.4: Competency and Promoting Continual Learning

— R
 isk controls and their associated verification activities are Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
identified based on failure modes and their associated
Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
consequences and evaluated on a tailings facility-specific basis
considering all phases of the tailings facility lifecycle. Section 2.7.2: Assessing Credible Potential Consequences

— S
 uitably qualified and experienced experts are involved in tailings Section 3.2.4: Managing Uncertainty and Risk
facility risk identification and analysis, as well as in the
Section 3.3: Projection Conception
development and review of effectiveness of the associated
controls. Section 3.4: Design

— P
 erformance criteria are established for risk controls and their Section 3.6: Operations
associated monitoring, internal reporting and verification Section 3.7: Closure and Post-Closure
activities.

Relationship to the Global Industry Standard on

Tailings Management, the Conformance Protocols
ICMM and the Tailings Governance Framework 20
 ICMM Tailings Governance Framework Corresponding Sections in the ICMM Good
Practice Guide

Change Management: Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility

Risks associated with potential changes are assessed, controlled
Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
and communicated to avoid inadvertently compromising tailings
facility integrity. Section 2.5: Managing Information

— P
 rocesses are applied that involve the identification, Section 3.2.4: Managing Risk and Uncertainty
assessment, control and communication of risks to tailings
Section 3.3: Projection Conception
facility integrity arising from both internally-driven and
externally-driven change, to avoid introducing uncertain, Section 3.4: Design
unacceptable, and/or unmanaged risks.
Section 3.5: Construction
— D
 ocuments and records that support tailings facility planning,
Section 3.6: Operations
design, construction, operation, surveillance, management
and governance are maintained and kept suitably current Section 3.7: Closure and Post-Closure
and accessible.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
Processes are in place to recognise and respond to impending failure
Section 2.7: Emergency Preparedness and Response
of tailings facilities and mitigate the potential impacts arising from a
potentially catastrophic failure. Section 3.6: Operations

— A
 ction thresholds and their corresponding response to early
warning signs of potential catastrophic failure are established.

— E
 mergency preparedness and response plans are established
commensurate with potential failure consequences. Such plans
specify roles, responsibilities and communication procedures.

— E
 mergency preparedness and response plans are periodically
tested.

Review and Assurance: Section 2.3: Tailings Management System

Internal and external review and assurance processes are in place
Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
so that controls for tailings facility risks can be comprehensively
assessed and continually improved. Section 2.6: Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety

— Internal performance monitoring and inspections and internal

and external reviews and assurance are conducted
commensurate with consequences of tailings facility failure
to evaluate and to continually improve the effectiveness of
risk controls.

— O
 utcomes and actions arising from tailings facility review and
assurance processes are recorded, reviewed, closed-out and
communicated.

— P
 erformance of risk management programmes for tailings
facilities is reported to executive management on a regular basis.

Relationship to the Global Industry Standard on

Tailings Management, the Conformance Protocols
Tailings Management and the Tailings Governance Framework 21
1.3.3 Relationship between the Guide, the In turn, this Guide supports the interpretation and
Standard, the Conformance Protocols and implementation of many requirements within the
the Tailings Governance Framework Standard. It also supports the implementation of the
commitments within the Tailings Governance
The relationship between the Standard and ICMM’s
Framework Position Statement. In addition, the Guide
tailings-related documents (discussed in Sections 1.3.1
also refers to other sources of ICMM guidance that help
and 1.3.2) is illustrated in Figure 2 and may be
to support implementation of some of the
summarised as follows.
environmental and social requirements of the Standard
The two documents that include the commitments (primarily under Principles 1–3 of the Standard).
of membership are illustrated on the top of Figure 2.
Lastly, the ICMM Conformance Protocols (bottom left
The six commitments in the Tailings Governance
of Figure 2) support either self-assessments or
Framework Position Statement on tailings
independent third-party assessments of progress with
management and governance (see top left of Figure 2)
implementing the Standard (as described in Section 1.3.1
pre-date the requirements of the Standard which
above). Where appropriate, the Protocols refer to related
adequately addresses them. More broadly, the
sections of the Guide.
Standard (top right of Figure 2) outlines seventy-seven
Requirements for responsible tailings management, The relationship between the Standard, supporting
under fifteen Principles that cover six Topic areas. guidance from ICMM (and other authoritative sources of
The Standard has helped to inform the development guidance by organisations such as MAC) and technical
of this Guide (top right of Figure 2). guidelines produced by reputable technical
organisations such as those focused on dams is shown
in Figure 3.

Figure 2: Relationship between key documents

Outlines commitments
1 2 Outlines 77
December 2016

for 6 key elements of Informed requirements requirements for

tailings management Tailings Governance
Framework
within the Standard responsible tailings
and governance Position Statement
management

Supports implementation Enables conformance Helped to inform Supports

of the position statement with the Standard to development of interpretation and
commitments be assessed the Guide implementation of
many requirements

Supports self-
assessments and
third-party
4 Conformance
Protocols
Tailings
Management
3 Provides guidance on good
governance and engineering
practices for responsible
assessments of Global Industry Standard
on Tailings Management Good Practice Guide
tailings management
progress with Note: Also refers to other relevant
implementing the sources of ICMM guidance that
Draws upon and refers to support implementation such as
Standard ICMM’s ‘Integrated Mine Closure
related sections of Guide Good Practice Guide’ (2019)
February 2023

Relationship to the Global Industry Standard on

Tailings Management, the Conformance Protocols
ICMM and the Tailings Governance Framework 22
Figure 3: Increasing levels of detail between specific commitments, supporting guidance and technical guidelines

December 2016

Tailings Governance
Framework

Position Statement

Specific – Requirements of Standard

Commitments – Commitments in ICMM position statement on
Tailings Governance

– ICMM Tailings Management Good Practice

Supporting Guide and Conformance Protocols
Guidance – Other ICMM guides that deal with relevant
environmental and social requirements

– Technical guidelines from ICOLD, ANCOLD,

Technical CDA, JCOLD, SANCOLD, etc.
Guidelines

Relationship to the Global Industry Standard on

Tailings Management, the Conformance Protocols
Tailings Management and the Tailings Governance Framework 23
Part 2: Governance of
Tailings Management

ICMM Part 2: Governance of Tailings Management 24

Overview 2.1

The governance of tailings management Effective governance is essential to safe and

responsible tailings management. Elements of
as described in this Guide is consistent governance include:
with the Standard and refers to the
— Accountability, a corporate policy and related
organisational structures. Governance elements:
refers to the processes, procedures and - Competency and training
communication channels that a - Community engagement
company puts in place to ensure the - Communication
effective management, oversight and — Tailings management system (TMS)
accountability for tailings.
— O
 peration, maintenance, and surveillance (OMS)
activities

— Managing information

— Programme for reviewing tailings safety

— E
 mergency preparedness and response
planning (EPRP).

These governance elements provide an essential

framework within which all other activities related to
tailings management are conducted. To be effective,
the governance of tailings management must come
first, with all other activities conducted within that
framework.

Tailings Management Overview 25

Accountability, Policy 2.2
and Related Elements

2.2.1 Introduction — S
 hare information about tailings management
with regulators, communities, investors and other
Role clarity is critical to the safe management of tailings.
external parties.
From defining policy at the corporate level to
implementing regular measurements in the field at the
2.2.2 Accountability and Responsibility
technician’s level, and for every task in between, clear
roles and responsibilities enhance individual ownership Accountability, responsibility and authority are closely
of assigned scope. related concepts. The difference between them is
critical but is sometimes not clearly understood. The
Accountability, which cannot be delegated, should be
usage of these terms in this Guide is defined as follows:
underpinned by the Operator’s commitment to the safe
management of tailings, including providing the Accountability: The answerability of an individual for
resources (eg financial, personnel) needed to support their own performance and that of any personnel they
both the short- and long-term objectives for safe and direct, and for the completion of specified deliverables
responsible tailings management. or tasks in accordance with defined expectations. An
accountable person may delegate responsibility for the
The circumstances of each Operator and tailings facility
completion of the deliverable or task but not the
vary, and the governance and organisational structure
accountability.
should be appropriately tailored to suit each facility.
At a minimum, the Operator should: Responsibility: The duty or obligation of an individual or
organisation to perform an assigned duty or task in
— D
 efine and document accountabilities and
accordance with defined expectations, and which has a
responsibilities related to tailings management
consequence if the expectations are not met. An
for the:
individual or organisation with responsibility is
- BoD. accountable to the person that delegated that
- Accountable Executive. responsibility to them.
- Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE). Authority: The power to make decisions, assign
- Engineer of Record (EOR) and Design Team responsibilities, or delegate some or all authority, as
(Section 2.2.2). appropriate. The ability to act on behalf of the Operator.

— E
 stablish and maintain a corporate policy on tailings Personnel with accountability and responsibility for all
management through the BoD. decisions related to tailings management should be
identified and in place. Decisions should be made by
— U
 nderstand the competencies required for tailings
persons who have clear accountability or responsibility
management and ensure that relevant personnel
and who are appropriately qualified and experienced.
(employees, contractors and consultants) have those
Those persons with defined accountability and
competencies.
responsibility should also have the authority to make
— E
 ngage local communities on matters related to decisions commensurate with their level of
tailings management, including potential risks to responsibility. The Accountable Executive should have
those communities. clear authority commensurate with their accountability
and in cases where they need funding authorisations
— Integrate activities and communicate effectively,
beyond their authority, they should have access to and
both internally (eg between different business units)
communication with those who can provide
and externally, on matters related to tailings
authorisation in a timely manner.
management.

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 26

Persons with accountability, responsibility and authority 2.2.2.2 Accountable Executive
for tailings management should have an understanding
The BoD or CEO should designate one or more
– appropriate to their accountability, responsibility and
executive-level person(s) to be the Accountable
authority level – of how the tailings facility is planned,
Executive(s), who is/are accountable for the safety of
designed, constructed and operated and how it will be
tailings facilities and for minimising the social and
closed. This includes the risks posed by the tailings, the
environmental consequences of a potential tailings
risk management process and operational constraints.
facility failure. The Accountable Executive(s) may delegate
For persons with accountability, responsibility and responsibilities for tailings management and the
authority for tailings management, incentive payments development and implementation of the systems needed
or performance reviews should at least in part be based for safe, responsible tailings management but
on public safety and the integrity of tailings facilities. accountability cannot be delegated. The Accountable
Incentive payments should reflect the degree to which Executive(s) is/are directly answerable to the CEO (or to
public safety and the integrity of the tailings facility are the BoD in the case that a CEO is the Accountable
part of the role. Long-term incentives for relevant Executive) on matters related to tailings management and
executive managers should also take tailings should have regular communication with the BoD
management into account. (initiated either by the BoD or the Accountable
Executive(s)). The mechanism for holding the
To enhance clarity of roles and responsibilities, an
Accountable Executive(s) accountable should be
Operator may elect to use a tool such as a RACI
documented. The role and accountability of the BoD
(responsible, accountable, consult and inform) matrix
versus the Accountable Executive(s) determined by the
or a RASCI (responsible, accountable, support, consult
Operator and should also be documented.
and inform) matrix to describe roles and relationships
between employees and with contractors and Responsibilities of the Accountable Executive(s) include:
consultants, including the Engineer of Record (EOR)
— H
 aving accountability and responsibility for putting in
and the Design Team.
place an appropriate management structure.
2.2.2.1 Board of Directors — W
 ith authorisation from the BoD, ensures that the
necessary resources are in place for tailings
While companies may be organised in different ways,
management.
this Guide adopts the Standard’s definition of BoD. The
ultimate governing body of the Operator is the BoD, — D
 emonstrating to the BoD whether tailings are
which is typically elected by the shareholders of the managed responsibly and in accordance with
Operator. The BoD is the entity with the final decision- applicable legal requirements and standards.
making authority for the Operator and holds the
authority to, among other things, set the Operator’s
policies, objectives and overall direction, and oversee
the firm’s executives. As the term is used here, it
encompasses any individual or entity with control over
the Operator, including, for example, the owner or
owners. Where the State serves as the Operator, the
BoD is understood to mean the government official with
ultimate responsibility for the final decisions of the
Operator.

Accordingly, the Standard requires that the BoD adopt

and publish a policy on or commitment to the safety
management of tailings facilities, to emergency
preparedness and response, and to recovery after
failure.

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 27

— D
 elegating responsibility and authority for endorsed by Independent Review, while maintaining the
tailings management and defining the personnel flexibility to upgrade the design for the highest
responsibilities, authority and reporting relationships consequence later in the facility’s lifecycle.
to implement the systems needed for safe,
The Accountable Executive(s) may be supported by a
responsible tailings management throughout
corporate expert(s) in tailings management to help
the lifecycle.
oversee the Operator’s portfolio of tailings facilities and
— D
 elegating responsibility and authority for the to provide a bridge between the Accountable
development of integrated closure plans to ensure Executive(s) and the RTFE and EOR for each tailings
facility integrity post-closure. facility for which the Operator is responsible.
— B
 eing aware of the key outcomes of tailings risk
assessments and how these risks are being 2.2.2.3 Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer
managed. As a minimum, the Operator should designate one RTFE
— B
 eing accountable for a programme of tailings for each tailings facility. The RTFE is accountable for the
management training and for emergency integrity of that tailings facility. During the Construction
preparedness and response. and Operations phases, an RTFE should be available at
all times (although this person does not necessarily
— E
 stablishing a programme for reviewing tailings
need to be located on site). Alternatively, there may be
safety, including Independent Review.
an RTFE at the corporate level, with responsibility for
— F
 or new tailings facilities, approving that the design more than one tailings facility.
satisfies the as low as reasonably practicable
The RTFE liaises with the EOR and has regular
(ALARP) principle and approving additional steps to
communication with the Accountable Executive or their
further reduce potential consequences to people
delegate. The RTFE should also liaise with internal teams
and/or the environment, where appropriate.
with direct and indirect responsibilities related to tailings
— Having scheduled communication with the EOR. management such as operations, planning, regulatory
affairs, social performance and the environment. The
— E
 ncouraging open, transparent communication
among all employees and contractors regarding RTFE should be familiar with the design, construction,
concerns about tailings facility integrity, safety or operation and performance of the tailings facility and
compliance. Establishing a formal, confidential and have experience, knowledge and competencies
written process to receive, investigate and promptly appropriate to the complexity of the facility and the
address concerns from employees and contractors risks posed.
about possible permit violations or other matters The RTFE should have clearly defined, delegated
relating to regulatory compliance, public safety, responsibilities for tailings management and should
tailings facility integrity or the environment. have the appropriate competencies to carry out these
The Accountable Executive(s) should embrace the use responsibilities. They should identify the scope of work
of conservative external loading criteria as a guiding and budget requirements for all aspects of tailings
philosophy for tailings facilities. Where appropriate, the management, including the EOR. The RTFE should
Accountable Executive(s) may decide to adopt lower delegate specific tasks and responsibilities for aspects
design criteria if recommended by the EOR and of tailings management to qualified personnel.

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 28

 reclamation as practicable during the Operations
phase, and implementation of the closure plan at
the end of the Operations phase (Section 3.7).

In Detail — M
 aintain records related to design, construction
and OMS (Section 2.5).
Examples of the responsibilities of a RTFE include:
— E
 nsure inspections (eg dam safety inspections or
— C
 oordinate their efforts through the Accountable
DSRs) are completed (Section 2.6).
Executive for an aligned approach to tailings
governance for the Operator. — Review and update the OMS manual (Section 2.4).

— Implement the TMS (Section 2.3). — E

 nsure that emergency response plans are
developed, maintained and tested, either as
— E
 stablish, with input from appropriate personnel, a
stand-alone plans or as components of sitewide
budget for approval by the Accountable Executive
emergency response plans directly related to
or persons with delegated budget authority.
tailings management (Section 2.7).
— W
 ith input from the Accountable Executive or
— Implement measures to remedy variances from
persons with delegated responsibility, establish an
performance objectives or criteria (Section 3.5, 3.6
organisational structure with roles and
and 3.7).
responsibilities that meets the operational needs.
— Implement a programme for reviewing tailings
— E
 stablish a formal relationship with the EOR and
safety, including Independent Review (Section 2.6).
Design Team to ensure that construction and
operation meet the design intent and are — Identify when/where contemplated operational
compliant with legal requirements (Sections 3.4, changes are a potential deviation from the design
3.5 and 3.6). intent and engage the EOR or Design Team as
part of the process to manage change (Sections
— E
 nsure surveillance is undertaken in accordance
2.3, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7).
with design intent, performance objectives and
the risk management plan (Section 2.4). — P
 articipate in or provide input to community
engagement activities related to tailings
— E
 nsure the development of the tailings facility
management (Section 2.2.5).
closure plan, implementation of progressive

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 29

2.2.2.4 Engineer of Record and Design Team — In cases where the Operator has more than one EOR
with responsibilities related to different
The EOR is a fundamental role in the development and
embankments, the roles and responsibilities of each
management of safe tailings facilities. While this role
EOR should be clearly defined, together with the
can be described using various terminology, at its core,
relationship between these EORs.
the EOR role:
— M
 echanisms to ensure that relevant personnel
— P
 rovides assurance to the Operator and relevant
understand the role, responsibilities and authority of
regulatory authorities that the tailings facility design
the EOR.
conforms with and meets applicable regulations,
statutes, guidelines, codes and standards. — R
 esources required for the EOR to fulfil the assigned
role and responsibilities, including financial
— C
 onfirms that the facility has been constructed and
resources, support personnel required (and
is being operated consistent with the design intent
appropriate qualifications) and other resources.
presented in the design drawings, specifications and
design basis documentation. — S
 pecific deliverables to be provided by the EOR and
associated schedules.
— P
 rovides critical, ongoing support during the
Operations phase and through the lifespan of the The EOR shares responsibility with the RTFE for assuring
facility, confirming that the facility is being safely to the Operator and other stakeholders that the facility
operated and performing as planned. is constructed, operated, monitored and performing
according to the design criteria and intent, applicable
The purpose of the EOR role should be understood as a
design standards, change management processes, risk
means to ensure that business and operational
controls, relevant guidelines and accepted engineering
decisions made by the Operator are informed by an
practices. All levels of the Operator’s organisation
engineer who understands the design principles and
should understand the responsibility and authority held
technical limitations of the tailings facility and the
by the EOR. The EOR should have regular, scheduled
impact of changes on its safety and performance.
communication with the Accountable Executive or
There are multiple models that can fulfil the role of EOR, delegate. In addition, they should have the ability to
and past practices for the engagement of an EOR have ultimately raise concerns directly with the Accountable
varied significantly in different countries and regions of Executive if necessary.
the world. This Guide recognises that a ‘one-size-fits-
The EOR should have professional attributes aligned
all’ approach is impractical and acknowledges two
with the responsibilities required for the given tailings
basic models for fulfilling the role of EOR – an external
facility inclusive of that facility’s complexity and
EOR or an internal EOR – and that multiple variations of
precedence. Selection of the appropriate person for the
each model may exist.
EOR role and ensuring this person has adequate
It is up to each Operator to determine and document support is fundamental to tailings facility safety.
the following:
Because the scope of an EOR for most tailings facilities
— E
 OR model best suited to their needs and their is so broad, implementation of the role typically requires
capacity. the combined expertise of an individual EOR and a
supporting multi-disciplinary team. This multi-
— R
 equired qualifications and competencies for the
disciplinary team should be scaled according to the
EOR, and the process to ensure that these
complexity of each facility. Regardless of how individual
requirements are met.
responsibilities are delegated among the various
— Responsibility, authority and role of the EOR. members of the team, the overarching responsibility for
understanding the design concept and how it applies to
— Relationship between the EOR and the RTFE.
the construction and successful operation of the facility
— Relationship between the EOR and the Design Team. resides with the individual appointed as EOR.

— R
 elationship between the EOR and members of the The Design Team develops the design of the tailings
Operator’s technical and functional teams and facility. The work involved may include the initial design
contractors related to tailings management. for a new tailings facility, planned construction through
the Operations phase, and any material changes to the
— R
 elationship between the EOR and the programme
design of the tailings facility. The Operator should define
for reviewing tailings safety (eg role of the EOR in
and document the roles and responsibilities and
Independent Review).

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 30

relationship of the EOR relative to the Design Team. As Tailings facilities are long-lived structures that change
with the EOR, there are different models for the Design throughout their lives and may require maintenance and
Team. The Design Team may be from the same firm as surveillance long after the original EOR has retired from
the EOR, which is helpful in terms of facilitating effective professional practice. Thus, managing change of the
communication and collaboration. In some instances, EOR is critical to the continuity of safe and responsible
there may be a single or lead designer, sometimes tailings management.
referred to as the Designer of Record. In some cases,
Above all, the EOR needs to accept the commitment, be
the EOR may fulfil the design function. It is up to
available when required, and communicate effectively
the Operator, subject to any relevant legal requirements,
with the RTFE and Accountable Executive (or delegate).
to determine the most appropriate approach.
The EOR needs to gain the confidence of the
Like the EOR, the Design Team members should have Independent Reviewer(s) through demonstrated
professional attributes aligned with the responsibilities commitment and competent responses to issues as
required for the given tailings facility inclusive of that they arise.
facility’s complexity and precedence. The role of the
EOR with respect to design is further discussed in
Section 3.4.

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 31

 in the event the EOR identifies any critical
concerns or any significant outstanding concerns
that have not been adequately addressed by the
RTFE or others with relevant responsibility and
In Detail
authority.
Examples of normal responsibilities carried by the
— A
 dvising on contemplated changes to the tailings
EOR include:
facility’s operation.
— D
 ocumentation of information on the design,
— P
 articipating in inspections and Independent
design basis and design intent of the facility
Review (Section 2.6.4).
(Section 3.4.5).
— W
 orking with the RTFE, be responsible for
— P
 roviding guidance and oversight to the
preparation of or review of the Construction
investigations and studies needed to adequately
Records Report (CRR) (‘as-built’ report) and
characterise the site (Section 3.3.2).
updates (Section 3.5.4).
— Identifying and providing oversight to the
— D
 eveloping and maintaining relevant records
necessary design analyses as required to develop
related to design, construction and operation,
the design basis for the facility (Section 3.4.3).
maintenance, surveillance and closure (Section
— P
 roviding responsible charge for reviewing and 2.5), and handing those records over to the
approving data analyses and deliverables Operator.
prepared by Design Team, Operator or third
With respect to managing a change of the EOR the
parties.
following should be considered:
— P
 roviding engineering analysis in support of the
— S
 uccession planning for the EOR role is important
development of the closure plan (Section 3.7).
(Section 2.3.2.1).
— P
 roviding input into the OMS manual and
— Change for the sake of change should be avoided.
implementation of OMS activities (Section 2.4) in
accordance with the design. — D
 ecisions to select, retain or change the EOR
should never be based on cost alone. The selection
— R
 eceiving and reviewing tailings facility
of the EOR should be decided by the Accountable
performance data at a frequency determined
Executive with input from the RTFE and informed,
based on the risks.
but not decided by, procurement personnel.
— P
 articipating in periodic risk assessments
Where procurement practices place a strong
(Sections 3.2 and 3.4.2).
emphasis on competitive costs, this can result in
— P
 articipating in the identification and evaluation of breaking the design into small segments for either
potential failure modes, and the identification of economic or other management objectives. This
credible failure modes. creates an unnecessary risk by not taking a holistic
approach to design. Thus, procurement policies that
— P
 articipating in the development of the risk
ensure experience is adequately weighted in
management plan, including risk controls and
selecting the EOR and Design Team are helpful to
critical controls and associated surveillance.
make sure that decisions are not being driven unduly
— O
 verseeing or verifying quality management by economics.
during construction (Section 3.5).
All tailings facilities evolve and change throughout
— P
 reparing a periodic Deviance Accountability their lifecycle. As such, the Operator should review
Report (DAR) (Section 3.5.3). the required qualifications of the EOR periodically
(every three to five years for tailings facilities in the
— C
 onfirming that the tailings facility’s operation is
Operations, Closure and Post-Closure phases, even
compliant or identifying variances from
more frequently as projects progress from the Project
performance criteria and advising the Operator
Conception phase through to the Design phase) to
with recommendations.
ensure the EOR has the experience, knowledge and
— Notifying the Accountable Executive (or delegate) competencies appropriate to the tailings facility.

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 32

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 33
2.2.3 Corporate Policy on Tailings — P
 roviding adequate resources (financial, personnel,
Management etc) to manage tailings in accordance with the policy.

Establishing a corporate policy on tailings management The corporate policy should be:
provides an important basis for establishing corporate
— Reviewed and endorsed by the BoD.
priorities and performance objectives (Section 3.3.3)
related to tailings management. A policy is an important — Consistent with applicable legal requirements.
tool to demonstrate, both internally and externally, the
— Communicated to employees.
Operator’s commitment to tailings management.
— U
 nderstood to a degree appropriate to their roles
The policy should be aligned with the Operator’s
and responsibilities by personnel whose activities
commitment to implementing a corporate safety
may affect tailings management either directly or
culture: prioritising safe and responsible tailings
indirectly.
management with the ultimate goal of zero fatalities
and catastrophic events. — Publicly available.

The policy should be integrated with corporate policies Tailings management is a core business function of the
related to sustainability, health and safety, business mining industry, and as described in Sections 1.2.2.2 and
ethics and other related elements to ensure that: 3.2, planning for tailings management should be
integrated into planning related to relevant aspects of
— C
 orporate commitments and goals related to tailings
mining operations, such as ore extraction and
management are integrated with and reflected in
processing, sitewide water management, management
other corporate commitments.
of waste rock and other mine wastes, and sitewide
— O
 ther corporate commitments and goals are closure planning. To facilitate this integrated approach,
reflected in tailings management. it is essential that all business units understand the
corporate policy on tailings management and their role
Operators should develop a policy on tailings
in implementing the policy, including the importance of
management that best meets their needs and corporate
integrated mine planning. Furthermore, the corporate
management approach while addressing their legal
policy and site-specific performance objectives for
requirements and commitments to local communities. As
tailings management should be integrated into sitewide
their portfolio of tailings facilities and associated risks will
policies, objectives and plans.
change with time, the Operator should re-evaluate the
adequacy of the policy on a regular basis.
2.2.4 Competency and Promoting Continual
The corporate policy should demonstrate the Operator’s Learning
commitment to:
Tailings management requires the Operator and
— P
 rotection of health and safety of employees, personnel involved in tailings management to have a
contractors and the public. level of competence consistent with the requirements
of the tailings facility and its risks. The key elements of
— S
 afe and responsible management of tailings with
developing and maintaining competence are
the objective of zero fatalities and eliminating
qualifications, training and experience.
catastrophic failures.

— A
 llocation of appropriate resources to support Competency
tailings management activities. Competencies comprise knowledge, skills and abilities
and are typically demonstrated through behaviour.
— Implementing effective governance of tailings
Competency is important for effective performance.
management through the actions of the Operator’s
High level competencies for tailings management may
employees, contractors and consultants.
be identified by the Operator and should reflect the
— A
 n organisational culture that promotes learning, Operator’s values. Those broader competencies are
communication, early problem recognition and early often supported by role specific competencies,
escalation of issues. performance indicators, knowledge/skills/abilities and
current learning resources for the position.
— E
 mergency preparedness and post-incident
recovery if a failure occurs. As tailings personnel progress through their careers,
they are naturally expected to gain competency in key
— Implementing a programme for reviewing tailings
practice areas. A competency framework should be
safety, including Independent Review.

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 34

developed and used in conjunction with a mentoring — U
 nderstanding of and knowledge in relevant
and training system to maximise learning and practice areas
development. When assessing competency, consider
— U
 nderstanding and application of relevant theory
such aspects as:
and practice
— Purpose of the position
— E xecution of the TMS
— Nature of the work
— Leadership skills and behaviours
— Education/Experience
Operators should identify appropriate qualifications
— Level of interaction and experience requirements for all personnel who
play safety-critical roles related to tailings
— Autonomy/decision-making capacity and authority
management, including, but not limited to the RTFE,
— Budgetary responsibilities the EOR and the Accountable Executive. Operators
should ensure that incumbents of these roles have the
— Managerial responsibilities
identified qualifications and experience appropriate
— Skill demonstration also for the relevant lifecycle phase, and develop
succession plans for these personnel.

‘responsible charge’ for the facility. The EOR should

also have additional skills and characteristics that
allow them to: effectively and respectfully
communicate with a broad audience; convey
In Detail
competence and reliability; and gain trust from clients
and peers in the tailings facility safety community.
Attributes of Key Roles
Further information on competencies for key roles are
RTFE
discussed below.
The RTFE should understand the tailings facilities for
which they are responsible, the risks, and the manner
Accountable Executive
in which those risks are being managed, including any
The Accountable Executive does not necessarily
failures, deficiencies or opportunities for improvement.
need to be an expert in tailings management but
They should be informed by evaluations of
should have the competency to:
performance and results of reviews conducted as part
— U
 nderstand the concepts of tailings management of the TMS (Section 2.3), the results of the programme
and the associated risks. for reviewing tailings safety (including Independent
Review) (Section 2.6) and be apprised of any
— K
 now what key questions to ask of their personnel
significant developments in between these activities.
relative to tailings management.

— A
 rticulate a clear, honest assessment of tailings Independent Review
risks to the BoD. Independent Review is conducted by one or more
appropriately qualified and experienced individuals
— A
 dvocate for resources needed for tailings
who have not been directly involved with the design
management.
or operation of the particular tailings facility. The
qualifications and experience of reviewers should be
EOR
aligned with the tailings facility’s complexity and risk
The EOR should have education, experience,
profile. Similar to the EOR, Independent Reviewers
capabilities and knowledge commensurate with the
should have education, experience, capabilities and
complexity of the facility and potential consequences
knowledge commensurate with the complexity of the
of a failure in the areas of design, construction,
facility and potential consequences of a failure in the
operation and performance evaluation, which are
areas of design, construction, operation and
gained through directly related experience. This
performance evaluation, which are gained through
includes facility-specific knowledge to a sufficient
directly-related experience.
level of detail that the EOR can demonstrate

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 35

Promoting Continual Learning informally. Formal programmes and materials should
Training should build skills and expand job knowledge be developed to cover essential elements required
and understanding. A training programme should be under the training programme. Additionally, informal
developed and implemented that considers: learning happens through experience and can be
developed through reading relevant publications,
— Training for new personnel.
engaging with subject matter experts, participation in
— R
 efresher training at a frequency determined by the inspections and reviews, interacting with an industry
Operator, considering the risk profile of the tailings network, internal knowledge sharing, and exposure to
facility. new approaches or technologies.

— T
 raining associated with significant changes such Promoting continual learning will help to ensure that
as updates to the OMS manual or emergency personnel have the competencies and qualifications
preparedness plans. necessary for tailings management and can also help
to ensure staff retention and reduce turnover by
— Training for competency development.
creating more opportunities for career advancement.
Better trained personnel can help to facilitate
Training should address:
improved tailings management, and reducing
— General aspects, such as the Operator’s policy and
turnover reduces risks associated with changes in
commitments related to tailings management, and
personnel.
the overall goals of safe, responsible tailings
management for personnel with direct and indirect Operators should establish mechanisms that
roles related to tailings management. incorporate workers’ experience-based knowledge
into planning, design and operation for all phases of
— S
 pecific aspects (eg technical, communication,
the tailings facility lifecycle. Operators should also
management) related to the roles and responsibilities
establish mechanisms that promote cross-functional
of personnel with direct roles related to tailings
collaboration to ensure effective data and knowledge
management.
sharing, communication and implementation of
Operators should aim to develop a corporate culture management measures to support public safety
that promotes continual learning, both formally and and the integrity of the tailings facility.

also be improved by better understanding the

experiences of others in tailings-related roles. When
planning a training programme, consider if there is an
opportunity to engage others involved with tailings
In Detail
management.
Providing appropriate training to those who are
Training may be carried out using in-house resources
involved in tailings management, including
but there may be a need to involve external parties
employees, contractors, consultants and suppliers,
such as the Design Team or EOR in development of
will require different training at different levels. For
the training materials. Operators may consider some
example, senior management should receive higher
form of evaluation of personnel on their knowledge
level, conceptual training about the risks of tailings
relative to their role to demonstrate competency.
management, while mine managers and others
A tracking mechanism should be in place (eg training
working directly on specific aspects of tailings
needs matrix) to ensure that all relevant personnel
facilities through various lifecycle phases should
receive appropriate training.
receive detailed and relevant training that
corresponds to their work. Tailings management may

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 36

2.2.5 Community Engagement and the development of the closure plan (Section
3.7.2).
Community engagement helps to build trust and
prevent the potential for conflicts with communities. It — C
 o-developing community-focused emergency
can help to ensure that communities have an preparedness measures (Section 2.7).
understanding of the risks to them associated with
Community engagement related to tailings
tailings facilities, and how the Operator is managing
management should be integrated with broader
those risks, including the emergency preparedness
community engagement activities, although
measures that are in place. It can also help to inform
engagement more specifically targeted to tailings
better decisions about tailings management, including:
management may be appropriate on some topics (eg
— E
 valuating alternatives (Section 3.3.4) for a new community input during the Project Conception phase
tailings facility or extending the life of an existing (Section 3.3)). Engagement should be coordinated with
facility. and conducted in collaboration with personnel with
specific expertise in community engagement, but
— R
 eflecting community concerns and values in
tailings specialists involved in community engagement
performance objectives (Section 3.3.3).
should receive appropriate training.
— Identification of post-closure land-use objectives

Further Reading:
ICMM: Stakeholder Research Toolkit

ICMM: Community Development Toolkit

In Detail
ICMM: Understanding Company–Community
The Standard has specific requirements related Relations Toolkit
to respecting the rights of project-affected people
ICMM: Indigenous Peoples and Mining: Good
which are outside the scope of this Guide and
Practice Guide
are addressed in other guidance from ICMM
(Section 1.3.1). ICMM: Integrating human rights due diligence into
corporate risk management processes
Community engagement may also extend to providing
a direct role in the development and implementation of ICMM: Handling and Resolving Local-Level Concerns
some surveillance activities (eg downstream water and Grievances
quality monitoring). This can help to:
ICMM: International Finance Corporation and
— E
 nsure that surveillance programmes include International Committee of the Red Cross: Voluntary
parameters of concern to communities. Principles on Security and Human Rights:
Implementation Guidance Tools
— P
 rovide a direct mechanism for communities to
share their unique knowledge and understanding MAC: Towards Sustainable Mining Indigenous and
of the area (eg traditional knowledge). Community Relationships Protocol (2019)
— H
 elp to build trust through the direct involvement
of trained community members in surveillance,
including both data collection and analysis (eg
involvement in downstream water quality
monitoring).

— H
 elp to build community capacity, developing
transferable skills and potentially providing a basis
for greater community involvement in surveillance
during the Post-Closure phase.

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 37

2.2.6 Communication — Breakdowns in communication should be investigated
to learn from them and improve communication.
An Operator should describe expectations for
communication as well as lines of communication as — T
 he effectiveness of communication should be
they relate to tailings management and related assessed regularly, with the aim of identifying
activities. Processes should be established and deficiencies and opportunities for improvement.
implemented for two-way communication for personnel
In addition, an Operator should establish mechanisms that
who have accountability or responsibility tailings
recognise, reward and protect from retaliation, employees
management, including reporting of significant
and contractors who report problems or identify
information and decisions to senior management, the
opportunities for improving tailings facility management.
EOR, regulators and communities, as appropriate.
An Operator should respond in a timely manner and
While documenting and adhering to processes and communicate actions taken and their outcomes.
lines of communication are important, there are limits to
In accordance with international good practices for
what can be achieved through written policies and
whistleblower protection, an Operator should not
procedures. Effective communication is a skill that
discharge, discriminate against or otherwise retaliate in
should be developed and addressed as part of training
any way against a whistleblower who, in good faith, has
activities, including providing training on mechanisms
reported possible permit violations or other matters
for communication, and communication expectations
relating to regulatory compliance, public safety, tailings
commensurate with the roles of personnel. In addition,
facility integrity or the environment.
to help to improve communication:

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 38

2.2.7 Sharing Information commitment to safe tailings facility management, its
governance framework, and its policies, standard or
There is a wide range of information about tailings
approaches to the design, construction, monitoring
management, including information about risks and and closure of tailings facilities. The Standard also
how the Operator is managing those risks, that outlines specific elements for Operators to summarise
Operators should plan to share with communities and for disclosure.
other stakeholders. In addition, there may be a range
of information that the Operator is required to provide An Operator may also be required to share a range of
to meet legal requirements. However, sharing information with relevant jurisdictions to meet various
information should be tailored to the needs and legal requirements. An Operator should compile a list
capacity of those with whom it is being shared. of all legal requirements relevant to tailings
management, including a description of the
Sharing information with communities about tailings information required to meet each legal requirement.
management helps to build trust, increase This list should also clarify whether the information
transparency, and provide evidence to demonstrate submitted to meet various legal requirements will be in
safe tailings management. It builds upon community the public domain. The Operator’s plan for managing
engagement (Section 2.2.5) and communication conformance (Section 2.3.2.2) should include this list,
(Section 2.2.6). Operators may consult with with a plan to ensure that all the relevant legal
communities to identify: requirements are met.
— Information about tailings management that they There is a wide range of information that an Operator
want the Operator to share with them. needs to be able to safely manage tailings (Section
— F
 orm in which the information should be provided 2.5). This information provides the basis for what is
by the Operator (eg language, level of detail). shared with communities and other stakeholders, but
it is up to the Operator to put this information in a form
— Mechanisms for sharing information (eg Operator’s (eg plain language summaries) that is useful to
website). communities and other stakeholders, and
— Frequency of sharing of information. constructively contributes to building trust and
transparency. In determining the information to be
The Operator should consider developing a plan for shared and the form in which it will be shared, the
sharing information with communities based on input Operator should be cognizant of any legal limitations
from consultations and refine how it shares on the sharing in information, specifically if related to
information as engagement with communities evolves. securities-related limits on sharing forward-looking
In developing a plan to share information with information.
communities, an Operator should be cognizant of the
In addition, the Operator should respond in a
detailed requirements for public disclosure in the
systematic and timely manner to requests from
Standard (see Requirement 15.1).
interested and affected stakeholders for additional
In addition to communities, there are other information material to the public safety and integrity
stakeholders (eg shareholders, investors) with whom of a tailings facility. When the request for information
the Operator should consider sharing information is denied, the Operator should provide an explanation
about tailings management. The nature of the to the requesting stakeholder.
information shared and the mechanisms for sharing
The Operator should also commit to cooperate in
this information may be different than for information
credible global transparency initiatives to create
shared with communities, depending on the needs
standardised, independent, industry-wide and publicly
and nature of the stakeholder.
accessible databases, inventories or other information
Specifically, per the Standard, an Operator is required repositories about the safety and integrity of tailings
to publish and regularly update information on its facilities.

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 39

Tailings Management Systems 2.3

2.3.1 Introduction Implementation of TMSs should align with the

corporate policy on tailings management and follow
The development and implementation of a TMS is
an iterative cycle throughout the lifecycle of a tailings
essential to the effective governance of tailings
facility (Figure 4):
management, which, as described in Section 1.2.2, is
one of the foundations of safe tailings management, 1) Plan: Developing Plans for Tailings Management.
together with the implementation of good engineering The Operator uses the corporate policy as a basis
practice. for establishing all systems, information and plans
relevant to the current lifecycle phase and plans, at
A site-specific TMS integrates all of the Operator’s
an appropriate level of detail, for future lifecycle
systems, information, plans, practices and processes
phases (eg begin development of OMS activities
related to the management of a given tailings facility
during the Project Conception phase, refine during
into one comprehensive framework. It provides a:
the Design phase, and implement, review and
— G
 overnance structure with checks and balances on update as necessary during subsequent phases).
decision-making, including third-party oversight (eg
2) Do: Implementing the TMS. Systems and plans are
Independent Review).
implemented as appropriate to the lifecycle phase.
— M
 echanism to effectively implement good
3) Check: Evaluating Performance. The performance of
engineering practices for tailings management.
the tailings facility and the systems and plans in
— M
 eans to facilitate effective communication place to manage the facility are measured (eg
to address risk and drive action, including surveillance, inspections, Independent Review,
communication between: audits) to determine whether the performance
- Senior management accountable for tailings objectives are being met and to identify potential
management and those responsible for tailings problems. If the performance objectives are not
management. being met, the need for potential corrective actions
is identified. Similarly, opportunities for continual
- Those with direct responsibilities for tailings
improvement are identified.
management and those with indirect
responsibilities for tailings management (eg 4) Act: Identifying Actions to Improve Performance:
procurement, ore processing operations). The results of performance evaluations are reviewed
by senior management to understand whether the
— Mechanism to help to ensure that decisions are made:
facility and systems, and plans to manage the
- Consistent with the corporate policy, performance facility, are effective. Action plans to address
objectives, the design intent and the risk deficiencies or opportunities for continual
management plan. improvement are developed.
- Informed by risk.
The cycle then repeats, beginning with reviews and
- Taking into account relevant information (eg updates, as appropriate, to all systems, information and
surveillance results, Independent Review, plans to improve performance and in accordance with
community perspectives). the lifecycle phase. The revised plans are implemented,
- At the appropriate level within the organisation, and performance is evaluated.
commensurate with the risks associated with the
decision.

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 40

The key to the success of implementing a TMS is — Elements within the scope of the TMS are
ensuring that: deliberately managed within the framework of the
management system.
— The scope of the TMS is clearly defined.
For existing facilities, a TMS can be developed and
— The relationships between the TMS and other
implemented at any phase of the lifecycle to provide
sitewide systems (eg sitewide ESMS, sitewide water
more effective integration and governance of tailings
management plan) are understood.
management activities.

leadership and commitment’ (International

Organization for Standardization (ISO)).

TMSs as described in this Guide are aligned with the

In Detail ISO 14001 definition of an environmental
management system which includes: an
A management system describes the set of
organisational structure, planning activities,
procedures an organisation needs to follow in order
responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and
to meet its objectives. The objective of implementing
resources for developing, implementing, achieving,
management systems is to ‘help organisations
reviewing and maintaining policies.
improve their performance by specifying repeatable
steps that organisations consciously implement to
Further Reading:
achieve their goals and objectives, and to create an
MAC (2019): A Guide to the Management of Tailings
organisational culture that reflexively engages in a
Facilities, Version 3.1
continuous cycle of self-evaluation, correction and
ISO 14001 – Environmental Management
improvement of operations and processes through
heightened employee awareness and management

Figure 4: Elements of a tailings management system and application across the lifecycle

Act: Plan:
Review and develop Develop plans for
action plans Tailings Facility Lifecycle tailings management

Material Changes

Project
Design Operations Closure Post-Closure
Conception

Construction

Check: Do:
Evaluate Implement the tailings
performance management system

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 41

2.3.2 Plan: Developing Plans for Tailings Developing Plans for Tailings Management should be
Management closely integrated with sitewide mine planning (Section
3.2.2) and should take into account anticipated
Developing Plans for Tailings Management involves
transitions to different lifecycle phases, anticipated
developing information and plans related to tailings
changes and evolution of the tailings facility, and
management and updating the information and plans
anticipated changes and evolution of the overall mine
as appropriate throughout the lifecycle, in alignment
plan.
with corporate policy. This includes developing and
updating as appropriate the following systems, For new facilities, the development of the systems,
information and plans: information and plans for a TMS should begin as early
as possible in the Project Conception and Design
— Site characterisation (Section 3.3.2)
phases of the lifecycle.
— Risk assessment (Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4)
For Operators of existing tailings facilities developing
— Multi-criteria alternatives analysis (Section 3.3.4) a TMS, many of the systems, information and plans
items listed above may already exist, while others may
— P
 erformance objectives, indicators and criteria
not. The objective of the TMS is to bring all systems,
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3)
information and plans related to tailings management
— Risk management plan (Sections 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6) under a single umbrella to help to ensure a consistent,
comprehensive, rigorous and systematic approach to
— D
 ocumentation of the design of the tailings facility,
tailings management. Operators of existing facilities
including the design intent and basis (Section 3.4.5)
developing a TMS should conduct a gap analysis and
— Water management plan (Section 3.2.3) assess the adequacy of existing systems, information
and plans. The gap analysis should also consider input
— T
 ailings transportation and deposition plan
from previous reviews (eg Independent Review), audits
(Section 3.4.4)
or other mechanisms to provide internal or external
— C
 losure (including progressive closure) plan oversight or advice on how the tailings facility is
(Section 3.7.2) managed. An action plan should be developed and
implemented to address gaps, deficiencies or
— OMS manual (Section 2.4)
inconsistencies/conflicts between these existing
— E
 mergency preparedness and response plan (EPRP) systems, information and plans.
(Section 2.7)
2.3.2.1 Managing Change
— C
 ompetencies for key roles related to tailings
management (Section 2.2.4) Managing change is critical to the safe and
responsible management of tailings, and change may
— Plans for managing:
be a potential source of risk. Tailings facilities are
- Change subject to change throughout their lifecycle. This
- Conformance includes changes in a tailings facility itself (eg
- Information (Section 2.5) increasing the size or height of the facility,
implementing progressive reclamation) and changes in
- Quality (Section 3.4.5 and 3.5.2)
the environment in which a tailings facility exists (eg
- Construction (Section 3.5) mine plan changes such as a mine life extension,
— Resources for tailings management ownership, personnel, legal requirements,
communities, climate). In addition, changes to
— P
 rogramme for reviewing tailings safety, including implement continual improvement, such as good
Independent Review (Section 2.6). engineering practices, also need to be managed
Aspects to be addressed that are not addressed appropriately.
elsewhere in the Guide are described below.

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 42

Processes to manage change should be documented Changes that are beyond the Operator’s control such
and implemented to ensure that tailings continue to be as changes in legal requirements or changes in nearby
managed safely and responsibly. communities (eg new downstream social or economic
infrastructure) may also be very important but may be
All potential changes should be carefully considered to
more challenging to manage as the Operator may have
ensure that there are no adverse or unintended
less latitude for proactive actions. An important aspect
consequences associated with changes. Further
of managing such changes is remaining alert to
information is provided on three types of changes:
potential developments outside the Operator’s control,
— Potential material changes (Section 3.6.3). in order to have as much advance warning as possible
of a potential change.
— C
 hanges in personnel in key roles (internal and
external) (see below). Processes for managing change should address
identifying and engaging internal and external
— C
 hanges in ownership of a tailings facility (see
stakeholders relevant to the potential change.
below).

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 43

 — Deviance Accountability Report (DAR)

— Construction Records Report (CRR)

— TMS
In Detail
— OMS manual
Changes in Personnel in Key Roles
Succession plans should be in place for key roles — Closure plan
related to tailings management, including the EOR,
— Assignment of accountability and responsibility
RTFE, Accountable Executive and Independent
Reviewers. The focus of such planning is not on the — Competency of personnel in key positions
staffing or human resources aspects. Rather, it is to
— Performance of the tailings facility
ensure that a plan is put in place, proactively, to
manage changes in such key roles, whether the — R
 ecord of conformance, including compliance
changes are expected or unexpected. with legal requirements

Succession plans should include descriptions of the — O

 utcomes of the programme for reviewing tailings
roles and responsibilities, required qualifications, and safety, including Independent Review.
the process for filling external roles in the event of
This review will also help to inform actions taken in
change. With respect to a change in the EOR the
the event that the merger or acquisition proceeds.
succession plan should also address the transfer of
appropriate documentation to the new EOR.
Hand-over if a merger or acquisition occurs
If a merger or acquisition occurs, then the new
Changes in Ownership
Operator should consider the importance of
There are two aspects to be considered as part of a
continuity, versus the need for change to improve
change in ownership:
tailings management and reduce risks. If tailings are
being managed in a safe, responsible manner by
Due diligence of the prospective new Operator in
competent personnel with appropriate systems and
advance of a merger or acquisition
documentation in place, then it may be best to avoid
A prospective new Operator should include a
undue changes.
thorough review of all tailings facilities that may be
included within a merger or acquisition. A review of Changes, such as changes in key personnel (eg
potential risks and liabilities associated with tailings RTFE, EOR) are a risk, given the complexities of
management is as important as a review of the tailings management and the time it takes to properly
potential assets, perhaps even more so, to help to understand how a particular tailings facility is
ensure that the prospective owner is making an designed and operated.
informed decision.
However, if through the review before the merger or
Such a review may be limited by the amount of acquisition, or through further assessment after the
information available to the prospective new merger or acquisition, the new Operator concludes
Operator, but to the extent possible such a review that changes are needed to address deficiencies and
should include (Section 2.5): reduce risks, then these changes should be made.

— Site characterisation It is important that the existing Operator ensures the

transfer of all relevant information to the new
— Risk assessment
Operator, including:
— Risk management plan
— Documentation related to all the information listed
— Design basis report (DBR) above for a review prior to a merger or acquisition.

— Construction versus Design Intent Verification — All relevant archival information.

(CDIV)

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 44

2.3.2.2 Managing Conformance — S
 chedules of activities that integrate the required
resources related to tailings management. Examples
The Operator should document and implement
of activities to be scheduled include the timing of
conformance management processes to ensure that:
construction, access to construction material,
— A
 pplicable legal requirements and commitments reviews, inspections and any other item critical to
(including commitments/conditions associated successfully implementing the TMS.
with environmental assessment and permitting) are
Measures should be in place for financial control as well
identified, documented, understood, effectively
as competency and training (Section 2.2.4) and
communicated and met.
communication (Section 2.2.6).
— O
 perator’s policies, guidelines, standards and
The Operator should establish and document a budget
practices are identified, documented, implemented
for tailings management, considering both short-term
and met, and are reviewed periodically.
(eg one to two years) and long-term (eg including the
— T
 hose accountable and responsible for Closure and Post-Closure phases) needs for safe,
conformance understand the conformance responsible tailings management throughout the
management plan and have the necessary training lifecycle.
and competence.
The Operator should establish and document the
— P
 rocedures to assess the state of conformance, associated financial controls, obtain budget approval
including frequencies, have been established, and track capital and operating costs against the
implemented, documented and communicated as budget. In addition, at a frequency documented and
required for safe, responsible tailings management. appropriate to the tailings facility and its lifecycle phase,
the Operator should re-evaluate the decommissioning
— S
 tatus of conformance is documented and
and reclamation provision for each facility
reported internally and externally, as required (eg
commensurate with corporate policy, good practices
as required as per legal requirements).
and the applicable legal requirements and
Documentation of conformance management commitments.
processes should include processes to follow in cases
of non-conformance, including: Further Reading:
ICMM: Financial Concepts for Mine Closure
— D
 ocumenting and reporting the non-conformance,
internally and externally, as required.
2.3.3 Do: Implementing the Tailings
— Initiating investigations to determine the causes of Management System
the non-conformance.
When fully implemented, a TMS will facilitate continual
— Addressing consequences of the non- improvement in safe, responsible tailings management.
conformance. The objective is to implement all the elements of the
TMS in a manner appropriate to the lifecycle phase of
2.3.2.3 Resources the tailings facility, to ensure that:

For effective implementation of a TMS, including — A

 ctivities relevant to that lifecycle phase are
eventual decommissioning and closure, and sustained effectively implemented.
post-closure management, the Operator should
— P
 erformance objectives are met, risks are managed,
identify, secure and regularly review adequacy of:
and the tailings facility is performing as expected
— H
 uman resources and external contractors and as per the design intent for the lifecycle phase
and consultants. of the facility.

— Condition, function and suitability of equipment. — S

 urveillance programmes and decision-making
mechanisms are in place to be able to respond in a
— F
 inancial resources needed to address both
timely manner to variances from expected behaviour
operating and capital costs, including expected
or performance criteria.
costs in the Closure and Post-Closure phases.

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 45

— C
 onformance requirements relevant to that lifecycle 2.3.4 Check: Evaluating Performance
phase are met.
Evaluating Performance builds upon the results of
— C
 hange is managed effectively throughout the surveillance (Section 2.4.3) and the programme for
lifecycle. reviewing tailings safety, including Independent Review
(Section 2.6). It occurs at a range of time scales and is
Implementing the TMS requires the implementation of
intended to:
relevant plans, including action plans developed in
previous iterations of the management system process — A
 ssess whether performance objectives (Sections
(Section 2.3.5). 3.2 and 3.3) are being met.
Integral to this for tailings facilities in the Operations, — A
 ssess whether the design intent is being met
Closure and Post-Closure phases of the lifecycle is the (Section 3.4.5).
implementation of OMS activities (Section 2.4). OMS
— A
 ssess the effectiveness of risk management
activities are essential to the day-to-day implementation
measures, including risk controls (Sections 3.2, 3.4
of the TMS and all associated plans and operating in
and 3.6).
conformance with the performance objectives (Sections
3.2 and 3.3) and the design intent of the facility (Section — E
 stablish a mechanism to conduct post-incident
3.4.5). The conceptual development of OMS activities analyses.
should begin during the Project Conception phase and
— Inform Identifying Actions to Improve Performance.
be refined during the Design phase.
Aspects of performance that should be evaluated
The development and testing of the EPRP (Section 2.7)
include:
should continue throughout the Operations, Closure,
and Post-Closure phases, and the Operator should — P
 erformance of the tailings facility against
maintain a state of readiness to be able to implement performance objectives and the design intent
the EPRP if an emergency occurs. (Section 3.4.5).
During the Construction phase (Section 3.5), the — C
 ompliance with legal requirements and
implementation of the TMS includes constructing in conformance with plans and commitments.
accordance with the design (Section 3.4.5) and the
— A
 dequacy of the TMS and associated elements,
Quality Management Plan (Section 3.5.2). It also
including the systems, information and plans listed in
includes developing and updating as appropriate the:
Section 2.3.2.
— Construction versus Design Intent Verification (CDIV)
— D
 ocumentation associated with construction
— Deviance Accountability Report (DAR) activities (Section 3.5):
— Construction Records Report (CRR). - CDIV
- DAR
For tailings facilities in the Closure and Post-Closure
phases, implementing the TMS includes: - CRR.

— Implementing the closure plan. — Adequacy of resources for tailings management.

— C
 onducting long-term OMS activities, as necessary, Evaluating Performance should include the identification
in accordance with the closure plan. of deficiencies and opportunities for improvement.

In cases where changes are made, those changes Evaluating Performance is an ongoing, iterative process
should be: that involves two-way communication between a range
of personnel involved in tailings management. Through
— D
 ocumented, including incorporation into design the surveillance of performance criteria associated with
or operational documents where relevant. risk controls (Section 3.6.4), Evaluating Performance
— C
 ommunicated to relevant personnel provides essential short-term input to decision-making.
(proactively when possible). The RTFE, EOR and Independent Reviewers all have
roles to play including providing input to and receiving
— S
 upported with appropriate training, depending outputs from Evaluating Performance, depending on
on the nature of the change (Section 2.2.4). both the information and time scale involved.

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 46

Results of Evaluating Performance should be and level of detail documented in the Operator’s policies
documented in a performance review and reported to and procedures. The results of Evaluating Performance
the RTFE, the Accountable Executive and, as may also be reflected in the information provided to
appropriate, the BoD, at a frequency (at least annual) project-affected people (Section 2.2.7).

— H
 ow can a similar event be prevented from
happening in the future?

— W
 ere any mistakes made that led to the incident,
In Detail or in responding to the incident? If so, how can
those mistakes be avoided in the future?
As part of Evaluating Performance, the Operator
should establish a mechanism to conduct post- — W
 hat can be done to improve response if a similar
incident analyses for incidents related to tailings incident occurs in the future?
management that may occur, such as cases of
— A
 re there any recommendations for changes to
non-conformance, unanticipated upset conditions, or
the TMS, EPRP or OMS manual as an outcome of
an emergency. This is particularly important for
the post-incident analysis?
incidents with material impacts (eg business
disruption, release of material, non-compliance with If an incident occurs, a post-incident analysis should
legal requirements) and in such cases, post-incident be initiated as soon as possible afterwards, while the
analyses may be conducted in more detail and with memories of the personnel involved remain fresh. The
more intense scrutiny. It is important to learn from results of the analysis should be documented and
such analyses to help prevent similar incidents from reported to the RTFE, Accountable Executive and
occurring in the future. Post-incident analyses should BoD, as appropriate. Operators are encouraged to
consider both the technical and governance aspects share their analyses and outcomes with the industry
that potentially contributed to the incident and the more broadly, so that others may learn and
Operator’s response to the incident. They could also subsequently improve their tailings management
consider a range of questions such as: practices.

— W
 hat was the root cause of the incident, and what
were the contributing factors?

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 47

2.3.5 Act: Identifying Actions to Improve of previously developed and approved action plans,
Performance including any deviations from approved action plans.

Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should be As part of Identifying Actions to Improve Performance,
conducted on a regular basis. The objective is to review the Operator should also consider future plans, such as
current performance and future plans, and to drive planned future construction, facility expansions or other
improvement in tailings facility performance by relevant planned changes. Action plans should be
developing action plans to address deficiencies and developed accordingly to ensure that the systems,
opportunities for continual improvement. This element of information and plans developed as part of Developing
the TMS integrates and is informed by all available, Plans for Tailings Management are revised as needed.
relevant information including the outcomes of Evaluating This effectively completes the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle
Performance and inputs, advice and recommendations of the TMS, in that the Act stage informs the
from a programme for reviewing tailings safety, including subsequent Plan stage.
Independent Review (Section 2.6).
The frequency of Identifying Actions to Improve
Conducted by the RTFE, EOR and other personnel Performance varies, but is typically annual except
involved in tailings management, this element of the during the Post-Closure phase, when a lower frequency
TMS should evaluate: may be appropriate.

— Suitability, effectiveness and the need for To ensure that information is communicated to allow the
changes to: Operator to understand whether tailings are being
- The TMS and all associated elements, including managed in a safe, responsible manner, the results and
the systems, information and plans listed in action plans developed should be reported, at an
Section 2.3.2. appropriate level of detail to:

- Controls related to construction (Section 3.5). — RTFE

— A
 dequacy of resources committed to tailings — EOR
management, including adequacy of human
— Accountable Executive (or delegate)
resources and competencies required.
— BoD, where appropriate
If deficiencies or opportunities for continual
improvement are identified, then action plans should be These reports can also be provided to other business
developed with input from the EOR and mechanisms units (eg management responsible for ore processing) to
implemented as part of a programme for reviewing help ensure the continued coordination of activities
tailings safety. directly and indirectly related to tailings management.

Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should also In addition, these reports can help to form the basis for the
provide an update on the status of the implementation public disclosure of information (Section 2.2.7 and 2.6).

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 48

 also provide a summary of any significant issues
related to the performance of the tailings facility and
TMS, including:

In Detail — C
 onformance with the performance objectives
and design intent.
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance provides
an opportunity for the RTFE, EOR and other personnel — C
 ompliance with legal requirements, conformance
involved in tailings management to: with standards, policies and commitments, and
status of corrective actions.
— R
 econfirm alignment between design intent, risk
management plan, and OMS activities. — Tailings facility maintenance and surveillance.

— D
 iscuss realised or anticipated changes and their — Input from the programme for reviewing tailings
implications/management. safety ().

— Identify opportunities for improvement. The outcomes of Identifying Actions to Improve

Performance should be documented and reported to
As part of Identifying Actions for Improving
the Accountable Executive, including:
Performance, changes since the previous review that
are relevant to tailings management should be — C
 onclusions regarding the performance of the
identified and their significance should be evaluated, tailings facility, the TMS and associated plans,
such as: OMS manual and EPRP.

— C
 hanges to legal requirements, standards and — If needed, action plans to:
guidance, industry best practice and
— Ensure that performance objectives are met.
commitments to communities.
— A
 ddress non-conformance with requirements,
— C
 hanges in mine operating conditions (eg
standards, policy or commitments.
production rate) or site environmental conditions.
— Implement recommendations for continual
— C
 hanges outside the mine property that may
improvement.
influence the nature and significance of potential
impacts resulting from the tailings facility on the — A
 ny recommendations for modifications to the
external environment or vice versa. TMS, OMS manual or EPRP.

— Changes in the risk profile of the tailings facility. — A

 ny recommendations for additional resources for
tailings management.
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 49

Operation, Maintenance 2.4
and Surveillance

2.4.1 Introduction — Design intent (Section 3.4.3).

OMS activities are fundamental to the day-to-day — Conformance management plan (Section 2.3.2.2).
management of tailings facilities. The TMS, performance
The OMS manual should also describe the linkages with
objectives, risk management plan and design intent
emergency preparedness and response (Sections 2.4.5
provide a framework for safe, responsible tailings
and 2.7).
management, but OMS activities are needed to implement
them on a day-to-day basis. Operators that do not OMS is applicable across the lifecycle. It is important to
effectively implement OMS activities cannot adequately emphasise the operation does not just include activities
understand their risks, proactively manage tailings, make related to the active placement of tailings during the
informed decisions or have any confidence that tailings Operations phase of the lifecycle. It also includes
and associated risks are being effectively managed. activities related to water management, reclamation
and, where applicable, the management of other
OMS activities should be documented in an OMS
materials (eg residues from water treatment such as
manual, and should be aligned with:
lime treatment sludge) that may continue to be
— TMS (Section 2.3) and overall governance structures deposited into the tailings facility after the end of the
for tailings management. Operations phase. Thus, in most cases, operation
activities will be necessary in the Closure phase and
— Lifecycle phase of the facility (Section 1.2.1).
may also be necessary in the Post-Closure phase.
— P
 erformance objectives, criteria and indicators to be
While the need for operation activities may cease at
included in the design of the surveillance
some point (eg reclamation is complete and there is no
programmes that measure performance throughout
longer a need for active water management), the need
the tailings facility lifecycle (Section 3.3.3).
for maintenance and surveillance activities continues
— Closure plan and objectives. until the tailings facility reaches a point where ongoing
maintenance and surveillance are no longer needed to
— R
 isk management plan including risks controls and
ensure that the facility is safe and that the performance
associated performance criteria (Sections 3.6.4 and
objectives for closure continue to be met. This is directly
3.2.4).
tied to completion of the closure success criteria
(Section 3.7.3) and the transition from an active facility
to a closed facility (Section 3.7.4.1).

Further Reading:
MAC (2019): Developing an Operation, Maintenance, and
Surveillance Manual for Tailings and Water Management
Facilities

2.4.2 Development of an OMS Manual

An OMS manual is intended to be a practical, ‘hands on’
document describing plans and procedures for all
aspects of operation, maintenance, and surveillance
activities associated with a tailings facility. It can be
seen as the ‘owner’s manual’ for a tailings facility.

An OMS manual should be aligned with the

performance objectives and risk management plan for

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 50

the tailings facility to which it is applied, including the OMS activities should begin during the Project
closure plan. Linking the facility’s risk management plan Conception and Design phases, and some surveillance
with OMS activities is at the core of an effective OMS activities (eg monitoring of meteorological conditions)
manual. This includes specifying actions to be taken if may begin during these phases. By the end of the
performance is outside the expected range, indicating Design phase, the surveillance programme should be
upset or potential emergency situations, but also designed so that relevant instrumentation can be
ensuring that OMS activities are planned and installed during construction. The OMS manual should
implemented in a manner consistent with the design be refined during the Construction phase so that it is
intent, the risk management plan and the closure plan. ready for implementation at the beginning of the
Operations phase, and reflects the as-built conditions
To be effective, an OMS manual should:
(eg final configuration of the tailings pipeline and
— Be site-specific, not ‘off-the-shelf’ and should: pumping system) and any deviations from the design
- Address the specific conditions and circumstances that were implemented during the Construction phase
of the site. (Section 3.5). The OMS manual also should be updated
to reflect the final as-built conditions of the ore
- Contain or link to all information needed to
processing facility as they relate to characteristics of
conduct OMS activities.
the tailings that will be produced (eg solids content of
- Integrate
 the knowledge and experience of
the tailings).
personnel who have worked on the site.
The OMS manual should be ready for implementation
— D
 efine roles, responsibilities and levels of authority
at the beginning of the Operations phase and should
for personnel involved in tailings management.
continue to be reviewed and updated as needed
— Be integrated with overall site plans and procedures. throughout the Operations phase. In addition, the OMS
manual should address the potential for the temporary
— Be written:
suspension of mine operations (Section 3.6.5), including
- By personnel with specific and detailed knowledge a short-term, emergency suspension or a longer-term
of the tailings facility, with input from consultants suspension of unknown duration. Having an OMS plan
or other third parties as appropriate. for a temporary suspension helps to ensure that risks
- For
 personnel directly involved in tailings are appropriately managed during the transition to
management, and not for other audiences such as suspension and during the period of the suspension.
regulators, senior management or communities. OMS activities associated with a transition back to
- In
 a clear, concise, easily understandable manner, operations should also be described.
and include information regarding how more The development of OMS activities for the Closure and
detailed information can be accessed. Post-Closure phases should happen in concert with the
— B
 e improved over time, reflecting feedback from development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2). This is
Performance Evaluation (Section 2.3.4), action plans important to ensure that OMS activities during the
to address deficiencies or for continual improvement Operations phase are consistent with the closure plan,
(Section 2.3.5), and lessons learned by personnel lay the foundation for the implementation of the closure
involved in tailings management. plan, and address progressive reclamation activities to
be implemented prior to transition to the Closure phase.
An OMS manual should describe the boundaries of its For existing tailings facilities that do not have an OMS
scope of application. The scope should include all manual, the Operator should develop a manual,
operational controls that can influence the performance informed by:
and risk management of the tailings facility (eg tailings
transport, placement of tailings, physical containment — Conducting a gap analysis.
of the tailings, water management and seepage — Assessing current OMS activities and the degree to
management, reclamation and closure activities). which they are aligned with the performance
The scope is defined on a site-specific basis, taking into objectives and risk management plan.
account the characteristics and lifecycle stage of the
tailings facility and linkages with other relevant plans OMS manuals should be regularly reviewed and
and procedures. updated as appropriate to ensure that they are up to
date. An out-of-date OMS manual may pose a risk to
For new tailings facilities or for material changes such the safety of the tailings facility.
as a mine life extension, planning and development of

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 51

There are many potential drivers for the need for a As described further in Section 2.5, an OMS manual
review and update of an OMS manual, including: should be a controlled document. Since OMS manuals
are accessible to many people involved in tailings
— U
 pdates to the risk assessment and the risk
management and are updated frequently, effective
management plan.
document control for the OMS manual is particularly
— P
 lanned changes as the tailing facility evolves important. The Operator should define mechanisms for:
throughout the Operations phase (eg raising
— R
 eview of the draft OMS manual and proposed
embankment structures to increase capacity).
updates, including input from the EOR.
— Material changes to the design.
— A
 pproval of the OMS manual and subsequent
— Adoption of new technologies (eg surveillance updates, including clarifying who has the authority to
technology). approve major revisions (eg new procedures) versus
minor revisions (eg updating personnel contact
— Transitions in the lifecycle phase of the facility.
information, reflecting changes in personnel).
— Changes in personnel.
— E
 nsuring that all personnel have access to and are
— C
 hanges in relevant infrastructure (eg pumping working with the most up-to-date version.
systems for tailings or water).
2.4.3 Contents of an OMS Manual
In conducting reviews, a wide range of information
should be considered, including: An OMS manual should:

— P
 erformance of the facility, including any deficiencies — A
 ddress site-specific aspects of OMS governance,
in performance. building on overall accountability and responsibility
for tailings management (Section 2.2.2), and should
— T
 ailings facility design and any deviations from the
document site-specific OMS activities.
design.
— D
 efine and describe plans and procedures for
— C
 urrent constructed conditions (Section 3.5) and
implementing activities related to the transport,
construction history.
placement and permanent storage of tailings and,
— Current lifecycle phase of the facility. where applicable, water and the recycling of water.

— Status of progressive reclamation activities. — D

 efine and describe plans for the preventative,
predictive and corrective maintenance of tailings
— R
 elevant advice and recommendations from site
infrastructure and all equipment associated with the
inspections, and the programme for reviewing
tailings infrastructure.
tailings safety, including Independent Review.
— Describe surveillance activities (inspection and
— C
 hanges since the last review of the OMS manual,
monitoring) associated with the tailings
such as changes in:
infrastructure including the documentation, analysis
- Characteristics of the tailings facility (eg increased and communication of results.
embankment height since the last review).
- Performance objectives and indicators. 2.4.3.1 OMS Governance
- Risk assessment and the risk management plan.
An OMS manual should describe:
- Personnel or organisational structure.
— Tasks and functions related to OMS activities.
- Legal requirements.
- Closure plan. — R
 oles, responsibilities and level of authority of
personnel or groups that assume these tasks and
— P
 lans to address any gaps or deficiencies in functions, including the RTFE(s) and the EOR
performance. (Section 2.2.2) and other key personnel involved
— Plans for continual improvement. in tailings management.

— Future plans for the tailings facility. — Competencies required for various roles.

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 52

— Functional relationships and lines of communication:
- Between personnel and groups involved in OMS
activities.
- With groups outside the scope of the OMS manual
and involved in activities that may affect tailings
management.
- With external parties, including reviewers,
regulators and communities.

An OMS manual should also describe:

— R
 eporting relationships between different individuals
and business units with direct and indirect roles
related to tailings management.

— H
 ow information related to specific OMS activities
should flow.

— P
 rocesses and procedures for reporting outcomes
of OMS activities.

In describing roles, responsibilities, levels of authority

and relationships, an OMS manual development team
- What actions are contractors or consultants
should focus on functional relationships, rather than
expected to take?
organisational relationships. This approach may be
useful for overcoming functional and communication Actions to be taken should be clearly described so
silos that may be unintentionally reinforced by that appropriate action can be taken in a timely
organisational structures. manner.

An OMS manual should describe reporting procedures

2.4.3.2 Operation
for any surveillance results that are outside the
expected range of observations or performance, as Operation refers to the operation of the tailings facility
these results may be indicative of upset conditions or a and associated activities, including:
potential emergency. Any such results should be
— Transport and deposition of tailings (Section 3.4.4).
communicated in a timely manner so that appropriate
decisions can be taken by those with the responsibility — C
 onstruction during the Operations and Closure
and authority to act under the circumstances. phases (Section 3.5).

An OMS manual should clearly describe the roles, — M

 anagement of water and seepage during the
responsibilities and authority of the RTFE and other Operations and Closure phases, and potentially
employees, the EOR, and the contractors or consultants also in the Post-Closure phase (Section 3.2.3).
involved in surveillance. This is particularly important
— R
 eclamation activities during the Operations and
with respect to surveillance linked to critical controls. An
Closure phases (Section 3.7).
OMS manual should describe:
— In some cases, operation may also include:
— W
 ho is responsible for surveillance data acquisition
and analysis? - Deposition of non-tailings materials in the tailings
facility (eg waste rock or lime treatment sludge)
— W
 hat are the lines of communication for reporting in during the Operations and Closure phases, and
the event that results are outside the range specified potentially also in the Post-Closure phase.
for the critical control performance criteria?
–R
 emoval of tailings for reprocessing or other
— If critical control performance criteria are exceeded: purposes during the Closure or Post-Closure
- What actions are the RTFE(s) and other employees phases.
expected to take?

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 53

Thus, operation applies not just to the Operations phase facility. Maintenance includes preventative, predictive and
of the lifecycle but also to the Closure phase and in corrective activities carried out to provide continued
many cases the Post-Closure phase. proper operation of all infrastructure related to tailings
management, or to adjust infrastructure to ensure
This component of an OMS manual should define and
operation in conformance with performance objectives.
describe the plans and procedures for implementing
operating controls that enable the tailings facility to be The maintenance component of an OMS manual
operated in accordance with the design intent, identifies and describes:
performance objectives, risk management plan and
— A
 ll infrastructure (eg embankments, associated water
closure plan. Plans and procedures are typically
management infrastructure, mechanical systems,
documented in standard operating procedures (SOPs).
electrical systems, instrumentation, etc) within the
The management of every tailings facility should follow scope of the OMS manual that has maintenance
a range of SOPs that best reflect the characteristics of requirements.
that facility and support the performance objectives
— P
 reventative, predictive and corrective maintenance
and risk management plan. A typical approach is to
activities.
develop a suite of SOPs that serve as the foundation of
a well-managed facility. The SOPs described in an OMS There are three categories of maintenance activities:
manual will be dependent on the lifecycle phase of the
Preventative maintenance: Planned, recurring
tailings facility.
maintenance activities conducted at a fixed or
SOPs describe performance indicators and pre-defined approximate frequency and not typically arising from
actions (eg TARPs) to be taken if associated results of surveillance activities. Examples include:
performance criteria deviate from defined ranges. SOPs
— R
 egularly scheduled oil change on a pump, as per
include a description of the potential ramifications of
manufacturers specifications.
not responding to a deviation.
— C
 alibration and maintenance of surveillance
SOPs should be reviewed at an established frequency
instruments.
and updated as appropriate, and any changes in
procedures should be documented. Predictive maintenance: Pre-defined maintenance
conducted in response to the results of surveillance
2.4.3.3 Maintenance activities that measure the condition of a specific
component against performance criteria. Examples
The objective of maintenance is to provide preventative
include:
and corrective means to achieve performance objectives
and manage risk throughout the lifecycle of a tailings — R
 eplacement of a section of tailings pipeline based on
monitoring of the pipe thickness.

— R
 emoval of debris from a spillway based on debris
accumulation.

— Removal of trees growing on embankments.

Corrective maintenance: The repair of tailings facility

components to prevent further deterioration and ensure
their operation in conformance with performance
objectives. The need for corrective maintenance is based
on surveillance activities, with surveillance results
identifying the need and urgency of maintenance.
Pre-defined actions based on surveillance results and
performance criteria (eg TARPs) may include specific
maintenance activities. Examples include:

— Repair of erosion gullies.

— Unplugging of toe drains.

— R
 eplacement of a broken pump or failed
section of pipeline.

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 54

 For predictive maintenance, an OMS manual should
also describe:

— Items described above for preventative

In Detail maintenance.

For all categories of maintenance activities, an OMS — P

 re-defined maintenance activities that are
manual should describe (or link to relevant references): conducted based on results of surveillance
activities (eg clearing of snow, clearing of debris
— T
 he nature of the activity and the specific
from spillways).
maintenance requirements (eg refer to
manufacturers maintenance specifications, SOPs). — Linkages with surveillance activities, including:

— L ocation of the infrastructure requiring - Associated surveillance parameters.

maintenance. - Performance criteria linked to the need to carry
out the maintenance.
— Q
 ualifications or competencies required to
conduct the maintenance (eg must be an - Communication
 procedures to ensure that
electrician, must be certified to work in enclosed results of surveillance activities, and
spaces). recommendations for maintenance, are
documented and reported in a timely manner so
— Safety hazards and procedures. that the maintenance activity can be carried out.
— P
 ersonnel or groups responsible for carrying out For corrective maintenance, an OMS manual should
the maintenance. also describe:
— R
 esources required to conduct the maintenance — Items described above for preventative and
(eg equipment, materials, personnel): predictive maintenance.
— C
 ommunication procedures associated with — C
 redible failure mode based on risk analysis and
maintenance activities that potentially affect other risk controls.
activities, eg for maintenance that requires that
power be disrupted, what other infrastructure will — F
 or each event, the pre-defined corrective
be affected, when will it be affected, for how long, maintenance activities.
when will power be restored, and who will need to — Surveillance activities associated with those events.
know this.
— Communication procedures to ensure that:
— Tracking and documentation requirements, such as:
- Results of surveillance activities are documented
- Tracking to ensure activity was completed in a and reported in a timely manner.
timely manner.
- Necessary resources are mobilised.
- Documentation of the condition of the
- Corrective maintenance is carried out.
equipment or other observations made by
personnel doing the maintenance. — P
 rocedures to return to normal operation (if
- Documentation to demonstrate the activity was applicable).
carried out appropriately. While predictive and corrective maintenance are
- Recommendations from personnel doing the linked to surveillance results, these maintenance
maintenance. activities could include maintenance of surveillance
instruments if surveillance results indicate that an
— Reporting requirements:
instrument is no longer functioning or is not
- Information to be reported. functioning reliably.
- How information should be reported.
An OMS manual should identify materials (eg parts,
- To whom information needs to be reported.
filter material, rip rap) that should be kept in inventory
- Reporting timelines. on site to prevent delay in the maintenance of
For preventative maintenance, an OMS manual components tied to risk controls. In addition, resources
should also describe the frequency at which the identified in the EPRP should be kept in inventory on
maintenance activity is to be conducted. site, in the event that an emergency occurs.

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 55

2.4.3.4 Surveillance For surveillance to be effective in risk management
and a risk-informed approach, the results should be
Surveillance involves the inspection and monitoring (ie
collated, examined, analysed and reported in a timely
collection of qualitative and quantitative observations
and effective manner.
and data) of activities and infrastructure related to
tailings management. Surveillance also includes the An effective surveillance programme is:
timely documentation, analysis and communication of
— C
 onducted by a range of personnel with direct and
surveillance results, to inform decision-making and
indirect responsibilities related to tailings
verify whether performance objectives (Sections 3.2
management.
and 3.3), the risk management plan (Sections 3.2 and
3.4), and the design intent (Section 3.4.5), are being — A
 pplied across the lifecycle of a tailings facility, while
met. Surveillance results are used to identify trends adapting to the specific surveillance needs of each
and behaviours that are indicative of the tailings lifecycle phase and changing site conditions.
facility’s actual performance.
— B
 ased on site-specific performance objectives and
An OMS manual should describe two types of the risk management plan.
surveillance activities: site observation and
— U
 sed to inform decision-making related to tailings
inspections, and instrument monitoring. The different
management, based on the clear, timely reporting
activities are complementary, and are equally
of surveillance results.
important to safe, responsible tailings management.

For site observation an OMS manual should describe:

— P
 rocesses and procedures for documenting
observations (eg a checklist may be provided to
In Detail personnel with instructions for written and
photographic documentation of observed
Surveillance activities should be aligned with the
conditions).
design intent (Section 3.4.5), performance objectives
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3) and the risk management plan — P
 rocesses for reporting any observations that
(Sections 3.2 and 3.4). A failure to conduct have been documented.
surveillance of the necessary parameters or
For inspections, an OMS manual should describe the:
conducting surveillance at an inadequate frequency
could result in a failure to identify instances where — Scope and objective of the inspection.
action needs to be taken. Similarly, a failure to analyse
— F
 requency for conducting the inspection (eg could
and report results in a timely manner could result in
be once or more per shift for some types of
actions being taken too late, if at all, leading to a loss
inspections, weekly, monthly or quarterly for
of control.
others).

Site Observation and Inspections — C

 ircumstances that would trigger the need for
Site observation and inspections are used to identify unscheduled inspections.
and track visible changes in the condition of the
— Conditions or aspects to be observed as part
tailings facility. Site observation and inspections
of the inspection.
include the direct observations by personnel on or
adjacent to tailings facilities and may also include — P
 rocesses and procedures for documenting and
observations from helicopters, and photos/videos reporting results of inspections.
taken from unmanned airborne vehicles (UAVs/
drones and satellites) or surveillance cameras. Instrument Monitoring
Instrument monitoring provides information on
Site observation and inspections are an integral part
parameters or characteristics that cannot be
of the surveillance programme and may provide the
detected through site observation or inspections (eg
first indication of changing or adverse conditions,
groundwater movement, water quality), cannot be
particularly where instrument monitoring is scarce or
observed with sufficient precision and accuracy (eg
absent, or where adverse conditions develop outside
movement or settling of a tailings facility), or need to
the area of sensitivity of the instruments present.

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 56

 be monitored at high frequency or continuously (eg — M
 ethodology and procedures for data analysis,
bird monitoring to activate deterrent systems). including comparisons with expected
performance and risk controls.
The objective of instrument monitoring is to collect
data to be used to assess the performance of the — W
 ho is responsible for data analysis for each
tailings facility against the performance objectives parameter.
and indicators, and the risk management plan.
— F
 orm in which surveillance results and analysis
Instrument monitoring and site observation and
need to be reported (eg written report, graph,
inspections function together as a comprehensive
table).
data set to enable the assessment of facility
performance and provide a basis for informed — Timeframes for data analysis and reporting.
decisions. All are essential, and none of these forms
— Procedures for reporting results if:
of surveillance can be neglected if performance
objectives are to be met and risks are to be managed. - Observations and performance are within the
expected range.
For instrument monitoring, an OMS manual should
- Any observations or performance are outside
describe:
the expected range.
— P
 arameters to be included as part of instrument
— Who is responsible for reporting.
monitoring, including those not directly related to
the tailings facility (eg meteorological data, — To whom the reports are to be provided.
seismic monitoring).
Considerations for the Design of a Surveillance
— T
 he frequency of data acquisition for each
Programme
parameter.
There is no ‘one-size-fits all’ approach to surveillance.
— Instrument(s) to be used for each parameter. Each surveillance programme should be designed on
a site-specific basis to be able to provide accurate,
— W
 ho is responsible for data acquisition for each
meaningful information about the performance of the
parameter.
tailings facility.
— L ocations of instruments, or locations where
When designing or reviewing a surveillance programme,
samples are to be collected (eg sampling of pore
the following questions should be considered:
water quality).
— W
 hat do you need to know? Why do you need to
— M
 ethodology and procedures for data acquisition,
know it? What will this information or data tell you?
including those related to quality management (eg
- What information do you need to understand
instrument calibration).
the performance of the tailings facility?
— P
 rocesses and procedures for documenting the - What is the risk management plan and what are
results of instrument surveillance, and the the surveillance requirements stemming from it?
interpretation of results.
- What are the performance objectives, criteria
— Who is responsible for documenting the results. and indicators for the risk controls for the
tailings facility?
Analysis of Surveillance Results
— Who needs to know it, and why?
For the effective use of surveillance results in tailings
management and decision-making, results should be — W
 hat types of information do you need that can
collated, examined, analysed and reported in a timely be acquired through direct, visual observation of
and effective manner. the tailings facility? For this type of information:

For all surveillance activities, an OMS manual should - How often should visual observations or
describe: inspections be made to give you the information
you need?
— T
 he expected range of observations or
- What should the person(s) observing or
performance of surveillance parameters, so any
inspecting be looking for?
results outside that range can be identified and
- Who should they tell if they see something of
reported.
potential concern?

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 57

 — What types of information do you need that can For example, a given degree of movement
only be acquired indirectly, through measurement detected in an embankment structure may be
of associated parameters or analysis of samples? normal and consistent with the design for one
- What
 methodologies can be used to collect the tailings facility but may be cause for concern at
data needed to provide this information? a different facility.
- How frequently does this data need to be — How does this data need to be analysed? How
collected to provide the information you need? frequently does it need to be analysed to provide
- Is
 real-time or continuous monitoring possible? the information you need?
If so, is it appropriate?
— What form do the results need to be presented in
— How can surveillance results be verified and to allow you to understand what the information is
calibrated? For example: telling you, how it relates to other information, and
- H
 ow can results from remote sensing methods what it is telling about the performance of the
such as satellite observations be verified or tailings facility?
‘ground-truthed’?
- H
 ow can results be calibrated to understand
what they mean in the context of a specific
tailings facility and the performance objectives,
design intent and risk management plan?

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 58

2.4.4 Implementation of an OMS Manual 2.4.5 Linkages with Emergency Preparedness
and Response
An OMS manual is only effective if it is properly and
consistently implemented. This requires that the It is important to understand the relationship between
manual be accessible and that all personnel expected emergency preparedness and response (Section 2.7)
to use the manual: and OMS activities. Typically, OMS activities are
conducted under normal, and upset or unusual
— Are aware of its purpose and importance.
conditions, while the EPRP functions when there is an
— K
 now how to access the current version of the emergency. While different Operators may establish the
OMS manual. boundary between upset and emergency conditions
differently, it is important to define this boundary, and
— U
 nderstand their roles, responsibilities and level of
thus define the boundary between the scope of OMS,
authority related to tailings management.
and the scope of emergency response.
— H
 ave the knowledge and competence to fulfil their
The OMS manual and EPRP for a given tailings facility
roles and responsibilities.
should be aligned, such that there are no functional
— Understand the OMS activities they are engaged in. gaps between normal operation and emergency
response, and that procedures are in place to transition
The Operator should consider providing training
from normal conditions to an emergency situation that
(internal or external) to help ensure that personnel
may arise.
have the necessary knowledge and competence. As
part of training, personnel should understand how to A mine can have many types of potential emergency
recognise problems, upset or unusual conditions, and situations, although it should be noted that credible
understand the importance of reporting those to the failure modes with negligible likelihood may not
appropriate person in a prompt manner. Training necessarily need emergency plans. In terms of tailings
should emphasise the importance of this and make it facilities specifically, for each potential emergency
clear that personnel are strongly encouraged to do so. associated with a credible failure mode, an OMS manual
Furthermore, it should be made clear that reporting should describe:
problems, upset, or unusual conditions will not result
— T
 he performance, occurrences or observations that
in negative implications for the personnel reporting (eg
would result in an emergency being declared (eg
disciplinary measures, termination of employment).
based on risk controls and associated performance
This is key to the effective early recognition of
criteria) (Section 3.6.4).
problems so that timely action can be taken.
— R
 oles and responsibilities of key personnel in
The Operator should have a roll-out strategy, including
transition from normal or upset conditions to an
a training component, for a new OMS manual or any
emergency.
significant revisions to the OMS manual.
— A
 ctions to be taken to transition from normal or
Beyond training for new versions of the OMS manual,
upset conditions to an emergency situation.
regular refresher activities should be provided (eg
annual), and new personnel should receive training
specific to their roles in OMS. The Operator may also
consider mentoring programmes or other activities to
help encourage the retention and advancement of
personnel with roles related to tailings management.
This will help to ensure a higher level of competency,
lower staff turnover and provide a basis for succession
planning.

As part of implementation of the OMS manual, and as

further described in Section 2.5.4, the Operator should
develop systems for the control of information (eg
maintenance records) generated by OMS activities, to
ensure that all necessary information is appropriately
recorded and is stored in a secure, retrievable manner.

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 59

Managing Information 2.5

2.5.1 Introduction an identification of the information that Operators

should have to enable safe tailings management.
The Operator’s access to and use of up-to-date,
accurate information is critical to enabling safe, For information and documents identified in Sections
responsible tailings management. Preparing and 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, Operators should also document, where
updating documentation on information on all aspects applicable:
of tailings management is critical to providing a
— R
 esources required (eg budget, human resources,
basis for:
equipment, and material).
— S
 afe design, construction, operation and closure of
— Specific accountabilities and responsibilities.
tailings facilities.
— C
 ompetencies required of personnel with various
— Decision-making to ensure safe tailings
roles and responsibilities.
management.
— Schedules for implementation and reviews/updates.
— Managing change.
— Status of implementation.
— Developing and implementing a closure plan.
— Mechanisms and reporting for documenting
— Fully understanding and effectively managing risks.
outcomes.
In addition, it is important to identify and retain key
information for future reference, including in the 2.5.2 Information Related to Governance of
long-term through the Closure and Post-Closure Tailings Management
phases.
The Operator should appropriately document and
This includes documentation describing key aspects maintain information related to all aspects of
related to: governance of tailings management and ensure that
documentation is up to date. This includes the following
— Governance of tailings management.
elements:
— Planning, design, construction, operation and OMS
— A
 ccountability and responsibility for key positions
activities, and closure of tailings facilities.
(Section 2.2.2), including documentation on:
This also includes all documents developed by the - L ines of communication and associated
Operator in response to legal requirements and expectations.
commitments to communities, including commitments - Succession process and information transfer for
to public disclosure. succession.
First and foremost, this information is critical to the — C
 orporate policy on tailings management
Operator. However, it may also provide the basis for (Section 2.2.3).
information that is disclosed to regulators, potentially
affected communities, other stakeholders and the — D
 ocumentation related to the implementation of the
public (Section 2.2.7). TMS, including (Section 2.3):
- Mechanisms for implementing the TMS.
In describing the information listed in the sections
below, it is important to emphasise that it is the - Outcomes of Identifying Actions to Improve
concepts and content that are important. It is up to Performance, including action plans developed.
the discretion of the Operator to determine how best — O
 MS manual (Section 2.4) and outcomes of OMS
to structure and organise this information, including activities (eg surveillance results).
what to call different documents. The sections below
are not intended to be a ‘table of contents’ but rather — Documentation related to the programme for

ICMM Managing Information 60

 reviewing tailings safety, including (Section 2.6): undertake studies to improve information (eg to improve
- Mechanisms for reporting results internally and site characterisation). It is important to recognise that
externally. gaps, such as a lack of detailed site characterisation,
may increase uncertainty about the future performance
- Outcomes of reviews and the Operator’s responses
of a tailings facility.
to outcomes (eg actions to implement
recommendations). Types of information that should be documented and
maintained include:
— EPRP, including results of testing (Section 2.7).
— Site
 characterisation, including plans for
2.5.3 Information Related to the Project updating and improving the site characterisation
Conception, Design, Construction, Operation (Section 3.3.2).
and Closure of Tailings Facilities
— Risk assessment, including (Section 3.2.4):
Information related to the project conception, design, - Outcomes and key conclusions.
construction, operation and closure of tailings facilities
- A summary for senior management (eg
should be appropriately documented and maintained to
Accountable Executive).
ensure that documentation is up to date.
- Schedule for periodic reviews.
It is important to note that Operators may not have all of
- Factors that would trigger an unscheduled review.
this information for all of their tailings facilities, particularly
older facilities that were designed and constructed many — Multi-criteria alternatives analysis, including a
decades ago. Such information may not have been summary for senior management of (Section 3.3.4):
produced (eg multi-criteria alternatives analyses were not - Alternatives considered.
conducted) or may be inadequate compared to current - Factors considered in the decision-making
good practice (eg site characterisation information) or process.
may have been lost or destroyed over time (eg original
- Key factors leading to the selection of the
drawings). In some cases, it will be impossible to fill such
preferred alternative.
gaps (eg an Operator cannot retroactively do an
alternatives analysis). In other cases, Operators may

Tailings Management Managing Information 61

— P
 erformance objectives, indicators and criteria, - D
 uring the Closure phase, the status of
including (Section 3.3.3): implementation of the plan.
- Schedule for periodic reviews. - During the Post-Closure phase:
- Factors that would trigger an unscheduled review. ◊S
 tatus of performance against the closure plan
and objective.
— Risk management plan including (Section 3.2.4):
◊S
 tatus of achieving the intended post-closure
- Status of development and implementation.
land use.
- A summary for senior management.
- A summary for senior management, appropriate to
- A description of risk controls, associated the lifecycle phase and the status of development/
performance criteria and surveillance implementation of the closure plan.
requirements, and pre-defined actions to be taken
if performance is outside expected ranges. 2.5.4 Control of Information
— Information on the design of the tailings facility, The use of inaccurate, incomplete or out-of-date
including (Section 3.4.5): information can increase uncertainty and pose a risk,
- The design basis and approach. as can the loss of records of essential information
- Design of all stages of the facility, including (eg reports, SOPs, photos, maps, drawings, surveillance
construction drawings. results).

— Quality management plan (Section 3.5.2). Information that is identified by the Operator as
necessary to safe tailings management, throughout
— T
 ailings transportation and deposition plan
the lifecycle of the tailings facility, should be controlled.
(Section 3.4.4).
Control of information includes establishing and
— Water management plan (Section 3.2.3).
implementing a process to ensure necessary
— Information on the construction of the tailings facility information is documented, and that key documents
(initial construction and construction activities and information are maintained, retained and archived.
through the balance of the lifecycle) (Section 3.5). There are two aspects to the control of information:

— Closure plan including: — A

 ccess to, and use of, up-to-date, accurate
- Closure objectives and post-closure land use. information.

- Status of development of the closure plan, — Identification and retention of records that are
including opportunities for progressive closure potentially useful to the future management of the
activities. tailings facility.
- Community engagement activities related to
closure plan development and implementation.
- Schedule for review and updates to the closure
plan.

ICMM Managing Information 62

 Access to these documents may be interrupted (eg
loss of paper copies due to fire, temporary loss of
access to electronic copies due to loss of power).
The risks associated with the loss of access of
In Detail
documents should be assessed, particularly in the
The information described in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 case of documents that are accessed electronically.
should be managed within controlled documents,
There may be certain documents or content that
including:
should be accessible as a paper copy in the event
— P
 roviding a procedure for the systematic that electronic versions are not accessible. For
identification of documents (eg numbering system example, a loss of power restricting access to
consistently applied). electronic versions may be linked to certain risk
controls (eg loss of ability to operate pumps) and
— D
 efining the process for reviewing and updating
having access to a paper copy of the OMS manual
the document, including both major and minor
(Section 2.4) during such periods may be necessary
updates.
for the effective response to the situation. Similarly,
— Identifying persons with authority to revise the having access to paper copies of an EPRP may be
document, and the scope of their authority (eg essential in some potential emergencies.
some may only have the authority to amend
Specific risks and vulnerabilities associated with the
certain sections).
potential loss of access to documents should be
— D
 escribing mechanisms for the approval of identified and contingency plans and information
revisions to the document. technology security plans should be developed,
including:
— F
 or electronic documents, developing and
implementing measures to prevent unintended — P
 rocedures for the backup and recovery of paper
changes, or to prevent any changes by personnel and electronic copies.
without the appropriate authority.
— P
 lans to prevent unauthorised access, including
In addition, there should be defined procedures for: access to documentation, as well as access to
instruments (eg surveillance instruments) and
— P
 roviding relevant personnel with access to the
other technologies that may be connected to
document and any supporting documents (ie
mobile networks or wireless internet.
distributing paper copies or providing access to
electronic versions). — R
 etention of paper copies of critical sections of
documents that can be used in the event of a loss
— Informing personnel of changes to the document
of access to electronic documents.
relevant to their roles and responsibilities.
Another consideration for the control of documented
— C
 ontrol of reference information used to develop
information is the management of legacy electronic
and update the document or referred to in the
formats. A plan should be developed, with input from
document.
information technology and management experts, to
— R
 estricting access to out-of-date versions and address the management of legacy electronic
clearly labelling those versions as out of date. formats to ensure that records potentially useful to
tailings management are not lost or made impossible
— Identifying out-of-date materials that should be
to access in the future as a result of the
retained.
obsolescence of software, electronic file formats or
— A
 rchiving or disposing of out-of-date materials, data storage media.
as appropriate.

Tailings Management Managing Information 63

Programme for Reviewing 2.6
Tailings Safety

2.6.1 Introduction Responding to this challenge requires a well-designed

review programme with multiple levels of safety
A strong emphasis on the review of safety of tailings
assessment. Understanding safety cannot be
facilities is essential to provide oversight of all the
simplified to a verification of performance against a few
factors that influence safety.
key technical parameters or criteria, unless they reveal
A significant challenge in reviewing and assessing the that a failure is imminent. A review programme
safety of tailings facilities is that they are in a near providing oversight needs to address a range of
constant state of change from their initial questions related to a tailings facility and how it is
construction, throughout the Operations phase as the being managed.
size of the facility increases, and throughout the
Responding to this range of questions requires a range
Closure phase when the closure plan is implemented.
of competencies in reviewers. In addition, there is no
Given the complex, dynamic nature of tailings facilities
single review mechanism that can answer such a range
and the mining operations within which they exist, and
of questions, nor would it be desirable or effective to
the nature of the governance structures needed to
rely on a single review mechanism and single team of
ensure safe tailings management, the programme for
people to provide oversight of all aspects of tailings
reviewing the safety of tailings facilities should be
management. A review programme consisting of
multi-faceted and comprehensive if it is to be
several different mechanisms, implemented in an
effective. This is imperative given the potential for
integrated manner, is needed.
human error in so many different aspects of tailings
management.

ICMM Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 64

 consistent with the objectives of safe, responsible
tailings management (Section 3.3.3)?

— H
 as the Operator developed a tailings facility
In Detail design that is consistent with the objectives of safe,
responsible tailings management (Section 3.4)?
Questions that may be addressed by a review
programme include: — H
 as the Operator developed a risk management
plan that eliminates risk where possible, and
— A
 re governance structures and systems
describes measures to reduce or mitigate
appropriate and are they being implemented
remaining risks (Section 3.2.4.3)? Is the risk
effectively? Do these structures and systems
management plan being implemented effectively?
include adequate mechanisms to manage
change, and are these mechanisms being — H
 as the tailings facility been constructed in a
implemented effectively (Section 2.3.2.1)? manner consistent with the design intent? Have
deviations (Section 3.5.3) and as-built conditions
— D
 o personnel with accountability, responsibility
(Section 3.5.4) been adequately documented?
and authority related to tailings management have
the necessary competencies? — H
 as the Operator developed OMS activities that
are aligned with the performance objectives, risk
— A
 re lines of communication clear and adequate,
management plan and design intent (Section 2.4)?
and is communication effective?
Are these OMS activities being implemented
— A
 re personnel encouraged to report problems, effectively?
errors or concerns in a prompt manner, and are
— Is the tailings facility performing in accordance
they free from potential negative repercussions if
with the performance objectives, risk
they do so?
management plan and design intent (Section
— D
 oes the Operator have information on the site 2.3.4)? Is the tailings facility expected to continue
characteristics necessary to inform decisions to perform in this manner?
throughout the lifecycle (Section 3.3.2)?
— H
 as the Operator identified closure objectives and
— D
 oes the Operator understand the risk to the a post-closure land use (Sections 3.3.3 and 3.7)?
degree necessary to inform decisions through the
— H
 as the tailings facility been planned,
lifecycle (Section 3.2.4)?
designed, constructed and operated in a manner
— D
 oes the Operator recognise and understand consistent with the closure objectives and post-
uncertainties associated with risk? Has the closure land use?
Operator taken steps to reduce uncertainty
— A
 re there deficiencies in the responses to any of
(Section 3.2.4)?
the above questions?
— H
 as the Operator developed performance
— A
 re there opportunities for continual
objectives, indicators and criteria that are
improvement?

2.6.2 Designing a Programme for Reviewing — Reviews of the TMS

Tailings Safety — Audits or verifications.
There are several different review mechanisms that can
To ensure that the review programme is effective for the
be implemented to provide a programme for reviewing
tailings facility in question, the Operator should consider
the safety of tailings facilities, including:
the site-specific design of such a programme, including
— Independent Review factors such as:

— Dam safety reviews (DSRs) — W

 hat are the objectives of the overall review
programme and what are the topics or questions
— Tailings stewardship reviews
to be addressed?

Tailings Management Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 65

— What is the lifecycle phase of the tailings facility? Figure 5: Integration of a programme for tailings
safety review into the tailings management system
— H
 ow complex is the tailings facility and what are the
risks?
Act: Plan:
— W
 hat will be the relationship between reviewers and Review and Develop plans
the Operator’s employees and consultants, including develop action for tailings
plans management
the Accountable Executive, the RTFE and the EOR?

— H
 ow frequently is review needed to reflect the state
of change of the tailings facility?
Programme
— A
 re there relevant legal requirements or other to review
requirements or commitments that need to be tailings safety

considered in the design of the programme?

The design of a review programme should describe:

Check: Do:
— Review mechanisms to be used. Evaluate Implement
performance the tailings
management
— M
 andate, objectives and scope of each system
mechanisms.

— Frequency of application of each mechanism.

— C
 ompetencies required for reviewers for each impartial and objective manner. Reviewers must be
mechanism, taking into account the mandate and empowered to bring forward observations, advice and
objectives, and the complexity and risks associated recommendations for safe, responsible tailings
with the tailings facility. management, including constructive criticism of the
Operator. Reviewers must be able to conduct the review
— The degree of independence expected. free of the risk of negative repercussions, particularly in
The Operator should also consider and describe the the case of employees who are involved in reviews.
relationship between different review mechanisms Reviewers would be considered independent if they
within the programme, how each mechanism is have not been directly involved with the design or
intended to address the overall objectives of the review operation of the particular tailings facility. Independence
programme, and how these mechanisms will be is important because an independent reviewer can bring
integrated with each other. Different Operators may, for a fresh, outside perspective. They may recognise
example, define the scope of Independent Review deficiencies or opportunities that someone more familiar
versus a tailings stewardship review differently. There is with the tailings facility may overlook or fail to recognise.
no ‘right’ definition of the scope of these mechanisms. Independence also lends credibility.
However, when designing a review programme the
scope of these mechanisms should be made clear to — However, as noted above, tailings facilities and the
avoid confusion. associated systems to manage them are complex.
It can take a long time to fully understand this
The review programme should be designed to be complexity. The more independent a reviewer is,
integrated with the TMS to ensure that reviews are fully the less familiar they may be. As a result, there is a
informed by, and in turn inform, the ongoing Plan-Do- potential for their observations or recommendations
Check-Act cycle of the TMS, including developing and to be based on an incomplete understanding of the
implementing action plans to address deficiencies and tailings facility and associated systems. On the other
opportunities for continual improvement. This is hand, this lack of familiarity may lead them to identify
illustrated in Figure 5. concerns not necessarily evident to those more
A further consideration for an Operator in developing a familiar with the facility. There is an important role to
review programme is balancing the need for the play in the review programme both for reviewers with:
independence of reviewers with the need for familiarity — G
 reater familiarity and a more complete
with the tailings facility and how it is managed. understanding of the tailings facility in question.
Regardless of who is involved in conducting a review, it — L ess familiarity with the tailings facility in question,
is essential that they undertake the review in an but a greater degree of independence.

ICMM Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 66

2.6.3 Template for a Programme for — Results of Independent Review, tailings stewardship
Reviewing Tailings Safety reviews, and reviews of the TMS are considered by
the Operator in Identifying Action to Improve
Recognising the importance of designing a review Performance (Section 2.3.5), and action plans should
programme on a site-specific basis, this section be developed and implemented to address
proposes a template for an effective programme for deficiencies and opportunities for continual
reviewing tailings safety. This proposed review improvement.
programme consists of the following elements,
implemented in an integrated manner: A review programme rigorously implemented following
this template, with close coordination between the
— A
 s described in Section 2.3.4, the Performance Independent Review and the tailings stewardship
Evaluation element of the TMS should include the review, would provide effective oversight to help ensure
preparation of an annual performance review by safety. Furthermore, it would meet or exceed the level of
the EOR, addressing whether the tailings facility is assurance that is typically provided by the use of dam
performing as intended. safety reviews (Section 2.6.5).
- T
 his report is provided to those involved in
tailings safety review for information. 2.6.4 Independent Review
- The design of the programme should specify Independent Review provides periodic review of the
which review mechanism is responsible for Operator’s engineering practices throughout the
reviewing this annual report and assessing its lifecycle and provides the Operator with objective
conclusions. opinions and advice, and potentially recommendations
regarding the risks and the state of tailings
— Independent Review is conducted periodically to
management, independent of the personnel
review plans and engineering practices throughout
responsible for tailings management.
the lifecycle.
Independent Review is applicable throughout the
— T
 ailings stewardship reviews are conducted
lifecycle of a tailings facility. The input of Independent
periodically to provide detailed reviews of
Review should be sought from the Project Conception
operational practices.
(Section 3.3) and Design (Section 3.4) phases, through
— T
 he TMS and associated governance mechanisms to reviewing performance during the Post-Closure
are reviewed periodically. phase (Section 3.7). This includes seeking input from

Tailings Management Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 67

Independent Review on the development of the typically included, based on consideration of
closure plan (Section 3.7.2) and consideration of surveillance data, input from a tailings stewardship
potential material changes (Section 3.6.3). However, review, and site inspection.
over the lifecycle the scope and focus of Independent
Independent Review is conducted by one or more
Review should be re-adjusted to ensure it remains appropriately qualified and experienced individuals.
relevant and effective. Mechanisms for Independent Review can include a
Independent Review typically provides an assessment multi-person board, commonly referred to as an
of the underlying drivers of tailings safety, such as the Independent Tailings Review Board (ITRB) or an
site characterisation and models (Section 3.3.2), individual reviewer, referred to in the Standard as
a Senior Independent Technical Reviewer.
design intent and assumptions, performance against
the design intent, and models used to verify design The Independent Reviewers do not have decision-
assumptions and to predict future performance. More making authority and do not replace the role of the
specific consideration of current performance is also EOR for assessing tailings facility safety.

- Performance objectives and the design intent

are being met.
- The facility is predicted to continue to perform
In Detail as intended.

Independent Review provides input to the — E

 ffectiveness of plans and processes for tailings
Accountable Executive and RTFE on a range of management, such as the surveillance
aspects related tailings management, such as: programme.

— Adequacy of site characterisation. — D

 evelopment and implementation of the closure
plan.
— D
 esign and conduct of the multi-criteria
alternatives analysis, and the conclusions of — Opportunities for continual improvement.
the analysis. To be effective, Independent Review should consider
— Completeness/appropriateness of: plans for future mine development and associated
tailings management. This may include considering
- The Operator’s understanding of the risks posed
information such as the anticipated life-of-mine
by tailings management and the need to
based on current exploration results, as opposed to
conduct an up-to-date or more thorough risk
the expected life-of-mine based on proven reserves
assessment.
and resources. A difference of several years in
The planned or existing risk management plan. life-of-mine may have significant implications for
tailings management. However, this may require
— D
 esign of the tailings facility and the adequacy of
disclosure to Independent Reviewers of forward-
associated documentation.
looking information. Public disclosure of information
— W
 hether the design criteria and performance of this nature may be limited by securities law,
objectives for tailings management are consistent depending on the relevant jurisdiction. As a result, in
with legal requirements, industry guidelines and such cases, it is important that the meetings and
best practices, and current theory, methodologies detailed reports of Independent Review be
and experience. confidential. However, an Operator may prepare a
summary that does not reveal forward looking
— C
 urrent or anticipated performance of tailings
information that may be provided to regulators,
management including whether:
investors, communities or other stakeholders.

ICMM Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 68

2.6.5 Dam Safety Reviews assessed in isolation from consideration of the facility
as a whole. Thus, a more holistic approach is needed
Dam safety reviews (DSRs) are a review mechanism
when assessing the safety of tailings facilities.
adapted from practices for water dams and are
commonly applied to tailings embankments. DSRs are — T
 he high degree of independence of DSRs, as noted
required under legal requirements in some jurisdictions above, can also be a limitation. Persons performing a
and are required in the Standard. DSR may lack the familiarity and knowledge needed
to fully understand a tailings facility and its
Ideally, a DSR is a review mechanism that is conducted
management.
in a systematic manner by an independent qualified
review engineer to assess and evaluate the safety of an It is important that Operators, regulators, and other
embankment or tailings facility against failure modes, in stakeholders recognise the limitations of DSRs and
order to make a statement on the safety of the facility, recognise the importance of considering the outputs of
including whether or not it meets the design intent and a range of review mechanisms for tailings safety. In
applicable safety criteria, and whether it poses any addition, Operators should consider measures to
unacceptable risks. A DSR may include the address these limitations, such as modifying the DSR
consideration of technical, operational and governance methodology to take a more holistic view of the entire
aspects. An equivalence to this ideal DSR may exist, tailings facility.
such as that described in Section 2.6.3.
2.6.6 Tailings Stewardship Reviews
DSRs consistent with the above description have
certain advantages when conducted in a multi- There is a review mechanism, sometimes referred to as
disciplinary manner, notably: a tailings stewardship review, that is complementary but
different than Independent Review.
— R
 ecognition and acceptance by regulators and other
stakeholders. — It is more operationally focused than Independent
Review:
— P
 otentially, a higher degree of independence
- It
 may go into a greater degree of detail on
compared to other review mechanisms described in
operational performance, plans and practices (eg
this section.
OMS activities) related to the safety of the tailings
However, particularly given the widespread recognition facility and may highlight areas of focus for
and acceptance of DSRs, there is a risk of placing too Independent Review.
much reliance on and confidence in them. This - It
 would not typically include elements such as
confidence should be tempered by understanding the reviewing and providing input to the multi-criteria
limitations of DSRs and, as described in Section 2.6.1, alternatives analysis (Section 3.3.4), the
Operators should implement a review programme development of the design of the tailings facility
consisting of several different mechanisms to reduce (Section 3.4.3), or the development of the closure
reliance on any one mechanism. plan (Section 3.7.2).
DSRs also have important limitations, in part based on — It is conducted by an independent engineer,
their origins in practices for water dams: supported by the EOR, personnel from the site, and
— T
 hey are often not conducted at an adequate potentially personnel from other sites or the
frequency to reflect the dynamic nature of tailings Operator’s corporate team.
facilities. For example, conducting a DSR every five Given the more detailed focus of a tailings stewardship
years may be adequate for a water dam that has review compared to Independent Review, those
been operating for 10–15 years or more after conducting tailings stewardship reviews need a greater
construction is complete. However, in a five-year degree of familiarity with the tailings facility and the
period a tailings facility may have changed quite Operator’s plans and practices. As such, a tailings
considerably. stewardship review should consider the outcomes of a
— M
 ethodologies for DSRs often focus on the review of the tailings management system.
embankments. However, the safety of an tailings The key activities of a tailings stewardship review
facility embankment cannot be appropriately include:

Tailings Management Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 69

— Reviewing a detailed summary of information Tailings stewardship reviews may be conducted
provided by the Operator, including: annually for tailings facilities in the Operations and
- Current and planned operations. Closure phases of the lifecycle. They may be conducted
less frequently in the Post-Closure phase, depending
- Surveillance results.
on the risks posed, the state of reclamation, the
- Status of implementation of recommendations
performance of the facility and predicted future
of previous reviews.
performance.
— C
 onducting a detailed inspection of the tailings
The results of the inspection should be documented,
facility.
including supporting inspection checklists and
— R
 eviewing operational plans, practices and photographs. A report of the tailings stewardship review
procedures to assess the effectiveness of is then prepared by the independent engineer, including
implementation in supporting the achievement of any recommendations regarding:
the performance objectives and design intent of the
— S
 ignificant tailings facility safety concerns and/or
tailings facility. The plans, practices and procedures
concerns requiring immediate or time-sensitive
reviewed may include:
actions.
- OMS manual
— Tailings facility safety concerns or conditions
- EPRP
requiring time-sensitive action by a date
- Tailings transport and deposition plan. recommended in the review.
- Water management plan, including seepage
— Improvements to plans, practices and procedures.
control and collection, as they relate to stability
of the tailings facility.

— S
 tatus of actions taken on recommendations from
previous tailings stewardship reviews.

— S
 urveillance programme, including parameters,
In Detail frequency of data collection and instrumentation.

A tailings stewardship review considers a wide range — R

 esults of surveillance and inspections since the
of information, such as: last tailings stewardship review.

— C
 urrent status and future plans regarding the — Results of Independent Review.
tailings facility.
— S
 tatus of site characterisation and the site
— History of the tailings facility, including: characterisation model.
- The design intent and the design basis.
— R
 esults of modelling of current and future tailings
- The evolution of the facility from the facility performance.
Construction phase onwards.
— S
 tatus of the OMS manual, EPRP, and related
- Deviations from the design intent and design
documents.
basis.
- Material changes that have been implemented — S
 tatus of training for personnel with direct roles
since the last stewardship review. related to tailings management.

— Risk assessment. — C
 urrent and future operational or technical
challenges.
— Closure plan.

ICMM Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 70

2.6.7 Review of the Tailings Management A review of the TMS should identify deficiencies and
System opportunities for continual improvement related to the
tailing management system and governance
The TMS and associated governance mechanisms
mechanisms and make recommendations for actions to
should be reviewed periodically to assess whether they
be taken to address any deficiencies or opportunities
are effective and fit for purpose for achieving the
for improvement.
objective of safe tailings management.
These reviews may be undertaken internally or
The scope of a review of the TMS, also referred to as a
externally. However, an external perspective may be
governance review, should include a review of the
particularly effective in identifying underlying
completeness and effectiveness of:
deficiencies, particularly those related to the overall
— A
 ssignment of accountability and responsibility, corporate culture of the Operator.
including the effectiveness of the Accountable
The results of the review of the TMS should be
Executive in decision-making related to tailings
considered by the Operator in Identifying Actions to
management (Section 2.2.2).
Improve Performance (Section 2.3.5). Results help to
— C
 orporate policy of tailings management facilitate informed decisions regarding tailings
(Section 2.2.3). management so that tailings-related risks are managed
safely and responsibly.
— Implementation of the TMS (Section 2.3).

— Management of information (Section 2.5). 2.6.8 Audits

— Functional and organisational structure. Audits (also referred to as verifications or validations)
are formal, systematic, documented examinations of a
— L ines of communication and effectiveness of
tailings facility’s conformance with explicit, agreed,
communication (Section 2.2.6).
prescribed criteria, including legal requirements, the
— R
 elationships with business units with indirect roles Operator’s policy and commitments, applicable
related to tailings management. standards, or performance expectations. Audits
evaluate and report on the degree of conformance with
— Ongoing integrated mine planning (Section 3.2.2).
stipulated criteria, based on the systematic collection
— Integration with sitewide systems, such as a sitewide and documentation of relevant evidence. These review
ESMS. mechanisms involve some degree of judgement but are
not designed to determine root cause of deficiencies, or
— C
 onformance with legal requirements, corporate
to evaluate effectiveness.
policies and practices, and commitments to
communities (Section 2.3.2.2). Audits can be conducted both internally (eg by
employees with appropriate knowledge and
— E
 ffectiveness of response to any non-conformances,
competencies who are independent, impartial and
incidents, or complaints.
objective with respect to the management of the
tailings facility being audited) or externally. The
frequency would depend on several factors, including
the objective and scope of the audit.

Tailings Management Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 71

Emergency Preparedness 2.7
and Response

2.7.1 Introduction The objective of the EPRP is to prevent, mitigate or

reduce impacts (eg injury or loss of life) in the event an
Recognising that the ultimate goal of this Guide is to
emergency occurs.
eliminate fatalities and catastrophic events, it is
nonetheless important to be prepared for a potential The EPRP should:
emergency.
— Describe measures the Operator will take to prepare
There is a wide range of potential emergencies that for an emergency and to respond if an emergency
may occur associated with tailings facilities, and it is occurs. This detailed description is primarily for use
essential for Operators to be prepared to effectively by the Operator and should be integrated into the
respond if an emergency occurs. Such potential sitewide emergency plan. This description should:
emergency scenarios may include: structural failure - Identify potential emergencies that could occur.
of a facility, rising water levels within a facility, ◊ Potential emergencies may be categorised based
unusual and excessive cracking of an embankment, on the nature of the potential emergency or the
a sudden loss of environmental containment of a nature of the response that would be required.
facility, or other events. There are also other types of This may assist in describing the measures to be
emergencies that may affect a mine site more taken if an emergency occurs.
generally, including a tailings facility, such as a loss
- Describe measures to be taken if an emergency
of power, or extreme conditions such as an
occurs.
earthquake, wildfire, landslide or avalanche.
- Identify resources needed to respond to an
Operators should develop and be prepared to emergency.
implement a site-specific EPRP for credible failure
- Address any necessary coordination with off-site
modes that could lead to emergencies. This includes
emergency responders, local communities, public
credible failure modes that could lead to
sector agencies and other parties that may be
catastrophic failures.
involved in emergency response (eg other
Emergency planning related to tailings facilities businesses).
should be integrated into broader, sitewide - D
 escribe mechanisms to implement the plan if an
emergency planning so that the Operator has a emergency occurs.
comprehensive EPRP to address the full range of
— P
 rovide information to off-site emergency
potential emergencies that could occur.
responders, communities2 and public sector
Note that, as described in Section 2.4.5, different agencies to assist in the development of their
Operators may establish the boundary between emergency response measures and collaborate with
upset and emergency conditions differently. them in that development.
Operator’s should clearly define this boundary, and
— P
 rovide information to other parties that may be
this defines the scope of potential events to be
impacted if an emergency occurs.
addressed in the EPRP. The surveillance programme
(Section 2.4.3.4) should include surveillance activities — A
 lign with the OMS manual, as discussed in
capable of identifying the performance, occurrences Section 2.4.5.
or observations that would result in an emergency
being declared (eg based on risk controls and
associated performance criteria) (Section 3.6.4).

2. In the context of emergency preparedness, communities include places where people reside permanently or temporarily,
including individual residences and recreational sites such as campgrounds.

ICMM Emergency Preparedness and Response 72

Operators should engage off-site emergency — A
 fter updates to the risk assessment (Section 3.2.4)
responders, communities, public sector agencies, and if those updates lead to changes in the
where relevant, other parties that may be involved in understanding of credible failure modes or potential
emergency response, in the development of relevant consequences of a failure.
components of the EPRP (ie components related to
— In response to material changes to the tailings
potential emergencies that could have off-site impacts,
facility (Section 3.6.3).
or for which the Operator may require external support
to respond to the emergency). This process should — W
 hen the lifecycle transitions to a different phase
include supporting communities and public sector (eg transition from Operations to Closure phase).
agencies to develop their own EPRPs. It is up to the
— To reflect relevant changes in:
Operator, in consultation with off-site emergency
responders, communities and public sector agencies, to - Personnel or organisational structures related to
determine how best to organise information related to emergency response and referred to in the EPRP.
emergency preparedness. - Sources
 or contact information related to off-site
support, such as suppliers of material or
The EPRP should be tested throughout all phases of the
equipment that would be used for emergency
lifecycle at a frequency established in the plan, or more
response.
frequently if triggered by a material change either to the
- Practices or technology related to emergency
tailings facility or to the social, environmental and local
response (eg warning systems).
economic context. Testing should involve communities
and public sector agencies, including off-site - Legal requirements.
emergency responders, who would be involved in — O
 ther changes on or off-site relevant to emergency
responding to an emergency. Operators should response, such as changes to road access,
meaningfully engage with employees and contractors communication or other infrastructure.
to inform the development and testing of the EPRP and
co-develop community-focused emergency Further Reading:
preparedness measures with project-affected people. ICMM and UNEP: Good practice in emergency
The EPRP should be revised, as appropriate, to reflect preparedness and response
outcomes and lessons learned from testing.
UNEP: Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies
The EPRP should also be reviewed and updated as at Local Level (APELL)
appropriate:

Tailings Management Emergency Preparedness and Response 73

2.7.2 Assessing Credible Potential impacted in the event that an emergency occurs. This
Consequences information is needed to help develop emergency
response measures.
The starting point for developing an EPRP is the
identification of potential failure modes and Such credible failure scenarios fall into two basic
determining whether those potential failure modes are categories, based on behaviour of the material if a
credible. Credible failure modes, discussed further in failure occurs, and thus the methods used to conduct
Section 3.4.3, are failure mechanisms that are more detailed analysis of potential consequences:
technically feasible given the materials present in the
— C
 redible failure scenarios that would include a flow
tailings facility and its foundation, the properties of
of materials – water alone or water and solids (ie
these materials, the configuration of the tailings
tailings and other entrained solids such as soil)
facility, drainage conditions and surface water control
– into the downstream environment.
at the tailings facility, throughout its lifecycle under the
static and transient loading conditions the facility may — C
 redible failure scenarios with potentially
be subject to over that lifecycle. Credible failure catastrophic consequences but not related to a
modes are identified through the risk assessment flow of materials into the downstream environment
process (Section 3.2.4). (eg a slump of tailings solids with limited water).

Once credible failure modes have been identified, a Flow failures are the failure mode most often
preliminary analysis should be conducted to identify associated with catastrophic consequences when
and assess the scenarios that could develop and the failures occur.
potential consequences of those scenarios, including
For credible failure scenarios that would include a flow
impacts on human health and safety, the environment
of material, a breach analysis should be conducted to
and infrastructure. This provides the basis for
estimate:
identifying and describing credible failure scenarios to
be addressed in the EPRP. — T
 he physical area that would be impacted by a
potential failure.
A credible failure mode and a credible failure scenario
are related, but different. A simplified explanation of — F
 low arrival times at various downstream locations
the difference is as follows: (eg communities, bridges).

Credible failure mode = credible mechanism + credible — F

 low depth and velocities at various downstream
initiating event + credible failure process (each locations.
element needs to be credible for the failure mode to
— Duration of flooding.
be credible).
— Depth of material deposition.
Credible failure scenario = credible failure mode +
credible consequences (each element needs to be For credible failure scenarios which are not related to
credible for the failure scenario to be credible). a flow of material, the Operator should conduct an
appropriate analysis (eg simplified deformation
For credible failure scenarios that would not have
analysis) to estimate in more detail the potential
catastrophic consequences, the EPRP may be
consequences if a failure were to occur.
developed on the basis of this preliminary analysis.
The decision tree provided in Figure 6 illustrates this
For credible failure scenarios that could have
process.
catastrophic consequences, more detailed analysis of
potential consequences should be conducted to
Further Reading:
inform development of the EPRP. The purpose of more
APEGBC: Flood Mapping in BC: Professional Practice
detailed analysis is to identify communities,
Guidelines.
infrastructure, residences, farms, recreational facilities,
wildlife habitat and other features that could be

ICMM Emergency Preparedness and Response 74

 pressure sensors and auto shut-off valves coupled
with visual observations and actions are in place.
Alternatively, depending upon where a tailings
pipeline is located, a break in that pipeline could
In Detail
result in a catastrophic failure if the pressure sensors
Failure modes may be geotechnical in nature, as and the auto shut-off valves fail and if the facility is
described in Section 3.4.3.10. For the purpose of remote with infrequent observations.
emergency planning, the following types of
Figure 6 is focused on decision-making for EPRP
geotechnical failure modes should be considered:
development, recognising that risk controls would be
— T
 ailings are sufficiently saturated that they are developed and implemented, and surveillance
potentially able to flow and could become mobile measures would be in place to reduce the likelihood
in the event of a failure (ie credible flow failure of failures (Sections 2.4, 3.2.4.3 and 3.6.4).
scenario).

— T
 ailings that are sufficiently unsaturated that they Figure 6: Decision tree for evaluating potential
could not flow in the event of a failure, but could consequences of credible failure modes to
become mobile (eg credible failure modes could inform development of EPRPs
lead to a slump).
No, or with
However, not all credible failure modes are negligible Facility has one or more
likelihood credible failure scenarios?
geotechnical in nature. For example, the EPRP for
tailings management may address credible failures Yes
associated with tailings transportation such as a No, or with If a failure occurs could
negligible
break of a tailings pipeline. In addition, sitewide tailings and water flow
likelihood impactfully?
emergencies such as wildfire could also lead to
credible failure modes related to tailings under some Yes

circumstances. Thus, it is important that Operators Conduct a breach analysis

consider geotechnical as well as non-geotechnical
failure modes when developing EPRPs.
Analysis of potential
Some credible failure modes may or may not have impacts informs
development of EPRP
the potential to be catastrophic, depending on the
layers of controls in place. For example, a break in a
tailings pipeline could result in minimal spilled volume Note: The process of evaluating risks and informing/updating the EPRP
occurs throughout the life of the facility. For operating facilities, Figure 8
and associated impact either due to where it is explains the process of reviewing credible failure modes, risk and uncertainty
on an ongoing basis.
placed relative to the embankment and/or where

2.7.3 Description of Measures the Operator An EPRP for a tailings facility in the Closure or Post-
Should Take Closure phases of the lifecycle should be adapted to
those phases, when there may be fewer personnel and
The EPRP should include a description of the measures
less equipment on site, and thus fewer resources on
the Operator will take to prepare for emergencies, and
hand to be able to respond to an emergency. The EPRP
to respond if an emergency occurs. Although some
may need to involve local contractors who could provide
aspects of this element of the EPRP may involve
heavy equipment and operators, as well as measures to
external parties, it is intended to be an internal
ensure that equipment, fuel and personnel can be
document. Elements of an EPRP that would be
transported to the site. Contingency plans may be
implemented by external parties should be developed
needed for power generation on site and
cooperatively and be provided to them.
communication infrastructure.

Tailings Management Emergency Preparedness and Response 75

 - Communication systems, equipment and
materials.

— P
 rocedures to activate the EPRP, including internal
In Detail and external notification and communication plans
for emergency response, including up-to-date
An EPRP should describe the following, regarding the
contact information (eg phone numbers and email
measures the Operator will take to prepare for an
addresses) for relevant personnel, both internal
emergency, and to respond if an emergency occurs:
and external.
— C
 redible failure scenarios that may occur and the
— T
 raining requirements and plans for relevant
conditions that would trigger implementation of
personnel, including external parties such as
the EPRP.
off-site emergency responders.
— P
 otential impacts of credible failure scenarios, and
— Procedures or actions to be taken to:
the likelihood of those scenarios.
- Prevent an upset or unusual condition from
— R
 esources (people, equipment, materials) required becoming an emergency.
to respond to an emergency, including identifying
- Mitigate on and off-site safety, environmental,
resources that need to be retained on site (eg
and infrastructure impacts associated with
equipment, stockpiles of rip rap or other
emergency situations.
materials).
- Mitigate consequences if an emergency occurs
— R
 oles and responsibilities of the Operator’s (eg through the development of evacuation and
employees, contractors, and consultants, and rescue plans).
relevant external parties (eg public sector
agencies, off-site emergency responders) and the — M
 echanisms to alert potentially affected parties of
overall command structure (who is in charge of an imminent or developing emergency situation
response and associated reporting relationships) (eg alarms to notify downstream communities in
in the event of an emergency. the event of a tailings facility failure).

— A
 ny mutual aid agreements with external parties, — M
 easures to provide humanitarian aid, if
such as public sector agencies, other industrial necessary.
facilities (eg nearby mines) or contractors (eg — S
 urveillance requirements to be described in OMS
heavy machinery). manual (Section 2.4), to be able to identify the
— D
 escription of features and characteristics on and onset of an emergency.
off-site relevant to emergency response, including: — Procedures and frequencies to test the EPRP.
- Access, including primary and secondary means
— P
 rocedures for the administration and update of
to access the mine site, tailings facility and
the EPRP.
potentially impacted areas, and means of
reaching the site of a potential emergency under
various conditions (eg foot, boat, helicopter,
all-terrain vehicle etc.).

ICMM Emergency Preparedness and Response 76

2.7.4 Provision of Information to External Procedures should be established and implemented for
Parties regularly scheduled review and testing of the EPRP to
ensure that the plan is up to date and adequate. The
For tailings facilities with credible failure scenarios that
results of tests should be evaluated to identify any
could lead to off-site impacts, the Operator should
deficiencies or opportunities for improving the EPRP
provide information to off-site emergency responders,
and the plan should be updated accordingly.
communities and public sector agencies to assist in the
development of their emergency response measures Review and testing of the EPRP should involve
and collaborate with them in that development. The communities and public sector agencies, including
information provided is typically similar to but less off-site emergency responders, with roles or
detailed than the information in the Operator’s EPRP. responsibilities related to emergency response.
This information should be tailored to the needs of
The potential off-site consequences of a failure should
off-site emergency responders, communities and public
be a key consideration in identifying communities and
sector agencies and developed with their input. It
public sector agencies to be engaged in EPRP
typically includes descriptions of:
development and testing, and implementation in the
— T
 he tailings facility, the credible failure scenarios and event that an emergency occurs. However, in identifying
the potential impacts, including potential impacts if stakeholders to be engaged, the Operator should
flow of material occurs. consider the engagement of stakeholders beyond
those that would be directly impacted by an emergency.
— R
 oles and responsibilities of the Operator and
In addition, there may be stakeholders who have
external parties (eg off-site emergency responders,
important response capacity that could assist in
regulatory agencies) and the overall command
responding if an emergency occurs (eg a larger
structure (who is in charge of response, associated
community more distant from the mine site, but with
reporting relationships, and relationship between the
more response capacity than closer communities).
Operator and other parties) in the event of an
emergency. Considering community-focused measures and public
sector capacity, an Operator should take all reasonable
— N
 otification procedures to be followed if an
steps to maintain a shared state of readiness for tailings
emergency occurs or is imminent.
facility credible flow failure scenarios by securing
— M
 echanisms to alert potentially affected parties of resources and carrying out annual training and
an imminent or developing emergency situation (eg exercises. An Operator should conduct emergency
alarms to notify downstream communities in the response simulations at a frequency established in the
event of a tailings facility failure). EPRP (at least every three years) for tailings facilities
with potential loss of life. Simulations can range from
2.7.5 EPRP Development, Readiness and tabletop exercises to field exercises of an emergency
Response and can include the testing of multiple failure scenarios.

All relevant personnel, including external parties, should In the case of an actual catastrophic tailings facility
be familiar with the EPRP and their roles and failure, an operator should provide immediate response
responsibilities if an emergency occurs. They should to save lives, supply humanitarian aid and minimise
also know how to access relevant portions of the EPRP, environmental harm.
recognising the external parties may not be provided
access portions of the EPRP related to any emergencies
that would not have off-site impacts, or any portions
containing confidential information.

Tailings Management Emergency Preparedness and Response 77

Part 3: Implementation
of Good Engineering
Practices for Tailings
Management

Part 3: Implementation of Good Engineering

ICMM Practices for Tailings Management 78
Overview 3.1

Sufficiently robust engineering — Overarching engineering concepts:

practices, coupled with governance - Integrated mine planning

- Integrated tailings and water management
described in Part 2, are essential to
- Managing risk and uncertainty.
safe, responsible tailings management.
Elements described in Part 3 of this — Engineering activities throughout the lifecycle:
- Project Conception
Guide include:
- Design
- Construction
- Operations
- Closure and Post-Closure.

While inadequate engineering has been a major factor

in many tailings facility failures, rigorous application of
this Guide across the lifecycle at all tailings facilities,
new and existing, will lead to improved engineering
practice and safer tailings facilities. The primary basis
for the following content is to establish integrated
procedures that prevent catastrophic failures.
Governance described in Part 2 of this Guide provides
the framework to be sure rigorous implementation of
Part 3 occurs.

This Guide encourages integrated procedures that may

help to prevent catastrophic failures. This may be
realised by implementing full application of the
precautionary approach or a performance-based
risk-informed approach to tailings facility lifecycle
management depending upon the nature of the tailings
facility. Comprehensive documentation, such as the
Design Basis Report (DBR), Design Report and the
Construction Records Report (CRR), irrespective of the
design approach, are important to tailings facility
lifecycle management. To underscore this point, of the
tailings failures reviewed by Morgenstern (2018),
inadequate characterisation of foundation conditions,
both geological and geotechnical, was a contributing
factor in about 40% of the cases.

Tailings Management Overview 79

Overarching Engineering Concepts 3.2

3.2.1 Introduction — Integration of water management (Section 3.2.3).

Mines and their multiple work areas, facilities, and — D

 evelopment, analysis, and selection of alternatives
personnel are complex systems. The mines are only during the Project Conception phase (Section 3.3.5).
able to function optimally and in a risk-informed manner
— Design of tailings facilities (Section 3.4).
by integrating the various components and workflows
within the mine site. — Development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2).

Through studying lessons learned in case histories, Examples of integration aspects include:
Operators now understand the need to consider all
— T
 he life of the mine reserve and resource should be
material aspects of the mine site when conducting
integral in determining tailings capacity
‘mine planning’. Likewise, Operators increasingly
requirements.
recognise the interdependence of sitewide water
management on the integrated understanding and — O
 re processing approaches and anticipated ore
management of tailings facilities. variability.

Once systems and personnel (operators, engineers, — T

 ailings technology selection requires consideration
managers from relevant disciplines) are integrated, it is of production rate and material properties, climate
possible to ascertain and manage risk and uncertainty, and water balance, power and closure objectives.
in particular for tailings facilities, more fully. Managing
— C
 onsideration of availability and quality of
risk and uncertainty is part of the core culture of mining
construction materials for components of the tailings
Operators and this Guide expresses how to apply
facility, such as embankment fill, drainage features
available tools to improve risk-informed decision-
and seepage control features.
making throughout the tailings facility lifecycle.
— E
 nvironmental objectives and controls considering
3.2.2 Integrated Mine Planning Across the local conditions and broader operations and closure.
Lifecycle — C
 losure considerations such as plans, design, cover
As described in Section 1.2.2, an integrated approach to materials, progressive reclamation and post-mining
mine planning is essential to safe tailings management. land use.
Integrated mine planning involves the full integration of
— P
 lanning of mine economics should consider all
planning across the lifecycle of all aspects that can
aspects of tailings management.
impact the project conception, design, construction,
operation, and closure of tailings facilities, including: Integrated mine planning is also important to optimising
decisions during the Operations phase (Section 3.6) and
— Commitments to stakeholders
should be considered on the context of potential
— Ore extraction material changes. As described in Sections 1.2.1 and
2.2.3, integration begins with the corporate policy and
— Ore processing
the Operator’s executives conveying the importance of
— Sitewide water management and coordination of implementing integrated practices.

— M
 anagement of other mine wastes such as waste Change management is integral to integrated mine
rock planning as well, as described in Section 2.3.1.

— Mine closure. Figure 7 illustrates the lifecycle phases, the key tailings
management outcomes of each phase, and the
An integrated approach to mine planning is particularly
linkages with integrated mine planning across the
important for:
lifecycle, including closure plan development and
implementation.

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 80

Figure 7: Tailings management lifecycle, key outcomes of each phase of the lifecycle, and the linkages with
integrated mine planning across the lifecycle, including closure plan development and implementation

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Temporary Suspension

Operations Closure Post-Closure

Project Design Construction Operate in Implement closure Implement
Conception Finalise detailed Construct in accordance with in accordance post-closure in
design and accordance with performance with the closure accordance with
Select preferred
obtain necessary the detailed objectives, design plan and final the closure plan
alternative to
approvals. design and intent and closure closure design. and final closure
advance to
document plan. Address Address design. Address
design and obtain deficiencies and deficiencies and deficiencies and
necessary deviations and
as-built implement implement implement
approvals. measures for measures for measures for
conditions.
continual continual continual
improvement. improvement. improvement.

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

3.2.3 Integration of Tailings and Water This inextricable linkage between tailings and water
Management management necessitates a good understanding of all
water inflows and outflows to a tailings facility, including
Water management is an important aspect in safety
variations over time and uncertainties in those
and stability considerations for all surface disposal
variations. Many credible failure modes for tailings
tailings facilities. This is true even for facilities where the
facilities are rooted in water management and the
tailings have been filtered and are unsaturated, with the
presence of water exacerbates the consequences of a
tailings stacked and no water storage pond associated
potential failure even if water is not an initial failure
with the tailings facility. It is important to evaluate
trigger.
efficient measures to minimise the water in or on the
tailings facility as part of the site water management There are two concepts fundamental to water
plan. That said, in some cases, storage of water in a management:
tailings facility is integral to the design intent, as an
— When practicable, keep water that has not come in
environmental control or to manage seasonal
contact with the mine site from coming into contact
fluctuations at a mine site. Another driver in sitewide
with the tailings and other parts of the mine site by
water management is to ensure adequate supply of
diversion of surface water or other means.
water is always available to the ore processing facility
while minimising impacts on water supply for the — For the water that does enter the site, establish
surrounding area and communities. While these drivers engineering controls to mitigate geotechnical and
are valid, safety of the facility must always be geochemical risks across the mine site.
paramount.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 81

Management of water needs to be carefully considered requirements. Design flood considerations should be
throughout the lifecycle of tailings facilities, and an consistently applied throughout all phases of the
integrated approach to sitewide water management is lifecycle. Water storage requirements, operating
needed to ensure effective water management freeboard of the tailings facility, and spillway design
(Sections 1.2.2 and 3.2.3). Water management is an should be based on the hydrology of the watershed and
integral component of the Project Conception and reviewed periodically to assess drying or wetting trends
Design phases. Fresh water demand for ore processing in the climate. Ideally, excess water from storms or
is typically tied to the tailings technology as well as site run-off volumes would be drawn down from the tailings
tailings characteristics. Beyond the tailings facility and facility in a relatively short period of time; regardless,
the mine site, water management should consider the post-flood event conditions should be considered in
broader watershed level and potential impacts to the facility stability analyses.
watershed. In this regard, ICMM’s Position Statement
Further, the water management plan should incorporate
on Water Stewardship (2017) and the Water Reporting
the assessment of diversions, discharges, and strategies
Good Practice Guide (2021) apply sitewide, including at
for any water storage inventories. The plan should also
tailings facilities.
address seepage and managing impacts to groundwater
When developing a water management plan for a (ie ponds, interceptor systems, hydrologic sinks, liners).
tailings facility (within the context of a sitewide water Other important plan components include reuse
management plan), the plan should clearly define pumping systems and treatment systems for recycling or
sitewide strategies and objectives for water discharge. The plan should begin by defining a
management, including relevant legal requirements and conceptual flow schematic, operational rules for given
any additional social and environmental commitments facilities and performance indicators. With the inclusion
the Operator has made such as protecting against of the mine plan and associated sitewide water needs
unintentional releases. (sources, types, reliability), water management should be
an ongoing process underpinned by a regularly updated
Hydrology and hydrogeology data, including the
water balance model.
delineation of the mine site and tailings facility
catchment area(s) and all potential water sources A water balance for the mine site as a whole, and the
(process and non-process), should be considered in tailings facility in particular, should consider quantifying
the development of a water management plan and the inflows and outflows of water to the site and flows
design of the tailings facility. Throughout the lifecycle, within the site. A surveillance programme should be
it is helpful to identify plausible changes and challenges developed and implemented to measure flows and
considering operational and natural system variability calibrate the water balance. The water balance should
and uncertainties. For example, depending on site- consider the need for reused / recycled water and fresh
specific conditions, an active mining operation may water and maximum pond storage (where applicable) to
lower groundwater levels under a tailings facility, but ensure that the design intent is met. In line with this
post-closure, groundwater levels may rise. Similarly, Guide’s overarching theme of integrated mine planning
it is helpful to consider regional hydrogeology during that considers the tailings facility lifecycle, closure
the development of facility-specific models. Design considerations should be included in long-term water
parameters should be established and documented, modelling scenarios and planning.
then monitored to identify variances, validate
Forecast scenarios should also include potential future
projections and anticipate potential problems.
changes in climate conditions, including changes in
The appropriate design flood(s) should be identified, both mean annual conditions (eg mean annual
with reference to good design practices, input from the precipitation) and changes in return period and intensity
EOR and Independent Review, and consistent with legal of extreme events. Operators should use projections to:

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 82

— Identify vulnerabilities and assess risks associated plans should recognise and evaluate potential
with climate change. implications of uncertainty with the complexities of
tailings facilities. Water balance modelling and
— S
 eek to understand the vulnerability of their site
planning should be a continual improvement process
design criteria in the face of a range of incremental
with regular updates to the calibration and validation
risks associated with climate change.
The water management plan should clarify the
— U
 ltimately develop a path forward to implement
personnel who are assigned responsibility for water
appropriate mitigation measures.
management for specific facilities, description of the
Building on the results of the water balance model, the facilities and their context within the broader mine
plan should outline key risks and opportunities for a plan. The plan should also clarify who has
site (and given tailings facility) with respect to water responsibility to manage the water balance model and
management, as identified and explained using the update it regularly. Most importantly, the water
water balance model for critical facilities and balance and water management plans should be
consideration of regulatory, social and environmental incorporated into overall construction, operation, and
aspects of the broader catchment. Risks should be closure management planning of the tailings facility
considered and integrated with broader risk and coordinated with broader sitewide planning, such
processes and an action plan should be developed that they guide decision-making and are updated
and executed. Water modelling and management accordingly.

An effective approach to water balance modelling is to

consider the whole lifecycle of the site, from current
conditions through to the Closure and Post-Closure
phases. Useful deliverables from a successful water
In Detail
balance model are the model itself, flow diagrams and
the associated list of flow components, and a water
Water Balance Modelling
balance report or user manual that details the
Water balance models are tools for helping make
assumptions and input parameters used to develop
informed water management decisions. In addition to
the model. Model development typically starts simply,
providing a historical accounting of the system flows
and complexity is added carefully, if and when
and an understanding of makeup water needs, they
required, until the modelling objectives are met.
can simulate the future behaviour of a site's water
management system (if properly calibrated) and Key considerations in tailings facility water balance
compare options for improving performance. Models modelling:
should also be forward thinking to assess and adapt
— F
 low diagram and operational rules including
to climate change needs. Water balance models are
connectivity with surrounding mine and/or
used to:
downstream environment where appropriate.
— Assess the system’s past performance.
— T
 ailings deposition method, history, plans, and
— O
 ptimise short- to medium-term operational associated modelling inclusive of depositional
decisions. geometries.

— A
 ssess the performance of future water — Tailings deposit density and voids entrainment.
management improvements through evaluation of
— Infiltration and seepage, and interaction of
scenarios.
groundwater with tailings facility.
— S
 upport water reporting requirements on water
— Evaporation.
inflows/outflows, water use and reuse / recycle,
and other water metrics. — M
 etered and unmetered inflows and outflows
including contributions from precipitation run-off.
— Identify flow monitoring requirements.
— U
 ncertainties and sensitivities of physical system
— P
 rovide estimates of future flows for closure
such as difficult to measure parameters, error,
planning.
operational change and trends in climate.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 83

 By integrating the water balance with sitewide personnel responsible for managing the water
activities, consideration of sitewide mass balance can aspects of the site such as mining, ore processing,
be better coordinated, as well. Sitewide mass balance engineering, environment, tailings and water
(solids and liquids) is helpful for evaluating impacts to management.
tailings facility operation due to changes in ore body,
mining rate, ore processing technology or Attributes of Good Water Balance Models
performance, ore mineralogy, water chemistry and Water balance model development is site-specific
integrated closure plans. and attributes of a good water balance model
include:
Flow Diagrams
— T
 he water balance model includes a clear
A flow diagram is a visual representation of the
definition of the tailings facility and its associated
water balance model and site water management.
storage capacity
Developing flow diagrams is the first step in the
and other relevant water management facilities
development of a water balance model and they
within a site’s footprint, accounting for inflows,
provide a conceptual model for model development.
outflows and storage and incorporate the site’s
Flow diagrams show the water infrastructure, key site
mine plan and water management plan.
features (pits, ponds, dumps, plants, tailings facilities,
etc.) and the links, or flow components, between the — T
 he model is easy to understand, review and
features and which flows have reliable measurements. update including the use of notes and comments
Flow diagrams are complemented by descriptions of within the model.
each flow component. A set of flow diagrams and
— T
 here is comprehensive documentation on the
associated descriptions of flow components may
input parameters and assumptions as well as the
be used to represent the evolution of the site
calculations used in the model.
through time.
— M
 odel logic is simple and clean with easily
Attributes of good flow diagrams include:
identifiable input data. Examples of logic include
— T
 he flow diagram elements are superimposed on operational rules/procedures such as hierarchy of
a site layout drawing/map, or an aerial photo or water use and variability of recycled versus fresh
satellite image is used as the background. water during wet and dry periods and after rain
events, management pond levels under various
— Intuitive symbols are used to represent key
conditions, etc.
features and are positioned where they are
physically located on the site layout map. — M
 odel components naming convention is
deliberate and consistent throughout.
— W
 here possible, flow components (the links
between the various water features) follow their — T
 he model is developed to a level of detail
physical alignment. necessary to:

— T
 he flow diagram and list of flow components is - Meet the specific objectives decided upon by
comprehensive to include all flows (metered and the development stakeholders.
non-metered) that will be modelled and those - Inform and improve a site’s current and future
necessary to meet the objectives of the model. water management practices.
- Provide data to report on water metrics.
— T
 he list of flow components contains a clear and
concise description for each flow component and - Assess water performance against pre-defined
the location surveillance instrumentation. targets.

— T
 he flow components naming convention is — M
 odel complexity and detail is supported by
consistent with the water balance model. available data and specific purpose to meet the
objective.
The flow diagrams and the associated list of flow
components should be reviewed and updated — The assumptions and uncertainties associated
periodically or following changes to site water with the model are considered:
management practices. During the water balance - Calibration is regularly reviewed and validated or
review process, input should be gathered from site adjusted as needed to improve forecasts.

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 84

 - Sensitivity analyses and/or probabilistic analyses conditions, typically a mixture of wet/dry and
are conducted to help to improve understanding average climate conditions.
and confidence in decisions. - Stochastic forecasting to provide an
— T
 he water balance time step selected is granular understanding of climate/hydrologic variability
enough to represent the variability of flow including potential for climate change and the
conditions. Recommended minimum model time risks to current and planned water management
steps are: scenarios.

- Daily time step for the model runs (recognising — R

 esults include graphs comparing modelled
that some input parameters could vary hourly, versus monitored data to allow for model
daily, monthly, seasonally or annually). validation at each update.
- Monthly results reporting.
Further Reading:
— T
 he water balance model includes three types of — ICMM: Water Reporting Good Practice Guide,
climate scenarios: 2nd edition
- Historical scenario with historical climate inputs
— ICMM: Water Stewardship Maturity Framework
to calibrate and validate the model.
- Deterministic forecasting scenarios, including — ICMM: Adapting to a Changing Climate: Building
average climate conditions, relevant wet/dry resilience in the mining and metals industry
climate conditions, and user-defined climate

3.2.4 Managing Uncertainty and Risk Figure 8: Framework for a risk-informed approach
for tailings management
3.2.4.1 Introduction
Requirement 10.1 of the Standard states, ‘Conduct and Risk Assessment
update risk assessments with a qualified multi- Risk Identification
disciplinary team using good practice methodologies at
Risk Analysis
a minimum every three years and more frequently
whenever there is a material change either to the Risk Evaluation

tailings facility or to the social, environmental and local

economic context. Transmit risk assessments to the
Surveillance and Review Risk Management
ITRB or senior independent technical reviewer for
review, and address with urgency all unacceptable Surveillance Risk Mitigation

tailings facility risks.’ Performance Evaluation Risk Communication

Historically, there have been two approaches in dam

safety risk assessment and management; a prescriptive
approach and risk-informed decision-making. Risk-
informed decision-making builds upon prescriptive
approaches which are reliant on prescribed criteria. measures, surveillance and review, risk communication,
These criteria are traditionally established through and risk recording and reporting. The inter-related
risk-based approaches such as the use of nature of these components is shown in Figure 8.
consequence classification during the Design phase.
Risk management considers all types and severities of
Risk-informed decision-making is underpinned by risk risks: this Guide primarily focuses on those risks that
assessment, which comprises a series of steps: risk have the potential to result in a catastrophic failure. As
identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation. In turn, described below, assessing risk involves consideration
risk-informed decision-making improves and informs of both the potential consequences of an event and the
risk management (risk reduction) activities. Risk likelihood of that event occurring and an adverse
management includes implementation of risk reduction structural response to the event.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 85

There are several tools to support Operators in 3.2.4.2 Elements of Risk Assessment
identifying, analysing and evaluating risk, ranging from
Safety is improved by first understanding a tailings
simple experience-based ones to more complex
facility’s potential failure modes, the likelihood of these
quantitative tools. Qualitative or semi-quantitative risk
hazards occurring, and then using that information to
assessment tools using the concept of event trees are
develop and implement measures to mitigate, prevent,
typically the most helpful for aiding the understanding
and/or reduce risk, where warranted. These safety
of tailings facility risks. Typically, fully quantitative
improvements can be accomplished through effective
approaches are only appropriate to consider for specific
risk assessment and risk management. The following
risk drivers. Fully quantitative processes may also
outlines the components of risk assessment and
inadvertently lead to a false sense of certainty
management. As stated, risk assessment includes the
with results.
steps of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk
Risk-informed decision-making steps should be evaluation. The EOR should be a key contributor to this
conducted by an experienced team comprising the assessment and the Independent Reviewer should
Operator’s staff, the EOR and potentially other multi- review the assessment.
disciplinary experts as appropriate. The team should
challenge themselves to ensure that the risk process Risk Identification
remains unbiased and that it reflects actual credible risks. The first step of risk identification is to identify site-
As such, the risk process and outcomes should specific potential failure modes. A potential failure mode
be reviewed and updated throughout the lifecycle is a cause of failure, chain of events (event tree), or one
(regularly and when potential material changes are being possible way a system can fail. In the context of tailings
considered), and the resulting risk management plan management failure modes may include a range of
should be updated accordingly. Implementing a TMS, hazards or threats such as:
which includes Evaluating Performance and Identifying
— Natural hazards (eg earthquake, landslide, extreme
Actions to Improve Performance (Section 2.3), provides a
weather event).
structured approached to reviewing and updating the
risk assessment and the risk management plan.

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 86

— Events related to an engineered structure (eg events must typically occur in sequence. Potential
piping of water through a tailings facility scenarios include:
embankment).
— The design flood occurs but the facility has been
— Operational events (eg failure of a tailings pipeline). constructed and operated as expected and there is
no adverse structural response.
Once site-specific potential failure modes have been
identified they should be characterised, first to — T
 he design flood occurs but there is a defect in the
determine if they are credible and then to determine crest height for a measurable distance along the
the likelihood of occurrence if they are credible. embankment crest due to Operator error in
Credible failure modes are defined per the Standard. construction sequencing and the flood volume is
A potential failure mode may be non-credible if ruled ponded against the embankment until overtopping
out categorically during initial screening. For example, occurs at the low section. This overtopping erodes the
overtopping by a flood event typically would not be embankment in an uncontrolled manner, ultimately
considered a credible failure mode if the facility has a breaching the tailings facility and allowing flood waters
confirmed catchment and storage for multiple and tailings slurry to leave the facility.
maximum credible inflow events, and geotechnical
In the first case, the events that occurred did not lead to
analyses have demonstrated that storing this excess
failure. However, in the second case, the unwanted events
water (even if extended duration is necessary) would
compounded, ultimately leading to a failure. Consideration
not create a stability concern. Further, investigations
of compounding factors is important, and brainstorming
and analyses may be sufficient to determine from a
sessions to identify such combinations of events are vital
practical perspective that a failure mode is non-
to the efficacy of the risk analysis and assessment
credible. For example, it may be determined that the
process. Some credible failure modes may be
tailings facility has design features that fully mitigate a
catastrophic failure modes (and may involve flow failures)
potential failure mode and that confidence in the
and these are addressed in Section 2.7. Some tailings
design, as-built condition, and rigorous operating
facilities have credible failure modes, but these may not
controls render a failure mode as non-credible. This
have potential catastrophic consequences. An Operator’s
assessment of credibility should be repeated through
thorough evaluation of each of their tailings facilities can
the life of the facility, particularly if there are material
be used to identify the subset of facilities that do have
changes. As described in Section 3.4.3 and in the
catastrophic credible failure modes. This subset becomes
Standard, for closure design, an appropriate design
the focus of the Operator for the application of
criterion to consider in the analysis of credible failure
appropriate levels of risk management to prevent any of
modes relative to non-credible failure modes may be
these modes from manifesting into an actual event.
on the order of 1:10,000 with the provisos outlined in
the Standard and this Guide regarding deterministic
Risk Analysis
alternatives. This design criterion should not be
Risk analysis involves the characterisation of what is
confused with likelihood of occurrence of a given
known and what is uncertain about the present and
failure mode, though.
future performance of an existing or planned tailings
For each credible failure mode that still exists, facility. During risk analysis, the likelihood of the specific
the likelihood of the event leading to specific potential failure mode loading condition, the likelihood of
consequences should be estimated, which includes an adverse structural response, and the magnitude of
the likelihood of the specific loading condition and the consequences are estimated for each potential
the likelihood of an adverse structural response to the failure mode. As discussed in Section 2.7, there are
event. Event trees help to illuminate the likelihood of various techniques for determining potential
an event occurring (along with an adverse structural consequences and the appropriate tool should be
response). selected when considering specific failure modes. Risk
analysis is often facilitated by someone with significant
For example, for a tailings facility embankment to
risk analysis experience, which can help to prevent bias
breach and tailings to be discharged, a series of
in the process.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 87

The nature of the decisions that the risk analysis will Uncertainty is the result of imperfect knowledge about
inform determines the level of detail needed and the the present or future state of a system, event, situation
degree of acceptable uncertainty. Typically, a lower or population under consideration. To manage risk,
level of detail and a higher degree of uncertainty is uncertainty should be acknowledged, assessed and
appropriate for the Project Conception phase considered. In tailings management, uncertainty may be
(Section 3.3) or for developing a conceptual closure plan due to:
(Section 3.7.2). Potential Problem Analysis is a tool that
— Gaps in knowledge about hazards and potential
works well in the Project Conception phase. As the
failure modes (site characterisation, Section 3.3.2).
design of a tailings facility or closure plan then advances
For example:
to final, executable form, more detail and less uncertainty
in risk analysis is needed. Potential Failure Mode Analysis - Uncertainty in the results of models used to assess
or Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Semi- hazards such as hydrogeological models, stability
Quantitative Risk Analysis with Event Tree Analysis are models or climate change models.
tools that typically work well as design progresses and a - Lack of complete understanding of foundation
facility moves into the Construction and Operations conditions, including surficial and bedrock geology.
phases. Regardless of the tool selected, it is important
follow a consistent approach and to assume that one — N
 atural variability in any given process or event. The
does not know the answer to the questions that arise conservative nature of engineering analysis could
unless specific information, data and/or analyses are mute the range of this potential variability.
available to support assumptions. — A
 n incomplete understanding of the potential
consequences of an event. For example,

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 88

 uncertainties in breach analyses (Section 2.7.2). As uncertainty is reduced, input parameters and
analyses become more realistic as they are based on
— T
 he challenging nature of accurately estimating
facts rather than assumptions.
likelihood.

— T
 he effectiveness of risk management measures in Risk Evaluation
reducing likelihood, consequence, or both. Risk evaluation compares the outcomes of risk analysis
for existing conditions to determine if risks are within
— T
 he changing nature of some risks (hazard creep) for
acceptable limits, whether present risk measures and
which likelihood or consequence may change over
controls are adequate, and what additional alternative
time (site characterisation, Section 3.3.2). This
risk reduction measures could be considered.
includes changes in climate, downstream conditions
(eg new communities or infrastructure) or legal The process typically considers the following, among
requirements. other aspects: robustness of design, past and future
performance monitoring, site context, and practicality of
Risk estimates will have a degree of uncertainty that
any remediation considered. Guidelines from regulatory
should be characterised. This includes acknowledging
agencies, governing bodies, other industries associated
that there is a degree of subjectivity in estimating risk,
with tailings facility safety, and corporate governance
reflecting various factors such as the experience and
should all be reviewed to determine what risks are within
expertise of those involved in developing the estimate,
normal operating limits. Understanding environmental,
the models used, and the comprehensiveness of
social, cultural, ethical, political, and legal considerations
available site characterisation information. Uncertainty
should also be included in risk evaluation.
may be represented by assigning ranges to estimates
of both likelihood and consequence. The team typically considers risk mitigation alternatives
at this stage. The outcome of the risk assessment
When uncertainty is high, it is important to consider
includes recommendations for actions deemed justified
applying conservative assumptions in the selection of
by the team.
input parameters and the analysis of the likelihood or
potential consequences of an event. Steps should also
3.2.4.3 Risk Management
be taken to reduce uncertainty, such as:
Risk management includes assessing effects due to
— Improving the understanding of the tailings facility
changes or deviations both in isolation and as a
and factors influencing it through improved site
compounding effect. Risk management builds upon the
characterisation (Section 3.3.3).
results of risk assessment as well as uncertainty
— R
 efined modelling of potential consequences analysis and involves the systematic development and
(Section 2.7.2). implementation of strategies to eliminate or reduce
risks. These strategies include potential actions to
— D
 eveloping a robust tailings facility design with less
reduce the likelihood of occurrence and/or the
uncertainty in design criteria (Section 3.4).
magnitude of consequences of credible failure modes
— A
 ccurately documenting constructed conditions to that were evaluated to have a higher risk.
reduce uncertainty about the characteristics of the
Typical strategies may include recurring and monitoring
tailings facility and associated embankments
activities such as routine and special inspections,
(Section 3.5.4).
instrumentation and its evaluation, structural analyses,
— U
 sing the results of Evaluating Performance site investigations, development and testing of EPRPs,
(Section 2.3.4) including surveillance (Section 2.4.3) Independent Review and regulatory reviews, and/or
and the programme for reviewing tailing safety, implementation of constructed risk reduction measures,
including Independent Review (Section 2.6) to review projects or improved operational controls.
and update the risk assessment and validate the
Risk management should also consider and document
design basis of the tailings facility throughout the
estimated risk after a remedial action and/or enhanced
lifecycle.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 89

operational practices or surveillance have been Figure 9: The concept of assessing benefit of
implemented. Credible failure scenarios that that have mitigation effort to residual risks with ALARP
elevated levels of risk may require mitigation measures
to reduce risk. The level of acceptable risk is defined by
each Operator using ALARP or by local regulatory
requirements, as applicable.

For those risks that cannot be eliminated or avoided, a

Resources
Risk
key concept in risk-informed decision-making is Le
vel
reducing identified risks (likelihood and/or of ri
sk
ALARP
consequence) to levels that are ALARP. As defined in
the Standard, ALARP requires that all reasonable Resources, effort
measures be taken with respect to ‘tolerable’ or
acceptable risks to reduce them even further until the Cost / Benefit
cost and other impacts of additional risk reduction are
grossly disproportionate to the benefit.
to further reduce risk and the amount of risk reduction
Factors involved in applying ALARP include: achieved) and then comparing it to other risk reduction
actions implemented by peers in the industry. If the
— Application of relevant good practice.
costs to achieve an additional level of risk reduction are
— T
 he level of incremental risk in relation to the grossly disproportional to achieving the same
established risk guidelines. magnitude of risk reduction at other tailings facilities,
the current risk may be considered ALARP. This comes
— T
 he cost-effectiveness of the risk reduction
with the caveat that operating contexts differ and that
measures in relation to likelihood and/or
this will have a bearing on the determination of ALARP.
consequence.
There are many factors that can contribute to the
— R
 emaining life of the facility and potential alignment decision that ALARP has been satisfied and no further
with closure planning which may reduce likelihood action is justified. There may be some instances when
and/or consequence. ALARP is achieved that an Operator may wish to
consider other alternatives at their discretion to further
— S
 ocietal concerns as revealed by consultation with
lower risk. This is indicated in Requirement 5.7 whereby
the community and other stakeholders.
Operators identify additional reasonable steps to
— O
 ther factors such as consideration of standards- reduce potential consequences (ie by re-evaluating
based approaches, benchmarking, direct business alternatives for new facilities or considering various
impacts, constructability, implementation schedule engineering solutions for existing facilities).
and environmental consequences.
The Standard states that the Accountable Executive
The concept of ALARP is illustrated in Figure 9. must confirm and document that specific tailings
The ‘Resources, effort’ line in this graph represents a facilities meet ALARP (Requirement 4.7, 5.7). The RTFE
multiple of potential factors whereby the sharp rise in should, with input from the EOR and the Operator’s site
resources to reduce risks would be grossly leadership, present the Accountable Executive with risk
disproportionate to the benefit realised. Each Operator management measure to achieve ALARP, ideally after
will have its own processes to address such factors seeking advice from Independent Review. It is good
including use of good practice guidance and practice to provide more than one option for
jurisdictional requirements on risk evaluations and consideration such that risk levels and resource
management. requirements are understood and aligned with the
Operator’s policy.
When a judgement is made that risks are ALARP, this is
often determined by comparing the effectiveness of The urgency of completing safety actions should be
reducing risk further (evaluated by considering the cost commensurate with risk. Prioritisation of risk reduction

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 90

measures should be based on prioritisation of safety, The key to effective risk management is avoiding
while allowing for second-order factors as appropriate. complacency. Having a plan does not mean that risks
are being properly managed, but it can give the illusion
Risk management plans may be used to describe risk
that they are. It is vital that risk management plans be
controls to reduced risks identified through risk
effectively implemented. This includes integrating risk
assessment, as well as actions, persons responsible for
management into the TMS (Section 2.3) and ensuring
completing the actions, and timelines for action
that risk management plans are integrated into and
completion. Risk controls may include operating rules
implemented through OMS activities (Section 2.4) with
with ongoing surveillance and validation or discrete
clear accountability and responsibility (Section 2.2.2),
implementation of new mitigation measures. Typically, a
and input from a programme for reviewing tailings
conceptual risk management plan is developed during
safety, including Independent Review (Section 2.6).
the Project Conception phase (Section 3.3) and is
refined and developed in greater detail during the Risk communication is an important element of
Design phase (Section 3.4). A risk register, including the managing risk and includes open, two-way exchange of
associated prioritised risk controls, should be information and opinion about hazards and risks leading
developed, and it should be reviewed and updated to a better understanding of risk management decisions.
throughout the life of the facility. It encompasses both internal communication (eg
between the EOR, RTFE, Accountable Executive and BoD)
The risk processes and outcomes should be
and external communication (eg between the Operator
reassessed, updated and reviewed regularly as
and regulatory agencies or communities as appropriate).
appropriate through the lifecycle of the facility,
particularly in the event of material changes.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 91

Project Conception 3.3

3.3.1 Introduction - Modification to the design of a tailings facility, such

as the strengthening of embankments or
Project Conception consists of the development and
reductions in water levels.
analysis of a range of alternatives (eg the location of a
new tailings facility, technologies to be applied). The — R
 e-activation of an existing tailings facility for mine
primary output is the final, approved selection of the re-opening.
preferred alternative and associated costing estimates — Closure and Post-Closure phases.
in accordance with corporate requirements.
Key activities in the Project Conception phase are:
The Project Conception phase is a process of making
— R
 isk identification and analysis which begins with
some of the most important decisions about tailings
Potential Problem Analysis (Section 3.2.4).
management, some of which will be difficult or
impossible to reverse once the Design phase has been — Site characterisation.
completed and executed. Thus, Operators should — Definition of performance objectives and design criteria.
carefully consider the Project Conception phase before
the Design phase is initiated. — Identification of alternatives, development of
preliminary designs, and multi-criteria alternatives
It is important to emphasise that Project Conception is analysis to select the preferred alternative.
not relevant only to new tailings facilities. It is a recurring
— Integration of a conceptual closure plan
activity through the lifecycle and can also be applied to
planning for: As described in Section 3.2.2, an integrated approach to
mine planning is essential to safe tailings management
— P
 otential material changes in design (depending on
and involves the full integration of planning across the
complexity), such as:
lifecycle of all aspects that can impact tailings
- Extensions to the life of an existing tailings facility, management. An integrated approach is particularly
beyond its initial design capacity. invaluable in the Project Conception phase.

recognising that changes may be appropriate or

necessary if the project needs change from one
phase to the next. Independent Review provides
input to the Operator on a range of aspects
In Detail
related to Project Conception, such as:
Operators may consider the following: - D
 esign of site characterisation activities, to help
— A
 ppoint the EOR and engage the Design Team ensure that the right information is collected and
(ideally from the same firm, but other models can to help eliminate gaps and reduce uncertainty.
work as well). Ideally, the EOR would follow the - Conduct of the risk analysis, including the
project through to the Design, Construction, and uncertainty assessment.
Operations phases (recognising that changing the - Design and conduct of the multi-criteria
EOR is a significant effort at any phase). alternatives analysis.
— A
 ppoint Independent Reviewer(s) (or a Senior — Independent Reviewer(s) can be a sounding board
Technical Reviewer) and determine the initiation of to test ideas: their experience with other projects
and mechanism for Independent Review moving may be invaluable to the Operator.
into the Design phase (Section 2.6.2). The
reviewer(s) at this state may follow the project — Initiate risk analysis and evaluation (Section 3.2.4).
through the next phases of the lifecycle, Risk analysis is used in the Project Conception

ICMM Project Conception 92

 phase to inform development of preliminary designs refined moving into the Design phase (Section 3.4).
and the multi-criteria alternatives analysis. Potential This stage would consider the options for siting
Problem Analysis, including identification of hazards and technology management technology
and potential failure modes, is particularly important (alternative processing, dewatering, blending and/
during the Project Conception phase. or comingling, transport, storage, construction
materials and conceptual closure plans).
— U
 ncertainty Analysis to assess and recognise
uncertainty in the risk analysis. This analysis will — E
 valuate alternatives to select the preferred
inform the multi-criteria alternatives analysis as alternative to advance to the Design phase
well as further site characterisation work aimed at (Section 3.4).
reducing uncertainty. This uncertainty analysis
— D
 evelop and submit documentation to support
includes broad topics, such as climate change
the approval of the preferred alternative, both
and foundation conditions.
internally by the senior management/Accountable
— U
 ndertake preliminary site characterisation Executive and, if applicable, by government
studies and develop preliminary site authorities.
characterisation models (Section 3.3.2).
During this phase, an Operator may wish to initiate
— C
 onsider the operating strategy including the community engagement (Section 2.2.5). Input from
Operator’s forecast of ability to implement controls, community engagement is helpful in identifying
especially administrative controls (often found in a community values to be considered in the Project
project’s future OMS), and a clear definition of the Conception phase and gathering information about
inherent risk posed by each option. community knowledge and understanding of the
area. This input helps to inform the multi-criteria
— Identify alternatives and develop a preliminary
alternatives analysis.
design for each alternative consistent with the
guidance in Section 3.3.4, including a preliminary Figure 10 highlights the key activities of the Project
selection of design criteria (Section 3.4.3) and the Conception phase of the lifecycle.
development of a preliminary design, which will be

Figure 10: Key activities of the Project Conception phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Project Conception
Select preferred alternative to
advance to design, informed by:
– Site characterisation models
– Performance objectives Temporary Suspension
– Conceptual closure plan
– Risk identification and analysis
Prepare:
– Site characterisation models
– Evaluation of Alternatives Design Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure
– Design Basis Report (DBR)

Potential material
changes go to either
Project Conception
or Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Tailings Management Project Conception 93

3.3.2 Site Characterisation — Informing the knowledge base for the site, which
focuses on the holistic consideration for social and
Site characterisation is an iterative process that is
economic factors as well as environmental and
initiated during the Project Conception phase and
infrastructure factors (Section 1.3.1).
continues throughout the lifecycle of the tailings facility. It
involves the collection and compilation of a wide range of The information collected through site characterisation
information about a site and the adjacent environment, informs a range of models that are aggregated to create
and the development of a site characterisation model. an overall site characterisation model such as:
Site characterisation typically begins as a desktop
— Climate including predictions of potential changes
assessment and field reconnaissance. It is refined with
field investigations as alternatives are narrowed and the — Geology
project proceeds to the Design phase. (Section 3.4). Site
— Hydrogeology and hydrology
characterisation is critical to the long-term stability of the
tailings facility and it requires substantial field — T
 ailings characteristics (geotechnical and
investigations and analyses. geochemical)

The information collected as part of the site — Foundation characteristics

characterisation studies is used to inform integrated
— Seismic conditions.
mine planning (Section 3.2.2), the Project Conception
and Design phases (Section 3.4), and closure plan During the Project Conception phase, at least
development (Section 3.7.2). The site characterisation preliminary site characterisation is conducted for each
also serves as an input for: alternative developed and evaluated. For preliminary
screening of alternatives, this may focus on a few
— C
 onducting and updating the risk assessment
specific parameters with a higher degree of uncertainty.
(Section 3.2.4).
As alternatives are eliminated through pre-screening
— D
 eveloping and updating the risk management plan and remaining alternatives are designed in more detail
(Section 3.2.4). and are then evaluated more rigorously, site
characterisation information and models for those
— Identifying alternatives and developing preliminary
alternatives should be refined to increase detail and
designs for alternatives and evaluating alternatives
reduce uncertainty.
and developing the detailed design (Section 3.3.4).
Once the preferred alternative is selected and the
— D
 eveloping and updating the DBR (Section 3.4.5) and
Operator proceeds to more detailed studies, and
helping to validate the design intent.
ultimately the executable design for construction, the
— Development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2). level of detail should increase further, and models
should be refined to further reduce uncertainty.

The collection of site characterisation information

should continue throughout the lifecycle. The site
characterisation model should be refined and updated
based on updated site characterisation information,
constructed conditions (Section 3.5.4) and surveillance
results (Section 2.4).

Site characterisation information and the level of detail

required changes and expands through the project
lifecycle. However, ensuring adequate capital and time
to conduct thorough testing and material
characterisation at the early stages of project design,
and ongoing as tailings are deposited, underpins
successful outcomes in later Closure and Post-Closure
phases. This includes a holistic site characterisation
programme that is inclusive of the broader spatial
context of the tailings facility.

Site characterisation should also address the

information requirements identified through community

ICMM Project Conception 94

 — F
 eatures that could preclude a tailings facility at
that location (eg flora and fauna, hazards, social or
cultural features).

In Detail — Closure considerations and closure plan.

Site characterisation involves the collection and — S

 ite topography and other geographical
consideration of potential future changes with a wide information.
range of information such as:
— Bedrock and surficial geology, and hydrogeology.
— Characteristics of the proposed mine.
— Site geotechnical characterisation.
— C
 haracteristics and anticipated behaviour
— Seismicity.
(geotechnical and geochemical) of the tailings.
It is especially critical for tailings facilities having — Hydrology.
embankments or other structural elements
— N
 atural hazards (eg landslides, avalanches,
constructed of tailings.
tsunami impact zones, etc).
— P
 hysical and chemical characteristics of other
— T
 errestrial environment, aquatic environment,
materials intended to be used in construction.
archaeology, socio-economic factors, indigenous
— A
 vailability and characteristics of impoundment and other considerations within the footprint of
construction materials. the planned tailings facility, and in upstream and
downstream areas.
— Basic information about potential alternatives.
— Climate trend considerations.
— E xisting and planned infrastructure.
— Air and water management related studies.

engagement and Independent Review, as well as — M

 itigation of negative environmental impacts by
the collection of information related to relevant legal ensuring the continued physical and chemical
requirements. stability of the tailings facility.

— A
 cceptable post-closure use within a feasible
3.3.3 Performance Objectives
technical and economic framework.
Setting performance objectives underpins safe tailings
Setting performance objectives begins during the
management. Performance objectives should be
Project Conception phase. Although performance
aligned with and translate the corporate policy on
objectives set at this phase may be high level, they are
tailings management into specific performance
crucial to providing a basis for the multi-criteria
expectations for a tailings facility throughout its
alternatives analysis.
lifecycle. When considering the Closure and Post-
Closure phases of the lifecycle, the development of Performance objectives should then be refined and
success criteria as early as possible is important to developed in more detail, particularly during the Design
establish appropriate indicators for closure and phase (Section 3.4) (eg more specific performance
landform performance (Section 3.7.3). objectives for water management or geotechnical
aspects of design and operation). Going into the
Performance objectives and associated performance
Construction and Operations phases, performance
indicators and performance criteria should address:
objectives should be quantifiable for a given tailings
— Protection of employee and public health and safety. facility.

— D
 esign objectives and criteria, including The tailings facility should be constructed, operated,
geotechnical, geochemical, operational, community and closed in accordance with the performance
and environmental performance objectives that the objectives, while recognising that those objectives
tailings facility is expected to achieve. should be reviewed and updated, as appropriate, during
these lifecycle phases.

Tailings Management Project Conception 95

3.3.4 Multi-Criteria Alternatives Analysis To be effective, it is essential that the evaluation
of alternatives:
Multi-criteria alternatives analysis (also known as
evaluation of alternatives or options assessment) is a — B
 e conducted by a multi-disciplinary team, to be
rigorous, multi-step process to inform decisions. In a able to interpret and assess the full range of
tailings management context, this process should be information considered in the process.
used to inform decisions during the Project Conception
— B
 e informed by the work on site characterisation and
phase. Per the Standard, the primary goal of evaluating
the knowledge base for the site, which focuses on
alternatives for an overall development project is to: (i)
the holistic consideration of social and economic
select an alternative that minimises risks to people and
factors as well as environmental and infrastructure
the environment throughout the tailings facility lifecycle
factors (Section 3.3.2).
including Closure and Post-Closure; and (ii) minimise
the volume of tailings and water placed in external — H
 ave technical input from Independent Review
tailings facilities. during the design of the evaluation of alternatives
and through the steps in the process.
From an Operator’s perspective the evaluation of
alternatives for a tailings facility, including multi-criteria — B
 e appropriately scaled and scoped to the planning
analysis could include processes such as multiple decision to be made.
accounts analysis (MAA) or assessments which
— H
 ave input from potentially affected communities
consider the best appropriate technology. These
as appropriate (eg new tailings facilities, closure
analyses provide a structured approach to assessing
planning).
and weighting of various ‘musts’ and ‘wants.’ As such,
an effective evaluation is an invaluable tool during — C
 onsider the performance objectives and risk
Project Conception. It provides a means of integrating a analysis and integrate those into decision criteria in
wide range of relevant information into the decision- the evaluation of alternatives.
making process, and provides a basis for documenting
— C
 onsider all aspects of the project, direct or indirect,
outcomes that can then be used to demonstrate the
that may contribute to the evaluation of each
basis for decisions to:
alternative (eg design of the mine and ore
— Senior management processing to the extent that they would impact
tailings production, water management and
— Regulatory agencies
treatment).
— Investors and insurance providers
— C
 onsider and integrate a wide range of information
— Potentially affected communities. about the characteristics of each alternative being
evaluated, and relevant to the planning decision to
The process allows for the consideration of
be made, such as:
environmental, technical, socio-economic, temporal
- Technical considerations (eg geotechnical,
and project economics factors in a transparent manner
geochemical, mine operations).
and allows the testing of the outcomes under different
assumptions. - Environmental considerations (eg potential impacts
on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems).
The evaluation of alternatives can be used to inform
- Socio-economic consideration (eg potential
a range of decisions such as the selection of the
impacts on communities and other economic,
preferred options for:
recreational, spiritual or subsistence activities).
— Locations to be used for new tailings facilities. - Project economics (eg short- and long-term
— Tailings management technology. capital costs, operating costs and closure costs).

— Increasing the capacity of existing tailings facilities. — C

 onsider the uncertainty of assumptions and design
parameters and their potential implications of
— A material change in tailings facility design. outcomes of the analysis process. An example of
— Re-activation of an existing tailings facility. managing these uncertainties includes use of
sensitivity analysis.
— Closure design.

ICMM Project Conception 96

— Consider each alternative across the relevant phases One of the strengths of MAA is that the methodology
of the lifecycle of the tailings facility (eg for new provides a mechanism to be transparent about biases
tailings facilities, consider the lifecycle implications and assumptions, and to test outcomes against those
of each alternative from the Construction phase biases and assumptions in a robust and rigorous
through to the Closure and Post-Closure phases). manner. No decision is entirely objective and there is
always an element of subjectivity. Rather than trying to
remove that subjectivity, the methodology recognises it
and allows that subjectivity to be tested.

3. Pre-screen possible alternatives to eliminate from

further consideration any that would have
characteristics that would be ‘show-stoppers’.

In Detail 4. Characterise remaining alternatives.

Decisions made based on the evaluation of 5. Assess remaining alternatives using MAA or a
alternatives require an understanding of the potential similar decision-making tool. MAA can be broken
positive and negative impacts of each alternative down into two sub-steps:
evaluated across a range of site-specific aspects a . Describe all factors that will be considered in
encompassing technical, environmental and socio- the analysis by establishing accounts (eg
economic considerations, and project economics. environmental, technical, and socio-economic
Evaluating and balancing these potential positive and considerations), sub-accounts within each
negative impacts is important in making the optimum account, and indicators for each sub-account.
decision, but it is challenging to evaluate such
b. Conduct a value-based decision process to
disparate aspects. An evaluation of alternatives
assess the combined benefits and impacts
methodology, including MAA, provides a tool to do
(advantages and disadvantages) for each of the
this, while allowing inputs to and outcomes of the
alternatives assessed.
decision- making process to be communicated
internally and externally in a transparent manner. 6. Conduct a sensitivity analysis to test the
robustness and validity of the outcomes of the
Evaluation of alternatives should be conducted as a
MAA against various biases and assumptions.
multi-step process:
MAA provides a method of integrated assessment of
1. Identify the objective and scope – the decision
different characteristics of alternatives (eg for
that is to be informed by the evaluation of
comparing potential impacts on wildlife with capital
alternatives process and factors that will be
costs). In effect, these tools provide a rigorous,
considered.
semi-quantitative means of comparing otherwise
2. Develop a plan for conducting the evaluation of unrelated elements.
alternatives, including who will be involved.

Tailings Management Project Conception 97

 For example, in addition to geotechnical stability
during operations, technology assessments could
prioritise technologies that:

In Detail — Enable tailings facilities to transition from

operations to closure and post-closure phases.
It is good practice to incorporate closure
requirements into the design and construction of a — Eliminate or reduce the need for long-term ongoing
tailings facility from the project conception phase. management (eg water treatment in perpetuity).
Incorporating closure requirements as early as
— Evaluate the potential interconnectivity between
possible facilitates the ongoing management of
capital costs, operational costs and total closure
tailings facility closure risks throughout all future
costs over the life of the facility.
lifecycle phases.
— Support the target planned post-mining land
Assessments used to consider best appropriate use (for example, hydrology and soil-related
technologies are one method to ensure closure and factors that might support the relevant vegetation
post-closure considerations are accounted for from re-establishment; or designs that optimise
the earliest stages of tailings facility design and post-closure socioeconomic uses of the area).
construction. The level of detail required for these
assessments can differ on a jurisdictional basis, — Allow for flexibility in closure planning and
especially when considering the incorporation of encourage collaboration with stakeholders on
closure requirements. closure objectives.
— Facilitate progressive closure activities during
Where applicable or in addition to jurisdictional
operations.
requirements, technology assessments can consider
site-specific tailings facility design options that Incorporation of long-term closure considerations
optimise closure and post-closure outcomes. during the project conception phase will result in
This will prioritise designs and technologies that tailings facilities that are more likely to successfully
enable a safe, stable, non-polluting facility, capable transition from operations to closure, in a way that
of sustaining a post-closure land use. reduces environmental and social impacts and
potential legacy issues.

ICMM 98
Design 3.4

3.4.1 Introduction — E
 stablishing the Design Team , including
engineering consultants (typically from the same
The design process is iterative, starting during the
firm as the EOR, recognising that other models may
Project Conception phase when conceptual designs
exist) including the Operator’s representatives who
are developed for alternatives to be evaluated (Section
engage in the design process (typically includes
3.3.4). Those conceptual designs are further refined to
the RTFE and other experienced operational
preliminary designs for the detailed analysis leading to
experts).
the selection of the preferred alternative. During the
Design phase, the preliminary design for the preferred — D
 efining the roles and responsibilities of the EOR
alternative is developed to the stage of a detailed and Design Team and their relationship through the
design for approval, and ultimately to an executable design process.
design for construction.
— E
 ngaging Independent Reviewers in the design
The objective for this design process throughout the process.
lifecycle of the tailings facility should be to limit credible
— Developing a formal change management system.
failure modes, either to having no credible failure modes
or, where credible modes cannot be eliminated, — R
 efining site characterisation information and the
ensuring that potentially catastrophic credible failure site characterisation model to a degree where
modes are managed using the ALARP approach residual uncertainties are acceptable.
through the phase(s) of the facility’s lifecycle where they
— R
 efining the risk assessment to reduce
are present (Section 3.2.4).
uncertainties and addressing residual uncertainties
The main activities for the Design phase are: in the design and risk management plan.

— A
 ppointing an EOR for the Design phase if the EOR — Developing the tailings facility design:
from the Project Conception phase is not retained. - Develop the design initially using the
This EOR will likely have a longer-term responsibility. precautionary-based approach.
- Enhance
 the design based on adoption of the
performance-based approach or define why this
is not necessary.
- Incorporate closure requirements into design
criteria.

— E
 stablishing quality management specifications
including requirements for consideration and
documentation of deviations and documentation of
constructed conditions.

— D
 ocumenting the design criteria and intent in the
Design Basis Report (DBR).

— D
 eveloping the tailings transportation and
deposition plan.

— Complete design verification.

The steps are similar, although they may be simplified

when the Design phase is being applied to other
decisions such as closure design or design for
material changes.

Tailings Management Design 99

Figure 11: Key activities of the Design phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Design
Finalise detailed design,
informed by:
– Site characterisation models
– Performance objectives
Temporary Suspension
– Conceptual closure plan
– Risk assessment
Prepare:
– Updated site
Project characterisation models Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure
Post-Closure
Conception – Updated DBR

Potential material
changes go to either
Project Conception
or Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

The outcome of the Design phase is an executable The conduct of social, environmental and local economic
engineering design with detailed specifications, impact assessments is not addressed in this Guide.
including quality management, to be used for the
Figure 11 illustrates the key activities of the Design
subsequent Construction, Operations and Closure
phase of the lifecycle.
phases, as well as any other documents required for
final approval and initiation of construction. The design
3.4.2 Managing Uncertainty and Assessing
should be reviewed and updated as performance and
Risk in Design
site data become available and in response to material
changes to the tailings facility or its performance. Risk assessment during the Design phase continues the
work done during the Project Conception phase but is
In parallel, a full assessment of the potential social,
focused on supporting the design process.
environmental and local economic impacts of the
tailings facility and of any credible failure modes The objectives are to:
throughout its lifecycle, including Closure and Post-
— R
 educe the uncertainty associated with key design
Closure, should be undertaken, to inform the design
elements and design the tailings facility to reduce
process. Closure objectives and activities should be
or eliminate specific risks, to the extent feasible.
considered during the design phase and be informed by
trade-off analyses completed during project conception — D
 evelop a risk management plan to limit the impact
(Section 3.3.4). Where impact assessments predict of residual risks.
material acute or chronic impacts, the Operator should
— D
 evelop a surveillance plan to sufficiently inform
develop, document and implement impact mitigation
implementation of the risk management plan.
and management plans using the mitigation hierarchy.

ICMM Design 100

 A risk management plan should be developed in
detail as part of the Design phase, with components
of the risk management plan incorporated into the
design of the tailings facility, where applicable (eg
In Detail
seepage control features).
Reduce Uncertainty and Refine Risk Estimates
To support the implementation of the risk
Reducing uncertainty may often be facilitated by
management plan, a surveillance plan should be
additional site characterisation and more relevant
developed and integrated into the OMS manual
modelling that targets key design elements.
(Section 2.4). OMS requirements should be
Risk estimates should be refined, based on a better considered in the final design, particularly for any
understanding of both the likelihood and potential instrumentation that would need to be installed
consequences of various unwanted events. during the Construction phase, and for any
This guidance recommends semi-quantitative surveillance activities that would need to be initiated
risk assessment supported by event tree analyses during Construction.
where such detail is appropriate, supported by the
ALARP principle.

3.4.3 Tailings Facility Design

3.4.3.1 Overview
Failure of a tailings facility is unacceptable, particularly
any failure that leads to fatalities or otherwise
catastrophic outcomes. Thus, designing, constructing,
operating and closing facilities to reduce or eliminate
credible failure modes is of paramount importance.

Conventional tailings facility design philosophy over

the past decades can generally be grouped into the
approaches depicted on Figure 12, all of which are best
implemented when risk-informed. The more layers that
are applied, the better risk informed the approach
becomes.

Figure 12: Management of uncertainty in design approaches

Considers the management of uncertainty and risk in

Risk Informed material decisions regardless of approach.

Extends problem interrogation beyond the Precautionary

approach, establishing flexible, meaningful and measurable
Performance-Based performance objectives throughout Construction,
Operations and Closure, and enhances the assessment
of safety in a more comprehensive manner.

Precautionary Extends the Prescriptive approach using the Observational

Method to monitor for performance that is indicative of
assumed potential failure modes to validate the design
basis, and to mitigate if not.

Applies prescribed criteria, such as Factor of Safety, to

Prescriptive assess the margin of safety against shear failure but is not
able to address complex or dynamic design considerations,
such as the risk of brittle failure and the magnitude of
seismic deformations.

Tailings Management Design 101

The following sub-sections explain each approach: may be further modifications during the Closure phase.
prescriptive, precautionary and performance-based, As a result, the approach commonly used for water
with risk-informed decision-making as an overarching dams to apply a lower FoS for construction than in
theme. operations is not transferable to tailings facilities since
construction is often ongoing together with tailings
3.4.3.2 Prescriptive Approach to Tailings facility operation. Despite this, the approach is still used
Facility Design too frequently for tailings facilities.

The prescriptive approach to designing tailings facilities A further limitation of the FoS is that formulating a valid
came to prominence in the 1970s as an adaptation from FoS for a given tailings facility is dependent upon the
design practices for water dams. In its basic form, the selection of appropriate parameters and access to
approach often uses a prescribed Factor of Safety (FoS) reliable data (eg extensive field and laboratory studies
as a criterion that is perceived by some to denote as part of site characterisation (Section 3.3.3)). It is also
whether or not a tailings facility is safe. Due to the dependent upon the competency and experience of
seemingly straightforward application of FoS, it has those involved. If the FoS has been erroneously
broad appeal. calculated to be above a prescribed value, but the
actual FoS is really below that value, then the tailings
3.4.3.3 Limitations of Prescriptive Approach facility may be less safe than assumed by the Operator.
Additionally, since the FoS is calculated for an
A FoS is often misinterpreted as a sole measure of safety.
embankment as a whole, it may not adequately account
It is based on the premise that a higher FoS reduces the for zones of local resistance and/or weakness within an
likelihood of failure. However, a FoS is not a measurable embankment, thus potentially overlooking or not
value; it is an outcome based on inputs which are derived recognising the significance of the ‘weakest link’ in an
by the designer based on site data, laboratory testing embankment. Solutions to addressing these limitations
and modelling. Natural variations in site and laboratory are outlined in the following sub-sections.
data give rise to uncertainty around the calculated FoS.
However, FoS values are rarely reported with uncertainty 3.4.3.4 Precautionary Approach to Tailings
limits. Further, a given value of FoS has an entirely Facility Design
different meaning if an identical value exists for both a
site with a brittle credible failure mode and one with only Despite the limitations regarding FoS, many tailings
non-brittle credible failure modes. facilities have been safely constructed and operated
by combining a prescriptive approach with the
An over-reliance on FoS can lead to complacency – a Observational method, which is referred to in this Guide
sense that if the design FoS is met then the facility is as the ‘precautionary approach’. Performance that is
safe. Complacency can also lead to an inadequate indicative of a potential failure mode is identified and
standard of care regarding other factors that may be monitored in order to validate whether the design basis
just as important, if not more so, to the safety of a given remains sound and if not, to initiate mitigation
tailings facility, such as using engineering analysis measures. The amount by which variances from
methodology that may not be applicable to a specific expected performance can be tolerated is often then
situation, just because the method is convenient or supported by additional design calculations and
familiar, or a lack of urgency to act in response to judgement. During the Construction, Operations, and
specific problematic observations in the field. Closure phases, performance behaviour surveillance is
conducted in accordance with the design criteria and
As noted, the concept of FoS was originally developed
expected ranges such that appropriate corrective
for water dams and has been adapted to tailings
action can be taken when exceedances are
facilities. One significant difference between water
encountered. The precautionary approach also requires
dams and tailings facilities is that water dams are
a contingency design to be implementable when and if
typically built to final height at the outset, whereas
observations require that mitigation is necessary.
tailings facility embankments are typically constructed
in stages, with a starter embankment before deposition Currently, the use of the precautionary approach is
of tailings commences, and raises to increase capacity widespread across the mining industry, and in many
through the Operations phase of the lifecycle. There cases the continued use of this approach is appropriate

ICMM Design 102

and effective in ensuring safe tailings management. — It provides an initial Design phase as a first step to a
The precautionary approach is applicable and effective performance-based design which in turn leads to
in many circumstances because: improved safety and reliability of performance.

— T
 here are existing tailings facilities that have been An illustration of the precautionary approach for design,
safely designed, constructed and operated using this construction, operation and closure is presented in
approach. If properly understood and calibrated with Figure 13. As illustrated, this approach relies on defining
relevant experience, the precautionary approach can the acceptance criteria for the facility, which is often the
continue to be used for such facilities. minimum acceptable FoS, either prescribed by
regulation or defined by the EOR or Design Team
— T
 he application of the precautionary approach can be
(recognising that separate FoS values may be adopted
validated by precedence and by confirmation that
for the Construction, Operations, and Closure phases).
neither the foundation materials nor the foundations
During the life of the tailings facility observations are
themselves or other structural components of the
made via surveillance to assess whether the facility is
tailings facility are susceptible to strain weakening
meeting the intent of the design, and hence consistent
failure under the design criteria or other elements of
with the required FoS.
non-homogeneous straining.

Figure 13: Precautionary-Based Approach to Design, Construction, Operations and Closure

Select Design Geotechnical model

Acceptance Criteria Hydrogeological model
Geologic model
Seismic Hazard model
Develop Design Meeting
Climate
Acceptance Criteria for
Geomorphology
the most likely case and
worst case Experience and case studies

Define Trigger Levels

for Monitoring

Establish Surveillance
Programme to address
Credible Failure Modes

Apply Remedial Collect and Interpret

Measures Surveillance Data

Adopt reasonable Intent

worst-case contingency No Yes Continue Construction/
of Design
design or modify Being Met? Operation/Closure
accordingly

It should be noted that most of the recent high-profile representation of pore pressure conditions and external
failures of tailings facilities had an acceptable FoS within loading conditions, along with appropriate surveillance
the context of the precautionary approach, although for all credible failure modes is necessary with the
there were challenges with its application and precautionary approach.
understanding. The precautionary approach is not
A key point of the precautionary approach is that the
appropriate when brittle failure modes are present,
tailings facility response (via surveillance) is always
especially if they are not recognised and eliminated.
reactive, based on what has been observed.
Appropriate material characterisation with appropriate

Tailings Management Design 103

For the application of the precautionary approach to
design for static failure modes, this Guide
recommends that:

— D
 esign FoS are not prescribed but should be
determined by the EOR and the Design Team and
should be endorsed by Independent Review.

— T
 he sensitivities of safe design to material
characterisation and site characterisation should
be recognised by the EOR and the Design Team
and their evaluations should be endorsed by
Independent Review. Significant consideration
should be given to selecting appropriately
conservative material strength parameters for
deterministic analysis of the FoS.

— T
 he reliance on and limitations of the observational
method should be recognised (see below).

Regarding the application of precautionary-based

design in practice for dynamic (seismic) failure modes, — T
 he reasonable worst case considers what might
appropriate methods for assessing both potential occur in a worst-case scenario and how it might be
seismic deformations and post-earthquake stability mitigated. It is not intended to be an operational
should be selected by the EOR and the Design Team target but facilitates the proactive consideration of
and reviewed by the Independent Reviewer(s). There potential challenges leading to potential design
may also be occasions when using a FoS approach or modification. The provision of a constructible
simplified deformation analysis can be a preliminary contingency design is an integral part of the
screening tool, but screening should not replace the reasonably worst-case design.
need for more rigorous seismic deformation analyses
in highly seismic areas or with designs that contain 3.4.3.5 Limitations of the Precautionary
fragile elements (eg a low permeability core prone to Approach
cracking, drains prone to clogging). The design criteria
to be adopted for these cases are: The precautionary approach has important limitations,
related to shortcomings inherent in the application of
— There should be no loss of containment. the observational method:
— T
 here should be no secondary failure modes (eg — It is a reactive method. Once an observation is made
cracking, shear of filters, disruption of drains) that that appears to be contrary to the intent of the design,
can lead to collapse. remedial actions may be required. Determining the
Experience indicates that a specified post- appropriate remedial measures may be complicated
earthquake FoS can be useful to ensure that runaway by a lack of data, poor interpretation of the
displacements are precluded early in the design surveillance data, and/or a lack of understanding of
process. the origin or cause of the observation. In some cases,
the lack of understanding could lead to the adoption
Finally, as noted above, for the precautionary of an incorrect remedial measure. For more complex
approach, the tailings facility design should be tailings facilities, there is an increased risk of reaching
developed in terms of two cases: i) the recommended an incorrect conclusion regarding the performance of
design case; and ii) the reasonable worst case. This the facility if the surveillance programme is not
distinction has the following strengths: designed or interpreted appropriately.
— T
 he recommended design case provides — It is not readily applicable in cases where the failure
guidance on how to interpret variability in material mechanism is predominantly brittle, which might
properties based on detailed field and laboratory occur in tailings prone to liquefaction or in cases of
characterisation as well as providing a first step strain weakening foundations. Such mechanisms
towards the adoption of performance-based typically evolve more rapidly than could be observed
design.

ICMM Design 104

 or responded to with contingency measures, or 3.4.3.6 Performance-Based Approach to
where other constraints preclude the timely and Tailings Facility Design
effective application of such measures. Brittle failure
For some tailings facilities, including those with credible
mechanisms have been involved in many of the
brittle failure modes, the precautionary approach has
historical catastrophic failures of tailings facilities.
important limitations that can render it inappropriate. In
— It is only effective for variances in performance that these cases, the application of a performance-based
were foreseen, and for which remedial measures/ approach to tailings facility design, operation and
actions have been identified in advance. If a variance closure serves to reduce risk and improve safe tailings
occurs that was not foreseen and monitored, the management, consistent with the ultimate goal of
method will not detect the variance and often eliminating catastrophic events and fatalities. The
remediation cannot be applied. performance-based approach moves toward adopting
a proactive procedure for managing tailings facility
— Implementation of remedial measures/actions
performance data. This is accomplished by defining
requires that the initiation mechanism be well-
performance objectives using sequential forecasts of
understood among the Operator’s team working on
the tailings facility behaviour through all phases of the
the tailings facility (ie operators, managers, RTFE,
lifecycle and verifying that the performance is behaving
EOR).
as intended throughout the lifecycle.
— If contingency measures are not planned at the
The performance-based approach is made possible by
outset the value of the observational method is
some of the major developments in tailings management
seriously impaired. For example, if an initiation
that have occurred, notably the expansion of surveillance
mechanism is observed that could be addressed by
capacity, including remote data gathering and automated
constructing a downstream buttress on the
processing, together with numerical simulation tools to
embankment, but the construction of an
forecast tailings facility performance and behaviour in a
embankment as a contingency measure was not
timely manner. The communication technology with
foreseen, then construction may not be possible due
sometimes remote facilities and increased computational
to a lack of adequate space to construct the buttress
speeds enable real- or close-to-real-time ability to
and/or a lack of construction materials.
evaluate actual performance relative to predictive tools
— F
 or more complex tailings facilities, there is an and to continually improve those predictive tools to
increased risk of reaching an incorrect conclusion better inform future behaviour.
regarding the performance of the facility if the
This performance focuses on all observable, relevant
surveillance programme is not designed or
parameters and characteristics such as deformations,
interpreted appropriately.
piezometric pressures, seepage flows and cracking. The
validation of performance in this comprehensive
manner provides increased confidence that the facility
is behaving as intended and that safety is being
ensured.

As an example, a performance objective of limiting the

amount of strain/deformation within the foundation or a
layer within the foundation may be adopted in order to
prevent the material from reaching residual strength by
realising its brittle behaviour potential. Monitoring the
strain within this layer relative is a key performance
indicator; results are used to calibrate and forecast
strain (performance criteria) through modelling.

An illustration of the application of the performance-

based approach in design, construction, operation, and
closure is presented in Figure 14.

Tailings Management Design 105

Figure 14: Performance-Based Approach to Design, Construction, Operations and Closure

Select performance Geotechnical model

objectives Hydrogeological model
Geologic model
Seismic Hazard model
Develop preliminary
Climate
design
Geomorphology
Experience and case studies
Predict performance
outcomes

Does
Predicted
Develop surveillance
Revise design No Performance Yes
programme
and/or objectives Meet
and complete design
Objectives?

Collect and interpret performance

data

Analyse data and predict

performance
No

Analyse and predict

performance outcome
Does
Yes Is Design Performance Yes Continue Construction/
Revise design Change Meet Operations/Closure
Required? Forecast?

No

Recalibrate model and

reforecast performance

The following are key to this approach: forecasting may utilise advanced numerical
techniques such as finite element or finite difference
During the design process:
models. These tools are often initially constructed
— U
 se site characterisation data (geotechnical, using case study inputs and the somewhat limited
geologic, hydrogeologic, seismic, climate) to site characterisation data that are available during
establish performance objectives for the tailings the Design phase. The ability to calibrate many of
facility. These objectives should focus on the critical these models during the Design phase is limited.
elements that would affect safe construction,
During the Construction, Operations, Closure, and
operation, and closure.
Post-Closure phases:
— F
 orecast behaviour as part of the design process to
— Assess current behaviour.
inform the evolution and finalisation of the design to
meet the performance objectives. Forecasting tools — C
 alibrate and re-forecast the performance of the
are selected dependant on the complexity of the facility, comparing against the performance
challenges and the questions that need to be objectives. If the re-forecast does not meet the
answered. The tools may be relatively simple performance objectives, changes to the design and/
analytical models but, where appropriate,

ICMM Design 106

 or performance objectives may be required, as — Include a need to assess deformations resulting
indicated by the EOR. from earthquakes.

— Inform the need for potential changes to the design — A

 re potentially unstable due to high pore pressure
to improve facility safety and test proposed changes due to loading from the tailings facility.
to the design by predicting future behaviour if the
The EOR is responsible for recommending detailed
proposed changes are implemented.
design criteria and for utilising a Design Team with
The advantages of applying the performance-based adequate relevant experience compatible with the
approach include: complexity of the assignment. In addition, the EOR and
the Operator must always recognise legal requirements
— It provides a reliable and proactive basis for
applicable to the design process and the selection of
interpreting all of the significant aspects and
design criteria.
observations of tailings facility performance related
to evaluating safety. The EOR and the Design Team are expected to
formulate the procedures and the material property
— D
 esign assumptions are continually challenged and
characterisation required to initiate the design process.
subject to validation in a comprehensive manner.
Relative to a precautionary approach, the required
— T
 he staged simulation of behaviour and incremental instrumentation is expanded in order to maximise the
forward projection strengthens the confirmation of validation of performance to the degree considered to
safety. be of value. The EOR is responsible for determining
whether the facility’s embankment and foundation are
— Its adoption (including use of specific/specialised
adequately robust to meet the performance objectives.
monitoring instruments for collecting data for
updating analyses) overcomes some of the This Guide recommends the adoption of performance-
limitations associated with the definition of FoS to based design utilising the forecast of deformation, pore
shear failure modes as often defined in practice. (The pressures and seepage for all phases of the lifecycle of
FoS may not adequately highlight zones of local a tailings facility where conditions such as those
resistance and/or weakness.) outlined apply.

— T
 he improved simulation and calibration with time Furthermore, the adoption of the principles of risk-
also provides a more authoritative record that the informed decision-making enhances the capacity to
overall response of the facility based on constructed convey safety assessments to multiple stakeholders.
conditions is in accordance with the design intent.
3.4.3.7 Limitations of the Performance-Based
— S
 eismic resistant design relies on the approach to
Approach
assess potential deformations.
The performance-based approach is a natural
— T
 he onset of localisation of deformations and
extension of the observational method that is
progressive failure can be determined.
established good practice within the precautionary
— E
 xperience indicates that regulators benefit from approach. It extends to the evaluation of total
more observable performance objectives to meet performance of the tailings facility throughout its
their needs and this is facilitated by the lifecycle from construction to closure. By validating total
performance-based approach. performance of the tailings facility, the evaluation of
safety is enhanced. Total performance includes
The performance-based approach can be applied to all
deformations, pore pressures, and other aspects such
tailings facilities, but based upon the analysis of past
as drain performance and cracking (if tolerable). The
failures, it can be particularly valuable to achieve robust
capacity to undertake performance-based design
design and maintain integrity to prevent the failure of
requires the knowledge of current advances in
tailings facilities that:
deformation and pore pressure modelling as well as
— A
 re spatially complex and variable, including having advances in surveillance technology and methodology
issues of strain compatibility and interaction of needed to be able to apply the performance-based
material within the facility and foundation zones. approach to validate performance. This relies on the
EOR and Design Team having the necessary
— E xhibit the potential for strain weakening (brittle).
competency to undertake design on this basis, and to
— A
 re susceptible to liquefaction leading to potential determine adequate deformation and resistance limits
flow failure. to ensure safety. Broad application of the performance-

Tailings Management Design 107

based approach will therefore require a focused building The ALARP concept is fully compatible with the
of capacity in the industry and sharing of case history principles of risk-informed design. As discussed in
examples, of which a number already exist. Section 3.2, while there are descriptions of the ALARP
process in the public domain, the application of ALARP
Further, the Operator’s tailings engineers, operators and
can be quite robust. ALARP can be implemented using
management team need to understand what is required
a range of semi-quantitative, qualitative or experiential
to use this approach. Because design assumptions are
methods, depending on the project conditions (eg
continually challenged and subject to validation, the
geographic location, social considerations/constraints,
successful application hinges on an Operator’s
environment considerations, etc) and complexity.
adaptability, planning and ability to embrace new
Regardless of the method(s) used to implement ALARP,
technology (software and hardware).
the process itself is a powerful tool to document the
decisions and approaches that were adopted to reduce
3.4.3.8 Risk-Informed Decision-making in
risk during the lifecycle of the tailings facility.
Design
Regardless of the design approach, designs should be 3.4.3.9 External Loading Criteria for Design
informed by an appropriate assessment of the risks and
Recognising that Operators can follow the Standard
uncertainties associated with the proposed or existing
directly, as an alternative, this Guide proposes beginning
tailings facilities. An overview of a range of risk
the design process for new tailings facilities by assuming
management tools available to inform design was
the need for extreme loading design criteria because,
presented in Section 3.2.
while not the only factor involved, robust design with
A design appropriately informed by risk applies the conservative criteria is supportive of preventing
evaluation of uncertainty in material properties, external catastrophic failures. Selecting conservative criteria is
loadings, analytical models and interpretations. It also consistent with the safety culture of the mining industry
requires an appropriately informed level of independent and the ultimate goal of preventing catastrophic failures.
review; to do otherwise is in itself a risk to the design. By beginning with extreme loading criteria, consequence
A risk-informed design takes the input from the risk classification of a credible failure is not necessary for the
assessment at any level of sophistication, as sophistication purposes of establishing design criteria.
should be commensurate with the design stage of the
Although this Guide enters the design process
facility (Section 3.2), and uses that information in setting
assuming extreme criteria, it provides the flexibility
performance criteria and analytical methodology, and the
that the EOR may recommend alternative criteria if
bounds of sensitivity applied to both.
appropriate, based on site-specific considerations, a

ICMM Design 108

risk assessment that justifies a different approach as There are nuances between this Guide and the
appropriately protective against catastrophic risk, and Standard, with the common objective of selecting
endorsement by Independent Review. ALARP applies to external loading criteria to support the safe design of a
existing facilities as well. given tailings facility. While the Guide provides a design
process that does not require the use of a prescriptive
The extreme loading design criteria proposed by
consequence classification process, the Standard
the Guide are:
enters the design process for new facilities by formally
 esign flood: A maximum design flood (MDF) with a
D determining the consequence of failure classification of
return period of 1 in 10,000 years should be considered a tailings facility by assessing downstream conditions
for new facilities and for the screening of facilities and consideration of credible failure modes as
already under construction (in operation) or already described in Requirement 4.1.
closed. In the latter cases, a reduction in the MDF can
Further, the Standard provides a consequence
be considered based on a recommendation from the
classification (Annex 2, Table 1) as well as external
EOR, endorsement by Independent Review and
loading criteria (Annex 2, Tables 2 and 3) applicable for
approval by the Operator. This should be supported by a
the safe design of new tailings facilities while
risk evaluation using the ALARP principle.
recognising that other guidelines and/or legal
This Guidance also recognises that more extreme requirements may be applied. The external loading
floods (probable maximum flood (PMF)) may be criteria for the Operations and Closure phases vary
recommended by the EOR or they may be required based on the consequence classification. The external
under legal requirements in some jurisdictions. In such loading criteria for the Post-Closure phase are
cases, the judgement of the EOR and/or legal associated with extreme consequence for tailings
requirements take precedence. Recent developments in facilities Closure phases. During the Operations phase,
estimating extreme floods increases the confidence in the design may be based on extreme loading criteria or
estimates of PMF and should be recognised. the current consequence classification criteria. If the
current criteria are used, the Operator must maintain
Design earthquake: A maximum design earthquake
the ability to upgrade to extreme external loading
(MDE) with a return period from a probabilistic seismic
criteria throughout the facility lifecycle and check at
hazard analysis (PSHA) of 1 in 10,000 years should be
least every five years whether there is a material change
considered for new facilities and for the screening of
that requires upgrade of the facility. If so, upgrade must
facilities already under construction (in operation) or
be completed within three years. Regardless, the design
already closed.
for closure should ultimately use appropriate design
Alternatively, where appropriate for the seismological criteria, such as those included in Annex 3 of the
setting, a deterministic maximum credible earthquake Standard or should justify using lower criteria through
(MCE) may be adopted as MDE for new facilities and for use of the ALARP principle for existing facilities per
the screening of facilities already under construction or Requirement 4.7.
already closed. In either case, the selection of
The Guide recognises that consequences will need to
probabilistic or deterministic methodologies and their
be considered in the risk assessment process and EPRP
associated loadings and a reduction in the MDE from
if catastrophic credible failures are present, even if
those outlined above can be accepted based on a
using extreme loadings for the design process.
recommendation from the EOR, endorsement by
Independent Review and approval by the Operator.

Tailings Management Design 109

3.4.3.10 Failure Modes Every historic catastrophic failure has resulted from one
or more of the following failure modes:
Beyond establishing external loading criteria, many
other factors are critical to preventing catastrophic — O
 vertopping (ie loss of containment through a
failures. The next piece of design is assessing potential breach).
failure modes and the development of a design that
— S
 eepage and erosion (eg piping, decant structure
minimises or eliminates credible failure modes and thus
failure and any other failure related to water
sets a tailings facility up for success in the prevention of
movement).
catastrophic outcomes from credible failure modes.
— Instability both due to excessive deformations within
As described in Section 2.7.2 and 3.7.4 and consistent
the embankment and/or its abutments/foundations.
with the goal of eliminating fatalities and catastrophic
failures, ideally each tailings facility would have limited The following sections highlight some special
or no credible catastrophic failure modes. However, considerations associated with each potential
some facilities do have credible failure modes that can failure mode.
lead to catastrophic outcomes and these should be
addressed by appropriate design measures.

— T
 he storage of the MDF event, or a portion thereof,
that results in temporary wetting and restoration
of the beach.

In Detail — U
 se of good practices for estimating the design
flood, considering climate trends and the potential
Overtopping
for a series of events to occur consecutively (wet
Tailings facilities are not typically designed to
season or year, as is appropriate for local conditions).
accommodate overtopping. Exceptions can exist when
the embankment(s) is composed of sufficiently coarse — W
 here present, the malfunction of spillways that
rockfill or other erosion-resistant material and is may be relied upon to manage the extreme design
designed to act as a flow-through embankment. In flood event.
general, safety with respect to overtopping is ensured
— L ong-term settlement of tailings and
by the provision of adequate freeboard that can include
embankments.
a sufficiently sized and operating spillway. This design
consideration is incorporated in the water balance — E
 arthquake-related settlement of tailings and
(Section 3.2.3) around the tailings facility as an element embankments.
that reflects the construction schedule of the facility.
— T
 he potential for cracking due to desiccation in
The construction plan should incorporate the the upper portion of the beach.
consideration of the ore processing facility’s tailings
— T
 he operational beach length that would be a
production plan as well as the tailings transport and
performance requirement under normal operating
deposition plan, water management requirements,
conditions.
tailings deposit density, associated contingencies,
and adequate freeboard to safely manage the — R
 estriction on the migration of the reclaim pond(s)
extreme design flood event. Maintaining freeboard within the tailings facility.
requirements is a critical performance objective of
— R
 ecognition of competing water utilisation
any tailings facility where overtopping is a credible
objectives such as management of geochemical
failure mode. Violating this requirement has been
risks or fugitive dust.
known to aggravate consequences even if initial
overtopping was not the cause of a failure. — Ice formation that may interrupt/impact the water
reclaim system.
Some design considerations related to freeboard
requirements are: — P
 resence of upstream hazards or structures that
could fail and cause a cascading failure of the
— T
 he implications of wind-generated waves and
tailings facility.
reservoir setup.

ICMM Design 110

 Seepage and Internal Erosion tailings and/or foundation materials under
Design and construction to control seepage and consideration affect the hydraulic gradient at which
prevent internal erosion that may result in the failure suffusion becomes significant and the issue of
of a tailings facility falls into two classes of problems: internal stability needs to be considered. Critical
hydraulic gradients are very sensitive to the degree of
— Physical aspects of seepage control.
internal stability of a granular material.
— Chemical aspects of seepage control.
Simple prescriptive design measures are not well-
Piping is a form of internal erosion in a tailings facility, suited to accommodate the variations of materials
embankment, or foundation resulting from seepage that commonly occur in tailings facility
that causes progressive erosion and formation of a embankments. The EOR should be responsible for:
cavity or ‘pipe’ which may progress. Piping failures
— E
 stablishing the parameters required for the
typically occur rapidly and Fell et al. (2003) noted
evaluation of seepage-induced flows in both the
that in the majority of cases there were less than
tailings facility and the foundation. Unsaturated
6–12 hours between the first observation of a
flow needs to be considered where appropriate.
concentrated leak and a breach of the tailings facility.
While piping may occur during the Construction and — E
 stablishing critical hydraulic gradients to control
Operations phases, given the usual composition of internal erosion.
tailings, the occurrence of catastrophic failure from
— E
 stablishing the capacity/demand ratio (FoS for
this mode is not common. However, it is noted that
drains) for all drainage elements.
decant towers and/or other engineered conduits
(pipelines) in tailings facilities may fail structurally and — P
 roviding capacity for seepage modelling in both
may also lead to piping. The rate of filling of a tailings two- and three-dimensions, where appropriate.
facility of any significant size is generally low enough
— P
 roviding specifications for all drainage control
to allow time to intervene and modify the design if
measures.
piping due to filter incompatibility is observed (finer
material is able to migrate into coarser material). — D
 esign of the surveillance programme for
Nevertheless, the significance of controlling seepage seepage.
in tailings facilities and the prevention of piping is a
Some design considerations associated with
paramount consideration in tailings facility
seepage and internal erosion of tailings facilities
engineering and the principles follow those in use
include the following:
for water dam design.
— T
 he capacity/demand ratio should be large
The physics governing seepage through both
enough to accommodate the uncertainties
saturated and unsaturated materials are well
associated with estimating seepage flows.
established. With the determination of the controlling
hydraulic conductivity properties at a given tailings — C
 are should be taken to avoid utilising materials in
facility, for both the foundation and tailings seepage control elements that can degrade with
embankment section(s), the calculation of seepage time.
discharges and associated piezometric distributions
— D
 esign of control elements such as filters should
are readily computed. The critical hydraulic gradient
consider the ease of construction and related
at which upward directed flow reduces the effective
quality control to enhance reliable performance.
stress to zero is also determined by the porosity and
Design should also should recognise tailings
density of the local porous material. However, it is well
facility deformations including those anticipated
established that the gradient at which particles begin
by design earthquake ground motions and should
to move is less than the critical gradient at which
be robust enough to continue functioning
effective stress is zero, but there is no clear limit
following such events.
regarding the rate of particle migration at these
reduced hydraulic gradients. A variety of tests have — If the closure plan includes a functional water
been developed to aid in determining this limit. This is body on the surface of the tailings facility and if
made more complex by the occurrence of suffusion there would be active seepage as a result,
which is the selected transportation and washing out consideration should be given to reducing the
of fines from a coarse material. The uniformity of the allowable hydraulic gradient in the tailings facility.

Tailings Management Design 111

 — In addition to piezometric and discharge — T
 he presence of brittle materials, either within the
monitoring, considerations should be given to embankment, abutment, or foundation of the
methods that can be invoked to locate zones of embankment, that could lead to the rapid loss of
excessive seepage if they are threatening safe shear strength.
performance. Techniques based on self-potential
— T
 he development of static liquefaction due to
measurements (passive electrical geophysical
rapid construction loading or the development of
method) and differential temperature
undrained loading conditions in brittle materials
measurements have proved successful in practice.
at the onset of yield.
The development of powerful and effective numerical
— T
 he development of dynamic liquefaction due
modelling software to forecast piezometric
to seismicity or blasting.
distributions and seepage discharges is an integral
component of performance-based design. While — E xcessive differential settlement of soft zones.
accurate prediction of both piezometric distributions
Many of these issues can be identified during site
and seepage discharges of tailings facilities is
characterisation (Section 3.3.2), however others, such
challenging and often not reliable, predictions can be
as construction loading, will need to be addressed as
improved by means of history-matching of model
part of the construction documentation and the
behaviour to historic data and incremental forward
quality management process.
projections conducted in a systematic manner. The
net result is an increased confidence in safe The driving forces of the tailings facility behind an
operation and the development of an insightful tool embankment and, in turn, on the foundations for the
for final closure design. embankment, need to be sufficiently met by the
resisting forces of the embankment at all phases of
Chemical aspects of seepage are typically thought of
the facility’s lifecycle. The driving forces can and will
in relation to the water quality of the process-
vary due to construction activities, external loads (ie
affected water and the composition of the
seismic events) and the size and shape of the facility
groundwater (which may be influenced by the
as it evolves. The nature of the foundation materials
construction and operation of the tailings facility).
and the embankment materials need to work in
These considerations are important throughout the
tandem to create a stable mass. As above, brittle
facility lifecycle to ensure Design and Operations are
materials in either the embankment or the foundation
in compliance with the permit / regulatory
require special consideration inclusive of design and
requirements for the facility. Seepage considerations
construction based upon either lower bound
should also include potential geochemical changes
strengths (eg assume the brittleness is triggered) or
to materials in the tailings facility and the foundation
sufficient robustness to prevent the sudden loss of
to assess whether such changes could affect the
strength from ever occurring.
physical stability of the tailings facility. For example:
Many tailings facilities have embankments
— C
 onsideration of whether geochemical changes
constructed using tailings. This is a widespread, safe
could affect the strength of tailings (if used as a
and logical approach as it does not involve the use of
structural element in the facility), other
other natural materials and minimises disturbance
embankment materials and/or foundation
outside the tailings facility footprint. However, tailings
materials.
material varies in mechanical behaviour and it is
— W
 hether precipitates or other geochemical essential that the gradation, fabric (including grain
changes could reduce the permeability of angularity) and bulk density be determined.
structural elements such as drainage features or
Where tailings are used as a construction material or
embankment fill.
are present in the embankment foundation, likely pore
— W
 hether seepage water could increase or pressure conditions should be modelled during the
decrease permeability in the foundation due to Design phase and during construction they should be
geochemical reactions. appropriately measured and interpreted. A proper
combination of pore pressures and bulk density is
Tailings Embankment Stability required to correctly estimate in-situ stresses and,
The stability of the tailings embankments and hence, in-situ state. There can be considerable
abutments may be impacted by: non-conservatism involved in using incorrect values.

ICMM Design 112

 Tailings facility embankments are commonly — H
 aving a relatively small ponded water on tailings
classified according to their geometry (ie upstream, facility surface.
centreline, downstream). There are variations of this
— C
 ompaction of the downstream embankment
classification, but it is adequate for the purposes of
zone
this Guide. Experience indicates that failures have
occurred at a small percentage of each type of tailing — Having relatively flat embankment side slopes.
facility embankment geometry, but that instances of
In addition, upstream facilities require rigorous TMS
catastrophic failure have been relatively more
implementation.
common at upstream-type embankments, for
example due to static or dynamic liquefaction Recent experience has highlighted the challenges
conditions. While failures have occurred with associated with selecting the appropriate FoS to
upstream construction, there have also been prevent failure in a variety of facility configurations.
numerous successes. Instead of specifying fixed values, this Guide favours
the selection of site-specific design criteria based on
Setting aside failure associated with foundation
the evaluation of site complexity by means of the EOR
conditions, this Guide considers that upstream
(in accordance with applicable legal requirements)
construction embankments can be safely
and notes that the following particularly complex
constructed, operated and closed provided they are
circumstances should be recognised:
supported at the downstream embankment zone by
a dilative and/or unsaturated buttress that can be — A
 ccumulated experience with a particular soil
monitored and that provides adequate resistance if or rock mass.
the upstream contents liquefy. This resistance does
— V
 ariable construction and operating conditions
not preclude deformations associated with seismic
that may affect in-place properties and stability of
loading provided there is no loss of containment and
the tailings facility and embankments.
that no secondary failure modes develop. Examples
of physical features that are often helpful in achieving — R
 esponse of unconsolidated materials in the
upstream embankment stability include: foundation and variations in response under
different confining stresses and stress levels.
— H
 aving a relatively low rate of increases in
embankment height. — T
 ime-dependent, deformation-dependent and
stress path-dependent processes that may affect
— U
 sing relatively coarse tailings with low clay
the critical material processes such as the
content for the construction of the embankment.
operational pore pressures and shear strengths.
— Having a well-drained foundation
— Potential for brittle failure.
— B
 eing located in an area with a relatively arid
— Susceptibility to static and dynamic liquefaction
climate
that may include strain weakening.
— B
 eing located in an area with relatively low
seismicity

Tailings Management Design 113

3.4.4 Tailings Transportation and — Potential impacts on risks.
Deposition Plan — P
 otential impacts on the implementation of the
The tailings transportation and deposition plan is closure plan.
initially developed during the Project Conception phase
In developing the tailings transportation and deposition
and refined during the Design phase. It should be
plan, a range of site characterisation (Section 3.3.2)
integrated with the design approach for the tailings
information should be considered. These characteristics
facility and the overall plan for ore extraction and
should be validated and updated on a periodic basis
processing. It should describe how tailings will be
throughout the lifecycle. If some characteristics do not
transported to and deposited in the tailings facility, and
meet the design specifications or intent, then the
how the capacity of the tailings facility will be increased
potential impacts and risks of these deviations should be
over the life of the mine. It is crucial to successfully
assessed, and appropriate actions taken to address
operating the facility from construction to closure.
them.
The tailings transportation and deposition plan should be
Depending on how water will be managed, and whether
integrated into the OMS manual (Section 2.4) and
water will be stored in the tailings facility, the tailings
implemented and regularly reviewed and updated during
transportation and deposition plan should be integrated
the Operations phase of the lifecycle (Section 3.6).
with the water management plan.
The plan should be developed, implemented and
Deposition plans typically allow for the expansion of the
updated in a manner that is aligned with the closure
tailings facility over the life-of-mine to accommodate
concept and closure plan (Section 3.7.2), to ensure that
increasing amounts of tailings solids. This could include
the final tailings surface topography at the end of the
staged lifts to increase the height of embankments to
Operations phase facilitates the implementation of the
accommodate additional tailings, or planned lateral
closure plan and post-closure land use.
expansions into new cells of the tailings facility.
Proposed changes to the tailings transportation and Depending on the water content of the tailings, and the
deposition plan should be carefully considered taking relationship between tailings management and water
into account: management, such expansions may also increase the
capacity to store water and increase the retention time
— Potential operational impacts.
of water within the tailings facility.

ICMM Design 114

 Will there be separate ‘clean’ tailings and
potentially acid-generating tailings, which would
be managed differently? Will tailings be split
based on particle size distribution or other
In Detail
physical factors? If separated, how will these
The tailings transportation and deposition plan is different types of tailings be managed?
integral to the selection of the tailings management
— C
 onsideration of whether alternative deposition
technology and the site-specific conditions of the
approaches might be feasible approaching the
tailings facility. Examples of aspects to consider include:
end of the Operations phase to achieve closure
— W
 hether the tailings will be managed as slurry, or objectives.
whether they will be dewatered to some degree
— W
 hether any other materials, such as waste rock
and managed as thickened, paste or filtered
or treatment sludge, will be managed with the
tailings. The planned moisture content and the
tailings. For example: Will potentially acid-
physical characteristics of the tailings are
generating waste rock be managed with the
essential to the plan.
tailings to prevent or control acidic drainage?
— W
 hat types of embankments, if any, will be What quantities of these materials will be placed
constructed? What will the construction method in the tailings facility, compared with the quantity
be? What materials are to be used? What will be of tailings?
the method of raising those embankments during
— H
 ow will the tailings be transported from the ore
the Operations phase?
processing facility to the tailings facility? Options
— O
 verall sitewide mass balance considerations for include a pipeline in the cases of slurry, thickened
operation and closure and integration of or paste tailings, and truck or conveyor belt in the
deposition planning with the water balance and case of filtered tailings.
management plans.
— In colder climates, whether ice lenses could form
— C
 onsideration of the potential range of tailings in deposit and how to manage them.
index properties, moisture content, rheology,
— M
 ethods to prevent the release of tailings into the
swelling clays, etc, as relevant for project-specific
environment during transportation to the tailings
conditions.
facility.
— Material placement/approaches planned.
— H
 ow will the tailings and any other materials be
— M
 ethods, if any, to control seepage from the placed or deposited within the tailings facility?
tailings facility, such as the use of liners, water
— H
 ow much water will be retained in the tailings
retaining embankments or underdrains. This
facility? What measures are in place to deal with
should also consider the potential implications of
excess water, such as due to high intensity
the inclusion of liner materials on the geotechnical
precipitation, extreme snowpack/melt, extended
stability of a facility.
periods of wet weather, extended periods of water
— W
 hether there will be a single type of tailings, or retention, etc?
whether there will be different types. For example:

3.4.5 Documentation of Design important components to be considered in developing

documentation and refers to documents where
The Standard refers to a Design Basis Report (DBR) and
information might be housed, for ease of writing this
a Design Report. Some Operators may wish to combine
text; however, it is not intended to be prescriptive.
all this information into a single report, others will prefer
to spread it out over a few reports. Regardless of The DBR is a foundational document that records the
format, it is important to document the design basis as design basis and the outcomes from the design
well as issued for construction drawings, specifications, process. It also incorporates updates throughout the
and construction quality management planning as key lifecycle of a tailings facility. The site characterisation
elements of the Design phase. This Guide refers to the studies (Section 3.3.2) inform the DBR. The models and

Tailings Management Design 115

information described in the DBR underpin the of ultimately transitioning to ensure that the DBR is
decisions that the EOR (with the support of the Design reflective of site-specific investigations and studies.
Team) makes in setting design criteria for the facility.
The DBR should describe the risk controls and
Development of the DBR should begin during the
associated performance criteria (Section 3.6.4) that are
Project Conception phase (Section 3.3) to include the
used in the design and implementation of the
alternatives evaluated (Section 3.3.4), and should be
surveillance programme (Section 2.4.3.4). The EOR
refined during the design of the selected alternative to
should review and update the DBR throughout the
provide the basis for construction, operation, and
lifecycle of the facility to ensure the DBR reflects the
closure of the tailings facility. The DBR should be further
current status of the tailings facility and future plans. A
updated throughout the lifecycle of the facility, with
DBR should contain enough detail to provide a basis for
each phase informing subsequent phases.
comparison of:
The DBR should include the following:
— C
 onstructed conditions (clarifying any deviations
— D
 esign criteria considering site-specific conditions from the original design).
that underpin tailings facility designs through field
— Any changes to the original design intent.
investigation, laboratory work and modelling and
analyses. Where assumptions are made early in the — A
 ctual performance against performance objectives,
lifecycle, this should also be clearly defined until data indicators, and criteria described in the DBR.
is available to confirm criteria.
— Updates to the closure plan.
— P
 erformance objectives which will be met by TARPs
— A
 ny extensions to the capacity of the tailings facility
(eg seepage stability, allowable deformation) and the
beyond the original design intent.
tailings facility design components.
It is important to keep the DBR-related information up to
— S
 ummary of supporting information used to
date and integrated. For example, it is valuable to
demonstrate that the tailings facility, as designed,
incorporate data and analyses from periodic material
will meet the design criteria and performance
characterisation programmes with previous design/
objectives.
material characterisation data to validate interpretation
Facets of a DBR typically include site conditions, and to document any in-situ changes. Likewise, if there
geotechnical properties of and criteria used for are known changes to construction material/methods
foundation and tailings material, starter facility and (eg to seismic loading models, input data, etc) these
embankment characteristics, tailings transport should be incorporated with DBR information. Similarly,
(distribution) and deposition system, reclaim water designs may change due to the permitting process and
system, water management, environmental approvals. Important changes should be managed and
components, supporting infrastructure, and a integrated into the documentation.
description of battery limits (boundary for area of
Independent Review is critical for the DBR due to its
responsibility).
foundational nature in tailings management. The DBR
The DBR should be updated throughout the design should also address the information requirements
process to include increasing detail and complexity identified through community engagement and
reflective of the design decisions and site-specific data Independent Review, as well as provide information
that are collected as progress is made on the project related to the relevant legal requirements and risk
design studies. Early design stages often include management plan.
assumptions or estimates for certain parameters until
The DBR or other documents further include detailed
site-specific data become available as the design of the
construction drawings and construction specifications.
tailings facility advances. It is important to note the
These are used together with the construction quality
status of information in the DBR (assumed or estimated
management plan for the basis for execution of the
from similar projects versus site-specific) with the goal
design.

ICMM Design 116

 — Embankment characteristics

— Slope stability

— Discharge and seepage controls

In Detail
— B
 reach analysis and inundation studies (if
A typical DBR includes the following sections with
appropriate based on risk assessment)
reference to the relevant technical references and
reports: — Tailings distribution and reclaim water system

— Tailing facility general information — Tailings deposition

— Mine production plan — Earthworks and constructability

— Battery limits — Structural design criteria

— T
 opographic survey methodology, datum/ — D
 esign criteria for electrical infrastructure (eg
coordinate system pumps, surveillance instruments, etc.)

— Climate and meteorology — Closure design criteria

— G
 eology (including structural geology and — Costing basis and drawing standards.
presence of faults) and hydrogeology
Beyond integrating the underpinning models, the DBR
— Geological and hydrogeological characterisation defines whether the tailings facility approach will use
precautionary design or performance-based design
— S
 ite geotechnical characterisation – including
and provides important design criteria such as FoS
foundation and borrow materials
and allowable deformations, potential for strain
— Seismicity and seismic design requirements weakening, etc. It describes the scope and level of
detail of information and analyses used to make
— Surface water management
decisions, along with applicable legal requirements
— Geochemical considerations and guidelines, demonstrating the validity of those
decisions.
— Tailings characteristics and rheology

— Water balance

Tailings Management Design 117

Construction 3.5

3.5.1 Introduction appointing an EOR for the Construction phase

through a change management process. This EOR
Construction is a recurring lifecycle activity that
is likely to have a longer-term responsibility.
progresses the Design phase outputs of a
construction design including drawings, technical — Developing a construction management plan.
specifications and quality management into a
— Developing a project execution plan.
commissioned facility that is received by the Operator
for ongoing operations. The initial stage of a tailings — E
 stablishing the construction team, including
facility is commonly constructed by a contractor with defining the roles and responsibilities of the EOR
subsequent stages either continuing to be contractor and the construction team and their relationship
built or alternatively built by the Operator’s site team. through the design process.
Sometimes at existing mine sites, the Operator’s team
— E
 xecution of the QA/QC programme based on the
may have the capacity to perform some of the initial
plans developed during the Design phase.
stage construction of a new tailings facility.
Regardless of who performs the construction, a — D
 eveloping and maintaining a construction risk
strong quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) register to track risks to project schedule and cost.
programme is important. The construction risk register is one piece of the
broader risk assessment and risk management
Construction implementation should incorporate the
process for the tailings facility which should also be
consideration of the ore processing facility’s tailings
considered through the Construction phase,
production plan, as well as the tailings transport and
particularly when considering changes to the
deposition plan, water management requirements,
design (Section 3.2.4).
associated contingencies, and adequate freeboard to
safely manage the design flood event. — Initiating the tender process and procurement with
clarity around required qualifications and
The main activities for the Construction phase are:
experience in establishing potential bidders and
— If the EOR from the Design phase is not retained, the assessment of bids.

ICMM Construction 118

— D
 eveloping a construction health, safety and the design intent, detailed specifications, quality
environmental plan. management programme for subsequent use in the
Operations and Closure phases, as well as any other
— Advancing construction activities.
documents required for final approval and initiation of
— Commissioning the constructed facility. the Operations phase. Subsequent Construction phase
activities use similar elements to progress the tailings
— D
 eveloping accurate documentation including the
facility through its lifecycle, as required per the Design,
Deviance Accountability Report (DAR) and the
Operations, and Closure phases and/or if mitigation is
Construction Records Report (CRR).
required.
The outcome of the initial Construction phase is a
Figure 15 illustrates the key activities of the Construction
commissioned facility constructed in accordance with
phase of the lifecycle.

Figure 15: Key activities of the Construction phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Construction
Construct in accordance
with the DBR.
Prepare and update across
the life cycle:
– Construction vs Design
Intent Verification
– Deviance Accountability
Report Temporary Suspension
– Construction Records Report
Prepare:
– Updated site
Project Design characterisation models Operations Closure Post-Closure
Conception – Updated DBR

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

3.5.2 Construction Management Plan application, and revised and improved as warranted. It is
not intended to be a step-by-step procedure for each
The execution of the engineering design requires a
activity. Typically, it is a document that outlines general
well-developed management framework to ensure its
activities, procedures, requirements and schedules for
successful implementation. The management
successful completion.
framework encompasses the development of a
construction management plan to establish uniform The construction management plan typically includes
policies and procedures that ensure facility construction several elements that may be packaged in a variety of
is conducted safely in accordance with the construction formats at the preference of the Operator. The planning
drawings, technical specifications and the QA/QC process and clarity of outcomes is the important aspect
programme. The construction management plan is an of the following, not the specific nomenclature or how
overarching plan and is intended to be flexible in its the outcomes are packaged:

Tailings Management Construction 119

Project execution plan: 3.5.3 Deviations from Design
— Describes how the construction is to be undertaken.
It is not uncommon for situations to arise during
It provides specific requirements for the activities,
construction that necessitate a deviation from the
schedules (including key milestone dates), and
design or construction specifications. Such deviations
organisational framework.
do not create any facility safety concerns provided they
— Construction execution plan: are assessed, reviewed and documented as part of the
Details how and when the construction activities are overall construction management process. These
to be undertaken. deviations can range from very minor to material
changes requiring a design modification. Deviations are
Risk management plan: a normal part of the construction process, as actual
— Details results of facility risk assessment activities conditions (eg foundation conditions or characteristics
conducted during the Design phase. This information of construction materials) will never be exactly the same
should be referenced carefully when design changes as those anticipated based on the information available
are proposed. Risk ownership and continuity from during the Project Conception and Design phases.
the Design phase across Construction and into the Deviations may also occur due to permitting
Operations phase is critical in managing change requirements.
during this transition period.
Proposed deviations should be carefully considered.
— F
 acility risk assessments are updated to reflect Haphazard or undocumented deviations should be
constructed conditions and any additional avoided. A clear process should be established in
information relevant to risk (eg hazards) collected advance of commencing construction for the
during construction (new information, new consideration and potential approval of deviations,
developments, changes required in design due to including delegating responsibility and authority for
geomorphology, water management, climatic such decisions. This process should be aligned with
changes, or unforeseen major events or topographic tailings management governance and involve the entire
conditions). breadth of the team responsible for safe management
of tailings (Accountable Executive, RTFE, EOR, Design
— P
 roject-level risk (risks to schedule and cost) may
Team and Independent Review).
also be captured in a construction risk register.
The potential impacts of the proposed deviations on the
Quality management plan: design intent, expected performance, feasibility and
— Describes both the QA and QC requirements cost of the closure and progressive closure plan and
determined by the EOR for construction, where: risk profile of the tailings facility should be assessed and
understood before any deviation is approved.
— Q
 A is the implementation of a system to ensure
design and construction activities will deliver the It is important to be aware of the potential cumulative
project requirements in accordance with the design effects of multiple minor deviations which may not be of
intent. consequence on their own. In assessing proposed
deviations, previous deviations should be considered
— Q
 C is the inspection of the construction works and
and the potential for a cumulative effect should be
material verification, via testing, to ensure
evaluated.
compliance with the requirements of the drawings
and technical specifications. Construction QA processes may identify non-
conformances with design specifications from time to
Water management plan:
time. If not immediately resolved, a non-conformance
— D
 etails how water will be managed during report should be issued and tracked until it is resolved.
construction, outlines start-up water requirements, The intent is to eliminate these, and this is the typical
and references overall objectives for safe water outcome. However, some non-conformances may be
management for the completed tailings facility and disputed and unreasonable to resolve due to costs and/
is tied to the sitewide and tailings facility-specific or schedule implications. Under these few
water balance model and plan (Section 3.2.3). circumstances, the non-conformances can be
considered deviations from the design.

ICMM Construction 120

A CDIV process should be conducted by the Operator of construction are documented, together with any
with support from the EOR to ensure: non-conformances and their resolution.

— T
 he design intent, as per the DBR, has been Any unresolved deviations identified in the CRR can be
implemented and is still being met if the site carried into the DAR process. The DAR process can be
conditions encountered during construction varied used throughout the lifecycle of the tailings facility,
from the design assumptions. identifying and reviewing potential implications of
changes to the facility and evaluating their acceptability.
— A
 ny discrepancies between the field conditions
The DAR is discussed further in Section 3.6.3.
encountered during construction and the design
assumptions are clearly identified and reviewed, The CRR should document the initial construction of a
such that the design can be reviewed and adjusted new tailings facility and should be updated to reflect
as required to account for the actual field conditions. other construction activities when they occur
This information is critical for the design of throughout the lifecycle, including:
subsequent facility stages.
— O
 ngoing construction through the Operations phase
The results of the CDIV should be included in a CRR for to increase the capacity of the tailings facility.
new tailings facilities or other relevant documents such
— Construction for any material changes.
as an annual report for operating tailings facilities.
— D
 esign modifications and implementation of the
3.5.4 Documentation of Constructed closure plan.
Conditions
Construction records, including QA/QC documentation,
Accurate documentation of as-constructed conditions construction surveys and as-built drawings, and
is critical. Such documentation provides the information commissioning documentation should be retained to
needed to: provide the documentation that the construction was in
accordance with the construction drawings and
— C
 ontinue construction of the tailings facility during
technical specifications. These may be consolidated in
the Operations phase.
the CRR. These records are important for the ongoing
— Inform any future consideration of changes in the management of the tailings facility and provide a critical
design of the tailings facility. database for ongoing construction and geotechnical
assessments. If construction is conducted in multiple
— U
 nderstand and remedy problems that may arise
stages, it is helpful to consolidate the CRR and drawings
in the future.
as a complete reference of the cumulative facility
Constructed conditions should be documented in a construction or develop another equivalent approach to
CRR signed by the EOR and RTFE per Requirement 6.3 integrating information.
of the Standard. Through the CDIV and Independent
To facilitate ease of access and the analysis of
Review, this includes verification of whether the
constructed conditions this information may include
constructed conditions meet the design intent and
detailed geo-location data and be compiled in a
specifications.
comprehensive GIS-based retrievable system. This may
The CRR should also summarise the results of the CDIV not be possible for existing sites with incomplete
to ensure that all changes to the design or any aspect construction records.

Tailings Management Construction 121

Operations 3.6

3.6.1 Introduction — R
 isk management plan is implemented and is
reviewed and updated regularly (Sections 3.2.4 and
The Operations phase is the period in the lifecycle when
3.4).
tailings are transported to, and placed in, the tailings
facility. It may also include the temporary suspension of — O
 MS activities are implemented to operationalise the
mine operations (Section 3.6.5). TMS and risk management plan (Section 2.4).

The full range of concepts, principles and practices for — T

 ailings transportation and deposition plan is
tailings management are deployed during the implemented, reviewed and updated regularly
Operations phase to ensure safe, responsible tailings (Section 3.4.4).
management, are as follows:
— R
 isk assessment is updated periodically
— T
 ailings are managed in accordance with overall (Section 3.2.4).
governance for tailings management, with
— C
 onstruction activities continue to increase the
accountability and responsibility appropriately
capacity of a tailings facility and the volume of
assigned (Section 2.2).
stored tailings as mining and ore processing
— TMS is implemented (Section 2.3). operations proceed (Section 3.5). Constructed
- Evaluating Performance is ongoing. conditions are accurately documented, including
deviations from the design intent and design basis.
- Identifying Actions to Improve Performance
Deviations are assessed through the change
includes the reporting of performance to the
management system (Section 2.3.2.1).
Accountable Executive.
- Action plans are developed and implemented to — A
 programme for reviewing tailings safety is
address deficiencies or opportunities for continual implemented (Section 2.6).
improvement. — Community engagement continues (Section 2.2.5).

ICMM Operations 122

— T
 MS and OMS manual are reviewed and updated as — A
 ll updates and operational changes are assessed
appropriate (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). through the change management system (Section
2.3.2.1) ensuring that implications of any updates and
— E
 PRP is tested and updated as appropriate
changes are reflected in other site-wide documents
(Section 2.7).
and systems (eg closure plans).
— Development of the closure plan continues
During the Operations phase, the Operator should
(Section 3.7.2).
plan for the possible temporary suspension of mine
— S
 ite characterisation information is updated and operations. Depending on the nature of the project,
improved through sample and data collection, the Operator may also implement progressive
testing and analyses to identify any changes that reclamation to test closure concepts, ensure regulatory
could affect the design or operation of the tailings acceptance and integrate stakeholder engagement into
facility. This information is used to confirm site the process.
characterisation models (eg tailings material
Figure 16 illustrates the key activities of the Operations
characterisation) and the DBR is updated accordingly
phase of the lifecycle.
(Section 3.3.2).

Figure 16: Key activities of the Operations phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Operations
Conduct OMS activities in
accordance with:
– Performance objectives
– Risk management plan
– Design intent
– Closure plan
Evaluate performance of
tailings facility and tailings
management governance:
– Address deficiencies
– Implement measures for
continual improvement
Review/update:
Temporary Suspension
– DBR
– Tailings management system
– OMS manual
– EPRP
Project Design Construction – Site characterisation models Closure Post-Closure
Conception – Risk assessment

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Tailings Management Operations 123

3.6.2 Applying to Existing Tailings Facilities collection to develop or refine site characterisation
models to validate understanding of stability
This Guide is intended to support the management of
performance, updated or more comprehensive risk
both new and existing tailings facilities. However,
assessment). Prioritisation of gaps and the development
determining how to apply the Guide to an existing
of action plans should be done with input from the EOR
facility can be challenging and a site-specific
and Independent Review.
approach should be taken.
A key consideration in prioritising gaps and the
The first step should be to conduct a gap analysis
development of action plans is appropriately scaling
against the elements related to governance of tailings
application of the guidance to the tailings facility in
management (Part 2) and the implementation of good
question. Considerations in scaling application of the
engineering practices described in Part 3. Depending
guidance will typically include:
on the Operator, conducting a gap analysis may
require external expertise and input. This analysis — A
 vailability of meaningful information about the
should include inspection and identification of any history of the tailings facility.
immediate concerns followed by a more detailed
— U
 ncertainties associated with credibility of potential
analysis that includes review of the:
failure modes.
— Application
 of the TMS (Section 2.3) and its
— Complexity and size of the tailings facility.
integration in sitewide integrated mine planning
(Sections 1.2.1 and 3.2.2). — Risks and the potential consequences of failure.

— Risk assessment (Section 3.2). — Lifecycle phase.

— D
 ocumentation related to tailings facility — Closure plan.
engineering and management, if available, even if
In addition, the Operator should consider the continued
under different name/format:
suitability of application of the precautionary approach,
- Site characterisation information and models versus adoption of a performance-based approach
(Section 3.3.2). (Section 3.4.3).
- Design information including the design, the
The Operator should develop a schedule for
design intent and design basis (Design Report
sequencing and implementing action plans, develop a
and DBR, Section 3.4.5).
budget, and obtain budget approval. Action plans
- Information on the construction of the tailings should then be implemented in accordance with the
facility, including as-built conditions (CRR, schedule, cognizant of the importance of effectively
Section 3.5.4), and deviations from the design managing change through this process (Section 2.3.2.1).
(DAR, Section 3.5.3).
- OMS activities (OMS manual, Section 2.4).
- Closure plan (Section 3.7.2).

— C
 urrent and historical performance of the tailings
facility, including conformance with the design
intent, corporate policy on tailings management,
legal requirements and commitments to
communities (Section 2.3.4).

— E
 PRP and results of any tests conducted
(Section 2.7).

— R
 eports from a programme for reviewing tailings
safety (eg Independent Review) (Section 2.6).

Once a gap analysis has been completed, the

Operator should prioritise gaps that present the
highest potential facility safety risks and develop
action plans to address those gaps (eg operational
improvements to address identified potential
instability, additional site investigation or data

ICMM Operations 124

 — Are facility performance objectives, indicators and
criteria across lifecycle phases identified and
described, including quantification (Section 3.3.3)?

In Detail — D
 oes the Operator have an up-to-date risk
assessment (Section 3.2.4)? Does the Operator
Questions to consider in this gap analysis include:
understand the uncertainties associated with the
Questions related to governance of tailings risk assessment? Has the Operator identified
management credible failure modes and assessed the potential
— Does the Operator have a corporate policy on consequences of failure?
tailings management? Does this policy include a
— D
 oes the Operator have an up-to-date risk
goal of eliminating fatalities and catastrophic
management plan and is it being implemented
failures (Section 2.2.3)?
(Section 3.2)? Does the risk management plan
— H
 ave accountability and responsibility been reduce risk according to ALARP? Are additional
assigned for roles described in Section 2.2.2 and mitigations needed?
are persons in these roles appropriately
— D
 oes the Operator have documentation on the
competent as per Section 2.2.4? Are there clear
design, the design intent, and the design basis for
lines of communication between key roles?
the tailings facility (eg a Design Report and DBR)?
— H
 as a TMS been developed and implemented Is this documentation adequate and updated as
(Section 2.3)? Are processes in place to manage appropriate (Section 3.4.5)?
change (Section 2.3.2.1)?
— H
 as an integrated tailings and water management
— H
 as an OMS manual been developed and plan been developed and is it based on up-to-
implemented? Is it up to date, accessible, date data and operating rules (Section 3.2.3)?
understood and utilised by relevant personnel
— D
 oes the Operator have a plan for construction
(Section 2.4)?
management, including quality management
— Is the Operator effectively managing information (Section 3.5.2)? Is construction being done in
related to tailings management (Section 2.5)? accordance with this plan?

— D
 oes the Operator have a programme in place to — D
 oes the Operator have an accurate, up-to-date
review tailings safety, including Independent record of the constructed tailings facility, including
Review (Section 2.6)? and accurate understanding of:

— D
 oes the Operator have an EPRP? Is the plan - Current conditions (Section 3.5.4)?
tested and updated appropriately (Section 2.7)? - Deviations
 from the design intent and design
Are communities and public sector agencies basis, including the rationale for such decisions
engaged (Section 2.2.5)? and assessment for implications to facility
performance (Section 3.5.3)?
Questions related to engineering practice
— D
 oes the Operator have and use an up-to-date
— Is site characterisation information (including
closure plan towards which progress is being
tailings material characterisation) adequate and is
made?
this information up to date (Section 3.3.2)?

Tailings Management Operations 125

3.6.3 Potential Material Changes (eg increase in volume of water from underground
mine workings as mine development progresses).
As described in Section 2.3.2.1, managing change is
- Climate conditions.
essential to safe tailings management. Potential material
changes, in particular, should be carefully considered. - Upstream or downstream infrastructure or
conditions.
A material change is a change to the design or
operation of a tailings facility, proposed or made after This may also include changes to address deficiencies
the design for the initial construction has been finalised in performance or changes to improve performance (eg
and initial construction has commenced. A material adoption of improved engineering practices).
change would be a change important enough to merit It is important to be aware of the potential cumulative
attention, such as a change that has the potential to effects of multiple changes or deviations which may
influence the risk or performance of a tailings facility. not, on their own, be material. In considering non-
The criteria for what would constitute a material change material changes, previous changes or deviations
should be defined by the Operator, with input from the should be considered and the potential for a cumulative
EOR and Independent Review. effect should be evaluated.
Examples of potential material changes include Potential material changes should be carefully
changes to: considered by the Operator and EOR, taking into
— T
 he tailings facility design, design intent, or design account both short- and long-term implications, before
basis as documented in the design report and DBR making any decision on implementation, to determine:
(Section 3.4.5). — W
 hether or not to proceed with the change,
— O
 perating plans or procedures (eg tailings if applicable.
transportation and deposition plan (Section 3.4.4). — How best to proceed with the change.
— B
 usiness case and overall mine plan, such as a mine On a case-by-case basis, the Operator and EOR should
life extension. engage personnel with the appropriate competencies
— Other changes such as: and qualifications in the evaluation, planning and design
of potential material changes. In some cases, a multi-
- Behaviour or characteristics of tailings associated disciplinary approach may be appropriate and may
with the ore or ore processing. involve personnel outside the RTFE’s immediate
- Behaviour or characteristics of construction organisation. For example, a proposed change in ore
materials for embankments. processing that would result in different tailings
- Site water management and water balance characteristics may require ore processing and tailings

ICMM Operations 126

management teams to collaborate, consistent with the No matter how a tailings facility was originally
integrated mine planning approach (Sections 1.2.2 and designed, constructed and operated, a rigorous
3.2.2). approach to decision-making, conducted within an
effective governance structure, can help to ensure
Depending on the complexity of the potential material
that tailings are safely managed. Elements of a
change, it may be appropriate to evaluate the potential
risk-informed approach to decision-making are
change using the steps outlined for the Project
described in Section 3.2.4.
Conception phase (eg risk analysis and multi-criteria
alternatives analysis) (Section 3.3). In other cases, a less Decisions to be made during these lifecycle phases
rigorous decision analysis approach may be can be categorised as:
appropriate, and the proposed material change can
— Immediate or short-term operational decisions,
proceed to the Design phase (Section 3.4).
such as responding to unusual or upset conditions
Input should be obtained from the EOR on potential (eg a decision to implement predictive
material changes. Some Operators may wish to seek maintenance (Section 2.4.3.3) or a decision to
input from Independent Review as well. increase surveillance frequency (Section 2.4.3.4)).

As part of the planning to implement a material change, — Medium- or longer-term decisions, such as:
the Operator should consider not only the need to - Responding to deficiencies in performance or
update relevant aspects of the design, but also other opportunities to continual improvement (eg
plans and processes. For example, implementing the responding to recommendations from
material change may necessitate changes to the OMS Independent Review) (Section 2.6).
manual.
- Material changes to improve performance (eg
The decision to implement the proposed material construction of a buttress).
change should be made at a level in the organisation - Adjusting the design or operating practices in
commensurate with the significance of the change (eg response to an updated validation of the design
RTFE, Accountable Executive or BoD, as appropriate). basis or updated predictions of the future
performance of the tailing facility.
The process of considering potential material changes,
and of implementing approved material changes should Decision-making for medium- and longer-term
be properly documented. The DAR (Section 3.5.4) is decisions would typically be addressed through the
intended to contain a record of all the deviations from process to manage change (Section 2.3.2.1) as these
the design across the lifecycle, including both material would be considered material changes (Section 3.6.3).
and non-material changes. The records contained in These types of decisions are also addressed in
the DAR also provide a basis for assessing the potential Section 3.4.3 in the context of the discussion of the
cumulative effects of proposed changes or deviations. If precautionary-based approach and application of the
any material changes are proposed that are outside the observational method (Sections 3.4.3.4 and 3.4.3.5),
scope of the DAR, these should also be properly and the discussion of the performance-based
documented. approach (Section 3.4.3.6).

The balance of this section is focused on decision-

3.6.4 Decision-Making
making for immediate and short-term operational
decisions.
3.6.4.1 Introduction
Good information is essential to all decisions. The
Making risk-informed decisions is essential to safe
effective implementation of risk-informed decision-
tailings management through the Operations phase and
making is predicated upon the effective surveillance
the subsequent Closure and Post-Closure phases. This
of tailings facility performance. A properly designed
applies equally to new tailings facilities planned,
and implemented surveillance programme, aligned
designed and constructed following the guidance in
with the performance objectives and risk
Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, and to facilities that are
management plan, is essential to making good
many decades old that were constructed to very
decisions (Section 2.4.3.4).
different standards.

Tailings Management Operations 127

3.6.4.2 Developing a Framework for against the performance criteria, and if those criteria
Decision-making are not met, then the pre-defined risk controls are
implemented.
To facilitate making immediate and short-term
decisions in a risk-informed manner, Operators should Risk controls may include a subset of controls referred
develop a framework for decision-making. A TMS to as critical controls, which are risk management
provides a governance framework for decision-making measures to mitigate credible failure modes that could
and surveillance plays an essential role in providing lead to a catastrophic failure (Sections 2.7 and 3.2.4).
information. However, without a rigorous approach to Risk controls may include operating rules with ongoing
decision-making for tailings management, informed by surveillance and validation or discrete implementation
surveillance results, there is an increased risk that of new mitigation measures.
decisions:
Clear, effective, timely communication is essential to
— Are based on incomplete or inaccurate information. decision-making (Section 2.2.6), particularly in the case
of any variances from the expected ranges of
— Are ad hoc and short-sighted in nature.
performance. Communication procedures and lines of
— F
 ail to recognise and account for embedded communication associated with decision-making
ignorance, increasing the potential for human error. should be documented and communicated to relevant
personnel. Similarly, the pre-defined risk controls should
— F
 ail to support the objective of the safe management
be documented, and personnel who may be
of tailings.
responsible for the implementation of those risk
— F
 ail to account for interactions between seemingly controls should be informed and trained appropriately
unrelated decisions. so that they are able to act if necessary.

— D
 efer or transfer risks to the Closure phase without The advantage of this approach, including pre-defining
fully considering the potential implications. the risk controls to be implemented, is that it facilitates
prompt action if the performance is outside the
A rigorous approach to decisions provides a structured,
specified range, since the Operator, with input from the
consistent mechanism for decision-making, helping to
EOR, has already identified the action to be taken. It also
ensure that decisions are taken by persons with the
empowers junior staff with the authority to act in the
appropriate authority and competencies, and are based
event that the RTFE and EOR cannot be contacted in a
on relevant information.
timely manner.
A decision-making framework is based on the intersection
between credible failure modes, performance indicators
and criteria, and the risk management plan. A decision-
making framework should identify:

— C
 redible failure modes potentially subject
to immediate or short-term decisions (ie
implementation of mitigation).

— P
 erformance indicators and criteria able to
measure and assess performance relevant to
those credible failure modes.

— S
 urveillance measures aligned with the
performance criteria.

— P
 re-defined risk management measures (risk controls)
to be taken if the performance criteria associated with
the credible failure modes are not met.

Once the framework is established, surveillance

measures are then implemented, results are measured

ICMM Operations 128

Other business units that could be affected by or — D
 efine a series of thresholds corresponding to
involved in the implementation pre-defined risk increasing concern or risk. For each threshold level,
controls should be engaged in developing the define the risk controls to be implemented. The risk
decision-making framework and understand the management response is escalated as the concern
actions to be taken. For example, if exceeding the (magnitude of variance of performance) increases. The
minimum freeboard behind an embankment means number of levels of thresholds is dependent upon the
that risk controls need to be taken to reduce or stop performance indicator and the associated risk controls.
the flow of tailings into the tailings facility, then those
The most appropriate approach to take depends on the
responsible for ore processing / generating tailings
nature of the credible failure mode and associated
material need to be aware of this and need to be part
performance indicators. Where the second approach is
of the process.
feasible, it will provide the Operator with greater flexibility
and capability to manage risk.
3.6.4.3 Trigger Action Response Plans
This second approach is sometimes referred to as a
When defining the performance criteria and the risk
trigger action response plan (TARP), although other terms
controls to be implemented if those criteria are not
are also used to describe this concept. TARPs may be
met, there are two basic approaches. For a given
used to define escalating risk management actions
performance indicator associated with a credible
under upset or unusual conditions and may also define
failure mode the Operator may:
the transition to emergency situations. It is up to the
— D
 efine a single threshold for the performance Operator to determine what is considered upset versus
criteria and define the risk control(s) to be emergency conditions, and the role of TARPs in the
implemented if that threshold is exceeded. management of upset conditions.

emergency. Pre-defined risk controls are

implemented. Surveillance activities are intensified
to monitor the performance indicator in question,
related performance criteria, and the effectiveness
In Detail
of the risk control implemented. Expert advice
An example of a four risk-level framework for a may be sought as appropriate. Results of follow-
TARP is: up surveillance activities are documented and
reported. The accumulation or combination of
—  Green – Acceptable Situation. Normal operating
moderate-risk situations could lead to a high-risk
conditions. Performance is in line with
situation and threshold values may need to be
performance criteria.
assessed accordingly.
— Yellow – Minor Risk Situation. The EOR and RTFE
— Red – High Risk Situation. Depending on the
should be notified. There may be a pre-defined
credible failure mode and how the thresholds are
risk control to be implemented, or the pre-defined
defined, reaching this level means there is an
action may be to increase the frequency of
imminent loss of control or that a loss of control
surveillance and analysis. Additional surveillance
has occurred. Depending on the potential
activities may be undertaken. Surveillance results
consequences, this may trigger very significant
and corresponding actions are documented and
pre-defined risk controls (eg ceasing ore
reported.
processing operations, emergency release of
—  Orange – Moderate-Risk Situation. In addition to water through the spillway) or it may trigger the
the EOR and RTFE, the Accountable Executive is implementation of the EPRP. It is important to note
notified. Depending on the credible failure mode that the accumulation or combination of
and associated level of concern, regulators, local moderate-risk situations could lead to a high-risk
emergency responders and communities should situation and threshold values may need to be
be notified if further escalation could lead to an assessed accordingly.

Tailings Management Operations 129

3.6.5 Temporary Suspension of Mine During temporary suspension, OMS activities continue
Operations and the closure plan is not implemented. However, in
some cases temporary suspension may lead to closure
During a temporary suspension of operations, ore
of the mine and implementation of the closure plan.
extraction and processing have been suspended and
the placement of tailings into the facility is not
3.6.6 Progressive Reclamation
occurring. A suspension may be short-term (eg
temporary suspension due to wildfires, labour Progressive reclamation is the reclamation or
disruption) or of a longer, indeterminant duration (eg remediation of certain portions of a mine site during the
due to low commodity prices). Operations phase, in advance of the Closure phase and
implementation of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2).
The specific timing, duration and circumstances related
to a temporary suspension are not usually known in Progressive reclamation may not be possible at some
advance. However, a temporary suspension is a tailings facilities. Where progressive reclamation is
significant change and, like all changes, must be possible, it may be temporary, or intended to be a
appropriately managed to reduce the risks associated component of the closure plan. However, where non-
with tailings management. temporary progressive reclamation can be undertaken,
it should be planned and undertaken:
The Operator should consider developing a contingency
plan for different credible scenarios for a temporary — In accordance with the operating plans (eg tailings
suspension, including identifying the resources (eg transportation and deposition plan) and the closure
personnel, power supply, equipment) needed for the plan (Section 3.7.2).
continued safe management of the tailings facility for
— In a manner consistent with closure objectives, the
the duration of a temporary suspension and
performance objectives and risk management plan
coordination with the regulatory authority as
(Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).
appropriate. Such plans should also address OMS
activities specific to temporary suspension (eg — In a manner consistent with ongoing OMS activities
suppressing dust from areas of the tailings facility that (Section 2.4).
are normally wet) and the re-start of mine operations.
As progressive reclamation proceeds, the risk
Contingency plans should also address the potential
assessment should be reviewed accordingly, and the
implications of a longer temporary suspension, such
risk management plan updated as appropriate. OMS
as changes in water management and implications for
activities should also be reviewed and revised as
water levels in the tailings facility or changes to seepage
appropriate. The closure plan should be updated to
volume and chemistry.
reflect the state of progressive reclamation.

ICMM Operations 130

Closure and Post-Closure 3.7

3.7.1 Introduction capable of being closed with surveillance and limited

management or maintenance requirements. To be
Planning for closure and operating a tailings facility in a
considered a landform, the facility cannot develop a
manner consistent with the closure objectives are activities
credible catastrophic failure scenario. Irrespective for
that crosscut the entire lifecycle. Thus, while Closure and
the closure configuration selected, it is good practice
Post-Closure can be regarded as distinct phases of the
to reference not only this section, but also the ICMM
lifecycle, planning and design for these phases begin at
Integrated Mine Closure: Good Practice Guide (2025)
the outset of the Project Conception phase and continues
and any site-specific regulatory criteria to achieve the
throughout the lifecycle. Closure planning for an existing
identified post-closure land use, and physical and
tailings facility that is not yet closed does not exclude it
chemical stability in the long term.
from this process; rather, it accelerates the need to apply
the scope of work described in this section to ensure a Considerations when following this guidance will include
successful outcome. Figure 17 illustrates the incorporation the recognition of application in variable environments,
of closure and progressive closure planning throughout under different (and sometimes changing) legal
each lifecycle phase. requirements, and sometimes changing stakeholder
objectives and closure success criteria. The ability to
The guidance presented here is focused on the theme of
adapt to these considerations is key to a successful
preventing catastrophic tailings facility failures from the
outcome. Opportunities to execute progressive
beginning of the tailings facility’s lifecycle through to the
reclamation, (including trials when/where possible)
Closure and Post-Closure phases. For many tailings
should be taken to test closure concepts, ensure
facilities, a post-closure objective can include having the
regulatory acceptance and integrate stakeholder
facility become a landform. Landforms, as used in this
engagement into the process.
guidance, are not prescriptive, but meet the objective of
being long-term, stable earth structures which are

Figure 17: Integrated Mine Closure Framework across each lifecycle phase
Final Relinquishment
Project Design Construction Operations & Progressive Closure Closure Post-Closure
Conception

Monitoring, Final Closure

Implementation Maintenance &
Closure Planning Management
and Design
Progressive Closure

Monitoring & Review

Monitoring & Review

Stakeholder Engagement

Planning and Implementing Social Transition

Mine Plan Updates

Tailings Management Closure and Post-Closure 131

3.7.2 Development of the Closure Plan The developed closure plan should also include the
opportunities to undertake progressive closure
For new tailings facilities or major expansions, the
activities. At sites where progressive closure is possible,
development of closure plans and performance
undertaking these activities throughout the mine life
objectives for closure and post-closure should begin
can improve the likelihood of successfully meeting
during the Project Conception phase (Section 3.3).
closure objectives and can reduce financial and closure
Tailings facilities should be planned and designed,
risks such as those associated with strategic tailings
from the outset, with closure and post-closure in
deposition or final closure geometries. Progressive
mind. This directly relates to the use of multi-criteria
closure activities could also include testing closure
analyses conducted early in the design phase to
methodologies during operations to expand the closure
provide an early opportunity to reduce the risk of a
knowledge base. These methods considered early in
facility not meeting closure objectives (Section 3.3.4).
the development of the closure plan assists operators
A closure plan (ideally developed during the Project to execute and complete the closure of tailings storage
Conception stage) requires a vision, principles and facilities efficiently and with more cost effectiveness
objectives. It should become more detailed and and cost certainty. Progressive closure is a dynamic and
elaborated during the Design phase (Section 3.4). The iterative process and will be influenced by many factors,
closure plan should then be refined, elaborated, verified including:
and updated periodically during the Operations phase
— The mine plan and schedule,
of the lifecycle, and in preparation for transition to the
Closure phase. The closure plan and objectives should — The characteristics of the materials being excavated
be considered in the multi-criteria alternatives analysis (eg commodity and waste streams),
conducted during the Project Conception phase of the
— Resource availability, equipment and materials,
tailings facility and should be a key consideration in the
facility design and location, and in the technology — Management of risks (eg water management or
decisions of the facility, including technology geotechnical considerations),
assessments (Section 3.3.4). The OMS manual
— Changing social and environmental conditions
(Section 2.4) should be aligned with the closure plan
(eg water accessibility, internal and external
and objectives so that activities during the Operations
expectations),
phase (Section 3.6) are consistent with and support the
closure plan and objectives. — The mine location and stakeholder requirements.

Project Conception:
— Perform relevant baseline studies and data
gathering, including biodiversity baselines,
relevant to the tailings facility.
In Detail
— Engagement with communities and Indigenous
Progressive closure of tailings facilities needs to be
Peoples to understand post-mine land capability
integrated into the broader site closure plan. For
of tailings facilities, potential uses and impact on
guidance on mine closure planning and execution,
closure design.
ICMM’s Integrated Mine Closure Good Practice Guide
(2025) highlights the crucial steps for managing mine — Develop post-mining land use objectives for the
waste (including tailings), which need to be tailings facility.
considered throughout the mine’s life.
— Development of closure plans for the tailings
The items summarised below should be considered facility, based on a range of mine plan scenarios
specifically for the context of closing tailings facilities. and predictive modelling.

ICMM Closure and Post-Closure 132

 — Evaluate opportunities for progressive closure of Construction:
tailings facilities within the developed mine plan — Support discussions with external stakeholders on
scenarios. leveraging socioeconomic benefits of current/
future land uses. Continue discussions on
Design: planning and longer-term facilitation of closure of
— Ongoing engagement with relevant stakeholders the tailings facility.
and Indigenous Peoples.
— Evaluate and realise opportunities to advance
— Selection of mine plans, processing and tailings progressive closure activities during construction.
technologies that integrate and enable
— Salvage and store organic soils for progressive
progressive and final closure of the tailings facility.
and final closure of the tailings facility and update
— Consideration of environmental and social mine plans accordingly, including establishment
contexts within the landscape or catchment. and maintenance of an inventory.

— Identification of activities required to attain long- — Ensure a QA/QC plan detects, manages and
term physical and chemical stability and achieve evaluates deviations from original designs,
the post-closure land use (eg chemical and geotechnical (such as differential settlement)
physical characterisation and associated and geochemical deviances. Integrate associated
management activities). actions into updated mine plans. Track waste
material source and destination required to enable
— Identify and address the potential modes of failure
progressive and final closure of the tailings facility.
that could occur post-closure, such as increasing
the capacity of emergency spillways to account — Update risk management plans, OMS activities
for overtopping events. and closure plans during any progressive closure
opportunities.
— Thoroughly characterise the geochemistry of the
tailings, underlying geology and tailings
Operations:
embankment and foundation construction
— Progressive closure of areas where tailings
materials (see GARD guide for appropriate
deposition is complete including water
protocols for geochemical characterisation3).
management, resloping, cover placement,
— Evaluate, plan and schedule specific material revegetation, monitoring and maintenance.
source and destination requirements to enable
— Evaluate and document the performance of
integration of progressive and final closure into
progressively closed areas and continuously
mine plans.
integrate improvement opportunities into
— Plan for closure and post-closure site water progressive and final closure plans.
management requirements, such as using
— Track and document any material changes
adaptive water management approaches and
between design and execution and evaluate their
climate-specific cover systems.
impact on progressive and final closure plans for
— Consider and plan for post-closure ongoing the tailings facility. Integrate outcomes into
monitoring of seepage to confirm that volumes subsequent mine plan iterations.
and quality meet and will continue to meet
— Update risk management plans, OMS activities
discharge criteria.
and closure plans during any progressive closure
— Identify the salvage and storage of soils to enable opportunities.
progressive and final closure of the tailings facility
and integrate into mine plans.

3. Source: http://www.gardguide.com/index.php?title=Main_Page

Tailings Management Closure and Post-Closure 133

For existing tailings facilities that do not have closure engineered landforms, intended to remain physically
plans, the development of closure plans should begin and chemically stable for the long-term while enabling
as soon as possible. If the facility was not planned and the post-closure land use to be attained. It is important
designed from the outset with closure in mind, then to strike a balance between short-term financial or
options for closure vision, principles, and objectives may operational priorities and optimal design and
be more limited, but it is none the less imperative that operational practices that would have lower long-term
the Operator begins the process of planning for closure. impacts, complexity or risks.
The development of the closure plan may lead to
The development of the closure plan should be
changes in current practices or the adoption of newer
informed by a range of available reference materials and
technologies to reduce risk and better position the
tools including ICMM Integrated Mine Closure: Good
tailings facility for closure. Regular review of such
Practice Guide (2025). Section 5 of that guidance
opportunities is central to continual improvement for
highlights the benefits of identifying the post-closure
any tailings facility.
land use early in the operations lifespan when possible,
Designing and operating for closure requires a long- and outlines the factors to consider in making this
term, holistic view. Tailings facilities should be planned, decision. Clear identification of post-closure land use
designed, constructed, operated and closed on the aids development of the closure vision which is a useful
assumption that they will be permanent landforms. element of closure plan development.
Tailings facilities, designed for closure, are true future

— Socioeconomic context, including community

and other external stakeholder preferences.
This context needs to be considered both pre-
mining and throughout the mining lifecycle.
In Detail
— Landownership – current and future.
Potential and desired post-closure land use will
be informed by factors that include: — Holistic business case, that includes capital,
operational and maintenance costs.
— Location of the tailings facility (eg remote versus
proximal to populations, climatic setting). — Regional plans.

— Pre-mining land use and the historical, current Several of these factors may be beyond the direct
and potential future use of surrounding lands. influence of the Operator, therefore ongoing
engagement and consultation are important.
— Permanent alterations to the landscape as a
result of mining and tailings storage activities. Further detail can be found in the ICMM
Integrated Mine Closure: Good Practice Guide
— Land capability of the tailings storage facility
(2025), Section 5.
to define feasible land uses.

— Regulatory considerations/obligations that may

influence post-closure land use.

3.7.3 Development of Success Criteria — Specific: Criteria should relate directly to the
overarching closure objectives of the site or can be
Success criteria, also known as closure criteria, are
specific to closure activities which apply to the
measurable parameters that indicate when closure
tailings facility.
activities have been successful. Success criteria may be
developed specifically for the tailings facility, and should — Measurable: Criteria must be able to be measured to
be integrated within the site-wide closure plan. Success demonstrate that it has been met to stakeholders or
criteria should be Specific, Measurable, Achievable, the regulator. Numerical criteria are common as they
Relevant and Timely (SMART) indicators. SMART are easily measured, but narrative criteria may also
principles for closure are: be required. For example, as-built drawings or field
inspections.

ICMM Closure and Post-Closure 134

— Achievable: It is critical that the criteria are realistic — Air quality and airborne dust generation and levels
and can be achieved. Unrealistic or poorly defined (eg particulate matter concentrations),
criteria can delay or prevent relinquishment, or
— Geotechnical performance of the tailings
unnecessarily extend monitoring periods.
storage facility as per the design requirements
— Relevant: Criteria must be aligned with the closure (eg settlement rates),
objectives and the social, environmental and
— Final infiltration rates (eg mm/year or percent of
regulatory context of the site and tailings facility.
median annual precipitation),
— Timely: All criteria should have an explicit or implicit
— Vegetation and ecosystem establishment and
time component. In the case of tailings facility
resilience (eg species diversity, coverage, stem
closure, an extended monitoring period will likely be
density),
required. The duration of the monitoring period
should be defined early in the planning phases. — Seepage quantity (eg metres3/year) and quality
(eg monitoring results and inspection reports),
Section 9 of the ICMM Integrated Mine Closure Good
Practice Guide (2025) provides guidance on the — Runoff quantity (eg metres3/year) and quality
development of SMART criteria. (eg monitoring results and inspection reports),

For tailings facilities, success criteria development — Performance of stormwater runoff conveyance
should be aligned with the closure objective of structures (eg occurrence and volume (litres/year) of
developing a final landform that supports the identified direct discharge (overflows) or field inspection
post-closure land use. For many tailings facilities reports),
effective closure can be demonstrated through using
— Effluent water chemistry (eg monitoring results and
SMART success criteria to show that a landform is safe,
inspection reports).
stable, non-polluting, and able to sustain the identified
post-closure land use. Tool 10, ‘Considerations in developing closure activities
for domain specific issues’ from the ICMM Integrated
Examples of success criteria include:
Mine Closure Good Practice Guide (2025), provides
— Soil stability and erosion rates for rehabilitated considerations on the physical and chemical stability
areas (eg tonnes/hectare/year, field observations), of tailings at closure. It is a valuable reference for
developing success criteria across these areas.

Tailings Management Closure and Post-Closure 135

Both lagging and leading indicators should be Further detail on the identification and assessment of
considered in the development of success criteria. risks and opportunities in a closure context is included
in Section 7 and Tool 8 of the ICMM Integrated Mine
— Leading indicators – give early signals or measure
Closure Good Practice Guide (2025). Both sections
progress towards a goal or closure objective. In
include guidance on the integration of residual risks.
tailings facility management, an example leading
indicator for closure would be effective surface
3.7.4 Execution of Closure Plan
water management that prevents erosion and any
subsequent impacts to stability. The execution of the closure plan can be a period
of rapid change. It is vital to have established
— Lagging indicators – measure ‘after the fact’
performance objectives and success criteria in order to
information and demonstrate final outcomes.
establish metrics and achieve designated goals during
A tailings facility closure example would be the
the Closure phase when the plan is executed. It is
successful establishment of native vegetation or
important that the Operator continues to be diligent
a measured lack of downstream contamination
through this phase, and does not become complacent
from seepage.
about tailings safety because tailings are no longer
By considering the specific risks associated with tailings being produced and deposited in the tailings facility. In
facility closure, leading indicators can be utilised to particular:
measure progress towards closure objectives ensuring
— O
 verall governance structures should remain in
a focus on risk prevention, mitigation and management.
place, with accountability and responsibility
Should credible failure modes exist for a closed tailings appropriately assigned.
facility, residual risks will inevitably remain and require
— C
 hange management should remain robust as
ongoing use of both leading and lagging indicators.
transitions occur in processes and personnel from
Additional governance on identification and risk
the Operations phase to the Closure and Post-
management of credible failures modes is available
Closure phases.
from the Standard.

ICMM Closure and Post-Closure 136

— T
 MS continues to be implemented to the extent — Independent Review continues with a focus both on
appliable and this is revised to reflect post-closure implementation of the closure plan and preparations
activities. for the Post-Closure phase.

— R
 isk assessment should be updated for closure, and — Community engagement continues.
the risk management plan updated accordingly.
— E
 PRP is updated to reflect closure conditions,
— O
 MS manual should be updated for closure and including a potential change in the role of the
implemented to meet the requirements for the Operator and third parties in responding to an
Closure and Post-Closure phases. emergency as the Operator’s on-site resources
change.
— C
 onstruction activities are carried out as per the
closure plan, with adherence to design specifications Figure 18 illustrates the key activities of the Closure
and quality management requirements. phase of the lifecycle.

Figure 18: Key activities of the Closure phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Closure
Implement closure in
accordance with closure plan
and final closure design.
Conduct operation,
maintenance and surveillance
activities in accordance with:
– Performance objectives
– Risk management plan
– DBR
– Closure plan
Evaluate performance of
tailings facility and tailings
management governance:
– Address deficiencies
– Implement measures for
continual improvement
Review/update:
– DBR
Temporary Suspension
– Tailings management system
– OMS manual
– EPRP
– Site characterisation models
Project Design Construction Operations Post-Closure
Conception – Risk assessment

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Tailings Management Closure and Post-Closure 137

3.7.4.1 Transitioning from active to closed Where a state of ‘safe closure’ is obtained for a facility
before post-closure land use objectives are achieved,
Closure is inherently multi-disciplinary and is impacted
any limitations on future activities on the landform should
by decisions made across the business and
be documented. Ensuring governance structures are in
throughout the entire lifecycle of the tailings facility.
place to facilitate effective communication between
Therefore, integration of closure considerations into
closure and tailings personnel will support a successful
wider business processes is essential for optimising
closure transition. The ICMM Integrated Mine Closure
closure outcomes for the tailings facility. While every
Good Practice Guide (Tool 10) provides support on the
facility is unique and will have site-specific closure
governance of tailings facilities during closure and
objectives and closure success criteria, the
post-closure.
overarching closure principles are expected to apply
to all facilities. For example, the principles presented in
3.7.5 Post-Closure
Section 4 of the ICMM Integrated Mine Closure Good
Practice Guide (2025) address that a closed facility In contrast to the Closure phase, the Post-Closure phase
should be safe, stable, non-polluting and able to begins when the activities from the Closure phase have
support the post-closure land use. been fully implemented, and the facility enters a period of
long-term maintenance and surveillance. Complacency
The Standard defines ‘safe closure’ as a closed
remains a significant risk, however, since the
tailings facility that does not pose ongoing material
consequences of a tailings facility failure may be the
risks to people or the environment which has been
same as if the facility were still in the Operations or
confirmed by an ITRB or senior independent technical
Closure phase. It is important that all stakeholders are
reviewer and signed off by the Accountable Executive.
engaged in and understand the Post-Closure phase
Following a safe closure designation, the facility is no
objectives and success criteria.
longer deemed to be a tailings facility for the purposes
of the Standard (GISTM, 2021, p31). A tailings facility in the Post-Closure phase may require
the same level of care as it did in earlier phases of the
As ‘safe closure’ by definition relates primarily to the
lifecycle. This can be a challenge, since the Operator will
management or control of risks to people and the
have few if any personnel on site at all times, and
environment, a facility may be in a state of ‘safe
depending on the location there may be more limited
closure’ without necessarily having achieved all the
access to a power supply, communication
requirements for responsible closure (eg without
infrastructure, etc.
having achieved post-closure land use objectives).
Regardless of whether a safe closure designation is For the Post-Closure phase, the Operator should:
sought before or after achievement of the post-
— E
 nsure a form of governance structure remains, with
closure land use objectives or any other elements of
accountability and responsibility appropriately
responsible closure of the facility in entirety, it is good
assigned (this may include a hand-over process of the
practice to have clear company-level guidance on the
Operator itself).
process to achieve safe closure. This should include
the key personnel involved in decision making and — C
 ontinue to implement the TMS, although the
determining the technical, social, and environmental frequency of Identifying Actions to Improve
criteria required for the designation. Performance and reporting to the Accountable
Executive may be decreased.
To support the process towards safe closure and
beyond to all other elements of a responsibly closed — M
 aintain the tailings facility site characterisation,
facility collaboration between the tailings and multi- knowledge base and record management.
disciplinary closure teams is essential. This should
— P
 eriodically update the risk assessment, particularly if
occur throughout the life of the facility, to ensure
there are changes in the facility performance or external
effective integration of all closure considerations, in
changes that could impact the risk (eg increased
addition to those relating to ‘safe closure’.
population in the potential area of inundation).

ICMM Closure and Post-Closure 138

 — Update the risk management plan as appropriate. Performance monitoring is needed to determine whether
specific agreed criteria are being met. The EPRP should
— U
 pdate the OMS manual and review periodically
be updated, in particular to reflect that the Operator may
through the Post-Closure phase and update as
have a limited capacity for immediate response to an
appropriate. There may be a greater role for
emergency, and therefore any emergency response may
community engagement in surveillance in the
be much more reliant on third parties.
Post-Closure phase.
The EPRP should also reflect changes in other
— Continue to conduct Independent Review, at an
resources available to respond to an emergency, such
appropriate frequency.
as a lack of heavy equipment, power supply, fuel or
— Continue community engagement, although the communication infrastructure. Continued testing of the
frequency may be reduced once established EPRP is imperative.
success criteria have been achieved.
Figure 19 illustrates the key activities of the Post-
Closure phase of the lifecycle.

Figure 19: Key activities of the Post-Closure phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Post-Closure
Conduct operation,
maintenance and surveillance
activities in accordance with:
– Performance objectives
– Risk management plan
– DBR
– Closure plan
Evaluate performance of
tailings facility and tailings
management governance:
– Address deficiencies
– Implement measures for
continual improvement
Temporary Suspension Review/update:
– DBR
– Tailings management system
– OMS manual
– EPRP
Project Design Construction Operations Closure – Site characterisation models
Conception – Risk assessment

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Tailings Management Closure and Post-Closure 139

Glossary

Accountability: The answerability of an individual for Breach analysis: A study that assumes a failure of
their own performance and that of any personnel they the tailings facility and estimates its impact. Breach
direct, and for the completion of specified deliverables analyses should be based on credible failure modes
or tasks in accordance with defined expectations. An where loss of containment is possible. The results
accountable person may delegate responsibility for should determine the physical area impacted by a
completion of the deliverable or task, but not the potential failure, flow arrival times, depth and velocities,
accountability. duration of flooding, and depth of material deposition.
The breach analysis is based on scenarios which are
Accountable Executive: One or more executive(s) who
not connected to probability of occurrence. It is
is/are directly answerable to the CEO on matters related
primarily used to inform emergency preparedness and
to this Standard, communicates with the Board of
response planning and for determining the potential
Directors, and who is accountable for the safety of
consequences of failure. [based on the definition
tailings facilities and for minimising the social and provided in the Standard]
environmental consequences of a potential tailings
facility failure. The Accountable Executive(s) may Catastrophic failure: A tailings facility failure that results
delegate responsibilities but not accountability. in material disruption to social, environmental and local
[based on the definition provided in the Standard] economic systems. Such failures are a function of the
interaction between hazard exposure, vulnerability, and
As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP): ALARP the capacity of people and systems to respond.
requires that all reasonable measures be taken with Catastrophic events typically involve numerous adverse
respect to ‘tolerable’ or acceptable risks to reduce them impacts, at different scales and over different
even further until the cost and other impacts of timeframes, including loss of life, damage to physical
additional risk reduction are grossly disproportionate to infrastructure or natural assets, and disruption to lives,
the benefit. [based on the definition provided in the livelihoods and social order. Operators may be affected
Standard] by damage to assets, disruption to operations, financial
Authority: The power to make decisions, assign loss or negative impact to reputation. Catastrophic
responsibilities, or delegate some or all authority, as failures exceed the capacity of affected people to cope
appropriate. The ability to act on behalf of the Operator. using their own resources, triggering the need for
outside assistance in emergency response, restoration
Board of Directors (BoD): The ultimate governing body and recovery efforts. [based on the definition provided
of the Operator typically elected by the shareholders of in the Standard]
the Operator. The BoD is the entity with the final
Community: A social group possessing shared beliefs
decision-making authority for the Operator and holds
and values, stable membership and the expectation of
the authority to, among other things, set the Operator’s
continued interaction. It may be defined geographically,
policies, objectives and overall direction as well as
by political or resource boundaries, or socially as a
oversee the firm’s executives. As the term is used here,
community of individuals with common interests.
it encompasses any individual or entity with control over
the Operator, including, for example, the owner or Construction versus Design Intent Verification (CDIV):
owners. Where the State serves as the Operator, the Intended to ensure the design intent is implemented
BoD shall be understood to mean the government and still being met if the site conditions vary from the
official with ultimate responsibility for the final decisions design assumptions. The CDIV identifies any
of the Operator. [based on the definition provided in the discrepancies between the field conditions and the
Standard] design assumptions, such that the design can be

ICMM Glossary 140

adjusted to account for the actual field conditions. of a critical control would disproportionately increase
[based on the definition provided in the Standard] the risk despite the existence of the other controls.
[based on the definition provided in the Standard]
Construction Records Report (CRR): Describes all
aspects of the ‘as-built’ product, including all Dam Safety Review (DSR): A convention from the water
geometrical information, materials, laboratory and field dam industry to describe periodic and systematic
test results, construction activities, schedule, equipment process carried out by an independent qualified review
and procedures, quality control and quality assurance engineer to assess and evaluate the safety of a dam or
data, results of Construction versus Design Intent system of dams against failure modes, in order to make
Verification (CDIV), changes to design or any aspect of a statement on the safety of the facility. A safe tailings
construction, non-conformances and their resolution, facility is one that performs its intended function under
construction photographs, construction shift reports, both normal and unusual conditions; does not impose
and any other relevant information. Instruments and an unacceptable risk to people, property or
their installation details, calibration records and readings environment; and meets applicable safety criteria. An
must be included in the CRR. Roles, responsibilities and alternative approach that involves regular review of the
personnel, including Independent Review, should be entire facility though use of a programme for reviewing
documented. Detailed construction record drawings are tailings safety as outlined in this Guide. [based on the
fundamental. [based on the definition provided in the definition provided in the Standard]
Standard]
Design Basis Report (DBR): Provides the basis for the
Continual improvement: The process of implementing design, operation, construction, monitoring and risk
incremental improvements and standardisation to management of a tailings facility. [based on the
achieve better environmental and management system definition provided in the Standard]
performance.
Deviance Accountability Report (DAR): Provides an
Credible failure mode/scenario: Refers to technically assessment of the cumulative impact of changes to the
feasible failure mechanisms given the materials present tailings facility on the risk level of the achieved product
in the structure and its foundation, the properties of and defines the potential requirement for updates to the
these materials, the configuration of the structure, design, Design Basis Report (DBR), and operation,
drainage conditions and surface water control at the maintenance, and surveillance (OMS) activities. [based
tailings facility, throughout its lifecycle. Credible failure on the definition provided in the Standard]
modes can and do typically vary during the lifecycle of
Embankment: A term used to denote engineered
the facility as the conditions vary. A tailings facility that
structures designed and built to retain tailings solids
is appropriately designed and operated considers all of
and, where applicable, water. Constructed of tailings
these credible failure modes and includes sufficient
and/or other materials, embankments may include
resilience against each. Different failure modes will
dams, dikes or other structures.
result in different failure scenarios. Some tailings
facilities will have no credible failure modes. Further, Emergency: A situation that poses an impending or
even more tailings facilities will have no credible immediate risk to health, life, property, and/or the
catastrophic failure modes. The term ‘credible failure environment, and which requires urgent intervention to
mode’ is not associated with a probability of this event prevent or limit the expected adverse outcomes.
occurring and having credible failure modes is not a
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP):
reflection of facility safety. The process of assessing
A site-specific plan developed to identify hazards,
credibility or non-credibility of failure modes for a given
assess capacity, and prepare for an emergency based
tailing facility should consider, among other factors
on tailings facility credible failure scenarios, and to
such as construction and operations, whether the
respond if it occurs. This may be part of operation-wide
facility is designed to extreme external loads. [based
emergency response planning and includes the
on the definition provided in the Standard]
identification of response capacity and any necessary
Critical controls: A control that is critical to preventing coordination with off-site emergency responders, local
a potential undesirable event or mitigating the communities and public sector agencies. The
consequences of such an event. The absence or failure development of the EPRP includes a community-

Tailings Management Glossary 141

focused planning process to support the co- — Construction
 and Operations phases of new tailings
development and implementation of emergency facilities.
response measures by those vulnerable to a tailings
— Closure and Post-Closure phases of tailings facilities.
facility failure. [based on the definition provided in the
Standard] — Any
 material changes to the design or operation of
tailings facilities.
Engineer of Record (EOR): The qualified engineering
firm responsible for confirming that the tailings facility is — Re-commissioning
 of an existing tailings facility for a
designed, constructed and decommissioned with mine re-opening.
appropriate concern for integrity of the facility, and that
Project Conception consists of the analysis of a range
it aligns with and meets applicable regulations, statutes,
of alternatives (eg location of a new tailings facility,
guidelines, codes and standards. The EOR may
technologies to be applied).
delegate responsibility but not accountability. In some
highly regulated jurisdictions, notably Japan, the role of Design: A recurring lifecycle activity that builds upon the
EoR is undertaken by the responsible regulatory decisions made in the Project Conception phase. Once
authorities. [based on the definition provided in the a preferred alternative has been selected, all aspects of
Standard] that alternative are designed in detail, based on the
design intent and defined performance objectives.
Independent Review: Independent, objective, expert
commentary, advice, and, potentially, recommendations Construction: A recurring lifecycle activity that includes:
to assist in identifying, understanding and managing
— Initial
 construction prior to the start-up of a new
risks associated with tailings facilities. This information
tailings facility (eg starter embankment, tailings
is provided to the Operator to:
lines).
— F
 acilitate informed management decisions regarding
— Ongoing
 construction through the operating life of
tailings management so that tailings-related risks are
the mine to increase the capacity of the tailings
managed responsibly and in accordance with an
facility (eg facility raises).
acceptable standard of care.
Construction may also include:
— E
 nsure that the Accountable Executive has a third-
party opinion regarding the risks and the state of the — Construction
 for any material changes (eg increase
tailings facility and the implementation of the TMS, capacity beyond original design intent, buttress to
independent of the teams (employees, consultants strengthen a tailings facility).
and contractors) responsible for planning, designing,
— Construction
 during the Closure phase (eg
constructing, operating and maintaining the facility.
installation of covers).
Legal requirement: Any law, statute, ordinance, decree,
Operations: The period in the lifecycle when tailings are
requirement, order, judgement, rule or regulation of, and
transported to, and deposited in, the tailings facility,
the terms of any license or permit issued by, any
inclusive of any periods of inactivity prior to the
governmental authority.
commencement of implementation of the closure plan.
Lifecycle: The series of activities or phases in the life of Construction may be ongoing or periodic throughout
a tailings facility, consisting of: Project Conception, the Operations phase. In addition, progressive
Design, Construction, Operations, Closure and Post- reclamation in preparation for closure and consistent
Closure. At some sites, the lifecycle may also include with the closure plan may occur during the Operations
temporary suspension of mine operations. Some phase. In some cases, after the end of the active
phases, such as Operations, Closure and Post-Closure, deposition of tailings, tailings may be removed from the
typically only occur once in the lifecycle of a tailings tailings facility for reprocessing or other uses. Such
facility, while other activities, such as Project activity would also be considered Operations.
Conception, Design and Construction, may be recurring
Temporary suspension of mine operations: A period of
at different periods through the life of a tailings facility.
time when mine operations have been suspended and
Project Conception: A recurring lifecycle activity that is tailings are not being deposited into the facility. The
the first step in the planning and design for: suspension may be short-term (eg temporary suspension

ICMM Glossary 142

due to wildfires, labour disruption) or of a longer, Material change: A change to the design or operation of
indeterminant duration (eg due to low commodity prices). a tailings facility, proposed or made after the design for
initial construction has been finalised and initial
During temporary suspension, maintenance and
construction has commenced. A material change would
surveillance continue and some operation activities (eg
be a change important enough to merit attention, such
active water management) may also continue. The
as a change that has the potential to influence the risk
closure plan is not implemented. However, temporary
or performance of a tailings facility. The criteria for what
suspension may lead to closure in some cases.
would constitute a material change should be defined
Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when deposition of by the Operator, with input from the EOR and
tailings into the tailings facility ceases permanently and Independent Review.
the closure plan is implemented, including: Management system: Processes and procedures
— T
 ransitioning from the Operations phase to the that collectively provide a systematic framework for
Closure phase and the Post-Closure phase. ensuring that tasks are performed correctly,
consistently and effectively to achieve a specified
— Removal of infrastructure such as pipelines. outcome and to drive continual improvement in
— Changes to water management or treatment. performance. A systems approach to management
requires an assessment of what needs to be done,
— C
 onstruction of covers, recontouring or revegetation planning to achieve the objective, implementation of the
of tailings and any embankments or other structural plan, and review of performance in meeting the set
elements. objective. A management system also considers
necessary personnel, resources and documentation
— O
 ther reclamation, rehabilitation, decommissioning
requirements. Other definitions associated with
and monitoring activities.
management systems are:
Post-Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when the
 Policy: The expression of management’s commitment
closure plan has been implemented and the tailings
to a particular issue area that presents the stance of
facility has transitioned to long-term maintenance and
the company to interested external parties.
surveillance. The Post-Closure phase should recognise
all the aspects of safety and environmental compliance Practice: Documented approaches to carrying out a
related to long-term stability and legal requirements. task.

During the Closure or Post-Closure phases, tailings  Procedure: A documented description of how a
facilities could return to the Operations phase. In task is to be carried out.
addition, tailings could be removed for reprocessing to
Observational method: A continuous, managed,
recover additional commodities of value, or to be used integrated, process of design, construction control,
for other purposes (eg construction material). monitoring and review that enables previously defined
In some jurisdictions, during the Post-Closure phase, modifications to be incorporated during or after
responsibility for a tailings facility may transfer from the construction as appropriate. All of these aspects must
Operator to jurisdictional control. It is recommended for be demonstrably robust. The key element of the
Operators to work with stakeholders to ensure that observational method is the proactive assessment at
appropriate monitoring and maintenance will continue the design stage of every possible unfavourable
to occur during the Post-Closure phase and that situation that might be disclosed by the monitoring
dedicated oversite and financial mechanisms are in programme and the development of an action plan or
mitigative measure to reduce risk in case the
place for required activities.
unfavourable situation is observed. This element forms
Maintenance: Includes preventative, predictive and the basis of a performance-based risk management
corrective activities carried out to provide continued approach. The objective is to achieve greater overall
proper operation of all infrastructure (eg civil, safety. See Peck, R.B. (1969), ‘Advantages and
mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, etc), or to adjust Limitations of the observational method in Applied Soil
infrastructure to ensure operation in conformance with Mechanics’, Geotechnique 19(2), pp.171–187. [based on
performance objectives. the definition provided in the Standard]

Tailings Management Glossary 143

Operation: Includes activities related to the transport, adequate confidence that the entity will fulfil
placement and permanent storage of tailings and, requirements for quality.
where applicable, process water, effluents and residues,
 uality control (QC): The operational techniques and
Q
and the recycling of process water, inclusive of any
activities that are used to fulfil requirements for quality.
periods of inactivity prior to commencement of
implementation of the closure plan. The term ‘operation’ Responsibility: The duty or obligation of an individual or
applies throughout all phases of the lifecycle of a organisation to perform an assigned duty or task in
tailings facility and is not limited to the Operations accordance with defined expectations, and which has a
phase of the lifecycle when tailings are being actively consequence if expectations are not met. An individual
placed in the facility. As a result, operation also includes or organisation with responsibility is accountable to the
reclamation and related activities. person that delegated that responsibility to them.

Operator: An entity that singly, or jointly with other Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE): An
entities, exercises ultimate control of a tailings facility. engineer appointed by the Operator to be responsible
This may include a corporation, partnership, owner, for the tailings facility. The RTFE must be available at all
affiliate, subsidiary, joint venture or other entity, including times during the Construction, Operations and Closure
any State agency, that controls a tailings facility. [based phases of the lifecycle. The RTFE has clearly defined,
on the definition provided in the Standard] delegated responsibility for management of the tailings
facility and has appropriate qualifications and
Performance: There are three key terms related to experience compatible with the level of complexity of
performance, defined as follows: the tailings facility. The RTFE is responsible for the
 erformance objectives are overall goals, arising from
P scope of work and budget requirements for the tailings
the Operator’s policy and commitment, which are facility, including risk management. The RTFE may
quantified where practicable. They may be defined at delegate specific tasks and responsibilities for aspects
various levels of detail such as this tailings facility will of tailings management to qualified personnel but not
not experience a catastrophic failure versus accountability. [based on the definition provided in the
deformation of the embankment will be minimised. Standard]

Performance indicators are detailed performance Risk: A potential negative impact, detrimental to
requirements that arise from the performance operations, a facility, the environment, public health, or
objectives and that need to be established and met safety, that may arise from some present process or
in order to achieve those objectives. Performance future event. When evaluating risk, both the potential
indicators must be measurable and quantifiable. severity and consequence of the impact and its
probability of occurrence are considered.
Performance criteria are established based on

expected or predicted performance and are used to Risk controls: Measures put in place to either:
evaluate performance indicators and define limits of — P
 revent or reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of
performance outside which risk management action an unwanted event; or
needs to be taken.
— M
 inimise or mitigate the negative consequences if
Personnel: Includes employees, contractors and the unwanted event does occur.
consultants (eg designer, Engineer-of-Record) and
Risks need to be managed via controls, and risk
includes those with direct responsibilities for tailings
controls should have designated owners and defined
management as well as those with indirect
accountabilities. Some risk controls are designated as
responsibilities whose roles may be related in some
critical controls.
manner to tailings management (eg heavy equipment
operators working on or adjacent to tailings facilities). Stakeholders: Persons or groups who are directly or
indirectly affected by a project, as well as those who may
Quality: The degree to which a set of inherent
have interests in a project and/or the ability to influence
characteristics fulfils requirement.
its outcome, positively or negatively. Stakeholders may
Quality assurance (QA): All those planned and include workers, trade unions, project-affected people or
systematic activities implemented to provide communities and their formal and informal

ICMM Glossary 144

representatives, national or local government authorities, responsibilities, preparing and implementing operation,
politicians, religious leaders, civil society organisations maintenance and surveillance (OMS) activities and the
and groups with special interests, the academic emergency preparedness and response plan (EPRP).
community, or other businesses. Different stakeholders The TMS, and its various elements, must interact with
will often have divergent views, both within and across other systems, such as the environmental and social
stakeholder groupings. [based on the definition provided management system (ESMS), the operation-wide
in the Standard] management system, and the regulatory system. This
systems interaction is fundamental to the effective
Surveillance: Includes the inspection and monitoring (ie
implementation of the Standard. [based on the
collection of qualitative and quantitative observations
definition provided in the Standard]
and data) of activities and infrastructure related to tailings
management. Surveillance also includes the timely Technical: In this Guide, the term ‘technical’ refers to
documentation, analysis and communication of the physical science and engineering aspects of tailings
surveillance results, to inform decision-making and verify management.
whether performance objectives and risk management
Trigger Action Response Plan (TARP): A TARP is a tool
objectives, including critical controls, are being met.
to manage risk controls, including critical controls.
Tailings: A by-product of mining, consisting of the TARPs provide pre-defined trigger levels for
processed rock or soil left over from the separation of performance criteria that are based on the risk controls
the commodities of value from the rock or soil within and critical controls of the tailings facility. The trigger
which they occur. levels are developed based on the performance
objectives and risk management plan for the tailings
Tailings facility: A facility that is designed and managed
facility. TARPs describe actions to be taken if trigger
to contain the tailings produced by a mine. A tailings
levels are exceeded (performance is outside the normal
facility includes the collective engineered structures,
range), to prevent a loss of control. A range of actions is
components and equipment involved in the
pre-defined, based on the magnitude of the
management of tailings solids, other mine waste
exceedance of the trigger level. [based on the definition
managed with tailings (eg waste rock, water treatment
provided in the Standard]
residues), and any water managed in tailings facilities,
including pore fluid, any pond(s), and surface water
and run-off.

Tailings management system (TMS): The site-specific

TMS comprises the key components for management
and design of the tailings facility and is often referred to
as the ‘framework’ that manages these components.
The TMS sits at the core of the Standard and is focused
on the safe operation and management of the tailings
facility throughout its lifecycle (see above). The TMS
follows the well-established Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle.
Each Operator develops a TMS that best suits their
organisation and tailings facilities. A TMS includes
elements such as: establishing policies, planning,
designing and establishing performance objectives,
managing change, identifying and securing adequate
resources (experienced and/or qualified personnel,
equipment, scheduling, data, documentation and
financial resources), conducting performance
evaluations and risk assessments, establishing and
implementing controls for risk management, auditing
and reviewing for continual improvement, implementing
a management system with clear accountabilities and

Tailings Management Glossary 145

 List of Acronyms

ALARP: As low as reasonably practicable

BoD: Board of Directors
CRR: Construction Records Report
CDIV: Construction versus Design Intent Verification
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
DAR: Deviance Accountability Report
DBR: Design Basis Report
DSR: Dam Safety Review
EOR: Engineer of Record
EPRP: Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
ESMS: Environmental and Social Management System
FoS: Factor of Safety
ITRB: Independent Tailings Review Board
ISO: International Organization for Standardization
MAA: Multiple Accounts Analysis
MAC: Mining Association of Canada
MCE: Maximum Credible Earthquake
MDE: Maximum Design Earthquake
MDF: Maximum Design Flood
OMS: Operation, maintenance and surveillance
PMF: Probably Maximum Flood
PSHA: Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
QA: Quality assurance
QC: Quality control
RTFE: Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer
SOP : Standard operating procedure
TARP: Trigger Action Response Plan
TMS: Tailings Management System

ICMM List of Acronyms 146

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