GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES

Principled Pragmatism in
Mexico’s Foreign Policy
Variables and Assumptions
Rafael Velazquez-Flores
 Global Foreign Policy Studies

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Karen E. Smith
Department of International Relations
London School of Economics and Political Science
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Kai He
Centre for Governance and Public Policy
Griffith University
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James Madison College
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Karin Aggestam
Lund University
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Indonesian Academy of Sciences
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Amnon Aran
City, University of London
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 Klaus Brummer
Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
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Feliciano de Sá Guimarães
Universidade de São Paulo
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Erin Kristin Jenne

Central European University
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Juliet Kaarbo
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Hiro Katsumata
Tohoku University
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Nanyang Technological University
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Universidad del Rosario
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This Series publishes cutting-edge scholarship on foreign policy with a
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 Rafael Velazquez-Flores

Principled Pragmatism
in Mexico’s Foreign
Policy
Variables and Assumptions
Rafael Velazquez-Flores
School of Economics and IR
Autonomous University of Baja California
Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico

Global Foreign Policy Studies

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 CHAPTER 6

Pragmatism and Nationalism in Mexico’s

Foreign Policy During the Cardenas
Administration and the Second World War,
1934–1946

This chapter analyzes Mexico’s foreign policy during the Lazaro Cardenas
and the Manuel Avila Camacho administrations. Both sexenios had some-
thing in common. First, the two governments enjoyed political stability,
economic growth, and social cohesion. Second, the international environ-
ment became highly favorable. Thus, Mexico acquired an enormous bar-
gaining power. Then, the possibilities to project a pragmatist foreign
policy grew. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first one examines
the nationalistic and pragmatic Cardenas’ foreign policy. The second part
evaluates Mexico’s foreign policy during the Avila Camacho government.
At the end of the chapter, there is a brief analysis as a conclusion.

Principled Pragmatism and Nationalism in Cardenas’

Foreign Policy
This part describes and explains Cardenas’ main foreign policy actions
(1934–1940). First, it presents the key domestic, external, and individual
variables that impacted Mexico’s external activity and propose some first
assumptions. Second, it analyzes the multilateral policy, principlism pre-
dominated, but there were some doses of pragmatism. Third, it continues
with the expropriation of the oil companies, which was a highly pragmatic
decision and one of the most important acts that a post-revolutionary
government carried out vis-à-vis external powers, such as the oil

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 93

Switzerland AG 2022
R. Velazquez-Flores, Principled Pragmatism in Mexico’s Foreign
Policy, Global Foreign Policy Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99573-7_6
94 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

companies. Finally, it presents Mexico’s position at the beginning of the

Second World War, in which Cardenas resorted to a principled pragma-
tism to cope with national interests and external threats.

Domestic, External, and Individual Variables

In 1934, domestic and external conditions started to change gradually.
On the one hand, when President Lazaro Cardenas took power, Mexico’s
political system had not yet achieved real stability since former-President
Calles was still highly influential in domestic issues, and some regional
“caciques” still took up arms to overthrow the constitutional government.
However, Cardenas implemented policies to stabilize the political system.
On the other, the international system improved for Mexico because, in
Europe, a conflict was arising. As a result, world powers paid attention to
the situation in the old continent. When the war broke out, Mexico
became a strategic nation because it owned natural resources necessary for
the battlefield, and it possessed a privileged geopolitical position.
Lazaro Cardenas was the candidate for the PNR, a political party
founded by Calles in 1929.1 After the turmoil, Calles wanted to stabilize
Mexico’s political system and create a political institution congregating
different social sectors. The idea was to normalize elections and peacefully
transfer presidential power since, in the past, several presidents were killed.
Besides, the government wanted to create a political organization to pres-
ent its demand through institutionalized channels. In other words, the
purpose was to solve social problems and foment social cohesion through
peaceful means. In the election, Cardenas won with 98.2% of the votes.
After several years of civil wars, the result was a surprise, but it also estab-
lished the basis for a future stable political system. There were other can-
didates, but they had very few votes (Table 6.1).
In a bold decision, Lazaro Cardenas exiled Calles in 1936 to end the
dualism of power. As a result, Cardenas had greater political control when
the “Maximum Chief of the Revolution” left the country. Then, the
political system started to show significant stability since Cardenas could
put down other uprisings that arose in the country. He also removed the
military sector from the official party since they were responsible for many

1
Years later, the PNR became PMR. Then, it converted into PRI. This political party ruled
Mexico from 1929 to 2000. In every presidential election, PRI always won. Therefore,
Mexico’s political system was characterized by a one-party system between 1929 and 2000.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 95

Table 6.1 Electoral results 1934

Candidate Political party Ideology Vote
percentage

Lazaro Cardenas del Rio PNR Center-­ 98.2%

left
Jose Antonio Villarreal CRPI Center 1.1%
Adalberto Tejeda Olivares Partidos Socialistas de Leftist 0.7%
Izquierda
Hernan Laborde PCM Leftist 0
Rodriguez

Source: Own elaboration with data from INE.

Table 6.2 Economic statistics 1935

Year GDP Inflation External debt Trade Foreign
growth (GDP (Exports, billion investments
percentage) dollars) (Billion dollars)

1935 7.56 0.67 25.57 208.40 NA

Source: Own elaboration with data from several sources, mainly INEGI

revolts. Furthermore, his administration organized workers and peasants

to incorporate labor unions. In this way, social sectors demanded solutions
to their problems through official channels.
Even though Mexico’s economy still suffered the effects of the Great
Depression and foreign interests were still dominating critical economic
sectors, political stability promoted economic growth. In 1935, GDP
grew 7.56%, which was a positive figure. Consequently, industry and agri-
culture started to show better indicators. External debt only represented
25% of GDP. Trade and foreign investments also increased. Therefore, the
economic situation improved significantly (Table 6.2).
In the same token, Cardenas’ populist policies increased social cohe-
sion. For example, his administration constructed hospitals, schools, and
distributed land to peasants. In sum, domestic conditions were optimal for
Mexico’s foreign policy since political stability, economic growth, and
social cohesion improved its leeway.
The international environment also experienced some significant
changes between 1934 and 1940. On the one hand, the United States
96 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

showed a new disposition in its policy toward Latin America, inaugurating

the basis of the so-called Good Neighbor Policy. Under this new foreign
policy, Washington would no longer pressure or intervene directly in Latin
American nations but establish cordial relations with Latin American
nations. On the other hand, the situation in Europe was deteriorating due
to the growing Nazi-fascist ideology. Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935; Spain
was in the midst of a civil war by 1936; Germany annexed Austria and
Sudetenland in 1938 and occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939. In Asia, Japan
invaded Manchuria in 1931. These events showed the decadence of the
League of Nations and predicted a new worldwide conflict. Therefore,
world powers’ attention was centered on those events, and Mexico was
not a priority.
Given the dangerous situation in Europe and Asia, the American
nations sought to consolidate their institutional solidarity. In 1936, they
organized the Inter-American Peacebuilding Conference in Buenos Aires.
One of its central objectives was to create a consultation system among
members in a significant threat to regional security. In other words, the
ministers of foreign affairs would meet, if necessary, to discuss and propose
measures to confront any severe menace. Similarly, the VIII Pan American
Conference was held in 1938 in Lima, Peru. At this meeting, the United
States accepted the principle of Non-Intervention as the basis for inter-­
American relations. Equally, the participants approved that all disputes
should be resolved by peaceful means and that the use of force was illegal.
Once the Second World War broke out, the American nations met in
Panama in 1939, in the First Consultation Meeting. In 1940 the second
meeting took place in Havana, Cuba. Both were organized to discuss col-
lective defense and establish the necessary measures to face the challenges
of world conflict.
Due to these new conditions, Mexico’s international bargaining power
increased significantly. In addition, political stability, economic growth,
social cohesion, and a favorable international atmosphere strengthened
the possibilities for an effective foreign policy. Mexico could put condi-
tions on other countries to reach agreements in this context. Therefore,
pragmatism could be applied. Under these circumstances, objectives
would likely be achieved. Lazaro Cardenas’ main goals were to apply the
constitutional articles related to international issues, solve the main prob-
lems with foreign oil companies, maintain neutrality in the Second World
War, diversify Mexico’s foreign economic relations, increase trade and for-
eign investments to promote economic growth, defend human rights of
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 97

migrants in the United States, maintain friendly relationships with all

countries, strengthen Latin American solidarity due to the world conflict,
and guarantee national security in the light of the world conflict. Since
many of these objectives had an economic and security nature, Cardenas
would require some pragmatism to achieve them.
In his inauguration speech, Cardenas declared that “Mexico will con-
tinue to maintain its policy of cordiality and good understanding, adjust-
ing, as up to now, to stay within the strict canons established by international
law, strengthening the strong ties of friendship that bind it with the other
nations of the world.” Cardenas’ ideology was nationalistic and anti-­
imperialist in international terms. Due to the domestic situation, he was
more interested in internal problems, and international issues were not a
priority at the beginning of his administration. He never traveled abroad
while in office. Thus, at the individual level, principism would be an
option. However, when the international atmosphere worsened, the com-
bination of national interests and Cardenas’ ideology could assume that
principled pragmatism was the option. In other words, Mexico could proj-
ect a pragmatic foreign policy without abandoning its traditional precepts.

Mexico in the World, Participation in the League of Nations,

and the Position Toward the Spanish Civil War
Mexico participated in the world organization after joining the League of
Nations in 1931. Its performance was based on foreign policy principles,
such as Non-Intervention and Peaceful Resolution of Disputes. For exam-
ple, Mexico effectively settled the territorial dispute between Colombia
and Peru. Similarly, the country promoted a ceasefire in the Chaco War
between Paraguay and Bolivia. Within this organization, Mexico was one
of the few nations that defended Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) from the inva-
sion by Benito Mussolini. Furthermore, Mexico was the only nation that
did not accept the League of Nations resolution that legitimized the
Italian invasion.2 This conflict originated in 1934 because Italian troops
invaded the territory of this African country. Mexico was one of the lead-
ing promoters in the League of Nations to reject the fascist imperialist
policy and impose sanctions against Italy for the invasion. In 1937, Isidro
Fabela, Mexico’s representative to the League of Nations, rejected a

2
Manuel Tello, “Algunos aspectos de la participacion de Mexico en la Sociedad de
Naciones,” in Foro Internacional, Vol VI-2, 3, 1965–1966.
98 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

resolution that practically wiped Abyssinia off the map.3 Thanks to Fabela’s
diplomatic efforts, the resolution was unsuccessful. Mexico did not accept
territorial acquisition using force. From then on, Mexico and Abyssinia
established close relations. The African country has been grateful for the
detail ever since. The defense of Abyssinia gave Mexico high international
prestige at that time.
In the same logic, Mexico also condemned the Japanese invasions in
Manchuria and backed up a League of Nations resolution, which pro-
tested for the German reestablishment of its army in 1935. Mexico also
opposed the German annexation of Austria in 1938 and the invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1939. In addition, the country condemned the German
attacks on Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Finally,
following its traditional pacifist policy, the Mexican delegation denounced
the USSR’s aggression to Finland.
Similarly, in the League of Nations, the Cardenas government defended
the Spanish Republicans and protested for the Nazi-fascist aid that
Francisco Franco received to overthrow the democratic government.
Although Mexico assumed a neutral position in almost all international
conflicts, the 1936 Spanish Civil War case was an exception. In the League
of Nations, the Cardenista government declared that Spain was a victim of
external aggression and that Mexico had the moral right to support the
Spanish Republic.4 Moving away from the essence of the Estrada y
Carranza Doctrine, Mexico sent money and arms to the Republicans. The
Foreign Affairs Secretary also ordered his representation in France to pur-
chase military equipment and bring it into Spain through third parties.
Mexico was the only Latin American country that supported the
Republicans. Other nations deemed that Mexico was not respecting its
neutrality. But Lazaro Cardenas knew that if the Spanish rebels overthrew
the legitimate government supported by the Nazis and fascists, then
Germany and Italy would have no obstacles to, later, do the same in other
European countries. In this case, Cardenas chose a pragmatic option and
justified it with the argument that Mexico has the moral duty to defend a
democratic government.
Later, Lazaro Cardenas initiated a policy that would increase the coun-
try’s international prestige and become a pillar of Mexico’s foreign policy:
political asylum. As another way to help Spanish Republicans, Mexico

3
Fabian Herrera, Mexico en la Sociedad de Naciones, 1931–1940 (Mexico City: SRE, 2014).
4
Juan Carlos Mendoza, op. cit., p. 100.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 99

received 480 orphaned children from the civil war in 1937. Later, thou-
sands of Spanish refugees began to arrive. In total, Mexico received
between 20,000 and 30,000 Spanish refugees.5 Many of them made a
notable contribution to culture, the arts, science, economics, and other
areas. When fascist Falangists triumphed in 1939, Mexico broke diplo-
matic relations with the regime of Francisco Franco. The decision was
incompatible with the Estrada Doctrine, so Cardenas preferred a prag-
matic approach Cardenas in the case of Spain.
Lazaro Cardenas not only granted political asylum to the Spanish. In
1936, the president authorized Leon Trotsky in Mexico, a Russian perse-
cuted by Joseph Stalin. Previously, the artists Diego Rivera and Frida
Kahlo had requested Francisco Mugica, a close politician to Lazaro
Cardenas, to convince the president to grant asylum to Trotsky. As there
were no diplomatic relations with the USSR, Cardenas accepted the pro-
posal and asked them to meet Eduardo Hay, secretary of Foreign Relations,
to process the visa. When they met with Hay, the Chancellor refused to
grant the visa. The promoters of the asylum returned with Mugica to solve
the mess. Ultimately, the asylum was granted due to Cardenas’ interven-
tion. Trotsky arrived in Mexico in early 1937.
During Cardenas’s government, Mexico significantly participated dur-
ing the inter-American meetings. Before the Second World War broke out,
the American countries held several meetings to discuss the seriousness
and scope of the conflict. The meetings immediately strengthened conti-
nental solidarity in the Nazi and fascist threat. In this multilateral mecha-
nism, Mexico also applied its principal foreign policy. When the world
conflagration broke out, the American nations met in Panama in 1939, in
the First Consultation Meeting. This meeting produced the Declaration
of Panama, which adopted the General Declaration of Neutrality and cre-
ated a maritime security zone. The second meeting was held in Havana,
Cuba, in 1940.6 The main concern was the possible transfer of sovereignty
of some territories in America owned by the powers defeated by the
Germans. A resolution called Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation was
also approved, which, without becoming a military alliance, established
the foundations of what would later become the inter-American collective
security system.

5
Mario Ojeda, Mexico y la guerra civil española (Mexico City: Turner, 2005).
6
Ismael Moreno, Origenes y evolucion del sistema interamericano (Mexico City, SRE,
1977), p. 84-85.
100 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

A Pragmatic Approach to an Old and Controversial Problem:

the Expropriation of the Oil Companies
At the beginning of the Cardenista administration, a key goal was the
application of article 27 of the constitution. Although the matter was
resolved in Calles’ period, the oil businessmen were interested in knowing
Cardenas’ position on the subject. At first, the Mexican president made
the owners of the companies see that he had no intention of taking any
extreme measures. As a result, the businessmen were calm, but they main-
tained their distrust. However, Cardenas did intervene quickly in the
worker-employer relationship. The new president supported the workers
and unified all the oil workers in a single labor union since they were
divided. Later, the union reached a collective contract that improved
working benefits.
In 1936, Lazaro Cardenas issued the new Expropriation Law. With this
new regulation, the Mexican government had the right to expropriate the
companies for national interest and pay compensation according to the
fiscal cost within ten years. Oil businessmen were immediately alarmed. To
calm them, Cardenas announced that he had no intention of expropriating
their properties. Later, the oil workers union demanded a salary increase.
The companies denied it, and the matter reached the Federal Conciliation
and Arbitration Board, a governmental office to conciliate interests and
resolve labor problems between employers and workers. After studying
the case for some time, this instance supported the workers and demanded
that the companies pay the increase. The businessmen refused and turned
the issue to the Nation’s Supreme Court. The highest court denied the
appeal and ordered them to pay the raise immediately. Once the judicial
instances were exhausted, the businessmen took the case to the political
ground. A group of company representatives, together with the United
States Ambassador, Josephus Daniels, met with President Cardenas to
negotiate a way out of the conflict. As there was no solution because nei-
ther party wanted to give up their positions, on March 18, 1938, Lazaro
Cardenas took one of the most critical and pragmatic decisions of a post-­
revolutionary government to assert its autonomy from abroad: the expro-
priation of the oil companies.
The step taken by Cardenas affected US economic interests and aimed
at reducing the foreign influence on the national economy. With this
move, the Mexican government complied with the spirit of Article 27 and
affirmed its autonomy vis-à-vis abroad. About this, Lorenzo Meyer
points out:
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 101

The attitude of President Cardenas towards the oil companies was conse-
quent with a domestic policy that attempted to comply with the postulates
of the 1917 Constitution fully. The United States' situation was decisive in
formulating Mexican oil policy. The Good Neighbor and all the interna-
tional instruments that tried to resolve the divergences peacefully in the
Inter-American system gave Mexico, for the first time, a relative assurance
that the northern neighbor would not employ force to support the oil
companies.7

For his part, Mario Ojeda establishes that:

The expropriation of the oil companies carried out in 1938 marks, without
any doubt, the highest point reached by Mexico in the process of declaring
its autonomy vis-à-vis abroad economically, because foreign investments
experienced backwardness and reached, in absolute terms, the minimal
expression in Mexico; politically, because the very act of the expropriation
means a foreign policy decision of great extent.8

Cardenas took advantage of the sudden increase of his negotiating

capacity, which allowed him to apply a more pragmatic foreign policy.
Besides, he needed the money from the oil profits. Cardenas was sure that
the United States would not invade Mexico to recover the companies due
to the Good Neighbor policy. The expropriation was the most evident
proof of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. The US government’s deci-
sion not to intervene in the oil conflict definitively opened doors for a new
age of US-Mexican cooperation.
It was clear that Cardenas had decided with a vast base of popular sup-
port and took advantage of the new international situation that favored
him. This unique combination had enormously increased Mexico’s inter-
national negotiating capacity. As a result, the oil expropriation was one of
the most critical foreign policy decisions in the revolutionary period and
was the symbol of “Cardenista” nationalism, but at the same time of prag-
matism. From then on, oil became an essential part of Mexico’s national
identity and independence from foreign powers and a lever for national
development.

7
Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero (Mexico City: El
Colegio de Mexico, 1981), p. 345.
8
Mario Ojeda, Alcances y limites de la politica exterior de Mexico (Mexico City: El Colegio
de Mexico, 1976), pp. 27–28.
102 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

The bitter reactions of the expropriated companies did not wait.

Annoyed, the foreign businessmen immediately demanded that the mea-
sure be annulled because it was unconstitutional. Then they started a cam-
paign of lobbying strategies and boycotts. They ensured that Mexican oil
had no open markets for sale; they also boycotted all imports of spare
parts, machinery, and tools destined for the sector; they requested the
diplomatic support of their countries; there is even the version that they
had the intention of supporting a rebel movement to overthrow Cardenas
and put a president close to their interests.
In the diplomatic sphere, the UK government sent a protest note to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs claiming that it was confiscation and question-
ing the reasons for the expropriation. The note argued that the measure
was not in the general interest and that it was a political decision that
benefited only one group. In response, the Mexican government replied,
saying that the British had no right to question the reasons for the expro-
priation. Later and sarcastically, the United Kingdom sent another note
saying that Mexico could not even pay the compensation claims caused by
the damages during the Revolution. Much less could the government pay
the amount of the expropriation. In response, Cardenas sent a check for
the claims and broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.9
The decision contradicted Mexico’s principles and had, with any doubt, a
pragmatic nature. Nevertheless, Mexican public opinion did not protest
because Cardenas abandoned traditional tenets. On the contrary, they
supported him.
In the United States, there were two positions about expropriation.
The first one was headed by President Franklin Roosevelt and his ambas-
sador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels. They accepted the essence of the deci-
sion, but not the form. They requested adequate and immediate
compensation in cash. Considering US national interests, Roosevelt and
Daniels did not want to affect the bilateral relationship with the oil issue
since they wanted to guarantee Mexico’s collaboration before an immi-
nent war with Japan. The other position, headed by Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, did not accept the nationalization and supported entrepre-
neurs to recover their industries. The State Department feared that the
expropriation in Mexico could set a precedent in other Latin American
countries. Therefore, the main goal was to support the private property of
US citizens abroad. Thus, US diplomats began to send protest notes to

9
Lorenzo Meyer, “La marca del nacionalismo,” op. cit., p. 134.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 103

pressure Mexico’s government. They even proposed submitting the case

to international arbitration. Despite the support of the US president to
Cardenas’ government, Cordell Hull managed to get the Treasury
Department to suspend US purchases of Mexican silver and oil. The mea-
sure affected the national economy and left the Mexican oil industry in
trouble.
Faced with diplomatic pressure, the Lazaro Cardenas government pre-
pared to defend the expropriation through principal and pragmatic mea-
sures. He rejected the protest notes on the diplomatic front and refused to
allow the expropriation to be mediated by a third party. On the domestic
front, the Mexican government used an effective strategy. He tried to
divide the companies by negotiating private arrangements with the small
ones. In the legal sphere, the Mexican courts supported Cardenas’s deci-
sion. To save the economic situation and face the boycott of its exports,
Mexico began to sell oil to Germany, Italy, and Japan. Cardenas did not
agree ideologically with those countries, but his administration wanted
close trade relations. With this pragmatic measure, the president put the
national interest first. In short, by 1940, when Lazaro Cardenas left power,
the matter had not been fully resolved because the companies still had
hopes of recovering their properties in court. The resolution of the issue
was left to the next administration.

Mexico’s Position at the Beginning of the Second World War:

Between Pragmatism and Principism
Once Second World War began, President Lazaro Cardenas declared that
Mexico would be neutral in the European conflict on September 4, 1939.
According to the Mexican pacifist policy and in congruence with foreign
policy principles, the president declared Mexico’s neutrality. With this dec-
laration, the Mexican president manifested his adherence to the norms of
International Law. To provide a legal framework for Mexican neutrality,
the Congress of the Union approved a bill that prohibited the submarines
and planes of the belligerents from being admitted into the national terri-
tory and Mexican waters.10
Mexican public opinion and key political actors supported Lazaro
Cardenas’s policy of neutrality. However, some actors were pro-Nazis, not

10
Rafael Velazquez, La Politica Exterior de Mexico durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial
(Mexico City: Plaza y Valdes, 2007), p. 107.
104 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

because they had a special affection for the Germans, but because an anti-
­US sentiment was still among public opinion because of US interventions
in Mexican politics during the Revolution. Despite this lack of consensus
around Cardenas’s foreign policy toward the Nazis, his administration
condemned German attacks. However, after the condemnations, Cardenas
sent his Secretary of Treasure, Eduardo Suarez, secretly to the German
Legation to explain that Mexico had to adopt that position because it had
to defend weak nations.11 Thus, in the public sphere, Cardenas protested
for any international aggression. But, in the private realm, his government
wanted to establish close trade and economic relations with Germany
because Cardenas calculated that Germany could win the war. This atti-
tude represented the double discourse in Mexico’s foreign policy, an
essential part of the principal pragmatism.
As a demonstration of solidarity with the nations invaded by the Nazis,
the Mexican government recognized the political existence of several
states in exile. Nevertheless, it continued to maintain relations with its
governments. Indeed, Lazaro Cardenas’ attitude of recognizing the gov-
ernments in exile did not break with the neutrality because Mexico did not
participate directly in the conflict; it was just a show of solidarity.
Initially, it was clear that Lazaro Cardenas was concerned about main-
taining neutrality. From a pragmatic perspective, the Mexican president
kept a policy of waiting until events unfolded to get a better overview.
Later, in the face of Germany’s aggression against the Netherlands and
Belgium, President Lazaro Cardenas again condemned the act and pub-
licly protested. Although Mexico declared its absolute neutrality at the
beginning of the Second World War, it is a fact that the Mexican govern-
ment would always condemn any aggression against democratic nations.
This was nothing more than a clear reflection of Mexico’s historical expe-
rience, which upon being attacked on different occasions, it would protest
against any intervention. From the previous statements, it is noted that
those made in the Cardenista period were more attached to neutrality.
When Manuel Avila assumed power, neutrality started to fade.
In general, the foreign policy of President Lazaro Cardenas was charac-
terized by high nationalism, his attachment to the democratic model, his
rejection of Nazi and fascist ideology, and his adherence to the interna-
tional legal order. But his government was also pragmatic because, after
the oil expropriation, Mexico sold oil to the Axis countries. In the case of

11
Daniela Gleizer, “Las relaciones entre Mexico y el Tercer Reich, 1933-1941” in
Tzintzun. Revista de Estudios Historicos, No. 64, 2016, pp. 223–258.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 105

the Spanish Civil War, Cardenas moved away from the traditional princi-
ples of Mexican foreign policy. Regarding the Inter-American Conferences,
Mexico had a very relevant performance since its government proposed
that the principle of Non-Intervention be included as a norm of conduct
among the American countries.

Mexico’s Foreign Policy During the Manuel

Avila Administration
This second part of the chapter describes and explains Mexico’s foreign
policy during the Manuel Avila administration (1940–1946). It describes
first domestic, external, and individual variables to make some assump-
tions. The second part depicts Mexico’s multilateral policy. The last part
examines the relation with the United States, where pragmatic coopera-
tion stood out.

Domestic, External, and Individual Variables

During the Second World War, the conjunction of internal and external
factors allowed Mexico to increase its international negotiation capacity
considerably for the first time in history. On the one hand, Mexico
showed significant political domestic stability, rapid economic growth,
and fast urbanization by 1940. On the other hand, the international situ-
ation was favorable for Mexico. The worldwide conflict had a significant
impact on the US interest in perfecting the mechanisms of an inter-
American alliance. Furthermore, the international demand for essential
goods increased, and Mexico had substantial quantities of strategic mate-
rials for the war efforts.
The presidential succession process started early in 1938. Then, a
Mexican practice was established: the incumbent president picked the
presidential candidate. Since the official party always won the election, the
chosen one became automatic in the next president. Thus, it was not the
party or the society that elected the president. This practice became a non-­
writing rule of the Mexican political system. Cardenas had many candi-
dates. Francisco Mugica, the Secretary of Communications and a close ally
to Cardenas, was the strongest alternative. However, his ideology was situ-
ated in the extreme left. Finally, due to the tense international environ-
ment, Cardenas opted for Manuel Avila Camacho, the Secretary of
Defense, who was moderate ideologically.
106 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

In 1940, the presidential election was very tense. On the day of the
voting, seven people were killed because different factions disputed the
control of the voting booths. Avila Camacho won the election with 93.9%
of the votes under the PMR, the political party that substituted
PNR. Although Camacho obtained a vast majority of ballots, Andrew
Almazan complained of electoral fraud. However, the transition was
smooth, and Avila Camacho took power on December 1, 1940. The sta-
bility of the political system resisted the first menace (Table 6.3).
By 1940, Mexico’s economy was in decent parameters. In 1941, GDP
grew 9.68%, one of the highest figures post-revolutionary periods.
Consequently, industry and agriculture started to show better indicators.
In addition, external debt only represented 14% of GDP, one of the lowest
historical percentages. Trade and foreign investments also presented posi-
tive numbers. In 1941, Mexico exported 243 billion dollars and received
16 billion dollars in foreign investment. Therefore, the economic situation
at the beginning of the sexenio was in excellent shape (Table 6.4).
Cardenas’ populist policies increased social cohesion. Besides, by 1940
Mexico experienced a significant population growth due to the end of the
civil war and improved health services. As a result, birth rates increased,
and the death rate decreased. At the same time, the nation also began to
witness an accelerated urbanization process. There was a constant migra-
tion from rural areas to cities. Thus, the urban population increased

Table 6.3 Electoral results 1940

Candidate Political party Ideology Vote percentage

Manuel Avila Camacho PMR Center-left 93.9%

Juan Andrew Almazan PRUN Right-wing 5.7%
Efrain Sanchez Tapia Independent Center 0.37%

Source: Own elaboration with data from INE.

Table 6.4 Economic statistics 1941

Year GDP Inflation External debt Trade Foreign
growth (GDP (Exports, billion investments
percentage) dollars) (Billion dollars)

1941 9.68 6.10 14.24% 243.20 16.27

Source: Own elaboration with data from several sources, mainly INEGI.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 107

significantly. Moreover, the middle-class sector doubled from 8% in 1910

to 16% in 1940. Despite these positive demographic figures, social differ-
ences persisted yet. In 1940, 87% of Mexicans belonged to the lowest
class. In sum, domestic conditions were optimal for Mexico’s foreign pol-
icy since political stability, economic growth, and social cohesion improved
drastically.
In the international context, the conflict escalated. In 1941, Hitler
invaded the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Greece. On December 7, 1941,
the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and the United States declared war.
This event brought advantages for Mexico because Washington urgently
needed to sign a joint military agreement with the southern neighbor to
protect the North American area. In this context, Mexico could condition
any aid. In 1944, the panorama improved when Germany defeated the
Soviet Union, and the allies began the landing in Normandy under
Operation Overlord in June. In 1945, Hitler committed suicide, and
Germany surrendered. Thus, the European war ended. In Yalta and
Potsdam, the three great powers met to decide the postwar conditions.
They agreed on how the new world organization will function and divided
Germany into four zones. In Bretton Woods, the allies established the
norms for the postwar financial system. After the United States dropped
two atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Japan surrendered, and
the war in Asia was over. The Second World War ended. In San Francisco,
the allies met and created the United Nations, which substituted the
League of Nations. The primary purpose of the new organization was to
avoid a Third World war and bring peace to the planet.
Due to these new conditions, Mexico’s international bargaining power
was still high. Political stability, economic growth, social cohesion, and a
favorable international atmosphere strengthened Mexico’s foreign policy.
Mexico could again put conditions on other countries to reach agree-
ments in this context. Therefore, pragmatism was still a possible option.
National interests focused on maintaining political stability, promoting
economic growth, reducing social differences, and securing Mexico from
any external threat. Thus, a dose of pragmatism would be needed. Key
foreign objectives were to solve the pending problems after the oil expro-
priation, maintain neutrality in the conflict, diversify Mexico’s foreign eco-
nomic relations, increase trade and attract foreign investments to promote
economic growth, defend human rights of migrants in the United States,
maintain friendly relationships with all countries, strengthen Latin
American solidarity, protect national security, and participate in the world
108 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

organization of the postwar era. Due to the war, diversifying economic

links and attracting investments would be difficult. Many markets were
closed, and nations were not investing. To maintain neutrality would also
be complicated since the United States entered the war. However, solving
the problems with the oil companies and protecting migrants’ human
rights in the United States would be possible if Avila Camacho aggregated
an important dose of pragmatism in the formula.
In his inauguration speech, Avila Camacho stated that “the doctrine of
peaceful and just relations constitutes the only hope of salvation from the
civilized norms of international coexistence, so necessary in this martyred
and bleeding world.” Due to the world conflict, the president had to pay
close attention to international issues. Avila Camacho was the second pres-
ident who traveled abroad in office. He accompanied Franklin Roosevelt
back home after the US president paid a visit to Avila Camacho in the city
of Monterrey. Thus, the Mexican president was interested in world affairs
at the individual level. Therefore, a pragmatic option would be possible
without abandoning Mexico’s traditional tenets.

Mexico’s Foreign Policy in the Second World War

in the Avila Camacho Administration

Between 1940 and 1946, Mexico’s foreign policy was determined by the
Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. In this context,
this second part of the chapter describes and analyzes key foreign actions
of the Avila Camacho administration. First, it explores Mexico’s multilat-
eral policy. Typically, Mexico used its traditional precepts in this realm, but
it also applied some pragmatism, especially when Germany sunk two
Mexican ships in the Mexican Gulf. This part focuses mainly on Mexico’s
participation in the inter-American system and the creation of the United
States. Second, it examines the relationship with the United States, in
which there was pragmatic cooperation.

Relations with Allies and Multilateral Policy

At the beginning of the Second World War, Mexico had broken diplo-
matic relations with several allied countries. There were no official ties to
the USSR since the Maximato period. There were also no links with the
United Kingdom due to the oil expropriation. Cardenas also interrupted
relations with Vichy France because it was a Hitler puppet government.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 109

With the United States, interactions were tense over the oil issue. With
Germany, the connection was favorable because Hitler was buying Mexican
oil. Paradoxically, the bilateral interactions were not at their best with the
allies; but, with the Nazis, the bond was friendly. However, the situation
changed significantly once the world conflict progressed.
By 1940, trade between Mexico and Germany was significantly reduced
due to the naval blockade imposed by the United Kingdom in Europe.
Even so, the Mexican government was highly interested in continuing this
exchange since Cardenas calculated that Germany could win the war and,
in the future, would control the European market. Later, from a prag-
matic perspective, Mexico remained in an attitude of waiting cautiously
for the development of events.
In its relationship with Germany at the beginning of the war, Mexico
played double-edge diplomacy, as Robert Putnam puts it.12 Even though
Mexico protested for German invasions in the League of Nations, the
Mexican government was willing to maintain close commercial relations
with Hitler. This pragmatism gave Mexico great flexibility in its foreign
policy. Later, Mexico began to show a hostile attitude toward Germany,
especially after the capitulation of France. Due to the propaganda issued
by the German Legation in favor of the Nazis, Mexico declared Artur
Dietrich, the German representative, persona non grata. Nevertheless, the
Germanic government sought to maintain a friendly relationship with
Mexico since it was interested in its oil. Hitler even suggested that if
Germany won a victory against the United Kingdom, the payment to the
expropriated English companies could be canceled.
In 1941, under legal arguments, the Avila administration decided to
seize the German ships stranded in the Mexican ports of Veracruz and
Tampico under the Angaria Law. The German Legation protested, but
Mexico claimed it was adopting this measure to maintain order and secu-
rity in Mexican ports and keep up with neutrality.13 Another sample of
hostility toward Germany was when Mexico accepted and applied the US
blacklist, which included German trading houses that threatened the secu-
rity of the American continent. In the fall of 1941, the German govern-
ment asked Mexico to withdraw the officials of the Mexican consulates
installed in Germany and the occupied territories. In response, Mexico

Robert Putnam, op. Cit.

12

Memorias de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores 1940–1941 (Mexico City: SRE,

13

1941), p. 157.
110 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

also requested the closure of the German consulates in Mexican territory.

With these measures, the economic relations between Mexico and
Germany were completely broken, leaving only the diplomatic ones. The
latter was definitively broken, at the initiative of Mexico, shortly after
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941. Later, the Avila Camacho govern-
ment declared war in May 1942, after German submarines sank two oil
tankers in the Mexican Gulf.14
In other bilateral ties, Mexico showed some independence. For exam-
ple, the country resumed diplomatic ties with the United Kingdom with-
out a solution to the oil issue. Mexico was the first country to recognize
Charles De Gaulle as French president in exile with France. In contrast,
the Mexican government never recognized the Franco regime with Spain.
With the USSR, Mexico reestablished diplomatic relations with Stalin
since both countries were fighting on the same side. In short, in its bilat-
eral relations, Mexico demonstrated broad autonomy and pragmatism in
its foreign policy during the Second World War.
Mexico gained a growing prestige in the world sphere in the multilat-
eral realm. Its active participation in the inter-American system gave
Mexico the role of a regional leader in the continent. At the Third Meeting
of Consultation, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, after the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, the United States stated that the aggression represented a
threat to continental security.15 The call was based on the principle of col-
lective security of the Havana meeting, which established that any aggres-
sion made to an American country would be considered aggression to all.
At the meeting, Mexico presented the following proposals: to interrupt
all trade with the Axis countries, not treat as belligerent any American
state that is in a state of war and adhere to the Atlantic Charter. All these
initiatives were approved. Mexico’s performance in the consultation meet-
ings was very significant. His attitude was always in favor of American
cooperation and solidarity. Its main objective was to maintain an active
presence in inter-American forums to influence the regional system and
establish itself as a leader in the continent. The constant presence of
Mexico in inter-American forums strengthened its international prestige.
The approval of most of the Mexican proposals in the meetings showed
the country’s high capacity for international negotiation.

Ibidem, p. 245.
14

Guillermo Garces, Mexico cincuenta años de politica internacional (Mexico City:

15

PRI, 1982).
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 111

Later, the region’s nations agreed that Mexico could host a special
meeting to discuss matters related to the end of the war and its possible
repercussions. This meeting was called the Chapultepec Conference and
was held in 1945. The meeting showed Mexico’s interest indirectly influ-
encing the postwar international reorganization. In this summit, the Latin
American countries agreed on a common position at the San Francisco
Conference, where the war winners would constitute the United Nations
in 1945.
When two Mexican oil tankers were sunk, Avila Camacho first adopted
a principled stance and demanded an apology and compensation for the
damage. However, Germany never replied, and Mexico changed the strat-
egy for a more pragmatic option. In 1942, Avila Camacho proposed to
Congress the declaration of war.16 The act was one of the most important
decisions for defending national dignity. Although Mexico had always
been a pacifist state by tradition, the declaration was made for the exclu-
sive purpose of legitimate defense. In this context, Mexico sent the sym-
bolic 201 Squadron to the battlefront, made up of war pilots trained in the
United States, and saw action in the Philippines. That was not Mexico’s
only contribution to the war. Thousands of Mexicans fought in Europe
under the US flag. As a result, as a US military partner, Mexico was able
to modernize its military technology. Mexico’s participation during the
war made it one of the victorious nations and participated directly, for the
first time in its history, in the negotiations for the formation of a new
world organization.
This prestige gained by the country allowed Mexico to obtain certain
advantages in dealing with other nations. For example, its most important
foreign policy principles were enshrined in the Declaration of Mexico and
in the Act of Chapultepec, documents that emanated from the Chapultepec
Conference. In addition, the San Francisco Conference, which gave rise to
the United Nations (UN), also adopted some of the views of Mexico.
Under Mexico’s initiative, the Franco regime was not included in the new
world organization. Likewise, the role of regional organizations in the
United Nations system was accepted as proposed by the Mexican delega-
tion; that is, there would be compatibility between the UN and regional
organizations. On the other hand, Eduardo Suarez, the Mexican Secretary
of the Treasury, had outstanding participation in confirming the new
international financial system outlined in the Breton Woods agreements.

16
Memorias de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores 1941–1942, p. 245.
112 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

Mexico’s multilateral policy granted international prestige for the

nation by the end of the Second World War. In both the League of Nations
and the United Nations, Mexico’s participation was based on a principist
foreign policy. Cardenas and Avila defended international law and pro-
moted solidarity among vulnerable countries. In the inter-American sys-
tem, Mexico was a pillar to establish a collective defense principle in the
continent.

US-Mexican Relationships During the Second World War: A New

Era of Pragmatic Cooperation
For Mexico, the link with the United States was the most important bilat-
eral relationship throughout the Second World War. This importance was
reciprocal since, for the United States, the neighbor was also strategic to
establish a military alliance of mutual defense against the Nazi and Japanese
threats. During the war period, the national interests of Mexico and the
United States coincided for the first time in bilateral history. Cooperation
between the two was vital to ward off the Nazi-fascist threat. Although
Public Opinion disagreed on a close collaboration with the United States
in national security issues, a political and economic alliance was necessary
to face the challenges posed by the global conflagration. As a result, the
conflict between Mexico and the United States was left behind and gave
way to bilateral and pragmatic cooperation. But first, pending issues had
to be resolved.
For the Roosevelt government, it was imperative to formalize a military
collaboration agreement with Mexico since a Japanese attack was possible
on the US Pacific coast. However, the government of Mexico conditioned
all types of military cooperation with the United States until a bilateral
agreement on pending issues was reached. From the perspective of Blanca
Torres, Mexico would get involved in lengthy negotiations with its neigh-
bor, “taking advantage of the strengthening of its negotiating capacity as
a result of the war” to reach agreements that favored its national interest.
The country “tried to influence events so as not to lose ground in what it
considered essential for the national interest and gave in what was consid-
ered secondary.” 17 In this sense, the Mexican government began negotia-
tions to agree on the issues that it considered most important at the

17
Blanca Torres, “Mexico en la segunda Guerra Mundial”, Volume 19, Historia de la
Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1979), p. 10.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 113

beginning of the Manuel Avila administration, such as compensation for

expropriated companies, claims caused in the Revolution, silver purchases,
etc. the problem of foreign debt. On the other hand, such problems as El
Chamizal and international waters were postponed for future negotiations
because they were not a priority.
With such a level of bargaining power, Mexico conditioned the celebra-
tion of a formal agreement of a joint defense until the expropriation issue
was resolved. Finally, after intense negotiations, in October 1941, both
governments had reached an understanding on the issue, apparently satis-
factory for both parties. But, unexpectedly, the United States suspended
the negotiations until the government had the consent of the oil compa-
nies. However, a month later, the American point of view changed, and
then the negotiations restarted again.18 The conclusion of this agreement
took place on November 19, 1941, just three weeks before the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor. With this agreement, The United States agreed to
resolve the pending problems derived from the oil expropriation: the sus-
pension of oil and silver purchases, the compensation for the oil compa-
nies, and the payments of old claims. In addition, both countries agreed to
create a joint commission to fix the value of the expropriated property.
When the commission reported the result of its study, Mexico was willing
to pay 30 million dollars, not the 100 million that the companies were
demanding. Then, the oil companies were furiously angry and turned to
the US government for help. Washington told them that it was a national
interest for the United States to get closer collaboration with Mexico.19
The signing of the agreement showed Mexico’s high level of negotiat-
ing to bargain because practically everything was arranged according to its
national interest. A high level of bargaining power was necessary for a
pragmatic approach. Pragmatism paid off for Mexico since the United
States started repurchasing oil and silver. In addition, the US government

18
When the Second World War began, the United States calculated a possible Japanese
invasion of its territory. The prediction was that Baja California (belonging to Mexico) was
the primary target of the Japanese. They would first invade Mexico (a less protected country
with a poorly trained army) and then penetrate the US territory through southern California.
Then, the United States was urged to sign a mutual defense agreement with Mexico to pro-
tect the peninsula since there was not even a radar in that area that could detect the Japanese
invasion. This situation caused Mexico to expand its international negotiating capacity by
setting conditions for a possible mutual defense agreement.
19
See Maria Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
114 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

accepted the payment of the compensation that Mexico was offering.

With this, Mexico won the battle against the expropriated companies.
By the same token, Mexico wanted to solve a very old and cumbersome
problem: foreign debt. Mexico and the International Bankers Committee
concluded an agreement in November 1941 to renegotiate the foreign
debt. The agreement was beneficial for Mexico since the debt amount was
reduced by almost 10%.20 Moreover, these arrangements secured Mexico’s
cooperation with the United States. After the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941, Avila’s administration severed diplomatic relations with
Germany, Italy, and Japan. In January 1942, the US-Mexican Joint
Defense Commission was formed.21 This agreement was the best example
of US-Mexican pragmatic cooperation. After a war, several invasions, and
loss of territory, Mexico agreed to become a military ally to the United
States in security issues.
There were two main US concerns on the military side at the beginning
of the Second World War. The first was a joint defense of the California
region since the Mexican peninsula was strategic for a possible Japanese
attack. The second concern was related to the constitution of a general
joint defense agreement between Mexico and the United States. Regarding
the first concern, the United States sought to install radar stations on the
Baja California peninsula. First, negotiations were not easy because there
was widespread domestic discontent for a US collaboration in this subject.
Second, in December 1941, President Avila appointed Lazaro Cardenas
Commander General of the Pacific, which constituted a guarantee for the
defense of Mexican sovereignty due to the nationalism of the former presi-
dent. Finally, both governments reached an agreement in March 1942,
called the Collaboration Plan Applicable to the Zone of California.22 This
arrangement established radar stations and built airfields in Mexican terri-
tory. In the bases installed on Mexican soil, the command would be in
charge of Mexican personnel, but it was accepted that the US military
would train Mexican staff. However, by 1943, the threat of an attack on
the area dissipated, and it was then that the United States government
began to lose interest in the region.

20
Blanca Torres, “De la Guerra al mundo bipolar,” Volume VII, Mexico y el mundo:
Historia de sus relaciones exteriores (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 2010), p. 43.
21
Blanca Torres, “Mexico en la segunda Guerra Mundial,” op. cit., p. 113.
22
Lorenzo Meyer & Josefina Zoraida, op. cit., p. 183.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 115

Regarding the second concern, in January 1942, the US-Mexican Joint

Defense Commission was established. The objective of this committee was
to study the progressive development of the war and its possible conse-
quences. Accordingly, the commission recommended the modernization
of the Mexican army and provided credits for this purpose.23 In January
1942, days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Third Inter-­
American Consultation Meeting, Mexico enacted a decree that the United
States would not be considered belligerent, allowing US ships and sea-
planes to remain in national waters. Likewise, the Mexican government
issued a decree by which permission was granted to Mexicans to render
their civil or military service in the United States during the war. For the
United States, the decree was of great help since more than 250,000
Mexicans participated in the battlefront, fighting under the US flag.
With the US-Mexican Joint Defense Commission, Mexico had access
to up to 40 million dollars through the Lend-Lease Act. The money was
invested in new Mexican aircraft and the first mechanized ground division.
As can be seen, Mexico obtained several benefits in this new pragmatic
cooperation with the United States. Mexico’s participation in the war was
small but significant. In 1944, Mexico and the United States reached an
agreement whereby the US military agreed to train a small Mexican air
force squadron. During 1945, the 201st squadron with 300 Mexicans was
in the Philippines until the end of the war.
Undoubtedly, Mexico also contributed decisively to the triumph of the
allies in the economic field. The country collaborated with its production
and labor to defeat the Axis powers. This aid was directed mainly toward
the United States since Mexico exported and imported more than 90% of
its products from that market. Both countries mutually benefited from this
commercial exchange. On the one hand, the United States ensured the
purchase of Mexican raw materials that were vital to its economy and pre-
vented Mexico from selling these materials to the Axis countries. On the
other hand, Mexico saw its economic growth favored by increasing US
demand for its products.
Mexico’s collaboration in the war effort was not limited to the military
sphere. In 1941, the United States signed a provisional agreement to buy
Mexican strategic minerals. Both countries signed a new formal trade
agreement that opened up the US market to several Mexican products a

23
Susana Chacon, “La negociacion del acuerdo militar entre Mexico y los Estados Unidos,
1940–1942,” in Foro Internacional, Vol. XL, 2 (160) abril-junio, 2000, pp. 307-344.
116 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

year later. By 1943, almost 90% of Mexico’s exports were bought in the
United States. Due to the war, many markets were closed. Because some
trade differences arose between Mexican and US entrepreneurs, both
countries created the US-Mexican Economic Cooperation Commission in
1943 to cope with conflict of interests.24 As can be observed, international
institutions were created to promote cooperation and reduce conflict.
Regarding trade, Mexico and the United States signed on July 15,
1941, a provisional agreement by which Washington pledged to acquire
all Mexican production of strategic materials for the battlefront. In
December 1942, the two countries signed a trade treaty by which they
agreed to lower trade barriers. In addition, both countries signed several
specific agreements to complement this treaty that allowed the United
States to purchase Mexican raw materials.
Economic cooperation was not limited to trade. For example, between
1941 and 1945, the US government granted roughly 90 million dollars to
Mexico to stabilize its peso, balance its trade deficit, and improve its com-
munications.25 From 1913 to 1941, Mexico had not received any interna-
tional loan, but US cooperation had reopened the international credit
system for Mexico. Therefore, Mexico also received a considerable amount
of direct foreign investments. Many European capitals had sought more
stable markets, and Mexico was a very attractive country. By 1945, Mexico
had received 568 million dollars. Its government decreed in 1944 a new
foreign investment law that was more in conformity with the current situ-
ation and responded better to Mexico’s national interests. In this case, the
Avila government opted for a more pragmatic stance to promote eco-
nomic development.
Regarding the migration topic, Mexico and the United States signed a
series of agreements to regulate the hiring of Mexicans in US labor fields.
Due to the need for more manpower, the United States government was
very interested in reaching an immigration settlement with Mexico.26 The
first of them was held in August 1942, by which Mexican braceros could
not be employed in military service and would not receive discriminatory
treatment. In addition, they would be guaranteed transportation, food,
24
Susana Chacon, La relacion entre Mexico y los Estados Unidos (1940–1955). Entre el con-
flicto y la cooperacion (Mexico City: FCE, 2008).
25
Luis Zorrilla, Historia de las relaciones entre Mexico y los Estados Unidos de America
1800–1958 (Mexico City: Porrua, 1977), p. 500.
26
See Richard Craig, The Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin: The
University of Texas Press, 1971).
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 117

competitive salaries, hygienic rooms, and free medical services. Even

Mexican Ministry of Labor supervisors could enter the United States to
monitor Mexican workers’ rights. The two countries benefited from the
conclusion of these agreements. The United States secured manpower in
the labor camps as thousands of US citizens were on the battlefront. For
its part, Mexico placed a large number of workers that the Mexican labor
market could not absorb. This has been the only agreement on Mexican
immigrants in the diplomatic history between Mexico and the United States.
By the end of the war, Mexico and the United States faced another
problem. The construction of dams on the side of the United States
reduced the amount of water Mexicans received along the border.
However, both countries were willing to settle the issue. After long and
difficult negotiations, in 1945, they finally signed an international agree-
ment to regulate the use of water and control the rivers’ flows. Since the
end of the war was imminent, both governments wanted to create enough
institutional instruments to deal with future issues.
The agreement was favorable for Mexico because it would receive the
volume of water it requested. The only pending issue was the El Chamizal
problem. As can be seen, all these agreements greatly benefited Mexico.
But, in return, the country promised to maintain close collaboration with
the United States in the military field. The alliance was reaffirmed when
Roosevelt made an official visit to Mexican territory in 1943. In return,
Avila accompanied his counterpart back to the United States. In their
speeches, both presidents reaffirmed the solidarity that united the two
nations and resolved to remain united in friendship to defeat the common
enemy. By now, the Mexican government seemed to have forgotten the
resentments caused by the United States in the past and was ready to
become its ally. Pragmatism prevailed.

Chapter Analysis
In sum, Mexico’s foreign policy during the Cardenista era and the Second
World War was characterized by the use of principal and pragmatic
approaches at the same time. First, Cardenas defended national interest in
the oil issue, particularly vis-à-vis the United States and the United
Kingdom. Second, the expropriation of the oil companies was a pragmatic
decision because it represented a triumph before external powers; it meant
the state sovereignty over Mexico’s natural resources. Third, it was an
instrument to promote economic growth.
118 R. VELAZQUEZ-FLORES

In Spain and German cases, he resorted to a principist pragmatism.

First, his administration defended the Spanish Republic and protested
Nazi attacks. Then, however, the Mexican government sent arms and
money to the Republicans, which can be considered a contradiction of the
Non-Intervention principle. Nevertheless, Cardenas justified the decision
with the argument that Mexico had the moral duty to defend democracy.
Therefore, Cardenas showed pragmatism without abandoning Mexico’s
traditional principles. This combination became a central part of Mexico’s
principled pragmatism for the future. With Germany, Mexico sold oil to
Nazis and sought a close economic relationship with Hitler.
The variables that best explain this principled pragmatism were the
domestic and external conditions and Cardenas’ nationalism. The con-
junction of a favorable international environment and a stable internal
situation increased Mexico’s bargaining power, which allowed Mexico to
develop a pragmatic foreign policy.
The Avila administration accepted a close and pragmatic economic
cooperation and a military alliance with the United States to promote
Mexico’s economic growth during the war. Therefore, the emphasis was
on the economic criteria. Avila ceded in security issues to get economic
benefits. For example, he accepted an agreement for mutual defense.
However, Mexico was able to establish conditions. For example, the gov-
ernment did not accept any accord if pending issues related to the oil
expropriation were not solved first. Thus, the US-Mexican relationship in
this period contributed to the consolidation of Mexico’s political stability
and the promotion of economic development. As a result, the Mexican
government was better positioned to advance Mexico’s national interests.
As a result, US-Mexican relations experienced a substantial shift in this
period: confrontation was replaced by cooperation.
Due to several variables, Mexico’s principled pragmatism toward the
United States was possible. First, domestic and external factors increased
Mexico’s bargaining power; thus, the government could negotiate better
conditions in treaties with the United States. Second, Mexico and US
national interests coincided for the first time in history. Third, the creation
of several commissions and the signing of diverse treaties allowed both
countries to institutionalize the relationship and find better instruments to
deal with bilateral issues. So forth, the substantial international changes
and the threat brought by Second World War made both countries seek
cooperation.
 6 PRAGMATISM AND NATIONALISM IN MEXICO’S FOREIGN POLICY… 119

Despite the reluctance of various nationalist groups, relations between

Mexico and the United States were characterized by mutual solidarity and
cooperation in the political, military, and economic fields. Mexican prag-
matism paid off since both countries benefited. Mexico reached favorable
agreements that solved significant problems, such as oil expropriation, for-
eign debt, compensation claims, migration, and trade. For its part, the
United States achieved military and bracero collaboration agreements that
at that time were a priority for its security and economy. In contrast to
previous years, Mexico ended up as an ally for the United States, leaving
confrontation behind.
In the economic sector, pragmatism is rewarded. GDP grew consider-
ably. For example, in 1941, it was 9.68%. After a turbulent period during
the Revolution, this was a very high number. Between 1935 and 1946, the
GDP percentage of external debt diminished drastically from 25.57% to
only 4.18. The debt agreement with the United States helped reach this
percentage. Moreover, Mexico’s exports doubled from 208 billion dollars
in 1935 to 570 in 1946. Trade agreements with the United States and its
need for strategic natural resources paved the way to achieve these num-
bers. Finally, foreign investment was reduced, and inflation increased, but
this was due to the world conflict. In the end, Mexico’s pragmatism led to
economic growth (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5 Economic statistics 1935–1946

Year GDP Inflation GDP percentage of Trade Foreign
growth external debt (Exports, US billion investments
dollars) (US billion
dollars)

1935 7.56 0.67 25.57 208.4 NA

1941 9.68 6.10 14.24 243.2 16.27
1946 6.49 18.75 4.18 570.1 11.47

Source: Own elaboration with data from several sources, mainly INEGI and Mexican Central Bank.