City University of Pasay

Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City

School of Law
____________________________________________________________________________________________

Table of Contents
Rule 10
Bautista vs Maya-Maya Cottages, 476 SCRA 419…………………………………………………2-3
Guntalilib v Dela Cruz,G.R. No. 200042, July 07, 2016……………………………………………4-5
Mercado v. Alphaland Corp., G.R. No. 237059 [February 15, 2022]……………………………..6-7
Valenzuela v Court of Appeals, 416 Phil 289……………………………………………………….8-9
Lisam Enterprises, Inc. v. Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc., G.R. No. 143264, [April 23, 2012],………… 10-11

Central Bank Board of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 173399, [February 21, 2017]…………12-13

Central Bank Board of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 173399, [February 21, 2017]………….14-15

Campos Rueda Corp. vs. Baustista, 6 SCRA 240……………………………………………….16-17

Swagman Hotels & Travel Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, [April 8, 2005]………18-19
APT vs. CA, 324 SCRA 533……………………………………………………………………. 20-21
Loy, Jr. v. San Miguel Corp. Employees UnionPTGWO, G.R. No. 164886, [November 24, 2009]……22-23
B. Van Zuiden Bros., Ltd. v. GTVL Manufacturing Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 147905, [May 28, 2007]……………..24-25

Olivarez Reality vs. Castillo, GR 196251, 2014…………………………………………………26-27

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
___________________________________________________________________________
RAFAEL BAUTISTA and LIGAYA ROSEL, Petitioners,vs.
MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 148361, November 29, 2005
Third Division

SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.: Ponente

Facts:
The petitioners, Sps.Rafael Bautista and Ligaya Rosel, filed with the Court of Appeals a

special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43574. They alleged

that the amended complaint does not cure the defect in the original complaint which does not

state a cause of action. Clearly, in admitting respondent’s amended complaint, the trial court

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On November

24, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and

prohibition.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in

its Resolution of May 30, 2001.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not

commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting

respondent’s amended complaint.

Ruling:

NO. The Supreme Court, speaking through Associate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-

GUTIERREZ, ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly held that in issuing the assailed Order

admitting the amended complaint because under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Amendments as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right

at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within

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School of Law

ten (10) days after it is served." The provision clearly shows that before the filing of any

responsive pleading, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading, regardless of

whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. It is settled that a motion to

dismiss is not the responsive pleading contemplated by the Rule. The trial court did not gravely

abuse its discretion. Hence, neither certiorari nor prohibition would lie. WHEREFORE, the petition

is DENIED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

43574 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioners.

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
___________________________________________________________________________________________

FELIZARDO T. GUNTALILIB, Petitioner, vs. AURELIO Y. DELA CRUZ AND SALOME V.

DELA CRUZ, Respondents

G.R. No. 200042, July 07, 2016

Second Division

DEL CASTILLO, J.: Ponente

Facts:

This petition involves a dispute over a land between the petitioner, Feliza T.Guntalilib and

respondents, Aurelio Y. Dela Cruz and Salome V. Dela Cruz. The respondents filed a complaint

for quieting of title and cancellation of an unnumbered Original Certificate of Title held by

petitioner’s predecessor. This case was originally in the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,

Nueva Vizcaya, Branches 28 and 27, respectively, in Civil Case No. 6975; and the CA's January

5, 2012, Resolution denying herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner and his

co-defendants opposed the Motion for Admission of Amended Complaint, arguing in their

Opposition (Ad Cautelam)that the motion was a mere scrap of paper because it did not comply

with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), as no date

of hearing was set and the motion was addressed to the Clerk of Court alone; that the verification

and certification on non-forum shopping contained in the original Complaint, being defective,

could not be cured by the subsequent filing of the Amended Complaint; and that the Amended

Complaint was improper and prohibited, as it is essentially aimed at setting aside the Decision in

LRC Case No. 6544 issued by a court of concurrent jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the original, as well as the amended complaint of respondents

failed to include all indispensable parties, thus, the courts a quo do not have jurisdiction

over the person of these omitted individuals, warranting the prompt dismissal of the case.

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School of Law

Ruling:

NO. The Supreme Court, through Associate Justice Del Castillo upheld the sale of land

without a proper title, is void for being a mere scrap of paper as it contained a defective verification

and certification against forum-shopping, is fundamentally absurd. The Motion for Admission of

Amended Complaint as not filed; the Court is still duty bound to recognize the right of herein

plaintiff under Rule 10 Section 2 where plaintiffs are allowed as a matter of right to file their

amended complaint anytime before a responsive pleading is filed. Considering that a Motion to

Dismiss is not a responsive pleading, this Court has no other recourse but to allow plaintiffs to

submit their amended complaint. With respect to the contention of the defendants that the

complaint failed to include and implead all indispensable parties, this Court construes the cited

case of Teresita V. Orbeta vs. Paul B. Sendong x x x that the High Court contemplated "the

absence of an indispensable party" and not the "absence of all indispensable parties". As this

Court is in the belief that plaintiff had impleaded some indispensable parties, then a trial on the

merits should proceed.

The allegations and prayer in their Amended Complaint make out a case for annulment

and cancellation of title, and not merely quieting of title. The petitioner and his co-defendants

have knowledge of OCT 213 and their existing titles; that through fraud, false misrepresentations,

and irregularities in the proceedings for reconstitution (LRC Case No. 6544). It has been held that

"[t]he underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title

cases are essentially the same an adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and

nullification of one of the two certificates of title. “Nonetheless, petitioner should not have been so

simplistic as to think that Civil Case No. 6975 is merely a quieting of title case.

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Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
______________________________________________________________________

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. ALPHALAND Corporation, ALPHALAND

MAKATI PLACE, INC., AND ALPHALAND SOUTHGATE TOWER, INC. [FORMERLY

ALPHALAND DEVELOPMENT, INC.], respondents

G.R. No. 237059. February 15, 2022

First Division

Facts:

The case originated from a Complaint for damages (original Complaint) filed by

respondent Alphaland Corporation (Alphaland) against the petitioner. Alphaland claimed that its

goodwill and reputation were harmed due to the petitioner's allegedly libelous statements, which

were published in various newspapers in 2015. The petitioner reportedly asserted that Alphaland

engaged in a "sweetheart" deal with the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) and that then-Vice

President Jejomar Binay received kickbacks from Alphaland in relation to a transaction between

Alphaland and BSP.

The RTC denied the move to dismiss and determined that the accusations in the initial

complaint were adequate to establish a cause of action. The petitioner's response that he was

not referring to Alphaland in his remarks, according to the RTC, was unrelated to the

complaint's sufficiency. Respondent Alphaland submitted an Amended Complaint, pleading

in the case's additional party plaintiffs, Alphaland Makati and Alphaland Southgate. As a result,

Mercado submitted a motion to expunge the amended complaint, arguing that the

amended complaint was a vain attempt to cure the absence of Alphaland's personality

to plead a cause of action.

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School of Law

Issue:

Whether or not CA err in ruling that the RTC did not commit Grave abuse of

discretion amounting to excess of Jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's Motion to

dismiss and Motion to expunge the amended Complaint?

Ruling:

NO. The petition was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals, held that in issuing the assailed orders denying the Motion for reconsideration

and Motion to expunge the amended Complaint from the records, the trial court did not gravely

abuse its discretion. Hence, neither Certiorari nor prohibition would lie in this case. The petitioner

had only filed a Motion to dismiss which is clearly not the responsive pleading contemplated

under Sec. 2, Rule 10.

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Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
___________________________________________________________________________

SPOUSES JOVITO VALENZUELA and NORMA VALENZUELA, SPOUSES ALFREDO

QUIAZON and BELLA GONZALES QUIAZON, SPOUSES EDUARDO DE GUZMAN and

JULIETA DE GUZMAN, DE GUZMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SKYFREIGHT

BROKERAGE, INC., ATTY. ROMULO R. BOBADILA and WEB-HEGG CONSTRUCTION

RESOURCES,INCORPORATED, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MANUEL T. DE GUIA and LETICIA

MARIANO DE GUIA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, METRO

MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 131175 August 28, 2001

Second Division

BUENA, J.: Ponente

Facts:

Upon motion of spouses Quiazon in Civil Case Nos. PQ-9412-P and PQ-9432-P, the lower

court issued an order dated 17 January 1996 directing the cancellation of the Notice of Lis

Pendens under Entry No. 81-11596 and Entry No. 81-12186 and the Adverse Claim under Entry

No. 81-11601 on TCT Nos. 39386 and 39397 in the name of spouses Quiazon. On 02 February

1996, private respondents sought to reconsider the trial court's order.

On 05 November 1997, the RTC-Pasay, Branch 231 issued an order admitting the

amended complaint, pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 August 1997.

Herein petitioners filed with the lower court a manifestation with a motion to reconsider to the

effect that they would file a "petition for review on certiorari" before the Supreme Court, to which

manifestation private respondents filed an opposition. Petitioners then filed a reply to the

opposition after which the lower court, in an order dated 23 January, decreed "that the admission

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School of Law

of the amended complaint and service of summons are hereby held in abeyance until after the

Supreme Court has resolved the case before it which has effectively placed this court on notice."

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court correct in rejecting the third amended complaint

and vacating the admission of the second amended complaint?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 44185 is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 231, is hereby ordered to admit

herein private respondents' amended complaint in Civil Case No. PQ-9412-P, to issue the

necessary summons to all impleaded defendants therein and to resolve the case with dispatch.

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Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
____________________________________________________________________________

LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A.

SORIANO, Petitioners,

vs.

BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL

BANK),* LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF LEANDRO A. SORIANO, JR., REGISTER OF

DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS L. SARTE, Respondents

G.R. No. 143264 April 23, 2012

Third Division

PERALTA, J.: Ponente

Facts:

On August 13, 1999, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for Annulment of

Mortgage with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction with Damages

with the RTC of Legaspi City. Petitioner Lolita A. Soriano alleged that she is a stockholder of

petitioner Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) and a member of its Board of Directors, designated as its

Corporate Secretary. This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, praying that the Resolution1 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (RTC),

dated November 11, 1999, dismissing petitioners’ complaint, and its Order2 dated May 15, 2000,

denying herein petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint,

be reversed and set aside.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

DENIED THE ADMISSION OF PETITIONERS' AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED AS A MATTER

OF RIGHT, AFTER THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS ISSUED BUT BEFORE ITS FINALITY.

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Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law

RULING:

The Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4, dated November 11,

1999, dismissing petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case No. 9729, and its Order dated May 15, 2000,

denying herein petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint,

are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4, is

hereby DIRECTED to ADMIT the Amended Complaint. Considering further, that this case has

been pending for some time and, under R.A. No. 8799, it is now the regular courts which have

jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes, the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4 is

hereby DIRECTED to PROCEED with dispatch in trying Civil Case No. 9

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School of Law

CENTRAL BOOK OF LIQUIDATORS, Petitioner vs.,

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent

G.R. No. 173399 February 21, 2017

EN BANC

SERENO, CJ.: ponente

Facts:

On 29 May 1995, pursuant to the recent development, Banco Filipino filed a Motion to

Admit Attached Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the three consolidated cases - Civil Case

Nos. 8108, 9675, and 10183 - before the RTC. In its Amended/Supplemental Complaint,

respondent bank sought to substitute the CB-BOL for the defunct CB and its MB. Respondent

also aimed to recover at least ₱18 billion in actual damages, litigation expenses, attorney's fees,

interests, and costs of suit against petitioner and individuals who had allegedly acted with malice

and evident bad faith in placing the bank under conservatorship and eventually closing it down in

1985.

The trial court, through an Order dated 29 March 1996, granted the Motion to Admit filed

by Banco Filipino and accordingly admitted the latter's Amended/Supplemental Complaint.

Consequently, the CB-BOL was substituted for the defunct CB in respondents’ civil cases, which

are still pending with the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in admitting Banco Filipino's Second

Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the consolidated civil cases before it.

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 City University of Pasay
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School of Law

Ruling:

The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ma.Lourdes P.A.Sereno, held that

the Petition of the CB-BOL is GRANTED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27

January 2006 and Resolution dated 27 June 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86697 are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City,

Branch 136 is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of this case with utmost dispatch.

The joinder of causes of action is indeed allowed under Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997

Rules of Court; but if there are multiple parties, the joinder is made subject to the rules on joinder

of parties under Section 6, Rule 3. Specifically, before causes of action and parties can be joined

in a complaint involving multiple parties, (1) the right to relief must arise out of the same

transaction or series of transactions and (2) there must be a question of law or fact common to all

the parties

Rule 10 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court allows the parties to supplement their

pleadings by setting forth transactions, occurrences, or events that happened since the date of

the pleading sought to be supplemented. However, the option of a party-litigant to supplement a

pleading is not without limitation. A supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something

to the primary pleading. Its usual function is to set up new facts that justify, enlarge, or change the

kind of relief sought with respect to the same subject matter as that of the original complaint.

Banco Filipino's attempt, through the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint, to hold

the BSP and its MB liable for causes of action that arose in 1994. Respondent is not without any

relief. If the RTC finds that the BSP was indeed a transferee pendente lite, the failure to implead

it would not prevent the trial court from holding the BSP liable, should liability now attach for acts

alleged in the original Complaint.

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
____________________________________________________________________________

CENTRAL BOOK OF LIQUIDATORS, Petitioner vs.,

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent

G.R. No. 173399 February 21, 2017

EN BANC

SERENO, CJ.: ponente

Facts:

On 29 May 1995, pursuant to the recent development, Banco Filipino filed a Motion to

Admit Attached Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the three consolidated cases - Civil Case

Nos. 8108, 9675, and 10183 - before the RTC. In its Amended/Supplemental Complaint,

respondent bank sought to substitute the CB-BOL for the defunct CB and its MB. Respondent

also aimed to recover at least ₱18 billion in actual damages, litigation expenses, attorney's fees,

interests, and costs of suit against petitioner and individuals who had allegedly acted with malice

and evident bad faith in placing the bank under conservatorship and eventually closing it down in

1985.

The trial court, through an Order dated 29 March 1996, granted the Motion to Admit filed

by Banco Filipino and accordingly admitted the latter's Amended/Supplemental Complaint.

Consequently, the CB-BOL was substituted for the defunct CB in respondents’ civil cases, which

are still pending with the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC erred in admitting Banco Filipino's Second

Amended/Supplemental Complaint in the consolidated civil cases before it.

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law

Ruling:

The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ma.Lourdes P.A.Sereno, held that

the Petition of the CB-BOL is GRANTED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27

January 2006 and Resolution dated 27 June 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86697 are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City,

Branch 136 is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of this case with utmost dispatch.

The joinder of causes of action is indeed allowed under Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997

Rules of Court; but if there are multiple parties, the joinder is made subject to the rules on joinder

of parties under Section 6, Rule 3. Specifically, before causes of action and parties can be joined

in a complaint involving multiple parties, (1) the right to relief must arise out of the same

transaction or series of transactions and (2) there must be a question of law or fact common to all

the parties

Rule 10 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court allows the parties to supplement their

pleadings by setting forth transactions, occurrences, or events that happened since the date of

the pleading sought to be supplemented. However, the option of a party-litigant to supplement a

pleading is not without limitation. A supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something

to the primary pleading. Its usual function is to set up new facts that justify, enlarge, or change the

kind of relief sought with respect to the same subject matter as that of the original complaint.

Banco Filipino's attempt, through the Second Amended/Supplemental Complaint, to hold

the BSP and its MB liable for causes of action that arose in 1994. Respondent is not without any

relief. If the RTC finds that the BSP was indeed a transferee pendente lite, the failure to implead

it would not prevent the trial court from holding the BSP liable, should liability now attach for acts

alleged in the original Complaint.

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Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
___________________________________________________________________________

CAMPOS RUEDA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, as Presiding

Judge, HON. BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, HON. ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, HON. AMANDO

C. BUGAYONG, as Associate Judges, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and MANUEL

MUYOT, respondents

G.R. No. L-18453 September 29, 1962

EN BANC

DIZON, J.: ponente

Facts:

Respondent Muyot must have finally realized that the Court of Industrial Relations had no

jurisdiction over his claims for, according to his answer filed in the present case, he had filed on

July 14, 1961 — more than two years after the filing of his action — a motion for leave to amend

his complaint and to admit the amended complaint attached to his motion, the amendment

consisting precisely in the addition of a third cause of action where inter alia, he alleged that on

May 31, 1953, he was illegally dismissed by herein petitioner and that, as a consequence he was

entitled to reinstatement, with back wages from the date of his illegal dismissal up to his actual

reinstatement.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the case.

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law

Ruling:

The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyot's complaint to place his action within the

jurisdiction of the respondent court could not be cured by amendment, for in Rosario vs.

Carandang, we clearly held that "a complaint cannot be amended so as to confer jurisdiction on

the court in which it is filed, if the cause of action originally set forth was not within the court's

jurisdiction." (51 O.G. 2387, April 28, 1955).

Moreover, the record does not show at all that the Court of Industrial Relations had

admitted the amended complaint. In the light of our view on the question of jurisdiction, we deem

it unnecessary, for the purpose of this decision, to decide the questions of res judicata and

prescription of the causes of action raised in the petition under consideration.

WHEREFORE the writs prayed for are granted and, as a consequence, the orders complained of

are annulled. With costs.

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Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
____________________________________________________________________________

SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL INC., petitioners vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and

NEAL B. CHRISTIAN, respondents

G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005

First Division

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: ponente

Facts:

On 2 February 1999, private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of

Baguio City, Branch 59, a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner

corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. The petitioner corporation, together with its president and

vice-president, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack cause of action and novation of the

principal obligations. According to them, Christian had no cause of action because the three

promissory notes were not yet due and demandable.The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s

appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Appellant Swagman’s interpretation that

the three (3) promissory notes have been novated by reason of appellee Christian’s acceptance

of the monthly payments of US$750.00 as capital repayments continuously even after the filing

of the instant case is a little bit strained considering the stiff requirements of the law on novation

that the intention to novate must appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that

are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY AFFIRM A

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS INVALID DUE TO LACK OF CAUSE OF

ACTION.

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Ruling:

According to the trial court, and sustained by the Court of Appeals, this Section allows a

complaint that does not state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without

objection during the trial. Thus, it ruled that even if the private respondent had no cause of action

when he filed the complaint for a sum of money and damages because none of the three

promissory notes was due yet, he could nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes

dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997, which became due during the pendency of the case in

view of the introduction of evidence of their maturity during the trial. Such interpretation of Section

5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous. Amendments of pleadings are

allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a

case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to

technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a single

proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein

evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial,

and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party.

Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented

during the trial. However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action

in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege

the essential facts.

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____________________________________________________________________________
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS S. CABARRUS, SR., JESUS S. CABARRUS, JR., JAIME T.
CABARRUS, JOSE MIGUEL CABARRUS, ALEJANDRO S. PASTOR, JR., ANTONIO U.
MIRANDA, and MIGUEL M. ANTONIO, as Minority Stock-Holders of Marinduque Mining
and Industrial Corporation, respondents
G.R. No. 121171 December 29, 1998
THIRD DIVISION
KAPUNAN, J.: ponente
On December 27, 1994, the petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the Order dated

November 28, 1994. Private respondents, in turn, submitted their reply and opposition thereto.

On January 18, 1995, the trial court handed down its order denying APT's motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. The trial court declared that

"considering that the defendant APT, through counsel, officially and actually received a copy of

the Order of this Court dated November 28, 1994 on December 6, 1994, the Motion for

Reconsideration thereof filed by the defendant APT on December 27, 1994, or after the lapse of

21 days, was clearly filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period prescribed or provided for by

law for the filing of an appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or decisions of any

court in all cases, and by necessary implication for the filing of a motion for reconsideration

thereof. “On February 7, 1995, petitioner received private respondents' Motion for Execution and

Appointment of Custodian of Proceeds of Execution dated February 6, 1995. Petitioner thereafter

filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with temporary restraining order

and/or preliminary injunction dated February 13, 1996, to annul and declare as void the Orders of

the RTC-Makati dated November 28, 1994, and January 18, 1995, for having been issued without

or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.

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School of Law

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

THE MAKATI REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 62 WHICH HAS PREVIOUSLY

DISMISSED CIVIL CASE NO. 9900 HAD LOST JURISDICTION TO CONFIRM THE ARBITRAL

AWARD UNDER THE SAME CIVIL CASE AND NOT RULING THAT THE APPLICATION FOR

CONFIRMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED AS A NEW CASE TO BE RAFFLED OFF

AMONG THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE RTC.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court, through Kapunan J, ponente, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated July 17, 1995, as well as the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, dated

November 28, 1994 and January 19, 1995, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the

decision of the Arbitration Committee is hereby VACATED.

It is evident that not only did the arbitration committee exceed its powers or so imperfectly

execute them, but also, its findings and conclusions are palpably devoid of any factual basis, and

in manifest disregard of the law. We do not find it necessary to remand this case to the RTC for

appropriate action. The pleadings and memoranda filed with this Court, as well as in the Court of

Appeals, raised and extensively discussed the issues on the merits. Such being the case, there

is sufficient basis for us to resolve the controversy between the parties anchored on the records

and the pleadings before us.

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Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
____________________________________________________________________________

JOSE FELICIANO LOY, JR., RAYMUNDO HIPOLITO III, and EDGARDO RIDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-Philippine Transport and General
Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), as represented by its President Ma. PILAR B.
AQUINO and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., as represented
by its President Daniel Borbon, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164886 November 24, 2009
SECOND DIVISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.: ponente
Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision dated September 29, 2003 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66261. The Court of Appeals nullified the Decision

rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 53, in Civil Case No. 93-67275,

which granted the motion for summary judgment and ordered the release of the ₱3 million

garnished funds in favor of petitioners Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr. (Loy, Jr.), Raymundo Hipolito III

(Hipolito III) and Edgardo Ridao (Ridao), as payment for their claim for attorney’s fees.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY

RECOGNIZED INTERVENOR-RESPONDENT SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES

CREDIT COOPERATIVE INC., CONTRARY TO LAW UNDER ARTICLE 242 (D) AND (F) OF

THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED AND WHOSE IDENTITY TO BE THAT OF THE

DEFENDANT UNION HAD ALREADY BEEN FINALLY RULED BY THE COURT A QUO

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law

Ruling:
We find that the RTC erroneously ruled on this matter. First, it does not appear from the

Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Jaime M. Vibar, the IBP Commissioner who tried

the disbarment case, that a pronouncement was made as to how much Hipolito III (petitioner

herein) should receive as attorney’s fees. The IBP merely sustained Hipolito III’s entitlement to

compensation for acting as union counsel in collaboration with Loy, Jr. and Ridao (co-petitioners

herein) in concluding the 1992-1995 CBA, but refused to fix an amount as the matter was already

being heard in court. Second, the testimony of Abuerne was unsubstantiated by evidence, thereby

making her an incompetent witness to testify on such matters. The records of the Credit

Cooperative were not presented to substantiate Abuerne’s statements. The lawyer who was

allegedly paid ₱2.3 million attorney’s fees in 1990 was not also presented to testify. No proof was

proffered to show that Hipolito III was entitled to or actually received the amount. Hence, the RTC

arbitrarily fixed petitioners’ attorney’s fees at ₱3 million despite insufficient factual basis.

Summary judgments are sanctioned by the Rules of Court as a device to simplify and

expedite the resolution of cases when, as shown by pleadings, affidavits, depositions or

admissions on the records, there are no genuine issues which would entail an expensive, lengthy

and protracted trial. However, if there is a genuine issue of material fact which calls for the

presentation of evidence, resort to summary judgment would not be proper. Stated otherwise, if

there exists an issue of fact, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
_____________________________________________________________________
B. VAN ZUIDEN BROS., LTD., petitioner,
vs.
GTVL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 147905 May 28, 2007
Second Division
CARPIO, J.: ponente
Facts:
On 13 July 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent,

docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0249. Instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a Motion to

Dismiss5 on the ground that petitioner has no legal capacity to sue. Respondent alleged that

petitioner is doing business in the Philippines without securing the required license. Accordingly,

petitioner cannot sue before Philippine courts.

After an exchange of several pleadings between the parties, the trial court issued an

Order on 10 November 1999 dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained

the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner, an unlicensed foreign corporation, has legal

capacity to sue before Philippine courts.

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 258,

Parañaque City (trial court) dismissing the complaint for sum of money filed by B. Van Zuiden

Bros., Ltd. (petitioner) against GTVL Manufacturing Industries, Inc. (respondent). Section 133 of

the Corporation Code provides:

Doing business without license. — No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines

without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any

action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such

corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals

on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

An unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines cannot sue before

Philippine courts. On the other hand, an unlicensed foreign corporation not doing business in the

Philippines can sue before Philippine courts.

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law
____________________________________________________________________________

OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION and DR. PABLO R. OLIVAREZ, petitioner,

vs.

BENJAMIN CASTILLO, respondent.

G.R. No. 196251 July 9, 2014

THIRD DIVISION

LEONEN, J.: ponente

Facts:

On April 5, 2000, Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation, represented by Dr. Pablo

R. Olivarez, entered into a contract of conditional sale over the property. Under the deed of

conditional sale, Castillo agreed to sell his property to Olivarez Realty Corporation for

₱19,080,490.00. Castillo prayed for rescission of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines. He further prayed that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez be made

solidarily liable for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Issue:

Whether or not Olivarez Realty Corporation failed to pay installments of the

property’s purchase price as the parties agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale.

Ruling:

The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ decision dated

July 20, 2010, and in CA-G.R. CV No. 91244 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The deed of

conditional sale dated April 5, 2000, is declared CANCELLED. Petitioner Olivarez Realty

Corporation shall RETURN to respondent Benjamin Castillo the possession of the property

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 City University of Pasay
Pasadeña Street F.B. Harrison, Pasay City
School of Law

covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19972 together with all the improvements that

petitioner corporation introduced on the property. The amount of ₱2,500,000.00 is FORFEITED

in favor of respondent Benjamin Castillo as reasonable compensation for the use of petitioner

Olivarez Realty Corporation of the property. Petitioner Olivarez Realty Corporation shall PAY

respondent Benjamin Castillo ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary

damages, and ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees with interest at 6% per annum from the time this

decision becomes final and executory until petitioner corporation fully pays the amount of

damages.

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