l\epuhlic of tbe ~bilippines

~uprtme <!Court
;iAl!lanHa

EN BANC

BELINDA D.R. DO LERA, G.R. No. 253940

Petitioner,
Present:

GESMUNDO, CJ,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO,
- versus - LAZARO-JAVIER,*
INTING,
ZALAMEDA **
'
LOPEZ,M.,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.
DIMAAMPAO,
MARQUEZ,
KHO, JR., and
SINGH, JJ ***

Promulgated:
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM.,
Respondent. October 24, 2023

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ ~ ~-.-~; ~ ~~

INTING, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari' assailing the

Decision2 dated May 18, 2020, and the Resolution3 dated September 28,
2020, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 159511. The

• On official business.
•• On official business.
••• On official business.
1
Rollo, pp. 11 - 29.
2 Id. at 34-41. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. anct concurred in by Associate
Justices Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles and Florencio Mallanao Mamauag, Jr.
3
Id. at 43-44.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 253940

assailed issuances upheld the Resolution 4 dated March 7, 2018, and the
Order5 dated August 1, 2018, of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in
SSC Case No. 4-0032-17-N that denied the Petition 6 for payment of
survivorship pension filed by Belinda D.R. Dolera (petitioner).

The Antecedents

The case stemmed from petitioner's application for survivorship

pension before respondent Social Security System (SSS) accruing from
the death of her husband, Leonardo L. Dolera (Leonardo), who was a
member-pensioner of the SSS during his lifetime. 7

Initially, petitioner and Leonardo lived as common-law spouses and

had a child in 1979. On May 22, 1980, Leonardo became disabled and
started receiving his permanent total disability pension from SSS. 8 More
than a year thereafter, or on October 13, 1981, Leonardo mmTied
petitioner. 9 After living together as husband and wife for 28 years,
Leonardo died on November 14, 2009. 10 As Leonardo's surviving spouse,
petitioner filed a claim for survivorship pension with the SSS Diliman,
Quezon City Branch. 11

In the notice 12 dated April 5, 2011, the SSS denied petitioner's

claim pursuant to Section 13-A(c) of Republic Act No. 8282, 13 or the
"Social Security Act of 1997" (Social Security Law), which provides that
"[u]pon the death ofthe permanent total disability pensioner, his [or her]
primary beneficiaries as ofthe date ofdisability shall be entitled to receive
the monthly pension xx x." According to the SSS, petitioner could not be
considered as a primary beneficiary under the Social Security Law as she
only became Leonardo's legitimate spouse after the date of his pennanent
total disability. 14

On April 4, 2017, petitioner filed a Petition 15 before the SSC,

docketed as SSC Case No. 4-0032-17-N. She averred that as the surviving

4
Id. at 65-69. Penned by Commissioner Diana Pardo Aguilar.
Id. at 77.
6
Id. at 82-89.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 65--66.
9
Id. at 91. See Martiage Contract dated October 13, 1981 belween Leonardo Dolera and Belinda
Delos Reyes.
10
Id. at 92. (Certificate of Death dated November 16, 2009 of Leonardo)
" Id. at 65.
12
Id. at 93. Signed by Assistant Branch Head Leonora S. Nuque.
" Approved on May I, 1997.
14
Rollo, p. 93.
15
Id. at 82-89.

(17
Decision 3 G.R. No. 253940

legal spouse ofLeonardo, she is a qualified beneficiary of the survivorship

pension. 16 She also argued that Section 13-A(c) of the Social Security Law
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it discriminated
against her and other dependent spouses who contracted their respective
marriages to pensioners after the latter suffered permanent total
disability. 17

Likewise, petitioner maintained that Section 13-A(c) violated her

right to due process of law as it confiscated her social security benefit
without notice and hearing. 18 In support of her stand, petitioner cited the
following case laws: (1) Dycaico v. SSS19 (Dycaico) and (2) GSIS, Cebu
City Branch v. Montesclaros 20 (Montesclaros ).

In its Answer,2 1 the SSS countered that Section 13-A(c) of the

Social Security Law does not run afoul of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution considering that the Dycaico ruling was inapplicable to
petitioner's case. 22 It insisted that petitioner was disqualified to claim for
the survivorship pension accruing from Leonardo's death as she became
his legitimate spouse only after the date of his disability. 23

The SSC Ruling

The SSC denied the petition for lack of merit in the Resolution24
dated March 7, 2018:

This Commission cannot apply the ruling in the Dycaico case

because it concerns SS benefit accruing from the death of a retiree
pensioner under Section 12-B (d)[25 l ofR.A. 8282 while the instant case

16 Id. at 83-84.
17 Id. at 84-86.
18
Id. at 86-88.
19
513 Phil. 23 (2005).
20
478 Phil. 573 (2004).
21
Rollo, pp. 99-10 l.
22 Id. at 100.
23 Id.
24
Id. at 65----09.
25
Section 12(B) of Republic Act No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. (a) A member who has paid at least one hundred twenty (120)
monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement and who (I) has reached the age of sixty
(60) years and is already separated from employment or has ceased to be self-employed or (2) has
reached the age of sixty five (65) years, shall be entitled for as long as he lives to the monthly
pension: Provided, That he shall have the option to receive his first eighteen (I 8) monthly pensions
in lump sum discounted at a preferential rate of interest to be determined by the SSS.

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement
shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension.
 Decision 4 G.R. No. 253940

pertains to the SS benefit accruing from the death of a permanent total

disability pensioner under Section 13-A (c) of said law.

Besides, to apply it by analogy will be, in[-]effect, a declaration

that the proviso "as of the date of disability" in Section 13-A (c) of the
R.A. 8282 unconstitutional. To declare a law or part of the law
unconstitutional is the power of judicial review, which is vested in the
Supreme Court, with a majority vote of the members sitting en bane.
As correctly emphasized by respondent SSS, unless Section 13-A (c)
of the [Social Security Law] or any proviso thereof is declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the said provision of the law
remains valid. 26

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the SSC denied it in the

Order2 7 dated August 1, 2018. Thus, she elevated the case to the CA via a
Petition for Review2 8 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

The CA Ruling

The CA denied the petition in the Decision29 dated May 18, 2020. 30
In upholding the SSC, the CA applied the "plain meaning" rule or verba
legis doctrine31 and ratiocinated:

... This rule of interpretation is in deference to the plenary

power of Congress to make, alter[,] and repeal laws as this power is an
embodiment of the People's sovereign will. Accordingly, when the
words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, courts cannot deviate
from the text of the law and resort to interpretation lest they end up
betraying their solemn duty to uphold the law and worse, violating the
constitutional principle of separation of powers.

In the present case, Section 8 (e) and (k) of [the Social Security
Law] expressly enumerated the persons entitled to receive benefits
from the deceased member.of SSS ...

From the above-quoted provisions, it can be readily seen that a

legal spouse is among the beneficiaries of a deceased SSS member.
However, to qualify as a primary beneficiary of a deceased permanent
total disability pensioner under Section 13-A (c), the legal spouse
should have acquired the status of a primary beneficiary "as of the date
ofdisabilily,["] i.e. the occurrence of the pensioner's disability. Taking
into account that Section 13-A (c) is clear and unambiguous, it must be

26
Rollo, p. 68.
27
Id. at 77.
28
Id. at 45--{i3.
29
Id. at 34-4 I.
3
o Id. at 40.
31
Id. at 36.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 253940

given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

Hence, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same
according to its clear language. 32 (Citations omitted; italics in the
original)

Likewise, the CA agreed with the SSC that the cases of Dycaico
and Montesclaros are not applicable in the instant case as they involved
different factual milieus, viz.:

[In Dycaico, the] claimant therein is the surviving spouse of a

deceased retiree pensioner who claimed to have been unjustly deprived
of her survivorship pension pursuant to Section 12-B (d) of [the Social
Security Law] which mandated that the primary beneficiaries of a
retiree, as of the date of his retirement, shall be entitled to receive the
death benefit pension.... The Supreme Court declared the proviso "as
of the date of his retirement" unconstitutional as it violates the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.... In contrast,
Belinda is claiming a social security benefit pursuant to Section 13-A
(c), an entirely different provision of [the Social Security Law] which
specifically governs the monthly pen.sion of a deceased permanent total
disability pensioner....

Likewise, the case of GSIS v. Aiontesclaros is not applicable in

this case because the main issue raised therein does not involve any
proviso of [the Social Security Law] but the validity of the proviso in
[Presidential Decree] No: 1146 which prohibits t.lie dependent spouse
from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married
the pensioner within three (3) years before the latter qualified for the
· pension. In addition, .the Montesclaros case also pertains to a retiree
and not a disability pensioner. 33 (Italics in the originsil)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied her motion

in the Resolution34 dated September 28, 2020 ..

Hence, the present petition. 35

The Issue

The issue before the Court is whether the CA committed a reversible

error in agreeing with the SSC that petitioner is not entitled to survivorship
pension under the Social Security Law.

32
Id. at 36-37
33
Id. at 38-39.
34
Id. at 43--44.
35
Id. at I l-29.
 Decision 6 G.R. No. 253940

Arguments ofPetitioner

Petitioner argues that the proviso "as of the date of disability" in

Section 13-A(c) of the Social Security Law, which qualifies the term
"primary beneficiaries," violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. She points out that the very purpose of the
Social Security Law is to promote social justice and to provide meaningful
protection to the members of the SSS and their beneficiaries against
contingencies resulting in financial burden. 36 As such, petitioner contends
that the CA should have granted her claim following the cases of Dycaico
and Montesclaros. 37

Arguments of the SSS

For its part, the SSS contends that the case of Dycaico is not
applicable at bar as it involves a different factual milieu. It points out that
in Dycaico, the claim was based on Section 12-B(d) of the Social Security
Law, while petitioner's claim, under the same law, is based on Section 13-
A( c), i.e., the deceased SSS member in Dycaico was a retiree pensioner,
while Leonardo, the deceased husband of petitioner, was a permanent
total disability pensioner. 38

Further, the SSS avers that although petitioner was the legal spouse
of a deceased SSS member, she cannot be considered as a primary
beneficiary under Section 13-A(c), as their marriage was contracted after
her husband became disabled. 39 The SSS maintains that Section 13-A(c),
being clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity, must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 40

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Statutes enacted to promote social justice are considered social

welfare legislations. In cases involving these legislations, doubts should

36
Id. at 16-17.
37
Id. at 17--.24.
38
Id. at 145-146. See Comment of the SSS dated April 12, 2021.
39
Id. at 147.
40
Id.at 147-148.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 253940

be liberally construed in favor of the intended beneficiary of the statute,4 1

for it is only by giving them a liberal construction that the constitutional
policy concerning promotion of social justice42 is realized.

The Social Security Law is a social welfare legislation enacted

pursuant to the policy of the State to promote social justice and provide
protection to the workers and their beneficiaries against the hazards of
contingencies, such as disability and death, resulting in loss of income or
financial burden. 43 Section 13-A(c) thereof provides:

SEC. 13-A. Permanent Disability Benefits. - ....

c. Upon the death of the pennanent total disability pensioner, his

primary beneficiaries as of the date of disability shall be entitled to
receive the monthly pension[.]

Under Section 8(k) of the Social Security Law, the term "primary
beneficiaries" pertains to the following: (1) "the dependent spouse until
he or she remarries;" and (2) "the dependent legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted, and illegitimate children." Moreover, paragraph (e) of the
same section provides that the surviving spouse, to be considered as a
primary beneficiary, must be "entitled by law to receive support from the
member."

This notwithstanding, to be considered as a primary beneficiary

who is entitled to receive survivorship pension under Section 13-A(c) of
the Social Security Law, the applicant must be the legitimate spouse of the
pensioner as of the date of the latter s disability. On account of this
proviso, the SSC and the CA upheld the denial of petitioner's application
for survivorship pension. 44

The Court finds the proviso "as of the date of disability" under
Section 13-A(c) void for being violative of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution.

The proviso "as of the date of

disability" under Section 13-A(c)
violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution; the

41
See Salabe" Social Security Commission, 880 Phil. 29, 59 (2020).
42
See Constitution, Art. XIII, Sections 1 and 2.
43
Republic Act No. 8282, Sec. 2.
44
Rollo, pp. 37-38, 67----08.

((J
 Decision 8 G.R. No. 253940

ruling in Dycaico is applicable

by analogy to the present case.

The case of Dycaico involved the claim for survivorship pension of

therein petitioner Elena Dycaico (Elena) accruing from the death of her
husband, Bonifacio Dycaico (Bonifacio). Bonifacio became a member of
the SSS on January 24, 1980, and named Elena and their eight children as
his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit ofmarriage. 45

In June 1989, Bonifacio retired from work and began receiving his
monthly pension from the SSS until he died on June 19, 1997. A few
months prior to his death, Bonifacio married Elena. After Bonifacio's
death, Elena filed her application for survivorship pension with the SSS.
Pursuant to Section 12-B(d) of the Social Security Law, the SSS denied
Elena's claim and held that she was not considered a primary beneficiary
of Bonifacio because her marriage to him in 1997 took place after his
retirement. 46

The SSC and the CA agreed with the SSS that the primary
beneficiaries who are entitled to survivorship pension are only those who
qualify as such upon the date of retirement of the deceased member. They
held that because Elena was not yet the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as
of the date of his retirement, she could not be considered as his primary
beneficiary within the contemplation of Section 12-B(d) of the Social
Security Law. 47

Elena elevated the case to the Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. In Dycaico, the Court ruled in favor of Elena
and struck down the proviso "as of the date of his retirement" in Section
12-B(d) of the Social Security Law on the ground that it infringes the
equal protection clause. The Court declared that "[t}he nexus of the
classification to the policy objective is vague andjlimsy[,]" 48 viz.:

As illustrated by the petitioner's case, the proviso "as of the date

of his retirement" in Section 12-B(d) of [the Social Security Law]
which qualifies the term "primary beneficiaries" results in the
classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two
groups:

45
Dycaico v. SSS, supra note ! 9, at 26 .
•, Id.
47
Id. at 27--28.
48
Id. at 36.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 253940

(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective

[m ]arriages to SSS members were contracted
prior to the latter's retirement; and

(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective

marriages to SSS members were contracted after
the latter's retirement.

Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is

that their respective marriages are valid. In other words, both groups
are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely
on the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the
second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was
contracted after his retirement. As such, she and those similarly situated
do not qualify as "primary beneficiaries" under Section 12-B(d) of [the
Social Security Law] and, therefore, are not entitled to survivor's
pension under the same provision by reason of the subject proviso.

The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out
the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso "as of the date of his
retirement" to qualify the term "primary beneficiaries" in Section 12-
B(d) thereof. To the Court's mind, however, it reflects congressional
concern with the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for
the purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was
apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by
persons solely to enable .one spouse to claim benefits upon the
anticipated death of the other spouse.

This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying

dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivor's
pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after
the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said
marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective
of the law[.] 49

The constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the law50

means that a statute is based on reasonable classification,51 such that: (1)
it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class. 52 It is only in cases where there
are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another
that the law may treat and regulate one class differently from the other. 53

49
Id. at 33-36.
5
°
51
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. I.
GSIS,. Cebu City Branch v. AJontescfaros, supra note 20, at 587.
s2 Id.
53
Id. at 587-588.
 Decision 10 G.R. No. 253940

In Dycaico, "dependent spouses" as primary beneficiaries under

Section 12-B(d) of the Social Security Law were classified based on the
time when their respective marriages to the SSS members were contracted
and with reference to the latter's respective dates of retirement. In other
words, two groups of "dependent spouses" were determined: (1) those
whose respective marriages to the SSS members were contracted prior to
the latter's retirement; and (2) those whose respective marriages to the
SSS members were contracted after the latter's retirement.

In the present case, "dependent spouses" as primary beneficiaries

under Section 13-A(c) may similarly be classified into two groups: (1)
those whose respective marriages to the SSS members were contracted
prior to the latter's disability; and (2) those whose respective marriages to
the SSS members were contracted after the latter's disability. While both
groups are considered legitimate spouses of the deceased pensioners, the
difference rests exclusively on the dates when they contracted their
respective marriages. Applying the classification, petitioner belongs to the
second group of dependent spouses.

By analogy, the proviso "as ofthe date ofdisability" in Section 13-

A(c) may be likened to the phrase "as of the date of his retirement" in
Section 12-B(d), which the Court, in Dycaico, held as violative of the
equal protection clause. 54 Notably, both Section 12-B(d) and Section 13-
A( c) discriminate against the groups of dependent spouses who married
the pensioners after the latter qualified for their pension. Specifically,
Section 12-B(d) disqualifies dependent spouses who married their
pensioner-spouses after the latter's retirement, while Section 13-A(c)
disqualifies dependent spouses who married their pensioner-spouses after
the latter became disabled.

Significantly, the Court in Dycaico identified the concern of the

Congress regarding the possibility of relationships entered for the purpose
of obtaining benefits from the SSS member or pensioner. 55 However,
while finding the concern to be valid, the Court held that the classification
under Section 12-B(d) bore no relation to the achievement of the policy
objective of the Social Security Law.

In addition, the Court viewed that the policy objective would be

achievable if the Congress had instead prescribed a "durational period of
relationship" as a requirement for entitlement to survivor's pension:

54
Dy;;uico v. SSS, supra note 19, at 33-37.
55
Id. at 35-36.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 253940

... [I]f it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham

marriages or those entered in contemplation of irrnninent death, then it
should have prescribed a definite "duration-of-relationship" or
durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for
entitlement to survivor's pension. For example, in the United States, a
provision in their social security law which excludes from social
security benefits the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased wage
earner who had their respective relationships to the wage earner for less
than nine months prior to his death, was declared valid. Thus, nine
months is recognized in the United States as the minimum duration of
a marriage to consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the
purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension. 56 (Citations omitted)

In essence, what the Congress sought to avoid in enacting the Social

Security Law was only the granting of benefits in favor of surviving
spouses whose respective marriages to the deceased pensioners were a
sham. To the Court, the classification under Section 13-A(c) of
"dependent spouses" into two groups, through the qualifying phrase "as
of the date of disability," is unreasonable and not necessarily an effective
means to achieve the Social Security Law's policy objective of preventing
sham marriages. Ori the contrary, it creates undue prejudice and
discrimination against dependent spouses who did not contract their
respective marriages to their pensioner-spouses for the purpose of
obtaining benefits and who would otherwise be entitled to the survivorship
pension if not for the unreasonable classification.

For instance, in the present case, the marriage between petitioner

and her deceased husband, Leonardo, was by no means a sham. While the
marriage was contracted only after Leonardo suffered a disability, it bears
mentioning that the couple already had a child prior to the disability. More
importantly, they lived exclusively as husband and wife, and their union
lasted for 28 years before Leonardo died on November 14, 2009. 57

Under the circumstances, the marriage of petitioner to Leonardo

cannot be considered as a scheme that she employed merely to enable her
to qualify for survivorship pension. To be sure, it was one that was entered
into without any semblance of bad faith.

On this score, it is worth mentioning that common-law relationships

are recognized under the Family Code of the Philippines58 (Family Code).

56 Id. at 36.
57
Rollo, p. 66.
58
Executive Order No. 209, entitled "The Family Code of the Philippines," took effect on August 3,
19RS.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 253940

For instance,Articles 147 59 and 148 60 of the Family Code provides that the
property regime of unions without marriage shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.

The Court finds that the proviso "as of the date of disability" under
Section 13-A(c) is unfounded and inharmonious with the spirit behind the
enactment of the Social Security Law. The unqualified denial of claims
for benefits filed by surviving legitimate spouses who contracted their
marriages to the pensioner-spouses after the latter's disability evidently
discriminates against common-law relationships which are common and
even recognized by the Family Code as family units and unions.

Evidently, the classification espoused by Section 13-A(c) does not

rest on real and substantial distinctions and is not germane to the purpose
of the Social Security Law. It is arbitrary and too sweeping as it considers
all marriages contracted after the date of the pensioners' disability as a
sham, regardless of the circumstances of the case. 61

59
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated·to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former' s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivas of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith. the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
60
Article 148 of the Family Code reads:
ARTICLE 148. In cases of cohabitation not falli11g under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual jomt contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. TI1e same rule and presumptiun shall apply to joint deposits
of money and evidences of credit.
If one c,f the panies is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute cornmuriity or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing ru]es on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
61
See Dycaico v. SSS, supra note 19, at 37.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 253940

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the proviso "as of the
date of disability" violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

The· classification under Section

13-A(c) also infringes upon the
due process clause of the
Constitution; the ruling in
Montesclaros is applicable by
analogy to the present case.

In the case of Montesclaros, the Court held that employees have

contractual or vested rights in their pension where it is part of the terms of
employment. It elucidated that "where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he [or she] acquires a vested right to benefits that
is protected by the due process clause" 62 and that "[r]etirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate
payment under pre-existing. law." 63 Significantly, considering that the
dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, "a widow's [or
widower's] right to receive pension following the demise of her [or his
spouse] is also part of the [latter] ·,s contractual compensation. " 64

Although . the subject matter in Montesclaros involved

retirement benefits under Presidential Decree No. 1146,65 or the "Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977," the pronouncement therein
that retirement benefits are protected property interest of the retirees
applies by analogy to workers covered by the Social Security Law,
such as Leonardo. 66 Considering his compulsory contributions to the SSS,
Leonardo's pension did not constitute a mere gratuity but formed part of
his compensation. 67 Corollary thereto, petitioner's right to receive the
survivorship pension was already established because surviving spouses
of deceased pensioners are entitled to it. 68 Thus, the unceremonious denial
thereof is an outright confiscation of petitioner's right in violation of the
due process clause. 69

As it appears, Section 13-A(c) creates a conclusive presumption:

that marriages contracted after the SSS member already suffered

62
GSJS, Cebu City Branch v. Montesc!aros, supra note 20, at 584.
,, id.
64 Id.
65
Approved.on May 31, 1977.
66
See Dycai~·G l: SSS, suprd note 19, at 3 '8._
67
Id. at 38--39.
68 id at. :;9_
69
Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. 1.
 Decision 14 G.R. No. 253940

disability are for an illicit purpose. The presumption is dangerous as it

assumes a fact which is not necessarily true . This amounts to a deprivation
of property without being afforded the opportunity to be heard. 70

All told, the Court strikes down the proviso "as of the date of
disability" in Section 13-A(c) of the Social Security Law for being an
infringement of the 'due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. it.is incumbent upon the SSS to grant petitioner's claim for
survivorship pension, which accrued from the death of her husband
Leonardo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

May 18, 2020, and the Resolution dated September 28, 2020, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 159511 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The proviso "as of the date of disability" in Section 13-A(c) of Republic
Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System
is ORDERED to process the claim of petitioner Belinda D.R. Dolera for
survivorship pension in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

70
See D--,.:cai.:D i,: SSS', .rnpn: note 19, at .:JO.
 Decision 15 G.R. No. 253940

On official business
~tltL~ANDo AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER
Associate Justice Associate Justice

On official business
RODIL V. ZALAMEDA
Associate Justice

"--
SAMUEL~~-, RICA~ R. ROSARIO
Associate Justice A\ociate Justice

JHOS~LOPEZ
Associate Justice

,>;-1/J/J~~~
J~MIDAS P. ~QUEZ
Associate Justice

On official business
MARIA FILOMENA D. SINGH
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

~~~
Au(XA~Jl-R G. GESMUNDO
/ fl &ziefJustice

/17