Chapter 1 Introducing Theory 4.4. Introduction 4.2. The production of knowiedge 4.3 Theorizing human geography 4.4 Conclusion eur aimed 1.1 INTRODUCTION Just fifty years ago, geography was frequently characterized as an atheoretical endeavour. Now, such criticisms are rare, and the pendulum has swung the other way, with some suggesting it is overly theoretical at the expense of empir- ical study. This is a charge expressed by many undergraduate geography students, who often claim not only to dislike theory but also to challenge its value and relevance, particularly that which might be termed abstract or conceptual theory: This book has been written to illustrate (o sceptical students the value and utility of geographic theory, As such, it aims to illustrate how the world around us is theorized from a gcographic perspective; why there are different, competing theories; and how and why theories, and their popularity, change over time. Put simply, a theory is a set of ideas about how the world works. As such, it is the means by which geographers seek to describe, explain or predict aspects of the world. Harvey (1969; 1972) likens theory to a map. A map, he details, provides a range of usefuul functions, It acts as a store of knowledge about a landscape, it reveals basic patterns and relationships between features in a Tandseape and it acts as a communication device, allowing users to navigate the terrain. Theory performs similar functions, detailing knowledge about the world, revealing relationships between data and communicating such know- ledge. Both maps and theory are selective portrayals designed to detail with clarity a richer and more complex landscape. Both use specific ‘languages’ to construct, store and communicate knowledge, For example, a map uses symbols made intelligible through a legend, a projection, a scale and an orientation. And just as there are different kinds of maps (e.g, contour, choropleth and so on} displaying data at different scales, so also there are different kinds of theory. In all cases of map and theory, a consistent set of rules is used in their creation, designed to create internal consistency whereby contradictions and fallacies are minimized. Just as the art of creating, using and interpreting maps is not easily acquired but is learnt over time and developed with experience, so it is the same theory. Consequently, theory can be difficult to comprehend and interpret because its construction and use is not always intuitive and its central tenets and. underlying constructs have to be learnt. Like a map, however, once it is appreciated how theory is constructed,‘ Theorizing Human Geographies: interpreted and used, theory becomes a valuable tool for understanding and engaging with the world: ‘a practical means for getting on’ (Thrift, 1999, p. 334). Hence, there is an important link between theory and praxis. Praxis concerns how theoretical ideas are translated into practice through research, teaching, discussion and debate. As such, our central argument in this book is that, while it is tempting to dismniss theory, or to try to avoid it because it seems difficult, the reality of doing geography is that we cannot avvid theory. In short, theory infuses the practices of academic geography. In trying to understand the world about us, even in common-sense and non-academic ways (e.g, trying to predict who might win a political election or knowing where to shop for particu- Jar products), we are constantly employing theoretical tools and making claims or judgements about how the world works and our position within it. As Harvey (1969, p. 87) notes, ‘any speculative fantasy may thus be regarded as a theory of some sort’. In many ways, academics seek to develop and deepen our under- standing of the world by extending everyday and intuitive theory-making. They do this by constructing, testing and refining theoretical tools which seck to describe and explain phenomena and situations. Often, this theorizing involves adapting theories developed in other disciplines, such as social theory, economic theory or political theory. Ultimately, this borrowing’ of ideas from other discip- lines serves to make the strange familiar, and helps geographers to conceive of the world in new ways (Culler, 1997). Unsurprisingly, there are many different opinions concerning how one should go about the tasks of thinking and researching particular phenomena, actions, ideas and concepts. This brings us to questions of philosophy. Put at its simplest, philosophy can be described as theories about theory. It promotes a fundamental and general analysis of the world and attempts to know it: Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. ... Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (Wittgenstein, 1921) ‘Just as there are many theories in geography, so there are also many definitions ‘of, and approaches to, philosophy. Philosophical questions are about the most fundamental aspects of life: reality, the nature of knowing, the mind, matter, truth and so on. However, it is not the subject matter alone that defines philosophy, so much 2s the style of questioning and the extent to which it interrogates the deep-rooted assumptions of both the issues in question and the questions themselves. Philosophy, then, is about the rigorous interroga- tion of the definitions and assumptions employed in all thinking, including those of everyday life and the academy. As such, it is more a method of ana- lysis than the study of any particular substantive issue or ermpirical subject, matter One of the perennial foci of philosophical analysis is questions about the nature of knowledge or the ways in which the world may be known. In other words, it is concerned with defining and delimiting the nature and focus of theories and how they are constructed and operate. Consequently, everyIntroducing Theory 5 theory sits within a philosophical framework. One usefull way to think about philosophy, the differences between philosophic traditions and the ways in which they underpin particular theories is to identify their qualities in relation to four key characteristics: ontology, epistemology, ideology, and methodology. These four components essentially define the parameters of each philosophical approach to study, as several different positions can be adopted in relation 10 each component. Ontology is part of metaphysics, the branch of philosophy that studies the nature and operation of reality or being, It concerns the set of specific assump- tions about the nature of existence underlying a theory or system of ideas; belicfs about what exists and can be observed, and therefore known. For example, we can believe that the world exists and is organized as part of an ordered universe, or, conversely, that the universe and its contents are inherently chaotic and must be understood in those terms, Science as practised in disciplines such as biology, chemistry and physics generally accepts the former and posits that we can only truly know what can be observed and measured in quantitative terms. These disciplines generally ignore questions such as ‘Is there a God?", regarding them. as essentially unknowable questions of faith. Such an ontological position means that those geographers who subscribe to such a belief put verifiable, measurable facts ai the core of their theories, rejecting values, opinions and beliefs as unverifiable, and therefore unknowable in any kind of strict sense (or at least unacceptable as evidence). Others posit that values and opinions can be known, either through scientific measurement or other means, and are therefore legitimate constituents of knowledge production. Different ontologies informing geographical thcory therefore set out a number of positions such as: the things we experience are the things that exist; the things we agree amongst ourselves to exist, exist; what exists is what is perceived to exist; and so on (johnston, 1986). Epistemology concerns how knowledge is derived or arrived at; assumptions about how we can know the world. Essentially it concerns how we can validly come to know something, As we will see in Chapter 2, episiemologies in physical geography have tended to draw on a set of foundational beliefs that underpin science more generally. These belief contend that the world can only be truly known and understood through the application of a rigorous and systematic scientific method that is logical and rational. In this framework, physical geographers come to know the ‘truth? about the world through systematic, scientific measurement and analysis of collected data, However, science’s ‘claims to know’ have been challenged on a number of fronts. For example, foundational beliefs concerning truth, objectivity and value-free practice have been deconstructed and shown to be open to contestation. Moreover, it has been argued that traditional geography privileges particular West ways of viewing the world, overvaluing Cartesian geometry and visual data whilst dismissing other forms of knowledge as unscientific and therefore less valid and worthy (Rose, 1993; Gregory, 1997). For these reasons, and others, human geographers have often embraced other epistemologies of knowledge, and struggled to reconcile their own studies with those of physical geography 1 and masculine6 ‘Theorizing Human Geographies and the ‘natural sciences’, Hence, epistemology in human geography is often predicated on interpretative frameworks adapted from the humanities rather than the natural sciences. Heolegy concerns the underlying social/ political reasons or purpose for seck- ing knowledge, and like many other fundamental concerns in theory it strad- dles all of the main branches of philosophy: ontology, epistemology and ethics. Some philosophies posit that the production of knowledge should be an ideo- logically neutral activity. This view implies that it is the job of a theorist to Gevelop ideas about how the world works and itis for others to decide how to use the ideas they uncover, Others posit that it is impossible to be ideologically neutral, and that, whether we like it or not, it is impossible to isolate personal social and political belief from wider theorization. On this basis, they argue that academics should use their theories to try and change the world for the better rather than leave it to others to interpret their ideas (sce Section 3.2). This debate is well illustrated by the exchange between Reg Golledge (1993, 1996; see Box 2.2), Brendan Gleeson (1996) and Rob Imrie (1996) about how research concerning the geographies of disability should be framed idcologic- ally, Golledge, for example, argued that geographers need to map out the spaces of disability from a scientific and ideologically neutral perspective, effectively mapping the geographies of disabled people. In response, Gleeson and Imrie contended that geographers should seck to create ideologically infused, transformative geographies for and with disabled people, aiming to alter the social and political conditions that serve to oppress people with Gisabilities, “Methodology is the set of procedures used to develop or test a theory; itis the means by which data are generated and analysed. To be consistent, these pro- cedures must not deviate from the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the overall philosophy of investigation. So, for example, someone who believes that metaphysical questions are impossible for science to answer will not normally attempt to pose such questions. Such a researcher will instead seek measurable, quantifiable facts that can be analysed and modelled using scientific techniques. For others, metaphysical questions can be known and therefore such questions can usefully be asked. Whatever the beliefs, the upshot is that there is a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods that cnable inherently different questions to be answered about what exists and what is important in the world. Like theory, these methods derive from different disciplines, with healthy debate existing about the merits of particular methods in relation to particular epistemologies, ontologies and ideologies (see Flowerdew and Martin, 1997; Robinson, 1998; Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Geographers’ recent sustained engagement with different philosophical traditions means that there is now a number of competing schools of thought on how best to think geographically and how most effectively to rescarch geographical questions (sce Chapter 2). Consequently; contemporary human geography has been characterized as being extremely dliverse in the range of approaches and methods of enquiry it employs (Cloke et al, 1991). It is this high degree of theoretical plurality that can make geography confusing for studentsIntroducing Theory 7 new to the discipline. However, as Hill (1981, p. 38) notes, it is important to engage with philosophy as it underpins all geographic thought: Many geographers doubt that philosophical issues are actually relevant to geographic research. [However] no research (geographic or otherwise) takes place in a philosophical vacuum. Even if itis not explicitly articulated all research is guided by a set of philosophical beliefs. These beliefs influence or motivate the selection of topics for research, the selection of methods for research, and the manner in which completed projects are subjected to evaluation. In short, philosophical issues permeate every decision in geography. As might be imagined, developing a theoretical position that is coherent and internally consistent in relation to a particular philosophical tradition (and its underpinning ideology, ontology, epistemology and methodology) is no easy task. Consequently, the arguments developed are quite complex, using carefully selected and, it often seems, ambiguous and overly complicated language. The net effect of this for the reader is ‘often a lot of apprehension, disenchantment and an uneasy feeling of being lost in a philosophical wilderness’ (Ragurman, 1994, p. 244). Theory, whether conceptual (abstract) or quite grounded (concrete), can often be very difficult to comprehend. This applies as much to academics as it does to students, We would be the first to acknowledge that we struggle with many theoretical constructs and we certainly do not claim to have detailed knowledge of all the theories currently employed in geography or their philosophical bases. It is, however, important to try to grasp why thinking geographically isa vital part of becoming a geographer, The central purpose of this book is to help you to explore different approaches to geographical theory and philosophy. Sometimes this will prove a difficult journey, but hopefully a stimulating and rewarding one. Certainly, on completion of this journey, you will have a filler understanding of what it means to think ‘geographically’, and you will be able to: 1. understand how geographers have approached a particular issue and why they have studied the world in the way that they have; 2. appreciate why geography is so wide-ranging in the type of theories it has developed, and appreciate the arguments for and against different theories; 3. understand how theoretical ideas are diffused through and across disciplin- ary boundaries, being adapted for particular ends by geographers and others; 4. develop your own understanding of the practice of geography and be able 1o Justify and defend your own thinking; 5. think through issues you encounter outside the remit of your academic studies and make beneficial links back to these.8 Theorizing Human Geograp! a 1.2 THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE, Before we turn to examine how theory has shaped the discipline of geography, it is worth exploring the nature of knowledge production. This discussion is use- ful, we feel, for two reasons, First, it provides an illustration of competing theories of the same endeavour (knowledge production), and second, it helps to explain how we have approached the writing of this book. The two theories we examine here can be characterized as a scientific approach and a situated approach. A Scientific’ understanding of knowledge production is that it is a rational, objective, and neutral pursuit, That is, the role of scientists is to gather data which they then analyse using standardized and non-biasing procedures (cg. using statistical tests). All analysis and interpretation is carried out in a detached manner to provide a set of value-free results. This scientific approach thus supposes that the world consists of data that can be collected or ‘harvested’ unproblematically when using carefully constructed method- ologies that conform to scientific standards and that knowledge can be gained simply by analysing these data in a particular fashion. Until recently, nearly all geographical analyses, regardless of philosophical differences in ideology, ontology, epistemology and methodology, claimed to adopt such an approach. That is, regardless of what were considered to be valid sources of data, all data were collected and analysed rigorously from an ‘objective’ position. This scientific approach meant that regardless of how the results were used, the findings from one study could be validly compared with another, so a body of knowledge could develop and accumulate in a logical ‘This scientific account of knowledge production has been challenged by those who believe that knowledge is not simply ‘out there’ waiting to be col- lected and processed, but rather knowledge is made by actors who are situated within particular contexts. As such, knowledge production is not a neutral or objective activity but is constructed, partial, situated and positioned. Here, the work of Donna Haraway (1991; see Box 1.3) has been important. She contends that objectivity is a parable which fails to describe how scientific research is actually undertaken. She suggests that all forms of knowledge are social constructions. That is, theorization, and its operationalization through research, is shaped by a host of influences ranging from personal belief to the conditions of funding to individual relationships between researcher and researched. Academic work then is recognized as being situated (cg,, shaped by the culture of academia, institutional pressures, individual lifestyles) and political (e.g, developed for particular ideological purposes) (Bourdieu, 1988). As a con- sequence, Haraway argues for the development of ‘situated knowledges’ where theorization and empirical research are framed within the context within which they were formulated. She thus posits that a view from an acknowledged (situ- ated) position may be more truthful than one from nowhere (ie., a supposed objective, neutral one). The Women and Geography Study Group (WGSG) (1997, p. 14; see Box 2.5) elaborate: ‘kJnowledge is never pure but is alwaysIntroducing Theory 9 situated in the complex and sometimes contradictory social locations of its producers and audiences’ This situated approach to the production of knowledge also recognizes that what constitutes ‘academic knowledge’ is shaped by silences and exclusions. Feminist theorists in particular have argued that the academy, including geography (sce Domosh, 1991; Rose, 1993), is masculinist in nature (see also Section 2.4). The suggestion here is that men have dominated the academy and what constitutes legitimate’ and scientific knowledge has largely been decided by men: It is important to realise how much geography as we know it today is the product of a scrics of decisions, some considered and others more impulsive, some prompted by idealism and others more pragmatic, but all of them taken in particular historical situations by a relatively small number of men occupying positions of authority and prestige in the discipline, (Gregory, 1978, p. 18) Accordingly, the contributions of women have largely been written out of the history of geography, and, even when female academics have been recognized for their academic achievements, this is often because they have adopted a masculine or ‘malestream’ way of looking at the world (Blunt and Wills, 2000). ‘Moreover, the geographies and histories of other groups, such as black people, thosc in developing countries, disabled people, gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans- gender individuals, have largely been written from certain dominant positions, thereby silencing other voices and providing selective and partial geographical accounts (see Sibley, 1995). A significant part of contemporary human geography has been directed at uncovering these silences and exclusions and challenging traditional cpistemologics of what are considered valid forms of knowledge and how such knowledge should be generated or constructed (see Chapter 3) Geography’s contribution to the study of how knowledge is produced, beyond many geographers adopting a more reflexive approach to their work (see Chapter 3), has been a recognition that knowledge is socially and spatially situated (see, for example, Livingstone, 19928; Sibley, 1995; Sidaway, 1997). In essence, this suggests that the form and content of knowledge is dependent on the location in which it is formulated: Your context ~ your location in the world ~ shapes your view of the world and therefore what you see as important, as worth knowing; context shapes the theories/stories you concoct of the world to describe and explain it, (Hanson, 1992, p. 573) ‘As such, there has been a recent concern with exploring the ‘sites, places or media in and through which geographical knowledge is produced, transmitted and consumed? by both ‘expert’ and ‘ay’ people (Desforges and Jones, 2001, p. 334). This has led to the development of approaches to human geography0 ‘Theorizing Human Geographies informed by work in feminist, post-colonial and postmodern geography that ‘acknowledges that the nature of geography has always been contested and negotiated . . . recognises that geography has meant different things for different people in different places; and ... focuses on accounting for how and why particular practices of geography get to be legitimated at different times and in different places’ (Women and Geography Study Group, 1997, p. 14). We are broadly in agreement with the argument that knowledge production is not neutral and objective pursuit, but is rather embedded in the practices and ideologies of its creators and the contexts within which they operate. ‘Accordingly, this book seeks to describe the situatedness of different. geo- graphical theories, (partially) charting, from our own situated positions (as white, male, heterosexual, middle-class academics schooled in England and Ireland, with particular research interests), the changing nature of geographical thinking in both general (Chapters 2 and 3) and specific terms (Chapters 4 to 7). As such, we do not claim to be geography’s ‘umpires’, charting a definitive guide to conternporary theoretical understanding or dictating which theory is ‘right’ or “better” than others, Rather, we acknowledge that the ‘stories’ we tell are partial, selective and shaped by our own views and historics and the pedagogic purpose of the text ~ the book is merely one account which we are sure will be contested by others. Moreover, while we do hold personal preferences for which approaches have more salience for us in our own work, we acknowledge that they are not necessarily ‘right’ or ‘better’, They do however have salience for us, allowing us to theorize the world in ways which seem to make sense. We start this exercise by exploring the varying ways in which human geography is defined. 1.38 THEORIZING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY In this section, we start to think about how geography has been variously theorized over time, beginning by considering how the discipline itself is con- ceived. Given the discussion so far, it should be of litle surprise to learn that the definition of human geography as a disciplinary endeavour is constantly changing, as the focus, content and praxis of geography are continually rethought. Over the past forty years, in particular, as geography has entered into a sustained engagement with philosophy, questioning its ideology, epistemology, ontology and methodology (see Chapter 2), the question of how geographers conceive their disciplinary focus has diversified. This is because there is a recursive relationship between theoretical approach and the object (and objectives) of study, with each affecting the other. Indeed, the different theories and philosophies of geography provide a distinctive view of the nature of geography (Harvey, 1969}. Consequently, for decades contemporary human geography has been struggling with its identity, with no clear consensus as to what geographers are, what geographers do, or how they should study the world. ‘This means that a number of different definitions of geography can be found (sce Figure 1.1),Introducing Theory ” Figure 1.1 Detining geography Hartshorne (1959, p.21): “Goography is concerned to provide accurate, orderly, and rational description and Interpretation of the variable character of the Earth's surface.” The Concise Oxtord Dictionary (1984, p. 511): “Geography, n. Scionce of the earth's surface, form, physical features, natural and poltical divisions, climate, productions, population, etc. (mathematical, physical and political, ~, the science in these aspects); subject matter of ~; features, arrangement, of place; treatise or manual of ~” Yeates (1968, p. 1): "Geography can be regarded as a science concemed with the rational develop- ment, and testing, of theories that explain and predict the spatial distribution and location of various characteristics on the surface of the earth.” Duntord (1981, p. 85): "Geography is the study of spatial forms and structures produced historically and specified by modes of production.’ Haggett (1981, p. 133): ‘Geography is] tho study of tho Earth’s surface as the space within which the human population lives.’ Johnston (1986, p. ‘Literally defined as “earth description’, geography is widely accepted as a discip- {ine that provides “knowledge about the earth as the home of humankind”. Haggott (1990): “Geographers are concemed with three kinds of analysis: ‘= Spatial (location): numbers, characteristics, activities and ci + Ecological: the relationship between humans and environment. ‘¢ Regional: the combination ofthe first two themes in areal differentiation.” ibutions. Geography Working Group's Interim Report (1990: Department of Education and Science and the Welsh Office): ‘+ Geography explores the relationship between the Earth and its peoples through the study of place, space, and environment. Geographers ask questions where and what: also how and whi. ‘+ The study of place seeks to describe and understand not only the location of the physical and human features ot the Earth, but also the processes, systems, and interrelationships that create or influence those features. + The study of space seeks to explore the relationships between places and patterns of activity arising from the use people make of the physical settings where they live and work. ‘+ The study of the environment embraces both its physical and human dimen- sions, Thus it addresses the resources, sometimes scarce and fragile, that the Earth provides and on which al fe depends; the impact on those resources of human activites; and wider social, economic, political and cultural con- sequences ofthe interrelationship between the two’12 ‘Theorizing Human Geographies Gale (1992, p.21): “Geograpry, for me, is about how we view the world, how we ses people in places.” Peet (1998, p. 1): ‘Geography is the study of relations between society and the natural environment. Geography icoks at how society shapes, alters, and increasingly transforms the ‘natural environment, creating humanised forms from stretches of pristine nature, and then sedimenting layers of socialisation one within the other, on top of the ‘other, until a complex natural-social landscape results. Geogrephy also looks at ‘how nature condttions society, in some original sone of creating the people and raw materials which social forces “work up” into culture, and in an ongoing sense of Placing limits and offering material potentials for social processes like economic development. ‘Source: Updated from Kitchin and Tate (2000, p. 4) As Tim Unwin (1992) notes, part of the problem is that definitions can change depending on whether we ty to define geography as simply ‘what geographers do’ (acaclemic), ‘what geographers study’ (vernacular) or in terms of its distinctive contribution to teaching and learning (pedagogic). However, the problem is more deep-rooted than how we decide to define a subject. As Peter Haggett (1990) details, geography has a long history and its develop- ment as an area of study contributes to the difficulty in assigning an agreed definition. He reports that geography occupies a puzzling position within the organization of knowledge, straddling both the social and natural sciences. This he attributes to the development of geography as a distinct form of knowledge by classical Greck scholars who viewed humanity as an integral part of nature. By the time geography became an established university subject in the late nineteenth century, academic studies had already been divided into the natural and physical sciences on the one hand, and the humanities and social sciences on the other. Geography, with its natural and social constituents, had to be slotted into this existing inappropriate structure. This uncasy positioning, at the intersection of natural and social science, he suggests, has led contemporary human geographers to constantly refine and redefine their discipline in order to demonstrate its intellectual worth. David Livingstone (1992b), in contrast, argues hat this process of refinement and redefinition is not a recent phenomenon. He details how geography as a practice has constantly changed throughout history, with different people attaching salience to different interpretations in particular contexts: Geography... has meant different things to different people at different times and in different places. (Livingstone, 1992b, p. x) This continual contest over the definitions of geography, then, is due to the way in which different scholars conceptualize and rework the content and focus of the subject. In other words, there are many different geographies, some new,Introducing Theory 19 some old, All have slightly different philosophical bases, different emphases, and some arc more widely practised than others. For example, Hartshorne (1959) saw geography as an idiggraphic science (that is, its main emphasis being descrip- tion), whereas Yeates (1968) saw geography as a nomothetic science (that is, its ‘main emphasis being explanation and law-giving). Some scholars still agree with Hartshorne or Yeates, but others have a different vision, seeing potential in approaches which transcend both description and science, In the rest of this section, we illustrate the ways in which the definition of geography continues to be contested by briefly detailing how three of geography’s core concepts — space, place and nature — are persistently being rethought in relation to geographical theories. 13.1 Space ‘How geographers and others understand space is always changing. As we detail more fully in Chapter 2, most geographical analyses up until the 1970s adopted (implicitly, if not explicitly] an absolute understanding of space (Shields, 1997). In this view, space is understood asa system of organization, a gcometry, ‘a kind of absolute grid, within which objects are located and events occur’ (Curry, 1995, p. 5). In geographic terms, absolute space is defined and understood through Euclidean geometry (with x, y and ¢ dimensions) and, for analytical purposes, treated as an objective, empirical space: ‘an absolute container of static, though movable, objects and dynamic flows of behaviour’ (Gleeson, 1996, p. 390). Here, an essentialist view, where space is effectively reduced to the essence of geometry, is adopted so that dimensions and contents of space are unquestion- ably understood as being natural and given; there is a belief that there are pre-existing physical laws that can be scientifically measured, This conception of space largely underpins the work of positivistic and quantitative geographers. ‘They seck to delimit general spatial laws that can be used to explain the interrclationship between people and place, and identify the logic in patterns of human settlement and endeavour (see Chapter 2). For many, the key text here was David Harvey’s Explanation in Geography (1969), which detailed a comprehensive theoretical and empirical basis for ‘scientific geography’ (ee Box 6.2). More recently there has been sustained criticism of these absolute and essentialized conceptions of space. Indeed, some have argued that ‘reducing the world to a spaceless abstraction ... has] very limited utility’ (Crang and Thrift, 2000a, p. 2), suggesting that this take on space does not pay sufficient attention to the spatial problematic (and, hence, does not consider space at all). Instead, a relational view of space has been forwarded that seeks both to critique absolute theorizations and representations of space and to provide an alternative position, A relate understanding of space prioritizes analyses of how space is constituted and given meaning through human endeavour. Here, space is not a given neutral and passive geometry but rather is contimuously produced through socio-spatial relations; the relationship between space, spatial forms and spatial behaviour is not contingent upon ‘natural’ spatial laws, but is rather a product“ ‘Theorizing Human Geographies of cultural, social, political and economic relations; space is not essential in nature but is constructed and produceds space is not an objective structure but is a social experience. As such, space is ‘constituted through social relations and material social practices’ (Massey, 1994, p. 254). Against this, Ed Soja (1985) takes a more restricted view of space when he defines socially produced space as ‘spatiality’, suggesting that not all space is socially produced, but all spatiality is. Similarly, Shields (1991, p. 31) takes as his object of study ‘social spatialization’, a term which captures both the symbolic construction of space at the level of the social imaginary as well as its more concrete articulation in the landscape. Conceived of in these terms, an everyday space like football stadium can be seen to be both a physical form constructed by certain agents and institutions as well as a space given meaning through myth, language and ritual its use and occupation is shaped both by its material form and the immaterial meanings that coalesce around it. ‘The notion of treating space as socially produced is perhaps most clearly advocated in the work of Hemri Lefebvre (1991; see Box 1.1). He detailed how the production of space (i.e., the process of spatialization) is premised on three, complementary levels. First, he identified a set of spatial practices, ‘con- creie’ processes, flows and movements that can be perceived in the realm of the everyday, manifest as movernents, migrations, routines and other journeys ‘through and in space that influence the ‘where’ of human endeavours, In rela- tion to urban space, for example, itis these spatial practices that serve to (re)pro- duce the city, making and unmaking it as functioning urban system. Second, he identified a set of representations of space (e.g,, images, books, films and so on) which scrve to represent and make sense of space. ‘These conceptions of space have their own power to reproduce space, working ideologically to legitimate or contest particular spatial practices. Urban representations like plans or maps are Box 1.1 Henri Lefebvre (1901-91) Henti Lefebvre, a French sociologist-philosopher, has had a significant impact on how academics theorize space, especially since his book The Production of Space was translated into English in 1991 (Ed Soja, 1996, suggests that it is arguably the most important book ever written about human spatiality and spatial imagination — a point echoed by Mertitiel, 20008). In The Production of Space, Letebvre developed a ‘unitary theory of space’ that sought 'approchement between physical space (nature), mental space (formal abstractions about space), and social space (the space of human action and conflict and “sensory phenomena”)' (Merrifield, 2000b, p. 171). He suggested that these different types of space are of the same substance and same force, each being socially produced. Seeking to docode tho production of space, he emphasized the entwining ofthe three elements that make Up space: spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation (or representational space). In turn, these equate to the routine spatial behaviours: that can be perceived inthe world, the conceptions of space which order our notion of what is possible, and the spaces that are produced by the body in overyday practice. The relations between these are complex, 0 that representations of Space are held in tension with spaces of representation, producing spatial prac- tice. Moreover, it is apparent that spatial practice provides the basis for bothIntroducing Theory 15 thus recognized as social productions, commonly produced by professionals such as engineers, architects and planners who purport to offer an objective view of the way the city works, Third, Lefebvre identified the existence of spaces of representation. In contrast to perceived or represented space, this is the space that is lived and felt by people as they weave their way through everyday life Lefebvre saw that these spaces too were imbued with ideological and political content, claiming that it is in such spaces that the dchumanizing tendencies wrought by capitalist processes could be overcome (ie., proclaiming the power of people to produce their own space and create new forms of urban life). ‘Together, these three forms of space combine to produce a complex spatiality, the relationship between them varying over time. Crucially, all three make up ‘space’; analytical priority cannot automatically be given to one over any of the others, ‘As Crang and Thrift (2000a and b) note, one of the consequences of non- absolute understandings of space is that space has come to mean different things to many people, especially those outside the discipline of geography, taking on metaphorical qualities that seem far removed from ‘space as con- tainer’. One can take space to exist separate from social conceptions of space, or take space to be always social. Equally, one may see spaces as fixed outside time, or always in a ‘state of becoming’, known only in, and through ime (Unwin, 2000), In short, then, space is a highly complex term that is used and under- stood in a variety of ways. We return to many of these understandings later in the book. representations of space and spatial representations. Transforming Marx's period- ization of capitalism into a history of space, Lefebvre accordingly showed how itferant relations Detween those elements produced different forms of space, from the historical space of classical times to the abstract and contradictory spaces of late capitalism. In the latter epoch, for example, he argued that the abstract space ‘of cold capitalism had overpowered the lived space of sensuous and warm bodies, and that a rational bureaucratic form of space had become dominant. Shields (1398), however, argues strongly against these periodizing concepts, suggesting that different forms of space can coexist. Lefebvre's work implies that the main struggle in sociely is not class struggle, but spatial conflict. Although his ultimate faith in the abilty of human beings to create revolutionary forms of space (differen tial space) through bodily practice is somewhat at odds with much post-structuralist thinking, Letebvre’s work has been widely cited and celebrated by geographers, who emphasize that it represents a thoroughly geographical analysis of social life (Soja, 1996). Further reading: Lefebvre (1991); Merrifield (2000b); Shields (1998); Unwin (2000)6 ‘Theorizing Human Geographies 1.3.2 Place As with space, place, until relatively recently, was theorized purely in absolute terms, Within this tradition (as adopted by regional and quantitative geog- raphy), place was understood merely as a gathering of people in a bounded locale (territory) ~ literally a portion of geographic space (Duncan, 2000). Place was thus conceived as a unique site that, while connected to other places, could bbe understood as a largely self-contained unit. This unit, because of its salience to the people living there, gave rise to a ‘sense of place’ which itself could be studied as a phenomenon unique to that locale. For example, during the 1970s, geographers adopting humanistic approaches (see Section 2.3) began to undermine the absolute conception of place in two ways, First, these humanist approaches saw place as more subjectively defined. As such, what constituted a place was seen to be largely individualist, although attachments and meanings were often shared. A place meant different things to different people. This led Agnew (1987) and Entrikin (1991) to provide working definitions that mediated between objective and subjective understandings of place. Entrikin (1991), for example, argued that place is both the external context of our actions and a centre of meaning; there is a tension between subjective and objective concep- tions of place that has to be accommodated in theorizing and researching geographic questions. Agnew (1987) identifies three main elements of place, the first two objective, the last subjectiv 1. Locale ~ the settings in which social relations are constituted; 2 Location — the objective geographical area encompassing the sctting for social 2, Lacation — the objective geographical area encompassing the setting for social interaction as defined by social and economic processes operating at a wider scale. 3. Sense of place ~ the local structure of subjective feeling associated with an area. Second, humanist approaches, along with Marxist geographers, began to adopt a critical approach questioning the uniqueness of places within a globalizing world. For example, Edward Relph (1976), in his book Place and Placelessness, critiqued the uniqueness and ‘sense of place’ of traditional conceptions of lace. p Relph’s thesis was that a combination of economic and cultural globalization (see Chapter 8) and large-scale mobility is transforming the relationship between people and place, and thus how place and place-making should be theorized. Through a sustained analysis he discussed experiences of ‘out- siderness’ and ‘insiderness’ in places. Peet (1998, p. 50) summarized these experiences as: ‘exibtential outsiderness, in which alll places assume the same meaningless identity; objective outsiderness’, in which places are viewed scientific- ally and passively; ‘incidental outsidemess, in which places are experienced as little more than backgrounds for activities; xicarious insiderness, in which places are experienced in a second-hand way" (e.g, through paintings); ‘behavioural insideress, which involves more emotional and empathetic involvement in a place; and finally existential insiderness, when a place is experienced withoutIntrodueing Theory 7 deliberate and unselfeonscious reflection, yet is full of significance’. Relph (1976) used these concepts to examine the notion of ‘authentic’ place-making and inauthentic place-making (placelessness), To Relph, an authentic ‘sense of place’ involved a sense of belonging, with an inauthentic being the converse. Tnauthentic places, he contended, are the prevalent mode of industrialized, mass societies and stem from an acceptance of mass values (Peet, 1998). Place lessness, then, is ‘a weakening of the identity of places to the point where they not only look alike, but feel alike and offer the same bland possibilities for experience’ (Relph, 1976, p. 90). Relph’s analysis leads towards a more selational understanding that views place as contingent and tied into a broader context. A relational understanding of place argues that places do not just exist as bounded territorial units but that they are created, and are situated in social, political, economic and historical contexts, which in turn they help to shape. Developing from the work of geographers adopting structuralist (¢g, Pred, 1984), critical (g, Harvey, 19892) and feminist (e.g, Rose, 1993) approaches (see Chapter 2), places are thus theorized as very complex entities that are situated within and shaped by forces from well beyond their own notional boundaries. Here, there is a recogni- tion that places should not be romanticized as pre-political entities but that they are shaped by often oppressive institutional forces and social relationships. Doreen Massey's (1991, 1994, 1997) writing has been particularly influen- tial in reshaping how we conceptualize place (see Box 1,2). She views places as. the complex intersections and outcomes of power geometries that operate across many spatial scales from the body to the global (see Chapters 4 and 8). To her, places are thus constituted of, and the outcome of, multiple, intersecting social, political and economic relations, giving rise to a myriad of spatialities. Places and the social relations within and between them, then, are the results of par- ticular arrangements of power, whether it is individual and institutional, or imaginative and material. As such, places are not defined by their unique and Box 1.2 Doreen Massey (1944) Doreen Massey, Professor of Geography at the Open University (UK), has been a key influence on the discipline of geography for more than two decades. Her earlier ‘work combined Marxist and feminist theories to examine the spatial and gendered division of labour (1984). Here, we consider her recent work on understanding the ‘concept of place. Starting with an article in Marxism Today (1981), she has through ‘a number of publications (¢.g., 1984, 1995, 1997) developed a progressive sense ‘of place’, formulated as a reaction to the charge by some theorists that the signifi cance of piace(s) was being eroded by large-scale ‘space-time compression’ due to globalization (see Chapter 8). To Massey, places are produced by the complex intersection of processes that operate across spatial scales from the local to th ‘global. Places then are made up of flows and movements, rather than rootedness and tradition. So, for example, in her example of Kilburn, a district of London, she Notes that its residents’ sense of place is defined by a number of factors ranging from in-migration from Ireland, Pakistan and other nations: local, national and intornational employers; iis rango of employment types; its diversity of shops,18 ‘Theortzing Human Geographies distinctive location, but rather by ‘the intersections of sets of social relations stretched out over particular spaces’ (WGSG 1997, p. 8). These relations exist at a variety of interlocking scales. Massey's ‘progressive concept of place recognises the open and porous boundaries of place as well as the myriad interlinkages and interdependencies among places. It also acknowledges that the lives of some people are highly intercon- nected into a global network . . . while others lead severcly circumscribed lives? (Duncan, 2000, p. 583). Places are thus relational and contingent, experienced and understood differently by different people; they are multiple, contested, fluid and uncertain (rather than fixed territorial units). As Linda McDowell (1999, p. 4) writes, ‘It is socio-spatial practices that define places and these practices result in overlapping and intersecting places with multiple and chan- ging boundaries, constituted and maintained by social relations of power and exclusion, Places are made through power relations which construct the rules which define boundaries. These boundaries are both social and spatial — they define who belongs to a place and who may be excluded, as well as the location or site of the experience.’ 13.3 Nature Like space and place, nature is a contested term meaning different things to different people, Indeed, the cultural critic Raymond Williams (1976, p. 184; sce Box 5.1) proposed that is it ‘perhaps the most complex word in the language’. Castrce (2000, p. 537) suggests that this complexity can be boiled down into three main meanings: firstly, the essence of something (as in ‘it’s in his nature’); secondly, areas unaltered by human actions (.e., nature as @ realm external to humanity and society); and thirdly, the physical world in its entirery, perhaps including humans (ie., nature as a universal realm of which humans, as a species, are part). All three meanings can be understood differently, with restaurants and services; and so on. Kilburn is simultaneously local and global, its social, cultural and economic relations stretched out across the globe in a myriad of ways. She goes on to argue that the socio-spatial processes that operate within land across, and which help to shape, a piace, are knitted within complex poner geomettias. in other words, socio-spatial processes that help shape and define places do not operate evenly, with different social groups and individuals relatively positioned as a consequence. Places then are not mara bounded locales where people gather, nor are they being unproblematically eroded and rendered place- less by processes of globalization, but rather they are complex enfties shaped by particular power geometries that operate across spatial scales. This progressive understanding of piace thus unifies the tensions between local and global, while recognizing uniqueness and difference, and acknowledging the unevenness of processes shaping places. Further reading: Massey (1991, 1995); Duncan (2000)Introducing Theory 9 alternative conceptualization dependent on whether nature is perceived to be essential or constructed. ‘Traditional, essentialist understandings of nature accept it as a fixed, stable concept. Here, the idea of what constitutes nature is accepted unproblematic~ ally and uncritically. Such conceptualizations often underlie research concerned. with resource management and some environmentalism, Here, there are def- inite understandings of what nature and natural resources are, and the focus of attention is on how people use and misuse them. Within such understanding, nature and human ‘culture’ are often positioned as separate, although symbiotic {mutually supporting) domains. In contrast, other theorists question both the essentialized notion of nature and the separation between nature and humanity. They posit that ‘nature is as much an idea or concept as it is material reality’ Clastree, 2000, p. 539) Consequently, they argue that nature is a social construction and an instrument of social poveer (that is, it is employed politically). Far from being separate from, or subordinate to, humanity, these theorists argue, nature is discursively con- structed to particular discourses and representations that are ideologically charged (i., designed to portray certain messages). In other words, they suggest that there is ‘nothing natural about nature at all’ (Barnes and Gregory, 1996, p. 174). Drawing on an historical analysis of ideas and science, they demonstrate that how nature has been conceived has changed over time, for example from a God-given landscape to an evolutionary one. Moreover, they highlight how nature is produced and remade by humans, blurring the dualisms between culture and nature, and technology and nature (¢.g,, through farming practices, wildlife television programmes, genetic engineering, biotechnology, ‘medical science and so on) The conflict over the definition of the term has led to many different contested positions. Here, we detail just a fev following Barnes and Gregory (1996). The first two adopt largely essentialist positions and the latter two employ constructivist positions (although note, this not always the case). Technocentrism is founded on the view that nature is malleable and easily manipu- lated, something to dominate and use, and can be improved through human intervention. ‘This view is underlain by the assumptions that nature is separate from humanity, that it exists to satisfy human purposes and that it is best managed through science. Deep Ecology and Ecocentrism seek a less exploitative approach, suggesting that humans need to live in harmony with nature. Deep Ecology, in particular, argues that all life is valuable and that it is immoral not to seek some kind of coexistence. Ecofzninism is a reaction to the androcentric bias of much Deep Beology and Marxism, anguing that these approaches reproduce the subordinate position of women by conceiving of nature through masculinist reasoning. Finally, Marcists suggest that Ecocentrism is politically naive, contending that humanity's relationship with nature has been driven by capitalist social relations. ‘They suggest that how nature is thought about and represented is shaped by how it is exploited and used economically and politically ‘The adoption of non-essentialist and politicized conceptions of nature has20 ‘Theorizing Human Geographies Jed many human geographers to reconsider the relationship between people and nature. Much of this work has studied what has been termed the ‘produe- tion of nature’, that is, how people have shaped nature for capital gain (see 1. Smith, 1984); for example, examining how farmers use selection and breed- ing methods to alter farm livestock and crops in order to increase productivity, More recent work has taken a more ‘cultural perspective (see Section 3.1), and has explored people’s relationship with animals from a non-economic perspec- tive. Work here has investigated how animals are represented in the media (eg, wildlife films and books), how we treat ‘wild? animals (e.g, hunting versus preservation) and how we allocate ‘nature’ a place in the city through the design of 200s, parks and urban gardens (see Wolch and Emel, 1997; Philo and Wilbert, 2000). This research highlights the ways in which ideas about nature, in this case animals, are mediated and how nature is understood and has changed over time. Other culturally orientated geographers have focused on our relationship to, and consumption of, ‘nature’. For example, there is much rescarch exploring the moral panics accompanying the advent of genetically modified and ‘contaminated’ food products (Whatmore and Thorne, 1997), while others have examined the management and conservation of natural landscapes and vistas. As we discuss more fully in Chapter 4, another growing area of interest is in the geography of the body. Here, geographers are starting to examine how the ‘natural’ body is a socially inscribed concept, with our understanding of it as something that is biologically given being disrupted by changing notions of health, beauty, fimess and appearance. In particular, technological enhancements (e.¢., cosmetic surgery) and replacements (e.¢. pacemakers) are problematizing the idea that bodies are only medically and biologically defined, Here the work of Donna Haraway has been important (see Box 1.3). Box 1.3 Donna Haraway (1944~ ) Donna Haraway is Professor of History of Consciousness and Women's Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. As detailed in the text, her wide-ranging critique of modern science has been important in at least two respects. First, her attack on the supposed objectivity of modem science has gained widespread sup- port amongst many geographers (see Section 1.2). Consequently, her concapt of ‘situated knowledges’ has been widely adopted, reshaping the praxis of much contemporary human geographiy. Second, her critiques of essentialist understand- ings of nature have helped to reconfigure how human geographers understand the concept of nature. Haraway's work seeks to disrupt the binaries of culture/nature ‘and technology/natura which underlie scientilic thinking, Sho does this through lan expioration of the concept of the cyborg, illustrating the ways in which the human body is not solely a biological entity but is increasingly replaced, reshaped land supplemented by technology. Developing the motif of the cyborg body,Introducing Thoory a1 1.4 CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have sought to detail what theory is, to explain why engaging with theoretical ideas is important, and started to illustrate the ways in which different theoretical ideas lead to different understandings of the world, It should hopefully be clear that you cannot avoid theory in the study of geography; theory is an inherent part of geographical praxis shaping how we conceptualize, approach, analyse and interpret the world we inhabit, Given this, it seems eminently sensible to try to understand different theoretical ideas, how they relate to one another and how they can be employed to create different geographical knowledges. Tn this way, you can start to understand and appreciate the role of theory in how you understand geographical phenomena. The rest of the book is designed to help you to start to think geographically from a more informed position, illustrating how the same geographical concepts have been conceptualized in alternative ways according to different theoretical frameworks, Hence, in the following chapter we provide a brief history of geographic thought, documenting key theoretical traditions in human geography, followed in Chapter 3 by a survey of some of the emerging theoretical ideas that are shaping contemporary human geography. Haraway contends that human embodiment is fluid, partial and dynamic, ascribed ‘meaning through social practices, norms and expectations. Using these ideas, Haraway has developed what she terms a ‘cyborg politics’ which aims to under- ‘mine the naturalization of women’s subjugation to men (e.g., that itis natural that women ocoupy certain roles such as the main child carer) by undermining the ‘systems of binary thought that undertie such assertions. In effect, Haraway is seek- ing to create a new body politics of gender that is not reliant on the so-called natural attributes of bodies, thus subverting patriarchy. Given the focus on gender, her ‘work in ralation to rethinking the naturainess of the human body has been widoly Used by feminist geographers seeking to explain the ways in which women are ‘socio-spatially marginalized and oppressed (see Section 2.4). Further Reading: Haraway (1985, 1991)Chapter 2 A Brief History of Geographic Thought MER ceae 2:1 Histories of geographies 22 Geography as (spatia)) science 2.3 Developing ‘numan-centred' theories ‘Structural theories and radical responses: 25 Conclusion: an intellectual battleground? 2.1 HISTORIES OF GEOGRAPHIES In the first chapter, we began to explore the importance of theory in geography by demonstrating that all geographical enquiry is, to a lesser or greater extent, informed by ideas and theories about how the world works. In particular, we cmphasized the fact that theory informs what geographers study and how they study it. We began to show this by looking at definitions of geography (in terms of its preoccupation with the related concepts of space, place and nature) and how they have been informed by particular packages of theoretical and con- ceptual thought. However, so far we have not explored how such theories have impinged on what academic geographers have actually done (i.c., how they have gone about studying and writing ‘geography’). But in many ways, theory cannot exist without praxis; for Harvey (1999, p. 576) the acid test of new thinking comes with the active transformation of geographical thought into practice. It is impossible — or at least very difficult — to assess the utility of geographic theory without exploring how it has helped (or hindered) geographers in their research, discussion and debate. Consequently, we cannot hope to understand the prac- tice of geography without understanding something of the theories that inform that practice. Equally itis extremely difficult to understand why certain theories enjoy popularity unless we are aware of how they are sustained, reproduced and modified through practice ‘The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to identify how different philosophical and theoretical impulses have served to influence the practices and procedures of academic geography (and vice versa) at different times. First and fore- most, the intention is to show that human geographers have imagined and conceptualized the relationships between people and their surround varying ways, developing different theories to account for the ‘realities’ of everyday life. As we shall see, these theories, which are informed and sustained by distinct philosophies of knowledge, are often antithetical, in the sense that some theories contradict and undermine other theories. This has led to innumerable intellectual confrontations and skirmishes as geographers seek to prove that ‘their’ theory is the correct one for explaining the nature ofA Brie! History of Geographic Thought 23 the relationship between people and place. In turn, it will be demonstrated that different geographers have adopted very different approaches for exploring these relationships. Here, the Tinks between high-level ‘abstract? thinking and the nitty-gritty business of actually studying the world are brought into sharper focus; the history of geography tells us that what geographers have studied, and the way they have studied it, have been explicitly and implicitly informed by philosophical and theoretical concerns (Martin and James, 1993). As we stressed in Chapter 1, geographers have not been able to avoid theory any less than they have been able to avoid engaging with the messiness of the real world! ‘What will become evident in our brief history of geographical theory is that, at certain times, particular packages of theoretical and philosophical thought have enjoyed wide currency in the discipline, so that distinctive ways of ‘doing’ geography have become widespread. This has led several commentators to highlight geography’s propensity to move through successive phases of intel- ectual and theoretical development where particular ideas about what is the ‘correct’ way of doing geography have become dominant (Mair, 1986; Unwin, 1992; Haggett, 2001). In the work of Ron Johnston, in particular, this has led to the descriptions of different geographic paradigms (Johnston, 1986, 1991, 2000). This concept was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his key work The ‘Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970). In essence, paradigms refer to the idea that academic disciplines move through phases of development characterized by different assumptions about how work should proceed. By way of example, Kuhn referred to the development of chemistry from an embryonic and pre-paradigmatic endeavour (associated with random experiments in alchemy) to a scientific paradigm underpinned by atomic theory, standardized chemical classifications and experimental procedures, In turn, he stressed that each para- digm is associated with the development of particular forms of notation, jargon and language ~ often incomprehensible to those working outside the paradigm. In Kuhn's estimation, each paradigm becomes an accepted way of gathering and synthesizing knowledge until the weight of ‘anomalies’ which cannot be explained using existing theories demands the formulation of new ideas. It is at this point that an apparently superior paradigm may emerge, with existing theories and ideas rejected in favour of this new paradigm. Ofien, the influence of one academic or one key text has been sufficient to dramatically change the trajectory of a discipline, instigating such a paradigm shift. In chemistry, for instance, Dalton’s work on atomic theory is cited as a key influence in the development of scientific chemistry, while the replacement of Newtonian physics by Einstein’s theory of relativity is often cited as the quintessential paradigm shift in the history of physics. What Kuhn's ideas suggest is that every academic discipline goes through distinct episodes where different assumptions about what exists and how to study it predominate. Moving from one paradigm to another demands a fun- damental re-conceptualization of the world by academics ~ they need to look at the world in a new way and learn a new language for talking about it. What Kuhn thus documents is a situation where disputes over fundamentals mean24 ‘Theorizing Human Geographies that meaningful debates between the proponents of different paradigms are impossible ~ they simply ‘argue past each other’, As we shall see, this assertion resonates with some of the episodes in the history of geography, as many thinkers in geography have argued (at various times) that their way of locking at the world represents the most meaningful, progressive and correct way of doing geography, rejecting existing modes of exploration and explanation out of hand. Exploring this contention, Johnston identifies three separate para- digms thar became dominant within academic geography in the period up to 1950, These can be summarized briefly as follows: + Exploration: An arguably pre-paradigmatic phase of geography where the growth of knowledge about the globe was the principal aim. This was char acterized by efforts to accumulate and map information about the world, implicating geography in the wider process whereby the colonial powers sought to expand their global reach through the accumulation of knowledge. Here, the dominant motif was one of integrating knowledge acquired on ‘voyages of discovery’ into coherent and logically presented taxonomies, encyclopaedias and gazetteers. This paradigm can be loosely traced from the beginnings of European maritime trade and exploration in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to the late nineteenth century. At this stage, geography was also closely associated with cartography, so that charting the ‘unknown? lands and ‘empty spaces’ beyond the European heartland was a key objective (Harley, 1992), Gradually, however, dissatisfaction set in with this accumula- tion of knowledge for accumulation’s sake, leading some to advocate that this knowledge ought to be used to test certain assumptions about the links between people and their surroundings. + Environmental determinism: Associated with the institutionalization of geog- raphy in the nineteenth century (2g, the formation of the Royal Geo- graphical Society in Britain in 1830), this was a paradigm characterized by attempts to theorize the types of human activity documented in different paris of the world with reference 1o characteristics of the environment Influenced by Darwinian and evolutionary thinking, this proposed that human activities were influenced by their environment. In the view of its most forthright proponents (American geographers Ellen Semple and Ellsworth Huntingdon), climate and physical conditions were bequeathed causal powers, able to determine human development, physiology and cul- ture, In turn, this led to explanations of national development based on accounts of environmental physical characteristics. For example, late nine- teenth- and early twentieth-century texts on Australia described dangerous and hostile environment that was consequently populated by Aboriginal races that were deemed inferior to white European races (eee Ploszajska, 2000}. Tt has been subsequently argued that this ‘new geography’ was there- fore connected to the impulses of colonialism, albeit in the guise of ‘new imperialism’ (see especially Livingstone, 1992a). So, while this paradigm shift witnessed geographers beginning to engage with the ideas of inductive and logical reasoning in the development of theory (particularly in the work ofA.Brlef History of Geographic Thought 25 Fredrich Ratzel), cumulative evidence suggested that environmental deter- minism was too simplistic to explain the variations in human activity and culture, leading to spurious (and often racist) theories of environmental caus- ation. Ultimately, and retrospectively, this led many to begin to question the usefulness of this paradigm. + Regionatiom: Associated primarily with the work of French geographer Vidal de la Blache at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this paradigm argued that the region should become the primary focus of geo- graphical enquiry. ‘This took inspiration from preceding paradigms in the sense that it involved taxonomic classification of different regions in terms of the gerzes de ve (or ways of life) that characterized them, as well as postulating a relationship between physical environment and human activity (see also Sauer, 1925). Yet, unlike determinist accounts, a premium was placed on rich descriptions of the intimate and varied relationship of culture, physical land- scape and region, with the interconnection of these three resulting in the distinctive identities of (for example) specific counties, regions and nations. Hartshorne (1939) was later to codify this concern with areal differentiation in his text The Nate of Geegraphy, which provided an erudite theoretical framework for regional geography based on the identification of regional differences and similarities. In passing, we should note that Johnston’s description of paradigm shifis has been widely disputed, with Mayhew (2001), for example, suggesting that it imposes too much order on the ‘geography’ carried out in the carly modern period (ic., pre-nineteenth century). None the less, this threefold description of geography’s theoretical influences has been ofien repeated (eg, Bird, 1989; Cloke ¢f al., 1991), and provides the basis of human geography’s ‘institutional memory’ (Barnes, 2001). However, after 1950, Johnston (and others} have recognized a much more rapid sct of paradigm shifis as geographers have become increasingly pre- occupied with the purpose, direction and relevance of their discipline (and increasingly dissatisfied with the theory and practice of regional geography). ‘Thus, writing in 1991, Johnston identified a ‘quantitative revolution’ leading to the establishment of a spatial science paradigm in the 1950s and 1960s, a behavioural and humanistic paradigm cmerging in the 1960s and 1970s and a radical/structural paradigm becoming dominant in the 1970s and 1980s (sec also Bird, 1989; Peet, 1998; Haggett, 2001). It is these apparently distinctive episodes that provide the context for contemporary geographical thinking, and, as such, they provide the focus of our chapter. What this historiography will hopefully show is that contemporary theoretical approaches to human geography need to be understood contextually, in relation, to at least three things (see Castree and Sparke, 2000): 1. The history of geography — how geography has actually developed in terms of what geographers have studied {and how). 2. The sociology of geography — how institutions, social networks, journals and.26 ‘Theorlzing Human Geographies educational structures (particularly universities) have shaped the develop- ment of geography. 3. The psychology of geography — how individual geographers have adopted ways of thinking about and interpreting the world, whether conformist or confrontational, Here, we must therefore balance our focus on the first of these with an under- standing that geography has not developed in a vacuum, but has been developed by individuals (and individuals collaborating) within particular insti- tutional and social structures. A key argument running through this chapter (and, by implication, the book) is that it is impossible to understand what geog- raphers do without reference to the way that individual theories have been promoted (or quashed) by particular practitioners at particular moments in the development of a discipline which, in turn, is subject to a series of social, professional and institutional influences, In relation to the latter, we need to be mindful of the geographers’ accountability to the university or college in which he or she works, the wider geographical community that he or she represents and the wider society which he or she often claims to serve. For instance, Castree and Sparke (2000) argue that in recent years geographers have been subject to a series of corporatist accounting pressures which have forced them to focus on the quantity rather than quality of their work, and that the changing nature of their work can only be understood in relation to these institutional imperatives (see also Sidaway, 1997}. As the chapter unfolds, the difficulty of writing geography’s histories will become apparent. In particular, any attempt to write the recent history of geographical thought in terms of distiner paradigms will be seen to be highly problematic, not to say dubious. As Johnston’s (1991) own attempts to use Kuhn's paradigm concept have demonstrated, the danger of adopting the paradigm idea is that it imposes an artificial constancy on what Livingstone (1992a) memorably termed the ‘situated messiness’ of geographical endeavour. In particular, the idea that geography has moved through unified (and gener- ational) paradigms glosses over the ideas and practices associated with those who did not conform to the dominant or fashionable way of doing things. The consensus among geographers at any one time that there is a best way of doing things has seldom been complete or stable, and to pretend that it has been so is to obliterate the voices of many researchers. In relation to recent histories of Anglo-American human geography, we therefore need to be mindful of the fact that it is often white, English-spcaking, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied male academies who seek to define the Zeitgeist and identify which ideas are most useful to progress. The net result of this is that dissenting voiees — and alterna- tive traditions within geography ~ are often marginalised or obliterated in the pages of geographic history (Greed, 1993; Sibley, 1995). At the same time, we should be wary of an account that presents a linear, developmental account of geography as the surnmation of its history rather than its Aistors; the enterprise of geography takes many forms, and it is only relatively recently that geog- raphers have began to acknowledge the existence of different knowledgesABriof History of Geographic Thought ar (Bell «tal., 1995; Driver, 1995). Mindful of this, as you read our account of the recent histories of geographic thought, you might want to reflect on the gender, age, class and posiionality of the most forthright proponents of particular world views (something evident in our thinker profiles). You will probably begin to. discern that certain types of academics are represented as having had most influence on the discipline’s trajectory, with others apparently conforming to their ideas in order to get published. In later chapters, we will perhaps see this trend is beginning to change, as geography opens up to a plurality of voices and ideas, but for now you should be wary that most histories of geography can serve to legitimate the careers of an academic elite while obliterating the views of others regarded as insignificant. 2.2 GEOGRAPHY AS (SPATIAL) SCIENCE The relationship between human geography and science has always been com- plex, and although many human geographers have identified strongly with the methods and ideas of science, the relationship between them has been marked by periods of mutual distrust and antagonism (Gregory, 1994b; Massey, 1999b). In part, this is a consequence of geography’s uniquely broad focus, which encompasses the exploration of both physical and human phenomena (see Chapter 1). While this twin focus lends geography much of its distinetiveness as a discipline, the net result of this is that something of a schism has emerged between those physical geographers who identify with the natural sciences and those human geographers who feel an affinity with the arts and humanities. This is mirrored in many geography departments in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where students specializing in physical geography are often awarded a Bachelor of Sciences degree and those mainly studying human geography receive a Bachelor of Arts Tn this sense, it could be argued chat, historically, most human geographers have felt distanced from debates concerning the philosophies and methods of science, preferring to subscribe to a version of geography which concerns itself with scholarly interpretation rather than sci- entific explanation, Certainly, this could be described as the dominant feeling among human geographers in the pre-war era, where an emphasis on the careful description of people and place was deemed the cornerstone of a discipline based on areal differentiation (Gregory, 1978), Yet to argue that pre- war human geography was not at all influenced by the ideas and theories of science would be quite incorrect. Regional geography was in fact implicitly rooted in long-standing ideas about the procedures and philosophies of sci- ence, particularly induction. ‘This is a process which led geographers to make generalizations on the basis of repeated observations, so that conclusions about the nature of different spaces and places could be made on the basis of par- ticular premises. This implied the adoption of scientific notions of causality, where ceriain things were deemed to be associated with other things. For instance, in many accounts, regularities in human behaviour in different regions of the world were deemed to be related to certain environmental28 Theorizing Human Geographies characteristics of that region. By extension, this led geographers to make certain universal conclusions. However, it was in the 1950s that human geographers apparently became more concerned with adopting the principles and practices of scientific investi- gation (Rogers, 1996). In part, this appeared to be related to concerns that geography was unsystematic in its explorations, We can perhaps discern two underlying anxieties here: firstly, that geographers were simply accumulating facts (about regional geography, for example), without integrating ther into an overarching theoretical framework, and, secondly, that they lacked the ability to distinguish between causal correlations and accidental or spurious associations. An example of the latter may be found in the environmentally determinist (and possibilis!) accounts that suggested that a factor such as high ambient tempera- ture, for example, caused a lack of development in a region because of its tendency to induce sloth and idleness among local residents. While such an assertion might appear correct on the basis of observation, by the standards of scientific method, such thinking represents ‘bad’ science as it fails to distinguish between causal and non-causal relationships, Moreover, it was apparent to some that much geographical thinking was guilty of committing what, by scientific standards, were obvious ecological fallacies ~ i.e., believing that the character- istics of people could be inferred from the aggregate data that described the gencral character of the arca.in which they reside. For instance, to infer that a person living in a country where average educational attainment is low will have a poor standard of education is an example of how inductive thinking can lead to overgeneralized and false conclusions. In logical terms, this represents a process whereby the truth of a universal conclusion cannot be guaranteed even if particular premises are true (Werlen, 1993). When coupled with a general institutional desire to establish human geog- raphy on more systematic grounds, the problems of such fallacious thinking were identified as a serious hindrance to the development of the discipline by a number of practitioners (Hill, 1981). Different histories of geography have thus identified particular individuals (and publications) that encouraged geographers to establish their studies on more scientific (and apparently firmer) ground. Notably, these included a posthumous paper published in 1953 by Fredrich Schaefer on ‘Exceptionalism in Geography’. Herein, he rejected the argument that there was anything particularly unique about geograpby’s focus on a parate range of natural and human phenomena, arguing that it could profitably engage with ideas from mainstream science about the possibility (and desir- ability) of constructing general laws through systematic study. This suggested that there could be an essential unity of method between the natural and social sciences (ie., naturalism), making possible a conversation between physical and human geography. Schaefer identified the essence of synthetic, nomettetic science as being a process of inference and observation leading to the deduction of causal relations. More broadly, this begins to indicate the principal features of positivist science, a form of scientific thinking which can trace its roots to the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and later to the writings of Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Rejecting the imprecise and poorly specified thinking thatA Brit History of Geographie Thought 29 characterized science at the time, Comte argued that the objective collection of data was a prerequisite to the discovery of cause and effect relationships. ‘The characteristic features of contemporary positivism may be catalogued as follows {see Johnston, 1986) Positivist science is based on the collection of data through observation and measurement of things that are known to exist and can be directly experienced (Comte’s notion of le rd!) — Positivist science assumes that the development of generalizations and deduced laws can only follow on the basis of repeated observations and the testing of hypotheses about the causal relationships that exist berween phenomena (Comte’s notion of /a certitude); — Positivist science aims to combine accepted generalizations and hypotheses into theories and laws that explain how the world works (Comte’s precept of le pbc) — Positivist science argues that these theories can never be completely valid- ated (ie,, verified) in the sense of proved absolutely correct, but can be provisionally accepted until contrary evidence or data are collected (hence, Comte’s notion of Puiile - knowledge as a means to an end). In relation to the latter, itis significant chat falsification has been identified as, one of the important distinctions between science and non-science (Kitchin and ‘Tate, 2000). However, it has also been argued that this is the distinction between two forms of post-Comte positivistic science, logical positnism and critical rationalism, the former emphasizing verification, the later stressing the importance of falsification (Werlen, 1993). Falsification suggests that science should not seek confirmatory evidence for its theories, but should concern itself with identifying contradictory evidence that would lead to the rejection of hypotheses and ideas. In short, falsification involves checking a theory against evidence that could disprove it rather than collecting and accumulating support ing evidence for the theory: Thus, to use an often-cited example of the differ- ence between the two approaches, the continual collection of examples of white swans as evidence for the hypothesis that ‘all swans arc white’ would never completely verify the claim until every single swan was demonstrated to be white, Falsification, on the other hand, invokes searching for evidence of black. {or non-white) swans so that a failure to find them would permit the conclusion that the opposite must apply (Le., ‘all swans are white’). This theory is then upheld provisionally, unless and until evidence to the contrary is produced (lor example, a black swan). In practice, rational criteria for falsification are gener- ally established so tat one anomaly or single disconfirmation would not result in the rejection of a theory, but a certain weight of evidence would (Gregory, 1978). In this light, the goal of scientific process is to strive for better theories through a progressive process of measurement, hypothesis testing and rejection of theories. Through the influential work of Popper and Lakatos, logical positiv- ism also stressed thar certain mathematical and scientific statements were axio- ‘matic, and required no empirical validation (hence departing from Comte’s20 ‘Theorizing Human Geographios assumption that all statements were to be grounded in direct experience of the world). Rooted in (logical) positivist philosophy, scientific method appeared to offer systematization and rigour. Within human geography, this appeared attractive to many of those geographers who regarded regional geography as banal and descriptive. Hence, Schaefer was drawn to logical positivism (via the work of Gustav Bergamann and the Vienna Circle) because he saw the regionalism pursued by Hartshorne and Sauer eal. as simply uncovering patterns, not pro- ducing laws. Significantly, it also seemed to offer a way for geographers to harness the potential offered by new technologies of computation and data handling, with onc of the pionecrs of quantification in geography, William Garrison (1956, p. 428), proclaiming the virtues of ‘the universal language of mathematics’, The turn to positivist packages of thought was thus closely associated with geographers’ use of quantitative methodologies. This was mani- fest in the adoption of statistical and computational procedures which allowed. the processing of increasingly large data sets. These were accordingly analysed 0 that significant regularities and patterns in the data could be distinguished from insignificant {and hence spurious) regularities. Adapting the ideas of Bayesian probability, this often resulted in theories being built on the basis of reasonable probability (a variant of critical rationalism that holds to the con- cept of degrees of truth rather than verification or falsification of the truth). In the 1950s and 1960s this encouraged some far-reaching attempts to restyle geog- raphy as a spatial science, seeking to construct theory on the basis of statistical analysis (Robinson, 1998). This was reflected in the publication of texts present- ing the principles of statistical analysis to geographers (c.g., S. Gregory, 1963), and, later, those that sketched out the principles of spatial statistics based on regression, clustering and autocorrelation (Abler ef af, 1971). For many, the ultimate promise of this progressive and processional process of statistical Box 2.1 Peter Haggett (1933-) In many accounts, Peter Haggett's paper at the Royal Geographical Society in 1963 is depicted as a pivotal moment in the rejection of an ‘old style’ regional geography and its replacomont by a ‘new, scientific geography (Robinson, 1998). ‘This paper used statistical methods (such as probability sampling) to describe patterns of forestry in Brazil, challenging the dominant mode of interpretative description. Provoking disquiet in some quarters, this none the less paved the way for Haggett’s first text, the well-received Locational Analysis in Human Geography (1965). Combining the ‘new’ geography's interest in quantification with an aware ness of the potentiality of a new way of thinking about space, this volume was particularly significant in terms ofits emphasis on the formal geometries of space. ‘Characterizing geography as a search for order, this — and his later work with Richard Chorley, Network Analysis in Geography (1969) ~ offered a tool kit for scientific geography comprising (new) techniques of autocorrelation, regression and spatial analysis. More importantly, perhaps, it sought to stress the analytical breakthroughs that might be possible by considering the arrangement of space in terms of networks, movements and flows, proposing that this taxonomy could be used efectivaly to model and predict patterns in space. In later work, he added aA Briet History of Geographic Thought 31 testing and theory-building was the constru: and Haggett, 1967). Retrospectively, this period is described as representing a pivotal era in the history of the discipline - geography’s ‘Quantitative Revolution’ (Bird, 1989; Barnes, 2001a). In fact, its apparent that many geographers were not swept up in the enthusiasms for quantification, hypothesisesting and statistical analysis. None the less, this new ‘scientific’ paradigm was responsible for ushering in a new conceptualization of space which became widespread among even those geographers resistant to the notion of quantification. In effect, this was to conceive of space as a surface on which the relationships between (measurable) things were played out. Looking towards other disciplines, notably neoclassical ‘economics and physics, this placed emphasis on the importance of three related concepts ~ direction, distance and connection. In short, it became axiomatic that the relationships between things on the earth’s surface could be explained in terms of these key concepts, and that it was possible to discern regular patterns which could be (geometrically) mapped and modelled (Wilson, 1999). ‘This heralded a new language of spatial physics where human activities and phenomena could be reduced co movernents, networks, nodes or hicrarchies played out on the earth’s surface. This effectively reduced the earth’s surface to an isotropic plane — a blank canvas on which human relationships were played. out. This empirico-physical conception of space thus lies at the extreme of the scale we examined in Chapter |, imagining space as presocial and absolute as, opposed to social and relational (see also Soja, 1996). The promise of spatial science was to suggest that both human and physical geographers alike could enact a rigorous exploration of spatial structure ~ an argument emphasized in Peter Haggett's Geography: A Modern Synthesis (1975) (sce also Box 2.1). By adapting and rewriting classical locational theory (especially the models of land use proposed by Von ‘Thiinen, Christaller, Weber mn of predictive models (Chorley ‘consideration of the effects of time to his analysis of spatial pattems, heightening ‘geographers’ awareness of writing on spatial diffusion being undertaken by those in other disciplines (notably, epidemiology). These ideas were combined in his book Geography: A Modern Synthesis 1975) — which tomained the standard intro- ‘ductory text for human geography over the next decade. Though such ideas of ioca- tional analysis have subsequently been subject to vehement critique, Haggett’s ‘work (including studies of the diffusion of HIV) continues to follow the principles of scientific explanation upheld in his early work, though his overview of the discipline, The Geographer’s Art (1990), suggests that he is aware of the limitations, as we as considerable merits, of a geography founded on positivist principles and practices. The reissue of his key work in 2001 as Geography: A Global Synthesis ‘shows his wilingness to engage with ona of the Key concepts in contemporary ‘geography (.e., globalization), but a critical reading suggests an unwilingness to engage with many others, He is currently Emeritus Professor at the University of Bristol Further reading: Haggett (1990, 2001)32 ‘Theorizing Human Geographies and Lésch), Haggett and others proposed that there could be an integrative and comprehensive foundation for modelling geographical pattern and process (ie., a belief in naturalism — the equivalence of the natural and social sciences). This suggested that the place of things could be mapped, explained and predicted through the identification of underlying laws — often mathematically derived ~ of interaction and movement, with friction of distance regarded as a key factor explaining patterns of human behaviour, For such reasons, many spatial inter- action models were referred to as gravity models because of the way that they utilized Newtonian theories (of gravitational attraction) to model flows between {nodal} points, Thus, where a ‘natural’ science like physics tied to create gen- eral laws and rules about things like molecular structure, geography sought to create models of spatial structure which could, for example, generalize settle- ment patterns, urban growth or agricultural land use (eg, Berry, 1967). The analogous use of scientific theory even led some to propose that human geog- raphy could be described as spatial physics (Hill, 1981), bequeathing it the status of a ‘hard? scientific discipline rather than a ‘soit’ artistic pursuit. This seductive type of argument was typical of the case made for scientific human geography, with the standards of precision, rigour and accuracy evident in mainstream science proposed as the only genuinely explanatory framework available for the generation of valid and reliable knowledge (Wilson, 1972). This was also a key factor encouraging the adoption of the ideas and language {if not always the method) of science among those preoccupied with the status of the discipline and the links between physical and human geography. Add- itionally, for those believing that geography should be engaging with policy debates, scientific geography appeared to have considerable potential 10 ‘become ‘applied’ geography, offering an objective and value-free perspective on the success of, for example, environmental management and planning policies (Pacione, 1999). Within Johnston’s (1991) disputed description of geography’s paradigmatic progression, the move fiom a ‘dominant’ mode of regional geography was one that occurred in the late 1950s and 1960s. What is perhaps obscured here is that the positivist underpinnings of scientific method were not widely understood or discussed until somewhat later. Specifically, Harvey's Explanation in Geography (1969) was perhaps the first book-length treatise examining the theoretical basis of spatial science (ee also Box 6.2). Essentially, summarizing developments in the discipline, this sought to review the scientific principles and methods which had been adopted by those secking to transform geography into a fully-fledged spatial science. None the less, even Harvey was more concerned to offer a rigor- ous epistemological framework for future geographic research rather than explore the intricacies ~ and assumptions ~ of scientific thought (Cloke ¢ al., 1991). However, the publication of this book was to provoke widespread discus- sion of such issues, including much critical reflection on the philosophical basis of spatial science. Crucially, much of this was to focus on the assurned ‘value- neutrality’ of positivist inquiry, which was increasingly shown to be based on an idealized and unachievable notion of scientific objectivity Barnes and Duncan, 1992; Rose, 1993).ABriof History of Geographic Thought 3 Accordingly, by the time that the principles and methodologies of spatial science had been codified and widely disseminated, something of a backlash had developed, with critiques being articulated by a number of geographers (ironically, including Harvey) who felt that positivism offered an inadequate philosophical and political basis for the development of theory in human geog- raphy. As we shall see, these criticisms concerned both the ontological and epistemological basis of spatial science, characterizing quantification variously as arid, simplistic, irrelevant and exclusive, While many of these critiques were misplaced, and only applied to caricatured versions of logical positivism (Sheppard, 2001), their cumulative impact was to fuel the search for alternative theoretical frameworks in human geography. None the less, positivism in its various guises continues to underpin much research in human geography, particularly (but not all] research involving quantification, Similarly, the search for ‘ground truth’ and the principles of spatial science have continued to inform the development of Geographic Information Systems (Pickles, 1995). Hence, Barnes (2001b, p. 416) has insisted that ‘the quantitative revolution was a pivotal moment for human geography, shaping it theoretically, methodologically and sociologically for years afterwards’ 2.3 DEVELOPING ‘HUMAN-CENTRED’ THEORIES. As described above, the proponents of spatial science argued that an under- standing of spatial structures through quantitative analysis and modelling would lead to an enhanced understanding of spatial organization and human activity, Yet criticisins of this approach became increasingly widespread in the 1960s and 1970s as the assumptions of spatial science and (logical) positivism were bought into question. One of the most obvious critiques was that the isotropic and featurcless landscapes assumed by spatial science simply did not exist (Cloke tal, 1991). More fimdamental, perhaps, was the cmerging criticism that spatial science worked with a very limited view of what it is to be human. In many of the models developed by spatial scientists, people were frequently represented as vectors or movements (making up aggregated flows). Rejecting this idea, many geographers began to propose alternative models of human subjectivity in an attempt to articulate a more ‘human’ human geography, As Plummer (1983, pp. 77-8) explains, ‘many sociologists or geographers begin with a view of the person as an active, creative world-builder, but before they have finished their theoretical endeavours, they have enchained, dehumanized, rendered passive and lost that same person’ (sce also Holloway and Hubbard, 2001, pp. 8-12). Two important (andl related) traditions that emerged as a result of this critique were behavioural and humanistic geography. 2.3.1 The behavioural critique Like those who attempted to restyle geography as a spatial science, behavioural geographers largely took their inspiration from the sciences, particularlyEn ‘Theorizing Human Geographies psychology. In broad terms, psychology is the ‘science of the mind’. Many people's image of psychology is that of a laboratory-based discipline, of scien- tists im white coats monitoring the behaviour of rats in mazes; for others, it might be of the psychoanalyst asking the patients to lic back on the couch and to tell them about their childhood. Either way, it might seem a little surprising that some geographers looked to psychology to provide them with clues as to how people related to their surroundings. However, the engagement between geog- raphy and psychology remains a very important one, albeit one that has become somewhat ghettoized since its heyday in the 1970s, Attempting to identify when this interest in psychology first became apparent is by no means straightforward (Goodey and Gold, 1985), although certain figures have been cited as particu- larly influential in expanding the horizons of geography beyond the realms of locational analysis by exploring psychological ideas. Gilbert White, William Kirk, John Wright and David Lowenthal have all been credited with bringing such ideas into the geographical fold, although further archival analysis reveals less obvious lines of intellectual heritage from the Berkeley School (a North American group of historical-cultural geographers led by Catl Sauer and inter- ested in the relationships between humans and environments as manifest in specific landscapes). Although many of these individuals and groups were writ- ing in the 1940s and 1950s at a time when descriptive regional analysis was still, predominant, their influence was primarily felt in the late 1960s as dissatisfac~ tion with the mechanistic and deterministic nature of the models prominent in the discipline began to take hold (Gold, 1992). ‘One of the most important ideas that these geographers began to introduce to the discipline is that space is not a real (or objective) phenomenon which is experienced and understood in a similar manner by all individuals, Instead, behavioural perspectives alerted geographers to the fact that each individual potentially possesses a unique understanding of his or her surroundings, and that this understanding is shaped by mental processes of information gathering and organization Porteous, 1977; Gold, 1980). Here, the key psychological con- cepts of perception and cognition became widely utilized by geographers in their anxiety to explain why human behaviour did not fit the patterns sometimes anticipated in the models of spatial science. Simply put, these concepts propose that people do not have complete or perfect understanding of their environ ment, but have only partial knowledge because of the way that the senses (touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing) acquire information fiom the surround ings (Rodaway, 1994). This perceived information is then organized through mental processes of cognition to construct selective, partial and distorted images of the world which vary from person to person. Thus an important precept underlying behavioural geography is that it is mislcading to analyse human spatial behaviour in relation to the objective, ‘rcaP environment, as people do not conceive of (and experience) space in this way. Instead, it is suggested that the focus should be on the way that people act in relation to the images of space that they construct, shifting the focus from the way people dwell in ‘concrete’ empirico-physical space to the geographies of the mind (Holloway and Hubbard, 2001).A Brlot History of Geographic Thought 35 Therefore, fundamental (o @ behavioural perspective is the idea that people’s knowledge of their surroundings is perceived through the senses and mediated by processes of the human mind, The idea that people's behaviour in the world might best be understood by focusing on their perception of the world is often claimed ‘o have been introduced to geography by William Kirk (1963, p. 361), who sought to make a distinction between the objective (or real) and behavioural environment. In his view, while the former consisted of the physical world around us, the latter consisted of the ‘psycho-physical field in which phenomenal facts are arranged into patterns or structures that acquire values in cultural contexts’. Kirk thus believed it was the behavioural, not the objective, environment that provided the basis for human behaviour and decision-making. In effect, this idea challenged the idea that human responses to environmental stimuli are based on the environment as it ‘really’ is, and instead proposed that these responses are based on the environment as it is perceived to be. The implication here was that human beings do not make decisions based on full, accurate and objective information about what exists in the world, but on what ‘our senses tell us exists and what our brain is capable of dealing with. According to Kirk, our daily interactions with our surroundings could only be understood in relation to the partial, distorted and simplified understanding that we have of ‘our surroundings (ee Walmsley and Lewis, 1993), Methodologically, behavioural geography continued within the traditions of quantitative and scientific analysis, leading some to depict it as an outgrowth, rather than a reaction to, spatial science (Harvey, 1970). Foremost in this endeavour was the utilization of questionnaires, perceptual tests and rating scales to explore the images of the environment that informed individuals) decision-making processes. This included methods designed to measure people’s ability to remember, process and evaluate spatial information. Acknow- ledging a dichotomy between fact/value and objective/subjective space, much of this was designed to identify differences between {for example) real and perceived distance/orientation (see Walmsley and Lewis, 1993). One of the more innovative techniques adopted for these ends was the mental map tech- nique (devised by an architect-planner, Kevin Lynch, 1960). This technique simply required that individuals completed a basic sketch map of a town or area, marking those features that were most important to them. Examining these maps became a means by which geographers could see how people men- tally simplified their surroundings and how images of place varied according 10 a person’s gender, age, class, place of residence and so on (Kitchin, 1996). In part, such knowledge allowed geographers to explain why certain individuals, adopted behaviour which might, in relation to the decision-making assumptions of neoclassical theory, be described as suboptimal or satisficing, In the work of Reg Golledge (Box 2.2), this notion of mental mapping was extended into a wider project of understanding spatial memory, cognitive ability and way- finding This seemingly promised a full integration of psychological theory and ideas into an understanding of spatial behaviour, and hence the development of better models of spatial decision-making. By the 1970s, bchavioural geography was increasingly being adopted by