CHAPTER2

The Evolution of Strategic

Thought
J. Mohan Malik

The origins of modern strategic thought can be traced back to the classical
strategists. An examination of their works shows that the basic questions
with which they have grappled over the past two centuries have been
remarkably constant. There are strategic principles that hold good for all
times and for all arms -irrespective of changes in technology and strategies.
Not only that, the historical background can help us to clarify and under-
stand contemporary issues. To understand the present and the future we
need to understand the past because events do not take place in a vacuum,
they have their roots in history. We cannot understand what is happening
in Russia or China today if we do not know their past. History matters. This
is especially true of the principles of war and military strategy. But history
is not the only guide to the future. The present provides the patterns that
can help identify the directions of change. These days one hears so much
about 'change' and 'revolution' in almost every field- changes in world
politics, the economy, the revolution in communications technology, and of
course the revolution in military affairs (RMA)- that the risk of losing sight
of the continuities in human life is ever-present. Much has changed in our
world, yet much remains the same.
War is a fascinating subject, central to any understanding of the world
and the way it has developed. Despite the dubious morality of using
violence to achieve personal or political aims, the fact remains that it has
been used to do just that throughout recorded history. Men have studied
war for almost as long as they have been making it. Detailed records exist
from as far back as 1288 BC and the Battle of Kadesh between the Egyptians
and the Hittites. 'War does not belong in the realm of art and science; rather
it is a part of man's social existence', wrote Carl von Clausewitz. 1 Naval
theorist Alfred Mahan concurred: 'Conflict is the condition of alllife.' 2
Strategy plays a very important role in war or any military operation.
The word 'strategy' has its origins in the Greek word strategos, which is

13
C. A. Snyder (ed.), Contemporary Security and Strategy
© Deakin University 1999
14 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

normally translated as 'general'. Strategy, in that sense, has an obvious

military character. However, since the Second World War civil institutions-
businesses, corporations, non-military government departments, even uni-
versities - have come to develop strategies, by which they usually mean
policy planning of any kind. Thus the term strategy is no longer the sole
province of the military. As war and society have become more compli-
cated, its definition has been broadened to include
consideration of non-military factors - economic, political, psychological, moral,
legal and technological. In its fuller meaning, strategy is the art of mobilizing and
directing the total resources of a nation or community of nations, including the
armed forces, to safeguard and promote its interests against its enemies, actual or
potential. 3

In this broader sense, strategy is also called 'grand strategy'. In the military
context, 'strategy' means policy or planning that involves the actual use or
the threat of use of force; the application of force as an instrument of
national policy.4 The formulation of strategy is dependent on the geogra-
phy, economy, society and politics of a given country. In other words
strategy includes the development, intellectual mastery and utilisation of
all of the state's resources for the purpose of implementing its policy in war.
When the classical strategists wrote about war and strategy they did not
distinguish between strategy and tactics. Strategy is generally equated with
policies, and tactics with the particular means used to implement those
policies. It should be noted that strategy at the national level did not take
place until the emergence of modern nation-state system in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. Martin van Creveld argues that 'Strategy in the sense
that Napoleon, Jomini and Clausewitz made classic hardly existed before
their time.' 5 According to Robert O'Neill, 'The strategy we read of in
connection with the wars of the Greeks and Romans is little more than
grand tactics.' 6 The current meaning of the term strategy, in the way it is
used today, was first defined in the Oxford Dictionary in 1825, that is, in the
immediate post-Napoleonic era. In recent times a more useful distinction
has been made between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of
warfare. The strategic level is concerned with the employment of a nation's
entire armed forces in the larger totality of the nation's security; the opera-
tional with the employment of forces in a military campaign or operation;
and the tactical with forces actually in contact with the opponent.
War is an unpredictable business, and because of this soldiers and
scholars throughout history have searched for a magic solution to the
business of war - some list of golden rules that, if satisfied, will guarantee
victory. Past battles and campaigns have been closely studied and com-
pared, the reasons for defeat or victory examined and a series of principles
of war evolved. Battle changes for the soldier from war to war and often
during them. Weapons are improved, accuracy is increased and lethality
 J. Mohan Malik 15

grows over time. The horse is replaced by the tank and the spear by the
rifle. At the lowest levels, warfare is vastly different from earlier times. The
company commander of the 1991 Gulf War would probably have difficulty
relating to the experiences of a centurion of the Roman Empire. However, at
the operational and strategic levels these principles dominate the teachings
of modern military institutions because they are a summary of great histor-
ical experience and provide guidelines for studying and thinking about
war. But it is not knowledge of the principles alone that is important, rather
the degree of intelligent use made of them. The Australian Army's current
doctrine lists the principles of war as practical guides and warns that
'disregard of them involves risk and has often brought failure'? The US
Army Field Manual FM-100-5 states that the principles of war 'have essen-
tially stood the tests of analysis, experimentation, and practice'. 8 The
equivalent British Army Field Manual states: 'A study of the history of war
reveals that its conduct is influenced by certain broad precepts which have
come to be recognised as principles of war. Revolutions in technology,
developments in weaponry and improvements in mobility have wrought
changes in the apJ'lication of these principles without detracting from their
general validity'. The timelessness and enduring relevance of the princi-
ples of war derives from their didactic purpose: they seek to explain neither
why wars should be waged nor how battles should be fought, but how they
may be won. That is why the philosophies of the classical strategists are still
applicable as elements of modern and future defence strategy, and provide
the tools with which to analyse existing strategies and proposals for the
future.
This chapter outlines the fundamental tenets of modern strategic thought
as it has evolved over the past three centuries and demonstrates their
relevance in the post-nuclear information age of the twenty-first century.
It is divided into four sections to discuss four out of five major schools of
strategic thought - continental, maritime, aerospace, revolutionary and
nuclear. The nuclear school of strategy is discussed in a later chapter.
Though we cannot divide strategy into neat boxes, because in practice these
theories do not stand alone, a separate, in-depth analysis of the origins of
each school of strategy provides a convenient starting point for a proper
understanding of the evolution of modern strategic thought. It is generally
accepted that the joint application of these strategies is essential to victory in
the age of joint warfare.

The Continental School

Niccolo Machiavelli, Carl von Clausewitz, Antonie Henri de Jomini, Sun

Tzu and Basil Liddell-Hart are the doyens of the continental school, which
16 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

is concerned with ground warfare between armies and has historically been
the major instrument of geopolitical, military strategy. It has also been the
main influence on the shape of warfare in the twentieth century. Machia-
velli, Jomini and Clausewitz are described as the strategists of 'offensive
war' whereas Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu are described as the strategists of
'limited or defensive war'. The strategists of offensive war were committed
to the Clausewitzian conviction that the destruction of enemy armies is the
ultimate objective of war and that navies and air forces exist primarily to
transport troops to the combat zone and support them in situ. The horror of
the unjustifiable enormity of the loss of life on the battlefield during the
First World War prompted strategists such as Liddell-Hart, J. F. C. Fuller
and others to seek ways to avoid attrition warfare and manoeuvre theorists
came to the fore. Interestingly, such theories had already been propounded
by Sun Tzu in 500 BC.

Machiavelli

Machiavelli is said to have laid the foundations of military strategy. The

politico-strategic environment before Machiavelli was characterised by the
personal wars of kings and princes, temporary private armies, poorly
trained soldiers who were often mercenaries, personal acts of bravery, the
wars of the Crusades, endless sieges and inconclusive battles. Writing in an
era of 'might is right', when every large state believed in the expansion of its
territory and power by the use of force, Machiavelli was the first political
thinker to grasp the competitive nature of the global system. He saw politics
as a struggle for survival between growing and expanding organisms - in
which wars were natural and necessary. He concluded that the existence of
such an organism depended on its capacity for war and tried 'to extricate
the conduct of wars from the sterile concepts of his times' .10 He believed
that political institutions must be organised in such a way as to create
favourable preconditions for the functioning of the military. This theme
dominates all of Machiavelli's works. In The Art of War he dissociated
warfare from religious and ethical inhibitions and related it to constitu-
tional, economic and political factors. That defence of a state was the
responsibility not of a special privileged group or the ruler but the concern
of all those in society was the first lesson Machiavelli drew from his study
of warfare in the Middle Ages. His advocacy of conscription assigned
Machiavelli a prominent place in the development of military thought.
Thus he foresaw what would happen in the future.
The key elements of Machiavelli's thought are as follows. First, war is an
important activity in political life. Second, the existence of struggles and
uncertainties shapes the character and methods of war. Third, the aim of
 J. Mohan Malik 17

war must be the total defeat of the enemy. Fourth, wars must be 'short and
sharp'. They must be ended as quickly as possible with the attainment of a
definite result. Fifth, since everything depends on the outcome of the battle,
everything possible must be done to ensure victory, including the full use of
forces even if the enemy seems of inferior strength. Sixth, a decisive battle
should be the aim of every military campaign, and every military campaign
must be a planned and coordinated operation. Seventh, command must be
in the hands of one person. Eighth, military success depends on order and
discipline. Ninth, there should be a close and harmonious relationship
between the political and military authorities and institutions. Finally,
mercenaries cannot ensure victory; a state must have its own 'proper
army'. 11
The problems Machiavelli discussed are not bound to any historical
period. For example during the French Revolution, military organisations
and the conduct of war assumed new forms due to the growth of engineer-
ing and technology. But still Machiavelli's ideas - the establishment of
military institutions and conducting war in accordance with rationat valid
rules - retained their vitality. It is noteworthy that Clausewitz, who was
extremely critical and contemptuous of other military writers, conceded
that Machiavelli 'had a very sound judgement in military matters. 112 De-
spite the new features that Clausewitz introduced and were outside the
framework of Machiavelli's thought, he agreed with Machiavelli that the
validity of any analysis of military problems depended on a correct concept
of the nature of war.

Jomini and Clausewitz

From 1784 onwards, French armies crushed their European opponents,

began to transform the political structure of Europe and brought Napoleon
Bonaparte to power in France. These were the times of great upheaval.
Napoleon's military successes provided valuable lessons for the under-
standing of military operations. Napoleon's genius at the strategic and
operational levels of war was a major catalyst for the development of the
continental school of strategic thought throughout the nineteenth century.
Under his leadership the French produced the first mass army in modern
history and other European powers were forced to follow suit. Foremost
among the new school of military authors to emerge during the Napoleonic
era were the Swiss Antonie Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) and the Prussian
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), who had an everlasting influence on both
military theory and popular conceptions of warfare.
Prior to the nineteenth century, Europe also experienced a wave of
philosophical thought known as the Enlightenment, which emphasised
18 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

rational objective analysis and the search for clarity. A succession of writers
attempted to uncover the scientific principles underlying the conduct of
war, confident that military art 'like all others is founded on certain and
fixed principles'. 13 The Enlightenment gave way to a period dominated by
German idealists and Romantic philosophers, who focused on the psycho-
logical, emotional, subjective and intuitive dimensions. Henceforth military
thought followed one of two paths: a retrospective one, looking to the
Enlightenment and seeking scientific correctness; and a forward looking,
Romantic one that saw war as the 'realm of the uncertain and unpredict-
able, a matching not so much of intelligence as of will, personality and
moral fibre' .14 Jomini followed the Enlightenment line and by searched for
certain and fixed principles of war, whilst Clausewitz combined the best of
the traditional Enlightenment with the German romantic tradition. To-
gether Jomini and Clausewitz are regarded as the forefathers of modern
strategy. While Clausewitz is the most prominent and well-known author-
ity on war and strategy today, the name of Jomini was synonymous with
military wisdom in the nineteenth century. Their lives were full of striking
similarities and violent contrasts. 15

Similarities in the Works of Jomini and Clausewitz

A careful comparison of Jomini's Summary of the Art of War (1838) and

Clausewitz's On War (1831) discloses a considerable amount of common
basic military theory. Both wrote of the tactical and strategic method, and
each appreciated the great importance of morale. Clausewitz advocated
simplicity of plans and emphasised the 'friction' of war. For Jomini, sim-
plicity in battle planning was a cardinal virtue because he believed that 'the
more simple a decisive manoeuvre is, the more certain will be its success'.
Both frequently referred to the 'drama' of war; war was something fluid,
changing and subject to chance. Both emphasised the destruction of enemy
forces as the key objective of a military operation. Both were primarily
concerned with land warfare. Both were fully aware of the value of surprise
and the advantages of the strategic initiative. Both emphasised the need to
concentrate forces upon the 'decisive point' of battle. Both were the strate-
gists of offensive war. Clausewitz's On War simply reinforced Jomini's
emphasis on the massive, aggressive use of force.

Differences in the Lives and Works of Jomini and Clausewitz

Despite several similarities in the works of Jomini and Clausewitz the

outlook of the two men was very different. For example they looked upon
each other as competitors or rivals in the field of military writing. While it is
 J. Mohan Malik 19

not certain if the two ever met; it is known that they disagreed in print for
years. For Jomini, historical events formed the basis of his own grasp of the
strategic principles of war. But Clausewitz disagreed sharply with a num-
ber of Jomini' s specific historical judgments 'and charged him with two
faults- theoretical bias and inadequate knowledge. Clausewitz read Jomi-
ni's History of the Major Military Operations, published in 1804-5, and con-
sidered it good, but felt that Jomini had not sufficiently distinguished the
incidental from the essential. Jomini, in tum, regretted that Clausewitz had
not lived to read his Summary of the Art of War, believing that this might
have converted Clausewitz to Jomini's point of view. Some key points of
difference are discussed below.

1. The practitioner versus the philosopher or the tactician versus the strate-
gist. The fundamental difference between the two is that while Jomini
wrote princi:Rally as a practitioner of war, Clausewitz wrote as a philoso-
pher of war. 6 Indeed Clausewitz wrote On War as an intellectual exercise to
satisfy himself, while Jomini wrote in order to publish his works and
further his career. Clausewitz's interest in theology and Kant's philosophy
led him to explore the philosophical components of war and the basic
nature of war. Jomini was more concerned with the practical aspects of
war and thus sought to construct a theoretical system for winning wars.
Therefore it is said that Clausewitz wrote at the strategic level of war while
Jomini wrote at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. For example
Jomini's doctrine focused on the importance of manoeuvre, the use of
interior lines, the role of intelligence and careful planning, and the need
for strategic reserves to determine victory.
Jomini' s key objective was to identify principles and rules that would
enable a commander to wage wars successfully. Jomini believed that there
was one principle underlying the success of both Napoleon and Frederick
the Great: 'the concentration of one's forces successively on the decisive
points in the theatre of war, and as far as possible against the communica-
tions of the enemy without disrupting one's own'. This objective could best
be achieved by the mastery of what he called 'interior lines'. 17 Jomini' s
concept of interior lines of operations refers to one side striving for a
position within separated enemy forces, making it possible to indepen-
dently to strike elements of the enemy force. Jomini hoped to provide the
army comma,nder with a practical manual that would 'guide him in the task
of directing operations in the midst of the noise and tumult of battle.' 18 For
him, warfare revolved around his basic ideas that: 'Strategy is the key to
warfare; all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and,
that these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weak-
er enemy forces at some decisive point, if strategy is to lead to victory.' 19 He
believed that these principles 'could be disregarded only with the greatest
danger'. 20
20 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

Jomini's principles were prescriptions for strategic choices. For example

where to fight, for what purpose and in what force. In fact '[s]trategic choice
... remains a basic problem even in an age of microelectronics, nuclear
energy and the exploitation of "space" itself for military purposes'. 21 In
Jomini's view most military commanders made the wrong strategic choices
because they did not understand the principles of strategy. Those principles
he summarised in one sentence as 'bringing superior force to bear on a
point where the enemy is both weaker and vulnerable to crippling da-
mage'.22
Clausewitz denied the validity of such formulations. Why? One, because
they were oversimplifications; and two, because they ignored what Clau-
sewitz saw as the essence of war. He said that Jomini's principles 'aim at
fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain . . . all military action is
intertwined with psychological forces and effects'. While Jomini was ada-
mant that Napoleon's success came from the application of these scientific
principles, Clausewitz was not convinced. For Clausewitz there were no
laws or rules that could determine success on the battlefield. For him, in
war 'many roads lead to success'. 23 Clausewitz was more concerned with
philosophical analysis than prescription and he sought to penetrate 'the
essence of absolute war [and] ... to understand war in the various forms it
actually takes, as a social and political phenomenon, and in its strategic,
operational and tactical aspects' ?4 His theorv is as successful in presenting
the calculating and rational side of war as in analysing its non-rational and
unpredictable qualities.
In short, Clausewitz put more stress on the importance of morale and
psychological factors in warfare than did Jomini's theory of 'scientific
warfare'. Clausewitz did recognise certain definite principles of war, which
he considered simple common sense. Unlike Jomini he did not try to
develop 'system' for waging war. He felt that war was 'too complex to be
reduced to a neat system of rules and diagram' ?5 No theory of war can be
intellectually correct and complete.

2. The centre of gravity.A key feature of Clausewitz' s conception of grand

strategy is his theory of the 'centre of gravity or strength', which is 'that
point in the enemy's organism- military, politicat social, economic, etc. - at
which, should he be defeated, or should he lose it, the whole structure of
national power will collapse'. 26 According to Clausewitz, the ideal strategy
is to identify the enemy's centre of gravity, and then to direct all one's
energies against it. Clausewitz gave three examples of the 'centre of grav-
ity': the opponent's army; its capital; and if it had a strong protector, the
army of this ally. This Clausewitzian thesis of strikes against the enemy's
centre of gravity was similar to Jomini's idea of massive strikes against the
enemy's 'decisive point' - that point in the enemy's defences which if
attacked, destroyed or captured would cause the enemy's total collapse.
 J. Mohan Malik 21

For example, during the 1990-91 Gulf War the Iraq Republican Guard,
communications, military installations and command and control systems
were identified as what Clausewitz called 'the centre of gravity' and Jomini
called 'the decisive point'.
Nonetheless, Jomini's idea of massive strikes against the enemy's deci-
sive point was dismissed by Clausewitz, who saw it as an attempt to
'reduce the whole secret of the art of war to the formula of numerical
superiority at a certain time in a certain place'. 27 According to Clausewitz,
this was an 'oversimplification which would not have stood up for a
moment against the realities of war'. 28
On the surface, Jomini's own formula does not look very different from
that of Clausewitz- 'the best strategy is to be very strong; first in general,
and then at the decisive point'. 29 But in reality there is some difference.
Whereas Jomini wrote many chapters analysing where and what that
decisive point might be, Clausewitz saw the main problem as a moral
one; that is, the capacity of the commander to maintain his determination
and will against all odds and then concentrate his forces against the decisive
point. Anyone undertaking a war enters the realm of chance.
For Clausewitz war was a messy affair that could not be reduced to a set
of lessons and laws. There is no strategy that will always succeed. Military
commanders have to live by their wits as much as by their intelligence.
Courage alone is not enough. What is required is an intelligent application
of force at the right time, at the right place. Thus Clausewitz sought to
destroy the formalistic strategy of manoeuvre that was in vogue during this
period, largely due to Jomini's influence.

3. The role of logistics or supplies. For Jomini, supply or logistics was a

serious problem; his writings show that 'he understood the important place
of logistics in mobile and expansive warfare'. 30 As J.D. Hittle notes:

Jomini's experience in the Peninsular campaigns and in the Russian invasion

convinced him of the difficulty of waging successful war against a nation
resorting to what we currently call'the scorched earth' policy. Our modem field
commanders are still struggling with the problem that worried Jomini: how to
keep supplies abreast of rapidly moving troops. 31

In this respect he was much more practical in his appreciation of logistics

than Clausewitz, who tried to separate military supplies from the business
of war. Clausewitz believed that matters that do not relate to the act of
fighting but only to the maintenance of equipment and care of the sick are
not important.
But for Jomini, supply was closely connected with the entire pattern of
war and helped determined the outcome of military operations. Once again,
after the Gulf War General Norman Scharwzkopf revealed the importance
22 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

of Jomini's influence on the logistical planning of Operation Desert Storm.

He said: 'I would not move against Saddam until there were 60 days' stocks
on the ground. My operations guys said that we could wind up the whole
affair in 30 days, but Jomini had recommended to prepare for twice the length of
the operation. I took his advice.' 32

4. The relationship between political and military authorities. Jomini 'saw war
largely in personal, heroic terms, controlled by the masterful commander'. 33
To Jomini, the examples set by Frederick the Great and Napoleon suggested
that wars should be fought by rulers, who combined in their own persons,
political and military leadership. He had very little to say about the relation-
ship between political and military authorities. But as democracy, bureau-
cracy and meritocracy began to transform the military by 1800, the political
relationship became problematic. However Jomini did not address this
problem. Soldiers could find what they wanted in Jomini's writings: good
arguments against strict subordination to political authority. Jomini be-
lieved that once a war started the political leadership must leave the
military commander free to wage war according to scientific principles that
the military had identified. 34 In other words, Jomini was against any
political interference in military matters.
While Jomini insisted on the supremacy of military leadership, Clause-
witz insisted that the political leadership had to have the last word, because
the nature of policy determined the nature of war and political circum-
stances shaped strategy. After all, as Clausewitz put it: 'War is nothing but
the continuation of policy with other means.' 35 For Clausewitz 'real war'
comprised three elements referred to as the 'remarkable trinity' and seen as
the main areas of action by different segments of society: the people, repre-
senting violence, passion and the exercise of popular will; the army, repre-
senting the interplay of chance and uncertainty that characterise military
operations; and the government, representing the importance of politics in
selecting ends, allocating means and controlling escalation. That is why
Clausewitz saw war 'in what may be called tragic terms, always threatening
to escape human control'. 36 Clausewitz wrote that in the study of war, a
trilogy comprising the government, the military and the people must be
considered, and to ignore any part of the trilogy would render any analysis
useless. Thus Clausewitz brought out the political nature of war: war as a
means to an end, not an end in itself. War should be brought to an end as
soon as the objective is achieved. In other words, war is essentially sub-
ordinate to politics. A close integration of politics and war is a central thesis
of the Clausewitzian perception of the war. Perhaps that is why he is more
popular than Jomini in this age of democracy.
Again we can see the continued relevance of the classical strategists
during the 1991 Gulf War, where the subordination of war to political
objectives was evident. President Bush's decision, against General Schwarz-
 J. Mohan Malik 23

kopf' s advice, to end the war when the main objective had been achieved
reflected the political objective. The coalition nations did not want to push
for the total destruction of the Iraqi armed forces nor the removal of their
leader. Jomini would have certainly disapproved of Bush's decision to
terminate the war, but Clausewitz would have supported it.

5. The concept of 'friction'. Another of Clausewitz's important contributions

to military thought was his very practical concept of 'friction in war' to
explain why military theory often proved so difficult to put into practice. 'It
is friction', said Clausewitz, 'that distinguishes real war from war on paper.
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is very difficult. 137
Clausewitz wrote of the uncertain nature of war. For him, war was
shrouded in friction, ambiguity, uncertainty and chance. So what is this
'friction'? It is basically Murphy's Law: anything that can go wrong will go
wrong. Anything that reduces military capability and affects the outcome of
war is called friction. It is caused by fear, exhaustion, stress, suffering,
confusion and unpredictable factors such as bad weather. Each war is like
sailing an uncharted sea, full of reefs. If a fog descends it may wholly wreck
an advance; but it could equally help prevent an agonising defeat.
In his search for the scientific principles underlying war, Jomini initially
underestimated or ignored the qualities of personal leadership that enabled
Napoleon and many others to snatch victory out of disaster. Half acknowl-
edging this - perhaps after reading Clausewitz's On War - Jomini later
emphasised that 'war is a great drama, in which a thousand physical or
moral causes operate . . . and which cannot be reduced to mathematical
calculations.... War is not an exact science, but a drama full of passion.' 38
Thus, Jomini ended up saying exactly what Clausewitz had already said
about the uncertain nature of war.

6. Objectives and types of war. Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini conceived of

warfare in largely spatial terms, that is, territorial gain was the true objec-
tive of armed conflict. Furthermore Jomini gave major emphasis to the
offensive; Clausewitz to the defensive offensive. For Clausewitz, defence
was a stronger form of warfare than offence, for it is easier to preserve than
to acquire.

7. Civil wars or people's wars. While Jomini detested the concept of 'civil
war' or 'people's war', Clausewitz considered that people's wars could be
highly effective if carried out in conjunction with the operations of a regular
army. Critics argue that Jomini tended to ignore historical cases of these,
which undermined his 'scientific theory of war', and his silence on civil
wars is a good example of this. In a civil war the enemy is everywhere and
24 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

yet nowhere to be seen, which makes it difficult to identify the 'decisive

point' against which massive attacks can be launched.

8. Maritime warfare. Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini had a sound appreciation of

maritime power and discussed maritime warfare, probably due to the
French plans to invade England at the height of Napoleon's success. Jomini
made important - although indirect - contributions to the development of
naval doctrine. Clausewitz, as a Prussian, had no need to consider this type
of operation.

9. The value of bushes and woods. Jomini was the product of an age that
thought in terms of mass and manoeuvre. He showed an amazing under-
standing of the use of cover and concealment, and pointed to the impor-
tance of using what was naturally present in the terrain to shelter troops
from artillery fire. To Jomini, the prudent use of natural cover to mask
movement and a detailed supply plan were important elements of a suc-
cessful campaign. He criticised Clausewitz' s view that 'he who occupies a
bush acts blindly, and discovers nothing of what the enemy is doing'. 39

In short, a comparison of their ideas reveals the fundamental difference in

their approach to the study of war. Clausewitz wrote at the strategic level
while Jomini wrote at the operational and tactical levels. Jomini was archi-
tecturally geometric; Clausewitz was artistically holistic.
It should be noted that the differences between the strategic thoughts of
Jomini and Clausewitz have been overemphasised to some extent because
of their tendency to see one another as competitors. There were some points
relating to theory and technique upon which Jomini and Clausewitz did
disagree, yet 'when their works are compared ... on the basis of broad
concepts, much military thinking is common to both'. 40 In fact, Jomini's
practical teachings tend to complement Clausewitz' s philosophical analysis.
And the Prussian' s emphasis upon the intangible components of war seems
to give greater strength to Jomini's principles. There is nothing illogical or
contradictory in this because 'both were writing of the same thing - the new
type of war born in the Napoleonic era'. 41 Much of modem military think-
ing is based on their works. Many of Clausewitz' s concepts - such as
friction, the key role of human behaviour in the face of battle, the political
nature of war, the centre of gravity, and the culminating point of victory -
are timeless and form the basis of much of today's strategic thought.
Clausewitz is said to have done the same for the study of war as Adam
Smith did for the study of economics. Clausewitz has a timeless quality, but
Jomini should not be dismissed. The influence of both Clausewitz and
Jomini is enduring and substantial.
 ]. Mohan Malik 25

Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu

Basil Liddell-Hartis famous for his strategy of the indirect approach', and
as the prophet of mechanised wartare or blitzkrieg. The strategy of the
indirect approach first found full expression in 1929 in a volume entitled
The Decisive Wars of History. 42 Liddell-Hart's ideas were influenced by his
disenchantment with the misconduct of the First World War. He witnessed
the terrible devastation and killing caused by what he believed was a faulty
strategy based on Clausewitzian doctrines and leading to the brutality of
trench warfare. He was not a pacifist, however, and he never believed that
war could be avoided altogether. His objective was to consider how war
could be fought more cleanly, more decisively, more intelligently and,
above all, as humanely as possible.
While Clausewitz was the strategist of 'offensive war', Liddell-Hart was
the strategist of 'defensive or limited war'. He believed that given the
changes in military technology, offence was no longer the correct strategy.
Rather the 'indirect strategy' of manoeuvre and surprise, which forced the
enemy to disperse his forces, was the correct strategy. Thus, in a deeper and
wider sense than Clausewitz implied, the defensive is the stronger as well
as the more economical form of strategy.
His main conclusion was that 'the strength of the enemy ... is dependent
upon stability or "equilibrium" of control, morale and supply'. He said: 'in
all the decisive campaigns, the dislocation of the enemy's psychological and
physical balance has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his
overthrow. This dislocation has been produced by the indirect approach.'
He crystallised the lessons of the history of war into two simple maxims:
one negative, one positive. 'The first is that ... no general is justified in
launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position.' To
do so is like knowingly hitting one's head against the wall. Second, 'instead
of seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by one's attack, it must be upset
before a real attack is, or can be successfully, launched'. As he put it: 'The
soundest strategy is to postpone the battle, and the soundest tactics to
postpone attack, until the moral dislocation of the enemy renders the
delivery of a decisive blow practicable.' 43
Liddell-Hart's definition of strat~ is 'the art of distributing military
means to fulfil the ends of policy'. The heart of military strategy is the
battle of resolve between the two opponents. According to Liddell-Hart, 'in
war the chief incalculable is the human mind, which manifests itself in
resistance ... [strategy's] purpose is to diminish the possibility of resis-
tance'. 45 This struggle of will and wits has brought strategists as far re-
moved as Oausewitz, Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu to place heavy emphasis
on the psychological dimension of conflict.
Liddell-Hart was not the first strategist to consider the indirect approach
- many of the maxims developed in his writings had also been expounded
26 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

by Sun Tzu in about 500 BC. Indeed Sun Tzu was the first to advocate an
indirect approach. He contended that 'in all fi~hting ... indirect methods
will be needed in order to ensure victorv'. 4 Sun Tzu's military ideas
contained many of the tenets of the indirect approach: deception, speed,
avoidance of attrition, striking what is weak and vulnerable, emphasis on
manoeuvre and, more importantly, attacking the enemy's will to fight. 47
Sun Tzu's The Art of War, is the oldest military work in existence. It deals
with principles and fundamentals that are as relevant today as they were
centuries ago. It teaches how to win with a minimum of fighting - by
knowing the enemy, deceiving the enemy and exploiting the enemy's
weaknesses. Liddell-Hart had great respect for Sun Tzu, and called him
'that great master, Sun'.
However it was Liddell-Hart who, after a study of past campaigns, first
formalised the concept of the 'indirect approach'. Liddell-Hart claimed no
originality for the concept, but rather drew the principles from the study of
decisive military campaigns in history.
He wrote: 'in history, the indirect approach has normally consisted of a
logistical military move directed against an economic target - the source of
supply of either the opposing state or army.' 'The chief objective is to
undermine the opponent's will and to induce his collapse or dislocation.' 48
There are various means of doing this, depending on the circumstances of
the crisis. Bloody fighting may be necessary, and armed forces need to be
prepared for it. But skilled strategists seek to minimise or avoid such direct
clashes. The most effective indirect approach is one that lures or surprises
your opponents into a false move - so that they become victims of their own
plans.
Liddell-Hart identified eight maxims- six positive and two negative-
which apply to both strategy and tactics. 49 The indirect approach is con-
cerned with dislocation and exploitation by means of manoeuvre and
surprise. His positive maxims are as follows. First, adjust your end to your
means. It is not wise 'to bite off more than you can chew'. Second, always
keep your objective in mind while adapting your plan to the circumstances.
Third, choose the line that is least expected. Try to put yourself in the
enemy's shoes, and anticipate what they will foresee or try to forestall.
Fourth, exploit the line of least resistance. Fifth take a line of operation that
offers alternative objectives. Thus the enemy will not be sure what you are
going to do next. Finally, ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible
- adaptable to circumstances. His two negative maxims are: do not attack an
enemy who is on guard; and do not launch an attack along the same lines or
in the same form as one that has once failed.
The essential truth underlying these maxims is that for success, two
major problems must be solved - dislocation and exploitation. One pre-
cedes and one follows the actual blow. In short a strategy requires a clear
understanding of the objective, a detailed appreciation of the opponent's
 J. Mohan Malik 27

and one's own capabilities and a thorough knowledge of the likely operat-
ing environment.
Here there is a remarkable similarity between the views of Liddell-Hart
and Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu summarised much of this argument in the following
words: 'If you know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be
endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will be
total.' Like Liddell-Hart, Sun Tzu advised that battle should be avoided
unless all considerations are favourable. The key to Sun Tzu's thought is
that the ultimate victory is inducing a surrender without striking a blow. He
believed that it is more important to kill the enemy's courage than to kill the
enemy's soldiers. Like Liddell-Hart, Sun Tzu advised against repeating
tactics which have gained you one victory. Sun Tzu's The Art of War
possesses an enduring beauty, both in its language and in its simplicity.
In a few pages it lays out the basic principles for planning and executing a
military campaign, examines the qualities of good leadership, and sets
criteria for judging whether the political ends justify the military means. 50
According to Liddell-Hart, a strategist's objective is 'not to seek battle'
but rather to 'seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of
itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this.
In other words, dislocation is the aim of strategy, its sequel may be ... the
enemy's dissolution.' 51 Sun Tzu's ideas regarding strategic objective bear a
close resemblance to Liddell-Hart's. Sun Tzu wrote that in general'the best
policy is to take the state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the
enemy's army is better than to destroy it. To subdue the enemy without
fight.ing is the acme of skill. Those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army
without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them, and over~
throw his state without protracted operations.' 52 History shows that very
few countries have ever benefited from a long, protracted war (witness
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq). So wars of attrition must be avoided.
According to Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu, the perfect strategy would there-
fore be to produce a result without any serious fighting. The psychological
action itself should be so effective that the enemy surrenders without any
physical action being required.
Now, how is this strategic psychological and physical dislocation pro-
duced?53 It is produced by a combination of political, economic, social and
military means. In the physical or logistic sphere, dislocation is caused by a
move that (1) upsets the enemy's disposition and, by compelling a sudden
'change of front', disrupts the distribution and organisation of the enemy's
forces; (2) separates the enemy's forces; (3) endangers the enemy's supplies
and communications; and (4) threatens the enemy's lines of retreat, which
could be used by the enemy to reestablish themselves. 54 In the psychologi-
cal sphere, dislocation is caused by surprise, speedy movement or the
ability to impose threatening circumstances. According to Liddell-Hart,
these two elements - surprise and movement - react with each other,
28 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

'Movement generates surprise and surprise gives impetus to movement.'

'Psycholo§ical dislocation fundamentally springs from this sense of being
trapped.' 5 He suggests that a clever commander will take the line of least
expectation to attack the enemy's rear. A move towards an opponent's rear
not only causes physical redeployment of the opponents forces but also
creates the feeling of entrapment. The psychological impact is such that an
enemy will react, sometimes disproportionately, to protect the rear. The
impact is greater if the move is sudden.
Surprise and movement form the cornerstone of success in the psycho-
logical dimension. A rapid move offers the potential to get inside the
enemy's decision cycle. This concept is the basis of the manoeuvre theory
currently embraced by most armies.
Only when the physical and psychological dislocations are combined
does the strategy become an 'indirect approach'. 56 Liddell-Hart refers to
Stonewall Jackson's motto: 'Mystify, mislead and surprise', or in General
Sherman's terms, 'put your enemy on the horns of a dilemma'. 57 In parti-
cular, the concepts of surprise, flexibility, economy of force, mobility and
morale are inherent to the successful application of a strategy of indirect
approach. Once again, Liddell-Hart's ideas bear close resemblance to Sun
Tzu's:
All warfare is based on deception. Therefore when capable, feign incapacity;
when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you're far away. When far
away, that you're near. Offer the enemls a bait to lure him, feign disorder and
strike him. Speed is the essence of war. 8

Liddell-Hart's strategy is aimed at bringing about the physical and emotional or

psychological dislocation of the enemy. Why? Because the strength of the enemy
depends on the physical and psychological balance of its forces. It is the
feeling of being trapped that accelerates the enemy's dislocation. This
dislocation is produced by surprise, manoeuvre and deception. By identify-
ing economic targets, Liddell-Hartis stressing that it is not correct to direct
an attack against the enemy's military strength alone. It is better to attack
the enemy by seeking out the communications and support facilities. While
planning an attack on the enemy's communications, we should remember
that the farther from the front the enemy's lines of communication are cut,
the greater the impact on the enemy army. This attack on non-military
targets forces the enemy to change their direction of action and upsets their
plans of war. Sun Tzu also believed that the aim of strategy is the destruc-
tion of the enemy's morale, leading to dislocation and defeat.
Furthermore, Liddell-Hart's recommendation to take the line of least
resistance or the line of least expectation sounds very similar to what Sun
Tzu recommended. 59 Sun Tzu said: '[t]ake advantage of the enemy's un-
preparedness, travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has
taken no precautions' Sun Tzu stressed the need for the use of an indirect
 J. Mohan Malik 29

route to close with the enemy. If you want to gain an advantage over an
enemy, lull them into a false sense of security. Sun Tzu advised: 'The enemy
must not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great
many places. . . . And when he prepares everywhere, he will be weak
everywhere.' Sun Tzu identified the link between speed and surprise, and
urged commanders to 'appear at points which the enemy must hasten to
defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected'. 60 Both Liddell-
Hart and Sun Tzu believed that speed, mobility or rapidity and manoeuvre
are the essence of warfare. For example, when the coalition forces swept
past the Iraqi defences with a lightning flank attack during the 1991 Gulf
War, one US Marine Corps brigadier remarked: 'This is simply pure Sun
Tzu.' Liddell-Hart also emphasised this point: 'Make it uncertain which
way you are heading and the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces to
cover all options.' He states that 'Natural hazards, 'however, formidable,
are inherently less dangerous and less uncertain than fighting hazards'. 61
Another related but important feature of indirect approach is the stress
on alternative objectives to achieve a strategic goal. If the enemy is certain
about your point of aim, they will do everything to guard themselves.
Flexibility needs to be exercised in following the line of least expectation
and least resistance to induce the enemy's collapse. Napoleon and General
Sherman demonstrated that speedy and flexible offensive operations that
threaten alternative objectives exploit the enemy's weaknesses effectively.
By repeatedly putting the enemy 'on the horns of a dilemma' regarding the
objectives of the attack, the enemy's capacity to resistance is seriously
undermined. Liddell-Hart concluded that a 'plan like a tree must have
branches if it is to bear fruit'. 62 Therefore the best way is to operate along
a line that offers alternative objectives. Liddell-Hart's emphasis on alter-
native objectives reinforces Sun Tzu's emphasis on the art of deception in
warfare.
Furthermore Sun Tzu's emphasis on deception in warfare underlines the
importance of the acquisition and manipulation of information to one's
advantage. Information warfare has become the latest buzzword in military
establishments. Information warfare as a concept is not new- denying your
enemy knowledge of your plans and actions is as old as warfare itself. 'Sun
Tzu would have [certainly] considered the enemy's electronic nerves the
perfect target; so do today's practitioners of information warfare.' 63

Differences between the Indirect and Direct Approaches

Liddell-Hart criticised the Clausewitzian notion of treating war as mainly a

matter of concentrating superior force. He argued that true concentration of
force is the product of dispersion forced upon the enemy by manoeuvre. To
concentrate all is impractical and even dangerous. Concentrating your force
30 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

against an object too solid to be shattered is useless and counterproductive.

Effective concentration can only be achieved when the enemy's forces are
dispersed, and in order to ensure the dispersal of enemy forces, one's own
forces must be widely distributed or perceived as widely distributed. So
force your enemy to disperse their forces widely before the start of the war.
Your dispersat their dispersion and then your concentration. In short, true
concentration is the product of calculated dispersal.
Clausewitz and Liddell-Hart differed in more than one area. Whereas
Clausewitz emphasised the need to attack the strongest power first in a
coalition of hostile states, Liddell-Hart suggested the opposite: 'Attack the
weaker side of the coalition first'. According to Liddell-Hart, 'In a campaign
against more than one state or army, it is more fruitful to concentrate
against the weaker partner, than to attempt the overthrow of the stronger,
in the belief that the weaker partner's defeat will automatically involve the
collapse of the others.' 64 A sort of chain reaction will follow. Like Liddell-
Hart, Sun Tzu argued that in war the way to avoid the strong is to strike the
weak, that is, one should strike against the enemy's most vulnerable spot
rather than his strongest bulwark. For example Churchill's concept of
attacking the 'soft underbelly of Europe' (Italy) was based on Liddell-Hart's
principle of attacking the weaker coalition partner. So was the abortive
Gallipoli campaign, which if better executed may have taken Turkey out of
the war. The idea was to weaken Germany by knocking its allies out of the
war.
Liddell-Hart contended that whereas military strategy is only concerned
with the problem of winning the war, grand strategy must take a longer-
term view - its aim is to win the peace. Here he makes an important point: if
you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effects,
you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, and it is almost certain that
the peace will be a bad one and will contain the germs of another war. A
state that expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own
policy and future. Self-exhaustion through war has killed more states than
any foreign aggressor. Sun Tzu also voiced his opposition to the humiliation
and total defeat of the enemy: 'Do not press a desperate foe too hard.'
Clausewitz rejected the idea that an enemy can be overcome without
great bloodshed. He took no account, said Liddell-Hart, of the outcome as
enlightened self-interest, a settlement of the issue profitable to the nation.
Victory, in the true sense, implies that the state of peace is better after the
war than before. Statesmen should never lose sight of the postwar prospect
when chasing the 'mirage of victory'. Total victory complicates the task of
achieving a just and reasonable peace settlement. The terms of an unjust
peace settlement lead to another war. This is exactly what happened after
the First World War. Liddell-Hart wrote: that the 'object of war is to attain a
better peace'. 65 If this is not the case, then why take the risks associated with
waging war. Following the war, one still has to live with one's neighbours,
 J. Mohan Malik 31

wars do not change geography. He drew our attention to the 'peace that
must follow war' and warned that leaders who seek wars eventually bring
about the downfall of their own state.
Liddell-Hart castigated the Clausewitzian concept of 'absolute war' and
instead proposed a 'strategy of limited aim'. Liddell-Hart's concept of
limited war acquired new meaning and significance in the nuclear age.
Critics of Liddell-Hart argue that he was misrepresenting Clausewitz who
had never said that the enemy's armed forces were the real objective and
that Liddell-Hart was actually repeating Clausewitz in most of his argu-
ments. He 'was so emotionally involved in attacking the inept conduct of
the First World War and its legacy that he was unable to approach its more
general causes with detachment. Instead he found a plausible scapegoat in
Clausewitzian notions.' 66 Strategically, what Clausewitz was essentially
saying was what Liddell-Hart called the indirect approach: concentrate
your strength against the weakest spot of the enemy's centre of gravity.

The Continued Importance of the Indirect Approach

Whatever its shortcomings, 'the strategy of indirect approach encouraged a

new generation of officers to think in terms of achieving success by surprise
and superior mobility; and to make full use of science and technology to
minimize casualties'. 67 The importance of the indirect approach lies in its
stress on the psychological dislocation and deep penetration of the enemy's
defences to paralyse the 'nerve system' of command. After 1945 several
outstanding German generals acknowledged Liddell-Hart as their guru.
His most valuable contribution to German military thought lay in his
concepts of deep strategic penetration, massed armoured forces and infan-
try, and mechanised supporting arms independent from all-tank divisions.
General Heinz Guderian paid a glowing tribute to Liddell-Hart by describ-
ing him as 'the creator of the theory of the conduct of mechanized war'. 68 In
the Second World War, Guderian's operations exemplify Liddell-Hart's
concept of mechanised warfare. 69 Technology created a revolution in the
physical dimension of the indirect approach. For Liddell-Hart, mechanisa-
tion was the solution to the deadlock in the theatre of war, and alon~ with
J. F. C. Fuller, advocated tanks as the centrepiece of future battles. 0 The
German blitzkrieg in Europe before the Second World War was a good
example of bringing about the enemy's dissolution without the need to
fight. Whether or not it was developed from Liddell-Hart's indirect ap-
proach the blitzkrieg epitomised the fundamentals of this strategy. The
Germans achieved a strategic situation so advantageous that battle was
unnecessary for decisive victory. Since then, advances in military technol-
ogy have further enhanced the ability to dislocate the opponent's army. The
utilisation of modern weapons for long-range and precision targeting has
32 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

facilitated the destruction of economic targets, lines of communication and

psychological targets, which is vital to the reinforcement of highly mobile
modem forces.
Even more than the Germans, it has been the Israelis who have been the
best pupils of Liddell-Hart, perhaps because of their geopolitical circum-
stances, their limited strategic depth and their unwillingness to suffer
extensive battle casualties. Liddell-Hart's writings played an important part
in the Israeli operations of 1956 and 1967. 71 Israel's first strikes were
sudden, unexpected and caught the enemy off balance, and thereby gave
a decisive advantage in the first hours of the conflict. The Israelis valued
and put into practice his idea that the farther from the front the enemy's line
of communications can be cut, the greater the long-term benefits. Israel's
Chief of Staff during the War of Independence, Yadin, acknowledged that
he had tried to direct operations in accordance with Liddell-Hart's princi-
ples.

There is no doubt that the strategy of indirect approach is the only sound strategy
... it is necessary to achieve the three following aims: (a) cut the enemy's lines of
communication, thus paralyzing his physical buildup; (b) seal him off from his
lines of retreat, thus undermining the enemy's will and morale; [and] (c) attack
his centres of administration and disrupt his communications, thus severing the
link between his brain and limbs. 72

Brian Bond rightly argues that '[w]ith the growth of the defensive power
and self-confidence of the Arab nations, it seems unlikely that the Israelis
will have another opportunity to implement the indirect approach on the
ground comparable to their successes in 1956 and 1967'. But then it was
Liddell-Hart who warned against repeating tactics that have gained you
one victory. 'In attempting to compare the influence of the pen over the
sword, it should be remembered that Liddell-Hart himself recognized that
the Israelis commanders had not merely fulfilled his principles, but also
improved upon them.' 73
The 1990-91 Gulf War further demonstrated the value of the indirect
approach. The military planners targeted Iraq's leadership and communi-
cation facilities (the centres of administration), munitions factories (sources
of supply) and, defensive weapons, bridges and railroads (severing the
lines of retreat and supply). The aim of this was to soften the battleground
and weaken the enemy's will to resistance before engaging the ground
forces. Massive attacks on the command and control systems caused a
dilemma in the minds of the Iraqi commanders, who were used to main-
taining strict control of their units. General Schwarzkopf recognised that the
Iraqi defences were strongest in the south and as a result he chose the line of
least expectation and the line of least resistance by moving to the west of the
main Iraqi positions and effectively outflanking the Iraqi forces. Repeated
 ]. Mohan Malik 33

rehearsals for an amphibious landing off the Kuwaiti coast were nothing
but an exercise in deception that led Saddam Hussein to believe that the
coalition would attack from the south. Thus the main assault came not from
the south, as expected, but from the west, which was described by General
Schwarzkopf as a 'left hook play'. This manoeuvre allowed the allied forces
to advance to within 100 miles of Baghdad, effectively cutting off the Iraqi
forces in Kuwait and allowing them only a narrow escape route northwards
along the main highway, which then became a graveyard. The rapid move
to cut the lines of communication left the Iraqi forces physically and
psychologically trapped, resulting in their spectacularly swift defeat. The
Allied land operation was preceded by massive air strikes. The physical and
psychological effect this produced implies that the indirect approach may
be extended beyond the continental school approach to include air and
maritime warfare. According to J. C. Wylie, Liddell-Hart's indirect ap-
proach 'is an essential quality for the maritime theory'?4
An analysis of the Gulf War demonstrates that Liddell-Hart's strategy
and maxims are readily applicable today. The operational success of the
Allies in the Gulf War was due to the physical and psychological dislocation
of the Iraqi forces, caused by a combination of the destruction of the
command and control systems, the progressive erosion of morale, deception
and the unexpected adoption of the lines of least expectation and least
resistance. Developments in technology mean that commanders can now
manoeuvre more readily, and enhance their ability to manoeuvre by selec-
tively striking the enemy to bring about dislocation. The greatest contribu-
tion of technology is that it has reduced the limitations imposed by terrain.
In essence, there are now more lines of least resistance from which to
choose. Technology and mobility have extended the range of battle.
Long-range weapons and precision targeting have made distant economic,
communications and psychological targets easily accessible. Any approach
that follows the path of least expectation and threatens the enemy's centre
of gravity, thereby causing them to feel trapped, will achieve strategic
objectives at minimal cost and with the most economic use of military force.
In short, the importance of the indirect approach lies in its emphasis on
psychologically and physically dislocating the enemy, preferably before the
start of the battle. Much of what Liddell-Hart wrote is applicable at both the
operational and the strategic level: surprise, speed, deception, manoeuvre,
destruction of supply lines, flexibility, economy of force, mobility, morale,
and use of lines of least expectation and least resistance. These principles
have stood the test of time and can be called the enduring principles of
limited war. Thus it can be argued that the theoretical underpinnings of
limited war and low-intensity conflict come from the strategic ideas of
Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu. Modem military technology has certainly chan-
ged the nature of war. 'Since 1945, nuclear weapons have largely forestalled
major wars between states, while partisans and freedom fighters outside the
34 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

Clausewitzian model have toppled states all over the world.' 75 The essence
of future war will not be the total destruction or complete rout of the
opponent. Rather it will be minimum destruction, minimum bloodshed
and partial defeat of the opponent. Unlike Clausewitz, who believed that
'war is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds', Liddell-Hart and
Sun Tzu held that the most successful general is the one who achieves his
ends without battle, or with minimal losses. Sun Tzu's notion of winning a
war without fighting a battle - or at least a traditional, close battle - 'may
become the dominant preoccupation of military institutions' ?6
To sum up, the origins of the continental school of strategy go back to
Machiavelli, the Napoleonic wars and the theories of Jomini and Clause-
witz, Liddell-Hart and Sun Tzu. These concepts have influenced the think-
ing of practitioners of the continental strategy right up to the present.

The Maritime School

Influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, advocates of this school hold that

control of the seas will ultimately determine decisions ashore. They believe
that domination of critical sea lanes and choke points enables forces afloat
to exert indirect pressure on forces ashore by means of naval blockades,
interdiction missions and so on. Maritime theory thus consists of control of
the sea and the exploitation of this control to help establish control on the
land. It does not necessarily focus directly on the destruction of enemy
forces, but rather on strangling trade and limiting manoeuvrability.
Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), an American naval officer, is hailed as the
prophet of sea power and naval strategy. According to Margaret Sprout, 'no
other single person has so directly and profoundly influenced the theory of
sea and naval strategy as Mahan'?7 Mahan's two great works, The Influence
of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 and The Influence of Sea Power upon the
French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, were published in 1890 and 1892
respectively. They constitute a naval history of Britain towards the end of
the age of sail. According to Mahan the control of the sea - 'an historic
factor' - 'had never been systematically appreciated and expounded'. 78
The Influence of Sea Power upon History appeared at a uniquely propitious
time. The following decade was crowned with international events of great
significance in naval history: Germany's decision to construct a modem
naval fleet, the Spanish-American War and the consequent emergence of
the United States as a world power. Furthermore, naval architecture and
naval technology had reached later stages of the industrial revolution: sails
had given way to steam, wooden hulls to iron and steel, cannons to rifled
 J. Mohan Malik 35

big guns. New weapons were soon to be introduced and specialised naval
vessels were being designed for specialised naval functions.
The maritime dominance by Great Britain, the supreme example of sea
power at work, was the subject of Mahan's writings. His objective was to
estimate the effect of 'sea power' upon the course of history and the
prosperity of nations. By 'sea power', Mahan meant command of the sea
through naval superiority; and that combination of maritime commerce,
overseas possessions and privileged access to foreign markets which pro-
duces national wealth and greatness (in terms of production, resources,
colonies and markets)?9
The central theme of Mahan's works is simple: in every phase of the
prolonged contest between England and France, from 1688 to the fall of
Napoleon, command of the sea by naval domination, or lack of it, deter-
mined the outcome. 'It was not by attempting great military operations on
land, but by controlling the sea, and through the sea, the world outside
Europe', that English statesmen 'ensured the triumph of their country.' 80
Mahan wrote that naval operations, especially those directed against trade
and logistic supply or redeployment could be crucial to nations waging
land wars. He argued that 'if navies ... exist for the protection of com-
merce, it inevitably follows that 'the stoppage of commerce compels peace.
Wars are won by the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea....
[Wars] are lost by failure to prevent such strangulation of one's own
country. Control of maritime commerce through command of the sea is
the primary function of navies.' 81 'Here was the clue to the rise and fall of
empires [and great powers]: control of the sea or lack of it.' 82 Mahan's
contribution to modem strategy lies in three areas: first, he developed a
philosophy of sea power that won recognition and acceptance far beyond
professional naval circles; second, he formulated a new theory of naval
strategy; and third, he was a critical student of naval tactics.
Naval strategy and sea power are conditioned, in his view, by certain
fundamental natural phenomena (such as a nation's insular or continental
situation) and by national policies related to navies, the merchant marine
and overseas bases. Naval tactics, on the other hand, are concerned with
operations after the beginning of actual combat. Tactics - being the art of
using weapons forged by man - may change as weapons themselves
change. But as the principles of naval strategy have a broader foundation,
they 'remain, as though laid upon a rock' and operate in times of peace as
well as in times of war.
In other words, Mahan argued that technology makes a difference to
naval tactics, not to strategy. This clear distinction between strategy and
tactics was one of the things that raised Mahan above the level of earlier
writers. In Mahan's view, navies are better instruments of national policy
than are armies. Why? Because 'the influence of a navy could be felt where
the national armies cannot go'. 83
36 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

What are the elements of sea power? Extrapolating from the seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century English history, Mahan postulated six 'general
conditions affecting sea power' that he saw as universal and timeless in
character: (1) the geographical location of a country; (2) its physical con-
formation; (3) the extent of its territory; (4) the size of its population; (5) the
national character; and (6) the character and policy of the government. 84
The main theme in Mahan's writings then, is the supreme importance of
sea power in the shaping of national destinies. The major source of his
writings and teachings was Jomini. It is said that Mahan took Jomini to sea.
From Jomini he learned the few principles of land warfare that are applic-
able to war at sea: the principle of concentration; the strategic value of the
central position and interior lines of operations; and the close relationship
between logistics and combat. Mahan insisted that concentration of force is
'the predominant principle' of naval warfare. 85 This, he said, is true of naval
tactics as well as naval strategy. Thus the essence of Mahan's strategic
doctrine is the need to control the sea (or command of the sea), which
can be done only by a concentration of force that is capable of driving
enemy naval and merchant ships from the seas. Command of the sea means
the ability either to bottle up the enemy fleet in port, or to destroy it in battle
if it put to sea. Such a naval battle might, like a land battle according to
Jomini, achieve victory by directing concentrated force onto a weak section
of the enemy- as Nelson did at the Battle of the Nile in 1798. Control of the
sea by reducing the size of the enemy navy is the primary consideration in a
naval war. Therefore, both strategically and tactically, navies should be
employed offensively. According to Mahan, 'In naval warfare, coast defence
is the defensive factor, the navy the offensive factor.' 86
Like Jomini, Mahan laid great stress on logistics. 'Proper naval bases and
access to them by the fleet are essential ingredients to a successful maritime
strategy.' 87 His work is pure Jomini in another sense too. Like Jomini,
Mahan sought to determine the fundamental truths (or principles) of naval
warfare 'which remain constant, and being therefore of universal applica-
tion, can be elevated to the rank of general principles'. 88
The idea of decisive battle also links Mahan with Clausewitz. The sub-
ordination of strategy to policy was as central to his scheme of thought as it
was to that of Clausewitz. 'War,' wrote Mahan in 1896, 'is simply a political
movement, though violent and exceptional in character ... the military arm
awaits upon and is subservient to the political interests and civil power of
the state.' 89 Clausewitz also stressed that war is subordinate to politics.
However Mahan's analysis and interpretations have been criticised by
°
historians, chiefly on the ground of oversimplification by omission. 9 First,
it is argued that 'Mahan's general theories about the influence of sea power
on history do not account for the rise of such obviously non-maritime
empires as Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Turkey under the Otto-
mans, and Germany under Bismark.' Besides, it is contended that
 J. Mohan Malik 37

many factors other than naval superiority must be taken into account to explain
British victories over the French in the period between 1688 and 1815. Mastery of
the seas was no doubt critical, but so were the military (army) operations of
England and its allies on the European continent. So too were the diplomatic
successes of British statesmen in manipulating the balance of power against
France by organizing and sustaining hostile coalitions among its Continental
neighbors. 91

According to Gerald S. Graham, there is no evidence to suggest that 'the

denial of colonial commerce (by the Royal Navy) materially altered the
French strategic position on the continent. ... Loss of "command of the
sea" diminished but never dangerously reduced French resources and
staying power. There was not ... a "strangulation" of France by English
sea power.' Mahan is also guilty of confusing a necessary cause with the
sufficient cause. Sea power one of the many reasons - perhaps a very
important reason - but certainly not the only reason for Britain's victory
over France in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries. 92
Second, since Mahan was opposed to the division of naval forces, he
failed to pay sufficient attention to the requirements of amphibious warfare
and its place in naval strategy. As Philip Crowl observes: 'Power-projection
from the sea, a naval mission of growing significance in the twentieth
century, was thus mostly disregarded by Mahan. Even more important is
his failure to give much serious attention to the interdependence of armies
and navies in wartime.' Mahan 'treated the Royal Navy as an autonomous
agent acting independently of military operations on the Continent and not
much concerned with, or affected by, the outcome of land battles. Coordi-
nation between ground and naval forces, to be sure, was not a salient
feature of warfare in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' (perhaps
because of non-existent communication technology). 93 Still, Mahan's 'ne-
glect of the utility of naval artillery and sea-borne infantry assaults against
targets ashore was a serious omission' in his theory of fundamental and
unchangeable principles of naval warfare. 94 US victory in the Pacific in the
Second World War 'was the product of combined arms, not of the auton-
omous operations of the United States Navy. Developments since 1945 have
further enhanced the interdependence of all armed services and have
blurred former distinctions between land-, air- and sea-based weapons to
a degree inconceivable to Mahan.' 95
Still, to be fair to Mahan it must be said that the issues he addressed are
still relevant. He drew our attention 'to such matters as the meaning of the
concept of national interest; the moral dimensions of military force; the
responsibilities, as well as the opportunities, of world power; the nature of
American dependence on sea lines of communication; the composition of
fleets; the logistical requirements of warfare; and most importantly, the use
of navies as instruments of national policy'. 96 He also clearly recognised the
38 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

interdependence of navies, commerce, resources and overseas markets.

Mahan's writings had a practical influence on German policy second only
to their influence in the United States. In addition The Influence of Sea Power
upon History was adopted as a text in all Japanese naval and military
colleges. No one could dispute his contention that the development of
profitable economic interests overseas is dependent upon the possession
of sea power. Nor could one deny that the possession of sea power is an
essential prerequisite for great-power status. No power can be called a great
or world power unless it has a significant naval capability.

The Aerospace School

The first prophets of air power postulated their ideas well before the First
World War. Major J.D. Fullarton of the British Royal Engineers proposed in
1893 that a nation at war would require 'command of the air' and future
conflicts would see 'the chief work ... done in the air, and the arrival of the
aerial fleet over the enemy's capital will probably conclude the campaign'. 97
H. G. Wells' novel War in the Air, written in 1908, described an aerial assault
that made all preceding technology redundant and caused devastation
beyond that previously experienced. 98 These visionaries, however, are not
the accepted 'early advocates of air power'. That distinction lies with others
who provided the conceptual foundation for the use of air power.

Guilo Douhet, Billy Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard and Alexander

de Seversky

The 'early advocates' refers to those involved in promoting the importance

of air power prior to the Second World War. Air power's original propo-
nents include Guilo Douhet (1869-1930) of Italy, William (Billy) Mitchell
(1879-1936) of the United States, Sir Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956) of Britain
and Alexander de Seversky (1894-1974) of Russia. They are called 'early
advocates' because they 'postulated their ideas at a time Gust after the First
World War), [when] little ex.fgerience had been gained from the use of
aircraft for military purposes'. 9 Unlike the continental and maritime strate-
gists, the early air power theorists were unable to base their theories on the
lessons of history. They essentially argued that air power was, or had the
potential to be, a weapon of immense capability. Therefore the war of
attrition experienced in the First World War, which led to significant loss
of life, could become a thing of the past. Much like Liddell-Hart, their ideas
 J. Mohan Malik 39

were influenced by the conduct of the First World War. They believed that
the outcome of future conflict would be decided not on the ground in trench
warfare, but up in the air. They were all convinced that strategic bombing or
the use of offensive air power could shatter the morale of the civilian
population and destroy the enemy's defence-industrial infrastructure and
thereby end the war very quickly.
By air power, we mean the use of aircraft for military purposes. Air
power has redrawn traditional battle lines and introduced a third dimen-
sion into warfare. With this, the claim that air power is 'the ultimate
strategic weapon' has often been advanced- 'ultimate' in the sense that it
is final and decisive and impossible to exceed or override; and 'strategic' in
the sense that it is used as an instrument of national policy. To be 'the
ultimate strategic weapon', a weapon system must be capable of bringing
about the 'surrender' of a nation through its strategic and not its tactical
application, in a manner superior to all other means.
In this context it is useful to remember the distinction between a 'strategic
weapon' and a 'strategic strike'. A strategic strike is the tactical or opera-
tional application of a particular weapon system. The Israeli air raid against
Iraqi nuclear installations in the early 1980s is a good example of a strategic
strike. A strategic weapon, on the other hand, is a weapon system with the
utility or the capability to achieve strategic goals. An ultimate strategic
weapon can therefore be interpreted as a weapon that enables the execution
of a strategy. The aerial atomic attacks on Japan in August 1945 are the only
example of this. In this sense an aircraft armed with nuclear weapons can be
regarded as an ultimate strategic weapon if it brings about the complete
surrender of the enemy.
What follows is a comparative analysis of the theories espoused by
Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard and Seversky and whether their theories have
stood the test of time, plus a brief analysis of the role of air power in the
1990--91 Gulf War. As noted earlier, 'any study of classical strategists must
bear in mind the time and context in which they postulated their ideas. Each
was driven by his own national view of history, geography, economics,
politics, science, technology, psychology, society and military affairs ....
[Air power theorists] were more concerned with developing theories spe-
cific to their respective nations', not with rcroducing a universal theory
based upon commonly accepted principles. 1 0
Giulio Douhet, an Italian army officer, is the best known of the early air
power advocates. In his book Command of the Air, published in 1921, he
enunciated a theory for the strategic application of air power. He argued
that 'To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the
air means defeat.' Douhet' s concepts reflect Italy's geographic position. Due
to Italy's susceptibility to invasion, Douhet believed that a 'first strike'
capability was necessary to ensure the maintenance of the sovereignty of
his nation. Thus he recommended offensive action to achieve defence.
40 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

Douhet wrote: 'Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in
the character of war, not those who adapt themselves after the changes
occur.' 101 The key elements of Douhet's theory are that command of the air
or air supremacy is essential to victory. The enemy air force should be
destroyed on the ground through attacks on airfields and aircraft factories.
The airplane is 'the offensive weapon par excellence'; and all future con-
flicts would be 'unrestrained total wars with no distinction between com-
batants and non-combatants. The entire population and all the resources of
a nation would be sucked into the war because wars would be won by
attacking the weakest points in the enemy's defences, that is, population
centres and civilian morale.' Successful offensives by ground forces are no
longer possible. Douhet also emphasised the need for the 'progressive
decrease of land and naval forces'. As a result, a nation must be prepared
at the outset to launch massive bombing attacks on the enemy's centres of
population, government and industry - hit first and hit hard to shatter
civilian morale, leave the enemy government no option but to seek peace;
and to do this, an independent air force armed with long-range bombers is
the primary requirement. 102
Douhet predicted that death and destruction inflicted on the enemy by
bombers laden with high explosives, chemical or biological weapons would
lead to a complete breakdown of the social structure of the enemy country
and the terrified public would induce their government to surrender.
Douhet advocated the deployment of aircraft, not as a means of augmenting
existing ground forces, but as a means of taking war to the very heart of the
enemy, 'by the bombardment of the centres of population in an effort to
destroy opposition civilian morale' .103 In Douhet' s doctrine, victory is
assured when 'command of the air' has been achieved.
Douhet expressed air power in its purest form, unhindered by a counter-
force. In his view there is no other weapon, be it machine gun or tank,
capable of changing the face of warfare like air power. In Douhet' s thinking,
air power is the ultimate strategic weapon because he defined strategy only
in terms of the imagined destructive potential of air power. For Douhet
there was only one strategy, and that was total war.
Douhet dismissed the effectiveness of surface air defences such as radar,
arguing that 'Nothing man can do on the surface of the earth can interfere
with a plane in flight.' 104 How wrong he was! This tendency to ignore or
underestimate any technological, organisational or tactical means by which
a nation could defend itself from aerial bombardment led him to over-
estimate the effect of bombing on civilian morale and national pride.
As noted earlier, Douhet' s ideas were influenced by the First World War,
which was characterised by stalemate and mutual mass slaughter. It was
against this background that strategists such as Douhet and Liddell-Hart
were looking for short-cuts to victory. And air power was seen as providing
that short cut to victory. As he wrote: 'Future wars may yet prove to be
 J. Mohan Malik 41

more humane than wars in the past in spite of all, because they may in the
long run shed less blood.dos
Billy Mitchell led the campaign in the United States for an independent
air force. His ideas were somewhat less strident than those of Douhet,
however. Mitchell had a broader interest than Douhet in all levels and
types of aircraft, not just bombers. He advocated a mixed air force of fighter,
pursuit and bombing aircraft. This 'mix' was necessary to complete his
concept of operations for the defence of his country. The central theme of
Mitchell's work was not strategic bombing but 'the centralized coordination
of all air assets under the control of an autonomous air force command'. 106
If this was achieved, he felt, everything else would fall into its proper place.
Unlike Douhet, the air force for Mitchell was the 'shield and the sword'
(first defence, then offence) rather than a purely a first-strike force. He did
not want to limit air power to a purely strategic bombardment role. Mitchell
foresaw the use of air power in support of ground operations, against
shipping and in air combat operations. He believed in the tactical use of
air power for the destruction of enemy surface combat forces. He argued for
selective military targeting, in contrast to Douhet' s bombing of population
centres.
Mitchell did not advocate air power at the expense of ground forces. He
did not think, as Douhet did, that the enemy's surface forces could be
ignored. Nor was he convinced of the ability of air power alone to achieve
victory. He 'appreciated the importance of concerted action between land,
sea and air forces' .107
There were, however, some similarities in the strategic thinking of Mitch-
ell and Douhet. Mitchell was convinced that 'in an age of aerial warfare,
ground and naval campaigns were subsidiary to the main air effort, if not
totally unnecessary'. 108 He provided a dramatic demonstration of his the-
ories by sinking the captured German dreadnought Ostfriesland with 2000
pound bombs during trials off the coast of Norfolk, Virginia in 1921.109 He
echoed Douhet by saying that 'neither armies nor navies can exist unless the
air is controlled over them'. Like Douhet, Mitchell believed that strategic
bombing could have 'a greater influence on the ultimate decision of war
than any other arm', and in the long run would provide a more humane
outcome to war. Also like Douhet, he 'failed to conceive the effectiveness
that Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Surface-to-Air Missile systems were to
achieve'.U 0 Mitchell's advocacy of a mixed air force structure shows his
preference for a tactical aviation role. This could be interpreted to mean
that, for Mitchell, air power was not the ultimate strategic weapon in the
sense it was for Douhet. For Mitchell, air power was a strategic weapon but
not the ultimate strategic weapon.
Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard, also called the Father of the Royal Air
Force, was the only early air power advocate to command an independent
air force. He subscribed to Douhet's belief that 'the nation that would stand
42 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

being bombed the longest would win in the end'. 111 His ideas are consid-
ered less consistent than those of some other theorists however. Like
Douhet, he believed there was no defence against the bomber and that
bombing would have a massive moral and material effect that would be
sufficient to break down an enemy's resistance. Trenchard proposed four
principles for the use of air power: (1) gain and maintain air supremacy; (2)
destroy, through strategic bombing, the enemy's means of production and
communications; (3) prevent enemy interference with friendly land, sea and
air operations; and (4) prevent the freedom of action of enemy land, sea and
air forces.
Like Douhet and Mitchell, Trenchard believed that there was 'abundant
evidence that armies and navies are powerless unless we [the air force]
control the air' Y 2 Trenchard saw the navy as serving a valuable role in
protecting one's own trade and disrupting the trade of the enemy, but with
a much smaller fleet composed of small ships and submarines. As for the
army, he saw its initial role as that of 'base' protection and defence of the
homeland with anti-aircraft guns. Once air supremacy had been achieved,
he saw the need for a smaller, 'highly trained, more efficiently equipped
and more mobile army to occupy the enemy's country and to bring about
enemy's ultimate defeat'Y 3
In this later requirement, that of formally occupying the enemy's terri-
tory, Trenchard differed significantly from Douhet (and Mitchell). The last
stage of the 1990-91 Gulf War showed the validity of Trenchard's argu-
ment. As General Norman Schwarzkopf wrote, from an infantryman's point
of view 'there would always be a need for an Army. Who had ever seized
and held territory with an airplane.' 114 Furthermore, unlike Douhet, Tren-
chard opposed the indiscriminate bombing of cities but favoured strategic
bombing of 'legitimate military targets . . . even if such attacks caused
incidental loss of civilian life and destruction of civilian property' ys
Trenchard does not appear to have advocated air power as the ultimate
strategic weapon. He did believe that air attacks would produce a much
quicker end to wars, and this indicates that he considered air power to be of
more importance than land power, and therefore like Mitchell he saw air
power as only a strategic weapon. He viewed strategic air power as being
capable of accelerating victory, but a victory that, in the final analysis, must
be earned on the ground.
Like other air power theorists, Alexander de Seversky, in his book Victory
through Air Power, argued that air power was paramount over land and
naval warfare. Like Douhet, he believed that the army and navy would be
required to play a waiting role while the bomber pounded the enemy into
submission. He believed that air power alone could cause an enemy to
surrender without the need to resort to traditional military action. Like
Douhet, he was an enthusiastic advocate of air power as the ultimate
strategic weapon. But much of his writing could be classified as science
 J. Mohan Malik 43

fiction and he is not regarded as a serious strategist. Seversky was more

preoccupied with marketing or propagating the military capacity of avia-
tion.
To sum up, for Douhet and Seversky air power was the ultimate strategic
weapon, for Trenchard it was a strategic weapon, and for Mitchell it was a
weapon of immense potential, capable of augmenting and transforming
battlefield action.
Despite the many, though subtle, differences between the four theorists,
the similarities are notable. They saw the aeroplane as the ultimate offensive
weapon and believed that anti-aircraft artillery would be ineffective, and
also doubted the efficacy of airborne interception. They all emphasised the
importance of strategic bombing to shatter the enemy's economic, industrial
and population centres and its will to wage war; the need for an indepen-
dent air force and the offensive use of air power as the guiding strategy; the
need to gain and maintain command of the air, or air supremacy; the need
to relegate ground and naval forces to secondary roles; and the need to see
air power primarily as a means of deterrence and coercion.
Subsequent air wars have confirmed some of the ideas of the early
theorists but have also revealed serious shortcomings. The Second World
War provided the first opportunity to validate these theories. But the war
showed that Douhet and others had been too optimistic. Firstly, effective air
defences could be used against bombing campaigns, both from the air and
the ground. Secondly, bombing raids against the civilian population were
not as effective as the air power theorists thought. As a matter of fact,
during the blitz, civilian morale increased in defiance.
Though weapons of mass destruction (gas and biological weapons) were
not used in the Second World War, one could argue that the aerial delivery
of atomic bombs at the end of war was consistent with Douhet' s theory of
air power. Thus only in the case of nuclear warfare did air power prove its
potential as the ultimate strategic weapon. In subsequent conflicts, how-
ever, total war has been avoided. Douhet' s principle, which required de-
struction of the enemy's air force on the ground, was the basis of Israeli's
strategy in the 1967 war and it helped to bring Israel a quick victory. The
Second World War did support the more general theories of Mitchell. His
concept of air power included the need for bombers, fighters and ground
attack aircraft, and together these did contribute to victory. The limitations
of air power were evident in conventional conflicts in the Middle East,
Korea and the Indian subcontinent and in revolutionary warfare (such as in
Vietnam and Afghanistan), demonstrating that air power is not necessarily
the panacea the early advocates portrayed.
The 1990-91 Gulf War has been seen as a watershed for air power, with
some military observers claiming that it represents an outstanding success
for the air power theorists. The total paralysis of the Iraqi Air Force and the
ineffectiveness of ground and air defence systems allowed the allied forces
44 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

to gain air supremacy and launch deep penetration strikes. Apart from
destroying vital military and industrial facilities, air power is believed to
have brought sufficient pressure to bear on the civilian population to shatter
the Iraqi's will to fight. Though no weapons of mass destruction were used,
this strategy appears to have been an almost classical Douhetian air power
strategy. During the Gulf War 'a big banner in the snack bar at the US Air
Command Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, proclaimed
that: "Mitchell and Douhet were right!" ' 116 Edward Luttwak declared that
'[i]n Desert Storm, air warfare had finally recovered the lost qualities of Air
Power that Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard and other theorists of the 1920s
had taken for granted ... the promise of "victory through Air Power" was
finally redeemed in the Iraq air war' _11 7 Had the early air power advocates
been able to follow the events of early 1991, there is little doubt that each
would have claimed some credit for the successful employment of air
power during the Gulf War. Some even claim that the war against Ira~
was won by air power alone long before the start of the ground offensiveY
However it is inappropriate and premature to say that air power alone
won the Gulf War. The Gulf War did highlight the effectiveness of air
power in a limited war, but the combined onslaught of the world's most
modem, high-tech air powers failed to destroy Iraq's military machine,
especially its nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile production centres. This
was despite the fact that Iraq's air defences were weak and its air force
played hardly any role in the war. Moreover Eliot Cohen contends that the
air campaign had very little to do with the kinds of operation envisaged by
the original theorists. No theorist envisaged an attack on the telecommuni-
cations systems of an enemy or the ability to attack large population centres
without killing many civilians. He claims that the Gulf War showed the
potential strength of air power but under extremely favourable conditions.
'Militarily, the coalition enjoyed a favourable air situation, qualitatively and
quantitatively, from the very beginning of offensive operations.' 119 As
Cohen argues: 'Increasingly, all forms of warfare have an air component:
armies and navies cannot function unless they exploit the third dimension.
This trend, however, does not necessarily mean the dominance of air forces
as we have known them, much less the vindication of early theories of aerial
warfare. 120 Air power can wreak great destruction in favourable circum-
stances, circumstances that may well not apply in future conflicts. It is also
unlikely that a future Third World combatant would behave in a similar
manner. Nor is one likely to present a target system suitable for attack, as
did Iraq. Not only that, the Gulf War will stimulate a search for cheaper and
more effective air defence systems that may make the future use of air
power less effective.
The success of air power in the Gulf War was most evident in its tactical
application against surface forces. When used together with an effective
psychological operations campaign, it encouraged mass surrender. In this
 J. Mohan Malik 45

sense the Gulf War shows that air power is indeed a valuable strategic
weapon, but certainly not the ultimate strategic weapon.
Here it is worth remembering one important fact: throughout history,
weapons have appeared that have been referred to as 'the ultimate strategic
weapon', or a weapon for which there is no answer. Just as frequently,
weapons have been developed to counter them. For example the longbow
prompted the introduction of body armour, with the sword came the shield,
surface fleets saw the evolution of submarines, anti-aircraft defences were
built to counter air attacks, and nuclear weapons, which until recently were
seen as the ultimate strategic weapons, have not proved to be an exception.
For example the US 'Strategic Defense Initiative' or 'Star Wars' project was
aimed at rendering nuclear weapons obsolete in the twenty-first century.
Hence we must take care when assessing the impact of a new weapon
system and selecting the force structure. Those early advocates of air power
who considered it the ultimate strategic weapon did so because they
incorrectly assessed the nature of air power and strategy. They did not
fully understand air power's limitations; they overestimated its effect and
potential; and they failed to appreciate that the technological, organisa-
tional, tactical and political reactions to the threat posed by air power would
render it less potent. Put simply, they underestimated human ingenuity.
The fact that some analysts advocated fighting the Gulf War with air power
alone shows that the risk of repeating the errors of the past is always there.
Although it cannot be denied that modem air power has gained much with
the introduction of precision guided munitions, as demonstrated in the Gulf
War, the idea of air power winning wars by itself is likely to remain an
illusion until air forces acquire a weapon that is both destructive and
discriminatory and is used in a total war. With the advent of second-strike
capabilities, Douhet' s first-strike concept has lost all practical relevance.
Besides, as will be argued in Chapter 9, total war is less likely now. In the
twenty-first century, localised, regional wars are much more likely than a
no-holds-barred, global shootout. The Gulf War showed that air power can
be highly effective when its limitations are understood and it is used
without compromise in limited wars for limited purposes. Air power is
not a panacea for all types of conflict. Alone it has not and will not deliver
victory. It appears that Mitchell's less ambitious claims for air power have
so far been vindicated in what is still a developing area of warfare.

The Revolutionary School

Revolutionary warfare differs from conventional interstate or international

conflicts in the sense that revolutionary wars are intrastate wars; they occur
46 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

within states. The chief objective of revolutionary war is 'the seizure of

political power by the use of armed force, destruction of an existing societ;(;
and its institutions and their replacement with new state structure' .1 1
Marx, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara were the
leading proponents and practitioners of this type of warfare. Widespread
popular discontent is the primary cause of revolutionary war. 'The revolu-
tionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilising the
masses and by relying on them', said Mao Tse-tung. Moreover 'a revolu-
tionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action' .122
Revolutionary warfare can assume different forms: wars of national
liberation, rebellions against or violent efforts to overthrow an established
sociopolitical system, civil war or people's war, secessionist movements,
guerrilla war, insurgency and small wars. According to John Shy and
Thomas Collier, 'Revolutionary warfare, as a fully developed concept, is a
relatively recent phenomenon largely because it is so closely associated
with two aspects of modernity- industrialism and imperialism.' 123 Nation-
alists, Marxists and other radical critics of imperialism, capitalism and
feudalism were among the first to mobilise people in support of armed
struggle to overthrow oppressive regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin Amer-
ica. There are others who argue that this type of warfare has always existed.
It is reminiscent of medieval warfare, which was marked by widespread
pillage and the avoidance of pitched battles. They attribute the strategic
principles of revolutionary warfare to Sun Tzu. In fact contemporary inter-
est in Sun Tzu owes a great deal to the success of revolutionary and
insurgency movements in the twentieth century, particularly the campaigns
of Mao Tse-tung in China and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. Many of Sun Tzu's
strategic ideas were adopted by the practitioners of guerrilla warfare -
avoid costly pitched battles, attack weakness and avoid strength, use hit
and run tactics, elude enemy pursuit by hiding in the hills, in forests or
among the populace, and forage off of the enemy. 124 Thus in a sense Sun
Tzu laid the foundations of revolutionary warfare. Mao Tse-tung was a
great admirer of Sun Tzu and his military writings. All of Sun Tzu's reasons
for taking a country intact were pertinent to Mao as a revolutionary. It
provided his logistical support. Destroying it would have been quite coun-
terproductive and costly to rebuild. His was a battle for the hearts and
minds of the people. Mao's military ideas have the same ring of simplicity
as those of Sun Tzu. When the enemy advances, retreat. When the enemy
halts, advance. When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, attack. When the
enemy retreats, pursue.
Small bands of revolutionaries armed with small arms and the tactics of
revolutionary warfare have succeeded in forcing large occupying armies to
withdraw. Revolutionary war is by and large the tool of the weak against
the strong. That revolutionaries resort to guerrilla warfare reflects their
recognition of the fact that their opponents are stronger militarily. It is said
 ]. Mohan Malik 47

that 'revolutionary war has flourished in the nuclear age precisely because
new weapons have made war between great military powers impossible or
too dangerous'. 125 There have been instances when the growing costs of
waging a conventional war have forced traditional rivals to turn to uncon-
ventional means to achieve their strategic objectives, as in the Middle East
and the Indian subcontinent. As in the past, revolutionary warfare will
remain the predominant form of conflict in the future. As we approach the
turn of the century, revolutionary warfare is manifesting itself in two types
of low-intensity conflict: ethnic conflict and urban warfare. These types of
warfare will be discussed more fully in Chapter 9.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis demonstrates how and why the works of classical
strategists, written more than 200 years ago, remain as relevant in the
information age as they were centuries ago. It provides an understanding
of the origins of modern strategy and how earlier influences continue to
impinge on defence policy makers. While the instruments of war may have
radically changed the conditions of battle, there is an underlying continuity
in ideas about war and how to wage it. Many of the principles of war
outlined by classical strategists are simple and easy to understand - the
difficult part is to apply them. They vary from nation to nation according to
historical experience and need, but it is possible to find certain common
denominators that apply not as a check list to be slavishly followed, but as a
series of common-sense points to be borne in mind. They also serve as a
useful framework for the study of war and strategy.
Concepts such as the objective of battle, concentration of force, economy
of effort, the advantage of superior numbers, the use of surprise, the role of
friction, the uncertainty of war, the centre of gravity, the psychology of
defence and offence, careful planning, the need for peace-after-the-war
thought, strategic reserves, the indirect approach, initiatives at every level,
the political nature of war and the culminating point of victory are timeless.
They form the basis of much current strategic thought and are reflected in
the military doctrines of most modern armies. These principles of war have
stood the tests of analysis, experimentation and practice. These strategies all
form the basis of political objectives in everyday discussions of deterrence,
conflict management, crisis diplomacy, insurgency, arms control and lim-
ited wars in our post-nuclear information age.
To sum up, continental strategy, naval strategy, air strategy and revolu-
tionary strategy have one thing in common: they all emphasise the need to
strike a decisive blow to force one's will upon an opponent, preferably
48 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

without a direct assault on the enemy's main forces. It is important to

ensure that fighting is not prolonged and that a decisive result is achieved
as soon as possible. An important means of achieving this is to be stronger
than one's enemy. These days military planners do not speak in terms of a
continental strategy or an aerospace strategy or a naval strategy. The
Second World War blurred the distinction between the different schools
of classical thought and resulted in the joint application of force, in which
comprehensive strategies were used to combine or coordinate the assets
available in the different dimensions towards a single strategic or opera-
tional objective. As the 1990-91 Gulf War demonstrated, we live in an age of
joint warfare where there is no such thing as a purely land war, sea war or
air war.

Notes

1. C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton,
NJ, 1976) p. 149. And air power theorist Giulio Douhet added: 'Whenever two
men meet, conflict is inevitable.' G. Douhet, The Command of the Air (Rome,
1921, trans. D. Ferrari, Washington, DC, 1983), p. 3.
2. P.A. Crowl, 'Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian', in P. Paret (ed.),
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ,
1986), p. 468.
3. D. K. Palit, War in the Deterrent Age (London, 1966), pp. 32-5, emphasis added.
4. F.J. West, The Classical Strategists (Geelong, Vic., 1990), p. 4; pp. 3-12.
5. M. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA, 1985).
6. R. O'Neill, quoted in Michael Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War
(London, 1965), p. iii.
7. Australian Army, Manual of Land Warfare, Part One, Volume 1, Pamphlet 2. The
Fundamentals of Land Force Operations, 1985 (Canberra, ACT, 1985) pp. 2-4.
8. United States Army, 'Operations', in Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC,
1986).
9. British Army, 'The Fundamentals', in Army Field Manual, vol. 1 (1985); cited in
Z. Lanir, 'The "Principles of War" and Military Thinking', The Journal of
Strategic Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (1993), pp. 1-17.
10. Palit, War in the Deterrent Age, op. cit., p. 34.
11. F. Gilbert, 'Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War', in Paret, Makers of
Modern Strategy, op. cit., pp. 23-6.
12. Ibid., p. 31.
13. H. Lloyd, cited in Howard, The Theory and Practice of War, op. cit., p. 5.
14. Ibid., p. 10.
15. The discussion here draws on J.D. Hittle, fomini and His Summary of the Art of
War (Harrisburg, PA, 1958), pp. 1-37.
 ]. Mohan Malik 49

16. Ibid., p. 30.

17. Ibid., p. 29.
18. C. Brinton et al., 'Jomini', in E.M. Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy:
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ, 1971), p. 85.
19. J. Shy, 'Jomini', in Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, op. cit., p. 146.
20. Brinton, 'Jomini', op. cit., p. 85.
21. Shy, 'Jomini', op. cit., p. 167.
22. Ibid., p. 146.
23. Cited in M. Handel (ed.), Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (London, 1986), p. 8.
24. P. Paret, 'Clausewitz', in Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy, op. cit., p. 198.
25. United States Military Academy, Jomini, Clausewitz, Schlieffen (New York,
1967), p. 23.
26. J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (London, 1961), p. 67.
27. M. Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford, 1983), p. 41.
28. Ibid.
29. Clausewitz, On War, op. cit., p. 204.
30. Hittle, Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War, p. 22.
31. Ibid.
32. Extract from Schwarzkopf video (1992). Emphasis added.
33. Shy, 'Jomini', op. cit., p. 158.
34. Ibid., p. 161.
35. Oausewitz, On War, op. cit., p. 119; also cited in Paret, Makers of Modern
Strategy, op. cit., p. 200.
36. Shy, 'Jomini', op. cit., p. 158.
37. M. Howard, Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 26.
38. United States Military Academy, Jomini, Clausewitz, Schlieffen, op. cit., p. 14.
39. Hittle, Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War, op. cit., p. 28.
40. Ibid., p 36.
41. Ibid., p 36.
42. B. Bond, Liddell-Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (London, 1977), p. 54; B.
Liddell-Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach (London, 1941).
43. Liddell-Hart, ibid., p 182.
44. Ibid., p. 187.
45. Ibid., p. 189.
46. T.R. Phillips (ed.), Sun Tzu- The Art of War (Harrisburg, PA, 1944), p. 55.
47. Ibid., pp. 10-14.
48. Liddell-Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, op. cit., p. 188.
49. Ibid, pp. 215-16
50. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and introduced by S. B. Griffith (Oxford,
1963).
51. Liddell-Hart, The Strategy of the Indirect Approach, op. cit., p. 188.
52. Phillips, Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 12.
53. The discussion below draws on Liddell-Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach,
op. cit., pp. 182-4.
50 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

54. Ibid., p. 193.

55. Ibid., p. 194.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 198.
58. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, op. cit., p. 66.
59. Liddell-Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, op. cit., p. 19.
60. Phillips, Sun Tzu, op. cit., p. 58.
61. Liddell-Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, op. cit., p. 180.
62. Ibid., p 184.
63. 0. Morton, 'Survey: Defence Technology', The Economist, 10 June 1995, p. 13.
64. Liddell-Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach, op. cit., p. 215.
65. Ibid., p. 185.
66. The discussion here is based on Bond, Liddell-Hart, op. cit., p. 51.
67. Ibid., p. 59.
68. Ibid., p. 235.
69. Howard, The Theory and Practice of War, op. cit., pp. 129-85.
70. B. Bond and M. Alexander, 'Liddell-Hart and De Gaulle', in Paret, Makers of
Modern Strategy, op. cit., p. 601. It is often assumed that the blitzkrieg was
invented by Liddell-Hart, but in fact it owes much to the thinking of Moltke
and Schlieffen before the First World War and to the senior German
commanders during that war.
71. Liddell-Hart's Strategy: The Indirect Approach was translated into Hebrew and
widely read in military circles. See Bond, Liddell-Hart, op. cit., p. 245.
72. B. Liddell-Hart, Strategy, 2nd revised edn (London, 1954}, p. 397.
73. Bond, Liddell-Hart, op. cit., pp. 268-9.
74. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Sydney, NSW,
1976), p. 69.
75. M. van Creveld, 'High Technology and the Transformation of War, Part II',
RUSI Journal, vol. 137, no. 6 (1992), p. 63.
76. M.J. Mazarr, The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning
(Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1994), p. 28.
77. M. T. Sprout, 'Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power', in Earle, Makers of Modern
Strategy, op. cit., p. 416.
78. P. A. Crowl,' Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian', in Paret, Makers of
Modern Strategy, op. cit., p. 450.
79. Ibid., pp. 450-1.
80. Ibid., p. 452.
81. Ibid., p. 455.
82. Ibid., p. 450.
83. Ibid., p. 462.
84. Ibid., p. 463.
85. Ibid., pp. 456-7.
86. Ibid., pp. 458-9.
87. Ibid., p. 460.
 ]. Mohan Malik 51

88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., pp. 461-2.
90. The discussion here is based on ibid., p. 450.
91. Ibid., pp. 452-3.
92. Quoted in ibid., pp. 453-4.
93. Ibid., p. 461.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., p. 476.
96. Ibid., p. 477.
97. D. Macisaac, 'Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists', in Paret,
Makers of Modern Strategy, op. cit., p. 627.
98. E. Warner, 'Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare', in Earle
(ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy, op. cit., p. 486.
99. G. W. Waters, 'Why Study the Classical Air Power Theorists', Australian
Defence Force Journal, no. 86 (1991), p. 16.
100. Ibid., p. 17.
101. Douhet, The Command of the Air, op. cit., p. 30; A.J. Forrest, 'Giulio Douhet's
"The Command of the Air"- An Enduring Strategy?', Australian Defence Force
Journal, no. 112 (1995), pp. 3-10.
102. G. Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. D. Ferrari (New York, 1972),
p. 30.
103. Ibid.
104. Warner, 'Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky', op. cit., p. 491.
105. Douhet, The Command of the Air, op. cit., p. 61.
106. Macisaac, 'Voices from the Central Blue', op. cit., p. 631.
107. E. Warner, 'Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare', in E. M.
Earle (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, 1993), p. 498.
108. Macisaac, 'Voices from the Central Blue', op. cit., p. 633.
109. W. Mitchell, Winged Defense (New York, 1988), cited in Earle, Makers of Modern
Strategy, op. cit., p. 485.
110. Waters, 'Why Study the Classical Air Power Theorists', op. cit., p. 18.
111. D. Divine, The Broken Wing: A Study in the British Exercise of Air Power (London,
1966), p. 165.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. H. N. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York, 1993), p. 85.
115. Waters, 'Why Study the Classical Air Power Theorists', op. cit., p. 17.
116. C. G. Segre, 'Giulio Douhet: Strategist, Theorist, Prophet?', Journal of Strategic
Studies, vol. 15, no. 3 (1992), p. 351.
117. Quoted in ibid., p. 351.
118. For example seeN. Ashworth, 'Air Power Can Win Wars', Australian Defence
Force Journal, no. 112 (1995), pp. 13-15.
119. Quoted in M. J. Dugan, 'Operational Experience and Future Applications of
Air Power', RUSI Journal, August 1992, p. 35.
52 The Evolution of Strategic Thought

120. E. A. Cohen, 'The Meaning and Future of Air Power', Orbis, vol. 39, no. 2
(1995), p. 189.
121. J. Shy and T. W. Collier, 'Revolutionary War', in Paret, Makers of Modern
Strategy, op. cit., p. 817.
122. S. B. Griffith II, 'Introduction', Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York,
1961), p. 4.
123. Shy and Collier, 'Revolutionary War', op. cit., p. 822.
124. Ibid., p. 823.
125. Ibid., p. 818.