INSTITUTO SUPERIOR FEDERAL D-235

LENGUAS
COMPARADAS
EJE I

Prof.:Rivarola
Milagros
Chapter 1
Introduction: semantics and praglllatics

The fate of the earth depends on cross-cultural communication.

Deborah Tannen (1986:30)

1. Language as a tool of human interaction

This book is devoted to the study of language as a tool of human interac-

tion. It investigates various kinds of meanings which can be conveyed
in language (not in one language, but in different languages of the
world) - meanings which involve the interaction between the speaker
and the hearer.
It could be argued, of course, that all meanings involve interaction
between the speaker and the hearer: whether we talk about colours, ani-
mals, children, love, the fate of the universe, or even pure mathematics,
we use language as a tool of social interaction.
In some sense this is true. Nonetheless, there are words which involve
directly the concepts of 'I' and 'you', and interaction between 'I' and
'you', and there are others which do not. Similarly, there are grammati-
cal categories, and grammatical constructions, which involve these
concepts directly, and there are others which do not. For example, the
English words blue and yellow make no reference to the speaker, the
addressee, or the relationship between them; on the other hand, words
such as darling, bastard, already, yuk, thanks, or goodbye do. Similarly,
grammatical categories such as singular and plural number (dog vs. dogs)
or masculine and feminine gender (for example, la lille 'girl' vs. Ie
garfon 'boy' in French) do not involve the speaker, the addressee, or
the relationship between them; whereas categories such as diminutives
(doggie vs. dog), augmentatives (for example, problemon, problemazo
'big problem' vs. problema 'problem' in Spanish) or honorifics (for
example, otaku 'esteemed house' vs. ie 'house' in Japanese) do.
2 Introduction: semantics and pragmatics

At the level of grammatical constructions, the choice between an

imper~tive (a) and a so-called 'whimperative ' (b):
a. Sign this.
b. Would you sign this.
involves directly the relationship between the speaker and the addressee,
whereas the choice between a relative clause (a) and a participial
construction (b) does not:
a. The boy who was sitting in front ...
b. The boy sitting in front ...
This book, then, deals with words, categories, constructions, and
linguistic routines which involve interpersonal interaction, that is, which
involve, more or less directly, you and me. It is a book about you and
me, and about the different modes of interaction between you and me,
and, more particularly, between me and you (that is, between the speaker
and the hearer); and about cultural values and cultural norms which
shape these different modes of interaction.

2. Different cultures and different modes of interaction

There are many different possible modes of interaction between you and
me, between me and you. They depend partly on what you and I feel
and want at any particular time; but they depend also on who you and I
are - both as individuals and as members of particular social, cultural,
and ethnic groups. For example, if you and I are Japanese our interaction
will be different than it would be if we were both Americans or Russians.
And if we were both Americans, the prevailing modes of our interaction
would probably depend on whether we were white or black, Jewish or
non-Jewish, and so on.
Consider, for example, a typical Australian utterance such as Silly old
bugger!, recently used in public, in front of the television cameras, by
the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Bob Hawke, during a meet-the-public
session, when he was goaded by an old-age pensioner about high parlia-
mentary salaries. One has to know a good deal about Australian culture
and society (cf. Chapter 5) to interpret correctly the communicative value
 Different cultures and different modes of interaction 3

of this remark. In particular, one has to understand the link between

the common use of 'b-words' such as bugger, bastard, and bloody (cf.
Baker 1966:201) and the core Australian values of 'roughness', 'anti-
sentimentality', 'sincerity' and so on (cf. Renwick 1980; Wierzbicka, to
appear, chap. 11).
Similarly, one has to appreciate the core Australian values of
'mateship', 'toughness', 'anti-verbosity', 'anti-emotionality' and so on,
to appreciate the attitudes expressed in characteristic Australian greeting
e'xchanges (Bowles 1986:37; cf. Chapter 4):
G'day, mate, owyagowin?
Nobbad. Owsyerself? (Or: earn complain.)
In some cases, culture-specific modes of interaction have their own
folk names (cf. Chapter 5). This is the case with Black English speech
events such as 'rapping' or 'sounding', which can be illustrated with the
following characteristic utterances (Kochman 1972):
Baby, you're fine enough to make me spend my rent money.
(A 'rap' from a man to a woman.)
Baby, I sho' dig your mellow action. (Another e/xample of 'rap-
ping' to a woman.)
Yo mama is so bowlegged, she looks like a bite out of a donut.
(A 'sound' from a schoolboy to another schoolboy.)
But this is not necessarily always the case. Consider, for example, the
following conversation, from a short story by the Jewish-American
writer, Bernard Malamud:
[When he knocked, the door was opened by a thin, asthmatic, grey-haired
woman, in felt slippers.]
'Yes?' she said, expecting nothing. She listened without listening . He
could have sworn he had seen her, too, before but knew it was an
illusion.
'Salzman-does he live here? Pinye Salzman,' he said, 'the matchmaker?'
She stared at him a long minute. 'Of course.'
He felt embarrassed. 'Is he in?'
'No.' Her mouth, though left open, offered nothing more.
'The matter is urgent. Can you tell me where his office is?'
'In the air.' She pointed upward.
'You mean he has no office?' Leo asked.
'In his socks.' (... )
4 Introduction: semantics and pragmatics

'Where is he?' he insisted. 'I've got to see your husband.'

At length she answered, 'So who knows where he is? Every time he
thinks a new thought he runs to a different place. Go home, he will
find you.'
'Tell him Leo Finkle.'
She gave no sign she had heard.
(Malamud 1958:210-211)
The story is written in English, and it includes no unusual or non-
standard words, but the ways of speaking and of interacting reflected
here are those characteristic of Yiddish, not of (mainstream) American
English. Note in particular the use of No and Of course, the bare
imperatives Tell him and Go home, the rhetorical question Who knows?,
the irony, the wry humour, the bluntness and the gruffness (for discus-
sion, see Chapter 3 below).
And one last group of examples - English translations of typical
Yiddish blessings and curses (Matisoff 1979):
A lament to you, are you crazy or just feeble-minded?
Oh, you should be healthy, what a mess you've made here!
May he live - but not long.
A black year on her, all day long she chewed my ear off with
trivia!
My wife - must she live? - gave it away to him for nothing.
His son-in-law - may he grow like an onion with his head in
the earth - sold it to me.
Maybe my mother-in-law is going to visit us the day after
tomorrow, may the evil hour not come!
All such utterances encode important interactional meanings. This
book explores such meanings, and their cultural significance, and offers
a framework within which they can be described in an illuminating
and rigorous way.
 Pragmatics - the study of human interaction 5

3. Pragmatics - the study of human interaction

The discipline studying linguistic interaction between 'I' and 'you' is

called pragmatics, and the present book is a work in pragmatics. It
differs, however, from other works in pragmatics in so far as it is also a
work in semantics - not in the sense that some chapters of the book
are devoted to pragmatics, and others, to semantics, but in the sense that
pragmatics is approached here as a part, or an aspect, of semantics; and
this is the major theoretical novum of the present approach.
I will explain what I mean by means of an example. Let us consider
first the words question and ask, sentences (questions) such as What time
is it?, so-called 'indirect questions' such as I don't know what time it is,
and so-called pre-questions, such as Do you know what time it is?
Traditionally, the word question would be described in a dictionary,
the sentence type illustrated by What time is it? would be discussed in a
chapter of a grammar devoted to 'interrogative constructions', and the
type illustrated by I don't know what time it is in a chapter of a grammar
devoted to 'indirect questions', whereas expressions such as Do you
know, Did you know or You know would be discussed (if at all) in some
works on 'discourse strategies', 'discourse markers', or on 'organisation
of conversation'. Thus, these different descriptions of words, grammati-
cal constructions, and 'pragmatic devices' would be discussed in totally
different types of works, and in totally different frameworks - as if
they had nothing in common whatsoever.
In fact, however, they are of course closely related. They all involve
crucially the concepts of 'knowing', 'not knowing', and 'saying'; and
they all involve the concepts of 'you' and 'I'. They all involve some
semantic components such as 'I don't know' or 'you don't know', 'I
say' and 'I want you to say', 'I want to know' or 'I want you to know'.
All these are 'interactional' (or 'pragmatic') meanings. To understand
human interaction we have to understand 'interactional' meanings
expressed in speech; and we have to have suitable analytical tools for
identifying and describing such meanings.
In the past, analytical tools of this kind were sorely lacking. Quite
apart from the compartmentalisation of linguistic descriptions, which
made it impossible to even raise the question of the semantics of human
interaction, there were simply no adequate tools for describing any
kind of interactional meanings. Standard lexicographic descriptions of
6 Introduction: semantics and pragmatics

words such as question or ask illustrate rather well the general level of
precision and clarity prevailing in the description of such meanings. For
example, Longman's ambitious Dictionary of the English Language
(LDOTEL 1984), which, according to its jacket blurb, "provides unrival-
led access to contemporary English and the way it is used", offers us
the following definitions:
question a command or interrogative expression used to
elicit information or a response
interrogative - an interrogative utterance, a question
command the act of commanding
response an act of responding
(to) respond to write or speak in reply
(to) reply to respond in words or writing
All such explanations of interactional meanings (like, incidentally, those
of any other meanings) are, clearly, totally circular. But it is an illusion
to think that circularity of this kind is exclusively a feature of diction-
aries (which are, after all, modest practical reference works), whereas
scholarly literature on language use is somehow different. It is not
different. It relies on various more or less technical-sounding labels
(such as, for example, 'face', 'distance', 'indirectness', 'solidarity', 'inti-
macy', 'formality', and so on), which are never defined; or if they are
defined, they are defined in ways which prove, sooner or later, to be just
as circular and obscure as traditional dictionary definitions. Furthermore,
they are defined in terms which are language-specific (usually, English-
specific), and which provide no language-independent, universal per-
spective on the meanings expressed in linguistic interaction.

4. The natural semantic metalanguage

To compare meanings one has to be able to state them. To state the

meaning of a word, an expression or a construction, one needs a seman-
tic metalanguage. To compare meanings expressed in different languages
and different cultures, one needs a semantic metalanguage independent,
in essence, of any particular language or culture - and yet accessible
and open to interpretation through any language.
 The natural semantic metalanguage 7

1 propose for this purpose a 'natural semantic metalanguage', based on

a hypothetical system of universal semantic primitives, which my
colleagues and 1 have developed over more than two decades (see, in
particular, Boguslawski 1966, 1972, 1975, 1981a,b, 1989; Wierzbicka
1972, 1980, 1987, 1988, 1989a,b; Goddard 1989a,b); and this is the
metalanguage employed in the present book.
This means that 1 will try to state the meanings under consideration
in terms of simple and intuitively understandable sentences in natural
language. This, 1 believe, will ensure that the proposed semantic explica-
tions will be immediately verifiable and intuitively revealing. But the
subset of natural language in which the explications are formulated is
highly restricted, standardised, and to a large extent language-independ-
ent (that is, isomorphic to equivalent subsets of other natural languages).
For this reason, the natural language used in the explications - a kind
of highly reduced 'basic English ' - can be viewed as a formal semantic
metalanguage.
The metalanguage applied in the present work is, so to speak, carved
out of natural language - any natural language. For practical reasons,
the version of the metalanguage employed here is carved out of English,
but it could be just as easily carved out of Russian, Latin, Japanese, or
Swahili, because it is based, by and large, on what 1 believe to be the
universal core of natural languages. For example, if 1 say in an
explication: 'I want', 1 mean something that could be just as easily repre-
sented as 'ja xocu' (Russian) or 'ego volo' (Latin). The expression 'I
want' is used here, therefore, not as part of the 'normal' English
language, but as part of the English-based version of the universal
semantic metalanguage.
The metalanguage in question is a technical, artificial language, not a
natural language; nonetheless, it is appropriate and illuminating, 1 think,
to call it a 'natural semantic metalanguage', (cf. Goddard 1989a,b), be-
cause it is derived entirely from natural language and because it can be
understood via natural language without any additional arbitrary signs
and conventions. Arbitrary signs and conventions are not allowed in this
metalanguage, because their meaning would have to be explained - and
these explanations, in their turn, would not be intelligible unless they
were couched in immediately understandable natural language. (On the
other hand, it is allowed to use 'iconic' conventions, such as spatial
arrangement of components, the use of separate lines for different chunks
of meanings, and the like.)
8 Introduction: semantics and pragmatics

Addendum to Chapter 1
The 1991 version of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage included only
27 hypothetical semantic primes, although, as mentioned earlier, a
number of auxiliary concepts, regarded at the time as semantic "mole-
cules" rather than "atoms" were also used in the explications. The cur-
rent, greatly expanded, set includes 60 or so elements. Both versions, the
1991 and the current one, are given below. *
Universal semantic primes (1991 version)
Pronouns Determiners Classifiers Adjectives
I this kind of good
you the same part of bad
someone two
something all
Verbs Modals Place/Time Linkers
want can place like
don't want if/imagine time because
say after (before)
think above (under)
know
do
happen
Universal semantic primes (2003 version)
Substantives: I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING/THING, BODY
Determiners: THIS, THE SAME, OTHER
Quantifiers: ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH/MANY
Evaluators: GOOD, BAD
Descriptors: BIG, SMALL
Mental predicates: THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR
Speech: SAY, WORDS, TRUE
Actions, events and movement: DO, HAPPEN, MOVE
Existence and possession: THERE IS, HAVE
Life and death: LIVE, DIE
Time: WHEN/TIME, NOW, BEFORE, AFTER, A LONG TIME, A SHORT TIME, FOR SOME
TIME, MOMENT
Space: WHERE/PLACE, HERE, ABOVE, BELOW, FAR, NEAR, SIDE, INSIDE, TOUCHING
(CONTACT)
Logical concepts: NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF
Intensifier, augmentor: VERY, MORE
Taxonomy, partonomy: KIND OF, PART OF
Similarity: LIKE

* This paragraph replaces an outdated paragraph from the 1991 edition. This is the only
paragraph in the text of the first edition replaced with a new version. The only other change
in the 1991 text is the addition of the 2003 table of universal semantic primes, on the
same page.
Language Comparison: Core Concepts

Language Comparison: A General Overview

Language comparison is a fundamental practice in linguistics, aiming to analyze similarities and
differences between two or more languages. This comparative approach can provide insights into
linguistic structures, historical relationships, cognitive processes, and practical applications such as
language teaching or translation.

There are two main types of language comparison: synchronic and diachronic.

Synchronic Comparison
Synchronic comparison examines languages as they exist at a given point in time. It focuses on
describing and contrasting linguistic features such as phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and
pragmatics. This type of comparison is often used in contrastive analysis and typological studies. It helps
identify patterns that may affect language acquisition or translation between languages.

For example, comparing English and Spanish word order or tense systems can reveal structural
differences that influence how learners process and produce the second language.

Diachronic Comparison
Diachronic comparison, on the other hand, explores languages through time. It studies how languages
evolve and how they may share a common ancestry. This approach is central to historical linguistics and
involves the reconstruction of proto-languages and the classification of language families.

For instance, the comparative method has been used to reconstruct Proto-Indo-European, the
hypothesized ancestor of many European and South Asian languages. By comparing regular sound
correspondences and morphological patterns, linguists can trace how related languages diverged from a
common origin.

Contrastive Analysis as a Type of Synchronic Comparison

Contrastive Analysis (CA) is a specific form of synchronic language comparison. It involves the systematic
examination of two languages to identify structural similarities and differences, especially with the
purpose of informing language teaching and translation.

CA typically focuses on key linguistic levels such as phonology, morphology, syntax, lexis, and
pragmatics. It aims to predict learning difficulties by highlighting contrasts between a learner’s native
language (L1) and the target language (L2), a process that may lead to positive or negative transfer.

Robert Lado (1957), one of the foundational figures in the field, emphasized that:

"The most effective materials are those that are based upon a scientific description of the language to be
learned, carefully compared with a parallel description of the native language of the learner."
Although early contrastive analysis was strongly predictive, it has since evolved to account for learner
variability, interlanguage development, and error analysis. It remains a valuable tool in both applied
linguistics and language pedagogy.

Purposes of Language Comparison

Language comparison serves multiple goals:
- To understand universal and language-specific features (typology).
- To trace historical connections between languages (genealogical classification).
- To support language teaching through contrastive analysis.
- To aid in translation by identifying cross-linguistic equivalents.
- To inform computational models of language processing and machine translation.

Overall, language comparison is not limited to academic curiosity—it has practical implications for
education, communication, and cultural understanding.

Synchronic and Diachronic Language Comparison: A Closer Look

The distinction between synchronic and diachronic comparison is central in linguistics, particularly when
analyzing the structure, function, and evolution of languages. These two approaches serve different
purposes and are based on different theoretical assumptions.

Synchronic Comparison (Extended)

Synchronic comparison refers to the analysis of languages at a specific point in time, without considering
their historical development. It answers questions like: How do English and French differ in sentence
structure? or How do Japanese and Korean compare in terms of politeness markers?

Key features:
- Focuses on current language systems.
- Often used in typological, contrastive, and functional linguistics.
- Can be monolingual (e.g., comparing dialects) or cross-linguistic (e.g., comparing two unrelated
languages).
- Typically involves surface-level structures such as phonology, morphosyntax, semantics, and
pragmatics.

Applications:
- Useful in second language acquisition research.
- Relevant for machine translation and NLP.
- Essential in language typology.

Examples:
- Comparing SVO word order in English vs. SOV in Turkish.
- Analyzing the use of articles in English vs. their absence in Russian.
Diachronic Comparison (Extended)
Diachronic comparison studies languages over time, aiming to trace their historical development and
evolutionary changes. It is the core of historical linguistics.

Key features:
- Investigates language change in phonetics, morphology, syntax, and semantics.
- Explores language families, etymologies, and sound laws.
- Uses the comparative method to reconstruct proto-languages.

Applications:
- Helps classify languages into families.
- Explains why certain synchronic differences exist.
- Reveals long-term language contact effects.

Examples:
- Evolution of Latin habere into French avoir, Italian avere, and Spanish haber.
- Reconstructing Proto-Germanic from English father, German Vater, and Dutch vader.

Complementarity of Both Approaches

Although synchronic and diachronic comparisons focus on different temporal dimensions, they are
deeply interconnected. A synchronic anomaly might be the result of diachronic change, and vice versa.

Example: English do-support is a synchronic feature better understood through its diachronic
development.

References
- Campbell, L. (2013). Historical Linguistics: An Introduction (3rd ed.). Edinburgh University Press.
- Comrie, B. (1989). Language Universals and Linguistic Typology: Syntax and Morphology. Oxford:
Blackwell.
- Croft, W. (2003). Typology and Universals (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Haspelmath, M. (2010). Understanding Morphology (2nd ed.). Routledge.
- James, C. (1980). Contrastive Analysis. London: Longman.
- Lado, R. (1957). Linguistics Across Cultures: Applied Linguistics for Language Teachers. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
- Odlin, T. (1989). Language Transfer: Cross-Linguistic Influence in Language Learning. Cambridge
University Press.
- Saussure, F. de. (1916/2011). Course in General Linguistics. Open Court Publishing.
 THE ROLE OF SPANISH TRANSFER: THE NEED TO INCLUDE
CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS IN EFL TEACHING

l. INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial issues within the many psycholinguistic aspects involved in
the process of Foreign or Second Language Acquisition is that of the exact role played by the
first language. Generally it is accepted that Transfer, that is, interference frorn the frrst lan-
guage or mother tongue, is an important source for learners' errors. However, it can be said
that it still rernains an open question, since linguists have reached contradictory conclusions.
It seems there is no agreement as to the precise extent to which native language influences,
both fostering and constraining, the process of second or foreign language acquisition. The
.results ofthe nurnerous researches carried out by linguists tend to vary considerably, sorne re-
garding Transfer as prime, and others as marginal. Thus, while Dulay and Burt rnaintained
that fewer than 5 per cent of the errors rnade by Spanish children learning English could be
classified as interference errors, sorne comparative linguistics researches have found that
around 80 per cent of the errors were attributable to interference (Ruiz, 1991: 19). Sorne au-
thors assert that the percentages of errors caused by this interference vary from 33% to as
low as 3% (Abbot & Wingart, 1981: 230). In my own findings, which are reflected in the
Appendix, 63.87% of the errors made by my students at the Faculty of Philology were dueto
negative interference from Spanish. But before focusing on this material, it would be interest-
ing to comrnent briefly on the arguments given by scholars in an attempt to account for these
contradictory results.

2. SOME EXPLANATIONS

The explanation for those controversial conclusions about the role of interference is that
the researches have been based on insufficient or non-comparable data. As Ringbom (1987:
2) states, the role of the jirst language must, of course, be viewed in relation to other impor-
tant variables. At least five factors have been proved to influence the amount and nature of
L1 Transfer. They are the following:
- Firstly, it is important to notice whether we are dealing with Second or Foreign lan-
guage leamers. The former are supposed to learn the target language through verbal con-
tact with native speakers in a natural environment, and usually in combination with ~
instruction. It is also reasonable to think that they must be strongly motivated to learn the
community language in order to integrate themselves into that culture. This is not obvi-
ously the case of my students, who are leaming English as a Foreign language at the Uní-

Some Sundry Wits Gathered Together 1996: 55-71

Maria Isabel González Cruz
 Sorne Sundry Wits Gathered Together

versity. Their contact with English, the target language, only comes through .instruction
and in an L1 environment, with motivational differences. lnterferences are more likely to
occur in this situation, whereas most studies showing a limited role of interference focus
on Lz learning in an Lz environment, where the Lz input is abundant and varied.
- Secondly, the amount of Transfer also tends to vary depending on the stage of learn-
ing. lt has been estimated that interference from the mother tongue is more frequent with
elementary learners in the early stages, and when the Lz is learnt in an L1 environment
(Van Els, 1984: 58-9). Our students were not beginners but their levels varied a lot, rang-
ing from low intermediate to" advanced. Obviously, L1 influence is an indication óf low
acquisition (Krashen, 1988: 67), !Uld therefore not all students have the same problems
with Transfer: the poorer their command of English is, the more they tend to transfer
from Spanish.
- Thirdly, the kind of language task we assign to our students (translation, free composi-
tion, dictation) will also bring about a difference in the frequency of errors. lt has been
suggested (Nickel, 1987) that there is more Transfer in oral tasks and in translations than
in other types of tests or activities. This suggestion could probably be applied to free writ-
ten composition, because the student is in most cases, thinking in his native tongue and
tries to speak in the target language through a process very similar to the one followed in
a translation exercise (Ruiz, 1991: 19). This process is evident in many of the data collec-
ted in the Appendix.
-In the fourth place, there is evidence that the degree of interference is·partly determin-
ed by the degree of translatability between the languages involved. Interference occurs
predominantly when the two languages are closely related; that is, the kind of relation
between the target language and the first language can contribute both to facilitate or to
obstruct learning.
- The fifth factor is Error Analysis itself, since sometimes it is difficult to make a
clearcut distinction between those errors which are attributable to interference and those
which aren't. Besides, EA works with those errors students openly make, but it can not
cope with those errors they deliberately avoid to make, when because of the difficulty of
certain structures they just don't use them - the so called "avoidance phenomena" (Van
Els, 1984: 61-63). ·
There is, however, another argument that claims that those remarkable differences in the
percentages of errors caused by interference can also be due partly to the changes in fashion,
that is, the different theoretical tendencies may have had an influence both on the purposes
and on the results of the studies.

4. CA HYPOTHESIS
From the 40's to the late 60's, the idea that interference from the L1 was the major obsta-
ele to FL Learning was dominan! (Bley-Vronam, 1989: 55). This perspective was maintained
in close connection with the discipline called Contrastive Analysis (CA), which claimed that
the most effective materials for language teaching and learning were those based on a scien-
tific description of the language to be learned, carejully compared with a parallel description

56
 María Isabel González Cruz

ofthe native language ofthe leamer (Dulay-Burt, 1974: 97). Then, in the 70's the general de-
cline in interest in Contrastive Studies in favour of the Communicative approach and cogniti-
ve aspects of language teaching and learning provoked a loss of emphasis on this subject, and
Transfer became almost a dirty word. Another point for criticism on CA was caused by the
fact that sorne of its theoretical assumptions derived from the behaviourist psychology,I
which was no longer in fashion. As Abbot and Wingard (1981: 230) suggest, it seems only
natural that in those days sorne writers were more concemed with proving that there were
many errors which could not be attributed to Transfer, and this may have led them to oversta-
te their case. However, the idea of Transfer has been both respectable and fashionable again
in the 80's (Ringbom, 1987: 1). In short, somehow, the changes in the linguistic tendencies
may have had something to do with the variety of results obtained in the investigations car-
ried out so far to determine the extent to which Transfer negatively affects the process of ac-
quisition of English as a foreign language.
In his article "The exculpation of Contrastive Linguistics", C. James (1983) refuted the main
sources of criticism on the theories of CA. Among many others, he replied to two important
assumptions that have been held against CA: firstly, that CA has never claimed that LJ is the
sole source of error. And secondly, that the only claim Contrastive linguists have made is
their ability to predict behaviour that is likely to occur with greater than random frequency.
Following this line of thought, 1 agree with Wilkins (1972: 201) when he states that CA
should be carried out to provide a linguistic explanation for known errors, rather than as a
predictive procedure. lt really seems more sensible to make errors the starting point for CA
and not just a way of verifying hypothetical predictions. Accordingly, the only prediction we
can make is that the linguistic behaviour of second language leamers in the future is expected
to resemble closely the behaviour of language leamers in the past. And this is something we,
teachers, check every academic year with different groups of students.

5. ERROR ANALYSIS
In general, the field of Error Analysis abounds with controversy on key questions such as
when and how errors should be corrected, and even whether errors should be corrected at all
(Nunan, 1989: 31).2 But on balance, and despite its limitations, the analysis of our students'
errors is an important key toa better understanding ofthe processes underlying LJ. learning.
Errors provide teachers with relevant information on the particular flaws in the students'

1 According to the behaviourist ideas, language was a set of habits; then, when we try to leam the new habits of a se-
cond language, the old ones (!hose of the first language) will interfere. The mother tongue interferences will hinder
or facilitate the forrnation of the new habits of the second language depending on the similarities or differences be-
tween them.
2 Nunan clairns that correcting errors is of little benefit for long-term acquisition, since this is a subconscious pro-
cess, while Error correction and grammatical explanations are consious processes. Another point for criticism of
EA is that it is concemed only with what the leamer cannot do and neglects the more importan! point of what the
leamer can do.

57
 Sorne Sundry Wits Gathered Together

learning stage, so that our teaching should be directed at those points where students have
problems. However, we should also bear in mind, that lower frequency ... need not necessari-
ly mean that the point in question is less difficult (Ringbom, 1987: 70).
When analysing my students' errors, my purpose was not only to establish the frequency but
also the nature of those errors, in an attempt to determine the role Spanish played in their per-
formance· of English and to assess more accurately the kind of remedia! work that was neces-
sary for them. The appendix includes part of the material produced by my students taking
their final English Language exarnination at the Faculty of Philology, in the academic year
1992-93. The errors studied and cite~ here are from the performance data of the compositions
written by a total number of 80 students, who had received instruction in two different groups
of 46 and 34 respectively. The topic for their writing assignment was then Burglary: causes
and prevention. 1 partly followed Wyatt's (1973) system to classify the errors and ascertain
the exact rate at which they occurred in students' writing. They were first of all categorised as
Transfer errors, if Spanish was felt to be their cause, and no-Transfer errors, if that was not
the case. The former were also grouped into general categories according to the linguistic le-
ve! and the class they belonged to: Spelling, sentence structure, verb groups, noun groups,
pronouns, adjectives, prepositions and misuse of words and idioms. For no-Transfer_errors 1
used a similar classification in an attempt to sort out the items of the target language itself
that caused problems.
The figures in Table 1 (Appendix) show that out of a total of 656 errors, 419 could be traced
back to mother tongue interference, whereas, the remaining 237 were attributable to other
problems learners found in dealing with the structure of the English language. Therefore, a
majority of the errors were caused by the influence of their mother tongue, Spanish. Spanish
Transfer has a negative effect on students' performance of noun groups, vocabulary usage,
and sentence structure, which are the areas where they produce more errors; whereas pro-
nouns, verb groups and adjectives seem to cause less difficulty in their writing. As regards
no-Transfer en:ors, 1 carne to the conclusion that English verbs, sentence structure and vocab-
ulary usage lead students to a higher number of errors; while problems with pronouns, articles
and prepositions seem to be less frequent.
There is a considerable similarity in the form of many English and Spanish words. As a re-
sult, students tend to make spelling mistakes in those words which - except for a vowel or a
consonant- clearly resemble their Spanish equivalents, as we can see in the examples given in
Table II, Section A-1, which clearly show confusion with the Spanish spelling. On the other
hand, intralingual or non-Transfer errors in spelling also occur because of students' neglect or
failure to apply spelling rules, such as not doubling consonants, or not changing -i for -y
when adding the -ly ending, or the plural and the -ing morphemes (see table 11, Section B-1 ).
Transfer from Spanish is more frequent at the structurallevel. Most of the errors found in the
structure of the English sentences composed by students have to do with their application of
the features of Spanish syntactic rules when writing in English. First, the order subject+verb,
which is strictly followed in English, is altered as a consequence of direct translation from

58
 María Isabel González Cruz

Spanish structures, where the verb can precede the subject, both in oral and written language.
Thus, in sentence a-l (Table II, Section 2) the student clearly followed the Spanish pattem
when he wrote * In this article appears others important advises. His Spanish habits also in-
terfered and made him add the -s plural morphe¡ne to "other", in agreement with the plural
for the noun "advises". He obviously did not take into account that it is a mass noun- a dis-
tinction which does not exist in Spanish- and, besides, he also failed at the spelling, and used
"s" for "e".
Sentences 2 and 6 in Section 2a (Table II) are also interesting since both derive from direct
translation from Spanish. The only difference is that in sentence 6 the student remembered
the rule that all verbal forms must have a subject in English, and then he added "it" to the
conditional "would not exist". He didn't realise, though, that this way the sentence would
have two subjects, since the real subject of the verb actually appeared just behind it.
In Section 2c we can observe how Spanish tendency to omit the subject is the source of many
errors in students' performance of English. The inflectional endings of Spanish verbaÍ forms
are specific for each grammatical person, and this allows omission, which is impossible in
English. Notice how in sentence b-5, apart from sorne other evident mistakes, the student for-
got to use the subject pronoun for the verbs "leave" and "tell".
Section 2b shows how the position of the Direct Object is a minor source of errors as regards
structure. In English it comes immediately after the verb, especially in constructions with an
Object Attribute. This order can be altered in Spanish, and, therefore, we can find many sen-
tences following a Spanish pattem, like the ones in this section.
Section 2d includes a variety of structural mistakes which are clearly connected with the
Spanish versions they are paraphrasing. Thus, in sentence 1 the student follows the Spanish
expression "estar de acuerdo" by combining the verb "to be+ agree". This is a very frequent
error; the reverse also occurs very often, that is, the omission of the verb "to be" in those En-
glish constructions which do not take that verb form in Spanish, as they do in English. Por
instance, the verb "to be bom" is used without the "be" form, because its equivalent does not
occur in the Spanish verb "nacer". Finally, sentences d-3 and d-4 illustrate the same case: the
student follows the Spanish pattem when he uses the past tense "progressed" and "didn't ex-
ist" (instead of the infinitive "to progress" and "not to exist"), because he has been told that
this tense performs the functions of the subjunctive mood, which is used in the equivalent
Spanish construction, and which does not exist in English.
As regards the errors in Section 3 (verb groups), I observed there was little interference from
Spanish in the Compositions I studied. Only two cases of Transfer have been found. In sen-
tences a-1 and a-2 the student used the simple present to refer to an action in the immediate
future, which should have been expressed with the present continuous in English. A particu-
larly interesting error is the one in sentence b-1. It's the only example of wrong formation of
the tense which could be traced to mother-tongue interference, since most of the errors of this
kind are usually interlingual. Here, the student translated word for word, from Spanish into

59
 Sorne Sundry Wits Gathered Together

English, each of the items that forroed the verbal phrase. He mentally substituted "no ha" for
"haven't", "podido" for "could", "ser" for "be", and "comprobado" for "checked".
However, notice in Section 4 how the bulk of my students' interlingual errors appeared in
Noun groups. Here 1 included errors concerning the use and abuse of articles (examples in
Section 4a), or the unnecessary number agreement between modifier and Noun,like in c-1, c-
2, and c-4. All these errors are unmistakably caused by the interference from Spanish, as well
as the errors in Section b, which can pe explained by the fact that the distinction countable-
uncountable does not exist within Spanish nouns.
Errors in pronouns are also due to structural differences between Spanish and English: note
those in sentences a-1 and a-3, where the personal pronoun "they" (which is used in the
Spanish construction) stands for the corresponding object pronoun in English, "them". The
examples in Section b-5 are cases of addition of a pronoun that would occur in Spanish, but
not in English. And in Section c-5, sentence 1 shows the differences in agreement between
English and Spanish possessive pronouns. In English there is no concord in number between
the possessive forro and the number of things possessed, as it happens in Spanish. That is the
reason why the student wrote "their children" instead of "her children", after mistaking
"their" as the equivalent of the plural possessive forro for the third person "sus" in Spanish.
Likewise, in the following sentence, c-2, the student added the plural morphemt< to the pro-
noun "their", on the analogy of the plural mark in the Spanish "sus".
As regards adjectives, Spanish students have two problems: they tend to use them after the
nouns they qualify (see Section 6) and they also put them in the plural forro, as we can see in
the examples in Section b. Prepositions also constitute a troublesome issue, as the examples
in Section 7 prove. Students suffer a lot of Transfer, either by using them unnecessarily with
verbs that obviously take them in Spanish, or by not using them when they do not occur in
Spanish (see Sections a and b ). On other occasions, they simply write in English the appar-
ently equivalent preposition in Spanish, thus often making the wrong choice, since many
times they do not coincide, as we can observe in Section c. Sometimes, the problerh lies in
the fact that certain prepositions have a wider semantic reference in Spanish, such as por,
which means both "by" and "for", or desde, which can refer both to "since" or "from", or
even worse, en, which can be translated in English for "in", "on", or "at".
Many errors in vocabulary are also caused by the fact that for sorne Spanish words there is a
wider lexical distinction in English. This explains the errors 1 grouped in Section 8-b, where
students have dealt with English lexical items which have a single equivalent in Spanish: both
"treat" and "try" can be translated for "tratar"; "steal" and "rob" are "robar"; "do" and
"make" mean "hacer"; "say" and "tell" stand for "decir"; "pass" and "spend" are "pasar", and
the same happens with the couples "little-few" and "much-many", which mean "poco" and
"mucho", respectively.
On the other hand, similarity in forro between many English and Spanish words - the so call-
ed false friends - provokes many errors, since confusion arises easily in students, who take
"success" for "suceso" ~event), "actual" for "actual" (present, contemporary), "assist" for "a-

60
 María Isabel González Cruz

sistir" (attend), "support" for "soportar" (bear, stand), etc. The existence of so many English-
Spanish cognates invites students to fall back on the invention of vocabulary items by combi-
ning English endings and ~panish roots, every time they fail to find a proper English word. 1
made a long list in Section 9, where students used "satisfacing" (Spanish, satisfacer), for "sat-
isfying"; "retiraded" (retirado), for "retired"; "volunt" (voluntad), for "will"); "periodist"
(periodista), for "journalist"; "publicated" (publicado), for "published"; "argumented" (argu-
ment6), for "argued"; "detenninated" (determinado), for "a certain, specific"; "evit" (evitar),
for "avoid"; "explote" (explotar), for "exploit"; etc.
All the examples given in this part of the Appendix are clear cases of interlingual or Transfer
errors. In sorne cases, there is so much Transfer that it will be difficult to guess the meaning
for someone who doesn't understand Spanish. Note how in sentence 4 (Section 10) the stu-
dent translated word for word from Spanish in an attempt to compose an English sentence
which makes little sense:

I'm going to talk about the motive of the burglaries, because they are so often and as
they are realized, so like, the places where they are produced, who does them and who
social class is frequently stole, and, at the end, as people can stop them, the results in
people's personality and police's behaviour.

Here, this student makes several errors, and most of them are interlingual. First, she uses the
article in "the burglaries"; then she mistakes "because" for "why", probably because the dis-
tinction in Spanish between "por qué" in questions, and "porque", in answers, also causes her
problems. Thirdly, she uses "as" instead of "how", since both "as" and "how" can be trans-
lated in Spanish as "como 1 cómo" respectively; then the words "so" and "like" are combined,
following a Spanish expression, to fonn a hypothetical equivalent of the English idiom "~
well as", which results from joining the separated Spanish meanings of those two words. A
fifth Transfer error has to do with the wider meaning of the Spanish verb "hacer", which
stands both for "do" and "make"; and finally, she uses "at the end" meaning "in the end",
since both expressions have a common translation in Spanish, "al final". On the other hand,
the three remaining. errors underlined are intralingual, and have no relationship with the stu-
dent's mother tongue: she uses "often" as if it were the adjective "frequent", and omits the ar-
ticle when she refers to the Police.
To sum up, this identification of the errors together with a carefullisting or classification
constitute the first and most essential steps in remedial work. Hence, and following George's
(1972: 80) suggestions, we must selecta limited number of those unwanted fonns for remed-
ia! action through classroom study, taking into account factors such as the time available, the
frequency of occurrence of the error and the severity of impainnent of communication.

61
 Sorne Sundry Wits Gathered Together

6. CONCLUSION
The analysis of my students' errors revealed that interference from Spanish, their first
language or mother tongue, is clearly a major source of difficulty for them. The implication is
that a contrastive study of the wrong sentences produced in the target language and the corre-
sponding versions in L1 and Lz will help students overcome a great part of the errors they
máke. This is a strategy that may run counter to the direction in which language teaching
methods have been moving in recent years; but, in my opinion, many of m y students' errors
prove that their potential performance could only be improved thereby.
Obviously, L1 ihfluence is an indication oflow acquisition, and Krashen (1988: 67) assumes
it can be eliminated or at least reduced by natural intake and language use, but, as Van Els
(1984: 59-60) states, in so far as LJ interference occurs in 1-Q learning, CA plays, by defini-
tion, a complementary role. However, for the moment, the teaching materials and syllabuses
have focused exclusively on the structure of the target language, English. Besides, there hasn't
been systematic research into the effect of teaching methods based on CA. As Ruiz ( 1991 :
22) argues, in spite of the massive production of theoretical work, CA has fallen far behind
the theory, since it had very little impact on textbooks, teaching methodology, .and especially
on language teaching practice. In Atkinson's (1987: 247) words,

although the mother tongue is nota suitable basis for a methodology, it has, at alllev-
els, a variety of roles to play which are at present consistently undervalued ... and to
ignore the mother tongue in a monolingual classroom is almost certainly to teach with
less than maximum efficiency".

At present, rather than the question of which percentage of errors in a certain body of data is
attributable to interference, scholars' concem tends to go into a question that remains open to
discussion, and it is not whether transfer exists, but in what circumstances L2 leamers trans-
fer what, how much is transferred and why (Ringbom (1987: 2). However, the amount of
Transfer is likely to vary in accordance with the factors interacting in every leaming situation,
and this is obviously a fact that seems to seriously hinder the development of a general theory
both of language Transfer and Second Language Acquisition.

M" Isabel González Cruz

Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

62
 María Isabel González Cruz

APPENDIX
SUMMARY
Academic Y ear 92-93
Total Number of students 80
Composition Tapie: Burglary: causes and prevention
Total number of errors 656
Transfer errors 419
No Transfer errors 237

T AB LEI:
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE%
A) L-1 TRANSFER ERRORS in EFL 419 63.87%
l. SPELLING = 31 7.39%
a) Vowel errors 4
b) Consonan! error
b) Double Y. single consonants 6
e) Omission of one letter 11
d) Addition of one letter 1
e) Wrong combination of letters 1
2. SENTENCE STRUCTURE = 68 16.22%
a) Subject + Yerb order 22
b) Verb + Direct Object order 9
e) Omission of subject 20
d) Other eonstructions 17
3. VERB GROUPS = 5 1.19%
a) Wrong choice of tense 3
b) Wrong formation ofthe tense 2
4. NOUN GROUPS = 111 26.49%
a) Articles 70
b) Countable Y. uncountable 21
e) Modifier-noun number agreement 19
d) Other (genitiYe) 1
5. PRONOUNS 4 0.95%
a) Plural form for pronouns 1
b) Wrong pronoun 3
6. ADJECTIVES 28 6.68%
a) Wrong order Adj+N 8
b) Plural form for adjeetiYes 16
e) Omission of relatiYe anteceden! 4
7. PREPOSITIONS 66 15.75%
a) Omission of preposition 4
b) Unnecessary prepositions 29
e) Wrong preposition 33
8. VOCABULARY USAGE 106 25.29%
a) Misuse of words & idioms 20
b) No Spanish distinction 61
e) Vocabulary inYention 25

63
 Sorne Sundry Wits Gathered Together

B) NO TRANSFER ERRORS = 237 36.12%

l. SPELLING 23 9.70%
2. SENTENCE STRUCTURE 68 28.69%
a) Doub1e subjeet 12
b) Wrong eonstruetion 14
e) Wrong agreement 42
3. VERB GROUPS 71 29.95%
a) Omission of -s 3rd person singular 21
b) Wrong tense 20
e) Wrong formation of the tense 30
4. NOUN GROUPS 1 0.42%
a) Omission of article 1
5. PRONOUNS 1 0.42%
a) Wrong pronoun 1
6. PREPOSITIONS 9 3.79%
a) Wrong preposition 6
b) Unneeessary preposition 3
7. VOCABULARY 64 27.00%
a) Wrong word 32
b) Wrong word elass 33

T AB LEII: DATA
A) TRANSFER ERRORS

1: SPELLING
a) Vowel error: responsable, desappear
b) Consonant error: frecuently, receibe, essencial, confortable, sofisticated, provoces
e) Double v. single consonant: comunication, atention, posesion
d) Omission of one letter: objetive, goberment
e) Addition of one letter: crimens
e) Wrong combination of letters: inmediately

2: SENTENCE STRUCTURE
a) Subject + Verb order:
In this article appears others important advises
ifwouldn't exist this experiment. .
because is conceded great importance to enviro.nmentalfactors
knowing the causes that involves this problem
ex perts have said how is this process
to demonstrate what's his intention
think about what means to be an old one
it would not exist prívate schools
b) V erb + Direct Object order:
making raise the patriotism

64
 María Isabel González Cruz

violence can provoke in children a great inhibitment

lt can make from them violent people
Punishments could help to make lower the number ofmuggers
problem which has made happy to many couples
lt offers to the public a wide range of selection
e) Omission of subject:
but is more important to respect the Nature
so that seems there's someone living there
the author thinks is necessary to limit fredom
because is where they can get more prestige
Sometimes are we who tent the burglars to rob when, for example leave the house
andforget to close a window or when tell everybody we're going on holiday.
d) Other Wrong constructions ·
!'m entirely disagree
this makes they try to solve their situation
for making easy the burglaries
They are sO usual due to there are many economic problems
they wanted their society progressed
they wanted the poors didn't exist

3: VERB GROUPS
a) Wrong choice of tense:
call the local Police station to tell them they go on holidays.
Don 't say anybody that yo u leave your house
b) Wrong formation oftense:
this proyect haven't could be checked

4: NOUN GROUPS
a) Articles:
We don't worry about the security.
1 believe in the each one's own work
Burglars are interested in the tourism.
to prevent the burglary
The time is the enemy ofthe burglar ..
enjoy in the life
The people ought to protect their properties.
b) Countable v. uncountable:
sorne advises
all your furnitures
our jewelries
e) Modifier-Noun number wrong agreement:
severals cases
others methods

65
 Some Sundry Wits Gathered Together

their owns profits

certains kinds of animals
many others things

5:PRONOUNS
a) Wrong Pronoun:
This makes they try tó
to live where their possibilities let they live
we want they happen
b) Unnecessary pronoun:
find a chair to sit us·
We have to tell ita good neighbour that have a look at our house
Old people have to be treated as adults because they're it.
e) Plural form Pronoun:
A woman could have their children
according to theirs own necessity

6: ADJECTIVES
a) Adj+Noun wrong order:
to create human beings more intelligent
Burglary is an aspect very frightened
Burglary is a theme very difficult
things more expensive
b) Plural form for adjectives:
the poors
We are the responsibles
basics points
They are hungries
many privates banks
.differents views
They are more intelligents
... with very goods results

7: PREPOSITIONS
a) Omission of preposition:
things that be long us
People provide thieves a good opportunity

b) Unnecessary preposition:
... were against of that. .
Despite of the troubles . .
to answer to this question . .

66
 María Isabel González Cruz

call to the Police. .

enter in this world. .
has become in a very important cause. .
e) Wrong preposition:
since another point ojview
Byone hand
By this reason
in the first floor
responsible of .
they make their work of the same way. .
they depend of others

8: MISUSE OF WORDS & IDIOMS

a) Wrong word:
an experiment realized by many scientifics
a familiar can put on the lights
people will be treated by equal
b) No distinetion:
treat-try: Sorne of them treat to give a positive vision
It treats to establish in which cases society must distinguish. .
steal-rob: if yo u steal in a house
to rob many things
do-make: When we want someone to make something
sorne conditions had done this possible
questions they will do in the future
They do old people feel useless
say-tell: what we have said him
to say them the same
.. tell it to the Police
pass-spend: Everybody pass the best moments
most people pass the greater part of .
mueh-many: too much neighbours
so much people
many space at home
little-few: Afew money
e) eognates:
a frecuent succes
the actual increase
any more robs
have assisted to his course
support the terrible scandinavian weather

67
 Sorne Sundry Wits Gathered Together

9. VOCABULARY INVENTION .
. . . the objective of satisfacing .. .
. . . many retiraded swimmers .. .
. . . volunt of superation ...
a periodist ofThe Times has publicated an article . .
Dr Max argumented...
... a determinated kind ofperson ...
. . . to evit the war among nations.
. . . to explote them .
. . . organizated by ...
. . . they are destinated to enjoy ...
. . . they would be obligated to. .
. . . after seleccionating...
. . . was desesperated ...

10. MISCELLANEA- TRANSLATION

1 have heat-
He has 24 years,old-
there would have. more poor countries

!'m going to talk about the motive of the burglaries, because they are so often andas they are
realized, so like, the places where they are produced, who does them and who social class is
frecuently sto/e, and, at the end, as people can stop them, the results in people's personality
and police's behaviour.

B) NO-TRANSFER ERRORS

l. SPELLING
poweifull 1 unluckyly,l nervouss 1 an /rishman who teachs ... 1 wich

2. SENTENCE STRUCTURE
a) Double subject
the world of drugs that it's very poweifull
the burglar's job it's
what /'m looking for it is very different

b) Wrong constructions
In spite the increasing number ofburglaries ...
makes them to give up

68
 María Isabel González Cruz

a crystal hale in the door to can see

There are people's high number in this situation
There is no any
e) Wrong agreement
reasonsthatprovoces
other reason
they seems to live

3. VERB GROUPS
a) Omission of the 3rd person sing. -S
He sell these objects in the street.
a new burglary have happened
someone who have been burgled
Everybody know
b) Wrong tense
The better way to do it is . . fitting a lock. . to prevent burglars when you left home.
They can 't obtain a good job as other people that had studied. .
People who suffered robbs feel bad moments
then 1 realised 1 have been robbered
because it was the first place where they looked. +
b) Wrong formation oftense
without been saw
without being saw
Quinn is given a course+
The fear to be burgled has always remain in our minds
The olds are treating like objects
They will made
All of us has suffering during our lijes
should not to be at home

4. NOUN GROUPS
a) Omission of article
Police always gives them ...

5.PRONOUNS
a) Wrong pronoun
The primitive idea of it's use . .

6. PREPOSITIONS
a) Wrong preposition
their interest on taking ...

69
 Sorne Sundry Wits Gathered Together

to live on this way

on summer
b) Unnecessary preposition
thinking of someone is going to enter
they have to face with their physical problems

7. VOCABULARY
a) Wrongword
burglaries begin to work...
They, burglaries, ·are people who ...
many robbs happen
have been robbered
Doubt to this fact, ...
happy for being alone at least!
Befo re eating you must clean your teeth
b) Wrong word class
To closed all the windows
have to be more consequence
strong punishes
lt is obviously that
so clever than they first stop ...

REFERENCES

Atkinson, D. 1987: The Mother Tongue in the Classroom: a Neglected Resource? ELT Jour-
nal41 14: 241-247.
Abbot, G., Wingard, P. 1981: The Teaching of English asan lnternational Language. Lon-
don, Collins ELT.
Bley Vtoman, R. 1989: What is the Logical Problem of Foreign Language Learning? > Gass-
Schachter, eds. Linguistic Perspectives on Second Language Acquisition. Cambridge,
CUP.
Georg e, H. V. 1972: Common Errors in Language Learning. lnsights from English. Rowley,
Newbury House Publishers.
James, C. 1983: The Excu1pation of Contrastive Linguistics. > Robinet-Schachter, Second
Language Learning. Contrastive Analysis, Error Analysis and Related Aspects. Univer-
sity of Michigan Press.
Krashen, S. D. 1988: Second Language Acquisition and Second Language Learning. London,
Prentice Hall.
N unan, D. 1989: Understanding Language Classroom. A Cuide for Teacher-initiated Action.
London, Prentice Hall.

70
 María Isabel González Cruz

Richards, J. ed. 1974: Error Analysis. Perspectives on Second Language Acquisition. Essex,
Longman.
Ringbom, H. 1987: The Role of First Language in Foreign Language Leaming. Philade1phia,
Mu1tilingual Matters.
Ruíz, J. M. 1991: Contrastive Linguistics and the Teaching of a Second Language. ES 15: 15-
26.
Van Els, T., Bongaerts, T., Extra, G., van Os, & C., Janssen-van Dieten, A. 1984: Applied
Linguistics and the Leaming and Teaching of Foreign Languages. London, Arnold.
Wilkins, D. A. 1972: Linguistics in Language Teaching. London, Edward Arnold.
Wyatt, V. 1973: An Analysis ofErrors in Composition Writing. ELTXXVII 2: 177-6.

***

71
 Transfer, Contrastive Models, and Quantification in Linguistics

Concept of Transfer

In second language acquisition and contrastive linguistics, "transfer" refers to the influence of the

learner's first language (L1) on the acquisition of a second language (L2). This can manifest as

positive transfer, when L1 and L2 structures are similar and reinforce learning, or negative transfer

(interference), when differences lead to errors. Transfer is a central concept in error analysis and

contrastive studies and plays a crucial role in translation studies, especially when evaluating

linguistic interference between source and target texts.

Techniques and Models for Comparison

Contrastive analysis compares two or more languages systematically to identify similarities and

differences. This approach was especially influential in the 1950s and 60s with the work of Robert

Lado, who posited that areas of difference are more likely to lead to learning difficulties.

Main techniques/models include:

- Item-by-item comparison: Lexical, phonological, morphological, syntactic, and pragmatic levels.

- Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis (CAH): Predicts learning difficulties based on L1-L2 differences.

- Error Analysis: Focuses on actual learner errors, not just predictions.

- Interlanguage: Describes the learner's evolving language system influenced by transfer and

development.

- Translation-oriented models: Vinay & Darbelnet's comparative stylistics; Pym's translation

paradigms.

Quantification of Comparison

Quantification involves measuring contrastive phenomena to assess their impact. This can be done
through:

- Frequency counts: How often a structure appears in both languages.

- Error statistics: Frequency and type of errors caused by transfer.

- Corpus analysis: Comparing large datasets (parallel or learner corpora) to identify consistent

patterns.

- Scales of difficulty: Ranking structures based on learnability and contrastive complexity.

Quantitative approaches help validate linguistic predictions and guide curriculum development,

translation training, and language teaching by identifying priority areas.

Together, these concepts provide essential tools for applied linguistics, particularly in translation,

foreign language instruction, and error diagnosis.

 Formal and Contextual Equivalence in Translation

In translation studies, the concept of equivalence plays a central role in analyzing and evaluating

translation strategies. Two key types of equivalence often discussed are formal equivalence and

contextual (also called dynamic or functional) equivalence. These concepts help define how closely

a translation mirrors its source, either in structure or communicative effect.

Formal Equivalence

Formal equivalence refers to a type of translation that seeks to preserve the form and structure of

the source text as closely as possible. This includes aspects like syntax, grammatical categories,

word order, and even punctuation when relevant. The goal is to maintain a word-for-word or

structure-for-structure correspondence, assuming that the target reader will derive meaning from the

same forms as the source reader.

This concept was notably emphasized by Eugene Nida, who contrasted it with dynamic equivalence.

Formal equivalence is useful in contexts where fidelity to the source text is prioritized, such as legal

documents, historical texts, or sacred scriptures.

Example:

ST: "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth."

TT (formal equivalence): "Bienaventurados los mansos, porque ellos heredarán la tierra."

Here, structure, word choice, and register are preserved as much as possible.

Contextual (Dynamic or Functional) Equivalence

Contextual equivalence prioritizes the function, effect, and communicative intent of the original text

rather than its exact form. The translator aims to produce a translation that triggers a similar
response in the target audience, even if structural changes or cultural adaptations are necessary.

Nida called this dynamic equivalence, while others, like Katharina Reiss and Christiane Nord,

emphasize functional equivalence based on the Skopos (purpose) of the translation.

This type of equivalence is often preferred in advertising, literary texts, or user instructions, where

cultural relevance and reader comprehension are key.

Example:

ST: "Break a leg!"

TT (contextual equivalence): "¡Mucha suerte!" (in Spanish)

A literal translation would confuse the reader, while this version conveys the original meaning in a

culturally appropriate way.

Summary Comparison

| Feature | Formal Equivalence | Contextual Equivalence |

|-------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|

| Focus | Form and structure of the source | Meaning and effect in the target |

| Approach | Literal, close to the original | Adapted to audience and context |

| Example domains | Legal, religious, technical texts | Literature, marketing, conversation |

| Key Theorists | Nida (formal), Vinay & Darbelnet | Nida (dynamic), Reiss, Nord, Pym |

Final Remarks

While formal equivalence values fidelity to the linguistic surface of the source, contextual

equivalence emphasizes communicative effectiveness and cultural relevance. Neither is inherently

better; the choice depends on the purpose of the translation, the needs of the audience, and the

genre of the text.

Understanding and applying these types of equivalence allows translators and language

professionals to make informed decisions when navigating between languages and cultures.
Bibliografía

• Chesterman, A. (1997). Memes of translation: The spread of ideas in translation theory.

John Benjamins.
• Fawcett, P. (1997). Translation and language: Linguistic theories explained. St. Jerome
Publishing.
• Hatim, B., & Mason, I. (1997). The translator as communicator. Routledge.
• Lado, R. (1957). Linguistics across cultures: Applied linguistics for language teachers.
University of Michigan Press.
• Nida, E. A. (1964). Toward a science of translating: With special reference to principles and
procedures involved in Bible translating. E. J. Brill.
• Pym, A. (2010). Exploring translation theories. Routledge.
• Selinker, L. (1972). Interlanguage. International Review of Applied Linguistics in Language
Teaching, 10(3), 209–231.
• Vinay, J.-P., & Darbelnet, J. (1977). Comparative stylistics of French and English: A
methodology for translation (J. C. Sager & M.-J. Hamel, Trans. & Eds.). John Benjamins.
(Original work published 1958)
CHAPTER 1

What is a translation theory?

This short chapter explains what we mean by the terms “theory” and “paradigm,” and how
theorization can be related to translation practice. We also detail the overall chapter plan
of this course, some reasons for studying translation theory, and the ways this book may be
used as part of a learning process based on debate.

1.1 FROM THEORIZING TO THEORIES

Translators are theorizing all the time. Once they have identified a translation problem, they
usually have to decide between several possible solutions. Let us say you have to translate
the English term “Tory,” employed to designate the Conservative Party in Britain. According
to the situation, you might consider things like using the English term and inserting information
to explain it, or adding a footnote, or just giving a word-for-word equivalent of “Conservative
Party,” or naming the corresponding part of the political spectrum in the target culture, or
just leaving out the problematic name altogether. All those options could be legitimate,
given the appropriate text, purpose, and client. Formulating them ( generating possible
translations) and then choosing between them (selecting a definitive translation) can be a
difficult and complex operation, yet translators are doing precisely that all the time, in split
seconds. Whenever they do it, whenever they decide to opt for one rendition and not others,
they bring into play a series of ideas about what translation is and how it should be carried
out. They are theorizing.
The word “theory” probably comes from the Greek theā, view + -horan, to see – to
theorize is to look at a view (the word theater has the same origins). A theory sets the scene
where the generation and selection process takes place. Translators are thus constantly
theorizing as part of the regular practice of translating.
This private, internal theorizing becomes public when translators discuss what they do.
They occasionally theorize out loud when talking with other translators or with clients,
sometimes with fellow students or instructors. Sometimes this out-loud theorizing involves
no more than a few shared terms for the things we are dealing with. For example, here we
will refer to the “source text” as the one we translate from, and to the “target text” as the
translation we produce. By extension, we can talk about the “source language” and the “target
language,” or the “source culture” and the “target culture.” “Translating” would then be a
set of processes leading from one side to the other.
Do these terms mean that we are already using a theory? Probably not, at least not
in the sense of having an explicit theory and defending it. Then again, these interrelated
2 WHAT IS TRANSLATION THEORY?

names-for-things do tend to form models of translation, and those models conceal some
very powerful guiding ideas. Why, for example, should our terms reduce translation to an
affair of just two sides (“source” and “target”)? Surely each source can be traced back to a
number of previous sources? And each target is only a link towards further actions and
aims. For that matter, each text may contain elements of more than one language and culture.
In all these aspects there are usually more than just two sides involved. Further, when we
put the “source” and “target” concepts next to the “trans-” part of “translation,” we see that
the terms build a very spatial image in which our actions just go from one side to the other.
The words suggest that translators affect the target culture but not the source, thanks to a
transitivity that happens in space. Now, is this always true?
Compare that model with “anuvad,” a Sanskrit and Hindi term for written translation
that basically means, we are told, “repeating” or “saying later” (cf. Chesterman 2006; Spivak
2007: 274). According to this alternative term, the main difference between one text and
the other could be not in space, but in time. Translation might then be seen as a constant
process of updating and elaborating, rather than as some kind of physical movement across
cultures.
Our interrelated names-for-things form models, and those models become theories,
scenes set by ideas about what could or should be in a translation. In other words, our basic
terms encapsulate theories, even though we are mostly not aware of those theories.
This does not mean that all our inner theorizing is constantly turned into public theories.
When translators talk with each other, they mostly accept the common terms without too
much argument. Straight mistakes are usually fixed quickly, through reference to usage, to
linguistic knowledge, or to common sense. For instance, we might correct a translator who
identifies the term “Tory” with extreme right-wing politics. Any ensuing discussion could be
interesting but it will have no great need of translation theory (political theory, perhaps, but
not ideas about translation). Only when there are disagreements over different ways of
translating does private theorization tend to become public theory. If different translators
have come up with alternative renditions of the term “Tory,” one of them might argue that
“translation should explain the source culture” (so they will use the English term and add a
long footnote). Another might say that “translation should make things understandable to
the target culture” (so they will just put “the main right-wing party”). A third might consider
that “the translation should re-situate everything in the target culture” (so they would
give the name of a conservative target-culture party). And a fourth will perhaps insist that
since the source text was not primarily about politics, there is no need to waste time on an
ornamental detail (so they might calmly eliminate all reference to the term).
When those kinds of arguments are happening, practical theorizing is turning into explicit
theories. The arguments turn out to be between different theoretical positions. Sometimes
the exchanges turn one way rather than the other, and two initially opposed positions
will find they are compatible within a larger theory. Often, though, people remain with their
fixed positions; they keep arguing.

1.2 FROM THEORIES TO PARADIGMS

As theorizing turns into theory, some theories develop names and explanations for multiple
aspects of translation (including names for the presumed blindness of other theories).
When that stage is reached, we can legitimately talk about different “paradigms,” here
 WHAT IS TRANSLATION THEORY? 3

understood as sets of principles that underlie different groups of theories (in the general
sense outlined by Kuhn 1962). This particularly occurs when we find general ideas, relations,
and principles for which there is internal coherence and a shared point of departure. For
example, one set of theories uses the common terms “source,” “target,” and “equivalence.”
They agree that the term “equivalence” names a substantial relation between the “source”
and the “target”; their shared point of departure is the comparison of source texts with
target texts. People using those theories of equivalence can discuss translation with each
other fairly well. They share the same vague terms and general ideas about the aims of a
translation. They can even reach some kind of consensus about various modes of equivalence.
They are theorizing within the one paradigm.
On the other hand, we sometimes find people arguing about translation problems and
reaching nothing but constant disagreement. In such cases, the ideas are probably working
within quite different paradigms, with different points of departure. For example, one kind
of description works from comparisons between translations and non-translations (both in
the same language). People engaged in that activity come up with results that could be of
interest to psycholinguistics (the language used in translations is different from the language
found in non-translations). But that finding will appear almost totally irrelevant to anyone
working within the equivalence paradigm. If the language in translations is different, the
theorist of equivalence can still serenely argue that it should not be different. Each side
thus continues the discussion without appreciating the other side’s perspective. The
paradigms enter into conflict. The outcome may be continued tension (debate without
resolution), revolution (one paradigm wins out over the other), or more commonly silence
(people choose to travel along separate paths).

1.3 HOW THIS BOOK IS ORGANIZED

This book is structured in terms of paradigms rather than individual theories, theorists, or
schools. We will be talking about paradigms based on equivalence, purposes, descriptions,
uncertainty, localization, and, for want of a better term, cultural translation. Equivalence is
broken down into two sub-paradigms, corresponding to “natural” and “directional” equivalence.
We do this in order to underscore the complexity of equivalence, since some current theorists
tend to dismiss it as a naïve non-theory. The website associated with this course presents
supplementary materials, particularly on the intellectual background of the descriptive
paradigm, which is sometimes unfairly dismissed as nothing more than empiricism.
The order of the paradigms is very roughly chronological, starting around the 1960s
and reaching the present day, except for the “uncertainty” paradigm, which was present in
one form or another at the beginning. In fact, the fundamental conflict between uncertainty
and equivalence would be the basic problem to which all the paradigms respond.
This order does not mean that the newer theories have automatically replaced the
older ones. If that were true, you would only have to read the last chapter of this book. On
the contrary, we spend a lot of time on equivalence precisely to indicate its complexity and
longevity – a lot of equivalence theory lives on within the localization paradigm. Theories
can, of course, become ever better, more refined, or more exact in their descriptions and
predictions, in accordance with an accumulation of knowledge. This sometimes happens in
the field of translation, since the newer theories occasionally do try to accommodate the
perspectives of the older ones. For example, German-language Skopos theory can accept
4 WHAT IS TRANSLATION THEORY?

the equivalence paradigm as being appropriate to a “special case” scenario. That kind of
accumulation is not, however, to be found in any move to the uncertainty paradigm
(here including deconstruction), which would regard both equivalence and purpose as
indefensible essentialisms. In such cases, we can indeed talk about quite different paradigms
without trying to fit one inside the other. Those paradigms differ right from the very basic
questions of what translation is, what it can be, and how a translator should act in the world.
When the paradigms clash, people are often using the one word “translation” to refer to quite
different phenomena. Debate might then become pointless, at least until someone attempts
to rise above their initial paradigm. Only then, when an attempt is made to understand a
new view of translation, can there be productive theorizing in the public domain.
You may have to read all the chapters after all.

1.4 WHY STUDY TRANSLATION THEORIES?

Why study these theories? Instructors and trainers sometimes assume that a translator
who knows about different theories will work better than one who knows nothing about them.
As far as we know, there is no empirical evidence for that claim, and there are good reasons
to doubt its validity. All translators theorize, not just the ones who can express their theories
in technical terms. Untrained translators may work faster and more efficiently because they
know less about complex theories. They have fewer doubts and do not waste time reflecting
on the obvious. On the other hand, some awareness of different theories might be of practical
benefit when confronting problems for which there are no established solutions, where
significant creativity is required. The theories can pose productive questions, and sometimes
suggest successful answers. Theories can also be significant agents of change, especially
when moved from one professional culture to another, or when they are made to challenge
endemic thought (think about the Sanskrit idea of translation as “saying later”). And public
theories can help foster awareness of the complexities of translation, thus enhancing the
public image of translators and interpreters.
The practical advantage we want to defend here is that of a plurality of paradigms.
Rather than set out to defend one paradigm against all others, we are interested in promoting
awareness that there are many valuable ways of approaching translation, any of which may
prove useful or stimulating in a given situation.
Awareness of a range of theories can help the translation profession in several ways.
When arguments occur, theories provide translators with valuable tools not just to defend
their positions but also to find out about other positions. The theories might simply name
things that people had not previously thought about. If a client complains that the term
“Tory” has disappeared from the translation, you could say you have achieved “compensatory
correspondence” by comparing the British party with a target-culture party two pages later
in your target text. The client may not be entirely convinced, but the terms could help explain
some of the possibilities of translation. In fact, that piece of theory might be of as much
practical use to the client as to the translator. The more terms and ideas you have, the more
you and your client can explore the possibilities of translation.
Some knowledge of different theories can also be of direct assistance in the translation
process itself. At the beginning of this chapter we have presented a simple theory of
translation: a problem is identified, possible solutions are generated, and one solution is
selected. That is our own model (a set of related names-for-things), not a transcendent
 WHAT IS TRANSLATION THEORY? 5

truth. In terms of our model, a plurality of theories can widen the range of potential solutions
that translators think of. On the selective side, theories can also provide a range of reasons
for choosing one solution and discarding the rest, as well as defending that solution when
necessary. Some theories are very good for the generative side, since they criticize the
more obvious options and make one think about a wider range of factors. Descriptive,
deconstructionist, and cultural-translation approaches might all fit the bill there. Other kinds
of theory are needed for the selective moment of translating, when decisions have to be
made between the available alternatives. That is where reflections on ethics, on the basic
purposes of translation, could provide guidelines. Unfortunately that second kind of theory,
which should give reasons for selective decisions, has become unfashionable in some circles.
That is why we indulge in plurality, to try to redress the balance.

1.5 HOW SHOULD TRANSLATION THEORIES BE STUDIED?

Since all translators are always theorizing, it would be quite wrong to separate the theory
from the practice of which it is already a part. The best uses of theory are actually in active
discussions about different ways of solving translation problems. You can promote that
kind of discussion on the basis of translations that students have already done. You will find
that, at some points, one group of students will disagree with another group. Get those groups
to debate the point, then suggest the appropriate terms and concepts once the students
have demonstrated their need for those things. In this way, students come to theories only
when they find they need them. Classes on individual theories or paradigms can then build
on that practical basis.
Unfortunately our educational institutions tend to separate theory from practice, often
demanding a separate course in “translation theory.” If necessary, that can be done. However,
the theories and their implications should still be drawn out from a series of practical tasks,
structured as discovery processes. This book has been designed to allow such use. Towards
the end of each chapter we list some “frequently had arguments,” most of which do not
have any clear resolution, and many of which are not really as frequent as we would like
them to be. Then, at the end of each chapter we suggest some “projects and activities”
that can be carried out in class or given as assignments. No solutions are given to the
problems, and in many cases there are no correct solutions. Discussions and further
suggested activities are available on the course website. Of course, the examples should
always be adapted for use in a particular class. More important, the activities should be
integrated into the learning process; they should probably come at the beginning of a class,
rather than be used as an appendage at the end.
In a sense, the challenge of this book is to work against its fixed written form. The real
learning of theory, even for the self-learner, should be in dialogue and debate.
CHAPTER 2

Natural equivalence

This chapter starts from the idea that what we say in one language can have the same
value (the same worth or function) when it is translated into another language. The relation
between the source text and the translation is then one of equivalence (“equal value”), no
matter whether the relation is at the level of form, function, or anything in between.
Equivalence does not say that languages are the same; it just says that values can be the
same. The many theories that share this assumption can be fitted into a broad “equivalence
paradigm,” which can be broken down into two sub-paradigms. Here we focus on the
sub-paradigm where the things of equal value are presumed to exist prior to the act of
translation. This means that it makes no difference whether you translate from language A
into language B or vice versa. This kind of equivalence is considered “natural,” and it will be
opposed to what we call “directional” equivalence in Chapter 3. Natural equivalence stands
at the base of a strong and robust sub-paradigm closely allied with Applied Linguistics. It is
also close to what many translators, clients, and translation users believe about translation.
It should thus be appreciated in all its complexity. On the one hand, theories of natural
equivalence were an intellectual response to the structuralist vision of languages as world-
views. On the other, they have produced lists of equivalence-maintaining procedures that
try to describe what translators do. In this chapter we cover in some detail the list of translation
procedures proposed by Vinay and Darbelnet (1958/1972). One should not forget, however,
that the sub-paradigm has produced several such categorizations, and that all the lists were,
in their day, a response to an important problem within structuralist linguistics.

The term “equivalence,” in various European languages, became a feature of Western

translation theories in the second half of the twentieth century. Its heyday was in the 1960s
and 1970s, particularly within the frame of structuralist linguistics. The term roughly assumes
that, on some level, a source text and a translation can share the same value (“equi-valence”
means “equal value”), and that this assumed sameness is what distinguishes translations
from all other kinds of texts. Within the paradigm, to talk about translations is to talk about
different kinds of equivalence. In the course of the 1980s, however, the equivalence paradigm
came to be regarded as naïve or limited in scope. Mary Snell-Hornby, for example, jettisoned
equivalence as presenting “an illusion of symmetry between languages which hardly exists
beyond the level of vague approximations and which distorts the basic problems of translation”
(1988: 22).
Here we take the unpopular view that the equivalence paradigm was and remains far
richer than such quick dismissals would suggest. It merits a serious place alongside and
within the more recent paradigms. This is because, if you look closely, the theorizing of
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 7

The main points covered in this chapter are:

■ Equivalence is a relation of “equal value” between a source-text segment

and a target-text segment.
■ Equivalence can be established on any linguistic level, from form to
function.
■ Natural equivalence is presumed to exist between languages or cultures
prior to the act of translating.
■ Natural equivalence should not be affected by directionality: it should be
the same whether translated from language A into language B or the other
way around.
■ Structuralist linguistics, especially of the kind that sees languages as
world-views, would consider natural equivalence to be theoretically
impossible.
■ The equivalence paradigm solves this problem by working at levels lower
than language systems. This can be done by focusing on contextual
signification rather than systemic meaning, by undertaking componential
analysis, by assuming reference to a tertium comparationis, by assuming
that deverbalization is possible, or by rendering features that are marked.
■ Following Vinay and Darbelnet, there are several categorizations of the
procedures by which equivalence can be maintained.
■ The sub-paradigm of natural equivalence is historical, since it assumes the
production of stable texts in languages with equal expressive capacity.

equivalence has in fact involved two competing conceptualizations, which here we call
“natural” as opposed to “directional” equivalence. The intertwining duality of those notions
allows for considerable subtlety in some past and present theories. It also creates confusion,
not only in some of the theories of equivalence themselves but also in the many current
arguments against equivalence.
First we should understand what “natural” equivalence entails.

2.1 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE AS A CONCEPT

Most discussions of equivalence concern typical misunderstandings. For instance, Friday the
thirteenth is an unlucky day in English-language cultures but not in most other cultures. In
Spanish, the unlucky day is Tuesday the thirteenth. So when we translate the name of that
day, we have to know exactly what kind of information is required. If we are just referring to
the calendar, then Friday will do; if we are talking about bad luck, then a better translation
would probably be “Tuesday the thirteenth” (actually “martes 13,” or “martes y 13” in some
varieties). The world is full of such examples. The color of death is mostly black in the West,
mostly white in the East. A nodding head means agreement in Western Europe, disagreement
in Turkey. That is all boring textbook stuff.
The concept of equivalence underlies all these cases. Equivalence, we have posited,
says that a translation will have the same value as (some aspect of) its corresponding
8 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

source text. Sometimes the value is on the level of form (two words translated by two words);
sometimes it is reference (Friday is always the day before Saturday); sometimes it is function
(the function “bad luck on 13” corresponds to Friday in English, to Tuesday in Spanish).
Equivalence need not say exactly which kind of value is supposed to be the same in each
case; it just says that equal value can be achieved on one level or another.
Equivalence is a very simple idea. Unfortunately it becomes quite complex, both as a
term and as a theory.
As for the term, it seems that the first uses of “equivalence” in a technical sense
described the kind of relation that allows us to equate, more or less, the English “Friday the
13th” with the Spanish “martes 13.” When Friday becomes Tuesday, the two terms are
equivalent because they are considered to activate approximately the same cultural function.
This is the sense in which Vinay and Darbelnet used the term équivalence in 1958, and
Vázquez-Ayora used equivalencia in 1977. That is, for the initial period of contemporary
equivalence theories, the term referred to only one kind of translation option among many
(we shall soon look at the various alternative procedures described by Vinay and Darbelnet).
Equivalence was determined by function (the value “bad-luck day” in our example), which is
the opposite sense to what Snell-Hornby supposes when she talks about a “symmetry
between languages.” In this initial period, equivalence referred to what could be done at
points where there was precisely no symmetry between linguistic forms. Hence much
confusion.
It was not long before other theorists, particularly the American linguist and Bible scholar
Eugene Nida, would be talking about different kinds of equivalence. Nida, for example, might
look at the Spanish “martes 13” and see that there are two ways of rendering it: either as
“Tuesday the thirteenth” or as “Friday the thirteenth.” The first option would be “formal
equivalence” (since it mimics the form of what is said in Spanish); the second would be
what Nida calls “dynamic equivalence” (since it activates the same or similar cultural
function). As soon as theorists started talking about different kinds of equivalence, the
meaning of the term “equivalence” obviously became much broader, referring to a relation
of value on any level. It is in this wider sense that we are using it here.
On the level of practice, things are scarcely simpler. Consider for a moment the television
game shows that are popular all over the world. English audiences usually know a show
called The Price is Right. In French this becomes Le juste prix, and in Spanish, El precio justo.
Equivalence here is not on the level of form (four words become three, and the rhyme has
been lost), but it might be operative on the level of reference or function. In German this
show became Der Preis ist heiss, which changes the semantics (it back-translates as “The
price is hot,” as when children play the game of rising temperatures when one comes closer
to an object). The German name cleverly retains the rhyme, which might be what counts. It
could be getting very warm in its approach to equivalence.
If you start picking up examples like this and try to say what stays the same and what
has changed, you soon find that a translation can be equivalent to many different things.
For example, in the game show Who Wants to be a Millionaire? (which retains the structure
of that name in many languages), the contestants have a series of “lifelines” in English,
“jokers” in French and German, and a “comodín” (wild-card) in Spanish. Although those are
all very different images or metaphors, they do have something in common. Describing that
commonness can be a difficult operation. More intriguing is the fact that the reference to
“millionaire” is retained even though different local currencies make the amount quite different.
Given that the show format came from the United Kingdom, we should perhaps translate
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 9

the pounds into euros or dollars. This might give Who Wants to Win $1,867,500?. The title
has more money but is decidedly less catchy. One suspects that equivalence was never really
a question of exact values.
This is the point at which it makes some sense to talk about what is “natural” in
equivalence. Why does no one calculate the exact sum of money to be won? Because, it
appears, what counts is what is usually said in the target culture. If there is common agreement
that the term “millionaire” functions only to say “more money than most of us can imagine
possessing,” then all you need in any target language is the common term corresponding
to that very vague notion. The common expression on one side should correspond to the
common expression on the other. This is the sense in which we find the word “natural” in
definitions like the following:

Translating consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural

equivalent of the source-language message.
(Nida and Taber 1969: 12; italics added)

Of course, the theory becomes a little more sophisticated when we realize that not
everything we find in source texts is always “natural” or “common.” If it were, the texts would
be so boring that there would be little reason to translate them. We might then suppose
that whatever is uncommon (or better, “marked”) on one side be rendered as something
similarly uncommon (“marked”) on the other. For example, “The Price is Light” would
theoretically give rise to a more varied set of equivalents than does the more normal “The
Price is Right,” since you might try to render the markedness of “light.” The notion of
markedness, however, simply says that some things are natural and others are less natural.
It thus remains a theory of natural equivalence, since if there were no such thing as
naturalness (“unmarkedness”), the theory would make no sense.

2.2 EQUIVALENCE VS. STRUCTURALISM

In the second half of the twentieth century, translation theorists mostly dealt with this kind
of problem against the background of structuralist linguistics. A strong line of thought leading
from Wilhelm von Humboldt to Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf argued that different
languages express different views of the world. This connected with the views of the
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who in the early years of the twentieth century
explained how languages form systems that are meaningful only in terms of the differences
between the items. The word sheep, for example, has a value in English because it does not
designate a cow (or any other animal for which there are names in English) and it does not
refer to mutton, which is the meat, not the animal (the difference between names for animals
and names for their meat is fairly systemic in English) (Saussure 1916/1974: 115). In French,
on the other hand, the word mouton designates both the animal and the meat, both sheep
and mutton.
Such relations between terms were seen as different “structures.” Languages were
considered to be sets of such structures (and hence different “systems”). Structuralism
said we should study those relations rather than try to analyze the things themselves. Do
not look at actual sheep; do not ask what we want to do with those sheep; do not ask about
10 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

the universal ethics of eating sheep meat. Just look at the relations, the structures, which
are what make language meaningful. One should therefore conclude, according to
structuralist linguistics, that the words sheep and mouton have very different values. They
thus cannot translate each other with any degree of certainty. In fact, since different languages
cut the world up in very different ways, no words should be completely translatable out of
their language system. Translation should simply not be possible.
That kind of linguistics is of little help to anyone trying to translate television game shows.
It is not of any greater help to anyone trying to understand how translations are actually carried
out, so something must be wrong in the linguistics. As the French theorist Georges Mounin
argued in the early 1960s, “if the current theses on lexical, morphological, and syntactic
structures are accepted, one must conclude that translation is impossible. And yet translators
exist, they produce, and their products are found to be useful” (1963: 5; our translation). Either
translation did not really exist, or the dominant linguistic theories were inadequate. That is
the point at which the main theories of equivalence developed. They tried to explain something
that the linguistics of the day could not explain or somehow did not want to explain.
Think for a moment about the kinds of arguments that could be used here. What should
we say, for example, to someone who claims that the whole system of Spanish culture (not
just its language) gives meaning to “martes 13” (Tuesday the thirteenth) in a way that no
English system could ever reproduce? Martes y 13 is the stage name, for example, of a
popular pair of television comedians. Or what do we say to Poles who once argued that,
since the milk they bought had to be boiled before it could be drunk, their name for milk
could never be translated by the normal English term milk (cf. Hoffman 1989)? In fact, if
the structuralist approach is pushed, we can never be sure of understanding anything beyond
our own linguistic and cultural systems, let alone translating the little that we do understand.
Theories of equivalence then got to work. Here are some of the arguments that were
used to address this cluster of problems.

■ Signification: Within linguistic approaches, close attention was paid to what is meant
by “meaning.” Saussure had actually distinguished between a word’s “value” (which it
has in relation to the language system) and its “signification” (which it has in actual use).
To cite a famous example from chess, the value of the knight is the sum of all the moves
it is allowed to make, whereas the signification of an actual knight depends on the
position it occupies at any stage of a particular game. “Value” would thus depend on
the language system (which Saussure called langue), while “signification” depends on
the actual use of language (which Saussure termed parole). For theorists like Coseriu,
those terms could be mapped on to the German distinction between Sinn (stable
meaning) and Bedeutung (momentary signification). If translation could not reproduce
the former, it might still convey the latter. French, for example, has no word for shallow
(as in “shallow water”), but the signification can be conveyed by the two words peu
profound (“not very deep”) (cf. Coseriu 1978). The language structures could be different,
but equivalence was still possible.
■ Language use: Some theorists then took a closer look at the level of language use
(parole) rather than at the language system (langue). Saussure had actually claimed
that there could be no systematic scientific study of parole, but theorists like the Swiss-
German Werner Koller (1979/1992) were quite prepared to disregard the warning.
If something like equivalence could be demonstrated and analyzed, then there were
systems beyond that of langue.
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 11

■ Text levels: Others stressed that translation operates not on isolated words but on
whole texts, and texts have many linguistic layers. The linguist John Catford (1965)
pointed out that equivalence need not be on all these layers at once, but could be
“rank-bound.” We might thus strive for equivalence to the phonetics of a text, to the
lexis, to the phrase, to the sentence, to the semantic function, and so on. Catford saw
that most translating operates on one or several of these levels, so that “in the course
of a text, equivalence may shift up and down the rank scale” (1965: 76). This was a
comprehensive and dynamic theory of equivalence.
■ Componential analysis: A related approach, more within lexical semantics, was to
list all the functions and values associated with a source-text item, and then see
how many of them are found in the target-side equivalent. This kind of componential
analysis might analyze mouton as “+ animal + meat – young meat (agneau),” mutton
as “+ meat – young meat (lamb),” and sheep as “+ animal.” Then we would make our
translation selections in accordance with the components active in the particular source
text. We could go further: lifeline could be turned into something like “amusing metaphor
+ way of solving a problem with luck rather than intelligence + no guarantee of success
+ need for human external support + nautical.” We would then find that the translations
joker and wild-card reproduce at least three of the five components, and would thus
be equivalent to no more than that level. There could be no guarantee, however, that
different people would recognize exactly the same components.

All of those ideas were problematic to some degree. All of them named or implied a relation
of equivalence, and they did so in a way that defended the existence of translation in the
face of structuralist linguistics. Their confrontational virtue is not to be belittled.

An example of comparative componential analysis

Comparative linguistics can provide ways of isolating semantic components. Bascom
(2007) gives the following analysis of the potential equivalents key and the Spanish
llave:

Wrench Llave (inglesa)

Faucet Llave (grifo)
Key Llave (de casa)

Piano key Tecla de piano

Computer key Tecla de ordenador

Key of a code Clave de un código

Key of music Clave de música

According to this analysis, the Spanish llave would only correspond to the component
“instrument for turning;” tecla corresponds to the component “thing to press down,”
and clave is only an equivalent of key when an abstract or metaphorical sense is
involved. This distinction between these components seems not to be made in English.
12 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

2.3 PROCEDURES FOR MAINTAINING NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

Another way to defend translation was to record and analyze the equivalents that can actually
be found in the world. One of the most entertaining texts in translation theory is the
introduction to Vinay and Darbelnet’s Stylistique comparée du français et de l’anglais, first
published in 1958. The two French linguists are driving from New York to Montreal, noting
down the street signs along the way:

We soon reach the Canadian border, where the language of our forefathers is music
to our ears. The Canadian highway is built on the same principles as the American one,
except that its signs are bilingual. After SLOW, written on the road-surface in enormous
letters, comes LENTEMENT, which takes up the entire width of the highway. What
an unwieldy adverb! A pity French never made an adverb just using the adjective
LENT. . . . But come to think of it, is LENTEMENT really the equivalent of SLOW? We
begin to have doubts, as one always does when shifting from one language to another,
when our SLIPPERY WHEN WET reappears around a bend, followed by the French
GLISSANT SI HUMIDE. Whoa!, as the Lone Ranger would say, let’s pause a while on
this SOFT SHOULDER, thankfully caressed by no translation, and meditate on this SI,
this “if,” more slippery itself than an acre of ice. No monolingual speaker of French
would ever have come straight out with the phrase, nor would they have sprayed paint
all over the road for the sake of a long adverb ending in – MENT. Here we reach a key
point, a sort of turning lock between two languages. But of course – parbleu! – instead
of LENTEMENT [adverb, as in English] it should have been RALENTIR [verb in the
infinitive, as in France]!
(Vinay and Darbelnet 1958/1972: 19; our translation)

What kind of equivalence is being sought here? The kind the linguists actually find is
exemplified by the long French adverb “lentement,” which says virtually the same thing
as the English adverb “slow.” It changes the length, but apparently there is room on the
road. What worries the linguists is that the sign “Lentement” is not what one would find
on roads in France. For them, the equivalent should be the verb “ralentir,” since that is
what would have been used if no one had been translating from English (and as if Canada
were itself within France). This second kind of equivalence is thus deemed “natural.” It is
what different languages and cultures seem to produce from within their own systems. This
natural equivalence is also reciprocal: “slow” should give “ralentir,” which should give “slow,”
and so on.
Natural equivalents do exist, but rarely in a state of untouched nature. As the East German
theorist Otto Kade (1968) argued, they are most frequently the stuff of terminology, of
artificially standardized words that are made to correspond to each other. All specialized
fields of knowledge have their terminologies; they are unnaturally creating “natural” equivalents
all the time. In Vinay and Darbelnet, however, the artificially imposed glossaries are to be
avoided where possible. The linguists are seeking equivalents characterized as “natural”
precisely because those equivalents are supposed to have developed without interference
from meddling linguists, translators, or other languages. In terms of this naturalism, the best
translations are found when you are not translating. We use this mode of thought whenever
we look for solutions in “parallel texts” (non-translational target-language texts on the same
topic as the source text).
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 13

In the late 1950s and 1960s, equivalence was often thought about in this way. The
problem was not primarily to show what the “thing” was or what one wanted to do with it
(Vinay and Darbelnet might have asked what words were best at actually making Canadian
drivers slow down). The problem was to describe ways in which equivalence could be attained
in all the situations where there were no obvious natural equivalents.
Vinay and Darbelnet worked from examples to define seven general procedures
(“procédés,” although others sometimes call them “strategies”) that could be used in this
kind of translation. Table 2.1 is a version of how they summarize their findings.
The seven procedures each come with examples on three levels of discourse. They go
from the most literal (at the top) to the most re-creative (at the bottom). Vinay and Darbelnet
actually describe this progression as being from the easiest to the most difficult, and this
makes some sense if we consider that the bottom situations are the ones where the translator
probably has the most options to choose from.
Note, though, that what the linguists are comparing are really the results of what
translators are presumed to do; the categories are based on no evidence of how a translator
might actually get from the source to the target. A simple model is nevertheless possible:
the translator might first try the “literal” procedure to see what that gives; if that does not
work, the translator can either go up the table (closer to the source) or down the table (closer
to the target culture). This means that not all the procedures necessarily count as good

Table 2.1 Vinay and Darbelnet’s General Table of Translation Procedures (our translation from
Vinay and Darbelnet 1958/1972: 55)

Lexis Collocation Message

1. Loan Fr. Bulldozer Fr. Science fiction Fr. Five o’clock tea
Eng. Fuselage Eng. À la mode Eng. Bon voyage
2. Calque Fr. Économiquement Fr. Lutétia Palace Fr. Compliments de
faible Eng. Governor General la saison
Eng. Normal School Eng. Take it or leave it
3. Literal translation Fr. Encre Fr. L’encre est sur la table Fr. Quelle heure est-il?
Eng. Ink Eng. The ink is on the table Eng. What time is it?
4. Transposition Fr. Expéditeur: Fr. Depuis la revalorisation Fr. Défense de fumer
Eng. From: du bois Eng. No smoking
Eng. As timber becomes
more valuable
5. Modulation Fr. Peu profond Fr. Donnez un peu de Fr. Complet
Eng. Shallow votre sang Eng. No vacancies
Eng. Give a pint of your
blood
6. Correspondence Fr. (milit.) La soupe Fr. Comme un chien dans Fr. Château de cartes
(équivalence) Eng. (milit.) Tea un jeu de quilles Eng. Hollow triumph
Eng. Like a bull in a china
shop
7. Adaptation Fr. Cyclisme Fr. En un clin d’œil Fr. Bon appetit!
Br. Eng. Cricket Eng. Before you could say Am. Eng. Hi!
Am. Eng. Baseball Jack Robinson
14 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

ways to produce natural equivalence – in each case, translators are only required to do the
best they can. For example, the use of loans and calques is only legitimate when there is
no more natural equivalent available (the examples in Table 2.1 are not meant to translate
each other). “Literal translation,” which here means fairly straightforward word-for-word, is
quite possible between cognate languages but can also frequently be deceptive, since
languages abound with “false friends” (lexical, phraseological and syntactic forms that look
similar but have different functions in different languages). Literalism is what gives the French
Lentement as the equivalent of Slow, and this is not what Vinay and Darbelnet consider
natural. The procedures of real interest to the linguists are transposition (where there
is a switching of grammatical categories) and modulation (where adjustments are made
for different discursive conventions). The remaining two procedures concern cultural
adjustments: correspondence (actually called équivalence in the French version) would use
all the corresponding proverbs and referents (like “Friday the thirteenth), and adaptation
would then refer to different things with loosely equivalent cultural functions: cycling is to
the French what cricket is to the British, or baseball to the Americans, we are told. At this
end of the table there are many very vague equivalents available, and translators can spend
hours exploring the possibilities (gardening is to the English what having lovers is to the
Italians, perhaps). In all, Vinay and Darbelnet’s procedures range from artificial or marked at
one end to the vague but naturalistic at the other. The French linguists were thus able to
recognize not only the desirability of natural equivalence, but also the practical need for
translators to produce other kinds of renditions as well.
In addition to the list of general procedures, Vinay and Darbelnet outline a series of
“prosodic effects” resulting from the above procedures. This gives a further list of “stylistic
procedures” operating closer to the sentence level. In most cases, the translator may be seen
as following the constraints imposed by the target language, without many alternatives to
choose between.

■ Amplification: The translation uses more words than the source text to express the
same idea. Example: “the charge against him” (four words) becomes “l’accusation portée
contre lui” (back-translation: “the charge brought against him” (five words)). When the
amplification is obligatory, the effect is called dilution. Example: “le bilan” (“the balance”)
becomes “the balance sheet” (1958/1972: 183). This category also covers what Vinay
and Darbelnet call étoffement (perhaps “completion” or “lengthening”) (1958/1972:
109ff.), where a target-text word grammatically needs the support of another word.
Example: “To the trains” becomes “Accès aux quais,” where the preposition for “to” (à)
grammatically needs the support of the noun meaning “access.”
■ Reduction (économie): The opposite of amplification (just take the above examples in
the opposite direction, since that is what natural equivalence invites us to do).
■ Explicitation: Procedure whereby the translation gives specifications that are only
implicit in the source text (1958/1972: 9). Example: “students of St. Mary’s” becomes
“étudiantes de l’école St. Mary,” where the French specifies that the students are women
and St. Mary’s is a school (1958/1972: 117).
■ Implicitation: The opposite of explicitation (again, the directionality of the above example
can be reversed, if and when it is common knowledge in the target culture that St. Mary’s
is a school for girls).
■ Generalization: When a specific (or concrete) term is translated as a more
general (or abstract) term. Example: “mutton” (the meat) becomes “mouton” (both
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 15

the animal and the meat; Vinay and Darbelnet refer to Saussure’s example), or the
American “alien” becomes “étranger” (which includes the concepts of both “foreigner”
and “alien”).
■ Particularization: The opposite of generalization (reverse the above examples).

There are actually more terms than these in Vinay and Darbelnet. The above should
suffice, however, to illustrate several points. First, these categories seem to be saying much
the same thing; the translation can give more (amplification, explicitation, generalization) or
less (reduction, implicitation, particularization). Second point: these terms have been used
throughout the equivalence paradigm, but in many different ways. Kinga Klaudy (2001),
for example, uses “explicitation” to cover everything that is “more,” and “implicitation” to
cover everything that is “less” (we will see other uses of the term “explicitation” in Chapter 6).
Third, the dominant factor in all these cases is the nature of the target language, or
better, the systemic differences between the source and the target languages. The individual
translator does not really have much choice. This is why the examples can all be read in both
directions. Even when Vinay and Darbelnet claim that French is more “abstract” than English,
so that there will be more generalization when moving in that direction, the difference is in
order to preserve the balance between the languages; it is not something affecting the
cognitive processes of the translator. To that extent, Vinay and Darbelnet consistently defend
the virtues of natural equivalence.
Not all procedures are consistently of this kind, however. Consider the example of
explicitation where “students at St. Mary’s” become explicitly female students in the French
translation (where the language obliges the noun to be male or female). Compare this with
a much-discussed example from Hönig and Kussmaul (1982/1996), where the term “Eton”
is rendered into German as “eine der englischen Eliteschulen” (one of the elite English
schools – we analyze the example in 5.6.2 below). This could be considered amplification
and explication, since it uses more words to convey the idea, and it makes explicit the
information that English readers would attach to the term “Eton.” The added information,
however, is not natural equivalence, and it is not really considered “explicitation” in the sense
in which Vinay and Darbelnet use the term. This is because the directionality does not
work in both senses. One can get from the English to the German with some surety, but will
the phrase “one of the elite English schools” necessarily bring us back to “Eton”? Probably
not, given that there are quite a few schools to choose from. Directionality is playing a far
more important role here, since we have started to think about what the users of the
translation might actually need to know. That is not something that Vinay and Darbelnet
took into account.
Vinay and Darbelnet actually mention one further procedure, a very important one, which
we present separately because it can be used in a particularly directional way:

■ Compensation: “Procedure whereby the tenor of the whole piece is maintained by

playing, in a stylistic detour, the note that could not be played in the same way and in
the same place as in the source” (1958/1972: 189). Our translation of Vinay and
Darbelnet here maintains the analogy with music. The examples are nevertheless clear
enough. French must choose between the intimate and formal second-person pronouns
(tu or vous); contemporary English cannot. To render the distinction, where pertinent,
the translator might opt for a switch from the family name to the given name, or to a
nickname, as in “My friends call me Bill,” to render “On se tutoie . . .” (meaning, “We can
16 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

use the intimate second-person pronoun . . .”). Compensation may also be used to
indicate various points of emphasis (for example, italics being used in English to render
a syntactic emphasis in French), or to render a switch from one linguistic variety to
another (examples may be found in Fawcett 1997).

There are quite a few theories that list procedures like this. Vinay and Darbelnet’s work
was inspired by Malblanc (1944/1963), who compared French and German. They in turn
became one of the points of reference for Vázquez-Ayora (1977), who worked on Spanish
and English. Different kinds of equivalence-maintaining procedures have been described
in a Russian tradition including Fedorov (1953), Shveitser (1973/1987) and Retsker
(1974), and by the American Malone (1988), all usefully summarized in Fawcett (1997).
When Muñoz Martín presents a comparison of several categorizations of what he calls
“translation strategies” (Table 2.2), the most striking aspect is perhaps that there could be
so many ways to cut up the same conceptual space. The terms for the procedures (or
strategies) have clearly not been standardized even within the sub-paradigm of natural
equivalence. Then again, perhaps the best evidence for the existence of the sub-paradigm
is the fact that these and many other linguists have agreed that this is the space where the
terms and concepts are needed.
The lists of procedures tend to make perfect sense when they are presented alongside
carefully selected examples. On the other hand, when you analyze a translation and you try
to say exactly which procedures have been used where, you often find that several categories
explain the same equivalence relation, and some relations do not fit comfortably into any
category. Vinay and Darbelnet recognize this problem:

The translation (on a door) of PRIVATE as DÉFENSE D’ENTRER [Prohibition to Enter]

is at once a transposition, a modulation, and a correspondence. It is a transposition
because the adjective private is rendered by a noun phrase; it is a modulation because
the statement becomes a warning . . ., and it is a correspondence because the translation
has been produced by going back to the situation without bothering about the structure
of the English-language phrase.
(Vinay and Darbelnet 1958/1972: 54; our translation)

If three categories explain the one phenomenon, do we really need all the categories? Or
are there potentially as many categories as there are equivalents? This is a theoretical problem
to which we will return in Chapter 3.
Even more serious questions are raised when we try to apply these categories to
translation between European and Asian languages. Let us go back to Table 2.1 and
consider the classical list of procedures. Since they were working between French and
English, Vinay and Darbelnet could more or less assume that the general default procedure
is “literal translation,” and only when that procedure does not work would the translator look
for alternative solutions higher on the list (“loan” or “calque”), or harder solutions a little further
down (“transposition,” “modulation,” etc.). Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, however, do not
have the explicit syntactic relations of Germanic or Romance languages, so the default
procedure is more usually at the level of “transposition” rather than “literal translation,” and
it is very difficult to make any consistent distinction between “transposition” and “modulation.”
At the same time, Japanese and Chinese (and perhaps to a lesser extent Korean) are very
open to borrowing when dealing with new “international” subject matter, so that loans and
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 17

Table 2.2 Comparison of proposed “translation strategies,” adapted from Muñoz Martín (1998)

Vinay and Darbelnet (1958) Vázquez Ayora (1977) Malone (1988)

Loan Equation
A→E
Literal translation

Matching
Calque
Substitution
Literal translation A→S

Transposition Transposition Reordering

More difficulty less

AB → BA
Modulation Modulation

Oblique
Correspondance (équivalence) Equivalencia

Adaptation Adaptation

Amplification
Amplification Amplification

Recrescence
A → AB
more ← translation proper → less

Implicitation Omission Reduction

AB → A

Compensation
Compensation

Explicitation Diffusion
Repackaging
Degree of difficulty not specified

A∩B → A | B
Explicitation
secondary

Condensation
Dilution
A | B → A∩B

Particularization Divergence
A → B/C
Zigzagging

Generalization Convergence
B/C → A

calques become far more frequent and acceptable ways to produce equivalence in those
particular fields. One of the results is that, if, for instance, you are translating from Chinese
into English in an international field, the source text seems to contain so many loans from
English that it is hard to describe what you are doing with them – should we perhaps add
a category for “loans returning to lender”? (Thanks are extended to students at the Monterey
Institute of International Studies for all these observations.) The classical linguistic theories
of equivalence require more work if they are to be extended beyond European languages.
18 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

2.4 TEXT-BASED EQUIVALENCE

We have noted that John Catford (1965) saw equivalence as being mostly “rank-bound,”
in the sense that it is not established on all linguistic levels at the same time. As the translator
moves along the text, the level of equivalence can thus shift up or down, from function
to phrase to term to morpheme, for example, in accordance with the various constraints
ensuing from the source text. Vinay and Darbelnet’s catalog of procedures (Table 2.1)
does not contradict that view, since the procedures correspond to the same hierarchy of
linguistic levels. Their preference is for movements downward in order to enhance naturalness,
but another theorist could legitimately argue for movements upward, without breaking
the theory.
One of the most developed theories of this kind is by the Swiss-German theorist Werner
Koller, whose textbook on “translation science” went through four editions and many reprints
between 1979 and 1992. Koller proposes five frames for equivalence relations: denotative
(based on extra-linguistic factors), connotative (based on the way the source text is
expressed), text-normative (respecting or changing textual and linguistic norms), pragmatic
(with respect to the receiver of the target text) and formal (the formal-aesthetic qualities
of the source text). These categories suggest that the translator selects the type of
equivalence most appropriate to the dominant function of the source text. Although Koller
allows that translators actively produce equivalence in the sense that equivalents need not
exist prior to the translation, the implicit role that he allows to the source text should be
enough to bring his approach under the umbrella of “natural equivalence.” He does not
really give us any other criterion for choosing between one level of equivalence or another,
since the source text itself ultimately determines when “pragmatic” equivalence is necessary.
The German theorist Katharina Reiss (1971/2000) was voicing fairly similar claims
during the same period. Her approach recognizes three basic text types (informative,
expressive, and operative) and she then argues that each type requires that equivalence be
sought on the level corresponding to it (giving appropriate weight to content, form or effect).
Reiss’s theory is traditionally classified as “functionalist,” and we will go into its details in our
chapter on German-language Skopos theory (4.2 below), but its basic approach is not entirely
out of place here. For as much as some would oppose Koller and Reiss, their theories are
both based on a mode of equivalence where the translation has to reproduce aspects of
what is functional in the source text, and the decisive factor is held to be none other than
the nature of the source text. To that extent, both have at least a foothold within the general
theory of natural equivalence.

2.5 REFERENCE TO A TERTIUM COMPARATIONIS

AND THE “THEORY OF SENSE”

The theories are rather vague about how natural equivalence works. They mostly assume
that there is a piece of reality or thought (a referent, a function, a message) that stands
outside all languages and to which two languages can refer. That thing would be a third
element of comparison, a tertium comparationis, available to both sides. The translator
thus goes from the source text to this thing, then from the thing to the corresponding target
text. Non-natural translations will result when one goes straight from the source text to the
target text, as in the case of Slow rendered as Lentement.
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 19

Perhaps the best-known account of this process is the one formulated by the Parisian
theorist Danica Seleskovitch. For her, a translation can only be natural if the translator
succeeds in forgetting entirely about the form of the source text. She recommends “listening
to the sense,” or “deverbalizing” the source text so that one is only aware of the sense,
which can be expressed in all languages. This is the basis of what is known as the theory
of sense (théorie du sens) (Seleskovich and Lederer 1984). From our perspective, it is a
process model of natural equivalence.
The great difficulty of this theory is that if a “sense” is deverbalized, how can we
ever know what it is? As soon as we indicate it to someone, we have given it a semiotic
form of one kind or another, and there are no forms (not even the little pictures or diagrams
sometimes used) that can be considered truly universal. So there is no real way of proving
that such a thing as “deverbalized sense” exists. “Listening to the sense” metaphorically
describes a mental state that simultaneous interpreters attain, but what they are hearing
cannot be a sense without form. This theory remains a loose metaphor with serious
pedagogical virtues.
One of the paradoxes here is that process models like Seleskovitch’s encourage
translators not to look at linguistic forms in great detail, whereas the comparative methods
espoused by Vinay and Darbelnet and the like were based on close attention to linguistic
forms in two languages. The process theories were breaking with linguistics, tending
to draw more on psychology (Seleskovitch turned to the French psychologist Piaget).
The comparative method, however, was entirely within linguistics. It would go on to compare
not just isolated phrases and collocations, but also pragmatic discourse conventions
and modes of text organization. Applied linguists like Hatim and Mason (1990, 1997)
extend the level of comparison, generally remaining within the sub-paradigm of natural
equivalence.
For the most idealistic natural equivalence, the ultimate aim is to find the pre-translational
equivalent that reproduces all aspects of the thing to be expressed. Naturalistic approaches
thus spend little time on defining translation; there is not much analysis of different types
of translation; there is no real consideration of translators having different aims. Those things
have somehow been decided by equivalence itself. Translation is simply translation. But
that is not always so.

2.6 THE VIRTUES OF NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

Natural equivalence is the basic theory in terms of which all the other paradigms in this
book will be defined. To that extent its role is foundational, at least within the narrative we
are creating here (soon we will see how historical the idea of natural equivalence actually
is). All the following paradigms will be able to say bad things about natural equivalence. To
achieve something of a balance, let us quickly repeat a few of the good things that may be
said about it.
In a period of structuralism that seemed to make translation theoretically impossible,
the concept of natural equivalence defended the existence of translation as a vital social
practice.
In a period of abstract speculation about structures, systems, and meaning, the theorists
of natural equivalence adopted rather empirical standpoints. They went to see what could
be done with language structures. If you look at Vinay and Darbelnet, Vázquez-Ayora, Catford,
20 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

Nida, or virtually any of the theorists mentioned here, the first thing you find is that their books
are full of examples, to the extent that the illustrations are often more engaging and
entertaining than the ideas being illustrated.
To give order to the data thus obtained, the theorists usually provided lists of procedures
and techniques actually used by translators. These results have proved to be valuable in the
training of translators, even when pedagogical applications were not the prime purpose of
the theories.
No matter how naïve or idealistic notions such as “same value,” “tertium comparationis,”
or “deverbalization” might be, their operational functions correspond to some very widespread
ideas about what translation is (or should be). If there is a general consensus among
professionals and clients that a translator should reproduce natural equivalence (no matter
what the actual terms used), then a theory which expresses that expectation is serving a
valuable social function. Only when we have terms for the consensus can we actually start
to discuss it and test its viability. To that extent, natural equivalence was perhaps the necessary
starting point for the paradigms that would come later.

2.7 FREQUENTLY HAD ARGUMENTS

Thanks to its foundational role, the concept of natural equivalence will be the subject of many
arguments throughout this book. At this stage it is nevertheless useful to summarize the
main debates that we have touched on so far.

2.7.1 “Natural equivalence presupposes a non-existent symmetry”

At the beginning of this chapter we saw Mary Snell-Hornby criticize equivalence as presenting
“an illusion of symmetry between languages.” We might now like to see her criticism as
actually stating the position of all the structuralist linguists that see different languages
dividing up the world in different ways. Does natural equivalence deny that fact? Probably
not, at least not if we look at the range of procedures formulated by Vinay and Darbelnet,
or if we follow the theories of “marked” vs. “unmarked,” or if componential analysis is used
to describe the differences as well as the similarities between languages. On the other
hand, Snell-Hornby might be referring to supposed symmetries of functions, in which case
her point appears valid: theorists of natural equivalence tend to assume that all languages
have the same expressive capacity (see 2.8 below).

2.7.2 “The tests of equivalence have no psychological basis”

Methods like componential analysis or the identification of procedures can to some

extent explain the equivalent pairs that we find, but they cannot claim to represent the
way translators actually think. As argued by Jean Delisle (1988: 72–73), they are linguistic
explanations without any reference to translators’ cognitive processes. This means
that their use in pedagogical situations could be misleading and even counter-productive.
Similar questions should also be asked about the empirical status of “deverbalization” and
the like.
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 21

2.7.3 “New information cannot be ‘natural’ ”

If translations are supposed to bring in information that is new to a language or culture,

then they cannot be expected to be “natural.” That is, new ideas and techniques will eventually
require new terms and expressions, so the translations are going to be marked in ways that
their source texts are not. This argument usually becomes a question for terminology: should
the translation use loans from the source text, or should new terms be invented from the
resources considered “natural” in the target language? The ideology of natural equivalence
would certainly prefer the latter, but the speed of technological change is pushing translators
to the use of loans and the like, particularly from English. There is little evidence that languages
are suffering directly as a result (as is occasionally claimed in the heat of debate). Languages
tend to die when they receive no translations at all.

2.7.4 “Naturalness hides imperialism”

If a translation brings to a culture a new way of thought, any attempt to present that
thought as being “natural” is fundamentally deceptive, and quite possibly imperialistic. Can
Nida really pretend that the Christian God was already in the countless non-Christian cultures
into whose languages the Bible is translated? When the “lamb of God” becomes a “seal of
God” for Inuit readers, the New Testament quite simply ceases to refer to first-century
Palestine. The nature of the source is thus concealed, the Inuit readers are deceived, and
we have an ideological “illusion of symmetry” far stronger than anything Snell-Hornby
was criticizing. At that point, translation has been reduced to the problem of marketing a
product (for criticisms of Nida along these lines, see Meschonnic (1973, 2003) and Gutt
(1991/2000)).

2.7.5 “Naturalness promotes parochialism”

Although equivalence could conceivably be based on the literalist level of the source
text or on “functions” of some kind, the sub-paradigm of natural equivalence mostly
favors translations that do not read like translations. Ernst-August Gutt (1991/2000),
for instance, argues that “equivalent function” produces an illusory naturalness, which
misleadingly presents the translation as if it were a non-translation. It is better, for him,
to look for equivalents that make the reader work. One variant of the anti-domestication
argument is found in the American translator and critic Lawrence Venuti (particularly 1998),
who is concerned not so much with the ways minor cultures are deceived as with the
effects that naturalness (“fluency”) has on the way major cultures see the rest of the world.
If all cultures are made to sound like contemporary fluent English, then Anglo-American
culture will believe that the whole world is like itself. For Venuti, a non-natural (“resistant”)
translation should therefore use forms that are not frequent in the target language,
whether or not those forms are equivalent to anything in the source text. At that point
the argument concerns primarily how one should write, and only secondarily how one
should translate.
Most of these points will be developed in future chapters.
22 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

2.8 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE AS A HISTORICAL

SUB-PARADIGM

To close this chapter, we should insist that natural equivalence is a profoundly historical idea,
even though it seems to express common sense. Notions of “equal value” presuppose that
different languages do or can express values that can be compared in some itemized way.
This need not mean that all languages look and sound the same; it need not involve the
“illusion of symmetry” that Snell-Hornby claims to have seen, but it does assume that different
languages are somehow on the same level.
That assumption is easily made with respect to our contemporary national languages:
English, French, Russian, Arabic, Japanese, or Hindi are by no means symmetrical but they
have roughly the same ranking in terms of expressive capacities. No one is seriously arguing
that any of these languages are inherently inferior to the others. But if we did believe that
a language was inferior, or perhaps systematically less developed in some area of technical
terminology, how could we defend natural equivalence as an ideal for translations into that
language?
Belief in the equal values of languages was quite rare in European theorizing prior
to the Renaissance. Much of medieval thinking assumed a hierarchy of languages,
where some were considered intrinsically better than others. At the top were the languages
of divine inspiration (Biblical Hebrew, New Testament Greek, Arabic, sometimes Sanskrit),
then the languages of divinely inspired translation (the Greek of the Septuagint, the Latin
of the Vulgate), then the national vernaculars, then the patois or regional dialects. This usually
meant that translation was seen as a way of enriching the target language with the values
of a superior source language. Most translations went downward in the hierarchy, from
Hebrew or Greek to Latin, or from Latin to the vernaculars. For as long as the hierarchy
existed, claims to equivalence (certainly without the term) played little role in thought
on translation.
For roughly parallel historical reasons, the basic idea of equivalence was difficult to
maintain prior to the age of the printing press. Before printing, the source text was not a
stable entity. Texts tended to undergo constant incremental changes in the process of
copying (each copyist adapted and changed things), and those small changes followed the
numerous variations of regional dialects, prior to the standardization of national vernaculars.
There was usually not just one “source text” waiting to be translated. There would be a
range of different manuscripts, with layer upon layer of different receptions inscribed in those
manuscripts. Translation could be seen as an extension of that process. Why try to be
equivalent if there is nothing stable to be equivalent to?
Printing and the rise of standardized vernaculars helped the conceptualization of
equivalence. True, the term “equivalence” was not used. In its place we usually find talk of
“fidelity,” often to an author, but also to a sense, intention, or function that could be found
in a fixed text.
In accordance with this same logic, the relative demise of equivalence as a concept
could correspond to the electronic technologies by which contemporary texts are constantly
evolving, primarily through updating (think of websites, software, and product documentation).
Without a fixed text, to what should a translation be equivalent?
Seen in this historical light, natural equivalence cannot really provide any guarantee of
a “true” or “valid” translation. Yet its power as a concept remains strong.
 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE 23

SUMMARY

This chapter started by defending the equivalence paradigm against those who misleadingly
reduce it to a belief that all languages are structured the same way. The chapter nevertheless
finishes with a rather negative assessment. We have indicated some of the things the sub-
paradigm of natural equivalence tends to leave out; we have argued that the ideal of pre-
existing equivalence is based on the historical conditions of print culture and national
vernacular languages; we have seen that the commonsensical notion of “equal value” really
only had intellectual validity in opposition to the structuralist belief in languages as world-
views; we have noted how natural equivalence can be described as illusory and deceptive.
Those critical evaluations certainly do not mean that the concept of natural equivalence can
simply be forgotten. Perhaps the most important things to retain from it are the categories
of translational procedures and modes of analysis. Terms like “modulation,” “explicitation,”
“compensation,” “markedness,” and “componential analysis” form the basic metalanguage
of linguistic approaches. They must be known and understood, even though different theories
tend to use the same terms in slightly different ways. No matter how much we might personally
believe that, in theory, equivalence does not exist, the sub-paradigm of natural equivalence
brings together the central problems of translation theory, and does so in ways that are not
always naïve. Once you have grasped the basic principles of this sub-paradigm, all the other
paradigms can be seen as responses to it.

SOURCES AND FURTHER READING

The Translation Studies Reader (Venuti 2000/2004) has texts by Vinay and Darbelnet,
Catford, and Nida (although Catford is not in the second edition). Munday (2001/2008)
places Vinay and Darbelnet and Catford in the chapter on shifts (“product and process” in
the second edition), which for us belongs to the descriptive paradigm. The basic theories of
natural equivalence are well summarized in Peter Fawcett’s Translation and Language.
Linguistic Theories Explained (1997). The classical texts are often still available and remain
very readable, thanks to the wealth of examples used within this sub-paradigm. A good library
should have Catford (1965), Vinay and Darbelnet (1958 and subsequent editions; English
translation published in 1995), and something of Nida (the general theory is in Toward a
Science of Translating, 1964). Critics of natural equivalence are nowadays abundant. Very
few of them, however, have taken the trouble to read the foundational texts in detail, or to
understand the intellectual climate of the decades in which the sub-paradigm developed.

Suggested projects and activities

Here we list questions and tasks that should be taken as general suggestions
for what can be done in the classroom. In some cases the tasks are aimed at
consolidating awareness of the theories presented in this chapter. In other cases,
however, we seek to raise awareness of problems that will be picked up in the next
few chapters.
24 NATURAL EQUIVALENCE

1 Consider this definition of translation: “Translating consists in reproducing in the

receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message”
(Nida and Taber 1969: 12). What should happen when the source text contains
items that are not natural? Find examples in any passage from the Old Testament.
2 Consider the road signs in your language. Which of them result from natural
equivalence? (Think about “Stop,” for a start.)
3 The following is a Dominican friar giving orders in recently conquered Mexico:

I hereby order that all friars in this house, whether in sermons, catechisms,
private talk among themselves, with secular Spaniards or with Indians, shall
refrain from using the name Cabahuil or Chi, or whatever else may be the case,
but shall use the name Dios [God in Spanish] to explain to the natives the nature
of the one true God.
(cited by Remesal 1966: 2.277; our translation)

Which name should the missionaries have used for God?

4 Locate the automatic translation programs Babelfish and Google Translate. Use
both to do back-translations several times (e.g. moving from English to German
to English to German, for the one text). What happens to equivalence? What
translation procedures are involved? What procedures are needed to improve
the translations?
5 Select a problematic term and several possible translations of it. Now attempt
a componential analysis of the term’s function in its original context. How many
components are found in the translations? How many have been lost? What
gains have been made?
6 For the same term, select its most frequent equivalent and do a comparative
analysis of both, as in the example of key vs. llave above. Does the comparative
analysis reveal semantic components that were not clear when you just looked
at the source language?
7 The Italian version of the game show Who Wants to be a Millionaire? was
originally called Chi vuol esser miliardario? (Who Wants to be a Billionaire?)
when it started in 1999, then became Chi vuol esser milionario? (Who Wants
to be a Millionaire?). Why the change? What kind of equivalence is this?
8 Check the names of game shows in your languages-other-than-English. How
many of them look natural? Do a web search to see how many of them are actually
translations. What kind of equivalence can explain them?
9 Consider the terms used in your languages-other-than-English for websites,
webpages, and Internet technology. How many of these terms are obviously
translations? How many would count as “natural” translations? Can you describe
the procedures by which they were produced (check the terms used in
Table 2.1)? Is there a difference between the official terms and the ones that
people commonly use?
10 Consider the terms used in your language for a “USB drive,” “pen drive,” “memory
stick,” or combinations of these. Is there a standard English term from which your
language has translated? Is “natural equivalence” still working when there are
several competing terms in the source language? Who did the translations?