HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

AT SHIMLA

Cr. OPC No.1/2019

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Reserved on: 12.10.2023

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Decided on: 24.11.2023

Court on its own motion …..Petitioner

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Versus

of
Karam Chand & ors. …...Respondents.

Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao,Chief Justice.
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The Hon’ble Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
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For the petitioner : Ms. Anubhuti Sharma, Advocate as Amicus
Curiae.
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For the respondent : Mr. Basant Pal Thakur, Advocate, for

respondents/contemnors no.2 to 4.
Respondents/contemnors no.2 and 3 in
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person.
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Jyotsna Rewal Dua

The allegation against the respondents is of tampering

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with the Court record. Pursuant to a direction issued by the learned

Single Judge of this Court on 10.04.2019 while deciding CMP(M)

No.971/2017 (Karam Chand & Ors. Vs. Kishore Singh & Ors.), this

1
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? yes

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suo motu criminal contempt proceeding was initiated against the

respondents.

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2. Facts leading to present proceedings:-

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2(i) Sh. Karam Chand, his wife Smt. Dhanno and their two

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sons namely Sh. Tarsem Lal & Sh. Dayal Singh were defendants in

Civil Suit No. 154/2008 instituted by S/Sh. Kishore Singh, Manohar

of
Singh and Raghubir Singh. The civil suit was decreed by the learned

Trial Court on 27.11.2014. S/Sh. Karam Chand, Tarsem Lal, Dayal

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Singh and Smt. Dhanno filed an appeal against the said judgment and
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decree before the learned First Appellate Court on 27.12.2014. Their

appeal was also dismissed on 23.12.2015.

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2(ii) Sh. Karam Chand, his wife and their two sons instituted a

Regular Second Appeal No.144/2019 under Section 100 of the Code of

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Civil Procedure in this Court on 17.07.2017 against the aforesaid

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judgments and decrees. Alongwith the appeal, an application CMP(M)

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No.971/2017 was moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for

condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The application was with the

averments that:- The judgment and decree was passed by the learned

First Appellate Court on 23.12.2015; Certified copy of the impugned

judgment and decree dated 23.12.2015 was applied on 26.12.2015;

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Certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree was attested on

05.11.2016; Certified copy of impugned judgment and decree was

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supplied to the appellants on 07.11.2016.

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On the basis of above dates given in the application

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regarding applying for the certified copy of impugned judgment &

decree as well as its preparation, it was further pleaded in the

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application that:- the limitation for filing the appeal had expired in

April 2017; The appellants had approached their learned counsel for
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filing the appeal in the High Court in March 2017, but it transpired that
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they did not have complete record of the case file; The record was

applied for and was made available to them in second week of July
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2017.

In view of aforesaid reasons given in the application,

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prayer was made for condoning the delay of about 166 days in
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instituting the appeal on 17.07.2017.

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2(iii) On being put to notice, the original plaintiffs filed reply

to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 29.08.2017.

The original plaintiffs/non-applicants pleaded that:-

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 The judgment and decree impugned in the second

appeal was passed by the learned First Appellate Court on

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23.12.2015.

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 Both sides had filed their respective applications

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for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and

decree on 26.12.2015. The serial number of the

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application moved by the plaintiffs was 11224, whereas

that of the defendants/applicants was 11228.

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 As per stamp of the copying agency impressed on
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the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree

as supplied to the plaintiffs/non-applicants, the date of

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attestation was 05.01.2016. The plaintiffs believed that

the same date should have been mentioned in the certified

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copy of the judgment & decree supplied to the

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defendants/applicants.
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 The plaintiffs/non-applicants suspected that there

had been interpolation/tampering in the date of attestation

reflected in the certified copy of the judgment and decree

annexed by the defendants/applicants alongwith the

regular second appeal. The certified copy supplied to the

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defendants/applicants should have carried the date

05.01.2016 as the date of attestation and not 05.11.2016.

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The plaintiffs/non-applicants prayed in their reply to call

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for the record of the copying agency and also to seek explanation from

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the concerned officials of the First Appellate Court as to why and how

10 months time was taken for attesting the certified copy of the

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judgment & decree when it was actually prepared on 05.01.2016.

2(iv) Based on the reply filed by the plaintiffs/non-applicants

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to the application moved by the defendants/applicants under Section 5
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of the Limitation Act, learned Single Judge vide order dated

30.08.2017 allowed the applicants to file rejoinder to the reply within

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three weeks. In the meanwhile, learned First Appellate Court was

directed to furnish its comments to the reply filed by the non-

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applicants.
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2(v) Learned First Appellate Court in its response dated

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01.09.2017 apprised that application No.11224 was submitted by the

counsel for the original plaintiffs/non-applicants on 26.12.2015; On

this application, certified copy of the judgment and decree was

prepared on 05.01.2016 and delivered on 06.01.2016. Learned First

Appellate Court also furnished the information that:- Both the sides

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had applied for certified copy of judgment and decree dated 23.12.2015

on 26.12.2015; Both sets of certified copy of judgment and decree

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sheet had been prepared by the same Copyist on 05.01.2016 and

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attested by the same Examiner on 05.01.2016; The date of preparation

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of the documents in both the applications was 05.01.2016; Applied for

documents in application No.11224 (moved by the original plaintiffs-

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non-applicants) were delivered on 06.01.2016 and in the application

No.11228 (moved by the original defendants-applicants) the documents

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were delivered on 07.01.2016. Abstract of relevant record was also
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made part and parcel of the response.

2(vi) On 06.12.2017, the Court granted last opportunity to the

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applicants to file rejoinder to the reply filed by non-applicants to the

application seeking condonation of delay.

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2(vii) On 18.12.2017, the defendants/applicants moved CMP

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No.10998/2017 under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure for

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withdrawal of CMP(M) No. 971/2017 (application under Section 5 of

the Limitation Act). The reason given for moving the second

application was that “due to oversight, the dates for attesting and

supply of the copy had been wrongly mentioned as 05.11.2016 and

07.11.2016, whereas the same were 05.01.2016 and 07.01.2016. This

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had occurred due to oversight and inadvertence.” The matter

proceeded further before the Court. The application seeking

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condonation of delay in filing the appeal bearing CMP(M)

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No.971/2017 was finally heard on 02.04.2019. Vide order dated

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10.04.2019, the application was dismissed. In view of dismissal of the

application, the appeal was also disposed of.

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While dismissing the application, the Court observed that

the interpolation/tampering
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defendants-applicants) were calculated to embarrass the Court in

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administering justice. Notice was directed to be issued to the appellants

in Form-I of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 to show cause as to why

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they should not be prosecuted and punished under the Contempt of

Courts Act.
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3. Instant proceedings
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3(i) Being put to notice, the original defendants/applicants

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(appellants in RSA No. 144/2019) caused their appearance in this

criminal contempt petition on 07.05.2019. Henceforth they are being

referred to as the respondents in Cr.OPC No.1/2019.

3(ii) The respondents four in number, filed their separate but

verbatim the same affidavits tendering unconditional apology and

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stating therein that they were illiterate rustic villagers and did not know

intricacies of law; That they were not aware of law of limitation; That

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they had supplied the certified copy of the judgment and decree as

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given by their counsel who conducted their case before the learned

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Courts below, to the counsel in the High Court; That they were not

aware of tampering of the dates in the certified copy of the judgment &

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decree; They had not carried out any tampering in the record.

3(iii) The affidavits of the respondents were considered on

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14.09.2021. Considering the fact that the allegations against the
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respondents were of tampering with the Court record, their apology

was not accepted. Charges against all the respondents were framed on
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21.09.2021. The respondents pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Ms.

Anubhuti Sharma, learned Advocate, was appointed as Amicus Curiae.

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3(iv) During the pendency of these proceedings, respondent

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No.1 died on 10.11.2021. Therefore, vide order dated 10.03.2022,

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contempt proceedings against him were closed as abated.

3(v) Evidence was adduced. Learned Amicus Curiae produced

three witnesses i.e. RW1- the Section Officer of RSA Branch of the

Registry of this Court, RW2- the Copying Agent from the office of

learned First Appellate Court and Reader Grade-I (Retd.) from the

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office of the learned First Appellate Court (mentioned as RW-2 in the

evidence). The respondents No.2-4 appeared in the witness box and

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stated that it was deceased respondent No.1 who had pursued the case

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before all the Courts & that respondents No.2-4 were not aware of any

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tampering/interpolation in the certified copy of the judgment & decree.

4. We have heard learned counsel on both sides. We have

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also considered entire case record including the evidence adduced in

this petition. rt
4(a) Factual side of the contempt petition.
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4(a)(i) Learned counsel for the respondents has not disputed the

factual position which is evident not only from the pleadings but also
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in light of the evidence advanced that the certified copy of the

judgment & decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court, applied
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for the respondents on 26.12.2015 was prepared on 05.01.2016 and

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delivered on 07.01.2016, however in the stamp impressed upon the

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certified copy of the judgment & decree appended by the respondents

alongwith their appeal there were interpolation in the aforesaid two

dates viz. 05.01.2016 was made to appear as 05.11.2016 and the date

07.01.2016 was made to look like 07.11.2016.

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4(a)(ii) Learned counsel for the respondents did not make

any submission disputing the tampering in judicial record attached with

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the regular second appeal filed by the respondents. The only factual

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submission urged by him is that:- The respondents No.2-4 had not

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interpolated the judicial record; It was only respondent No.1 who had

been actively pursuing the litigation; Fault if any, lay with him & not

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with the other respondents; Respondent No.1 having died during the

pendency of the contempt petition, this contempt proceeding was

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required to be closed. The sum & substance of the argument advanced
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by learned counsel for the respondents is that respondents No.2-4 had

no role whatsoever to play in the interpolation/tampering in the Court

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record.

4(a)(iii) The above argument is to be simply rejected.

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Interpolation in the Court record has been established. Sh. Inder Raj-
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the Section Officer, RSA branch of this Court while deposing as RW1
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stated that as per record of RSA No.144/2019, in the certified copy of

the judgment & decree of the learned First Appellate Court, the

attestation date has been mentioned as 05.11.2016 and 07.11.2016 as

the date of delivery. RW2-Sh. Rakesh Sharma, the concerned copying

agent of the learned First Appellate Court brought the relevant record.

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He stated that:- Application No.11224 (Ext.RW-2/D) was received in

the copying agency on 26.12.2015 through Sh. Mohan Lal Sharma-

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Advocate. The application for certified copy was supplied on

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06.01.2016; The application No.11228 (Ext.RW-2/E) was received in

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the copying agency through Sh. N.K. Bali, Advocate and applied for

certified copy was supplied on 07.01.2016. The abstract of register was

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exhibited as RW-2/A and the aforesaid entries as Ext.RW-2/B-1 , RW-

2/B-2, RW-2/C-1, RW-2/C-2. No question on these aspects has been

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put to the witnesses by the respondents.
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4(a)(iv) In view of the pleadings, documents, evidence and

also the stand taken by the respondents, there is no dispute that there
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had been tampering in the Court record. It is writ large that the date of

attestation of certified copy of the judgment & decree dated 23.12.2015

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passed by the learned First Appellate Court was actually 05.01.2016

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but interpolated in the copy annexed with respondents’ second appeal

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as 05.11.2016. Similarly date of supply of certified copy to the

respondents was 07.01.2016 but was interpolated as 07.11.2016.

4(a)(v) A half hearted argument was raised by learned counsel

for the respondents that even though there has been tampering &

interpolation in the Court record but it was not done by respondents

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No.2-4; It was the work of respondent No.1, who had been actively

pursuing the case. We may notice here, all the respondents including

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deceased respondent No.1 were the appellants in the regular second

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appeal No.144/2019. Power of attorney authorizing filing of the second

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appeal was signed by all the respondents. CMP(M) No.971/2017 under

Section 5 of the limitation Act was filed in the second appeal by all the

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respondents for the benefit of all of them. The Court record more

particularly the
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applying/preparation/delivering of certified copy of the judgment &

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decree reflects that the certified copy of judgment & decree was

applied by learned counsel for the respondents, was prepared &

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attested on 05.01.2016. The date 05.01.2016 was however interpolated

to look like 05.11.2016. Further it was established that the certified

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copy of the judgment & decree was delivered on 07.01.2016, whereas

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by way of tampering in the impressed endorsement, the date has been

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made to look like 07.11.2016. It is the respondents, who would have

been benefited by the interpolation and none else. Merely because the

affidavit in support of the application seeking condonation of delay was

that of respondent No.1, aged about 80 years, would not mean that

respondents No.2-4 can be exculpated from the established tampering

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of Court record. We hold accordingly. No other point on factual matrix

was raised by learned counsel for the respondents.

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4(b) Whether the acts of tampering/interpolation carried

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out by the respondents in the certified copy of the judgment and

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decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court amount to

criminal contempt, is the next question to be considered.

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4(b)(i) Criminal contempt is defined in Section 2(c) of the

Contempt of Courts Act as under:-

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“……….2(c) “Criminal Contempt” means the publication (Whether by
words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
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otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-
(i) scandalises or tends to scanalise, or lowers or tends to lower the
authority of, any court; or
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(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of

any judicial proceedings; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct,
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the administration of justice in any other manner;”

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It is well settled that a person who makes an attempt to

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deceive the Court, files fabricated document, tenders false affidavit in

Court and interferes with the administration of justice, commits

Contempt of Court.

4(b)(ii) In (1995) 3 SCC 757 (Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of

Haryana) the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under in respect of

tampering of Court record and production of false document:-

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“38. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 (for short the Act)
defines criminal contempt as "the publication (whether by words, spoken
or written or by signs or visible representation or otherwise) of any

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matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever to (1) scandalised or

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tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of any court;
(2) prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of
judicial proceedings or (3) interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstruct

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or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner.
Thus, any conduct which has the tendency to interfere with the
administration of justice or the due course of judicial proceedings

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amounts to the commission of criminal contempt. The swearing of false
affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing
obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the
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tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of
justice. The filing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings in any court
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of law exposes the intention of the concerned party in perverting the
course of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be
slighted nor the majesty of law be made a mockery by such acts or
conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation or even while
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appearing as witnesses. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or

undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by
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resorting to the filing of false evidence, commits criminal contempt of

the court and renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with
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the Act. Filing of false affidavits or making false statement on oath in

Courts aims at striking a blow at the Rule of Law and no court can
ignore such conduct which has the tendency to shake public confidence
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in the judicial institutions because the very structure of an ordered life is

put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is
allowed to be poisoned by anyone resorting to filing of false affidavits or
giving of false statements and fabricating false evidence in a court of law.
The stream of justice has to be kept clear and pure and anyone soiling its
purity must be dealt with sternly so that the message perculates loud and
clear that no one can be permitted to undermine the dignity of the court
and interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or the

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administration of justice. In Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma,

[1995] 1 SCC 421, the respondent produced a false and fabricated
certificate to defeat the claim of the respondent for transfer of a case.

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This action was found to be an act amounting to interference with the

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administration of justice.

4(b)(iii) A false or a misleading or wrong statement deliberately

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and willfully made by the parties to the proceedings to obtain

favourable order would prejudice or interfere with due course of

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judicial proceedings. Filing of fabricated documents amounts to

criminal contempt of judicial process. The person doing it has no

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regard for truth. Such an action amounts to criminal contempt of
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judicial proceedings of the Court. [See 1996 (7) SCC 397 (Afzal &

Anr vs State Of Haryana & Ors)].

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4(b)(iv) [(2001) 5 SCC 501 (Re: Bineet Kumar Singh vs

Unknown)], was a case where fabricated & forged order of Supreme

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Court was used for the purpose of conferring some benefits on group
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of persons. The Hon’ble Court held that nothing is more incumbent

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upon the Courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from

being misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when the

order of the Court is forged and produced to gain undue advantage.

Criminal contempt has been defined in Section 2(c) to mean

interference with the administration of justice in any manner. When a

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person is found to have utilized an order of a Court which he knows to

be incorrect for conferring benefit, the very utilization of the

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fabricated order by the person concerned would be sufficient to hold

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him guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he himself is

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the author of fabrication.

4(b)(v) 2014 (12) SCC 11 (Ram Niranjan Roy And Others vs

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State Of Bihar) was a case where the appellant was held guilty of

tampering with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The
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Apex Court held the act fell within the purview of Section 2(c) of the
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Contempt of Courts Act. Relevant paragraphs from the judgment read

as under:-
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“17…………….Thus, the words ‘didn’t shout’ have replaced the word

‘shouted.’ When we asked for an explanation, the appellant stated that
there is no tampering, but it is merely a typing error. We refuse to accept
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this explanation. In this case, by replacing the word ‘shouted’ by the

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words ‘didn’t shout’ the appellant has changed the entire meaning of the
sentence to suit his case that he did not shout in the court. Thus, he is
guilty of tampering with the High Court’s order and filing it in this
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Court. This would, in our opinion, be criminal contempt as defined

by Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. There is abundance
of judgments of this Court on this issue. This Court has taken a strict
view of such conduct.

18. We may usefully refer to Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma

where in a transfer petition the contemnor had filed a forged experience
certificate purportedly issued by the Principal of a college from Nagpur.
The Principal filed affidavit stating that the said certificate is forged.

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This Court observed that an act which interferes or tends to interfere or

obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice would be
criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts

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Act, 1971. This Court further observed that if recourse to falsehood is

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taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or
impede even flow of justice and would prevent the courts from
performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do. The contemnor

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was, therefore, suitably sentenced.

19. In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh a forged/fabricated order of this court

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was used for the purpose of conferring some benefits on a group of
persons. This Court took a strict view of the matter and observed as
under:
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the administration of justice pure and undefiled. It is difficult to
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rigidly define contempt. While on the one hand, the dignity of
the court has to be maintained at all costs, it must also be borne
in mind that the contempt jurisdiction is of a special nature and
should be sparingly used. The Supreme Court is the highest
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court of record and it is charged with the duties and

responsibilities of protecting the dignity of the court. To
discharge its obligation as the custodian of the administration of
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justice in the country and as the highest court imbued with

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supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over all the lower courts

and tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted
with the power to see that the stream of justice in the country
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remains pure, that its course is not hindered or obstructed in any

manner, that justice is delivered without fear or favour. To
discharge this obligation, the Supreme Court has to take
cognizance of the deviation from the path of justice. The sole
object of the court wielding its power to punish for contempt is
always for the course of administration of justice. Nothing is
more incumbent upon the courts of justice than to preserve their
proceedings from being misrepresented, nor is there anything
more pernicious when the order of the court is forged and

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produced to gain undue advantage. Criminal contempt has been

defined in Section 2(c) to mean interference with the
administration of justice in any manner. A false or misleading or

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a wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by a party to

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the proceedings to obtain a favourable order would undoubtedly
tantamount to interference with the due course of judicial
proceedings. When a person is found to have utilised an order of

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a court which he or she knows to be incorrect for conferring
benefit on persons who are not entitled to the same, the very
utilisation of the fabricated order by the person concerned

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would be sufficient to hold him/her guilty of contempt,
irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is

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We respectfully concur with these observations.

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20. We shall now turn to the affidavit filed by the appellant in this Court.
He has sworn an affidavit stating that the annexures of the criminal
appeal are the true copies of the originals and the facts stated in the
criminal appeal are true to his knowledge. As already noted by us, the
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appellant has tampered with the original impugned order. He stated that
he had filed a bail application in the High Court. The copy of the said
bail application filed in this Court is unsigned and supported by
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unsigned affidavit bearing no name of the lawyer. The appellant has not
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made the Registrar of the Patna High Court party to the appeal. The
Registrar could have clarified whether any bail application was, in fact,
filed by the appellant. In any case, we have perused the record and we
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find that there is no such bail application in the record. Thus, in this
Court the appellant has filed a false affidavit. This amounts to contempt
of this Court.”

4(b)(vi) AIR 2022 SC 5711 (In Re: Perry Kansagra), was a

case where the contemnor had falsely represented before the foreign

jurisdiction about the orders passed by the Indian Courts. Hon’ble

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Apex Court held that the acts lowered the authority of the Supreme

Court. The contemnor had interfered with the due course of judicial

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proceedings and obstructed the administration of justice which is a

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clear case of criminal contempt.

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4(b)(vii) In the instant case, the dates figuring in the certified copy

of the judgment & decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court

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have been tampered by the respondents. In their application seeking

condonation of delay, the fabricated dates in the judicial document

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were passed on as the actual dates and made the basis for the prayer.
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These acts amount to interference in the administration of justice.

Respondents attempted to deceive the Court in order to obtain

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favourable order in their application seeking condonation of delay in

filing the appeal. The acts fall within the definition of criminal
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contempt in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act and attract the
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liability of contempt.
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4(c) The second contention of learned counsel for the

respondents is that this contempt proceeding was initiated beyond

the period of one year from the date of commission of

contemptuous act, therefore, cannot proceed in view of limitation

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imposed in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The section is

as follows:-

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“20. Limitation for actions for contempt. No Court shall initiate any
proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is

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alleged to have been committed.”

Article 215 of the Constitution of India empowers the

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High Court to punish for its contempt, it would be appropriate to

reproduce hereinafter Article 215 of the Constitution of India:-

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“Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the
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powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of
itself.
We may now refer to legal position in reference to
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Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Article 215 of the

Constitution of India.
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4(c)(i) 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 529 (Pritam Pal Vs. High Court
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of Madhya Pradesh), laid down that the power conferred upon the
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Supreme Court and the High Court, being Courts of record under

Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively, is an inherent

power and as the jurisdiction vested in these Courts is a special one

not derived from any other statute, but from the aforesaid Articles of

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 21

the Constitution of India. Such power cannot be either abridged by

any legislation or abrogated or cut down.

.
4(c)(ii) In 1998 (7) SCC 379 (Dr. L.P.Misra Vs. State of U.P.), it

.P
was held that the High Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction

H
vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a

jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure

of
prescribed by law.

4(c)(iii) rt In 2001 (7) SCC 549 (Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian

& Others), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that ‘there is no doubt that
ou
the Supreme Court & the High Courts are the Courts of Record and

the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt.
C

Previous decisions of the Supreme Court clearly show that this power

cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article

h

129 and Article 215 is absolute can there be any legislation

ig

indicating the manner and the extent to which that power can be
H

exercised? If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or

abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 there

can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having

been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for

the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded

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 22

as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for

initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a

.
provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction

.P
under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution.

H
Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that it has always

frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power.

of
Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in

accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature it would stand

rt
to reason that the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 should
ou
be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted

law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict, the provisions should

C

be construed harmoniously. Some previous judgments on the issue

were noticed by the Apex Court in the following para:-

h

“32 The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 inter alia provides for what is
ig

not to be regarded as contempt; it specifies in Section 12 the maximum

punishment which can be imposed; procedure to be followed where
H

contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or in the High Court or

cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases is provided by Sections
14 and 15; the procedure to be followed after taking cognizance is
provided by Section 17; Section 18 provides that in every case of criminal
contempt under Section 15 the same shall be heard and determined by a
Bench of not less than two Judges; Section 19 gives the right of appeal
from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt. There is no challenge to the validity
of any of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act as being violative

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 23

or in conflict with any provisions of the Constitution. Barring

observations of this Court in the Supreme Court Bar Association's case
(supra), where it did not express any opinion on the question whether

.
maximum punishment fixed by the 1971 Act was binding on the Court, no

.P
doubt has been expressed about the validity of any provision of the 1971
Act. In exercise of its constitutional power this Court has, on the other
hand, applied the provisions of the Act while exercising jurisdiction

H
under Article 129 or 125 of the Constitution. In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's
case (supra) it recognised that the 1926 Act placed a limitation on the
amount of punishment which could be imposed. Baradakanta Mishra's

of
case was decided on the interpretation of Section 19 of the 1971 Act,
namely, there was no right of appeal if the Court did not take action or
initiate contempt proceedings. In the case of Firm Ganpat Ram
rt
Rajkumar's case (supra) the Court did not hold that Section 20 of the
1971 Act was inapplicable. It came to the conclusion that the application
ou
for initiating contempt proceedings (was within time and limitation had
to be calculated) as for the purpose of limitation date of filing was
relevant and furthermore that was a case of continuing wrong. In Kartick
Chandra Das case (supra) the provisions of the Limitation Act were held
C

to be applicable in dealing with application under Section 5 in

connection with an appeal filed under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. A
h

three-Judge Bench in Dr L. P. Misra's case (supra) observed that the

procedure provided by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be
ig

followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the

Constitution. It would, therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so
interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under Article
H

129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of the Contempt of Courts
Act relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a
reasonable period of limitation can also be provided.”

4(c)(iv) In (2016) 14 SCC 251 (Maheshwar Peri & Ors. Vs.

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad), the Apex Court reiterated

that in an action initiated for contempt under Article 129 of the

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 24

Constitution by the Supreme Court or under Article 215 thereof by the

High Court, the prosecution proceeding has to be in consonance with

.
the Contempt of Courts Act. The suo motu contempt initiated by the

.P
High Court was held to be hit by the limitation of one year prescribed

H
under the Act. Relevant paragraphs from the judgment are extracted

hereinafter:-

of
“1. Leave granted. What is the period of limitation for suo motu
initiation of contempt proceedings, is the short question for consideration
in this case.
rt
2-6………………...
ou
7. The main contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the
appellants is that the High Court, having initiated action only after four
years of the alleged contempt, the whole proceedings are barred
by Section 20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred
C

to as ‘the Act’) which has prescribed the period of limitation of one year
for initiating any proceedings of contempt, be it suo motu or
h

otherwise. Section 20 of the Act reads as follows:

“20. Limitation for actions for contempt.—No court shall initiate

ig

any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or

otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on
H

which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. "

8-12 ……………...

13. Criminal Contempt of court subordinate to High Court can be

initiated either suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General.
The suo motu action is set in motion on a Reference made to it by the
subordinate court. In view of the process involved in making the
Reference by the subordinate court, in Pallav Sheth case (supra), it has
been held that the Reference is the starting point of the process of

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 25

initiation of the action for contempt. That is why in paragraph-39, which

we have extracted above, it has been clearly held that:

“39…. unless a court was to take suo motu action, the proceeding

.
under The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would normally

.P
commence with the filing of an application drawing the attention
of the court to the contempt having been committed.”

H
The application is the motion provided under Section 15 of The
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any person other than
Advocate General, can be made only with the consent in writing of the

of
Advocate General. In other words, any other application made by a
person without the consent of the Advocate General, is not an
application in the eyes of law.”
rt
14. This aspect has been succinctly discussed and subtly
distinguished in paragraph-44 of the Pallav Sheth case.
ou
“44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely,
that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise
than on the court’s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case
C

would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu

proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a
notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an
h

application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to

be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated,
ig

either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo

motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the
H

contempt is alleged to have been committed.”

15. Coming to the factual matrix of the present case, the High Court
is clear in its mind that the action under Section 15 of the Act is initiated
suo motu by the High Court. To make it abundantly clear in the
impugned order, it is said that the name of the petitioner is not to be
shown in the cause list. Apparently, it can only be suo motu because the
application filed by the advocates, and which is referred to in the
impugned order, is without the consent in writing of the Advocate
General. The only application other than by the Advocate General,

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 26

contemplated under Section 15 of the Act, is the motion made by any

person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. Being a
jurisdiction which, when exercised, is fraught with serious

.
consequences, the Parliament has thought it justifiably fit to provide for

.P
such safeguards. Thus, the impugned article, having been published on
10.11.2008 and the High Court having initiated the suo motu action only
on 28.04.2015, the same is hit by the limitation of one year prescribed

H
under the Act.”

4(c)(v) In the backdrop of above legal position, the plea of

of
limitation taken by learned counsel for the respondents is to be

examined in the facts of the instant case. The regular second appeal
rt
alongwith the interpolated & tampered certified copy of the judgment
ou
and decree of the learned Appellate Court was filed by the respondents

in this Court on 17.07.2017. Notice was issued in the accompanying

C

application CMP(M) No.971/2017 seeking condonation of delay on

01.08.2017. The non-applicants filed their reply to the application on

h

09.08.2017 expressing doubts over the date of attestation, preparation

ig

& delivery impressed in the endorsement seal on the certified copy of

H

judgment and decree. The Court called for the comments of the

learned First Appellate Court on 30.08.2017. The matter was ordered

to be listed on 04.10.2017. Learned First Appellate Court furnished its

comments. Thereafter at the request of the present respondents

(appellants in RSA) the matter was adjourned on 18.10.2017,

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 27

13.11.2017 & 15.11.2017. On 06.12.2017, following order was passed

in the matter:-

.
“Despite repeated opportunities having been afforded to the applicants to

.P
file rejoinder w.e.f. 30.08.2017, they have failed to do so. As a matter of
sheer indulgence and by way of last opportunity, two weeks’ further time

H
is granted to do the needful, failing which the application shall be
considered on the basis of the pleadings as existing in the case file.”

of
Another application was moved by the present

respondents for withdrawing the application seeking condonation of

rt
delay. The matter proceeded further and was repeatedly adjourned at

the behest of present respondents (appellants in the RSA). Following

ou
orders were passed in the matter on 07.03.2018 and 04.04.2018,

respectively:-
C

“Mr. Abhay Kaushal, learned vice counsel appearing for the

applicants/appellants prays for and is granted three weeks time to file
h

rejoinder.”
ig

&

“Learned counsel for the applicants prays for further three weeks’ time to
H

file rejoinder. As a matter of sheer indulgence and by way of last

opportunity further three weeks’ time is granted to do the needful.”

In the meanwhile, in the application moved by the present

respondents seeking to withdraw the application for condonation of

delay, adjournments were sought for filing the rejoinder. Such

adjournments were granted to them on 25.04.2018, 16.05.2018,

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 28

23.05.2018 and 19.06.2018. The rejoinder was eventually filed on

10.07.2018.

.
On 24.07.2018, learned counsel representing the present

.P
respondents (appellants in RSA) sought permission to withdraw from

H
the case. Permission was granted. The present respondents prayed for

and were allowed time to engage another counsel. The matter was

of
thereafter adjourned time and again at the request of the

appellants/present respondents, who attended the hearing in person.

rt
Finally, vide order dated 21.08.2018, the Secretary H.P. Legal Services
ou
Authority was directed to provide legal aid to applicant No.2. The

matter was adjourned thereafter at the request of learned legal aid

C

counsel. It was finally heard on 02.04.2019 & the order was passed on

10.04.2019 dismissing the application & inter alia directing the

h

Registry to initiate this contempt proceeding.

ig

In light of orders passed in the regular second appeal, it is

H

evident that the cause of action to initiate the contempt proceedings

arose not on 05.01.2016 or 07.01.2016 as is contended by learned

counsel for the respondents, rather the cause of action arose only on

10.04.2019 when prima facie the Court concluded after hearing learned

counsel on both sides that there was tampering in the Court record.

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 29

Therefore, the contention put-forth by learned counsel for the

respondents that contempt action cannot be initiated against the

.
respondents, being barred by limitation provided under Section 20 of

.P
the Contempt of Courts Act is devoid of merit. In Pallav Sheth v.

H
Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549, at page 571 the Supreme Court held that

where fraud is committed by a party, time for computing the period of

of
limitation commences from the date of knowledge of act of fraud and

that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation

rt
Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of
ou
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the

provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted. It

C

declared:

“44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that
h

initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the
court’s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would
ig

necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is

the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases
H

initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion,

therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that
action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court
issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on
which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
45. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that even if the
provisions of Section 20 do not bar the High Court from taking action if
proceedings are initiated by the filing of an application within a period of
one year of the contempt having been committed, in the present case the

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 30

period of limitation must be regarded as having expired long before the

filing of the application by the Custodian and, therefore, no action on
such an application could be taken by the Court.

.
46. The record discloses that the Custodian received information of the

.P
appellant having committed contempt by taking over benami concerns,
transferring funds to these concerns and operating their accounts
clandestinely only from a letter dated 5-5-1998 from the Income Tax

H
Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18-6-1998, a petition was filed
for initiating action in contempt and notice issued by the Special Court
on 9-4-1999. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that

of
where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by
the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period
rt
were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
ou
application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. This
Court in the case of Kartick Chandra Das has held that by virtue of
C

Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands
prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts
h

Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of

the Limitation Act stand attracted.
ig

47. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that where, in the
case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is
prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit
H

or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or

his agent [Section 17(1)(b)] or where any document necessary to
establish the right of the plaintiff or the applicant has been fraudulently
concealed from him [Section 17(1)(d)], the period of limitation shall not
begin to run until the plaintiff or the applicant has discovered the fraud
or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or
in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant
first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling

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 31

its production. These provisions embody fundamental principles of justice

and equity viz. that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt
legal proceedings when the facts or material necessary for him to do so

.
have been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party who has

.P
acted fraudulently should not gain the benefit of limitation running in his
favour by virtue of such fraud.
48. The provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in

H
the present case. The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was unearthed
only on the Custodian receiving information from the Income Tax
Department, vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming aware of the

of
fraud, application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6-
1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is
on this application that the Special Court by its order of 9-4-1999
rt
directed the application to be treated as a show-cause notice to the
appellant to punish him for contempt. In view of the abovestated facts
ou
and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of
Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action taken
by the Special Court to punish the appellant for contempt was valid. The
Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the
C

sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the circumstances, to

examine the finding of the Special Court that this was a continuing wrong
h

or contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was not barred by

Section 20.”( emphasis supplied)
ig

This was reiterated in Bank of Baroda vs. Sadruddin

H

Hasan Daya…(2004) 1 SCC 360 as under:

“11. One of the pleas taken in the reply filed by the respondents is that
they had given the undertaking before the Bombay High Court on 5-10-
1999 but the present petition for initiating contempt proceedings against
them was filed after more than one year in May 2001 and consequently,
the same was barred by limitation by virtue of Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act. In this connection it may be noticed that the
petitioners are not party to Summary Suit No. 4571 of 1996 which was

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 32

instituted by Oman International Bank, SAOD in the Bombay High

Court wherein the respondents entered into a settlement and gave an
undertaking in the consent terms on 5-10-1999. Normally, a person who

.
is not a party to the suit or proceedings can get no knowledge of the

.P
affidavits or documents filed therein. It is categorically stated in para 14
of the present petition that in January 2001 the petitioners learnt about
the consent decree passed in the case of Oman International Bank

H
during the course of execution proceedings before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, when steps were taken to attach the aforesaid three properties.
The respondents have neither controverted the said fact nor have they

of
placed any material to show that the petitioners had got knowledge of
the consent terms filed by the respondents in the Bombay High Court at
any time prior thereto. The petitioners filed the present application
rt
within five months of getting knowledge of the undertaking given by the
respondents in the aforesaid case. In such a situation, the proceedings
ou
initiated against the respondents cannot be held to be barred by
limitation in view of the law laid down by this Court in Pallav Sheth v.
Custodian3, SCC paras 44 and 47, wherein it has been held that the
period of limitation in a case like the present one has to be counted from
C

the date of knowledge.”

(emphasis supplied)
h

In our opinion, the instant case being one initiated suo

ig

motu by the High Court, this court can be said to have knowledge of

the tampering of the record only when it applied it’s mind to the said
H

issue at the time it heard the matter on 2.4.2019 and only when it got

convinced that there was tampering of record by the respondents after

considering the material on record and pronounced the order on

10.4.2019. All intermediate stages before the same were stages where

the matter was under verification of said allegation made by original

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 33

plaintiffs, and steps taken by the Court in compliance with following of

due process preliminary to hearing of the matter. The respondents

.
cannot be allowed to take advantage of the time taken by them by

.P
seeking repeated adjournments before the learned Single Judge, so that

H
decision in the matter gets delayed and then plead that the suo motu

contempt is time barred. This principle is stated in maxim nullus

of
commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.

In Union of India v. Maj. Gen. Madan Lal Yadav …

rt
(1996) 4 SCC 127 the Supreme Court held :
ou
“28. Even if narrow interpretation is plausible, on the facts in this case,
we have no hesitation to conclude that the trial began on 25-2-1987 on
which date the court martial assembled, considered the charge and the
C

prosecution undertook to produce the respondent who was found escaped

from the open detention, before the Court. It is an admitted position that
GCM assembled on 25-2-1987. On consideration of the charge, the
h

proceedings were adjourned from day to day till the respondent appeared
on 2-3-1987. It is obvious that the respondent had avoided trial to see
ig

that the trial would not get commenced. Under the scheme of the Act and
the Rules, presence of the accused is a precondition for commencement of
H

trial. In his absence and until his presence was secured, it became
difficult, nay impossible, to proceed with the trial of the respondent-
accused. In this behalf, the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de
injuria sua propria — meaning no man can take advantage of his own
wrong — squarely stands in the way of avoidance by the respondent and
he is estopped to plead bar of limitation contained in Section 123(2). In
Broom’s Legal Maxim (10th Edn.) at p. 191 it is stated:
“… it is a maxim of law, recognised and established, that no man
shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which is

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 34

based on elementary principles, is fully recognised in courts of law

and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch
of legal procedure.”

.
The reasonableness of the rule being manifest, we proceed at once to

.P
show its application by reference to decided cases. It was noted therein
that a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong to gain the
favourable interpretation of the law. In support thereof, the author has

H
placed reliance on another maxim frustra legis auxilium invocat quaerit
qui in legem committit. He relies on Perry v. Fitzhowe. At p. 192, it is
stated that if a man be bound to appear on a certain day, and before that

of
day the obligee puts him in prison, the bond is void. At p. 193, it is stated
that “it is moreover a sound principle that he who prevents a thing from
being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has
rt
occasioned”. At p. 195, it is further stated that “a wrong doer ought not
to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong”. At p. 199 it is
ou
observed that “the rule applies to the extent of undoing the advantage
gained where that can be done and not to the extent of taking away a
right previously possessed”.
29. The Division Bench of the High Court has recorded the finding that
C

the respondent has absconded from open military detention. From the
narration of the facts it is clear that the respondent was bent upon
h

protracting preliminary investigation. Ultimately, when the GCM was

constituted, he had challenged his detention order. When he was
ig

unsuccessful and the trial was to begin he escaped the detention to

frustrate the commencement of the trial and pleaded bar of limitation on
and from 1-3-1987. The respondent having escaped from lawful military
H

custody and prevented the trial from being proceeded with in accordance
with law, the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua
propria squarely applies to the case and he having done the wrong,
cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of limitation to
frustrate the lawful trial by a competent GCM. Therefore, even on the
narrow interpretation, we hold that continuation of trial from 2-3-1987
which commenced on 25-2-1987 is not a bar and it is a valid trial.”
( emphasis supplied)

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 35

This principle has been reiterated in several cases such as

Swarnalata Sarkar v. State of West Bengal … (1996) 4 SCC 733;

.
Kanhaiya Kumar v Union of India … (2018) 14 SCC 279 etc.

.P
Therefore the plea of respondents that the instant

H
Criminal Contempt matter is barred by limitation, is rejected. We hold

this proceeding to be within the limitation period. We may also

of
profitably extract observations of Hon’ble Apex Court from

Dhananjay Sharma’s case (supra) that “the stream of administration of

rt
justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court's atmosphere
ou
may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial

firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain

C

the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to administer

justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Anyone who takes
h

recourse to fraud deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if

ig

anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the ad-
H

ministration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt

with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter

others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in

the system of administration of justice”.

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 36

It would also be pertinent to observe that Pallav Sheth’s

decision as followed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in AIR 2020 SC

.
3927 (In Re: Vijay Kurle & Others) was noticed in AIR 2022 SC

.P
5711 (In Re: Perry Kansagra) as under with reference to the

H
constitutional power of the Court to consider contumacious acts of

a contemnor & to punish him for the same:-

of
“ 13. The above said principle is followed in Re: Vijay Kurle and Ors.,
where this Court reiterated the above referred principle and held as
under: -
rt “38. The aforesaid finding clearly indicates that the Court
held that any law which stultifies or abrogates the power of the
ou
Supreme Court under Article 129 of the Constitution or of the
High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution, could not be
said to be validly enacted. It however, went on to hold that
C

providing the quantum of punishment or a period of limitation

would not mean that the powers of the Court under Article 129
have been stultified or abrogated. We are not going into the
h

correctness or otherwise of this judgment but it is clear that this

judgment only dealt with the issue whether the Parliament
ig

could fix a period of limitation to initiate the proceedings under

the Act. Without commenting one way or the other on Pallav
H

Seth's case (supra) it is clear that the same has not dealt with
the powers of this Court to issue suo motu notice of contempt.
39. In view of the above discussion we are clearly of the
view that the powers of the Supreme Court to initiate
contempt are not in any manner limited by the provisions of
the Act. This Court is vested with the constitutional powers to
deal with the contempt. Section 15 is not the source of the
power to issue notice for contempt. It only provides the
procedure in which such contempt is to be initiated and this

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 37

procedure provides that there are three ways of initiating a

contempt - (i) suo motu (ii) on the motion by the Advocate
General/Attorney General/Solicitor General and (iii) on the

.
basis of a petition filed by any other person with the consent in

.P
writing of the Advocate General/Attorney General/Solicitor
General. As far as suo motu petitions are concerned, there is
no requirement for taking consent of anybody because the

H
Court is exercising its inherent powers to issue notice for
contempt. This is not only clear from the provisions of the Act
but also clear from the Rules laid down by this Court.”

of
14. It is within the constitutional power of this Court to consider
the contumacious acts of a contemnor and to punish him/her for the
same. It is in exercise of such a power, unrestricted by the Contempt of
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Court Act that this Court had imposed a sentence of more than six
months and also directed in some cases that the contemnor shall
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undergo rigorous imprisonment.
15-16……….
17. This Court in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and ors.6
while articulating the powers under Article 129 held as follows: -
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“19. …It is therefore that Article 142 of the Constitution of

India mandates that this Court
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“… in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or

make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in
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any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so

passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the
territory of India …”.
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And it is also inter alia for the above enforcement, that

Article 129 of the Constitution of India, vests in the Supreme
Court the power, amongst other things, to enforce compliance
with the Court directions. The Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction and power to punish for its contempt. It is this
dispensation which authorises the Supreme Court to enforce
compliance with its orders. For, the power to punish would
serve no purpose if the power to enforce compliance was

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 38

lacking. It was, therefore, that this Court in Maninderjit Singh

Bitta v. Union of India [(2012) 1 SCC 273 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ)
88 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 528 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 83] with

.
reference to its contempt jurisdiction observed, thus : (SCC pp.

.P
28285, paras 26-27 & 34).
“26. It is also of some relevance to note that disobedience of
court orders by positive or active contribution or non-

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obedience by a passive and dormant conduct leads to the same
result. Disobedience of orders of the court strikes at the very
root of the rule of law on which the judicial system rests. The

of
rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society.
Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. If the judiciary is

rt to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true

to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted, the dignity
and authority of the courts have to be respected and protected
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at all costs (refer T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v.
Ashok Khot [(2006) 5 SCC 1] , SCC p. 6, para 5).
130. ...The scope of the instant contempt jurisdiction extends to
punishing contemnors for violating the Court's orders;
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punishing contemnors for disobeying the Court's orders;

punishing contemnors for breach of undertakings given to the
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Courts. It also extends to enforcement of the Court's orders. The

contempt jurisdiction even extends to punishing those who
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scandalise (or lower the authority of) any court; punishing

those who interfere in due course of judicial proceedings; and
punishing those who obstruct the administration of justice...”
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18…………...
19. In the circumstances and in order to mention the majesty of law,
we must impose upon adequate punishment on the contemnor. We have
also noted that the contemnor never showed any remorse or tender any
apology for his conduct.”

The Court would be failing in its duties, if the matter in

question is not dealt with in a proper and effective manner for

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 39

maintenance of majesty of Courts as otherwise the Law Courts would

lose their efficacy to the litigant public. [Re. 2000 (2) SCC 367

.
(Murray And Co vs Ashok Kr. Newatia)]. We may also gainfully

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quote from the judgment in Dhananjay Sharma’s case that the law of

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contempt is deterrent in nature and is concerned essentially with

prevention of scandalization or prejudice or interference with course

of
of judicial proceedings or administration of justice. The Criminal

contempt offends public and consists of conduct that offends majesty

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of law undermines the dignity of Court.
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5. Conclusion

5(i) We hold that respondents no.2-4 are guilty of criminal

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contempt under Section 2(c)(ii) & 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts

Act 1971 for wilfully tampering the judicial record by making

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interpolations in the copying agency details contained in the certified

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copy of the judgment & decree dated 23.12.2015 passed by learned

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Additional District Judge-I Una in C.A. No.1938/2014.

5(ii) We also hold that respondents no.2-4 made false

averments in CMP(M) No.971/2017 regarding dates of attestation &

supply of aforementioned certified copy, which act prejudiced the due

course of judicial proceedings and also interfered with & obstructed

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 40

the administration of justice. Thereby respondents no.2-4 have

committed an offence punishable under Section 12 of the Contempt of

.
Courts Act 1971.

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5(iii) Considering the nature of offence committed by

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respondents no.2-4 & the factual matrix of the case, we impose

following punishment upon them:-

of
5(iii)(a) Respondents no.2-4 shall render community service for a

period of two weeks in a span of two months and for this purpose shall
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forthwith make themselves available to the Pradhan of Gram
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Panchayat Haroli, District Una. The concerned Gram Panchayat shall

extract suitable & appropriate work from them for the benefit of the
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villagers/Gram Panchayat Haroli District Una.

5(iii)(b) After completion of the work under Clause 5(iii)(a) above

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to the satisfaction of the concerned Gram Panchayat, respondents

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no.2-4 shall report to the Secretary District Legal Services Authority

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Una, who shall in turn depute them for appropriate & suitable work

for a total period of four weeks in span of six months, in the Village

Legal Care and Sports Center, Haroli District Una.

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5(iii)(c) We impose a fine of Rs.2,000/- upon each of respondents

no.2-4. In default, respondent no.2-4 shall be liable to undergo simple

.
imprisonment for a period of one week.

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5(iii)(d) We impose exemplary costs of Rs.10,000/- upon each of

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respondents no.2-4 to be deposited by them within a period of two

weeks with District Legal Services Authority District Una.

of
This contemt petition is disposed of in terms of above

directions. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand

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disposed of.
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( M.S. Ramachandra Rao )

Chief Justice
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(Jyotsna Rewal Dua)

Judge
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24th November, 2023

(rohit)
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