Ethical Theses on the Blessed Life and Virtue

[Theses ethicae, de vita beata et virtute]

Pierre Du Moulin (praes.), Josias Vosberghius (resp.)

(Leiden: Franciscus Raphelengius, 1594)

Translated by David S. Sytsma

Translator’s Introduction

Pierre Du Moulin (1568–1658) was a famous Huguenot minister. This is an English translation of Theses
ethicae, de vita beata et virtute (1594), an ethical disputation over which Du Moulin presided during his early
period at Leiden university. Du Moulin discusses the topics of happiness and virtue. The disputation is of
interest since Du Moulin later produced successful systems of ethics in French and Latin: Les elements de la
philosophie morale (Sedan, 1624); and Ethicorum seu doctrinae moralis libri undecim (Amsterdam, 1645).

© David S. Sytsma, 2021 1

THESIS I. Constans est omnium opinio, THESIS I. It is the constant opinion of all that
summum bonum quod expetitur se ipsum & happiness is the highest good that is desired for its
non propter aliud, esse felicitatem: Sed in qua own sake and not because of something else. But
re sit ea posita, aut quo modo adipiscenda, there is debate in what thing it should be placed or
ambigitur. in what way it is obtained.

II. Nam prout quisque aut pauper est, aut II. For to the extent that anyone is either poor, or
inhonoratus, aut intemperans, ita vel divitias, dishonored, or intemperate, he supposes that the
vel honorem, vel voluptatem summum in vita highest good in life is either riches, or honor, or
bonum existimat. pleasure.1

III. Divitias qui summum bonum putant, eo III. Those who believe that riches are the highest
erroris arguuntur: 1. Quòd contingunt etiam good are shown to err, 1. Because [riches] come to
malis. 2. Quòd ut plurimum animum those who are evil. 2. Because they nearly always
corrumpunt. 3. Quòd ob aliud expetuntur. 4. corrupt the soul. 3. Because they are desired for the
Quòd apparent demum cùm amittuntur. 5. sake of something else.2 4. Because they appear [as
Quòd earum incerta possessio. good] finally when they are lost. 5. Because their
possession is uncertain.
IIII. Nec propius absunt à vero, qui
constituunt felicitatem in Honore, qui magis IIII. Nor are they closer to the truth, who place
est in honorante quàm honorato, 2. Qui ex happiness in honor, [1.] which is more in honoring
alienis iudiciis pendet, 3. Et pessimis than being honored, 2. which depends on a
quibusque contingit; 4. Et facilius amittitur someone else’s judgment,3 3. happens to even the
quàm quaeritur. worst people; 4. and is more easily lost than sought.

V. Sed indignissima est oratio eorum qui V. But the most shameful is the discourse of those
summum bonum faciunt Voluptatem who make the highest good to be bodily pleasure,
corporis, quae cum belluis nobis communis which we have in common with the beasts. [Then]
est; futuris longè felicioribus homine, quippe of course those with no conscience who delight in
quae maiori licentia, nulla conscientia natural pleasures with greater license [would
fruuntur voluptatibus naturalibus: Adde quòd receive] a far happier future. In additon because it
inficit animos vitiorum tabe, & est malorum infects souls with the decay of vices, and it is the
esca. bait of evils.4

VI. Politiores videntur apud quos Virtus inter VI. The more educated seem to be those for whom
bona ordinem ducit, quorum tamen sententia virtue leads to order among goods, yet their
nec satis explicata, nec nisi ex parte vera; cui opinion has not been sufficiently explained and is
assertioni ut fides constet, altiùs res repetenda only true in part. In order to secure this assertion,
est. the issue must be revisited at a deeper level.

1
Cf. EN 1.4, 1095a24.
2
Cf. EN 1.5, 1095a6-8.
3
Cf. EN 1.5, 1095b24-27.
4
Cf. Cicero, Cat. mai., 13.44: “Divine Plato escam
malorum appellat voluptatem...”
© David S. Sytsma, 2021 2
VII. Tres sunt seu partes seu facultates VII. There are three parts or faculties of the soul:
animae; Vegetans, sentiens, rationalis: the vegetative, sensetive, and rational. If there is any
Felicitas hominis in hac vita si qua est, happiness for humanity in this life, it ought to be
oportet sit perfectio & ornamentum alicuius the perfection and adornment of some of these
harum partium. [p. 4] parts.

VIII. Non est autem sentientis, nec vegetantis VIII. But the happiness of man does not consist in
perfectio, hominis felicitas, cùm hac in parte the perfection of the sensitive or vegetative [soul],5
à pecudibus & plantis longo intervallo since in this regard he is removed by a long interval
relinquatur. Erit igitur haec felicitas animae from animals and plants. Therefore this happiness
rationalis. will be found in the rational soul.

IX. Cùm verò nihil esse possit in anima IX. Since nothing in our soul can be more perfect
nostra virtute perfectius, sine dubio ex eius than virtue, without doubt people should be
possessione & usu felices homines censendi regarded as happy from its possession and use.6
sunt.
X. But since there are two faculties of the soul,
X. Sed duae animae facultates Mens, & mind and will, the virtues are divided into two
Voluntas, Virtutes in duas classes diviserunt: classes: some are of the mind, others are of the
ut aliae sint Mentis, aliae Voluntatis. will.7

XI. Virtutes mentis sunt quinque; Tres XI. There are five virtues of the mind. Three are
contemplativae, intelligentia, scientia, contemplative: intelligence, science, wisdom. One is
sapientia: Una activa, Prudentia: Una active: prudence. One is productive: skill.8 By far
effectiva, Ars: Inter quas longè princeps est the chief among them is wisdom, which is a
Sapientia, quae est cognitio rerum knowledge of the most excellent and eminent
praestantissimarum & sublimium, cum things, together with intelligence and science.9
intelligentia, & scientia. Unde sit ut From which it follows that blessedness is placed in
beatitudo in sapientia sublimiumque wisdom and the contemplation of eminent things.
contemplatione sit posita: Haec est beatitudo This is contemplative blessedness.10
contemplativa.

5
Cf. EN 1.7, 1097b35; 1.9, 1099b32-34.
6
Cf. EN 1.7, 1098a15-17.
7
Cf. EN 1.13, 1103a4-13; 2.1, 1103a14-17; 6.1,
1138b36-1139a1.
8
Cf. EN 6.3, 1139b14-18.
9
Cf. EN 6.7, 1141a9-19.
10
Cf. EN 10.7, 1177a17-22.
© David S. Sytsma, 2021 3
XII. Quae sint haec sublima, & quomodo in XII. What these eminent things are, and in what
eorum contemplationem assurgendum, & in way one should rise to their contemplation and rest
iis acquiescendum, Theologi est docere non in them, is something that theologians should
Ethici, qui vitam civiliter beatam exquirit: teach, and not ethicists, who inquire into the
hoc est, quae id sequitur quod est in blessed life in the civil sphere. That is, [ethics]
communi societate & vitae officiis per se attends to that which is desireable in itself for
expetendum: Honestum appellatur: estque common society and the duties of life. It is called
honestum voluntatis nostrae regula & honorable, and the honorable is the rule and
perfectio. perfection of our will.

XIII. Virtutes Voluntatis, quae & honesti XIII. The virtues of the will, which are also species
species, sunt tres: Fortitudo, temperantia, of the honorable, are three: fortitude, temperance,
iustitia: hae sunt Morales virtutes. and justice. These are moral virtues.

XIIII. His virtutibus, ut par est, ornatum, XIIII. It is fitting that we call the one adorned with
dicimus beatum secunda specie Felicitatis these virtues blessed with a second kind of
quae Practica appellatur, nec posse eum ulla happiness that is called practical, nor can he be
mole calamitatum ingruentium fieri miserum; made miserable by any trouble of violent
ita tamen ut non sit beatus censendus ob misfortune.11 Yet on the condition that blessedness
virtutis possessionem tantùm, sed praecipuè is not determined on account of the possession of
ob usum. virtue alone, but especially on account of its use.

XV. De Morali virtute duo in genere docet XV. Ethics teaches two things in general about
Ethicus: 1. quid sit, 2. quomodo adipiscenda. moral virtue: 1. what it is, 2. in what way it is
[p. 5] obtained.

XVI. Virtus est habitus voluntatis, XVI. Virtue is a habit of the will, holding a mean
mediocritatem tenens inter duo vitia extrema, between two extreme vices, one of which sins in
quorum alterum peccat in excessu, alterum in excess, the other in defect.12
defectu.

XVII. Estque contraria extremis, ut & XVII. There is a contrary to extremes, as also
extrema inter se, sed diverso modo, virtus among the extremes, but in a different way. Virtue
cum extremis pugnat, ut bonum cum malo; is opposed to extremes, as good to evil, whereas
extrema inter se ut excessus cum defectu. extremes are mutually opposed as excess to defect.

11
Cf. EN 1.10, 1100b33-1101a8.
12
Cf. EN 2.6, 1106b29-b34.
© David S. Sytsma, 2021 4
XVIII. Sed medium duplex est, alterum XVIII. But the mean is twofold, one with respect to
respectu rei, ut centrum in circulo, alterum the thing, as the center in the circle, another with
respectu nostri; ut in donando, mediocre respect to us, as in giving gifts, the gift is a mean in
donum est pro facultatum donantis modo: proportion to the ability only of the giver.13 Thus
Sic decem minas dare in Principe censebitur to give ten minas in the case of a prince is counted
avaritia, Drachmam dare in Mendico, as avarice, but to give a drachma in the case of a
profusio. Tale medium virtus sequitur. begger is counted as extravagance. Such is the mean
that virtue seeks.

XIX. Veruntamen cùm cupiditates aliae sint XIX. Nevertheless although some desires are
naturales, sed immodicae; ut cupiditas natural but excessive, as a burning desire for food,
ardentior, cibi, potus, prolis: Aliae prorsus drink, and offspring; others are entirely vicious, as
vitiosae, ut caedis, furti, adulterii appetentia: the desire for murder, theft, and adultery.14 Virtue
Priores quidem virtus accîdit, & intra certainly occurs with the former [natural desires],
mediocritatis limites compellit, animum quasi and constrains [them] within the limits of the
in aequilibrio honestatis suspendens: mean, suspending the soul as if in an equilibrium of
Posteriores exterminat, & exscindit. the honorable. [Virtue] expels and destroys the
latter [vicious desires].

XX. Ad germanam autem & genuinam XX. Moreover it is not enough for real and genuine
virtutem non satis est ut honesta aut iusta virtue that we act with honor or justice, but also
agamus, sed & ut honestè ac iustè: quod fiet, that we act honorably and justly. This will happen
si voluntariè honesta agemus: Si in bonum if we voluntarily act with honor—for a good end
finem: Si constanti voluntate. [and] with a steadfast will.

XXI. Qui verò invitus honesta facit, tam XXI. The one who does what is good unwillingly is
bonus consendus est, quàm peritus only deemed good as we would deem an archer to
sagittarius, qui clausis oculis, aut etiam be skilled who hit the mark with his eyes closed, or
nolens scopum sit assecutus: Nec unquam even without wanting to do so. Nobody will achieve
consequetur à quoquam ut bonus sit, qui id à goodness if it does not come from himself. It is the
se ipso non impetrat: par ratio de same way with respect to the ignorant.
inscientibus.

XXII. Vicissim in peccatis solemus eos qui XXII. Again we are accustomed to judge as worthy
inviti aut inscientes peccauerint, existimare of pardon, or treat with pity, those who sin
dignos venia, aut prosequi commiseratione; unwillingly or ignorantly—especially when he
praecipuè ubi resciverint, eos poeniteat. [p. 6] repents of those things once they are brought to
light.15

13
Cf. EN 2.6, 1106a24-b7.
14
Cf. EN 2.6, 1107a9-a27.
15
Cf. EN 3.1, 1110b17-24.
© David S. Sytsma, 2021 5
XXIII. Non est tamen ut idcirco quisquam XXIII. Still no one should therefore suppose an
putet insontem eum qui se scelere invitus aut unwilling or ignorant person who defiles himself
insciens polluerit; cùm & pro innocentia with wickedness to be innocent. While it is
vitam pacisci honestum sit, & iis qui honorable to make a covenant with the innocent
inscientes peccant, ipsa ignoratio interdum in and those who sin ignorantly, sometimes the
partem culpae accedat: Ut in Ebriis. ignorance itself is added on the side of his guilt, as
with those who get drunk.16

XXIIII. Praeterea est ignorantia quaedam XXIIII. In addition there is a certain ignorance
dolo proxima, Ut ignoratio tum universalium, bordering on deceit, as ignorance not only of
tum eorum quae publica lege sancita omnium universals, but also of everything that appears
oculis obversantur. sanctioned before the eyes of all by public law.

XXV. Inter actiones sunt maximè voluntariae, XXV. Among actions, those that occur from choice
quae fiunt ex proaeresi, & capto consilio. and taking counsel are the most voluntary. Counsel
Differt consilium à voluntate: Quod volumus differs from will. We will what is the end, as riches
finem ut divitias, bellum, consultamus de [or] war, [yet] we deliberate about the means by
mediis quibus quod volumus assequamur. which we may gain what we will.17

XXVI. Porro Virtutes Mentis doctrina & XXVI. Again we gain intellectual virtues by
experientia assequimur, morales instruction and experience, [but we gain] moral
consuetudine. neque enim iis à natura imbuti [virtues] by habit. Indeed we are not imbued with
sumus, quippe cùm in naturalibus facultas them by nature, since obviously the faculty precedes
agendi praecedat, actiones facultatem the activity in natural things, [and] actions follow
consequantur; contrà in virtute & omni alio the faculty. Conversly, with respect to virtue and
habitu ex praecedentibus actionibus habitus every other habit, a habit is produced from
contrahitur. preceding actions.18

XXVII. Indicium habitus iam formati, & XXVII. The pleasure that follows a good action is
fideliter impressi, est voluptas bonam evidence of a habit already formed and reliably
actionem consequens. impressed.

XXVIII. Verumenimuerò quia difficile est XXVIII. Because it is certainly difficult to strive
tantum contendere studio, ut perfectam with zeal alone to achieve the perfect mean, and the
mediocritatem assequamur, & rei difficultas difficulty is increased by indocility, it is useful to be
augetur indocilitate; quibusdam signis & aided by means of certain signs and precepts. And
praeceptis opus est adiuvari. Atque haec sunt: these are:

16
Cf. EN 3.5, 1113b30-33.
17
Cf. EN 3.2, 1111b26-30; 3.3, 1112b12; 3.5, 1113b3-5.
18
Cf. EN 2.1, 1103a14-b2.
© David S. Sytsma, 2021 6
XXIX. 1. Primùm recedendum magis ab XXIX. 1. In the first place, we ought to retreat
extremitate ea quae est à medio seu virtute more from that extreme that is farther from the
remotior; ut quia temeritas fortitudinem mean or virtue. For example, because rashness more
magis imitatur quàm timiditas, in closely resembles fortitude than cowardice, we
temeritatem potius propendeamus, quàm in should be more inclined to rashness than
timiditatem. cowardice.19

XXX. 2. Secundò summoveamus nos quàm XXX. 2. In the second place, we should keep away
longissimè ab eo extremo in quod sumus as far as possible from that extreme to which we are
procliviores: nam quemadmodum curva ligna more inclined. For just as curved wood is only
[p. 7] non aliter explices, quàm si ea in uncurled if you twist it in the opposite direction, so
contrarium intorseris; ita animus fugiens also the soul wishing to avoid a well-known vice,
vitium familiare, puta avaritiam, sine periculo for example greed, will without risk advance to the
etiam procurret ultra medium magis accedens other side of the mean that is closer to
ad profusionem. extravagence.20

XXXI. 3. Observemus religiose & cautè ne XXXI. 3. We should carefully and cautiously
voluptatum illecebris tentati capiamur; observe that we do not, being tempted, be seized by
difficilius enim est obsistere voluptati, quàm the enticements of pleasures. For it is more difficult
calamitati. to resist pleasure than calamity.21

XXXII. Cùm verò animus ita se composverit XXXII. Although the soul certainly should not
ut extra Medium nihil aut minimu[m] order itself to go beyond the mean even a little, we
excurrat, dicimus eum adeptum felicitatem are referring to obtaining that happiness that we
quam Practicam nuncupamus. call practical.

XXXIII. Non inficiamur tamen, usum virtutis XXXIII. Yet we do not deny that that an
etiam affluentia bonorum externorum abundance of external goods aids in the enjoyment
adiuvari, nam iis qui cum adversa fortuna of virtue,22 for those who are afflicted with bad
conflictantur, saepe adimitur non paucarum fortune are often deprived of the enjoyment of
virtutum usus, ut liberalitatis, moderationis, many virtues, such as liberality, moderation, and
& temperantiae circa voluptates, circa temperance concerning pleasures, honors, etc.
honores, &c.

19
Cf. EN 2.8, 1109a1-19.
20
Cf. EN 2.9, 1109b2-6.
21
Cf. EN 2.9, 1109b7-13.
22
Cf. EN 1.8, 1099a32-b8.
© David S. Sytsma, 2021 7
XXXIIII. Ideoque solidior & perfectior XXXIIII. Therefore the happiness that is from
felicitas quae est ex sapientia, ac wisdom and contemplation is more lasting and
contemplatione; quippe quae nullis aerumnis perfect. Of course it is not removed or hindered by
abrumpitur aut impeditur: & extra tela any hardship, and being placed beyond the thrust of
fortunae posita, nihil habet cum corpore fortune, it shares nothing with the body, for it is
commune; est enim animae cum Deo the union of the soul with God.
coniunctio.

DEO UNI ET TRINO GLORIA. GLORY BE TO THE TRIUNE GOD.23

23
I am grateful to Matthew T. Gaetano and Manfred
Svensson for helpful comments on this translation.
© David S. Sytsma, 2021 8