MANU/AP/0001/2025

Equivalent/Neutral Citation: 2025:APHC :100

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

Appeal Suit No. 1117/2016
Decided On: 03.01.2025
Mogadati Ramatulasamma Vs. Nandru Nagendramma
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T. Mallikarjuna Rao, J.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: P.S.P. Suresh Kumar
For Respondents/Defendant: Suresh Kumar Potturi
Case Note:
Contract -Specific performance -Suit for -Present appeal filed to challenge
decree and judgment, wheretrial court directeddefendant to either execute
sale deed or pay named amount with interest -Whetherdecree passed bytrial
court for specific performance or alternative payment should be upheld -Held,
trial court thoroughly analyzed pleadings and evidence -Plaintiff proved
Defendant's execution of agreement -Trial court's findings on Plaintiff's
readiness to perform upheld -Defendant's resistance to executing sale deed is
unjustified -Trial Judge exercised discretion to grant specific performance -
Defendant's conduct in delaying execution is incorrect -Considering house
property price escalation, additional amount awarded to Defendant -Plaintiff
must deposit interest on outstanding balance -Failure to do so will result in
full payment with interest at 18% per annum -No illegality in trial court's
judgment -Appeal partly allowed. [59],[61],[62]
JUDGMENT
T. Mallikarjuna Rao, J.
1 . The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short,
'C.P.C.'), is filed by the Appellant/Defendant challenging the decree and judgment dated
27.10.2016 in O.S.No.19 of 2014 passed by the learned XVI Additional District and
Sessions Judge at Nandigama, Krishna District (for short, 'the trial Court').
2 . Respondent is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.19 of 2014 for Specific
Performance of sale agreement dated 07.02.2014 seeking to direct the defendant to
receive the balance sale consideration of Rs.11,25,000/- and execute a regular
Registered sale deed in respect of plaint schedule property in favour of the Plaintiff at
his costs or in alternative to pass a decree for the amount of Rs.3,75,000/- with interest
at 24% per annum from the date of transaction till the date of realization. The Appellant
herein is the defendant in the suit.
3. Referring to the parties as arrayed in the suit is expedient to mitigate confusion and
better comprehend the case.

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4 . The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues
between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
(a) The Defendant is the sole owner of property No. 4, measuring 145.2 sq.
yards, situated in R.S. No. 323 of Jaggaiahpet, along with an RCC roofed
building (D.No. 6-591/4, Assessment No.1069006099, Electricity Service Nos.
5528 and 5527) (hereinafter, it would be referred as 'plaint schedule property').
The Defendant purchased this property from Kolagani Kondaiah through a
registered sale deed on 17.09.2005. On 07.02.2014, the Defendant offered to
sell the property to the Plaintiff for Rs. 15,00,000/- in Bill Maktha. The Plaintiff
accepted the offer and paid Rs. 3,75,000/- as earnest money. An agreement of
sale was executed the same day, stipulating that the Plaintiff would pay the
remaining Rs.11,75,000/- by 07.05.2014, and the Defendant would clear all
dues, including taxes, electricity, and water charges.
(b) The Plaintiff holds sufficient funds in the form of security deposits
(Nos.0333879 and 0333880) totalling Rs.9,00,000/- and a fixed deposit
(No.0333882) of Rs.4,50,000/- in the same bank under her husband's name,
with the fixed deposit maturing on 12.02.2014. The Plaintiff has been ready and
willing to perform her obligations under the sale agreement since its execution.
Despite this, when she approached the Defendant to complete the sale, the
Defendant delayed, citing various excuses. On 04.04.2014, Plaintiff issued a
legal notice confirming her readiness to pay the balance consideration and
complete the sale at her own cost. In response, the Defendant received the
notice but sent a caveat petition with false allegations, denying the sale
agreement instead of proceeding with the agreement. The Plaintiff later
discovered the Defendant's intention to avoid fulfilling her part of the contract
for wrongful gain.
5 . The Defendant filed a written statement denying the material allegations in the
plaint, claiming that the sale agreement was false, fraudulent, and fabricated, lacking
any consideration. She contended that in February 2014, with witness, she borrowed an
interest-free hand loan from Plaintiff to settle her bank debt. Satyanarayana, Atluri
Sridhar, and Pakalapati Kanaka Raju present. During this transaction, the Plaintiff
allegedly obtained the Defendant's signatures on blank stamped papers as collateral
security. The Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff issued a notice on 04.04.2014 with
false claims; there was no contract between the Plaintiff and Defendant, denying the
existence of the sale agreement. The legal notice issued by the Plaintiff is not valid in
the eye of the Law. She asserted the suit was fictitious, devoid of merit, and filed with
malafide intentions, seeking wrongful gain. The Defendant requested the suit be
dismissed with costs, asserting no equities favouring the Plaintiff.
6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the Defendant offered to sell the schedule property to the Plaintiff
for an amount of Rs.15,00,000/- entitled to a sale agreement with the Plaintiff
by receiving earnest amount of Rs.3,75,000/- on 07.02.2014?
(2) Whether the Plaintiff obtained the Defendant's signature on stamped paper
in connection with the borrowal money by the Defendant from the Plaintiff in
February, 2014?
(3) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of specific performance in
pursuance of the agreement of sale dated 07.02.2014?
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 (4) To what relief?
7 . During the trial, PWs.1 to 3 were examined on behalf of the Plaintiff and marked
Exs.A1 to A3 and Exs.X1 to X4. DWs.1 to 3 were examined on behalf of the Defendant,
and no documents were marked on behalf of the Defendant.
8 . After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court
decreed the suit with costs, directing the Plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration
of Rs.11,25,000/- to the Defendant or deposit the same within 15 days from the date of
judgment. On such deposit, thereafter, within 15 days, the Defendant shall execute a
regular sale deed and register the same in favour of the Plaintiff at the Plaintiff's costs
in pursuance of the sale agreement dated 07.02.2014 regarding the plaint schedule
property.
9. I have heard learned counsel appear on behalf of the respective parties at length and
have gone through the judgment and findings recorded by the learned trial Court while
decreeing the suit. I have also re-appreciated all the evidence on record, including the
depositions of witnesses examined.
10. Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, counsel for the Appellant/Defendant, argues that the trial
Court erred in not framing an issue on the Plaintiff's readiness and willingness and
failing to examine G. Ramesh, the scribe of the agreement, which he claims is fatal to
the Plaintiff's case. He further contends that the trial Court misinterpreted the evidence
of DW.2 and wrongly concluded on Issues 1 and 2. Learned counsel highlights that the
attestor of the sale agreement admitted to signing on blank paper, suggesting that
Ex.A1 was not executed with mutual consent. He asserts that the trial Court incorrectly
concluded that the non-issuance of a reply was detrimental to the Appellant's case and
misinterpreted Exs.X1 to X4 concerning the Plaintiff's readiness and willingness.
11. Per contra, Sri Suresh Kumar Potturi, learned counsel representing the Respondent
/ Plaintiff, argued that the trial Court appreciated the case facts and reached a correct
conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not require any interference.
12. Concerning the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the trial Court and in
light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the
following points would arise for determination:
1 . Is the trial Court justified in granting relief of specific performance of the
sale agreement, dated 07.02.2014?
2. Does the judgment passed by the trial Court need any interference?
POINTS NO.1 AND 2:
13. The First Appellate Court, being the final Court of fact, has jurisdiction to reverse or
affirm the trial court's findings. Considering the nature and scope of the First Appellate
Court in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar MANU/SC/0946/2014, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that:
15. Again, in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy MANU/SC/0768/2010, this
Court, taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court, reiterated the
principle as Mentioned above with these words:
3 . How the regular first Appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate
Court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various
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 decisions. Order 41 Code of Civil Procedure deals with appeals from
original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the
Judgment of the appellate Court shall state:
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision, and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the
relief to which the Appellant is entitled.
4 . The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the trial
court's findings. The first Appeal is a valuable right of the parties, and
unless restricted by Law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing
both on questions of fact and Law. The Judgment of the appellate Court
must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record
findings supported by reasons on all the issues arising along with the
contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for the decision of the
appellate Court. Sitting as a court of first Appeal, it was the duty of the
High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the
parties before recording its findings. The first Appeal is a valuable
right, and the parties have a right to be heard on questions of Law and
facts. The judgment in the first Appeal must address all the issues of
law and fact and decide on them by giving reasons in support of the
findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By
L.Rs. MANU/SC/0091/2001 and Madhukar and Ors. v. Sangram and
Ors. MANU/SC/0302/2001
The Court of First Appeal has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the
trial Court. When the Court of First Appeal takes a different view, the Judgment
of the first appellate Court must show the conscious application of mind and
record its findings based on the evidence adduced by the parties. The judgment
must record the reasons why the first appellate Court differs from the Judgment
of the Trial Court.
14. Normally, appreciation of the evidence by the trial Court is only interfered with by
the Appellate Court if such appreciation of evidence appears to be absurd or there has
been a serious challenge to such exercise. This proposition of Law has been so firmly
settled that it does not require any reiteration by citing any authority.
15. Given the settled legal position outlined above, I now re-appreciate the evidence on
record, taking into account the evidence adduced by both parties, to assess the
correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court.
16. In order to fully appreciate on whom the burden of proof lies, it will be desirable to
set out Sections 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act, which reads as follows:
"S. 101 Burden of Proof-- Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to
any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts
must prove that those facts exist.
When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the

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 burden of proof lies on that person.
Section 102 On whom the burden of proof lies-- The burden of proof in a suit
or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were
given on either side.
S. 103 Burden of proof as to particular fact---The burden of proof as to any
particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its
existence unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on
any particular person."
1 7 . In this context, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Raghavamma case held that the
burden of proof lies upon the persons to prove a fact, and it never shifts, but the onus
of proof shifts. It has been held in Lakshmana Vs. Venkateswarlu MANU/PR/0051/1949 :
AIR 1949 PC 278, that initial burden of proving a prima facie case in his favour is cast
on the Plaintiffs; when he gives such evidence as will support a prima facie case, the
onus shifts to the Defendants to adduce rebutting the evidence to meet the case made
out by the Plaintiffs. As the case continues to develop, the onus may shift back again to
the Plaintiffs.
18. The initial onus of proof and the legal burden is on the Plaintiff to establish the
truth, validity and binding nature of the suit agreement to sell. On behalf of the Plaintiff,
she testified as PW.1, and on behalf of the Defendant, she appeared as DW.1. Both
parties reiterated their respective pleadings in their chief examinations. The evidence
adduced establishes that the Defendant is the rightful and absolute owner of the
property in question, having purchased it from Kolagani Kondaiah through a registered
sale deed dated 17.09.2005. The Plaintiff also examined her husband, N. Vijaya Rao, as
PW.3. PW.2, K. Rama Koti, and the Defendant's husband, R. Ashok Kumar, who testified
as DW.3, are shown to be acted as the attestors of Ex.A.1, agreement of sale. PW.2
supported the Plaintiff's case in all aspects. However, DW.2 (Ch. Satyanarayana) and
DW.3 corroborated the Defendant's case.
1 9 . PWs.1 to 3 testified that on 07.02.2014, defendant offered to sell the schedule
property to Plaintiff for Rs.15,00,000/- in Bill Mattha. According to their evidence, PW.1
accepted the offer and paid the defendant Rs.3,75,000/- as earnest money. Upon receipt
of the payment, the Defendant executed Ex.A.1, the agreement in favour of Plaintiff,
with Gajji Ramesh acting as the scribe. In contrast, DWs.1 to 3 testified that DW.1 had
borrowed Rs.3,75,000/- from Plaintiff without interest, intending to repay her bank
debt. This transaction allegedly occurred in February 2014 in the presence of DW.2,
Atluri Sreedhar, and P. Kanaka Raju. They further claimed that Plaintiff had obtained the
Defendant's signature on blank stamped papers as collateral security, which Plaintiff and
her husband then fabricated Ex.A.1. DW.2 corroborated this by stating that Sreedhar
and Kanakaraju, who were teachers, were present during the money transaction.
According to the defence, no actual contract of sale was ever formed between the
Defendant and the Plaintiff.
20. As the trial Court rightly noted, PW.2 corroborated the Plaintiff's version of events,
attesting to the authenticity of Ex.A.1 by signing it as a witness alongside DW.3. This
lends weight to the Plaintiff's claim that the Defendant did indeed execute the
agreement in question. On the other hand, the Defendant maintains that Plaintiff
obtained her signature on blank stamped papers in connection with a financial
transaction. In her cross-examination, DW.1 conceded that she had signed Ex.A.1. Even
if Defendant's Explanation were to be accepted at face value, a critical point remains:

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Defendant herself acknowledges that her signature appears on Ex.A.1.
2 1 . In view of the fact that Plaintiff had discharged the initial burden to prove the
Ex.A.1 agreement, the onus shifted on the Defendant to controvert the genuineness of
the agreement. Against this background fact, I do not find any illegality in the
observation of the trial Court that the burden of proof was on the Defendant to prove
the circumstances under which Ex.A.1 came to be executed. In light of the evidence of
PWs.1 to 3, as detailed above, this Court finds that the Defendant has failed to provide
satisfactory or reliable evidence to undermine the testimony of these witnesses
regarding the execution of Ex.A.1 by the Defendant and the payment of the
consideration. The Defendant has not contested the receipt of the consideration amount
as outlined in Ex.A.1. The testimonies of PWs.1 to 3 remain consistent in their account
of the Defendant's execution of the Ex.A.1 agreement upon receipt of the agreed
consideration. Although PWs.1 to 3 were subjected to extensive cross-examination,
nothing substantial was elicited that could discredit their evidence or suggest any
inconsistencies. Moreover, PW.2, who is an attesting witness, has no apparent motive to
provide false testimony that would harm the Defendant's interests. He stands to gain
nothing by supporting the Plaintiff's case unless there is a kernel of truth to the
Plaintiff's claim. Therefore, the Defendant must demonstrate that she signed the
document without understanding its contents or the nature of the transaction. No valid
justification has been provided for lending such an amount to the Defendant without the
stipulation of interest. Her failure to provide convincing evidence in this regard weakens
her position and supports the Plaintiff's assertion of a valid agreement.
2 2 . The trial Court has rightly noted the evidence provided by DW.2 during cross-
examination, where he clearly expressed uncertainty regarding the Defendant's
agreement to sell the house property to the Plaintiff on 07.02.2014, as well as the
execution of the sale agreement and receipt of Rs.3,75,000/- as an advance on the
same day. Furthermore, DW.2's evidence shows that the Defendant's husband is a
teacher. DW.1's testimony further reveals that she is educated; she holds the position of
Junior Manager at the Visakhapatnam Steel Plant in Jaggayapeta. Given the educational
and professional backgrounds of the Defendant and her husband, it is highly improbable
that they would have signed blank stamped papers without understanding the full
implications. As DWs.1 and 3 are employed in stable positions, with access to their
salary certificates, they could easily secure a loan of Rs.3,75,000/- from a financial
institution such as a bank. Therefore, this Court finds it difficult to accept the
Defendant's contention that they would willingly sign blank stamped papers for such a
relatively small sum without comprehending the grave consequences of their actions.
The evidence and surrounding circumstances do not lend credence to such a claim.
23. I have carefully and critically analyzed the evidence on record. The evidence on the
side of Plaintiff is, by any standards, sufficient to prove the truth, validity, and binding
nature of Ex.A.1's agreement of sale. This further reinforces the credibility and
reliability of the Plaintiff's evidence and the validity of the Ex.A.1 agreement. Therefore,
this Court remains unpersuaded by the Defendant's defence and upholds the evidence
presented by the Plaintiff.
24. As per the terms stipulated in the Ex.A.1 agreement, the Plaintiff is obligated to pay
the outstanding balance of Rs.11,25,000/- to the Defendant on or before 07.05.2014,
and in return, the Defendant is to execute a duly registered sale deed in favour of the
Plaintiff at the Plaintiff's expense. Simultaneously, the Defendant is required to settle all
outstanding liabilities, including taxes, electricity charges, and water charges. Before
initiating the suit, Plaintiff issued a legal notice dated 04.04.2014 (Ex.A.2), expressing
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her intention to fulfill her contractual obligations. While the Defendant claims to have
not received the notice, she subsequently sent the Plaintiff a caveat petition (Ex.A.3).
However, a careful examination of Ex.A.2 demonstrates that the Plaintiff, well within the
prescribed timeline, had expressed both her readiness and willingness to perform her
part of the agreement.
2 5 . The Defendant's counsel questions the Plaintiff's financial capacity to pay the
balance sale consideration amount. However, the Defendant failed to elucidate why she
agreed with the Plaintiff if she lacked financial capacity. It strains credulity to believe
that the Defendant would willingly enter into the sale agreement without conducting due
diligence. However, Plaintiff has explicitly stated in the plaint that she holds sufficient
funds to fulfill her obligations under the sale agreement. She possesses fixed deposits
bearing Nos.0333879 and 0333880, issued by Sapthagiri Grameena Bank, Jaggayyapet
Branch, Jaggayyapet, in her name, totalling Rs.9,00,000/-, as well as another fixed
deposit bearing No.0333882, amounting to Rs.4,50,000/- issued in the name of her
husband.
2 6 . In support of her case, the Plaintiff has produced documents Ex.X.1 to Ex.X.4
through her husband, PW.3. Ex.X.1 is a Fixed Deposit Receipt (F.D.R.) dated
14.11.2014, issued in the name of PW.3, for Rs.8,87,000/-. Ex.X.2 is a Fixed Deposit
Receipt dated 12.12.2013, issued in the name of the Plaintiff, for Rs.4,50,000/-. Ex.X.3
is a Fixed Deposit Receipt dated 12.02.2013, also issued in the name of the Plaintiff, for
Rs.4,50,000/-. Lastly, Ex.X.4 is the Savings Bank (S.B.) account passbook issued by
Sapthagiri Grameena Bank, Jaggayyapet Branch, in the name of PW.3.
27. The Appellant/Defendant's counsel argues that the trial Court incorrectly concluded
that the documents Exs.X.1 to X.4 prove that Plaintiff's husband had sufficient funds to
pay the outstanding Rs.11,25,000/- to the Defendant within the agreed timeline. The
counsel contends that Ex. X.1, a Fixed Deposit Receipt dated 14.11.2014, does not
demonstrate that the Plaintiff had the necessary funds to settle the balance by the
stipulated date. Even if the amounts in Exs.X.2 and X.3, totalling Rs.9,00,000/-, are
considered; they fall short of the required Rs.11,25,000/-, indicating an insufficiency of
funds to meet the financial obligation. The Appellant/Defendant's counsel further argues
that Plaintiff must prove the availability of funds or show that arrangements were made
to obtain them. The learned counsel asserts that the Plaintiff failed to deposit the
balance of the sale consideration within the specified time frame and it establishes that
he is not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
2 8 . In U.N. Krishnamurthy (since deceased) Thr. L.R.s. Vs. A.M.Krishnamurthy
MANU/SC/0875/2022 : 2022:INSC:714, the Hon'ble Apex Court also held that:
There is a distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the
contract; both ingredients are necessary to relieve Specific performance. In His
Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar
MANU/SC/0522/1996 : 1996:INSC:590 : (1996) 4 SCC 526 Cited by Mr.
Venugopal, this Court said there was a difference between readiness and
willingness to perform a contract. While readiness means the capacity of the
Plaintiff to execute the agreement, which would include his financial position,
willingness relates to the Plaintiff's conduct. This Court took the same view in
Kalawati v. Rakesh Kumar. MANU/SC/0137/2018 : 2018:INSC:161 : (2018) 3
SCC 658.
In the said decision, it is further observed that:

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 23. Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, bars the relief of specific
performance of a contract in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove his
readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Given Explanation
(i) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the Plaintiff to
actually tender money to the defendant or to deposit money in Court, except
when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform
the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However,
Explanation (ii) says the Plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and
willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction.
24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to
pay money in terms of a contract, the Plaintiff would have to make specific
statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show the availability of funds
to make payment in terms of the contract in time. In other words, the Plaintiff
would have to plead that the Plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position
to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the
Plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in
terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the Plaintiff would have
to plead how the funds would be available to him specifically. To cite an
example, Plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement
with a financier for the disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance
with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money.
46. In this case, the respondent-plaintiff failed to discharge his duty to prove
his readiness as well as willingness to perform his part of the contract by
adducing cogent evidence. Acceptable evidence has not been placed on record
to prove his readiness and willingness. Further, it is clear from the respondent-
plaintiff's balance sheet that he did not have sufficient funds to discharge his
part of the contract in March 2003. Making a subsequent deposit of balance
consideration after the lapse of seven years would not establish the respondent-
plaintiff's readiness to discharge his part of the contract. Reliance may be
placed on Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan [Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba
Chavan, MANU/SC/0285/2005 : 2005:INSC:203 : (2005) 6 SCC 243] wherein
this Court speaking through S.B. Sinha, J. held that deposit of amount in Court
is not enough to arrive at the conclusion that Plaintiff was ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. Deposit in Court would not establish the
Plaintiff's readiness and willingness within the meaning of Section 16(c) of the
Specific Relief Act. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below (SCC
p. 260, para 45).
2 9 . In P. Daivasigamani Vs. S.Sambandan MANU/SC/1309/2022, the Hon'ble Apex
Court referred to the case of Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty
MANU/SC/0471/1999 : 1999:INSC:317 : (1999) 6 SCC 337, a three- judge Bench of the
Apex Court observed that:
1 2 . The ratio in Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao
MANU/SC/0310/1964 : 1964:INSC:264 : AIR 1965 SC 1405, it has been
observed as follows:
"It is significant that this Explanation carves out a contract which
involves payment of money as a separate class from Section 16(c).
Explanation (i) uses the words "it is not essential for the plaintiff
actually to tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money

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 except when so directed by the court". (emphasis supplied) This speaks
in a negative term of what is not essential for the Plaintiff to do. This is
more in support of the Plaintiff that he need not tender to the defendant
or deposit in Court any money, but the Plaintiff must [as per
Explanation (ii)] at least over his performance or readiness and
willingness to perform his part of the contract".
18. In Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh MANU/SC/0629/1996 : 1996:INSC:687 :
(1997) 2 SCC 200 this Court had laid down that Law is not in doubt and it is
not a condition that the respondents (Plaintiffs) should have ready cash with
them. It is sufficient for the respondents to establish that they could pay the
sale consideration. They don't need to always carry the money with them from
the date of the suit till the date of the decree. The said principle was followed
in the case of A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed MANU/SC/0234/2017 :
2017:INSC:202 : (2017) 4 SCC 654, in case of C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy
MANU/SC/0142/2020 : 2020:INSC:143 : (2020) 3 SCC 280 etc.
30. In Nathulal Vs. Phoolchand MANU/SC/0492/1969 : 1969:INSC:290 : A.I.R. 1970 SC
546, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:
6............ To prove himself ready and willing, a purchaser does not necessarily
have to produce the money or to vouch for a concluded scheme for financing
the transaction: Bank of India Ltd. & Ors. v. Jamsetji A. H. Chinoy and Messrs.
Chinoy and Company MANU/PR/0035/1949 : AIR 1950 P.C. 90 at p.96.
31. Learned counsel for the Respondent Relied On the decision in C.S. Venkatesh vs.
A.S.C. Murthy (D) by L.R. and Ors. MANU/SC/0142/2020 : 2020:INSC:143, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
Mere plea that he is ready to pay the consideration, without any material to
substantiate this plea, cannot be accepted. The Plaintiff doesn't need to produce
ready money, but it is mandatory on his part to prove that he has the means to
generate the consideration amount. Except for the statement of PW-1, there is
no evidence to show that Plaintiff has the means to make arrangements for
payment of consideration under the reconveyance agreement.
32. In light of the above settled legal position, this Court views that mere non-deposit
of the balance sale consideration amount cannot be a ground to hold that the Plaintiff is
not ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. It is not the
Appellant/Defendant case that, despite the direction of the trial Court or this Court, the
Respondent/Plaintiff failed to deposit the amount. As already pointed out, Exs.X.2 and
X.3 establish that Plaintiff had Rs.9,00,000/- with her much before the stipulated date
and Ex.X.1 establishes that she could generate Rs.8,87,000/- within six months of the
specified time.
33. The learned counsel for the Defendant asserts that the trial Court placed undue
emphasis on the alleged admission made by the Defendant in the cross-examination.
Defendant testified during cross-examination that on the date of Ex.A.1 agreement, she
did sign the document and receive the money by the sale of the property and that it was
not as a hand loan.
3 4 . Learned counsel for the Appellant further Relied On the decisions in Reliance
General Insurance Company Limited vs. S. Sunitha and Ors. MANU/AP/0154/2016, and
M.Yadagiri Reddy V. V.C. Brahmanna and Ors. MANU/AP/0891/2004, wherein the
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composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
9.......... The Law is fairly settled that evidence of a witness is to be read as a
whole, and no stray sentence can be taken to say as any admission. To consider
as admission, it must be clear from the entire reading of the evidence and not
from pick and choose of any sentence alone without reading and understanding
on what context the witness so deposed...................
35. After a thorough and meticulous review of the deposition of DW.1, this Court is
firmly disinclined to accept the submission made by the Defendant's counsel that the
statement in question constitutes merely a stray sentence elicited during cross-
examination. This Court finds that, given the professional stature of DW.1 as a Manager
in a Steel Plant, there exists no reasonable possibility that the question posed by the
counsel misled her. Moreover, it is essential to highlight that the Defendant has not
contended, nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest, that the deposition of
DW.1 was improperly recorded. If there were any legitimate concerns regarding the
accuracy of the deposition, it was the Defendant's responsibility to raise such issues
before the trial Court. However, no such objection appears to have been made, nor has
there been any indication that the Defendant sought to address this matter with the trial
Court. In the absence of any effort by the Defendant to challenge the deposition or to
bring the matter to the trial Court's attention, this Court is compelled to treat the
statement in question as a judicial admission. Judicial admissions, once made, carry
significant weight and cannot be lightly disregarded.
3 6 . Learned counsel for the Respondent Relied On the decision of the Divisional
Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. V. Samir Chandra Chaudhary
MANU/SC/0414/2005 : 2005:INSC:295, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
...................... Admission is the best piece of evidence against the persons
making admission. As was observed by this Court in Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram
Gopal and Ors. MANU/SC/0003/1978 : AIR1979SC861 in the backdrop of
Section 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, the 'Evidence Act'), it is
true that evidentiary admissions are not conclusive proof of the facts admitted
and may be explained or shown to be wrong, but they do raise estoppel and
shift the burden of proof placing it on the person making the admission or his
representative-in- interest. Unless shown or explained to be wrong, they are
efficacious proof of the facts admitted. As observed by Phipson in his Law of
Evidence (1953 Edition, Para 678), the weight of admission depends on the
circumstances under which it was made; these circumstances may always be
proved to impeach or enhance its credibility. The effect of admission is that it
shifts the onus on the person admitting the fact on the principle that what a
party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so, and until
the presumption is rebutted, the fact admitted must be taken to be established.
37. Learned counsel for the Respondent Relied On the decision in Avadh Kishore Das V.
Ram Gopal and Ors. MANU/SC/0003/1978, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
held that:
2 3 . .................... It is true that evidentiary admissions are not conclusive
proof of the facts admitted and may be explained or shown to be wrong. Still,
they do raise estoppel and shift the burden of proof onto the person making
them or his representative-in-interest. Unless shown or explained to be wrong,
they are efficacious proof of the facts admitted. Here, the defendant, far from

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 explaining the admission or declaration made by the deceased Mahant, under
whom he (Defendant) claims, has Affirmed that the entire property in suit is the
absolute property of the God, Thakurji, as a juristic person. Therefore, it is too
late for the defendant to wriggle out of the same. It cannot be said that
defendant had inadvertently Affirmed the correctness of the
admission/declaration made in the will Mentioned above by the deceased
Mahant. ...............
38. Even in the absence of such admission in DW.1's cross-examination, this Court is
unequivocally satisfied that Plaintiff has successfully established the execution of the
sale agreement. This conclusion is substantiated by the testimony of one of the
attesting witnesses, whose evidence lends significant credence to the Plaintiff's case.
Furthermore, the Defendant has failed to provide a coherent or satisfactory explanation
regarding the circumstances under which the agreement was signed. In the absence of
any plausible explanation from the Defendant, the Court is compelled to draw an
inference in favour of Plaintiff and treat this omission as a circumstance that further
strengthens Plaintiff's stand.
39. The learned counsel for the Appellant asserts that the Plaintiff has failed to adhere
to the mandatory provisions of the Specific Relief Act, particularly Section 16(c) of the
Act. In this regard, he Relied On the decision in P. Ravindranath and Another V. Sasikala
and Others MANU/SC/0718/2024, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
22...............(i) Relief of specific performance of the contract is a discretionary
relief. As such, while exercising power to grant specific performance of a
contract, the courts need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the
pleadings and the evidence, particularly led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have
to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made a case for a grant
of relief of specific performance of a contract. The Act of 1963 provides certain
checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs
before they can become entitled to such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for
specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for
specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be
rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be
pleaded and proved by the Plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of
contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be
mandatory.
X
(v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the
plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale
deed to the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of
the sale deed.
40. To consider the said submission, I have gone through the plaint averments. In the
plaint, it is stated that Plaintiff has consistently demonstrated her readiness and
willingness to perform her part of the sale agreement. Accordingly, she approached the
Defendant, requesting that the remaining balance be accepted so that the Defendant
may fulfill her obligations under the contract and execute a duly registered sale deed in
Plaintiff's name.
4 1 . In E.Anantha Padmanabha Reddy and another V. Chadalavada Srinivasa Rao
MANU/HY/0229/2018 : 2019 (2) A.L.D. 85 (D.B.), the composite High Court of Andhra
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Pradesh held that:
2 8 . Therefore, what is required to be seen by the Court is whether the
requirements of Section 16(c) are satisfied or not. If these requirements are
satisfied otherwise than by way of a parrot-like repetition of the contents of
Form Nos.47 and 48, then there can be no objection based on Form Nos.47 and
48.
42. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the
parties, I have no hesitation in holding that there was due compliance with section
16(c) r/w Explanation of the Specific Relief Act on the part of the Plaintiff and that it
was the Appellant who had raised a contention regarding the forfeiture of the advance
amount.
43. Learned counsel for the Appellant contends that the Plaintiff needs to establish that
she is always willing and ready to perform her part of the contract. However, Plaintiff
failed to pay the balance even according to the Ex.A.1 agreement.
4 4 . In Chunduru Padmavati V. Chunduru Narasimha Rao MANU/AP/0157/2000 :
2000(1) ALT 613, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, held as
under:-
"7. It is well settled that in the case of contracts relating to the sale of
immovable property, generally, time is not regarded as the essence of the
contract. It is, however, open to the parties to make time the essence of the
contract by making express provisions on that behalf in the contract. It can also
be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Even
though time was not made initially the essence of the contract, it can be made
the essence of the contract by subsequent notice. In Chandi Rani v. Kamal Rani,
a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that even where time is not of
the essence of the contract, the Plaintiff must perform his part of the contract
within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking
at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the
contract, nature of the property and the object of making the contract. This
principle was reiterated in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in K.S.
Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, MANU/SC/0404/1997 : 1997 (2) Supreme 597, where
the Apex Court, in keeping with the changing times, has made a bold departure
from the traditional rule that time is not of the essence of the contract in the
case of immovable properties in the following words:
"Indeed we are inclined to think that the rigour of the rule evolved by
Courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of
immoveable properties evolved in times when prices and values were
stable and inflation was unknown-requires to be relaxed if not
modified, particularly in the case of urban immoveable properties. It is
high time we do so."
45. Whether the Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract is
required to be decided in light of the pleadings of the parties, evidence produced by her
and her conduct. The thrust of the case set up by the Appellant/Defendant was that the
Defendant neither executed the agreement nor received the advance amount. It is
significant to note that the Defendant had set up the case of total denial. She pleaded
that the agreement for sale (Ex.A.1) was a fabricated document and that Plaintiff had
fabricated the same in connection with the business transactions between them. In this
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case, after taking into consideration the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties
and other material placed before the Court, this Court views that though Plaintiff is
ready and willing to perform her part of the contract, the Defendant did not come
forward in terms of the agreement, and questioned the genuineness of the Ex.A.1
agreement.
46. The Defendant's counsel further contended that the Plaintiff sought an alternative
relief, specifically the refund of the advance amount, and that the Defendant was willing
to return the same along with the interest. However, the trial Court did not consider the
Defendant's submission by recording its reasons.
47. In P.C.Varghese v. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi and Others MANU/SC/1085/2005
: 2005:INSC:501 : AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 145, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that an alternative plea of refund of the earnest amount and damage could not be a bar
to claiming a decree for the specific performance of a contract.
48. After careful consideration, this Court finds no force in the said submission. Simply
because the Plaintiff has claimed alternative relief, it cannot be held that the Plaintiff is
not entitled to the primary relief of specific performance. The grant of alternative relief
will arise if the Plaintiff's claim for specific performance is refused. When the Plaintiff
asks for alternative relief, there is no legal presumption or assumption that she gives up
the primary relief of specific performance of the contract.
49. In the present case, the Appellant had neither pleaded hardship nor produced any
evidence to show that it would be inequitable to order specific performance of the
agreement. Instead, the important plea taken by the Appellant was that the agreement
was fictitious and fabricated, and the Defendant had neither executed the same nor
received the earnest money. As Mentioned above, the trial Court found this plea to be
wholly untenable. No evidence is placed before the Court to show the escalation in the
price of the land. However, it cannot, by itself, be grounds for denying relief of specific
performance.
50. Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act contains the cases in which the Court may
properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. Three types of cases
have been given under sub-section (2) in the form of clauses (a), (b) & (c), in which
the Court exercises its discretion not to decree specific performance; it is useful to
extract the said clauses hereunder:
(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of
entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract
was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the
Plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the
defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would
involve no such hardship on the Plaintiff or
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which,
though not rendering the contract voidable, make it inequitable to enforce
specific performance.
51. The instant case does not fall under any of these clauses. Usually, when the trial
Court exercises its discretion in one way or another after appreciating the entire
evidence and the materials on record, the Appellate Court should only interfere if it is
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established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against
judicial principles. The Appellate Court should also not exercise its discretion against
the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic
considerations. Nevertheless, once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and
further requirements for getting such a decree are established, the Court has to exercise
its discretion to grant relief for a specific performance.
52. Since the Defendant's case is one of denial, the Plaintiff's case that she is ready and
willing to perform her part of the contract is sufficient to infer that the Plaintiff is ready
and willing to perform her part of the contract. Therefore, the argument raised by the
learned counsel for the Appellant that the Plaintiff has yet to provide evidence to prove
her readiness and willingness to perform the contract is not tenable.
5 3 . In Veeramareddy Nagabhushana Rao V. Jyothula Venkateswara Rao
MANU/AP/0874/2010 : 2011 (1) ALT 600 (DB), the Division Bench of the composite
High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
20. Once the Defendant has failed to prove that the suit agreement of sale is
fabricated, all other defences taken by him, such as readiness and willingness
of the Plaintiff and there is no requirement of selling the suit schedule property,
are all supplementary, based on which, equitable relief of decreeing the suit
cannot be refused to the Plaintiff when it is otherwise legal and justified to do
so.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
32.................... The Plaintiff cannot be denied the equitable relief and, more
so, the ease of specific performance being discretionary, and the trial Court,
having rightly exercised the said discretion based on the available material, is
not liable to be interfered with in Appeal.
54. Moreover, it is the Defendant who had always been trying to wriggle out of the
contract by disputing the execution of the agreement of sale. Now, the Defendant
cannot take advantage of her wrong and then plead that a grant of decree of specific
performance would be inequitable. It is not established by the Defendant that during the
period between Ex.A1 and the date of filing of the suit, there was a rise in prices
regarding immovable properties like the plaint schedule property, which made the
Plaintiff avail of this opportunity. Escalation of prices cannot be grounds for denying the
relief of specific performance.
55. When the Defendant failed to explain the circumstances which forced her to sign
the Ex.A.1 agreement by placing cogent and convincing evidence, the judgment passed
by the trial Court cannot be found to be fault. This Court views that once a party to a
contract has repudiated the agreement, the other party doesn't need to tender the
amount payable under the contract in the manner provided in the contract to claim its
specific performance successfully. Once it was held that the Defendant committed a
breach in avoiding to execute the agreement, whereas the Plaintiff performed her part of
the agreement and was ready and willing to perform her part, the trial Court was
justified in exercising its discretion in favour of the Plaintiff by passing a decree for
specific performance of agreement against the Defendant.
56. Therefore, in all probabilities, the Defendant herself executed Ex.A.1 agreement of
sale in favour of Plaintiff. Once it is accepted that the Ex.A.1 sale agreement is true and
its contents are proved, it follows that the consideration has passed and that the case of
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the Plaintiff stands proved in all respects. Thus, on an overall consideration of the facts
and evidence in juxtaposition, an inevitable and safe conclusion can be reached that the
Plaintiff discharged the legal burden as well and, therefore, it can safely be held that the
suit sale agreement is true, valid and binding and is supported by consideration. As
seen from the facts on hand, it is not the case of Defendant that Plaintiff was not ready
and willing to get the sale deed registered. It is also not her case that the Plaintiff was
not in a position to arrange the required money to get the sale deed registered. Thus,
the Plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief from specific performance.
57. In Veeramareddy Nagabhushana Rao V. Jyothula Venkateswara Rao (cited supra),
the Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh referred to the
decision of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation V. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg and
Another MANU/SC/0443/1976 : 1976:INSC:311 : AIR 1977 SC 747, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was of the view that once discretion has been exercised by the lower
Court in a given set of facts in favour of a party unless that discretion exercised is
capricious, the appellate Court would not interfere since another possible result could
have come in the suit, had the appellate Court decided the suit.
58. In Prakash Chandra V. Angadlal and Others MANU/SC/0022/1979 : AIR 1979 SC
1241, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the ordinary rule is that specific
performance should be granted. It ought to be denied only when equitable
considerations point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would
constitute an adequate relief. In the present case, the conduct of the Plaintiff has not
been such as to disentitle her from the relief of specific performance.
59. The trial Court comprehensively analyzed the pleadings and the evidence of the
parties. It held that Plaintiff has succeeded in proving the execution of the Ex.A.1
agreement by the Defendant. After reviewing all the evidence on record, this Court
upholds the trial Court's findings that the Defendant executed Ex.A.1 agreement
agreeing to the terms and conditions. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court views that Plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform her part of the
contract and that defendant is evading her responsibility. There are no justifiable
reasons to arrive at a different conclusion. The learned trial judge used his discretion to
grant relief for the specific performance of the agreement, and the said discretion was
based on the proper exercise of sound principles. The Defendant's conduct in resisting
the execution of the sale deed is entirely incorrect.
6 0 . In Nirmala Anand V. Advent Corporation Private Limited MANU/SC/0845/2002 :
2002:INSC:414 : 2002 0 AIR (SC) 3396, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
6) It is true that the grant of decree of specific performance lies at the
discretion of the Court, and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary
to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is
further well settled that the Court, in its discretion, can impose any reasonable
condition, including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other
while granting or refusing a decree of specific performance. Whether the
purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or
converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Ordinarily,
the Plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on
account of the phenomenal increase in price during the pendency of litigation.
That may be, in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to
be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a
general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily, the Plaintiff cannot be allowed to

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 have, for her alone, the entire benefit of a phenomenal increase in the value of
the property during the pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities,
one of the considerations to be kept in view is who the defaulting party is. It is
also to be borne in mind whether a party is trying to take undue advantage over
the other as well as the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by
directing the specific performance. There may be other circumstances in which
parties may not have any control. The totality of the circumstances is required
to be seen.
61. In light of the potential escalation in house property prices and adhering to the
principles set forth in Nirmala Anand's case (as cited above), this Court deems it
appropriate to award an additional sum of Rs.3,00,000/- to the Defendant in the
interest of justice. It has come to the Court's attention that the Plaintiff deposited the
balance sale consideration amount after the decree's passing. However, a certified copy
of such a deposit has not been placed. As such, this Court directs that Plaintiff deposit
interest within two months from the date of this judgment, at the rate of 18% per
annum, on the outstanding balance of Rs.11,75,000/- from 07.05.2014 until the date of
deposit. It goes without saying that in the event of the Plaintiff's failure to deposit the
outstanding balance, the Plaintiff shall be required to pay the full balance amount along
with interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
62. The trial Court's findings are accurate, and there is no need for interference except
for the inclusion of interest on the balance sale consideration amount and the awarding
additional amount. Having concluded that the judgment of the trial court results from
proper appreciation of evidence, I find no illegality or arbitrariness in the impugned
judgment. This Court views that the findings arrived at by the trial Court are correct,
and the Appellant/Defendant has shown no justifiable reasons for arriving at different
conclusions except as indicated above. Accordingly, the points raised in the Appeal are
answered.
63. As a result,
(a) The Appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree dated dt.27.10.2016
passed in O.S.No.19 of 2014 by the learned XVI Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Nandigama, is hereby confirmed, granting the relief of specific
performance with costs, and
(b) The judgment and decree dated 27.10.2016 passed in O.S.No.19 of 2014 is
modified; the Plaintiff shall deposit interest at the rate of 18% per annum on
the outstanding balance of Rs.11,75,000/- from 07.05.2014 until the date of
deposit, within two months from the date of this judgment. In the event of the
Plaintiff's failure to deposit the outstanding balance, the Plaintiff shall be
required to pay the full balance amount along with interest at the rate of 18%
per annum.
(c) The Plaintiff is further directed to deposit an additional amount of
Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs Fifty Thousand Only) within two months
from the date of judgment, in addition to the balance sale consideration
amount;
(d) Upon such deposits, the defendant shall execute the sale deed in favour of
the Plaintiff within one month. Failure to comply will lead to the Court
executing the sale deed in favour of the Plaintiff for the plaint scheduled
property.
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 (e) After the execution of the sale deed, the Defendant is entitled to withdraw
the amount deposited in the Court.
(f) In the facts and circumstances, the parties have to bear their costs in the
Appeal.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this Appeal, shall stand closed.
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