Creativity Diagnostics

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Preface

Creativity diagnostics is without a doubt a “difficult business” and presents almost

insurmountable challenges to every practitioner. By no means do grand ideas flow
easily in this task, and a “know-how” does not automatically emerge. Based on
previous publications, it can be assumed that many attempts have already been
made to assess creativity, for example, through specially developed creativity tests.
With the exception of pieces of work or work samples from the artistic-scientific
milieu to determine “creative” talents, it has neither been conclusively achieved in
educational diagnostics for schoolchildren nor in corporate personnel selection or
professional aptitude diagnostics to master these methodological requirements and
to develop suitable or—even better—optimal procedures or instruments.
Given this initial situation, it is understandably difficult for any author to con-
front this problem and take on the methodological challenge in order to set new
accents in creativity diagnostics. I myself have also long considered how a useful
contribution in the form of a specialist book could turn out, without merely “sim-
ply and bluntly” repeating the findings and procedures published so far or similar!
It is simply a fact that creativity is not only an ominous and dazzling term but
also represents a personality trait that cannot be prescribed and established under
comparable conditions. “Be spontaneous” is just as ineffective as “be creative”!
Under these conditions, standardized procedures like tests can only fail, so it is a
wonder that creativity tests have nevertheless been constructed and exist as diag-
nostic instruments. Therefore, the purpose of this contribution is not to present a
new creativity test or similar as a standardized instrument, but to highlight other
possibilities of creativity diagnostics that could also be conceivable in occupa-
tional aptitude diagnostics. Undoubtedly, an important concern in this context is
to point out that there is not one single or the approach, but rather it is impor-
tant to “let the mind wander” and systematically expand the diagnostic framework.
Perhaps a more playfully constructed and conducted procedure can also come
closer to creativity (see Appendix 2).
As a solution and an option, on the one hand, the application of scenarios
of “open problems” is offered, which, however, should be well prepared both
methodically with the help of special and suitable assessment grids and by prior
exploration of the expected answers or solutions. Scenarios differ from strictly
regulated procedures like tests by the rather informal approach to the open prob-
lems, which the candidate attempts to solve through questions and answers

v
vi Preface

to themselves and is observed and assessed by a “jury.” On the other hand, the
diagnostician should not “stare like a rabbit at a snake” only at creativity or focus
solely on it as a characteristic, but should simultaneously keep an eye on the
“nosological network” of personality traits corresponding with creativity and aim
to create a profile of characteristics.
Another possibility would be not only to search for creative behavior in a posi-
tive sense, but instead to turn to a “negative diagnostics” in order to diagnose, for
example, rigid or inflexible behavior, which very likely means the opposite of cre-
ativity and becomes particularly noticeable within social relationships. Especially
in social relationships, it sometimes depends on imagination, empathy, and intu-
ition, which are revealed in social understanding and the consciously chosen or
involuntary reactions, for example, in the request for feedback. Unfortunately, not
everyone possesses or masters these “social skills” to a sufficient degree.
Not only for social relationships, in addition to the production of good ideas
and solutions to the problems at hand, is mental flexibility and the ability to com-
bine required, which positively and creatively manifests itself in the effective use
of mental and diverse assessment schemes or category systems. In contrast to
intelligence diagnostics, in creativity diagnostics, there is not one correct solution,
but usually, many alternatives are available to choose from.
In the age of social media, social resonance in the public sphere also plays
an increasingly significant role in creative ideas or works, which, in their impact
through dissemination on the internet or in social networks, and in their usefulness
as feedback to the (creative) initiator, should not be underestimated.
It remains to be hoped that this reading contains and presents some suggestions
and alternatives for creativity diagnostics that could noticeably assist you as a per-
sonnel manager and evaluator of individuals.

Recklinghausen Dr. Heribert Wienkamp

in January 2024
Contents

1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Intelligence Research and Intelligence Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Overview of Classical Intelligence Models and
Intelligence Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Further Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1 Metacognitions as Mediators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2 Affective Influences on New Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Creativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 Creativity as a Personality Construct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 Personality Traits Corresponding with Creativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 Creativity as a Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4 Creativity and Innovation Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4 Attempts at Creativity Diagnostics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1 Creativity Tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.1 Creativity Tests in Educational Diagnostics. . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.2 Creativity Tests in Vocational Aptitude Diagnostics . . . . . . 28
4.2 Other Methods for Creativity Diagnostics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3 Direct or Indirect Creativity Diagnostics as an Alternative?. . . . . . 37
4.4 Creative Diagnostics by “Domains” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5 Creativity in Social Interactions and Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1 Creativity in Understanding Other People. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.1 Attributions Can Contribute Explanations and Aid
Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.2 Category Systems Serve Social Orientation and Support
Ongoing Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.1.3 Creativity in Judgments and Decisions
under Uncertainty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

vii
viii Contents

5.2 Creativity in Interpersonal Behavior Towards Other People. . . . . . 53

5.3 Creativity in Social Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4 Possibility of Creativity Assessment in Social Relationsships
and Situations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6 Motivational Factors in Social Relationships and Interactions . . . . . 63
6.1 Attachment Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.2 Conditions and Possibilities of (Creative) Willingness to Help. . . . 66
6.3 Selfish Tendencies in the Exercise of Creativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.4 Small Group Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7 Creativity Diagnostics Within the Framework of Personality
Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.1 The “Classics” of Personality Tests and Their Possible
Relation to Creativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.1.1 The Feature Scales of Eysenck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.1.2 The Personality Traits of the “Big Five”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2 Personality Tests Based on Goal- and Interest-Driven Approach
and Avoidance Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2.1 The “Approach and Avoidance Temperament
Questionnaire (ATQ)” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.2.2 “Promotion Focus” and “Prevention Focus”. . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.2.3 The “BIS and BAS Scales” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.2.4 Incentive Motivation and Other Personality Traits as
Possible Correlates to Creativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
7.3 Other Personality Procedures for Self-Assessment
of Creativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
8 Take Aways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.1 Creativity—A Challenging Terrain to Navigate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.2 If You Want to Understand Creativity, You Should also Keep
Intelligence in Mind. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.3 Creativity is More Than Just a “Catchphrase”!. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
8.4 Creativity Diagnostics: An “Impossible Task”—Or Possible
After All?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
8.5 Creativity in the “Social World” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8.6 Motivation and Dynamics Shape Social Relationships. . . . . . . . . . 94
8.7 Personality Diagnostics in the Light of Creativity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
8.8 Summary and Outlook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Appendix 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Appendix 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Introduction
1

Some, if not many, people doubt that creativity diagnostics can be accomplished at
all. For creativity diagnostics is a paradox or a contradiction in itself, as no person
can be creative on command! “Be spontaneous” works just as little in communica-
tion and interaction among people, as we all know, as the command: Be creative!
Creativity and intelligence sometimes seem like “Siamese twins,” which com-
plement each other and somehow belong together, but do not unite or merge,
instead remaining independent mental achievements. Thus, there is no way around
dealing with intelligence research or the diagnostics of mental performances and
processes when discussing creativity, or specifically creativity diagnostics.
Much has already been said and written about intelligence, and as a result of
scientific research, a number of intelligence models exist that differ and distin-
guish themselves in their structures and in their diversity of components or in their
functions. Thus, it is not presumptuous to say that there is not the intelligence con-
cept per se, but rather many—which is also not a novelty in scientific research!
Even vaguer, or even “fuzzier,” is the concept of creativity. For some research-
ers, it is a part or subfactor of intelligence, associated with inspiration, insight
(English: insight), or inventiveness or creativity (e.g., as a defined intelligence
performance in the “Berlin Intelligence Structure Test” by Jäger et al., 1997; see
also Sect. 4.1.2). Other authors (see Guilford, 1964; cited in Preiser, 1976, p. 55)
describe creativity as “divergent thinking” (as a counterpart or contrast to “conver-
gent thinking”) or also “inferential thinking” (see e.g., Schuler & Görlich, 2007,
p. 20 ff.), when the aspect of synthesis ability in problem-solving with the help
or application of new ideas is particularly prominent. Sternberg (1985) contrasted
“inductive reasoning” with “deductive reasoning” as fluid abilities that lead to
ideas or solutions, which is related to the thought process starting either “bottom-
up” or “top-down.” New ideas do not automatically lead to “brilliant” solutions by
themselves, but they must be connectable and integrate with existing experiential
knowledge, making them context-dependent.

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2 1 Introduction

Puristically viewed, a creation or a creative product would be something that

has not existed before or has never been there. But: In our world, creativity is
understood as something that emerges from the existing and develops into some-
thing new. This applies equally to mental (like ideas or thoughts) as well as mate-
rial (like products or objects) creations. Creative achievements are thus new to us
as directly affected individuals, but not necessarily for all people in this world, as
Barron (1965, p. 3 ff.) highlighted in his review.
The concept of creativity can be further expanded if it is understood as a “social
and cultural product” whose development is only granted to humans. However,
it is also clear that such a universal understanding of creative achievements cre-
ated by “human hands” (or creativity as a trait) increasingly distances itself from
the concern and determination or diagnostics of creativity. Such an opinion or
approach appeals to authors (see e.g., the anthology by Neves-Pereira & Pinheiro,
2023) who view creativity as a general human trait or characteristic closely linked
to an individual's life history and finds its origin therein. Against the backdrop of
humanity, this statement is understandable and comprehensible!—Or put differ-
ently: If every person can or is creative only in their own way, why should we
then try to determine or objectify creativity? Perhaps only to capture and identify
different degrees of creativity, that is, to quantify or measure it? And what would
be the point if creativity or the quality of creative achievements can only be judged
individually and thus not directly comparable? Many questions that demand seri-
ous answers!
However, it is not the case that the attempt to conduct creativity diagnostics
has never been made in scientific psychology. Some creativity tests in professional
aptitude diagnostics, as well as work samples, e.g., as proof of suitability or tal-
ent for studying at an art college, may provide evidence for this. Not to mention
the efforts with preschool or school children to determine creative performances or
talents, which were not particularly successful under certain situational conditions
(see e.g., Seiffge-Krenke, 1974).
In dealing with creativity diagnostics, it is essential to first closely examine the
relationship between intelligence and creativity or to devote oneself to intelligence
research with its different models and diagnostic procedures. Then it is necessary
to turn to the construct of “creativity” with the aim of determining and describing
its independence as a mental or cognitive performance, in order to find initial or
further research approaches. In the professional context or in the working world,
the distinction from the characteristic “innovation capacity” plays a particularly
important role. Finally, the special situation in job-related creativity diagnostics
must be addressed to indicate the limits and perspectives or prospects of success
for any kind of creativity diagnostics—or not!
In conclusion, an “excursion” or a foray into the “social reality” of human
interactions and relationships is needed before addressing the embedding of cre-
ativity diagnostics in general personality diagnostics. As will be shown, creative
approaches are indeed helpful in truly understanding other individuals in their cur-
rent situation and in handling and successfully managing a range of social matters
and phenomena.
Intelligence Research
and Intelligence Models 2

According to the opinion of many scientists and in view of their existing findings,
intelligence is an important prerequisite for initiating and developing something
like problem-solving ability—or even creativity, where the designation fits and
is appropriate. Research results from relevant studies on creative achievements
showed correlative relationships of a medium or moderate size around r = 0.30,
thus indicating a statistically significant connection between the evaluated crea-
tive achievements and the total score of an intelligence test. Since, as a rule, the
individual intelligence factors also stood in a positive correlative relationship with
each other of approximately comparable size and expression, it can be assumed
that a whole bundle of intellectual abilities generated the correlative connection to
creativity, although the influence of individual intelligence factors was controver-
sial in research and sparked lively discussions.
Perhaps it makes sense, therefore, to gradually and stepwise introduce intelli-
gence as a mental performance and in this sequence address the existing insights
into the sizes of intelligence as causes of mental performances along with their
theories and models.
It should be mentioned in advance that for every theory or psychological con-
struct, it is necessary to clarify the contents to establish face validity as a thematic
framework for further empirical investigations. This works best through surveys of
both laypeople and experts about what they generally understand by intelligence
and which specific mental processes they attribute to intelligence. According to
statements from intelligence research, experts and laypeople are quite in agree-
ment when asked about their view and opinion of an “ideal” intelligent person, as
indicated by the high correlation measures (see Sternberg, 1985, p. 64).
In contrast to these implicit theories, which are more a matter of opinion about
intelligence or intelligent people as projections, scientific intelligence research
is increasingly dedicated to uncovering intelligence structures and causative fac-
tors as (or for) intelligence performances and uses empirical investigations with
subsequent objective mathematical-statistical evaluation to verify their (explicit)

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4 2 Intelligence Research and Intelligence Models

theories and models. A popular evaluation tool is factor analysis (see, for example,
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, as a representative of multivariate statistical methods),
which searches through the diversity of individual and test results for so-called
main components as causes and identifies them as such, making their existence
dependent on the extent to which they can explain the variability or variance in
the test results and assign them to defined intelligence factors. Depending on the
question, there are independent operationalizations in which the search direction
reveals itself depending on the model-theoretical considerations such as assump-
tions or hypotheses.

2.1 Overview of Classical Intelligence Models

and Intelligence Factors

Initially, there were different ideas in psychology about what intelligence means
and constitutes when the rather banal view that intelligence is what an intelligence
test measures does not apply and is ignored. All psychometrically derived intel-
ligence models are more or less the result of factor analyses that decomposed
the event space of test results into influence or causative factors, i.e., intelligence
factors.
An earlier approach assumed a general factor (g) for intelligence, which pro-
duces the mental energy for intellectual cognitive performances and is responsible
for the activities in various subfactors of intelligence. These subfactors include, for
example, 1) reading and comprehension, 2) verbal fluency in the use of language,
3) numerical understanding and calculations, 4) spatial visualization ability, etc.
A completely different model proceeded “bottom-up” instead of “top-down”
and oriented itself to the mental qualities and processes by breaking down mental
performances according to results, contents, and operations, which in Guilford’s
model (1964; cited in Preiser, 1976, p. 54 ff.) later led to 120 “activity cells” of
mental abilities and activities. For a large part of these activity cells, empirical evi-
dence could also be provided from research and practice. Subsequent factor anal-
yses led to the extraction of main factors of intelligent performances such as 1)
memory performances, 2) convergent thinking for drawing logical conclusions as
the only correct or obvious result for judgments and decisions, 3) divergent think-
ing for generating new thoughts, creative ideas, and associations from existing
information with several possible solution alternatives, 4) evaluations for reflec-
tions and controls, and 5) other cognitions such as perceptions, imaginations, etc.
Other models of intelligence were satisfied with coarser structures or classifica-
tions, such as a differentiation between verbal-knowledge-based intelligence and
practical-technical intelligence or between “fluid” and “crystalline” intelligence
with their divergent independent functions and processes.
Fluid intelligence represents inductive thinking, which is supposed to lead
to or contribute to logical conclusions. Colloquially, this mental activity can
2.1 Overview of Classical Intelligence Models and Intelligence … 5

also be translated or described with the solution of “brain teasers.” Often, cer-
tain conditions or premises are given in the test tasks, e.g., a number series with
the sequence 3, 6, 9, etc., which follows a certain rule that the test subject has to
derive from a selection of alternatives and complete the number series with the
next (correct or right) element.
Fluid intelligence also includes deductive reasoning. Such mental activities
require “abstraction skills,” by concluding from individual parts to the “big pic-
ture,” for example, through summaries or classifications, which could be referred
to as categorization or structure formation, to establish a connection between ele-
ment and category. Likewise, linear transformations fall under this, such as (A >
B) and (B > C) = > (A > C), as well as conditional conditions and derivations, for
example, in the form of “if-then statements.”
Crystalline intelligence, on the other hand, is dedicated to the use of language
and understanding texts. It is either about the “art of learning vocabulary” or deci-
phering the provided clues from text passages with unknown words to infer the
possible meaning of the new unknown word. To keep track of these many models
and submodels or facets of intelligence (from the already cited specialized litera-
ture), reference is made to Table 2.1 as an aid.
Other models assume a genetically determined component of intelligence in
competition with a cultural-social influence (see e.g. Wewetzer, 1984).
Of the individual qualities of intelligence, the problem-solving ability, which is
so important and decisive in practice, is likely to depend. However, complicated
or complex problem-solving requires a dedicated and disciplined process if it is to
be effective and sustainable in the long term. For more clarity and transparency, a
“process model” of cognitive performances and processes can provide, which fol-
lows the following sequences:

1) Perception and recognition of whether there is a problem to be solved at all, and

if so, what type of problem it is. Tackling “pseudo-problems” or attempting to
solve the “wrong problems” has never worked and is a pure waste of time and
resources.
2) Complex problems require careful analysis according to, for example, “cause-
effect” or, as in medicine, according to disease and symptoms (or in the diagnos-
tic process exactly the other way around). Only when all details, relationships,
and ramifications are openly “on the table” can the search for a solution begin.
3) Summaries, categorizations, or exclusion of elements as mental abstractions
result in an action strategy that follows certain target ideas. Action goals are
then the product of synthesis ability and provide a solution path as a sequence
of partial steps, i.e., what is to be done now and next, which would generally be
referred to as an action strategy. Sometimes, experimenting through “trial-error
behavior” and the “view from above” or the whole (“the big picture”) is neces-
sary and required.
4) Since errors or mistakes can never be completely ruled out during the action pro-
cess, process control and self-reflection must take place at the end—preferably
through plausibility checks or, if possible, through external feedback.
6 2 Intelligence Research and Intelligence Models

Table 2.1  Schema for classifying selected thinking styles as facets of intelligence

No. Model or Design Example Note
1 General factor—Subfactors Intelligence quotient (IQ) Several subfactors make up
vs. the general factor
e.g., memory performance
2 Analytical—Inferential Detail-oriented investiga- It applies: Thesis +
thinking tions and evaluations Antithesis = Synthesis
vs.
Synthesis formation
3 Fluid (liquid)—Crystalline “Brain teasers” Logical reasoning versus
intelligence vs. language applications
Vocabulary learning (exegeses) with necessary
prior knowledge
4 Inductive—Deductive Finding solutions and mak- Direction: once “bot-
thinking ing decisions tom-up,” on the other
vs. “top-down”
Abstractions through inte-
gration (class formation)
and transformations (e.g.,
“if, then”)
5 Divergent—Convergent Idea generation Divergent thinking
thinking vs. = multidimensional think-
Review and evaluation ing or
creativity (?)
6 Linguistic-knowledge- Learning from new Linking old and new as
based—Practical-technical information plus (pre-) well as transfer to new
intelligence knowledge problems
vs.
Application of know-how
(“knowing how”)
7 Social—Pragmatic Dealing with people in Subjective experience
intelligence social situations compared to the
vs. situational-object-related
Tactical skill “world”

2.2 Further Models

Not only the “classical” intelligence models shape the current state of intelli-
gence research. In addition to these historical concepts, new approaches now and
repeatedly provide additional insights that apparently researched more “behind the
scenes” and relied, among other things, on metacognitions. Metacognitions could
clarify or demonstrate as correlations previously hidden connections and links
between the intelligence factors as predictors or independent variables (IV) and the
observable intelligence performances or test results as dependent variables (DV).
But not only these intervening variables as mediators shape the events accord-
ing to current ideas, but also entirely different factors must be considered in the
2.2 Further Models 7

context of mental performances or comparable matters, which are not necessarily

attributable to cognitive or mental information and processing processes. Rather,
they originate from the emotional or emotional experience background, i.e., the
“emotional memory,” which, parallel to the mental processing processes, equally
contribute to judgment formation or decision-making in significant situations or
difficult problem constellations. Intuition, hedonistic influences, and the use of
both cognitive heuristics and affect-related decision bases such as the “affect heu-
ristic” by Slovic et al. (2009) are the decisive psychological mechanisms for this.

2.2.1 Metacognitions as Mediators

Metacognitions support manifest cognitive or mental performances through pre-

dictions, planning, control (or monitoring), imagination or imaginations, elabo-
rations through, for example, experimenting in the sense of “trial and error,” and
controls for self-checking or reflection, as particularly noted by Sternberg (1985,
pp. 23 and 80 ff.).
In metacognitions, general intelligence is reflected, which particularly deter-
mines “coping,” namely to manage new challenges or problems with the avail-
able means or resources and thus to deal with them successfully (which could also
be understood and referred to as resilience)—unlike when dealing with already
known tasks, where expertise, skill through practice, and speed show as perfor-
mance and success criteria (cf. Sternberg, 1985, p. 77).
It is often assumed that metacognitions benefit from the subconscious and find
support through insights, inspirations (as new ideas), or mental leaps. Similar to
the findings from Gestalt psychology, perspective changes, attitude changes, or the
like can create new other shapes or figures against the existing background (which
would be the experiential knowledge). However, it is controversial to what extent
these theoretical assumptions are verifiable (see Sternberg, 1985, pp. 79 f.).
According to Sternberg (1985), the functionalities of metacognitions include:

(1) decoding, namely separating important from unimportant or irrelevant

information;
(2) selective combining, to give details a deeper meaning together with other infor-
mation and to integrate them into a coherent picture; for example, in medicine,
not just one symptom leads to a diagnosis, but often several symptoms;
(3) selective comparisons of new insights with existing knowledge (i.e., “old knowl-
edge”) increase know-how and are what constitutes expertise.

With the help of these cognitive or mental operations, an individual derives what
constitutes a successful action strategy, which inspires them and can rely on plan-
ning and control and on decisions based on correct, reality-based judgments
in their concrete behavior. It should also be considered that new knowledge is
not yet a guarantee for successful task completion or problem-solving if these
8 2 Intelligence Research and Intelligence Models

metacognitions are inadequately developed or do not function appropriately (cf.

Sternberg, 1985, p. 110).
Whether metacognitions influence intellectual performance, for example, repre-
sented in school grades as success criteria (or DV), can be methodically examined
through a “multiple linear regression analysis (MLRA)” according to the approach
of Barron and Kenny (1986) for investigating moderator or mediator effects. In
this methodological concept, as in any MLRA, certain predictors are present as
independent influencing factors (or IV). On the other hand, in line with the model
for the possible influence of intervening variables, there are, on one hand, modera-
tors (e.g., gender or age). Moderators gradually determine the influence of the IV
on the DV, for example, if older schoolchildren tend to achieve better test results
than younger schoolchildren. Mediators are, on the other hand, the psychologi-
cal constructs acting in the background (such as exam or test anxiety), which can
exert a dominant influence and are to be detected through theoretical or hypotheti-
cal assumptions (such as hypotheses).
Independent predictors (as IV) can, according to an example by Barron and
Kenny (1986), in this model, be an instruction as a learning aid with the exper-
imental variant “yes” or “no”, the dependent outcome or criterion variable, for
example, the result in points in a performance test. As intervening variables, once
the affiliation to a social class, such as a child with or without a migration back-
ground, was considered as a moderator, and on the other hand, exam anxiety as a
psychological construct, which was to be measured, for example, through a per-
sonality test with the feature scale “exam anxiety.” Sometimes it may happen that
the influence on the dependent variable “result in the performance test” depends
solely on the negative influence of the mediator “exam anxiety,” and when control-
ling for this intervening variable, the influence of the predictor “learning aid yes or
no” becomes statistically insignificant or even tends towards zero.
Metacognitions are also associated with mediators, which moderate the influ-
ence of one or more independent variables, such as vocabulary knowledge in a
foreign language or reading comprehension in a text with unknown words, which
is evident in text exegeses with a hermeneutic background and can be determined.
The influence of these independent variables on a criterion variable such as the
school grade could possibly be overlaid and moderated by metacognitions, which
would need to be diagnosed.
Metacognitions gain effectiveness, for example, through decoding or discover-
ing important information or when combining this new information by establish-
ing abstract connections and, for example, deciphering their meaning through
cause-effect mechanisms (also with the help of currently known “if-then state-
ments”). Finally, the newly gained insights should be compared with existing
knowledge and, as far as possible, checked for plausibility. Together with the other
variables IV and DV, the extent of the metacognitions should be operationalized
and captured and presented within the framework of an overall model, and the
individual effects on the DV should be calculated.
As a result of such an analysis, it could be found:
2.2 Further Models 9

a) The mediator variable (or here the metacognitions) has no influence on the exter-
nal or success criterion (e.g., the school grade).
b) The mediator exerts a partial influence on the criterion variable or the success
criterion if the regression coefficients of the IV (e.g., vocabulary knowledge)
become smaller and lose weight, so that the mediator as metacognition acquires
and has a possibly statistically significant influence on the DV.
c) The mediator or the metacognitions exert a total influence on the success crite-
rion as DV, so that the independent predictors no longer exert a statistically sig-
nificant or even no influence at all, and the mediator variable alone contributes to
explaining the variance.

It is easy to determine that the metacognitions described here directly relate to the
sub-steps or sequences in the “process model of intellectual performance” (see
Sect. 2.1) and enrich and underpin the actions with specific cognitive inputs as
abilities for general problem-solving.
Whether “practical intelligence,” as outlined by Sternberg (1985, p. 267 ff.),
shows a certain proximity to metacognitions is a matter of opinion. It is certain
that this form of intelligence did not significantly correlate with intelligence quo-
tients (IQ) and derives and transfers its know-how or “know-how” from other con-
texts or areas of life. Most often, “practical intelligence” (here called “pragmatic
intelligence”; see Table 2.1) was demonstrated through very intimate and precise
knowledge of the relevant area of life, such as the professional or working world,
where “tactical skill” was successfully applied to newly arisen problems.

2.2.2 Affective Influences on New Problems

In addition to cognitive factors, alongside metacognitions for special intellec-

tual performances, emotional or affective influences also act as “input providers”
in many problem-solving attempts. They provide the individual with a feeling-
dependent orientation as a decision-making or action aid in many critical situa-
tions, which is gladly used in case of doubt.
In research, the term intuition or “intuitive intelligence” is used when emo-
tional impulses are meant in behavioral reactions. In common parlance, terms
like “having a good nose” or “gut feeling,” which manifests as an inherent feel-
ing in important decisions, are used. All in all, feelings accompany the decision-
making or behavioral process and provide this process with important orientation.
Emotional sensations are particularly evident when a “good” idea suddenly
reaches consciousness, and after the euphoria, a deep relieving relaxation occurs,
which is experienced as very pleasant.
Also, heuristics as so-called rules of thumb are occasionally or frequently used
as orientation aids in decisions or problem-solving when other behaviorally rel-
evant information is lacking. Heuristics are based on experiential knowledge from
the past, and the decision-maker is guided by what seems familiar or known to
him. On the other hand, the alternative favored by the application of the heuristic