History of India’s Nuclear Program

After independence in 1947, Indian Atomic Energy Commission was

established in 1948 under Atomic Energy Act. The program was led by
Indian physicists Homi Bhabha and others. Nehru considered atomic
bomb as ‘symbol of evil’ and thus India’s nuclear program was focused
only development for civil use of nuclear energy

However, India kept the option of nuclear weapons open and also
opposed the United States’ Baruch Plan, which proposed the international
control of nuclear energy, on the grounds that it ‘sought to prohibit
national research and development in atomic energy production’.

In 1960, the government issued tender for India’s first nuclear power
station near Tarapur, Maharashtra. India’s nuclear power stations began
operations with US assistance in Tarapur and with Canadian assistance in
Rajasthan.

While the conflict with Pakistan was not new for India, 1962 war with China
was a wakeup call for India. India appealed to both the superpowers, US
and USSR for assistance who were distracted by ongoing Cuban Missile
Crisis. This prompted India to serious consider nuclear weapons, and the
conviction was further strengthened when China tested its first atomic
bomb in October 1964.

Homi Bhabha, for example, urged the Indian government to approve an

atomic bomb program, arguing that ‘atomic weapons give a State
possessing them in adequate numbers a deterrent power against attack
from a much stronger State.’ However, erstwhile prime minister Shastri
was opposed to the idea of bomb. Homi Bhabha also sought US assistance
in development of nuclear bomb, which decided not to cooperate.

1966 saw the unfortunate death of Shastri as well as Homi Bhabha. New
prime minister Indira Gandhi was a strong proponent of nuclear weapons.
Physicist Raja Ramanna, was named the new head of BARC and the
process of developing nuclear weapon officially began.
1.1 Smiling Buddha
The decision to finally test a bomb was largely motivated by India’s desire
to be independent from Western interference. Thus, in 1968, India refused
to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In August 1971, India
took another step away from the West when it signed the Treaty of Peace,
Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union. In December 1971,
war broke out between India and Pakistan over the separatist movement
in East Pakistan (modern Bangladesh) with China and the United States
siding with Pakistan.

In September 1972, Prime Minister Gandhi officially approved a nuclear

test. “There was never a discussion among us over whether we shouldn’t
make the bomb,” affirmed Raja Ramanna. “How to do it was more
important. For us it was a matter of prestige that would justify our ancient
past.”

At the Pokhran test site, On May 18, 1974, the 3,000-pound device
exploded with a force equivalent to 8 kilotons of TNT. Ramanna reportedly
informed Gandhi of the successful test through a coded message: “The
Buddha is smiling.” Although officially known as Pokhran I, the 1974 test
was informally named “Smiling Buddha” and is frequently referred to as
such.

Canada pulled its support for the Indian nuclear program shortly
afterwards. The United States likewise considered the test, a violation of
the Atoms for Peace program and responded with sanctions against India.
As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger affirmed, “The Indian nuclear
explosion…raises anew the spectre of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons
in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust”.

Shortly afterwards, to control the export of nuclear material and nuclear

technology, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed, the same year
(1974). Led by USA, the NSG governs the transfers of civilian nuclear
material and nuclear-related equipment and technology.
1.2 Weaponization of Nuclear Bomb and
Pokhran II
After testing its first bomb in 1974, it took over two decades to build a
nuclear arsenal and delivery system capable of military deployment. In the
years after Smiling Buddha, India had significant difficulty procuring
nuclear materials from a suddenly hostile international market. Despite
challenges, the BARC leadership managed to construct—the Dhruva
reactor—in 1977. The reactor would produce most of the plutonium for
India’s nuclear weapons program, but did not reach full power until 1988.

The Indian government also approved a ballistic missile program in 1983.

Over the next decade, the defence Research and Development Laboratory
(DRDL) built the short-range Prithvi missile and the long-range Agni
missile. Both were eventually equipped with nuclear warheads.

During the 1990s, with advent of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), which sought to put an end to all nuclear explosions, including
underground tests, India faced renewed international pressure,
particularly from the US. India did not ratify the treaty; somewhat
ironically, neither did the United States.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee explained India’s motivation to

develop nuclear weapons at a UN meeting in 1997: “I told President
Clinton that when my third eye looks at the door of the Security Council
chamber, it sees a little sign that says ‘only those with economic power or
nuclear weapons allowed.’ I said to him, ‘it is very difficult to achieve
economic wealth.’”

On May 11, 1998, Operation Shakti—also known as Pokhran II—took place.

India tested five nuclear devices, although not all of them detonated.
“India is now a nuclear weapons state,” declared Prime Minister Vajpayee
days after the tests. “We have the capacity for a big bomb now. Ours will
never be weapons of aggression.”

India faced almost universal condemnation in the aftermath of the

Pokhran II tests. The United States said it was “deeply disappointed” in
India’s decision, the United Kingdom expressed its “displeasure,” and
Germany called the tests “a slap in the face” of the countries who had
signed the CTBT. As Pakistani Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan asserted,
“India has thumbed its nose to the Western world and the entire
international community.”

Less than three weeks later, Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test.

1.3 Present Status

Soon after announcing its nuclear capabilities, India established the
National Security Advisory Board, which devised a no-first-use policy for
Indian nuclear weapons. This policy was later amended to consider a
biological or chemical attack against India to be sufficient grounds for a
nuclear response.

Although the United States implemented economic sanctions against

India after the 1998 tests, Indo-American relations have since warmed. In
2005, the two countries agreed to the India–United States Civil Nuclear
Agreement.

Recently with capability of launching nuclear missiles from sea

(submarines), India achieved the 2nd strike capability thus, making India’s
nuclear deterrent more robust.

Today, the civilian Nuclear Command Authority chaired by the prime

minister has sole authority to authorize a nuclear strike. Some estimates
put India’s nuclear arsenal at 135 nuclear warheads.

2. India’s Nuclear Doctrine

2.1 The Doctrine
Just after the 1998 tests, former Prime Minister Vajpayee tabled a paper
titled ‘Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy’ which was the first
comprehensive document on India’s nuclear stand. This document stated
that ‘nuclear weapons were not weapons of war’ and declared that India’s
nuclear capacity was for self-defence, an insurance that India would not
be threatened or coerced by flexing nuclear might.

Five years later, India released its nuclear doctrine in 2003. Keeping its
ideals intact, India said that it would not be the one to initiate a nuclear
warfare but if attacked its retaliation would cause ‘unacceptable damage’
to the perpetrator. This came to be known as India’s ‘No First Use’ or NFU
doctrine.

A nuclear doctrine has three objectives. 1) Internally, it guides the military

of the country and also provides reassurance to its people and allies. 2)
Internationally, it is a way to send message to the potential adversaries. 3)
Lastly, because nuclear weapons are not conventional weapons, a nuclear
doctrine is essential to prevent a nuclear war.

Rakesh Sood has briefly summarized the Indian Nuclear doctrine of 2003
as following:

1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;

2. A posture of no-first-use;
3. Nuclear retaliatory use in response to a nuclear attack on
Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere;
4. Nuclear retaliation to be massive and inflict unacceptable
damage;
5. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
states;
6. Option of nuclear retaliation in response to chemical or
biological attack on India, or on Indian forces anywhere;
7. Continuation of strict export controls on nuclear and missile
related materials and technologies;
8. Participation in the FMCT negotiations;
9. Continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests;
10. Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free-
world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory
nuclear disarmament
The doctrine reflects the idea that nuclear weapons are political in nature
and are not weapons of war. The document explains India’s need for
security in a nuclearized environment. The doctrine also establishes India
as a ‘responsible nuclear-armed state’ which is ready to develop
confidence building measures in the region.

The doctrine explains India’s posture and rationale behind acquiring

nuclear weapons. The doctrine is based on ‘defensive realism’ and reflects
India’s pacific culture. According to Raja Menan, “India’s nuclear doctrine
reflect not so much of India’s strategic choice, it rather reflects India’s
culture.”

Rakesh Sood tags India as a ‘reluctant nuclear-armed state’ that makes it

unique. This reluctance grew out of India’s belief in a nuclear weapon free
world. This philosophy is rooted in India’s non-violent struggle for
freedom and its immediate aspiration to be an autonomous state, able to
provide development and equity to its people. Keeping this in mind, India
acquired a tradition of restraint with regards to using violence but it was
also aware to develop the capacity to ‘coerce’ which was to be used when
everything else failed.

Credible Minimum Deterrence

Credible Minimum Deterrence is a posturing adopted by India to convey a
non-aggressive and defensive nuclear posture. It suggests maintaining
nuclear arsenal that fulfils the bare needs of defence and security. It
implies that the nuclear arsenals will be minimal enough to provide
credible deterrence against adversaries. The definition of ‘minimum’ (the
number of warheads and delivery systems at a given point of time) can be
dynamically driven by the strategic environment (perceived strength or
build-up of rival arsenals).

Massive Retaliation
It denotes that In the event of an attack from an aggressor, a state would
massively retaliate by using a force disproportionate to the size of the
attack.
2.2 Arguments in Favour of No First Use
India’s doctrine has been reviewed with time and it has been realised that
it is not prudent for India to change its No First Use doctrine. First of all,
India’s deterrence will not be strengthened instead will suffer if no first
clause is removed. The NFU brings clarity to India’s nuclear policy by
defining the limits which if breached would cause massive nuclear
retaliation.

Abandoning the NFU would mean compromising the ‘credible minimum

deterrence’ by removing the clarity. As ‘credible minimum deterrence’ is
built upon an assured second-strike capability, and removes the need and
urgency of indefinite expansion of nuclear arsenal; removing NFU would
cause a nuclear arms race in the region ending up in high insecurity and
instability.

The NFU provides resistance to the temptation to make a disarming first

strike in a crisis. In case First Use is adopted, the country will have to keep
its warhead assembled along with the delivery vehicles. This increases the
chances of miscalculation and consequently the chances of nuclear
exchange. Moreover, NFU also shuts the possibility of any irrational pre-
emptive strike.

Moreover, if there would not be a policy like no first use then the aggressor
would feel that striking pre-emptively would benefit them in a possible
nuclear exchange. It would also increase mutual suspicion between the
two ever hostile and nuclear armed nation having first strike capacity.

Scholarly Perspective
According to K Subramaniam, deterrence is all about perception rather
than posture. The first use posture may be highly provocative. It may force
country to attack to save itself from attack, no first use is better for
deterrence.

According to Shivashankar Menon, first use policy would destabilize the

security environment in South Asia. What is important is survivability. He
gives the example of China. Despite asymmetry with USA, China maintains
no first use. Thus, has credible deterrence.

According to Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan, “nuclear warheads are for tackling

the insecurity of national survival. This applies to countries like Israel and
Pakistan who have perceived existential threats from their neighbours.
India does not have such existential threat, it only has fear of a nuclear
attack, to which it has built up capacity to retaliate.”

For Manpreet Sethi. No first use policy has following advantages:

No need to have expensive nuclear weapon infrastructure. Onus of

escalation is on adversary. There is no need to keep nuclear forces on
trigger. India can keep the weapons in disassembled form, no need to
build security system required to prevent unauthorized use. First use
capabilities require huge investment in research and development, at
present India does not have that much capacity.

2.3 Arguments in Favour of First Use

Strategists like Bharat Karnard favour first use policy. For him, “No first use
is relevant only for the country that has extreme confidence in the
survivability of its nuclear forces. No first use requires efficient ‘crisis
management’. Efficient crisis management is not the forte of India. Indian
bureaucracy is manifestly incapable of crisis management.”

According to Former Lt. General B. S. Nagal. Former commander in chief of

strategic forces command, “No first use is morally wrong, it puts our
population under huge threat. There is no logic to accept large scale
destruction in the first strike.”

2.4 Disarmament
While India has refused to sign NPT and CTBT because of their
discriminatory nature, it has always made the posture for comprehensive,
verifiable, universal disarmament. India has utilized multilateral platforms
like NAM and UNGA. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi presented ‘Rajiv Gandhi action
plan’ for nuclear disarmament. The plan proposes:
 1. Time bound elimination of nuclear weapons.
2. Countries should adopt phased approach. (3 stages) and in
stage there will be verification.
3. Countries should take binding commitments.
2.5 Way Forward
The first nuclear age was largely during the cold war, dominated by US-
USSR dyad and depending on their dynamics. Today we are in the second
nuclear age when the centre of gravity has shifted from Euro-Atlantic to
the Indo-Pacific which brings in multiple players into the equation. A
nuclear war between two players might draw in other players.

The Indian government has repeatedly reviewed it’s no first use policy and
upheld it for achieving the goal of credible minimum deterrence. NFU
aligns very well with India’s world view and aspirations. With NFU India
has maintained the continuity in its image as a responsible state.

It has been emphasized that India should focus more on crisis

management, survivability, building a robust nuclear triad, addressing the
loopholes, developing infrastructure rather than changing to first use.

According to P K Chari, nuclear doctrines need not to be static, it should be

a work in progress. If needed, required changes should be made.
According to him, there was no need for India to go for ‘no first use’ when
according to Indian leadership, the purpose of nuclear weapons was to
achieve deterrence against China.

When India has no first use, It does not give enough deterrence, there is a
huge probability of conventional war. Like Pakistan, India needed 1st use
approach against China. Similarly, he suggests that we have used our
nuclear weapons to gain deterrence only in case of nuclear attack whereas
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons give it deterrence in all conditions. i.e. from
conventional to proxy war and from proxy war to nuclear war. Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons are explicitly for military purposes. India’s nuclear
weapons are primarily for political purposes.

Lt. Gen (Retd.) Syed Ata Hasnain emphasizes that NFU is no cast in stone,
we can always be flexible and make a decision of first use if the crisis
demands so. He adds that India while maintaining its NFU doctrine can
prepare for the instance of first use also (Indians, 2022).

3. Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement

3.1 Background
The NPT gave a recognized right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy to member countries. Citing is as unfair and discriminatory; India
did not join the treaty. Separately, countries led by the U.S., set up an
informal group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to control exports of
nuclear materials, equipment and technology.

Consequently, India was left outside the international nuclear order, which
forced India to develop its own resources for each stage of the nuclear fuel
cycle and power generation. Given that India is estimated to possess
reserves of about 80,000–112,000 tons of uranium, India has more than
enough fissile material to supply its nuclear weapons program.

However, the amount of nuclear fuel required for the electricity generation
sector is far greater than that required to maintain a nuclear weapons
program, and India’s estimated reserve of uranium represents only 1% of
the world’s known uranium reserves. Thus, NSG’s uranium export
restrictions mainly affected Indian nuclear power generation capacity.
Although India achieved its strategic objectives from the Pokhran nuclear
tests in 1998, it continued to find its civil nuclear program isolated
internationally.

3.2 The Agreement

To end this nuclear apartheid, there was an effort from India and US.
Consequently, on 18 July 2005, in a joint statement by then Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush, a
framework for Indo US nuclear agreement was created.

Under the agreement, India agreed to separate its civil and military
nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In exchange, the
United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with
India.

This U.S.-India nuclear deal took more than three years to come to fruition
as it had to go through several complex stages, including 1) amendment of
U.S. domestic law, especially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 2) a civil-
military nuclear Separation Plan in India, 3) an India-IAEA safeguards
(inspections) agreement and 4) the grant of an exemption for India by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with

India. Following this, the 48-nation NSG granted the waiver to India the
same year, allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from
other countries. The implementation of this waiver made India the only
known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear
commerce with the rest of the world.

The U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement or Indo-US nuclear deal is also

popularly known as 123 Agreement, since section 123 of the United
States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, titled “Cooperation With Other Nations”,
establishes an agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear
deals between the US and any other nation.

3.3 Scholarly Perspectives

According to C Rajamohan, Indo US civil nuclear agreement is not just a
commercial agreement but an agreement with huge geopolitical
significance. It is above all the recognition of India as a major power, it
legitimizes India’s nuclear weapons, it establishes India as a responsible
player in international politics.

According to Rajeshwari Rajagopalan, “The Indo-US nuclear agreement

was a direct consequence of the US’ recognition of India as a major power
and an acknowledgement of India’s strong non-proliferation record.”
Sumit Ganguly highlights the aim of USA through the deal i.e. to balance
China. “A stronger partnership with New Delhi would help Washington
balance a rising China.”

“The Indo-US nuclear deal of 2005 was a turning point in India’s foreign
policy as it raised India’s global stature, and opened up many
opportunities.” S Jaishankar