(Ebook) Mental Health Screening and Assessment

in Juvenile Justice by Thomas Grisso PhD, Gina

Vincent, Daniel Seagrave PsyD ISBN
9781593851323, 1593851324 download
https://ebooknice.com/product/mental-health-screening-and-
assessment-in-juvenile-justice-1785496

Explore and download more ebooks at ebooknice.com

Here are some recommended products that we believe you will be
interested in. You can click the link to download.

(Ebook) Biota Grow 2C gather 2C cook by Loucas, Jason; Viles, James

ISBN 9781459699816, 9781743365571, 9781925268492, 1459699815,
1743365578, 1925268497

https://ebooknice.com/product/biota-grow-2c-gather-2c-cook-6661374

(Ebook) Matematik 5000+ Kurs 2c Lärobok by Lena Alfredsson, Hans

Heikne, Sanna Bodemyr ISBN 9789127456600, 9127456609

https://ebooknice.com/product/matematik-5000-kurs-2c-larobok-23848312

(Ebook) SAT II Success MATH 1C and 2C 2002 (Peterson's SAT II Success)

by Peterson's ISBN 9780768906677, 0768906679

https://ebooknice.com/product/sat-ii-success-
math-1c-and-2c-2002-peterson-s-sat-ii-success-1722018

(Ebook) Foundations of Forensic Mental Health Assessment by Kirk

Heilbrun, Thomas Grisso, Alan M. Goldstein ISBN 9780195323092,
9780199724154, 0195323092, 0199724156

https://ebooknice.com/product/foundations-of-forensic-mental-health-
assessment-2323962
(Ebook) Master SAT II Math 1c and 2c 4th ed (Arco Master the SAT
Subject Test: Math Levels 1 & 2) by Arco ISBN 9780768923049,
0768923042

https://ebooknice.com/product/master-sat-ii-math-1c-and-2c-4th-ed-
arco-master-the-sat-subject-test-math-levels-1-2-2326094

(Ebook) Cambridge IGCSE and O Level History Workbook 2C - Depth Study:

the United States, 1919-41 2nd Edition by Benjamin Harrison ISBN
9781398375147, 9781398375048, 1398375144, 1398375047

https://ebooknice.com/product/cambridge-igcse-and-o-level-history-
workbook-2c-depth-study-the-united-states-1919-41-2nd-edition-53538044

(Ebook) Animal Maltreatment: Forensic Mental Health Issues and

Evaluations by Lacey Levitt, Gary Patronek, Thomas Grisso ISBN
9780199360901, 0199360901

https://ebooknice.com/product/animal-maltreatment-forensic-mental-
health-issues-and-evaluations-5243420

(Ebook) Rehabilitation and Health Assessment: Applying ICF Guidelines

by Elias Mpofu PhD, Thomas Oakland PhD ISBN 9780826157348, 0826157343

https://ebooknice.com/product/rehabilitation-and-health-assessment-
applying-icf-guidelines-1714916

(Ebook) Handbook of African American Health by Robert L. Hampton PhD,

Raymond L. Crowel PsyD, Thomas P. Gullotta MA MSW ISBN 9781606237168,
1606237160

https://ebooknice.com/product/handbook-of-african-american-
health-1834928
 MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING
AND ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE
This page intentionally left blank
Mental Health Screening
and Assessment
in Juvenile Justice

EDITED BY

THOMAS GRISSO
GINA VINCENT
DANIEL SEAGRAVE

THE GUILFORD PRESS

New York London
© 2005 The Guilford Press
A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc.
72 Spring Street, New York, NY 10012
www.guilford.com

All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or

transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the
Publisher.

Printed in the United States of America

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Last digit is print number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mental health screening and assessment in juvenile justice / edited by Thomas
Grisso, Gina Vincent, Daniel Seagrave.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-59385-132-4 (hardcover)
1. Juvenile delinquents—Psychology. 2. Juvenile delinquents—Mental health
services. I. Grisso, Thomas. II. Vincent, Gina. III. Seagrave, Daniel.
HV9069.M46 2005
364.36′ 01′ 9—dc22
2004024044
 About the Editors

Thomas Grisso, PhD, is Professor of Psychiatry, Director of Psychology, and

Coordinator of the Law and Psychiatry Program at the University of Massa-
chusetts Medical School in Worcester. His research, teaching, and clinical
practice focus on forensic mental health evaluations and services. Dr. Grisso
has received numerous awards, including the American Psychological Associa-
tion’s Award for Distinguished Contributions to Research in Public Policy,
and has authored several books on psychology and juvenile justice. He is also
a member of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent
Development and Juvenile Justice.

Gina Vincent, PhD, is Assistant Professor in the Law and Psychiatry Program
in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Massachusetts Medical
School. She is Co-Investigator of the National Norms for the MAYSI-2 pro-
ject, funded by the William T. Grant Foundation, and Project Director of the
Juvenile Adjudicative Competence project, funded by the MacArthur Founda-
tion. Dr. Vincent has published and presented at over 25 international and
national conferences in the areas of juvenile psychopathy, juvenile sex offend-
ing, violence risk assessment, and mental disorder in juvenile justice.

Daniel Seagrave, PsyD, is a clinical psychologist who holds a Diplomate in

Forensic Psychology through the American Board of Professional Psychology.
He is the former Director of the Forensic Division of the New Mexico State
Hospital. Dr. Seagrave’s private practice focused on forensic evaluations for
both criminal and juvenile court, including competence to stand trial, mental
state at the time of an offense, violence risk, and sexual offender risk. He is
currently employed as a clinical psychologist with the Los Alamos National
Laboratory where he primarily conducts fitness-for-duty evaluations of em-
ployees in nuclear-weapons-related positions. His research interests include
juvenile violence risk assessment and the application of psychopathy concepts
to juvenile offenders.

v
This page intentionally left blank
 Contributors

Thomas Achenbach, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, University of Vermont,

Burlington, Vermont
Amanda Anderson, BA, Drug Abuse Comprehensive Coordinating Office, Tampa,
Florida
Robert P. Archer, PhD, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Eastern
Virginia Medical School, Norfolk, Virginia
Leena K. Augimeri, MEd, Child Development Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Emily M. Baker, PsyD, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Eastern
Virginia Medical School, Norfolk, Virginia
Robert Barnoski, PhD, Washington State Institute for Public Policy, Olympia,
Washington
Patrick A. Bartel, PhD, Youth Forensic Psychiatric Services of British Columbia,
Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada
Randy Borum, PsyD, Department of Mental Health Law and Policy, University of
South Florida, Tampa, Florida
Jenine Boyd, PhD, Fort Bend County Juvenile Probation Department, Richmond,
Texas
John Briere, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, University of Southern California, Los
Angeles, California
Carl B. Clements, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Lois Oberlander Condie, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, Children’s Hospital,
Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts
Carla A. Counts, BS, Department of Psychology, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, Florida
Joanne L. Davis, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Tulsa, Tulsa,
Oklahoma

vii
viii Contributors

Richard Dembo, PhD, Department of Criminology, University of South Florida,

Tampa, Florida
Prudence Fisher, PhD, New York State Psychiatric Institute, Columbia University,
New York, New York
Julian D. Ford, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, University of Connecticut Health
Center, Farmington, Connecticut
Adelle E. Forth, PhD, Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa,
Ontario, Canada
Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein, PhD, Department of Clinical and Health Psychology,
Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Thomas Grisso, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts
Medical School, Worcester, Massachusetts
Samantha Harvell, BA, Department of Psychology, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC
Kay Hodges, PhD, Department of Psychology, Eastern Michigan University,
Ypsilanti, Michigan
Robert D. Hoge, PhD, Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa,
Ontario, Canada
Rachel Kalbeitzer, MS, Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania
Christopher J. Koegl, MA, Child Development Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
David Lachar, PhD, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science, University of
Texas–Houston Medical School, Houston, Texas
Linda E. Lazowski, PhD, The SASSI Institute, Springville, Indiana
Anne-Marie R. Leistico, MA, Department of Psychology, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Kathryn S. Levene, MSW, Child Development Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Bryan R. Loney, PhD, Department of Psychology, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, Florida
Christopher P. Lucas, MD, New York State Psychiatric Institute, Columbia
University, New York, New York
Steven Markussen, BFA, Snohomish County Juvenile Court, Everett, Washington
Larkin S. McReynolds, PhD, New York State Psychiatric Institute, Columbia
University, New York, New York
Franklin G. Miller, PhD, The SASSI Institute, Springville, Indiana
Jana Mullins, BA, Department of Psychology, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa,
Alabama
 Contributors ix

Elana Newman, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Tulsa, Tulsa,

Oklahoma
Judith C. Quinlan, BA, Department of Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts
Medical School, Worcester, Massachusetts
Karen L. Salekin, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Randall T. Salekin, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Crystal L. Schrum, MA, Department of Psychology, University of Alabama,
Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Gina Vincent, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts Medical
School, Worcester, Massachusetts
Gail A. Wasserman, PhD, New York State Psychiatric Institute, Columbia
University, New York, New York
Christopher D. Webster, PhD, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University,
Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, and Child Development Institute, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada
Jennifer Meltzer Wolpaw, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, University of
Connecticut Health Center, Farmington, Connecticut
Jennifer L. Woolard, PhD, Department of Psychology, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC
This page intentionally left blank
 Preface

At the time we were completing the editing of this volume, a U.S. House of
Representatives subcommittee announced its review of a report on the incar-
ceration of youths in our nation’s juvenile pretrial detention centers. Unlike
federal legislative reviews of juvenile justice issues in the early 1990s, this one
did not focus on the escalation of youth violence and how to contain it.
Instead, it affirmed that at least 15,000 youths annually are incarcerated upon
their arrest not because they are especially dangerous, but because of their
acute mental disorders. They are locked up in juvenile detention centers until
someone can find psychiatric or community mental health resources to pro-
vide them treatment.
This report is only the latest evidence of a crisis in our nation’s mental
health services for children, and the impact of that crisis on delinquency and
the juvenile justice system. It became apparent about a decade ago, and its
necessary implications for juvenile justice policy are now fully acknowledged
by federal agencies, state juvenile justice systems, and administrators of juve-
nile justice programs. The public safety and child welfare mandates of the
juvenile justice system must attend to the extraordinary proportion of youths
with mental disorders who are in the custody of our juvenile justice facilities.
There is widespread agreement that it is bad policy to presume that the juve-
nile justice system must become our nation’s mental health system for youths.
But federal and state requirements have now made it clear that juvenile justice
programs must be an active, affirmative, and effective part of the solution.
Two undeniable components in that mandate have arisen as clear obliga-
tions for the juvenile justice system. One is the obligation to identify mental
health needs among youths in its custody. The other is to develop emergency
systems of care—strategies for emergency mental health services, diversion,
and collaboration with mental health agencies—to respond to youths’ mental
health needs as they enter the system, and to blend necessary mental health
treatment with other delinquency rehabilitation programming for mentally
disordered youths who remain in custody because of their serious delin-
quency.

xi
xii Preface

This book is aimed at assisting the juvenile justice system to fulfill these
new mandates by providing effective mental health screening and assessment
of youths as they enter the juvenile justice system. Recognition of the crisis has
resulted in a number of literature resources for juvenile justice personnel
(which we describe in Chapter 1) that define the rising tide of youths with
mental disorders in juvenile justice programs, describe their disorders, analyze
necessary changes in juvenile justice policy, and call for reform. Yet the litera-
ture to date has provided few resources that offer specific guidance to assist
juvenile justice personnel in translating the need for mental health screening
and assessment into action. Offering such guidance is the purpose of this
book.
During the past few years, we have served as consultants to policymakers,
administrators, program managers, and mental health professionals in juve-
nile justice systems nationwide, assisting them in their struggle with the man-
date to identify the mental health needs of youths in their custody. The diffi-
culties that we have identified in this challenge have been largely problems of
translating technology for a new application.
When juvenile justice programs take on mental health screening and
assessment, they face the same challenges any organization faces in adopting a
new technology. Often they are largely unfamiliar with the technology—that
is, the screening and assessment tools that psychologists have recently devel-
oped for use in identifying youths’ mental health needs. The test developers
have been successful to varying degrees in configuring their tests for use spe-
cifically in juvenile justice settings, so different tests are likely to serve the
needs of particular juvenile justice programs better or less well. Thus juvenile
justice administrators and their clinicians must learn something about those
tests in order to make their choices.
Yet, well beyond this, they must consider ways in which their own pro-
gram operations must undergo modification when these tests are put in place.
Mental health screening and assessment involve not only the tests themselves,
but a process for administering them, training people to use them, deciding
what to do with their results, and putting in place procedures that people will
follow (e.g., diversion, emergency referral) when mental health needs are iden-
tified in this way. Like desktop computers when they were first introduced
into commercial offices, screening and assessment tools are likely to be no
more effective than the people who operate them and the office’s procedures
for maximizing their use. Moreover, staff members who are responsible for
screening for mental health needs become more aware of those needs, and this
itself can have an effect on the way that staffers carry out their obligations
toward youths, their agency, and their special role in society.
Part I of this book consists of four chapters that fully explore the essential
points to be considered in decisions to implement mental health screening and
assessment in juvenile justice settings. It has been written for a wide range of
juvenile justice personnel: administrators, program managers, mental health
professionals who consult to juvenile justice settings, policymakers (e.g., legis-
 Preface xiii

lators and federal or state juvenile justice planners), and judges and lawyers
involved in juvenile justice endeavors. This audience includes students in
training for any of these roles. Just as we do not need to know the circuitry
and binary processes inside our desktop computers in order to use them effec-
tively, these users of screening and assessment technology do not need to
know the psychometric intricacies of test development. But they do need to
know why, when, and how to use the technology to its greatest advantage.
This was the aim that we had in mind as we made decisions about content and
style of communication in these chapters.
However, we also envisioned that much of what these chapters convey
would be of special interest as well to psychologists and psychiatrists (and
their trainees) who develop screening and assessment methods for adolescents
generally and for use in juvenile justice systems specifically. Test construction
begins with measurement theory and a thorough knowledge of what one
wishes to measure. But these things alone are unlikely to produce a useful test
if one is not thoroughly familiar with the demands of the settings in which the
test will eventually be used. The desktop computer would have been a failure
if it had been developed only as a precise tool, without careful thought to the
everyday demands of the offices that it was destined to serve. Similarly, these
chapters provide psychometricians with a detailed, inside look at the enor-
mously complex circumstances that arise when screening and assessment tools
are put to work in nonclinical settings, often staffed by persons without clini-
cal or psychometric training, where issues of public safety and due process
create a very different set of demands from those of the mental health clinic or
adolescent hospital ward.
The remaining sections of the book—Parts II through VI—provide
reviews of some of the most promising tools currently available for use in
juvenile justice programs to identify youths’ mental health needs. Most of the
instruments are relatively new, having been developed since 1990—an era in
which the mental health assessment of adolescents (and of delinquent youths
specifically) has experienced a surge, due to recent advances in theories of
adolescent psychopathology itself. They were selected from a larger number of
instruments on the basis of a few criteria: (1) Their manuals and other materi-
als are available from commercial test publishers; (2) they were developed spe-
cifically for, or are often encountered in use in, juvenile justice settings; (3)
they were developed with procedures that satisfy basic criteria for test con-
struction; and (4) they are backed by enough research to have shown at least
good promise of their reliability and validity for use in juvenile justice pro-
grams.
Each review is relatively brief, yet sufficiently complete to provide a thor-
ough understanding of the utility of the instrument. Each instrument review
follows precisely the same outline, which is helpful if one is comparing the
content and utility of various instruments. In most cases, the reviewers of the
instruments are the instruments’ authors themselves, assuring that the infor-
mation on each one provides the best insight into its development and the
xiv Preface

most recent information on its validation. The authors of the reviews have
necessarily had to use some technical terms in describing the evidence for reli-
ability and validity of their instruments. But we have been especially careful to
prepare the reader for this in Chapter 4, which offers basic definitions of those
terms in a manner that does not require any training in psychometrics and
focuses only on the useful meanings of the terms and concepts in everyday
application of the instruments.
Finally, we commend those who have decided to read this book and to
place it on their bookshelves as a professional resource. You are doing so with
the prospect of undertaking the difficult task of developing mental health
screening and assessment in juvenile justice programs. You are not alone. It is
an undertaking that has recently been recognized nationwide as essential to
the welfare of our youths and the fulfillment of the system’s mandate for pub-
lic safety.

THOMAS GRISSO
GINA VINCENT
DANIEL SEAGRAVE
 Contents

PART I. PREPARING FOR SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT 1

IN JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS

CHAPTER 1. Why We Need Mental Health Screening 3

and Assessment in Juvenile Justice Programs
Thomas Grisso

CHAPTER 2. A Developmental Perspective on Adolescent 22

Personality, Psychopathology, and Delinquency
Gina Vincent and Thomas Grisso

CHAPTER 3. The Context for Mental Health Screening 44

and Assessment
Thomas Grisso and Gina Vincent

CHAPTER 4. Evaluating the Properties of Instruments 71

for Screening and Assessment
Thomas Grisso

PART II. MULTIDIMENSIONAL BRIEF SCREENING TOOLS 97

CHAPTER 5. Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument—Version 2 99

Thomas Grisso and Judith C. Quinlan

CHAPTER 6. Problem-Oriented Screening Instrument for Teenagers 112

Richard Dembo and Amanda Anderson

CHAPTER 7. Child and Adolescent Functional Assessment Scale 123

Kay Hodges

xv
xvi Contents

PART III. UNIDIMENSIONAL SCREENING TOOLS 137

CHAPTER 8. Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory 139

for Adolescents—Second Version
Franklin G. Miller and Linda E. Lazowski

CHAPTER 9. Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children 152

Jennifer Meltzer Wolpaw, Julian D. Ford, Elana Newman,
Joanne L. Davis, and John Briere

CHAPTER 10. Scales for Assessing Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 166

Disorder
Bryan R. Loney and Carla A. Counts

PART IV. COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 185

CHAPTER 11. Achenbach System of Empirically Based Assessment 187

Thomas Achenbach

CHAPTER 12. Personality Inventory for Children, Second Edition; 205

Personality Inventory for Youth;
and Student Behavior Survey
David Lachar and Jenine Boyd

CHAPTER 13. Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children: 224

Present State Voice Version
Gail A. Wasserman, Larkin S. McReynolds,
Prudence Fisher, and Christopher P. Lucas

CHAPTER 14. Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory— 240

Adolescent
Robert P. Archer and Emily M. Baker

CHAPTER 15. Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory 253

Randall T. Salekin, Anne-Marie R. Leistico,
Crystal L. Schrum, and Jana Mullins
 Contents xvii

PART V. RISK FOR VIOLENCE AND RECIDIVISM 265

ASSESSMENT TOOLS

CHAPTER 16. Washington State Juvenile Court Assessment 271

Robert Barnoski and Steven Markussen

CHAPTER 17. Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory 283

Robert D. Hoge

CHAPTER 18. Early Assessment Risk Lists for Boys and Girls 295
Leena K. Augimeri, Christopher J. Koegl,
Kathryn S. Levene, and Christopher D. Webster

CHAPTER 19. Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth 311

Randy Borum, Patrick A. Bartel, and Adelle E. Forth

CHAPTER 20. Hare Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version 324

Adelle E. Forth

PART VI. FORENSIC ASSESSMENT TOOLS 339

CHAPTER 21. Risk–Sophistication–Treatment Inventory 341

Randall T. Salekin, Karen L. Salekin, Carl B. Clements,
and Anne-Marie R. Leistico

CHAPTER 22. Instruments for Assessing Understanding 357

and Appreciation of Miranda Rights
Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein, Lois Oberlander Condie,
and Rachel Kalbeitzer

CHAPTER 23. MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool— 370

Criminal Adjudication
Jennifer L. Woolard and Samantha Harvell

Index 385
This page intentionally left blank
 P A RT I

Preparing for Screening

and Assessment
in Juvenile Justice Programs
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
produces these feebly-distinguished small groups, and these strongly-distinguished
great groups. The impression made by these two parallelisms, which add meaning
to each other, is deepened by the third parallelism, which enforces the meaning of
both—the parallelism, namely, that as, between the species, genera, orders,
classes, &c., which naturalists have formed, there are transitional types; so
between the groups, sub-groups, and sub-sub-groups, which we know to have
been evolved, types of intermediate values exist. And these three correspondences
between the known results of evolution and the results here ascribed to evolution,
have further weight given to them by the fact, that the kinship of groups through
their lowest members is just the kinship which the hypothesis of evolution implies.

Even in the absence of these specific agreements, the broad fact of unity amid
multiformity, which organisms so strikingly display, is strongly suggestive of
evolution. Freeing ourselves from pre-conceptions, we shall see good reason to
think with Mr. Darwin, "that propinquity of descent—the only known cause of the
similarity of organic beings—is the bond, hidden as it is by various degrees of
modification, which is partly revealed to us by our classifications." When we
consider that this only known cause of similarity, joined with the only known cause
of divergence (the influence of conditions), gives us a key to these likenesses
obscured by unlikenesses; we shall see that were there none of those remarkable
harmonies above pointed out, the truths of classification would still yield strong
support to our conclusion.
 CHAPTER V.

THE ARGUMENTS FROM EMBRYOLOGY.

§ 127a. Already I have emphasized the truth that Nature is always

more complex than we suppose (§ 74a)—that there are complexities
within complexities. Here we find illustrated this truth under another
aspect. When seeking to formulate the arguments from Embryology,
we are shown that the facts as presented in Nature are not to be
expressed in the simple generalizations we at first make.

While we recognize this truth we must also recognize the truth that
only by enunciation and acceptance of imperfect generalizations can
we progress to perfect ones. The order of Evolution is conformed to
by ideas as by other things. The advance is, and must be, from the
indefinite to the definite. It is impossible to express the totality of
any natural phenomenon in a single proposition. To the primary
statement expressing that which is most dominant have to be added
secondary statements qualifying it. We see this even in so simple a
case as the flight of a projectile. The young artillery officer is first
taught that a cannon-shot describes a curve treated as a parabola,
though literally part of an extremely eccentric ellipse not
distinguishable from a parabola. Presently he learns that
atmospheric resistance, causing a continual decrease of velocity,
entails a deviation from that theoretical path which is calculated on
the supposition that the velocity is uniform; and this incorrectness he
has to allow for. Then, further, there comes the lateral deviation due
to wind, which may be appreciable if the wind is strong and the
range great. To introduce him all at once to the correct conception
thus finally reached would be impossible: it has to be reached
through successive qualifications. And that which holds even in this
simple case necessarily holds more conspicuously in complex cases.
The title of the chapter suggests a metaphor, which is, indeed,
something more than a metaphor. There is an embryology of
conceptions. That this statement is not wholly a figure of speech, we
shall see on considering that cerebral organization is a part of
organization at large; and that the evolving nervous plexus which is
the correlative of an evolving conception, must conform to the
general law of change conformed to in the evolution of the whole
nervous structure as well as in the evolution of the whole bodily
structure. As the body has at first a rude form, very remotely
suggesting that which is presently developed by the superposing of
modifications on modifications; so the brain as a whole and its
contained ideas together make up an inner world answering with
extreme indefiniteness to that outer world to which it is brought by
successive approximations into tolerable correspondence; and so any
nervous plexus and its associated hypothesis, which refer to some
external group of phenomena under investigation, have to reach
their final developments by successive corrections.

This being the course of discovery must also be the course of

exposition. In pursuance of this course we may therefore fitly
contemplate that early formula of embryological development which
we owe to von Baer.

§ 128. Already in § 52, where the generalization of von Baer

respecting the relations of embryos was set forth, there was given
the warning, above repeated with greater distinctness, that it is only
an adumbration.

In the words of his translator, he "found that in its earliest stage,

every organism has the greatest number of characters in common
with all other organisms in their earliest stages; that at a stage
somewhat later, its structure is like the structures displayed at
corresponding phases by a less extensive multitude of organisms;
that at each subsequent stage, traits are acquired which successively
distinguished the developing embryo from groups of embryos that it
previously resembled—thus step by step diminishing the class of
embryos which it still resembles; and that thus the class of similar
forms is finally narrowed to the species of which it is a member."

Assuming for a moment that this generalization is true as it stands,

or rather, assuming that the qualifications needed are not such as
destroy its correspondence with the average facts, we shall see that
it has profound significance. For if we follow out in thought the
implications—if we conceive the germs of all kinds of organisms
simultaneously developing, and imagine that after taking their first
step together, at the second step one half of the vast multitude
diverges from the other half; if, at the next step, we mentally watch
the parts of each great assemblage beginning to take two or more
routes of development; if we represent to ourselves such
bifurcations going on, stage after stage, in all the branches; we shall
see that there must result an aggregate analogous, in its
arrangement of parts, to a tree. If this vast genealogical tree be
contemplated as a whole, made up of trunk, main branches,
secondary branches, and so on as far as the terminal twigs; it will be
perceived that all the various kinds of organisms represented by
these terminal twigs, forming the periphery of the tree, will stand
related to one another in small groups, which are united into groups
of groups, and so on. The embryological tree, expressing the
developmental relations of organisms, will be similar to the tree
which symbolizes their classificatory relations. That subordination of
classes, orders, genera, and species, to which naturalists have been
gradually led, is just that subordination which results from the
divergence and re-divergence of embryos, as they all unfold. On the
hypothesis of evolution this parallelism has a meaning—indicates
that primordial kinship of all organisms, and that progressive
differentiation of them, which the hypothesis alleges. But on any
other hypothesis the parallelism is meaningless; or rather, it raises a
difficulty; since it implies either an effect without a cause or a design
without a purpose.
§ 129. This conception of a tree, symbolizing the relationships of
types and a species derived from the same root, has a concomitant
conception. The implication is that each organism, setting out from
the simple nucleated cell, must in the course of its development
follow the line of the trunk, some main branch, some sub-branch,
some sub-sub-branch, &c., of this embryological tree; and so on till it
reaches that ultimate twig representing the species of which it is a
member. It must in a general way go through the particular line of
forms which preceded it in all past times: there must be what has
been aptly called a "recapitulation" of the successive ancestral
structures. This, at least, is the conclusion necessitated by the
generalization we are considering under its original crude form.

Von Baer lived in the days when the Development Hypothesis was
mentioned only to be ridiculed, and he joined in the ridicule. What
he conceived to be the meaning of these groupings of organisms
and these relations among their embryological histories, is not
obvious. The only alternative to the hypothesis of Evolution is the
hypothesis of Special Creation; and as he did not accept the one it is
inferable that he accepted the other. But if he did this he must in the
first place have found no answer to the inquiry why organisms
specially created should have the embryological kinships he
described. And in the second place, after discovering that his alleged
law was traversed by many and various nonconformities, he would
have been without any explanation of these. Observe the positions
which were open to him and the reasons which show them to be
untenable.

If it be said that the conditions of the case necessitated the

derivation of all organisms from simple germs, and therefore
necessitated a morphological unity in their primitive states; there
arises the obvious answer, that the morphological unity thus implied,
is not the only morphological unity to be accounted for. Were this
the only unity, the various kinds of organisms, setting out from a
common primordial form, should all begin from the first to diverge
individually, as so many radii from a centre; which they do not. If,
otherwise, it be said that organisms were framed upon certain types,
and that those of the same type continue developing together in the
same direction, until it is time for them to begin putting on their
specialities of structure; then the answer is, that when they do
finally diverge they ought severally to develop in direct lines towards
their final forms. No reason can be assigned why, having parted
company, some should progress towards their final forms by
irregular or circuitous routes. On the hypothesis of design such
deviations are inexplicable.

The hypothesis of evolution, however, while it pre-supposes those

kinships among embryos in their early forms which are found to
exist, also leads us to expect nonconformities in their courses of
development. If, as any rational theory of evolution implies, the
progressive differentiations of types from one another during past
times, have resulted from the direct and indirect effects of external
conditions—if races of organisms have become different, either by
immediate adaptations to unlike habits of life, or by the mediate
adaptations resulting from preservation of the individuals most fitted
for such habits of life, or by both; and if most embryonic changes
are significant of changes that were undergone by ancestral races;
then these irregularities must be anticipated. For the successive
changes in modes of life pursued by successive ancestral races, can
have had no regularity of sequence. In some cases they must have
been more numerous than in others; in some cases they must have
been greater in degree than in others; in some cases they must
have been to simpler modes, in some cases to more complex modes,
and in some cases to modes neither higher nor lower. Of two
cognate races which diverged in the remote past, the one may have
had descendants that have remained tolerably constant in their
habits, while the other may have had descendants that have passed
through widely-aberrant modes of life; and yet some of these last
may have eventually taken to modes of life like those of the other
races derived from the same stock. And if the metamorphoses of
embryos indicate, in a general way, the changes of structure
undergone by ancestors; then, the later embryologic changes of
such two allied races will be somewhat different, though they may
end in very similar forms. An illustration will make this clear. Mr.
Darwin says: "Petrels are the most aërial and oceanic of birds, but in
the quiet sounds of Tierra del Fuego, the Puffinuria berardi, in its
general habits, in its astonishing power of diving, its manner of
swimming, and of flying when unwillingly it takes flight, would be
mistaken by any one for an auk or grebe; nevertheless, it is
essentially a petrel, but with many parts of its organization
profoundly modified." Now if we suppose these grebe-like habits to
be continued through a long epoch, the petrel-form to be still more
obscured, and the approximation to the grebe-form still closer; it is
manifest that while the chicks of the grebe and the Puffinuria will,
during their early stages of development, display that likeness
involved by their common derivation from some early type of bird,
the chick of the Puffinuria will eventually begin to show deviations,
representative of the ancestral petrel-structure, and will afterwards
begin to lose these distinctions and assume the grebe-structure.

Hence, remembering the perpetual intrusions of organisms on one

another's modes of life, often widely different; and remembering
that these intrusions have been going on from the beginning; we
shall be prepared to find that the general law of embryonic
parallelism is qualified by irregularities which are mostly small, in
many cases considerable, and occasionally great. The hypothesis of
evolution accounts for these: it does more—it implies the necessity
of them.

§ 130. The substitutions of organs and the suppressions of organs,

are among those secondary embryological phenomena which
harmonize with the belief in evolution but cannot be reconciled with
any other belief. Some embryos, during early stages of development,
possess organs that afterwards dwindle away, as there arise other
organs to discharge the same functions. And in other embryos
organs make their appearance, grow to certain points, have no
functions to discharge, and disappear by absorption.

We have a remarkable instance of substitution in the temporary

appliances for respiration, which some embryos exhibit. During the
first phase of its development, the mammalian embryo possesses a
system of blood-vessels distributed over what is called the area
vasculosa—a system of vessels homologous with one which, among
fishes, serves for aërating the blood until the permanent respiratory
organs come into play. Now since this system of blood-vessels, not
being in proximity to an oxygenated medium, cannot be serviceable
to the mammalian embryo during development of the lungs, as it is
serviceable in the embryo-fish during development of the gills, this
needless formation of it is unaccountable as a result of design. But it
is quite congruous with the supposition that the mammalian type
arose out of lower vertebrate types. For in such case the mammalian
embryo, passing through states representing in a general way those
which its remote ancestors had in common with the lower
Vertebrata, develops this system of vessels in like manner with
them. An instance more significant still is furnished by certain
Amphibia. One of the facts early made familiar to the natural-history
student is that the tadpole breathes by external branchiæ, and that
these, needful during its aquatic life, dwindle away as fast as it
develops the lungs fitting it for terrestrial life. But in one of the
higher Amphibia, the viviparous Salamander, these transformations
ordinarily undergone during the free life of the larva, are undergone
by the embryo in the egg. The branchiæ are developed though there
is no use for them: lungs being substituted as breathing appliances
before the creature is born.

Even more striking than the substitutions of organs are the

suppressions of organs. Mr. Darwin names some cases as "extremely
curious; for instance, the presence of teeth in fœtal whales, which
when grown up have not a tooth in their heads;... It has even been
stated on good authority that rudiments of teeth can be detected in
the beaks of certain embryonic birds." Irreconcilable with any
teleological theory, these facts do not even harmonize with the
theory of fixed types which are maintained by the development of all
the typical parts, even where not wanted; seeing that the
disappearance of these incipient organs during fœtal life spoils the
typical resemblance. But while to other hypotheses these facts are
stumbling-blocks, they yield strong support to the hypothesis of
evolution.

Allied to these cases, are the cases of what has been called
retrograde development. Many parasitic creatures and creatures
which, after leading active lives for a time, become fixed, lose, in
their adult states, the limbs and senses they had when young. It
may be alleged, however, that these creatures could not secure the
habitats needful for them, without possessing, during their larval
stages, eyes and swimming appendages which eventually become
useless; that though, by losing these, their organization retrogresses
in one direction, it progresses in another direction; and that,
therefore, they do not exhibit the needless development of a higher
type on the way to a lower type. Nevertheless there are instances of
a descent in organization, following an apparently-superfluous
ascent. Mr. Darwin says that in some genera of cirripedes, "the larvæ
become developed either into hermaphrodites having the ordinary
structure, or into what I have called complemental males, and in the
latter, the development has assuredly been retrograde; for the male
is a mere sack, which lives for a short time, and is destitute of
mouth, stomach, or other organ of importance, excepting for
reproduction."

§ 130a. But now let us contemplate more closely the energies at

work in the unfolding embryo, or rather the energies which the facts
appear to imply.
Whatever natures we ascribe to the hypothetical units proper to
each kind of organism, we must conclude that from the beginning of
embryonic development, they have a proclivity towards the structure
of that organism. Because of their phylogenetic origin, they must
tend towards the form of the primitive type; but the superposed
modifications, conflicting with their initial tendency, must cause a
swerving towards each successively higher type. To take an
illustration:—If in the germ-plasm out of which will come a
vertebrate animal there is a proclivity towards the primitive piscine
form, there must, if the germ-plasm is derived from a mammal, be
also from the outset a proclivity towards the mammalian form. While
the initial type tends continually to establish itself the terminal type
tends also to establish itself. The intermediate structures must be
influenced by their conflict, as well as by the conflict of each with
the proclivities towards the amphibian and reptilian types. This
complication of tendencies is increased by the intervention of several
other factors.

There is the factor of economy. An embryo in which the

transformations have absorbed the smallest amount of energy and
wasted the smallest amount of matter, will have an advantage over
embryos the transformations of which have cost more in energy and
matter: the young animal will set out with a greater surplus of
vitality, and will be more likely than others to live and propagate.
Again, in the embryos of its descendants, inheriting the tendency to
economical transformation, those which evolve at the least cost will
thrive more than the rest and be more likely to have posterity. Thus
will result a continual shortening of the processes. We can see alike
that this must take place and that it does take place. If the whole
series of phylogenetic changes had to be repeated—if the embryo
mammal had to become a complete fish, and then a complete
amphibian, and then a complete reptile, there would be an immense
amount of superfluous building up and pulling down, entailing great
waste of time and of materials. Evidently these abridgments which
economy entails, necessitate that unfolding embryos bear but rude
resemblances to lower types ancestrally passed through—vaguely
represent their dominant traits only.

From this principle of economy arise several derivative principles,

which may be best dealt with separately.

§ 130b. In some cases the substitution of an abridged for an

unabridged course of evolution causes the entire disappearance of
certain intermediate forms. Structural arrangements once passed
through during the unfolding are dropped out of the series.

In the evolution of these embryos with which there is not laid up a

large amount of food-yolk there occurs at the outset a striking
omission of this kind. When, by successive fissions, the fertilized cell
has given rise to a cluster of cells constituting a hollow sphere,
known as a blastula, the next change under its original form is the
introversion of one side, so as to produce two layers in place of one.
An idea of the change may be obtained by taking an india-rubber
ball (having a hole through which the air may escape) and thrusting
in one side until its anterior surface touches the interior surface of
the other side. If the cup-shaped structure resulting be supposed to
have its wide opening gradually narrowed, until it becomes the
mouth of an internal chamber, it will represent what is known as a
gastrula—a double layer of cells, of which the outer is called epiblast
and the inner hypoblast (answering to ectoderm and endoderm)
inclosing a cavity known as the archenteron, or primitive digestive
sac. But now in place of this original mode of forming the gastrula,
there occurs a mode known as delamination. Throughout its whole
extent the single layer splits so as to become a double layer—one
sphere of cells inclosing the other; and after this direct formation of
the double layer there is a direct formation of an opening through it
into the internal cavity. There is thus a shortening of the primitive
process: a number of changes are left out.
Often a kindred passing over of stages at later periods of
development may be observed. In certain of the Mollusca, as the
Patella chiton, the egg gives origin to a free-swimming larva known
as a trochosphere, from which presently comes the ordinary
molluscous organization. In the highest division of the Molluscs,
however, the Cephalopods, no trochosphere is formed. The nutritive
matter laid up in the egg is used in building up the young animal
without any indication of an ancestral larva.

§ 130c. Among principles derived from the principle of economy is

the principle of pre-adaptation—a name which we may appropriately
coin to indicate an adaptation made in advance of the time at which
it could have arisen in the course of phylogenetic history.

How pre-adaptation may result from economy will be shown by an

illustration which human methods of construction furnish. Let us
assume that building houses of a certain type has become an
established habit, and that, as a part of each house, there is a
staircase of given size. And suppose that in consequence of changed
conditions—say the walling in of the town, limiting the internal space
and increasing ground-rents—it becomes the policy to build houses
of many stories, let out in flats to different tenants. For the
increased passing up and down, a staircase wider at its lower part
will be required. If now the builder, when putting up the ground
floor, follows the old dimensions, then after all the stories are built,
the lower part of the staircase, if it is to yield equal facilities for
passage, must be reconstructed. Instead of a staircase adapted to
those few stories which the original type of house had, economy will
dictate a pre-adaptation of the staircase to the additional stories.

On carrying this idea with us, we shall see that if from some type of
organism there is evolved a type in which enlargement of a certain
part is needed to meet increased functions, the greater size of this
part will begin to show itself during early stages of unfolding. That
unbuilding and rebuilding which would be needful were it laid down
of its original size, will be made needless if from the beginning it is
laid down of a larger size. Hence, in successive generations, the
greater prosperity and multiplication of individuals in which this part
is at the outset somewhat larger than usual, must eventually
establish a marked excess in its development at an early stage. The
facts agree with this inference.

Referring to the contrasts between embryos, Mr. Adam Sedgwick

says that "a species is distinct and distinguishable from its allies from
the very earliest stages." Whereas, according to the law of von Baer,
"animals so closely allied as the fowl and duck would be
indistinguishable in the early stages of development," "yet I can
distinguish a fowl and a duck embryo on the second day by the
inspection of a single transverse section through the trunk." This
experience harmonizes with the statement of the late Prof. Agassiz,
that in some cases traits characterizing the species appear at an
earlier period than traits characterizing the genus.

Similar in their implications are the facts recently published by Dr. E.

Mehnert, concerning the feet of pentadactyle vertebrates. A leading
example is furnished by the foot in the struthious birds. Out of the
original five digits the two which eventually become large while the
others disappear, soon give sign of their future predominance: their
early sizes being in excess of those required for the usual functional
requirements in birds, and preparing the way for their special
requirements in the struthious birds. Dr. Mehnert shows that a like
lesson is given by the relative developments of legs and wings in
these birds. Ordinarily in vertebrates the fore limbs grow more
rapidly than the hind limbs; but in the ostrich, in which the hind
limbs or legs have to become so large while the wings are but little
wanted, the leg development goes in advance of the wing-
development in early embryonic stages: there is a pre-adaptation.
Much more striking are examples furnished by creatures whose
modes of existence require that they shall have enormous fertility—
require that the generative system shall be very large. Ordinarily the
organs devoted to maintenance of the race develop later than the
organs devoted to maintenance of the individual. But this order is
inverted in certain Entozoa. To these creatures, imbedded in nutritive
matters, self-maintenance cost nothing, and the structures devoted
to it are relatively of less importance than the structures devoted to
race-maintenance, which, to make up for the small chance any one
germ has of getting into a fit habitat, have to produce immense
numbers of germs. Here the rudiments of the generative systems
are the first to become visible—here, in virtue of the principle of pre-
adaptation, a structure belonging to the terminal form asserts itself
so early in the developmental process as almost to obliterate the
structure of the initial form.

It may be that in some cases where the growth of certain organs

goes in advance of the normal order, the element of time comes into
play—the greater time required for construction. To elucidate this let
us revert to our simile. Suppose that the staircase above instanced,
or at any rate its lower part, is required to be of marble with
balusters finely carved. If this piece of work is not promptly
commenced and pushed on fast, it will not be completed when the
rest of the house is ready: workmen and tools will still block it up at
a time when it should be available. Similarly among the parts of an
unfolding embryo, those in which there is a great deal of
constructive work must early take such shape as will allow of this.
Now of all the tissues the nervous tissue is that which takes longest
to repair when injured; and it seems a not improbable inference that
it is a tissue which is slower in its histological development than
others. If this be so, we may see why, in the embryos of the higher
vertebrates, the central nervous system quickly grows large in
comparison to the other systems—why by pre-adaptation the brain
of a chick develops in advance of other organs so much more than
the brain of a fish.
§ 130d. Yet another complication has to be noted. From the principle
of economy, it seems inferable that decrease and disappearance of
organs which were useful in ancestral types but have ceased to be
useful, should take place uniformly; but they do not. In the words of
Mr. Adam Sedgwick, "some ancestral organs persist in the embryo in
a functionless rudimentary (vestigial) condition and at the same time
without any reference to adult structures, while other ancestral
organs have disappeared without leaving a trace."[46] This anomaly
is rendered more striking when joined with the fact that some of the
structures which remain conspicuous are relatively ancient, while
some which have been obliterated are relatively modern—e. g., "gill
slits [which date back to the fish-ancestor], have been retained in
embryology, whereas other organs which have much more recently
disappeared, e. g. teeth of birds, fore-limbs of snakes [dating back
to the reptile ancestor], have been entirely lost."[47] Mr. Sedgwick
ascribes these anomalies to the difference between larval
development and embryonic development, and expresses his general
belief thus:—

"The conclusion here reached is that, whereas larval

development must retain traces (it may be very faint) of
ancestral stages of structure because they are built out of
ancestral stages, embryonic development need not necessarily
do so, and very often does not; that embryonic development in
so far as it is a record at all, is a record of structural features of
previous larval stages. Characters which disappear during free
life disappear also in the embryo, but characters which though
lost by the adult are retained in the larva may ultimately be
absorbed into the embryonic phase and leave their traces in
embryonic development."[48]

To set forth the evidence justifying this view would encumber too
much the general argument. Towards elucidation of such
irregularities let me name two factors which should I think be taken
into account.

Abridgment of embryonic stages cannot go on uniformly with all

disused organs. Where an organ is of such size that progressive
diminution of it will appreciably profit the young animal, by leaving it
a larger surplus of unused material, we may expect progressive
diminution to occur. Contrariwise, if the organ is relatively so small
that each decrease will not, by sensibly increasing the reserve of
nutriment, give the young animal an advantage over others,
decrease must not be looked for: there may be a survival of it even
though of very ancient origin.

Again, the reduction of a superfluous part can take place only on

condition that the economy resulting from each descending variation
of it, is of greater importance than are the effects of variations
simultaneously occurring in other parts. If by increase or decrease of
any other parts of the embryo, survival of the animal is furthered in
a greater degree than by decrease of this superfluous part, then
such decrease is unlikely; since it is illegitimate to count upon the
repeated concurrence of favourable variations in two or more parts
which are independent. So that if changes of an advantageous kind
are going on elsewhere in the embryo a useless part may remain
long undiminished.

Yet another cause operates, and perhaps cooperates. Embryonic

survival of an organ which has become functionless, may readily
happen if, during subsequent stages of development, parts of it are
utilized as parts of other organs. In the words of Mr. J. T.
Cunningham:—

"It seems to be a general fact that a structure which in

metamorphosis disappears completely may easily be omitted
altogether in embryonic development, while one which is
 modified into something else continues to pass more or less
through its original larval condition." (Science Progress, July,
1897, p. 488.)

One more factor of considerable importance should be taken into

account. A disused organ which entails evil because construction of
it involves needless cost, may entail further evil by being in the way.
This, it seems to me, is the reason why the fore-limbs of snakes
have disappeared from their embryos. When the long-bodied lizard
out of which the ophidian type evolved, crept through stiff herbage,
and moved its head from side to side to find openings, there
resulted alternate bends of its body, which were the beginnings of
lateral undulations; and we may easily see that in proportion as it
thus progressed by insinuating itself through interstices, the fore-
limbs, less and less used for walking, would be more and more in
the way; and the lengthening of the body, increasing the undulatory
motion and decreasing the use of the fore-limbs, would eventually
make them absolute impediments. Hence besides the benefit in
economy of construction gained by embryos in which the fore-limbs
were in early stages a little less developed than usual, they would
gain an advantage by having, when mature, smaller fore-limbs than
usual, leading to greater facility of locomotion. There would be a
double set of influences causing, through selection, a comparatively
rapid decrease of these appendages. And we may I think see also,
on contemplating the kind of movement, that the fore-limbs would
be more in the way than the hind limbs, which would consequently
dwindle with such smaller rapidity as to make continuance of the
rudiments of them comprehensible.

§ 131-132. So that while the embryonic law enunciated by von Baer

is in harmony with the hypothesis of evolution, and is, indeed, a law
which this hypothesis implies, the nonconformities to the law are
also interpretable by this hypothesis.
Parallelism between the courses of development in species allied by
remote ancestry, is liable to be variously modified in correspondence
with the later ancestral forms passed through after divergence of
such species. The substitution of a direct for an indirect process of
formation, which we have reason to believe will show itself, must
obscure the embryonic history. And the principle of economy which
leads to this substitution produces effects that are very irregular and
uncertain in consequence of the endlessly varied conditions. Thus
several causes conspire to produce deviations from the general law.

Let it be remarked, finally, that the ability to trace out embryologic

kinships and the inability to do this, occur just where, according to
the hypothesis of Evolution, they should occur. We saw in § 100a
that zoologists are agreed in grouping animals into some 17 phyla—
Mollusca, Arthropoda, Echinodermata, &c.—each of which includes a
number of classes severally sub-divided into orders, genera, species.
All the members of each phylum are so related embryologically, that
the existence of a common ancestor of them in the remote past is
considered certain. But when it comes to the relations among the
archaic ancestors, opinion is unsettled. Whether, for instance, the
primitive Chordata, out of which the Vertebrata emerged, have
molluscan affinities or annelidan affinities, is still a matter in dispute.
With regard to the origins of various other types no settled
conclusions are held. Now it is clear that on tracing down each
branch of the great genealogical tree, kinships would be much more
manifest among the recently-differentiated forms than among those
forms which diverged from one another in the earliest stages of
organic life, and had separated widely before any of the types we
now know had come into existence.
 CHAPTER VI.

THE ARGUMENTS FROM MORPHOLOGY.

§ 133. Leaving out of consideration those parallelisms among their

modes of development which characterize organisms belonging to
each group, that community of plan which exists among them when
mature is extremely remarkable and extremely suggestive. As before
shown (§ 103), neither the supposition that these combinations of
attributes which unite classes are fortuitous, nor the supposition that
no other combinations were practicable, nor the supposition of
adherence to pre-determined typical plans, suffices to explain the
facts. An instance will best prepare the reader for seeing the true
meaning of these fundamental likenesses.

Under the immensely-varied forms of insects, greatly elongated like

the dragon-fly or contracted in shape like the lady-bird, winged like
the butterfly or wingless like the flea, we find this character in
common—there are primarily seventeen segments.[49] These
segments may be distinctly marked or they may be so fused as to
make it difficult to find the divisions between them, but they always
exist. What now can be the meaning of this community of structure
throughout the hundred thousand kinds of insects filling the air,
burrowing in the earth, swimming in the water? Why under the
down-covered body of a moth and under the hard wing-cases of a
beetle, should there be discovered the same number of divisions?
Why should there be no more somites in the Stick-insect, or other
Phasmid a foot long, than there are in a small creature like the
louse? Why should the inert Aphis and the swift-flying Emperor-
butterfly be constructed on the same fundamental plan? It cannot be
by chance that there exist equal numbers of segments in all these
multitudes of species. There is no reason to think it was necessary,
in the sense that no other number would have made a possible
organism. And to say that it is the result of design—to say that the
Creator followed this pattern throughout, merely for the purpose of
maintaining the pattern—is to assign an absurd motive. No rational
interpretation of these and countless like morphological facts, can be
given except by the hypothesis of evolution; and from the hypothesis
of evolution they are corollaries. If organic forms have arisen from
common stocks by perpetual divergences and re-divergences—if
they have continued to inherit, more or less clearly, the characters of
ancestral races; then there will naturally result these communities of
fundamental structure among creatures which have severally
become modified in multitudinous ways and degrees, in adaptation
to their respective modes of life. To this let it be added that while
the belief in an intentional adhesion to a pre-determined pattern
throughout a whole group, is negatived by the occurrence of
occasional deviations from the pattern; such deviations are
reconcilable with the belief in evolution. As pointed out in the last
chapter, ancestral traits will be obscured more or less according as
the superposed modifications of structure, have or have not been
furthered by the conditions of life and development to which the
type has been subjected.

§ 134. Besides these wide-embracing and often deeply-hidden

homologies, which hold together different animals, there are the
scarcely-less significant homologies between different organs of the
same animal. These, like the others, are obstacles to the
supernatural interpretations and supports of the natural
interpretation.

One of the most familiar and instructive examples is furnished by the

vertebral column. Snakes, which move sinuously through and over
plants and stones, obviously need a segmentation of the bony axis
from end to end; and inasmuch as flexibility is required throughout
the whole length of the body, there is advantage in the comparative
uniformity of this segmentation. The movements would be impeded
if, instead of a chain of vertebræ varying but little in their lengths,
there existed in the middle of the series some long bony mass that
would not bend. But in the higher Vertebrata, the mechanical actions
and reactions demand that while some parts of the vertebral column
shall be flexible, other parts shall be inflexible. Inflexibility is
specially requisite in that part of it called the sacrum; which, in
mammals and birds, forms a fulcrum exposed to the greatest strains
the skeleton has to bear. Now in both mammals and birds, this rigid
portion of the vertebral column is not made of one long segment or
vertebra, but of several segments fused together. In man there are
five of these confluent sacral vertebræ; and in the ostrich tribe they
number from seventeen to twenty. Why is this? Why, if the skeleton
of each species was separately contrived, was this bony mass made
by soldering together a number of vertebræ like those forming the
rest of the column, instead of being made out of one single piece?
And why, if typical uniformity was to be maintained, does the
number of sacral vertebræ vary within the same order of birds? Why,
too, should the development of the sacrum be by the round-about
process of first forming its separate constituent vertebræ, and then
destroying their separateness? In the embryo of a mammal or bird,
the central element of the vertebral column is, at the outset,
continuous. The segments that are to become vertebræ, arise
gradually in the adjacent mesoderm, and enwrap this originally-
homogeneous axis or notochord. Equally in those parts of the spine
which are to remain flexible, and in those parts which are to grow
rigid, these segments are formed; and that part of the spine which is
to compose the sacrum, having acquired this segmental structure,
loses it again by coalescence of the segments. To what end is this
construction and re-construction? If, originally, the spine in
vertebrate animals consisted from head to tail of separate moveable
segments, as it does still in fishes and some reptiles—if, in the
evolution of the higher Vertebrata, certain of these moveable
segments were rendered less moveable with respect to one another,
by the mechanical conditions they were exposed to, and at length
became relatively immovable; it is comprehensible why the sacrum
formed out of them, should continue ever after to show its originally-
segmented structure. But on any other hypothesis this segmented
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

ebooknice.com