Briefing Paper

March 2025

HSBA

ON THE BRINK
The Politics of Violence in South Sudan
Joshua Craze

On the Brink 1
Credits and About the author

contributors Joshua Craze is a writer with more than a decade of experience conducting research
in Sudan and South Sudan. His essays are published in the New York Review of
Books and the New Left Review, among many other publications. He is finishing
a book for Fitzcarraldo Editions on war and bureaucracy in South Sudan.

Editor and project coordinator:

Khristopher Carlson Acknowledgements
Production and communications I thank the Small Arms Survey, and in particular Khristopher Carlson, as well as
coordinators: two anonymous reviewers, for greatly improving this Briefing Paper. I would also
Olivia Denonville, Katie Lazaro, and like to express my special gratitude to everyone who spoke to me in South Sudan—
Lionel Kosirnik would that they could be named here.

Copy-editor:
Alessandra Allen
Proofreader:
Stephanie Huitson
Design and layout:
Rick Jones
Cartography:
Jillian Luff, MAPgrafix

The Small Arms Survey takes no position

regarding the status, names, or borders
of countries or territories mentioned in
this publication.

Front cover photo

A woman walks through the Renk Transit Center in
Upper Nile state, South Sudan, near the Sudan
border, February 2025.
Source: Diego Menjíbar Reynés

2 HSBA Briefing Paper March 2025

Overview Introduction
In September 2024, after Kiir announced
This Briefing Paper examines what led South Sudan to a further two-year extension of the transi-
delay elections scheduled for December 2024 and considers tional process, he began clearing house.
The rapid turnover of government per-
likely developments in the new two-year transitional period. sonnel increased. Simon Juach Deng
It focuses on the place of the Tumaini Peace Initiative in and Atak Santino Majak from the Office
of the President were replaced, among
South Sudan’s political compact, the effects of the war in many others. In the past Kiir had expertly
Sudan on politics in Juba, and the violence scarring the coun- used appointments and dismissals to
marginalize threats to his rule by set-
try. The paper finds that South Sudanese President Salva ting his rivals against each other.1 In the
Kiir’s decision to delay elections was not due to straitened second half of 2024, however, some
politicians whispered that the decisions
economic circumstances, but was rather an attempt to keep were coming too fast, without rhyme or
together a fraying elite compact. Political dynamics in Juba reason.2 Rumours abounded that Kiir
was increasingly paranoid, or, some
also led to the collapse of the Tumaini talks. Kiir’s chosen said, seriously ill.3
successor, Benjamin Bol Mel, may not have the political By October 2024, the situation
seemed ripe for revolt. Most govern-
capital to take over South Sudan. This paper concludes by ment salaries had not been paid since
analysing the lineaments of the civil war that would likely November 2023. Even their payment
made little difference to those living in
ensue if Kiir’s succession plan fails. Juba—inflation in 2024 soared to 600%
Discontent was growing among unpaid
members of the security ser­vices and
the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces

Key findings (SSPDF).4 Chatter among the country’s

elite was no longer about elections but
about what the government would look
The Tumaini talks are an attempt to integrate hold-out like after Kiir’s presidency ended.
groups and dissident politicians into Kiir’s political Kiir made the situation all the more
combustible with a series of provocative
compact. The talks were undermined by politicians who decisions. On 2 October, he removed
risked losing their positions within that coalition. Akol Koor Kuc, the head of the Internal
Security Bureau (ISB) of the National
Thus far, Kiir has walked a tightrope over the war in Security Service (NSS), amid rumours
he was plotting a coup. Initially, Kiir
Sudan. He retains a close relationship with the Sudanese seemed to be trying to appease his
Armed Forces (SAF). Several members of his coalition rival by appointing him the governor of
Warrap state, but after Akol Koor returned
have also forged business ties with the Rapid Support to Juba from Dubai on 9 October his
Forces (RSF). gubernatorial appointment was abruptly
revoked.5 Rumours also swirled that Kiir
South Sudan is in the grip of a lasting economic crisis. had removed Lual Wek Gem, also known
as Lual Maroldit, from his position as
In 2024, the country’s main oil pipeline went offline and the Commander of Tiger Division (Radio
inflation soared to 600%. Tamazuj, 2024b).6 Kiir had sacked
important commanders and politicians
Plans for a post-Kiir South Sudan are being plotted by his before, but never figures so central to
his security apparatus.
supporters and rivals. Among those jockeying for power, On 21 November, tensions erupted
there is no one able to command the assent of the coun- into open gunfire in Juba, after an attempt
by the security services to relocate Akol
try’s elite; civil war is a very real possibility following the Koor from his residence in Tongpiny was
end of Kiir’s reign. resisted by his bodyguards.7 Following an
intervention on 23 November by Santino
Deng Wol, at that time the chief of defence
forces for the SSPDF, Akol Koor consented
to be moved to Jebel, where he report-
edly gave up his mobile phones—part
of an effort to cut contact between the
former spy chief and forces loyal to him
(Sudans Post, 2024).8 Uncertainty then
surrounded the fate of Stephen Marshall
Babanen, the Murle chief of military

On the Brink 3
intelligence, who is a sworn enemy of A productive non-election to be undertaken, and security sector
Akol Koor.9 On 26 November, South reform (SSR) arrangements, which were
Sudanese traders fled markets in Juba In 2018, South Sudan’s civil war (2013–18) supposed to create a unified army, had
amid rumours—denied by the SSPDF— ended with the Revitalized Agreement still not been finalized. All these delays
that Babanen had been dismissed. At the on the Resolution of the Conflict in the exasperated the international community.
end of November, many feared South Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). For the Troika, elections were the sine
Sudan was about to explode. Yet the That agreement created a transitional qua non of the peace agreement, and
bomb never went off (see Map 1 for government and stipulated that elections the further extension was bewailed as a
information on armed groups' control would be held in 2022. Over the next collective failure of South Sudan’s lead-
and activity as of December 2024). four years, little was done to implement ership (Troika, 2024).11 The government
In 2005, a strong Sudan People’s the agreement, and in February 2022 blamed the delay on South Sudan’s ailing
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and a the government delayed elections until economy, with the minister of cabinet
diverse set of security actors could act December 2024. On 13 September 2024, affairs Martin Elia Lomuro citing a lack
as a check on Kiir’s power. Since the the South Sudanese government once of funds as the primary reason for not
fracturing of the Sudan People’s Libera- again delayed elections, extending the having held elections as planned (Radio
tion Movement/Army-in-Opposition transitional period for a further two Tamazuj, 2024a).12
(SPLM/A-IO), there has been no viable years. In some senses, this was 2022, Neither the Troika’s nor Lomuro’s
alternative to the system of patronage redux. From 2018 to 2024, implementa- position is particularly edifying. One
constructed around Kiir. The system tion of the peace agreement proceeded presumes a lack of government will; the
created by Kiir’s mode of rule, as this at a glacial pace. By the time the second other presumes that the government is
Briefing Paper will show, prevented extension was announced, more than six willing, but lacks the resources to hold
the electoral process and blocked the years after the signing of the R-ARCSS, elections. What these positions occlude
Tumaini Peace Initiative. Its true cost the South Sudanese constitution had is that the South Sudanese government
will only be felt when Kiir is gone.10 still not been drafted, a census had yet has considerable political will, along

Map 1 Areas of armed groups’ control and activity

Notes: CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; RAA = Ruweng Administrative Area; SSUF/A = South Sudan United Front Army;
SLA-AW = Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid.

4 HSBA Briefing Paper March 2025

with the material capacity to actualize
many of the projects it finds important. Conflict has often followed
Delays in the implementation of the
R-ARCSS are political choices. Initially,
the ponderous formation of a transitional from interethnic competition over
government—which took two years,
rather than the eight months set out for
this process in the R-ARCSS—enabled
county- and state-level positions
Kiir to forge a coalition of relatively weak
candidates, dependent on his largesse.
Kiir’s regime effectively functioned as a
that are treated as sinecures, and
used to funnel scarce resources
centralized dictatorship, with positions
distributed in Juba following the pre-
scriptions of the R-ARCSS—according to

to one community at the expense

a calculus worked out among the elite,
rather than on the basis of local legiti-
macy (Craze and Markó, 2022). Though
the SPLM/A-IO was formally allocated
positions under the terms of the R-ARCSS, of another.”
substantively its representatives were
isolated from government funding and
real power, and dependent on Kiir’s
regime—the same was true of the other opportunistic assemblages, created to tent within South Sudan, which reflected
parties to the agreement. gain access to posts within the transi- both the country’s direction and the pres-
Extending the transition period in tional government.15 None of these ence, within Kiir’s coterie of advisers, of
2022 proved productive for Kiir, as it parties have any real organizational figures closely connected to the former
allowed him to use the very terms of the basis in South Sudan.16 While they had Sudanese dictator, Omar al-Bashir (Small
peace agreement to further consolidate allowed Kiir to maximize his allocation Arms Survey, 2023c; 2024a). Despite
his grip on power, continuing the pro- of government positions, they were such discontent, there were no other
ject of the civil war, albeit by different dispensable. Having weakened the viable candidates for the presidency—
means. Stalled implementation of SSR, opposition during the first five years of precisely thanks to Kiir’s strategies of
for instance, allowed the government the transitional period, Kiir prepared to divide and rule—and the SPLM was the
to humiliate SPLA-IO forces expecting vanquish them at the ballot box. overwhelming favourite to win almost
salaries and weapons under the terms Much of South Sudan also eagerly all the national and gubernatorial elec-
of the R-ARCSS, and precipitated whole- anticipated elections (PeaceRep, 2024). tions scheduled for 2024.
sale defections from the opposition During the extended transitional period, In spite of overwhelming popular sup-
(Craze, 2020). These defections weak- elections became the sociological fact port for elections in South Sudan, there
ened Riek Machar, the leader of the around which South Sudan’s political were formidable obstacles, both practi-
SPLM/A-IO, and allowed Kiir to assert life was organized. At the state level, cal and political. Practically, conducting
control over South Sudan by setting Potemkin figures installed via the R-ARCSS a census and demarcating constituency
opposition forces against each other and began jockeying to try and ensure they boundaries in a country beset by flood-
making them dependent on his favour would receive SPLM nominations for ing and riven with conflict would have
(Craze, 2024b). state-level positions, in the hope that been extremely difficult to carry out.
By the middle of the first extension the party’s favour would enable them to Both processes would also have been
period, elections had begun to seem like overcome their lack of local legitimacy.17 politically explosive. Since 2005, the
an attractive prospect for Kiir. Central to Ethnic communities across the country South Sudanese regime has encouraged
this changed evaluation of the electoral engaged in elaborate electoral calcula- ethnic groups to think of administrative
process was the growing weakness of the tions over who would be permitted to units—such as counties, payams, and
SPLM/A-IO. Kiir had peeled off much of stand for positions. Kiir began preparing bomas—as communitarian possessions.
the opposition group’s military strength for elections by holding rallies across Interethnic relations have frayed as groups
through defections and brutal military much of the country, as the SPLM party have come to understand themselves as
campaigns, often waged via proxies machinery in all three regions of South mini-states in zero-sum competitions
(Craze, 2022a; OHCHR, 2022). Machar’s Sudan nominated him for president (Small with their neighbours (Craze, 2013; 2014;
support, particularly among the Eastern Arms Survey, 2023d). The always-frenetic 2019). Conflict has often followed from
Nuer, had plummeted as his weakness turnover of state and national positions interethnic competition over county- and
at the national level was revealed.13 also shifted to reflect an electoral cal- state-level positions that are treated as
Blocked from sources of funding and fear- culus. Weak political figures useful for sinecures, and used to funnel scarce
ful of rivals, Machar appointed a narrow blocking powerful local politicians were resources to one community at the
circle of loyalists to the government posi- replaced by populist figures capable of expense of another (Small Arms Survey,
tions allocated to the SPLM-IO, alienating winning elections (Small Arms Survey, 2024b).19 The process of state-creation
much of the Nuer political class, who 2023b; 2023d). Kiir also re-emphasized in South Sudan, from 2005 to 2024, led
jumped ship and joined the government.14 his place in the SPLM/A’s long struggle to national fragmentation. In this con-
Opposition weakness extended to against the Sudanese government in text, any attempt to conduct a census
South Sudan’s other political parties. Khartoum, rhetorically appealing to a would be a fraught endeavour given that
Many groupings, including the South time of relative unity.18 This appeal was such determinations of population size
Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), were designed to assuage widespread discon- would be used for many forms of resource

On the Brink 5
allocation, including the disbursement of opposition groups from holding rallies The Tumaini Peace
humanitarian resources.20 Determining or building up a base of support (UNHRC,
and demarcating constituency boundaries 2023, pp. 23–24). Machar’s official posi- Initiative
would also be difficult. In both Warrap tion was to call for the full implementa- One of the only ways to justify an exten-
(Craze, 2022b; Pendle, 2014) and Upper tion of the peace agreement, including sion acceptable to the international com-
Nile states (Craze, 2019; Pritchard, 2020), the long-delayed creation of a national munity would have been to integrate the
for instance, borders imposed by top- army, but such a position masked his hold-out groups and dissident politicians
down, state-driven processes have desire to avoid elections in toto. Other that had not signed the R-ARCSS into
created intergroup conflict. These struc- opposition groups had similar qualms: the Revitalized Government of National
tural political problems, almost impossi- the SSOA and the Other Political Parties Unity (R-TGoNU).24 The hold-out groups
ble to address, could have been resolved (OPP) had no ground operations that would then have needed to disarm and
by simply ignoring them. Senior members would have allowed them to contest elec- form political parties before elections
of the SPLM stated that an election with- tions, and would have lost the positions could be held. Several of these hold-out
out a permanent constitution or a census guaranteed to them by the R-ARCSS. groups, including the National Salvation
would have been possible (UNSC, 2024a, Even more substantively, it was parts Front (NAS) of Thomas Cirillo, Pagan
p. 8). While such an election would not of Kiir’s coalition that resisted elections. Amum’s Real-SPLM, and Paul Malong
have met international standards of best Like the SSOA and the OPP, many SPLM Awan’s South Sudan United Front, had
practice, it would, nonetheless, have politicians lacked local legitimacy, and been involved in intermittent talks with
been an election. feared that elections would spell the end the South Sudanese government, held in
The more determinant obstacle to of their time in power. Explicitly coming Rome under the auspices of Sant’Egidio,
elections lay not in the practical prob- out against the elections, however, was a Catholic lay association. Kiir’s regime
lems posed by the process but rather in not politically possible: they were the used these talks as an opportunity to
the system that had ensured Kiir’s rule horizon against which South Sudanese try to split the opposition by opening
since 2018. Many members of the tran- politics was being organized. Instead, up separate negotiating channels with
sitional government were well aware under the cover of delays, the electoral individual rebels—most notably with
that they risked losing all their privileges process was left to atrophy. While key Malong. The government withdrew from
if an election were to take place. No one pieces of legislation were signed into the Rome talks in March 2023, in theory
stood to lose more than Machar. The law—such as the National Elections Act due to a disagreement over the agenda.
SPLM/A-IO was initially a Nuer force, and the Political Parties Act—the forma- In December 2023, the South Suda-
which gave form to the widespread tion of these reconstituted electoral nese government surprised Sant’Egidio
community anger that had ensued after bodies proceeded at a snail’s pace and by asking the Kenyan president, William
the Juba massacres of December 2013 they were given no money to carry out Ruto, to host talks with the hold-out
(AUCISS, 2014). It was initially almost their responsibilities. Their staff remained groups. For Ruto, holding the talks in
entirely led by Nuer commanders who unpaid and it was almost impossible for Nairobi was part of a broader effort to
had previously served with the South opposition groups to register themselves position Kenya as the region’s diplo-
Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) of Paulino as political parties.23 matic epicentre, and consolidate links
Matiep (Young, 2006; 2015; 2016). By This left Kiir in a contradictory posi- between Kenya and South Sudan. For
2022, most of these commanders had tion. He would have personally benefited Kiir, moving the talks to Nairobi allowed
left the SPLM/A-IO, dissatisfied with from elections; however, while the system him to sideline Cirillo, who was not will-
Machar’s leadership, while many of the created by the R-ARCSS had enabled ing to come to the Kenyan capital, whence
rank-and-file of the SPLM/A-IO felt that him to fragment the political class, and the NSS had abducted dissidents as
the leadership of the organization had so dominate it, this had left individual recently as 2023 (Amnesty International,
betrayed its communitarian roots. Machar politicians dependent on his largesse 2023). Kiir hoped that sidelining Cirillo
would continue to lose both commanders and the positions allocated to them would lead to the hold-out groups aban-
and popularity over the next two years, under the terms of the peace agreement. doning demands to fundamentally change
including—humiliatingly—the defection This meant Kiir was surrounded by five the structure of his regime, while allow-
of Simon Maguek Gai in Leer town in vice presidents and any number of politi- ing him to absorb some rebel leaders—
October 2023.21 To the extent that it had cians invested in maintaining the system notably Amum, Stephen Buay Rolnyang
managed to build a party outside Nuer enabled by the R-ARCSS. Although Kiir (Buay), and Malong—into government.
territory, by 2022, the SPLM-IO was ultimately determines the fate of these Several months of shuttle diplomacy
largely composed of politicians who had figures, he does so within a system in ensued between Nairobi and Juba. Ruto
opportunistically used their membership which he must constantly balance rival- assigned the retired general Lazaro
to gain access to political power. For rous politicians, and in which he is ulti- Sumbeiywo to oversee the initiative:
instance, diaspora politicians in Warrap mately dependent on his coalition in Sumbeiywo had previously served as
without a hope of obtaining a place within order to rule. Rather than come out Kenya’s special envoy (1997–98) to Inter-
the SPLM returned to the state in 2020–22 against the elections, this coalition governmental Authority on Development
to take advantage of positions proffered killed the electoral process by allowing (IGAD)-led talks designed to end the
by the SPLM-IO, in the full knowledge it to sink into a morass of delays and a second Sudanese civil war, before becom-
that their sinecures depended on the lack of funding. Delays were once again ing a mediator in the negotiations that led
continuation of transitional arrangements politically expedient—if not for Kiir, then to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(Craze, 2022b, pp. 29–30).22 for the political elite on which his rule (CPA) in 2005. He thus carried symbolic
The SPLM-IO was keenly aware that depends. By the end of 2023, it was weight, and knew many of the participants
it would have overwhelmingly lost the increasingly apparent that the elections in what was christened the Tumaini Peace
elections postulated for December 2024, scheduled for December 2024 would Initiative, after the Swahili word for hope.
especially as the SPLM was holding the not occur, and Kiir began looking for an The initiative launched on 9 May 2024,
country’s purse strings and preventing escape route. with Ruto pressuring Kiir to attend.

6 HSBA Briefing Paper March 2025

 The Tumaini talks were more inclusive
than the Rome initiative. As expected, Kiir’s regime did not want
NAS did not participate, citing security
concerns.25 The other members of the
Cirillo-led faction of the South Sudan the Tumaini talks to change the
Opposition Movement’s Alliance (SSOMA),
including the South Sudan Movement
for Change of Alex Yata and the National
structure of power created by the
R-ARCSS, but rather intended to
Democratic Movement-Patriotic Front
led by Emmanuel Ajawin, also refused to
join the talks. The other faction of the
SSOMA, however, which included Amum
and Malong, did choose to participate. change the personnel within that
It was joined by another rebel grouping,
the South Sudan United National Alliance
(SSUNA), which had not participated in structure by absorbing opposition
the Rome talks. The SSUNA was a vehicle
for the ambitions of Buay, a former SPLA
commander from Mayom county, who
politicians into it.”
rebelled in 2021 after clashing with
other members of the Bul Nuer political
elite.26 He leads the South Sudan People’s imity to the RSF.29 Until November 2024, politicians into it. Since 2005, Kiir has
Movement (SSPM). The SSUNA is com- Gatwich remained trapped in Rabak.30 ruled by a frenetic cycling through of
posed of the SSPM and a number of In Gatwich’s place, the talks included the potential rivals, building up politicians
minor rebel factions. These lesser fac- Patriotic Resistance Movement, a minor through appointments and gifts before
tions do not have any substantive forces splinter faction of the SPLA-IO-Kitgwang. displacing them in favour of their adver-
on the ground; they were incorporated Also included was a NAS splinter group saries. Some politicians have gone
into the SSUNA so as to give Buay more composed of retired police officers with through more than one cycle. Kiir’s
seats at the table. The SSOMA and the no forces on the ground. The message principal goal at the Tumaini talks was
SSUNA were joined at the talks by civil from the South Sudanese government to cut a deal with his erstwhile enemy,
society participants. Like the minor rebel was clear: either participate in the talks, Malong, his former chief of staff, who
factions, these groups had little politi- or an ersatz version of your group will be may once have investigated the possibil-
cal weight. conjured up to sign the agreement. ity of overthrowing him (Boswell, 2019).
Kiir’s primary focus was rather on the From the beginning, the Tumaini talks Malong’s return to Juba would have
absorption of Amum, Buay, and Malong were marked by a chasm between the enabled two political shifts. In Northern
into the political compact in Juba. From government’s intentions and the hold- Bahr el Ghazal state, Malong’s exit in
the beginning, the minor rebel move- out groups’ demands. The opposition 2017 had led Kiir to empower a clique
ments inside the SSUNA and the SSOMA believed that the government was getting of politicians formerly close to Bashir’s
complained about the dominance of the weaker: it knew that the elections sched- regime in the north (Small Arms Survey,
leading commanders. One group within uled for December 2024 were unlikely to 2024a). These figures—including the
the SSUNA, the United Democratic Revo- occur and that, after the country’s main then-governor of the state, Tong Akeen;
lutionary Movement (UDRM), withdrew oil pipeline had shut down in February, the national minister of investment,
from the coalition in June, complaining the country’s dire economic situation Dhieu Mathok Diing; and the then-SSOA
of Nuer pre-eminence.27 Another group, had tipped into catastrophe. ‘Since we vice president, Hussein Abdel Bagi—
the Upper Nile People’s Liberation Front, arrived,’ one high-ranking member of lacked popular legitimacy in Northern
led by the veteran Shilluk commander an opposition group told the author, Bahr el Ghazal, where they were seen
Henry Oyai Ayago, had deputized Peter ‘we are all looking around and working as impositions from Juba.32 Abdel Bagi,
Chuol Gatluak to represent it, only for out our price. Since February, I think mine whose father had run a militia that had
Gatluak to rebel in Nairobi and form his has gone up.’31 The hold-out groups raped and pillaged its way through the
own one-man movement, the Nilotic were emboldened to make sweeping state at Khartoum’s behest, was particu-
People’s Movement, which demanded demands. Initially, they asked for the larly hated (Rift Valley Institute, 2020).
autonomy for the Upper Nile region.28 constitutional process to be moved from Malong’s return would have allowed the
Gatluak soon lost his place within the Juba to Nairobi. On 7 June the SSOMA reconstitution of popular SPLM authority
SSUNA—and at the negotiating table. also proposed, inter alia, that the NSS in the state.
Noticeable by his absence was be replaced by a purely intelligence- Even more importantly, the return of
Simon Gatwich Dual, the head of the gathering body without military capacity, Malong would have been a blow to his
SPLM/A-IO Kitgwang faction. Since and that Kiir commit to not standing for implacable enemy, Akol Koor. Malong
Kitgwang had ruptured internally (Craze, office in elections, which the proposal blamed Akol Koor for orchestrating his
2022a, pp. 38–46), Gatwich, a venerable stated should be held in three years’ ousting and saw the spymaster as the
Lou Nuer commander, had been in Sudan time. All these measures were non- principal obstacle to his return. Kiir was
—initially in Khartoum and then, after starters for the government. also concerned about Akol Koor, who
the outbreak of the civil war, in Rabak, Kiir’s regime did not want the Tumaini he suspected of plotting to take power.
White Nile state. Gatwich had wanted to talks to change the structure of power Akol Koor and his associates were also
participate in Tumaini, but his way was created by the R-ARCSS, but rather opposed to Kiir fast-tracking Bol Mel
blocked by SAF, which would not give intended to change the personnel within through the machinery of government,
up a prize asset to Kenya, given its prox- that structure by absorbing opposition and appointing the Northern Bahr el

On the Brink 7
 At the beginning of 2024, external sponsorship: the SPLM/A relied
on Ethiopian and Soviet support in the
1980s, while the SSDF had backing from
Kiir hoped his absorption of the Khartoum. The regional realignment
expressed by the R-ARCSS, which was
overseen by both Kampala and Khartoum,
opposition would soon include meant opposition forces could not find
support outside South Sudan’s borders.

the participants of the Tumaini

As Kiir no longer had to worry about
Sudan’s backing of South Sudanese
rebels, he could instead outsource con-

Peace Initiative. Kiir’s strategy, flict inside the country to those very
rebel groups: witness his use of Shilluk
commander Johnson Olonyi’s forces,

however, was not well received by the Agwelek, to fight both the SPLA-IO
and Gatwich’s Kitgwang in Upper Nile
(Small Arms Survey, 2023a).
Amum, Buay, and Malong.” By mid-2023, the geopolitical situa-
tion had changed. The war in Sudan
meant there was the possibility of one or
the other side supporting rebel groups
Ghazal native as his successor. This was Khartoum, would also serve as a check inside South Sudan; Buay’s forces had
not the first time Kiir had been concerned on the former members of Bashir’s fought for the RSF, as had small numbers
about Akol Koor. He had previously tried National Congress Party (NCP), such as of Malong’s forces.37 Furthermore, in order
to limit Akol Koor’s power in 2020 by Tut Kew Gatluak, who, in May 2023, still to have elections, Kiir needed at least
dismissing him from his informal posi- played an important role in Kiir’s regime.35 the appearance of stability within South
tion on the Nilepet board and promoting Tut Kew had a fractious but effective Sudan: too much open conflict would
Nhial Deng Nhial to the position of min- alliance with the then-governor of Unity have made the electoral process impos-
ister of presidential affairs, in order to state, Nguen Monytuil, who was a former sible. Commanders such as Olonyi, and
create a counterweight to Akol Koor’s member of Matiep’s SSDF, backed by minor renegade generals such as Dickson
powerbase in his home state of Warrap.33 Khartoum (Craze and Tubiana, 2016; Gatluak, were effectively bought off and
He also instructed Bol Akot Bol, a Renk Small Arms Survey, 2023c), until Nguen’s then warehoused in Juba, under house
Dinka general, to use a disarmament cam- dismissal in May 2024. Buay, who had arrest—their political and military powers
paign in Tonj East county as a facade to always remained within the SPLA, and neutralized (Craze, 2024a).38
go after fighters supported by Akol Koor had not rebelled until 2021, is a popular At the beginning of 2024, Kiir hoped
(Craze, 2022b, pp. 32–38), while simul- Bul Nuer commander with political ambi- his absorption of the opposition would
taneously building up SSPDF Military tions. He would have enabled Kiir to limit soon include the participants of the
Intelligence under Rin Tueny Mabor Deng the power of the Bul Nuer power bloc that Tumaini Peace Initiative. Kiir’s strategy,
as a counterweight to the NSS. The dis- surrounded Tut Kew and Nguen.36 The however, was not well received by Amum,
armament campaign failed. Powerbrokers alignment of this bloc with the govern- Buay, and Malong. The hold-out groups
in the SPLM, including Kuol Manyang, ment during the South Sudanese civil looked dimly on the prospect of returning
began to positioned Nhial as a replace- war had enabled it to maintain control of to Juba, only to find themselves remote
ment for Kiir; Nhial was then removed, Unity state (Craze and Tubiana, 2016). from real power, given meaningless
and Akol Koor restored. After his restora- During the transitional period, this same sinecures and effectively kept under
tion, Akol Koor’s power grew, especially bloc had entrenched Kiir’s connection to house arrest—the fate of both Machar
in Warrap: he was responsible for the Khartoum. With elections anticipated, and Olonyi. Despite their potential
2022 dismissal of Aleu Anyieny Aleu as however, figures such as Tut Kew had usefulness to Kiir, this fate could not be
the state governor and his replacement become increasingly unpopular, and a ruled out, and was far from the radical
with Manheim Bol Malek (Craze, 2023d).34 shift within the ruling coalition to legacy reform of R-ARCSS that the hold-out
In May 2024, the return of Malong was SPLM/A figures, who fought during the groups had envisaged.
considered as a means of blocking Akol second civil war, would likely have been Kiir’s plan also faced opposition in
Koor’s power. positively received, especially among Juba. The integration of the participants
The other figures that Kiir wished to the SPLM/A old guard of Jonglei and in the Tumaini talks into the government
bring into government would also have Warrap states. threatened the political compact created
allowed him to marginalize enemies in These projected pivots were part of by the R-ARCSS, just as the prospect of
Juba. While Amum, the Shilluk politician, a changing strategy for Kiir’s regime. elections had done. This opposition was
no longer has a popular constituency in During the initial transitional period, Kiir intensified by the actions of the partici-
Upper Nile, he remains a potent figure had focused on splitting the opposition pants in the talks: the hold-out groups
within the SPLM, and is a potential by creating divisions in rebel groups and and the Kenyan mediation stretched the
counterweight to the minister of cabinet setting politicians against each other. The negotiations to encompass a far more
affairs, Lomuro (Craze, 2019, p. 30), as opposition, without the sort of external radical agenda than that envisaged in
well as a viable secretary general for the supplies—in terms of money and materiel Juba. The opposition even proposed sub-
SPLM. Amum, who had always been one —that could attract popular support, suming the R-ARCSS into the Tumaini
of the ‘Garangists’ most loyal to John found itself unable to constitute a viable Peace Initiative. Its position was that,
Garang’s vision of a New Sudan, and alternative order. Historically, opposition given that the transitional process had
implacably opposed to the regime in forces in southern Sudan have needed not borne fruit in Juba, matters such as

8 HSBA Briefing Paper March 2025

the constitution should be worked out and supporters from the NSS. Tut Kew assistant, Lual Dau, as secretary general.
in Nairobi. By 15 July, the two sides had was also removed from his position as Negotiations between Kiir’s regime and
made some hesitant progress, but all presidential security adviser in January the UPA resumed in January, but were
the major issues remained unresolved. 2025, and first appointed the envoy to unable to overcome substantive differ-
The SPLM/A-IO was resistant to the the Middle East, before being demoted ences over the status of the talks. On
Tumaini talks, because it feared a dilu- to the ambassador of Kuwait in February 9 February 2025, the talks were adjourned,
tion of its own representation in the 2025. Tut Kew’s demotion was the final with no date set for them to resume.
R-TGoNU. Machar’s fears were not act in the removal of Akol Koor’s support- While the return of Amum and Malong
misplaced—for Kiir, such dilution would ers within the government.40 might still be part of a future government
have been one of the talks’ beneficial With the dismissal of Nguen Monytuil strategy, dependent on an unfolding
consequences. On 16 July, the SPLM/A-IO and Tut Kew, Kiir had also removed the situation in Juba, by the end of January
withdrew, claiming that the Tumaini Peace Bul Nuer elite that had been in control of 2025 opposition politicians considered
Initiative was undermining the R-ARCSS. Unity state. In their place, Kiir promoted the talks dead.42
Machar was not the only one in Juba to Riek Biem Tap (Riek Biem)—now governor
feel threatened by the Tumaini talks. of Unity state—along with Joseph Manuat,
Many of Kiir’s coterie of close advisers a former SSDF commander, and Tito Biel
also worried that they would lose their Wek, a former SPLA-IO commander as well Walking the tightrope
places to politicians from the hold-out as a former member of the SSDF, to con- The Sudanese civil war that began on
groups. Lomuro feared Amum’s return, stitute a new Bul Nuer elite in Unity state, 15 April 2023 has been both devastating
while Tut Kew Gatluak was opposed to which had no need for Buay, who spent and profitable for South Sudan. The
Buay’s integration: not only would Buay September–December 2024 competing devastation is easier to grasp. Over a
pose a threat to Tut Kew’s status within with Manuat and Biel Wek to recruit forces million people have fled the conflict in
the Bul Nuer community, but the two men in Mayom county.41 In Northern Bahr el Sudan and entered South Sudan, a coun-
have personal enmity—Buay’s troops Ghazal, Tong Akeen was dismissed in May try of approximately 12 million people
killed Tut Kew’s brother, then the com- 2024, and Hussein Abdel Bagi in Febru- that is already struggling with extensive
missioner in Mayom, in 2022. Tut Kew ary 2025. Many of the figures close to flooding affecting 1.4 million people
took revenge by having one of Buay’s them in national government were also and a protracted economic crisis
officers burned alive. moved on. Without Akol Koor in need of (OCHA, 2024). In addition, two million
Resistance in Juba led the Tumaini negation or the former NCP forces in con- people remain internally displaced
initiative to stall. The government can- trol of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, it became (IOM, 2024). According to the World
celled a scheduled meeting between unclear what role Malong might play in Food Programme, nine million people,
some of the hold-out groups and Kiir in Kiir’s rejigged SPLM. 74% of the population, are in need of
Pretoria, South Africa, at the beginning Meanwhile, resistance to the Tumaini humanitarian assistance as of October
of August 2024. By mid-August, the talks in Juba remained strong. Having 2024 (WFP, 2024). The Integrated Food
R-TGoNU signed a measure agreeing that committed to the talks, however, it is Security Phase Classification (IPC) eval-
the Tumaini initiative would complement, unlikely that Kiir’s regime will want uation for South Sudan classified 6.3
rather than replace, the R-ARCSS, nullify- them to fail, if for no other reason than million people as being in IPC Phase 3
ing the grander visions of the hold-out Ruto’s investment in the Tumaini process (crisis) or above as of November 2024—
groups. In theory, a final agreement was means the Kenyan leader is desperate those in Phase 5 (catastrophe) include
to have been signed in Nairobi between for an outcome he can call a success. 31,000 ‘returnees’ from Sudan (IPC,
the participants in the Tumaini Peace To resolve this contradiction, Kiir tried 2024). Returnees—the word often used
Initiative on 16 September. Resistance to limit the scope of the talks and over- for South Sudanese fleeing the conflict
to the talks in Juba, however, was such come opposition in Juba. At the begin- in the north—is an inadequate formula-
that the signing of the agreement was ning of November 2024, Kiir sacked the tion: many of the people leaving Sudan
torpedoed by the unilateral announce- government’s special envoy to Tumaini, have not lived in southern Sudan for
ment on 13 September of an extension to Albino Mathom Ayuel. A week later, he decades and, even for those who have
the transitional period: the opprobrium formed a new R-TGoNU delegation to been domiciled in South Sudan more
of the international community proved Nairobi, which once again included recently, many areas are uninhabitable
less worrying to Kiir than the fracture the SPLM-IO. The new delegation was due to flooding or conflict. Such unsettle-
within his coalition that the Tumaini composed of many of the politicians— ment is an opportunity for enrichment
agreement would have provoked. including Lomuro—originally hostile and political power. Displaced peoples
With the signing of the extension, to the talks. Kiir’s gambit was that, by have been funnelled to sites that allow
the Tumaini talks were plunged into appointing those originally hostile to politicians to make claims to contested
uncertainty. Kiir launched the Tumaini Tumaini to conduct the negotiations, he territory (Small Arms Survey, 2023c).
initiative with goals that, by December could push them into owning the process. The location of these sites is itself a
2024, had been achieved by other means. Against this backdrop, the opposition locus for political struggles between
The removal of Akol Koor in October 2024 has seen its political value decrease; it is politicians, for the displaced are a useful
had been accomplished without Malong’s no longer clear that the government needs resource to be cultivated: local adminis-
return. Akol Koor and Maroldit had been the hold-out groups to come to Juba. trations receive a cut—putatively for the
replaced by veteran SPLA commanders, In response to government attempts to host community—from the humanitari-
chosen so as to split the two men’s home negotiate separate deals with each of the an aid given out to support refugees
constituencies, rendering them less main participants in the talks, in Janu- (Craze, 2023e).
able to form opposition blocs.39 In the ary 2025 the opposition formed a new The economic consequences of the
months following Akol Koor’s dismissal, movement, the United People’s Alliance war in Sudan have also been both dev-
Kiir ordered Akec Tong Aleu to remove (UPA), led by Amum, with Malong and astating and profitable for South Sudan.
the former director general’s relatives Mario Laku as deputies, and Malong’s The devastation is once again clearer.

On the Brink 9
Border communities reliant on trade interests in Kafia Kingi, in the contested Kiir’s regime—none of which have been
with the north have seen the flow of border zone. Western Bahr el Ghazal rep- honoured. Giving up Gatwich costs SAF
essential goods reduced to a trickle resents an important nexus for the war little—there is no shortage of desperate
(Majok, 2024; REACH, 2024), increasing economy: gold flows south, to Kampala South Sudanese rebels in the border
their dependence on flows of Ugandan and Juba, with regular flights leaving Wau zone ready to receive Sudanese succour
commodities from a remote Juba. For the for both cities, while fuel goes north. if they need to find spoilers—and they are
elite in the capital, inured to these scar- While connections to the RSF have relatively certain of Kiir’s loyalty, espe-
cities, the most damaging consequence proved profitable for some in Kiir’s cially given SAF’s recent successes on
of the war thus far was the February 2024 circles, they also pose risks. Kiir is the battlefield. For Gatwich, though,
rupture of the pipeline that carried South walking a delicate tightrope over the the agreement represents a path into
Sudan’s heavy Dar Blend crude oil north war in Sudan, and attempting to appease ignominy: the last deputy commander-in-
to Port Sudan, reducing South Sudan’s three sides. When Abdel Fattah al-Burhan chief was Matiep, who took the position
exports from 150,000 barrels per day to visited Juba in September 2024, he came in 2006, only to find himself remote from
just 45,000 (UNSC, 2024b).43 The remain- with several demands.44 Most press­ power and far from his troops. The posi-
ing pipeline carries Nile Blend and runs ingly, he asked for the cross-border tion was retired after Matiep’s death, but
from Unity state through to Khartoum, trade with the RSF to stop. Kiir gave an then reintroduced for Gatwich; he is not
where it meets and runs alongside the order halting dozens of trucks in Aweil wrong to feel foreboding.
first pipeline, all the way to Port Sudan; from going north, but this was a pause, Kiir must, however, appease not only
oil from the Unity pipeline is usually not a cessation. In a situation of eco- SAF, but also the RSF. Some of the areas
allocated to Bol Mel’s companies, as nomic crisis, Kiir does not have the through which both the Dar Blend and
part of the oil-for-roads programme, capacity to order the elite to stop trading Nile Blend pipelines travel are controlled
which is intended to get oil revenues with the RSF. by the paramilitary group. On 1 November
off the book and into the pockets of Nonetheless, Kiir’s first loyalty is to 2024, Kiir’s regime made an agreement
selected members of the elite surround- the SAF regime in Port Sudan. Without with the RSF to protect a 237-km stretch
ing Kiir as quickly as possible (Craze, it, he has no capacity to export oil, of pipeline that passes through their
2023a; UNSC, 2023). The shut-off of the as such exports must run through the territory. Kiir cannot definitively shut
Dar Blend pipeline has meant that the Red Sea port and, given the current down cross-border trade with the RSF:
government is largely denuded of funds. crisis in the RSF—both military and his control of politics in Juba has partly
The 2024–25 budget is only half funded. political—the paramilitary force cannot been achieved by outsourcing revenue
A third of that budget is dedicated to be expected to expand into eastern collection and economic activity to locally
salaries, with around 70% of this funding Sudan in the near future (Craze and empowered actors, as the Small Arms
the security sector (UNSC, 2024b). The Makawi, 2025).45 Moreover, the SAF Survey explored in a previous Briefing
consequences? Discontented soldiers, regime provides the blueprint for Kiir’s Paper (Craze, 2023a). The regime in Juba
politicians excluded from the coterie model of government. Finally, a shift to lacks the absolute strength to block
around Bol Mel clamouring for petro­ the RSF could potentially result in an cross-border trade from which some of
dollars to be reallocated to salaries, and external backer for rebel groups inside the elite profits. Finally, just as with SAF,
a dramatic worsening of the economic South Sudan—an outcome that Kiir has a definitive move against the RSF would
situation in Juba. assiduously avoided. invite retaliation, and the paramilitary
For the elite, the war has nonetheless Negotiations in Port Sudan in the group has already sponsored militias
offered opportunities for economic second half of 2024 and into 2025 saw present inside South Sudan. Buay’s
enrichment. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Kiir bring one potential spoiler into the SSPM has already fought with the RSF at
traders now bring commodities from government fold. In talks conducted with Babanusa, as have other opportunistic
Juba and sell them to Sudanese custom- the then-chief of the NSS, Akec Tong commanders, looking for weapons and
ers, in a reverse of customary flows, which Aleu, at the beginning of February 2025, payment. For Kiir, the most appealing
saw the northern state reliant on goods Gatwich agreed to a deal that would diplomatic position is to remain neutral,
from Sudan. Fuel is the most lucrative see him become the deputy commander- while engaging with both groups.
market, and the best customer is the in-chief of the SSPDF, with his forces The possibility of hold-out groups
RSF, installed at Raiq Mandalla—some integrated into the army. Whether the currently outside the ambit of Kiir’s
10 km north of Kiir Adem (Majok, 2024). deal actually comes to pass remains regime making common cause with the
While the state government formally uncertain; Gatwich signed the agree- RSF increases the paramilitary group’s
banned the export of fuel to Sudan in ment under pressure from Ahmed potential to unsettle the fragile compact
November 2023, this has made little Ibrahim Mufadal, the director of Sudan’s in South Sudan. A further reason for the
difference to current flows: the RSF is General Intelligence Service, which Tumaini Peace Initiative was to pull those
desperate for fuel, and the traders for offered Gatwich as part of a package groups closer to Kiir’s coalition, and out
dollars. Flowing south, alongside refu- deal. In return for Gatwich’s return to of the reach of the RSF: if such groups are
gees and returnees, is war loot, including South Sudan, Kiir offered SAF the possi- given sinecures in Juba, they are much
sheet metal, and a flourishing trade in bility of moving troops and materiel less likely to be recruited as spoilers. In
stolen cars destined for Juba (Craze, through South Sudan to its beleaguered Nairobi, hold-out groups have already
2024a, p. 6). All these goods flow into a bases in South and West Kordofan, which approached the RSF for materiel and
militarized border economy. otherwise lack supply routes to SAF- funds. The RSF, however, is leery of
In Western Bahr el Ghazal, there is controlled territories in Sudan. Tong moving against Kiir’s regime. There is
also a lucrative border trade with the Aleu’s subsequent dismissal, however, no shortage of desperate recruits inside
RSF. The RSF purchases goods and fuel has given Gatwich and the SPLA-IO- Sudan and, in October–November 2024,
in both Wau, the state capital, and Raga Kitgwang pause. The February 2025 the RSF went on an extensive recruitment
county, before returning to Sudan. The agreement is only the latest of several drive in Darfur and West Kordofan. It can
paramilitary group also has gold mining agreements that Gatwich has signed with also recruit among South Sudanese

10 HSBA Briefing Paper March 2025

stranded in Sudan, without worrying
about formally including hold-out groups For the international
with its coalition. Such groups would
make more demands on the RSF’s high
command than displaced men trying to community, optimism in Juba
survive. Furthermore, a formal alliance of
the RSF with South Sudan rebel groups
would assist SAF’s rhetorical claim that
proved a means of ignoring the
disintegration occurring across
the RSF’s war is being fought by foreign-
ers. The RSF is still keen—despite the
massacres it has committed—to position
itself as a legitimate force in the eyes
of the international community, and much of the country, fuelled by
supporting rebel movements in South
Sudan hardly helps with such a position.
Moreover, at present, Kiir’s regime offers the very processes of state-
the RSF all that it needs: fuel, supplies,
shared business interests, and payments
for pipeline security.
building that were supposed to
render South Sudan a successful
An uneasy détente is thus the most
likely continuation of the current war,
relative to South Sudan, with Kiir refus-

country.”
ing to be drawn into backing either side
in the civil war to his north. This would
further enable him to maintain his con-
nections to the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army-North (SPLA-N), under Abdelaziz
dollars, donor funds, and international SPLM began to break apart and become
Al-Hilu, which maintains residences in
good will into Juba gave rise to dreams a site merely for political competition
Juba and moves supplies through South
of a regional economic powerhouse and for positions, with discussion and dis-
Sudan. A part of this balancing act will be
a liberal democratic state (Craze, 2021; sent stifled.
to work out a political agreement with SAF
Thomas, 2015). During this period, the It is this disintegration of the South
and the RSF if and when the Dar Blend
SPLM was still a significant political force, Sudanese nationalist project that created
pipeline is restarted: a cash-strapped
and the economic situation enabled the the backdrop to the civil war that began
SAF, largely dependent on Qatari funds
growth of a nascent national bureaucracy in 2013. The SPLA had been fractured
for liquidity, has asked for a higher transit
(Markó, 2015). There was an immense by Kiir’s ‘big tent’ policy of 2005–06,
fee, while the RSF has also demanded a feeling of optimism about South Sudan, which had brought in militias formerly
share of the pipeline fees. RSF officials most fundamentally among South Suda- backed by Khartoum, and turned the
have also asked South Sudan to cut off nese refugees returning to the country, army into a collection of fractious com-
payments to Burhan’s government by ready to make a new life. manders, each in charge of their own
placing the transit-related fees in an For the international community, individual forces. In response, govern-
escrow account until the war ends— optimism in Juba proved a means of ment elites, lacking any confidence in
a non-starter for SAF. These demands ignoring the disintegration occurring a fractured army, built up mono-ethnic
are bargaining attempts by the RSF to across much of the country, fuelled by militia forces, such as the Mathiang
drive up the price it can extract for guar- the very processes of state-building that Anyoor (Boswell, 2019). The ethniciza-
anteeing pipeline security. Despite these were supposed to render South Sudan tion of military force in South Sudan,
entrenched interests, a deal is likely to a successful country. A military class, and the growth of militias with direct
be found. All sides will benefit from the which had initially emerged during the relations to political actors operating
resumption of oil flow, just as all sides second Sudanese civil war on the back outside the ambit of the formal state,
have benefited from the war: livestock of militarized kinship networks and set the stage for a civil war (Craze, 2020)
exports to the Gulf from Sudan are at an the appropriation of external flows of that began as part of a zero-sum com-
all-time high, thanks to collusion between humanitarian aid and materiel, grasped petition between elite politicians for
SAF and the RSF, while, in South Sudan, hold of flows of petrodollars and donor control of the patrimonial machine Kiir
the elite enriches itself through backroom funds (Craze, 2023a; Pinaud, 2014). It had constructed, but soon spiralled into
deals with the paramilitaries (Duffield maintained its power in Juba by using a more chaotic conflict.
and Stockton, 2024; Thomas, 2024). political positions as sinecures; elites During the civil war, the fragmenta-
In these joint economic activities, the outside the Juba compact leveraged tion of South Sudan continued apace.
warring elites of both countries are not violence in the peripheries to bid for While Western diplomats often depicted
opposed, but unified. positions in the centre (Craze, 2022a). the war as a conflict between two bellig-
In the periphery, the militarization of erent parties—the SPLA and the SPLA-IO
ethnic and kinship ties—already a feature —in reality, both sides were collections
South Sudan in fragments of the second civil war (Craze, 2022b;
Pinaud, 2016)—continued apace. This
of actors invested in local struggles but
in need of national support and flows of
In retrospect, the six years that followed led to a disintegration of both vernacu- materiel and material. Actors joined the
the signing of the CPA, prior to inde- lar and formal institutions: customary SPLA and SPLA-IO as a means of access-
pendence, were banner years for South authorities increasingly became sub- ing these flows. It was such rebranding
Sudanese nationalism. Flows of petro- ject to government control, while the of local struggles as part of a national

On the Brink 11
Map 2 Armed clashes in South Sudan, 2018–24

conflict—and the recognition later Such fragmentation has produced increasingly ethnicized competitions
bestowed on these contingent coalitions conflict across the country. In 2023, for political positions and resources,
by the R-ARCSS—that gave the illusion a Small Arms Survey Briefing Paper inflamed by politicians in Juba using
of unity to a fragmented conflict. included a map of the conflicts that violence as a means of competing
The peace agreement consolidated have occurred in South Sudan since the for influence—such as in Western
the lineaments of the wartime system signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018 (Craze, Equatoria and Upper Nile;
(Craze and Markó, 2022). A fractious 2023a).46 Map 2 is an updated version, clashes between groups that make
political elite competed for positions illustrating how conflict has continued zero-sum bids for territory and
within a centralized dictatorship in to spread across the country. In 2024 humanitarian resources, in a situa-
Juba, while the peripheries of the coun- and 2025, contentions over resources tion in which co-existence, given
try fought for representation on the and SSPDF atrocities against civilians the nature of the South Sudanese
basis of ethnic and sectional identity. pitted the Nuer White Army against state, is almost impossible—such
The formation of administrative areas government forces and allied militias in as the Twic–Ngok conflict in Abyei
for the Murle (the Greater Pibor Admin- Nasir, while an ethnicized contention (Craze, 2023b);
istrative Area, or GPAA) and the Padang over military positions in Pochalla led to
Dinka of Unity state (RAA) is exemplary the SSPDF committing widespread atroci- government-backed forces clashing
of a broader trend: during fieldwork ties against the Anuak. In December with hold-out groups, the SPLA-IO,
undertaken from 2018 to 2024, almost 2024, clashes were ongoing, once again, or NAS—such as Central Equatoria
every ethnic group demanded its own in Tambura county, Western Equatoria, and Unity states; and
administrative area, as the national com- between the Balanda and the Azande community resistance to government-
pact fragmented and political power, (Craze, 2023c), while conflict had not backed encroachment (from both
on the ground, became understood as a ceased in Warrap state. Conceptually, Juba and Uganda) on their territory—
series of sinecures to be competed over one can discern four types of conflict such as Eastern Equatoria state and
by ethnic groups. currently scarring South Sudan: Nasir, Upper Nile.

12 HSBA Briefing Paper March 2025

 The R-TGoNU, a government of national but has otherwise remained out of the rivals who have grown too influential. Also
unity, has presided over a half decade of public eye. Even Kiir’s removal of Gordon important in explaining the quiescence
division in South Sudan. An apparent Koang Biel, the EU- and US-sanctioned of dismissed politicians is the sense of
unity in Juba has been achieved only at commissioner of Koch county responsible positions as sinecures, in which both
the cost of the immiseration and destitu- for several government-backed campaigns people and communities take turns.
tion of the periphery. The recent Ugandan of sexual violence and ethnic cleansing In Akobo, sections of the Lou Nuer talk
encroachment into South Sudan must in Leer county, did not lead the former openly about state-level positions rotat-
be understood against this background commissioner to revolt. ing between them, each one availing
(Small Arms Survey, 2024b). In Eastern In comparison to 2005–11, when dis- themselves of the resources of the state
Equatoria, the Uganda Peoples’ Defence missal from positions or electoral loss for a given period. Politicians, too, get a
Forces (UPDF) have moved into Magwi frequently caused commanders to revolt chance to ‘eat’, before being replaced.
county, displacing civilians in a nominally and try to leverage violence in order to Nguen’s long run as governor of Unity
SPLM-IO-loyal territory, and have report- obtain political positions, the period since allowed him to amass resources that
edly begun to farm. In Western Bahr el 2018 has been notable for the quiescence leave him satisfied with being—at least
Ghazal, the UPDF, with an escort of the of the dismissed. Such acquiescence on for now—out of political office.
NSS and the SSPDF, moved to Wau, and the part of the deposed is testament to In this system, no individual is nec-
then into Boro Medina, in Raga county, Kiir’s power. In the absence of viable essary—except Kiir himself. Analyses of
where they are overseeing gold mines. external backers for rebellion, and with his rule tend to fall into two camps. Kiir is
These acts may seem like violations of opposition groups fractured, command- considered either a strategic mastermind,
South Sudanese national sovereignty. ers considering rebellion have had to ruthlessly dispatching his enemies, or a
Both encroachments, however, are backed face the reality of Kiir’s overwhelming hopeless politician, whose continued
by elements of the national government.47 military and financial domination of the survival never ceases to amaze analysts.
For Kiir’s regime, external forces—in this state. The fracturing of South Sudan has Neither of these forms of analysis is
case their Ugandan backers—prove more meant that while each commander—such correct. Kiir is a tactically astute politi-
reliable allies than the people of South as Gordon Koang—may be dominant in cian—as befits a former intelligence
Sudan. Such encroachments, then, are their own area, they cannot resist the officer—focused on survival. His genius
a consolidation of the form of private gov- forces arrayed against them: each com- has been to create a system with him at
ernment that has come to characterize mander is weak, relative to Kiir, and the centre, as the necessary mediating
Kiir’s regime, in which individual actors, dependent on his favour. force between rivalrous coalitions, whose
even if they are formally within the ambit The removal of Akol Koor in October shapes constantly change. Many of his
of the state, make alliances with both 2024 was politically much less risky than frenetic appointments are designed to
external powers (such as Uganda or the the earlier removal of Malong. Malong’s mollify these coalitions, and represent
RSF) and local ethnic forces, in order to forces were largely ethnically recruited in hedges that prevent outright conflict.
accumulate resources and maintain politi- Northern Bahr el Ghazal—where he had Although Kiir is at the centre of the
cal domination. earlier served as a commander during system, this does not make him strong:
the second Sudanese civil war and then the more the system is centralized in him,
as governor during the CPA period the more he is beholden to politicians
(2005–11)—and he treated the force as whose constant demands he must
Kiir’s shadow a personal army: contributing cows to appease, for there are no mediating
In Juba’s diplomatic circles, there is a soldiers’ marriages and embedding him- institutions other than Kiir himself.
predilection for focusing on important self within the kinship relations of his Paradoxically, the shutdown of the Upper
individuals, believed to hold the clues forces (Pinaud, 2016). To remove Malong Nile pipeline has strengthened Kiir’s
to divining South Sudan’s future. Kiir’s risked an uprising in Northern Bahr el position in the short term, rather than
potential successors are a favourite topic Ghazal. While Akol Koor has extensively weakening it: the flow of petrodollars is
of conversation around the pool at the recruited in Warrap, his home state, his now restricted to his close confidants and
European Union (EU) compound. Yet the own section—the Atok—is relatively small, family, minimizing the capacity of poten-
enduring feature of Kiir’s regime, with one and the NSS is a multi-ethnic force. In tial rivals to use oil funds to raise forces.
key exception, has been the durability of multiple conversations with NSS person- It is not incorrect to claim that Kiir
the system, rather than the individuals nel over the last half decade, the author is the only thing holding South Sudan
that compose it. Time and again, Kiir has has noted the degree to which their together. Dinka rivals, in particular, are
replaced seemingly essential parts of his loyalty has been to the institution, rather wary of causing disruption to this system,
coalition. In 2024, he removed one of than the figure of Akol Koor. While Kiir lest the Dinka coalition splits apart and
the longest standing governors of South has created private, direct links with the other groups attempt to take power, with
Sudan, Nguen Monytuil, in Unity state, commanders within his coalition, Akol potentially calamitous consequences for
and replaced him with another Bul Nuer Koor built perhaps the only functional Bahr el Ghazal; ethnic hatred towards
figure, Riek Biem, who he hoped would multi-ethnic institution remaining in the Dinka, after years of land occupancy
prove a more popular gubernatorial South Sudan. That, paradoxically, made and violence targeting other ethnic
appointment. This has proved not to be it relatively easy to remove him.49 groups by predominately Dinka forces, is
the case: Riek Biem has already been Juba is now full of warehoused com- well entrenched in much of the country.50
accused of nepotism and of marginalizing manders and politicians. One reason Many of Kiir’s decisions have nonetheless
other, non-Bul Nuer, groups in the state.48 that such warehousing is palatable is eroded confidence in his leadership.
Yet there has been no strong opposition because Kiir has often systematically Most notably, his support to Adut Salva,
to Biem’s rule, which has taken on simi- empowered both a favoured politician his eldest daughter, and Bol Mel, as
lar lineaments to that of his predeces- and their rival. Politicians who seemed they engage in widespread corruption
sor (Small Arms Survey, 2023c). Nguen out for the count are retrieved when it is and resource extraction, has increased
thanked Kiir for the opportunity to serve, politically expedient, and used to block disquiet within the SPLM elite.

On the Brink 13
 The elite around Kiir have Conclusion
John Garang, the original leader of the

profited from the immiseration of SPLM/A, was frequently quoted as

saying he wished to bring the ‘town to
the village’. Rather than an urbanization
the nation, which has generated that saw thousands flee starvation in the
peripheries in the hope of employment
in the outskirts of cities, as was the case
a surplus class of young men that in Sudan in the 1980s (Khair, Makawi,
and Craze, 2024), Garang wanted the

can be conscripted into state

SPLM/A to generalize urban development
across Sudan; his aim was to create
education and jobs, and overcome the

security forces, and made to fight deleterious centre–periphery relations

that had marred the country’s history,
in which the peripheries were treated

wars in the periphery to guarantee merely as reserves of resources, includ-

ing cheap labour, and violently policed.
A little more than 40 years after the writ-
positions in the capital.” ing of the first SPLM manifesto (SPLM,
1983), the system of rule in Juba looks
much like the regimes in Khartoum against
which Garang and the SPLM fought.
Talk in Juba is now not of elections, to enable a peaceful transfer of power, in The elite around Kiir have profited
but of life after Kiir. The question of suc- the event of a serious illness or death. from the immiseration of the nation,
cession is becoming the central political The best possible future for South which has generated a surplus class of
question for South Sudan’s elite. It is Sudan, if it is to minimize violence, is the young men that can be conscripted into
almost certain that this succession will continuation of the violent structure of state security forces, and made to fight
mark a break with the formal terms of the Kiir’s regime, under a new dictator. It is wars in the periphery to guarantee posi-
R-ARCSS. The Bahr el Ghazal Dinka elite likely that this will come to pass. There tions in the capital. Yet in other ways,
is insistent that the presidency must are no opposition figures with external the town has come to the village. South
stay in the region. A step towards the support, and no one, inside or outside Sudan is an increasingly market-based
coronation of Kiir’s chosen successor, the government, has sufficient military society, and people are reliant on sala-
Bol Mel, was taken on 10 February 2025, resources to act as a check on Kiir’s gov- ries, even as the source of salaries has
when James Wani Igga was replaced as ernment. Despite disgruntlement from dried up (Thomas, 2019). The town has
vice president for the economics cluster the SPLM/A veterans, and anger from also permeated South Sudan’s strongly
by Bol Mel. Simultaneously, elite figures Bor that a Dinka from Bahr el Ghazal has democratic vernacular institutions, to
who opposed Bol Mel were removed from once again been chosen to lead South their detriment: instrumentalization by
their positions, including Akec Tong Aleu Sudan, the absence of any viable oppo- politicians in Juba has undermined
and Tut Kew Gatluak. While the coalition sition means that the country will likely customary authorities and marginalized
around the president’s daughter, Adut fall in line behind Bol Mel, Kiir’s chosen strong local figures that can pose a chal-
lenge to Kiir’s regime.
Salva, the first lady, Mary Ayen Mayardit, successor, despite his lack of popularity.
The village has also come to the
and her brother, Gregory Vasili, favours The alternative—a civil war between
town, but only in the worst possible
Bol Mel, he faces significant resistance. fractured military elites—is even worse.
ways. Flooding and conflict have created
For the SPLM old guard, Bol Mel, Such a war would not proceed along lines
a more urbanized population, but with-
a figure from outside the SPLM/A hier- consonant with Western diplomats’
out an economy that could enable such
archy who fought during the second civil imaginary of the last civil war: a conflict
urbanization to lead to flourishing lives.
war, is deeply unacceptable. He is seen between two belligerent parties, which
Urban politics in South Sudan is increas-
as ‘jumping the line’ and his involvement can be ended by a peace agreement ingly an intensification of the same sort
in corruption exceeds even the record that effectively buys off the opposition. of zero-sum competitions that politicians
set by the SPLM cadres that created the South Sudan is now too fractured, and have created in the periphery as a condi-
South Sudanese state during the CPA such a war would instead likely be an tion of their rule.
period. The other figures within Kiir’s intensification of the conflicts that cur- The calamitous economic situation
close circle are politically weak function- rently mar the country, with international and the collapse in wages for the secu-
aries, chosen for just that reason: they actors—including Uganda and Sudan— rity services have led to an incendiary
remain unable to challenge Kiir’s position. becoming involved, and southern Sudan situation in South Sudan. Confidence in
Their very weakness means they are not becoming a series of localized militarized security forces around the country has
viable as presidential candidates. The economies, as it was during the second plunged, and discontent has risen. It is
strength of Kiir’s regime is also the reason Sudanese civil war. In such circum- these circumstances, structurally, that
it likely cannot continue beyond his presi- stances, the same sort of liberal peace- will form the basis for the next war in
dency. There remains a slim possibility making that characterized the CPA and South Sudan. Such has been the success
that a SPLM/A veteran from Bahr el the R-ARCSS (Young, 2019) would pro- of Kiir’s strategies of division and fragmen-
Ghazal, such as Daniel Awet Akot, the duce a fiction of stability in Juba, but tation, however, that there is no current
presidential adviser for military affairs, not the possibility of real governance in basis for an opposition that actually
could command sufficient political capital the rest of the country. breaks with the logic of the current

14 HSBA Briefing Paper March 2025

regime. While it is true that there have SPLM/A-N Sudan People’s Liberation 10 Interviews for this Briefing Paper were
never been rebel movements in South Army-North conducted in Juba (February 2024), in
Sudan that are not backed by external Nairobi (May–June 2024; October–
SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces
powers, it is equally true that successful November 2024), and via phone and
SSOA South Sudan Opposition Alliance video calls. This research builds on the
rebel movements in the region have been
SSOMA South Sudan Opposition author’s 17-year long engagement with
based on discontented populations
Movement’s Alliance South Sudan and recent fieldwork under-
immiserated and impoverished by cen- taken in 2019–24.
tralized regimes. Such discontent is all SSPDF South Sudan People’s Defence 11 The Troika is composed of the Govern-
too often seized by an elite class, which Forces ments of Norway, the United Kingdom,
turns it to its own ends. The 1983 SPLM SSPM South Sudan People’s Movement and the United States.
manifesto warns against the errors of 12 Lack of funding is also the rationale for the
SSR Security sector reform
prior revolutionaries, such as Anyanya I, extension given in the official extension
who merely served to enrich themselves SSUF/A South Sudan United Front Army agreement (South Sudan, 2024, 4.2.ii).
in the same manner as the northern elite, SSUNA South Sudan United National 13 The Eastern and Western Nuer speak
at the cost of the people (SPLM, 1983, Alliance different dialects and live in different
p. 22). This warning has been borne out areas of South Sudan. The Eastern Nuer
UDRM United Democratic Revolutionary (the Gawaar, Jikany, and Lou sections)
by the current regime. Opposition to the Movement live east of the White Nile and in the
regime has been proven easily neutralized
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund Gambella region of Ethiopia, while the
by Juba. Such opposition, though, cannot Western Nuer are primarily to be found
be reduced to the factions warehoused in UPA United People’s Alliance
in Unity state and are composed of the
the capital: current community resistance UPDF Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Adok, Bul, Jagai, Jikany, Leek, and Nyong
against government forces is a resistance sections, among others.
against the predatory nature of the state 14 The Small Arms Survey’s Mapping Actors
itself, and cannot be solved by yet another and Alliances Project in South Sudan
agreement worked out in Juba. Notes (MAAPSS) provided forensic analysis of
these appointments and their political
1 Kiir had seen off many rivals in such a
repercussions from 2020 to 2021.
fashion, including Paul Malong Awan
Published MAAPSS Updates are avail-
Abbreviations and (Boswell, 2019) and Nhial Deng Nhial
(Craze, 2022b).
able here: https://smallarmssurvey.org/
project/mapping-actors-and-alliances-
acronyms 2 Telephone and in-person interviews with
project-south-sudan-maapss.
South Sudanese politicians, Juba and
15 For an in-depth discussion of the role the
CAR Central African Republic Nairobi, September–November 2024.
SSOA has played in facilitating Kiir’s reign,
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 3 Interviews with international observers
relative to Jonglei state, see Small Arms
and South Sudanese politicians, Juba,
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo Survey (2023b).
Nairobi, and New York, September–
16 Telephone interviews with key informants
EU European Union November 2024.
in Aweil, Bentiu, Wau, Yambio, and else-
4 The national army of South Sudan changed
GPAA Greater Pibor Administrative Area its name from the Sudan People’s Libera-
where, January–December 2024.
IPC Integrated Food Security Phase 17 For an example of this dynamic in Western
tion Army (SPLA) to the SSPDF in October
Equatoria, see Craze (2023c).
Classification 2018. This paper will observe this change
of nomenclature, referring to the SPLA 18 This unity was more rhetorical than it was
ISB Internal Security Bureau actual: during the second civil war, many
prior to this time.
NAS National Salvation Front 5 Following South Sudanese convention, communities felt excluded by the SPLM/A,
Akol Koor Kuc is referred to as Akol Koor, which they viewed as an occupying army
NCP National Congress Party (Nyaba, 1997). Nonetheless, Kiir’s attempt
rather than by his surname.
NSS National Security Service 6 After weeks of uncertainty, Kiir’s regime to re-emphasize the nationalist struggle
OPP Other Political Parties finally confirmed that Maroldit had been also explained, for instance, his 2023
removed as the commander of Tiger Divi- choice of deputy governor for Western
RAA Ruweng Administrative Area Bahr el Ghazal (Small Arms Survey, 2023d).
sion. He was assigned to Division 1 in Renk
R-ARCSS Revitalized Agreement on the but moved to his home area in Gogrial 19 For a broader discussion of the relation-
Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic following Akol Koor’s arrest. Maroldit, ship between ethnic identity, borders,
of South Sudan according to some sources, had been and political power, see Cormack (2016);
plotting with Akol Koor to remove Kiir, Craze (2022a).
RSF Rapid Support Forces 20 The deeply flawed UN Population Fund
though Kiir’s main problem with the two
R-TGoNU Revitalized Government of men is more likely to have been their (UNFPA) population estimate conducted
National Unity opposition to Bol Mel. in 2021, but only released in 2023, in
7 The attempt was led by Akec Tong Aleu, cooperation with the National Bureau of
SAF Sudanese Armed Forces Statistics, is an example of how a census
who had replaced Akol Koor as the head
SLA-AW Sudan Liberation Army- of the ISB of the NSS, souring the relation- can generate tensions. It estimated that
Abdul Wahid ship between the two men. Warrap state’s population was 2.6 million,
8 In December 2024, Deng Wol, who opposed and gave similarly heightened figures for
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
the ascension of Bol Mel, was removed the other states of Bahr el Ghazal. If the
SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation as the chief of defence forces. As of UNFPA figures are correct, Bahr el Ghazal
Movement February 2025, Akol Koor is effectively recorded a population growth rate, since
SPLM/A-IO Sudan People’s Liberation under house arrest, with his residence the last census in southern Sudan in 2008,
Movement/Army-in-Opposition surrounded by SSPDF Military Intelligence of 240%: a rate unparalleled in human
and Tiger Division. history (Mayai, 2023). In contrast, the
SPLM/A-IO-Kitgwang Sudan People’s 9 This is partly due to Akol Koor’s connec- population figures for many of the areas
Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition- tions to David Yau Yau, one of Babanen’s where one finds SPLM-IO-supporting
Kitgwang rivals for power in Pibor. populations were extremely low, and

On the Brink 15
 showed no growth since 2008. The 32 Akeen was removed as governor of North- further south, near the frontline between
numbers provided by the UNFPA were ern Bahr el Ghazal in June 2024, and SAF and the RSF in White Nile state, lead-
subsequently adopted by a number of replaced with Uber Ajong Mawut. The ing to a rupture of the pipeline.
agencies, including the United Nations new governor is from the same family as 44 Telephone interviews with SAF Military
Office for the Coordination of Humani­ James Ajongo, who replaced Malong as Intelligence, name withheld, September–
tarian Affairs (OCHA), which used it as head of the SPLA and hails from the most November 2024.
the base for the ‘South Sudan: Humani- prominent Luo family in the state. Hussein 45 Telephone interviews with RSF personnel,
tarian Needs and Response Plan 2024’ Abdel Bagi was removed as vice president November 2024.
and the Integrated Food Security Phase on 10 February 2025, following long- 46 According to the United Nations Mission
Classification (IPC) for South Sudan—the standing disagreements with other in South Sudan Human Rights Division
globally recognized standard for assess- members of the SSOA and—within Bagi’s (UNMISS-HRD), there was a 24% increase
ing food insecurity. Such utilizations of own South Sudan People’s Movement/ in violent incidents in 2023 compared to
population figures are politically explo- Army—with Costello Garang. 2022 (UNMISS-HRD, 2024).
sive because they shift the assessment 33 Nhial Deng Nhial is an extremely popular 47 Interviews with sources in Boro Medina,
of humanitarian needs and thus the politician from Tonj South, Warrap state. Raga county; Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal;
distribution of humanitarian aid. See 34 Bol Malek was also soon removed as gov- and Magwi county, Eastern Equatoria,
HCT (2023); IPC (2023); UNFPA (2021). ernor. Francis Marial Abur was appointed June–December 2024.
For a study of the IPC, see Craze (2024c); the governor of Warrap after Akol Koor’s 48 Telephone interviews with informants
for a study of the UNFPA estimate, see S. appointment to the position was rescinded in Bentiu, Unity state, November–
and Marko (forthcoming). in October 2024. He, too, was removed December 2024.
21 Leer county is Machar’s place of birth, on 19 February 2025, and replaced by 49 Some of the NSS’s funding for diverse
and Gai had been backed by Machar the storied SSPDF commander, Magok economic activities went directly to Akol
despite his unpopularity among the Magok Deng, who hails from Tonj (see Koor, and was used to pay for some of
SPLA-IO’s military leadership in Unity ‘Kiir’s shadow’ section below). the organization’s wage bill. This led to a
state. See Small Arms Survey (2023c). 35 Tut Kew was removed as a presidential crisis in payments immediately after Akol
22 Interviews with SPLM-IO politicians in security adviser in December 2024— Koor’s removal. By February 2025, however,
Kuajok and Warrap town, 2021. a development discussed below. these flows had been reconstituted.
23 See UNHRC (2023); UNSC (2024a). 36 Buay is from the Kwech section of the Bul 50 For accounts of ethnically targeted killing
24 Troika diplomats privately indicated that Nuer. Within the Kwech, he is from the by Dinka forces, see Amnesty International
this would have been the only acceptable Nyang subsection, and within the Nyang, (2017); Craze (2019); HRW (2014).
justification for extending the transitional from the Gangaak subsection. Bapiny
process. Conversations in Juba, London, Monytuil, the SSOA commander, his
Nairobi, and Washington, DC, January– brother Nguen Monytuil, the former gov-
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Northern Bahr el-Ghazal during the Sudan Tong Akeen Ngor’s Reign in Northern
Conflict. Research Paper. Rift Valley Insti- Bahr el Ghazal State. HSBA Situation
tute. March. Update. June.

On the Brink 17
About the
HSBA project
The Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan is
a multiyear project administered by the Small Arms Survey since 2006. It was
developed in cooperation with the Canadian government, the United Nations
Mission in Sudan, the United Nations Development Programme, and a wide
array of international and Sudanese partners. Through the active generation
and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the project supports violence
reduction initiatives, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programmes and incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, as well as security
sector reform and arms control interventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The
HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on the political and economic drivers of
conflict and insecurity. Publications in Arabic, English, and French are available at:
www.smallarmssurvey.org.

The Small Arms Survey is a centre for applied knowledge dedicated to prevent-
ing and reducing illicit small arms proliferation and armed violence. The Survey
informs policy and practice through a combination of data, evidence-based
knowledge, authoritative resources and tools, and tailored expert advice and
training, and by bringing together practitioners and policymakers.
The Survey is an associated programme of the Geneva Graduate Institute, located
in Switzerland, and has an international staff with expertise in security studies,
political science, law, economics, development studies, sociology, criminology,
and database and programme management. It collaborates with a network of
researchers, practitioners, partner institutions, non-governmental organizations,
and governments in more than 50 countries.
The Survey’s activities and outputs are made possible through core support as
well as project funding. A full list of current donors and projects can be accessed
via the Small Arms Survey website. For more information, please visit:
www.smallarmssurvey.org.

Contact details
Small Arms Survey
Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
t +41 22 908 5777
e [email protected]

A publication of the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment

for Sudan and South Sudan project with support from the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

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@SmallArmsSurvey HSBA