Master’s degree thesis

IP501909 MSc thesis, discipline oriented master

Situational awareness in Demanding Marine Operations

Vivek kumar

Number of pages including this page: 79

Aalesund, 30.05.2014
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Preface

The thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for degree in Master in Product and
System Design Engineering from Aalesund University College. I am being supervised by Associate
Professor Magne Aarset.The work has been done in the field of situation awareness in demanding marine
operations. Professor Magne has guided me from time to time and his ideas helped me in achieving
desired results in allotted span of time.

The idea for the topic “Situational awareness” comes from his side from one of his present work in the
field of human factors and situational awareness. I was interested in taking topic in the field of risk
management in marine operations but when I approached him for discussing possible topic for my
master thesis in autumn semester, he introduced me with the concept of situational awareness ,its
importance and increasing popularity in the present time. We discussed it for few times before we the
topic for my master thesis. Another driving force to select this as my master thesis topic is that, not much
work has been done in the field of situational awareness in maritime industry. Though lot of work has
been done in the field of situational awareness in the aviation field which become motivation for me to
pursue it in the field of maritime industry.

Writing the thesis was not that easy and I got help from lot of people from my supervisor and other
teachers through new ideas, comments and the literature in the form of study material.etc

AUC, 30 May 2104

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Abstract

It has been observed that mostly cause of the accidents in the maritime industry is due to lack of
primary situational awareness and secondary loss of SA.Moreover it is difficult to estimate the exact
reasons for the loss of SA in real time simulations because of varying work load and fatigue issues.
This study examined situational awareness among licensed captains and pilots of the maritime time
industry by feedback obtained through set of questionnaire covering the factors which could
contribute to loss of situational awareness of the crew on board a vessel. A questionnaire is made
and filled out by the professionals working in different companies serving different vessels and have
different background and different set of work experience. The personnel include ship captains, crew
members, first engineers, second engineers, technical personnel etc.

The data is collected and analyzed to find out commonalities and issues regarding the understanding
of situation. From the survey and questionnaire the factors like fatigue, lack of SA, loss of SA ,lack
of knowledge,stress,communication gap, dangerous drugs and alcohol influence and mental load
conditions are evaluated to know the SA of experts and the students. The impact of these factors
and degree of their effect has direct influence on the current situational awareness in case of
maneuvering the vessel towards the shore.

These factors were compared and resulted in the identification of mental workload as the
predominant factor affecting situational awareness. Upon further examination of mental workload, it
was found that loss of situational awareness is likely to occur when a vessel captain is distracted by
some external factors cell pho like useless alarms on board which distracts the pilot or crew members
on board from carrying out essential steps to avoid accidents. In addition, the results also indicated
complacency potential, a function of attitude toward automation and perception of mental workload.
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Acknowledgements

It will not be wrong to say that there is a contribution of lot of people in different ways at different times. I
would like to express my special thanks to my advisor Professor Magne Aarset, who has been a mentor,
guide, and a teacher for me. I would like to thank him for encouraging me from time to time. His advice on
both researches as well as on guiding me has been priceless. I would also like to thank him for making
my master thesis defense an enjoyable and stress free moment. I once again thank him for brilliant
guidance, comments and suggestions which enlightened the desire and thirst to complete the task well in
time. I would especially like to thank all the faculty members for their kind help from time to time. All of you
have been there to support me when I need their help.

A special thanks to my family. It is difficult to express in words how much grateful I am to my parents for
kind of sacrifices they made for me. Their well wishes and prayers gave me inner strength to sustain in
difficult times. They not only supported me from time to time but they enlightened me and gave me
courage to face the reality with strength. I would also like to thank all of my friends who supported me in
writing, and incented me to strive towards my goal. I would also like to thank OSC, Offshore Simulation
Centre and all the instructors working there who guided me and helped me in conducting various
interviews and surveys.

I would like to extend my gratitude to all professionals including Captains, crew

members,engineers,management people who extended their support to me by giving their valuable time
to me by participating in various interviews and surveys.
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Table of contents
LIST OF FIGURES
TERMINOLOGY
ABBREVIATIONS
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 DEMANDING MARINE OPERATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 2
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 PURPOSE .............................................................................................................................................................. 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ..................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 RESEARCH FOCUS ................................................................................................................................................ 5

2 LITERATURE SURVEY ........................................................................................................................................ 6

2.1 THEORY OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ... ............................................................................................................ 6
2.2 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BY ENDSLEY .............................................................................................................. 8
2.3 THREE LEVEL MODEL .. ........................................................................................................................................ 8
2.4 INTERACTIVE SUB SYSTEM THEORY MODEL .. .................................................................................................... 11
2.5 THE PERPETUAL CYCLE APPROACH .. ................................................................................................................. 12
2.6 THE PROBLEMS WITH ACCIDENT STUDIES .. ........................................................................................................ 14
2.7 EXAMPLES OF ACCIDENTS .. ............................................................................................................................... 16

3 METHODS .............................................................................................................................................................. 19
3.1 FLOW CHART...................................................................................................................................................... 19
3.2 THEORY ............................................................................................................................................................. 20
3.3 PRELEMINARY RESEARCH .................................................................................................................................. 20
3.4 INTEGERATED SURVEY AND INTERVIEWS ........................................................................................................... 21
3.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................................... 21
3.6 EXPECTED RESULTS ........................................................................................................................................... 21

4 RESULTS ................................................................................................................................................................ 22
4.1 BACKGROUND OF PARTICIPANTS ........................................................................................................................ 22
4.2 FATIGUE............................................................................................................................................................. 22
4.3 COMMUNICATION .............................................................................................................................................. 27
4.4 SOCIAL STRESS................................................................................................................................................... 39
4.5 MENTAL WORKLOAD.......................................................................................................................................... 42

5 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ................................................................................................................................ 56

5.1 FATIGUE ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................ 56
5.1.1 Company awareness of fatigue issues ....................................................................................................... 56
5.1.2 Crew endurance managment systems ....................................................................................................... 57
5.1.3 Potential of fatigue.................................................................................................................................... 58
5.2 COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS .............................................................................................................................. 59
5.2.1 Communication with other commerical vessels ........................................................................................ 59
5.2.2 Communicaiton with VTS ......................................................................................................................... 60
5.2.3 Communication with recreational vessels ................................................................................................ 60
5.3 SOCIAL STRESS ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................. 60
5.4 WORKPLACE STRESS ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................... 60
5.5 MENTAL WORKLOAD ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................ 62
5.6 DISTRACTION AND LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ...................................................................................... 62
5.7 MENTAL WORKLOAD VS. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.......................................................................................... 63
5.8 COMPLACENCY THEORIES TO MARITIME INDUSTRY/VESSELS ............................................................................. 63
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6 RISK MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................................................... 64

6.1 THEORY ............................................................................................................................................................. 64
6.2 THE CONCEPT OF RISK ........................................................................................................................................ 64
6.3 MANAGING RISKS ............................................................................................................................................... 66
6.4 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................. 67
6.5 RISK ASSOCIATED WITH LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ............................................................................. 68
6.6 RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN .................................................................................................................................. 69
6.7 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ACTIVITIES ................................................................................................................ 69
6.8 METHODOLOGY FLOW CHART ............................................................................................................................ 70

7 RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 71
7.1 MANAGEMENT SUPPORT .................................................................................................................................... 71
7.2 IDENTIFICATION OF COST ................................................................................................................................... 71
7.3 INCLUSION OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM ............................................................................................... 72
7.4 OBJECTIVES OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM.............................................................................................. 72

8 CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................................... 78
9 FURTHER WORK ................................................................................................................................................. 79
REFERENCES
APPENDIX
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List of figures

Figure Description Page No

1.1 Demanding marine operation on board a vessel 2

1.2 Automatic Identification system 4

1.3 Vessel Traffic Service 4

1.4 Inter connectivity between factors and Situational awareness in a Loop 5

2.1 Endsley’s model of Situational Awareness 9

2.2 Interactive Sub Theory model of Situational Awareness 11

2.3 Perpetual cycle model of Situational Awareness 13

2.4 Fatal accidents/Collisions due to human error/Loss of SA 16

4.1 Combined effect of forces 54

6.1 Risk management process 65

6.2 Methodology to carry out risk management process 66

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List of Tables

Table Description Page

4.1 Methods to address fatigue 22

4.2 Crew Endurance Training. 23

4.3 Working overtime 23

4.4 Fatigue from engine noise 24

4.5 Fatigue from engine vibrations 24

4.6 Quality of sleep on board a vessel 25

4.7 Preference of shifts while working on board a vessel 26

4.8 Deckhands report the results of rounds. 27

4.9 Deckhands report the hazard to navigation at night. 27

4.10 Understanding of wind and current upon watch relief 28

4.11 Understanding of location of other vessels and hazards to navigation 29
4.12 Understanding of vessel navigation light configuration 29
4.13 Understanding of communication to other vessels through VHF-FM radio 30
4.14 Other commercial vessels to respond through VHF-FM radio. 31
4.15 Understanding of navigational light configuration by other commercial vessels. 31
4.16 Understanding of communication through VHF-FM radio 32
4.17 Understanding of meaning of 1 and 2 whistle signal by recreational vessels 33
4.18 Understanding of navigational light configuration by recreational vessels 33
4.19 Understanding of communication through whistle or spot light 34
4.20 Understanding the response of whistle /spotlight by recreational vessels 35
4.21 Understanding of communication by flash light or by whistling 35
4.22 Usefulness of radar to avoid the collisions 36
4.23 Usefulness of AIS/Electronic charts 37
4.24 Usefulness of VTS. 37
4.25 Understanding of crew of weather and location of other vessels 38
4.26 Loosing the Job 39
4.27 Current marital status 39
4.28 Stability of relationships with the family 40
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4.29 Support to the family and paying the bills 40

4.30 Role of cell phones/ emails in the stability of the family 41
4.31 Tense relationship with the crew members 42
4.32 Worry about other captain understanding 42
4.33 Worry about the other operator understands 43
4.34 Boredom in straight- away without any traffic 44
4.35 Distraction of cell phone calls in busy waters 44
4.36 Distraction of cell phone calls in Non busy waters 45
4.37 Dependence on navigational aids and landmarks 46
4.38 Dependence on equipments for knowing other vessels location. 46
4.39 Reliability of radar in comparison to AIS for knowing vessel locations 47
4.40 Paper charts reliability in comparison to electronic charts 48
4.41 Difficulty in operation of electronic charts 48
4.42 Difficulty in operating AIS transponder. 49
4.43 Dependence on Pilot house alarms for informing the problems about engine 50
4.44 Vessel engines running at optimal performance 50
4.45 Steering the same course through the lock 51
4.46 Steer the same course through the bridge 52
4.47 Encountering same commercial vessels on subsequent transits 52
4.48 Encountering same passing arrangements with commercial vessels 53
4.49 Situation of wind / Tides/Currents presence by surprise. 54
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Abbreviations

SA Situational awareness

VTS Vessel traffic service

AIS Automatic Identification System

ABS American Bureau of Shipping

SAC Safety Advisory Committee

U.S.C.G United States Coast Guard

VHF Very high frequency

FM Frequency Modulation

AIST Automatic Identification system Transponder

MRO Medical Review Officer

IMO International Marine Organisation

QA Quality Assurance

EC Electronic Charts

MW Mental workload

RV Recreational vessels

CEMS Crew Endurance Management Systems

CPRS Complacency Potential Rating Scale

BPS Boredom Proneness Scale

ECS Electronic Charting System

SMS Safety Management System

SMI System Maintenance and Improvement

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Introduction

Norway is renowned for its feet in the field of maritime industry. The cluster of shipping is spread all over
the country with its unique specialization in depth. One can easily see the variety, penetration in the
shipping industry with latest and modern technologies in the field. It is easy to see big manufacturing
yards, lot of big manufacturing companies dealing with ship equipments and lot of supporting companies
working in close collaboration with each other. The distribution of business in maritime industry is closely
observed with uniqueness in expertise varying from one place to another. For instance, the financial side
of it is heavily distributed in capital city Oslo which acts as a hub to link and spread the business with the
world, the city of Bergen is renowned for commercial side of maritime industry. Many multinational
companies are working in Norway and providing a platform for technology spread across the country and
helps in making a name in the world. Many big companies like DNV, NOV, Rolls Royce and Aker
solutions have their headquarters in the country and working in close collaborations with the local
companies.

The west coast of Norway is renowned for having leading yards and supporting industries for ship
equipment in close collaborations with offshore firms. There are many other big names like Kongsberg,
Schumberger etc which holds leading stature in the maritime industry. Some of them are specialized in
the manufacturing, some of them have their name in providing support facilities, and some of them are
good in providing technical solutions. The companies like ABB, DNV works in the rules and classification
not only at micro level but at international level in maritime industry. Many reputed institutions,
universities like NTNU,University of Stavanger are working in close collaborations with big companies
thereby spreading firsthand knowledge to potential students .

As most of universities and university colleges are working in close collaborations with maritime
industries, it gives immense knowledge to the students to gain interest in maritime industry thereby
sharpening their skills in the field of maritime industry. Most of the programs being run in Norwegian
universities and colleges have special emphasis on marine sector and there are many courses in
bachelor and master curriculum that are linked with maritime industry.

The wide spread of maritime industry in the country attracts global companies to work with local
companies thereby creating awareness and exchange of technology. Due to the popularity of maritime
industry, many institutions, colleges and universities are offering courses on maritime to the international
students thereby contributing in gaining awareness on global scale.

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1.1 Demanding Marine operations

In the project we will study how people make decisions during demanding and advanced marine
operations, particularly under stress. The main purpose of the thesis is to find out the optimal systems
and solutions which will cater for Situational Awareness (SA) and support for the decision to be taken
during the hard times. Advanced and demanding marine operations have brought up the complexity in the
system because of quest to go long way in search of providing vast number of services and mastering the
system.

The complex systems with automation embedded brought complexity into the system. It is generally
found with the quest to go deep waters, maneuvering with heavier load, tackling with harsh environment
under lot of work load and stress conditions. Because of the complexity in the system alone, there is
substantial need of thrusting new technologies which will not only add functionality but also gives unique
direction to the technical system.

Figure 1.1: Demanding marine operations on board a vessel

The frequent problem on board is availability of enormous data which makes task even more
difficult to recognize the importance of the information needed to carry out particular operation
successfully in hand. The data available to the use and information which is important for a particular
operation to be carried out is very important and need to be addressed in right way.

The thesis intents to alter the trend of growing complexity in the system due to the presence of
enormous inputs by following user centered design which not only simplify the system but also
provide point to point interfaces to be connected there by eliminating the useless information which is
present in the form of input data ,thereby making the process simpler and efficient.

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The task primarily revolves around importance of changing the epicenter technology centered to task
centered. In the technology centered user is provided enormous amount of input which some times
in the hour of stress lead to catastrophic event as user has to make tough decision to select
appropriate input from the vast available data thereby by making the process more complex and error
prone. By changing it to the task centered, the user has less input data in hand and thereby he is in
good position to analyze the situation right as he has been aware of the situation, process , the input
and what he has to do in decision making.

We will therefore start with a literature study followed by detailed analysis of one or two advanced marine
operations and a System Design Specification. We will also focus on how to support all phases of an
operation (planning, execution and evaluation) including human aspects like the need for education, skill
training as well as crew resource management training.

1.2 Problem Statement

The studies of vessel accidents in general don’t provide concrete information regarding various factors
that has led to the disaster. In other words, the studies done so far in the vessel accidents do not identify
the factors that influence the situational awareness of the working crew on board a vessel. This can be
evident from the statistics obtained which shows that loss of situational awareness accounted only 36%
of human error in maritime industry where as in reality this figures should be much higher considering the
fact that lapse of situational awareness accounts around 70% of human error( Horberry and Grech).

The primary reason behind this varying figure is due to the fact that in most of the marine accidents, the
emphasis has been laid only on certain areas which seem important in terms of company preferences in
face saving and economy. Moreover in between, there are numerous incidents of near miss situations
which otherwise could have served as reference if quoted and brought in sight. These incidents not only
would have provided the information but at the same time highlighted lapses on the part of crew working
on vessels. The study draws upon the incidents and experiences of licensed captains and pilots of marine
industry to determine the underlying factors affecting situational awareness.

1.3 Purpose

The purpose of the study is to collect the information and data which helps in defining various factors
that can account for influencing the situational awareness on board a vessel that could end up resulting
in vessel accidents or near miss situations. All the factors are compared to come up with most
predominant factor causing lapse or loss of situational awareness. This information will be used to create
a foundation for root-cause analysis, to provide recommendations for addressing the predominant factor,
and to suggest areas for future research in the maritime industry.

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1.4 Terminology

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) - It is a classification society whose primary role is to consider the
safety of life, property and the environment by following some standard rules and regulations. These rules
are developed and verified for the standards in the field of design, construction and maintenance of
marine related facilities.

Automatic Identification System (AIS):-AIS is an automatic tracking system which is used in ships and
vessels to control the traffic and to identify the position of the vessel by electronically exchanging the data
with nearby ships AIS base stations and satellites.

Figure 1.2: Automatic identification System Figure 1.3Vessel Traffic Service.

Courtesy of Wikipedia online Encyclopedia< http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vessel-Traffic-Service, Automatic

Identification System

Crew member/Deckhand:-An individual performing deck equipment maintenance, line handling and
lookout duties on board a vessel.

Port-Left. Often used during the arrangements with other vessels e.g. port to port passing.

Starboard-Right. Often used during passing arrangements with other vessels (e.g. starboard to starboard
passing).

Vessel traffic service (VTS): - VTS is a system which is used to guide vessels of the presence of other
vessels and was established to regulate and help to maintain a steady flow of vessel traffic in rivers and
harbors worldwide.

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1.5 Research Focus

What are human factors and how the human factors influence situational awareness?
What are various factors that affect situational awareness?
How the factors affect navigation and decision making in context of situational awareness?
Which is the predominant factor that affects the situational awareness on board a vessel and
influences the decision making to large extent?
How the predominant factor be addressed to mitigate its effect on situational awareness?

Figure 1.4 Inter connectivity between factors and Situational awareness in a Loop

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Chapter 2

Literature Survey

2.1 Theory of Situational Awareness

According to a comparison of measures study,HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007, the term

Situational awareness itself is argumentive because of its vast description in terms of measurement and
understanding through model making. If we study the term SA through academic literature the term has
been explained and constructed via number of theoretical models through vast number of approaches in
order to explain the SA measurement techniques and methods. Further, a range of different SA
measurement approaches have been developed. Of the theories presented in the literature, Endsley’s
three-level model is the most popular and its counterpart measurement approach which takes into
account information processing, the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT;
Endsley, 1995b) is the most commonly used procedure for measuring SA, despite questions regarding its
validity as an SA measure. Many researchers have argued that further investigation is required in the
area of SA measurement in complex systems, particularly in the area of team SA (e.g. Artman, 2000;
Gorman, Cooke & Winner, 2006, Patrick, James, Ahmed & Halliday, 2006; Salmon, Stanton, Walker and
Green, 2006) and also that in order to understand the construct within collaborative environments, a
different perspective may be required (e.g. Artman & Garbis, 1998; Shu and Furuta, 2005; Siemieniuch &
Sinclair, 2006) in the report HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007.

According to the report of comparison of measures” HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007.

and Measuring Situation Awareness in complex systems by Paul M.Salmon,Neville A .Stanton, Guy
H.Walker,Daniel Jenkins “ The interconnectivity over the description of SA theoretical models and its
measurement approaches will continue to be the driving force for constructing simpler and more
practical and error free model for SA.SA is a vital factor as it is related to the individual and the team
performance and related directly to the design of the control systems,command,training programs and
procedures to be laid down in SA”. It follows then that system designers and also training and procedure
designers need to be able to accurately describe and measure individual and team SA in these
environments, as do analysts wishing to evaluate SA in collaborative environments. Therefore it becomes
important to measure the operator or user SA not only in terms of the theoretical SA related theory but
also in conjunction to the system, design, procedures and evaluation efforts. Researchers need valid and
reliable methods of assessing operator SA in order to test and advance SA theory, whilst system,
procedure and training program designers need ways of assuring that SA is improved and not degraded

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by a new system, interface, procedure or training program. SA is the decorative term which depicts the
level of awareness a user or individual has while undergoing some decision making process or
performing a complex process. It is the measure of the dynamic understanding of “ what is actually
going on” (Endsley, 1995a).SA found it is emergence from the operation point of view when it is used
for the first time for the analysis of military aircraft crews during the first world war(Press, 1986; cited in
Endsley, 1995a).Even with the introduction of the concept of SA, it doesn’t have that much information
to support the need to get the attention in the academic and research literature until late (Stanton and
Young, 2000), when SA related research began to emerge within the aviation and air traffic control
domains.

According to Endsley,(1993 b),It is also pertinent to mention here that despite of the term SA
highlighted on global scene with its utility primarily focused in the field of aviation and air traffic
control, not much work has been done with SA techniques and measurement procedures to build up
useful model in maritime industry to supplement the decision making processes and their
interdependencies in safety issues of the operations.(Endsley, 1993).

SA was becoming a broader term ,the literature published in a special issue of Human factors journal on
SA (Endsley,1995a,b) clearly shows SA become topic which was discussed by various researchers and
been related in various diversified field of the academic studies. The research since evolved within the
system design and evaluation for the procedures and continued to dominate the human factors research
worldwide.

Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to present these definitions in their entirety. But the classical
and most commonly used definition of SA used on broad scale is used by Endsley, who defines SA as
a product which find its origin from the process of situational assessment of the individual; or user
undergoing a particular operation or decision making process.

In report comparison of measures in HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007, the understanding

of the user or individual which defines the boundaries of the system alone includes “The perception of the
elements in the environment within time and space, and the understanding of their meaning in relation to
their occurrence in the present and dependency in near future the comprehension of their meaning, and
the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley , 1995a, p.36).

In the report “Comparison of measures “Smith and Hancock (1995) define SA as ‘adaptive, externally
directed consciousnesses. Bedny and Meister (1999) argue that SA provides, “dynamic orientation in a
situation, the opportunity to reflect not only on the present but the past and future, as well as not only
actual but potential features of situations. This dynamic reflection contains logical conceptual,
imaginative, conscious and unconscious components. Based on these, individuals develop mental
models of external events” (Bedny and Meister, 1999, p.71).

Apart from the preliminary definitions proposed by Endsley, more researchers have attempted to define
the construct (e.g. Adams, Tenney & Pew, 1995, Sarter and Woods, 1991, Taylor, 1990). With more

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research going on, the shift was clearly seen from defining the SA from only awareness to the user
dynamic internal representation of the ongoing situation which takes input from the data in hand and
also from the past results of the similar events happened.

With the introduction of various definitions of SA, the conflict lies between the definition laid down by
Endsley,1995a who describes SA as product of awareness on the behalf of individual performing some
decision making process,Fracker in 1991 who describes SA as process itself for gaining the awareness
of the process by undergoing it without having prior knowledge in the form of events and Smith and
Hancock,1995 who consider SA as combination of both Endsley and Fracker interpretation in defining
the term SA .

This is a debate that will no doubt continue unabated; however, we argue that in order to fully appreciate
the construct, an understanding of both the process and the product is required (Stanton, Chambers &
Piggott, 2001).

2.2 Situation Awareness Theory by Endsley

According to the report “Comparison of measures”, HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007 ,SA
theories were primarily based on SA of the individual operators undergoing set of decision making
process as stated by (e.g.Endsley, 1995a) and the models that currently dominate the literature are
individual oriented theories, including Endsley’s three-level model (Endsley, 1995a), Smith and Hancock’s
perceptual cycle model (Smith and Hancock, 1995) and Bedny and Meister’s activity theory model (Bedny
and Meister, 1999).These models have been divided on the basis of process (Fracker) vs. product(
Endsley) vs. combination of both product and process( Hancock and Smith).

These models differ from each other in terms of psychological approach which takes into account the
logic behind describing SA. The three level model (Endsley, 1995a) takes into account an information
processing approach, Smith and Hancock (1995) use a perceptual cycle model approach, and Bedny and
Meister (1999) use an activity theory model to describe SA. Within the literature, it is these three
theoretical perspectives that currently dominate (Stanton, Chambers & Piggott, 2001).

2.3 The Three-Level Model

Endsley’s three-level model describes SA as a product comprising three hierarchical levels that describes
situational assessment of the operator or individual to achieve the SA which separates it from the
processes. According to” Comparison of measures”, HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007.

The Endsley model is a basic model which takes into consideration information as a input given to the
system or the individual performing some complex operation or involved in some decision making

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process and it only after the individual gets the information ,he is in the position to perceive the
information from the set of inputs he got and later leads to the decision making and action execution.

According to the model (By Endsley) SA acquisition and maintenance is influenced by individual (e.g.
experience, training, workload etc), task (e.g. complexity) and systemic factors (e.g. interface design)
(Endsley, 1995a). A brief description of the three levels of SA is given below.

Figure 2.1: Endsley’s model of Situational Awareness. Courtesy of Wikipedia online Encyclopedia<
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/endsley

Level 1: Perception of the Elements

The first step involves perceiving the status, attributes and dynamics of task-related elements in the
surrounding environment (Endsley, 1995a).In the report “Comparison of measures”, HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3
Version 2/ 25 September 2007, Endsley states at this time the only thing which is important is to perceive
the input data and no further processing of data have to be considered. The data perceived by the
individual undergoing the decision making process depends on variety of factors which includes the
nature of task, complexity of the operation, nature of input information, level of difficulty, dependent
variables, operator goals, experience of the individual, expectations of the process and operator, design
interface, system design complexity, man machine interaction, capabilities and automation of the
machinery. According to Endsley (1995a), “a person’s goals and plans direct which aspects of the
environment are attended to in the development of SA” (Endsley, 1995a, Page no 47).

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Level 2: Comprehension of the Current Situation

According to Endsley as stated in the report of comparison of measures “HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25

September 2007”, The Level 2 SA Level takes one step ahead from perceiving the data to interpretation
the data level 1 to level 2.Level 2 SA involves understanding for user or individual to comprehend or
realize the importance of the data in relation to the task and goals ahead. It is very important stage as the
goals of the task depends on the understanding of important data which can accomplish a particular
work task in much effective and safe way. During the acquisition of level 2 SA “the decision maker forms
a holistic picture of the environment, comprehending the significance of objects and events” (Endsley,
1995a, pg 37).

Similar to level 1 SA, the interpretation and comprehension of SA-related data is influenced by an
individual’s goals, expectations, experience in the form of mental models, and preconceptions regarding
the situation. The only difference here is the ability of individual or operator to recognize the important
elements or inputs which are most important for achieving the goals of particular work task. Use of
experience in the form of mental models to facilitate the acquisition of level 2 SA. According to Endsley,
individual with more experience will use their experience from the past to facilitate the combination of
level 1 SA with Level 2 SA to achieve its goals in much better way.

Level 3: Forecasting Future System States

In the report of comparison of measures HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007,Endsley and

by Paul M.Salmon,the level 3 SA takes into account future system states meaning it involves in
determining future states of the system and its elements for the complex and different decision
making processes which involves intense thinking and assessment to achieve a desired goal in the
future event which is unknown to this time of level 2 SA. Using a combination of level 1 and 2 SA-related
knowledge, and experience in the form of mental models, individuals can forecast likely future states in
the situation.

For example, pilot flying military aircraft uses Level 1 and level 2 SA related information to decide the
course of action of the enemy plane, its position ,location and objectives as depicted by Endsley
,1995a.Another random example is captain of ship sailing in region with bad weather or environment can
take into account his past experience and the input data available which depicts some key leads for
that particular region. The captain of the ship can do this through perceiving and understanding the
speed, location, formation and movements of tides and environment inputs and comparing this to
experience (in the form of mental models) of similar situations. This comparison of situational data with
past experience allows operators to project future situational states.

Therefore it becomes an obvious statement that 3 level model plays an important role in the development
and maintenance of SA. Features in the environment are mapped to mental models in the operators
mind, and the models are then used to facilitate the development of SA (Endsley, 1995a).

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Mental models (formed by training and experience) are used to facilitate the achievement of SA by
directing attention to critical elements in the environment (level 1), integrating the elements to aid
understanding of their meaning (level 2) and generating possible future states and events (level 3).

2.4 Interactive Sub-Systems Theory

In the interactive sub system theory proposed by Bedny and Meister (1999) stated in the report of
comparison of measures “HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007”, Endsley takes into account
a different approach as compared to product theory proposed by Endsley 1995a, which describes SA as
merely an activity approach focusing various processes that associated with desired work task to be
performed by human taking into account the human behaviour towards the desired task in hand. The
theory of activity takes into consideration that individuals possess goals which shows the end state of the
activity, motives that direct them towards the end state and course of actions, methods that help in
achieving these goals and end states By (Bedny and Meister, 1999).The model is shown below:-

Figure 2.2: Interactive Sub Theory model of Situational Awareness

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The differences between the goals and the present situation motivate an individual to take action towards
achieving the goal. The end state activity comprises three stages: the orientation stage, the executive
stage and the evaluative stage (Bedny and Meister, 1999). The orientation stage focuses the initial
development stage where the internal picture of the current situation is accessed. The executive stage
involves proceeding towards a desired goal via decision-making and action execution.

According to Bedny and Meister (1999) as stated in the report “HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25
September 2007” comparison of situational awareness measures, Endsley propose that each and every
functional block presented in the above figure has particular role to play in the development and
maintenance of SA and the blocks are the activities which upon fulfilment helps in achieving the desired
outputs through SA.It is also important to mention here that model itself is prototype of basic 3 level
model proposed by (Endsley,1995a) which accounts for Level 1,2 and 3 SA.eg the interpretation of
information as input is influenced by internal block with meaning of input information as to what kind of
information is needed for the said goal, which information is important for the goal and how it is relevant
to the system. In short, these block carrying information depend on each other to attain their specific
goals. The interpretation of incoming information (function block 1) is influenced by an individual’s goals
(function block 2),conceptual model of the current situation (function block 8) and past experience
(function block 7).This pattern of interpretation then modifies goals and model of current situation. Critical
environmental features are then identified (function block 3) which is primarily based on their importance
in task or final goal with evaluative and inducing components of motivation which include a) Sense b)
Motivation functional block 4, which directs their interaction with the world (function block 5). The extent
to which individual proceeds to engage the task goals is determined by their goals (Block 2 ) and their
evaluation of current situation ( Block 6).The result of the individual/operator interaction with world is
recorded and is stored as experience( Block 7) which is related to conceptual model ( Block 8).

According to the model, the core processes involved in the acquisition of SA are the conceptual model
(functional block 8), the image-goal (functional block 2) and the subjectively relevant task conditions
(function block 3). “Bedny and Meister” (1999) therefore suggest that the conceptual model (function
block 8), the image goal (function block 2) and the subjectively relevant task conditions (function block 3)
are the key blocks involved in the development of SA (Stanton et al, 2001).

2.5 The Perceptual Cycle Approach

In the literature from the report comparison of situational awareness during command and control activity;
HFIDTC/2/1.2.5/3 Version 2/ 25 September 2007, Endsley approach has been employed by Smith and
Hancock’s (1995) who considered SA as database of knowledge creation and to use the knowledge to
take actions. Smith and Hancock’s model was influenced by perceptual cycle model by Niesser’s (1976)
which take into account the individual’s interaction with the world and role of sequence of information’s in
our interactions. The perceptual model includes the perception of the individual on external explorations

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which is again the subset of the knowledge model designed to perform the task. It has been observed
that outcome of the interaction with the world result in modifying original knowledge model which in turn
directs further exploration. This process of directed interaction and modification continues in an infinite
cyclical nature. Using this approach Smith and Hancock (1995) came to the conclusion that SA is neither
present in the world nor in the individual itself but it is the knowledge which individual gains through
repeated interactions with the world. Smith and Hancock (1995) found that the process of achieving and
maintaining SA takes into account internal mental models inherited inside the individual which he attains
either by repeated conversation with the world or by past experience of similar situations.

These mental models thereby acts as intermediate for undergoing the situational events bringing an
individual to the level where he is position to pay attention to the environment to meet certain specific
tasks and directing them to take appropriate course of action depending upon the prior knowledge
attained by them through repeated interactions or through past similar experiences (Hancock and Smith
model). So by doing this according to him, individual would find him in better position to understand the
situation for meeting their ultimate end goals. In the meanwhile, some uncertainties and unexpected
events give birth to changes in the already existing model which is illustrated in detail in the figure shown
below:-

Figure 2.3: Perpetual cycle model of Situational Awareness. Courtesy of Wikipedia online Encyclopedia<
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/perpetual

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So unlike the three level models which consider SA as product model, according to Endsley (1995a) and
is in isolation to process. Here the SA is viewed as both process and the product giving a product which is
separate from the processes, SA is viewed as both process and product, offering an explanation of the
cognitive activity involved in achieving SA and also a judgment as to what the product of SA comprises.
Smith and Hancock’s (1995) model therefore based on the representations of situational awareness in
different environments. For example, in reference to air traffic controllers ‘losing the picture’, Smith and
Hancock suggest that “SA is not the controller’s picture. Rather it is the controllers SA that builds the
picture and that enables them to know that what they know is insufficient for the increasing demands.”
(Smith and Hancock, 1995, p. 142).To summarise, each theory has its useful components. As Stanton et
al (2001) point out, ‘there appears to be an element of truth in all of them’. In terms of theoretical utility,
Smith and Hancock’s model is perhaps the most useful, since it caters for the dynamic aspects of SA
(Stanton et al, 2001), whereas the theory of activity model is useful since it details the internal activities
involved in developing SA when an individual performs activity. Endsley’s three level model, on the other
hand, offers a very neat and intuitive description of SA which allows researchers to measure the construct
simplistically and also to abstract SA requirements at each level. As a consequence of this, the three level
model is the most useful for researchers wishing to describe the nature and content of operator SA in
complex systems and also for measuring the construct. Further, Endsley’s work has proved to be the
most useful for informing system design and evaluation (e.g.Endsley, Bolte & Jones, 2003, Endsley &
Garland, 2000).

2.6 The Problem with Accident Studies

In order to nail down the possible factors affecting the lapse in the situational awareness, many
approaches could be followed .One possible way is to go by conventional way of investigating the
record or data base of maritime accidents occurred in the past. Generally not much has been said and
recorded in terms of accountability of human errors and practices that could help in analyzing the
situational awareness.
It has also been observed that the records of maritime accidents have some vital parameters
missing in terms of human involvement or errors as most of the companies do face saving by hiding the
information which if revealed would result in bad name for their company .There has also been some
instances where there is lack of information and data which resulted in miscommunication and
misleading the investigation.

Therefore depending only on the records and data of maritime accidents in the past is not
wise step to evaluate the broad term situational awareness. Mica Endsley stated that the term
situational awareness is much bigger and board term which could cover wide range of information
gathered from reports, literature review, near miss reports and even normal operations on board the
vessel which could result in some other loss of situational awareness.

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Besides the above incredible achievements in the maritime industry with the introduction of so many
advanced and sophisticated machinery, technology on board. It is unfortunate that maritime causality rate
is still on the higher side which is beyond the point of acceptance. The next thing which comes out in our
mind is what could be the reason behind it which triggers panic on board causing unexpected accidents
thereby causing great loss in terms of human and material. The first thing which comes in our mind is
failure in the machinery on board a vessel. Yes off course this is one of the reasons why accidents do
happen. But it is also important to mention here that 56% of the accidents happen on board are due to
one or other kind of human negligence often called as Human error where as 30% of the accidents do
occur either due to lack of knowledge, lack of SA or even loss of SA due to some distracting events
happening on board a vessel(TSAC-6).From the data we have from TSAC-6,the approximate figures for
the percentage of the accidents occurring either due to lack of SA or human errors account for 80-88%
of tanker accidents,75% of towing vessels undergoing groundings,85-95% of collisions ,70% of collisions
and approximately 72% of accidents occurring due to fire and explosions.

Keeping in view the rate of accidents and amount of causalities occurring, it is most important to focus
what is causing what. What would be most important areas to be focused and addressed in order to keep
the incidents to minimum and foremost area of concern which comes into the mind on first instance is
human error and lack of SA.

A Dutch study of 100 marine casualties found that the number of causes per accident ranged from 7 to
58, with a median of 23.It often starts with minor errors or minor mistakes which doesn’t seem threatening
to cause a major catastrophe but when these minor things and events converge they result in major
causality. It has been observed that majority of the accidents which happen due to human error is caused
by combination of human error. It means it is incapability of human ,individual or operator to recognise
and put check on the minor mistakes committed by him and due to this lack of SA,leads to wrong
assessment of the situation and thereby resulting to an unavoidable accident .

In majority of the accidents caused due to human negligence, it is often caused by more than one or two
people which result in creating condition for the accident if not addressed in appropriate way. That means
that if just one of those human errors had not occurred, the chain of events would have been broken, and
the accident would not have happened. Therefore, it becomes an important issue not only to address the
safety on board but also to be awarded of other dependent events which if not addressed in proper way
would result into catastrophic results.

This forms the hypothesis for the involvement of events focusing on the SA awareness and how to work
in close collaboration in order to have better understanding of each and every step in an ongoing process.

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By keeping this we can have better command and there by having the capability to break the chain of
errors and mistakes thereby providing better and safety of the system.

Figure 2.4: Showing fatal accidents/Collisions due to human error/Loss of SA. Courtesy of Wikipedia
online Encyclopaedia< http://en.wikipedia.org/

2.7 Examples of accidents

(Literature reviewed from report on Marine accidents by National Transport Safety Board)

The first example is the collision of the M/V SANTA CRUZ II and the USCGC CUYAHOGA, which
occurred on a clear, calm night on the Chesapeake Bay. The visibility was good and both the vessels saw
each other as the radar do. So what could have been the reason for the collision when everything seems
going smoothly in perfect weather conditions that day. CUYAHOGA turned in front of the SANTA CRUZ
II. In the collision that ensued, 11 Coast Guardsmen lost their lives. What could have caused such a
tragedy? Equipment malfunctions?

It was clear example of human error on board vessel. There were primarily two errors made, first one
was made by CUYAHOGA’s captain, he miss read the configuration of running lights on SANTA CRUZ
II and thereby resulting in wrong approximation about the heading and size of the vessel. As the
number of crew on board was cut short to less number there by over stressing the crew to do all the
operations alone. They were in the state of excessive stress caused by over workload. Fatigue and
excessive workload have been considered as the major reasons for the catastrophic collision.

The second example is the grounding of the vessel TORREY CANYON. This also happened at the time
of clear weather-day time when it was sunshine, daylight on the English Channel proceeding through
Scilly Islands. The ship ran around and thereby spilling around 100,000 tons of oil.

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From the report four human errors were found which were held responsible for the accident. The first one
was the enormous economic pressure exerted by the management on the master to keep to schedule.
He was about to unload cargo and for that he has to head into deep water terminal in Wales.

In the above two cases, we have seen that human errors are of different kinds. It could be simple lack of
knowledge of the scenario, it could be total loss of SA and wrong assessment to due lack of experience
and inability to read the equipment .So in short human error is much bigger and wider term as
compared to operator or individual making an error.

Some more examples of accidents involving human errors have been demonstrated without undergoing
in detail and are as follows:-

STAB 1975 (Glasgow)

Tanker, EDITH TERKOL

A Danish tanker, EDITH TERKOL in 1975 having GZ curves capsized in the Baltic Sea near Swedish
island of Goaland.There was sudden rolling of the vessel and immediately capsized. She was on the
ballast journey. Only two persons on board survived.

STAB 1982 (Tokyo)

The “ALEXANDER L. KIELLAND” was initially made as a drilling rig, but had been served as an
accommodation platform for Ekofish field in the North Sea. So in order to transform the vessel to cater
new needs for accommodation purposes, some modifications have been introduced in the structure in
which new containers were mounted on the deck, forward to the drilling tower. Due to overloading the
structure, enormous stress was produced and structure failed. The fatigue started with fatigue crack in the
Bracing D-6 and other five bracing which are connected to column D subsequently exposed to enormous
fatigue and finally failed due to over loading resulting in the total loss of the column.

STAB 1986 (Gdansk, Poland)

Similarly Large Stern Trawler on 6th January 1982, a large stern trawler of 549 gross tonnages, similar to
the “GAUL”, capsized and founded during hauling a net in the Bering Sea. In the accident out of 33 crew
members on board, only one survived and 32 people lost their lives.

STAB 1994 (Florida, EEUU)

Another human error responsible for the capsizing of vessel “ZENOBIA”, due to load shifting onboard
caused by uncontrollable manoeuvre motion.

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“STARTS PRIDE II” Fishing vessel

The paper “STRAITS PRIDE II”, 1994 illustrates the capsizing of the small fishing vessel. The analysis
shows the importance of Para vanes with respect to the stability of the ship and is considered to be the
most important element to be taken into account during the designing process. This study focused on
the capsizing of this small fishing vessel, which partially lost the side pare vane in the capsize, and
pointed at other capsizes where the par vane was considered to be a contributing factor.

STAB 1997 (Varna)

Another chapter underlying the human error resulting in the sinking of cargo ship in front of Catalonia
Coast in Spain just after two hours of departure when the weather was clear. The accident was
investigated by company and the port authorities in order to find out the possible reasons for capsizing of
the vessel. It was observed the accident occurred due to the stability of the ship which got disturbed
due to sudden shift of load on the vessel due to sharp manoeuvre motion.

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Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 Flow chart

LITERATURE REVIEW

Goal: To access the situational awareness of professionals including Captains, Chief engineers, Ist
engineers and other crew members working in different companies, holding different positions and having
different set of experience and expertise.

Complexity of carrying demanding marine operations

Theory of Situational awareness

 Endsley’s 3 level model for situational awareness

-Level 1: Perception of elements

-Level 2: Comprehension of current situation.
-Level 3: Forecasting future system states.

 Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT; Endsley, 1995b)

 Smith and Hancock (1995) definition of Situational awareness.
 Literature review of problems related t o marine accidents.

FIELD RESEARCH

 Preliminary research
 Integrated surveys and Interviews.
 Research Limitations
 Expected results
 Findings
- Response from the feedback of the questionnaire responding to various factors affecting the
situational awareness of the crew on board a vessel.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
 Recommendations
 Conclusion

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3.2 Theory

It has been observed that in the maritime industry, situational awareness plays major role and
can be affected by psychological reasons for instance stress and fatigue issues on board the vessel. It
could also be lack of communication between the crew members, use of restricted commodities like
alchol,drugs and also because of the presence of social stress elements in the minds of the crew on
board the vessel.However,the most commonly observed cause of lapse in the situational awareness are
fatigue issues, mental workload and social stresses. However there are number of programs which are
run by the companies in service that help the crew to have better situational awareness of the system and
activities they performing.

The aim of these programs is to highlight the possible loopholes resulting in the lapses in
situational awareness of crew members working on the vessel. These programs consider the possible
human errors made by the crew members on carrying out their regular normal activities on the vessel.
Identifying the possible lapses in the situational awareness resulting from human error would not be
enough to go in deep to find out what went wrong. It is also important to find out the appropriate reasons
as to what made the person to commit a mistake and under what circumstances and situations it
happened.

Therefore it is important to pin point the possible factors that are responsible in effecting the
normal functioning of the crew and thereby reducing the human errors on board the vessel. There for an
effort has been made to find out the possible factors and reasons which affect the situational awareness
of the crew members there by addressing the issue and come up with possible recommendations that
would eliminate the errors from the system and thereby making the maritime operations much safer
in future.

3.3 Preliminary Research

The Preliminary research was conducted from 2006 to 2007. The aim of the research is to get the
information and knowledge of vessel operations and various elements associated with its functioning. For
this, a questionnaire has been developed which covers various factors from fatigue issues on board
vessel to social stresses and mental load. The Preliminary research also included some surveys and
interviews with licensed captains and pilots onboard the vessel in the past.

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3.4 Integrated Survey and Interviews

The survey portion of the interview consisted of several sections and was developed and altered on the
basis of studied of situational awareness in the maritime industry and feedback acquired from the
personnel working on ships holding different positions and having different skills and experience. The
final survey was altered several times prior feedback (see appendix A). Section one of the survey covers
background information; responses in this section were used to determine the experience levels of the
participants and help ensure accuracy of the data. Section 2 highlighted connections between fatigue and
situational awareness. Section three identified the relationship between communication and situational
awareness. Section four highlighted the relationship between social stress and situational awareness.
Section six of the survey identified connections between mental workload and situational awareness. The
questionnaire was formed and distributed among 12 personnel in first session having different
background, age, experience, and expertise and work experience. A comparison of the situational
awareness factors was conducted and the predominant factor was identified.

3.5 Research Limitations

The scope of this research is limited to few number of personnel engaged in the maritime industry
working in different ships and performing certain specified roles. Research does not include interviews of
other crewmembers such as deckhands, engineers, or cooks. It is also important to mention that data
collected have been restricted to the operations carried out in some specified time of the year and things
have been generalized after analyzing the factors. This could not be exact as it is difficult to generalize
the data and to make recommendations based on particular time of the year. Also in different time of
years there is different intensity of traffic and this could easily vary the amount of stress level, mental
load and situational awareness needed.

3.6 Expected Results

The findings shows various factors that affect the situational awareness of the crew members working
on board the vessel and how this lapse in the situational awareness result in causing fatal accidents or
possible catastrophic incidents.. This study was also expected to highlight trends in the relationship
between the participants’ background and situational awareness. Getting the feedback from the
questionnaire filled by participants helped in generalizing the outcomes that could play an important
role in determining factors effecting situational awareness on board the vessel. The results would
suggest areas for future research.

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Chapter 4

Results

4.1 Background of Participants

The questionnaire has been spread in two groups. In the group we have 12 people. All are from different
backgrounds, working in different companies, performing different roles and have different experience
levels. The level of experience varies from captain of the ship to Chief Engineers, engineers, first officers,
Second Officers and some recent graduates who joined the ship recently. The experience level of the
participants interviewed is between 2 to 25 years .Time spent underway ranged from 90 days to 180
days per tour of duty .When asked to describe their current health, nine participants stated that they were
in excellent health, while seven stated they were in good health and 4 stated they were in fair health.

4.2 Fatigue

Fatigue was described as a state of exhaustion that affects concentration and induces feelings of concern
about vessel accident.

Table 4.1 Methods to address fatigue.

NOISE,VIBRATIONS AND INSULATION 09

MULTI SHIFTS,6 HOUR ON-6 HOUR OFF 07
ENFORCEMENT OF 12 HOUR RULE 03
WORKING OVERTIME 11

Table 4.1shows the breakdown of the methods employed by personnel on board the vessel to address
the fatigue issues. On the basis of the data acquired from the questionnaire, we can be in better position
to measure the situational awareness of fatigue. The results of this study show that nine vessels on which
captains/crew/ engineers are currently employed (50%) have installed noise and vibration absorbing
barriers onboard their vessels. Noise and vibration barriers are the modifications in the engineering
context on board the vessel that can reduce the extent of noise and vibrations originating from the engine.

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This does not include muffler systems, which only reduce engine noise, but not engine vibration. For one
participant it doesn’t matter what kind of shift he is given and 02 participants doesn’t want to comment on
the issue.
Under 46 CFR 15.705 (c), an operator steering a vessel bigger than 26ft is not allowed to work for
a period more than 12 hours in 24 hour period. The results from Table show that 07 people working in
different companies enforce multi shifts which is 6 hour on and 6 hour off, where as only 03 people
working in three different companies described that they enforce of 12 hour rule or their desire to work
in straight 12 hour shift .
Table 4.2 Crew Endurance Training.
Often 01
Seldom 04
Never 03
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.2 measures how many companies take measures to conduct fatigue or crew endurance training.
Table shows that 9% (approx) of companies, who employ the licensed officers interviewed, conduct this
training on a regular basis, while 33% conduct this training on an occasional basis ,25% of companies
never conduct this training and 33% of companies or participants doesn’t know about the program.

Crew Endurance Training

12
11
10
9
8
7
Number of participants 6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t want
Occurance to answer

Table 4.3 Working over time.

Often 04
Seldom 07
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 00

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Table 4.3 shows how many companies/participants work overtime for conducting their normal duties on
board vessel for last one year of their sailing. It shows that 04 participants ( 33.33%) often have to work
overtime on board vessel to carry out their normal duties,07 participants ( 58.33%) does overtime
occasionally when there is a need to do so,01 participant (9%) doesn’t overtime on board vessel to
perform his normal duties.

WORK OVERTIME
8
7
6
5
NUMBER OF
4
PARTICIPANTS
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.4 Fatigue from engine noise

Often 02
Seldom 00
Never 10
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 00

Table 4.5 Fatigue from engine vibration

Often 01
Seldom 03
Never 08
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 00

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 measure whether engine noise and vibration qualify as fatigue factor causing in
convenience to the crew while sleeping in the night.

According to Tables 4.4, 02 participants (16%) often get fatigue from the noise of engine which causes
discomfort to them from sleeping sound in the night, where as majority of participant on board a vessel
10 participant(83.33%) never get fatigue from the noise of engine there by having no problem in
getting sound sleep after normal working on board a ship.

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ENGINE NOISE
11
10
9
8
7
NUMBER OF 6
PARTICIPANTS 5
4
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

According to Table 4.5 ,01 participant ( 9%) often gets fatigue from the vibration of the engine which
prevent him from getting sound sleep after normal working hours,03 participants ( 25%) participants
occasionally gets fatigue from the engine vibrations which prevent them from getting sound sleep where
as majority 08 participants (66.66%) doesn’t get any fatigue from the engine vibrations there by getting
sound sleep after normal working hours.

ENGINE VIBRATION
9
8
7
6

NUMBER OF 5
PARTICIPANTS 4

3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.6: Quality of sleep on board a vessel as compared to home

Good 02
Fair 10
Poor 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 00

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AALESUND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

Table 4.6 shows the quality of sleep on board as compared to sleep at home. It shows that 02
participants( 16%) have no problem with the quality of sleep on board vessel, they are of the opinion
that quality of sleep on vessel is good where as majority 10 participants ( 83.33%) feel that the quality
of sleep on board a vessel is fair as compared to what they have at home. This account for some
kind of fatigue which could be result of inconveniences caused by the above mentioned factors in the
tables above i.e. noise from the engine, vibrations and over time etc.

QUALITY OF SLEEP
11
10
9
8
7
NUMBER OF 6
PARTICIPANTS 5
4
3
2
1
0
Good Fair Poor Doesn’t know/Don’t want
to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.7: Preference of shifts while working on board a vessel

12 Hour shift straight 03
Multi shifts 06 hour on -06 off 07
Doesn’t make any difference 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 01

Table 4.7 shows the preference of working shifts and it shows that 03 participants (33.33%) prefer to
work on 12 hour straight shift,07 participants ( 58.33%) prefer to work on multi shifts of 6 hour on and
6 hours off, for one participant it doesn’t matter if he choose to work on single 12 hour shift or work
in multi shift of 6 hour on and 6 hour off and 01 participant doesn’t want to answer the query.

SHIFT PREFERENCE
8
7
6
5
NUMBER OF
4
PARTICIPANTS
3
2
1
0
12 Hour shift straight Multi shifts 06 hour on Doesn’t make any Doesn’t know/Don’t
-06 off difference want to answer
OCCURANCE

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4.3 Communication

Communication was described as communication with crewmembers, other vessels, or VTS and how
much this helps them in attaining situational awareness.

Table 4.8. Deckhands report the results of rounds.

Often 04
Seldom 07
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 01

Table 4.8 shows how often the deckhands report to the captain regarding their routine rounds every
single day. It shows that o4 participants (33.33%) feel that deckhand often report about the rounds to the
captain, where as 07 participants (58.33%) feels that deckhands seldom report the rounds to the captain
and one participate doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

ROUND REPORTING
8

5
NUMBER OF
4
PARTICIPANTS
3

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.9. Deckhands report the hazard to navigation at night.

Often 03
Seldom 05
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 03

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AALESUND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

Table 4.9 shows the reporting of hazard to navigation at night. It shows 03 participants (25%) feels that
deckhands report the hazard to navigation at night, 05 participants ( 41%) feels that deckhands
occasionally report the hazard to navigation at night, where as 01 participants feels that deckhands
never report the hazard to navigation at night and 03 participants ( 25%) doesn’t want to answer the
query.

NAVIGATION AT NIGHT
6

4
NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS
2

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.10: Understanding of wind and current upon watch relief

Often 10
Seldom 00
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 02

Table 4.10 shows the understanding of wind and current upon watch relief. It shows 10 participants
(83.33%) have sound understanding of wind and current upon watch relief, where as 02 participants
(16.67%) doesn’t want to answer the query.

WIND AND CURRENT

11
10
9
8
7
NUMBER OF 6
PARTICIPANTS 5
4
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.11: Understanding of location of other vessels and hazards to navigation upon watch relief.

Often 09
Seldom 01
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 02

Table 4.11 shows the participant understanding of location of other vessels and hazards to navigation
upon watch relief. It shows that 09 participants ( 75%) have the sound understanding of other vessels
and hazard to navigation upon watch relief, where as one participant feels that he occasionally have the
understanding of the other vessels and seldom report the hazards to navigation upon watch relief where
as 02 participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

UNDERSTANDING OF OTHER VESSELS

10
9
8
7
6
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS 5
4
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t want to
answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.12: Understanding of vessel navigation light configuration

Often 07
Seldom 02
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 03

Table 4.12 shows crew understanding of vessel navigation light configuration. It is important for the crew
to have the understanding of vessel light configuration when passing across each other. From the
questionnaire we see that 07 participants (58.3%) often have the understanding of vessel navigation
light configuration, 02 participants (16.67%) occasionally understand the vessel navigation light

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AALESUND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

configuration and 03 participants ( 25%) doesn’t want to comment on the issue may be due to policies
of the company or having least knowledge about the system.

NAVIGATION LIGHT CONFIGURATION

8
7
6
5
NUMBER OF
4
PARTICIPANTS
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t want
to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.13: Understanding of communication to other vessels through VHF-FM radio.

Often 07
Seldom 03
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 01

Table 4.13 shows the understanding of communication to other vessels through VHF-FM radio. It shows
07 participants (58.33%) often understand the communication to be given to other vessels through
VHF-FM radio,03 participants ( 25%) occasionally understand the communication with other vessels
through VHF-FM radio where as 01 participant doesn’t have any information regarding the
communication to be made to other vessel through VHF-FM radio and one participant doesn’t want to
comment on the issue due to lack of knowledge.

VHF-FM RADIO
8
7
6
5
NUMBER OF
4
PARTICIPANTS
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.14: Other commercial vessels to respond through VHF-FM radio.

Often 08
Seldom 02
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 02

Table 4.14 shows communication of other commercial vessels through VHF-FM radio.08 number of
participants often believes that other commercial vessels respond through VHF-FM radio,02 number of
participants believes that other commercial vessels occasionally respond with VHF-FM radio and 02
number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue because of lack of information about it.

VHF-FM RADIO( COMMERCIAL VESSELS)

9

5
NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS 4

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.15: Understanding of navigational light configuration by other commercial vessels.

Often 06
Seldom 02
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.15 shows the understanding of navigational light configuration by other commercial vessels. 06
numbers of participants often believe that other commercial vessel do have understanding of
navigational light configuration,02 participants believes that only sometimes commercial vessels
understand the navigation light configuration where as 04 number of participants doesn’t want to
comment on the issue due to lack of information.

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NAVIGATION
7
6
5

NUMBER OF 4
PARTICIPANTS 3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.16: Understanding of communication to other recreational vessels through VHF-FM radio.

Often 04
Seldom 04
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.16 shows the crew member understanding of communication through VHF-FM radio with other
recreational vessels.04 number of participants often believe that they have understanding of
communication through VHF-FM radio with other recreational vessels and equal number 04 participants
believe they seldom have the knowledge and understanding of communication by VHF-FM radio with
other recreational vessels and also 04 number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

VHF-FM RADIO ( RECREATIONAL VESSELS

6

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.17: Understanding of meaning of 1 and 2 whistle signal by recreational vessels.

Highly 02
Seldom 05
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.17 shows the understanding of 1 and 2 signals by recreational vessels.)2 number of participants
often believe that other recreational vessels understands the meaning of 1 and 2 whistle signal, where
as 05 number of participants seldom believe that other recreational vessels understand the meaning of
1 and 2 whistle signals and 04 number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

1&2 WHISTLE SIGNALS

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS

0
Highly Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.18: Understanding of navigational light configuration by recreational vessels.

Highly 04
Seldom 03
Never 02
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 03

Table 4.18 shows the understanding of navigational light configuration by recreational vessels.04 number
of participants often believe that other recreational vessels understand the navigation light
configuratiuon,03 participants seldom believe that other recreational vessels understands the
navigational light configuration where as 02 number of participants believe that recreational vessels
doesn’t understand the navigation light configuration and 03 number of participants doesn’t want to
comment on the issue.

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NAVIGATION LIGHT CONFIGURATION

5

3
NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS
2

0
Highly Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.19: Understanding of communication through whistle or spot light to attract the attention of
recreational vessels.

High 02
Seldom 06
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 03

Table 4.19 shows ability of crew to understand the communication through whistle or spot light to attract
the attention of recreational vessels.02 number of participants highly believe that they use
communication through whistle or spot light to attract other recreational vessels,06 number of
participants seldom believe that they make communication with whistle or spot light to attract the
attention of other recreational vessels, 01 number of participant doesn’t communicate with whistle or
spot light to attract other recreational vessels and 03 number of participants doesn’t want to comment
on the issue.

WHISTLE/SPOT LIGHT

7
6
5

NUMBER OF 4
PARTICIPANTS 3

2
1
0
High Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.20: Understanding the response of whistle /spotlight by recreational vessels.

Often 03
Seldom 02
Never 02
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 05

Table 4.20 shows response of recreational vessels on getting signal through whistle and spot light.03
number of participants often believe that recreational vessels maneuver upon getting response
through whistle or spot light,02 number of participants seldom believe that recreational vessels
maneuver upon getting the signals,02 number of participants don’t believe that they understand the
signals and 05 number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

WHISTLE/SPOT LIGHT FOR RECREATIONAL VESSELS

4
NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS
2

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.21: Understanding of communication by flash light or by whistling while making passing
arrangements with other commercial vessels.

Often 02
Seldom 01

Never 05
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.21: Shows use of whistle or spot light while making passing arrangements with other commercial
vessels.)2 number of participants often believe that they use spot light and whistle as communication
with other commercial vessels while making passing arrangements,01 number of participant seldom
believe that he makes communication like spot light or whistle to make passing arrangement with other
commercial vessel, 05 number of participants doesn’t make use of whistle or spot light while making

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AALESUND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

passing arrangements with other commercial vessels and 04 number of participants doesn’t want to
comment on the issue.

PASSING ARRANGEMENTS

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.22: Usefulness of radar to avoid the collisions

Very 06
Seldom 02
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.22 shows usefulness of radar to avoid collisisons.06 number of participants often believe that
they find information through radar as important to avoid the collisions,02 number of participants
seldom find the information through radar as important and 04 number of participants doesn’t want to
comment on the issue.

RADAR
7
6
5
NUMBER OF 4
PARTICIPANTS 3
2
1
0
Very Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.23: Usefulness of AIS/Electronic charts to plan ahead and avoid potential collisions with other
vessels.

Very 04
Seldom 03
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 05

Table 4.23 shows the usefulness of AIS /Electronic charts. .04 number of participants often believe that
they find information through AIS/Electronic charts as important to plan ahead and avoid the
collisions,03 number of participants seldom find the information through AIS/Electronic charts as
important and 05 number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

AIS

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS

0
Very Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.24: Usefulness of VTS.

Very 05
Seldom 02
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 05

Table 4.24 shows the usefulness of VTS. .05 number of participants often believe that they find
information through VTS as important ,02 number of participants seldom find the information through
VTS as important and 05 number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

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VTS
6

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS

0
Very Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.25: Understanding of crew of weather and location of other vessels

Often 07
Seldom 01
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.25 shows the understanding of crew regarding weather and location of other vessels. .07 number
of participants often believe that they have understanding of weather and location of other vessels ,01
number of participants seldom believe that he have understanding of weather and location of other
vessels and 04 number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

WEATHER AND LOCATION OF OTHER VESSELS

8

5
NUMBER OF
4
PARTICIPANTS
3

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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4.4 Social stress

Table 4.26: Loosing the Job

Often 00
Seldom 06
Never 06
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 00

Table 4.26 shows the fear in the minds of crew of losing the job. 06 number of participants often believe
that they have fear in their minds of losing the job and equal number 06 participants believe that they
never ever had any fear regarding losing their jobs.

FEAR OF LOOSING JOB

7
6
5
NUMBER OF 4
PARTICIPANTS 3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.27: Current marital status

Married 07
Single 05

Table 4.27 shows the marital status of the participants. Out of 12 numbers of participants, 07 numbers of
participants are married and 05 numbers of participants are single.

MARITIAL STATUS
8
7
6
5
NUMBER OF
4
PARTICIPANTS
3
2
1
0
Married OCCURANCE Single

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Table 4.28: Stability of relationships with the family

Often 01
Seldom 08
Never 03
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 00

Table 4.28 shows the stability in the relationships of crew members with their family when on board the
vessel. Out of 12 numbers of participants, 01 number of participant often believe that he worry about the
relationship with his family on board the ship, 08 numbers of participants seldom worry about the
relationships with their family members when on board the vessel where as 03 numbers of participants
never worry about their relationships when on board the vessel.

RELATIONSHIP STABILITY
9
8
7
6

NUMBER OF 5
PARTICIPANTS 4

3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t want
to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.29: Support to the family and paying the bills

Often 00
Seldom 03
Never 09
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 00

Table 4.29 shows the support of crew members to their family members for paying the bills. Out of 12
numbers of participants, 03 number of participant seldom worry about lending support to their family
members and pay their bills where as 09 numbers of participants never worry about support to their
family and paying the bills.

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SUPPORT TO FAMILY
10
9
8
7
6
NUMBER OF
5
PARTICIPANTS
4
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t want
to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.30: Role of cell phones/ emails in the stability of the family
Often 12
Seldom 00
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 00

Table 4.30 shows the role of cell phones/emails in the stability of the family when on board the vessel. All
of the participants 12 in number believes that cell phones/email often play an important role in providing
the stability towards their family members while working on the ship.

ROLE OF EMAILS/CELLPHONES ON BOARD A VESSEL

13
12
11
10
9
8
NUMBER OF 7
PARTICIPANTS 6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.31: Tense relationship with the crew members.

Often 01
Seldom 06
Never 04
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 01

Table 4.31 shows relationship between crew members working on board the vessel. Out of 12
participants only one of participant believe that he often have tense relationship with other crew
members, where as 06 number of participants occasionally have tense relationships with their crew
members where as 04 number of participants never had any tense relationship with other crew
members while working on board the vessel.

RELATIONSHIP WITH CREW

7

4
NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS
3

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

4.5 Mental workload

Table 4.32: Worry about other captain understanding, When Steering the vessel in front of other vessels

Often 06
Seldom 01
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.32 shows the worry of crew about other captain understanding while steering the vessel in front
of other vessels. Out of 12 participants 06 number of participants believe that they often worry about

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other captain understanding when steering the vessel in front of other vessels, where as 01 number of
participant never worry about other captain understanding when steering the vessel in front of other
vessels where as 04 number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

STEERING ISSUES
7

4
NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS 3

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.33: Worry about the other operator’s understanding of our vessel’s maneuvering limitations.

Often 03
Seldom 04
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.33 Worry of the crew members about other operator understands of their vessel maneuvering
limitations. Out of 12 participants, 03 numbers of participants often worry about the other operator
understanding of their vessel maneuvering limitations, 04 numbers of participants seldom worry about the
other operator understanding of their vessel maneuvering limitations and 04 numbers of participants don’t
want to comment on the issue.

4
NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS
2

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.34: Boredom in straight- away without any traffic.

Often 03
Seldom 04
Never 02
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 03

Table 4.34 shows crew boredom in straight away without any traffic. Out of 12 participants, 03 numbers of
participants often get bored while passing through non traffic zone, 04 numbers of participants seldom
get bored while passing through non traffic zone ,02 number of participants never get bored while
passing through non traffic zone and 03 numbers of participants don’t want to comment on the issue.

BOREDOM
6

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.35 Distraction of cell phone calls in busy waters

Often 06
Seldom 03
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 02

Table 4.35 shows crew distraction by cell phone calls in busy waters. Out of 12 participants, 06 numbers
of participants often get distracted by phone calls when they are passing through high traffic zone ,03
numbers of participants seldom get distracted by phone calls when they are passing through high traffic
zone,01 number of participants never get distracted by phone calls when they are passing through high
traffic zone and 02 numbers of participants don’t want to comment on the issue.

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DISTRACTION FROM CELL PHONES

7

4
NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS
3

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.36 Distraction of cell phone calls in Non busy waters

Often 02
Seldom 03
Never 05

Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 02

Table 4.36 shows crew distraction by cell phone calls in non busy waters. Out of 12 participants, 02
numbers of participants often get distracted by phone calls when they are passing through no traffic
zone ,03 numbers of participants seldom get distracted by phone calls when they are passing through no
traffic zone,05 number of participants never get distracted by phone calls when they are passing through
no traffic zone and 02 numbers of participants don’t want to comment on the issue.

DISTRACTION FROM CELL PHONES

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS
2

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.37: Dependence on navigational aids and landmarks.

Electronic charts 08
Paper charts 03
Radar 07
Publications/Notices 04

Table 4.37 shows crew dependence on navigational aids. Out of 12 participants, 08 numbers of
participants often depends on electronic charts for navigational aids and landmarks , 03 numbers of
participants often depends on paper charts for navigational aids and landmarks, 07 numbers of
participants often depends on radar for navigational aids and landmarks and 04 numbers of
participants depends on publications /notices for navigational aids and landmarks.

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
9

5
NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS
4

0
Electronic charts Paper charts Radar Publications/Notices
OCCURANCE

Table 4.38: Dependence on equipments for knowing other vessels location.

AIS 10
Radar 10
VHF-FM RADIO 05

Table 4.38 shows crew dependence on navigational aids. Out of 12 participants, 10 numbers of
participants often depends on AIS and Radar for navigational aids and landmarks and 05 numbers of
participants depends VHF-FM radio for navigational aids and landmarks.

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DEPENDENCE ON EQUIPMENTS
11
10
9
8
7

NUMBER OF 6
PARTICIPANTS 5
4
3
2
1
0
AIS Radar VHF-FM RADIO
OCCURANCE

Table 4.39: Reliability of radar in comparison to AIS for knowing vessel locations

More reliable than 09

As reliable as 01
Not as reliable as 00
I don’t know/Don’t want to answer 02

Table 4.39 shows reliability of radar in comparison to AIS for knowing vessel locations. Out of 12
participants, 09 numbers of participants often find radar communication means more reliable than AIS
for knowing the vessel locations, 01 numbers of participant find radar communication means as reliable
as AIS for knowing the vessel locations, and 02 numbers of participants doesn’t want to comment on the
issue.

RADAR PERFERENCE TO AIS

10
9
8
7
6
NUMBER OF
5
PARTICIPANTS
4
3
2
1
0
More reliable than As reliable as Not as reliable as I don’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.40: Paper charts reliability in comparison to electronic charts for navigational purposes

More reliable than 02

As reliable as 02
Not as reliable as 04
I don’t know/Don’t want to answer 04

Table 4.40 shows reliability of paper charts in comparison to electronic charts for navigational purposes.
Out of 12 participants, 02 numbers of participants find paper chart communication means more reliable
than electronic charts for navigational purposes, 02 numbers of participant find paper chart
communication means as reliable as electronic charts for navigational purposes, 02 numbers of
participants thinks that paper charts are not as reliable as electronic charts and 04 number of participants
doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS
2

0
More reliable than As reliable as Not as reliable as I don’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.41: Difficulty in operation of electronic charts

Often 00
Seldom 03
Never 06
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 03

Table 4.41 shows difficulty in operation of electronic charts for navigational purposes. Out of 12
participants, 03 numbers of participants seldom find difficulty in reading and operating electronic charts
for navigational purposes, 06 numbers of participants never find difficulty in reading and operating
electronic charts for navigational purposes and 03 numbers of participants doesn’t want to comment on
the issue.

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ELECTRONIC CHARTS

4
NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS
3

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.42: Difficulty in operating AIS transponder.

Often 00
Seldom 02
Never 08
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 02

Table 4.42 shows difficulty in operation of AIS transponder for navigational purposes. Out of 12
participants, 02 numbers of participants seldom find difficulty in operating AIS transponder for
navigational purposes, 08 numbers of participants never find difficulty in operating AIS transponder for
navigational purposes and 02 numbers of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

AIS TRANSPONDER
9

NUMBER OF 5
PARTICIPANTS 4

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.43: Dependence on Pilot house alarms for informing the problems about engine

Often 03
Seldom 01
Never 03
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 05

Table 4.43 shows the dependency of crew on pilot house alarms for informing the problems about the
engine. Out of 12 participants, 03 numbers of participants often depend on pilot house alarms for
informing the problems related to engines, 01 numbers of participant seldom depend on pilot house
alarms for informing the problems related to engines and 03 numbers of participants never depend on
pilot house alarms for informing the problems related to engines 05 numbers of participants doesn’t want
to comment on the issue.

PILOT HOUSE ALARMS

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.44: Vessel engines running at optimal performance

Often 05
Seldom 01
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 05

Table 4.44 shows the knowledge of crew over optimal performance of engine. Out of 12 participants, 05
numbers of participants often believe that vessel engines are running at optimal performance, 01
numbers of participant seldom believe that vessel engines are running at optimal performance, and 01

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number of participant never believe that vessel engines are running at optimal performance and 05
numbers of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

ENGINE PERFORMANCE

4
NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS
2

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.45: Steering the same course through the lock

Often 03
Seldom 02
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 07

Table 4.45 shows the knowledge of crew over steering the same course through the lock. Out of 12
participants, 03 numbers of participants often believe that they are steering the same course through the
lock, 02 numbers of participants seldom believe that that they are steering the same course through the
lock, and 07 numbers of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

STEERING THROGH THE LOCK

8
7
6
5
NUMBER OF
4
PARTICIPANTS
3
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.46: Steer the same course through the bridge

Often 06
Seldom 01
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 05

Table 4.46 shows the knowledge of crew over steering the same course through the Bridge. Out of 12
participants, 06 numbers of participants often believe that they are steering the same course through the
bridge, 01 numbers of participants seldom believe that that they are steering the same course through the
bridge, and 05 numbers of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

STEERING THROUGH BRIDGE

7

4
NUMBER OF
PARTICIPANTS 3

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.47: Encountering same commercial vessels on subsequent transits

Often 01
Seldom 04
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 06

Table 4.47 shows the crew encountering the same commercial vessels on subsequent transits. Out of 12
participants, 01 numbers of participant often believe that he is encountering the same commercial vessels
on subsequent transits, 04 numbers of participants seldom believe that they are encountering the same
commercial vessels on subsequent transits, 01 numbers of participant never believe that he is
encountering the same commercial vessels on subsequent transits and 06 numbers of participants
doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

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ENCOUNTERING COMMERCIAL VESSELS

7

NUMBER OF 3
PARTICIPANTS
2

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

Table 4.48: Encountering same passing arrangements with commercial vessels

Often 04
Seldom 03
Never 00
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 05

Table 4.48 shows the crew encountering the same passing arrangements with commercial vessels .Out
of 12 participants, 04 numbers of participant often believe that they are encountering the same passing
arrangements with commercial vessels, 03 numbers of participants seldom believe that they are
encountering the same passing arrangements with commercial vessels, and 05 numbers of participants
doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

PASSING ARRANGEMNETS
6

NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS

0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

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Table 4.49: Situation of wind / Tides/Currents presence by surprise.

Often 02
Seldom 04
Never 01
Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer 05

Table 4.49 shows sudden encounter to wind/Tides/Currents .Out of 12 participants, 02 numbers of

participant often believe that they encounter situation of wind, tides and currents suddenly by surprise, 04
numbers of participants seldom believe that they encounter situation of wind, tides and currents suddenly
by surprise, 01 number of participant never believe that he encounter situation of wind, tides and currents
suddenly by surprise and 05 numbers of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

WINDS/TIDES/CURRENTS
6
5
4
NUMBER OF
3
PARTICIPANTS
2
1
0
Often Seldom Never Doesn’t know/Don’t
want to answer
OCCURANCE

4.3 Combined results (All factors)

Figure 4.1: Showing combined effect of various factors

12

10

6
Often
4
Seldom
2
Never

0 Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer

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Figure 4.2: Showing combined effect of factors

9
8
7
6
5
4
3 Often
2
Seldom
1
0 Never

Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer

Figure 4.3: Showing combined effect of factors

9
8
7
6
5
4
3 Often
2
Seldom
1
0 Never

Doesn’t know/Don’t want to answer

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Chapter 5

Discussion of results

5.1 Fatigue Analysis

From the feedback of the participants, it was evident that there has not much effect of fatigue on
the normal working performance of the crew on board the vessel. This attribute to the awareness of the
companies on fatigue issues through various programs. From the questionnaire, we can see that most of
the crew doesn’t have any problems from the engine noise or vibrations which itself concluded the
awareness and possible work done by the company to provide insulation and sound proof
accommodation to the crew in order to avoid the fatigue issues. In addition to it, the working hours for
the crew and captain have been modeled in such a way that they don’t encounter fatigue issues by
working overtime and that way avoiding any possible loss of situational awareness. In addition to above
mentioned steps, companies are committed to provide crew endurance management programs (See
Tables (2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).

Apart from positives, we can also see in tables that some of participants feel that they are
subjected to fatigue issues due to improper sleep caused by noise coming from the engines and
vibrations. In simple words some of the companies are still lagging behind in providing sound proof
accommodations to its crew members which becomes primary reason for their crew to experience
fatigue issues. This could result in some catastrophic incidents. But the positives which we can take from
the survey that more and more companies have been indulged in providing better living conditions on
board the vessel and in future we see more companies will provide better accommodation for the
crew by incorporating sound proof facilities.

5.1.1 Company awareness of fatigue issues

From the finding of the fatigue issues from the feedback acquired from the participants working in
different companies and positions, we find that most of the companies are aware of fatigue issues and
lot of work has been done by them by incorporating some management and engineering solutions to
overcome the problem of fatigue on board a vessel(See table1).In addition to it some other
management programs like crew endurance management program(see table 2),providing better
working hours(see table 6) where the management provide shift preference system to make sure that
their crew doesn’t expose to working overtime. Moreover lot of work has been done by their companies
in combating the problem of noise coming from the engine and vibrations according to the participants.
This has been done by providing sound proof decks, doors bulkheads etc

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In brief the conclusion is that participant companies have been working in providing better work
atmosphere from better stress free accommodations to provision of flexible shifts, introduction of
management programs etc .This result in acquiring better situational awareness of the work on board
the vessel.

5.1.2 Crew Endurance Management System

Table 2 measures how many companies take measures to conduct fatigue or crew endurance training.
Table shows that 9% (approx) of companies, who employ the licensed officers interviewed, conduct this
training on a regular basis, while 33% conduct this training on an occasional basis ,25% of companies
never conduct this training and 33% of companies or participants doesn’t know about the program. From
the analysis, it is evident that around 42% of companies from the feedback of participants are aware of
crew endurance management system and programs which have been implemented in their training as
part of imparting knowledge. But still from the analysis of data majority of the participants feels that they
are not aware of CEMS and don’t know about its strengths.

The CEMS is primarily attributed to U.S Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard
with the purpose “This Instruction establishes the requirements and the delivery system to support a
program, Crew Endurance Management (CEM), to identify and control endurance risk for personnel
conducting cutter, boat, aviation, marine inspection and pollution response, security, command and
control operations and activities. This program serves all active duty, reserve, Auxiliary, and civilian Coast
Guard personnel”.
The review of endurance and fatigue management reveals key elements that should be included in CEM
to ensure its effectiveness on real grounds. They are as follows:-

1) Workload balancing.
2) Appropriate scheduling.
3) Training (for staff and supervisors).
4) Tools to plan and monitor crew endurance.
5) Consideration of environmental conditions.
6) Promotion of physical fitness.
7) Diet/nutrition considerations.
The workload balancing is vital element in CEMS by the virtue of which proper utilization of resources can
be performed. From the analysis of the data obtained from the questionnaire regarding work load
balancing shows that 03 participants (33.33%) prefer to work on 12 hour straight shift,07 participants (
58.33%) prefer to work on multi shifts of 6 hour on and 6 hours off, for one participant it doesn’t
matter if he choose to work on single 12 hour shift or work in multi shift of 6 hour on and 6 hour off

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and 01 participant doesn’t want to answer the query. See Table 6.Most of the participants working in
different companies believe that workload balancing in very important for better functioning as well as
avoid stress level on board a vessel. The introduction of different work shifts reduces the chances of the
crew to undergo working overtime, thereby providing better management of the crew (See table 3).
Appropriate scheduling of manpower with proper formulation of time schedules enable crew to act in
much better and safe way on board a vessel.
Training to the crew including the management programs like crew endurance management system to
identify and control endurance risk for personnel performing command and control operations and
activities (See Table 3).

5.1.3 Potential of fatigue

From the feedback of the questionnaire, it is evident that most of the participants working in different
companies have no issues with fatigue arising from mechanical, structural and engineering sources.
According to Tables 4, 02 participants (16%) often get fatigue from the noise of engine which causes
discomfort to them from sleeping sound in the night, where as majority of participant on board a vessel
10 participant(83.33%) never get fatigue from the noise of engine there by having no problem in
getting sound sleep after normal working on board a ship .
In similar way in case of discomfort from the noise and vibration of engines, According to Table 5 ,01
participant ( 9%) often gets fatigue from the vibration of the engine which prevent him from getting sound
sleep after normal working hours,03 participants ( 25%) participants occasionally gets fatigue from the
engine vibrations which prevent them from getting sound sleep where as majority 08 participants
(66.66%) doesn’t get any fatigue from the engine vibrations there by getting sound sleep after normal
working hours.
It concludes that majority of the crew doesn’t encounter any discomfort arising from the engine noise
and vibrations as most of the companies today consider it important to have insulation around the
accommodation and thereby providing better living conditions for the crew to remain stress and fatigue
free. Though in some of the cases as evident in response of some participants that they encounter
discomfort either from the noise of the engine or vibrations itself.
It is possible to see accident due to the fatigue factor in maritime industry, the Exxon Valdez case draw lot
of attention of the maritime organizations on the fatigue issue.” The Role Of Human Fatigue Factor
Towards Maritime Casualties” Maritime Transport & Navigation Journal, Vol. 2 (2010), No. 2.The US
th
tanker Exxon near Alaska’s coast got stranded on 24 March 1989( Cardiff University,1996).The primary
reason which came up in front from the investigation was the fatigue issue” there was no rested officer
to undergo the navigation during the voyage”

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5.2 Communication Analysis

The communication on board vessel is very important and plays vital role in safety of the vessel. The
communication can broadly be divided into internal communication which is communication between crew
and captain of the same ship or vessel or external communication between the captain and crew of
different vessels. Mostly with the decisions, signals and message sending between each other.
The main issue with communication appears to be associated with the lack of verbal communication
between the vessels, resulting in the increased use of the vessel’s whistle or spotlight as an alternate
means to verbal communication. It is not possible for the captain alone to know about all the activities
occurring on board vessel, so it becomes an equally important for crew/deckhands to inform about the
activities happening around. In the questionnaire itself, majority of the participants feel that deckhands
inform about the activities happening around the vessel to the captain to have better view.(See Table 07).

Table 7 shows how often the deckhands report to the captain regarding their routine rounds every single
day. It shows that o4 participants (33.33%) feel that deckhand often report about the rounds to the
captain, where as 07 participants (64%) feels that deckhands seldom report the rounds to the captain and
one participate doesn’t want to comment on the issue.

5.2.1 Communication with Other Commercial Vessels

There is no doubt in the fact that communication between two vessels captain is not only effective but
also effect tremendously in safety of the vessels through situational awareness. In the questionnaire it is
evident that verbal communication between two commercial vessels is important as most of the
participants believe that some kind of verbal communication is happening between two vessels. See
Tables 10, 11,12,13,14 and 15. This verbal communication forms the basis of the communication
including formulation and sending of the message, transmitting and receiving of the message and
understanding and acting on the message as described by Endsley, 1995.

The communication loop is demonstrated by Tables from 10-16, where most of the participants
interviewed were frequently able to conduct two-way passing arrangements with other commercial
vessels on VHF-FM radio. Further not only the crew feels highly confident in achieving the knowledge of
their navigation attributes through non verbal modes of signal like spot light and whistling (See Table 16)
but at same time acquires the situational awareness about the location of the other vessels around
them. Radar and AIS (especially with electronic chart integration) can be considered as optional and
additional modes of non verbal means of communications which further strengthens the ability to
acquire situational awareness on board vessel to combat catastrophic incidents.( See Table 21,22 and
23).

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5.2.2 Communication with VTS

The use of VTS plays an important role in attaining the situational awareness in terms of communication
regarding the location, course of action and speed of other vessel transiting the waters. The information
attained from VTS helps the captain to adjust the speed and course to accommodate the passing
arrangements for other vessels. See Table 20.VTS as tool helps in broadcasting the location of the
vessels. See Table 23.In the questionnaire, 05 number of participants often believe that they find
information through VTS as important ,02 number of participants seldom find the information through
VTS as important and 05 number of participants doesn’t want to comment on the issue. In general, all
the captains consider that information acquired from VTS is highly reliable and helps in preventing
catastrophic collisions with other vessels around.

5.2.3 Communication with Recreational Vessels

The main issue with the communication between normal and recreational vessel is repeated use of non
verbal means of communication.(See Tables 15,16,17,18 and 19).The analysis shows that most of the
time only way of communication between commercial and recreational vessels in non-verbal using 1 and
2 type of whistle because of lack of radio equipments. However it has been observed that using non
verbal means of communication doesn’t affect situational awareness in both type of communications
message is formulated, generated, transmitted and received and finally acted upon.

5.3 Social Stress Analysis

Social stress was not determined to be a significant factor in loss of situational awareness. This result can
be credited to the captain’s socio-economic status and supportive relationships among family and vessel
crew. Socioeconomic status (SES) is generally measures in terms of education, occupation and income.
It is commonly conceptualized as the social standing or class of an individual or group. When viewed
through a social class lens, privilege, power, and control are emphasized. Furthermore, an examination of
SES as a gradient or continuous variable reveals inequities in access to and distribution of resources.
SES is relevant to all realms of behavioral and social science, including research, practice, education,
and advocacy.

5.4 Workplace Stress Analysis

Multiple factors can affect the decision making of the captain working on board a vessel. Research shows
that strain in the job and repetitive hazardous work conditions may impose serious effects in situational
awareness of ongoing activity generally because of loss of information or awareness. Stress experienced

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and perceived can affect a person’s psychological well-being. Work stress research has examined the
psychological demands of a work load, workers’ perceived sense of control over their performance, safety
stressors, work organization, and work atmosphere (Clarke, 2006; Aittomäki, Lahelma, & Roos, 2003;
Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002; Dembe, Erickson, Delbos, & Banks, 2005; MacDonald,
Harenstam, Warren, & Punnett, 2008; Landsbergis, Cahill, & Schnall, 1999).

From the questionnaire, the primary factors that can influence the decision making on board the vessel
are marital status of the crew, stability in the relationship with the family support to the family in paying
their bills, use of cell phones in communicating the family members at the time of sailing, relationship with
crew members etc

From the questionnaire, Table 25 telling the pressure in the minds of the crew to lose the job. This can
play an important role in situational awareness lapse primarily due to the fear in the mind of the crew to
lose the job. From the analysis it was mix result as exactly half participants believe that they have fear
in the mind to lose their jobs while they are away from their family.

Stability of relationship with family plays an important role which again has mixed results in the
questionnaire. Table 27 shows the stability in the relationships of crew members with their family when on
board the vessel. Out of 12 numbers of participants, 01 number of participant often believe that he worry
about the relationship with his family on board the ship, 08 numbers of participants seldom worry about
the relationships with their family members when on board the vessel where as 03 numbers of
participants never worry about their relationships when on board the vessel.

Support to the family and paying the bills is another factor that could create confusion and uncertainty in
the minds of personnel working on board a vessel. But from the questionnaire most of the participants
are of the opinion that they don’t often worry of supporting family and paying the bills. While this again
depends on the location and country your are from. Since the economic condition of people in general in
Norway is better than most other countries because of the organized system rendered by the
government institutions which almost cover all important aspects of human needs like housing, health
and economic conditions. So most of the participants don’t think much of the support to the family in
terms of money (See Table 28).

Table 28 shows the support of crew members to their family members for paying the bills. Out of 12
numbers of participants, 03 number of participant seldom worry about lending support to their family
members and pay their bills where as 09 numbers of participants never worry about support to their
family and paying the bills.

Tense relationship with crew members on board a vessel plays huge affect on the thinking capability and
situational awareness of the crew. It can affect the decision making capability of the individual and it is

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evident from the questionnaire, that most of the crew members have cordial relationship and seldom see
any conflict of interest between them.

Table 30 shows relationship between crew members working on board the vessel. Out of 12 participants
only one of participant believe that he often have tense relationship with other crew members, where
as 06 number of participants occasionally have tense relationships with their crew members where as
04 number of participants never had any tense relationship with other crew members while
working on board the vessel.

5.5 Mental workload analysis

Mental workload is vital in evaluating the performance of captain, crew members, a duty officer,
dockhand, a helmsman and a pilot. Mental workload is useful to evaluate performance of ship bridge
teammates: a captain, a duty officer, a helmsman, and a pilot. The physiological indices, heart rate
variability and nasal temperature, are good indices of the mental workload found in ship handling;
however, it is best if we get response and evaluation results quickly on the spot.

In fact, a further breakdown of mental workload shows that loss of situational awareness could be
possible in case of some external distractions like a cell phone call from family or from the company at the
time when vessel is passing through high traffic zone in between number of recreational vessels. The
urgency of call some time divert the attention of the captain and may result in loss of situational
awareness and end up in catastrophic incidents.

It could be worry about other captain understanding, when steering the vessel in front of other vessels, it
could be because of boredom while sailing through straight waterways without traffic around, it could also
be because of distraction from the cell phones while passing through high traffic zones. See Tables 31,
33 and 34.
In addition to above mentioned factors some time situational awareness can also be result of
repetitive work pattern which develop complacency among the crew and posses’ serious threat to the
safety Furthermore, the results shows that lapses often occur due to complex design and operation of
some operations.

5.6 Distraction and Loss of Situational Awareness

In most of the cases the potential loss of situational awareness is because of lack of confidence,
competencies or decision making at crucial juncture of time. See Tables 31 and 32. This is due to lack of
confidence in the competencies or predictability of the recreational vessel operator, especially in regards
to the operator’s lack of understanding of the meaning of whistle signals and navigational light

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configuration and lack of understanding about the maneuverability of the vessel. The lack of confidence
and competence among the crew is predominately because of increased fear, lack of attention,
distraction, worry of other vessel operator’s skills. See Table 31 and 32.

5.7 Mental workload analysis vs. Situational awareness

There is direct relation between mental workload and situational awareness, though situational
awareness has not gained that focus as compared to factors like fatigue or stress. Situation awareness is
defined as the perception of various elements present in the environment with in volume of time and
space. It is primarily a cognitive phenomenon which supports the actions but it is not the part of the action
itself. There is interaction between mental workload and the situational awareness. The relationship
between situation awareness and mental workload is explained by operator experience and skills. Skilled
operators can generally preserve situational awareness with lower resource cost (Wickens, 2001)

If we see deep into mental workload, we come across the exact correlation with term complacency. In
other words due to repetitive nature of operation or job, there developed a casual approach of the
operator to do that operation there by creating loss of situational awareness and finally accident. In
particular it is difficult to come across exact reasons for loss of situational awareness or complacency on
human part while doing a particular operation. It could be dull nature of work, repetitive cycles, distraction
of any kind, and mental stress, and workload, difficulty in coping with complex technologies, system
design complexity and complex interfaces. Moreover lot of research has been done in finding out exact
reasons of complacent behavior on the part of human to make those mistakes. However there are some
similarities in both aviation and maritime industry as both are falling under the category of transportation
and it is highly possible that the factors which lead to complacency on human part in aviation find some
similarities in maritime industry.

5.8 Complacency Theories to maritime industry/Vessels

The result from the complacency theory in maritime industry is likely to occur in case the captain of ship
steering the vessel in normal environmental conditions undergoing same set of repetitive operations and
following the same path each and every time. Every time following the same checklists, passing same
commercial vessels, using same means of communication every time, using same charts and means to
navigate. This repetitive nature of operation performed by captain and crew members over longer
duration often develops environment of boredom and operators, crew or captain develop causal way of
performing the same set of things with a mindset that he cannot be wrong pretending to be master in
performing the operations. This often results in forming loss of situational awareness and thereby
resulting in disaster.

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Chapter 6
Risk Management
6.1 Theory

There is always risk involved during the marine operations. Risk management technique is employed to
identify and then manage threats that could severely impact on operations. Generally, the process take
into consideration the various operations involved in identifying potential threats to the organization and
the chances or likelihood of their occurrence, and then after analyzing the data, steps or actions to
address the most likely threats.

In every situation where there is urgency to make decision ,there is always amount of doubt and
uncertainty in the minds of decision makers who have to see pro and cons of the decision and the
impact it brings with it.” Uncertainty exists where the all possible consequences of an event are unknown,
the probability of either the hazards and/or their associated consequences are uncertain, or both the
consequences and the probabilities are unknown”,Bitaraf, Saminehsadata and Mohammad Shahriaria
.The immediate step to carry out in order to assess the impact of risk, it is foremost important to study
the root cause analysis of various steps from possible risk involved, the frequency of
occurance,possible impact of it. This phenomenon where attention is paid on evaluation of risk involved
and finding out what impact it will have on the system is called as Risk assessment.

The main threats in carrying out operations are can be technical causes, organizational causes and
maintenance issues. But it has been observed that major causes of accidents are due to lapse of
situational awareness on the part of crew that ultimately results in happening of catastrophic incident. The
required considerations and appropriate actions to reduce the risks levels as a result of identified
variables have been analyzed for the selected possible hazardous scenarios.

The implementation of this model in the selected case study proves that the model has the ability to
support decision makers and managers in the working environment to take up immediate necessary
action or steps by addressing the important key variables which cause potential threat for hazard
situation.

6.2 The concept of risk:-

Risk is the probability that a hazard will turn into a disaster. In general everyone has its own way of
expressing the term risk and as child we all been told often that don’t do this, don’t do that as there is an
element of risk involved in it.

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Even though the result of taking risk could be devastating but still we all take risks simply because we
calculate the impact and possible consequences of it is called as calculated risk. Example we all know
that driving a motor bike or car ,climbing a mountain or investing money in share market is risky affair
and is like do or die situation but still we take it as we evaluate it carefully and believe that the chances
of its occurrence are rare.

When we evaluate a risk, therefore, we take into account two factors - the probability of something
happening that we don't want, and the consequences if it does.

Another example which could be stated is journey by airplane as every one of us are aware of
consequences if something bad happen. The chances of survival are negligible but at the same time we
never hesitate to travel by plane, simply because it is very rare that it will happen.”The Probability of it is
very small nearly 1 in 52 million according to National Transportation Safety Board. Therefore it low
possibility of occurrence make the risk very acceptable.

So whether we choose to accept or decline a risk depends on the mix of two factors:

 probability; and
 consequence

Therefore identifying, evaluating and understand risk is very important and crucial part. The first part in
defining risk management process is to define the risk involved in particular operation to be performed.
For example in our case operation with engine on board a vessel, we need to define the whole operation
of the engine along with possible risk factors that are threat to its operation.

After defining the possible risks involved in carrying out engine operation, the next step is to analyze the
possible risks. By doing it we can possibly find out that what causes what. In other words which factor has
the potential to breakdown the engine while it is performing or what could be the possible consequence of
the failure. By analysis we are in better position to define various risks involved with a particular
operation and at the same time we have made a check list which is equipped enough to define causes
and consequences or failure. It is also called as Risk analysis and it is further divided into two categories
viz risk identification and Risk evaluation. In these two categories, majority of times a check list is
developed which states how much is the risk involved in carrying out a particular operation, what
could be possible reasons for the failure and what would be the consequences.

The next step in risk management process is risk control and risk financing. In the risk control emphasis
has been laid on elimination of risks, following some rules and policies to reduce the risks involved in
carrying out operations.

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Figure 6.1: Risk Management Process, Courtesy of Textbook, Risk, Issues and Crisis Management,
Magne Aarset

6.3 Managing risks

In order to manage the risks in demanding marine operations, it is very important to carry out over all risk
assessment within marine operations. The risk assessment of operations is designated to formulate
procedure which defines which operation is critical and associated with greater amount of risk. According
to DNV three-step process for management of risks within marine operations: − “An overall risk
assessment of the operations to define them within low (L), medium (M) or high (H) potential risk
categories”.

Based on the intent of risk involved in a particular operation, a detailed risk identification program should
be established by the virtue of which a potential risk in a particular operation is reduced to an acceptable
level through specific actions and risk reducing activities.

The risk assessment has been carried out by following:-

1. FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis)

a. (FMEA Analysis techniques for system reliability)
b. (FMEA Practices for heavy mechanical machinery Applications)
c. (Design FMEA, Process FMEA and Machinery FMEA)
2. FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis)
3. FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)
4. HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Analysis)

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5. CCA (Cause Consequence Analysis)

6. MORT (Management Oversight Risk Tree)
7. SMORT (Safety Management Organization Review Technique)
8. 4 M’s method.
9. Functional flow chart oriented methodology.
10. Monte-Carlo simulation method.

6.4 METHODOLOGY

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5

Establish Establish Overall Risk Risk

process acceptance assessment & identification reducing
plan criteria Categorization activities activities

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)

Check list Check list

Risk activities risk reducing

Check list activities

Process Assessment process

(F) (G) (H) (I)

Risk management plan

(J)Risk management plan

Figure 6.2: Methodology to carry out risk management process

(A) --- HSE Philosophy ownership, (B)---Risk acceptance criteria (C)--- Categorization of operations.
(D)--- Mandatory tools (E) --- Optional tools (J) ----- Risk management program

(A) HSE Philosophy and Strategy:-In risk management process specific HSE policy and strategy
should be formulated which targets to achieve safety and repute in the following areas:- Personnel
safety, Environment, Assets and Reputation

(B) Risk Acceptance criteria:-They should be broadly categorized into two types:

Consequence categories and Probability categories. In consequence categories, consequence

should be divided into categories. Each category should have specific criteria in compliance with HSE

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policy and goals. The probability categories should be qualitatively described with supplementary
guidance if needed.

Risk categories: - The consequence and probability category describes risk. They should be under
categories with higher risk, lower risk and medium risks categories.

Acceptable Risk: The Low Risk category is considered acceptable subject to application of the
principle of ALARP and activities as specified in this RP.

(B) Categorizations of Operations: According to DNV, “HSE policy should be defined, and as basis
for specifying required QA activities, risk identification activities and risk reducing activities for the
planned operations should be categorized into the following potential risk categories”: -Low,
medium and high.

6.5 How risk is associated with loss of situational awareness?

The four stages to mitigate risk involves are Appraisal, Planning, Execution and Monitoring. The first
step in the process is collecting the information needed before planning stage. This is the first step
where the situational awareness is gained. In this stage of the process all relevant information and
data is collected to be used in the next stage.

The second stage is planning itself. In this step the information and data which is collected is
projected ahead. The next stage in passage planning is planning itself. This is equivalent to
understanding and projecting ahead. The navigation of entire vessel has always been challenge and
must be adequately planned with unique strategies.

Execution and monitoring are the next two stages of planning. The right combination of these is very
important for projecting the situational awareness. While executing and monitoring, the team
members shall maintain a close and continuous monitoring of the vessel’s position.

In fact in all the factors taken into consideration in the questionnaire from usefulness of
communication means like VHF-FM radio, Usefulness of radar and electronic charts, passing
arrangements of vessels, understanding of navigational aids, steering through bridge and lock etc.

There is always an enormous amount of risk associated and therefore it becomes very important to
carry out proper risk management program to carry out these operations in very effective and risk free
manner.

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6.5 Risk management plan

Introduction
Objectives
Application Step 1
Overall Responsibility

HSE Philosophy and Strategy

HSE Goals
HSE Philosophy Step 2
QA and QS Philosophy
Risk Accept Criteria

Organization and Resp.

Organization Step 3
Key Personnel

Object and Operation Step 4

Defined Objects and Operations
Overall Risk Assessment and Risk Category

Process, Risk Identification and Risk Reducing Activities

Process Activities
General QA Activities
Risk Identification Activities Step 5
Risk Reducing Activities
Close Out

6.6 Hazard Identification activities

The hazard identification is generally dependent on the type of activity or process like if it is engineering
process, procedural process, mechanical process or activity based.

In general applications where there is involvement of human or some task has been accomplished by
human, task analysis or procedural HAZOP is right tool for identification of hazard and it generally
account for human error while undergoing that task.

FMEA (Failure mode effect analysis) is carried out where there is criticality in terms of information of
failure modes of the equipment or process alone.

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6.8 Methodology flow chart

Need for marine operation

.

- Define objects to be handled

- Define required operations for

each object

Define screening/accept criteria

- For each operation conclude on

potential risk based on assessment.

- For each object summarize and

conclude and on potential risk. Assessment form
Conclusions:

High, Medium, Low potential risk

Prepare first part of Risk

Management Plan specifying Risk
Reducing Activities and detailed
Risk Identification Activities. Plan
will be a function of defined Overall process activities
category (higher risk will result in a
more comprehensive plan).

Overall Goal-Define Risk ID and QA activities

reducing activities place them in
time and clearly assign
responsibilities Detailed risk identification and
reduction activities
Define main activity and detailed
follow up

Check Lists to form part of Risk Activity check list format and guidance
Management Plan.

Perform detailed risk identification

activities as specified in Risk
Management Plan (Hazop, Hazid.)

Category

Ok

70

Re-assess operation and specified activities if major

revision of methods and/or change of contractors
AALESUND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

Chapter 7

Recommendations

7.1 Management Support

The most important criteria to address situational awareness and safety on board a vessel is to ensure
the inclusion of management support at right time. It has been found that management support is often
handy in long-term improvement on board a vessel. Each ship board management team mostly
comprises of two Masters and two chief engineers which are responsible for the overall care of the
vessels. The idea of introduction of management support stimulates the interest and involvement in their
own vessel by active involvement to ensure optimal maintenance and meeting technical requirements in
long terms to cut down the costs.

The Masters and Chief Engineers work together, while on board and are primarily responsible for the
overall functioning of vessel and includes budgets, spares and stores, and repairs and maintenance. In
addition to this, both are also responsible for the risk management, inclusion of safety and regulatory
issues in addition to recruitments of right personnel and ratings. The balance between offshore and
management on vessel is very important and lapse in this often result in occurrence of catastrophic
incident. The shore organization should provide technical support, crewing and co-ordination between
the personnel etc.By including management support there is tremendous improvement in the system in
terms of making fast decisions, improving the cost effectiveness and motivating the
people.workers,officers to work effectively with lesser risks.

7.2 Identification of costs

The cost incurred in case of accidents is categorized into direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are the
costs that include loss of inventory, commodities, vessel breakdown, damage to the structure, the cost
involved in the repair of the vessel and the compensation to be given to the workers. The costs to be
incurred in medical aid to the workers, personnel include medical expenses for hospitals, doctors, drugs
and health insurance etc.

The indirect costs are the costs which are to be paid in terms of contingent costs like the damage
done to the environment, pollution caused due to the accident, marine life disturbed and the other
factors which are directly linked to the environment. These indirect costs are something which is
difficult for the ship owners or the company to evaluate and often end up in disaster to the company in
terms of money. In some of the cases the extent of damage to the environment is that much that it is

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often observed that sum total of all the expenses from the indirect costs is much more than direct costs
involved in the accidents. Therefore it is very important to include better management and safety
programs in order to avoid the accidents there by saving enormous amount of capital which
otherwise be disaster to the company.

7.3 Inclusion of Safety Management program

In most of the cases nearly 70-80% of the accidents and causalities occur due to the negligence of
human called human error or human element. Human element plays huge role in causing marine
causalities, including those where structural or equipment failure. Consequently, the international
maritime community and the U.S. Coast Guard saw the need to emphasize shipboard safety
management practices to minimize human errors or omissions. Therefore inclusion of safety management
program is very important element in avoiding any catastrophic incident to occur.

7.4 Objectives of safety management program:-

- To provide safe working conditions and safe practices in ship operations in accordance with rules
and regulations of IMO with special consideration to environment and safety.
- To incorporate risk management program like preventive risk management program etc.
- To enhance the skills and knowledge of the working crew members in identifying the risks and
mitigating at their own.

A Safety management program consists of following elements:-

a) Safety and Environmental Protection Policy

b) Company Responsibility and Authority
c) Designated Persons
d) Master’s Responsibility
e) Resources and Personnel
f) Vessel Operating Procedures
g) Emergency Preparedness
h) Reporting Procedures
i) Maintenance
j) Documentation
k) Company Verification and Review

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7.5 Safety and Environmental Protection Policy

There should be very clear safety and environment policy that clearly defines the responsibilities and
commitment to the safety of the crew and vessel in accordance with the environment rules. The
company’s objectives and standards must be set at the highest level that is reasonable for the company
to enforce. (As per Safety Management System manual Guidebook), by Commandant (G-MSO-2)
U.S. Coast Guard. At the very least, the company shall comply with all mandatory rules and regulations.
The policy should describe:

- The policy should describe all the interacting elements in very clear way.
- The policy should describe how the following objectives are to be met and various procedures.
- The policies should describe all the safeguards against every possible risk on board a vessel.
- Avoidance of damage to the vessel and the property.

The policy should encourage continuous improvement in safety awareness and safety management
skills. It should be signed by the owner or comparable decision-maker and should be reviewed at regular
intervals to ensure that it remains relevant and effective.

7.6 Company Responsibility and Authority

In accordance with Section 33 CFR 96.230 (b), “A company must document the responsibility, authority
and interaction of all personnel who manage, perform and verify the work relating to and affecting safety
and pollution prevention”.(As per Safety Management System manual Guidebook), by Commandant
(G-MSO-2) U.S. Coast Guard.

Responsibility
In accordance to Section 33 CFR 96.230, responsibilities have to be fixed at first place and are as
follows:-

1) Appropriate details of the ship operator(s)

2) The full name and entity of the operator responsible for operation of the ship if not the owner
himself must have been brought to the notice of Coast guard.
3) The person(s) or position(s) with the highest authority in the development, implementation, and
maintenance and how they can be contacted.
4) The person(s) or position(s) with the responsibility to carry out overall operational responsibility
and authority to govern procedures for safety, environmental protection.

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7.7 Master’s responsibility

Master’s responsibility plays an major role and formulated and referenced in the Section 33 CFR
96.250( d,e),(As per Safety Management System manual Guidebook), by Commandant (G-MSO-2)
U.S. Coast Guard as follows:-

1) The company should always documents the roles and responsibilities with regard to safety and
environmental policies of the company.
2) Motivating the crew to follow and understand the policies.
3) Make sure that policies have been implemented by the personnel on board the vessel.
4) Reporting in case of non understanding and the deficiencies to the shore management at the
earliest as possible.

7.8 Resources and personnel

In accordance to Section 33 CFR 96.250 (f), (As per Safety Management System manual Guidebook),
by Commandant (G-MSO-2) U.S. Coast Guard, rules for resources and personnel should be
implemented and are as follows:-

The recruitment of the master(s) is very important and should only be appointed if -

1) They have required amount of training under their belt.

2) They are medically fit.
3) They must hold experience and valid certifications from international operations.
4) They have ample experience to carry out the operations on type of vessel assigned to them.

7.9 Communication

It is the responsibility of the Master to ensure that all the crew members are able to communicate with
each other as well as with the passengers on board.

Effective communication between the crew and their passengers can be crucial in the outcome of an
emergency situation.

7.10 Vessel operating procedures

It is very important that company should document various procedures that are linked with plans and
instructions for vessel operations concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution. The
various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel. This information should be
easily understood by all relevant shipboard personnel.

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7.11 Hints and Suggestions

For instance all the documentation regarding various procedures, implementation procedures and
instructions should be kept very simple and understandable in terms of implementation. Checklists may
help to guarantee that all routines in a particular operational phase are covered.

Two areas have to be covered one is regulatory and other is Non regulatory. (As per Safety
Management System manual Guidebook), by Commandant (G-MSO-2) U.S. Coast Guard

Regulatory

Certification of Inspection - 46 CFR 176

Certificates and Documentation - SOLAS

Discharge of Oils and Garbage - 33 CFR 151

Working Hours - 46 CFR 15.710

Personnel Management and Standards - 46 CFR 10

On Board Medical Arrangements - 46 CFR 184.710, 160.041

Checking Stability - 46 CFR 185.315, 185.340

Assessment of Weather Conditions - 46 CFR 185.304

Securing Loading Doors, Hatches, and All Openings - 46 CFR 185.330, 185.335

Pre-Underway Checklist - 46 CFR 185.320

Voyage Plan and Verification of Nautical Charts and Publications - 46 CFR 184.420, 185.503; 33 CFR
62.21

Loading and Discharging Passengers - 46 CFR 185.506, 185.504 Fuelling and Ventilation Requirements
for Gas Powered Vessels - 46 CFR 182.460

Bridge Watch keeping Arrangements - Rule 5, Inland Navigational

Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972; and Rule 5, Inland Navigational Rules Act of 1980 (33
U.S.C. 2005)

Other Watch keeping Arrangements - 46 CFR 15.705; Rule 5, Inland Navigational Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972; and Rule 5, Inland Navigational Rules Act of 1980 (33 U.S.C. 2005)

Special Requirements for Bad Weather and Fog - 46 CFR.510, 185.512

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7.12 Emergency Preparedness

The company should establish procedures to prepare for various emergencies involving pollution and the
safety of the vessel, crew, and passengers. The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to
qualified personnel.
(As per Safety Management System manual Guidebook), by Commandant (G-MSO-2) U.S. Coast
Guard

Regulatory

Fire Fighting Drills and Training - 46 CFR 185.524

Abandon Ship and Man Overboard Drills and Training - 46 CFR 185.512, 185.520, 180.210

Discharge of Oil, Garbage, and Response to Pollution - MARPOL 73/78 Regulation 26, Protocol I

Fire - 46 CFR 185.524

Flooding and Flood Control - 46 CFR 182.500-530

Man Overboard - 46 CFR 185.510

First Aid - 46 CFR 184.710, 160.041

7.13 Reporting procedures

In accordance to Section 33CFR 96(g).As per Safety Management System manual Guidebook), by
Commandant (G-MSO-2) U.S. Coast Guard, there should be scope of documenting the reporting
procedures as “The reporting of accidents, hazardous situations, and discharges of oil and garbage
should be done in a timely manner. Corrective measures taken should improve safety and pollution
prevention. Procedures and responsibilities for reporting these events will be clearly established.

Non-conformities may be identified by any crew member at any time or during an SMS internal audit.
Non-conformity reports should be available for use by any crew member who identifies non-conformity.
This form describes the non-conformity, proposed corrective actions, and corrective actions taken. It lists
and has the signatures of the person(s) involved in the detection and correction of the non-conformity”.

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7.14 Maintenance

In accordance to section 33 CFR 96.250 (j). (As per Safety Management System manual Guidebook),
by Commandant (G-MSO-2) U.S. Coast Guard ,the company should make all possible efforts to
document various maintenance procedures for each vessel and are as follows:-

1) To hold inspections at appropriate intervals.

2) To report non-conformities with possible cause, if it is known.
3) To take corrective measures and actions
4) To formulate preventive maintenance programs, maintain records of inspections, non-
conformities and corrective actions for future actions.

In accordance to Section 33 CFR 250.96 (j), the following areas to be covered under regulatory
Dry-dock and internal examinations - 46 CFR 176.600 through 670
Hull inspection - 46 CFR 176.802
Machinery inspection - 46 CFR 176.804
Electrical inspection - 46 CFR 176.806
Lifesaving Equipment inspection and maintenance - 46 CFR 176.808, Part 185 Subpart G
Firefighting Equipment inspection and maintenance - 46 CFR 176.810, 181.120, NFPA 10
Pressure Vessel and Boiler inspections - 46 CFR 176.812
Steering System inspection - 46 CFR 176.814
Miscellaneous Systems and Equipment inspections - 46 CFR 176.816

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Chapter 8

Conclusion

In this study we have evaluated various factors which could have some impact on the situational
awareness of the crew on board a vessel. These factors are as follows: - Fatigue, drugs, social stress,
mental load etc.

These factors if not addressed properly will certainly going to have adverse effect on the situational
awareness of the operator or crew which can lead to catastrophic incidents. These factors were
compared and mental workload was identified as the most predominant factor that caused loss of
situational awareness. Various possibilities have been discussed in this study taking into consideration
ground situation of crew/captain and other staff working on the vessel.

The feedback obtained from the questionnaire duly filled by the people working in different companies,
having different field of experience and have different set of skills and predominant factors and their
outcomes have been documented in sequence. A further examination of mental workload revealed that
loss of situational awareness is likely to occur during situations where the vessel captain is discussing
business matters with the company on cell phone or steering in the vicinity of recreational vessels.

It has also been found out that in some cases complacency factor is responsible for the lapse and loss of
situational awareness thereby increasing the possibility of accident.

The loss of situational awareness could be avoided by having good awareness of various safety and
management programs implemented by the companies to measure unsafe behaviors, to avoid regular
repetitive operations etc. Variation and avoidance of routine operations can be an effective tool for
addressing complacency potential.

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Further work

 To develop procedure to measure situational awareness during real time simulations on simulator
using Freeze probe and Real Time Probe Techniques.
 To suggest the matrices for situational awareness with respect to risks.
 To make simulations on simulator using Observer Rating, SAGAT and SART Approaches.

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Factors Integration Defence Technology Centre (HFI-DTC) Brunel University, BIT Lab, School of
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Endsley, M.R. & Smolensky, M.W.1998: Situational Awareness in Air Traffic Control

Jones D.G; & Endsley, M.R .1996: Sources of Situation Awareness errors in aviation, Aviat Space Envir
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Maritime Accidents and Human Performance: The Statistical Trail: Clifford C. Baker, American Bureau of
Shipping, Ah Kuan Seah, American Bureau of Shipping; Presented at MARTECH 2004, Singapore,
September 22-24, 2004

International centre for cruise research, Marine accidents report (1979-2012)

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William B. Fitzpatrick, and Cory C. Sheffer
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McCallum, Marvin C., et al. Communications Problems in Marine Casualties. Groton: U.S. Coast Guard
Research and Development Center, 2000.
AALESUND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

APPENDIX: INTREGRATED SURVEY AND INTERVIEW

This is a questionnaire for use in a pilot study at Aalesund University College comparing perception of
situational awareness during operations in the aviation and the marine industry.

The information in this questionnaire will be treated completely anonymous, exclusively for scientific
research and there will be no possibilities for tracking any of the respondents.

Thank you for your participation!

Section A

1. Gender: .................

2. Age: .................

3. What is your position on the vessel you are sailing on regularly? ...............

4. For how many years have you been holding a License for this position (see question 3)?

…….…………………………

5. How many days are you usually onboard the vessel (see question 3) per

year?...........................................

6. How would you like to describe your present condition of physical health? (Mark the alternative

below.)

a) Excellent b) Good c) Fair d) Poor

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Section B (Fatigue)

1. How often have you experienced fatigue issues, which you feel compromised safety on board the
ship for the latest year?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know / I don't want to answer

2. Have you been trained with respect to crew endurance management?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know / I don't want to answer

3. How often have been working overtime while at sea for the latest year?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

4. Do you find it difficult to sleep because of the noise coming from the engine room?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

5. Do you find it difficult to sleep because of the vibration coming from the engine room?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
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d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

6. How would you rate the quality of sleep on board the vessel as compared to normal sleep you
have when at home?

a) Good
b) Fair
c) Poor
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

7. What do you prefer regarding shifts on board?

a) I prefer one 12 hour shift

b) Prefer Multi-shifts like 6 Hours on - 6 hours off
c) Doesn’t make any difference
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer
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SECTION C – Communication

Here, the questions are regarding communication on board the vessel you are sailing on regularly, and
could e.g. be communication between crewmembers or members of the crew on other vessels.

Here, by “Deckhand” we mean a member of the crew who performs manual labor on board.

1. The deckhand’s __________ report the results of their rounds of the vessel?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

2. The deckhand’s __________ can be counted on to report hazards to navigation at night?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

3. I am ____________ satisfied that I understand wind and current when I relieve the watch?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

4. I am ____________ satisfied that I understand the location of other vessels and hazards to
navigation when I relieve the watch?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer
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5. I am ____________ confident that I understand my vessel’s navigation light configuration and

change it whenever required by the rules to do so.
a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

6. I ___________ communicate passing arrangements to other commercial vessels via VHF-FM

radio?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

7. Other commercial vessels ___________ respond via VHF-FM radio?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

8. I am ____________ confident that other commercial vessels understand navigation light

configuration?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

9. I ___________ communicate passing arrangements to other recreational vessels via VHF-FM

radio?
a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer
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10. Other recreational vessels ___________ respond via VHF-FM radio or other signal device?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don’t know/I don’t want to answer

11. I am ____________ confident that recreational vessels understand the meaning of 1 and 2
whistle signal?
a) Highly
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don’t know/I don’t want to answer

12. I am ____________ confident that recreational vessels understand my navigation light

configuration?

a) Highly
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

13. I ______________ use my whistle or spotlight to attract the attention of other recreational
vessels?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

14. The recreational vessels ____________ maneuvers out of the way upon hearing my whistle or
seeing my spotlight?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
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d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

15. I ___________ flash my spotlight or use my whistle when making passing arrangements with
other commercial vessels?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer
16. I find that information on vessel characteristics from radar is __________ critical to being able to
plan ahead and avoid potential collisions with other vessels.

a) Very
b) Seldom
c) Not
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

17. I find that information on vessel characteristics from AIS / Electronic Chart is __________ critical
to being able to plan ahead and avoid potential collisions with other vessels
a) Very
b) Seldom
c) Not
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

18. I find that information from VTS is __________ critical

a) Very
b) Seldom
c) Not
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

19. Do crew have clear understanding of weather and location of other vessels?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer
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SECTION D: Social stress

1. I __________________ worry about losing my job?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

2. What is your current marital status?

a) Married
b) Single

3. When underway, I ____________ worry about the stability of my relationship with my family?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

4. I ______________ worry about being able to support my family and pay the bills?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

5. E-mail / Cell phones are ______________ helpful for the stability of my relationship?
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a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

6. I ______________ have tense relations with other crew-members?

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer
AALESUND UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

SECTION E: Mental load

Mental Workload is the amount of mental work associated with information processing from steering a
vessel; time spent communicating with other vessels or using electronic charts and radar.

1. When steering a vessel in the presence of other vessels, I ______________ worry about the
other Captain’s understanding of my vessel’s maneuvering limitations.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

2. When steering a vessel in the presence of other recreational vessels or fishing vessels, I
______________ worry about the other operator’s understanding of my vessel’s maneuvering
limitations.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

3. I __________ feel bored when steering on long straight-aways or areas with little to non vessel
traffic.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

4. I find that cell phone calls I receive in a busy section of the waterway are _____________
distracting.

a) Often
b) Seldom
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c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

5. I find that cell phone calls I receive in a non-busy section of the waterway are _____________
distracting.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

6. I rely heavily on __________________ for information regarding navigational aids and landmarks
(check all that apply).

a) Electronic charts
b) Paper charts
c) Radar
d) Publications/Notices

7. During the day, I rely heavily on __________________ for knowing vessel locations when not in
visual sight (check all that applies).

a) AIS
b) Radar
c) VHF-FM Radio

8. At night, Radar is __________________ AIS for knowing vessel locations.

a) More reliable than

b) As reliable as
c) Not as reliable as
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

9. Paper charts are ___________________ Electronic Charts for information of navigational aids
and landmarks.

a) More reliable than

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b) As reliable as
c) Not as reliable as
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

10. I _____________ have a difficult time trying to operate the Electronic Chart.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

11. I _____________ have a difficult time trying to operate the AIS transponder.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

12. I _____________ rely on the pilothouse alarms to inform of problems with the vessel’s engines.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

13. I am ______________ confident that the vessel’s engines are running at optimal performance.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

14. I ______________ steer the same course through a lock.

a) Often
b) Seldom
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c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

15. I ______________ steer the same course through a bridge.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

16. I ______________ encounter the same commercial vessels on subsequent transits.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

17. I ______________ encounter the same passing arrangements with commercial vessels.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer

18. I ___________ encounter situations where the wind / tide/ currents catch me by surprise.

a) Often
b) Seldom
c) Never
d) I don't know/ I don't want to answer