Arguments For and Against

the Existence of God

Analysis and Discussion
by

Dr. Michael Aristidou

August 2008
Words and Meaning
Knowing what one means by X or Y is crucial in order to
have any meaningful dialogue.

Example: Consider the following “interesting” dialogue (Smith, 1989, p.29):

Jones: An unie exists

White: Prove it
Jones: It has rained for 3 consecutive days, that’s my proof

Who is to “blame” here? Both !!

Words and Meaning (cont.)
Jones must specify what an “unie” is, and White must demand a
definition before a proof.

Otherwise, the whole dialogue is meaningless.

Similarly, theists must first specify what “god” means in

their arguments for existence.

As Ayer said:

“to say that god exists is to make a metaphysical utterance that cannot be
either true nor false”

[A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 1935]

An “unie” perhaps?
God and god…

We use(d) the following convention (Smith, 1989, p.xii):

God = the Judeo-Christeo-Islamic god (omnibenevolent,

omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent, etc)

god = any supernatural being (not subject to the natural laws, transcends human
understanding, etc)

The following arguments deal basically with the notion of “God” (rather
than “god”).
god…
But, what about “god” then?
The problem is that the term “supernatural” does NOT tell us anything
positive about god. It tell us what god is not (not part of the natural
universe), not what god is.

This raises the following questions:

- How could anyone recognize god?
- How could “unnatural” existence be conceived?
- Could a supernatural being be above natural law and not possess specific
attributes?
Which make the notion of god incomprehensible. Natural existence is a
redundancy. If god is to exist without a limited nature, is like to exist without
any nature at all.
god…(cont.)
A notion of god, then, that is incomprehensible to man, makes god
unknowable.

Example: Consider the following dialogue (Smith, 1989, p.43):

Jones: I believe in god

White: What is “god”?
Jones: I don’t know
White: But what is it that you believe in?
Jones: I don’t know that either
White: Then of what possible significance is your original claim to
believe in god? How does your “belief” differ from no belief
whatsoever?
As the previous dialogue shows:

If god is unknowable, then the notion of “god” is either:

(a) A meaningless word, or (at best)

(b) It signifies that (or all) that we don’t know

Finally, as Branden argues:

The assertion that a thing is unknowable carries the necessary epistemological

implication that the speaker is omniscient – that he has total knowledge of
everything in the universe and, from his unique vantage point, is able to proclaim
that certain things are inherently beyond the reach of man’s knowledge and
understanding.

[N. Branden,
Branden, “The Objectivist Newsletter”
Newsletter”, Vol.2, No.1, p,3, 1963]
Some Arguments For the Existence
of God.

(with capital “G”. Something which, at least, has some attributes which “could”
be comprehensible by man)
The Ontological Argument
Anselm of Canterbury, in his Proslogion (1077), presents the
following argument for the existence of god. The argument is known
as the Ontological Argument, and it goes as follows (Sober, 1995):

(1) God is, by definition, the greatest [most perfect] being possible.
(2) A being who fails to exist in the actual world (while existing in
other possible worlds) is less perfect than a being who exists
in all possible worlds.
--------------
(3) God exists (necessarily).

Note: Prior to Anselm, others proposed similar types of ontological arguments. For example,
Avicenna (965-
(965-1037) in The Book of Healing (Section: Metaphysics) he presents, perhaps,
the first ontological type argument.
Analysis
Gaunilo’s critique: (G-islands)

(1) A G-island is, by definition, the greatest [most perfect] island possible.
(2) An island that fails to exist in the actual world (while existing in
other possible worlds) is less perfect than an island that exists
in all possible worlds.
--------------
(3) A G-island exists (necessarily).

So, since there are NO G-island, that means that the above argument is invalid. That is:

(1) If the Ont. Arg.

Arg. is valid, then the G-
G-island Arg.
Arg. is valid (same structure).
(2) The G-G-island Arg.
Arg. is not valid.
--------------
(3) the Ont. Arg.
Arg. is not valid.
This can't be a G-island…
Deductive Arguments…
Anselm dismissed this criticism as irrelevant (that his argument applies to God,
not islands). He was wrong, though, as the validity of deductive arguments
depends on their structure, not their subject matter.

Example: The following argument, is a perfectly VALID argument:

(1) All pigs can fly.

(2) Anything that flies knows Math. C
--------------
(3) All pigs know Math.

Euler Diagram
(where A=pigs, B=can fly,
fly, and C=know Math)

The problem with Gaunilo’s criticism, though, is that it doesn’t tell us where
Anselm has gone wrong.
Existence…
Kant’s critique: (“existence” as property)

Kant criticized the above argument by saying that existence is not

really a property of a thing. As he said:

By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing -- even if we

completely determine it -- we do not make the least addition to the thing when we
further declare that this thing is.
[I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1878, (trsl
(trsl.. by N.K. Smith, 1929, Ch.III,
Ch.III, S.4, p.505, London:
Macmillan)]

In other words, when we say that dogs are intelligent, we are predicating a
property of dogs (namely, intelligence). But, when we say that dogs exist we
are NOT attributing the property of existence to dogs, but rather we are saying
something about the concept of doghood. To say that dogs exist is to say that
the concept of doghood is exemplified.
Also…
Aquinas’s critique: (“existence” prior perfection, etc)

Aquinas criticized the above argument by saying that existence should

precede any notion of perfection, greatness, etc, and not vice versa.

But most importantly, he said:

Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something
than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be
a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not
therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but
only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be
admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be
thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

[T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part 1, Q.2, Art.1, 1265-

1265-1274 (trsl
(trsl.. by Fathers of the English
Dominican Province, Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)]
Main Criticism
The two objections in the previous passage speak for themselves, but
combining his second objection, namely:
“Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually
exists something than which nothing greater can be thought”

with Kant’s objection that:

“When, therefore, I think a being as the supreme reality, without any defect, the
question still remains whether it exists or not”

one arrives to the main objection to the Ont. Arg. which is this:
The fact that existence is built into a concept X does NOT necessarily
imply that there exists a thing Z to which the concept applies.

(i.e., Accepting that God is defined as a necessarily existing being, all that we are simply
saying is that: If there is a God, then he necessarily exists. The definition does NOT
imply the existence of anything that necessarily exists, which will make the
argument INVALID)
The Cosmological Argument
Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica (1274), presents 5 arguments
that supposedly prove the existence of God. The 2nd argument, also
known as the Cosmological Argument (or, first cause argument),
goes as follows (Sober, 1995):

(1) Some events cause other events.

(2) If an event happens, then it must be caused by something
outside of itself.
(3) There can be no infinite cause/effect chains.
(4) So, there is a first uncaused cause.
--------------
(5) God exists.

Note: Prior to Aquinas, others proposed similar types of cosmological

cosmological arguments. For example, Aristotle argued
in his Metaphysics (Book XII, Chapter 7, 1072) for the notion of a “prime mover unmoved”
unmoved” (πρώτον κινούν
ακίνητον)
ακίνητον)
Analysis
God or something else?

What this argument at most establishes is the existence of a first

cause and NOT God. This first cause could be a big explosion (“big
bang”) and not necessarily a God as Aquinas understood him (i.e.
omnipotent, omniscient, etc).

Hence, the move from premise (4) to premise (5) is MISTAKEN!

(and hence, the Cosm. Arg. is invalid)
What about the premises?
Contradictory premises?

Previously, we said “at most”, etc, but actually the argument does NOT
even prove the existence of a first cause. Indeed, premises (2) and (4)
are contradictory. One cannot reach the conclusion in (4), as (2)
precludes such possibility.

Hence, once again, the argument is invalid.

Logical Fallacies?
Birthday Fallacy?

Suppose we grant premise (2), and that is true, indeed, that each
causal chain has a beginning (an uncaused cause). Does it necessarily
follow that there is an uncaused cause that is the origin of all causal
chains? No it does NOT.

The above error in the argument is called the Birthday Fallacy.

That is: Every person has a birthday (a day which he/she was born).
------------
There is a single day that is everybody’s birthday.

At most, the Cosm. Arg. shows the existence of at least one first cause, and
not exactly one, otherwise it commits the Birthday Fallacy (hence invalid).
Note:
Although Aquinas intended to account for chains that extend from the
present to the past, that is:
PAST PRESENT FUTURE

E0 →L→ E3 → E 2 → E1 → L
premise (3), in virtue of what it says, has the following implication:
PAST PRESENT FUTURE

E0 →L→ E3 → E 2 → E1 → L E n −1 → E n
That is, cause and effect chains must be finite in either time direction.
Kalam Cosmological Argument
A more “refined” version of the cosmological argument (usually called
the Kalam Cosmological Argument (from Arabic: kalam = speech,
dialectical theology) is given by Craig (in his The Kalam Cosmological
Argument, 1979) below:

(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

(2) The universe began to exist.
--------------
(3) The universe has a cause of its existence.
Analysis
Would you agree that the Bing Bang Theory could be employed here in
support of (2) of the argument?

The problem, though, is this: “The argument above either commits one to a
dualism or commits one to the view that there are physical things that came to
exist without a cause. If dualism is the choice, then premise (2) has no longer
the support of the Bing Bang Theory (as the latter rejects supernatural
causes), and if physical things that came to exist uncaused is the choice, then
premise (1) is being contradicted (and hence the whole argument is
contradictory) ”.

Many theists (including Craig) intend the above argument as an argument for
the existence of God (with capital “G”). Would you say that the argument
establishes the existence of such a type of god?
Design Argument
Aquinas’ 5th argument in Summa Theologica is an argument also
known as the Design Argument, and it goes as follows (Sober, 1995):

(1) Among objects that act for an end, some have minds whereas
others do not.
(2) An object that acts for an end, but does not itself have a mind,
must have been designed by a being that has a mind.
(3) So, there exists a being with a mind who designed all mindless
objects that act for an end.
--------------
(4) God exists.
Analysis

- Can you give an example of a mindless object that acts for an end?

- Does the argument say that humans, for example, were designed by
God?

- Does the transition from some premises to others (which ones?)

commits the Birthday Fallacy?

If the argument commits, indeed, the Birthday Fallacy, then the

argument is invalid.
Hume
A more “romantic” version of the Design Argument is given by Hume,
who was also one of its most fierce critics:

“Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it
to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser
machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses
and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most
minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into
admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means
to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the
productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and
intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by
all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature
is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties,
proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a
posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity,
and his similarity to human mind and intelligence”.
[D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1854, Part II, p.13-
p.13-14, Kessinger Publishing, 2004]
The watch argument…
Paley’s Argument(s):

(1) A watch is intricate and well suited to the task of measuring time.
--------------
(2) A watch is the product of intelligent design.

As Paley says, granting the argument above, one should grant the following two
arguments as well:

A B
(1) An organism is intricate and well suited to (1) The universe is intricate and well suited to
the task of survival and reproduction. the task of providing and sustaining life.
-------------- --------------
(2) An organism is the product of intelligent design. (2) The
The universe is the product of intelligent design.
Would you agree that, indeed, the world is a “fine tuned”
machine in which things work with perfect accuracy?

Hume certainly wouldn’t:

“If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had
an architect or builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have
experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that
the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty
infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude
is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a
presumption concerning a similar cause[…]. For ought we can know a priori, matter may
may contain the source or spring of order originally within itself as well as mind does;
and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, from an internal
unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to conceive that
their ideas, in the great universal mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into
that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed”.

[D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1854, Part II, p.15-
p.15-16, Kessinger Publishing, 2004]
The two objections…

Hume, basically, poses two objections to the Design

Argument. Namely: (a) weak analogy
(b) alternative hypothesis.

Is objection (a) a strong enough objection to challenge the “design hypothesis”

(over the “random hypothesis”), as perhaps the best explanation for something
like the human eye coming into existence?
Objection (a) formalized.
Hume argument could be described as follows:

(1) Object A has property P.

(2) Object A and object B are similar to a degree n.
[n] --------------
(3) Object B has property P.

where n∈[0,1] (1=A,B are identical, 0=A,B are different) and [n]=probability that the conclusion follows.

In particularly:
A B
(1) A watch is the product of intelligent design. (1) A watch is the product of intelligent design.
(2) A watch and an organism are n-similar. (2) A watch and the universe are n-similar .
[n] -------------- [n] --------------
(3) An organisms is the product of intelligent design. (3) The universe is the product of intelligent
design.
Cont.
But as Hume argues:

In A, an organism is NOT really similar to a watch in very

many aspects, so n is very small. Hence, [n] is very small.

In B, the universe is NOT really similar to a watch in very

many aspects, so n is very small. Hence, [n] is very small.

In both cases, the analogy is weak and hence the argument is weak.
Objection (b).
Taking as an example the human eye again, would you say that
Hume’s objection (b) is valid, considering the fact that Evolution
Theory is the best explanation so far (or, at least, a better alternative
hypothesis than the design hypothesis (and simpler--Occam’s Razor))
on how the human eye came into existence?

- Couldn’t evolution have also been designed by a designer? Could that

designer be the Judeo-Christeo-Islamic god?

- Would the phenomenon of imperfect adaptation cause a problem to

the idea of evolution being designed by a designer?
(e.g. Panda’s “thumb”, fetal growth and birth (malnutrition, premature birth, etc))

(What about other natural mistakes? Extra limbs, conjoined twins, etc?)

(There are philosophical arguments, not just scientific, against the notion of a “designer”,
as we will see later)
M. Denton said in his “The Puzzle of Perfection” (in Readings in the
Philosophy of Religion, by K.J. Clark, 2000, p.44):

…a few imperfect adaptations which give every impression of having been

achieved [nature] by chance are certainly, amid the general perfection of
design in nature, an insufficient basis on which to argue for the all
sufficiency of chance.

The problem, though, is that the above comment misses the point. The point
is for one to account for the imperfect adaptations, mistakes, etc, assuming
that nature was designed by a perfect god and didn’t occur randomly. Saying,
for example, that imperfect adaptations are deliberately designed as such by
god as well, because that way they (will) serve a higher purpose, or plan, or
a higher design, not only is an unsatisfactory answer (it resorts to dubious
explanations) but perhaps require, also, omniscient on behalf of the speaker.
EXERCISE
Aquinas’ 4th Argument (“In Degrees Properties”) in Summa
Theologica runs as follows [Sober, 1995]:

(1) Objects have properties to greater or lesser extends.

(2) If an object has a property to a lesser extent, then there exists some
other object that has that property to the maximum possible degree
(call this a maximum exemplar of the property).
(3) So, there is an entity that has all properties to the maximum possible
degree.
--------------
(4) God exists.

Find at least one objection to the above argument. If you don’t…

…you ARE a believer. But, hey...at least you go to HEAVEN !!
SOLUTION
- One could object premise (2): The fact that G. W. Bush is
less than maximally smart, doesn’t mean that there must
exist a maximally smart president.

- Birthday Fallacy: Even if each property has a maximum

exemplar, it doesn’t follow that there is an entity that is
is the a maximum exemplar of all properties.

- Contradiction: If intelligence has its maximum exemplar,

then stupidity would have its maximum exemplar as too.
But then, this would imply that God is both maximally
intelligent and maximally stupid.
Some Arguments Against the
Existence of God.
What about arguments against?

A problem that many regard as a key issue in providing an

argument against the existence of God is the problem of
evil. Epicurus stated it as follows:

“Is [god] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?”

[D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1854, Part X, p.56, Kessinger Publishing, 2004]
Evil…
- In your view, is there evil in the world or not?

- If yes, does it then render the following three

statements, namely:
“god is omnibenevolent”, “god is omnipotent”, and “evil exists”,

contradictory?
Argument from Evil
The notion of evil gives rise to the following argument against the
existence of god (usually called the Argument from Evil), which
goes as follows [Sober, 1995]:

(1) If God were to exists, then God would be omnibenevolent,

omnipotent, and omniscient (call those properties omni-BPS, for
short).
(2) If an omni-BPS god existed, then there would be no evil.
(3) There is evil.
---------------
(4) God does not exist.

(240-320) in his Treatise on the Anger of God. Also in

(First formally formulated by Lactantius (240-
Lucretius’
Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura)
Analysis
- One could attack premise (3), and basically claim that there is no
difference, really, between right and wrong. (The latter are human notions, etc.)

That’s a weak objection, though, since there are some acts which are clearly
wrong (e.g. torturing a baby for no reason, for fun, etc), and also premise (3)
is accepted by almost all religious traditions.

- One could also attack premise (1), and claim that God simply is not
omni-BPS, etc.

That might interpret evil, perhaps, as whatever God cannot prevent, fight, etc,
but still it doesn’t explain where evil came from. Also, God not being omni-BPS,
etc, it is not what at least the Judeo-Christeo-Islamic tradition considers God to
be.

(But, since others (ancient Greek religion, Zoroastrianism, etc) denied that God(s) are
omni-BPS, rejecting premise (1) is a good option to go in explaining why evil exists)
Analysis (cont.)
A stronger objection to the Arg. From Evil is rejecting premise (2).
Then, one needs to show how evil and an omni-BPS God could be
reconciled (Theodicy).

Theodicy is the claim that some evils are allowed by God because they
are “soul-building” evils. (i.e. they make humans better people)

The “parent-child analogy” is usually introduced: Just as a parent will allow

some bad things in order for the child to grow stronger, similarly God allows
some bad things for our benefit.

Questions, of course, could be raised:

- Why God couldn’t simply make us with strong souls in the first place?
(So we can take credit for our strong souls (characters, achievements, etc) and not
just simply be grateful to a benevolent God (perhaps?))
- Why is it so important that we be able to take credit for our strong souls?
(So we…)….It doesn’t matter!!
From Evil #2
It doesn’t matter because even if one suppose for a second that premise
(2) is false, and some amount of evil is allowed to exist along with an
omni-BPS God, then one could suggest the following argument [Sober,1995]:

(1) If an omni-BPS God existed, then the amount of evil would

not exceed a soul-building minimum (the minimum amount that
suffices to have strong soul).
(2) The amount of evil does exceed a soul-building minimum.
---------------
(3) An omni-BPS God does not exist.

One, of course, could challenge premise (2) above, and claim that we are not in the position
to know/say how much evil is required for one’s soul-building.

But, this charge could perhaps be neutralized by pointing to the facts which show that not
only some evils that hit one are immensely disanalogous to any soul improvement, some
are unnecessary, and some are even destructive.

(e.g. X breaks his leg in soccer, and then X gets cancer and dies suffering)
Free Will
To refute the previous argument, one must present reasons good
enough that explain why would an omni-BPS God permit more evil
than the necessary soul-building minimum.

A usual response is because of Free Will. Since we are free to do good or evil,
then evil from free will is “added” to what God allows as necessary.
(Notice that the suggestion above, would challenge premise (1) of the Arg. From Evil #2)

But, consider the following two examples:

(a) Hitler (great suffering and death -- Couldn’t God intervene and make a difference?)
(b) Bubonic Plague (great suffering and death – Couldn’t God do something about it?)

One might consider example (a) as weak, since as free agents we could have acted,
perhaps, in such ways to prevent Hitler from coming to power, etc. Unless if God
intervened at the sperm/egg level and prevented Hitler from coming to be, which also
could be perhaps thought of as God undermining our free choices. Example (b) is stronger
as we couldn’t have done much (didn’t know cure, etc) and it came out of no one’s will.
From Evil #3
But, as before, the examples could suggest the following modified
(and more powerful) version of the previous argument, which
additionally takes free will into consideration [Sober,1995]:

(1) If an omni-BPS God existed, then there would be no more

evil than the minimum required for soul-building and as a
consequence of free will.
(2) The amount of evil does exceed the minimum required for
soul-building and as a consequence of free will.
---------------
(3) An omni-BPS God does not exist.

Now, to refute the above, one must provide reasons good enough for one to reject
premises (1) and (2). As we said before (in the Design case), insisting that the “mystery”
is somehow too great is NO reply at all (if not worse than no reply at all).
Note:
- Do you think that premised (2) could be challenged by
using Plato’s Euthyphro’s Dilemma in a way that shows
that evil is irrelevant to God?

- Would that undermine the Argument from Evil?

- Do you think that the argument is a convincing argument

against the existence of god? (with lower case “g”)
Euthypro’s Dilemma (recall)
“Is the pious loved (or commanded) by the gods because it
is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”
[Plato, Euthyphro, 380 BC]

(pious = what is moral, right, good, etc)

(loved or commanded (or wanted), etc)

The problem is that in the above, one can’t have both. If you have
both, then the above claim is equivalent to:
“God loves (wants, etc) X because God loves (wants, etc) X”

which this, according to Cogburn, “makes God sound a lot more like a willful
pre-adolescent than the sort of being that mature adults ought to worship,
love, and emulate”. [J. Cogburn, Philosophy Through Video Games, 2008]
Carneades’ Argument(s)
Empiricus (160-210), in his Against the Physicists presents the following
argument by Carneades (213-128 BC) against the existence of God:

(1) If God is all-virtuous and possesses wisdom, it possesses

sound deliberation.
(2) And if God deliberates, there is something which is non-
evident to God.
(3) It is impossible that anything would be non-evident to God.
--------------
(4) God does not exist.

Refined versions of some of Carneades’

Carneades’ arguments have been proposed. For example, D. Walton, in
God?” [Philo, No.2, 1999
his “Can an Ancient Argument of Carneades […] Disprove the Existence of God?”
(in The Impossibility of God, M. Martin and R. Monnier,
Monnier, 2003, p.38)], presents an ontological type
Carneadean-
Carneadean-based argument.
Analysis
- Do you think that the argument above could undermine
the case for a wise God?

- Do you think that the argument above could undermine

the case for a God who was/is the designer of the
universe?

- Do you think that the argument is a convincing argument

against the existence of God (or god)?
Some Objections
J. Turner (a student of mine) objected to Carneades’ Arg. as follows:

Premise (1) merely states that that God has the ability to deliberate; it
does not say that he needs to deliberate or whether he does deliberate
or not. Possessing all the faculties required to do something does neither
mean that you will do it, not that you have done it (nor that you will
eventually do it). So, by analogy, consider the following argument:

(1) I have the ability to hit someone in the face.

(2) A person who hits someone in the face is a bad person.
--------------
(3) I am a bad person.

which is valid, but unsound, argument.

It is true, for the analogy to “run” Turner has to produce a valid unsound
argument. But, is his argument really valid?
Is it valid?
The answer is NO. Because, for his arg. to be valid, it has to have the
following structure:
C

But, because Ability To Hit ≠ Hit ., his argument has the following form
instead:

D D
(a) or (b)
C C

(where A=You, B=Ability to Hit, C=Hit, D=Bad)

Can it be fixed?
Yes, Turner’s premise (2) could be changed into:

(2)’ “A person who has the ability to hit someone in the face is a bad person”

which will turn his argument into the valid argument:

(1) I have the ability to hit someone in the face.

(2)’ A person who has the ability to hit someone in the face is a bad
person.
--------------
(3) I am a bad person.
C
which has the appropriate form:
Problem…
But now, the problem is that his arg. becomes too weak.

That is because:

- Premise (2)’ becomes highly implausible (unlike Carneades’ premise (2)).

- Counterintuitive: We rarely think that a person who has the ability to hit (not
hit) someone in the face is necessarily a bad person. There
are also countless examples of good persons with such ability.
- Definitional: Premise (2) is a definition. It defines as a bad person a person with the
ability to hit one in the face. Hence, is a BAD definition.

(More accurately, (2)’

(2)’ should had been: (2)’’
(2)’’ “If a person…
person…, then is bad”
bad”. But then, compare (2)’’
(2)’’ and (2).)

- It would imply that, basically, almost everybody is a bad person.

Indeed, change “I” for any X to get: (1) X has the ability to hit someone in the face.
(2)’ A person who has the ability to hit someone
in the face is a bad person.
--------------
(3) X is a bad person.
A Design Type Carneadean-Based Argument
Finally, perhaps one could also challenge premise (1) of Carneades’ Arg.,
on the basis that it suggests that one accumulates wisdom by sound
deliberation, like humans do, which is unlikely that theists would accept
that.

Nevertheless, one could still perhaps make a case against an “infinitely wise” God
with the following design type Carneadean-based argument:
(1) If God exists, then God has infinite wisdom.
(2) God’s infinite wisdom produced the world and its content.
(3) Infinite wisdom produces (if not perfect) at least highly successful things in the world.
(4) There are highly unsuccessful things in the world.
--------------
(5) God does not exist.

The argument is valid. So to refute its conclusion, one has to reject one of its
premises.
Note:
Feel free to try to refute it…

Observe this, though:

Most likely, one would attack premises (1) and (2). But, what
would rejecting (1) and (2) imply for a theist? It would imply
that:
- God does NOT have infinite wisdom.
- The world was NOT produced out of God’s infinite wisdom.

But, these are premises that, usually, a theist takes for

granted !!
Conclusions
“Μηδενί άλλω πείθεσθαι η τω λόγω”
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ
(Πλάτων, “Κρίτων”, 46β)

OK, don’t panic…Let me help:

“Nothing can convince me but reason”

SOCRATES
(Plato, “Crito”, 46b)
Thank You Very Much…!!

You Have Been a Great Audience.

References
1. Aristotle, Metaphysics (Book XII, Chapter 7, 1072, 350 BC (trsl. by W.D. Ross, 1924)).
2. T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, (Part 1, Q.2, Art.1, 1265-1274 (trsl. by Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)).
3. Avicenna, The Book of Healing (“Metaphysics”, 965-1037).
4. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 1935.
5. N. Branden, “The Objectivist Newsletter”, Vol.2, No.1, p,3, 1963.
6. W.L. Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Harper & Row, 1979.
7. J. Cogburn, Philosophy Through Video Games, Elsevier, 2008.
8. M. Denton said in his “The Puzzle of Perfection” (in Readings in the Philosophy of
Religion, by K.J. Clark, 2000, p.44).
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182, (trsl. by R. G. Bury), Loeb Classical Library, No. 311, 1936.
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Publishing, 2004.
11. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1878, (trsl. by N.K. Smith, 1929, Ch.III, S.4, p.505,
London: Macmillan).
12. Lactantius, Treatise on the Anger of God (240-320).
13. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (99 BC-55 BC)
14. Plato, Euthyphro, 380 BC (trsl by B. Jowett, 1891).
15. Plato, Crito, 46b, 360 BC (trsl by B. Jowett).
16. G.H. Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God, Prometheus Books, 1989.
17. E. Sober, Core Questions in Philosophy, Prentice Hall, 1995.
18. J. Turner, HW 6, Q.4 (from M. Aristidou’s class Introduction to Philosophy, at DIT,
Summer 2008).
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God?” (Philo, No.2, 1999 (in The Impossibility of God, M. Martin and R. Monnier, 2003,
p.38)).