PostGIS in Action 2nd Edition Regina O.

Obe
download

https://ebookultra.com/download/postgis-in-action-2nd-edition-
regina-o-obe/

Explore and download more ebooks or textbooks

at ebookultra.com
 We believe these products will be a great fit for you. Click
the link to download now, or visit ebookultra.com
to discover even more!

PostgreSQL Up and Running A Practical Introduction to the

Advanced Open Source Database Second Edition Regina O. Obe

https://ebookultra.com/download/postgresql-up-and-running-a-practical-
introduction-to-the-advanced-open-source-database-second-edition-
regina-o-obe/

PostGIS Cookbook 2nd edition Edition Corti

https://ebookultra.com/download/postgis-cookbook-2nd-edition-edition-
corti/

C Concurrency in Action 2nd Edition Anthony Williams

https://ebookultra.com/download/c-concurrency-in-action-2nd-edition-
anthony-williams/

Music Therapy in Action 2nd Edition Mary Priestley

https://ebookultra.com/download/music-therapy-in-action-2nd-edition-
mary-priestley/
BDD in Action 2nd Edition MEAP V13 John Ferguson Smart

https://ebookultra.com/download/bdd-in-action-2nd-edition-
meap-v13-john-ferguson-smart/

Windows Phone 8 in Action 2nd Edition Timothy Binkley-

Jones

https://ebookultra.com/download/windows-phone-8-in-action-2nd-edition-
timothy-binkley-jones/

The Presidency in a Separated System 2nd Edition Charles

O. Jones

https://ebookultra.com/download/the-presidency-in-a-separated-
system-2nd-edition-charles-o-jones/

On the Internet Thinking in Action 2nd Edition Hubert L.

Dreyfus

https://ebookultra.com/download/on-the-internet-thinking-in-
action-2nd-edition-hubert-l-dreyfus/

Equine Reproduction 2nd Edition Angus O. Mckinnon

https://ebookultra.com/download/equine-reproduction-2nd-edition-angus-
o-mckinnon/
PostGIS in Action 2nd Edition Regina O. Obe Digital
Instant Download
Author(s): Regina O. Obe, Leo S. Hsu
ISBN(s): 9781617291395, 1617291390
Edition: 2
File Details: PDF, 11.07 MB
Year: 2015
Language: english
IN ACTION
SECOND EDITION

Regina O. Obe
Leo S. Hsu
FOREWORD BY PAUL RAMSEY

MANNING

www.it-ebooks.info
 Praise for the First Edition of PostGIS in Action

All PostGIS users, from novices to experts, will benefit from this book. Don’t use Post-
GIS without it!
—Brent Wood, NIWA

An elegant introduction to a difficult domain.

—Mark Leslie, LISAsoft Pty Ltd.

It’s next to impossible to explain geospatial SQL succinctly, but this book pulls it off!
—Andy Saurin, Saurin Solutions

A great guide for the beginner and a great reference for the advanced user.
—Bruce Rindahl, Ventura County Watershed Protection District

Required reading for anyone wanting to get the most out of PostGIS.
—James Fee, WeoGeo.com

The must-have guide if you aim to do any serious professional PostGIS development.
—Paolo Corti, European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS)

If you don’t understand the benefits of PostGIS, this book will give you the Aha!
moment you have been waiting for. It is the most comprehensive book of its kind.
—Jeff Addison, Southgate Software Ltd.

This is the PostGIS reference I’ve always wished for.

—Bill Dollins, Zekiah Technologies, Inc.

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>
www.it-ebooks.info
PostGIS in Action
SECOND EDITION

REGINA O. OBE
LEO S. HSU

MANNING
SHELTER ISLAND

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
For online information and ordering of this and other Manning books, please visit
www.manning.com. The publisher offers discounts on this book when ordered in quantity.
For more information, please contact
Special Sales Department
Manning Publications Co.
20 Baldwin Road
PO Box 761
Shelter Island, NY 11964
Email: [email protected]

©2015 by Manning Publications Co. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in

any form or by means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or otherwise, without prior written
permission of the publisher.

Many of the designations used by manufacturers and sellers to distinguish their products are
claimed as trademarks. Where those designations appear in the book, and Manning
Publications was aware of a trademark claim, the designations have been printed in initial caps
or all caps.

Recognizing the importance of preserving what has been written, it is Manning’s policy to have
the books we publish printed on acid-free paper, and we exert our best efforts to that end.
Recognizing also our responsibility to conserve the resources of our planet, Manning books
are printed on paper that is at least 15 percent recycled and processed without the use of
elemental chlorine.

Manning Publications Co. Development editor: Jeff Bleiel

20 Baldwin Road Technical development editor: Deepak Vohra
PO Box 761 Copyeditors: Benjamin Berg, Andy Carroll
Shelter Island, NY 11964 Proofreader: Katie Tennant
Technical proofreader: David Pombal
Typesetter: Dottie Marsico
Cover designer: Marija Tudor

ISBN 9781617291395
Printed in the United States of America
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – EBM – 20 19 18 17 16 15

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
 To Dr. Ernest Olagbade Obe (1935–2012),
professor, chief, daddy

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>
www.it-ebooks.info
 brief contents
PART 1 INTRODUCTION TO POSTGIS ........................................1
1 ■ What is a spatial database? 3
2 ■ Spatial data types 27
3 ■ Spatial reference system considerations 60
4 ■ Working with real data 82
5 ■ Using PostGIS on the desktop 113
6 ■ Geometry and geography functions 140
7 ■ Raster functions 175
8 ■ PostGIS TIGER geocoder 203
9 ■ Geometry relationships 218

PART 2 PUTTING POSTGIS TO WORK .................................... 245

10 ■ Proximity analysis 247
11 ■ Geometry and geography processing 261
12 ■ Raster processing 287
13 ■ Building and using topologies 309
14 ■ Organizing spatial data 337
15 ■ Query performance tuning 369

vii

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
viii BRIEF CONTENTS

PART 3 USING POSTGIS WITH OTHER TOOLS ........................407

16 ■ Extending PostGIS with pgRouting and procedural
languages 409
17 ■ Using PostGIS in web applications 442

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
 contents
foreword xix
preface xxi
acknowledgments xxii
about this book xxiv

PART 1 INTRODUCTION TO POSTGIS ...............................1

1 What is a spatial database?

1.1 Thinking spatially 4
3

1.2 Introducing PostGIS 6

Why PostGIS 7 ■
Alternatives to PostGIS 10 ■
Installing
PostGIS 12
1.3 Spatial data types 14
Geometry type 15 ■
Geography type 15 ■
Raster type 16
Topology type 17
1.4 Hello real world 17
Digesting the problem 18 Modeling 19 Loading data 21
■ ■

Writing the query 24 Viewing spatial data with OpenJump 25

■

1.5 Summary 26

ix

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
x CONTENTS

2 Spatial data types

2.1 Type modifiers
27
28
Subtype type modifiers 28 ■
Spatial reference identifier 29
2.2 Geometry 29
Points 30 Linestrings 31 Polygons 32 Collection
■ ■ ■

geometries 34 The M coordinate 38 The Z coordinate

■ ■
40
Polyhedral surfaces and TINs 42 Curved geometries 44 ■

Spatial catalog for geometry 49 Managing geometry ■

columns 51
2.3 Geography 52
Differences between geography and geometry 53 ■
Spatial catalogs
for geography 54
2.4 Raster 54
Properties of rasters 55 ■
Creating rasters 56 ■
Spatial catalog
for rasters 58
2.5 Summary 59

3 Spatial reference system considerations

3.1 Spatial reference systems: what are they? 61
60

Geoids 61 Ellipsoids 63 Datum 65 Coordinate

■ ■ ■

reference system 65 Spatial reference system essentials 66

■

Projections 66
3.2 Selecting a spatial reference system for storing data 69
Pros and cons of using EPSG:4326 70 Geography data type for ■

EPSG:4326 71 Mapping just for presentation 71

■

Covering the globe when distance is a concern 74

3.3 Determining the spatial reference system of source data 76
Guessing at a spatial reference system 77 When the spatial ■

reference system is missing from spatial_ref_sys table 80

3.4 Summary 81

4 Working with real data

4.1 General utilities 83
82

PostgreSQL built-in tools 83 ■

Downloading files 84
Extracting files 85
4.2 Importing and exporting shapefiles 86
Importing with shp2pgsql 87 Importing and exporting with
■

shp2pgsql-gui 88 Exporting with pgsql2shp 91

■

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
 CONTENTS xi

4.3 Importing and exporting vector data with ogr2ogr 92

Environment variables 93 Ogrinfo 93 ■ ■
Importing with
ogr2ogr 93 Exporting with ogr2ogr 97
■

4.4 Importing OpenStreetMap data with osm2pgsql 99

Getting OSM data 100 ■
Loading OSM-formatted data with
osm2pgsql 101
4.5 Importing and exporting raster data 103
Using gdalinfo to inspect rasters 103 Importing raster data with ■

raster2pgsql 105 Gdal_translate and gdalwarp 108

■

Using PostgreSQL functions to output raster data 110

4.6 Summary 111

5 Using PostGIS on the desktop

5.1 Desktop viewing tools at a glance
113
114
Capsule reviews 114 ■
Spatial database support 116
Format support 117 ■
Web services supported 119
5.2 OpenJUMP workbench 120
OpenJUMP feature summary 120 PostGIS support 121 ■

Register data source 122 Rendering PostGIS geometries 123

■

Exporting data 125

5.3 QGIS 126
Installing QGIS 126 Using QGIS with PostGIS
■
126
Importing and exporting layers 131
5.4 uDig 133
Using uDig with PostGIS 133 Connecting to PostGIS ■
134
Viewing and filtering PostGIS data 134
5.5 gvSIG 135
Using gvSIG with PostGIS 136 ■
Exporting data 139
5.6 Summary 139

6 Geometry and geography functions

6.1 Output functions 141
140

Well-known binary (WKB) and well-known text (WKT) 142

Keyhole Markup Language (KML) 142 Geography Markup ■

Language (GML) 142 Geometry JavaScript Object Notation

■

(GeoJSON) 143 Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) 143

■

Extensible 3D Graphics (X3D) 144 Examples of output ■

functions 144 Geohash 145

■

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
xii CONTENTS

6.2 Constructor functions 146

Creating geometries from text and binary formats 146 Creating ■

geographies from text and binary formats 150 Using text or ■

binary representations as function arguments 150

6.3 Accessor and setter functions 151
Spatial reference identifiers 151 Transforming geometry to
■

different spatial references 152 Using transformation with the

■

geography type 153 Geometry type functions 153 Geometry

■ ■

and coordinate dimensions 155 Retrieving coordinates 155

■

Checking geometry validity 156 Number of points that defines a

■

geometry 156
6.4 Measurement functions 158
Geometry planar measurements 159 ■
Geodetic
measurements 160
6.5 Decomposition functions 161
Bounding box of geometries 161 Boundaries and converting
■

polygons to linestrings 163 Centroid and point on surface 165

■

Returning points defining a geometry 166 Decomposing multi- ■

geometries and geometry collections 167

6.6 Composition functions 168
Making points 169 Making polygons
■
170 ■
Promoting single
geometries to multi-geometries 171
6.7 Simplification functions 172
Grid snapping and coordinate rounding 172
Simplification 172
6.8 Summary 174

7 Raster functions
7.1
175
Raster terminology 176
7.2 Raster constructors 178
Converting geometries to rasters with ST_AsRaster 179 Loading ■

rasters with raster2pgsql 181 Constructing rasters from scratch:

■

ST_MakeEmptyRaster and ST_AddBand 182 Setting pixels: ■

ST_SetValue and ST_SetValues 182 Creating rasters from other

■

rasters 184 Converting other raster formats with

■

ST_FromGDALRaster 186
7.3 Raster output functions 186
ST_AsPNG, ST_AsJPEG, and ST_AsTiff 186 Output using ■

ST_AsGDALRaster 187 Using psql to export rasters 189

■

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
 CONTENTS xiii

7.4 Raster accessors and setters 190

Basic raster metadata properties 191 Pixel statistics 192 ■

Pixel value accessors 193 Band metadata setters 195

■

7.5 Georeferencing functions 196

Metadata setters 196 ■
Processing functions 197
7.6 Reclassing functions 200
7.7 Polygonizing functions 201
ST_ConvexHull 201 ST_Envelope ■
201 ■
ST_Polygon 201
ST_MinConvexHull 201
7.8 Summary 202

8 PostGIS TIGER geocoder

8.1
203
Installing the PostGIS TIGER geocoder 204
8.2 Loading TIGER data 205
Configuration tables 205 ■
Loading nation and state data 205
8.3 Normalizing addresses 207
Using normalize_address 207 ■
Using the PAGC address
normalizer 208
8.4 Geocoding 211
Geocoding using address text 212 Geocoding using normalized
■

addresses 214 Batch geocoding 214

■

8.5 Reverse geocoding 216

8.6 Summary 217

9 Geometry relationships
9.1 Bounding box and geometry comparators
218
219
The bounding box 219 ■
Bounding box comparators 221
9.2 Relating two geometries 222
Interior, exterior, and boundary of a geometry 222
Intersections 222 A house plan model 227 Contains and
■ ■

within 228 Covers and covered by 230 Contains

■ ■

properly 230 Overlapping geometries 232 Touching

■ ■

geometries 232 Crossing geometries 233 Disjoint

■ ■

geometries 234
9.3 The faces of equality: geometry 234
Spatial equality versus geometric equality 235 ■
Bounding-box
equality 236

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
xiv CONTENTS

9.4 Underpinnings of relationship functions 239

The intersection matrix 240 ■
Using ST_Relate 241
9.5 Summary 244

PART 2 PUTTING POSTGIS TO WORK ...........................245

10 Proximity analysis
10.1
247
Nearest neighbor searches 248
Which places are within X distance? 248 Using ST_DWithin ■

and ST_Distance for N closest results 248 Using ST_DWithin ■

and DISTINCT ON to find closest locations 249 Intersects with ■

tolerance 250 Finding N closest places using KNN distance

■

bounding-box operators 250 Combining KNN distance-box

■

operators with ST_Distance 252 Using window functions to find

■

closest N places 254

10.2 Using KNN with geography types 255
10.3 Geotagging 256
Tagging data to a specific region 257 Linear referencing: ■

snapping points to the closest linestring 258

10.4 Summary 259

11 Geometry and geography processing 261

11.1 Using spatial aggregate functions 262
Creating a multipolygon from many multipolygon records 262
Creating linestrings from points 264
11.2 Clipping, splitting, tessellating 265
Clipping 266 ■
Splitting 267 ■
Tessellating 268
11.3 Breaking linestrings into smaller segments 274
Segmentizing linestrings 274 Creating two-point linestrings
■

from many-point linestrings 275 Breaking linestrings at point

■

junctions 276
11.4 Translating, scaling, and rotating geometries 279
Translating 279 ■
Scaling 281 ■
Rotating 283
11.5 Using geometry functions to manipulate and create
geographies 284
Cast-safe functions 284 ■
Transformation-recommended
functions 285
11.6 Summary 286

Licensed to tracy moore <[email protected]>

www.it-ebooks.info
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
be our sole Instructor, but will send us to Divine Revelation when it
may be had.

GOD does nothing in vain, he gives no Power or Faculty which he

has not allotted to some proportionate use, if therefore he has given
to Mankind a Rational Mind, every individual Understanding ought to
be employ’d in somewhat worthy of it. The Meanest Person shou’d
Think as Justly, tho’ not as Capaciously, as the greatest Philosopher.
And if the Understanding be made for the Contemplation of Truth,
and I know not what else it can be made for, either there are many
Understandings who are never able to attain what they were
design’d and fitted for, which is contrary to the Supposition that GOD
made nothing in Vain, or else the very meanest must be put in a
way of attaining it: Now how can this be if all that which goes to the
composition of a Knowing Man in th’account of the World, be
necessary to make one so? All have not leisure to Learn Languages
and pore on Books, nor Opportunity to Converse with the Learned;
but all may Think, may use their own Faculties rightly, and consult
the Master who is within them.

By Ideas we sometimes understand in general all that which is the

immediate Object of the Mind, whatever it Perceives; and in this
large Sense it may take in all Thought, all that we are any ways
capable of Discerning: So when we say we have no Idea of a thing,
’tis as much as to say we know nothing of the matter. Again, it is
more strictly taken for that which represents to the Mind some
Object distinct from it, whether Clearly or Confusedly; when this is
its import, our Knowledge is said to be as Clear as our Ideas are. For
that Idea which represents a thing so Clearly, that by an Attent and
Simple View we may discern its Properties and Modifications, at least
so far as they can be Known, is never false; all our Certainty and
Evidence depends on it, if we Know not Truly what is thus
represented to our Minds we know nothing. Thus the Idea of
Equality between 2 and 2 is so evident that it is impossible to doubt
of it, no Arguments could convince us of the Contrary, nor be able to
persuade us that the same may be found between 2 and 3.
And as such an Idea as this is never False, so neither can any Idea
be said to be so, if by False we mean that which has no Existence;
our Idea certainly Exists, tho’ there be not any thing in Nature
Correspondent to it. For tho’ there be no such thing as a Golden
Mountain, yet when I think of one, ’tis certain I have an Idea of it.

But our Ideas are then said to be False, or rather Wrong, when they
have no Conformity to the Real Nature of the Thing whose Name
they bear. So that properly Speaking it is not the Idea but the
judgment that is False; we err in supposing that our Idea is
answerable to something without us when it is not. In simple
Perceptions we are not often deceiv’d, but we frequently mistake in
Compounding them, by Uniting several things which have no
Agreement, and Separating others which are Essentially United.
Indeed it may happen that our Perceptions are faulty sometimes,
thro the Indisposition of the Organs or Faculties, thus a Man who
has the Jaundice sees every thing ting’d with Yellow, yet even here
the Error is not in the Simple Idea but in the Compos’d one, for we
do not mistake when we say the Object appears Yellow to our Sight,
tho’ we do, when we affirm that it does, or ought to do so to others.
So again, when the Mind does not sufficiently Attend to her Ideas
nor Examine them on all sides, ’tis very likely she will Think amiss,
but this also is a false Judgment, that which is amiss in the
Perception being rather the Inadequateness than the Falshood. Thus
in many Cases we enquire no farther than whether an Action be not
Directly Forbidden, and if we do not find it Absolutely Unlawful, we
think that sufficient to Authorize the Practise of it, not considering it
as we ought to do, Cloathed with the Circumstances of Scandal,
Temptation, &c. which place it in the same Classes with things
unlawful, at least make it so to us.

Rational Creatures shou’d endeavour to have right Ideas of every

thing that comes under their Cognizance, but yet our Ideas of
Morality, our thoughts about Religion are those which we shou’d with
greatest speed and diligence rectifie, because they are of most
importance, the Life to come, as well as all the Occurrences of This,
depending on them. We shou’d search for Truth in our most
abstracted Speculations, but it concerns us nearly to follow her close
in what relates to the Conduct of our Lives. For the main thing we
are to drive at in all our Studies, and that which is the greatest
Improvement of our Understandings is the Art of Prudence, the
being all of a Piece, managing all our Words and Actions as it
becomes Wise Persons and Good Christians.

Yet in this we are commonly most faulty; for besides the deceits of
our Passions, our Ideas of Particular Vertues and Vices, Goods and
Evils, being an assemblage of divers simple Perceptions, and
including several Judgments are therefore liable to mistake, and
much more so considering how we commonly come by them. We
hear the Word that Stands for such a Thing, suppose Honor, and
then instead of enquiring what it is at the Fountain-head the Oracles
of GOD, and our own, or the Impartial Reason of the Wisest and the
Best, Custom and the Observations we make on the Practice of such
as Pretend to it forms our Idea, which is seldom a Right one, the
Opinions and Practices of the World being very fallacious, and many
times quite opposite to the Dictates of Reason wou’d we but give ear
to them. For what a strange distorted Idea of Honor must they
needs have, who can think it Honourable to break a Vow that ought
to be Kept, and Dishonourable to get loose from an Engagement
that ought to be Broken? Who cannot endure to be tax’d with a Lye,
and yet never think fit to keep their Word? What do they think of
Greatness who support their Pomp at the Expence of the Groans and
Tears of many Injur’d Families? What is their Idea of Heaven, who
profess to Believe such a thing, and yet never endeavour to Qualifie
themselves for the Enjoyment of it? Have they any Idea at all of
these things when they speak of ’em? Or, if they have, is it not a
very false one?

Now that we may avoid mistake the better, and because we usually
join Words to our Ideas even when we only Meditate, we shou’d free
them from all Equivocation, not make use of any Word, which has
not a Distinct Idea annex’d to it, and where Custom has join’d many
Ideas to one Word, carefully separate and distinguish them. For if
our Words are Equivocal, how can we by Pronouncing such and
such, excite the same Idea in another that is in our own Mind, which
is the End of Speech, and consequently how can we be Understood?
And if sometimes we annex one Idea to a Word, and sometimes
another, we may for ever wrangle with those who perhaps wou’d be
found to agree with us if we Understood each other, but can neither
Convince them, nor clear up the Matter to our own Mind. For
Instance: Shou’d I dispute Whether Evil were to be Chosen? Without
defining what I mean by Evil, which is a Word customarily apply’d to
things of different Natures, and shou’d conclude in the Affirmative,
meaning at the same time the Evil of Pain, or any Corporal Loss or
Punishment, I were not mistaken, tho’ another Person who annexes
no other Idea but that of Sin to the word Evil, might Justly contradict
me and say that I was. Or if in the Process of my Discourse, I shou’d
without giving notice of it, substitute the Idea of Sin instead of that
of Pain, when I mention Evil, I shou’d argue falsly. For it is a Maxim
that we may Chuse a less Evil to avoid a greater, if both of them be
Corporal Evils, or if one of them be so, and we chuse it to avoid a
Sin, between which and the Evil of Pain there is no Comparison: But
if the two Evils propos’d to our Choice be both of them Sinful, that
Principle will not hold, we must Chuse neither, whatever comes on’t,
Sin being Eligible no manner of way.

Thus many times our Ideas are thought to be false when the fault is
really in our Language, we make use of Words without joyning any,
or only loose and indeterminate Ideas to them, Prating like Parrots
who can Modify Sounds, and Pronounce Syllables, and sometimes
martial them as a Man wou’d, tho without the use of Reason or
understanding any thing by them. So that after a long Discourse and
many fine Words, our Hearer may justly ask us what we have been
saying? And what it is we wou’d be at? And so a great part, of the
Good Breeding of the World, many Elegant Complements pass for
nothing, they have no meaning, or if they have, ’tis quite contrary to
what the Words in other Cases signifie.
From the Companion of two or more Ideas clearly Conceived arises a
Judgment, which we may lay down for a Principle, and as we have
occasion Argue from. Always observing that those Judgments which
we take for Axioms or Principles, be such as carry the highest
Evidence and Conviction, such as every one who will but in the least
Attend may Clearly see, and be fully convinced of, and which need
not another Idea for their Demonstration. Thus from the Agreement
which we plainly perceive between the Ideas of GOD and of
Goodness singly consider’d, we discern that they may be joyn’d
together so as to form this Proposition, That GOD is Good: And from
the evident disparity that is between GOD and Injustice, we learn to
affirm this other, That he is not Unjust. And so long as we Judge of
Nothing but what we see Clearly, we can’t be mistaken in our
Judgments, we may indeed in those Reasonings and Deductions we
draw from them, if we are Ignorant of the Laws of Argumentation,
or Negligent in the Observation of them.

The First and Principal thing therefore to be observed in all the

Operations of the Mind is, That we determine nothing about those
things of which we have not a Clear Idea, and as Distinct as the
Nature of the Subject will permit, for we cannot properly be said to
Know any thing which does not Clearly and Evidently appear to us.
Whatever we see Distinctly we likewise see Clearly, Distinction
always including Clearness, tho this does not necessarily include
that, there being many Objects Clear to the view of the Mind, which
yet can’t be said to be Distinct.

That (to use the Words of a Celebrated Author)

Les Princip. de may be said to be “Clear which is Present and
la Philos. de M. Manifest to an attentive Mind; so as we say we see
Des Cartes. Pt.
Objects Clearly, when being present to our Eyes
I. §. 45.
they sufficiently Act on ’em, and our Eyes are
dispos’d to regard ’em. And that Distinct, which is so Clear, Particular,
and Different from all other things, that it contains not any thing in it
self which appears not manifestly to him who considers it as he
ought.” Thus we may have a Clear, but not a Distinct and Perfect
Idea of GOD and of our own Souls; their Existence and some of their
Properties and Attributes may be Certainly and Indubitably Known,
but we can’t Know the Nature of our Souls Distinctly, for Reasons too
long to be mentioned here, and less that of GOD, because he is
Infinite. Now where our Knowlege is Distinct, we may boldly deny of
a subject, all that which after a careful Examination we find not in it:
But where our Knowlege is only Clear, and not Distinct, tho’ we may
safely Affirm what we see, yet we can’t without a hardy Presumption
Deny of it what we see not. And were it not very common to find
People both Talking and Writing of things of which they have no
Notion, no Clear Idea; nay and determining Dogmatically concerning
the intire Nature of those of which they cannot possibly have an
Adequate and Distinct one, it might seem impertinent to desire them
to speak no farther than they Apprehend. They will tell you
Peremptorily of Contradictions and Absurdities in such matters as
they themselves must allow they cannot Comprehend, tho others as
Sharp sighted as themselves can see no such thing as they complain
of.

As Judgments are form’d by the Comparing of Ideas, so Reasoning

or Discourse arises from the Companion or Combination of several
Judgments. Nature teaches us when we can’t find out what Relation
one Idea bears to another by a Simple view or bare Comparison, to
seek for a Common Measure or third Idea, which Relating to the
other two, we may by Comparing it with each of ’em, discern
wherein they agree or differ. Our Invention discovers it self in
proposing readily apt Ideas for this Middle Term, our Judgment in
making Choice of such as are Clearest and most to our purpose, and
the excellency of our Reasoning consists in our Skill and Dexterity in
Applying them.

Invention indeed is the hardest part, when Proofs are found it is not
very difficult to manage them. And to know precisely wherein their
Nature consists, may help us somewhat in our enquiries after ’em.
An Intermediate Idea then which can make out an Agreement
between other Ideas, must be Equivalent to, and yet Distinct from
those we compare by it. Where Ideas agree it will not be hard to
find such an Equivalent, and if after diligent search we cannot meet
with any, ’tis a pretty sure Sign that they do not agree. It is not
necessary indeed that our Middle Idea be Equivalent in all respects,
’tis enough if it be in such as make the Comparison: And when it is
so to one of the Compar’d Ideas but not to the other, that’s a Proof
that they do not agree amongst themselves.

All the Commerce and Intercourse of the World is manag’d by

Equivalents, Conversation as well as Traffick. Why do we Trust our
Friends but because their Truth and Honesty appears to us
Equivalent to the Confidence we repose in ’em? Why do we perform
Good Offices to others, but because there’s a proportion between
them and the Merit of the Person, or our own Circumstances? And as
the way to know the Worth of things is to Compare them one with
another, so in like manner we come to the Knowlege of the Truth of
’em by an Equal Ballancing. But you will say, Tho I may learn the
value of a Spanish Coin by Weighing, or Comparing it with some
other Money whose Standard I know, and so discern what
proportion it bears to those Goods I wou’d exchange; yet what
Scales shall I find to weigh Ideas? What Hand so even as to poize
them Justly? Or if that might be done, yet where shall I meet with
an Equivalent Idea when I have occasion to use one?

In answer to this Demand I consider, that as Light is always visible

to us if we have an Organ to receive it, if we turn our Eyes towards
it, and that nothing interpose between it and us; so is Truth, we are
surrounded with it, and GOD has given us Faculties to receive it. If it
be ask’d, Why then do we so seldom find it? The Reason is, because
instead of making right use of our Faculties we employ them in
keeping it out; we either shut our Eyes, or if we vouchsafe to open
them, we are sure to view it thro such unsuitable Mediums as fail
not to misrepresent it to us. As for those few Noble Spirits, who
open the Windows of their Souls to let in Truth, and take the Films
of Interest, Passion and Prejudice from before their Eyes, they will
certainly be Enlighten’d, and cannot miss of obtaining as much Truth
as they are capable of Receiving. For, to go on with the Comparison,
as we can See no farther than our own Horizon, tho the Light shine
never so bright around us; and as we cannot discern every Object
even within that Compass Clearly, nor Any Distinctly but what we
particularly apply our selves to; So neither are our Capacities large
enough to take in All Truth, as has been often said, nor are we
capable of attaining Any, without Attention and diligent Examination.
But if we carefully Consider those Ideas we already have and Attend
to those Truths we are acquainted with, we cannot want Mediums to
discover more, if our Enquiries be after that which is within our
Reach. He who is the Fountain of Truth is also a GOD of Order, and
has so regularly connex’d one Truth with another, that the discovery
of one is a step towards a further Progress; so that if we diligently
Examine those Truths which, we Know, they will clear the way to
what we search after: For it seldom happens but that the Question it
self directs us to some Idea that will serve for the Explanation or
Proof of it.

There is no Object, no Accident of Life but affords us matter of

Instruction. GOD has so dispos’d all the Works of his Hands, all the
Actings of his Providence, that every one of ’em ministers to our
Improvement, if we will but Observe and Apply them. Indeed this
Living Ex Tempore which most of us are guilty of, our making no
Reflections, our Gay and Volatile Humour which transports us in an
Instant from one thing to another, e’re we have with the Industrious
Bee suck’d those Sweets it wou’d afford us, frequently renders his
gracious Bounty ineffectual. For as the Diligent-hand maketh Rich,
whil’st the Slothful and Prodigal come to nothing, so the Use of our
Powers improves and Encreases them, and the most Observing and
Considerate is the Wisest Person: For she lays up in her Mind as in a
Store-house, ready to produce on all Occasions, a Clear and Simple
Idea of every Object that has at any time presented it self. And
perhaps the difference between one Womans Reason and anothers
may consist only in this, that the one has amass’d a greater number
of such Ideas than the other, and dispos’d them more Orderly in her
Understanding, so that they are at hand, ready to be apply’d to
those Complex Ideas whose Agreement or Disagreement cannot be
found out but by the means of some of ’em.

But because Examples are more familiar than Precepts, as

condescending to shew us the very manner of Practising them, I
shall endeavour to make the matter in Hand as plain as I can by
subjoining Instances to the following Rules, which Rules as I have
not taken wholly on Trust from others, so neither do I pretend to be
the Inventer of ’em.

We have heard already that a Medium is necessary when we can’t

discern the Relation that is between two or more Ideas by Intuition
or a simple View. Could this alone procure us what we seek after,
the addition of other Ideas wou’d be needless, since to make a shew
of Wit by tedious Arguings and unnecessary Flourishes, does only
Perplex and Incumber the Matter, Intuition being the Simplest, and
on that account the best way of Knowing.

Rule I. And therefore we shou’d in the first place, Acquaint our

selves throughly with the State of the Question, have a Distinct
Notion of our Subject whatever it be, and of the Terms we make use
of, knowing precisely what it is we drive at: that so we may in the
second.

Rule II. Cut off all needless Ideas and whatever has not a necessary
Connexion to the matter under Consideration, which serve only to fill
up the Capacity of the Mind, and to Divide and Distract the
Attention. From the neglect of this comes those causless
Digressions, tedious Parentheses and Impertinent Remarques which
we meet with in some Authors. For, as when our Sight is diffus’d and
extended to many Objects at once we see none of them Distinctly;
so when the Mind grasps at every Idea that presents it self, or
rambles after such as relate not to its Present Business, it loses its
hold and retains a very feeble Apprehension of that which it shou’d
Attend. Some have added another Rule (viz.) That we Reason only
on those things of which we have Clear Ideas; but I take it to be a
Consequence of the first, and therefore do not make it a distinct
one: For we can by no means Understand our Subject, or be well
acquainted with the State of the Question, unless we have a Clear
Idea of all its Terms.

Rule III. Our Business being stated, the next Rule is To conduct our
Thoughts by Order, beginning with the most Simple and Easie
Objects, And ascending as by Degrees to the Knowlege of the more
Compos’d. I need not tell you, that Order makes every thing, Easie,
Strong and Beautiful, and that the Superstructure is neither like to
Last or Please unless the Foundation be duly laid, for this is obvious
to the most Superficial Reader. Nor are they likely to solve the
Difficult, who have neglected or slightly pass’d over the Easie
Questions. Our Knowledge is gradual, and by passing Regularly thro
Plain things, we arrive in due time at the more Abstruse.

Rule IV. In this Method we are to practise the Fourth Rule which is,
Not to leave any part of our Subject unexamin’d, it being as
necessary to Consider All that can let in Light, as to shut out what’s
Foreign to it. We may stop short of Truth as well as over-run it; and
tho we look never so attentively on our proper Object, if we view but
half of it, we may be as much mistaken, as if we extended our Sight
beyond it. Some Objects agree very well when observ’d on one side,
which upon turning the other shew a great disparity. Thus the Right
Angle of a Triangle may be like to one part of a Square, but compare
the Whole, and you’l find ’em very different Figures. And a Moral
Action may in some Circumstance be not only Fit but Necessary,
which in others, where Time, Place, and the like have made an
alteration, wou’d be most Improper; so that if we venture to Act on
the former Judgment, we may easily do amiss, if we wou’d Act as
we ought, we must view its New Face, and see with what Aspect
that looks on us.

To this Rule belongs that of Dividing the Subject of our Meditations

into as many Parts, as we can, and as shall be requisite to
Understand it perfectly. This is indeed most necessary in difficult
Questions, which will scarce be unravell’d but in this manner by
Pieces: Ever taking care to make Exact Reviews, and to Sum up our
Evidence justly e’re we pass Sentence and fix our Judgment.

Rule V. To which purpose we must Always keep our Subject Directly

in our Eye, and Closely pursue it thro all our Progress; there being
no better Sign of a good Understanding than Thinking Closely and
Pertinently, and Reasoning dependently, so as to make the former
part of our Discourse a support to the Latter, and This an Illustration
of That, carrying Light and Evidence in ev’ry step we take. The
neglect of this Rule is the Cause why our Discoveries of Truth are
seldom Exact, that so much is often said to so little purpose; and
many Intelligent and Industrious Readers when they have Read over
a Book are very little wiser than when they began it. And that the
two last Rules may be the better observ’d, ’twill be fit very often to
look over our Process so far as we have gone, that so by rendring
our Subject Familiar, we may the sooner arrive to an Exact Knowlege
of it.

Rule VI. All which being done we are in a fair way towards keeping
the last Rule, which is, To judge no further than we Perceive, and
not to take any thing for Truth which we do not evidently Know to
be so. Indeed in some Cases we are forc’d to content our selves with
Probability, but ’twere well if we did so only where ’tis plainly
Necessary. That is, when the Subject of our Meditation is such as we
cannot possibly have a Certain Knowlege of, because we are not
furnish’d with Proofs which have a Constant and Immutable
Connexion with the Ideas we apply them to, or because we can’t
perceive it, which is our Case in such Exigencies as oblige us to Act
presently, on a cursory view of the Arguments propos’d to us, when
we want time to trace them to the bottom, and to make use of such
means as wou’d discover Truth.

I cannot think we are often driven to such straits in any considerable

Affair, tho I believe that very many Subjects may be propos’d to us,
concerning which we cannot readily pass our Judgment, either
because we never consider’d them before, or because we are
wanting in some Means that lead to the Knowlege, of ’em. In which
Case Reason wills that we suspend our Judgment till we can be
better Inform’d; nor wou’d it have us remit our Search after
Certainty, even in those very Cases in which we may sometimes be
forc’d to Act only on Probable Grounds. For Reason can’t rest
satisfy’d with Probabilities where Evidence is possible, our Passions
and Interest may, but That does not incline us to leave off Enquiring
lest we happen to meet somewhat contrary to our Desires. No,
Reason requires us to continue our Enquiries with all the Industry we
can, till they’ve put us in Possession of Truth, and when we have
found, enjoyns us to follow her, how opposite soever she may cause
our Latter Actions to be to our Former. But by this we may learn
(and so we may by every thing that such weak and fallible Creatures
as we are, perform) to think Candidly of those whose Opinions and
Actions differ from our own. Because we do not know the necessity
of their Affairs, nor in what ill Circumstances they are plac’d in
respect of Truth.

And now to Apply what has been said; The State of the Question
being Distinctly known, and certain Ideas fixt to the Terms we make
use of, we shall find sometimes that the Difference which was
suppos’d to be between the Things themselves, is only in words, in
the divers ways we make use of to express the same Idea.

For if upon looking into our selves we discern, that these different
Terms have but one and the same Idea, when we have corrected
our Expressions the Controversie is at an End, and we need enquire
no further. Thus, If we are ask’d Whether GOD is Infinitely Perfect?
There needs no Intermediate Idea to compare the Idea of GOD with
that of Infinite Perfection, since we may discern them on the very
first view to be one and the same Idea differently express’d, which
to go about to explain or prove were only to cumber with needless
words, and to make what is Clear, Obscure. For we Injure a Cause
instead of Defending it, by attempting an Explanation or Proof of
things so Clear, that as they do not need, so perhaps they are not
Capable of any.

But if it be made a Question Whether there is a GOD, or a Being

Infinitely Perfect? We are then to Examin the Agreement between
our Idea of GOD and that of Existence. Now this may be discern’d by
Intuition, for upon a View of our Ideas we find that Existence is a
Perfection, and the Foundation of all other Perfections, since that
which has no Being cannot be suppos’d to have any Perfection. And
tho the Idea of Existence is not Adequate to that of Perfection, yet
the Idea of Perfection Includes that of Existence, and if That Idea
were divided into parts, one part of it wou’d exactly agree with This.
So that if we will allow that Any Being is Infinite in All Perfections,
we cannot deny that that Being Exists; Existence it self being one
Perfection, and such an one as all the rest are built upon.

If unreasonable Men will farther demand, Why is it necessary that All

Perfection shou’d be Centred in One Being, is’t not enough that it be
parcel’d out amongst many? And tho it be true that that Being who
has all Perfection must needs Exist, yet where’s the Necessity of an
All-Perfect Being? We must then look about for Proofs and
Intermediate Ideas, and the Objection it self will furnish us with one.
For those Many whose Particular Ideas it wou’d have joyn’d together
to make a Compound one of All-Perfection, are no other than
Creatures, as will appear if we consider our Idea of Particular Being
and of Creature, which are so far from having any thing to
distinguish ’em, that in all Points they resemble each other. Now this
Idea naturally suggests to us that of Creation, or a Power of giving
Being to that which before the exerting of that Power had none,
which Idea if we use it as a Medium, will serve to discover to us the
necessity of an All-Perfect Being.

For in the first place, what ever has any Perfection or Excellency (for
that’s all we mean by Perfection here) must either have it of it self,
or derive it from some other Being. Now Creatures cannot have their
Perfections from themselves because they have not their Being, for
to suppose that they Made themselves is an Absurdity too ridiculous
to be seriously refuted, ’tis to suppose them to Be and not to Be at
the same time, and that when they were Nothing, they were able to
do the greatest Matter. Nor can they derive either Being or
Perfection from any other Creature. For tho some Particular Beings
may seem to be the Cause of the Perfections of others, as the
Watch-maker may be said to be the Cause of the Regular Motions of
the Watch, yet trace it a little farther, and you’l find this very Cause
shall need another, and so without End, till you come to the
Foundation-head, to that All-Perfect Being, who is the last resort of
our Thoughts, and in whom they Naturally and Necessarily rest and
terminate. If to this it be Objected that we as good as affirm that
this All-Perfect Being is his own Maker, by saying he is Self-Existent,
and so we fall into the same Absurdity which we imputed to that
Opinion which supposes that Creatures were their own Maker. The
reply is easie, That we do not say he Made himself, we only affirm
that his Nature is such, that tho we can’t sufficiently Explain because
we can’t comprehend it, yet thus much we can discern, that if he did
not Exist of himself no other Being could ever have Existed. So that
either All must be swallow’d up in an Infinite Nothing, if Nothing can
properly have that Epithet, and we must suppose, that neither we
our selves, nor any of those Creatures about us ever had, or ever
can have a Being, which is too ridiculous to imagine, or else we must
needs have recourse to a Self-Existing Being, who is the Maker and
Lord of all things. And since Self Existence must of necessity be
plac’d somewhere, is it not much more Natural and Reasonable to
place it in Infinite Perfection, than amongst poor, frail Creatures,
whose Origin we may trace, and whose End we see daily hastning?

To Sum up all: Since there are Innumerable Beings in the World,

which have each of them their several Excellencies or Perfections;
Since these can no more derive their Perfections than their Being
from themselves or from any other Creature; Since a Self-Existing
Being is the result of our Thoughts; the First and only True Cause,
without whom it is impossible that any thing should ever have
Existed; since Creatures with their Being receive all that depends on
it from him their Maker; Since none can give what he has not, and
therefore he who Communicates an innumerable variety of
Perfections to his Creatures, even all that they enjoy, must needs
contain in himself all those Beauties and Perfections he is pleas’d to
Communicate to Inferior Beings; nothing can be more Plain and
Evident than that there is a GOD, and that the Existence of an All-
Perfect Being is Absolutely necessary.

Perhaps these Arguments are not in Form, I do not oblige my Self to

follow servilely the Rules of Art, nor know I what better Judges will
think of ’em, but they seem to me to be Clear, Rational and
Concluding, which is all I aim at. And I hope the Reader will receive
from hence more light into the way of Arguing, than she cou’d have
gain’d had I spent as many Pages in prescribing Rules and giving
trifling Examples, which when they are known, merit only to be
forgot again. But if some are better pleas’d with the usual way of
Syllogism, and think an Argument cannot be rightly managed
without one, for their Satisfaction we will add another Instance.

Suppose the Question were put Whether a Rich Man is Happy? By a

Rich Man understanding one who possesses the Wealth and Good
things of this World, and by Happy the Enjoyment of the Proper
Good of Man. We compare the two Terms Riches and Happiness
together, to discern if they be so much one and the same, that what
is affirm’d of the one may be laid of the other; but we find they are
not. For if Riches and Happiness were terms Convertible, then all
who are Happy must be Rich, and all who are Rich must be Happy,
to affirm the last of which is to beg the Question, and the contrary
appears by the following Argument, which makes use of Satisfaction
with ones own Condition for the middle Idea or Common Measure.

He who is Happy is satisfied with his Condition and free from

Anxious Cares and Solicitude (for these proceeding from the want of
Good, he who enjoys his proper Good cannot be subject to them.)
But Riches do not free us from Anxieties and Solicitude, they many
times encrease them, Therefore to be Rich and to be Happy are not
one and the same thing.

Again, If there are some who are Happy and yet not Rich, then
Riches and Happiness are two distinct things. But a Good Poor Man
is Happy (in the Enjoyment of GOD who is better to him than
Thousands of Gold and Silver,) therefore Riches and Happiness are
to be distinguish’d.

We may further consider, that if the Enjoyment of Riches can make a

Man Happy according to our Notion of Happiness, they must be his
Proper Good. Now if we compare the Idea of Riches with that which
we have of Man, we shall find in the former nothing but what’s
Material, External and Adventitious, but our Idea of the latter
represents to us somewhat that Thinks, and so is of an Immaterial
and more noble Nature, a Nature altogether different from the
former, and much more excellent and Superior to it; and by
Consequence the less Noble cannot be the Good of the more, nor a
Body or an Extended Substance, the Proper Good of the Mind, a
Spiritual or Thinking Substance. So that upon the whole matter we
find, that we cannot affirm a Man is Happy because he is Rich,
neither can we deny it; Riches consider’d absolutely in themselves,
neither make a Man Happy nor hinder him from being so. They
Contribute to his Happiness or they Obstruct it according to the Use
he makes of ’em.

As for the Common Rules of Disputation they do more frequently

Intangle than Clear a Question, nor is it worth while to know any
more of them than may help to guard us from the Sophistry of those
who use them, and assist us in the managing an Argument fairly, so
long as it is Tenable, and till we are driven from it by the meer dint
of Truth. To be able to hold an Argument Right or Wrong may pass
with some perhaps for the Character of a Good Disputant, which yet
I think it is not, but must by no means be allow’d to be that of a
Rational Person; it belongs to such to detect as soon as may be the
Fallacies of an ill one, and to establish Truth with the Clearest
Evidence. For indeed Truth not Victory is what we shou’d contend for
in all Disputes, it being more Glorious to be Overcome by her than to
Triumph under the Banners of Error. And therefore we pervert our
Reason when we make it the Instrument of an Endless Contention,
by seeking after Quirks and Subtilties, abusing Equivocal Terms, and
by practising the rest of those little Arts every Sophister is full of,
which are of no service in the discovery of Truth, all they can do is to
Ward off an Opponents blow, to make a Noise and raise a Dust, that
so we may escape in the Hurry, our Foil being undiscover’d.

It were endless to reckon up all the Fallacies we put on our selves

and endeavour to obtrude on others. On our selves in the first place,
for however we may be pleas’d in the Contemplation of our own
Craft or to use those softer Names we are apt to give it, our
Acuteness and Ingenuity; who ever attempts to impose on others is
first impos’d on himself, he is cheated by some of those grand
Deceivers, the World, the Flesh, and the Devil, and made to believe
that Vain-glory, Secular Interest, Ambition or perhaps Sensuality or
Revenge, or any the like contemptible Appetites are preferable to
Integrity and Truth.

Neither is it necessary to reduce the most usual

Art of Thinking Sophisms to general Heads, since that’s already
Pt. 3. Ch. 19, very well perform’d in a Book to which I’de rather
20.
refer you, than be at the trouble of Transcribing,
having nothing to add but this, that if I be not mistaken, all the false
Arguings enumerated there, and what others you may happen to
meet with may be discover’d and avoided by the Rules already
given, and do indeed proceed, so far as they relate to the
Understanding, from the Non-observation of some of ’em.

But it is to little purpose to guard our selves against the Sophisms of

the Head, if we lie open to those of the Heart. One irregular Passion
will put a greater Obstacle between us and Truth, than the brightest
Understanding and clearest Reasonings can easily remove. This
every one of us is apt to discern in others, but we’re blind to it in our
selves. We can readily say that it is Pride or Obstinacy, Interest or
Passion or in a word Self-love that keeps our Neighbour from
Conviction, but all this while imagine our own Hearts are very clear
of ’em, tho’ more Impartial Judges are of another Mind.

I wish there were no Reason to think that there are some who
attempt to maintain an Opinion which they know to be false, or at
least which they have cause to suspect, and therefore industriously
avoid what wou’d manifest their Error. ’Tis hop’d however that the
greatest part of the Disputers of the World are not of this number,
and that the reason why they offer their Neighbours Sophistical
Arguments, is because they are not aware of it themselves; That
what makes them so Positive is their firm persuasion that they are
acted only by a Zeal for GOD, an honest Constancy and Stanch
Integrity, tho at the very same time quite different Motives move
them under these Appearances.

And indeed he must be an extraordinary good Man, a Wonder scarce

produc’d in an Age, who has no Irregular Passion stirring; Who
receives no Manner of Tincture from Pride and Vitious Self-Love, to
which all are so prone, and which hide themselves under so many
disguises; Who is got above the World its Terrors and Allurements,
has laid up his Treasure in Heaven, and is fully Contented with his
Present Circumstances, let them be what they will, having made
them the boundaries of his Desires; who knows how to live on a
Little very happily and therefore receives no Bias from his own
Conveniency, nor is weigh’d down by the dead Weight of his
Appetites and Interests; which ought to be the Temper of every
Person who wou’d find out Truth, and who desires to make a Right
Judgment in all things.

We all pretend to this it’s true, and think our selves Injur’d if it be
not believ’d that we are Disinteress’d and free from Passion, that no
Humour or Private End, nothing but an honest Zeal for Truth gives
warmth to our Discourses; and yet it often happens that e’re we
Conclude them, we give just occasion to have it thought, that how
large soever our Knowlege in other things may be, we are not well
acquainted with our own Hearts. All which consider’d, how
confidently soever we’re perswaded of our own Integrity, tho we
think we have penetrated to the very bottom of our Hearts, it wou’d
not be amiss to suspect our selves sometimes, and to fear a Bias,
even at the very instant we take care to avoid one.

For Truth being but One, and the Rational Faculties not differing in
Kind but in Degree, tho there may be different Measures of
Understanding, there could not be such Contradictions in Mens
Opinions as we find there are, even in those who examin as well as
in those who do not, were they acted only by the Love of Truth, and
did not Self-Love perswade them that they shall find their own
particular account by such an Opposition. I wou’d not be so
understood as if I thought that in all Controversies one side must
needs be Criminal, if not by Wilfully Opposing Truth, yet at least by
an indulgence of such unmortifi’d Passions as estrange them from
her. No, without doubt great allowances are to be made on the score
of Education, Capacity, the Leisure, and Opportunity of Information
we have had. But this we may venture to say, that had we but a
Modest Opinion of our selves, believing it as possible for us as for
those who contradict us to be mistaken, did we behave our selves
answerable to such a belief; were we seriously convinc’d that
nothing is so much our Interest as a readiness to admit of Truth,
from what ever Hand it comes, greatest part of our Disputes wou’d
have a better Issue than we generally find. At least if we cou’d not
be to happy as to Convince one another, our Contests wou’d be
manag’d with more Temper and Moderation, wou’d not conclude in
such a breach of Charity, or at best in such a Coldness for each
other, as they usually do.

If we consider wisely we shall find it to be our Present Interest as

well as our Future, to do that in Reality which all of us Pretend to,
that is, to Search after and to Follow Truth. And to do it with all that
Candor and Ingenuity which becomes a true Philosopher as well as a
good Christian, making use of no Arguments but what we really
believe, and giving them up contentedly when we meet with
stronger. Our Present Interest, which is that which weighs most with
the generality, and to which we make all other considerations give
place; For what is it we Contend for? They who have such little Souls
as to bait at any thing beneath the highest End, make Reputation
their Aim, and with it that Authority and Wealth which usually
attends it. But now Reputation cannot be acquir’d, at least not a
lasting one, by Fallacious Reasonings; we may perhaps for a while
get a Name by them amongst unwary Persons, but the World grows
too quick-sighted to be long impos’d on. If a Love of Truth do not,
yet Envy and Emulation will set other heads a Work to discover our
Ignorance or Fraud, they are upon the same Design, and will not
suffer us to go away with the Prize undeservedly. And besides, with
how ill an Aspect must he needs appear who does not Reason fairly,
and by consequence, how unlike is he to gain on those who hear
him? There are but three Causes to which false Arguments can be
refer’d, Ignorance, Rashness, or Design, and the being suspected for
any one of these hinders us very much in acquiring that Reputation,
Authority or Preferment we desire. I must confess were we sure the
Fallacy wou’d not be detected, and that we shou’d not lie under
Suspicion of it, we might gain our point; for provided the Paint do
not rub off, good Colouring may serve a present turn as well as a
true Complection: But there is little reason to hope for this, because
of what was just now mention’d, and for other Reasons that might
be added.

Now what can be more provoking than the Idea we have of a

Designing Person? of one who thinks his own Intellectuals so strong
and ours so weak, that he can make us swallow any thing, and lead
us where he pleases? such an one seems to have an Intention to
reduce us to the vilest Slavery, the Captivation of our
Understandings, which we justly reckon to be the highest Insolence.
And since every one puts in for a share of Sense, and thinks he has
no reason to complain of the distribution of it, whoever supposes
that another has an over-weaning Opinion of his own, must needs
think that he undervalues his Neighbours Understanding, and will
certainly repay him in his own Coin, and deny him those advantages
he seems to arrogate.

The most we can say for our selves when the weakness of our
Arguments comes to be discover’d, is that we were mistaken thro
Rashness or Ignorance, which tho more pardonable than the former,
are no recommending Qualities. If we argue falsly and know not that
we do so, we shall be more pittied than when we do, but either way
disappointed. And if we have added Rash Censures of those who are
not of our Mind, Pride or Positiveness to our Errors as we cannot so
handsomely Retreat so neither will so fair a Quarter be allow’d as
those who Argue with Meekness, Modesty and Charity may well
expect. So that when we have cast up our Account and estimated
the Present Advantages that false Arguings bring us, I fear what we
have got by a Pretence to Truth, won’t be found to countervail the
loss we shall sustain by the Discovery that it was no more. Which
may induce us (if other Considerations will not) to be wary in
receiving any Proposition ourselves; and restrain us from being
forward to impose our Sentiments on others.

After all, ’tis a melancholy reflection that a great part of Mankind

stand in need of Arguments drawn from so low a Motive as Worldly
Interest, to persuade them to that to which they have much greater
inducements. It is strange that we shou’d need any other
considerations besides the bare performance of our Duty, and those
unspeakable advantages laid up for all such as do it sincerely,
hereafter. When we have the Approbation of GOD and the infinite
Rewards he has propos’d to those who study to recommend
themselves to him, for our Encouragement, how low are we sunk if
the Applause of Men and the little Trifles which they can bestow
weigh any thing with us! I am therefore almost asham’d of
proposing so mean a consideration, but the degeneracy of the Age
requir’d it, and they who perhaps at first follow Truth as the Jews did
once, for the Loaves only, may at last be attracted by its own Native
Beauties.
 §. V. As Nature teaches us Logic, so does it instruct
L’art de Penser, us in Rhetoric much better than Rules of Art, which
p. 22. if they are good ones are nothing else but those
Judicious Observations which Men of Sense have
drawn from Nature, and which all who reflect on the Operations of
their own Minds will find out ’emselves. The common Precepts of
Rhetoric may teach us how to reduce Ingenious ways of speaking to
a certain Rule, but they do not teach us how to Invent them, this is
Natures work and she does it best; there is as much difference
between Natural and Artificial Eloquence as there is between Paint
and True Beauty. So that as a good Author well observes, all that’s
useful in this Art, “is the avoiding certain evil ways of Writing and
Speaking, and above all an Artificial and Rhetorical Stile compos’d of
false Thoughts, Hyperboles and forc’d Figures which is the greatest
fault in Rhetoric.”

I shall not therefore recommend under the name of Rhetoric an Art

of speaking floridly on all Subjects, and of dressing up Error and
Impertinence in a quaint and taking garb; any more than I did that
Wrangling which goes by the name of Logic, and which teaches to
dispute for and against all Propositions indefinitely whether they are
True or False. It is an abuse both of Reason and Address to press’em
into the Service of a Trifle or an Untruth; and a mistake to think that
any Argument can be rightly made, or any Discourse truly Eloquent
that does not illustrate and inforce Truth. For the design of Rhetoric
is to remove those Prejudices that lie in the way of Truth, to Reduce
the Passions to the Government of Reason; to place our Subject in a
Right Light, and excite our Hearers to a due consideration of it. And
I know not what exactness of Method, pure and proper Language,
Figures, insinuating ways of Address and the like signify, any farther
than as they contribute to the Service of Truth by rendring our
Discourse Intelligible, Agreeable and Convincing. They are indeed
very serviceable to it when they are duly managed, for Good Sense
loses much of its efficacy by being ill express’d, and an ill stile is
nothing else but the neglect of some of these, or over doing others
of ’em.
Obscurity, one of the greatest faults in Writing, does commonly
proceed from a want of Meditation, for when we pretend to teach
others what we do not understand our selves, no wonder that we do
it at a sorry rate. ’Tis true, Obscurity is sometimes design’d, to
conceal an erroneous opinion which an Author dares not openly
own, or which if it be discover’d he has a mind to evade. And
sometimes even an honest and good Writer who studies to avoid
may insensibly fall into it, by reason that his Ideas being become
familiar to himself by frequent Meditation, a long train of ’em are
readily excited in his mind, by a word or two which he’s us’d to
annex to them; but it is not so with his Readers who are perhaps
strangers to his Meditations, and yet ought to have the very same
Idea rais’d in theirs that was in the Authors mind, or else they
cannot understand him. If therefore we desire to be intelligible to
every body, our Expressions must be more plain and explicit than
they needed to be if we writ only for our selves, or for those to
whom frequent Discourse has made our Ideas familiar.

Not that it is necessary to express at length all the Process our Mind
goes thro in resolving a Question, this wou’d spin out our Discourse
to an unprofitable tediousness, the Operations of the Mind being
much more speedy than those of the Tongue or Pen. But we shou’d
fold up our Thoughts so closely and neatly, expressing them in such
significant tho few words, as that the Readers Mind may easily open
and enlarge them. And if this can be done with facility we are
Perspicuous as well as Strong, if with difficulty or not at all, we’re
then perplext and Obscure Writers.

Scarce any thing conduces more to Clearness, the great Beauty of

writing, than Exactness of Method; nor perhaps to Persuasion, for by
putting every thing in its proper place with due Order and
Connexion, the Readers Mind is gently led where the Writer wou’d
have it. Such a Stile is Easy without Softness, Copious as that
signifies the omission of nothing necessary, yet not Wordy and
Tedious; nor stuft with Nauseous Repetitions, which they who do not
Think before they Write and dispose their Matter duly, can scarce
avoid. The Method of Thinking has been already shewn, and the
same is to be observ’d in Writing, which if it be what it ought; is
nothing else but the communicating to others the result of our
frequent and deep Meditations, in such a manner as we judge most
effectual to convince them of those Truths which we believe. Always
remembring that the most natural Order is ever best; that we must
first prepare their minds by removing those Prejudices and Passions
which are in our way, and then propose our Reasons with all the
Clearness and Force, with all the Tenderness and Good-Nature we
can.

And since the Clearness and Connexion as well as

Lock of Hum. the Emphasis and Beauty of a Discourse depends
Und. B. 3. Ch. 7. in a great measure on a right use of the Particles,
whoever wou’d Write well ought to inform
themselves nicely in their Proprieties. an And, a The, a But, a For,
&c. do very much perplex the Sense when they are misplac’d, and
make the Reader take it many times quite otherwise than the Writer
meant it. But this is not a place to say all that this Subject deserves;
they who wou’d have much in a little, may consult an Ingenious
Author who has touch’d upon’t, and from thence take hints to
observe how these little words are applied in good Authors, and how
themselves may best use them to express the several Postures of
their own Minds.

In a word, I know not a more compendious way to good Speaking

and Writing, than to chuse out the most excellent in either as a
Model on which to form our selves. Or rather to imitate the
Perfections of all, and avoid their mistakes; for few are so perfect as
to be without fault, and few so bad as to have nothing good in them.
A true Judgment distinguishes, and neither rejects the Good for the
sake of the Bad, nor admits the Bad because of the Good that is
mingled with it. No sort of Style but has its excellency and is liable to
defect: If care be not taken the Sublime which subdues us with
Nobleness of Thought and Grandeur of Expression, will fly out of
sight and by being Empty and Bombast become contemptible. The
Plain and Simple will grow Dull and Abject; the Severe dry and
Rugged, the Florid vain and impertinent. The Strong instead of
rousing the Mind will distract and intangle it by being Obscure; even
the Easy and Perspicuous if it be too diffuse, or ever delicate tires us
instead of pleasing. Good Sense is the principal thing without which
all our polishing is of little Worth, and yet if Ornament be wholly
neglected very few will regard us. Studied and artificial periods are
not natural enough to please, they shew too much solicitude about
what does not deserve it, and a loose and careless Style declares too
much contempt of the Public. Neither Reason nor Wit entertain us if
they are driven beyond a certain pitch, and Pleasure it self is
offensive if it be not judiciously dispenc’d.

Every Author almost has some beauty or blemish remarkable in his

Style from whence it takes its name; and every Reader has a
peculiar tast of Books as well as Meats. One wou’d have the Subject
exhausted, another is not pleas’d if somewhat be not left to enlarge
on in his own Meditations. This affects a Grave that a Florid Style;
One is for Easiness, a second for Plainness, a third for Strength, and
a fourth for Politeness. And perhaps the great secret of Writing is the
mixing all these in so just a proportion that every one may tast what
he likes without being disgusted by its contrary. And may find at
once that by the Solidity of the Reason, the purity and propriety of
Expression, and insinuating agreeableness of Address, his
Understanding is Enlightned, his Affections subdued and his Will duly
regulated.

This is indeed the true End of Writing, and it wou’d not be hard for
every one to judge how well they had answer’d it, wou’d they but
lay aside Self-Love, so much of it at least, as makes them partial to
their own Productions. Did we consider our own with the same
Severity, or but Indifferency that we do anothers Writing, we might
pass a due Censure on it, might discern what Thought was Crude or
ill exprest, what Reasoning weak, what passage superfluous, where
we were flat and dull, where extravagant and vain, and by Criticizing
on our selves do a greater kindness to the World than we can in
making our Remarques on others. Nor shou’d we be at a loss, if we
were Impartial, in finding out Methods to Inform, Persuade and
Please; for Human Nature is for the most part much alike in all, and
that which has a good effect on us, will generally speaking have the
same on others. So that to guess what success we are like to have,
we need only suppose our selves in the place of those we Address
to, and consider how such a Discourse wou’d operate on us, if we
had their Infirmities and Thoughts about us.

And if we do so I believe we shall find, there’s nothing more

improper than Pride and Positiveness, nor any thing more prevalent
than an innocent compliance with their weakness: Such as pretends
not to dictate to their Ignorance, but only to explain and illustrate
what they did or might have known before if they had consider’d it,
and supposes that their Minds being employ’d about some other
things was the reason why they did not discern it as well as we. For
Human Nature is not willing to own its Ignorance; Truth is so very
attractive, there’s such a natural agreement between our Minds and
it, that we care not to be thought so dull as not to be able to find
out by our selves such obvious matters. We shou’d therefore be
careful that nothing pass from us which upbraids our Neighbours
Ignorance, but study to remove’t without appearing to take notice of
it, and permit’em to fancy if they please, that we believe them as
Wise and Good as we endeavour to make them. By this we gain
their Affections which is the hardest part of our Work, excite their
Industry and infuse a new Life into all Generous Tempers, who
conclude there’s great hopes they may with a little pains attain what
others think they Know already, and are asham’d to fall short of the
good Opinion we have entertain’d of ’em.

And since many wou’d yield to the Clear Light of Truth were’t not for
the shame of being overcome, we shou’d Convince but not Triumph,
and rather Conceal our Conquest than Publish it. We doubly oblige
our Neighbours when we reduce them into the Right Way, and keep
it from being taken notice of that they were once in the Wrong,
which is certainly a much greater satisfaction than that blaze of
Glory which is quickly out, that noise of Applause which will soon be
over. For the gaining of our Neighbour, at least the having honestly
endeavour’d it, and the leading our own Vanity in Triumph are Real
Goods and such as we shall always have the Comfort of. It is to be
wish’d that such Propositions as are not attended with the Clearest
Evidence were deliver’d only by way of Enquiry, since even the
brightest Truth when Dogmatically dictated is apt to offend our
Readers, and make them imagine their Liberty’s impos’d on, so far is
Positiveness from bringing any body over to our Sentiments. And
besides, we’re all of us liable to mistake, and few have Humility
enough to confess themselves Deceiv’d in what they have
confidently asserted, but think they’re obliged in Honour to maintain
an Opinion they’ve once been Zealous for, how desirous soever they
may be to get rid on’t, cou’d they do it handsomely. Now a Modest
way of delivering our Sentiments assists us in this, and leaves us at
liberty to take either side of the Question as Reason and Riper
Consideration shall determine.

In short, as Thinking conformably to the Nature of Things is True

Knowledge, so th’ expressing our Thoughts in such a way, as most
readily, and with the greatest Clearness and Life, excites in others
the very same Idea that was in us, is the best Eloquence. For if our
Idea be conformable to the Nature of the thing it represents, and its
Relations duly stated, this is the most effectual way both to Inform
and Perswade, since Truth being always amiable, cannot fail of
attracting when she’s plac’d in a Right Light, and those to whom we
offer her, are made Able and Willing to discern her Beauties. If
therefore we throughly understand our Subject and are Zealously
affected with it, we shall neither want suitable words to explain, nor
perswasive Methods to recommend it.

And since Piety and Vertue shou’d in spite of the mistaken Customs
of the Age be the principal Theme of a Christians Conversation; that
which those who bear that Sacred Name ought always to regard
some way or other, even when it might be unseasonable to speak of
it directly, the way to be good Orators is to be good Christians, the
Practice of Religion will both instruct us in the Theory, and most
powerfully inforce what we say of it. Did we truly relish the Delights
of GOD’s Service, we cou’d neither refrain from talking of the
Pleasure, nor be so ill-natur’d as not to strive to Communicate it;
and were we duly warm’d with a Zeal for his Glory and concern for
our Neighbours Soul, no Figures of Rhetoric, no Art of Perswasion
wou’d be wanting to us. We shou’d diligently watch for
Opportunities, and carefully improve them, accommodating our
Discourse to the Understanding and Genius of all we cou’d hope to
do good to.

Besides, by being True Christians we have Really that Love for others
which all who desire to perswade must pretend to; we’ve that
Probity and Prudence, that Civility and Modesty which the Masters of
this Art say a good Orator must be endow’d with; and have pluck’d
up those Vicious Inclinations from whence the most distastful faults
of Writing proceed. For why do we chuse to be Obscure but because
we intend to Deceive, or wou’d be thought to see much farther than
our Neighbours? One sort of Vanity prompts us to be Rugged and
Severe, and so possess’d with the imagin’d Worth and Solidity of our
Discourse, that we think it beneath us to Polish it: Another disposes
us to Elaborate and Affected ways of Writing, to Pompous and
improper Ornaments; and why are we tediously Copious but that we
fancy every Thought of ours is extraordinary? Contradiction is indeed
for our advantage as tending to make us wiser, yet our Pride makes
us impatient under it, because it seems to Lessen that Esteem and
Deference we desire shou’d be paid us. Whence come those sharp
Reflections, those imagin’d strains of Wit, not to be endur’d amongst
Christians, and which serve not to Convince but to Provoke, whence
come they but from Ill-nature or Revenge, from a Contempt of
others and a desire to set forth our own Wit? Did we write less for
our selves we should sooner gain our Readers, who are many times
disgusted at a well writ Discourse if it carries a tang of Ostentation:
And were our Temper as Christian as it ought to be, our Zeal wou’d
be spent on the most Weighty things, not on little differences of
Opinions.
I have made no distinction in what has been said between Speaking
and Writing, because tho they are talents which do not always meet,
yet there is no material difference between ’em. They Write best
perhaps who do’t with the gentile and easy air of Conversation; and
they Talk best who mingle Solidity of Thought with th’ agreableness
of a ready Wit. As for Pronunciation, tho it takes more with some
Auditors many times than Good Sense, there needs little be said of it
here, since Women have no business with the Pulpit, the Bar or St.
Stephens Chappel: And Nature does for the most part furnish ’em
with such a Musical Tone, Perswasive Air and winning Address as
renders their Discourse sufficiently agreeable in Private
Conversation. And as to spelling which they’re said to be defective
in, if they don’t believe as they’re usually told, that it’s fit for ’em to
be so, and that to write exactly is too Pedantic, they may soon
correct that fault, by Pronouncing their words aright and Spelling
’em accordingly. I know this Rule won’t always hold because of an
Imperfection in our Language which has been oft complain’d of but
is not yet amended; But in this case a little Observation or recourse
to Books will assist us; and if at any time we happen to mistake by
Spelling as we Pronounce, the fault will be very Venial, and Custom
rather to blame than we.

I’ve said nothing of Grammar tho we can’t Write properly if we

transgress its Rules, supposing that Custom and the reading of
English Books are sufficient to teach us the Grammar of our own
Tongue, If we do but in any measure attend to them. And tho
Women are generally accus’d of Writing false English, if I may speak
my own Experience, their Mistakes are not so common as is
pretended, nor are they the only Persons guilty. What they most
commonly fail in is the Particles and Connexion, and that generally
thro a Briskness of temper which make them forget, or Hast which
will not suffer ’em to read over again what went before. And indeed,
those who Speak true Grammar unless they ’re very Careless cannot
write false, since they need only peruse what they’ve Writ, and
consider whether they wou’d express ’emselves thus in
Conversation.
 But for this and for Figures, &c. and indeed for all
Art of speaking. that relates to this Subject, I must refer you to an
Ingenious Treatise which handles it fully, and to
which I’me oblig’d in great measure for what little skill I have.
Observing only, that whatever it is we Treat of, our Stile shou’d be
such as may keep our Readers Attent, and induce them to go to the
End. Now Attention is usually fixt by Admiration, which is excited by
somewhat uncommon either in the Thought or way of Expression.
We fall a sleep over an Author who tells us in an ordinary manner no
more than we knew before: He who wou’d Take must be Sublime in
his Sense, and must cloath it after a Noble way. His Thoughts must
not be superficial, such as every one may fall into at the first glance,
but the very Spirits and Essence of Thinking, the sum of many hours
Meditation folded up in one handsome and comprehensive Period,
whose Language is Intelligible and Easy that the Readers may not
lose the pleasure of the Kernel, by the pain they find in cracking the
Shell. The most difficult Subject must be made easy by his way of
handling it; tho his Matter may deserve a Meditation, yet his
Expressions must be so Clear that he needs not be read twice to be
Understood; these are to be Natural and Familiar, condiscending to
the meanest Capacity, whilst his Thoughts are Great enough to
entertain the highest. He Discourses always on a Useful Subject in a
manner agreeable to it, and pleases that he may Instruct; Nothing
seems Studied in his whole Composition, yet every thing is
Extraordinary, a Beautiful Harmony shining thro all its parts. No
Sentence is Doubtful, no word Equivocal, his Arguments are Clear
and his Images Lively; all the Ideas he excites in your Mind, as
nearly resemble the thing they represent as Words can make them.
Whilst th’ exactness of his Method, and Force of his Reason
Enlighten and Convince the Mind; the Vivacity of his Imagination and
insinuating Address, gain the Affections and Conquer the Will. By the
weight and closeness of the former you wou’d take him for an Angel,
and the tender and affable sweetness of the last bespeaks him a
Friend. He considers that as mere Florish and Rhetorick are good for
nothing, so neither will bare Reason dull and heavily express’d
perform any great matter, at least not on those who need it most,
whose Palates being deprav’d their Medicines must be administred in
a pleasing Vehicle. Since Mankind are averse to their Real Happiness,
he does not only tell ’em their Duty but Interesses them in it; and
thinking it not enough to run ’em down with the strength of Reason,
he draws ’em over to a Voluntary Submission by th’ attractives of his
Eloquence. For he has a peculiar Turn and Air which animates every
Period, so that the very same Truth which was dry and Unaffecting
in a vulgar Authors words, Charms and Subdues you when cloath’d
in his. He shews no more warmth than may convince his Readers
that he’s heartily persuaded of the Truths he offers them; and if it is
necessary at any time to make use of Figures to give a more Lively
Representation than plain Expressions cou’d, to discribe his own
Passions and excite the same in others upon a just occasion, in a
word to awaken a Stupid and Clear the Mind of a Prejudic’d Reader,
his Figures are duly chosen and discreetly us’d. For he knows that
scarce any thing speaks a greater want of Judgment than the
shewing concern where there needs none, or is a worse fault in
Oratory than the polishing a Wrong or a Trifling Thought, the
neatness of whose dress may strike with Admiration perhaps at first
sight, but upon a review it will certainly appear Contemptible. And
therefore as he does not abound in Superfluous Ornaments, so
neither does he reject any thing that can promote his End, which is
not his own Reputation, but the Glory of his GOD and his Neighbours
Edification. He considers the narrowness of the Humane Mind, and
says all that is necessary but no more; Understands it so well as to
know what will move and Please, and has so much command of
himself as to give over when he has done enough. Yet he can
exhaust the most fruitful Subject without making the Reader weary;
for when he enlarges it is in Things not Words, and he mingles
Variety without Confusion. All the divers excellencies of different
Stiles meet in his to make up a perfect one, Strength and Ease,
Solidity and Liveliness, the Sublime and the Plain. He’s neither so
Lofty as to fly out of Sight, nor so humble as to become Creeping
and Contemptible. His Strength does not make him Rugged and
Perplext nor his Smoothness Weak and Nice; tho every thing is Neat,
there’s not a grain of Affectation; he is gratefull to the Ear, but far
remov’d from jingling Cadence. Brief when there is occasion without
Dryness or Obscurity, and Florid enough to entertain th’ Imagination
without Distracting the Mind. There’s not an Antiquated or Barbarous
Word to be found in him, all is Decent, Just and Natural; no peculiar
or Affected Phrases, whether Courtly or Clownish, Grave or
Burlesque. For Plain and Significant Language is ever best, we have
a mistaken Idea of Learning if we think to pretend to’t by sending
our Reader every minute to the Dictionary. Words out of the
common way are only allowable when they express our Sense with
greater Force than Ordinary ones cou’d, or when they are so
significant as to ease us of Circumlocutions, a hard word which I
cou’d not avoid without using half a dozen words.

After all, it may not be amiss to take notice that Ornaments are
common to Falshood and Truth, but Clearness and strength of
Reasoning are not. They who wou’d propagate Error usually disguise
it in Equivocal Terms and Obscure Phrases; they strive to engage our
Passions, rather than to Convince our Reason, and carry us away in
the torrent of a warm Imagination. They endeavour to refute, or if
they can’t do that, to Ridicule the contrary opinion, and think this
Sufficient to establish their own. Being much better skill’d in pulling
down former Systems than in building new ones, for it requires no
great skill to Object, and there are many Truths which we’re very
Certain of, and yet not able to answer every Impertinent Enquiry
concerning ’em. Their greatest Art is in confounding things, in giving
a probable Air to what they write, in pretending to Demonstration
where the nature of the Truth does not require’t, and in evading it
where it does. An Immoral or Heretical Discourse therefore may be
Cunningly but not well writ, for we can never plead for Error and
Vice with true Eloquence. We may trick’em up in a handsom Garb,
adorn’em with quaint Expressions, and give them such a plausible
turn as may enable them to do very much Mischief; but this is only a
fulsom Carcass, the substance and Life are not there if Vertue and
Truth are wanting.
§. VI. For it is to little purpose to Think well and speak well, unless
we Live well, this is our Great Affair and truest Excellency, the other
are no further to be regarded than as they may assist us in this. She
who does not draw this Inference from her Studies has Thought in
vain, her notions are Erroneous and Mistaken. And all her Eloquence
is but an empty noise, who employs it in any other design than in
gaining Proselytes to Heaven. I am therefore far from designing to
put Women on a vain pursuit after unnecessary and useless
Learning, nor wou’d by any means persuade them to endeavour
after Knowledge cou’d I be convinc’d that it is improper for ’em.
Because I know very well that tho a thing be never so excellent in it
self, it has but an ill grace if it be not suitable to the Person and
Condition it is apply’d to. Fine Cloaths and Equipage do not become
a Beggar, and a Mechanic who must work for daily bread for his
Family, wou’d be wickedly Employ’d shou’d he suffer ’em to starve
whilest he’s solving Mathematical Problems. If therefore Women
have another Duty incumbent on ’em, and such as is inconsistent
with what we here advise, we do ill to take them from it: But to
affirm this is to beg the Question, and is what I will never grant till it
be better prov’d than as yet it appears to be. For if the Grand
Business that Women as well as Men have to do in this World be to
prepare for the next, ought not all their Care and Industry to Centre
here? and since the matter is of Infinite Consequence is it equitable
to deny ’em the use of any help? If therefore Knowledge were but
any ways Instrumental, tho at the remotest distance, to the
Salvation of our Souls, it were fit to apply our selves to it; and how
much more when it is so necessary, that without it we can’t do any
thing that’s Excellent, or Practise Vertue in the most Perfect manner.
For unless we Understand our Duty and the Principles of Religion,
we don’t perform a Rational Service, it is but by Chance that we are
Good or so much as Christians. We are their Property into whose
hands we fall, and are led by those who with greatest Confidence
impose their Opinions on us; Are as moveable as the different
Circumstances that befall us; or if we happen to be Constant in our
first way, it is not Reason but Obstinacy that makes us so. A great
deal of Good will be omitted, and very much Evil, or Imperfection at
least, stick to us, if we are not throughly acquainted with the Law of
God and the secret springs and windings of our Hearts, which is
scarce to be obtain’d without much Meditation and the helps that
study affords.

And as when a rash young Traveller is about to run into dangerous

places beset with Thieves and full of Precipices, if you have any
hearty concern for his safety, you’l not think it enough barely to
shew him his way, or even to tell him of the Danger, especially if the
entrance seems fair and inviting and treacherous Companions are
upon the watch to decoy him into it: But you’l expose it in all its
frightful Circumstances, endeavour to quicken his vigilance and
excite his Passions, and all little enough for his Security. So it cannot
be thought sufficient that Women shou’d but just know whats
Commanded and what Forbid, without being inform’d of the Reasons
why, since this is not like to secure them in their Duty. For we find a
Natural Liberty within us which checks at an Injunction that has
nothing but Authority to back it; And tho Religion is indeed
supported by the Strongest Reasons, and inforc’d by the most
powerful Motives, yet if we are not acquainted with ’em, ’tis all one
to us as if it were not. But having spoke of this in the first part we
shall not farther enlarge on it here.

Perhaps it will be objected that we’ve said the great Truths of

Religion carry a force and Evidence suited to the very Vulgar, and
that GOD has not design’d All for Philosophers. And therefore if the
way to the most necessary Knowlege be so very plain, and all
Capacities are not fitted for higher attainments, what needs this ado
about th’ Improvement of our minds? the only thing necessary is to
be good Christians, and we may be that without being Philosophers.
Suppose we may: This will Justify such as want Time and Capacity,
but can never excuse the Sloth and Stupidity of those who have
both.

For unless we have very strange Notions of the Divine Wisdom we

must needs allow that every one is placed in such a Station as they
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

ebookultra.com