Conscious Will and Responsibility A Tribute to Benjamin

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PREFACE

The work of Benjamin Libet on the consciousness of intentions has implications for psychologists,
philosophers, neuroscientists, and lawyers. When Walter Sinnott-Armstrong suggested the notion of
holding a workshop in Libet’s honor that would bring an interdisciplinary group of scholars together
to consider these implications, I quickly agreed. We decided right away to hold the meeting in Tucson,
and the idea emerged to connect it to the Tucson Consciousness meeting—a natural link.
We are grateful to the organizers of the Consciousness meeting, in particular Uriah Kriegel and
Stuart Hameroff, for making this possibility a reality. The workshop was supported by the MacArthur
Law and Neuroscience Program at UC Santa Barbara, and by a number of sources at the University of
Arizona: the College of Law, the Eller College of Business and Public Administration, the College of
Social and Behavioral Sciences, the Program in Cognitive Science, and the Office of the Vice President
for Research. We thank these various contributors for their support. In addition, Catherine Carlin of
Oxford University Press quickly saw the virtues of this workshop and provided both financial backing
and a contract for this book. We thank her for this support, and for helping us initiate what we hope
will be an exciting series of volumes at the interdisciplinary interface represented in this collection.

Lynn Nadel and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

v
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CONTENTS

Introduction xi
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel
1. Do We Have Free Will? 1
Benjamin Libet
2. Why Libet’s Studies Don’t Pose a Threat to Free Will 11
Adina L. Roskies
3. Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness 23
Alfred R. Mele
4. Are Voluntary Movements Initiated Preconsciously? The Relationships
between Readiness Potentials, Urges, and Decisions 34
Susan Pockett and Suzanne C. Purdy
5. Do We Really Know What We Are Doing? Implications of Reported
Time of Decision for Theories of Volition 47
William P. Banks and Eve A. Isham
6. Volition: How Physiology Speaks to the Issue of Responsibility 61
Mark Hallett
7. What Are Intentions? 70
Elisabeth Pacherie and Patrick Haggard
8. Beyond Libet: Long-term Prediction of Free Choices from
Neuroimaging Signals 85
John-Dylan Haynes
9. Forward Modeling Mediates Motor Awareness 97
Francesca Carota, Michel Desmurget, and Angela Sirigu
10. Volition and the Function of Consciousness 109
Tashina L. Graves, Brian Maniscalco, and Hakwan Lau
11. Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility 124
Deborah Talmi and Chris D. Frith
12. Bending Time to One’s Will 134
Jeffrey P. Ebert and Daniel M. Wegner

vii
 viii CONTENTS

13. Prospective Codes Fulfilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will 146

Thalia Wheatley and Christine E. Looser
14. The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results 159
Terry Horgan
15. The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism 173
Thomas Nadelhoffer
16. Libet and the Criminal Law’s Voluntary Act Requirement 189
Gideon Yaffe
17. Criminal and Moral Responsibility and the Libet Experiments 204
Larry Alexander
18. Libet’s Challenge(s) to Responsible Agency 207
Michael S. Moore
19. Lessons from Libet 235
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Author Index 247
Subject Index 255
CONTRIBUTORS

Larry Alexander Patrick Haggard

Warren Distinguished Professor Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience
University of San Diego School of Law Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
San Diego, CA University College London
London, UK
William P. Banks
Professor, Department of Psychology Mark Hallett
Pomona College Chief, Human Motor Control Section
Claremont, CA National Institute of Neurological Disorders
and Stroke
Francesca Carota National Institutes of Health
Postdoctoral Fellow Bethesda, MD
Center for Cognitive Neuroscience
CNRS John-Dylan Haynes
Bron, France Professor for Theory and Analysis of
Large-Scale Brain Signals
Michel Desmurget Bernstein Center for Computational
Assistant Professor Neuroscience
Centre de Neurosciences Cognitives Charité–Universitätsmedizin Berlin
CNRS Berlin, Germany
Bron, France
Terry Horgan
Jeffrey P. Ebert Professor
Postdoctoral Fellow Department of Philosophy
Department of Psychology University of Arizona
Harvard University Tucson, AZ
Cambridge, MA
Eve A. Isham
Chris D. Frith Postdoctoral fellow
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging Center for Mind and Brain
University College London University of California
London, UK Davis, CA
Tashina L. Graves Hakwan Lau
Research Assistant Assistant Professor
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Columbia University Columbia University
New York, NY New York, NY
ix
 x CONTRIBUTORS

Christine E. Looser Suzanne C. Purdy

Psychological and Brain Sciences Associate Professor
Dartmouth College Department of Psychology
Hanover, NH University of Auckland
Auckland, New Zealand
Brian Maniscalco
PhD Candidate Adina L. Roskies
Department of Psychology Department of Philosophy
Columbia University Dartmouth College
New York, NY Hanover, NH

Alfred R. Mele Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics
Professor of Philosophy Philosophy Department
Department of Philosophy Kenan Institute for Ethics
Florida State University Duke University
Tallahassee, FL Durham, NC

Michael S. Moore Angela Sirigu

Walgreen University Chair, Professor of Law Research Director
Professor of Philosophy Center for Cognitive Neuroscience
Professor in the Center for Advanced Study CNRS
Co-Director, Program in Law and Philosophy Bron, France
University of Illinois
Champaign, IL Deborah Talmi
Lecturer
Lynn Nadel School of Psychological Sciences
Regents Professor University of Manchester
Department of Psychology Manchester, UK
University of Arizona
Tuscon, AZ Daniel M. Wegner
Professor
Thomas Nadelhoffer Department of Psychology
Assistant Professor Harvard University
Department of Philosophy Cambridge, MA
Dickinson College
Carlisle, PA Thalia Wheatley
Assistant Professor
Elisabeth Pacherie Psychological and Brain Sciences
Senior Researcher Dartmouth College
Institut Jean Nicod Hanover, NH
ENS, EHESS, CNRS
Paris, France Gideon Yaffe
Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law
Susan Pockett University of Southern California
Honorary Research Fellow Los Angeles, CA
Department of Physics
University of Auckland
New Zealand
Introduction

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University

Lynn Nadel, University of Arizona

Traditional philosophers often assume that the new challenge concerns not whether anything
main challenge to moral and legal responsibility causes our wills but, instead, whether our wills
in general comes from determinism: If our cause anything. This question is about the effects
choices and actions are determined, we cannot rather than the causes of our wills. It does not
do otherwise, so we are not free, and then how ask whether our wills are free but, rather, whether
could we be responsible? In reply to this chal- our wills are efficacious. The answer affects
lenge, compatibilists claim that we can have it whether or how we can control what we do (that
all: complete and universal determinism as well is, our actions) instead of whether we control
as total freedom and responsibility.1 According what we choose to do (that is, our wills).
to common versions of compatibilism, responsi- If our wills lack the power to cause the willed
bility does not require freedom from causation. actions, this impotence is supposed to raise
Instead, responsibility and freedom require only doubts about whether we are morally or legally
that agents be responsive to reasons for and responsible for those actions. These doubts arise
against their actions and/or that agents act on from the assumption that causation by will or
desires that fit with their values or second-order conscious will is necessary for complete moral or
desires. Understood in these ways, freedom and legal responsibility. This requirement seems
responsibility are compatible with determinism. enshrined in the voluntary act requirement,
Moreover, modern legal systems nowhere explic- which is present in almost all modern systems of
itly mention determinism or presuppose that criminal law. For example, the Model Penal
people and their acts are not caused or deter- Code Section 2.01 says, “a bodily movement that
mined or that they have free will of any kind that otherwise is not a product of the effort or deter-
excludes determinism.2 Courts do not and need mination of the actor, either conscious or habit-
not settle the issue of determinism before they ual” is not a voluntary act and, hence, cannot
put criminals in jail. That’s lucky, because it is alone be the basis for criminal liability or guilt. If
doubtful that courts could settle that perennial “a product of” means “caused by,” and “effort or
issue, especially within the temporal and eviden- determination” means “will,” then non-habitual
tial limits of trials. Of course, some moral phi- actions cannot alone be the basis for legal guilt
losophers and legal scholars still argue that under this voluntary act requirement unless they
determinism does or would undermine moral are caused by conscious will.
and legal responsibility,3 but many contempo- The fact that this legal requirement is so
raries think that they know at least roughly how widespread suggests that it is based on common
to answer this traditional challenge to moral and sense. This suggestion receives additional sup-
legal responsibility. port from moral intuitions. Consider normal
Even if so, a separate challenge still needs to reflective actions. When I choose to bet rather
be met. Unlike the old issue of determinism, this than fold in a poker game, I normally go through

xi
 xii INTRODUCTION

a conscious process of deliberation and then If responsibility requires causation by conscious

consciously choose to bet or fold by moving my will, but conscious will never causes actions,
mouth and hands in a certain way and at a cer- then even normal agents are never responsible
tain time rather than earlier or later. Acts that for their actions. The critical question, then, is
result from such conscious processes are seen as whether we should deny that conscious will
paradigms of acts for which agents are responsi- causes action in normal people.
ble. That seems to be why people are required to Some philosophers deny that any mental
pay their poker debts, at least normally. event or state can cause any bodily movement,
In contrast, when a person with Tourette’s such as an action. One form of this problem
syndrome yells or moves his or her body as a arises from dualism, which is the view that mind
result of brain mechanisms that do not involve and body are distinct and separable substances.4
such conscious processes, then we do not and Most dualists, including Descartes, held that
should not hold that person responsible for the body affects mind and mind affects body. This
act. Just imagine a person with Tourette’s syn- view was labeled interactionism. Critics argued,
drome playing poker and yelling “all in.” Even if however, that mind and body differ so much in
the person was thinking about moving all in their natures that we cannot make sense of causal
(that is, betting all of his chips), and even if he relations between mind and body. How can
had decided to do so and was just waiting for the changes in a substance without any spatial prop-
right moment, if this particular act of saying “all erties, such as mind, cause or be caused by
in” was a result of the Tourette’s syndrome and changes in a substance with spatial properties,
not a result of the conscious will to make that such as body? These critics were led to strange
bet, then we would and should not hold him positions like parallelism (the view that neither
responsible for making the bet. mind nor body causes changes in the other,
Similarly, people with alien hand syndrome although they change in parallel because of a
also would and should not be held responsible preestablished harmony that God created), occa-
for what their alien hand does, when that bodily sionalism (the view that, on those occasions
movement was not produced by any conscious when humans will physical motions, God detects
choice. If a poker player with alien hand syn- the will and causes the movement),5 and epiphe-
drome moves her chips into the pot and then nomenalism (the view that physical events cause
tells us that what pushed the chips was her alien mental events but mental events never cause
hand and not what she really chose to do, then physical events).6 These views are general theo-
(if we believe her) we would and should let her ries that apply as much to pain and perception as
take back the chips, even though people are not to will. Still, the last three views—parallelism,
normally allowed to take back such bets. People occasionalism, and epiphenomenalism—all
with Tourette’s or alien hand syndrome might imply that conscious wills, which are a kind of
be held responsible for not avoiding situations mental event, never cause bodily movements,
where their neural maladies would be misinter- which are a type of physical event.
preted or cause harm, but they are not and Although these old positions all assume dual-
should not usually be held responsible for the ism, some materialists or physicalists in the
acts themselves. nineteenth century adopted a variation on epi-
What removes or reduces responsibility in such phenomenalism. Even if a mental event is always
cases seems to be the fact that the agent’s conscious also a physical event, it is still a special kind of
will does not cause these bodily movements. Other physical event. Some physical events or states
interpretations are possible, of course, but cases (such as some brain states) are also mental
like these suggest to many people that we cannot be events, whereas other physical events or states
responsible for actions unless those actions are (such as rain states) are not mental. Indeed,
caused by a conscious will. many brain events, such as blood flow in the
A problem arises when people deny that brain stem, seem to have no mental properties at
conscious will causes action in normal people. all. Thus, even physicalists can hold that changes
INTRODUCTION xiii

in physical properties can cause changes in to have held something like this position.8 It can
mental properties, but changes in mental prop- be called epiphenomenalism about conscious-
erties cannot ever cause changes in physical ness, and it implies epiphenomenalism about
properties. This position amounts to a physical- conscious will.
ist version of epiphenomenalism. This position needs to be distinguished from
Since epiphenomenalism (whether dualist or the claim that unconscious forces affect our deci-
physicalist) is about all mental events and states, sions and our lives. Building on predecessors,
it does not apply only to will. Other philoso- Sigmund Freud emphasized the role of uncon-
phers, in contrast, restrict their claim to the par- scious mental states, especially unconscious
ticular mental event of willing. They deny that desires. More recently, psychologists9 have
willing to move ever causes any bodily move- shown how choices that seem to be based on
ment. Nietzsche, for example, says, “The ‘inner conscious reasons are affected by unconscious
world’ is full of phantoms and will-o’-the-wisps: factors. A well-known example is that people
the will is one of them. The will no longer moves named Ken are more likely than chance to move
anything, hence does not explain anything to Kentucky, people named Denis or Dennis are
either—it merely accompanies events; it can also more likely than chance to become dentists, and
be absent.”7 This claim applies not only to con- so on. This suggests that unconscious connec-
scious will but to all will. tions influence choices. However, that claim is
This broad claim is hard to evaluate scientifi- compatible with conscious reasons also having a
cally, because it applies to unconscious wills, and lot of influence on choices. After all, choices
unconscious wills are hard to detect. A person might be influenced by both conscious and
who has an unconscious will cannot detect it, unconscious causes. Moreover, the claim that
because it is unconscious. Observers (such as sci- unconscious forces influence choices is about
entists) also cannot detect it without reports or what causes the will rather than about what the
some telling effect. Moreover, many theorists will causes. Hence, this common claim is distinct
hold that wills, choices, intentions, and related from epiphenomenalism about consciousness or
mental events or states are necessarily conscious, about conscious will.
so the notion of an unconscious will is an oxy- Another body of evidence might seem to sup-
moron. For such reasons, most scientists and port the view that conscious wills never cause the
philosophers have focused on conscious will in willed actions. Some relevant experiments were
this debate. performed by Benjamin Libet and others who
This new challenge is still not about con- used methods derived from Libet. Additional
sciousness in general. Even if consciousness does experiments, using different paradigms, were
have some kinds of effects, such as through per- performed later by Dan Wegner and his follow-
ception, that does not show that conscious will ers. Most recently, John-Dylan Haynes has
causes action. The issue is also not about whether reported striking results that have led some com-
conscious will has any effects at all. Consciousness mentators to endorse related views. Of course,
of willing an act might affect how much guilt an more scientists have been involved in this tradi-
agent feels after doing that act, for example. Still, tion. Many of these experiments are described in
such later effects show only that conscious will various chapters in this volume, so there is no
can have side-effects, not that it has effects on need to summarize them here. The point for
the act that is willed. The real question, then, is now is just that these scientific findings are often
whether conscious will causes that act that is seen as suggesting that conscious wills never
willed. cause the willed acts.
A negative answer to this question can be Although this challenge is usually presented
reached through a general claim about con- universally about all acts, it could instead be
sciousness, namely, that consciousness and con- restricted to a subset of actions. This restriction
scious mental states or events never cause would not rob the thesis of interest if the acts
physical states or events. Thomas Huxley seems that are not caused by conscious will are ones
 xiv INTRODUCTION

whose agents seem responsible or where respon- than merely act on urges. Pockett and Purdy
sibility is controversial. Even if epiphenomenal- conclude that movements resulting from con-
ism about conscious will holds only for some but scious decisions are unlikely to be initiated pre-
not for all acts, this new challenge can still under- consciously. They, along with Roskies, also raise
mine common ascriptions of responsibility in the issue of whether and, if so, how the sorts of
special cases and, hence, can challenge common phenomena that Libet explores bear upon free-
standards of responsibility. dom and responsibility.
Even if these challenges can be met, their Another important problem for Libet’s
value should be clear. Libet’s experiments along method concerns the meaning and reliability of
with later research in the same tradition have his subjects’ reports of the time when they
raised new questions about common assump- became conscious of choosing or willing to move
tions regarding action, freedom, and responsi- (W). In Chapter 5, Banks and Isham describe a
bility. Even if we retain those assumptions in the new series of experiments suggesting that the
end, rethinking them can increase our confi- moment of decision is not introspected but is,
dence in them as well as our understanding of instead, inferred from the action. In line with
why they are true. Libet’s work, thus, contributes Libet, Banks and Isham conclude that conscious
a lot even to those who reject his claims. That is will is not involved in the cause of the action. In
why the contributors all pay tribute to him in Chapter 6, Mark Hallett describes an experiment
this collection. designed to time the thought (T) of movement
The best tribute to any thinker is careful without relying on introspective data or retro-
attention to his ideas, even when this attention spective reconstruction. Hallett’s experiment
leads to rejection. Libet’s views include descrip- found that T occurred later than observable
tive claims about the role of conscious will in brain events linked to action. His results also
action as well as philosophical and normative suggest that there is not enough time to veto
conclusions that are supposed to follow from his action after willing becomes conscious, contrary
descriptive premises given additional normative to Libet’s way of saving free will.
assumptions.10 Whether those claims, assump- Some critics have charged that Libet conflates
tions, and conclusions are defensible—and different mental states. In Chapter 7, Pacherie
whether those conclusions follow from his prem- and Haggard distinguish immediate intentions
ises or from later work in this tradition—are the from prospective intentions as well as what-
issues addressed in the essays in this volume. decisions and how-decisions from when-
This volume opens with a classic essay in decisions. They use their framework to clarify
which Libet lays out his basic experimental results which mental states Libet’s experiments were
and draws philosophical lessons regarding free about. In Chapter 8, Haynes reports experiments
will and responsibility. This chapter raises the using fMRI and pattern classifiers to explore less
issues to be discussed in the rest of the volume. immediate intentions and choices than Libet
One crucial issue concerns the interpretation studied. Haynes found signals from unconscious
of the readiness potential (RP). In Chapter 2, brain activity that predict, above chance, deci-
Roskies questions the relation between the RP sions 7–10 seconds in advance, and he was also
and movement initiation as well as the impor- able to separate the “what” from the “when” in a
tance of the timing of the initial rise of the RP. In decision.
Chapter 3, Mele argues that the RP is better seen These results raise important questions about
as an urge that causes a decision than as a deci- when and why our wills become conscious. The
sion itself and also that the RP has not been issue of consciousness is addressed in Chapter 9,
shown to be sufficient for action. In Chapter 4, where Carota, Desmurget, and Sirigu present
Pockett and Purdy then present new experimen- evidence that the motor system is mainly aware
tal evidence that the RP is not sufficient for of its intention but not of the details of the ongo-
action and begins significantly later than Libet ing movements, as long as the goal is achieved.
suggested when subjects make decisions rather In Chapter 10, Graves, Maniscalco, and Lau
INTRODUCTION xv

discuss evidence that complex actions can be require any revision of traditional notions of
performed without consciousness or can be moral and criminal responsibility. In Chapter
directly influenced by unconscious information. 18, Moore then distinguishes three challenges to
They question whether the function of con- responsibility and proposes a novel model of
sciousness is to enable us to deliberate about our how conscious will causes bodily movement
actions, and they suggest an experiment to dem- and, hence, of how we can be morally responsi-
onstrate the true function of consciousness. ble for our voluntary actions. Finally, in Chapter
In Chapter 11, Talmi and Frith place these 19, Sinnott-Armstrong argues that the empirical
issues of consciousness in a larger context by findings of Libet and his followers do not under-
reinterpreting Libet’s results in light of a distinc- mine moral or legal responsibility in general
tion between Type 1 and Type 2 mental process- but do raise profound issues for some kinds of
ing. They use this framework to explain why we minimal action.
have a conscious experience of our own free will, These all-too brief descriptions of the
and they discuss potential moral consequences chapters do not do justice to their complexity,
of seeing apparent free will as an illusion. The subtlety, and richness. To appreciate those qual-
sense of freedom is closely allied with a sense of ities, the essays simply have to be read. Taken
agency, which is the topic of the next two chap- together, these essays show how fruitful and
ters. In Chapter 12, Ebert and Wegner argue that important Libet’s research has been. Whether or
we determine whether we are authors of actions not we agree with Libet’s claims, he clearly sets
through a variety of clues, including temporal the stage for a great deal of fascinating research
proximity between thoughts, actions, and events. and discussion.
When authorship is inferred, we then bind the
action and subsequent events together by per-
NOTES
ceiving the action and events as closer than they
otherwise would seem to be. In Chapter 13, 1. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compati-
Wheatley and Looser cite cases where the feeling bilism/
of will is imputed, manipulated, and taken away 2. See Stephen Morse, “The Non-problem of Free
inappropriately and independent of action. Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology,”
These cases are supposed to show that our sense Behavioral Sciences and the Law 25 (2007):
203–220.
of will, intentionality, and agency is inferred ret-
3. See the chapters by van Inwagen, O’Connor,
rospectively and might well be illusory.
Clarke, Ginet, Kane, Strawson, and Pereboom
In Chapter 14, Horgan argues that the work in Kane, Oxford Handbook of Free Will
of Libet and others is fully compatible with the (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
phenomenal character and content of the expe- 4. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/
rience of initiating an act. In his view, conscious 5. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/occasion
agentive experience is not illusory. In contrast, alism/
Nadelhoffer argues in Chapter 15 that recent 6. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphe
advances in psychology and neuroscience have nomenalism/
the potential to radically transform traditional 7. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols in The
views of human agency and free will. Portable Nietzsche, translated and edited by
The ultimate issue in these debates concerns Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1954),
moral and legal responsibility. In Chapter 16, pp. 494–495.
8. T. H. Huxley,“On the Hypothesis That Animals
Yaffe explains the meaning and explores the his-
Are Automata, and Its History,” The Fortnightly
torical sources of the voluntary act requirement
Review, n.s. 16 (1874): 555–580. Reprinted in
in law, and then he argues that Libet probably Method and Results: Essays by Thomas H. Huxley
has not shown that our acts are not voluntary in (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1898).
the sense that is relevant to law. In Chapter 17, Huxley reported the case of Sergeant F., who
Alexander suggests that the gatekeeper role for was hit by a bullet around his parietal lobe and
conscious will, which Libet allows, does not later sometimes exhibited complex behavior
xvi INTRODUCTION

(e.g., singing, writing a letter, “reloading,” 9. Such as those collected in R. R. Hassin,

“aiming,” and “firing” his cane with motions J. S. Uleman, and J. Bargh, The New Uncon-
appropriate to a rifle) while he seemed uncon- scious (New York; Oxford University Press,
scious (because he was not sensitive to pins and 2005).
shocks, as well as sounds, smells, tastes, and 10. This argument need not derive “ought” from
much vision). This case is supposed to suggest “is” or commit any “naturalistic fallacy,”
the possibility that consciousness is not neces- because the science need not settle any norma-
sary for complex and purposeful movements, tive issue without additional normative prem-
but it cannot show that conscious will is never ises that also need to be defended.
necessary for any bodily movement in normal
humans.
C HA PT ER 1
Do We Have Free Will?

Benjamin Libet

ABSTRACT definition of free will in these experiments was in

accord with common views. First, there should be
I have taken an experimental approach to this
no external control or cues to affect the occurrence
question. Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a
or emergence of the voluntary act under study; i.e.,
specific electrical change in the brain (the “readi-
it should be endogenous. Second, the subject
ness potential,” RP) that begins 550 ms before the
should feel that he/she wanted to do it, on her/his
act. Human subjects became aware of intention to
own initiative, and feel he could control what is
act 350–400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms before
being done, when to do it or not to do it. Many
the motor act. The volitional process is therefore
actions lack this second attribute. For example,
initiated unconsciously. But the conscious func-
when the primary motor area of the cerebral cortex
tion could still control the outcome; it can veto the
is stimulated, muscle contractions can be produced
act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These find-
in certain sites in the body. However, the subject (a
ings put constraints on views of how free will may
neurosurgical patient) reports that these actions
operate; it would not initiate a voluntary act but it
were imposed by the stimulator, i.e., that he did not
could control performance of the act. The findings
will these acts. And there are numerous clinical dis-
also affect views of guilt and responsibility.
orders in which a similar discrepancy between
But the deeper question still remains: Are freely
actions and will occurs.
voluntary acts subject to macrodeterministic laws
These include the involuntary actions in cere-
or can they appear without such constraints, non-
bral palsy, Parkinsonism, Huntington’s chorea,
determined by natural laws and “truly free?”
Tourette’s syndrome, and even obsessive com-
I shall present an experimentalist view about these
pulsions to act. A striking example is the “alien
fundamental philosophical opposites.
hand syndrome.” Patients with a lesion in a
The question of free will goes to the root of our fronto-medial portion of premotor area may
views about human nature and how we relate to find that the hand and arm on the affected side
the universe and to natural laws. Are we com- performs curious purposeful actions, such as
pletely defined by the deterministic nature of undoing a buttoned shirt when the subject is
physical laws? Theologically imposed fateful trying to button it up; all this occurs without or
destiny ironically produces a similar end-effect. even against the subject’s intention and will
In either case, we would be essentially sophisti- (cf. Spence & Frith, 1999, p. 23).
cated automatons, with our conscious feelings
and intentions tacked on as epiphenomena with
TIMING OF BRAIN PROCESSES
no causal power. Or, do we have some indepen-
AND CONSCIOUS WILL
dence in making choices and actions, not com-
pletely determined by the known physical laws? Performance of “self-paced” voluntary acts had,
I have taken an experimental approach to at surprisingly, been found to be preceded by a
least some aspects of the question. The operational slow electrical change recordable on the scalp at

1
 2 CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY

the vertex (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). The off “seconds” around the periphery was thus
onset of this electrical indication of certain brain equivalent to about 40 ms. When we tried out
activities preceded the actual movement by up to 1 s this method we were actually surprised to find
or more. It was termed the “Bereitschaftpotential” that each subject reported times for first aware-
or “readiness potential” (RP). To obtain the RP ness of wish to act (W) with a reliability of 20 ms,
required averaging the recordings in many self- for each group of 40 such trials. A test for the
paced acts. Subjects were therefore asked to per- accuracy of such reports was also encouraging. In
form their acts within time intervals of 30 s to this, the subject remained relaxed and did not
make the total study manageable. In our experi- perform any voluntary act. Instead, a weak
ments, however, we removed this constraint on electrical stimulus was delivered to the skin of
freedom of action; subjects performed a simple the same hand. The stimulus was applied at
flick or flexion of the wrist at any time they felt random times in the different trials.
the urge or wish to do so. These voluntary acts The experimental observers knew the actual
were to be performed capriciously, free of any time for each stimulus. The subject did not know
external limitations or restrictions (Libet, this actual time but was asked to report the
Wright, & Gleason, 1982). RPs in these acts clock-time at which he felt each such stimulus.
began with onsets averaging 550 ms before acti- Subjects accomplished this with an error of
vation of the involved muscle (Fig. 1.1). only −50 ms.
The brain was evidently beginning the voli-
tional process in this voluntary act well before The Experiment
the activation of the muscle that produced the
In the actual experiment, then, each RP was
movement. My question then became: when does
obtained from an averaged electrical recording
the conscious wish or intention (to perform the
in 40 trials. In each of these trials the subject per-
act) appear? In the traditional view of conscious
formed the sudden flick of the wrist whenever
will and free will, one would expect conscious
he/she freely wanted to do so. After each of these
will to appear before, or at the onset of, the RP,
trials, the subject reported W, the clock-time
and thus command the brain to perform the
associated with the first awareness of the wish to
intended act. But an appearance of conscious will
move (Libet, Gleason, et al., 1983).
550 ms or more before the act seemed intuitively
unlikely. It was clearly important to establish the
Brain Initiates Voluntary Act Unconsciously
time of the conscious will relative to the onset of
the brain process (RP); if conscious will were to The results of many such groups of trials are
follow the onset of RP, that would have a funda- diagrammed in Figure 1.3. For groups in which
mental impact on how we could view free will. all the voluntary acts were freely spontaneous,
To establish this temporal relation required a with no reports of rough preplanning of when
method for measuring the time of appearance of to act, the onset of RP averaged −550 ms (before
the conscious will in each such act. Initially, that the muscle was activated). The W times for first
seemed to me an impossible goal. But after some awareness of wish to act averaged about
time it occurred to me to try having the subject −200 ms., for all groups.
report a “clock-time” at which he/she was first This value was the same even when subjects
aware of the wish or urge to act (Fig. 1.2) (Libet, reported having preplanned roughly when to
Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). The clock had act! If we correct W for the −50 ms error in the
to be much faster than the usual clock, in order subjects’ reports of timings of the skin stimuli,
to accommodate time differences in the we have an average corrected W of about −150
hundreds of ms. For our clock, the spot of light ms. Clearly, the brain process (RP) to prepare
of a cathode ray oscilloscope was made to revolve for this voluntary act began about 400 ms. before
around the face of the scope like the sweep- the appearance of the conscious will to act (W).
second hand of an ordinary clock, but at a speed This relationship was true for every group of 40
approximately 25 times as fast. Each of the marked trials and in every one of the nine subjects studied.