religions

Article
“The Maqās.id Are the Qibla of the Jurists”: A Critical Analysis of
Contemporary References to and Usages of Abū H . āmid
Al-Ghazālı̄’s Dictum
Eva Kepplinger

Department of Islamic-Religious Studies, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg, 91054 Erlangen,

Germany; [email protected]

Abstract: Modernity reveals an intense preoccupation with the Intentions of the Sharia (maqās.id
al-sharı̄ a) and reflections of premodern scholars on this legal concept. Within contemporary research
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in this field, the famous scholar Abū H . āmid al-Ghazālı̄ (d. 505/1111), who is counted among the
pioneers of premodern contributions to the maqās.id, occupies a special position. In addition to his
general treatment of the maqās.id, one dictum of his in particular is often referred to in the modern
literature on the maqās.id. The quotation reads: “The maqās.id are the qibla of the jurists”, which he
mentioned in his book Kitāb H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn and is indicative of the central position of the maqās.id
in al-Ghazālı̄’s (legal) thought. My investigation of the contemporary, primarily Arabic, literature on
the maqās.id which cites this popular dictum reveals that the quote is used for many reasons and in
various contexts; however, a fuller engagement with the quote itself and in the context of al-Ghazālı̄’s
thought, as well as in his book, takes place very rarely, if at all, and even then, it is cursory. In
order to embed al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum in the wider frame of his thought, this article first presents his
general maqās.id-related thought and consequently expounds on it in the context of his book. To better
understand the usage of the quote in modern scholarship, the current maqās.id literature that refers to
the dictum is analyzed and categorized, showing how authors deploy it and to what end.

Keywords: Abū H . āmid al-Ghazālı̄; maqās.id; Kitāb H

. aqı̄qat al-qawlayn; modern legal literature; modern
Citation: Kepplinger, Eva. 2024. “The references to al-Ghazālı̄´s dictum
Maqās.id Are the Qibla of the Jurists”:
A Critical Analysis of Contemporary
References to and Usages of Abū
H. āmid Al-Ghazālı̄’s Dictum. Religions
1. Introduction
15: 165. https://doi.org/10.3390/ The sheer volume of literature that has been produced on Abū H . āmid al-Ghazālı̄
rel15020165 (d. 505/1111), whether on his life and works in general (see for instance Ormsby 2007;
Academic Editor: Mohamed Mosaad
Watt 1963), in the domain of philosophy (see for instance Griffel 2009),or on how he has
Abdelaziz Mohamed influenced Muslim thought (see Özervarlı 2016, pp. 253–82; Garden 2016, pp. 310–34),
clearly demonstrates that his wide-ranging contributions to diverse scholarly themes are
Received: 1 August 2023 still relevant for modern scholarship and that they are of great interest. Moreover, among
Revised: 14 December 2023 the recent preoccupation with the maqās.id al-sharı̄ a, this field also represents a domain
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Accepted: 7 January 2024

within al-Ghazālı̄’s contributions that is the subject of research. Among others, these studies
Published: 29 January 2024
range from whole monographs that describe al-Ghazālı̄’s contributions to the maqās.id (see
for instance, al-Kı̄lānı̄ 2009; Abdū 2002), to treatises on premodern developments in maqās.id-
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oriented legal thought, in which al-Ghazālı̄’s work, in addition to that of other renowned
Copyright: © 2024 by the author.
scholars—such as Abū l-Ma ālı̄ al-Juwaynı̄ (d. 477/1085), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), and
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Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

Abū Ish.āq al-Shāt.ibı̄ (d. 790/1388)—is mentioned (see for instance Opwis 2010, pp. 65–87),
This article is an open access article to critical discussions on his maqās.id concept.1 Overall, it may be said that hardly any
distributed under the terms and publication on the maqās.id exists that does not mention al-Ghazālı̄. The reason for this
conditions of the Creative Commons is that with his so-called maqās.id concept, which he mentioned in his famous oeuvre al-
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// Mustas.fā, he is said to have laid the foundation for Muslim legal thought. This contribution,
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ which is used as a basis by contemporary reformers and thinkers (Hallaq 1997, p. 132),
4.0/).

Religions 2024, 15, 165. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15020165 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions

Religions 2024, 15, 165 2 of 11

renders him a pioneer in Islamic legal thought and the “architect of the maqās.id theory”
(Nassery 2018, p. 78).
Within the current literature on the maqās.id, an incisive and expressive dictum of
al-Ghazālı̄ is mentioned. Translated literally into English it reads: “The objectives of legal
legislation are the prayer direction of the jurist”, which in the Arabic original is “qiblat
al-mujtahid maqās.id al-shar ” (al-Ghazālı̄ 2007, p. 91), and is found in his work Kitāb H
(

. aqı̄qat
al-qawlayn. Because this dictum is often repeated in the modern and particularly Arabic
literature on the maqās.id, it raises several questions of interest: In which works of literature
and in which context do authors refer to this quotation? What might be the intended
usage of this reference, or what message is it supposed to underscore? Significantly,
is the quotation referred to in a way that corresponds to al-Ghazālı̄’s original maqās.id
understanding or is it used only to bolster the opinions of modern authors on the maqās.id,
even at the expense of contradicting al-Ghazālı̄’s legal thought? This latter question is
of particular interest because critics of certain modern interpretations of classical maqās.id
concepts argue that the maqās.id today are understood and used completely differently
to how they were by premodern scholars, including al-Ghazālı̄ himself. Therefore, some
authors fear that classical Islamic juristic theories are in danger of destruction through
modern interpretations.2
In order to address these questions, this article begins with a general overview of
al-Ghazālı̄’s legal understanding and the role of reason, which he views as correct in the
process of legal reasoning or ijtihād, is discussed. In so doing, it offers a general overview
of further discussion on how he understands the maqās.id and the public interest (mas.lah.a)
and which role he regards as legitimate for reason in ijtihād. Furthermore, this discussion is
developed to better locate al-Ghazālı̄’s K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn chronologically in his stage
of life and thought. Following the discussion on ijtihād and reason, al-Ghazālı̄’s maqās.id
understanding is examined, for which especially his discussion of the maqās.id in his famous
al-Mustas.fā is used. Because al-Ghazālı̄ expresses his dictum in K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn, this
book and the context of the quotation are analyzed and discussed. Consequently, modern
references by contemporary authors to this dictum are studied and analyzed critically. The
results of this research are finally summarized in the conclusion. Besides other findings,
the present study shows that modern authors refer to al-Ghazālı̄’s quotation for different
reasons; however, a complete survey has been missing in the literature, a lacuna which this
article aims to fill.

1.1. Al-Ghazālı̄’s Understanding of the Role of Reason in the Process of Ijtihād

In reference to al-Ghazālı̄’s intense occupation with the law, Ormsby (2007, p. 35)
states, “Whatever his various excursions into almost every intellectual current of his time,
it was with law that he began and with law that he ended.” What becomes evident is that
throughout al-Ghazālı̄’s life, changes in his personal views had an immediate impact on
the development of his legal thought. Thus, about the beginnings of his juridical pursuits,
when he was still a student of al-Juwaynı̄ (Moosa 2013, p. 271), it can be said that his
publications were of little originality and that he rather focused on the defense of the shāfi ı̄ (

legal school, of which he was a staunch follower (ibid.).3 Over the course of time, his
scholarly interests became more developed and elaborated, and it is also noticeable that
the role which he had regarded as legitimate for the usage of reason in ijtihād changed.
Discussing the role of reason in the legal process, Rayyān (2021, p. 16) observes that over
the years, developments of the centrality of reason in al-Ghazālı̄’s thought can be noticed.
Hallaq goes further to explain that al-Ghazālı̄ in his early work al-Shifā al-ghalı̄l as-
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signed reason still more room than in later works and that he regarded the usage of mas.lah.a
as a legitimate basis for juridical norms of the sharı̄ a. Hallaq (1992, p. 189) says that in
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his approach, al-Ghazālı̄ displayed a “bold tendency towards reason” and that al-Ghazālı̄
on more than one occasion even had to distance himself from the Mu tazila. In contrast
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to that, in his last legal work, al-Mustas.fā, he clearly describes restrictions on the usage
of reason, and Hallaq speaks of a conservative stance in such usage in ijtihād, and that in
Religions 2024, 15, 165 3 of 11

that phase, al-Ghazālı̄ no longer understood reason as a major source in the work with
mas.lah.a but clearly limits its usage and role during ijtihād (ibid., pp. 189–90). Moosa (2013,
p. 261) suggests that a possible reason for this change of opinion is that al-Ghazālı̄ during
his different phases of life was embedded differently in the changing contexts of his time
and that he was involved in them intensely. As for the already mentioned change in the
role of reason in the process of ijtihād, Hallaq explains that al-Ghazālı̄ wrote his al-Shifā )

when he was deeply involved in so-called worldly occupations. He was then teaching in
Baghdad, issued fatwas, and was essentially interested in a variety of rational disciplines.
Therefore, while in al-Shifā his approaches display pragmatism that can be detected from
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the great attention he pays to the mas.lah.a, certain reflections on the mas.lah.a are completely
missing in al-Mustas.fā (Hallaq 1992, p. 190).4 As a possible reason for al-Ghazālı̄’s change in
approach, Hallaq points out that the scholar wrote his al-Mustas.fā during his far-reaching
spiritual crisis and therefore in a phase that “marked retreat to fearsome piety” (ibid.)5 .
Thus, according to Hallaq, al-Mustas.fā is not more than a teaching manual of Islamic law,
in which he ascribed for reason a certain legitimate realm “without risking what might
be taken as daring, innovative, or controversial” (ibid.). Therefore, when Emon considers
al-Ghazālı̄ among those premodern Muslim jurists who were wary of “reason holding an
unchecked ontological authority as a source of Shari’a”, then, according to Emon, al-Ghazālı̄
found with the mas.lah.a as described in al-Mustas.fā an approach that accepted the role of
reason in ijtihād but in a restricted fashion (Emon 2010, p. 152).
Since al-Ghazālı̄ expressed his ideas and definitions of the maqās.id and the mas.lah.a in
his al-Mustas.fā in detail, I will present these passages subsequently.

1.2. Al-Ghazālı̄’s Conceptualization of the Maqās.id in Al-Mustas.fā

Al-Ghazālı̄ discussed what is today called his “maqās.id-concept” within the context of
his debate of the mas.lah.a. The mas.lah.a again he addresses within a group of those sources
of the law that he defines as “speculative sources” (al-us.ūl al-mawhūma) (al-Ghazālı̄ 1997,
p. 390), which stresses—at least in this phase of his life and as mentioned above—his
skepticism toward reason as an unrestricted source of the law. The “speculative sources”
are preceded in al-Mustas.fā by indubitable sources, among which he counts the Quran and
the Prophetic tradition (h.adı̄th).
As for the “speculative sources” of Islamic law, he first mentions a general, linguistic
definition, namely, mas.lah.a, as an expression of acquiring a benefit or warding off harm
(jalb mas.lah.a wa-daf mafsada). However, he immediately makes it clear that this is not the
(

definition that he, as a jurist, works with. Al-Ghazālı̄ instead defines the mas.lah.a as “the
protection of what was intended by the divine lawgiver” (al-muh.āfaz.a alā maqs.ūd al-shar )
( (

(ibid., pp. 416–17).6 He explains further that Muslim jurists differ regarding the usage of
the mas.lah.a and its juridical legitimacy as a source of the law, and that principally they
differentiate between three of its categories. The first is that which is recognized by the
sharı̄ a as a legitimate source (ibid., pp. 414–15). This category receives its legitimacy
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through conclusion by analogy (qiyās). In this case, a textual example exists in either the
Quran or the Prophetic tradition, and when a new case or question arises that displays
certain characteristics similar to the textual example, an analogy from the text can be drawn
for the new question. For example, he mentions that everything that intoxicates, be that
from beverages or foods, is prohibited, because an analogy is drawn with wine, which is
mentioned in the Quran as prohibited, since, as al-Ghazālı̄ explains, this prohibition serves
to protect the faculty of reason, which makes humans accountable before God and creation
(ibid., p. 415).
A second category of mas.lah.a is not approved by the text and is rejected as a source
of law (ibid., pp. 414–15). The example al-Ghazālı̄ provides is when a ruler has sexual
intercourse during the fasting day of Ramadan and thus violates the law. For this sin,
certain forms of atonement are mentioned in a particular sequence in the Islamic sources.7
Al-Ghazālı̄ says that if this ruler is told by jurists that the king has to fast two continuous
months as a punishment for his sin, and this decision is argued as being a mas.lah.a because
Religions 2024, 15, 165 4 of 11

this sort of punishment would prevent the king from committing this sin again in the future,
al-Ghazālı̄ argues that this argument is wrong for it contradicts the textual sources and
the order or punishments mentioned therein. He further states that the above proposal by
scholars without considering the order of atonement mentioned in the Prophetic narrations
contradicts Islam and opens the door to a change in all the restrictions of the sharı̄ a and its (

sources and such an approach is therefore illegitimate (ibid., p. 415).

The third category is neither approved nor rejected by the text (ibid., pp. 414–15).
This type of mas.lah.a is the only form in which reason can be deployed so that new legal
decisions can be reached (Emon 2010, p. 155). Regarding this category, al-Ghazālı̄ suggests
that the mas.lah.a, in order to guarantee its legitimacy as a source, should be judged by its
strength. He argues that the strength of the mas.lah.a should be defined within three levels,
the strongest being one of necessities (d.arūrāt). The second and weaker level is that of needs
(h.ājāt) and the weakest is that of supplements (tah.sı̄nāt or tazyı̄nāt) (al-Ghazālı̄ 1997, p. 416).
For the formation of new legal decisions, according to al-Ghazālı̄, only the strongest level
of mas.lah.a provides enough strength as a legitimate basis (ibid., p. 420).
Regarding the juridical definition of mas.lah.a discussed above, namely, that mas.lah.a
means the protection of what has been intended by the divine lawgiver, al-Ghazālı̄ explains
further that God intends the protections of five values: religion (dı̄n), life (nafs), reason
( aql), progeny (nasl), and property (māl). Everything that helps to protect these five is a
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mas.lah.a and everything that fails them is a harm (mafsada) and warding it off is again a
mas.lah.a (ibid., p. 417).8 Those values are not derived from the Islamic primary sources,
but because of their centrality and their indirect mentioning in the sources, they must
be considered during the process of legal reasoning and the derivation of legal decisions
from the texts. Thus, they must be considered by the jurist in his juridical work (ibid.).
Al-Ghazālı̄ elucidates that those values or maqās.id are so essential that it is impossible for a
human community to not agree upon them and each legislation that wants good for people
must consider them necessarily (ibid.).9
Different from the level of necessities, the levels of h.ājāt and the tah.sı̄nāt must not be
used as a basis for legislation, because this would entail law based on personal opinion and
convenience (ibid., p. 420). However, they still need to be considered during ijtihād as well
as the interim stages between the three main levels, which al-Ghazālı̄ calls complementing
levels (takmila, tatimma) (ibid., p. 416). As an example of a complement of the highest level,
the d.arūrāt, al-Ghazālı̄ mentions the prohibition of consuming even a slight amount of
alcohol, because this might lead to more of its consumption (ibid., p. 417).

1.3. Al-Ghazālı̄’s Kitāb H

. aqı̄qat Al-Qawlayn and the Context of His Maqās.id-Dictum
According to H . ammād, al-Ghazālı̄’s book K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn represents his third
contribution to the field of us.ūl al-fiqh (H . ammād 1987, p. 175) and, as the full title indicates
(Kitāb H
. aqı̄qat al-qawlayn fı̄ tawjı̄h takhrı̄j al-Imām al-Shāfi ı̄ li-ba d. al-masā il alā qawlayn), it is a
( ( ) (

written defense of the eponymous founder of the shāfi ı̄ legal school, Imam Idrı̄s al-Shāfi ı̄.
( (

As mentioned, al-Ghazālı̄’s works must be read in light of the different phases of his life
when attempting to reconstruct his thought. This naturally leads one to ask, how can this
book be situated in the stages and scholarly writings of al-Ghazālı̄?
There are indeed several circumstances that indicate that this book is an early work
from al-Ghazālı̄’s career. Besides H . ammād’s observation above, al-Ghazālı̄ strongly defends
Imam al-Shāfi ı̄’s legal methodology, which, according to Moosa (2013, p. 271), is indicative
(

of the early juridical phase in al-Ghazālı̄’s life. Its style is reminiscent of another early work,
al-Mankhūl, in which he also defends al-Shāfi ı̄’s legal views (Zyzow 2013, pp. 73–74). That
(

al-Ghazālı̄ does not discuss complex juridical issues in the K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn, which
can be seen in later works, suggests that this work was written in an early stage of his
juridical career.
The book itself should perhaps be called a booklet, considering its modest size. Its
editor, Abū Abdullāh al-Dānı̄ b. Munı̄r Āl Zahwı̄, says that the original manuscript
(

consisted of 23 sheets, written on both sides, and on each page of about 16 lines (Āl
Religions 2024, 15, 165 5 of 11

Zahwı̄ 2007, p. 6). Āl Zahwı̄ mentions in the introduction that, after the booklet had been
kept in drawers and storages (h.abı̄s al-adrāj aw al-khazā in) for a long time, according to
)

his knowledge it has now been printed for the first time, which includes his editing and
commentary (ibid., p. 5). He says that there is no doubt that the author of the booklet is
al-Ghazālı̄ because his name is inscribed at the beginning. Moreover, many of al-Ghazālı̄’s
classical biographers, among them Ibn Khallikān (d. 680/1282), Ibn al-Subkı̄ (d. 771/1370),
and others, have ascribed this book to him (ibid., p. 6). Furthermore, Āl Zahwı̄ confirms that
a certain fiqh style that is typical of al-Ghazālı̄ can be clearly discerned in the work (ibid.).
As for the structure of the book, the editor’s introduction (ibid., pp. 5–7) is followed
by a biographical sketch of al-Ghazālı̄ (ibid., pp. 9–19) and finally by the main text itself
(al-Ghazālı̄ 2007, pp. 23–78). Al-Ghazālı̄ starts his oeuvre with an introduction of sorts
(ibid., pp. 23–35), comprising several sections that seem to have different aims. First, it
seems that a person has approached the scholar and complained that certain statements
are ascribed to al-Shāfi ı̄ that appear to be contradictory, as claimed by certain critics of the
(

Imam (ibid., p. 23). This person asked al-Ghazālı̄ to explain which of al-Shāfi ı̄’s statements
(

are correct, especially when there seem to be two contradictory statements on one single
question or topic (ibid., p. 24). Al-Ghazālı̄ explains that with his booklet he intends to
explain the reasons for the existence of two seemingly contractionary statements and to
elucidate their different branches (aqsām) and states that al-Shāfi ı̄’s opinion are correct and
(

according to the truth and that therefore he was on the straight path (ibid., p. 25). In the
following sections, headed “notification” (tanbı̄h) (ibid., pp. 26–28), “advice” (nas.ı̄h.a) (ibid.,
pp. 29–32), and “warning” (tah.dhı̄r) (ibid., pp. 33–35), al-Ghazālı̄ informs the reader one
should not believe that when there is a seeming contradiction in al-Shāfi ı̄’s opinions, that
(

he was not aware of this circumstance. Therefore, when judging al-Shāfi ı̄, and generally
(

any scholar, one should recognize one’s own limits and instead remain humble, because it
may well be that it is one’s own shortcomings in character, such as arrogance and pride, that
make one think that one is better than others. In addition, al-Ghazālı̄ warns the follower of
a legal school different from the shāfi ı̄ one that this person should not attack the founder
(

of another school, lest this attack be followed by a counter-attack and cause unpleasant
things to be said about one’s own school. Moreover, should questions and ambiguities
arise, scholars should be approached respectfully, especially al-Shāfi ı̄, whose grandeur and
(

position can only be comprehended by someone close to the Imam’s rank.

After this preamble and preparing readers for the work’s content, al-Ghazālı̄ turns
to the actual aim of the booklet, namely, to explain how it might be that seemingly con-
tradictory opinions of al-Shāfi ı̄ can be found on one single legal question or topic (ibid.,
(

pp. 35–78) and he enumerates five possible reasons. One of them is that situations appear in
which two different solutions (istis.h.ābān) are possible and correct and the more correct is not
obvious to the jurist (ibid., p. 50). Under the designation of “qiyās al-mas.lah.a”, he clarifies
what he means by citing an example of the two Companions of the Prophet Muh.ammad,
Abū Bakr (d. 12/634) and Umar b. al-Khat.t.āb (d. 24/644), when they were presented with
(

the question of how financial assets ( at.ā ) should be distributed among the Muslims. While
( )

Abū Bakr, following a particular logic, argued for an equal distribution among the Muslims,
(
Umar reasoned differently and argued for a distribution that considered a person’s sacri-
fices for Islam. However, after some time, Umar changed his opinion due to the change
(

in certain circumstances and he followed Abū Bakr. Therefore, in their ijtihād, the two
Companions at first, and under particular circumstances, had considered different mas.lah.as
in one question; however, when those circumstances changed, Umar changed his opinion
(

and then agreed with Abū Bakr’s reasoning (ibid., pp. 61–63). Al-Ghazālı̄ continues to state
that under this circumstance (i.e., the potential existence of different ijtihāds on one single
question), it might indeed occur that one single scholar holds one opinion and considers
certain maqās.id, but when circumstances change, certain other maqās.id are considered and
thus his legal opinion alters. Al-Ghazālı̄ says that when one or several scholars come to
different conclusions and the strongest solution is not evident, it might be possible that all
those solutions are according to God’s intentions and “the objectives of legal legislation
Religions 2024, 15, 165 6 of 11

are the prayer direction of the jurist” (qiblat al-mujtahid maqās.id al-shar ) and therefore, no
(

matter what the scholar decides in his ijtihād process, he should consider what the divine
legislation has intended (maqs.ūd al-shar ) (ibid., p. 63). After mentioning this dictum, he
(

does not delve further into a discussion of the maqās.id but continues with his narrative
of a real (or fictive) person to whom he explains the reasons for the existence of different
opinions of al-Shāfi ı̄. (

2. Modern Preoccupations with Al-Ghazālı̄’s Dictum

For the discussion of the modern preoccupation with al-Ghazālı̄’s maqās.id dictum, it is
important to note that this quote was already referred to by classical scholars. One of the
most prominent among them is Jalāl al-Dı̄n al-Suyūt.ı̄ (d. 910/1505). He mentions the quote
in his K. al-Radd alā man akhlada ilā al-ard. wa-jahila anna al-ijtihād fı̄ kull as.r fard., in which he
( (

argues for the necessity of a permanent ijtihād. He raises different aspects to strengthen his
argument and enumerates them. Thus, his mentioning of al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum is situated in
the general context of his defense of ijtihād, although it should be noted that the contents
before and after his citation are not related to the maqās.id. Under the number heading
“42” and referring to al-Ghazālı̄’s K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn, he brings up the quotation with
the following words: “the intentions of the divine legislation are the prayer direction of
the jurists” (maqās.id al-shar qiblat al-mujtahidı̄n), and he also cites al-Ghazālı̄’s example of
(

Abū Bakr and Umar b. al-Khat.t.āb to explain the reason for the existence of different legal
(

opinions (al-Suyūt.ı̄ 1907, pp. 91–92). Consequently, al-Suyūt.ı̄ neither discusses nor explains
the quotation, nor indeed the maqās.id in general,10 probably only citing it to stress his own
argument for the necessity of continuous ijtihad, along with his example that undertaking
ijtihād was the norm already among the Companions of the Prophet.
My study of modern publications that reference al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum revealed various
points of interest, which I will summarize below.

2.1. Al-Ghazālı̄’s Dictum in the Different Types of Literature on the Maqās.id

Modern contributions that mention al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum can be divided into two
different types of literature. One type describes classical, premodern concepts of the
maqās.id. In such publications, when al-Ghazālı̄’s maqās.id ideas are described, his quotation
is cited in order to stress or explain his understanding of the maqās.id. Examples include
Maqās.id al-sharı̄ a inda Ibn Taymiyya (al-Badawı̄ 2000, p. 107); al-Fikr al-maqās.ı̄dı̄ inda al-Imām
( ( (

al-Ghazālı̄ ( Abdū 2009, p. 130), where al-Ghazālı̄’s maqās.id thought is described and the
(

dictum is cited in answering the question of how, according to al-Ghazālı̄, the maqās.id can
be identified; al-Us.ūl al- aqliyya fı̄ fiqh al-sāda al-mālikiyya (al-Ramı̄lı̄ 2021, p. 167), though in
(

the context of discussing the Mālikı̄s and their understanding of the importance of maqās.id
al-shar and which legal principles they followed in their ijtihad (without any reference to
(

al-Ghazālı̄); and Maqās.id al- aqā id inda al-Imām al-Ghazālı̄, where the dictum is mentioned
( ) (

in a kalām context where the author describes some medieval scholars at times accusing
each other of takfı̄r (excommunication) and argues that one needs to consider the maqās.id,
at which point he refers to al-Ghazālı̄’s statement ( Abdū 2016, p. 68).
(

The second type of literature argues mostly for the importance of ijtihād and the
consideration of the maqās.id in that process. For instance, in the book al-Ijtihād, the author
underlines the significance of the maqās.id and stresses the central role they played in the
legal thought of premodern scholars. To emphasize his argument for a maqās.id-oriented,
contemporary ijtihād, he enumerates certain scholars, such as al-Shāfi ı̄ and al-Juwaynı̄,(

before he mentions al-Ghazālı̄’s quote (al-Indūnı̄sı̄ 2013, p. 503). The famous Moroccan
theologian Ah.mad al-Raysūnı̄ (2014, p. 92) also refers to al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum in his work
al-Fikr al-maqās.idı̄. Under the heading “al-Maqās.id qiblat al-mujtahidı̄n”, he says that scholars
strive to elaborate the maqās.id from the Islamic primary sources in order to then be guided
by them in their ijtihād. In this context, al-Ghazālı̄’s quote is mentioned to support al-
Raysūnı̄’s argument. The quotation is further used in the same vein for a contemporary,
timely ijtihād in the book al-Fikr al-manhajı̄ al- ilmı̄ inda al-us.ūliyyı̄n ( Awwām 2014, p. 223),
( ( (
Religions 2024, 15, 165 7 of 11

where the author proposes that the mujtahid in his legal work and in the process of ijtihād
must take the maqās.id as his qibla (an yaj al al-maqās.id qiblatahu). A similar line of thought
(

can be found in Mu assasat al-ijtihād (H

)

. afyān 2015, p. 79) and in an online article written

by Ayyād Kāmil al-Zı̄bārı̄.11 Likewise, it is argued in other works, such as Min al-ijtihād
fı̄ al-nas.s. ilā al-ijtihād fı̄ al-wāqi , that jurists agree that knowledge of the maqās.id and their
(

consideration is undoubtedly necessary in the legal process, and most probably with the
intention to underline this opinion, al-Ghazālı̄ is then quoted (Bin omar 2009, p. 124).
(

2.2. References Not to Al-Ghazālı̄’s Original Work but to Al-Suyūt.ı̄’s

What I noticed during this study is that most authors who refer to al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum
do not quote from the original source but primarily cite al-Suyūt.ı̄’s book (the few exceptions
will be discussed shortly). Examples of such authors include H . afyān (2015, p. 79); Bin omar
(

(2009, p. 124); Abdū (2002, p. 75ff.); al-Raysūnı̄ (2014, p. 92); al-Indūnı̄sı̄ (2013, p. 503); and
(

al-Badawı̄ (2000, p. 107).

Ayyād Kāmil al-Zı̄bārı̄ goes into more detail in his online contribution. After discussing
the linguistic meaning of the maqās.id, providing a technical definition, and explaining their
importance for ijtihād, he cites al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum, for which he first mentions as his source
the work by Ah.mad al-Raysūnı̄, called al-Fikr al-maqās.idı̄.12 However, he immediately
clarifies that this is a quotation that al-Suyūt.ı̄ has cited in his own book and that it originally
comes from al-Ghazālı̄’s K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn. This is the case when, without any direct
reference to al-Ghazālı̄ or to al-Suyūt.ı̄, al-Ghazālı̄’s quote is mentioned (al-Ramı̄lı̄ 2021,
p. 167). In another work, al-Nawāzil al-jadı̄da ( Uthmān 2014, p. 76), where the qualifications
(

for a mujtahid are listed by classical scholars and knowledge of the maqās.id is raised as
being among these requisites, the quote is mentioned and the source is given as al-Suyūt.ı̄,
but then it is said that the “quote originally comes from . . .” followed by an omission of
the name; thus, we can only assume that the non-mentioning of al-Ghazālı̄ was due to a
copyist’s (or some other) error. However, regarding the al-Suyūt.ı̄ citation, only his name is
given, but not his book and no further source details are provided.
Another variant is when, for instance, in Sijāsat al-tadarruj (al-Zı̄bārı̄ 2017, p. 2010),
the quote is provided but as its source, al-Raysūnı̄’s al-Fikr al-maqās.idı̄, is given without
mentioning either al-Ghazālı̄ or al-Suyūt.ı̄; thus, the reader is led to believe that al-Raysūnı̄
is the originator of the quote.
In an online article, the quote is mentioned as well as al-Ghazālı̄’s name, but no source
is provided.13
In al-Fikr al-maqās.idı̄ inda al-Imām al-Ghazālı̄ by Muh.ammad Abdū (2009, p. 130), the
( (

author says that al-Ghazālı̄ understood the maqās.id al-sharı̄ a as a qibla of the jurists, but he
(

does not provide a source for the paraphrased quote.

In his online article “al-Maqās.id qiblat al-mujtahidı̄n”, Uthmān Kad.wār mentions that
(

this is a quote which al-Suyūt.ı̄ “and other scholars” (without mentioning their names)
transmitted from al-Ghazālı̄, though no sources are provided. He argues that the maqās.id are
needed in diverse fields for the production of law during ijtihād and that the Companions
of the Prophet Muh.ammad already considered the maqās.id, even though at that time they
did not represent a distinguished, autonomous discipline, and that consequently, when
scholars in their different situations and circumstances considered the maqās.id, they arrived
at solutions that were suitable for their respective needs and situations.14
Beyond the Arab publications that refer to this quote, the German jurist Mathias Rohe
picks up on the statement in his Islamic Law in Past and Present. He refers to the quote
when he speaks about Islamic law in the modern age and says that in contemporary works
on ijtihād and the maqās.id, the dictum is often cited by classical scholars. In this context,
Rohe mentions al-Ghazālı̄’s quote, which he calls a “pithy statement” (Rohe 2014, p. 250),
though he does not reference the original source but an article by the Moroccan scholar
Muh.ammad Abdū (which I will discuss below).
(
Religions 2024, 15, 165 8 of 11

2.3. Few Cases with Direct Reference to the Original Al-Ghazālı̄ Source and Engagement with It
Despite the frequent references to al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum in the contemporary literature,
in my research I could only find very few instances in which there is a concrete engagement
with the original quote itself and its context. One such example is to be found in al-Fikr
al-manhajı̄ al- ilmı̄ inda al-us.ūliyyı̄n by Muh.ammad Abd al-Salām Awwām, who argues
( ( ( (

that the mujtahid in his legal reflections is obliged to take the maqās.id as his qibla (an yaj al (

al-maqās.id qiblatahu). In the footnote to this statement, Awwām directly cites K. H

(

. aqı̄qat
al-qawlayn, the version edited by Āl Zahwı̄. Awwām explains that although al-Suyūt.ı̄ has
(

mentioned this quote, a change in the expression does not result in a change in the meaning.
Furthermore, Awwām says that it is not clear which of the two versions of al-Ghazālı̄’s
(

statement is the original, the one which is mentioned in K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn edited by Āl
Zahwı̄ or the one that can be found in al-Suyūt.ı̄’s book ( Awwām 2014, pp. 222–23).
(

A detailed engagement with the quote is eventually found in the collected volume
Maqās.id al-sharı̄ a wa-l-ijtihād, edited by Yāsir Awda. In his chapter, “Maqās.id al-sharı̄ a
( ( (

qiblat al-mujtahidı̄n: Abū H . āmid al-Ghazālı̄ namūdhajan”, Muh.ammad Abdū discusses the
(

quote, where he deals with three big issues that are preceded by an introduction. In the
introduction, he mentions al-Ghazālı̄’s quote, but at this point, he does not mention a source
( Abdū 2008, p. 102). Later, he says that his intention with his article is to demonstrate
(

that in al-Ghazālı̄’s thought the maqās.id al-shar represent the qibla of the mujtahid (ibid.);
(

however, this statement is made without a direct reference to the original source. In
the first section of his chapter, Abdū again mentions the quote, this time with a direct
(

reference to al-Ghazālı̄’s K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn, and he even provides the page number
(ibid., p. 112); however, complete publication or edition details are not provided anywhere.
As for the quote’s context, Abdū explains it in a similar manner to al-Suyūtı̄ and points
(

to the example of Abū Bakr and Umar b. al-Khat.t.āb (ibid., pp. 109–10) and says that
(

al-Ghazālı̄’s citing the story of the two Companions explains his own maqās.id-oriented
thought. Abdū’s intention is to analyze this very thought of al-Ghazālı̄, and in order to
(

explain it to the reader, he quotes from al-Ghazālı̄’s presumably much later written work,
al-Mustas.fā. The second section of the chapter is dedicated to answering the question of
how, according to al-Ghazālı̄, the maqās.id can be determined (ithbāt al-maqās.id). This is
followed by the third and last section, in which al-Ghazālı̄’s understanding of the mas.lah.a
and examples for his mas.lah.a-oriented ijtihād are discussed. As for Abdū’s discussion
(

of the famous dictum, he mentions its original wording and embeds it in al-Ghazālı̄’s
general maqās.id thought, which, as mentioned, he elucidates by referring to al-Mustas.fā.
This means that he discusses the quote in order to demonstrate al-Ghazālı̄’s general maqās.id-
thought but without embedding the quote in its own context, that is, by merely citing the
K. H. aqı̄qat al-qawlayn and not discussing the book or its overall content. Thus, Abdū is a
(

valuable source for understanding al-Ghazālı̄’s general maqās.id understanding, although

the complete source of the quote is not provided. This is a shame because without these
essential publication details, further research becomes difficult. Moreover, since Abdū lists
(

all the other al-Ghazālı̄ sources that he consulted in his bibliography, it is probable that this
single source has been omitted by mistake.

3. Conclusions
What conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis? First, al-Ghazālı̄’s dictum
itself was presented and discussed, and its context in his K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn was analyzed.
This discussion showed that the context was not, as one would assume, that of the maqās.id
but of al-Ghazālı̄’s defense of Imam al-Shāfi ı̄’s legal methodology. After providing several
(

reasons why in al-Shāfi ı̄’s approach to one single question several or different opinions can
(

be found, al-Ghazālı̄ explains that during ijtihād it might indeed happen that at different
times and due to changing circumstances, and even if a scholar considers the maqās.id in
his ijtihād, he might arrive at different legal decisions. In the course of this argumentation,
al-Ghazālı̄ utters this quote and uses the example of the ijtihād of the Prophetic Companions
to stress his statement.
Religions 2024, 15, 165 9 of 11

As for other references to the famous quote, I cited al-Suyūt.ı̄, who, if not the first to
refer to it, was at least among the first premodern scholars to mention it in his own work
K. al-Radd alā man akhlada ilā al-ard. wa-jahila anna al-ijtihād fı̄ kuli as.r fard.. I showed how al-
( (

Suyūt.ı̄ did not mention al-Ghazālı̄’s quote in the context of an argumentation for the maqās.id
either, but that he cited the statement in his general call for the necessity of a permanent
ijtihād. Perhaps al-Suyūt.ı̄ used the dictum to stress that for a true and effective ijtihād to take
place, the maqās.id need to be considered by the scholars. Analyzing al-Suyūt.ı̄’s reference
of the quote was necessary for my subsequent engagement with the modern literature.
Among other results, this study revealed that a direct reference to al-Ghazālı̄’s original
work by contemporary authors only took place in very few cases and is mostly referred to
in al-Suyūt.ı̄’s book. This is surprising given that the original source, K. H . aqı̄qat al-qawlayn,
has been more recently edited and in print since at least 2007. Furthermore, I demonstrated
that within the modern literature, there are different ways in which al-Ghazālı̄’s quote is
used by contemporary authors. In one category of the literature, the dictum is utilized
when, among other premodern scholars, al-Ghazālı̄’s maqās.id understanding is discussed
and the quote is used to underline the centrality of the maqās.id in his legal thought. Another
category revealed that the quote is often used when authors emphasize the importance of
the maqās.id in order to guarantee an adequate ijtihād that meets today’s needs. Within both
categories, I observed that the referencing to the quote is merely performed to strengthen a
particular argument and that a deeper, analytical engagement with the statement is lacking
in most cases. Nor is the quote used, for instance, to reinforce controversial opinions,
with the aid of a “pithy statement” (Rohe 2014, p. 250), of renowned classical scholars
that perhaps would even contradict al-Ghazālı̄’s maqās.id-understanding. Thus, it can be
concluded that in most cases, the dictum is cited to either explain al-Ghazālı̄’s thought or
to stress today’s call for the necessity of a maqās.id-oriented ijtihād.
Finally, it is apparent that hardly any textual engagement with the often-cited dictum
can be found, besides the exception of the Moroccan scholar Muh.ammad Abdū, who, in his
(

article, undertakes a rudimentary contextualization of the quote. Thus, due to the research
gaps that I have identified, the present article serves, on the one hand, as an introduction
to al-Ghazālı̄’s maqās.id thought, facilitating the analysis and the contextualization of his
famous dictum in its original source, and on the other, to fill another lacuna, which is the
study of modern engagement with al-Ghazālı̄’s famous statement.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: The data has been contained in the article.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes
1 In this domain, contributions have become numerous and, among others, consist of the critique of al-Ghazālı̄’s restriction on the
maqās.id to the classical five values (Rayyān 2021, p. 24; Opwis 2017, p. 29). However, it is argued that it is not only in the modern
age that such critique is mentioned but that already classical scholars such as Taqı̄ al-Dı̄n al-Subkı̄ (d. 756/1355), Shihāb al-Dı̄n
al-Qarāfı̄ (d. 683/1285), Ibn Taymiyya, Izz al-Dı̄n b. Abd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350)
( (

criticized his concept (Ademi 2018, p. 224). In the modern age, the American Egyptian jurist Khaled Abou El Fadl suggests
that the classical five values mentioned by al-Ghazālı̄ should be interpreted according to modern needs. Thus, for example,
when al-Ghazālı̄ mentions the necessity of protecting religion (h.ifth al-dı̄n), Abou El Fadl proposes that this value should be
reinterpreted into the protection of religious freedom (Bassiouni 2014, p. 207). Another critique, expressed by the Moroccan
philosopher Abd al-Rah.mān T.āhā, reads that the five values mentioned by al-Ghazālı̄ and others are merely materialistic and
(

that ethics were disregarded when this early maqās.id concept was formulated (T.āhā 2015, p. 111).
2 See, for instance, Ahmad (2012, p. 122); Emon (2021, pp. 152–53); Zaman (2012, p. 37); Hallaq (1997, p. 214; 2004, p. 46).
3 For al-Ghazālı̄’s great admiration of Imam al-Shāfi ı̄, see, for instance, Ormsby (2007, pp. 40–41).
(
 Notes
1. In this domain, contributions have become numerous and, among others, consist of the critique of al-Ghazālī’s restriction on
the maqāṣid to the classical five values (Rayyān 2021, p. 24; Opwis 2017, p. 29). However, it is argued that it is not only in the
modern age that such critique is mentioned but that already classical scholars such as Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355), Shihāb
Religions 15, 165 (d. 683/1285), Ibn Taymiyya, ʿIzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d.
2024,al-Qarāfī
al-Dīn 10 of 11
751/1350) criticized his concept (Ademi 2018, p. 224). In the modern age, the American Egyptian jurist Khaled Abou El Fadl
suggests that the classical five values mentioned by al-Ghazālī should be interpreted according to modern needs. Thus, for
example, when al-Ghazālī mentions the necessity of protecting religion (ḥifth al-dīn), Abou El Fadl proposes that this value
4 Hallaq explains that with hisprotection
change of inreligious
thought, al-Ghazālı̄ was2014,
not p.an207).
exception
should be reinter-preted into the freedom (Bassiouni Anotherat all among
critique, Muslim
expressed by thescholars and he cites
famous
Moroccanexamples
philoso-pher ʿAbd them
among al-Raḥmān Ṭāhā, 1992,
(Hallaq p. 191).
reads that the five values mentioned by al-Ghazālī and others are merely
5 materialistic and that ethics were disregarded when this early maqāṣid concept was formulated (Ṭāhā 2015, p. 111).
Perhaps Moosa’s assumption as to why al-Ghazālı̄ addressed the maslah.a in al-Mustas.fā under the so-called suspect sources goes
2. See, for instance, Ahmad (2012, p. 122); Emon (2021, pp. 152–53); Zaman (2012, .p. 37); Hallaq (1997, p. 214; 2004, p. 46).
3.
too far when he assumes that because al-Ghazālı̄ was “cautious about venting this idea too loudly, he artfully discusses it in a
For al-Ghazālī’s great admiration of Imam al-Shāfiʿī, see, for instance, Ormsby (2007, pp. 40–41).
4.
section entitledthat
Hallaq explains ‘suspect
with hissources’” (Moosa al-Ghazālī
change in thought, 2013, p. 278). was not an exception at all among Muslim scholars and he cites
6 famous examples
According among them
to Nekroumi (1992,
(2018, p.p.177),
191).al-Ghazālı̄’s definitions of both the mas.lah.a and the maqās.id are today regarded as the first
5. Perhaps Moosa’s
systematic assumption
attempts of theiras tokind.
why al-Ghazālī
Following addressed
Opwis the maṣlaḥa
(2010, in al-Mustaṣfā
p. 67), it can beunder added thethat
so-called suspect sources
al-Ghazālı̄’s explanation of the mas.lah.a
goes too far when he assumes that because al-Ghazālī was “cautious about venting this idea too loudly, he artfully discusses it
since he first defined it became the standard definition in Islamic law.
7 in a section entitled ‘suspect sources’” (2013, p. 278).
6.
Several
According Prophetic
to Nekroumi narrations mention
(2018, p. 177), that indefinitions
al-Ghazālī’s such a case, a slave
of both should
the maṣlaḥa bethe
and freed. If the
maqāṣid are person is not capable
today regarded as the to do so, he or she
should fast forattempts
first systematic 60 consecutive
of their kind. days and if he
Following or she
Opwis is unable
(2010, p. 67), it to
candobethat,
addedthenthat feed 60 poor
al-Ghazālī’s people. of the
explanation
8 maṣlaḥa since he first defined it became theid
maqās standard definition in Islamic law.
For an analysis of al-Ghazālı̄’s . understanding, see, for instance, al-Kı̄lānı̄ (2009). The actual origin of the five d.arūrāt is
7. Several Prophetic narrations mention that in such a case, a slave should be freed. If the person is not capable to do so, he or she
unclear but they seem to have first emerged among the Khurasanian branch of the shāfi ı̄ school of law. Zyzow argues that in (

should fast for 60 consecutive days and if he or she is unable to do that, then feed 60 poor people.
8.
al-Ghazālı̄’s time, the doctrine was already well known (Zyzow 2013, p. 201).
For an analysis of al-Ghazālī’s maqāṣid understanding, see, for instance, al-Kīlānī (2009). The actual origin of the five ḍarūrāt is
9 An example
unclear but they heseem
provides
to havefor firstthe protection
emerged amongofthe religion
Khurasanianis thebranch
killing of of
thethe infidel
shāfiʿī schooland punishment
of law. Zyzow arguesof the
that innovator
in in religious
al-Ghazālī’s
affairs time, )the
(mubtadi anddoctrine
(
whoever was promotes
already wellthis known (2013, p. 201).
innovation among people. Al-Ghazālı̄ explains those punishments because through
9. An example
the actions of he these
provides for thereligion
people, protection of religion
becomes in isdanger
the killing of the infidel
(al-Ghazālı̄ andp.punishment
1997, 417). Another of theexample
innovatorfor
in religious
the protection of religion is
affairs (mubtadiʿ) and whoever promotes this innovation among people. Al-Ghazālī explains those punishments because
offered a few pages onwards when al-Ghazālı̄ argues that during war, when non-Muslims attack the Muslim community and
through the actions of these people, religion becomes in danger (al-Ghazālī 1997, p. 417). Another example for the protection of
have
religiontaken a group
is offered a fewofpages
Muslimsonwards as awhen
human shield, argues
al-Ghazālī even then Muslims
that during war,should attack the non-Muslim
when non-Muslims armycom-
attack the Muslim because otherwise they
themselves
munity and have willtaken
be attacked,
a group of the Muslim
Muslims as aterritory
human shield,may be evenconquered,
then Muslims and the Muslim
should attack thepopulation
non-Muslimkilled as a result (ibid., p. 420).
army because
He also reasons
otherwise that retaliation
they themselves (qis.ās.) the
will be attacked, is intended to protect
Muslim territory may people’s
be conquered,lives,andastheis the punishment
Muslim populationfor theasconsumption
killed a of alcohol,
result (ibid.,
since p. 420). He
the intellect also reasons
is meant to bethat retaliation
protected (qiṣāṣ) is the
through intended to protect people’s
implementation of thislives, as is the punishment
prohibition. The groundfor thefor the punishment of
consumption
adultery of alcohol,
(zina) again is since
thethe intellect protection
intended is meant to be ofprotected
progeny,through
and for thestealing
implementation
to protect of this prohibition.
people’s The ground
property (ibid., p. 417).
for the punishment of adultery (zina) again is the intended protection of progeny, and for stealing to protect people’s property
10 One p. 417).for the lack of deeper engagement with the maqās.id might be, as argued by some contemporary authors, that a general
(ibid.,reason
10. understanding
One reason for theon their
lack meaning
of deeper and rolewith
engagement in ijtihād
the maqāṣidwas might
alreadybe, clear to classical
as argued by some scholars,
contemporaryso that the provision
authors, that a of definitions and
general understanding
explanations was notonregarded
their meaning and role in See,
as necessary. ijtihādfor
was already clear
instance, Kamalito classical
(2012,scholars,
p. 6). so that the provision of
11 definitions and explanations was not regarded as necessary. See, for instance, Kamali (2012, p. 6).
http://alhiwarmagazine.blogspot.com/2014/12/blog-post_69.html (accessed on 15 April 2023).
11.
12 12. ‫ إدراك مقاصد الشريعة اإلسالمية‬:‫( مجلة الحوار‬alhiwarmagazine.blogspot.com)
(alhiwarmagazine.blogspot.com) (accessed on 24 January
(accessed 2024).
on 24 January 2024).
13
13. https://lakhasly.com/ar/view-summary/44EPhV8pjB (accessed on 19 April 2023).
14. https://lakhasly.com/ar/view-summary/44EPhV8pjB (accessed on 19 April 2023).
https://islamanar.com/destinationsthe-diligent/ (accessed on 15 April 2023).
14 https://islamanar.com/destinationsthe-diligent/ (accessed on 15 April 2023).
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