World Maritime University

The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World Maritime

University

World Maritime University Dissertations Dissertations

2006

Port state control : assessment and analysis

Hao Zhou
WMU

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations

Recommended Citation
Zhou, Hao, "Port state control : assessment and analysis" (2006). World Maritime University
Dissertations. 1120.
https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/1120

This Dissertation is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for
non-commercial, fair use academic purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without
express written permission from the World Maritime University. For more information, please contact
[email protected].
 World
World Maritime
Maritime University
University &
& Dalian
Dalian Maritime
Maritime University
University

Port State Control Regime

Port State and Perspectives
Control
AssessmentByand Analysis
By
FEI ZHONGQIANG
Zhou Hao
The People’s Republic of China
The People’s Republic of China
A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial
A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of
fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
In SCIENCE
MASTER OF
MARITIME SAFETY AND
In
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
MARITIME SAFETY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

2006
2006

C Copyright Zhou Hao, 2006

 Dedication
To my dear parent, Zhou Guangpeng, Zhou Chunlan
and
my beloved wife, He wei

I
 DECLARATION

I certify that all the material in this dissertation that is not my own work has been
identified, and that no material is included for which a degree has previously been
conferred on me.

The contents of this dissertation reflect my own personal views, and are not
necessarily endorsed by the University.

(Signature) ..........................................

(Date) ..........................................

Supervised by:

Li Wei

Associate Professor,

Maritime Safety and Environment management

Dalian Maritime University

Assessor:

Co-assessor:

II
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to thank China Maritime Safety Administration who nominated
me to pursue the course of Maritime Safety and Environment Management hold by
World Maritime University and Dalian Maritime University in Dalian.

Secondly, my sincere appreciation also extended to all the staff of World Maritime
University and Dalian Maritime University, especially to my dissertation supervisor,
Professor Li Wei, without his great help this dissertation could not have been
completed.

I also appreciate all the friends who have given me assistance in different aspects of
my studies.

My particular gratitude goes to my leaders and colleagues in the Jiangsu and Nanjing
Maritime Safety Administration for their nomination and great support for me to
study in World Maritime University and Dalian Maritime University.

Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to my dear father and mother, Zhou

Guangpeng and Zhou Chunlan, who have supported and encouraged me all the time.
I also wish to express my special gratitude to my beloved wife, He Wei, whose
support has always been encouraging.

III
Title: Port State Control: Assessment and Analysis

Degree: MSc

Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the d effectiveness of port State control from a global
perspective and the challenges faced in the current regime, based on the information
from IMO and several leading PSC MoUs as well as literatures from distinguished
scholars.

A brief retrospect is taken at the background of the emergence and development of

the international PSC regime. The definition of PSC and the main reasons, which
triggered the development of the PSC regime all over the world, are examined. The
legal basis for the port States to conduct PSC inspections is reviewed. The provisions
included in various international conventions, such as UNCLOS, SOLAS, MARPOL,
STCW and so on, are examined so that people may have a clear idea of the
legitimacy of the international PSC regime.

The rationale of regional PSC MoUs is investigated. The development of the nine
existing regional PSC MoUs and USCG in recent years is examined. The procedures
on conducting PSC inspection and guidelines developed by IMO recently are also
investigated.

The effectiveness of PSC is assessed mainly based on the inspection results from the
Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG during the last decades. The cost efficient of
PSC regime is also under scrutiny.

However, the PSC regime is not perfect in eliminating the substandard ships. It has

IV
its own inherent limitations. In addition, with the popularization of PSC regime,
some challenges emerge during the development. The imbalanced development of
PSC regime in the worldwide still gives living space to the substandard ships. The
effectiveness of the PSC regime is diluted by the unqualified Port State Control
Officers. Undue detention also reduces the fairness of the regime.

The concluding chapter provides a conclusion that the PSC is a supplement to the
flag State control. It is an effective regime in eliminating substandard ships. But it is
not yet effective enough to eliminate all of the substandard ships running around the
world. The responsibility of flag States, shipowners and other stakeholders should
never be neglected. Some recommendations and proposals may be useful in replying
the challenges faced by the PSC regime.

Key words: Port State control, Effectiveness, MoU, Challenges, PSCO, Safety,
International Conventions.

V
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration…………………………………………………………………………..

Acknowledgement…………………………………………………………...…………

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………...

Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………

List of Figures and Tables………………………………………...………………. …

List of Abbreviations……………………………………. …………………………

Chapter I: Introduction…………………………………………………………1

Chapter II: The Background of Port State Control

2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………4

2.2 Flag State jurisdiction and flag State control……………………………………4

2.3 Coastal State jurisdiction and port State jurisdiction……………………………5

2.4 Impetus for the emergence of PSC……………………………………………6

2.4.1 The failure of flag State implementation……………………………7

2.4.2 The booming of flag of convenience…………………………………7

2.4.3 Successional serious oil pollution accidents in 60s and 70s …………8

2.4.4 The failure of assuming their responsibilities by classification

societies……………………………………………………………9

2.5 The legal background of port State control……………………………………10

2.5.1 UNCLOS 1982………………………………………………………10

VI
 2.5.2 Control provisions in IMO conventions……………………………10

2.5.3 ILO conventions……………………………………………………11

2.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………11

Chapter III: The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………13

3.2 Rationale for growth in PSC regional agreements……………………………13

3.3 Introduction of the existing nine MoUs and USCG…………………………14

3.3.1 The existing nine MoUs……………………………………………14

3.3.2 USCG………………………………………………………………15

3.4 The development of the nine MoUs and USCG in the recent years…………16

3.4.1 Paris MoU……………………………………………………………16

3.4.2 Viña del Mar Agreement (Latin-America Agreement) ……………17

3.4.3 Tokyo MoU…………………………………………………………18

3.4.4 Caribbean MoU……………………………………………………18

3.4.5 Mediterranean MoU……………………………………………………19

3.4.6 Indian Ocean MoU…………………………………………………20

3.4.7 Abuja MoU…………………………………………………………20

3.4.8 Black Sea MoU………………………………………………………20

3.4.9 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Riyadh
MoU) ………………………………………………………………21

3.4.10 USCG…………………………………………………………………21

VII
 3.5 The PSC procedures and IMO guidelines of PSC on specific aspects ………22

3.5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………22

3.5.2 General………………………………………………………………22

3.5.3 No more favorable treatment and non-convention size ships………23

3.5.4 The IMO and ILO guidelines of PSC on specific aspects…………24

3.6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………24

Chapter : The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC

Regime

4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………26

4.2 The effectiveness of PSC regime………………………………………………26

4.2.1 The general profile of PSC inspections in the three regions………27

4.2.2 The Black-Grey-White List and Targeting System…………………31

4.2.3 Case study……………………………………………………………32

4.3 The cost efficiency of the PSC regime………………………………………34

4.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………35

Chapter : The Challenges to The Current PSC Regime

5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………36

5.2 The inherent limitations of PSC regime………………………………………36

5.2.1 The limitation to the scope and depth of PSC inspections…………36

5.2.2 The subjective elements in the PSC regime…………………………38

VIII
 5.2.3 The impact of the inherent limitations to the PSC regime…………39

5.3 The unbalanced development of the PSC regime……………………………39

5.3.1 The imbalance of the PSC development between the MoUs………40

5.3.2 The imbalance of the PSC development within the region of

MoU…………………………………………………………………42

5.3.3 The reasons behind the unbalanced development of the PSC

regime………………………………………………………………42

5.3.4 The negative effect of the imbalance………………………………44

5.3.5 Case study……………………………………………………………44

5.4 The challenges to the PSCOs…………………………………………………45

5.4.1 The shortage of PSCOs in some regions……………………………46

5.4.2 The professional knowledge level of PSCOs………………………47

5.4.3 The ethical principle of PSCOs……………………………………48

5.5 Undue detention…………………………………………………………………49

5.5.1 Overview of undue detention………………………………………49

5.5.2 The reasons of undue detention……………………………………50

5.5.3 Case study……………………………………………………………51

5.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………52

Chapter : Recommendations and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………53

6.2 Promote uniformity of the PSC regime worldwide……………………………53

IX
 6.3 Enhance the transparency of the PSC system…………………………………54

6.4 Promote the information exchange worldwide………………………………55

6.5 Develop detailed Guidelines on PSC for PSCOs……………………………56

6.6 Strengthen the recruiting and training of PSCOs………………………………56

6.7 Intensify the Targeting System………………………………………………57

6.8 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………58

References…………………………………………………………………………..59

Appendices

Appendix A: Table 1 Summary of status of conventions at 31 January 2005…………64

Appendix B: Table 2 Port State control agreements: comparative table………………66

Appendix C: Quality Shipping for the 21st Century…………………………………69

Appendix D: The items that can be included in one PSC inspection…………………73

Appendix E: The remedial actions in PSC inspection…………………………………74

Appendix F: Table 3 The status of the relevant instrument in Tokyo MoU…………75

Appendix G: Table 4 Port State inspection statistics of Tokyo MoU in 2004………..77

Appendix H: Table 5 The number of inspected ships per PSC officer in APEC
economies………………………………………………………………78

X
List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Number of inspections in three regions………………………………………..27

Figure 2: Number of individual ships inspected under Paris MoU and USCG……..28

Figure 3: Number of deficiencies observed under Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU……..29

Figure 4: Deficiency rate under Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU from 1998 to 2004….29

Figure 5: The number of detentions under Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG……30

Figure 6: The detention rate under Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG……………..31

Figure 7: The performance of Chinese ships under Paris MoU………………………33

Figure 8: The performance of Chinese ships under Tokyo MoU……………………..33

Figure 9: The performance of Chinese ships under USCG…………………………..34

Figure 10: The overall inspection rate in Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG… … 41

Figure 11: The detention rate of Panamanian ships in 2003…………………………42

Figure 12: The inspection percentage in Tokyo MoU from 1994 to 2004……………43

Table 1: Summary of status of conventions at 31 January 2005……………………64

Table 2: Port State control agreements: comparative table………………………………66

Table 3: The status of the relevant instrument in Tokyo MoU………………………76

Table 4: Port State inspection statistics of Tokyo MoU in 2004……………………77

Table 5: The number of inspected ships per PSC officer in APEC economies…78

XI
List of Abbreviations
AFS International Convention on the Control of Harmful
Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships
AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Administration

APCIS Asia-Pacific Computerized Information System

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASOC The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition

BIMCO Baltic and International Maritime Council

BSIS Black Sea MoU information system

BWM International Convention on the Management of Ballast

Water and Sediments
CCSSC Caribbean Cargo Ship Safety Code

CIC Concentrated Inspection Campaign

CLC Civil Liability Convention

CIALA Information Centre of the Latin American Agreement

CLMC Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention

CMSA China Maritime Safety Administration

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

FOC Flag of Convenience

FSI Flag State Implementation

IACS International Association of Classification Societies

ILO International Labor Organization

ILO 147 International Labour Organization Convention No.147

XII
IMDG International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code

IMO International Maritime Organization

IOCIS Indian Ocean MoU Computerized Information System

ISM International Management Code for the Safe Operation of

Ships and for Pollution Prevention
ISPS International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port
Facilities
KMI Korea Maritime Institute

LL 66 International Convention on Load Lines 1966 (LL 66)

MARPOL73/78 International Convention for the prevention of pollution

from ships 1973, as amended by the 1978 Protocol
MTSA 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002

NIC National Informatics Centre

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development
Paris MoU Paris Memorandum of Understanding

PSC Port State Control

PSCO Port State Control Officer

PSIX Port State Information eXchange

Qualship 21 Quality Shipping for the 21st Century

RINA Registro Italiano Navale

RO Recognized Organizations

SEAPOL Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law, Policy and

Management
SIReNaC Systeme d’Information Relatif aux Navires Controlle

XIII
SOLAS 1974/1978 Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974, as amended by the
1978 Protocol
STCW 1978/1995 International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,1978, as
amended in 1995
UN United Nations

UNCLOS 1982 United Nations Convention on The Law of The Sea, 1982

USCG The United State Coast Guard

XIV
Chapter I Introduction

Chapter I

Introduction

In the past 80 years, the shipping industry expanded greatly in scale. The world’s fleet
expanded from 61.5 million gross tonnage in 1924 to 584.9 million gross tonnage in
2002 (Francisco, 2003). With the booming of maritime activities, a series of maritime
accidents happened and caused a great loss and damage to human life, marine
environment and properties. In response, the international maritime community has
adopted international laws concerning safety, security at sea and marine environment
protection. These international laws include conventions such as United Nations
Convention on The Law of The Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS 1982), Safety of Life at Sea
Convention 1974, as amended by the 1978 Protocol (SOLAS 1974/1978),
International Convention for the prevention of pollution from ships 1973, as amended
by the 1978 Protocol (MARPOL73/78), International Convention on Load Lines 1966
(LL 66), International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995(1978 STCW as amended in
1995), the International Labour Organization Convention No.147(ILO 147), etc;
hundreds of codes such as International Management Code for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM), International Code for the Security of Ships
and of Port Facilities (ISPS), International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG
Code), etc and numerous resolutions and recommendations. They are developed by
United Nation (UN), International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International
Labor Organization (ILO) respectively. A list of status of IMO conventions is given in
Table 1 Appendix A. The purposes of these instruments are to improve the safety of
ships, protect the marine environment from ship-source pollution and raise the
standards of crewing, training and accommodation on board ships. As Parties to the
abovementioned international conventions the flag States have obligations to give full

1
Chapter I Introduction
and complete effects to these conventions. In other words, it is the responsibility of
the flag States to make sure that ships flying their flags are constructed, equipped,
maintained, manned and operated to comply with the standards laid down by the
relevant international organization.

Nevertheless, some flag States have neither political will nor financial muscle and
maritime know-how to properly discharge their regulatory obligations (Shiming,
2001). At the same time, shipowners and the classes fail their obligations in observing
the safe operation of ships because of the fierce competition in the maritime market.
This made many substandard ships easily fly the flag of these States and sail around
the world in unsafe condition. In consequence, these substandard ships became
threatening elements to the safety of human lives and maritime environment. A series
of maritime accidents which induced heavy loss of human lives and maritime
environment tragedy in the history have been proven to be the result of such defective
flag State control regime. International maritime community feel it is insufficient to
totally rely on the flag States to ensure “safe, secure, efficient shipping on clean
oceans”. Another tier of control - Port State Control (PSC) regime need to be set up to
eliminate the substandard ships which slipped from the flag State control regime.

Port State Control is the regime under which ships are inspected in ports of the
countries they visit to ensure they comply with internationally accepted standards and
are manned and operated in compliance with the applicable international laws (O’Neil,
2003). It is not a new concept. The port State control regulation existed in as early as
1929 SOLAS. Other major conventions such as MARPOL 73/78, 1978 STCW as
amended in 1995, ILO 147, etc have similar control provisions. Therefore, the powers
used by Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) are not new, it is the willingness to use
this power which is new (Özçayır, 2003).

However, we must bear in mind port State control is an important complement to the
work of the flag State but never be a replacement for it. Under international law, it is
the flag State that is primarily responsible for ensuring that ship on its register comply
with the applicable regulations and standards (O’Neil, 2003). In an ideal world where
flag States give full and complete effect to the adopted international conventions, port
State control would not be necessary.

2
Chapter I Introduction
During the past twenty years, port State control developed very fast. The first regional
agreement on port State control - The Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris
MoU) was signed in 1982. Now, there are nine regional MoUs which cover all over
the world. Port State control is playing an indispensable role in eliminating the
substandard ships. At one time, some questions such as the effectiveness of the PSC
regime, cost-efficiency of the PSC regime have always been debated in the
international maritime community. Also, in the future PSC regime face new
challenges such as imbalanced development of the PSC regime, lack of trained
PSCOs and undue detentions. This dissertation will review the development of PSC
regime, discuss the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the PSC regime and analyze
the challenges ahead. Finally, it will draw a conclusion and give recommendations or
solutions to the challenges. The research is primary based on the literatures of
distinguished scholars and documents from IMO and MoUs. The main difficulty
encountered in this research is the lack of information from PSC inspections in some
MoUs. Therefore, the analysis in this dissertation may not reflect the whole picture of
the world PSC regime.

3
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

Chapter II

The Background of Port State Control

2.1 Introduction

The emergence of PSC has many reasons. On one hand, some flag States fail their
obligations in ensuring the ships flying their flags to comply with the standards
stipulated in the international conventions. On the other hand, port State jurisdiction
as a relatively new concept has gained wide reorganization in international
community (Özçayır, 2003). At one time, the growth of flag of convenience and a
series of oil pollution accidents in 1960s and 1970s made people realize port State
control as a back-up control system need to be established to ensure the compliance of
ships.

2.2 Flag State jurisdiction and flag State control

The words “freedom of the seas” have been described as a fundamental element of
international law from the initiation of legal relationships between nations (Hawkins,
2005). The high seas are open to all States; whether coastal or land-locked. However,
ship has to posses a nationality through registration to be able to prove its existence
when it sails on the high seas. The reason behind this requirement is to ensure that
each vessel will be subject to some regulatory scheme and system of laws. Otherwise,
ships exist in the “legal vacuum”. Registration is the administration act by which

4
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

nationality and collateral rights and duties are conferred on a ship. With registration in
a State, a ship comes within the national jurisdiction of that State (Özçayır, 2003).

The term, jurisdiction describes the power of a State under international law to
exercise its authority over persons and property by the use of its municipal law. It is
one of the most important concepts of international maritime law (Özçayır, 2003).
Therefore, State assumes authority over the ship to exercise the power inherent in the
jurisdiction of the flag State. The State undertakes the national and international
responsibilities of a flag State in relation to that ship.

The national flag constitutes the primary source of State responsibility in relation to a
ship. On the high seas, only the flag State may exercise rights over the ship in relation
to jurisdiction. In other words, the State which has granted the ship the right to sail
under its flag has the exclusive right to exercise legislation and enforcement
jurisdiction over it on the high seas. The vessels on the high seas are subject to no
authority except that the State whose flag they fly.

When flag States has jurisdiction over the ships which are entitled to fly their flags,
they also have duties to ensure their ships comply with the standards accepted by the
flag States under international law and conventions. According to Article 94 of
UNCLOS 1982, every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag (UNCLOS,
1982). The flag State is required to take such measures for ships flying its flag as are
necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard to construction, maintenance and
seaworthiness, manning, labour condition and crew training, prevention collision.
This article establishes the link between municipal and international law (Özçayır,
2003). It imposes a duty on flag States to take any steps which may be necessary to
secure observance with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and
practices.

2.3 Coastal State jurisdiction and port State jurisdiction

5
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

Coastal State is the State within whose maritime zone a foreign ship is for the time
being. According to international law, any State having a coastline is entitled to take
certain limited steps to protect its own interests (Hare, 1994).

The international law provides that the maritime zone under the jurisdiction of coastal
State can be divided into 4 parts: internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The jurisdiction power of coastal State is
diminishing from internal water to the high seas. Subjected to few exceptions, the
coastal State may exercise full jurisdiction over foreign merchant ships within its
internal waters (Özçayır, 2003). In territorial sea, the coastal State can also exert
jurisdiction over foreign ships. But the foreign ships enjoy innocent passage over the
territorial sea.

Port State jurisdiction over the enforcement of applicable international rules and
standards for the protection and preservation of the marine environment is relatively
new concept (Özçayır, 2003). Historically, the port authorities did not enforce local
jurisdiction over foreign ships which are voluntarily and temporarily present in their
ports. Port State jurisdiction was first introduced for detailed international
consideration at the 1973 IMO conference on marine pollution. During the conference,
a proposal was made for port State enforcement. Although this proposal was not
adopted, it was considered as the most innovative and far-reaching one on port State
enforcement. Article 6(2) of MARPOL provides that port officials in the contracting
parties may inspect a foreign vessel in order to verify whether it has discharged in any
sea area harmful substance in violations of the regulations annexed to the convention.
Article 6(5) also provides a right of inspection applies to cases where port officials
receive from any other Parties to the convention, a request for an investigation
together with “sufficient evidence that the ship has discharged harmful substance or
effluent containing such substances in any place” (MARPOL, 2002).

2.4 Impetus for the emergence of PSC

6
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

In an ideal world, PSC would not exist if flag States fully and completely enforce
their obligation on implementation of the international conventions. However, some
flag States did not discharge their obligations to ensure the ships flying their flag to
conform the requirements and standards laid down in the international conventions.
Besides this fundamental reason, other factors such as the booming of flag of
convenience, successional serious oil pollution accidents in 60s and 70s, and the
failure of assuming their responsibilities by classification societies also contributed to
the emergence of PSC.

2.4.1 The failure of flag State implementation

The international law and conventions provide that flag States have a duty to ensure
that their ships comply with the standards accepted by the flag State. However, many
flag States have failed to implement international standards either because some
States do not have maritime administrations with systems in place to enforce the
relevant conventions they have signed, or because other States simply lack the will to
enforce the obligations they have signed up to (Williamson, 1996).

2.4.2 The booming of flag of convenience

Although the term of “flag of convenience” has been profusely used since 1950, the
use of Flags of Convenience (FOCs) dates back several centuries. In the 16th century,
British ships improperly used the Spanish flag in order to overcome the existing
restrictions about trade in the West Indies. Today, about 54% of world’s tonnage fly
the flag of convenience (Francisco, 2003). The shipowners registered their ships under
a foreign flag so as to overcome obstacles or restrictions of a political or economic
nature which affected their own country. There are various reasons for the booming of
FOC.

Fundamentally, there was no uniform interpretation on the meaning of “genuine link”

in the international maritime communities. Article 91 of UNCLOS provides that a
genuine link must exist between the flag State and the ship when the State grants
7
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

nationality to the ship. However, different States have different opinions on what is
the genuine link. Some States set very strict conditions on ship registry while FOC set
little restrictions on granting nationalities. Therefore, shipowners prefer to registering
their ships in FOC to round the restrictions set by their country. Furthermore, FOCs
set up advantages yielded by lower crew costs, freedom to use foreign labour, together
with low taxes to increase their share in the world fleet.

Today it is unfair to relate all FOCs to substandard or lost ships because some FOCs
have excellent safety records according to the fleet statistics and analyzing report on
detention in Europe, the USA and Asia in recent years (Francisco, 2003). But, for
many years, vessels registered under FOCs were involved in maritime disasters, such
as Amoco Cadiz, Torrey Canyon and the most recent Erika. Also, the casualty records
show that the casualty rate for FOC is substantially higher than that of the regulated
fleet. Let’s take the performance of Panama in 1997 for example, it lost more ships
and more tonnage than any other flag State in the world. And it had the highest
number of detentions, with 449 ships detained in this year (Özçayır, 2003). In this
case, the role of port State should be hardened as it has proved to be the most efficient
way of verifying compliance by registers, either open or closed (Francisco, 2003).

2.4.3 Successional serious oil pollution accidents in 60s and 70s

In the 1960s and 1970s, several serious oil pollution accidents happened. These
accidents cause great maritime environment disaster and economic loss. Especially,
Torry Canyon grounded along the Scilly Islands, UK in 1967 and lost almost 120,000
tonnes of oil. This accident highlights the issue concerning the extent to which a State
directly threatened or affected by a casualty which takes place outside its territorial
sea can or should be allowed to take measures to protect its coastline. In other words,
the rights of a coastal State to intervene in case of oil pollution threat because any
discharge in contravention of the convention or any alleged violation detected by a
member State may be reported to the flag State for investigation and legal action as
appropriate. Following deliberation in IMO’s legal committee, a diplomatic

8
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

conference met in 1969 to adopt two new instruments. The first one dealt with the
right to intervene, the international convention relating to intervention on the high sea
in case of oil pollution casualties (Intervention Convention). The second was Civil
Liability Convention (CLC). Under the intervention convention, the coastal State was
first time to be given the right to take preventive and mitigating actions against
vessels posing an environmental threat to its coast. Finally, in 1973 a significant
breakthrough came when the international Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, usually referred to as MARPOL, was adopted by IMO, which enshrined
the concept of Port State Control in international law. Following this convention, the
port States were provided the right to inspect ships and report their deficiencies to the
flag State and to detain ships until deficiencies were rectified

2.4.4 The failure of assuming their responsibilities by classification societies

The establishment of classification societies goes back to the 17th and early 18th
centuries. They came into existence during this period out of the needs of marine
insurers and shipowners. Today, the classification societies own duties to ensure that
the specified ship has been designed, built and is maintained according to the
classification society’s own rules. In addition, they are authorized by the flag States to
conduct statutory surveys and issue certificates in accordance with the various
international maritime conventions.

In most time, most classification societies especially the International Association of

Classification Societies (IACS) members do their job well in ensuring the safety and
quality of shipping. However, some classification societies fail to fulfill their duties
because of the fierce competition in the market. Also, world famous classification
societies did not do their job good enough in sometimes. For example the in the Erika
case, the ship’s class is granted by Registro Italiano Navale (RINA), who is a member
of IACS. In another case Prestige, the ship’s class is ABS. Lloyds Register and DNV,
BV and the Polish Register have sometimes faced (and hotly disputed) allegations that
their surveyors sell forged safety certificates (Hare, 1994). Therefore, another tier of

9
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

control regime need to be in place to monitor the performance of classification

societies.

2.5 The legal background of port State control

International maritime law codified the concept of port State control. The first one is
the Article 6(2) of MARPOL. Following MARPOL, other conventions also provides
control provisions which constitute the legal background of port State control.

2.5.1 UNCLOS 1982

UNCLOS 1982 is the constitution of the law of the sea. Almost all regulatory
maritime conventions can find their root in the UNCLOS 1982. The concept of PSC
can be found in part and . Article 25 of the UNCLOS (1982) empowered States
whose ports were used by vessels to take necessary steps to prevent any breach of the
conditions by vessels calling at their ports. Article 216 and 218 enable a port State to
enforce international antidumping and anti-pollution measures. In addition, States are
required by Article 219 to take administrative measures to prevent errant vessels from
sailing. Legitimacy for PSC inspections may be found in these Articles of UNCLOS.
The only limitation is that the steps taken should be reasonable, public, and not
discriminatory (Hare, 1994). These articles provide legal background of PSC in
UNCLOS 1982.

2.5.2 Control provisions in IMO conventions

The provisions for the control of foreign ships in ports originate from the inclusion of
a respective regulation in the SOLAS convention. the history of the control provisions,
aiming at verifying whether certificates carried on board ships in accordance with the
specific requirements of Chapter I of the SOLAS Convention, are valid or not, goes
back to 1914. Article 61 of 1914 SOLAS is the first control provision which required
the contracting government to verify the certificates carried on board. The following
SOLAS Convention also provided the control provision. Under Article 54 of the 1929

10
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

SOLAS Convention intervention actions were permitted to officers carrying out the
control. In Reg. 18 Chapter 1 of the 1948 SOLAS Port State control officers were
authorized for the first time, not to allow the unworthy ship to proceed to sea. Similar
provisions can be found in Reg. 19, Chapter 1 of the 1960 and 1974 SOLAS.

Other IMO conventions also contain control provisions which can be followed by a
Party to the relevant conventions to carry out inspection. These provisions are:

- Load Line 66, Article 21;

- MARPOL 73/78, Article 5 and 6, Reg. 8A of Annex , Reg. 15 of Annex ,
Reg. 8 of Annex , Reg. 8 of Annex and Reg. 10 of Annex
- STCW 78, Article and Reg. /4
- Tonnage 69, Article 12

2.5.3 ILO conventions

ILO Convention No. 147 Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention 1976
aims to establish basic minimum standards with regard to safety, working and labour
conditions for seafarers. It requires administrations to have effective legislation on
safe manning standards, hours of work, seafarers’ competency, social security and
sets of employment standards equivalent to those contained in a range of ILO
instruments. The control provision is contained in Article 4, which allows an
administration to apply its provisions (including the power of detention) to any ship,
which calls at its ports, whether or not the ship’s flag State has ratified the
Convention.

2.6 Conclusion

Port State control is a back-up control system because the primary responsibility to
safeguard against substandard ships lies with the flag States. Although many
international conventions provide power used by PSCOs, the willingness to use these
power is relative new. That is because regional cooperation between member States is

11
Chapter II The Background of Port State Control

necessary for effective PSC. Starting from Paris MoU, port State control became more
organized and widespread and now there is a MoU on PSC covering almost every part
of the world.

12
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

Chapter III

The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

3.1 Introduction

Memorandum of understanding on PSC is the regional agreement on PSC. The

purpose of MoUs is to achieve harmonization, the elimination of redundancy and
exchange of PSC information. In the present time, there are nine MoUs which cover
almost every part of the world. Paris MoU is the first MoU and regarded as model
upon which other regions of the world base their agreement on PSC. The Unite State
Coast Guard (USCG) is not a member of any MoU, but it can be regarded as a
regional MoU by itself.

3.2 Rationale for growth in PSC regional agreements

The establishment of regional initiatives in which States are tied together in their port
State control activities by MoUs. With the ease of dissemination of information
through the internet, it is also likely to become the norm that the various regional
initiatives, set up for geographic convenience, will increasingly share each other’s
database, thereby closing the net even more effectively on the unseaworthy ship and
its unscrupulous owner seeking to ply a trade into unsuspecting ports.

Crucial to the success of port State control operations is the sharing of information
gained about particular ships or their owners and operators, between jurisdictions in

13
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

and out of which those ships trade. There are two reasons for this. First, one would not
like unduly to inconvenience ships by inspecting them at each port. It is reasonable to
believe that Contracting States to conventions providing for PSC inspections will
follow through on those obligations, an uncoordinated effort within a region can result
in duplication of effort, redundancy, inefficiency and the few substandard ships that
should be detained being able to avoid detention.

Second, co-operation with other ports in the region make it possible to ensure that
identified substandard ships are effectively monitored. This applies especially to ships
that have been allowed to sail with certain minor deficiencies on condition that they
are rectified in the next port of call. When permission has been granted for a
substandard ship to sail from one port, contingent in the deficiencies being rectified in
the next port, it is essential for this information to be passed on to the authorities in
the next port to ensure that those deficiencies have, in fact, been rectified. If
subsequent PSC inspectors have no prior knowledge of earlier inspections, they can
not follow up in the correction of deficiencies or target habitual offenders.

3.3 Introduction of the existing nine MoUs and USCG

3.3.1 The existing nine MoUs

In the present, there are nine MoUs which totally have 130 member Maritime
Authorities. The nine MoUs are: Paris MoU, AcuerdoViña del Mar MoU
(Latin-America Agreement), Tokyo MoU, Caribbean MoU, Mediterranean MoU,
Indian Ocean MoU, West & Central Africa MoU (ABUJA MoU), Black Sea MoU,
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Riyadh MoU). All of the
nine MoUs have a Port State Control committee, the Secretariat and information
center. Port State control committee is the executive body, composed of
representatives from each maritime Authority of the MoU. The secretariat acts under
the guidance of the Port State Control Committee, prepares meetings and assists the
committee in carrying out its function. The secretariat also exchange information and

14
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

prepare reports. The information centers established database to store all details from
each inspection report whether deficiencies are found or not. Most of the MoUs
launched the computerized information system for the purpose of exchanging
information on port State inspections. This information exchange makes information
available to Authorities on inspection of ships in other regional ports to assist them in
their selection if foreign flag ships to be inspected and their exercise of port State
control on selected ships. The detailed information of the MoUs can be found in the
Appendix B Table 2

3.3.2 USCG

The USCG began inspecting foreign-flagged tank and passenger vessels nearly 40
years ago. However, the Coast Guard did not closely scrutinize foreign-flagged freight
ships until in 1994, when directed by Congress to develop a formal Port State Control
programme (USCG, 2005). The principle objective of this program is to identify high
risk foreign merchant ships on the basis of the performance records of their owners,
operators, classification societies and flag State and to systematically target ships for
boarding.

In the USA, there is no agreement or memorandum of understanding which is

specifically dedicated to port State control. The US exercise its port State control
authority through the US Coast Guard’s long foreign vessel boarding program, now
referred to as the Port State Control Program.

The USCG introduces the point rating system to assess the safety level of the vessels.
According to the point rating system, ships are categorized as Priority I, II or III.
Priority I includes the high-risk vessels, which require inspection before they are even
allowed into port limits, often at the buoys. Defects must be rectified before the vessel
enters the port if it is possible. Other ships will be inspected following the priority
rating assigned to them. Flags, owners & operators and classification societies are
assessed to help assigning the priority rating to a vessel under inspection. If any of

15
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

these entities fails to fully undertake its responsibilities for the safe operation of a ship,
then the ship is likely to be considered a sub-standard vessel by the USCG. A
percentage rating is then given to both flags and classification societies.

The USCG also publicize the lists of owners and operators, flag States and
classification societies, which have fallen foul of USCG PSC procedures during the
past twelve months. The USCG diligently publishes monthly detention records, giving
full details of the vessel and the defects both on its website and in Lloyds List.

3.4 The development of the nine MoUs and USCG in the recent years

3.4.1 Paris MoU

In 2004, for the first time since the inception of the Paris MoU the Committee
embarked on a fundamental review of the inspection regime. The port State control
region aims to enhance its fight against sub-standard shipping by adopting a more risk
based approach while at the same time reducing the burden on good operators.
Changes under consideration include a move towards full coverage of ships entering
the region rather than the current commitment of each member to inspect 25%.
Periods between inspections would depend on the risk profile of an individual vessel.
The review will also consider extending the current provisions for banning tankers,
bulk carriers and passenger ships to other ships which independent research has
shown to present a disproportionate risk, particularly to their crews. The Committee
will be working closely with the European Commission to take account of the 3rd
Maritime Safety Package in developing a new regime for the 21st century.

Continuing its annual programme of inspection campaigns the campaigns on GMDSS,

operational requirements and MARPOL Annex 1 for 2005 and 2006, respectively.

The Paris MoU organized the first Expert Training programme and the first
Specialized Training programme. The theme of the expert training programme are
safety and security, while the theme of the Specialized Training programme is the

16
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

inspection of bulk cargos (Paris MoU, 2005)

The Review Panel became a permanent feature of Paris MoU procedures in 2003.
Flag States or classification societies that cannot resolve a dispute concerning a
detention with the port State, may submit their case for review. The Review Panel is
composed of representatives of 3 different MoU Authorities, on a rotating basis, plus
the Secretariat.

In November 2004, the Second Joint Ministerial Conference of the Paris and Tokyo
Memoranda of Understanding on Port State Control was held in Canada. The
Conference demonstrated the joint commitment of the two regions to eliminate
substandard ships so as to promote maritime safety, working and living conditions on
board and protection of the marine environment and to work more closely for
harmonizing port State control procedures and enhancing port State control activities
and initiatives.

3.4.2 Acuerdo Viña del Mar Agreement (Latin-America Agreement)

The Committee approved interim PSC procedures relating to cargo operations in 2003.
A number of working groups and correspondence groups were established which
covered a wide variety of issues such as drawing up electronic data requirements to
facilitate the performance of and reporting on PSC activities related to maritime and
port security; drawing up proposals on harmonized PSC activities related to maritime
security; examining the viability of adopting regional standards and PSC measures
related to all vessels with a gross tonnage of less than 500 and examining deficiency
codes related to the implementation of the STCW Convention. Other matters such as
the activities of the Information Center, the participation of the Agreement at
international meetings and events, the training of inspectors, the verification
procedures and improvements in the management of inspections and related
information, the legal status of the Agreement’s relevant instruments and the activities
of other regional bodies and international organizations were discussed by the

17
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

Committee (IMO, 2004).

3.4.3 Tokyo MoU

The Committee adopted the revised Port State Control Manual on its 15th session.
The ship targeting system developed by Republic of Korea was launched on 1st
March, 2004. In order to be consistent with Paris MoU, the Concentrated Inspection
Campaigns (CICs) on the safety of bulk carrier, ISPS Code, operational requirements
and MARPOL Annex I were held in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively.

For the purpose of providing a mechanism for dealing with complaints by flag State
or recognized organization (RO) against detention order by the port State Authority
on a regional basis, Tokyo MoU launched a Detention Review Panel which
considered the complaint received from procedural and technical aspects and, if
appropriate, make advisory recommendation to the port State Authority to re-consider
its decision.

Besides, the Committee also considered on-going implementation and arrangements

of data exchange with other PSC data base systems, i.e. Systeme d’Information
Relatif aux Navires Controlles (SIReNaC) of Paris MoU, Black Sea MoU information
system (BSIS), Information Centre of the Latin American Agreement (CIALA) and
Port State Information eXchange (PSIX) of the USCG.

Tokyo MoU organized the fourteenth basic training course, eleventh seminar for port
State control officers and fellowship training course in 2004. For co-operating
implementation and enforcement of the ISPS Code, the seminar was dedicated to the
subject on maritime security. Under the current arrangement for PSC officers
exchange programme, the Authorities of Australia, Canada, Hong Kong (China),
Japan and New Zealand were provided the opportunity to send and receive one PSC
officer with each other for exchange (Tokyo MoU, 2005).

3.4.4 Caribbean MoU

18
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

In 2003, The Port State Control Committee adopted a work programme for the next
biennium, which includes the development of a training strategy for PSCOs, including
regular seminars, and the development of a Manual for Surveyors. Amendments to the
text of the MoU and to the Caribbean Cargo Ship Safety Code (CCSSC) were
discussed and agreed. The inclusion of the Code as a relevant instrument of the MoU
was agreed in principle. The Committee also discussed the adoption of a Maritime
Security Code for Cargo Vessels with a gross tonnage of between 100 and 500,
operating in the Caribbean region, which had been prepared in draft form by the IMO
Regional Maritime Adviser for the Caribbean.

The Committee also agreed to the relocation of the Information Center from Curaçao
to Suriname, following its agreement to accept an offer from Transport Canada to
implement and host the Caribbean Information System within the existing Canadian
port State control system (IMO, 2004).

3.4.5 Mediterranean MoU

In 2003, the Port State Control Committee held the 6th meeting of the Mediterranean
MoU. The Committee reviewed progress made on the development of targeting
factors and on the Mediterranean MoU Website. The Committee instructed the
Secretariat to develop draft rules of procedure for administrative and financial matters
for consideration by the Member States. The Committee established a Liaison
Officers Group to deal with the information system. The Committee also set up a
correspondence group to study the role of port State control in enhancing maritime
security and in the implementation of the ISPS Code. For the training issues, Member
States were urged to provide feedback to the European Commission on their
experiences in the use of the PSC training package on CD ROM developed by the
Commission. The Committee also supported proposals for approaching IMO with
requests for the conduct of training courses for PSCOs and five yearly refresher
courses for PSCOs (IMO, 2004).

19
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

3.4.6 Indian Ocean MoU

In 2004, with a view to harmonize inspections in the region, the Indian Ocean MoU
carried out a CIC on life saving-appliances. The Committee considered and approved
amendments to the Memorandum and the Manual for Inspectors. The Committee also
discussed PSC activities outside the Indian Ocean region, short and long-term training
programmes, as well as training of PSCOs relating to the implementation of the ISPS
Code. The development of the Indian Ocean MoU Computerized Information System
(IOCIS) by the National Informatics Centre (NIC) of the Government of India was
discussed and approved.

3.4.7 Abuja MoU

The 3rd meeting of the Abuja MoU Port State Control Committee held in 2003. Four
working groups were established dealing with the Information Centre, the manual for
PSCOs, training matters and administrative and financial issues.

The Committee also adopted two recommendations, one on the ratification of the
Abuja MoU and the relevant international conventions by the Member States and the
other on the regular payment by Member States of their financial contributions for the
functioning of the MoU. The Committee also issued a declaration stressing the Abuja
MoU’s commitment to the enhancement of maritime safety and pollution prevention
and to the harmonization of PSC procedures in the region. The appeal procedure also
was established.

3.4.8 Black Sea MoU

In 2004, working Group on PSC Manual conveyed during the 5th Committee meeting
and submitted proposal on improvement of the Black Sea MoU PSC Manual which
was adopted by the committee. The committee accepted the initial “Rule of
Procedures for Review Board” to implement on a trial basis. The Black Sea MoU
carried out a CIC on ISPS code, simultaneously with Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and

20
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

USCG. The Black Sea MOU also sent 2 senior PSCOs to participate the Paris MoU
seminar. The PSCO exchange programme also carried out among the member States
(Black Sea MoU, 2005).

To provide industry with the MoU news, procedures and inspection results, the Black
Sea MoU launched the internet web-sit containing general information on MoU,
regularly updated detention list and a direct link to the MoU database providing
on-the-fly inspection results in 2003.

3.4.9 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Riyadh MoU)

The Memorandum of Understanding on PSC for the States of the Cooperation

Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Riyadh MoU), was signed in Riyadh on 30
June 2004. To the present, there is little information on this MoU (IMO, 2004).

3.4.10 USCG

The USCG launched the Qualship 21 (Quality Shipping for the 21st Century) on
January 1, 2001 (See Appendix C for detail), which is an initiative to identify high
quality non-U.S. flagged vessels, and then reward them with incentives. The Qualship
21 programme also evaluates each registry for eligibility on an annual basis. So far
around 800 ships were were awarded Qualship 21 status in end of 2004. Eight States
were awarded Qualifying Registries as of March, 2005 (USCG, 2005).

The terrorist attacks on the U.S in September 2001 catalyzed significant security
enhancements to governing the USCG’s safety-oriented Port State programme. With
the adoption of the domestic legislation entitled “Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002”( MTSA 2002), the ISPS Code and MTSA 2002 represent a significant
expansion of focus for port State activities and are incorporated into their Port State
Control programme to the fullest extent possible. The programme seamlessly
incorporates and emphasizes compliance with security standards in addition to safety
and environmental compliance standards (USCG, 2005).

21
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

3.5 The PSC procedures and IMO guidelines of PSC on specific aspects

3.5.1 Introduction

Although the main conventions provide the control provisions, the detail procedures
on PSC are laid down in the IMO guidelines. In the 1981 Assembly, resolution
A.466( ) on procedures for the control of ships was adopted and since then a variety
of resolutions relating to port State control have became effective. The IMO
Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation (FSI) reviewed and amalgamated
existing resolutions and documents on port State control. As a result of this study,
resolution A.787 (19) was adopted by the 19th Assembly of IMO. The resolution is
intended to provide basic guidelines on the conduct of such inspections, the
recognition of the deficiencies of a ship, its equipment, its crew and the application of
control procedures. In 1999, the 21st Assembly adopted resolution A.882 (21) which
amended the resolution A. 787 (19). This amendment gave the establishment of “clear
ground” for more detail inspection, accidental damage, reports on remedial action and
additions to the list of certificates and documents. It was also agreed to incorporate the
Interim Guidelines for PSC related to the ISM Code. In addition, IMO adopted a list
of circulars which provide guidelines for the inspection on specific aspects of ship
operation, such as operation in compliance with ISPS Code, Annex to
MARPOL73/78.

3.5.2 General

According to the guidelines provided by IMO, when the PSCO conducts an inspection
of a ship, he may, before boarding, gain from its appearance in the water, an
impression of its standard of maintenance from such items as the condition of its
paint-work, corrosion, pitting or un-repaired damage. On boarding, and upon
introduction to the master or the responsible ship’s officer, the PSCO should examine
the vessel’s relevant certificates and documents. If the certificates are valid and the
PSCO’s general impression and visual observations on board confirm a good standard

22
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

of maintenance, the PSCO should general confine the inspection to reported or

observed deficiencies, if any. However, if the PSCO has clear grounds for carrying out
a more detailed inspection, the master should be informed. As for the deficiencies
found in the process of detailed inspection, the PSCO may take appropriate action to
require the crews rectify deficiencies as soon as possible. If the deficiencies are
serious enough to pose a danger in the forthcoming voyage, the PSCO may detain the
ship. The final purpose is to prevent a ship from proceeding to sea in an unsafe
condition or presenting unreasonable threat to marine environment.

3.5.3 No more favourable treatment and non-convention size ships

For the ship whose flag State is not a Party to a particular convention, the port State
which is a Party to the convention may still enforce the requirements of the
convention on this ship. Article (3) of the Protocol of 1987 to SOLAS 74; Article 5
(4) of MARPOL 73/78 and Article (5) of STCW 78 stipulate that not more
favourable treatment be given to ships of countries that are not Parties to these
convention. In other words, ships registered in non-Party States should be held to the
same international standards as ships registered in the port State, if the port State is a
Contracting Party to one of the conventions. The resolution A.787 (19) also provides
that:

All Parties should as a matter of principle apply the procedures….[of

no more favourable treatment]… to ships of no-Parties and ships
below convention size in order to ensure that equivalent surveys and
inspections are conducted and an equivalent level of safety and
protection of the marine environment are ensured.

The similar doctrine applies to ships below convention size. Generally speaking, a
ship should not be permitted to sail if it is not safe or if it poses a threat to the marine
environment. Although these ships may be exempted from international conventions,
PSCO may take action, including detention if necessary to ensure that the ship does

23
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

not present a clear hazard to safety, health or the environment. The conditions of and
on such ship and its equipment and the certification of the crew and the flag State’s
minimum manning standard shall be compatible with the aims of the provisions of the
conventions; otherwise, the ship shall be subject to such restriction as are necessary to
obtain a comparable level of safety and protection of the marine environment. States
in the Caribbean region have, with the assistance of IMO, developed specific regional
regulations governing non-convention sized ships. These regulations gain wide
recognition of USCG.

3.5.4 The IMO and ILO guidelines of PSC on specific aspects

Although the resolution A.787 (19) as amended by resolution A.882 (21) provides
basic guidelines on conducting the PSC inspections, IMO and ILO also adopted a list
of PSC inspection guidelines on maritime safety, security, environmental protection
and labour conditions on board ships. The IMO guidelines includes: Guidance For
Port State Control Officers On Issues Related to Certificates of Competency
(MSC/Circ. 1030), Guideline Relating to The Implementation of SOLAS Chapter
-2 and ISPS Code (MSC/Circ. 1111), Guidelines For PSC Under MARPOL Annex 6
(MEPC/Circ.472), etc. The ILO guideline includes Inspection of Labour Conditions
on Board Ship: Guide-lines for Procedure. All of these guidelines are supplement to
the basic guidelines of PSC contained in resolution A.787 (19) as amended by
resolution A.882 (21). They provide technical assistance for PSCOs to conduct PSC
inspections.

3.6 Conclusion

The existing nine MoUs and USCG almost cover every part of the world. Their
development is not homogeneous. The Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG are
relatively matured. Whereas other MoUs are still in the developing stage. Great effort
still needs to be taken by these MoUs and IMO to upgrade the PSC quality in these
MoUs. The nine MoUs basically apply the same inspection procedures recommended

24
Chapter III The Regional PSC MoUs and PSC Procedures

by IMO and ILO. However, the inspection procedure employed by USCG is slightly
different form the guidelines of IMO.

IMO developed not only basic procedures on conducting PSC inspections but also
guidelines on how to inspect some specific aspects of ship. These guidelines help
PSCOs carry out inspection in a more efficient and uniform way. They make the
development of PSC keep up with the development of international conventions. The
experience in the past 20 years showed that PSC had done a great effort in eliminating
substandard ships. However, to which extent that the PSC regime has achieved its
effectiveness? The next chapter will give a detained analysis on the effectiveness of
PSC regime.

25
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

Chapter

The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

4.1 Introduction

With the popularity of the concept of port State control, more and more States use
PSC as an effective tool to enforce the ships to implement IMO and ILO regulations
and eliminate substandard ships. Although the primary responsibilities of
implementing related international conventions lie on the flag States, the performance
of PSC in recent years seems to overweight the performance of flag State in achieving
their goal. This chapter will discuss the effectiveness of PSC regime by analyzing
performance of the two main MoUs and USCG in recent years.

Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the cost of the PSC regime in Paris MoU. And
the issue of cost efficiency of PSC regime will be analyzed from the economic point
of view.

4.2 The effectiveness of PSC regime

The PSC regime takes effect in two ways: one is through the control action taken in
inspections; another way is to promote flag States to implement international
conventions through publishing annual PSC report which contained their performance
of implementation in the last year. The former is a direct approach while the latter is
an indirect approach. This part will examine the performance of PSC regime only

26
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

through the statistics and empirical data published by the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and
USCG. There are two reasons for this. On one hand, according to the wordwide
statistics of PSC in 2004, the port State control inspections activities in these three
regions account for over 70 percent of the total inspections conducted in the whole
world. On the other hand, after years of development, the PSC regime in these three
regions especially in Europe where Paris MoU covered is matured. Therefore the
statistics data in the three regions are more representative than that in any other
region.

4.2.1 The general profile of PSC inspections in the three regions

As early as in 1992, the Paris MoU Secretariat admitted that, in the absence of any
better criteria, the quantity of PSC inspections is one indicator that can be relied upon
in measuring the impact of PSC in the region (Paris MoU, 1992).

Number of inspections in three regions

25000
21400
19766 20309 20316
20124
18681 19588
20000 17643 18399 18559
17379 17141
16034
14545 14931
15000
12448 11767 11955
11540 10711 10518
10000

5000

0
98

03

4
1 99

2 00

2 00

2 00

2 00
19

20

Paris MOU
Year
Tokyo MOU
Figure.1 (Source:Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG
USCG 2004 Annual Report)

27
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

Number of individual ships inspected under Paris MOU and USCG

14000 12382 12538
1116811248 11358 11658 11823
12000
10000 7880 7617 7657 7842
8000 7106 7673 7241
6000
4000
2000
0
98

99

00

01

02

03

04
19

19

20

20

20

20

20
Year
Figure.2 (Source: Paris MOU and USCG 2004 Paris MOU
USCG
Annual Report)

Figure 1 shows the number of inspections carried out under Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU
and USCG from 1998 to 2004. The number of inspections in Paris MoU and Tokyo
MoU steadily increased from 1998 to 2004. However, the increase in Tokyo MoU is
more swift and violent than that in Paris MoU. The reason behind this is that after
more than 20 years of development, the Paris MoU is relative mature. While Tokyo
MoU is still in its rapid grow up stage. The figure also shows the trend of the number
of inspections conducted by USCG is quite unstable. But the number jumped to its
historical height in 2004 because of U.S’s intense enthusiasm in implementing ISPS
Code. Figure 2 shows the number of individual ships that were subject to PSC under
Paris MoU and USCG from 1998 to 2004. It shows the same trend as the number of
inspection in Figure 1. With the growing number of inspections carried out, one notes
the increasing numbers of deficiencies identified during PSC inspection. The numbers
are given in Figure 3.

28
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

Number of deficiencies observed under Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU

84119
75210
71928 73163
69578
67735 68756 69079 64113
57831 60670 58435
52351 50136

Year
Paris MOU
Figure.3 (Source: Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU Tokyo MOU
2004 Annual Report)

The MoU annual reports use the concept of “deficiency rate” to express the
relationship between the number of deficiencies on the one hand, and the number of
inspections on the other. Figure 4 shows that the trend of the deficiency rate in Paris
MoU and Tokyo MoU developed in a different way. The general trend of deficiency
rate in Tokyo MoU rose from 1998 to 2003. It dropped sharply in 2004. While the
deficiency rate in Paris MoU reached its summit in 2001 and declined in the past 4
years.

Deficiency rate under Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU from 1998 to 2004
4.50 4.18
4.00 4.00 3.84
3.60 3.65 3.42
3.36
3.50 3.64 3.68
3.49 3.54
3.00 3.28 3.30
3.16
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
98

99

00

01

02

03

04
19

19

20

20

20

20

20

Year Paris MOU

Figure.4 (Source: Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU 2004 Annual Report) Tokyo MOU

That implies that more deficiencies per inspections have been observed in the 6 years.

29
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

The trend suggests that, very roughly, the “rectification rate” achieved by MoU is also
increasing. Deficiencies must be rectified before a ship is allowed to leave port. It is
assumed that, in most instances in which deficiencies are identified, a rectification
follows (Payoyo, 1994). The rising deficiency rates thus suggest a corresponding rise
in the rectification rate.

With regard to the delays or detentions effected in the three regions, Figure 5 shows
that a different trend of detention numbers in the three regions form 1998 to 2004. In
2000, Paris MoU detained the most ships in its history and the number of detention
fell from that year. That is because Paris MoU launched enhanced targeting system in
2000 (Shiming, 2001). The general trend of the number of detention in Tokyo MoU
rose in the 7 years. But the number of detention and detention rate sharply declined in
2004. This trend also happened on Paris MoU. The decline may be attributed to the
implementation of ISPS Code. From 1st July 2004, the ISPS Code came into force
and a CIC on the ISPS Code was carried out in Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU. The ISPS
related detention percentage is about 1%, much lower than the overall detention rate
of 6.51% in the region during the same period. While the trend of the number of
detention in USCG developed in an exactly opposite way to that in Tokyo MoU.

The number of detentions under Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG
1764
1800 1684 1699 1709
1598 1577
1600 1431 1393
1349 1307
1400
1187
1200 1061 1071 1101

1000
800
600
373
400 257
193 172 178 176
153
200
0
98

99

00

01

02

03

04
19

19

20

20

20

20

20

Year Paris M OU
Figure.5 (Source :Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG 2004 Annual Report) Tokyo M OU
USCG

30
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

Figure 6 shows that the trend of detention rate in the three regions basically followed
the same trend of number of detentions.

The detention rate under Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG
10.00% 9.06% 9.50%
9.15% 9.09%
9.00% 8.49%
7.76% 7.98%
8.00% 7.29% 7.17% 7.05%
6.87%
6.67% 6.51%
7.00%
5.84%
6.00%
4.73%
5.00%
4.00% 3.37%
2.52% 2.50% 2.43%
3.00% 2.19% 1.99%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
8

99

00

04
1 99

2 00

2 00

2 00
19

20

20
Year
Figure.6 (Source:Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG Paris MOU
Tokyo MOU
2004 Annual Report)
USCG

4.2.2 The Black-Grey-White List and Targeting System

Every year, the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG published the information of PSC
inspections which were conducted in their regions last year. The PSC committees
analyzed the inspections data and evaluated the performance of flag States through the
Black-Grey-White List System. Once the performance of a flag State in that year was
categorized in the Black List, the State would face two serious consequences. One
was the great politic pressure from the international community that required the State
taking effective measures to improve the safety level of the ships flying its flag.
Another was that through the targeting system, all ships flying the flag of black-listed
State would be targeted as the ships with higher priority to be inspected. The more
inspections are conducted on the ships flying the flag of the black-listed State, the
more deficiencies will be observed and more detentions will happened on these ships.
It is a vicious circle and will cause great financial loss to the flag State. The
black-listed flag State will be compelled to make appropriate policies to ensure the

31
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

ships flying its flag comply with international safety and environment protection
standards. Although some scholars argued the validity of black-listing a flag State
because the flag State is also a sovereign State, the experiences in Paris MoU, Tokyo
MoU and USCG show that Black-Grey-White List system which cooperates with
Targeting system is a powerful tool to enforce ships comply with international
conventions indirectly.

4.2.3 Case study

The PSC performance of Chinese ships before 1998 was very poor. Figure 7, Figure 8
and Figure 9 provides the performance of Chinese ships in Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU
and USCG. Before 1998, the 3 Year Rolling Average Detention Rate of Chinese ships
in the three regions was higher than those of the whole region. Consequentially, China
was blacklisted by the Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG before 1998. Chinese
government endured tremendous pressure from international community that required
improving the safety level of Chinese ships. Chinese shipping companies also
assumed great financial loss in the shipping market. The China Maritime Safety
Administration (CMSA) took appropriate measures such as enhancing the safety
management of the ship companies, the Pre-Voyage inspection and improving the
safety standard of statutory regulations to reduce the detention rate. These measures
took effect in 2000. China jumped into the White list and stabilized from 2000. This is
a good example that PSC regime promotes flag State implementation in an indirect
way.

32
 Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

The performance of Chinese ships under Paris MOU

20.00%
18.00% 17.73%
15.90%
16.00%
14.00%
12.00% 10.44%10.52% 9.78%
10.00% 8.57% 9.28% 9.24% 9.25% 8.84% The 3 Year Rolling
8.01% Average
8.00% 6.95%
Detention Rate of
6.00% 5.02%
4.37% Chinese Ships
4.00% 3.13% 2.85% 2.62%
1.86% The 3 Year Roling
2.00% Average
0.00% Detention Rate
Under Paris MOU
6

97

98

99

01

04
19 9

200

200

20 0
19

19

19

20

20
Year
Figure.7 (Source: Paris MOU Annual Report 1996-2004)

The performance of Chinese ships under Tokyo MOU

12.00%
9.55%
10.00%
7.87% 7.69% 7.65%
8.00% 7.11% 7.28% 7.27%
6.98%
6.41% The 3 Year
6.00% 5.37% Rolling Average
3.91%
Detention Rate
4.00% of Chinese Ships
2.40%
1.97% 1.69%
2.00% The 3 Year
Rolling Average
Detention Rate
0.00%
Under Tokyo
98

99

00

01

02

03

04

MOU
19

19

20

20

20

20

20

Year
Figure.8 (Source: Tokyo MOU Annual Report 1998-2004)

33
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

The preformance of Chinese ships under USCG

7.00%
6.15%
6.00% 6.03%
5.08%
5.00%
3.88%
4.00% 3.55% The 3 Year
2.70% Rolling Average
3.00% 2.19% 2.41% 2.22% 2.30% Detention Rate
2.00% 1.68% of Chinese Ships
0.74% 0.70% The 3 Year
1.00% 0.42% Rolling Average
Detention Rate
0.00%
Under USCG
98

00

02

04
199

200

200
19

20

20

20
Year
Figure.9 (Source: USCG PSC Annual Report 1998-2004)

4.3 The cost efficiency of the PSC regime

The issue of cost efficiency of the PSC regime concerns the cost spent on the regime
and the effectiveness. In the present, there is only one report available which contain
the cost of PSC regime: the Paris MoU 1992 Annual Report. As far as the
effectiveness of the PSC regime, there is still not any direct study which contained the
concrete quantity of the effectiveness. However, a study made by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 may throw some light on
the effectiveness of PSC regime through analyzing the financial advantages obtained
by shipowners as a result of non-observance of applicable international rules and
standards.

The Paris MoU Secretariat reports that, in the operation of the Paris MoU from 1982
to 1992, approximately US $ 25 M was spent to conduct about 12 5000 inspections on
9 5000 individual ships (Paris MoU, 1992) That means averagely $200 were spent on
every inspection. According to the Annual Report of Paris MoU in 1994, the
inspection percentage to the number of ships called in the region and the times of
inspection for an individual ship were respectively 26.8% and 1.59. Therefore, the

34
Chapter The Effectiveness and Cost Efficiency of The PSC Regime

cost spent on conducting PSC inspection for an individual ship in the whole year was
$200×26.8%×1.59 = $85.2

Another study by OECD in 1996 pointed out for a late 1970s built 30 000 dwt bulk
carrier operating within the handysize time charter market in 1994, the margin of
sub-standard operation can be seen to equate to some US $500/day or US
$182500/year (OECD, 1996) This can be regard as financial advantages obtained by
this substandard bulk carrier in 1994. The existence of the PSC regime under Paris
MoU is to ensure this bulk carrier to fully observe applicable international standards.
In other words, without the PSC regime the shipowner tend to operate this bulk carrier
in substandard safety level to save operational cost for its survival in the fierce
shipping market. Therefore, the effectiveness of the PSC regime on this bulk carrier in
1994 was equated to the financial advantages obtained through sub-standard operation,
which was $18 2500/year.

From above analysis, we can draw a conclusion that in 1994, for a late 1970s built 30
000 dwt bulk carrier operating in Paris MoU, the average PSC inspection cost was
$85.2/year, while the effectiveness of the PSC regime can be $18 2500/year! It is
really cost-effective way to ensure this ship to observe appropriate international
conventions. Although the above cost-benefit analysis only reflected the individual
case, it still provided a reference about to which extent the PSC regime was
cost-effective.

4.4 Conclusion

From the above discussion, it is clear that the PSC is a very effective regime to
improve ships safety level in direct or indirect ways in regions where the system
properly operated. In addition, compared with the benefit of the regime, the cost is so
little that can be neglected by the shipping industry. However, the PSC regime is not
congenitally perfect. And with the development of the regime, many new challenges
which may reduce the effectiveness of the PSC regime emerged.

35
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

Chapter

The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

5.1 Introduction

Although port State control is playing a more and more important role in improving
maritime safety and marine environment protection, it needs to be remembered that
port State control is an imperfect system operating in an imperfect world. It is neither
a cure all nor does it absolve others from their responsibilities (AMSA, 2001). There
are some challenges to the current PSC regime. Some challenges exist because the
PSC regime itself has inborn limitations. And the others come forth with the
development of the PSC regime.

5.2 The inherent limitations of PSC regime

PSC regime as a supplement to the flag State implementation is not a panacea to cure
the deficient flag State implementation. It also has its own limitations. The inherent
limitations of PSC regime fall into two major aspects. Firstly, the scope and depth of
PSC inspection are limited by time scale and access available to ships and shipowners
(Shiming, 2001) Secondly, there are many subjective elements in the PSC procedures.

5.2.1 The limitation to the scope and depth of PSC inspections

The Procedure For Port State Control provides that:

36
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

If the certificates are valid and the PSCO's general impression and
visual observations on board confirm a good standard of maintenance,
the PSCO should generally confine the inspection to reported or
observed deficiencies, if any. If, however, the PSCO from general
impressions or observations on board has clear grounds for believing
that the ship, its equipment or its crew do not substantially meet the
requirements, the PSCO should proceed to a more detailed inspection.

In other words, the ship should be exempted to detailed inspection unless clear
grounds exist. Once clear grounds exist, the ship will be subject to detailed inspection.
In this case, they are in fact challenging the authorities of the statutory certificates
because these certificates are only prima faci evidences that certify the ship and
shipboard operations comply with applicable international conventions. Although the
contents contained in these certificates authenticate the vessel observe applicable
conventions and everything is in good condition, the observed clear grounds are
enough to make PSCOs to believe that as a matter of fact, the ship, the ship equipment
and shipboard operation do not meet appropriate requirements. This is also why we
say PSC regime is the supplement to the flag State implementation.

However, a question arises in this situation: to which extent can a detailed inspection
be? There are two aspects to this question: one is how many items can be included in
the detailed inspection, another is how deep could a detailed inspection be.

The ship safety and shipboard safety operations involve many items. According to the
Form of PSC report, there are 444 items can be included in one PSC inspection. (See
Appendix D) The scope of these items is quite comprehensive. They range from
shipboard documents to equipment and safety operations by crew on board. However,
because of limited human resources and time of ship in port, it is impossible for
PSCOs to inspect every item in one inspection. In practices, the PSCOs can only
select some items in one inspection to be inspected. Therefore, the scope of inspection
is inexhaustive though it is a detailed inspection.

37
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

The depth of detailed inspection is more complicated. The ship, ship equipment and
shipboard operations involved many smaller details and layers of the ship. When the
statutory certificates are issued, there is, however, also need for a large number of
other certificates and other kinds of documentation to be issued for verifying
compliance of smaller details of the ship with the relevant requirements. Only by
having a several layer structure of certificates, the ship certificates can be issued
(Jönsson, 2005). Therefore, when the detailed inspection is carried out, the depth of
inspection should also touch smaller details of the ship and all layers structure of
certificates. However, the inspections by PSCOs can not be so detailed because of the
limited technical methods and professional knowledge level of PSCOs. For example,
although the Cargo Safety Equipment Certificate and Product Certificate issued by
ROs to certify the lifeboat on board meet the relevant requirements, the PSCOs can
inspect every detail of the lifeboat when clear grounds exist, such as the PSCO find
the lifeboat deform seriously. However, some particulars such as the longitude
strength of the lifeboat and strength of the material can not be scrutinized under the
conditions on board and the technical methods available by PSCOs.

5.2.2 The subjective elements in the PSC regime

Inevitably, the subjective elements exist in the PSC regime because it is the PSCOs to
conduct PSC inspections. Generally, the subjective elements may take effect in two
processes: the decision-making process on how detail will the inspection be; the
decision-making process on which remedial actions should be taken after deficiencies
are observed.

As the analysis made in section 5.2.1 point out, the scope of the detailed inspection
are extensive to about 444 items. Therefore, it is basically up to PSCOs to decide
which items should be included in one inspection. The scope of the chose items
depend on the professional knowledge level and preference of PSCOs, or in other
words to which extent that the PSCOs are familiar with the specific aspects of the ship.
Generally, a PSCO is inclined to choose the items which are known well by himself.

38
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

Another process where the subjective elements exist is designating control measures
after deficiencies are observed. The remedial actions can range from “rectified the
deficiency in three month” to “detention” (See Appendix E). Deciding which control
measures to be taken is also depended on PSCO, especially when PSCO decide to
detain a ship. Although the PSC procedure requires the PSCO should exercise
professional judgment to determine whether to detain a ship until the deficiencies are
corrected or to allow it to sail with certain deficiencies to the next port, the
professional judgment is also up to the PSCOs and different PSCOs will have
different judgments and interpretations to the same deficiency.

5.2.3 The impact of the inherent limitations to the PSC regime

The inherent limitations have two impacts to the PSC regime. On one hand, the
limited scope and depth of PSC inspections reduce the effectiveness of the PSC
regime. Once the scope and depth of inspection can not cover all aspects and every
detail of the ship, ship equipment and shipboard safety operation, the effectiveness of
the PSC regime can not reach its maximum. On the other hand, the subjective
elements in the course of inspection impact the fairness of the PSC regime. For the
same deficiencies, different PSCOs will take different control measures which are
based their individual professional judgments. Different control measures will bring
different impacts to ship operations. The fairness of the PSC regime is abated. More
seriously, ship sometimes is unduly detained by PSCOs, which will be discussed
latter.

5.3 The imbalanced development of the PSC regime

The development of the PSC regime is not homogeneous between the MoUs. Even
within the same region of the MoU, the development of PSC regime between different
member States is also unbalanced. These unhomogeneity greatly dilute the
effectiveness of the PSC regime because it is still beneficial to all concerned when
harmonization of the various areas of port State control administration and inspection

39
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

procedures can be achieved on an inter-regional basis (IMO, 2004).

5.3.1 The imbalance of the PSC development between the MoUs

Although PSC regime has been incorporated into UNCOLS and major marine
conventions and the first regional MoU operated more than 20 years, the operation of
the PSC regimes all over the world never achieved uniformity. The unhomogeneity
between the MoUs existed in many aspects of the operation of the PSC regime. Not
only some contexts of the MoUs themselves but also the practices and PSC
performance of the each MoU are not homogeneous.

As far as the MoUs themselves are concerned, the contexts of the agreements are not
same. Appendix B Table 2 gives a comparative table of the existing nine PSC regional
agreements. This table shows the relevant instruments of the MoUs which provide the
legal background of the PSC regime are not consistent. The TONNAGE 69
Convention which set the benchmark for other conventions is not included as relevant
instrument under Mediterranean MoU. The member States of AcuerdoViña del Mar
MoU can not enforce the requirements of the ILO Convention No. 147 (Minimum
Standard, 1976) on foreign ships because it did not accept the convention as the
relevant instrument. Even some MoUs included ILO 147 convention as their relevant
instrument, the adoption was only conditional. For example, although Tokyo MoU
adopted ILO 147 as its relevant instrument, the implementation of ILO Convention
No. 147 will not require any alterations to structure or facilities involving
accommodation for ships whose keels were laid down before April 1, 1994 (Tokyo
MoU, 2004). Apart from the relevant instruments, the target inspection rate set by the
MoUs ranged from 10% to 75%. The unhomogeneous contents of MoUs inevitably
led the unhomogeneous of the practice and performance of the PSC regime in
different MoUs.

The practices and performance of the nine MoUs and USCG also reinforced the above
point. The overall inspection rate in the region can be an indicator reflecting how

40
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

many inspections have been done on the ships called in this region.

The overall inspection rate in Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG
80.00% 78.00% 77.00%
71.00% 69.00%
70.00%
65.00%
60.00% 61.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
31.49%
30.00% 26.50% 27.60% 28.60% 27.30% 28.90% 30.07%
24.63% 22.26% 22.69% 23.75%
20.86% 19.58% 19.50%
20.00%
10.00%
The Paris
0.00% MOU
98

01

4
The Tokyo
1 99

2 00

2 00

2 00

2 00
19

20

Year MOU
USCG
Figure.10 (Source: Paris MOU, Tokyo MOU and USCG Annual
Report 1998-2004)

Figure 10 shows the overall inspection rate in Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG.
The highest overall inspection rate was 78% and achieved by Tokyo MoU in 2002,
while the lowest one was 19.5% and achieved by USCG in 2003.

Another indicator – the detention rate of a flag State in different MoUs may vividly
reflect the imbalance of the PSC regimes in the whole world. Theoretically, the PSC
inspection performance of a flag State especially a flag State of convenience in
different regions all over the world should be the same, because ocean is free for ships
to sail. However, the truth tell us another story.

41
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

The detention rate of Panamanian ships In 2003

16.00%
14.58%
14.00%
Paris MOU
12.00%
Acuerdo Vina del
10.00% Mar MOU
8.26% Tokyo MOU
8.00% 6.99%
5.78% Indian MOU
6.00%
3.63% 3.48% Black Dea MOU
4.00%
2.00% USCG

0.00%
MOUs
Figure.11 (Source: The 5 MOUs and USCG Annual Report 2003)

In 2002, Panama register held 21.7% share of the world fleet and was regard as the
largest flag State (Francisco, 2003). Figure 11 shows the detention rate of ships flying
flag of Panama in 2003. The detention rate in the 6 regions which almost covered this
planet ranged from 3.48% in U.S to 14.58% in Latin American area. It is interesting to
note that although U.S is supposed to have the strictest PSC regime, the detention rate
of Panamanian ships under USCG is the lowest in the 6 regions.

5.3.2 The imbalance of the PSC development within the region of MoU

Even inside the MoUs, the PSC regime never reached homogenous. The Tokyo MoU
can be a good example. Appendix F Table 3 gives the conventions status. The ILO
147 only has 4 signatory States in Asia-Pacific area. Appendix G Table 4 provided the
statistical data of the Tokyo MoU in 2004. The inspection rates of member Maritime
Authorities ranged from 0.80% to 74.41%. Similarly, the detention rate in this region
ranged from 0 to 22.68%

5.3.3 The reasons behind the unbalanced development of the PSC regime

Generally, there are mainly two reasons for the imbalance between and inside the
MoUs. On one hand, the political, economic and culture backgrounds of regional

42
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

MoUs and the member States are quite different. For example, most member States of
Paris MoU are developed countries and they stress the importance of accommodation,
working, food and catering conditions on board. Therefore, as Parties to the ILO
Convention No 147, they emphasize the inspections on items related to ILO 147 when
their PSCOs carry out PSC inspections. On the contrary, most member States in
Tokyo MoU are developing countries. Only 4 States are Parties to the ILO 147
convention. Therefore the PSCOs in the other States can not inspect the ILO related
items in the PSC inspections. According to the 2004 annual reports of the two MoUs,
the percentage of ILO 147 related deficiencies to the total deficiencies observed in the
two regions are respectively 13.51% and 3.24%.

On the other hand, different MoUs develop in different stages and a MoU in different
stages has different performance of PSC inspections. The oldest MoU is Paris MoU
which was established more than 20 years ago. Now, it is mature and its performance
has become stable. The youngest MoU is Riyadh MoU which was established in 2004
and still in its infant stage. When a MoU was in its inception stage, it usually took a
while for the regional MoUs to establishing their authority and unifying their PSC
practices (SEAPOL, 1999). The following figure about the regional inspection
percentages in Tokyo MoU can give a good example.

The inspection percentage in Tokyo MOU from 1994-2004

90%
78% 77%
80% 71% 69%
70% 65%
60% 61%
60% 52%
50%
50%
39%
40% 32% The
Inspection
30%
Percentage
20%
10%
0%
94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04
19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

20

20

Figure.12 (Source: Tokyo MOU Annual Report 2004)

43
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

Figure 12 illustrate that in 1994 when the Tokyo MoU began to operate, only 32%
ships called in this region were inspected. The inspection percentage increased
gradually to the peak point in 2002. From this year on, the inspection percentage
stabilized at around 75%, which is the target rate of Tokyo MoU.

5.3.4 The negative effect of the imbalance

Without homogeneity and uniformity between and inside the MoUs, the effectiveness
of PSC regime especially the effectiveness of the well-operated regime will be greatly
abated. With the imbalanced PSC development between the MoUs, the unscrupulous
operators of the substandard ships will seek regions have low inspections percentage
to avoid the disturbance of PSC inspections. With the unhomogeneity inside the
MoUs, the operators of substandard ships will divert their ship to ports in a region
with lower detention rate (Shiming, 2001). And the shipowners of these substandard
ships continue to enjoy the financial advantages over the ships in good conditions.
This will lead unfair competition in the shipping market. The substandard ships will
slip through the PSC regime which is the last safety net. In addition, the imbalance of
PSC regime can also result in unfair competition and vulnerability for ports of those
countries that do conduct proper inspection.

5.3.5 Case study

On 3rd Feb 2006, ferry “Al Salam Boccaccio 98” carrying 1415 passengers and 220
cars sunk in the Red Sea. She left Dhuba, Saudi Arabia for Safaga, Egypt with
passengers mostly Egyptians. Survivors said that a fire broke out, which escalated out
of control, explosion was heard, and ship listed then sank. According to report, 424
survivors were rescued. Close to 1000 persons were missing. International Maritime
Organization secretary general Efthimios Mitropoulos has led global expressions of shock and

grief at the sinking of the Egyptian passenger ro-ro ferry Al Salam Boccaccio 98 (Lloyd’s List,

2006).

The 36-year-old, 11,779 gross registered tonnage ro-ro ferry had undergone several
44
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

conversions to increase its capacity to 1,400 passengers and had been sailing under
the Panamanian flag since 1999. Previously it had flown the Italian flag under a
different name. RINA had classed the vessel since it was built (in Italy) in 1970. The
ferry was operated by Egyptian El Salam Maritime Company (Kennedy, 2006)

Faced with the pictures of grieved relatives of lost person, people can’t help asking
why this tragedy happened. Although the accident was still under investigation, what
was becoming very evident, however, was that this ferry was not able to trade in
Scandinavia before it was transferred to Red Sea, following the regional introduction
of the Stockholm rules (Corbett, 2006)

Following the Herald of Free Enterprise accident in 1987 and the Estonia in 1994,
international regulations were formulated for ro-ro passenger vessels that provided
improvements (post-2000) for the construction and operation of these vessels. This
so-called "Stockholm Agreement" sets out specific technical solutions to safeguard
these ships and ensure that a vessel is able to stay afloat during an emergency (for
instance, with 50 cm of water on deck) (Kennedy, 2006). Apparently, ferry “Al Salam
Boccaccio 98” could not meet the requirements of the Stockholm Agreement. After
this ferry transferred to Red Sea to avoid the rigorous regulation in Europe, it
continued to sail between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is the member State of
Mediterranean MoU where the target inspection rate is only 15%. And Saudi Arabia is
the member State of Riyadh MoU which was established in 2004 and still in its early
stage. The MoU need time to establish its authority and unify their PSC practices. The
imbalance of PSC regime among the Paris MoU, Mediterranean MoU and Riyadh
MoU gave living space to Al Salam Boccaccio 98. In other words, this ferry slip
through the maritime safety net weaved by the three MoUs.

5.4 The challenges to the PSCOs

The role of PSCO in the PSC regime is extreme important because he (she) is located
in the center of the PSC regime. The professional knowledge level, human resources

45
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

and ethical principle of PSCOs greatly impact the effectiveness and fairness of PSC
regime. The PSCOs are facing three challenges: the shortage of PSCOs in some
regions; more and more higher qualifications requirements to PSCOs; ethical
principle of PSCOs.

5.4.1 The shortage of PSCOs in some regions

Although a PSCO is not necessarily required to sit any standardized examination and
does not need to have prior experience at sea, the number of PSCOs in the region
where the ports have heavy traffic is quit low (Özçayır, 2003). Appendix H Table 5
gives the number of inspected ships per PSCO in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Economies. In Hongkong and Korea, the numbers of PSCOs in 2002 were
respectively 13 and 10. Another example, the South Africa Department of Transport
address in its 1998 annual report:

South Africa is situated on a particularly busy corner of the world’s

major sea routes. Frequently, weather conditions are dreadful and
many casualties occur. In this region, port State control is carried at
all the seven commercial ports by 24 professional deck and engineer
ship surveyors of the Chief Directorate of the Shipping. These
surveyors have to do a multiplicity of Merchant Shipping Act related
tasks concerning the ships register, certification of crew and pollution
monitoring. Therefore, in this region, statutory surveys take
preference and with staff shortages port State control is ineffective in
some ports.

The reason behind this is that there is a shortage of skilled and experienced persons in
the shipping industry and that future port State control officers would be difficult to
recruit in order to ensure that port State control inspections maintain the same high
standards (IMO, 2004). According to a study by Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO) in 2000, there will be a shortage of some 46,000 ship’s officer by

46
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

2010 (Grey, 2005).

The direct consequence of shortage of PSCOs is the great workloads for PSCOs. In
Korea, an inspector averagely conducted 184.6 inspections in 2002 (KMI, 2003). The
overweight workload for PSCOs inevitably lead that the quality of inspections can not
be assured.

5.4.2 The professional knowledge level of PSCOs

PSC inspections are highly professional job which can only be accomplished by
experienced inspectors with professional knowledge. During the process of
inspections, the inspectors use professional knowledge to decide if the ship, ship
equipment and shipboard operations comply with the applicable standards.
Particularly, the PSCO should exercise professional judgment to determine whether to
detain a ship (IMO, 1999). For the PSCOs, the professional knowledge level has two
sides. First, the PSCOs must acquire necessary knowledge of the provisions of the
applicable conventions and instruments before they are authorized to carry out PSC
inspections by port State. Second, the PSCOs must continuously update their
knowledge with respect to instruments related to port State control.

Before PSCOs begin their career as PSC inspectors, training should be provided to
them to acquire necessary knowledge. However, the scope of the necessary
knowledge is quite extensive, which includes conventions, codes, IMO resolutions
and numerical guidelines. And the contents of instruments are extremely complicated.
For example, the conventions have SOLAS, MARPOL73/78, STCW 78 as Amended
in 1995, LOADLINE, etc. Furthermore, all of these conventions have amendments.
The amendments apply to ships which were constructed in different years. Different
types of ships also have different applicable regulations in these conventions. For
PSCOs, it is a great challenge to make acquainted with these instruments.

With the development of international conventions, more and more amendments and
codes are adopted and become compulsory requirements to applicable ships, such as
47
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

Annex to MARPOL 73/78, ISPS Code. Thus, the PSCOs must update their
knowledge to keep up with the development of conventions. The PSC Procedure
requires that periodical seminars for PSCOs should be held in order to update their
knowledge with respect to instruments related to port State control (IMO, 1999). This
is not a big problem for the developed countries which have considerably bigger
budgets. But some developing countries have limited financial support to get their
PSCOs’ professional knowledge level improved. The PSCOs can not receive
sufficient knowledge update training and can not effectively carry out PSC
inspections.

5.4.3 The ethical principle of PSCOs

The PSCOs should hold integrity in ethic because they represent fairness and have
power to take control measures which can bring financial loss to shipowners. The
PSCOs and the persons assisting them should have no commercial interest, either in
the port of inspection or in the ships inspected, nor should PSCOs be employed by or
undertake work on behalf of recognized organizations (IMO, 1999).

However, like any other system where human beings are involved, the port State
control system can be abused (Özçayır, 2003). In recent years, port State control, so
often depicted as a knight in shining armour in the battle against substandard shipping,
has found itself fending off accusations of corruption (Corbett, 2004) George Barclay,
director of the international port State control database Equasis, also admitted: “This
is a problem that exist to a greater or lesser extent all over the world and will
unfortunately remain for a while” (Fairplay, 2004). Even more worse, the industry’s
silence on the issue ultimately makes it hard to assess accurately how widespread
corruption is (Fairplay, 2004).

There are mainly two reasons for the rampancy of the corruption. Firstly, as section
5.2.2 point out, there are many subjective elements in the PSC regime. These
subjective elements set aside space for the corruption. The PSC inspectors are free to

48
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

choose control measures once deficiencies are found. Secondly, the financial
incentives that creates for low-paid, overworked and undervalued port officials is one
of the driving force behind the abuses of the port State regime. PSC will always be a
problem area, as the inspectors are low paid and see great opportunities for a quick
buck (Slater, 2004).

The abuse of power by some PSC inspectors badly impairs the integrity, reputation
and effectiveness of PSC regime. If the endemic of corruption is rampant in the whole
world, the PSC regime can not exert its effect as a safety net. And even worse, it can
be a burden of the whole shipping industry.

5.5 Undue detention

5.5.1 Overview of undue detention

Detention is a very serious matter. Just as John Hare pointed out in 1997:

If a chartered vessel is facing cancellation dates and is unable to

complete loading or discharge by reason of a port State control
detention, her owner would clearly suffer considerable financial
losses. These losses may be mirrored down the charter party, and
could be compounded by publicized allegations that the owner’s
hitherto good trading name has been tarnished.

Undue detention is to detain a ship for what subsequently and in retrospect turns out
to be insufficient cause (Hare, 1997) The Procedure For Port State Control provides:
“when exercising control, all possible efforts should be made to avoid a ship being
unduly detained or delayed” (IMO, 1999). Nevertheless, undue detentions happen
occasionally in the worldwide. If there is an Achilles heel in current international port
State control practice it is that authorities may be concerned by their possible
exposure to actions for wrongful detention (Hare, 1997).

49
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

To avoid ships being unduly detained, the international conventions also provide that
an unduly detained ship will be entitle to compensation and can appeal against the
detention if the detained ship can prove wrongful detention (SOLAS, 1974). But it is
seldom to find any successful cases where an owner has successfully recovered
compensation following wrongful detention by a PSCO (Özçayır, 2003). The reason
behind this situation is that in any instance of alleged undue detention or delay the
burden of proof lies with the owner or operator of the ship (ASOC, 2003).

5.5.2 The reasons of undue detention

Generally, there are mainly two reasons for the undue detention. One is that the
PSCOs have insufficient professional knowledge and make inappropriate judgment.
Another reason is that there are still insufficient guidelines available to help PSCOs
make decision of detention.

The international conventions, codes, resolutions and guidelines are very complicated
instrument system for PSCOs to command. Furthermore, these instruments are not
invariable and are constantly amended. With the development of shipping industry,
more and more instruments are adopted and come into force. This raises huge
challenges to PSCOs. A qualified and experienced PSCO need a long time training
and should study the relevant instruments continuously. In case a PSCO has
insufficient knowledge in one aspect, he (she) may make inappropriate judgment
based on the insufficient knowledge and unduly detain the ship.

Even the PSCOs have sufficient professional knowledge, the insufficient guidelines
on PSC detention may also lead the PSCO unduly detain the ship. The PSC procedure
provides guidelines on detention and MoUs provide a list of detainable deficiencies,
but those are not enough for PSCOs to make professional judgment. For example,
when the ship is found to be deficient, a combination of deficiencies of a less serious
nature may also warrant the detention of the ship (IMO, 1999). However, there are no
any guidelines on what is the combination of deficiencies of a less serious nature that

50
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

may lead a detention. The PSCOs meet a big problem in this situation and undue
detention may happen.

5.5.3 Case study

The “Lantau Peak” case is a case that the vessel suffered undue detention and the
owner successfully recovered compensation following the wrongful detention by
PSCOs. In an important Federal Court of Canada decision on April 5, 2004 in
Maritime Consortium Management vs. Her Majesty the Queen in the right in Canada,
the shipowner was awarded $5,969,072 plus costs against the Crown in respect of the
negligent conduct of Canadian Port State Control inspectors and their superiors in
Vancouver and Ottawa with respect to the inspection and detention of the bulk carrier
Lantau Peak (Hawkins, 2005).

On April 5, 1997, the Lantau Peak arrived in Vancouver Harbour from Japan to
conduct some minor repairs and then load coal for a return voyage to Japan. Before
loading, the vessel had planned to repair hull frames found to be detached during the
voyage. On arrival alongside the berth, Lantau Peak was inspected by two Canadian
Steamship inspectors following which it was ordered detained as a measure of Ports
State Control. The vessel remained in detention for 130 days until August 13, 1997.
On departure the Lantau Peak sailed in ballast to China for extensive hull repairs
required by the terms of its release from detention. The detention was imposed
primarily on the basis of the inspector’s opinion that the hull frames were wasted by
corrosion beyond what was considered an acceptable limit. The limit imposed by the
inspectors was 17 percent of the original as-built thickness. The shipowner argued the
classification society, Class NK, requirements should be applied, not some unique
Vancouver standard. The shipowner commenced suit in the Federal Court of Canada
against Her Majesty and the local inspectors seeking damages for unnecessary repair
costs, off-hire expenses, port costs and bunker expenses. In a lengthy 189 pages
decision, Justice Campbell hold that his arbitrary determination was inconsistent with
the standards of both the flag administration and classification society and its basis

51
Chapter The Challenges to the Current PSC Regime

was not substantiated (Campbell, 2004). The ship owner was improperly required to
undertake unnecessary and extensive repairs in the Canadian port, rather than being
allowed to sail to a foreign port where repairs would have been less costly (Fairplay,
2004). The Port State Control inspectors and their supervisors in Transport Canada
were negligent in the conduct of their duties (Hawkins, 2005).

In this case, the root cause of the undue detention rested that the PSC inspectors made
a wrong judgment based on an arbitrary standard. The arbitrary standard required that
the maximum wastage of hull frame not exceed 17 percent of the original as-built
thickness, which was not international agreed standard contained in any international
conventions. The PSC inspectors referred to wrong standard and have inadequate
knowledge on the limitation of the wastage of hull frame.

5.6 Conclusion

The PSC regime is far from a perfect system to combat substandard ship and improve
maritime safety through promoting flag State implementation. More or less, the
inherent limitations and the weakness in the course of development impair its efficacy.
Large room still exists for the PSC regime to improve its performance. Policies and
measures need to be taken by the international maritime community to enlarge the
effectiveness and efficiency of the system. Some proposals have been adopted by
IMO, while some proposals are under discussion.

52
Chapter Recommendations and Conclusion

Chapter

Recommendations and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

Although PSC regime has achieved partial success, there is a mass room for the
improvement of the regime. There are many approaches available to improve the
performance of PSC regime. Most of them are to enhance the homogeneity of the PSC
regime through worldwide coordination and cooperation. No matter what approach is
employed, the active participations of all stakeholders in the maritime community
such as shipowners, classification societies, flag States and port State are essential.

6.2 Promote uniformity of the PSC regime worldwide

The uniformity of the PSC regime has two tiers: the uniformity within the region of
the MoU and the uniformity between the MoUs. To promote uniformity of the PSC
regime worldwide, the two tiers of uniformity need to be improved simultaneously.

For the improvement of uniformity within the region of the MoU, the PSC committee
of each MoU may play an important role. First, the PSC committee of each MoU
should develop a consistent PSC manual, preferably based on the PSC manual of
Paris MoU which is relatively mellow. The PSC manual provides the detailed
guidelines on the procedures of PSC inspection to unify the PSC practices. Second,
establish PSC auditing mechanisms in the context of the Voluntary IMO Member

53
Chapter Recommendations and Conclusion

State Audit Scheme. As far as the member States of IMO are concerned, their
maritime Authorities’ responsibilities of implementing international conventions rest
on not only ensuring ships flying their own flag to observe applicable standards as
flag State implementation, but also establishment an effective and consistent PSC
regime as a port State. The performance of PSC inspections is an important aspect of
the voluntary audit scheme. The MoU can also introduce the PSC self-assessment
scheme among the member Authorities of the MoU. In accordance with the PSC
performance of each Authority, the MoU may coordinate the practices of member
Authorities to achieve the uniformity within the region of MoU. Third, urge the
member Authorities of MoU that have not ratified all relevant instruments to do so as
soon as possible. Particularly, the MoU should promote the accession to the
conventions which aim to improve living and working conditions on board ships by
States of member authorities.

For the Uniformity between the MoUs, information exchange should be promoted.
Port State control is more effective when implemented on a regional basis. However,
it is still beneficial to all concerned when harmonization of the various areas of port
State control administration and inspection procedures can be achieved on an
inter-regional basis (IMO, 2004). To this end, all Port State Control Committees are
urged to keep each other fully informed of all new port State control initiatives
undertaken in their respective regions, in order to review whether reciprocal measures
can be introduced. Also, though the coordination of IMO, the PSC committees of
MoUs should enhance harmonization of coding systems, including those for ports and
places of inspection.

6.3 Enhance the transparency of the PSC system

For the success of the PSC, there is an urgent need for more transparency.
Transparency could not be the solution in eliminating substandard ships but surely it
is a step in the right direction (Cubbin, 2001). Some shipowners still consider the
risk of non-compliance to be outweighed by their commercial interest or survival in a

54
Chapter Recommendations and Conclusion

harsh market. Some relevant industry players are still more concerned about their
market share rather than the problem of substandard shipping. However, exposing
them to the public will surely benefit this world by raising the quality level of the
whole shipping industry. The publicized detention list will deter charterers to contract
bad quality ships. This trend has already emerged in the US where many major oil
companies are under public pressure not to charter ships with bad records (Shiming,
2001). In addition, to some extent transparency can prevent the abuse of PSC by some
inspectors.

One measure to increase transparency is continuous publication of detailed

information on a regular basis on detained ships, including the names of owners and
various commercial interests such as entities and charterers. More transparency is
being achieved as information on all appropriate parties involved in ships under
detention is made available to the port State. Another measure is to publish annual
report by every maritime Authority and MoU. Through the annual report, an overview
of the performance of port States and MoUs will be presented to the public yearly.
The port States with poor performance may receive pressure from public that require
them improving their PSC activities.

6.4 Promote the information exchange worldwide

The most obvious advantage of the information exchange is to avoid too frequent PSC
inspections on ships, especially on quality ships, while at the same time save valuable
inspection resources and cost to inspect the potential high-risk ships. Although the
existing nine MoUs have set up their own information center, some of them have no
computer network enabling their member States to store their inspection data in a
central database for use by other members, none of which are able to satisfactorily
exchange data with any of the others due to problems with technical IT compatibility.
To promote the information exchange worldwide, the first and the most important is
to help some of the developing MoUs to establish regional PSC computer databases.
Second, continue to improve the regional port State control information systems and

55
Chapter Recommendations and Conclusion

to work toward full exchange of information among the existing nine regional PSC
regimes and the USCG. This can be done by improving contact mechanisms amongst
the MoU secretariats and by facilitating the flow of information between MoU
information centres on action taken against sub-standard shipping.

6.5 Develop detailed guidelines on PSC for PSCOs

With the adoption of conventions such as International Convention on the Control of

Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships (AFS), International Convention on the
Management of Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM), more and more guidelines on
enforcing PSC aspects of these conventions are needed to help PSCOs carry out
inspections. These guidelines should be exhaustive enough to cover the every detailed
requirement of the conventions. After the guidelines on PSC inspections were
developed, they also need to be amended according to the practices in realities.

Apart from the IMO conventions, the enforcement of PSC aspects of ILO conventions
also need guidelines to help PSCOs conduct inspections living and working
conditions on board. The draft Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention (CLMC) is
submitted to ILO for adoption. Developing and implementing an inspection regime
that is based on the new ILO convention is urgent. This regime will enhance the
protection of the workers concerned and reflect the greater consistency, clarity,
adaptability and general applicability that the consolidation of the more than 60
maritime labour instruments will bring to the rapidly developing, globalized maritime
sector.

6.6 Strengthen the recruiting and training of PSCOs

The qualification of the PSCOs is the key to the success of the PSC regime. The
public acceptance and credibility of port State control depends greatly on the
professional attitude and skills of PSCOs and that suitably trained seafarers have a
crucial role in achieving safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans, and
making sure that port State control inspections maintain the expected high standards
56
Chapter Recommendations and Conclusion

(Tokyo MoU, 2005) Sufficient human resources should be available for the PSC
regime and the professional knowledge level of PSCOs should be improves
continuously. The following measures may be taken for these purposes:

First, appropriate programs should be instituted to attract and recruit qualified persons
to become port State control officers. This involves encouraging investment in
infrastructure, improving working conditions and, ultimately, encouraging more
persons to join the team of PSCO. Second, continue and enhance regional training
programs for PSCOs. The trainings have various types which can serve for different
levels. Besides the present basic training course, fellowship training and seminars for
PSCOs, the PSCO exchange programme which has obtained good effect in some
regions should be popularized. The PSCO exchange programme is intend to establish
a two-way PSCOs exchange in the region, whereby each Authority could send out
their officers to another Authority in exchange of receiving officers from that
Authority.

6.7 Intensify the Targeting System

The targeting systems can identify high risk ships for priority inspections while
leaving ships of prudent shipowners “in peace” as a reward for their good
performance. High-risk ships will be inspected more frequently than ships with a
lower risk profile and compliance measures taken, if necessary. At the same time the
precious PSC resources can be utilized more productively. In the present, the targeting
system runs very well in Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU and USCG. The other MoUs should
be recommended to follow these examples especially considering their relatively
shortage of resources so that the relatively high percentage of substandard ships can
be targeted more precisely. In addition, the targeting system based on a ship’s risk
profile can be improved to identify the companies operating sub-standard ships.
Through targeting the company with poor safety performance, the effectiveness of the
PSC regime can be improved.

57
Chapter Recommendations and Conclusion

6.8 Conclusion

The primarily responsibility of keeping the ship in compliance with international

standards rests on the shipowners, flag States and other relevant industry stakeholders.
The development of the PSC regime is the world reaction to the failure of shipowners
and flag States in fulfilling their responsibilities. PSC is only a back-up but not a
substitute for flag States enforcement, and it is in no way responsible for foreign
ship’s safety standards. It does not relieve the responsibility of flag States, owners and
other relevant industry players imposed by international legislation to do their jobs
properly and responsibly.

The legal basis and procedures of PSC were set up in the past decades. Its efficacy can
be extended if PSC is carried out on a regional basis. With the development of
regional PSC MoUs, the PSC regime is recognized by the world maritime community
as a more and more effective means in achieving safe, secure and efficient shipping
on clean oceans. So far, the PSC regime has achieved partial success in promoting the
safety level of the shipping. However, the PSC regime is far less perfect in achieving
it’s goal.

To make the PSC regime more effective, there is still a lot of work to be done.
Measures in improving the effectiveness of PSC included promoting the uniformity of
PSC regime worldwide, enhanced transparency through increased information
exchange within regions and inter-regionally, strengthening the recruiting and training
of PSCOs and intensifying the targeting system. IMO and PSC committees of MoUs
can play active roles so that all these measures can be taken in a globally harmonized
and consistent manner.

In a word, PSC regime is effective, but it faces some challenges. Great efforts still
need to be done by stakeholders to improve its efficacy. The ultimate goal is to
achieve safe, secure, efficient shipping on clean oceans, which is one of the oldest
industries in the history of mankind.

58
 References

Reference:

Australian Maritime Safety Administration (AMSA). (2001). Ensuring Compliance

Port State Control in Australia. Retrieved March 1, 2006 from the World Wide
Web:
wwwlive.amsa.gov.au/About_Amsa/Cooperate_information/AMSA_speeches/
Shipping_In_The_Asia-Pacific_Conference/PDFs/amsa_db.pdf

Bell, D. (1993). Port State control vflag State control: UK government position.
Marine Policy 1993 September 367-370

Black Sea MoU. (2005). Black Sea MoU annual report2004. Retrieved Mar, 1 2006
from the World Wide Web: http://www.bsmou.org/

Campbell, R. D. (2004). The Queen in the right in Canada and Ors (The "Lantau
Peak"). Retrieved Jan 20, 2006 from he World Wide Web:
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/index.shtml

Corbett, A. (2006). Class stands behind ferry. Trade Winds, February 2006, 42

Corbett, A. (2004). PSC corruption must be stopped. Trade Winds, February 2004, 2

Cubbin, A. (2000). Port State control and high-risk flags. Seaways, 11,15-22.

Fairplay. (2004). Port state corruption still goes unchallenged. Fairplay 2004
6264(350) 4

Fairplay Daily News (Jun 2004). Retrieved from the World Wide Web:
http://80.126.138.173/forum/zoeken/ zeevaart/pietsinke/2004_jun13.txt

Francisco J. Montero Llacer. (2003) Open registers: past, present and future. Marine
Policy 27 (2003) 513-523

Grey, M. (2005). Time to respect marine professionals BIMCO BULLETIN 100 85

Hare, J. (1994). Flag, Coastal & Port State Control. Sea changes, 16, 57-67

Hare, J. (1997). Port State control: strong medicine to cure a sick industry.
International and Comparative Law-Special Admiralty Issue, 26(3).

59
 References

Hawkins, T. S. (2004). Port state: out of control? Stand By…. 2005 March.

International Maritime Organization. (2004, January). Regional cooperation on port

State control: Progress report on regional PSC agreements. London: Author.

International Maritime Organization. (2004, December).Regional cooperation on

port State control: Second Joint Ministerial Conference of the Paris and Tokyo
Memoranda of Understanding on Port State Control. London: Author.

International Maritime Organization. (2004). Consolidated text of the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 1978: articles,
annexes and certificates. London: Author.

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as

modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, IMO, (2002)

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping

for Seafarers, 1978, as amended in 1995 and 1997 (STCW), IMO, (1996)

International Maritime Organization. (1999). Procedures for Port State Control:

Consolidated text of Res.A787(19), as amended by Res. A.882(21). London:
Author.

Jönsson, J. (2005). Ship survey and certification management. Unpublished lecture

handout, World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden.

Kasoulides, G.C. (1993). Port state control and jurisdiction: Evolution of the port
state regime. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Kennedy, F. (2006). Sea Views: RINA in spotlight over ferry sinking. Retrieved
March 10, 2006 from the World Wide Web:
http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/02/13/10018289.html

Korea Maritime Institute (KMI). (2003). Port State Control Regime and Perspectives
in Asia-Pacific Region. Retrieved Mar, 1 2006 from the World Wide Web:
www.kmi.re.kr/english/public/html/koica/2003/10.PDF

Lloyd’s List. (2006). Information Resources on Passenger Ship Safety. Retrieved

February 16, 2006 from the World Wide Web:

60
 References

www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=3002/Passenger%20Ship%20Safety
%20(16%20February%202006).doc

Mukherjee, P. K. (2001). Maritime zone and boundaries. Unpublished lecture

handout, World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden.

Mukherjee, P. K. (2000). Flag State, port State and coastal State jurisdictions.
Unpublished lecture handout, World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden.

Murkerjee, P. K. (2000). Maritime Legislation.

OECD. (1996). Competitive advantage obtained by some shipowners as a result of

non-observance of applicable international ruses and standards. Paris: Author.

O’Neil, W. (2003). Port State Control. London: LLP

Özçayır Z. O. (2001). Port State Control. London: LLP

Paris MoU. (2005). Paris MoU annual report2004. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.parismou.org/

Paris MoU. (2004). Paris MoU annual report 2003. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.parismou.org/

Paris MoU. (2003). Paris MoU annual report 2002. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.parismou.org/

Paris MoU. (2002). Paris MoU annual report2001. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.parismou.org/

Paris MoU. (2001). Paris MoU annual report2000. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.parismou.org/

Paris MOU. (2000). Paris MOU annual report 1999. Retrieved January 15, 2006
from the World Wide Web: http://www.parismou.org/
Paris MOU. (1999). Paris MOU annual report 1998. Retrieved January 15, 2006
from the World Wide Web: http://www.parismou.org/
Payoyo, P.B. (1994). Implementation of international conventions through port
state control - an assessment. Marine Policy 1994 18 (5) 379-392

61
 References

Pérez,C. (2004). Statistical analysis of PSC inspections: Inefficiency or Inadequate

procedures? Retrieved Mar, 1 2006 from the World Wide Web:
www2.uca.es/grup-invest/trans-maritimo/Trabajo1.pdf
Rothwell, D.R. (1992) Coastal State sovereignty and innocent passage. Marine
Policy 1992 November 427-437
Sage, B. (2005) Identification of ‘High RiskVessels’ in coastal waters. Marine
Policy 29 (2005) 349–355
Shiming, X. (2001). Port State Control: Review and Assessment. Unpublished
master’s thesis, World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden.
Slater, P. (2004). Port state corruption still goes unchallenged. Fairplay 2004
6264(350) 4

South Africa Department of Transport (SADT). (1998). Department of Transport:

Annual Report 1997 – 1998. Retrieved March 10, 2006 from the World Wide
Web: http://www.transport.gov.za/library/docs/annual/annual98/shipping.html

Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law, Policy and Management (SAPOL).

(1999). A Summary of the SEAPOL International Conference on Port State
Control: Past Successes, Future Challenges. Retrieved March 1, 2006 from the
World Wide Web:
http://www.seapol.org/NEWS%20LETTER%202.htm#A%20SUMMARY

The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC). (2003). Port state control - An
update on international law approaches to regulate vessels engaged in Antarctic
non-governmental activities. Retrieved March 10, 2006 from the World Wide
Web: www.asoc.org/Documents/ATCMXXVI/IP-44portstate.pdf

Tokyo MoU. (2005). Tokyo MoU Annual report 2004. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005 from
the World Wide Web: http://www.tokyo-mou.org/

Tokyo MoU. (2004). Tokyo MoU Annual report 2003. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005
from the World Wide Web: http://www.tokyo-mou.org/

Tokyo MoU. (2004, November). Memorandum of Understanding on Port State

Control in the Asia-Pacific Region. Tokyo: Author.

Tokyo MoU. (2003). Tokyo MoU Annual report 2002. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005
from the World Wide Web: http://www.tokyo-mou.org/

62
 References

Tokyo MoU. (2002). Tokyo MoU Annual report 2001. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005
from the World Wide Web: http://www.tokyo-mou.org/

Tokyo MoU. (2001). Tokyo MoU Annual report 2000. Retrieved Sep, 10 2005 from
the World Wide Web: http://www.tokyo-mou.org/

USCG.. (2005). USCG. Annual Report 2004. Retrieved 20 August 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pscweb/index.htm.

USCG.. (2004). USCG. Annual Report 2003. Retrieved 20 August 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pscweb/index.htm

USCG.. (2003). USCG. Annual Report 2002. Retrieved 20 August 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pscweb/index.htm

USCG.. (2002). USCG. Annual Report 2001. Retrieved 20 August 2005 from the
World Wide Web: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pscweb/index.htm

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, UN, (1982).

Williamson, H.M. (1996, September). Port State Control. Paper presented at the
Fourth Asia/Pacific Port State Control Committee Meeting, New Zealand.

Wonham, J. (1996). Some recent regulatory developments in IMO for which there
are Corresponding requirements in the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. Marine Policy 20 (5) 377-388

63
Appendices

Appendix A: Table 1 Summary of status of conventions at 31 January 2005

No. of
Entry into % world
Instrument Contracting
force date tonnage*
States
IMO Convention 17-Mar-58 164 98.56
1991 amendments - 87 83.58
SOLAS 1974 25-May-80 155 98.52
SOLAS Protocol 1978 01-May-81 107 94.99
SOLAS Protocol 1988 03-Feb-00 77 66.84
Stockholm Agreement 1996 01-Apr-97 9 9.58
LL 1966 21-Jul-68 155 98.49
LL Protocol 1988 03-Feb-00 73 63.28
TONNAGE 1969 18-Jul-82 142 98.25
COLREG 1972 15-Jul-77 146 97.60
CSC 1972 06-Sep-77 76 61.11
1993 amendments - 8 4.76
SFV Protocol 1993 - 10 9.71
STCW 1978 28-Apr-84 148 98.50
STCW-F 1995 - 4 3.26
SAR 1979 22-Jun-85 83 52.05
STP 1971 02-Jan-74 17 23.14
SPACE STP 1973 02-Jun-77 16 22.30
INMARSAT C 1976 16-Jul-79 89 92.22
INMARSAT OA 1976 16-Jul-79 87 91.35
1994 amendments - 40 29.10
FAL 1965 05-Mar-67 100 65.84
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex I/II) 02-Oct-83 130 97.07
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex III) 01-Jul-92 115 92.99
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex IV) 27-Sep-03 100 54.35
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex V) 31-Dec-88 119 95.23
MARPOL Protocol 1997 (Annex
VI) 19-May-05 19 60.04
LC 1972 30-Aug-75 81 69.85
1978 amendments - 20 19.23
LC Protocol 1996 - 21 12.02
INTERVENTION 1969 06-May-75 82 71.79
INTERVENTION Protocol 1973 30-Mar-83 47 46.08

64
Appendices

CLC 1969 19-Jun-75 45 4.81

CLC Protocol 1976 08-Apr-81 55 55.66
CLC Protocol 1992 30-May-96 104 93.44
FUND Protocol 1976 22-Nov-94 33 47.41
FUND Protocol 1992 30-May-96 93 88.49
FUND Protocol 2000 27-Jun-01 - -
FUND Protocol 2003 - 8 9.47
NUCLEAR 1971 15-Jul-75 17 19.76
PAL 1974 28-Apr-87 30 37.47
PAL Protocol 1976 30-Apr-89 24 37.17
PAL Protocol 1990 - 4 0.77
PAL Protocol 2002 - - -
LLMC 1976 01-Dec-86 47 49.75
LLMC Protocol 1996 13-May-04 15 14.94
SUA 1988 01-Mar-92 115 81.04
SUA Protocol 1988 01-Mar-92 104 76.95
SALVAGE 1989 14-Jul-96 48 36.77
OPRC 1990 13-May-95 82 63.67
HNS Convention 1996 - 8 5.37
OPRC/HNS 2000 - 11 16.11
BUNKERS CONVENTION 2001 - 6 4.09
AFS CONVENTION 2001 - 10 9.18
BWM CONVENTION 2004 - - -
* Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping/World Fleet Statistics as at 31 December 2003

65
 Appendices

Appendix B: Table 2 Port State control agreements: comparative table

Paris MoU Acuerdo de Viña del Mar Tokyo MoU
Participating 20 12 18
Maritime Authorities Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong
and Associate France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic of
Members Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New
Russian Federation, Slovenia Spain, Sweden, Venezuela Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation,
United Kingdom Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu and Viet Nam
Co-operating
Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta
Members
Observers Estonia, Latvia, United States, IMO, ILO, IMO, ROCRAM, United States Brunei, Macao (China) Solomon Islds*, United
Tokyo MoU, Caribbean MoU, Mediterranean States, IMO, ILO, ESCAP, Paris MoU, Indian
MoU and Black Sea MoU Ocean MoU and Viña del Mar Agreement
Target inspection rate 25 % annual inspection rate per country 15 % annual inspection rate per 75 % annual regional inspection rate
country within 3 years
Relevant LL 66 and LL PROT 88 SOLAS 74 LL 66 SOLAS 74 LL 66 and LL PROT 88 SOLAS 74
instruments SOLAS PROT 78 and 88 MARPOL 73/78 SOLAS PROT 78 MARPOL 73/78 SOLAS PROT 78 and 88 MARPOL 73/78
STCW 78 COLREG 72 STCW 78 COLREG 72 STCW 78 COLREG 72
ILO Convention No. 147 TONNAGE 69 TONNAGE 69 ILO Convention No. 147 TONNAGE 69
Information Centre DSI - Centre Administratif des Affaires Centro de Información del Acuerdo Asia-Pacific Computerized Information
location Maritimes (CAAM), Saint-Malo, France Latinoamericano(CIALA), Prefectura System (APCIS), Vladivostok, Russia
Naval Argentina, Buenos Aires
Committee A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities
composition and the EC Commission
Secretariat The Hague, The Netherlands Buenos Aires, Argentina Tokyo, Japan
Signed on 1 July 1982 5 November 1992 1 December 1993
Official languages English, French Spanish, Portuguese English
Concentrated Dedicated to operational compliance August - October 2002 July - September 2002 - ISM Code compliance.
inspection on board passenger ships. 1 May to 31 July - Training Convention on STCW. September - November 2003 - Bulk carrier
campaigns 2003 covering most of the cruise season in February - April 2003 - ISM. safety campaign (same questionnaire as Paris
Europe and Canada. MoU). Control of operational requirements
campaign in Autumn 2004. GMDSS 2005.
Major training/ 1st expert and specialized training - Human 2nd regional training course on PSC with
exchange issues Element and Safety and Environment: the 13th Tokyo MoU basic training course (11 - 28
Inspection of Tankers. 2nd expert training - Nov 2003) 10th seminar for PSC officers (22-24
Safety and Environment: IMDG Code, Load October 2003). Further fellowship training
Lines, GDMSS and Oily water separators. 3rd course (19 Sept.— 7 Oct. 2003). Two expert
expert training - Human element: ILO and mission training courses during 2003. Exchange
STCW conventions, Intercultural programme for PSC officers.
Communication and Operational Control.
Total number of 2002 - 1,577 detentions 2003 - 1,428 (9.45% 2002 - 151 detentions 3.3% detention 2001 - 1349 detentions (detention rate 7.76%)
inspections/ detention decrease in detentions) inspection rate in 2003 rate) 2003 - 126 detentions (2.8% 2002 - 1307 detentions (detention rate 6.67%)
rates +/- - 30.1% detention rate) 2003 -1709 detentions (detention rate 8.49%)
(31% increase in detentions)
Mr. J. Mansell (New Zealand) (Former
Chairman Mr. A. Cubbin (United Kingdom) Mr. E.S. Arce (Chile) Chairman) Mr. K.-T. Lim (Republic of Korea)
(Chairman elected in 2004) Mr. Y. Sasamura
Secretary-General Mr. R. Schiferli (Netherlands) Mr. J.J. Beltritti (Argentina) (Japan)
New Members/ Slovenia joined as full member 22 July 2003. Observers: Macao, China and Viña del Mar
Observers Agreement and Black Sea MoU.
PSCC meeting 36th meeting in Dubrovnik, Croatia 12-15 10th meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina 12th meeting in Renaca, Chile 24-27 March 2003.
May 2003. 37th meeting in Copenhagen, 1-3 September 2003. 11th meeting in Viña 13th meeting in Port Vila, Vanuatu 23-26 February
Denmark 11-14 May 2004. 38th meeting del Mar, Chile 22-24 September 2004. 2004. 14th meeting in Shanghai, China 22-25
in Helsinki, Finland 9-13 May 2005. 12th meeting in Lima, Peru September November 2004. 15th meeting in Thailand
2005. November 2005.
Inter-regional exchange Data provider to Equasis Data provider to Equasis Inter-regional exchange
of data Black Sea - Tokyo MoUs
Website Email www.parismou.org www.acuerdolatino.into.ar www.tokyo-mou.org
[email protected] ciala@prefecturanaval. gov. ar [email protected]
IMO workshop special Chairman 2nd workshop - Prefecto
responsibilities Mayor P. C. Escobar (Argentina)

* Pending acceptance

66
 Appendices

Caribbean MoU Mediterranean MoU Indian Ocean MoU

Participating 23 11 18
Maritime Anguilla*, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan; Australia, Bangladesh*, Djibouti*, Eritrea, India,
Authorities and Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda*, British Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique*,
Associate Virgin Islds*, Cayman Islds, Cuba, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority* Myanmar*, Oman, Seychelles*, South Africa, Sri
Members Dominica*, Dominican Republic*, Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Yemen
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti*, Jamaica,
Montserrat*, Netherlands Antilles, Saint
Kitts & Nevis*, Saint Lucia*, Saint
Vincent & the Grenadines*, Suriname,
Trinidad & Tobago, Turks and Caicos
Islds*
Observers IMO, ILO, CARICOM, IACS, Canada, IMO, ILO, EC Ethiopia, IMO, ILO, PMAESA,
USCG, Paris MoU, Viña del Mar, Tokyo
MoU, DNV, Equasis and LR-F
Target inspection 15 % annual inspection rate per country 15 % annual inspection rate per country 10 % annual inspection rate per country within 3
rate within 3 years within 3 years years
Relevant LL 66 SOLAS 74 LL 66 SOLAS 74 LL 66 SOLAS 74
instruments SOLAS PROT 78 MARPOL 73/78 SOLAS PROT 78 MARPOL 73/78 SOLAS PROT 78 MARPOL 73/78
STCW 78 COLREG 72 STCW 78 COLREG 72 STCW 78 COLREG 72
ILO Convention No. 147 TONNAGE 69 ILO Convention No. 147 ILO Convention No. 147 TONNAGE 69
Information Information Centre Suriname Information Centre Casablanca, Morocco Indian Ocean MoU Computerised Information
Centre location system (IOCIS), Information Centre Goa, India
Committee A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities
composition
Secretariat Kingston, Jamaica Alexandria, Egypt Goa, India
location
Signed on 9 February 1996 11 July 1997 5 June 1998
Official languages English Arabic, English and French English
Concentrated LSA campaign 2004. Fire-Fighting Appliances 1
inspection April-30 June 2005.
campaigns
Major Seminar for PSCOs in India
training/ exchange 8-10 February 2005.
i
Total number 2001 - 291 detentions (detention rate 5.27%)
of inspections/ 2002 - 306 detentions (detention rate 5.61%)
detention rates +/- 2003 - 472 detentions (detention rate 9.27%)
Mr. L. Vassallo (Malta)
Chairman Mr. I English (Guyana) Adm. H. Hosni (Egypt) (Former) Mr. M. Kinley (Australia)
Mr. F.S.A.H. El Kady (New 2005)
Secretary-General Mr. L. Bennett (Jamaica) Mr. B. Ganguli (India)
New Members/ Tokyo MoU Black Sea MoU Observer Yemen new member ( as of 7th meeting).
Observers Black Sea MoU and Equasis observers
PSCC meeting 8th Paramaribo, Suriname 6th meeting in Aqaba, Jordan (7-10 October 6th meeting in Goa, India (20 - 23 October 2003).
(28-30 October 2003). 9th meeting 2003). 7th meeting in Alexandria, Egypt (31 7th meeting in Amboseli, Kenya (27 - 30 September
in Havana, Cuba (7 to 9 January - 2 February 2005). Planned joint 2004). 8th meeting in the
September 2004). 10th meeting in PSCC meeting in 2006 with Black Sea MoU Maldives/South Africa (5 September 2005).
Cayman Islands (June 2005). in Istanbul, Turkey.

Inter-regional Unilateral consultation of Equasis

exchange of data
Website [email protected] www.medmou.org www.iomou.org
Email [email protected] [email protected]
IMO Chairman 3rd workshop Chairman 1* workshop - Capt. W.A. Dernier
workshop special -Admiral H. Hosni (Egypt) (South Africa)
responsibilities

*Pending acceptance

67
 Appendices

West and Central African MoU Black Sea MoU The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of
the Gulf (GCC) Riyadh MoU

Participating 16 6 6
Maritime Authorities Benin*, Cape Verde*, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire*, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian The Kingdom of Bahrain, State of Kuwait,
and Associate Gabon*, The Gambia*, Ghana, Guinea, Federation, Turkey and Ukraine Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar, Kingdom of
Members Liberia*, Mauritania*, Namibia*, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa* and
Togo*
Observers IMO, ILO, MOWCA IMO, ILO IMO, ILO
Target inspection 15 % annual inspection rate per country 15 % annual inspection rate per country 10 % annual inspection rate per country within 3
rate within 3 years within 3 years years.
Relevant instruments LL 66 SOLAS 74 LL 66 SOLAS 74 LL 66 SOLAS 74
SOLAS PROT 78 MARPOL 73/78 MARPOL 73/78 STCW 78 SOLAS PROT 78 MARPOL 73/78
STCW 78 COLREG 72 COLREG 72 TONNAGE 69 STCW 78 COLREG 72
ILO Convention No. 147 TONNAGE 69 ILO Convention No. 147 TONNAGE 69
ILO Convention No 174 (Minimum Standards,
1976)
Information Centre MOWCA Headquarters, Abidjan, Côte Black Sea Information System (BSIS), Muscat, Sultanate of Oman
location d'Ivoire. Temporarily moved to Nigeria Abuja Novorossiysk, Russian Federation
MoU Information Centre (AMIS)
Committee A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities A representative of each of the authorities
composition
Secretariat location Lagos, Nigeria Istanbul, Turkey Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Signed on 22 October 1999 7 April 2000 30 June 2004

Official languages English, French English Arabic (The official text of the Memorandum is the
English version)
Concentrated
inspection campaigns
Major training/ National Information Centres established Regional PSCO exchange programme IMO TC activity for IT development of
exchange issues and National Database Managers (NDBMs) initiated. PSCO Training Strategy (includes information centre (2004)
designated. NDBMs and PSCOs trained. basic training, PSCO workshops and
seminars, specialized training courses and
PSCOs exchange programme.) Interregional
exchange of PSC data with Tokyo MoU.
Total number 2003 - 2 detentions (detention rate 1.9%) 2002 - 222 detentions (detention
of inspections/ rate 6.28% in 2002) 2003 - 249
detention rates +/- detentions (detention rate 4.76%)
Capt. M. Chintoan-Uta
Chairman Mr. A. Mbaye (Senegal) Engr. B. Oluwole (Romania) (Former) Dr. V. Kliuev (Russian
Federation) (New 2004) Mr. H. Yüce (Turkey)
Secretary-General (Nigeria)
New Members/
Observers
PSCC meeting 3rd meeting in Brazzaville, Congo 22 - 24 4th meeting in Odessa, Ukraine (22 -26 April
October 2004. 4th meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in 2003) 5th meeting in Novorossiysk,
June 2005. Russian Federation (26-30 April 2004) 6th
meeting in Batumi, Georgia (18-22 April
2005) Planned joint PSCC meeting in 2006
with MED MoU in Istanbul, Turkey.
Inter-regional Inter-regional exchange Black
exchange of data Sea -Tokyo MoUs
Website Email [email protected] www.bsmou.org [email protected]
[email protected] [email protected]
IMO workshop Co-ordinator of Contact Group
special responsibilities on Information Exchange - Dr. V.
Kliuev (Russian Federation) (3rd workshop)

* Pending acceptance

Source: (IMO, 2004)

68
Appendices

Appendix C: Quality Shipping for the 21st Century

United States Coast Guard Port State Control Quality Shipping Initiative

The U.S. Coast Guard is pleased to submit a summary of Qualship 21, a new
initiative to identify quality, foreign-flagged vessels, and provide them with
incentives.

Qualship 21, Quality Shipping for the 21st Century

The number of substandard vessels in the United States waters has decreased, and a
very small percentage of port State control exams result in a detention. While our
targeting matrix appears to be effective in identifying the highest risk vessels for
boarding and examination, Coast Guard policy requires all foreign-flagged vessels to
be examined no less than once each year, regardless of the score that the vessel
receives in the matrix. This provides few incentives for the well run, quality ship, and
the United States believes that quality vessels should be recognized and rewarded for
their commitment to safety and quality. Therefore, on 1 January 2001, the United
States will implement an initiative to identify high-quality ships, and provide
incentives to encourage quality operations. This initiative is called, Qualship 21,
st
quality shipping for the 21 century.

By closely examining port State control data from the previous 3 years, the
characteristics of a typical quality vessel were identified. A quality vessel is
associated with a well run company, is classed by an organization with a quality
track record, is registered with a flag State with a superior port State control record,
and has an outstanding port State control history in the United States waters. Using
these general criteria, approximately 10% of the non-U.S. flagged vessels that call in
the United States will qualify for this initiative. The specific eligibility criteria are as

69
Appendices

follows:

1) The vessel may not have been detained, and determined to be substandard
in the U.S. within the previous 3 years;
2) The vessel may not have any marine violations (and no more than 1 Notice
of Violation, also known as a ticket) in U.S. waters within the previous 3
years;
3) The vessel may not have had any major marine casualties or serious
marine incidents in U.S. waters within the previous 3 years;
4) The vessel must have completed a successful U.S. Port State Control
examination within the previous 1 year;
5) The vessel may not be owned or operated by any company that has been
associated with a substandard vessel detention in the U.S. within 2 years;
6) The vessel may not be classed by, nor have its statutory Convention
Certificates issued by, a targeted class society. A class society is targeted
if points are assigned in the Coast Guard’s port State control targeting
matrix;
7) The vessel must be registered with a flag State that has a detention ratio
not more than 1/3 of the overall U.S. detention ratio (determined on a
3year rolling average), and the flag State must have at least 10 U.S.
distinct vessel arrivals in each of the last 3 years;
8) The vessel’s flag State must submit its Self-Assessment of Flag State
Performance to the IMO, and provide a copy to the Coast Guard; and
9) Though not specifically mentioned in the above criteria, the Coast Guard
reserves the right to restrict eligibility in the Qualship 21 initiative to any
vessel because of special circumstances including, but not limited to,
significant overseas casualties or detentions, and pending criminal or civil

70
Appendices

investigations

To encourage quality vessel operations, all Qualship 21 vessels will receive a

Qualship 21 Certificate, and the vessel’s name will be posted on the Qualship 21
page of the Coast Guard’s port State control internet web site. Qualship 21 vessels
will also receive the following incentives:

1) Freight ships will be eligible for a maximum of 2 years of limited port

State control oversight. Annual exams of these vessels will be eliminated
and replaced with biennial exams;
2) Tank ships must still be examined annually, but the mid-period
examination of a Qualship 21 tank vessel may be reduced in scope; and
3) Passenger vessels will not be eligible for a reduction in port State control
exams. While passenger vessels have an excellent safety record in the
United States, there is too much at risk to consider any changes to our
passenger vessel examination policy.

A vessel owner will not be required to apply for Qualship 21 designation. The Coast
Guard will screen its vessel database, and develop a list of ships that appears to meet
the Qualship 21 qualification criteria. Letters will be sent to the vessel owners to
notify them of the initiative, and their opportunity to participate. To qualify for the
original list, owners would be required to answer a series of questions to verify that
our initial screening of the vessel was correct.

The Qualship 21 vessel list will be published annually (with the first list published on
1 March 2001) on the Qualship 21 page of the headquarters port State control web
site. Amendments will be made in the 2nd quarter of each calendar year, to add the
vessels that were missed through the initial screening process. Input for the 2nd

71
Appendices

quarter amendment will come from vessel owners who believe they have vessels
eligible for designation, yet their vessels were not published on the list. Additionally,
the annual vessel list will be updated monthly when eligible vessels complete
required PSC exams, and when subtractions to the list are made as vessels trigger
exit criteria.

To maintain the integrity of the program, and to protect the safety of U.S. ports, a
Qualship 21 vessel will be removed from the program when it triggers the following
exit criteria: substandard detention in U.S. waters; marine violation, or more than 1
ticket; serious marine incident or major marine casualty; discovered in

U.S. waters with serious deficiencies, or failed to report a hazardous condition to the
Captain of the port; transfers class to a targeted class society; or changes registry to a
flag State that has a detention ratio more than 1/3 of the overall port State control
detention ratio, or to a flag State that has less than 10 distinct vessel arrivals ineach
of the previous 3 years.

72
Appendices

Appendix D: The items that can be included in one PSC inspection

CODES FOR NATURE CREW AND 0628 stowage of liferafts 0860 Entry dangerous spaces
OF DEFICIENCIES 0300 ACCOMMODATION (ILO 0629 marine evacuation system (instructions, warnings)
147) 0870 Cargo Gear Record Book
0100 SHIP'S CERTIFICATES AND 0301 minimum age 0630 launching arrangements for
survival craft 0899 other (accident prevention)
DOCUMENTS
cargo ship safety equipment 0310 dirty, parasites launching arrangements for STABILITY, STRUCTURE
0110 (including Exemption) 0320 Ventilation 0635 rescue boats 0900 AND RELATED
0321 Heating EQUIPMENT
0111 cargo ship safety construction 0636 helicopter
area
landing/pick-up
(including Exemption) 0322 Noise 0910 hydraulic and other closing
devices/watertight doors
0637 means of rescue
0112 (including ship
passenger safety
Exemption)
0330 sanitary facilities
signs, indicatiors (WT doors,
0340 drainage 0640 distress flares
0915 fire detectors, fire dampers,
0113 cargo ship safety radio
(including Exemption) 0350 lighting 0650 lifebuoys ventilation)
0360 pipes, wires (insulation) 0660 lifejackets 0920 Damage control plan
0114 cargo ship safety (including
0663 immersion suits
Exemption) 0361 Electrical devices 0930 stability/strength/loading
information and instruments
0370 sick bay 0664 anti-exposure suits
0116 (DoC/ISMofCode)
document Compliance
0371 medical equipment 0666 thermal protective aids 0931 information on A/A-max ratio
(ro-ro passenger ships)
0669 Radio life-saving appliances
0117 safety management certificate
(SMC/ISM Code)
0380 Access / Structure 0936 steering gear
0382 Sleeping room 0674 emergency equipment for
0120 load lines
No direct openings into
2-way communication 0938 damage to hull due to weather
or ship operation
0676 public address system
0130 liquefied gases in bulk
(CoF/GC Code)
0383 sleeping rooms from cargo /
0940 ballast, fuel and other tanks
machinery areas 0680 embarkation arrangements -
0131 liquefied gases in bulk 0384 Furnishings survival craft 0945 emergency
and switches
lighting, batteries
(CoF/IGC Code)
0385 Berth dimensions, etc. 0683 embarkation
rescue boats
arrangements -
0950 electric equipment in general
0135 document safe manning
minimum
0386 Clear head
means of recovery of 0951 low level lighting in corridors
0387 Messroom location 0684 lifesaving appliances
0140 dangerous chemicals in bulk
(CoF/BC Code)
0955 pilot ladders
0388 Oil skin locker 0686 buoyant apparatus
dangerous chemicals in bulk 0389 Laundry 0956 gangway,
ladder
accommodation
0141 (CoF/IBC Code) 0690 line throwing appliance
0390 Record of inspection 0960 means of escape
0692 operational readiness of
0150 prevention of pollution by oil 0399 other (accomodation) lifesaving appliances
(IOPP) 0970 location of emergency
installations
0400 FOOD AND CATERING 0694 evaluation, testing and
0155 prevention of pollution by
NLS in bulk (NLS)
(ILO 147) approval 0972 Permanent means of access
0410 galley, handling rooms on board training and
International Sewage 0695 instructions 0981 beams, frames, floors -
operational damage
0157 Pollution Prevention 0411 Ventilation
0696 maintenance and inspection
Certificate 0412 Lighting 0982 beams,
corrosion
frames, floors -
0158 Statement of Compliance 0413 Cleanliness 0697 Decision support system for
Masters on Passenger Ships
(CAS) 0983 hull - corrosion
0420 Provisions (quantity) 0699 other (life-saving) 0984 hull - cracking
0159 Interim Statement of
Compliance (CAS) 0421 Provisions (quality)
0700 FIRE SAFETY MEASURES 0985 bulkheads - corrosion
0430 water, pipes and tanks
0160 certificate ship security
International
0440 Cold rooms
0710 fire prevention
0986 bulkheads - operational
0711 inert gas system damage
0171 Special Purpose Ship Safety 0441 Cold room temperature 0987 bulkheads - cracking
0712 Division – main zones
0174 INF Certificate of Fitness 0442 Cold room cleanliness 0713 Main vertical zone 0988 decks - corrosion
0180 tonnage 0450 Food personal hygiene 0989 decks - cracking
0190 logbooks / compulsory entries 0451 Food temperature 0714 Doors
zone
within main vertical

0452 Food segregation 0990 enhanced

inspection
programme of
0199 other (certificates) 0715 fire detection
CERTIFICATION AND 0460 Record of inspection 0716 Fire patrol 0991 survey report file
0200 WATCHKEEPING FOR 0499 other (food)
SEAFARERS 0720 readily availability of fire 0992 Thickness
Report
Measurement
fighting equipment
0500 WORKING SPACES (ILO
0221 certificates
officer
for master and 147)
0725 fixed fire extinguishing 0999 other (stability/structure)
0510 Ventilation installation 1000 ALARM SIGNALS
0222 certificate
watchkeeping
for ratings for
0515 Heating 0730 appliances equipment and
fire fighting 1010 general alarm
0223 certificates for radio personnel 0520 lighting 1011 General emergency alarm
0735 personal equipment
0530 Safe means of access 1012 Crew alarm
0224 certificate for personnel on
0736 Emergency Escape Breathing
tankers 0531 Safe
Ship
means of access Shore – Device 1020 fire alarm
0226 certificate for personnel on
fast rescue boats Safe means of access Deck
0739 Emergency Fire Pump 1030 steering-gear alarm
0532 –Hold/Tank, 0740 fire pumps 1040 engineers' alarm
certificate for advanced etc.
0227 fire-fighting Means of control (opening, 1050 inert gas alarm
0533 Obstruction/slipping, etc.
0741 closure of skylights, pumps, 1060 machinery controls alarm
0228 Documentary evidence for 0540 Protection machinery etc. machinery spaces)
personnel on passenger ships 1070 UMS-alarms
0541 Electrical 0743 Fire-dampers
documentary evidence for 1080 boiler-alarm
0542 Machinery 0745 Ventilation
0229 personnel on ro-ro passenger
1090 Opening/closing watertight
ships 0543 Steam
pipes
pipes and pressure
0746 jacketed piping system for doors alarm
manning specified by the high pressure fuel lines 1099 other (alarms)
0230 minimum safe manning 0550 Danger areas 0750 international shore connection
document 0551 Gas instruments 0755 Fire control plan – all ships 1100 CARRIAGE OF CARGO
AND DANGEROUS GOODS
0241 certificate for medical first aid 0552 Emergency cleaning devices
0760 Unattended Machinery spaces 1110 stowage of cargo
0250 certificate for personnel on
survival craft and rescue boats
0599 other (working spaces) (UMS) evidence 1115 cargo securing manual
0600 LIFESAVING APPLIANCES
0251 Certificate for medical care 0770 Doc of Compliance
Dangerous Goods
1120 grain
0610 lifeboats
0252 Evidence of basic training 0611 lifeboat inventory 0799 other (fire safety) 1125 Authorization
carriage
for grain

0253 Schedules
personnel
for watchkeeping 0613 stowage of lifeboats 0800 ACCIDENT PREVENTION
1130 stowage/packaging of
(ILO 147) dangerous goods
0260 rest period 0615 rescue boats
0810 personal equipment
0261 Records of rest
0616 rescue boat inventory
0815 Warning notices 1131 document of compliance on
dangerous goods
0617 fast rescue boat
0270 Endorsement by flag States 0820 protection machines/parts booklet for bulk cargo
0618 stowage of rescue boats 1132 loading/unloading/stowage
0272 Application for endorsement 0830 pipes, wires (insulation)
0620 inflatable liferafts 1140 other cargo
0299 other (STCW) 0850 Structural features (ship)
0625 rigid liferafts

73
Appendices

1150 loading
equipment
and unloading 1585 rate-of-turn indicator 1850 fire protection cargo deck area 2299 other (MARPOL/Annex III)
1590 international code of signals 1860 personal protection 2300 MARPOL - ANNEX V
1160 holds and tanks 1591 Life-saving signals 1870 special requirements 2310 placards
1170 dangerous goods codes 1592 Use of the automatic pilot 1880 cargo information 2320 garbage management plan
1190 Lashing material Record of testing and drill of 1885 tank entry 2330 garbage record book
1199 other (cargo) 1593 steering gear
1886 emergency towing 2399 other (MARPOL/Annex V)
1200 LOAD LINES 1594 Voyage or passage plan arrangements ISM RELATED
1210 overloading 1595 Navigation bridge visibility 1887 Safe access to tanker bows 2500 DEFICIENCIES
1220 freeboard marks 1596 Navigation records 1899 other (oil tankers) 2510 safety and enviromental
1230 railing, cat walks Distress messages: obligations 1900 MARPOL - ANNEX II policy
1597 and procedures company responsibility and
1240 cargo and other hatchways 1910 cargo record book 2515
1599 other (navigation) authority
1250 covers (hatchway-, portable-,
tarpaulins, etc.) 1600 RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS
1911 p & a manual
2520 designated person(s)
1920 efficient stripping
1260 windows, side scuttles 1611 functional requirements 2525 masters responsibility and
1925 residue discharge systems authority
1270 doors 1620 main installation 1930 tank-washing equipment 2530 resources and personnel
1275 ventilators, air pipes, casings 1621 MF radio installation prohibited discharge of NLS
1940 2535 development of plans for
1280 machinery space openings 1623 MF/HF radio installation slops shipboard operations
1282 manholes/flush scuttles 1625 INMARSAT ship earth station 1960 cargo heating systems - cat. B 2540 emergency preparedness
substances
1284 cargo ports and similar
openings 1635 maintenance/duplication of
equipment ventilation
reports and analysis of
1970 2545 non-conformities, accidents
1286 scuppers, inlets and discharges Performance standards for procedures/equipment and hazardous occurrences
1645 radio equipment 1980 pollution report
1288 freeing ports 2550 maintenance of the ship and
1290 lashings (timber) 1651 VHF radio installation 1990 ship type designation equipment
1299 other (load lines) facilities for reception of Shipboard marine pollution 2555 documentation
1655 marine safety information 1992 emergency plan for noxious
MOORING 2560 company verification, review
satellite EPIRB 406MHz/1.6 liquid substances and evaluation
1300 ARRANGEMENTS (ILO 1671
147) GHz 1999 other (MARPOL/Annex II) certification, verification and
2565 control
1310 ropes, wires 1673 VHF EPIRB SOLAS RELATED
1675 radar transponder 2000 OPERATIONAL 2599 other (ISM)
1320 anchoring devices DEFICIENCIES
1330 winches and capstans 1677 reserve source of energy BULK CARRIERS -
2010 muster list 2600 ADDITIONAL SAFETY
1340 adequate lighting 1680 radio log (diary) MEASURES
2015 communication
1399 other (mooring) 1685 Operation/maintenance 2610 bulkhead strength
2020 fire drills
1686 Homing device
1400 PROPULSION AND
AUXILIARY MACHINERY 1699 other (radio)
2025 abandon ship drills 2620 endorsement of cargo booklet
2030 damage control plan 2630 triangle mark
1410 propulsion main engine 1700 MARPOL - ANNEX I 2640 cargo density declaration
2035 fire control plan
1420 cleanliness of engine room 1705 shipboard oil pollution
emergency plan (SOPEP) 2040 bridge operation 2650 loading instrument
1430 auxiliary engine 2660 Water level indicator
1710 oil record book 2041 operation of GMDSS
1435 Gauges, thermometers, etc equipment 2699 other (bulk carriers)
1440 bilge pumping arrangements 1720 control of discharge of oil
2042 HSC operation ADDITIONAL MEASURES
1450 UMS-ship 1721 retention of oil on board
Monitoring of voyage or 2700 TO ENHANCE MARITIME
segregation of oil and water 2043 passage plan SECURITY
1460 guards/fencing around
dangerous machinery parts
1725 ballast
2045 cargo operation 2705 Ship security defects
1470 insulation wetted through (oil) 1730 oil filtering equipment 2715 Ship security alert system
2050 operation of machinery
1499 other (machinery) pumping, piping and
1735 discharge arrangements of oil 2055 manuals, instructions, etc. 2720 Ship security plan
1500 SAFETY OF NAVIGATION tankers establishment of working 2725 Ship security officer
2056 language on board
1510 Type approval equipment oil discharge monitoring and 2730 Access control to ship
1740 control system dangerous goods or harmful
1512 Operational limitations for
passenger ships
2060 substances in packaged form
2735 Security drills
1745 15 PPM alarm arrangements 2799 Other (Maritime security)
SAR coordination plan for 1750 oil/water interface detector 2070 Operation of Fire Protection
1514 passenger ships trading on Systems ADDITIONAL MEASURES
fixed routes 1760 standard discharge connection 2800 TO ENHANCE MARITIME
2071 Maintenance of Fire SAFETY
1530 radar 1770 SBT, CBT, COW Protection Systems
COW operations and 2815 Marking of IMO number
1540 gyro compass 1771 2080 Operation of Life Saving
equipment manual Appliances 2820 Continuous synopsis record
1541 magnetic compass Other (Additional maritime
1772 double hull construction Maintenance of Life Saving 2899
emergency steering position 2081 safety)
1542 communications/compass hydrostatically balanced Appliances
1773 loading 2900 MARPOL ANNEX IV
reading 2090 Evaluation of Crew
1543 Compass correction log 1775 Condition Assessment Scheme Performance 2910 Sewage treatment plan
1780 pollution report 2099 other (SOLAS/operational) 2920 Sewage comminuting system
1544 Automatic
(ARPA)
radar plotting aid
1790 ship type designation MARPOL RELATED 2930 Sewage discharge connection
1546 direction finder 1795 suspected discharge violation 2100 OPERATIONAL 2999 Other (MARPOL-Annex IV)
DEFICIENCIES
1550 lights, shapes, sound-signals 1799 other (MARPOL/Annex I) 9900 ALL OTHER
2110 oil and oily mixtures from DEFICIENCIES
1551 signalling lamp 1800 OIL, CHEMICAL TANKERS machinery spaces
1560 charts AND GAS CARRIERS deficiencies clearly hazardous
loading, unloading and to safety, health or
1561 Electronic charts (ECDIS) 1810 cargo area segregation 2115 cleaning procedures for cargo 9901 environment, specified in
air intakes/openings to spaces of tankers clear text
1565 Automatic
System (AIS)
Identification
1815 accommodation-, machinery- 2120 garbage
and control station spaces deficiencies not clearly
1566 Voyage data recorder (VDR) 2130 Shipboard marine pollution 9902 hazardous to safty, health or
1816 wheelhouse door, -window emergency operation environment, specified in
1567 GNSS receiver clear text
1820 cargo pumproom/handling 2199 other (MARPOL/operational)
1570 nautical publications spaces 2200 MARPOL - ANNEX III
1575 echo-sounding device 1825 spaces in cargo areas 2210 packaging
1580 speed and distance indicator 1830 cargo transfer 2220 marking and labeling
1581 rudder angle indicator 1835 cargo vent system 2230 documentation
1582 revolution counter 1836 temperature control
2240 stowage
1583 variable pitch indicator 1840 instrumentation

Source: Port State Control Manual of Tokyo MOU 2004

74
Appendices

Appendix E: The remedial actions in PSC inspection

Codes for action taken

Code

Deficiency action code

10 deficiency rectified
15 rectify deficiency at next port
16 rectify deficiency within 14 days
17 rectify deficiency before departure
18 rectify deficiency within 3 months
30 detainable deficiency
99 other (specify in clear text)

PSC inspection action code (tick as applicable)

40 next port informed

45 rectify detainable deficiencies at next port
50 flag State/consul informed
55 flag State consulted
70 recognized organization informed
85 investigation of contravention of discharge provisions (MARPOL)

Source: Port State Control Manual of Tokyo MOU 2004

75
 TONNAG LOAD LOAD LINE SOLAS SOLAS MARPOL COLREG ILO
Authority SOLAS 74 STCW 78
E 69 LINE 66 PROT 88 PROT 78 PROT 88 73/78 72 147**
Australia 21/05/82 29/07/68 07/02/97 17/08/83 17/08/83 07/02/97 14/10/87 07/11/83 29/02/80 -

Canada 18/07/94 14/01/70 - 08/05/78 - - 16/11/92 06/11/87 07/03/75 25/05/93

Chile 22/11/82 10/03/75 03/03/95 28/03/80 15/07/92 29/09/95 10/10/94 09/06/87 02/08/77 -
Appendices

China 08/04/80 05/10/73 03/02/95 07/01/80 17/12/82 03/02/95 01/07/83 08/06/81 07/01/80 -

Fiji 29/11/72 29/11/72 28/07/04 04/03/83 28/07/04 28/07/04 - 27/03/91 04/03/83 -

Hong Kong, China* 18/07/82 16/08/72 23/10/02 25/05/80 14/11/81 23/10/02 11/04/85 03/11/84 15/07/77 28/11/80

Indonesia 14/03/89 17/01/77 - 17/02/81 23/08/88 - 21/10/86 27/01/87 13/11/79 -

Japan 17/07/80 15/05/68 24/06/97 15/05/80 15/05/80 24/06/97 09/06/83 27/05/82 21/06/77 31/05/83

Republic of Korea 18/01/80 10/07/69 14/11/94 31/12/80 02/12/82 14/11/94 23/07/84 04/04/85 29/07/77 -

Malaysia 24/04/84 12/01/71 - 19/10/83 19/10/83 - 31/01/97 31/01/92 23/12/80 -

Source: Tokyo MoU 2004 Annual Report

New Zealand 06/01/78 05/02/70 03/06/01 23/02/90 23/02/90 03/06/01 25/09/98 30/07/86 26/11/76 -

76
Papua New Guine 25/10/93 18/05/76 - 12/11/80 - - 25/10/93 28/10/91 18/05/76 -

Philippines 06/09/78 04/03/69 - 15/12/81 - - 15/06/01 22/02/84 - -

Russian Federation 20/11/69 04/07/66 18/08/00 09/01/80 12/05/81 18/08/00 03/11/83 09/10/79 09/11/73 07/05/91

Singapore 06/06/85 21/09/71 18/08/99 16/03/81 01/06/84 10/08/99 01/11/90 01/05/88 29/04/77 -

Thailand 11/06/96 30/12/92 - 18/12/84 - - - 19/06/97 06/08/79 -

Vanuatu 13/01/89 28/07/82 26/11/90 28/07/82 28/07/82 14/09/92 13/04/89 22/04/91 28/07/82 -

Viet Nam 18/12/90 18/12/90 27/05/02 18/12/90 12/10/92 27/05/02 29/05/91 18/12/90 18/12/90 -
Appendix F: Table 3 The status of the relevant instrument in Tokyo MoU

Brunei Darussalam 23/10/86 06/03/87 - 23/10/86 23/10/86 - 23/10/86 23/10/86 05/02/87 -

DPR Korea 18/10/89 18/10/89 08/08/01 01/05/85 01/05/85 08/08/01 01/05/85 01/05/85 01/05/85 -

Macao, China - - - - - - - - - -

Solomon Islands - - - 30/06/04 - - - 01/06/94 12/03/82 -

Entry into force date 18/07/1982 21/07/1968 03/02/2000 25/05/1980 01/05/1981 03/02/2000 02/10/1983 28/04/1984 15/07/1977 28/11/1981
Appendices

Appendix G: Table 4 Port State inspection statistics of Tokyo MoU in 2004

No. of individual ships

No. of inspections with

No. of individual ships

Detention percentage
rate
No. of inspections

of

No. of detentions
deficiencies

Inspection
Authority

deficiencies
inspected

visited 1)

(%) '
(%)2)
No.
Australia 2,628 3,228 1,781 7,509 177 3,532 74.41 5.48
3)
Canada 374 388 243 1,012 29 1,514 24.70 7.47

Chile 519 576 246 643 28 1,232 42.13 4.86

China 3,017 3,897 3,073 16,040 194 7,956 37.92 4.98

Fiji 7 7 2 5 0 135 5.19 0

Hong Kong, China 697 745 643 3,244 169 3,742 18.63 22.68

Indonesia 32 32 4 20 1 4,006 0.80 3.12

Japan 3,260 4,896 3,735 22,781 459 6,862 47.51 9.38

Republic of Korea 2,550 3,309 1,878 5,911 106 6,522 39.10 3.20
Malaysia 340 353 131 630 5 3,652 9.31 1.42

New Zealand 420 520 278 956 14 771 54.47 2.69

Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 307 0 0

Philippines 342 378 240 1,395 9 1,730 19.77 2.38

3)
Russian Federation 607 983 780 5,563 110 799 75.97 11.19

Singapore 1,322 1,612 1,011 5,223 64 7,762 17.03 3.97

Thailand 134 153 117 474 3 2,151 6.23 1.96

Vanuatu 6 6 4 18 0 32 18.75 0
Vietnam 290 317 230 1,739 25 1,153 25.15 7.89

Total 10,922 21,400 14,396 73,163 1,393 Regional Regional Regional

15,838 approx. 6.51%
69%

1) LMIU data for 2004.

2) Method for calculation of inspection rate is changed from 2004. See also second paragraph in page 12.
3) Data are only for the Pacific ports

Source: Tokyo MoU 2004 Annual Report

77
Appendices

Appendix H: Table 5 The number of inspected ships per PSC officer in APEC
economies

Number of Ships inspected per

Economies Ships inspected
PSC officers PSC officer
Australia 2,753 - -
Canada 350 200 1.75
Chile - 6 -
China 1,510 450 3.36
Hong Kong 900 13 69.23
Indonesia 853 26 32.81
Japan 3,579 - -
Korea 1,846 10 184.60
Malaysia 338 n.a. -
Mexico - 20 -
New Zealand 743 20 37.15
Papua New Guinea 0 n.a. -
Peru - 50 -
Philippines 135 100 1.35
Russia 428 57 7.51
Singapore 1,019 - -
Taipei - 200 -
Thailand 83 6 13.83

Source: KMI and KIMFT(2002), p.63.

78