Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

Phenomenological Distinctions and

the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths
Tze-wan Kwan
關子尹
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
PEACE II
21-25 September 2006, University of Tokyo

I. Introduction：Why comparing? How to compare?

This paper attempts to put two separate issues into contrast: “phenomenological distinctions” on the
one hand, and “Buddhist doctrine of two truths” on the other. Obviously, they both deal with
distinctions or differentiations in some sense. But with so many distinctions around, why should we
precisely compare these two? This is because these two distinctions are by no means low level
distinctions, but exhibit as high-order and in fact the most fundamental distinctions, which have
important bearing on the ultimate concerns respectively of phenomenology and of Buddhism. Given
their crucial importance in their respective theoretical contexts, it appears beneficial for us to put the
two captioned issues into stark contrast so that these two apparently disparate issues can shed light on
each other.

Conceptual distinctions can be drawn according to form or to content. Formal distinctions have to do
with the way how the distinctions are made, for example, whether we are talking about bifurcation,
tripartition, tetra-division, and so forth, or whether the distinguished items are relationally in parallel,
subordinating, opposing, or mutually dependent, etc. In regard to content, conceptual distinctions can
be made on the intension or extension of the concept, but to the last analysis there must always be a
subject matter for the distinction, according to which a set of distinguished items are always involved.
Some classical examples of such distinctions would be Plato’s distinction between different capacities
of the human soul, or Aristotle’s distinction between different kinds of movements, and Kant’s
distinction between different types of theologies, etc. When we are now trying to compare
phenomenological distinctions to the Buddhist doctrine of two truths, which also entail distinctions,
our comparison can accordingly be made in regard to form or to content. However, we must point out
at the outset that the latter approach, i.e. according to content, involves complications and difficulties
which have to be handled very carefully. There are two reasons for this:
1. Overall speaking, phenomenology and Buddhism, which have their roots in Western and Eastern
traditions respectively, do exhibit certain important themes of common interest, as, for instance,
consciousness (vijñāna) or being (bhāva). Yet, in regard to their basic concerns, phenomenology
and Buddhism are in fact very different. For example, despite the breadth in scope of its century
old tradition, phenomenology never touched upon the main concern of Buddhism in providing

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ways of deliverance (mukti) of the common walks of life. To be more specific, phenomenology
never handled the so-called asaṃskṛta dharma (無為法), which can be rendered into English
precisely as “unconditioned or non-phenomenal elements.” 1 Consequently, the similar themes
apparently common to phenomenology and Buddhism are in fact quite incommensurable.
Therefore, in our comparison, we have to be mindful of this constraint and should be very clear
about why and to which extent we are making the comparison. Otherwise, we will run the risk of
arriving at conclusions which are irrelevant or even inappropriate.
2. Although the various Buddhist schools rely on different sutras and have different doctrinal
emphases, they do share one common, uncontestable goal, namely, the attainment of the state of
“spiritual awakening or enlightenment”, which is precisely the root meaning of Buddha or bodhi.
But within the phenomenological tradition, it is much more difficult to single out such a common
goal. In fact, among the leading phenomenologists, it has been highly controversial which
“phenomenon” should be regarded as the most crucial and fundamental one. This makes a
comparison of phenomenology with Buddhism in regard to content very difficult.

On the contrary, a comparison of forms would be much easier, because in so doing, we only need to
focus on the formal relations of the concepts or the structure of the respective theories being compared.
For example, when comparing phenomenological distinctions to the Buddhist doctrine of two truths,
we only need to see if the two sides exhibit certain isomorphisms so as to infer that they might be
employing similar theoretical strategies, even though in respect of content they might be disparately
different. But at this point we must immediately clarify that, even when we are aiming at formal
comparison, it does not mean that we can totally do away with contents. Just as in natural entities, in
human knowledge, and in language usage form and content are inseparably bound to each other,
theoretical structures are also “hylomorphic” 2 in nature. Therefore, in our comparison of forms, we
also have to rely on contents, otherwise our comparison will have no way to unfold itself.

According to our above analysis, what we will do in this paper is the following: When comparing
“phenomenological distinctions” with “Buddhist doctrine of two truths”, we will start with a
comparison of the formal structures of the two issues and to argue that they both involves
“distinctions” of the highest order, the purpose of which is to bring out the ultimate concerns of the
respective theories or practices, whether these ultimate concerns are the constitution of world and
being (as in phenomenology), or final spiritual awakening (as in Buddhism). As to the question if
further comparison with respect to content can be made, we have to leave open at this point but will
explore cautiously in the course of our comparison.

1
Translation by William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, Web version
provide by Charles Muller (http://www.hm.tyg.jp/~acmuller/soothill/soothill-hodous.html , accessed 15 August 2006).
With the same token, similar Buddhist realms of discourse such as meditative deliverance (samādhi), emptiness (śūnyatā),
nirvana (nirvāṇa), supra-mundane wisdom (śrāvaka), etc. are all foreign to phenomenology.
2
Hylomorphisms of being, of knowledge, and of language are the basic positions of Aristotle, Kant, and Wilhelm von
Humboldt respectively.

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II. The Meaning of the “Doctrine of Two Truths” for the Theory and Practice of
Buddhism

Among the many Buddhist terminologies, that of “two truths” (satyadvaya) distinguishes itself as a
doctrine of the utmost importance, both in theory and in practice. Text-historically speaking, the
notion of satyadvaya was already implied in the Middle Agama (Madhyamāgama), and actually
mentioned in the Miscellaneous Agama (Samyuktāgama) and the Nirvana Sutras (Mahā-parinirvāṇa
sūtras), etc., although only in a very piecemeal and unsystematic fashion. But if we grasp the very
meaning of “two truths” sufficiently enough, we could readily convince ourselves that many major
sutras including the Diamond Sūtra, the Heart Sūtra, the Sandhinimocana-sūtra, or the
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra do convey the doctrine of “two truths” in some way. Because of the
importance of the doctrine of “two truths”, many basic teachings of Buddha such as “Four Noble
Truths” or “Twelve Links in the Chain of Existence” (twelve nidānas) can also be reformulated in
terms of this doctrine. 3 In the subsequent development of the abhidharma canon, the doctrine of “two
truths” was thematically expounded, first of all by Nāgārjuna (龍樹) and later also by Jñānagarbha (智
藏, 8th cent.) and Śāntarakṣita (寂護, 705-752 CE), etc. After the influx of Buddhism into China,
discussions on “two truths” became increasingly popular and even more sophisticated. Great Buddhist
monks including, Fayun (法雲, early 6th cent.), Zhiyi (智顗 538-597 CE) of the Tiantai School,
Jizang (吉藏 549-623 CE) of the San Lun (Mādhyamika) School, and Kuiji (窺基 632-682 CE) of the
Dharmalakṣaṇa (Yogācāra) School, etc. have all expounded the doctrine of “two truths” in great
details. Besides explaining the traditional term, they also proposed their own hierarchical
interpretations leading to multi-layered two-truth structures. The tradition of learning thus formed has
been well remarked by Zhiyi as follows: “The term ‘two truths’ can be found in many sutras, but its
meaning is subtle and has been understood differently leading to many controversies.” 4 As far as
social influence is concerned, the doctrine of “two truths” has had a profound influence on the
laypeople as well, the most remarkable example being Crown Prince Zhao-Ming of Liang Dynasty
(梁昭明太子), who, being an expert of the doctrine himself, has issued a decree asking all abbots,
princes and nobilities to submit essays in reply to his queries over the doctrine. 5

Most roughly expressed, “two truths” refer to “worldly truth” (世諦, 俗諦, saṃvṛti-satya)
and “real truth” (勝義諦, 真諦, paramārtha-satya); while the former refers to the truth as perceived
by the ordinary people, the later refers to truth in the eyes of the enlightened sage. Theoretically

3
SeeYin Shun (印順), Xingkongxue Tanyuan《性空學探源》, 1973, Taiwan, pp. 121-129.
4
Zhiyi, Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sutra. 智顗：
《法華玄義‧卷二上》(T33:702a). 「夫二諦者，名出眾經，而其
理難曉；世間紛紜，由來碩諍。」English translation is mine.
5
See Dao-Hsüan (596-667 CE), Guang Hong-Ming-Ji. 道宣：
《廣弘明集》卷二十四， 〈解二諦義令旨‧并答問〉(T52:247a
ff).

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speaking, as we have said at the outset, the notion of “two truths” or satyadvaya amounts to a kind of
distinction, which always serves a certain purpose. However, taking note of the different ways how the
“two truths” have been distinguished, and the controversies that came from them, it becomes
unmistakable, that the different versions of “two-truths” in history were serving different or at least
nuanced purposes. This makes it necessary for us to identify the various facets of the doctrine of
two-truths before we can meaningfully compare them to phenomenological distinctions. 6

1. “Two truths” as objective distinction for realities: Since the original meaning of satya is “true,
real actual, genuine…”, as so forth, some early Buddhists, especially those of the Sarvāstivāda
School (說一切有部) tried to employ the “two-truth” distinction precisely to differentiate what
they understood as real from what they understood as unreal. According to this horizon of
understanding, everyday phenomenal experiences such as a vase or a man are only the illusive
beings with no separate existence; they “are” only due to “unreal names” (假名saṃmuti) assigned
to them. On the contrary, realities are believed to be made up of the “minutest” atoms-like beings
(極微 paramāṇu) and the briefest unconcatenated moments of consciousness (剎那 kṣaṇa). This
way of distinguishing between the two “truths” left its traces in as early works as Vasubandhu’s
(世親) Abhidharmakośa 7 and (眾賢) Saṃghabhadra’s Abhidharmanyāyānusāra. 8 In short, in
Sarvāstivādaḥ or Hīnayāna Buddhism in general, the “two truth” distinction is used mainly in
establishing a cognitive-objective demarcation between the unreal and the real among worldly
existences. From the point of view of later Buddhist masters, this conception of “two truths” is of
course too simplistic. This is true especially if one takes into consideration the two-truth doctrines
of Jizang, Kuiji and Zhiyi. Jizang, for example, has in his works Meaning of Two Truths (二諦義)
and Profound Meaning of the Three Śāstras (三論玄義) 9 discussed and criticized extensively the
earlier receptions of the doctrine. Jizang’s most important contribution to the doctrine of “two
truths” was his distinction between two different approaches to the “two-truths” doctrine itself:
For him two truths” can be understood as “for-truths” (於諦) or as “teaching-truths” (教諦).
2. “For-truths”, or “two truths” as the steadfastness on two perspectives: Reflecting on the
general notion of “two truths” as distinguishable into “worldly truth” and “real truth,” Jizang
readily proposed that these two truths are in fact meant to be truths seen from the perspectives of
the ordinary people and of the enlightened respectively. Being “truths” in some sense, they are

6
Since the aim of this paper is to compare the Buddhist doctrine of two truths with phenomenological distinctions, and not
to delve into the over-complexities of the historical development of the doctrine of two truths itself, I will in the following
focus mainly on the version of the doctrine as expounded by Jizang, and will refer to other versions only if appropriate and
necessary.
7
學者通常認為《俱舍論》是世親未皈依大乘瑜伽行前的著作。其重視色界極微之立場可從《俱舍論》五位七十
五法中把色法列於五位之首可見，這與大乘《百法明門論》把「心法」和「心所有法」提前，而把本居首位的「色
法」放到第三位，可謂形成強烈對照。不過要補誌一點，近世西方著名印度學學者Erich Frauwallner 經研究後認為
《俱舍論》與《百法明門論》是同名的二人。
8
有關眾賢《順正理論》中分別判世俗諦與勝義諦為假（立）與實的理據，參見陳雁姿： 《陳那觀所緣緣論之研究》，
（香港：志蓮淨苑，1999） ，p.34ff。
9
吉藏：《三論玄義》(T45:3b)。

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valid so to speak “for” the two parties respectively, who in fact take seriously what they see as true.
So, for laypeople, the world’s being is a matter of certainty, which explains why they strive after it;
but for the enlightened sage, the world is “illusive”, “empty”, since from the enlightened point of
view, worldly phenomena are nothing more than the concatenation of various causes
(hetu-pratyaya) by sheer chances, and the insight into this underlying emptiness reveals itself as a
“truth”, which the enlightened tend to stay steadfast to! This approach to “two truths” is what
Jizang called “for-truths,” 10 which he described as follows：“Satya means truth, as being is true for
the layman, and emptiness true for the sage, both carrying the meaning of truth.” 11 For-truths
involve perspectives, but perspectives inevitably entail biases, which need to be transcended in the
long run. For laypeople, one good opportunity for transcendence is the contrasting view of the
enlightened in respect of the worldliness of the world, namely that, what appears to laypeople as
being could appear to others as “empty.” By way of such contrast, as suggested by Jizang, there is
the possibility “to convert laypeople opinion from being to emptiness.” 12 But this need of the
layman’s view for transcendence does not imply that the opposing view of the supposedly
enlightened that the world is “empty” is final and unbiased. In the more reflective Buddhist
doctrines, especially in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the thought of emptiness or śūnyatā can be
multi-faceted and some views of śūnyatā could be trapped in biases of their own. 13 For Buddhism,
a premature judgment of emptiness as uncompromisingly final is also in need of transcendence!
Therefore, Jizang made the overall judgment that “for-truths are erroneous.” 14
3. “Two truths” are mutually dependent：For Mahāyāna Buddhism, it is a basic insight that when
we are distinguishing between two truths, it must be borne in mind that the two truths are in fact
inter-dependent and can not be appropriately conceived when separated. In more practical terms,
enlightenment can not be manifested without reference to worldliness, and must be achieved
through unveiling the illusive nature of the latter. This is a basic insight common to the various
Mahāyāna teachings, examples of which are so numerous! In the Yogācāra doctrine of the “three
self-natures” and “three null-natures”, we see that in both cases, the third item is defined not on its
own, but as a distantiation from the first two. So, the “perfect true nature” (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva
圓成實性) is described as “always staying far away from the previous nature” (常遠離前性) 15 ,
and “ultimate null nature” (勝義無性) is depicted as “the subsequent is yielded by staying far
away from the earlier” (後由遠離前). 16 When trying to explain what the “fifth group of dharmas”
(i.e. asaṃskṛta) really means, Vasubandhu told us that rather than definable by itself, asaṃskṛta

10
Jizang, Meaning of Two Truths, hereafter MTT,吉藏： 《二諦義‧卷上》(T45:79ab)；Profound Discourse of the Mahāyāna
Doctrine, hereafter PDMD《大乘玄論‧卷三》(T45: 23b)。
11
Jizang, MTT, 吉藏： 《二諦義‧卷上》(T45:78c)。 「諦是實義，有於凡實，空於聖實，是二皆實。」
12
Jizang, MTT, 吉藏： 《二諦義‧卷中》 (T45:93b)。 「令眾生轉有入空」。
13
See Treatise on the Eighteen Emptinesses (十八空論), previously ascribed to Nāgārjuna but now considered
questionable, translated by Paramārtha (眞諦). (T31:861a-867a).
T

14
Jizang, MTT, 吉藏： 《二諦義‧卷上》 (T45:78c)。 「於諦是失」。
15
Vasubandhu, Thirty Verses on Consciousness-only (Trimśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi), verse 21.
16
Vasubandhu, Thirty Verses on Consciousness-only (Trimśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi), verse 24.

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acquires its meaning precisely through “what the first four groups of dharmas (collectively called
saṃskṛta ) reveal themselves to be”, namely as being illusive. 17 By the same token, nirvana as the
zeal of Buddhist practices should not be understood as a separate state totally cut off from worldly
life-death (reincarnation); on the contrary, nirvana must be achieved through a positive coming to
terms with this worldliness, through taking its challenges, through transcending it and being
settled with it. Consequently, some lapidary, but apparently contradictory and oxymoronic
statements in Buddhism such as that of “Life-Death is Nirvana” (生死即涅槃) 18 , “affliction (kleśa)
is awakening (bodhi)” (煩惱即菩提) 19 , or the well-known dictum “form is void and void is form”
(色即是空，空即是色) 20 are all arguably conveying this basic insight of the mutual dependence of
the two truths.
4. Two Truths doctrines as provisional and expedient strategies for heuristics: The emphasis of
the heuristic value of the doctrine of “two truths” was first made by Nāgārjuna. 21 Following the
Mādhyamika master, Jizang has further expounded this aspect of the doctrine and has maintained
that “two-truths” are to the last analysis “teaching-truths” (教諦). 22 He even maintained that “[the
two truths are] only doors leading to the doctrine, and have nothing to do with the theoretical
horizon.” 23 But to what extent are the two truths valuable as heuristics? Jizang’s answer is that it is
because people have different states of mind in regard to world perception and depending on the
way how these states of minds are biased, corresponding strategies could be helpful. Jizang
therefore diagnosed that “while the ordinary people hold steadfast to being, the two yānas
(dviyāna) tend to hold steadfast to emptiness.” 24 And because of these biases, there is the need “to
17
世親：《百法明門論》Vasubandhu, Sastra on the Door to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas.
18
A search for the dictum 生死即涅槃 in the Taisho Tripitaka returned 124 matching texts (each could contain multiple
matching strings), among which Jizang’s dictum can be found in his PDMD見吉藏《大乘玄論‧卷三》 (T45:47c).
19
A search for the dictum煩惱即菩提in the Taisho Tripitaka returned 103 matching texts. In the Platform Sutra of Hui
Neng, there is a refined expression of this thought: “The ordinary person is a Buddha. Vexation is bodhi. One moment with
a deluded mind you are an ordinary person; the next moment with the mind enlightened you are a Buddha. Clinging to
sense-objects this moment is vexation; detaching oneself the next moment is bodhi.” 「凡夫即佛，煩惱即菩提；前念迷
即凡夫，後念悟即佛；前念著境即煩惱，後念離境即菩提」 (T48:350b) English translation adopted from
http://www.ctzen.org/sunnyvale/enChineseZenMasterLec2.htm . Zhiyi even combined the two dicta about nirvana and
bodhi and said: “Realizing the sameness of life-death and nirvana is samādhi, attaining the sameness of affliction and
bodhi is wisdom.” 「體生死即涅槃名為定，達煩惱即菩提名為慧」. See Zhiyi《法華玄義‧卷九》(T33:790a). English
translation is mine.
20
While the dictum rūpaṃ śūnyatā, śūnyataiva rūpam色即是空，空即是色has become well-known even to the laypeople
mainly due to the popularity of the Heart Sutra, a search of the dictum in the Tripitaka returned as much as 102 matching
documents.
21
See Nāgārjuna, Mādhyamika śāstra,見龍樹： 《中論‧觀四諦品》 。全偈是「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法；一以世俗諦，
二第一義諦。若人不能知，分別於二諦，則於深佛法，不知真實義。若不依俗諦，不得第一諦；不得第一諦，則
不得涅槃。」吉藏在《二諦義》中除引用龍樹此偈外，亦曾引《大品般若經‧具足品》 「菩薩住二諦中為眾生說法」
一語，並且還主張說「是何物菩薩，今龍樹即其人也」 ，可見吉藏之二諦學說，基本上源出於龍樹［《二諦義‧卷
上》（T45:83a）］ 。
22
Jizang, MTT,吉藏： 《二諦義‧卷上》 (T45:78c)。
23
Jizang, PDMD, 吉藏：《大乘玄論‧卷一》(T45:15c)。Original text: 唯是教門，不關理境.
24
吉藏：《維摩經義疏‧卷二》(凡夫滯有，二乘偏滯空) (T38:928b)；See also智顗說．湛然略： 《維摩經略疏‧卷
一》(T38:572a). The so called “two yānas” or dviyāna refer to the first two of the three yānas, namely śrāvaka (聲聞) and
pratyekabuddha (緣覺) who still fall way short of final enlightenment. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, members of the third yāna
(bodhisattvas) are supposed to differ from those of the first two yānas (śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas) precisely in their

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speak about emptiness to those who are perplexed by being, and speak about being to those who
are perplexed by emptiness.” 25 By the same token, Hui Neng, the sixth patriarch of the Chinese
Ch’an School, also taught that, “When someone asks you about the meaning [of the doctrine],
reply with nothingness if he asks about being, reply with being if he asks about nothingness, reply
with the sacred if he asks about the lay, reply with the lay if he asks about the sacred. The two
ways are interrelated as such, that we have as a result the middle way.” 26 This strategy of Hui
Neng also suggested the main concern of the issue to be mainly therapeutic in nature, as Jizang
himself so aptly puts it: “Two truths as doors leading to the doctrine are nothing but the medicine
for the sickness of sentient beings.” 27 This again testify to Jizang’s basic judgment that despite its
seminal role in the development of Buddhism the doctrine of two truths “has nothing to do with
the meaning of the doctrine itself”, but is merely a matter of “temporary expediency” (權宜方便).
5. Two truths should be combined to yield the “first truth of the middle way”： As a kind of
distinction, the doctrine of two truths is of course destined to distinguishes between the worldly
and the enlightened, or between the lay and the sacred. But after clarifying the provisional,
expedient, and therapeutic character of the distinction, we realized that to the last analysis the talk
about the two truths are meant only to strategically restrict the two extremes of steadfastness on
being or on nothingness. Such an insight eventually leads one back to the fact that in Buddhism,
the doctrine of two truths is only a strategic way of presenting the “first truth of the middle way”
(中道第一義諦), which is the central teaching of Buddhism, emphasized by but not limited to the
Mādhyamika school. Although Jizang has discussed the doctrine of two truths in great details, he
reflectively limited the validity of the doctrine as follows: “with regard to that which can be
expressed, there are two truths; but with regard to that which is to be expressed, there is only one
truth.” 28 As the main descendent of Mādhyamika Buddhism in China, Jizang remained loyal to the
“eight negations” (八不) of Nāgārjuna, and declared that the “middle way” is “neither enlightened
nor worldly.” 29 This apparently paradoxical attitude in fact suggests that the middle way is not
exclusively on either side of the two extremes (遠離二邊). This emphasis of the “middle way” has
great bearing on the practices of the Buddhist way of living. It suggests that Buddhism has to be
practiced inside the world and not outside of it. It means that while the Buddhist should detach
himself from the aggregation of worldliness, this detachment should not be achieved through
seeking refuge in the realm of nothingness. On the contrary, it suggests that the truly enlightened

remaining mindful of the world’s sufferings even after their own enlightenment.
25
Jizang, PDMD, 吉藏： 《大乘玄論‧卷一》(T45:23a) Original text: 為著有者說空，為著空者說有. See also Jizang’s
《中觀論疏‧卷七》(T42:108c). In《法華玄論‧卷一》, Jizang has put this as:「為滯空者說有」, (T34:361b).
26
惠能：《壇經‧付囑品》。「若有人問汝義。問有將無對。問無將有對。問凡以聖對。問聖以凡對。二道相因。
生中道義。」
27
Jizang, PDMD, 吉藏：《大乘玄論‧卷五》 (T45: 73a)。「二諦教門，只是眾生病藥」。
28
Jizang, PDMD, 吉藏：《大乘玄論‧卷一》(T45: 16b)。「能表為名，則有二諦；若從所表為名，則唯一諦」 。
29
Jizang, PDMD, 吉藏： 《大乘玄論‧卷一》(T45: 16c)。 「不真不俗」 。 In some even more reflective contexts, Jizang even
further declared the “first truth of the middle way” to be transcending even the distinction between the extremes and the
middle itself, see MTT,《二諦義》(T45:91a)「二是偏不二是中。偏是一邊中是一邊。偏之與中。還是二邊。二邊故
名世諦。非偏非中乃是中道第一義諦也。」

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should be capable of handling worldliness with “expedient skills” (upāyakauśalya 方便善巧). 30

Regarding this, Hui Neng made his point most succinctly as follows: “The Kingdom of Buddha is
in this world, within which enlightenment is to be sought. To seek enlightenment by separating
from this world is as absurd as to search for a rabbit’s horn.” 31 。The convergence of the two truths
into the middle way has exerted a profound influence on the subsequence development of Chinese
Buddhism. It is therefore totally understandable why contemporary Chinese Buddhism is
proposing the ideal of “pure land on earth (or in the human realm)”, which is totally in line with
the traditional Buddhist dicta of “affliction is bodhi” and “life-death is nirvana.”
6. All linguistic distinctions in Buddhism are to the last analysis a matter of temporary
expediency: After clarifying the expedient nature of the doctrine of two truths, we can readily
understand why in various Buddhist schools there was the need to further elaborate on every
possible distinctions between the two truths. In the subsequent development of Buddhism in China,
there were, for example, a four-fold distinction both in the Mādhyamika School (Jizang) and in the
Dharmalakṣaṇa School (Kuiji), and even a seven-fold distinction in the Tiantai School (Zhiyi).
Such elaborated distinctions have become necessary because on the one hand there was the need
for the different Buddhist schools to single out their basic insights in contrast to those of previous
schools 32 , and on the other hand, because there was the need to lift the biases of those who are
perplexed by the doctrine itself in different stages of their way to final enlightenment. Although
these manifold distinctions between two truths are no doubt of great significance for those who are
in search of the right path to final enlightenment, they should not be taken as absolute so easily,
because whatever distinctions are occasionally made, they are meant to serve some specifically
heuristic purposes only, the final aim is to reveal the middle way between any possible extremes.
In Meaning of Two Truths, Jizang therefore remarked that, in regard to the doctrine of two truths,
“non-distinction (不二) is the essence, while distinction (二) is for application” only. 33 To
explicate his point, Jizang employed the famous parable of the finger and the moon (指月) to
further elaborate: “The two truths are meant to express the principle of non-distinction, just like
the finger pointing at the moon; the intended is not the finger, which only helps to point at the
moon. This is the same as with the teaching of two truths, which is meant to express
non-distinction; the intended is not distinction itself, which only helps to attain non-distinction.

30
“Expedient skills” as akin to true enlightenment was an idea emphasized in the entire sutra/sastra tradition. A search of
the word方便善巧 in the Tripitaka returned 567 matching documents.
31
See 惠能： 《壇經‧般若品》 (T48:351c)。 「佛法在世間，不離世間覺；離世覓菩提，恰如求兔角」. English translation
adopted from The Sutra of Wei Lang, translated by Wong Mou-Lam (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1973, reprint
of 1944 London edition), pp. 37-38.
32
This is what has been known among Chinese Buddhist as panjiao (判教),or making judgment on the various schools of
the Buddhist teaching.
33
Jizang, MTT, 吉藏； 《二諦義‧卷下》(T45: 108b)。 「不二為體，二為用」 。English translation is mine. Please note that
here 不二 and 二, which mean literally “not two” and “two” respectively, are rendered as “non-distinction” and
“distinction”; the notions 體and 用, usually translated as “substance” and “function”, are here rendered as “essence” and
“application” respectively. Please also note that “non-distinction” is a term which is comparable to “advaita” in Sanskrit.

8
 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

That is why non-distinction is the essence of two truths.” 34 With the same token, we witness that
when Jizang was expounding his four-fold distinction of two truths, the general rule was that an
upper level of distinction (eg. Level B) would regard the previous level of distinction (eg. Level A)
in toto as worldly (relative) truth, while taking its negation or transcendence (ie. ~ Level A) as the
real truth of this current level of distinction (Level B). And for a possibly still upper level of
distinction (level C), the worldly and real truths are Level B distinction and ~ Level B respectively.
But in order to avoid infinite regress, he depicted the real truth of the fourth and for him final level
of distinction to be a state of “the forgetfulness of speech and extinction of thought (言忘慮
絕) .” 35 In this way, Jizang’s manifold distinctions of two truths lead us back to the notion of
acintya or the “surpassing of words and thought” (不可思議) 36 or the state of “the destruction of
speech and the extinction of all thoughts and intentions of the mind.” 37 It is also along this line of
thought that we touch upon the most paradoxical role Buddhism assigned to language. While
basically a bundle of “unreal names” (saṃmuti), language itself is still a very important means for
man to disentangle himself from biases of all sorts and to elevate himself to a higher and higher
state of enlightenment, although the final aim of such language activities is nothing but the
cancellation of language itself, which amounts also to the cancellation of all aggregations and
biased intentions of the mind, so that it may abide by the world in a state of deliverance and go
through life and death with a touch of nirvana.

Up to this point, we can conclude our discussion so far as follows: The Buddhist doctrine of two truths
can be assessed both from the theoretical and the practical aspects. Theoretically speaking, the
doctrine has left a legacy of the most refined and structured conceptual distinctions within the
Buddhist tradition. But whatever the distinction, each of the two distinguished truths should never be
assessed and accepted on its own, because by itself, it only reflects a biased “for-perspective”.

34
Jizang, MTT, 吉藏； 《二諦義‧卷下》(T45: 108b)。 「二諦為表不二之理，如指指月，意不在指，指令得月。二諦
教亦爾，二諦為表不二，意不在二，為令得於不二，是故以不二為二諦體。」 Using the same parable of the finger and
the moon, Jizang suggested elsewhere in the same work that the doctrine of the two truths is meant to enlighten the “child”
(小兒) and not the “grown-up” (大老子). The heuristic role of the doctrine is further manifested. See MTT,《二諦義‧卷
上》(T45: 90a-b)。
35
See Jizang, PDMD, 吉藏： 《大乘玄論‧卷一》(T45:15c). The expression used here was 言忘慮絕, which differed
slightly from言亡慮絕, as has been usually found in the sutra-sastra tradition. See also《中觀論疏‧卷一》(T42:12a-19b)。
Furthermore, Zhiyi’s seven-fold distinction of two truths (七種二諦) is not only more complex than Jizang’s four-fold
version (四重二諦), it also touches upon the gradual transition from the Piṭaka (Hīnayāna) School, through the
Intermediate and the Differentiated Schools (Mahāyāna) to the Complete or Perfect Mahāyāna School (藏、通、別、圓).
When Zhiyi was talking about the “two truth” distinction on the seventh level of the Complete Teaching, the supposed
“worldly truth” refers to the very distinction of the void, the unreal, and the middle (空、假、中), whereas the finally real
truth refers to the “perfect combination” of the above three moments (三諦圓融). See Zhiyi, Profound Meaning of the
Lotus Sutra. 智顗： 《法華玄義‧卷二下》.
36
「不可思議」指意理之深奧，不可以心思之，不可以言議之。吉藏：《法華義疏‧卷二》中曾引述《大智度論》
的說法指出： 「小乘法中無不可思議事，唯大乘法中有之」(T34: 480b)。此外，大乘經典中的《華嚴經》和《維摩
經》分別有另叫作《不可思議經》和《不可思議解脫經》，不可思議之重要可見。
37
「一切言語道斷，心行處滅」，語出《瓔珞經‧下》 。其他相類似言辭於大乘經論中，所在多見，如《華嚴經‧
卷五》(T9: 424c)、《大智度論‧卷五》(T25: 96c)、《摩訶止觀》（T46:27a, 54b） 。

9
Kwan

Therefore two truths distinctions must always be understood in toto, as schemes of demarcations,
which are always meant to lead one from the extremes back to the middle, or to the one. In this regard,
I consider the following summarizing remarks made by Song monk Fa Yun (法雲 1085-1158 CE)
extremely revealing: “As said by earlier sages, if the worldly truth and the real truth both disappear,
the ‘two truths’ eternally remains; if nothingness and being both perish, the teaching of the one still
prevails. From this we learn that steadfastness of either of the two sides leads to failure, while mutual
fusion of the two brings success.” 38 - Then on the practical side of the issue, the deeper we delve into
the waters of the two truths, the more will we realize that two truths distinctions are to the final
analysis mainly of practical interest. It turns out that the varied and manifold distinctions of two truths
are nothing more than expedient strategies that help prevent the practising Buddhists from holding
steadfast to different kinds of extremes in their way of seeking final enlightenment. Therefore,
although all distinctions are meaningful at some point, they are to the last analysis only heuristic in
nature and are meant to be transcended once certain biases have been overcome. Since biases of the
human mind are manifold, layers and layers of two truth distinctions need to be instilled, in order that
the biases can be focused, and then transcended, one layer after the other… As linguistic
formulations, two truth distinctions should never be taken into consideration too verbally. In
Buddhism, language is considered as basically illusive in nature; yet, language is employed
strategically to undo its own spell. This scenario is described by the Chinese Buddhist tradition as
“using language to solace language” (以言遣言). 39 But in order that this heuristic process can come to
a stop, the practicing Buddhist must aim at attaining a state where all expedient distinctions are
transcended and all thoughts and actions are unified in an undifferentiated and unmotivated middle
ground of what could be could nirvana. This realm of enlightenment where human language finds its
limit can best be exemplified by the legendary reaction of Vimalakīrti to Mañjuśrī, which is
subsequently depicted in the Chinese Buddhist tradition as “using silence to solace language” (以默遣
言). 40

III. “Phenomenology” and Its Various Distinctions

This paper attempts to compare the Buddhist doctrine of two truths with “phenomenological
distinctions.” Here I understand under “phenomenological distinctions” those distinctions which are
crucial for the theoretical basis of the respective phenomenological doctrines. But before these
distinctions can be handled, let me first clarify what I mean by phenomenology in this paper. The
common understanding of the term refers to the school of thought founded by Husserl at the turn of
the twentieth century and further developed by Heidegger and others. However, in this paper, I am

38
See Fa Yun (1085-1158 CE), Fanyi Mingyi Chi (Translation of Terms and Meanings), 法雲,《翻譯名義集》
(T54:1176b). Original text:「又先德云。真俗雙泯。二諦恒存。空有兩亡一昧常現。是知各執則失。互融則得。」
39
See inter alia the works of Hui Yuan (慧遠 523-592 CE) and Cheng Guan (澄觀 738-838 CE).
40
See Hui Yuan (523-592 CE), 《大乘義章‧卷一》(T44:482b), also his 《維摩義記‧卷六》(T38:492c).

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 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

proposing to broaden the conception of phenomenology to include two major figures of Western
philosophy, namely, Kant and Hegel. There are two kinds of reasons for doing this, external reasons as
well as internal reasons..

External reasons: It is well-known that Kant went through a decade long “meditative period” before
he finally published his magnum opus Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Yet, we learn from Kant’s
correspondence that at the beginning of or even before this period Kant was planning to write a major
work on the topic “The Boundaries between Sensibility and Reason” (Die Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit
und der Vernunft) . From the overview described by Kant, we see that if the book were to finish as
planned, it would have been structurally equivalent to a combined volume of all three Critiques he
subsequently published. Under the first, “theoretical part”, Kant planned to include “phenomenology
in general” and metaphysics. 41 From this we can reason that the so-called “phenomenology in
general” was in fact referring to what Kant subsequently called “transcendental analytic”, that part of
the first Kritik which is supposedly the epoch making and most important part (at least in the eyes of
the Marburger Schule). From this we can justifiably argue that putting Kant’s work under a broad
concept of phenomenology is at least not against Kant’s own intention. As with Hegel, the mere fact
that he named his first major work Phänomenologie des Geistes makes it rather safe for us to refile the
same claim. However, if we feel uneasy to blur the concept of phenomenology by including these
“pre-phenomenological” doctrines, then all we need to do to ease such complaints is to mention the
fact that taking such a broad understanding of phenomenology was also in line with Husserl, the
founder of present day phenomenology. In a letter written to Dietrich Mahnke, Husserl pointed out
that phenomenology is in fact “the first entelechy of German philosophy, the philosophy of ‘German
Idealism’.” 42

Internal reasons: There are a number of reasons why Kant and Hegel are included in the comparison.
The first and foremost reason is that both Kant and Hegel have made extremely important conceptual
distinctions on the highest theoretical level which are comparable both to distinctions made by
Husserl and Heidegger and to the Buddhist doctrine. Secondly, their inclusion allows us to have more
samples for our comparison so that the isomorphisms in theoretical strategies we are looking for will

41
See Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz on 21 February 1772, Kants Gesmmelte Schriften (KGS), Band X, p. 129；here the term
“phaenomologie überhaupt” was different in spelling then later usages. And in another even earlier letter to J.H. Lambert
dated 2 September 1770, Kant also used the concept “phaenomologia generalis” to express the same thought, see KGS,
Band X, p.96 [Please note the spelling of the word “phaenomologie(ia)” which differed from later usages]. At last we
should note that Kant eventually gave up using the term phenomenology on such a high theoretical level, but in his late
work Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786), he still employed the term “Phänomenologie” to refer
to problems related to natural motion under the category of modality, see KGS, Band IV, pp. 477, 558-560.
42
Husserl’s original wordings were to relate phenomenology as “echte Entelechie der deutschen Philosophie, der des
‘deutschen Idealism.’ ”. See Edmund Husserl: Briefwechsel, Band III, hrsg. von Karl Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1994), p.432., cited in Rudolf Haller’s review of Husserls Briefwechsel [...], Grazer Philosophische Studien, volume 52,
1996-97, pp.227-236. For more discussion on this point, see Tze-wan Kwan “Periodization and Nomenclature in the
Historiography of Western Philosophy”, in 《現代哲學》(Xiandai Zhexue), No. 81, (No. 2, 2005) Guangzhou, Zhongshan
University, 2005.04, pp. 69-90.

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Kwan

be more readily visible. Thirdly, this inclusion allows us to identify cardinal issues of the
phenomenological movement which are more long-lasting in their significance.

With the inclusion of Kant and Hegel in to our comparison, the following question arises: If we take
the doctrine of “two truths” as pertaining to a major conceptual distinction of Buddhism, which
distinction than in the phenomenological tradition should we single out which is comparable in
importance? But regarding this question, we have already pointed out in the introductory section of
this paper that within the narrower or broader tradition of phenomenology, it is indeed difficult to spot
out one particular conceptual distinction which is comparable, at least terminologically, to that of the
Buddhist distinction between “two truths.” In fact it was because of this “shortage” that we have
resorted to the present attempt of cross cultural comparison. Consequently, what we can do in the
following is to scrutinize the four main figures Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger separately, to see
what conceptual distinctions were cardinal to their work. In so doing, we hope that some isomorphic
relations which are philosophically significant might eventually pop up.

A. Kant’s Distinction between “Phaenomena” and “Noumena”

a. In Kant’s philosophy, there are many important distinctions, but if we are to name the most
cardinal one, than I would no doubt opt for the distinction Kant made between “phaenomena and
noumena”, which obviously has its origin in Plato. It is commonplace, that, obviously due to
Parmenides’ influence, Plato showed a preference for the transcendent world of ideas to the
sensible world of experience. In his famous simile of the divided line of his Republic, Plato
proposed a tetra-division of being and knowledge. In this tetra-division, the lower two were
collectively described as sensible world (kosmos horaton (horoumenon)) whereas the upper two as
“intelligible world” (kosmos noeton (nooumenon)). 43 What Plato called sensible world has been
named by his posterity as “phenomenon”, a famous example being Aristotle attempt of the “rescue
of phenomena” in the face of Plato’s relative neglect of it. For Kant, the reiteration of this
distinction of old is of the greatest theoretical importance. This can be judged by the fact that the
chapter bearing the title “The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in general into Phenomena
und Noumena” was made the concluding chapter of the “Transcendental Analytic” , which is that
part of the First Critique which corresponds by and large to what Kant depicted earlier as
“phenomenology in general.” From the theoretical point of view, the most important thing is that
in making his new distinction, Kant clearly declares that it is phenomena which are to be regarded
as “real”, whereas noumena are only “problematic”. 44 From a philosophy-historical point of view,
this maneuver of Kant amounts to a drastic and conclusive rehabilitation of the experiential or
phenomenal realm two millennia after the Platonic legacy. This I think will have a lot to do with

43
See Plato, Republic, Book VI, 508c, 509d etc.
44
See Tze-wan Kwan, “On Kant's real/problematic distinction between Phaenomena and Noumena”, in: Tunghai Journal,
（東海學報）Vol.26, 1985, pp.173-209.

12
 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

the emphasis of and high regard for the terms Phänomen and Phänomenologie in the subsequent
development of Western philosophy.
b. Besides the above distinction, Kant also introduced another distinction which is at least of
comparable importance, the “empirical—transcendental” distinction. This second distinction
differs from the first distinction greatly because the two distinctions are not parallel to each other
and are addressing two different orders of theoretical questions; therefore, they are not
interchangeable at all. Whereas the first distinction deals with an “assignment of reality”, the
second distinction deals with the “justification” of that kind of reality Kant is now arguing for.
Strategically speaking, the purpose of distinguishing between the empirical and the transcendental
is to give justification for the realm of “phenomena” or experience. Kant’s position is that we have
to stand firmly on the “fruitful Bathos” of empirical fact, and then follow the hints provided by the
“combinations” (Verbindungen) as shown in our experience to retrospectively argue for the
necessity of a “transcendental realm”, which is nothing other than the a aprioi “conditions of
possibilities” of the “combined” experience as we actually come across in our everyday world. To
further explicate this theoretical strategy, this second distinction can be further elaborated as the
distinction between “empirical reality” and “transcendental ideality.” This two notions are in fact a
pair of mutually dependent principles that explain what human knowledge is; they are so
intimately related that they should be regarded as the two sides of the same coin. In fact, what
Kant calls Transzendentalphilosophie is founded basically on this second distinction. Concretely
speaking, “empirical reality” and “transcendental ideality” must be affirmed together. Here, the
principle of empirical reality requires that, if we try to assert the reality of experience, what we
should be asserting is precisely “things” as they appear to us and not as they are in themselves. In
other words, the reality Kant is arguing for is precisely not that kind of transcendent reality
conceived by Plato, but the certainty of immediate experience as such. But in order to avoid the
impasse of Humean skepticism, Kant supplements empirical reality from the very start with
transcendental ideality, which accounts from the very start for the conditions of possibility of the
synthetic combinations of experience which Hume found so difficult to deal with. However, in
order to avoid the dogmatic assertion of rationalism, Kant declares that the transcendental
conditions of possibility of experience (forms of intuition and arguably also the categories of
understanding) are only ideal (ie. not real), in the sense that apart from their role in supplying such
conditions for the empirically real, they “are nothing”, i.e., they do not pertain to any independent
existence. 45
c. Kant’s transcendental philosophy allows us to acknowledge and handle with experience “as such”,
i.e., in the way they are presented to us. In order to feel certain about phenomenal experience, we
indeed can conceive that it is made possible through various external and internal conditions. But
for Kant, these conditions can never be absolutely and exclusively determined, at least not through
our own finite intelligence. Therefore, externally, Kant only talks about objects as such but not

45
Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A28/B44.

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Kwan

objective existence. 46 Internally, when Kant talks about the human subject, what he is dealing
with are function (Funktionen), activities (Tätigkeiten, Handlungen), or uses (Gebräuche), but
never a mind substance or an independently existing subject. Compared with the subjectivists after
him, Kant’s philosophical position is a much more humble one.
d. While Kant was so stringent about objective and subjective existence in his theoretical philosophy,
his position in practical philosophy appeared at first glance to be a much looser one, for here he
did make allowance for the immortality of the soul, for the freedom of will, and for the existence
of God. But at this point we must immediately point out that these three “assertions” are for Kant
only “postulates of pure practical reason.” In other words, they are not valid as “theoretical
dogmas,” but are “presuppositions of necessarily practical import” 47 of human kind as a moral
agent who has to deal his own weaknesses in moral practices. After all, the objectively and
subjectively absolute are for Kant what finite human understanding cannot presumptuously touch
upon.
e. Of the two distinctions mentioned above, while the second distinction between “empirical” and
“transcendental” is theoretically more complex, it is the first distinction between “phenomena”
and “noumena” which is the more fundamental. For without the first distinction, the second would
become pointless. This is because the second distinction is in place only to provide justification for
the “phenomenal”, which Kant attempts to rehabilitate by drawing the first distinction. As with the
“noumenal” side of the first distinction, Kant’s intention seems to be one that assigns it to the
realm of “problema”, “projection”, and “postulates”, which are necessitated only from the human
point of view as a result of human finitude. This humanistic interest behind Kant’s distinctions
renders the role he played in the phenomenological tradition unmistakable.
f. If we use the Buddhist doctrines of two truths as a measuring rod, we can say that Kant’s
phenomena-noumena distinction is very similar both in form and content to the two-truth
distinction of the Sarvāstivāda School. This is because Kant’s distinction between phenomena (the
real) and noumena (the problematic) is formally speaking a distinction in regard to truth
assignments. However, in terms of the outcomes of the distinction, the Sarvāstivāda distinction
between the unreal nature of phenomenal experience and the real nature of the “minutest” is much
more akin to Plato or even Democritus than to Kant, who in fact turned the truth assignment
up-side-down. But with this assignment of phenomena to the real and noumena to the problematic
(projected), this basic distinction of Kant proves itself to be philosophically much more reflective
and for the subsequent development of related problems much more epoche-making than what the
Sarvāstivāda distinction has meant for the subsequent development of Buddhism. Furthermore,
although Kant’s “phenomena-noumena” distinction resembles the Sarvāstivāda distinction in form,
the notion of empirical reality implied by his “empirical-transcendental” distinction conveyed an
insight into the “suchness” (如如) of the world of experience which can only be found in

46
For Kant, the final origin of manifolds should be left undetermined. See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B145.
47
Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, KGS, Band V, p. 132. english translation by L.W. Beck.

14
 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

Mahāyāna Buddhism. More concretely expressed, although Kant assigned “reality” (being) to the
empirical and “ideality” to the transcendental, he showed no traces of any steadfastness on the
extremes of either reality or ideality: externally he was not anxious about proving the independent
existence of things, internally he did not make any presumptuous attempt to prove the existence of
an absolute subject. Rather, he remained content with the grounding of human experience as such
and of human intellectual activities as such. This style of philosophizing, according to my opinion,
still exhibits certain uniqueness, which Western philosophy and philosophy in general can learn
from.

B. Hegel’s Distinction between “Consciousness” and “Spirit”

a. We have remarked at the outset that the very concept of “phenomenon” is itself highly
controversial. If phenomenon in Kant refers to human experience, phenomenon in Hegel refers to
a very different domain, namely, to Spirit (Geist). This can be testified by the very title of Hegel’s
first major work: “Phänomenologie des Geistes.” Correspondingly, if we are to name a cardinal
distinction in Hegel’s system, we will have no better choice than the distinction between
“consciousness” and “Spirit”. In Hegel’s philosophy, the relation between consciousness and Spirit
has been a very subtle one, for consciousness and Spirit are in one sense “non-identical” and in
another “non-dual”, or they are at once “not the same” and “the same”, which is a position that
apparently violates the principle of non-contradiction in formal logic. In this cardinal distinction,
consciousness refers to “natural consciousness” or that of our everyday existence, and Spirit refers
to what Hegel called “Absolute Spirit” (or “das Absolute,” ontologically considered). 48
Consciousness and Spirit are not the same because while consciousness always reflects the state of
mind seen from a particular point of view, Spirit always represents the view of “absolute
knowledge”. Consciousness and Spirit are on the other hand “the same” (or non-dual, advaita)
because Hegel thinks that all particular consciousnesses and their views are engendered from the
Absolute according to an “internal purposiveness” intrinsic to the Absolute itself. While the
Absolute (knowledge) as the summation of all existence and views is capable of viewing the entire
existence through its absolute vantage point, it also requires the various stages of consciousness to
unfold and display themselves one after the other according to its absolute plan, the purpose of
which is to allow the Absolute itself to enjoy the riches of the whole range of existence precisely
from the manifold views which are characteristic of them. 49 This arrangement of the Absolute
Spirit to gain knowledge of its own entire self by self-degradation into particular consciousnesses
is what Hegel called the “cunning of [absolute] reason” (List der Vernunft). 50

48
Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Suhrkamp, Band 3, p.70f.
49
Jizang shows the same attitude of leaving room for common understanding to hold its own truth. See his word「於凡是
有名俗諦故，萬法不失」。Jizang, PDMD,《大乘玄論‧卷一》(T45: 23b)。
50
Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik II, Suhrkamp, Band 6, p. 452; 另參見 Enzyklopädie... (Lesser Logic), §209, Suhrkamp,

15
Kwan

b. This non-duality, or in Hegel’s own word, Sichselbstgleichheit 51 or self-sameness of

consciousness and Spirit, can only be fully understood from the point of view of the Absolute
Spirit; from the points of view of individual consciousnesses, however, owing to their bondage to
their own perspective, their self-sameness with the Absolute Spirit is but not immediately
transparent to them. However, as Hegel in his Phänomenologie des Geistes painstakingly showed,
consciousness can step by step free itself from this bondage by gaining insight into its own
one-sidedness (Einseitigkeit) and by negating it. Although Hegel described this process of
self-education of consciousness as full of doubt and even as a “highway of despair”, he did
consider consciousness as capable of arriving gradually at a turning point (Punkt) 52 where the
programme of Absolute Spirit will become clear. This process of semi-conscious approach to
Spirit has been depicted by Hegel with the Kantian notion of deduction (Deduktion). 53
c. A comparison of Hegel’s philosophy with Buddhism will show a lot of isomorphisms, although by
definition these isomorphisms are only formal in nature. At the first place, Hegel’s
consciousness-Spirit distinction is very similar to the Buddhist distinction between worldly and
real truths, especially the more sophisticated versions as expounded in the Mahāyāna teachings. In
a sense, consciousness and Spirit represent the two perspectives of the ordinary man and the
Absolute, which are very akin to Jizang’s “for-truths.” This juxtaposition of perspectives is what
Kant did not emphasize. 54 The distinction between consciousness and Spirit is a distinction
between the ordinary mind and the mind of the sage. Kojève has precisely used the notion of
“sage” (Wise Man) to depict the vantage point of Absolute Spirit. 55 Furthermore, Hegel’s idea of
the “self-sameness” of consciousness and Spirit is also comparable, at least formally, to the
Buddhist conception that the two truths should be combined into the one truth of the middle way.
d. Besides the cardinal distinction between consciousness and Spirit, there is in Hegel’s philosophy
another highly related distinction that deserves our attention. This involves a tripartition instead of
a bifurcation, and is described by Hegel as the “three moments of the logical,” which are nothing
but three basic modes of thought. In his Lesser Logic, Hegel defined these three moments as
follows: “(a) the Abstract side, or that of the understanding: (b) the Dialectical, or that of negative
reason: (g) the Speculative, or that of positive reason.” 56 From the comparative point of view, this
tripartition of the “logical” or modes of thought happens to be very similar in form to the doctrine
of the three self-natures (三自性) of the Yogācāra tradition, namely 遍計所執性
(parikalpitah-svabhāva), 依他起性 (paratantra-svabhāva), 圓成實性

Band 8, p.365.
51
Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I, Suhrkamp, Band 5, p.212; Phänomenologie des Geistes, p.53.
52
Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 81.
53
Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, , Band 5, p.43. Here Hegel characterized his programme of a Phänomenologie des
Geistes as „Deduktion“.。
54
Kant only emphasizes the perspective of the human. The possible perspective of the “noumenal” is not juxtaposed, but
only problematically “projected” from the human perspective. According to Kant, despite its “logical possibility”, the
perspective of the noumenal has to be “restricted”.
55
Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel (Paris: Gallimard, 1947, rep. 1968), p. 449ff.
56
Hegel, Enzyklopädie... (Lesser Logic), §79, Suhrkamp, Band 8, p. 168; for more explanation of the three “moments”, see
§80-82.

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 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

(pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). 57 As far as the form is concerned, these two schemes of distinction are
nearly parallel to each other, for they both have to do with the development of the mind from
stages of attachment or bondage to one-sided views, through stages of doubt and self-reflection, to
the final stage of enlightenment of “absolute” knowledge. Another interesting thing is that
although the “three moments of the logical” is a tripartition, it is but perfectly compatible with the
consciousness-Spirit bifurcation, just as the doctrine of three self-natures is perfectly compatible
with the doctrine of two truths in Buddhism. With the same token, Hegel’s dialectics in the broad
sense and the manifold two-truth structures of the various Mahāyāna schools are both rich in
heuristic meaning, no matter for the Buddhist practitioner or for the speculative philosopher.
e. In the above we have shown that Hegel’s philosophy and Buddhism have much in common in
regard to their formal structures. But as soon as we put these formal isomorphisms aside and look
closer into their theoretical concerns and contents, we notice immediately that these two systems
of thought are drastically different. Basically, although there are much discrepancy among the
various Buddhist schools, they more or less share the same final aim of final enlightenment or
nirvana, which suggests a way of life on earth that detaches human beings from worldly bondage
and sufferings. On the contrary, Hegel’s philosophy aims at the systematic construction of the
entire creation which it professes to summarize from the perspective of the Absolute Mind. In this
way, Hegel’s system turns out to be the integration and identification of Being and Thought, a
most ambitious project ever undertaken in the history of Western philosophy. This theoretical
outcome, however, has become highly controversial, and the most important query has been
whether the absolutized objective idealism of Hegel would not lead to a closed system which
would be detrimental to the future development of philosophy. Among many of such criticisms,
we found leading voices like that of Gadamer and Ricoeur. 58

C. Husserl’s distinction between the mudane-natural and the transcendental-phenomenological

a. Husserl’s thought has seen many changes since it’s starting phase which was influenced by logic
and mathematics. But if we are to suggest the most important conceptual distinction which
57
The three self-natures were extensively discussed in the Yogācāra tradition, the most eminent source being the Sutra of
the Explication of the Underlying Meaning (Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra)《解深密經‧卷二》(T16: 693b-694a)；Thirty Verses
on Consciousness-only (Trimśikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi)《唯識三十論頌》(T31: 61a)；and Analysis of the Middle and the
Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāsya)《辯中邊論》(T31: 470a), etc.
58
Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s skeptical attitude towards Hegel can be seen from the following dialogue between the two. See
Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer,: “General Discussion: The Conflict of Interpretations”, Phenomenology: Dialogues
and Bridges, edited by Bruzina and Wilshire (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), pp. 299-320. Here I am quoting the most
relevant passages: 1. Gadamer: “About Hegel, I have my reservations, but in my contribution here I tried to find a way of
overcoming the Hegelian end-point [...]” (p.314). 2. Ricoeur: “I am entirely on the side of Prof. Gadamer when he says
that we have to do without a philosophy of absolute knowledge. This is in fact the lament of modern philosophy, that we
have to raise Hegelian problems without the Hegelian solution. Each time we speak of negation, of dialectics, we are in
fact the heirs of the system in ruins. In a sense, I perceive phenomenology, existential philosophy, and hermeneutics as an
attempt to do the promised rational job in this situation of the impossibility of the system, and with the limiting idea not of
there being something an sich, but simply agreement.” (p.319)

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Kwan

signifies his entire legacy, I would focus myself on his later position of transcendental
phenomenology and name his distinction between the “natural” and the “phenomenological” as his
signature idea. Since another way to make the same distinction is to distinguish between
“mundane” and “transcendental,” so we can conjoin the two distinctions and speak of a tension
between “mundane nature” and “transcendental phenomenology” in Husserl. This distinction is so
important that nearly all of Husserl’s central ideas after his so-called “transcendental turn” are
derived from it, as for instance, the “transcendental reduction,” the “noesis-noema” distinction,
transcendental subjectivity, constitution, etc.
b. With our earlier discussion of the Buddhist doctrine of two truths as a backdrop, we can say that
Husserl’s cardinal distinction between “mundane nature” and “transcendental phenomenology” 59
is higher in order than Kant’s “phenomena-noumena” distinction or the “empirical-transcendental”
distinction. To use Jizang’s words, Husserl’s distinction is one drawn between two “for-truths”, i.e.,
between two “attitudes” (Einstellungen), between which a tension is formed. More importantly,
for Husserl, the main task of transcendental phenomenology is to first stand on the grounds of
“mundane nature”, but than perform a “change of attitude” (Einstellungsänderung) in order to get
at the realm of “transcendental phenomenology”, from which vantage point the meaning of
mundane nature is revealed as being “constituted” by the transcendental subject. In this regard, we
can argue that Husserl’s cardinal distinction is much closer to Hegel than to Kant, the difference is
only that in Husserl we don’t find the dialectical-speculative flavors which are characteristic for
Hegel.
c. Regarding the theory of “constitution”, it must be clarified that although this word seems to derive
from Kant, Kant’s whole position is totally different from that of Husserl. In fact Kant has used the
word mainly in the adjectival form—“constitutive” 60 . In contrast to “regulative”, “constitutive”
means for Kant always that constituent principle of human experience which stands on the firm
grounds of sensibility on the one hand and the rightful use of human understanding on the other.
Although Husserl started using the word konstitutiv and Konstitution following the Kantian legacy,
his subsequent usage of the word, especially in his “genetic” phenomenology, focused more and
more on the verbal forms such as “konstituiert”, “konstituieren”, and even “konstituierend…” 61
(present continuous tense) with the clear indication of using this word to signify the power of the
transcendental subject. A good example is the mention of the subject as “life and achievement that
constitute totality” which was in German “das Ganze konstituirende Leben und Leisten.” 62
d. Husserl’s phenomenology started with a descriptive phase, yet after the so-called transcendental
turn, which is very different from Kantian transcendentalism, Husserl became more and more

59
Of course this pair of terms are my own constructions based on Husserl’s terminologies.
60
This applies at least to all his three Critiques, in which the abstract noun Constitution was never used, not to mention the
verbal forms of the word such as constitui(e)rt, constitui(e)ren, or even constitui(e)rend, which later filled up Husserl’s
main work. Although Kant’s later works do contain such verbal constructions, they are used in various context like politics,
law, material nature, theology etc., and never explicitly as a predicate for the human subject.
61
See inter alia, Husserl, CM, p.100; FTL, p. 253.
62
Husserl, Krisis, p.209

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 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

inclined to establish a philosophy based on the constituting activities of the transcendental subject.
Although Husserl showed no tendency to follow the Hegelian speculative legacy, his attempt to
establish an “ultimately functioning-accomplishing subject” 63 , or some sense of “absolute
subject” 64 , is still unmistakable. This explains why in his rather late work Formale und
transzendental Logik he even made the following overtly idealistic statement about his programme:
“Absolute grounding of cognition is possible only in the all-embracing science of the
transcendental subjectivity, as the one absolute existent.” 65 As an aftermath of the Cartesian
tradition, Husserl’s theory of transcendental subjectivity has brought Western philosophy to a new
height, but in the eyes of those subsequent thinkers, Heidegger in particular, who became
convinced that the theory of subjectivity might bring about serious ecological, cultural, and
socio-political consequences, this subjectivistic programme of the later Husserl unavoidably has to
face revision and criticism.
e. If we go deeper in to Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl, we see that this criticism was directed not
so much at the concept of subjectivity itself, as at the over-exertion of man’s place in nature,
which Heidegger thought was implied in the Husserlian theory. This intricate relationship between
Husserl and Heidegger was succinctly described by Eugen Fink, who was in close contact with the
two masters in the middle of their conflict. Fink’s reflection was that Husserl’s and Heidegger’s
ways went more and more asunder because while Husserl was aiming at the “infinite”, Heidegger
wanted by all means to abide by the “finite”, in order not to “deify humanity.” 66 Against such a
backdrop, we can more readily understand why after the abandonment of the publication project of
“Being and Time” Heidegger turned to Kant (because of his finite attitude) to find his “refuge”
(Zuflucht) 67 to the extent that he even tried to “desubjectify” 68 Kant in order to fit Kant into his
evolving programme, and why Husserl was so disappointed after reading Heidegger’s
Kant-Buch. 69 We also can better understand why Heidegger has, in his late work “Das Ende der

63
Husserl, Krisis, p.185, note especially the present-continuous constructions in German: “letztlich fungierend-leistende
Subjekt(e).”
64
See Husserl’s Wiener Vortrag on “Die Krisis…”, Husserliana, Band VI, pp. 346-7.
65
Husserl, subtitle of §103 of his Formale und transzendentale Logik, 1929, p.240; engl. Cairns, p.271; Husserliana Band
XVII, p.278. The German text is: “Absolute Erkenntnisbegründung ist nur in der universalen Wissenschaft von der
transzendentalen Subjektivität als dem einizen absolut Seienden möglich”. In the following passage of the same section,
Husserl even mimicked Hegel by describing “transcendental subjectivity” as “alone […] exists ‘in itself and for itself’”
(Sie aber ist allein “in sich und für sich...” p.241; Engl. Cairns, p.273). Consequently, it was precisely this attitude that has
aroused Heidegger’s all-out criticisms. See Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 70.
66
See Eugen Fink, “Welt und Geschihcte”, Husserl et la Penseé moderne, Phaenomenologica 2 (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1959),
pp. 155-156. see also Dorion Cairns, Conversation with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), p.25.
67
See Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, preface to 4th edition.
68
For Kant’s changing attitude of Kant, see the follwoing two papers: 1) Hansgeorg Hoppe, „Wandlungen in der
Kant-Auffassung Heideggers“, in: Durchblicke.(…) S.284-317. 2) Daniel Dahlstrom: “Heidegger’s Kantian turn: Notes to
his Commentary on the Kritik der reinen Vernunft”, in: Review of Metaphysics, Vol.45, 1991, pp.329-361.
69
Heidegger’s position in the Kant-Buch was so different from Husserl’s that after reading the Kant-Buch, Husserl on his
part has expressed his strong disapproval with the following words written on the margins of his own copy: “… Die
'Geworfenheit' des Ich ist nicht seine Endlichkeit, seine Nichtabsolutheit. Das Absolute ist das Weltkonstituierende, und
sich selbst immanent Konstituierende etc.” [italics are mine], also “Was ist die Unendlichkeit gegenüber der Endlichkeit.
Warum überhaupt die Rede von Endlichkeit… was aber ein Widersinn ist.” Quoted from Iso Kern, Husserl und Kant. Eine
Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 130-131.

19
Kwan

Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens”, put Husserl and Hegel together in the same basket
while launching his severe criticism on their theories of subjectivity. 70

D. Heidegger on “Urphänomen”—From “Two Truths” to “One Truth”

a. Although well-known for his neologisms, Heidegger was but mocked by Husserl for playing with
word magic (Wortzauberei). 71 Indeed, already in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger has introduced a host of
important conceptual pairs which were crucial for the understanding of his thought: so, for
example, Sein-Seiendes, ontisch-ontologisch, phänomenal-phänomenologisch, or eigentlich-
-uneigentlich, and so forth. If we compare these demarcations with that of the Buddhist doctrine of
two truths, we see indeed a lot of similarities. But if I am now to single out the most fundamental
conceptual distinction for Heidegger as a whole, then none the above mentioned distinctions
would seem to me to be suitable, because without detriment to their relevance and importance in
other theoretical contexts, they simply fall short of that kind of characteristicum which might
sufficiently distinguish Heidegger’s unique position from that of his great phenomenological
predecessors.
b. In comparison to his earlier thoughts which were usually described as “hermeneutical
phenomenology”, Heidegger’s later thoughts exhibited a strongly mystical tendency. To
characterize this later phase of his thought, Heidegger himself has suggested the term “tautological
thinking”, which he even depicted as “the original meaning of phenomenology”. 72 Bearing in
mind the emphasis Heidegger has invested on the term “tautology” as an etiquette for the final
outlook of his legacy, should we look into this very term for our answer to the question concerning
the most fundamental Heideggerian distinction?
c. The basic purpose of phenomenology is to allow “phenomena” or “Sachen selbst” to show
themselves. But what phenomena or what “Sachen selbst” are supposed to be the most important?
Regarding this question, there seems to be great discrepancies among the major phenomenologists:
for Kant, it should be “phenomenal experience”, for Hegel “Absolute spirit”, for Husserl
“transcendental subjectivity”, and for Heidegger, it should arguably be “Being”. While Heidegger
at the time of Sein und Zeit was still not very sure about how “Being” should be handled and has
shifted his focus to the problem of Dasein instead, the later Heidegger became readily convinced
that “Being” as “appropriation” is in fact the all encompassing wholeness of the entire “existence”,

70
Martin Heidegger, “Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens”, Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen:
Niemeyer, 1976), p. 61ff., p.70. Here, Heidegger remarked clearly: “Und welches ist die Sache der philosophischen
Forschung? Sie ist für Husserl wie für Hegel gemäss der selben Überlieferung die Subjektivität des Bewusstseins.” For
further discussion, see Tze-wan Kwan, “Hegelian and Heideggerian Tautologies”, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 88
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), pp. 317-336.
71
Cairns, ibid., p. 107. If we believe in Cairns’ report, Husserl could have even criticized Heidegger’s work as leading to
“verbal decadence” (Wortentartung).
72
Heidegger, Vier Seminare (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1977), p.137. “…das Denken, dem hier nachgedacht wird,
nenne ich das tautologische Denken. Das ist der ursprüngliche Sinn der Phänomenologie.”

20
 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

which simply “is” as the primal event that evades any reasoning (ohne Warum, without why).
Being in this sense has been described by Heidegger differently as Sach-Verhalt 73 , as Ur-Sache 74 ,
or, following Goethe, as Urphänomen. 75
d. In order to emphasize the comprehensiveness, and uniqueness of such a holistic Urphänomen of
Being as Appropriation, the later Heidegger consistently used notions such as “simple oneness”
and“singularity”; or if “singularity” is not strong enough to offset multiplicity, he even employed
the word “only” (einzig) to underline the exclusiveness of this very singularity 76 , which is the
Same (tÚ aÈtÒ) and the only thing being talked about. Likewise, when Heidegger talks about the
Sach-Verhalt or about Ereignis, he refers to them (or better put, it) as “absolutely singular” (das
schlechthin Singuläre) 77 , or as singulare tantum 78 , which is a Latin word which already entails the
notion of “only”. In the following citation, we see how all these work together when the cardinal
concept of Ereignis is being discussed: “The word appropriation (Ereignis) here no longer means
what we would otherwise call a happening, an occurrence. It now is used as a Singulare tantum.
What it indicates appropriates only in the singular (Einzahl), nay, not even in terms of a number
any longer, but the only (einzig).” 79 Heidegger’s preference for the one, the singular and the only
reminds us of Parmenides’ characterization of Being (e‰nai) as tÚ ßn (the One), and the
Parmenidean dictum tÚ aÈtÒ acquires in Heidegger a completely new presence. 80
e. In Heidegger’s tautological phase, one remarkable linguistic feature of this thought was his
extensive use of what I have elsewhere described as a “tautological formula”, which is nothing but
the strategy of defining a term simply by repeating it as a verbal predicate. 81 So when Heidegger
has to say something about “thing”, “world”, “language”, “space”, or Being, he actually resorted
to put them as “das Ding dingt”, “die Welt weltet”, “die Sprache spricht”, “der Raum räumt ein”,
“das Seyn west” (“wesen” being depicted as the verb of Being).
f. Heidegger’s tautological thinking is in one respect very similar to Hegelian philosophy, for they
both try to reflect upon a primal, all encompassing and ultimate being or event. What is different is
that while Hegel considers this primal event as guided by an internal purposiveness which can
become transparent from an absolute point of view, Heidegger on the contrary is convinced that
this primal phenomenon is to the last analysis not accountable by reason. While Absolute Spirit is
for Hegel the pinnacle of infinitude, Heidegger reflected not only upon human finitude, but

73
Heidegger, ZSD, p. 20.
74
Heidegger, ZSD, p. 72.
75
Heidegger, ZSD, p. 72. In Goethe’s Werke, the expression “Urphänomen(e)” appeared no less than ten times
76
See Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie. Here Heidegger speaks of “the uniqueness of Seyn” (Einzigkeit des Seyns),
Gesamtausgabe, Band 65, p. 73; ID, p. 29.
77
Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximanders”, Holzwege (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1972), p. 318. Young and
Haynes have translated the term as “singular as such”, which is also fine.
78
Identität und Differenz, p. 29, 54.
79
Identität und Differenz, p. 29. “Das Wort Ereignis meint hier nicht mehr das, was wir sonst irgendein Geschehnis, ein
Vorkommnis nennen. Das Wort ist jetzt als Singulare tantum gebraucht. Was es nennt, ereignet sich nur in der Einzahl,
nein, nicht einmal mehr in einer Zahl, sondern einzig.”
80
For more discussions, see Tze-wan Kwan, “Hegelian and Heideggerian Tautologies”, op. cit.
81
This strategy can be found roughly in Sein und Zeit in the dictum “Zeitichkeit zeitigt sich…” (SZ, pp. 328ff.), but
extensive use was obviously made only in the late Heidegger.

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Kwan

finitude of Being itself. 82

g. Like his predecessors, Heidegger in fact did make up conceptual distinctions which are
comparable to the Buddhist distinction between worldly and real truths. This is especially true of
the earlier Heidegger. But in the final phase of his thought which he himself called “tautological
thinking”, he gave up making distinctions altogether and opted for the “one truth,” which,
according to Heidegger, can only be “apprehended” or “erörtert”, but not rationally explained.
Heidegger’s restriction of the role of language is very similar to the Buddhist’s insight of the
“forgetfulness of speech and extinction of thought.” Simply in regard to the form, this tautological
thinking of Heidegger gives us at first glance the impression, that it is comparable to the “first true
of the middle way” in Buddhism. But is this comparison a justifiable one? This is a question for
which I have a lot of doubts, but I will resume this issue in the conclusion.

IV. Conclusion: Between “Two Truths” and “Two Extremes”

—Satya-dvaya or Anta-dvaya?

We have explained at the outset that the kind of comparison attempted in this paper is a very difficulty
one. This is because the basic concerns of phenomenological distinctions on the one hand and the
Buddhist doctrine of two truths on the other are in fact so disparate, that any pretentious claim on their
relations could appear too artificial and far-fetched. The main reason why we nonetheless have
involved ourselves in such a comparison was our conviction that despite such disparateness in content,
the “form” of arguments or the “form” of the construction of theories in phenomenology and in
Buddhism could exhibit “isomorphisms”, which are nothing but similar theoretical/practical strategies
in bringing forth what the two parties really concerned about in terms of “contents”. Now after the
above brief survey of the Buddhist doctrine of two truths and of the phenomenological distinctions,
we might draw a tentative balance sheet as follows:

1) The Buddhists doctrine of two truths and phenomenological distinctions are in the first place
conceptual distinctions of the highest order. They both serve to bring out the basic concerns of
their respective traditions in the most pregnant manner. By comparing the Buddhist doctrine of
two truths with phenomenological distinctions we must conclude that, strategically speaking, the
former has been much more successful in focusing on the basic concerns of the Buddhist
tradition, than has the latter for phenomenology. In more specific terms, despite the theoretical
idiosyncrasies and different emphases of the various Buddhist schools (Mādhyamika and
Yogācāra for example) the Buddhist tradition has over a span of two millennia maintained the
one basic concern which is mutually acceptable among Buddhists, namely, the ultimate
enlightenment and deliverance of man in the midst of a world of interdependent origination. But

82
Regarding the finitude of Being, see Heidegger, ZSD, p. 53。

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 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

in a much shorter span of about two centuries, the phenomenological tradition has produced
utterly disparate conceptual distinctions addressing utterly different basic concerns. Of course,
“phenomenon” remained the basic theme of phenomenology in the broad sense, but precisely,
what does “phenomenon” mean? Which phenomena are the most fundamental ones? These are
questions that remained controversial throughout the entire tradition. Therefore, even if we want
to compare the phenomenological tradition to a big family, we must admit that the “family
resemblances” of members of this family are much looser than we might suppose.
2) Within the historical framework of this paper, Kant was the great-grand father of the
phenomenological family. It was in Kant that the status of phenomena was successfully
rehabilitated. It was also in Kant that the relationship between external knowledge and the role
of the human mind has been appropriately arbitrated. Kant was very mindful of the inviolability
of the boundaries between the various constitutive domains of human activities, but was flexible
enough to make allowance for the possible fusion of such boundaries through the use of
regulative-reflective judgment.
3) However, in the eyes of his theoretically more ambitious epigones, Hegel and Husserl in
particular, Kant was considered to be too humble with his philosophical programme, and was
complaint for being not radical enough to fathom the final sources of phenomena. Therefore, it
was not accidental that both Husserl and Hegel were, for different reasons, unhappy with Kant’s
treatment of “Dinge an sich.” And Hegel criticized Kant together with Hume the skepticist, 83
because for Hegel Kant’s theory was simply not “transparent” enough. 84 Unlike Kant, Hegel was
determined to traverse all conceptual boundaries. In this regards, the Hegelian
dialectical-speculative system did show some similarities to the layered “two-truth” distinctions
of Jizang, Kuiji and Zhiyi. However, despite this superficial similarities, we must point out that
for Buddhism, the ascending schemes of two-truth distinctions are destined merely to relieve the
practicing Buddhist from various sorts of biases and afflictions, and the final outcome should be
nothing more than a state of total freedom from such biases. But in Hegel, although the
dialectical movement of consciousness is supposedly a process of transcendence of
one-sidedness, the final stage of the movement leads to the assertion of an Absolute being,
which is from the Buddhist point of view, the greatest “steadfastness on being” ever imaginable.
4) As with Husserl, while admitting his own work to be rooted in German Idealism, the final
outcome of his transcendental phenomenology fell back on the footsteps of Hegel in an attempt
to absolutize subjectivity. It was in this regard that Husserl and Hegel were most akin to each
other. It is therefore perfectly understandable why Kojève asynchronously depicted Hegel’s
philosophical method as “phenomenological in Husserl’s sense of the term”, 85 the only

83
In the Lesser Logic, Hegel put Kant and Hume together and criticize them in one move. See Hegel, Lesser Logic, §37f,
§40f.
84
In fact, Hegel has often used “durchsichtig” or even “vollkommen durchsichtig” to depict his own speculative system,
which are expressions never used by Kant. See Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke (Suhrkamp), Band 3, pp.
180-181, 321, 497; Wissenschaft der Logik, II, Band 6, pp. 214, 550.
85
Kojève, op. cit.

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Kwan

difference being that Husserl’s method was without the speculative favour. This affinity of Hegel
and Husserl, as already mentioned above, has induced Heidegger to criticize them together for
their alleged frenzy for the infinite.
5) Regarding Heidegger, it is beyond doubt that he has performed the most thorough reflection on
Western thought and civilization, and in so doing has shown the greatest readiness to hook up
with wisdom of the East. In fact, no one who has read the late, “tautological” Heidegger, can
deny the fact that behind his mystical and somewhat misological thinking glimpses of sublime
wisdom can be found. Heidegger’s subsequent abandonment of making distinctions for the sake
of the “singular”, unique, and “only” truth was the clearest indication of his “Eastern”
connection. 86
6) In point of comparison, I said earlier that Heidegger’s tautological thinking of the “singular”
truth was similar in form to the Buddhist teaching of the “first truth of the middle way”, but not
comparable to it in spirit. Let me now explain why. In our earlier discussion, we have explained
that the Buddhist “middle way” is meant to prevent us from holding steadfast to either of the two
extremes (whether to being or to emptiness) and to handle worldliness with expedient skills
while remaining unattached to it. Against this measuring stick, we see precisely some shortfalls
of Heidegger’s late thought. Generally speaking, the late Heidegger was trapped in the
“tautological” deadlock. In this deadlock, what he could do was simply to abide by the
apprehension of the unspeakable, singular, but all encompassing truth (Urphänomen). In the
name of “tautology”, Heidegger advocated the attitude of “thinking Being without beings.” This
attitude, notwithstanding its intrinsic wisdom, could do harm to human understanding if
over-exerted and unchecked. For the late Heidegger, “Being” became as rich and as empty in
meaning as “Nothing.” Unlike the Buddhist ideal of “middle way”, which teaches us to be
expedient with worldliness, Heidegger’s teaching of the “singular truth” is obviously trapped in
the extreme of holding steadfast to emptiness, a mistake which was readily committed by the
two yānas (dviyāna) in the Buddhist tradition. In point of theory, I find it particularly lamentable
that Heidegger’s criticism of the subject, though justified to some extent, was so much overdone
that many positive and indispensable functions of the human subjectivity (including distinction
making and responsibility taking) were left in jeopardy. In point of practice, Heidegger
obviously fell short of that kind of expedient, worldly wisdom, which could have prevented him
from making such wrong political judgments as what he has committed in his relationship with
the Nazis.
7) As a historically bound system of thought, Kant’s philosophy unavoidably has its limitations. In
terms of theory, Kant did not show that kind of ambition as Husserl’s attempt of
Letztbegründung through transcendental subjectivity. He did not provide us with the
dialectical-speculative vigour as did Hegel. His philosophy also appeared less charismatic and
86
For more discussion on Heidegger’s Eastern connection other than that with Buddhism, see Tze-wan Kwan,
“Heidegger’s ‘Tautological Thinking’ and Taoist Philosophy” (海德格的「同一性」思維與道家哲學), in Phenomenology
& the Human Sciences《現象學與人文科學》, Taipei, Vol. 2, 2005.12, pp. 211-259.

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 Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths

overwhelming than that of Heidegger (hermeneutical as well as tautological). In short, as far as

theory construction is concerned, Kant’s philosophy might seem more “primitive” than that of
his epigones. Now through the above comparison with the Buddhist doctrine of two truths, we
discovered that Kant’s philosophy did exhibit a kind of poise which can no longer be found in
the philosophies of his successors. By this I mean that, although historically bound, Kant’s
philosophy was so well-positioned that it managed to free itself from the many historical
bondages that have troubled many of his contemporaries and epigones. Concretely speaking,
although Kant was an important figure of modern philosophy, his thought exhibited so to speak
the least “modernity” compared to his contemporaries. Although strongly influenced by the
enlightenment movement, he was able to keep “enlightenment reason” at arm’s length and has
shown deep reflections on reason’s functions and limits, and on its role in the midst of other
intellectual powers of humankind. Although Kant did talk about the human subject, he did so
without over-exerting its power, as did other members of the subjectivistic tradition. This is so
because Kant acknowledged and abided by the basic fact of human finitude. But on the other
hand and equally importantly, he did not give up doing justice to the human subject and its
functions despite its finitude. Therefore, in the subsequent waves of counter-enlightenment, of
post-modernity, and of anti-subjectivity, which lingered until nowadays, Kant’s basic position
remained the least vulnerable, which makes it an invaluable source of philosophical and cultural
reflection. All in all, in the whole course of the development of modern Western philosophy,
Kant has occupied an irreplaceable Sonderstellung, a kind of poise and elegance of thought that I
think has not been surpassed by any subsequent masters of the phenomenological tradition.
8) This Sonderstellung of Kant makes the attempt to map theoretical merits and improvements to
historical sequences questionable. Compared with Hegel, Husserl , and Heidegger, for example,
the legacy of Kant did appear at first glance more “primitive”, or somewhat Hīnayāna like. But
on second thoughts, the Kantian system with its well-balanced poise is probably that very
system of thought which is best comparable to the doctrine of the “middle way” which is
characteristic of Mahāyāna wisdom. On the contrary, the overtly ambitious subjectivity theories
of Hegel and Husserl on the one hand, and the inexpedient, tautological thinking of Heidegger
on the other seem rather to have fallen prey to the two extremes of ‘steadfastness” on being and
of nothingness. The distinction between “two truths” (二諦, satya-dvaya) belongs to the highest
wisdom of Buddhism; the danger of the “two extremes” (二邊, anta-dvaya) is but the greatest
thread to it. However, satya-dvaya and anta-dvaya are theoretically so closely related and
mutually transitional that for the Buddhist practitioner they are only separated by a hair’s
breadth. With these lessons of satya-dvaya and anta-dvaya, we might be able to say that the
century old dictum “Zurück zu Kant” is probably still not outdated.
9) In the history of Buddhism, the doctrine of two truths has served as a means for founders of the
various schools to better understand their own historical position in relation to their predecessors,

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Kwan

as well as for reconciliation with them. 87 Today we have borrowed this means for the better
understanding of the various stages of the phenomenological movement as well as of their
interrelationship. By tracing back to Kant and by emphasizing his Sonderstellung, I have not the
least intention to render obsolete the achievements of Hegel, Husserl or Heidegger, whose
contributions to philosophy are not to be questioned. Hegel’s insight into the dialectical nature of
experience, Husserl’s operative concepts such as horizon, intentionality, and life-world, and
Heidegger’s analysis of human Dasein und its temporality, etc. shall remain invaluable to
philosophy far and wide. What we need to beware of is only that their philosophical programmes
might lead to “extremes”, which are to be avoided. These extremes might not be so conspicuous
if our scope of attention is limited to the more recent developments. By reaching further back to
Kant and by learning from Buddhism, we reveal before our eyes some lasting debates which are
far from being settled, as, for instance, the role of the subject, its relation to the object and to the
world, the dialectics of finitude and infinity, constitution or regulation, so on and so forth. These
open questions prompt us to rethink the basic concerns of phenomenology and its future
direction. It requires us to assess if besides what is now modish we need to resume in a more
focused manner discussions we have left behind long ago.
10) But while saying all these, we should not lose sight of the fact that from the Buddhist point of
view, the entire phenomenological tradition is dealing mainly with the realm of saṃskṛta
dharma. What are known to Buddhism as asaṃskṛta dharma are seldom touched upon by the
West. For Buddhism, true enlightenment is much more a matter of real life practice and day to
day struggle with biases than the contemplation of a theory which is complete in itself. From the
Buddhist point of view, phenomenology has still a lot of biases to overcome before the right path
to enlightenment could be found. With this word, I do not mean that Western people should
necessarily accept the ultimate concern of Buddhism, ie. deliverance towards nirvana. Nor am I
suggesting that Buddhism itself is to the last analysis free from all biases. The comparison above
would have fulfilled its role, if by way of mutual contrast (whether only in form or also in
content) Buddhism and phenomenology can thrown light upon each other leading to a better
understanding of our issues that are not as easily penetrable when seen from either side alone.

Finis

Draft: 11 September 2006

For conference purpose only, please do not cite yet.
Comments are welcome: [email protected]

87
SeeYao Weiqun, “The Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths and Its Historical Meaning” in Religious Studies 姚衛群：
〈佛
教的「二諦」理論及其歷史意義〉第四節，《宗教學研究》，1999 年 1 期。Downloaded from《國學網站》
http://www.guoxue.com/www/xsxx/txt.asp?id=722. (10 Sept. 2006)

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