Addressing climate

and conflict-related
loss and damage in
fragile states
A focus on Mali
Ritu Bharadwaj, N Karthikeyan, Swati Chaliha
and Bakary Dembele

Working Paper Climate change

Keywords:
April 2025 Loss and damage, social protection,
climate justice, climate finance,
national climate change policies
About the authors Acknowledgements
Ritu Bharadwaj is director of climate resilience, finance and loss We begin by thanking the Danish International Development
and damage at IIED. Agency (DANIDA) for their funding support for this research.
N Karthikeyan is a development economist. We thank our partners DanChurchAid (DCA) and TASSAGHT,
along with their local team in Mali, whose support enabled
Swati Chaliha is a natural resource management professional
us to carry out grounded research. Within the DCA team
with experience in research at the intersection of policy and
we especially thank Hamidou Maiga for his support in data
practice, primarily on climate change adaptation, restoration and
collection and Claire Mohamed-Petit, conflict prevention and
agroforestry.
peacebuilding advisor. Special thanks to Mathilde Rabeyroux at
Bakary Dembele is the climate loss and damage project DCA for her support in coordinating the project among partners.
coordinator, a climate change environment and territories expert
We extend our gratitude to the reviewers at DCA — Mohamed
and an international cooperation and humanitarian aid specialist
Cissoko, Sidsel Koordt Vognsen, Ana Mosneaga and Elisa
at DanChurchAid Mali.
Benevelli — for their valuable feedback and suggestions that
Corresponding author: Ritu Bharadwaj, [email protected] helped strengthen this research paper.
We thank Nikhil Nigam for his contribution to data collection
using the Kobo Collect tool, training the research team to use
the tool and supporting analysis of the data collected.
We especially thank David Ackers, editorial manager at IIED,
for providing input and support throughout the development
of this publication. Thanks to Annette McGill for her support in
copyediting the working paper and Rosalind Cook for her work
on the design and layout.
Finally, we would like to thank Chandrakanth Vivekanandan,
programme manager at IIED and Martin Cummins, project
manager at IIED, for managing the publication’s production.

Published by IIED, April 2025

Bharadwaj, R, Karthikeyan, N, Chaliha, S and Dembele, B (2025) Addressing
climate and conflict-related loss and damage in fragile states: a focus on Mali.
IIED, London.
iied.org/22618iied
ISBN: 978-1-83759-138-1

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

This paper examines the compounding impacts

of climate change, conflict and socioeconomic
vulnerabilities on households in Mopti, Mali. It
analyses both economic and non-economic loss
and damage using the Comprehensive Climate
Impact Quantification toolkit and offers evidence-
based recommendations for building resilience in
fragile and conflict-affected settings.

Contents
Abbreviations7 3.3 Understanding the underlying drivers of
mobility: constructing the 3P index 25
Summary8 3.4 Why some households choose to migrate while
others do not 39
1 Introduction 10
1.1 Worsening conditions in fragile and 4 Understanding the scale of economic and non-
conflict-affected states  10 economic loss and damage 41
1.2 Climate change is a stress multiplier in FCAS 10 4.1 Understanding the interaction between
1.3 How compounding vulnerabilities drive loss different types of economic and non-economic
and damage  11 loss and damage 41
1.4 Multidimensional approach to assessing loss and 4.2 Quantifying the loss and damage affecting
damage in Mali 12 Mopti communities 44
4.3 The cost of economic and non-economic
2 Understanding the scale of climate
loss and damage for households 65
impacts in Mali 16
2.1 Analysis of disaster occurrence and 5 Recommendations 68
impact in Mali 16
6 Conclusion 76
2.2 Localised impact of climate trends in Mopti 17
2.3 Community perception of climate trends 19
Annexes77
3 Impact of climate change and conflict on Annex 1. Definition of fragile and conflict-affected
household migration decisions 21 states (FCAS) 77
3.1 How has migration and displacement increased Annex 2. Indicators for the internal conflict and
over the last few decades? 21 governance instability index for Mali 78
3.2 Trends in temporary migration and forced Annex 3. Sample profile of the study area 79
displacement22 Annex 4. Regression analysis model for
3.2 Exploring household reasons for migration understanding mobility-related decisions 81
and displacement 23
References82

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Figures
Figure 1. Multidimensional risk index of FCAS and other countries 12
Figure 2. Internal conflict and governance instability index for Mali 13
Figure 3. Research framework showing multidimensional approach for assessing vulnerability
and loss and damage 14
Figure 4. Interaction of predisposing, precipitating and protective factors 14
Figure 5. Change in disaster frequency in Mali 17
Figure 6. Number of deaths due to disasters in Mopti region, projected up to 2034 18
Figure 7. Number of people affected by disasters in Mopti region, projected up to 2034 18
Figure 8. Average perceived frequency of droughts 19
Figure 9. Average perceived frequency of floods 19
Figure 10. Years since households began migration or moved permanently (displaced) 21
Figure 11. Average number of household members who migrated/moved permanently in 2024 22
Figure 12. Migration/Displacement destination of households 23
Figure 13. Reasons households migrate 23
Figure 14. Reasons households are displaced 24
Figure 15. Differences in mobility among different ethnic communities, by household migration status 26
Figure 16. Food consumption, by household migration status 26
Figure 17. Educational status of the head of the household, by household migration status 27
Figure 18. Highest educational attainment within households, by household migration status 27
Figure 19. Percentage of children currently studying, by household migration status 28
Figure 20. Sex ratio (male to female) of households, by household migration status 28
Figure 21. Percentage of households headed by women, by household migration status 28
Figure 22. Credit sources available, by household migration status 29
Figure 23. Type of house owned, by household migration status 30
Figure 24. Home ownership status, by household migration status 30
Figure 25. Type of land holding among households, by household migration status 30
Figure 26. Livestock ownership, by household migration status 31
Figure 27. IRI values, by household migration status 32
Figure 28. CRI values, by household migration status 34
Figure 29. Household members seriously injured in the last three years, by household migration status 34
Figure 30. Households reporting the death of a family member in the last three years,
by household migration status 35
Figure 31. ICRI scores, by household migration status 36
Figure 32. Government social protection services used in the last year, by household migration status 37
Figure 33. NGO social protection services used in the last year, by household migration status 38
Figure 34. SPI scores, by household migration status 38
Figure 35. The C-CIQ assessment framework 42
Figure 36. Methodological framework for the C-CIQ toolkit 42

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Figure 37. Domains of economic and non-economic loss and damage impacts 43
Figure 38. C-CIQ’s conceptual framework for categorising loss and damage in Mopti 45
Figure 39. Indices constructed via the C-CIQ toolkit using the index-based valuation approach 45
Figure 40. Formulation of the tangible-functional loss and damage index 46
Figure 41. Reduction in average landholding of displaced households (acres) 48
Figure 42. Falls in average livestock ownership among displaced households 49
Figure 43. Biodiversity loss univariate indices, by household migration status 49
Figure 44. Reasons for biodiversity loss 50
Figure 45. Land degradation univariate indices, by household migration status 50
Figure 46. Reasons for land degradation 51
Figure 47. Tangible-functional loss and damage index 53
Figure 48. How the intangible-functional loss and damage index is constructed 54
Figure 49. Forced labour univariate indices, by household migration status 54
Figure 50. Forced labour univariate indices for migrant households 55
Figure 51. Forced labour univariate indices for displaced households 55
Figure 52. Living conditions univariate indices at source sites, by household migration status 56
Figure 53. Living conditions univariate indices for displaced households 56
Figure 54. Food security univariate indices, by household migration status 57
Figure 55. Food security univariate indices for displaced households 57
Figure 56. Intangible-functional loss and damage index 58
Figure 57. Construction of the tangible intrinsic loss and damage index 59
Figure 58. Reasons for serious injuries among household members in the last three years,
by household migration status 59
Figure 59. Reasons for death of household members in the last three years, by household migration status 60
Figure 60. Tangible-intrinsic loss and damage index 61
Figure 61. Formulation of the intangible intrinsic loss and damage index 62
Figure 62. Loss of cultural identity univariate indices, by household migration status 63
Figure 63. Reasons for cultural loss 63
Figure 64. Mental health problem univariate indices, by household migration status 64
Figure 65. Intangible-intrinsic loss and damage index 65
Figure 66. Total loss and damage at household level, by household migration status 67
Figure 67. Indicators for the internal conflict and governance instability index for Mali 78
Figure 68. Location of the study area  79

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Tables
Table 1. Composition of household income, by household migration status 31
Table 2. Reasons for injury in the last three years, by household migration status 35
Table 3. Reasons for household member’s death in the last three years, by household migration status 36
Table 4. Flood-related crop loss, by household migration status 46
Table 5. Drought-related crop loss, by household migration status 46
Table 6. Flood-related livestock loss, by household migration status 47
Table 7. Drought-related livestock loss, by household migration status 47
Table 8. Flood-related fishing income loss, by household migration status 47
Table 9. Drought-related fishing income loss, by household migration status 47
Table 10. Flood-related employment loss, by household migration status 48
Table 11. Drought-related employment loss, by household migration status 48
Table 12. Water availability-related drudgery, by household migration status 51
Table 13. Additional costs due to water scarcity, by household migration status 52
Table 14. Damage to housing assets, by household migration status 60
Table 15. Damage to tools and equipment related to livelihoods, by household migration status 61
Table 16. Economic valuation of loss and damage suffered, by household migration status 66
Table 17. Pathways for LLA to support climate resilience and adaptive peacebuilding  69
Table 18. Types of social protection delivery mechanisms for supporting climate resilience
and adaptive peacebuilding in Mali 72
Table 19. Sample covered for quantitative data collection 80
Table 20. Sample design for qualitative data collection 80

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Abbreviations
C-CIQ Comprehensive Climate Impact Quantification
CRI Climate risk index
EWS Early warning systems
FCAS Fragile and conflict-affected states
FGDs Focus group discussions
FRLD Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage
GCF Green Climate Fund
GDP Gross domestic product
GEF Global Environment Facility
ICRI Internal conflict risk index
IDPs Internally displaced persons
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRI Inherent resilience index
KIIs Key informant interviews
LDCs Least developed countries
LLA Locally led adaptation
MDBs Multilateral development banks
NGOs Nongovernmental organisations
ODA Official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SIDS Small Island Developing States
SPI Social protection index
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Summary
Nearly a billion people live in countries that are classified as fragile and conflict-
affected states (FCAS). This figure has nearly doubled in the past 20 years and
is expected to rise substantially by 2030. FCAS must grapple with complex,
multidimensional and compounding risks, including climate change, political
instability, economic fragility, weak governance and poor resilience. Supporting these
states is an urgent global challenge. Mali typifies these issues. Ranked 188 out of
193 countries in the 2022 Human Development Index (United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), no date), Mali faces protracted conflict, escalating climate
vulnerabilities and chronic development deficits. The Mopti region is an epicentre
of these crises: droughts and floods have devastated livelihoods, while conflict has
displaced thousands of people and disrupted social and economic systems.
Our research focused on five communes1 in Mopti. Our The 3P Framework categorises the drivers of
aim was to quantify the economic and non-economic vulnerability into predisposing, precipitating and
loss and damage experienced by communities in Mopti, protective factors using four key indices. The inherent
explore the triggers of migration and displacement, and resilience index (IRI) showed that displaced households
identify policy pathways to support resilience building in are the most structurally vulnerable because they have
fragile contexts. limited access to resources and essential services. The
climate risk index (CRI) assesses household exposure
We adopted a multidimensional research approach that
to climate-related hazards, and the internal conflict
integrated quantitative and qualitative methodologies.
risk index (ICRI) measures household exposure to
We surveyed households and conducted focus group
consequences of conflict. These indices show that
discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews
displaced households have the biggest exposure to
(KIIs). We used two analytical tools: the 3P Framework
both climate shocks and conflict risks.
for analysing the root causes of vulnerability and the
Comprehensive Climate Impact Quantification (C-CIQ)
Factors driving household
migration and displacement
toolkit, which integrates household-level data, regional
conflict and climate indices, and social protection
assessments into a unified framework.
We undertook a regression analysis to get deeper
Increasing climate impacts insights into the drivers of migration and displacement:

and migration
climate risks, conflict exposure and household resilience
levels. This found that:
Mali is witnessing increasing frequency and intensity of • Households that experienced fewer climate risks, such
climate disasters, including droughts, floods and erratic as droughts, floods and crop failures, were 2.3 times
rainfall. Incidences of drought increased from about six less likely to be displaced and 1.5 times less likely
to nearly nine times per decade, while incidences of to migrate. This confirms that climate instability is a
floods rose from four to more than five times per decade major trigger for both distress migration and forced
between 1994–2003 and 2014–2023. As climate displacement.
shocks become more frequent and intense, households
• Conflict exposure significantly increased the likelihood
are left with diminishing coping capacities, trapping them
of forced displacement. Households that faced less
in cycles of poverty and vulnerability. There has been a
violence and insecurity were three times less likely
sharp rise in migration and displacement, with 68% of
to be displaced, reinforcing the disruptive impact of
migrant and displaced households reporting that they had
conflict in uprooting families.
relocated for the first time within the past five years.

1 In Mali, administrative units are structured into regions, which are further divided into cercles (often translated as circles), communes and villages. A cercle
serves as an intermediate administrative division, typically consisting of multiple communes and functioning as a key level of governance and data collection.

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

• Households’ resilience levels also played a critical

role. Households with lower resilience were 5.09
Recommendations
times more likely to be displaced than those with Addressing these cascading impacts requires
stronger resilience. This suggests that economic integrated, context-specific interventions that bridge the
instability, lack of social support and weak institutional gap between immediate relief and long-term resilience
protections leave families far more vulnerable to building. Our recommendations focus on five key areas:
displacement, even in the absence of direct conflict or
1. Promote locally led adaptation (LLA) and
extreme climate events.
adaptive peacebuilding approaches: empowering
• There was no statistically significant relationship local institutions, communities and marginalised
between the social protection index (SPI) and groups to lead resilience building and adaptation is
household mobility choices, indicating that current crucial. Investments in climate-resilient agriculture and
social protection mechanisms in Mopti are insufficient water conservation infrastructure can directly reduce
to prevent migration or displacement. vulnerability.
Overall, the findings confirm that distress migration is 2. Strengthen shock-responsive and anticipatory
primarily driven by climate shocks, while a combination social protection mechanisms: social protection
of climate risks, conflict and low resilience makes forced systems should integrate early warning systems, pre-
displacement far more likely. registered beneficiary lists and forecast-based financing

The costs of economic and

to deliver timely interventions.

non-economic loss and

3. Invest in social protection delivery mechanisms
that work in FCAS: public works programmes, food
damage and in-kind assistance, and school feeding initiatives
show higher benefit–cost ratios in FCAS. These
The assessment of loss and damage at the household programmes can be better integrated into existing
level in Mopti reveals the devastating impacts systems. Governments and international donors should
experienced by non-migrant, migrant and displaced use a balanced mix of instruments, including public
households. works and targeted cash transfers, that can optimise
resources and improve resilience outcomes.
We examined loss and damage values based on the
most recent disaster year. They reflect the specific 4. Address inequity, exclusion and
impacts for that year; there is the potential for more marginalisation in delivery systems: rights-
significant losses in the future should current conditions based frameworks, decentralised delivery systems
persist or worsen. and portable social protection benefits can improve
accessibility and inclusivity. For instance, digital national
Droughts impose the highest economic burden across
registries can ensure that migrant and displaced
all household types, accounting for 34% of income loss
people can access entitlements across administrative
among non-migrants, 42% among migrants and an
boundaries.
alarming 61% among displaced households.
5. Enhance financing for resilience building: FCAS
Floods cause losses representing 27% of annual
face chronic underfunding in social protection and
income for non-migrants, 29% for migrants and 40%
resilience programmes, with an average spending of just
for displaced households. Key drivers include crop loss,
0.86% of gross domestic product (GDP). FCAS receive
livestock sickness, and housing and equipment damage.
disproportionately low climate finance. International
Displacement-related income loss adds another layer of financial institutions must prioritise debt relief and
vulnerability. Displaced households experience a drop restructuring for FCAS to help create fiscal space for
in household income equivalent to 46% of their annual resilience investments. Scaling up climate finance and
income. This shows the severe financial shock of forced official development assistance (ODA) is essential to
migration and the difficulty of finding employment in close the financing gap and enable FCAS to address
displacement contexts. their systemic vulnerabilities.
Overall, non-migrant households face a 75% loss of Our findings underscore the need for coordinated,
their annual income, migrant households experience inclusive and multifaceted interventions to address
losses of 90%, while displaced households face the impacts of climate change, conflict and
catastrophic losses of 184%, indicating a crisis that socioeconomic vulnerabilities in Mali and other FCAS.
leaves them with no hope of recovery without significant Without significant and sustained efforts, vulnerable
external support. communities will remain trapped in cycles of poverty,
displacement and loss.

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1
ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Introduction
1.1 Worsening conditions in Network Against Food Crises and Food Security

fragile and conflict-affected

Information Network, 2024). In FCAS, a considerable
proportion of young people, more than half of whom
states are women, are not engaged in employment, education
or training (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
FCAS represent one of the most pressing global and Development (OECD), 2022)​​. Gender inequality
challenges today. Over the past two decades, the is particularly acute in FCAS, which have some of
scale, complexity and impact of fragility have worsened the highest rates of gender-based violence and child
significantly (UNDP, 2022). The world is witnessing marriage, and where women and girls lack access to
more violent conflicts than at any time since 1945 education and healthcare and face greater economic
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021), hardships compared to women and girls in more stable
accompanied by the largest forced displacement societies (OECD, 2022)​. Countries with higher levels of
crisis on record (Office of the United Nations High gender equality tend to be more stable and experience
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2021)​​. Today, faster growth (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014).
nearly one billion people live in FCAS — almost double
Extreme poverty is becoming increasingly concentrated
the figure of 20 years ago (International Monetary Fund
in FCAS. Fragile states account for only 10% of the
(IMF), no date). The number of people living within 60km
world’s population, yet they exhibit a disproportionate
of conflict-related deaths has also nearly doubled since
share of global poverty​. Of the world’s 43 poorest
2007 (Corral et al., 2020). These trends underscore
countries, the majority are either classified as FCAS
the deepening vulnerabilities and systemic challenges
or located in sub-Saharan Africa, with poverty rates in
that FCAS face, where cycles of violence, poverty
FCAS exceeding 19% (Corral et al., 2020). Currently,
and instability continue to disrupt lives and undermine
about half of the global poor reside in FCAS and
development gains (UNDP, 2022).
according to World Bank Group estimates this figure
FCAS encompass a diverse group of countries, is projected to rise to two-thirds by 2030 (Corral et
including least developed countries (LDCs), Small al., 2020)​. This trend is informed by the fact that while
Island Developing States (SIDS) and other developing countries that have escaped fragility have reduced
nations. It is important to note that there is no universal poverty rates by more than half, those trapped in
definition or fixed list of FCAS (see Annex 1 for further chronic fragility have seen little or no progress. In fact,
details on FCAS definitions). Despite their diversity, individuals in chronically fragile economies are ten times
these states share a set of interlocking characteristics more likely to remain poor compared to those in stable
that hinder sustained progress. They are often marked regions (Corral et al., 2020)​.

1.2 Climate change is a

by weak administrative capacity, limited rule of law,
poor provision of basic services and high levels of
social polarisation. These structural weaknesses make
it difficult for FCAS to manage and mitigate risks
stress multiplier in FCAS
stemming from social, economic, political, governance, Climate change is a threat multiplier, exacerbating
security and environmental challenges (IMF, 2022). vulnerabilities and compounding the already fragile
conditions in FCAS (OECD, 2023). It is intensifying
This increasing fragility poses a significant threat to
social, economic and political pressures, eroding
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Two-
resilience and creating a context where communities
thirds of the 155 million acutely food-insecure people
exposed to climate crises are left without adequate
requiring urgent assistance live in FCAS (Global

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

support, breeding discontent and exacerbating existing countries, compared to 43.4 million refugees crossing
inequalities (OECD, 2023). While climate change international borders (UNHCR, 2024). While children
does not directly cause conflict, its impacts interact make up 30% of the world’s population, they account
with existing fragility and governance failures, driving for 40% of all those forcibly displaced, highlighting the
forced displacement, worsening food insecurity and disproportionate impact of these crises on vulnerable
undermining development gains (Potts et al., 2022). By people (UNHCR, 2024). In 2023 alone, conflict and
2030, climate impacts could push an additional 100 violence caused 20.5 million new displacements across
million people into poverty (World Bank Group, 2016). 45 countries and territories, while disasters triggered
While estimates vary, a World Bank Group assessment 26.4 million new displacements across 148 countries
estimates that, by 2050, up to 143 million people across and territories (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre,
sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America 2024). Neighbouring states shoulder a disproportionate
could become internally displaced due to a combination burden, hosting approximately 69% of global
of slow-onset climate impacts such as droughts, floods refugees, placing immense strain on their economies,
and rising sea levels (Rigaud et al., 2018). Moreover, infrastructure and social services (UNHCR, 2024).
FCAS are disproportionately represented among the
These displacements represent a growing crisis where
world’s most climate-vulnerable countries, with nearly
vulnerable communities are repeatedly forced to adapt,
three-quarters exhibiting weak institutional and financial
migrate and rebuild with little support. Many IDPs
capacity to adapt to these impacts. Compounding this
remain trapped in fragile states, where they experience
vulnerability, FCAS experience GDP losses from climate
inadequate shelter, limited access to healthcare and
shocks that are four times higher than those in other
precarious living conditions. The failure to address
countries, amplifying their economic and social fragility
these complex and overlapping risks creates a
(Jaramillo et al., 2023). Despite being at the forefront of
vicious cycle of vulnerability, where each new climate
climate impacts, FCAS receive disproportionately low
shock deepens existing vulnerabilities. The result is
levels of climate adaptation funding. Our review of the
a growing accumulation of both economic and non-
Green Climate Fund (GCF) portfolio for 2024 shows
economic losses and damages that are often invisible,
that on average, FCAS receive less than one-third
unaccounted for and inadequately addressed in
of climate finance allocated to non-conflict-affected
conventional climate impact assessments.
areas. This chronic underfunding perpetuates cycles of
vulnerability, leaving states unable to invest in resilient For instance, in Niger and Nigeria, the combination of
infrastructure, early warning systems (EWS) or long- frequent floods and prolonged droughts has devastated
term disaster preparedness. agricultural productivity, driving food insecurity, rising
debt and dependency on humanitarian assistance.
This disparity highlights a fundamental climate injustice:
Women and girls in these contexts face compounded
FCAS that are also LDCs contribute only 2.7% of
risks, including increased caregiving burdens, reduced
annual global greenhouse gas emissions, but they
access to education and heightened vulnerability to
accounted for 44% of people affected by disasters
gender-based violence (Bharadwaj and Shakya, 2021).
during 2019–2022 (International Rescue Committee,
Similarly, in Tanzania’s Singida municipality, repeated
2023). Yet these regions remain largely excluded from
exposure to climate shocks has increased household
global climate action and adaptation financing. The
stress, driven up health expenditures and forced
failure to address these inequalities risks perpetuating
children to drop out of school, perpetuating cycles of
cycles of fragility, displacement and poverty,
poverty and limiting future opportunities for resilience
undermining broader efforts towards sustainable
and recovery (Bharadwaj et al., 2022).
development and global peace (International Rescue
Committee, 2023). Addressing these challenges requires moving beyond

1.3 How compounding

narrow sectoral approaches to adopt a multidimensional
perspective that captures the full scope of vulnerabilities
vulnerabilities drive loss FCAS communities face. Not addressing these

and damage
interconnected risks will exacerbate both economic and
non-economic loss and damage, entrenching cycles of
poverty, inequality and fragility.
The world is already witnessing unprecedented levels
of climate-related displacement, disproportionately
affecting those in FCAS.
By the end of 2023, the number of forcibly displaced
people worldwide reached 117.3 million, the twelfth
consecutive annual increase (UNHCR, 2024). Internally
displaced persons (IDPs) now outnumber refugees,
with 68.3 million people displaced within their own

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

1.4 Multidimensional climate vulnerabilities. As one of the world’s most fragile

approach to assessing loss

and conflict-affected states, Mali faces intersecting
crises that have left millions of people trapped in cycles
and damage in Mali of poverty, displacement and insecurity (Cold-Ravnkilde
and Ba, 2022).
In this paper we have taken a multidimensional approach
The Mopti region epitomises these interconnected
to assessing and addressing loss and damage facing
challenges. It is one of Mali’s most conflict-affected
communities in the FCAS context (see Box 1 for
areas, with a complex interplay of environmental
multidimensional risks affecting FCAS). We selected
stressors, socioeconomic exclusion and deteriorating
Mali as the focus of this research because of its acute
governance structures (Cold-Ravnkilde and Ba, 2022).
development deficits, which are compounded by
Chronic poverty, limited access to essential services,
protracted conflict, governance fragility and escalating
weak institutions and recurring droughts and floods

BOX 1. MULTIDIMENSIONAL VIEW OF FCAS VULNERABILITIES

The INFORM multidimensional risk index is assessed based on a country’s exposure to natural and human-
induced hazards, its vulnerability to crises and its capacity to cope and adapt.
We analysed per capita GDP in relation to the INFORM multidimensional risk index for 32 FCAS, 23 non-FCAS
LDCs, 75 developing and 37 developed countries, covering a total of 167 countries (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Multidimensional risk index of FCAS and other countries

10

7
Multidimensional risk index

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
GDP per capita (0000s US$)
FCAS Other LDCs Other developing countries Developed countries

Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from European Commission Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre (DRMKC), no date

Our analysis shows that FCAS exhibit the highest average multidimensional risk at 6.09, which is 40% higher
than non-FCAS LDCs (4.36), 81% higher than other developing countries (3.37) and 185% higher than
developed countries (2.14). This indicates that FCAS face compounded risks across multiple dimensions,
including natural hazards, socioeconomic fragility, governance weaknesses and infrastructure deficits.
The higher vulnerability in FCAS spans several critical dimensions. Under hazard and exposure risk, FCAS
show higher exposure to natural hazards such as floods and droughts, alongside human-induced crises like
conflict and political instability. In terms of vulnerability, factors such as socioeconomic deprivation, inequality,
aid dependency and the presence of vulnerable groups, including displaced populations, further compound
their risks. Additionally, lack of coping capacity is evident in weak governance systems, poor infrastructure,
limited disaster risk reduction measures and insufficient access to health services.

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

have rendered Mopti highly vulnerable to both climatic The compounding crises in Mali make it a useful case
and non-climatic shocks (Benjaminsen et al., 2012). for understanding how climate change interacts with
Limited economic opportunities and heavy reliance on conflict and fragility to drive both economic and non-
climate-sensitive livelihoods such as agriculture and economic loss and damage.
pastoralism leave the population extremely vulnerable to
both environmental and sociopolitical shocks (UNHCR, Research approach and purpose
2021). Prolonged droughts have decimated crop yields,
To understand the complex links between vulnerabilities
while erratic rainfall and flooding have submerged
in Mali, we adopted a multidimensional research
farmland and displaced thousands of people (Giannini
approach that integrated quantitative and qualitative
et al., 2017). At the same time, ongoing armed conflicts
methodologies. This approach allowed us to carry out
have driven large-scale population movements,
a holistic assessment of how climate and conflict risks
disrupted local markets and intensified competition for
intersect in fragile environments, shaping household-
scarce resources (Giannini et al., 2017). A study by
level vulnerabilities and driving both economic and non-
the Danish Institute for International Studies reveals
economic loss and damage. The research methodology
that over 159,000 IDPs were recorded in Mopti in
involved household surveys, FGDs and KIIs.
September 2021, many of whom were forced to flee
repeated climate-related shocks and conflict-related Our research covered five communes in Mopti: Sio,
violence (Cold-Ravnkilde and Ba, 2022). Konna, Fatoma, Socoura and Mopti communes, which
were selected to reflect a cross-section of different
To better understand and quantify the overlapping risks
vulnerabilities and socioeconomic dynamics. Within
affecting Mali, we constructed an internal conflict and
these communes, we surveyed 408 households,
governance instability index (see Figure 2; for more
categorising them into 153 non-migrant households,
detail about the index and indicators used see Annex 2).
150 migrant (temporary migration) households and
This index for Mali shows a worsening scenario, rising 105 displaced households. The relatively smaller
sharply from 4.8 in 2006 to 8.48 in 2024. The figures sample size of displaced households was due to
highlight how these multidimensional factors interact logistical constraints in accessing them, along with
and reinforce one another, creating cascading risks time and resource constraints. We also conducted 22
that perpetuate fragility. For example, weak institutional FGDs and four KIIs with key stakeholders, including
frameworks limit the ability to respond effectively to local government officials, humanitarian actors and
climate-related disasters, while displacement pressures community leaders, to gather insights on institutional
worsen social grievances and heighten the risk of responses, coping mechanisms and gaps in addressing
conflict. These vulnerabilities are interwoven, amplifying vulnerabilities (for more details on the research sample,
one another and creating complex challenges that refer to Annex 3).
cannot be addressed through siloed interventions.

Figure 2. Internal conflict and governance instability index for Mali

10
Internal conflict and governance instability index

8.40 8.54 8.48

8.02 8.20
8 8.14
7.70
7.76
7.16 7.54
7.36
7.14

6 5.76
5.62
5.70 5.70
5.14
4.80 4.92

4
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Year

Source: Authors’ own calculation using data from https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/

www.iied.org 13
ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

We used two analytical tools: the C-CIQ toolkit nets. Together, these tools offer a robust framework for
(Bharadwaj et al., 2024) and the 3P Framework. The analysing the root causes and cascading impacts of
C-CIQ toolkit integrates household-level data, regional vulnerability in Mali.
conflict and climate indices, and social protection
The purpose of this research in Mali is fourfold:
assessments into a unified analytical framework
(see Figure 3). It allows for the quantification of both • To examine the multidimensional factors contributing
economic losses, such as income decline, infrastructure to vulnerability in communities grappling with
damage and agricultural disruption, and non-economic development deficits, climate impacts and conflict-
losses, such as mental health impacts, loss of cultural related challenges
heritage and the erosion of social cohesion.
• To understand why some households within the same
Complementing this, we used the 3P Framework to community are more vulnerable than others, analysing
categorise the drivers of vulnerability into predisposing, factors such as institutional support, access to
precipitating and protective factors (see Figure 4). We resources and social safety nets
assessed predisposing factors using the IRI, which
• To analyse the drivers of migration and displacement,
includes structural inequalities, economic limitations
identifying the triggers and coping strategies
and governance challenges that make households
employed by different household groups, and
inherently vulnerable. We analysed precipitating factors
by developing the CRI and the ICRI, focusing on • To quantify both economic and non-economic loss
immediate triggers such as climate shocks, droughts and damage caused by compounding vulnerabilities,
and conflict-related damages that drive households into highlighting impacts that are often invisible or
crisis situations. We assessed protective factors using inadequately accounted for in conventional
the SPI to understand the effectiveness of programmes assessments.
designed to mitigate vulnerability, including social safety

Figure 3. Research framework showing multidimensional approach for assessing vulnerability and loss and damage

Conflict drivers
Lack of coping Forced displacement,
Security threats, attacks,
ability distress migration
rebel movements,
conflict-related deaths Human rights
Economic drivers Demographic drivers violations
The
Marginal landholding, Lack of education,
influence of
crop loss, indebtedness low awareness
climate change
drivers such Multidimensional Loss and
as droughts vulnerability damage
and floods
Political drivers Social drivers
Weak institutions, Marginalisation, Loss of
human rights violations, exclusion, cultural identity
lack of transparency schism between
and accountability different groups Social protection Mental and
Support is insufficient physical health impact,
and inefficient wellbeing impacts
Source: Adapted from Bharadwaj et al., 2024

Figure 4. Interaction of predisposing, precipitating and protective factors

Predisposing
factors
+ Precipitating
factors
– Protective
factors
= Increased
vulnerability

Inherent resilience Climate risk index (CRI) and Social protection

index (IRI) internal conflict risk index (ICRI) index (SPI)

Source: Adapted from Bharadwaj et al., 2024

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

This research seeks to capture the full spectrum of

loss and damage, from measurable economic impacts
like lost incomes and destroyed infrastructure, to
intangible yet profound non-economic losses such
as psychological distress, loss of cultural ties and
weakened social cohesion.
The findings from this study are not only relevant to
Mali but can provide insights for other FCAS facing
similar challenges. By demonstrating the usefulness
of tools like the C-CIQ toolkit and the 3P Framework,
this research provides replicable methodologies that
can be adapted to other FCAS contexts. The analytical
tools and frameworks used in this study offer practical
templates for assessing vulnerabilities and quantifying
loss and damage in other regions facing overlapping
risks of climate shocks, conflict and development
deficits. By demonstrating the utility of these tools, this
research aims to bridge the gap between analysis and
actionable solutions, offering a replicable model for
addressing multidimensional risks in FCAS.
We also want to influence global policy discussions on
climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage funding,
and disaster risk reduction. By providing evidence of
the unique vulnerabilities that FCAS face, we hope
stakeholders will use the insights from this research to
demand a more equitable allocation of global financial
resources to address both economic and non-economic
dimensions of loss and damage. Policymakers,
humanitarian agencies and development partners
can also leverage these findings to design integrated
interventions that address immediate vulnerabilities
while building long-term resilience and stability.

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2
ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Understanding the
scale of climate
impacts in Mali
This section examines the scale and extent of climate The graph shows the rising frequency of disaster events
change impacts in Mali, focusing on both national in Mali over two distinct time periods: 1960–1990
trends and localised experiences at the community and 1991–2024. During the first period, the average
level in the Mopti region. It explores how the increasing frequency of disaster events was relatively low, with an
frequency and intensity of climate-induced events, average of 0.57 events per year. Disaster occurrences
including droughts, floods and irregular rainfall patterns, were sporadic, with significant gaps between events,
are affecting communities, livelihoods and ecosystems indicating a relatively stable period in terms of climate-
across the country. The analysis also delves into the induced disruptions.
specific impacts of these climate disasters in Mopti (see
However, the second period shows a clear increase:
Annex 3 for a map of the study area), providing insights
the average frequency of disaster events per year more
into how local populations understand and interpret
than doubled to 1.32. This period is marked by more
climate change-related shifts in the frequency and
frequent occurrences of droughts, floods and other
intensity of droughts and floods.
extreme weather events, reflecting the growing intensity
By integrating national data with localised analysis of climate variability and change. Peaks in certain
and community-level perspectives, this section offers years, such as 2005 and 2010, indicate exceptionally
a comprehensive overview of the scale and intensity severe climatic events, linked to widespread flooding
of climate impacts in Mali. This analysis serves as or prolonged droughts. This upward trend highlights
a foundation for subsequent discussions on the an escalation in the exposure of Mali to climate-related
intersection of climate vulnerability, social resilience and disasters. The increase in frequency corresponds with
long-term adaptation needs. broader global climate trends, where rising temperatures

2.1 Analysis of disaster

and changing precipitation patterns are driving more
frequent and intense extreme weather events.
occurrence and impact in Existing data shows that growing numbers of people
Mali are affected by disasters in Mali. This may indicate
worsening vulnerability, particularly in the context of
To understand how climate impacts have increased over more frequent climate shocks. In particular, 2012 and
time, we analysed the frequency of disaster events in 2020 stood out as critical years, with over seven million
Mali over a 64-year period (1960–2024) (EM-DAT, no people (nearly 32% of the total population) affected in
date). Our analysis shows a clear upward trend in the 2020 alone (EM-DAT, no date). This trend is especially
occurrence of extreme weather events (presented in concerning given the country’s reliance on agriculture,
Figure 5). fragile governance systems and limited institutional
capacity to respond effectively to such crises.

16 www.iied.org
 IIED WORKING PAPER

Figure 5. Change in disaster frequency in Mali

6
1961–1990 1991–2024
Average frequency of disaster Average frequency of disaster
events per year: 0.57 events per year: 1.32
5
Number of disasters

0
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
Year
Source: EMDAT, 2024

2.2 Localised impact of Our analysis shows that between 1991 and 2014,

climate trends in Mopti

there was a fluctuating but upward trajectory in
mortality due to disasters in Mopti, with noticeable
peaks during years of intense droughts and floods.
To understand the impact of the increasing frequency
Mortality figures remained relatively low during the
and intensity of disasters in Mali, we examined sub-
early 1990s but began to rise significantly from the
national data for the Mopti region. Mopti is one of the
late 1990s onwards. A sharp increase is observed
most vulnerable regions in Mali, frequently affected by
around 2007, with subsequent peaks in 2010 and
droughts, floods and other climate-related disasters.
2012, where mortality figures surpassed 50,000 and
However, as is common in many FCAS, getting data
60,000, respectively. These years correspond to
on disaster events is a significant challenge. Limited
severe droughts and flooding events, highlighting the
institutional capacity, fragmented reporting systems and
vulnerability of Mopti’s population to recurring and
conflict-related disruptions often constrain the collection
extreme climatic shocks.
and consistency of disaster-related data (OECD, 2022;
World Bank Group, 2020)​​. Insecurity, political instability Extrapolated data suggests a continued increase in
and weak governance often disrupt data collection disaster-related mortality if current trends persist. By
efforts, leading to significant gaps in monitoring disaster 2024, the projected mortality numbers show continuing
impacts​​. These challenges not only hinder accurate high fatality rates, with the potential to exceed the
assessments but also obstruct evidence-based policy historical peaks observed in 2012. If no significant
and planning, perpetuating vulnerabilities within already interventions are implemented to enhance disaster
fragile systems (OECD, 2022; World Bank Group, 2020). preparedness, EWS and adaptive capacity, projections
Despite data limitations, we used available data from for 2034 suggest an even steeper rise, crossing the
the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction threshold of 60,000 deaths annually.
(UNDRR) portal DesInventar Sendai (UNDRR, no date-a)
The data underlines how overlapping factors such as
up to 2014. Based on observed historical trends, we
weak healthcare infrastructure, inadequate disaster
extrapolated estimates for disaster-related mortality and
response systems and weak institutions compound the
the overall number of people affected by disasters for
impacts of disasters in Mopti. The rising mortality trend
2024 and projected these trends to 2034.
underscores the urgent need for localised disaster
preparedness strategies, improved health services and
Analysis of mortality trends in Mopti resilience-building measures in the region.
due to disasters
In Figure 6, we show the number of people who died
due to disasters in the Mopti region up to 2014, as well
as projections for 2024 and 2034.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Figure 6. Number of deaths due to disasters in Mopti region, projected up to 2034

70,000

60,000

50,000
Number of deaths

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0
1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035
Year

Figure 7. Number of people affected by disasters in Mopti region, projected up to 2034

4,000,000

3,500,000
Number of people affected by disasters

3,000,000

2,500,000

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

0
2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030
1990

2000

2035
1995

Year

upward trend, with significant events recorded in 2002,

Analysis of population affected by 2004 and 2005, when hundreds of thousands of people
disasters in Mopti were impacted by floods and droughts.
In Figure 7, we have examined the number of people Our projections suggest that the number of people
affected by disasters in Mopti up to 2014 and projected affected will continue to rise steeply if current trends
numbers for 2024 and 2034. persist. By 2024, disaster-affected populations are
expected to have surpassed historical peaks, potentially
The historical data indicates a clear upward trajectory
exceeding three million people in a single year. The
in the number of people affected by disasters in Mopti,
trendline for 2034 suggests an even more concerning
with sharp increases observed in the early 2000s
scenario, with affected populations continuing to grow
and particularly in 2012, when the affected population
exponentially, driven by both the increased frequency
exceeded 3.5 million. Prior to this spike, the affected
and intensity of disasters and the region’s limited
population fluctuated but demonstrated a consistent
capacity to prepare for and respond to such events.

18 www.iied.org
 IIED WORKING PAPER

This projected rise in affected populations reflects not recognised drought as a recurring challenge, its
only the direct impacts of disasters but also the broaderfrequency was perceived as relatively moderate, with
socioeconomic vulnerabilities of the Mopti region. High manageable intervals between dry spells. However,
dependence on agriculture, limited social protection during the period 2004 to 2013, the average frequency
mechanisms, displacement pressures and fragile of droughts rose significantly to 7.18 occurrences per
governance exacerbate the region’s susceptibility to decade. Communities reported more frequent dry
climatic shocks. spells, disrupting traditional crop cycles, reducing

2.3 Community perception

agricultural yields and placing additional stress on
pastoral systems. The situation worsened in the most
of climate trends recent decade, from 2014 to 2023, where the average
frequency of droughts increased sharply to 8.86
We gathered community perceptions in the Mopti occurrences per decade. Households noted shorter
region about the frequency of droughts and floods using intervals between droughts and longer periods of dry
household surveys and FGDs. Understanding how spells, exacerbating water scarcity, damaging rainfed
communities perceive and experience climate trends agricultural productivity and threatening pastoral
provides useful insights into the experiences of those livelihoods. These trends highlight the increasing
directly impacted by climate-related shocks. We cross- severity and recurrence of droughts in the Mopti
referenced the community perceptions with historical region, which place immense pressure on communities
data to identify trends in the frequency of these events dependent on natural resources for their survival. The
over the past three decades. While historical records community-level insights underscore the growing
provide quantitative evidence of climate trends, pressure on water resources and the subsequent
community perceptions offer crucial qualitative insights impacts on livelihoods and food security.
into how these changes are experienced at the local
level. This helps understand changes such as shifts in Perceptions of increasing flood
seasonal patterns and impacts on agriculture, water frequency
security and overall community resilience — factors that
may not always be fully reflected in national datasets. Figure 9 shows community perceptions of flood
frequency across the same three decades: 1994–2003,
Perceptions of increasing drought 2004–2013 and 2014–2023.
frequency Similar to droughts, the data shows an upward
trend in the perceived frequency of flood events in
Figure 8 shows the average frequency of droughts, as
the Mopti region over the past three decades. From
perceived by communities in Mopti, in three decades:
1994 to 2003, the average frequency of floods was
1994–2003, 2004–2013 and 2014–2023.
4.32 occurrences per decade. While floods were
The data reveals a clear upward trend in the frequency recognised as disruptive events, their occurrence was
of droughts, with each decade showing a marked perceived as less frequent and relatively manageable
increase in reported occurrences. Between 1994 during this period. Moving into the period from 2004 to
and 2003, the average frequency of droughts was 2013, the frequency of floods increased to an average
5.68 occurrences per decade. While communities of 4.59 occurrences per decade. Communities

Figure 8. Average perceived frequency of droughts Figure 9. Average perceived frequency of floods

6
10
Average perceived frequency of droughts

5.27
Average perceived frequency of floods

9 8.86
5
4.59
8 4.32
7.18
7 4
6 5.68

5 3
4
2
3
2
1
1
0 0
1994–2003 2004–2013 2014–2023 1994–2003 2004–2013 2014–2023

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

reported more frequent inundation of agricultural lands, These climatic shifts are not isolated occurrences but are
disruptions to settlements and significant crop losses. part of a broader pattern of increasing climate variability
In the most recent period covering 2014 to 2023, the and extreme weather events.
frequency of floods rose sharply to 5.27 occurrences
The dual impact of increasing drought and flood
per decade. Communities noted both flash floods
frequency creates a complex cycle of vulnerability.
and prolonged inundations, causing widespread
Droughts reduce agricultural yields, deplete water
damage to homes, infrastructure and farmlands. The
resources and trigger food insecurity, while floods
rising frequency of floods has compounded existing
cause damage to homes, infrastructure and agricultural
vulnerabilities in the region, with repeated flood events
fields. This dual burden undermines community
undermining recovery efforts, eroding agricultural
resilience and makes recovery increasingly difficult
productivity and increasing the risk of waterborne
after each event. As these climatic shocks become
diseases. These findings underscore the urgent need
more frequent and intense, households are left with
for robust flood mitigation strategies and adaptive
diminishing coping capacities, trapping them in cycles of
infrastructure to minimise the recurring damage caused
poverty and vulnerability. In many cases, the combined
by frequent flood events in Mopti.
effects of prolonged droughts and recurring floods
Community perceptions align closely with observed push households to make difficult decisions, including
meteorological data, highlighting a significant rise in both distress migration and forced displacement.
drought and flood events over the past three decades.

“The frequency of extreme events is increasing in the region. The scarcity of rain makes us
very tired and even when it starts raining it doesn’t last more than 20 days.”
FGD participant from Medina village in Mopti commune
“The cases of flooding and strong winds are becoming more and more frequent in the
Mopti region, if not every year. Drought is an ongoing process due to desertification and the
advancing Sahara.
The village of Kouna lies on the edge of a large pond fed by runoff and the rising level of the
River Niger. It is therefore highly exposed to flooding. Every winter, the flood waters rise right
up to the streets of Kouna.”
FGD participant from Kouna village in Sio commune
“The main extreme climatic events are floods, drought, strong aggressive winds and the delay
in the rainy season (around two months). The trends are negative in the Mopti region. Over
the past three years, the drought has become more severe from year to year. Extreme events
(floods/drought/strong winds) have had an exponential frequency in the Mopti region in recent
decades.”
FGD participant from Mandio village in Sio commune
“The scarcity of rain, drought and floods are the main extreme climatic events suffered every
year by the village of Barbé. Over the past five years, the village has frequently been the victim
of flooding, drought and bush fires caused by hot weather.”
FGD participant from Barbe village in Socoura commune
“Torrential rains cause flooding in the village… The development is very strange because the
rains are often torrential and less sufficient at the same time in recent years.”
FGD participant in Socoura commune

Note: The quotes have been translated from French. While adjustments have been made for clarity, we have tried to preserve the original tone and flow.

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IIED WORKING PAPER

Impact of climate
change and conflict on
household migration
decisions
This section explores how climate change is influencing
3.1 How has migration and
displacement increased over
household migration and displacement patterns
in Mali, with a specific focus on the Mopti region.
Migration, whether temporary or permanent, and forced
displacement have become increasingly common as
the last few decades?
communities grapple with the rising frequency and In Figure 10, we show a timeline of when households
intensity of climate-related shocks, compounded by in Mopti began undertaking migration or were
persistent conflict and fragile governance structures. displaced. It highlights a significant rise in migration and
This section examines the trends in migration and displacement in recent years, reflecting the escalating
displacement over recent decades, highlighting how pressures from both climate-related shocks and
environmental stressors, economic vulnerabilities and conflict-related insecurities.
social pressures intersect to drive these decisions.
Figure 10. Years since households began migration or moved permanently
We examine the factors motivating households to (displaced)
migrate or remain in place despite mounting challenges.
Our analysis looks at the underlying drivers by examining 80
predisposing factors, such as structural inequalities and 68%
70
Percentage of households

socioeconomic vulnerabilities, using the IRI. It further

explores the role of climate shocks (CRI) and conflict- 60
related pressures (ICRI) as immediate triggers that 50
precipitate migration. In addition, this section evaluates
the effectiveness of social protection systems (SPI) in 40
easing risks and offering households viable alternatives 30 28%
to distress migration. Through regression analysis, we
investigate why some households opt for temporary 20
migration or become displaced while others remain, 10
4%
despite facing similar climatic and conflict-related
0
pressures. Through this analysis, we aim to provide a More than 10 5–10 Less than 5
better understanding of the complex dynamics shaping years ago years ago years ago
migration decisions in fragile contexts, offering insights
for more targeted and effective policy interventions.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

The data collected from households reveals that 68%

3.2 Trends in temporary
migration and forced
of migrant households initiated migration or became
displaced within the last five years. This sharp increase
underscores the intensifying frequency and severity
of climatic events, such as droughts and floods,
displacement
coupled with growing insecurity. These overlapping The analysis of migration trends reveals distinct patterns
stressors have placed immense pressure on household in terms of who migrates within a household, where they
coping mechanisms, compelling many families to seek move to and how long they stay away.
temporary or permanent refuge elsewhere.
Figure 11 shows the demographic profile of household
In contrast, 28% of households reported that they members who migrated over the past year.
started their migration or displacement journey between
Adult males represent the largest proportion of
five and ten years ago. This period aligns with increasing
migrants, with an average of 1.62 per household. Female
environmental disruptions and sporadic conflict
adults are the next largest group, with an average of
incidents, highlighting a gradual buildup of vulnerabilities
0.39 per household. Among children, male adolescents
that eventually culminated in the large-scale movements
(15–18 years old) show higher migration rates (0.50
observed more recently.
per household) compared to female adolescents
Only 4% of households reported starting migration or (0.11), while younger children (under 15 years old)
displacement more than a decade ago. This indicates that have significantly lower migration rates, with both male
while migration has historically been undertaken in Mopti, and female children recording an average of 0.05
it was far less prevalent in earlier decades than now. per household. These figures suggest that migration
remains heavily male-dominated, driven by the need
The steep rise in migration and displacement within
to generate income and find livelihood opportunities.
the last five years suggests a critical threshold has
Women and children, though less likely to migrate, face
been crossed, where households are no longer able
increased vulnerability when left behind in resource-
to rely on traditional coping strategies (such as water
constrained environments.
management, crop and livestock diversification,
agroforestry systems, cultural and community practices). Figure 12 shows the migration and displacement
The confluence of increasing climate shocks, resource destinations, providing insight into where households
depletion and persistent conflict has created conditions choose to go — or end up.
where migration is no longer a choice but a necessity
This analysis shows that a significant proportion of
for survival.
migration and displacement occurs within Mali, with
These findings indicate a transition from temporary 69% of migrants moving to other regions. Although
migration patterns to more frequent and, in many cases, internal migration and displacement is the dominant
permanent displacement. pattern, cross-border migration/displacement is
also substantial, with 39% of households reporting
movement to other countries, often seeking employment

Figure 11. Average number of household members who migrated/moved permanently in 2024

Female children under 15 years old 0.05

Male children under 15 years old 0.05

Female children 15–18 years 0.11

Male children 15–18 years 0.50

Female adults 0.39

Male adults 1.62

Total household members 2.72

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

Average number of members per household

22 www.iied.org
 IIED WORKING PAPER

Figure 12. Migration/Displacement destination of households

3.2 Exploring household
80
69 reasons for migration and
70
displacement
Percentage of households

60
Migration and displacement in Mopti are shaped by
50 a range of interlinked factors, with climatic shocks,
39 conflict and socioeconomic vulnerabilities playing
40
central roles. This section explores the key reasons
30 behind household decisions to migrate temporarily or
20
18 for the longer term, highlighting the interconnected
influences of climate impacts, resource scarcity and
10 inadequate institutional support.
3
0 In Figure 13, we show the reasons for migration,
Within Other Other Other
the circle circles regions countries
highlighting the key drivers that make households leave
their villages.
We asked the households to score the reasons for
opportunities in neighbouring nations. Migration within
migration on a scale of 10. The main reasons why
the same circle or locally accounts for 18%, while
households migrate are financial and food crises caused
movement to other circles within the Mopti region
by drought (7.24) and conflict in the region (7.09).
remains minimal at 3%. These trends highlight that
Droughts lead to significant reductions in agricultural
while migration/displacement is often an internal
productivity and water availability. These losses result
phenomenon, cross-border movements cannot be
in financial hardship and food insecurity, compelling
overlooked, especially given the recurring economic and
households to migrate as a distress response to ensure
environmental pressures in Mopti.
survival. Conflict, often exacerbated by competition over
Information collected from households indicates dwindling resources such as arable land and water, has
that the major migration destinations are within emerged as another major factor. Households living in
Mali. Bamako, the capital city, emerges as the areas affected by violence and insecurity face limited
top destination, attracting 19% of migrants and economic prospects and heightened risks to their
displaced populations. This reflects the pull factor safety, leaving migration as one of the few viable coping
of urban centres offering relatively better economic strategies for those who can afford it.
opportunities, social services and perceived safety.
Lack of employment opportunities (6.38) and lack of
Sikasso follows at 16%, while Kayes (9%) and
assets (6.12) are also significant drivers of migration.
Segou (6%) are also important destinations. These
Households that rely heavily on agriculture and livestock
urban migration/displacement patterns highlight the
(both climate-sensitive livelihoods) are particularly
concentration of resources and opportunities in a few
vulnerable to environmental disruptions. Without assets
key cities, leaving rural regions like Mopti increasingly
or alternative sources of income, they are often forced
depopulated and socioeconomically weakened.

Figure 13. Reasons households migrate

Lack of infrastructure 4.27

Financial and food crisis caused by flood 4.36
Lack of education or employable skills 4.45
Lack of social status 4.57
Powerlessness 5.65
Lack of social protection 5.99
Lack of assets 6.12
Lack of employment opportunities 6.38
Conflict in the region 7.09
Financial and food crisis caused by drought 7.24
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Perception score value (range 1–10)

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

to undertake distress migration to sustain their families. Conflict in the region (8.31) stands out as the most
The lack of social protection systems (5.99) further significant factor, underscoring the acute vulnerability of
compounds these vulnerabilities. In the absence of households living in conflict-affected areas. Repeated
safety nets, such as cash transfers, food assistance or exposure to violence, combined with loss of livelihoods
other social safety nets, households are left with few and insecure living conditions, forces many families
options but to migrate when faced with crises. to flee their homes. Similarly, financial and food crises
caused by drought (7.34) remain a critical driver, as
Other notable factors include powerlessness2 (5.65)
prolonged dry spells continue to undermine food
and low social status (4.57), which highlight the
security and income generation, leaving households with
sociopolitical dimensions of vulnerability. Marginalised
no choice but to seek refuge elsewhere.
groups, including women, young people and those from
lower socioeconomic backgrounds, often have limited Powerlessness (6.58) and lack of employment
agency in decision making and resource allocation, opportunities (6.39) also feature prominently in
leaving them disproportionately affected by both climatic displacement decisions. Displaced households reported
and conflict-related shocks. Structural challenges, such a deep sense of disempowerment, as they are forced to
as lack of education and employable skills (4.45) and leave their homes without adequate support systems or
inadequate infrastructure facilities (4.27), also contribute assurance of being safe in their new locations. Lack of
to households’ inability to adapt in place, pushing them social protection (5.13) and lack of assets (5.08) further
towards migration. reflect the economic and institutional gaps that make it
difficult for households to remain resilient in the face of
Figure 14 shows the reasons for displacement, which
repeated shocks. While financial crises caused by floods
reveal both overlaps and differences compared to
(4.61) are a significant factor in displacement, they rank
migration drivers.
lower compared to those caused by droughts, likely due
to the higher frequency of droughts in the region.

Figure 14. Reasons households are displaced

Financial and food crisis caused by flood 4.61

Lack of social status 4.65
Lack of infrastructure 4.73
Lack of education or employable skills 4.79
Lack of assets 5.08
Lack of social protection 5.13
Lack of employment opportunities 6.39
Powerlessness 6.58
Financial and food crisis caused by drought 7.34
Conflict in the region 8.31
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Perception score value (range 1–10)

2 Powerlessness is a form of marginalisation where individuals lack the agency to influence decisions affecting their lives. Even when entitled to support,
systemic barriers and exclusion from decision-making processes deny them access to essential resources and opportunities.

24 www.iied.org
 IIED WORKING PAPER

“Our conditions are mostly miserable, as migrants are considered foreigners even in
destination locations inside Mali. Government representatives are often not able to impose
decisions in these destination locations due to local factors, for example ownership to land
rich in gold (where mining companies exert their own regulations).”
FGD participant from Mandio village of Sio commune
“Climate change has caused many young people to leave the countryside because there are no
jobs after working in the fields. Drought causes crop loss and pushes young people to migrate.”
FGD participant from Barbe village of Socoura commune
“Migrant workers at destination sites deal with various issues — everything from sexual violence
and unwanted pregnancies to unpaid wages, withheld salaries and even being deceived or
locked up. Their living conditions are quite rough, depending on where they end up.”
FGD participant of Takouti village in Socoura commune
“The major factors of migration are poverty and low crop yields in the village. The able-bodied
men migrate to the traditional gold-panning sites in the interiors of Mali. Some head towards
Maghreb or even Europe for improving the wellbeing of the families.”
FGD participant from Soufouroulaye village of Sio commune
“The rate of youth migration is increasing every year. As a result, the village does not even
have able-bodied workers in the dry season when there is a need for domestic work and
cleaning the fields.”
FGD participant from Fatoma commune
“Due to drought, migratory flows have multiplied exponentially every year.”
FGD participant from Komoguel 2 village of Mopti commune

Note: The quotes have been translated from French. While adjustments have been made for clarity, we have tried to preserve the original tone and flow.

3.3 Understanding the Together, these indices provide a multidimensional lens

underlying drivers of
to analyse why some households are more vulnerable
to distress migration than others despite facing similar
mobility: constructing the shocks. By analysing these drivers, this section offers

3P index
a clearer understanding of the systemic and immediate
factors influencing household mobility in Mopti, helping
design more targeted policy responses and resilience-
Our analysis in the previous section shows that
building strategies.
migration and displacement are not uniform
experiences. They are shaped by a combination of
structural vulnerabilities, immediate triggers and
3.3.1 Role of predisposing factors in
available safety nets. To better understand these creating differentiated impacts on
dynamics, we constructed the 3P index, comprising four households — the inherent resilience
key components: the IRI, the CRI, the ICRI and the SPI.
index
The IRI assesses structural vulnerabilities such as
The IRI was developed to assess the structural and
poverty, education levels, access to services and
socioeconomic characteristics that shape household
economic opportunities, highlighting how pre-existing
resilience and influence migration decisions. It focuses
conditions influence household resilience to shocks.
on predisposing factors — conditions that determine a
The CRI evaluates the scale and frequency of climate-
household’s capacity to cope with and adapt to climate
related hazards, including droughts and floods, and their
shocks and related stressors. These factors are not
impact on household stability. The ICRI examines the
directly tied to immediate climate impacts but serve as
extent to which conflict exacerbates vulnerabilities and
foundational drivers of resilience or vulnerability.
disrupts coping mechanisms, while the SPI measures
the availability and effectiveness of institutional safety The IRI uses eight key variables, each representing
nets in mitigating risks and supporting recovery. different dimensions of household resilience and

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

adaptive capacity. These variables include food compounded vulnerabilities related to environmental
consumption, educational status of the family head, pressures and social factors, including limited access to
percentage of children currently studying, house resources and protection mechanisms.
ownership, landholding size, household annual income,
Food security (see Figure 16): this is a fundamental
sex of the family head and toilet type. Each variable was
indicator of household resilience. Households with
normalised on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher scores
higher food consumption scores demonstrate better
indicating greater inherent resilience and lower scores
dietary diversity, meal frequency and access to essential
reflecting heightened vulnerability. The aggregated
nutrition. Non-migrant households reported the highest
score across these variables provide a single resilience
food consumption score (50.57), followed closely by
value for each household, enabling a comparative
migrant households (49.31). Displaced households,
analysis across migrant, displaced and non-migrant
however, reported a lower score (41.20), reflecting
households. The analysis below explains each variable
higher levels of food insecurity and vulnerability.
in detail, highlighting how these factors contribute
to resilience or exacerbate vulnerabilities in different Educational status (see Figures 17 and 18):
household categories. education is a critical enabler of resilience, equipping
individuals with skills, knowledge and opportunities for
Insights into predisposing factors
creating diversified livelihoods. The analysis in Figure 17
Social status and ethnic affiliation (see Figure 15):
this plays a significant role in shaping resilience and Figure 16. Food consumption, by household migration status
influencing migration and displacement patterns. In
terms of the IRI, some ethnic groups, including the Bozo 50.57
50 49.31
(50.00), Sarakole (46.85), Malinke (46.85) and Bambara
(46.74) ethnic groups, demonstrate higher resilience
Food consumption score

compared to the Sornhai (42.75), Fulani (40.44) and

Dogon (39.96) ethnic groups. Mobility patterns vary
41.20
across communities, reflecting differences in resilience
and vulnerability. Some communities have a higher 40
proportion of households that remain in place, while
others experience greater migration or displacement.
For example, the highest proportions of non-migrant
households are among the Sarakole (58%), Malinke
(46%) and Bambara (46%) ethnic groups. In contrast, 30
migration is notably higher among the Malinke (46%), Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
Bozo (43%) and Fulani (38%). Displacement follows
a different pattern, with the highest rates observed Note: Range 0–100. The higher the score value, the higher the food
security.
among the Songhay (41%) and Dogon (33%) showing

Figure 15. Differences in mobility among different ethnic communities, by household migration status

100
8
18 16 14
30 26
33
80 41
Percentage of households

28
46
39
60 43
29 39
38

40 36

58
46 46
20 39 38
32 34
23

0
Bozo Bambara Dogon Fulani Malinke Sarakole Songhay Other
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

Figure 17. Educational status of the head of the household, by household migration status

Non-migrants 35 39 10 3 14

Migrants 26 50 8 16

Displaced 51 40 3 6

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage of households
Illiterate Basic level Secondary level University diploma Other

Figure 18. Highest educational attainment within households, by household migration status

Non-migrants 21 50 18 6 5

Migrants 17 57 16 7 3

1
Displaced 30 56 7 7

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage of households
Illiterate Basic level Secondary level University diploma Other

shows significant disparities in the educational status of attainment in displaced households contribute to
family heads across household categories. Displaced restricted livelihood opportunities and reduced
households reported the highest levels of illiteracy capacity to adapt to changing environmental and
(51%), followed by non-migrant households (35%), while economic conditions.
migrant households had a comparatively lower illiteracy
Children’s educational status (see Figure 19): this
rate (26%). Households led by individuals with basic or
is both a reflection of and a contributor to household
secondary education displayed higher resilience, while
resilience. Data shows differences in children’s
those headed by illiterate individuals faced compounded
education status across household categories. Non-
vulnerabilities. Education plays a dual role: it not only
migrant and migrant households reported relatively
shapes livelihood opportunities but also affects access
higher percentages of children currently studying
to social protection and external support systems.
across all age groups, while displaced households
The analysis of the highest educational attainment consistently reported lower enrolment rates. For
within a household (see Figure 18) further reinforces example, only 50% of displaced male children aged
the resilience-building capacity of education. Among 6–14 years are currently studying, compared to 73%
displaced households, 56% reported basic-level in migrant households. This gap widens in older age
education as the highest attainment, with limited groups, where economic pressures often force children
representation in secondary or university-level from displaced households into informal labour. The
education. Migrant households had slightly higher education disruptions caused by displacement have
secondary-level education rates (16%), while non- long-term consequences, limiting future adaptive
migrant households reported a more balanced capacity and perpetuating cycles of vulnerability.
distribution across basic (50%), secondary (18%) and
higher education levels. Lower levels of educational

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Figure 19. Percentage of children currently studying, by household migration status

80
73
Percentage of children studying

66 67
61 63
59 59
60 57
53 52 51
50

40

20

0
Male 15–18 years old Female 15–18 years old Male 6–14 years old Female 6–18 years old
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Figure 20. Sex ratio (male to female) of households, by household migration status

Non-migrants 1.175

Migrants 1.186

Displaced 1.165

Mali average 1.033

0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20

Source: World Bank Group Database for 2022 (sex ratio at birth) Sex ratio (male to female)

Sex ratio, family size and gender of family head

Figure 21. Percentage of households headed by women, by household
migration status (see Figures 20 and 21): these are interconnected
demographic factors that together provide critical
20 insights into the differentiated vulnerabilities and
17 adaptive capacities of households in Mopti. The average
male-to-female ratio for households in Mali is 1.033. In
Percentage of households

15 Mopti, this ratio is higher across all groups: 1.175 for

non-migrant households, 1.186 for migrant households
and 1.165 for displaced populations. The higher ratio
of men to women reflects Mopti’s broader gender
10 dynamics, with elevated female mortality rates, driven
by poor healthcare access, conflict-related violence
and the disproportionate impacts of climate change on
5 women. These include increased workload, malnutrition
5
and exposure to health risks during crises, all of which
3
deepen gender disparities and social vulnerabilities.
Closely linked to the sex ratio is the gender of the head
0
of the family, which significantly influences household
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
resilience. Female-headed households often face

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

compounded social and economic challenges. Among displaced households, 43% own their homes but don’t
displaced households, 17% are headed by women, have legal papers confirming they own the land (title).
compared to just 5% of non-migrant households and Just over half (51%) own their homes with entitlement,
3% of migrant households. This over-representation of while 6% have made makeshift housing arrangements.
female-headed households among displaced groups Migrant households have slightly better ownership rates,
underscores their heightened vulnerability, as these with 59% owning their homes with entitlement and 35%
households often face barriers to accessing resources without entitlement. Non-migrant households exhibit
and opportunities. similar patterns, with 58% owning homes with entitlement
and 37% without entitlement. These patterns underscore
Access to credit (see Figure 22): this plays a vital
how mobility status influences access to secure housing
role in buffering households against shocks. Figure 22
tenure, with displaced populations having the most
highlights a critical gap in financial inclusion across
insecure housing tenure.
mobility groups, with displaced households being the
most marginalised. Non-migrant households report Agricultural land ownership and average
relatively better access to formal banking services (26%) landholding (see Figure 25): land ownership
compared to migrants (13%). Displaced households rely correlates closely with resilience. Our analysis of the
almost entirely on informal credit sources (99%). This is data on agricultural land ownership shows differences
because displacement limits financial inclusion (displaced across non-migrant, migrant and displaced households.
households are not able to open bank accounts without a Non-migrant households report the highest percentage
permanent address), forcing these households to rely on of land ownership, with 67% owning agricultural
informal credit networks, which often come with higher land. Migrant households have the next highest land
interest rates and exploitative terms. ownership rates at 61%, while displaced households
show the lowest ownership rates at 59%.
Asset ownership (see Figure 23 and 24): data on
housing type and ownership status is shown in Figures When examining average landholding size (see
23 and 24. The data on housing types highlights the Figure 25), non-migrant households have the largest
differences in living conditions across non-migrant, average holdings, owning 1.80 acres with legal
migrant and displaced households. Among displaced entitlement and 1.62 acres without legal entitlement
households, 100% live in mud houses with thatched (that is, they own the land but don’t have legal
roofs, highlighting their lack of access to more durable documents). Migrant households own slightly less, with
housing. Most migrant and non-migrant households also averages of 1.26 acres with legal entitlement and 1.46
live in mud houses, with 94% living in similar conditions. acres without. Displaced households appear most
A small fraction of migrant and non-migrant households disadvantaged, with average landholdings dropping
live in houses with metal sheet roofs (5% for both), and to 0.76 acres with legal entitlement and 1.32 acres
an even smaller percentage live in concrete buildings without. These findings highlight the compounded
(1% for both). vulnerabilities faced by displaced and migrant
households in terms of both access to land and their
Home ownership patterns (see Figure 24) further illustrate
security of land tenure.
the precarious situation of displaced households. Among

Figure 22. Credit sources available, by household migration status

26
Banks 13

72
Informal credit
sources 87
99

2
Others 0.36
0.68
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage of households
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Figure 23. Type of house owned, by household migration status

1
Non-migrants 5
94

1
Migrants 5
94

Displaced
100

0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of households
Concrete houses Houses with metal sheet roofs Mud houses with thatched roofs

Figure 24. Home ownership status, by household migration status

Non-migrants 58 37 3 3

Migrants 59 35 3 3

Displaced 51 43 6

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage of households
Owned with legal entitlement Owned without legal entitlement Rented/Leased Makeshift

Figure 25. Type of land holding among households, by household migration status

2.0
1.80
1.62
Average landholding (acres)

1.5 1.46
1.32
1.26

1.0
0.76

0.5 0.37
0.31
0.10 0.07 0.11
0
0
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
Owned with legal entitlement Owned without legal entitlement Rented/Leased Borrowed

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

Livestock ownership (see Figure 26): this highlights by migrant households at XOF 953,101 (US$1,574).
varying levels of economic resilience and access to In contrast, displaced households earn significantly
productive assets. Non-migrant households exhibit less, with an average annual income of XOF 600,329
relatively higher ownership of cattle (5%), sheep (2%) (US$991). This income disparity highlights the severe
and goats (2%) compared to migrant households, economic vulnerability of displaced households, driven
which own fewer cattle (2%), slightly more sheep (2%) by disruption of livelihoods and limited access to
and fewer goats (1%). Displaced households, however, sustainable income opportunities.
present an entirely different pattern, with significantly
Income sources also vary across these groups. In
higher ownership of cattle (16%), sheep (8%) and
Table 1, we show the different income sources across
goats (7%). This elevated livestock ownership among
household categories.
displaced households suggests that livestock serves as
a critical coping mechanism and mobile asset, acting The composition of household income reflects the
as both a source of income and food security. These distinct economic profiles of non-migrant, migrant and
figures indicate that while non-migrant and migrant displaced households, shaped by their mobility patterns,
households rely on diversified livestock holdings for livelihood assets and access to income sources. For
their livelihoods, displaced households demonstrate a non-migrant households, agriculture is the dominant
heavy dependence on livestock, particularly cattle, as a source of income, contributing 35%, aligning with their
primary economic buffer. This reliance could be linked higher rates of agricultural land ownership and larger
to limited access to land, agriculture and formal financial average landholdings. This strong reliance on agriculture
systems, making livestock a portable asset. ties non-migrants to their location, reinforcing their
reduced likelihood of migrating. Additionally, non-
Household annual income (see Table 1): this is
migrants report that a substantial portion of their income
a significant contributor to resilience. Non-migrant
(22%) comes from salaries, predominantly from formal
households reported the highest average annual
employment, indicating access to relatively stable fixed-
income at XOF 960,330 (US$1,586)3, followed closely

Figure 26. Livestock ownership, by household migration status

Cattle 5 2 16

Goats 2 1 7

Sheep 2 2 8

Other 2 1 1

0 5 10 15 20 25
Percentage of households
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Table 1. Composition of household income, by household migration status

ECONOMIC NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

ACTIVITY (% OF HOUSEHOLDS) (% OF HOUSEHOLDS) (% OF HOUSEHOLDS)
Agriculture and 35 28 41
agriculture labour
Livestock 11 7 39
Fishing 13 10 6
Non-farm income 5 7 7
Salary 22 16 3
Remittance 14 32 4

3 We have used the exchange rate as XOF 1 = US$0.001651

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

income opportunities. This income security may act suggests that while migration helps diversify income
as a financial buffer during crises, providing resilience sources, it does not always lead to greater resilience.
against economic shocks and reducing the push factors Migrant households remain vulnerable to economic and
for migration. climate shocks, much like those who do not migrate,
indicating that mobility alone is not a guaranteed
Migrant households, on the other hand, display a more
pathway to long-term stability. Migrants remain tied to
fluid income structure that reflects the temporary and
agriculture both at their place of origin and destination
seasonal nature of their mobility. Agriculture still plays
and depend heavily on remittances as a critical financial
a significant role, contributing 28% of their income,
buffer. The temporary and cyclical nature of migration
indicating their continued reliance on agricultural
may limit their ability to secure long-term economic
activities at both their origin and destination sites. A
stability. We can infer that for non-migrants, staying in
significant portion of the income for migrant households
one place may not necessarily signify greater resilience;
(32%) comes from remittances. This means that
rather, it could reflect limited mobility options or
household members who have migrated send money
concerns about the risks associated with migration.
back to their families, who remain in Mopti. These
remittances provide crucial financial support for non- In contrast, displaced households demonstrate
migrant household members. This dual dependence significantly lower resilience levels, reflecting the
on agriculture and remittances highlights their adaptive compounded vulnerabilities they face. Their limited
strategy to diversify income sources in response to access to stable housing, formal employment and
economic vulnerabilities created due to climate impacts. agricultural land ownership underscores their economic
and social precarity. Displaced households often
The income composition of displaced households
lose access to traditional support networks, essential
points to the significant precariousness of their
services and opportunities to build long-term assets,
economic situation. Agriculture contributes the largest
leaving them highly dependent on informal and often
share (41%) of their income, but this reliance reflects
exploitative coping mechanisms.
their engagement in low-paying agricultural labour rather
than land ownership. Additionally, 39% of their income However, it is important to note that while non-migrant
comes from livestock, aligning with earlier observations and migrant households display relatively higher resilience
about their livestock ownership. This heavy reliance on scores compared to displaced households, none of the
mobile assets such as livestock suggests that it is a groups exhibit high resilience levels overall. The resilience
coping mechanism. Displaced households also report scores across all household categories are modest,
minimal contributions from salaried income (3%) and underscoring the broader context of FCAS such as Mali,
remittances (4%), reflecting their limited integration into where systemic challenges, including weak governance,
formal labour markets and weaker social and financial persistent insecurity, limited access to essential services
support networks. and entrenched poverty, constrain households’ ability
to build sustainable resilience. This highlights the need
Overall inherent resilience index
for context-specific interventions that address structural
The aggregated IRI scores (see Figure 27) provides a inequalities, improve access to social services and
comprehensive measure of households structural and promote inclusive development pathways to build long-
socioeconomic capacity to cope with and adapt to term resilience for all households, particularly those
shocks, providing an overview of the resilience disparities displaced and most vulnerable.
across non-migrant, migrant and displaced households.
Non-migrant households exhibit the highest average
Figure 27. IRI values, by household migration status
resilience score (44.56), closely followed by migrant
households (44.21). Displaced households lag 45 44.56 44.21
significantly, with an average score of 37.23.
Inherent resilience index

The higher resilience among non-migrant households

can be attributed to their relatively stable access to 40
agricultural land, larger landholding sizes, better housing
37.23
ownership status and higher representation in salaried
employment. These factors collectively contribute to
35
greater financial and social stability, reducing their
susceptibility to shocks. Additionally, non-migrants
benefit from stronger community ties and localised
support systems, further reinforcing their resilience. 30
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
Migrant households, despite their mobility, maintain
a comparable resilience score to non-migrants. This Note: Range 0–100. Higher index value represents higher resilience.

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

“The children go to school, but the village 3.3.2 Climate impact as a precipitating
only has the first cycle of basic education. factor — the climate risk index
The village housing the second cycle of
basic education seems distant and the lack The CRI was developed to quantify the immediate and
tangible losses and damages households experience
of housing for the children increases the
due to climate-induced shocks. The CRI captures the
cases of abandonment. So out-of-school precipitating factors that act as triggers for migration
children spend their time doing domestic and displacement. These factors represent acute and
work, tending livestock, fishing, etc.” measurable impacts (rather than long-term structural
FGD participant from Dio village of Sio vulnerabilities) which force households to reassess their
commune survival strategies.
The CRI includes eight key variables: crop losses due to
“Breeders face all kinds of challenges, from
climate disasters, loss of livestock-related income, loss of
pastures getting destroyed and forage areas income due to reduced fish catch, loss of employment,
disappearing, to losing livestock during housing damage, damage to livelihood equipment,
disease outbreaks. They’re forced into increased health expenditures caused by water-related
transhumance, dealing with constant stress hardships, and the purchase of water during drought
and the disruption of the traditional way of life.” periods (see section 4 for loss and damage values
related to these variables). These variables collectively
FGD participant from Kouna village of Sio
capture the immediate economic and livelihood impacts
commune experienced by households during climate shocks. We
“…children no longer go to school because normalised each variable on a scale from 0 to 100, with
higher CRI values indicating greater exposure to climate
all the teachers have left the village for fear
risks and associated losses. This approach enables
of reprisals from radical armed groups… the cross-comparison of cumulative climate-related risks
boys carry out agricultural and fishing work. across non-migrant, migrant and displaced households.
At the same time, daughters support their
The CRI data in Figure 28 highlights the difference in
mothers in domestic tasks.” exposure and vulnerability across the three household
FGD participant from Kouna village of Sio categories. Non-migrant households report the lowest
commune average CRI score (38.89), suggesting a comparatively
lower level of direct exposure to acute climate risks.
“Households are adapting by cutting down However, this lower risk does not equate to resilience,
on the amount of cereals they eat each day!” as the persistent challenges of limited adaptation
FGD participant from Barbe of Socoura capacities, reliance on rainfed agriculture and limited
commune resource bases continue to pose significant barriers to
long-term stability. For many non-migrants, the ability to
“Farming households bear the brunt of remain in place is not necessarily a reflection of higher
extreme weather events, followed closely resilience but may also indicate a lack of mobility options
by fishing households. When the wintering or the perceived risks of migration.
season is unfavourable, both must wait for Migrants report a moderate CRI score (53.83),
the next rainy and cold season to adequately reflecting higher exposure to climate risks compared
meet their subsistence needs. Households to non-migrants. This elevated score suggests
in Dio village are not adequately prepared that migration often emerges as a reactive coping
mechanism rather than a proactive adaptation strategy.
for extreme climatic shocks. The community
Climate shocks act as precipitating factors that drive
experiences unpredictable and alternating these households to seek temporary or seasonal
extreme events, such as droughts and floods.” mobility. Despite moderate risks, many migrant
FGD participant from Dio village of Sio households remain tied to agricultural activities,
commune perpetuating their vulnerability to future shocks.

Note: The quotes have been translated from French. While adjustments have Displaced households exhibit the highest CRI score
been made for clarity, we have tried to preserve the original tone and flow. (66.19), emphasising their acute vulnerability and
chronic exposure to climate-induced losses. The
elevated risk profile among displaced households is
driven by compounding factors, including the loss of
agricultural assets, reliance on fragile shelters, disrupted
livelihoods and limited access to essential services.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Each variable was normalised on a scale from 0 to 100,

Figure 28. CRI values, by household migration status
70
with higher scores reflecting higher exposure to conflict-
66.19 related risks and lower scores indicating reduced
vulnerability. The aggregated index provides a single
composite risk value for each household, enabling a
60 comparative analysis across non-migrant, migrant and
53.83
displaced households.
Climate risk index

In the context of Mali, and specifically Mopti,

50 understanding the ICRI as a precipitating factor is
critical due to the unique intersection of climate risks
and conflict dynamics. While climate shocks captured
38.89 by the CRI create economic and environmental
40
stressors, such as crop losses, reduced fish catch and
loss of income, conflict intensifies these vulnerabilities
through violence, displacement and disruption of
30 livelihoods. Together, these two indices reveal a layered
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced and compounding vulnerability dynamic, where climate
Note: Range 0–100. Higher index value represents higher risk.
impacts and conflict risks not only coexist but also
reinforce one another, creating cyclical and protracted
crises for affected communities.
Unlike migrants, displaced households often experience
prolonged exposure to repeated shocks, with a limited Factors shaping internal conflict risk index
capacity to recover or rebuild.
Household injuries and their causes: we analysed
The CRI scores highlight the need for targeted how injuries resulting from disasters, accidents
interventions that address the specific vulnerabilities and conflict serve as significant stress multipliers,
of each group. For non-migrants, strengthening local intensifying vulnerabilities and compelling households
adaptation strategies and improving agricultural to make mobility decisions as a survival strategy rather
resilience can reduce their exposure to shocks. than a voluntary choice.
For migrants, enhancing livelihood diversification at
Figure 29 shows the overall percentage of households
both origin and destination points can create more
experiencing injuries over the past three years.
sustainable coping mechanisms. For displaced
households, comprehensive support systems that Non-migrant households report the lowest levels of
address housing security, access to services and injuries (8%), reflecting their relative insulation from
livelihood restoration are essential to breaking cycles of conflict hotspots and reduced exposure to direct
vulnerability and ensuring long-term resilience. violence. For migrant households, injury rates increase
to 22%, indicating heightened vulnerability in transit
3.3.3 Conflict as a precipitating factor — or engagement in precarious labour activities at their
internal conflict risk index destinations. Displaced households report the highest
injury rates (33%), underscoring the severe risks they
The ICRI was developed to assess the direct impacts
of conflict-related risks on households and their role in Figure 29. Household members seriously injured in the last three years, by
shaping vulnerability, resilience and mobility decisions. household migration status

In FCAS such as Mali, conflict exacerbates existing 40

structural and socioeconomic vulnerabilities, creating
acute stressors that force households into migration or 33
displacement as coping mechanisms. The ICRI focuses
Percentage of households

30
on the immediate and tangible consequences of
conflict, capturing how injuries, fatalities and persistent
22
exposure to violence disrupt household stability and
economic security. 20

To quantify these impacts, the ICRI was constructed

using two primary variables that represent critical
10 8
dimensions of conflict exposure: the percentage of
households reporting injuries to family members as a
result of conflict-related incidents and the percentage
of households that have experienced the loss of a family 0
member directly linked to conflict. Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

34 www.iied.org
 IIED WORKING PAPER

face, particularly during their displacement journeys and Of the households surveyed, 22% of non-migrant
in insecure or resource-scarce settlement areas. households reported a death, 15% of migrant
households reported a death and displaced households
Table 2 sets out the reasons behind these injuries,
recorded the highest rate of deaths at 23%. While
highlighting how different stressors — conflict,
non-migrant households face a considerable burden
disasters, accidents and other factors — cause these
of mortality, their deaths are primarily linked to non-
injuries.
conflict factors such as diseases and ageing. Migrant
For non-migrant households, injuries are predominantly households display relatively lower mortality rates,
attributed to accidents during travel (42%), while possibly indicating that migration serves as a temporary
conflict-related injuries (17%) and other reasons (17%) coping strategy, reducing prolonged exposure to high-
remain low. This suggests that non-migrant households, risk environments. Displaced households, however, face
while facing everyday risks, are less exposed to direct the highest mortality rates, underscoring the severe risks
violence from conflict. they encounter, both during displacement journeys and
at their destinations.
For migrant households, the picture shifts significantly.
Conflict emerges as the leading cause of injuries (61%), In Table 3, we have disaggregated the reasons behind
followed by accidents during travel (18%) and workplace household deaths across non-migrant, migrant and
incidents (12%). This highlights the precarious nature displaced categories.
of migration journeys and the exposure of migrants to
Non-migrant households attributed the majority of deaths
conflict zones both at their origin and during transit.
to diseases (64%), ageing (12%) and accidents (6%).
Disasters contribute minimally to injuries in this group
Conflict-related deaths account for only 9%, indicating
(6%), indicating that conflict outweighs environmental
that while conflict is a factor, non-migrants are relatively
factors in driving risks during migration.
insulated from direct violence. Migrant households
Among displaced households, conflict is an present a more mixed profile, with disease (48%) and
overwhelming driver of injuries, accounting for 57% of ageing (22%) remaining dominant causes, but conflict-
reported cases. This reflects the persistent exposure of related deaths (17%) are noticeably higher compared to
displaced communities to conflict not just at their point non-migrants. This suggests that while migration provides
of origin but also throughout their displacement journey.
While accidents during travel (23%) and disasters (11%) Figure 30. Households reporting the death of a family member in the last
also contribute, conflict remains the defining factor three years, by household migration status
behind their heightened vulnerability. Importantly, the
injuries reported by displaced households predominantly 30
occurred at their home site, serving as the direct trigger
for their displacement. 23
Percentage of households

22
Household fatalities and their causes: we also 20
analysed how conflict, disasters and other factors
contribute to the deaths of household members and 15
how these factors influence mobility decisions. A death
within a household is not only an immediate loss but
10
also has long-term social, emotional and economic
impacts, and often is a tipping point for migration or
displacement.
In Figure 30, we show the percentage of households 0
reporting the death of a family member during the past Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
three years.

Table 2. Reasons for injury in the last three years, by household migration status

REASON NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

(% OF HOUSEHOLDS) (% OF HOUSEHOLDS) (% OF HOUSEHOLDS)
Accidents at workplaces 8 12 3
Accidents during travel 42 18 23
Conflict 17 61 57
Disaster events 17 6 11
Other 17 3 6

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Table 3. Reasons for household member’s death in the last three years, by household migration status

REASON NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

(% OF HOUSEHOLDS) (% OF HOUSEHOLDS) (% OF HOUSEHOLDS)
Accident 6 4 8
Ageing 12 22 13
Conflict 9 17 58
Disaster events 6 9 13
Disease 64 48 8
Other 3 - -

some relief from prolonged exposure to conflict zones, Figure 31. ICRI scores, by household migration status
migrants remain vulnerable during transit and in unstable
environments at their destinations. 25
21.27
In contrast, displaced households show a deeply
concerning profile, with conflict being the dominant 20

Internal conflict risk index

cause of death (58%). Deaths from disasters (13%),
ageing (13%), diseases (8%) and accidents (8%) follow 15
but remain secondary contributors. This highlights the
acute and ongoing risks displaced households face 11.11
due to their persistent exposure to conflict-prone areas. 10
The significant share of conflict-related deaths among 6.43
displaced households indicates that displacement is
5
often a survival necessity driven by immediate threats to
life and security.
0
Overall internal conflict risk index
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
The ICRI provides an aggregated score of the
cumulative impact of injuries, fatalities and prolonged Note: Range 0–100. Higher index value represents higher risk.

exposure to conflict dynamics, offering a comparative

understanding of how conflict risk shapes vulnerability
Displaced households present the highest ICRI score
and mobility decisions across the different groups.
at 21.27, reflecting their acute and persistent exposure
Figure 31 shows a clear difference in ICRI scores to conflict risks. This score highlights the compounded
among the three household categories. Non-migrant vulnerabilities faced by displaced populations, who are
households exhibit the lowest ICRI score at 6.43, often forced to leave their homes due to life-threatening
indicating their relatively limited direct exposure to conflict events. Displacement rarely eliminates conflict-
conflict-related risks. This lower score suggests that related risks entirely, as many displaced households
non-migrants are more likely to reside in relatively stable continue to face violence, insecurity and unstable living
areas or have access to localised support systems that conditions in temporary shelters or conflict-prone
buffer against the direct impacts of conflict. However, resettlement areas. The elevated ICRI score underscores
it is important to note that while their risk exposure the chronic exposure of displaced households to ongoing
remains lower, they are not entirely insulated from violence, injuries and fatalities, making them the most
conflict dynamics, as reflected in the data on injuries vulnerable group in terms of conflict risk.
and deaths caused by conflict.
Together, these findings underscore the intertwined
Migrant households report a moderate ICRI score of role of conflict and climate shocks in driving mobility
11.11, highlighting a higher level of exposure to conflict decisions. Addressing these interlinked risks requires
risks compared to non-migrants. Migration often serves integrated interventions that simultaneously focus
as a coping strategy to escape acute conflict stressors, on conflict mitigation, protection mechanisms during
but this index suggests that migrants remain vulnerable transit, climate adaptation strategies and longer-term
to risks during transit and at their destinations. The integrated solutions for displaced populations, ensuring
persistence of conflict-related injuries and deaths among that households can build resilience to both conflict and
migrant households underscores the precariousness of climate shocks.
their mobility pathways and the challenges they face in
securing safety and stability in new locations.

36 www.iied.org
 IIED WORKING PAPER

3.3.4 Protective factors that mitigate total benefits going to the poorest 20% of recipients —
climate change impacts on households is just 0.4%, compared to the global average of 29%.

— social protection index The SPI uses multiple variables that reflect access to
both government and nongovernmental social protection
The SPI was developed to measure the extent to services. These include food aid, cash transfers, school
which households benefit from protective mechanisms meals, school aids, agricultural and veterinary extension
designed to mitigate the adverse impacts of climate services, crop insurance and economic support for
shocks and conflict-related stressors. Social protection livelihood activities. Each variable was normalised on
serves as a safety net, providing critical support through a scale from 0 to 100, where higher values indicate
various programmes, including food aid, cash transfers, greater access to protective services and thus stronger
school meals, agricultural extension services and resilience against external shocks.
economic assistance. In fragile and conflict-affected
Factors shaping the SPI
contexts like Mali, these protective mechanisms play
an essential role in stabilising vulnerable households, Social protection services provided by
enabling them to recover from shocks, reduce reliance on government (see Figure 32): access to social
harmful coping strategies and build long-term resilience. protection services varies significantly across the three
household categories. Non-migrant households report
A range of social protection programmes operate
relatively better access to government-led food aid
in Mali, including government-led initiatives and
(24%) and agricultural extension services (8%), which
nongovernmental organisation (NGO)-supported
helps stabilise their livelihoods and reduce economic
interventions. Government programmes include
shocks. Migrant households display lower levels of
Jigisemejiri (unconditional cash transfer), EMOP
access across most social protection services, with
PRRO (food aid), Program Cantine Scolaires
limited uptake of cash transfers and school aid (5%).
(school meal aid) and Assistance Alimentaire pour
This suggests that their migrant status may limit their
la Création d’Actifs 3A (public works). However,
integration into social protection systems at both origin
these programmes face significant challenges in
and destination points. Displaced households, however,
performance, limiting their reach and effectiveness
present the most concerning trends. While they report
in addressing household vulnerabilities (World
moderate access to food aid at both origin (17%)
Bank Group, no date-a). The coverage rate of all
and destination sites (30%), their overall reliance on
social protection programmes, in other words, the
destructive coping strategies highlights the fragmented
percentage of the population or a specific group
and inconsistent delivery of protective services in
benefiting from these programmes, is only 1%,
displacement settings.
significantly lower than the global average of 48%.
Additionally, the benefit incidence — the proportion of

Figure 32. Government social protection services used in the last year, by household migration status

30

25 24
Percentage of households

20
17 17

15
12 12
11
10 10 9 10
8
6
5 5 5
4 3 4
2
1 1
0
0
Agricultural Cash Crop Economic Food School School Social Veterinary
extension transfer insurance support aid aid meals pension and fishery
extension
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Social protection services provided by NGOs access to government safety nets, their SPI scores
(see Figure 33): the difference between outreach and reveal substantial unmet needs. These findings
uptake of government and NGO-provided services underscore the importance of strengthening and
further reveals critical gaps in social protection decentralising social protection systems to ensure
coverage. NGO-led interventions demonstrate higher inclusivity, accessibility, transparency and long-
uptake among displaced households, particularly in term resilience-building strategies for all household
food aid (73% at destination), cash transfers (40%) categories.
and school aid (19%). Non-migrant and migrant
households also benefit from NGO interventions, but at
comparatively lower levels, underscoring humanitarian Figure 34. SPI scores, by household migration status
agencies’ focus on displaced populations. 5
Overall social protection index
The aggregated SPI values (see Figure 34) reflect the 4.00
4
differences in household access to social protection.
Non-migrant households report the highest SPI score 3.33

Social protection index

(4.00), indicating slightly better access to formal
protective mechanisms, while migrant households have 3
a lower score of 2.38. Displaced households have 2.38
an SPI score of 3.33, suggesting a heavy reliance on
fragmented humanitarian support rather than consistent 2
access to structured social protection systems.
However, it is critical to note that the SPI scores across
all three household categories remain alarmingly low, 1
pointing to a systemic deficiency in the reach and
effectiveness of social protection mechanisms in Mali.
The SPI highlights critical gaps in social protection 0
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
across all household categories, with the highest
disparities observed for migrant and displaced Note: Range 0–100. Higher index value represents higher protection.
households. While non-migrants have relatively better

Figure 33. NGO social protection services used in the last year, by household migration status

70 67
63
60
Percentage of households

50
46

40
35 35

30 29
25 24 26
22 22 22
20 19
17 16
14 12
10 9 8
7 7

0
Agricultural Cash Economic Food School School Veterinary
extension transfer support aid aid meals and fishery
extension
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

3.4 Why some households The SPI was set as zero because of its low value.

choose to migrate while

The limited availability and reach of social protection
mechanisms across all household categories mean
others do not such mechanisms fail to act as a decisive buffer against
migration pressures. This underscores systemic
In FCAS such as Mali, where households face weaknesses in social safety nets in Mali, which are
overlapping vulnerabilities from climate shocks, unable to provide sufficient support to prevent distress
conflict risks and limited social protection, decisions migration.
regarding migration and displacement are complex and
Overall, the regression findings reveal that climate risks
multidimensional. While some households remain in
remain the most statistically significant driver of distress
place despite escalating risks, others choose migration
migration, while resilience, conflict exposure and social
as a coping strategy or are forced into displacement.
protection play secondary or context-dependent roles.
To unpack these dynamics, we carried out a regression
analysis (see Annex 4 for details of the regression Understanding of these drivers highlights the need for
analysis model) to identify the key factors driving targeted interventions that address climate vulnerability
household mobility decisions. We specifically tried to as a primary migration driver. Policies should focus
explain the roles of inherent resilience (IRI), climate risk on enhancing climate resilience through sustainable
(CRI), conflict risk (ICRI) and social protection (SPI) in agricultural practices, EWS, better governance and
shaping these outcomes. management of shared natural resources and livelihood
diversification. Additionally, social protection systems
3.4.1 Analysis of distress migration must be strengthened and made more accessible,
drivers particularly in high-risk areas, to reduce the pressure
to migrate under distress. Addressing conflict risks
The regression analysis helps understand the key through peacebuilding and security measures can
factors influencing households’ decisions to migrate create safer conditions for households, reducing forced
as a response to climate, conflict and socioeconomic migration patterns.
pressures. Our findings suggest that the decision to
migrate internally is significantly driven by climate-related 3.4.2 Analysing the drivers of
risks, while other factors, such as inherent resilience, displacement
conflict and access to social protection, appear less
influential. The regression analysis explored the determinants
of displacement, providing insights into why some
The CRI emerged as a statistically significant driver
households end up being uprooted in response to
of distress migration. Households experiencing lower
environmental, conflict and socioeconomic pressures.
climate risks were 1.95 times less likely to migrate
The findings indicate that climate risks, conflict and
compared to those facing high climate risks. This
inherent resilience play a significant role in influencing
suggests that gradual changes of the climate and
displacement patterns, whereas social protection
extreme weather events, including repeated droughts
appears to have limited influence.
and floods, and resulting agricultural failures, exert
substantial pressure on households, pushing them The analysis reveals that IRI is statistically significant
towards migration. in explaining displacement patterns. Households with
lower resilience were 4.09 times more likely to be
The regression results indicated that IRI was not
displaced compared to those with higher resilience. This
statistically significant for migration decisions,
highlights that pre-existing socioeconomic vulnerabilities
suggesting that differences in household resilience
— such as limited income, poor housing conditions, lack
levels do not strongly differentiate between non-migrant
of access to education and insufficient land ownership
and migrant households. Migrating households may
— significantly increase the likelihood of displacement.
not necessarily have lower resilience but are more
Vulnerable households are less equipped to absorb
likely responding to acute triggers, such as economic
shocks or recover from crises, pushing them into
pressures or insecurity.
displacement.
Conflict exposure, captured through the ICRI,
Climate risk also plays a decisive role in driving
was also not found to be statistically significant in
displacement. The CRI is statistically significant,
influencing migration decisions. This indicates that
showing that households experiencing lower climate
while conflict remains an acute stressor, it might not
risks were 1.29 times less likely to be displaced than
act independently as a migration driver but rather
those facing high climate risks. High exposure to
intensifies other vulnerabilities, such as food insecurity
climate shocks trigger abrupt displacement, leaving
and economic shocks.
households with little control over timing or destination.
The findings emphasise the critical role of climate

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

shocks in amplifying existing vulnerabilities and acting While migration may typically involve elements of
as immediate triggers for displacement. agency and planned mobility, displacement is often
characterised by urgency, lack of preparedness and
Conflict exposure, captured through the ICRI, emerged
restricted choices. The statistically significant role of
as another statistically significant driver of displacement.
IRI, CRI and ICRI in displacement (compared to their
Households experiencing lower internal conflict risks
limited role in migration) reflects the acute nature of the
were 2.07 times less likely to be displaced than those
stressors driving displacement.
exposed to high levels of violence. Conflict disrupts
household stability through violence, loss of lives, Addressing displacement requires multidimensional
destruction of assets and restricted access to essential interventions that tackle both structural and acute
services. In Mopti, several households have been drivers. Key policy priorities include strengthening
forced to flee their homes due to persistent violence, household resilience through poverty alleviation,
often without resources or clear relocation plans. The education and diversified income opportunities,
significant role of ICRI underscores how conflict acts as enhancing climate adaptation measures to reduce
both an immediate and sustained driver of displacement, vulnerability to environmental shocks, implementing
often compounding vulnerabilities caused by climate peacebuilding initiatives to reduce conflict risks and
risks and socioeconomic fragility. create safer living conditions, and improving social
protection systems to ensure they act as effective safety
The SPI was set to zero in the regression model, as
nets before displacement becomes unavoidable or to
access to social protection by both displaced and
assist households in searching for solutions once they
non-displaced households is too substantially low
become displaced.
to make any difference to mobility decisions. This
finding highlights a systemic failure of social protection
systems to act as effective safety nets in preventing
displacement. Limited access to food aid, cash
transfers, school meals and agricultural extension
services means that households already on the brink of
crisis lack the support needed to prevent displacement.
Furthermore, even after displacement, social protection
mechanisms remain insufficient to provide meaningful
assistance to stabilise affected households.
The findings illustrate that inherent resilience, climate
risks and conflict risks are deeply intertwined in driving
displacement. Households facing low resilience are
disproportionately affected by both climate shocks
and conflict, which act as immediate triggers for
displacement.

40 www.iied.org
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IIED WORKING PAPER

Understanding the
scale of economic and
non-economic loss
and damage
The preceding section highlighted how varying levels of loss and damage, focusing on how households in
of inherent resilience (IRI), exposure to climate risks Mopti have experienced and absorbed the impacts of
(CRI), internal conflict risks (ICRI) and the availability cascading risks.

4.1 Understanding the

of protective factors (SPI) influence household mobility
choices. However, these factors go beyond shaping
mobility decisions. They also drive significant economic
interaction between different
types of economic and non-
and non-economic loss and damage, much of which
remains underassessed and under-reported. In FCAS
contexts such as Mopti, where vulnerabilities are deeply
entrenched, the cascading impacts of these risks
economic loss and damage
manifest in profound ways. Figure 37 shows different types of economic and non-
economic loss and damage impact assessment that are
To better understand and quantify the losses and
used in the C-CIQ toolkit. The framework categorises
damages, we used the C-CIQ toolkit (see Box 2). This
impacts along two key spectrums: the value spectrum
toolkit provides a structured approach to measuring
(intrinsic vs. functional) and the tangibility spectrum
both tangible economic losses, such as income
(tangible vs. intangible). Additionally, it highlights the
reduction, property damage and livelihood disruptions,
importance of temporality (short-term vs. long-term
and intangible, non-economic losses, including
impacts) and spatiality (source vs. destination locations).
psychological trauma, social disintegration and cultural
For example, tangible losses, such as injuries or asset
erosion. By unpacking these impacts, we can generate
losses, are often measurable, while intangible losses,
insights to inform evidence-based interventions, guide
including mental health deterioration or loss of cultural
resource allocation strategies, and support the design
identity, are harder to quantify but equally significant. On
of context-specific policies that can effectively address
the value spectrum, functional values refer to practical
multifaceted challenges.
impacts affecting livelihoods and survival, while intrinsic
In the previous sections of this report, we focused values represent losses of aspects valued for their
on the first two stages of the C-CIQ methodology: inherent worth, such as dignity and cultural heritage.
community assessment and identifying predisposing, This framework allows us to understand how these
precipitating and protective factors. In this section, losses manifest and interact across multiple dimensions.
we delve into the categorisation and quantification

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

BOX 2. WHAT IS THE C-CIQ TOOLKIT AND HOW DOES IT

ASSESS LOSS AND DAMAGE?
The C-CIQ toolkit (Bharadwaj et al., 2024) is an integrated framework designed to assess and quantify the
economic and non-economic loss and damage experienced by communities exposed to climate risks, conflict
and other multidimensional stressors. It combines participatory approaches, community-led assessments and
robust analytical tools to capture the full scale and complexity of loss and damage across diverse contexts.
Figure 35. The C-CIQ assessment framework

Inclusive and participatory community assessment of loss and damage

SOLUTION PATHWAY
Shared learning Unpacking 3Ps (predisposing, precipitating and
dialogues protective factors)
Participatory Identifying Categorising economic and
approach to pre-exisiting non-economic loss and damage
co-identify economic conditions,
and non-economic Tangibility spectrum
precipitating factors Index-based valuation
L&Ds (tangible and
(climate stressors),
Key informant intangible L&Ds)
protective factors Constructing indices
interviews, Functional-intrinsic and sub-indices
Based on
household surveys, value spectrum
participatory Scaling
focus group assessments, other Listing variables
discussions under each domain Composite index
primary and combining
secondary sources sub-indices

Source: Bharadwaj et al., 2024

As shown in Figure 35, the C-CIQ assessment process begins with an inclusive and participatory community
assessment of loss and damage. This stage uses shared learning dialogues, household surveys, FGDs and KIIs
to co-identify both economic and non-economic loss and damage. The toolkit then moves to the unpacking of
the 3Ps — predisposing, precipitating and protective factors. This stage identifies pre-existing vulnerabilities,
immediate stressors (for example, climate events and conflict) and available protective mechanisms.
The assessment then categorises economic and non-economic loss and damage, covering two critical
dimensions: the tangibility spectrum (distinguishing between tangible and intangible losses) and the value
spectrum (functional versus intrinsic value). These categories allow for a holistic understanding of how loss and
damage manifests across different household contexts.
Figure 36. Methodological framework for the C-CIQ toolkit

Unpacking the sub-indices and indicators for

Index-based measuring loss and damage under tangibility,
valuation approach functional-intrinsic, spaciality and temporal domains

Using a combination of methods to

Economic Multi-criteria Composite risk quantify loss and damage for the
valuation decision-making analysis index indicators and sub-indices identified
through index-based valuation
Semi-quantitative and qualitative tools
Collection of data and information needed for economic valuation,
multi-criteria decision-making analysis and composite risk index
using tools like questionnaires, focus group discussions etc.

Source: Bharadwaj et al., 2024

Figure 36 details the methodological framework of the C-CIQ toolkit, showing how the index-based valuation
approach serves as the foundation for quantifying loss and damage. This approach combines economic
valuation, multi-criteria decision-making analysis and the creation of a composite risk index. By integrating semi-
quantitative and qualitative tools, such as household surveys and FGDs, the C-CIQ toolkit ensures that both
measurable and less tangible impacts are systematically captured and analysed.

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

Figure 37. Domains of economic and non-economic loss and damage impacts

ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC

LOSS AND DAMAGE

Value Tangibility
spectrum spectrum

Intrinsic Tangible
value

Temporality Spaciality

Functional Intangible
value

Source: Bharadwaj et al., 2024

The tangibility spectrum Intrinsic-functional spectrum

In Mopti, the impacts of climate change and conflict The intrinsic-functional spectrum helps categorise these
are visible and measurable, but they also extend losses based on their perceived value and purpose.
into intangible, less observable dimensions. On the Functional values are practical and related to the ability of
tangible spectrum, households face serious injuries, households to meet basic needs and sustain livelihoods.
loss of life and loss of assets such as housing, For example, loss of income, forced labour and declining
livestock and land in their home areas. These food security are functional losses that disrupt the ability
immediate and visible impacts are further exacerbated of households to work, earn and provide for their families.
by loss of income caused by crop failures, reduced These losses have direct consequences for household
livestock yields and declining fish catches, which push survival and economic stability.
households into cycles of poverty and distress. At
On the other hand, intrinsic losses hold inherent value,
destination sites, tangible impacts manifest in ways
independent of their practical utility. Deteriorating mental
such as increased health costs due to water scarcity-
health, loss of cultural identity and biodiversity loss
related drudgery and ongoing asset losses.
represent intrinsic values that cannot be easily measured
However, these tangible impacts trigger less visible but are profoundly significant. For instance, mental health
but equally devastating intangible impacts. At their problems arising from loss of income or displacement are
home sites, households face mental health problems, not valued for their effect on work capacity but for their
loss of cultural identity, biodiversity loss and land intrinsic impact on personal wellbeing and dignity.
degradation, which are harder to quantify but deeply
These intrinsic and functional losses are deeply
felt. At destination sites, intangible losses translate
interconnected. A household’s inability to sustain
into food insecurity, forced labour and deteriorating
functional roles (for example, because of loss of ability to
living conditions. The links between these tangible
earn an income) often intensifies intrinsic vulnerabilities
and intangible losses create a cascading chain
(for example, mental health problems). This dual
of vulnerabilities. For instance, the loss of income
spectrum emphasises the need to address both
(tangible) at the home site directly contributes to forced
practical and emotional aspects of loss and damage.
labour and mental health challenges (intangible) at the
destination site. This interdependence highlights how
tangible losses set off ripple effects that permeate
through various aspects of household wellbeing.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

The temporal dimension making it essential to move beyond siloed interventions

and adopt integrated, context-specific approaches that
The temporal dimension captures how losses and
address the full spectrum of household vulnerabilities.
damages evolve over time, distinguishing between
short-term shocks and long-term, chronic impacts. In Figure 38 we have presented the broad categories
In Mopti, short-term impacts include serious injuries, of loss and damage suffered by communities in Mopti,
immediate loss of assets and sudden drops in income under each of these domains.

4.2 Quantifying the loss

caused by droughts, floods or conflict incidents. These
shocks are acute and demand immediate responses.
However, long-term impacts are more insidious and and damage affecting Mopti
persistent. Over time, short-term shocks translate into
chronic food insecurity, prolonged mental health issues
communities
and worsening living conditions. These long-term We quantified the economic and non-economic loss
impacts often stem from repeated exposure to stressors and damage using four key indices constructed using
and a lack of adequate coping mechanisms. The the C-CIQ toolkit. These indices offered a framework
temporal dimension also reflects how households make to assess the diverse dimensions of loss and damage
difficult trade-offs: immediate survival (short term) often experienced by communities facing intersecting risks
comes at the cost of long-term wellbeing and resilience. from climate change, conflict and other multidimensional
vulnerabilities. The tangible-functional loss and damage
For example, a family may migrate temporarily to cope
index captures measurable, physical impacts that
with sudden income loss but face chronic poverty and
directly affect community functions, such as loss of
exploitation at their destination that can have profound
livelihoods, housing and income sources. The tangible-
impact over the longer term. Addressing both short-
intrinsic loss and damage index focuses on material
term and long-term impacts requires interventions that
losses valued for their inherent significance, such as
are not only reactive but also forward looking, ensuring
the destruction of cultural heritage sites. The intangible-
households can break free from cycles of repeated
functional loss and damage index evaluates less visible
vulnerability.
disruptions that hinder community functionality, such
as the breakdown of social cohesion or deteriorating
The spatial dimension mental health. Finally, the intangible-intrinsic loss and
The spatial dimension highlights geographic variations damage index addresses deeply personal, non-material
in how loss and damage are experienced across losses, including the erosion of cultural identity or a
source and destination locations. At their home sites, sense of place.
households grapple with loss of life, injuries, loss of
These indices, presented in Figure 39, served as the
assets and dwindling income opportunities, which serve
foundation for quantifying the impacts experienced by
as primary drivers of migration and displacement. These
households in Mopti.
impacts are compounded by the lack of adequate social
protection measures and limited access to resources.
4.2.1 Tangible-functional loss and
At their destinations, households encounter new and damage index
different challenges, including drudgery caused by
water scarcity, forced labour and food insecurity. The tangible-functional loss and damage index
These spatial disparities show that while migration or captures the measurable and practical consequences
displacement may offer temporary relief from one set of of climate change and environmental stressors on
risks, it often exposes households to a different set of communities. This index focuses on the functional
vulnerabilities. disruptions caused by biodiversity loss, economic
decline, land degradation, water scarcity and
The spatial interplay also demonstrates the cyclical
the physical burdens associated with accessing
nature of loss and damage. For instance, households
essential resources. These tangible impacts are often
forced to migrate due to failed crops and income
quantifiable and have direct implications for livelihoods,
losses at their home locations may face exploitative
health, productivity and overall wellbeing, highlighting
labour conditions and poor living standards at their
the cascading effects of environmental disruptions on
destinations, creating a feedback loop of vulnerability
both households and communities.
and deprivation.
Figure 40 illustrates the six key sub-indices that
Understanding the interaction between these dimensions
constitute the tangible-functional loss and damage
— tangibility, intrinsic-functional values, temporal
index: the biodiversity loss index, the loss of income
dynamics and spatial variations — is crucial for designing
index, the loss of income due to displacement index, the
holistic strategies to address loss and damage. Each
land degradation index, the elevated cost due to water
dimension interacts with and reinforces the others,
scarcity index and the water-related drudgery index.

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Figure 38. C-CIQ’s conceptual framework for categorising loss and damage in Mopti

Short term Long term Short term Long term

Destination
Reduction in income
due to displacement
Tangible

Serious injury Loss of life Loss of income (crop

(injury to family members) (death of family members) loss, livestock yield loss, Loss of biodiversity
fish catch reduction,
Loss of assets employment loss)
(housing, equipment) Health cost related to water
scarcity-related drudgery Land degradation

Destination Source
Drudgery caused by
water scarcity

Living conditions
Food security
Forced labour
Intangible

Mental health
problems
Food security
Cultural identity loss Living conditions

Forced labour

Source
Intrinsic Functional

Figure 39. Indices constructed via the C-CIQ toolkit using the index-based valuation approach

Tangible-functional loss Tangible-intrinsic loss

and damage index and damage index
Gauges the viable, physical Captures the physical or material
impacts of climate events that aspects of loss that are valued
effect community functions, such for their own sake, beyond
as loss of livelihoods. It assesses functional utility, such as the
how these functional aspects are
affected in concrete, measurable
Domain and destruction of a cultural heritage
ways
economic and site
non-economic
loss and
damage
assessment
Intangible-functional Intangible-intrinsic loss
loss and damage index and damage index
Evaluates the less visible but Measures the non-material
significant impacts that disrupt values of loss that are intrinsic
community functions, such as the such as the erosion of cultural
loss of social cohesion or mental identity or a sense of place,
health, which, while not physically which are deeply felt but not
measurable, still affect how a physically quantifiable
community operates

Source: Bharadwaj et al., 2024

These interconnected dimensions provide an overview measures to address both immediate and long-term
of the functional impacts experienced by affected consequences. The subsequent sections of this paper
populations, emphasising the need for targeted policy will delve into the detailed analysis of each sub-index.

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Figure 40. Formulation of the tangible-functional loss and damage index

Tangible-functional
loss and damage
index

Loss of income Water Elevated cost

Loss of due to Biodiversity Land fetching
income index displacement loss index degradation drudgery due to water
index index index scarcity

Loss of Agriculture Decline in: Decline in: Extra distance Cost of water
employment Employment Bee and other Soil moisture covered by purchased from
Fish catch insect species women in the market
Fishing Soil organic fetching water during droughts
reduction Bird species matter
Livestock during droughts Health costs
Loss of crop Fish species Soil productivity
yield Other Extra time due to water
Plant species Topsoil dedicated to fetching
Loss of livestock fetching water drudgery
animal yield Increased water
runoff during droughts

1. Quantification of the loss of income index a 11% loss and displaced households reported the
highest loss at 12%. Similarly, discontinuation of
The quantification of the loss of income index covers the
crop variety was most prevalent among non-migrants
economic impacts of climate-induced events, focusing
(23%) compared to migrants (15%) and displaced
on crop yield, livestock productivity, fishing income,
households (14%). In terms of annual household
employment opportunities, and access to land and
income, non-migrants lost 11% of their income,
livestock resources. The analysis highlights disparities
migrants 11% and displaced households 12%.
across non-migrant, migrant and displaced households,
highlighting the varying degrees of vulnerability and • Drought-related crop loss (see Table 5):
economic loss. households reported that there were significantly
higher reductions in crop yields during droughts, with
Crop loss (flood and drought impacts): floods
51% of non-migrant households reporting reduced
and droughts have severely impacted crop yields, crop
yields, compared to 35% of migrant households and
continuity and associated household income.
52% of displaced households. Discontinuation of
• Flood-related crop loss (see Table 4): non- crop variety — where farmers could no longer plant
migrant households reported an 12% reduction in water-dependent crops due to water scarcity —
crop yield, while migrant households experienced followed a similar pattern, with non-migrants at 35%,

Table 4. Flood-related crop loss, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Reduction of crop yield (% of households) 12 11 12
Discontinuation of crop variety 23 15 14
(% of households)
Loss value (% of total household 11 11 12
annual income)
Table 5. Drought-related crop loss, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Reduction of crop yield (% of households) 51 35 52
Discontinuation of crop variety 35 20 38
(% of households)
Loss value (% of total household 12 13 23
annual income)

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migrants at 20% and displaced households at 38%. among migrants. Income loss values were also highest
Non-migrant households lost 12% of their annual for displaced households at 14%, compared to 6% for
total income, while migrant households lost 13%. non-migrants and 9% for migrants.
Displaced households lost 23% of their total annual
These figures reveal that livestock losses
income, underlining the disproportionate vulnerability
disproportionately affect displaced households,
of displaced families.
deepening their economic vulnerability.
These figures show that displaced households bear
Fishing income loss (flood and drought impacts):
a significantly higher burden during both floods and
fishing households experienced significant reductions in
droughts, underscoring their heightened vulnerability.
fish catch and income during both floods and droughts.
Livestock loss (flood and drought impacts):
• Flood-related fishing income loss (see Table 8):
livestock productivity also suffered as a result of both
non-migrant households reported a 7% reduction in
floods and droughts.
fish catch, migrants 12% and displaced households
• Flood-related livestock loss (see Table 6): during 10%. The loss in household income was 1% for non-
floods, 26% of displaced households reported cattle migrants, 3% for migrants and 0.5% for displaced
sickness, compared to 10% among non-migrants households.
and 8% among migrants. Cattle deaths were similarly
• Drought-related fishing income loss (see
higher among displaced households (21%) compared
Table 9): fish catch reductions were more severe
to non-migrants (5%) and migrants (10%). The
during droughts: non-migrants reported a reduction of
percentage of annual household income lost was 8%
22%, migrants 23% and displaced households 19%.
for displaced households, compared to 2% for both
Income losses followed a similar trend, with 2% for
non-migrants and migrants.
non-migrants, 4% for migrants and 1% for displaced
• Drought-related livestock loss (see Table 7): households.
cattle sickness related to droughts affected all types of
These results indicate that while both floods and
households: 39% of displaced households reported
droughts impact fishing households, droughts cause
cattle sickness, significantly higher than 23% among
more severe and widespread income losses across all
non-migrants and 20% among migrants. Similarly,
groups.
36% of displaced households reported cattle deaths,
compared to 21% among non-migrants and 18%

Table 6. Flood-related livestock loss, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Cattle fell sick (% of households) 10 8 26
Cattle died (% of households) 5 10 21
Loss value (% of total household annual income) 2 2 8

Table 7. Drought-related livestock loss, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Cattle fell sick (% of households) 23 20 39
Cattle died (% of households) 21 18 36
Loss value (% of total household annual income) 6 9 14

Table 8. Flood-related fishing income loss, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Fish catch reduction (% of households) 7 12 10
Loss value (% of total household annual income) 1 3 0.5

Table 9. Drought-related fishing income loss, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Fish catch reduction (% of households) 22 23 19
Loss value (% of total household annual income) 2 4 1

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Employment loss (flood and drought impacts): Reduction in landholding and livestock ownership
employment opportunities were severely affected, among displaced households
especially among non-migrants and migrants.
• Landholding (see Figure 41): displaced households
• Flood-related employment loss (see Table 10): experienced a drastic reduction in landholding. In their
the average number of employment days lost source village, they owned, on average, 0.76 acres of
per year was 10.38 for non-migrants, 12.06 for land with legal entitlement, which decreased to 0.04
migrants and significantly lower at 3.81 for displaced acres at their displaced location. Similarly, land owned
households. Income loss values were 2%, 2% and without legal entitlement dropped from an average
1%, respectively. 1.32 acres to 0.04 acres.
• Drought-related employment loss (see • Livestock ownership (see Figure 42): livestock
Table 11): the average employment days lost per ownership also sharply declined. The average number
year were substantially higher during droughts: 58.59 of goats owned fell from 7.10 to 0.40, sheep from 7.62
for non-migrants, 77.76 for migrants and 64.14 for to 0.34, and cattle from 16.24 to 0.25. This overall
displaced households. Income loss values were 9% reduction indicates a substantial loss of productive
for non-migrants, 12% for migrants and 16% for assets, further limiting opportunities to earn income.
displaced households.
The loss of income index reveals that displaced
These figures highlight that migrants suffer higher households in Mopti suffer disproportionately higher
employment disruptions, but displaced households losses across crop yield, livestock, fishing, employment
experience more sustained income losses over time. and landholding during both floods and droughts.
These losses are compounded by their limited access
to resources and support systems. Addressing these
vulnerabilities requires interventions that restore livelihood
assets, improve resilience and provide financial safety
nets for displaced and migrant households.

Table 10. Flood-related employment loss, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Average number of employment days lost 10.38 12.06 3.81
Loss value (% of total household annual income) 2 2 1

Table 11. Drought-related employment loss, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Average number of employment days lost 58.59 77.76 64.14
Loss value (% of total household annual income) 9 12 16

Figure 41. Reduction in average landholding of displaced households (acres)

1.4 1.32

1.2
Average landholding (acres)

1.0

0.8 0.76

0.6

0.4

0.2 0.11 0.11

0.04 0.04 0.02
0
Land owned with Land owned without Rented/Leased Borrowed
legal entitlement legal entitlement
At source village At displaced destination

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Figure 42. Falls in average livestock ownership among displaced households

16.24
16

14
Average number of animals

12

10

8 7.62
7.10
6

2 1.25
0.25 0.40 0.34 0.04
0
Cattle Goats Sheep Other
At source village At displaced destination

2. Quantification of the biodiversity loss index with values of 84 for bee and insect species, 84 for bird
species, and 85 for fish species.
Biodiversity loss is a critical component of loss and
damage on the intangible-intrinsic spectrum, with While biodiversity loss is an area-wide phenomenon,
significant impacts on ecological balance, food systems differences in reported values may reflect variation in
and community resilience. The biodiversity loss index household exposure, dependence on natural resources
assesses the decline across various species categories and direct observation of ecosystem changes. Migrant
and identifies key drivers of this decline. households, for instance, may be more attuned to
environmental changes due to their movement across
Figure 43 presents the perceived biodiversity loss
different locations and their economic reliance on multiple
reported by households across different mobility
ecosystems. Displaced households, on the other hand,
categories, including declines in bees and insects,
may perceive biodiversity loss differently due to their
faunal species, birds, fish, and plants. Migrant
forced relocation, loss of traditional livelihoods and
households reported the highest levels of biodiversity
reduced access to familiar ecological resources.
loss across most categories, with an index value of 87
for fish species and 86 for bird species. Non-migrant Figure 44 shows the key reasons for biodiversity
households reported slightly lower levels, such as 84 loss based on household perceptions, highlighting
for bird species and 85 for fish species. Displaced deforestation (8.06) as the most significant driver,
households also reported significant biodiversity loss, followed by frequent droughts (7.18), pollution (6.46)

Figure 43. Biodiversity loss univariate indices, by household migration status

100
84 85 84 85 87 85 84 84 86 84 83 85 84
80 80
80
Index (1–100)

60

40

20

0
Plant species Fish species Faunal species Bird species Bee and other
decline decline decline decline insect species
decline
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
Note: Higher index value represents higher loss.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

and destruction of natural habitats (4.69). Floods (2.48) also impacting the livelihoods of communities who
and internal conflict (2.73) contribute comparatively less depend on the land. Addressing this challenge requires
to biodiversity loss but remain important factors. sustainable solutions that consider the intricate interplay
of these contributing factors (Coulibaly, 2021).
The scale of biodiversity losses experienced by the
community highlights the urgent need for integrated The analysis of the land degradation index shows
conservation strategies, including reforestation significant patterns of environmental decline across non-
programmes, sustainable agricultural practices and migrant, migrant and displaced households. Figure 45
pollution control measures. Additionally, community- highlights the extent of degradation in soil and land
led biodiversity conservation initiatives could play an quality indicators, while Figure 46 provides insights into
important role in addressing these losses and mitigating the underlying causes of land degradation.
further damage.
Figure 45 highlights the severe impact of land
3. Quantification of the land degradation index degradation across all household categories, with key
indicators reflecting significant declines in soil quality,
Land degradation in Mali results from a combination
productivity and water retention. The data measures the
of factors including climate change, deforestation,
extent of decline in various soil properties, including soil
overgrazing, overcultivation, unsustainable agricultural
productivity, topsoil retention and moisture levels.
practices, population growth and pollution. These
deplete soil nutrients, increase erosion and reduce Soil productivity shows the highest levels of
agricultural productivity, harming the environment and degradation, with all groups reporting values above

Figure 44. Reasons for biodiversity loss

Conflict 2.73

Deforestation 8.06

Destruction of natural habitats 4.69

Droughts 7.18

Floods 2.48

Pollution 6.46

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Score on a scale of 0–10

Figure 45. Land degradation univariate indices, by household migration status

90

85 85 85 85
85 84 84 84 84 84 84 85
84
82 83 82
Index (1–100)

81 81
80
80

75

70
Decline in Decline in soil Decline in soil Decline of soil Increased water Loss of
soil fertility organic matter productivity moisture runoff topsoil

Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Note: Higher index value represents higher loss.

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84, indicating widespread declines. Similarly, topsoil underscore the need for targeted interventions, including
loss and soil moisture reduction follow a comparable sustainable land management practices, reforestation
trend, reinforcing the scale of degradation across the programmes and conflict mitigation measures.
region. Increased water runoff, though slightly lower in
4. Quantification of the water-related
magnitude, remains high across all household groups.
drudgery index
While there are small variations between non-migrant,
migrant and displaced households, the overall takeaway The water-related drudgery index highlights the physical
is that land degradation is a widespread issue that and social burdens associated with accessing water
affects all groups, rather than one category being during periods of scarcity, particularly during droughts,
significantly worse off than others. The findings suggest which disproportionately affects women and girls, as
that climate stressors, deforestation and unsustainable they bear the main responsibility for fetching water in the
land use are collectively driving a sharp decline in household. The analysis captures key aspects of water
soil health, impacting agricultural productivity and availability, accessibility and the health impacts arising
ecosystem stability. from the efforts involved in collecting water.
Figure 46 shows the main drivers considered by The data presented in Table 12 shows that:
households to be causes of land degradation. Drought
• Water scarcity affected 52% of displaced
emerged as the most significant cause, scoring 8.13,
households, higher than non-migrant (46%) and
followed by deforestation at 8.02. Destruction of natural
migrant households (45%), highlighting increased
habitats was another critical factor, scoring 6.67, while
vulnerability due to displacement
pollution scored 4.47 and floods 4.59. Conflict also
contributed, scoring 5.67. • Access to clean water remained limited, with 23% of
non-migrant, 25% of migrant and 23% of displaced
In summary, land degradation was a pervasive issue
households reporting unavailability during droughts,
impacting all surveyed groups, with displaced households
showing minimal variation across groups
showing marginally higher vulnerability. The drivers

Figure 46. Reasons for land degradation

Conflict 5.67

Deforestation 8.02

Destruction of natural habitats 6.67

Droughts 8.13

Floods 4.59

Pollution 4.47

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Score on a scale of 0–10

Table 12. Water availability-related drudgery, by household migration status

ISSUES FACED NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

(% OF HOUSEHOLDS) (% OF HOUSEHOLDS) (% OF HOUSEHOLDS)
Clean water not available 23 25 23
during drought periods
Family members had health 18 12 13
issues due to walking longer
distances to collect water
Must walk long distances to 44 47 45
collect water
Water is scarce during 46 45 52
drought periods

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

• Walking long distances for water impacted 44% of water among displaced communities.
non-migrants, 47% of migrants and 45% of displaced
The spending on water for agriculture was notably
households, and
higher for migrant households (2%), compared
• Health issues due to walking longer distances to displaced (1%) and non-migrant households
affected 18% of non-migrants, 12% of migrants and (0.5%). Migrants likely face higher costs due to their
13% of displaced households, reflecting the physical dependence on external water sources for sustaining
toll, particularly on women and girls. agricultural productivity.
These findings collectively demonstrate that water- The spending on water for livestock was highest among
fetching drudgery is a multidimensional challenge, displaced households (0.7%), followed by non-migrants
with its impacts on all category of households. The (0.6%) and migrants (0.4%). This highlights the reliance
index underscores the need for interventions, such of displaced households on purchased water for
as improved water infrastructure, localised water sustaining livestock.
management systems, and health support services, to
Overall, water scarcity led to significant income losses,
alleviate these burdens effectively.
with migrant households experiencing the highest
5. Quantification of the elevated cost due to impact (5% of annual income), followed by non-migrants
water scarcity index (4%) and displaced households (3%). This highlights the
financial strain on migrant households, likely driven by
Droughts and water scarcity increase the financial
higher costs and reduced productivity.
burden on households in several ways, including having
to buy water and health costs related to the heavy Addressing costs incurred due to water scarcity
physical labour of collecting water. The elevated cost requires targeted interventions, such as improving
due to water scarcity (see Table 13) reflects the financial access to affordable and reliable water supply
burden households face as they cope with limited water systems, including community-based water storage
availability during drought periods. and distribution infrastructure, and promoting drought-
resilient agricultural practices. Additionally, reducing
Health-related costs due to walking long distances to
health burdens by providing localised water access
collect water were highest among migrant households
points and enhancing social protection schemes
(3% of annual household income), followed by non-
can help alleviate the financial strain on vulnerable
migrant households (2%) and significantly lower among
households.
displaced households (0.5%). This suggests that
migrants endure more strenuous conditions to access What does the tangible-functional loss and
water collection points. damage index reveal?
Spending on drinking water during drought periods The tangible-functional loss and damage index (see
showed relatively low percentages, with displaced Figure 47) highlights the immediate and measurable
households spending slightly more (0.7%) compared to impacts of environmental and climate-related stressors
non-migrants (0.6%) and migrants (0.5%). This indicates on economic productivity, natural resources and physical
a marginally higher dependency on purchased drinking wellbeing. The analysis reveals significant disparities

Table 13. Additional costs due to water scarcity, by household migration status

COST TYPE NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

(% OF HOUSEHOLD (% OF HOUSEHOLD (% OF HOUSEHOLD
ANNUAL INCOME) ANNUAL INCOME) ANNUAL INCOME)
Buying water for drinking 0.6 0.5 0.7
during drought periods
Buying water for 0.5 2 1
agriculture during drought
periods
Buying water for livestock 0.6 0.4 0.7
during drought periods
Health cost because of 2 3 0.5
walking long distances to
collect water
Total loss of income 4 5 3
because of water scarcity

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Figure 47. Tangible-functional loss and damage index

Temporal dimension of loss and damage

Short term Long term

At destination
Reduction in 78.18
income due to

Spatial dimension of loss and damage

displacement
Intangible loss and damage

57.38 47.17 39.87 Displaced

Loss of income (crop loss, livestock yield
loss, fish catch reduction, employment loss) 62.51 83.33 85.33 83.33
Biodiversity loss
Migrants
34.60 Health cost Drudgery 48.57
related to caused by
45.67 53.41
32.00 water scarcity- water
related scarcity Non-migrants

At source
45.10 Land degradation
drudgery
35.95
52.55 83.61 83.17 83.61

Functional loss and damage

across displaced, migrant and non-migrant populations, The land degradation index also shows similar values
with displaced households experiencing the highest across the three groups, with displaced and non-
levels of tangible-functional loss and damage. migrants scoring 83.61 and migrants at 83.17. This
reflects a shared vulnerability to soil fertility loss,
The index indicates that displaced households face the
reduced organic matter and increased water runoff.
most severe economic impacts, scoring 62.51, followed
by migrants at 53.41 and non-migrants at 52.55. This Overall, Figure 46 shows that displaced households
reflects significant income losses caused by crop yield experience the most severe and immediate impacts
reduction, livestock yield decline, fish catch reduction across most indices, particularly in income loss and
and loss of employment opportunities. water scarcity-related drudgery and health costs. While
biodiversity loss and land degradation remain pressing
Among displaced households, reduction in income due
challenges across all groups, displaced populations
to displacement emerges as one of the most significant
bear the heaviest burden of tangible-functional loss and
short-term functional losses, scoring an alarming 78.18.
damage. These findings call for targeted interventions to
These households often face immediate livelihood
address these inequalities and build resilience among
interruptions, limited access to productive assets and
the most vulnerable communities.
restricted economic opportunities, amplifying their
financial precarity.
4.2.2 Intangible-functional loss and
In terms of water scarcity-related drudgery, displaced damage index
populations score the highest (48.57) due to the
additional physical and time burdens associated with The intangible-functional loss and damage index captures
accessing water, particularly during droughts. Migrants the less visible but deeply impactful consequences of
and non-migrants score 45.67 and 45.10, respectively. climate-related shocks and stressors on households in
Similarly, the health cost index due to water scarcity Mopti. While these impacts may not always be easily
drudgery shows notable burdens, with displaced quantifiable, they significantly disrupt daily life, erode
households scoring 34.60, migrants 32.00 and non- wellbeing and perpetuate long-term vulnerabilities. This
migrants 35.95, emphasising the associated physical index focuses on three key dimensions: forced labour,
and financial tolls of water scarcity. poor living conditions and harassment, and food security.
The biodiversity loss index reveals minimal variation These dimensions collectively shed light on how
across the groups, with migrants scoring slightly higher intangible-functional losses impact household resilience,
at 85.33, followed by displaced households and non- social stability and overall quality of life. Figure 48
migrants at 83.33. This indicates widespread and shared illustrates the structure of the intangible-functional loss
consequences of biodiversity degradation, including the and damage index, detailing its key components and
decline of plant, fish, bird and insect species. their interconnected nature.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Figure 48. How the intangible-functional loss and damage index is constructed

Intangible-functional
loss and damage
index

Forced labour index Poor living conditions Food security index

and harassment index

Physical abuse Exposure to trespass by Food scarcity during floods

Sexual abuse strangers Food scarcity during droughts
Verbal abuse Exposure to weather elements Lack of availability of balanced
Lack of electricity food during floods
Lack of privacy for bathing, Lack of availability of balanced
urination and defecation food during droughts
Poor quality of water
Risk of encounter with insects,
snakes and animals

1. Quantification of the forced labour index Forced labour among migrant households (see
Figure 50): at source sites, the index value for physical
Forced labour is an important dimension of intangible-
abuse was 44, increasing to 48 at destination sites.
functional loss and damage, capturing the coercive
Verbal abuse also rises from 44 at source sites to
and exploitative conditions faced by households
49 at destination sites. Sexual abuse shows a similar
exposed to climate and conflict risks. The analysis
pattern, increasing from 41 at source sites to 45 at
focuses on three key indicators: physical abuse, verbal
destination sites.
abuse and sexual abuse.
This trend suggests that migration exacerbates exposure
Overall trends across household categories
to exploitative and abusive conditions, particularly at
(see Figure 49): physical abuse affects non-migrant
destination locations.
households with an index value of 42, migrant households
at 44 and displaced households at 43. Verbal abuse is Forced labour among displaced households
slightly more prevalent among displaced households (46) (see Figure 51): for displaced households, physical
compared to non-migrant households (42) and migrant abuse remains consistent between source sites (43)
households (44). Sexual abuse remains a significant and destination sites (44). Verbal abuse, however,
concern, reported by non-migrant households at 38 and shows a sharp decline from 46 at source sites to 44 at
by both migrant and displaced households at 41. destination sites. Sexual abuse also decreases from 41
at source sites to 40 at destination sites.
The data indicates that displaced households are the
most affected by sexual and verbal abuse, highlighting While verbal and sexual abuse slightly reduce following
their vulnerability post-displacement. displacement, physical abuse persists at concerning

Figure 49. Forced labour univariate indices, by household migration status

60

44 46
42 43 41 42 44
41
Index (0–100)

40 38

20

0
Physical abuse Sexual abuse Verbal abuse
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Note: Higher index value represents higher vulnerability.

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Figure 50. Forced labour univariate indices for migrant households

60
48 49
44 45 44
41
40
Index (0–100)

20

0
Physical abuse Sexual abuse Verbal abuse
At source sites At destination sites
Note: Higher index value represents higher vulnerability.

Figure 51. Forced labour univariate indices for displaced households

60

46
43 44 44
41 40
Index (0–100)

40

20

0
Physical abuse Sexual abuse Verbal abuse

At source sites At destination sites

Note: Higher index value represents higher vulnerability.

levels, underscoring the long-term vulnerability faced byFigure 52 shows that non-migrant, migrant and
displaced populations. displaced households report consistently high
exposure to extreme weather conditions, with values
These findings highlight the heightened vulnerability of
of 83.66, 83.00 and 82.86 respectively, underscoring
migrant households at their destinations, where they
widespread vulnerability across all groups. Exposure
are more exposed to exploitative conditions. Displaced
to insects and snakes is slightly higher among non-
households, despite some reductions in verbal
migrant households (71.24) compared to displaced
and sexual abuse post-relocation, continue to face
(70.00) and migrant households (66.00). Exposure to
persistent risks of physical abuse. The data underscores
trespassing by strangers shows displaced households
the urgent need for targeted interventions, including
scoring highest (64.76), followed by migrants (63.33)
stricter enforcement of labour rights, community-
and non-migrants (62.75). Lack of privacy for bathing
based monitoring systems to detect exploitation and
is more pronounced among displaced households
improved psychosocial support services to address
(53.81) compared to migrants (50.83) and non-
the mental health impacts of forced labour. Addressing
migrants (49.18). Sanitation facilities are slightly better
these issues holistically is essential for reducing the
among migrant households (48.83) compared to non-
vulnerability of affected households and ensuring their
migrants (50.33) and displaced households (50.71).
long-term resilience to exploitative labour conditions.
The lack of drinking water facilities is notably higher
2. Quantification of the poor living conditions and among displaced households (50.48) compared to
harassment index non-migrants (44.28) and migrant households (46.00).
A lack of electricity remains a significant concern,
Our analysis of poor living conditions and harassment
with displaced households scoring 65.00, migrants
highlights critical challenges faced by non-migrant,
65.50 and non-migrants 64.54, indicating persistent
migrant and displaced households across various
challenges across all groups.
indicators, revealing both common vulnerabilities and
group-specific variations.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Figure 52. Living conditions univariate indices at source sites, by household migration status
90
83.66

80
83.00
82.86

70
Index (0–100)

71.24

70.00
66.00

65.50
65.00
64.76

64.54
60

63.33
62.75

53.81
50

50.83

50.71
50.48

50.33
49.18

48.83
46.00
44.28
40

30
Exposure to Exposure to Exposure to Lack of drinking Lack of Lack of privacy Lack of
extreme insects trespass water facilities electricity bathing for sanitation
weather and snakes by strangers facilities facilities
conditions
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Note: Higher index value represents higher vulnerability.

Figure 53. Living conditions univariate indices for displaced households

90
85.00

80
82.86

70
70.71

71.90
Index (0–100)

70.00

64.76

65.00

65.00

60
60.24

59.05
58.33
53.81

50

50.71
50.48

40

30
Exposure Exposure to Exposure to Lack of Lack of Lack of Lack of
to extreme insects and trespass by drinking electricity privacy for sanitation
weather snakes strangers water facilities bathing facilities
conditions facilities
At source sites At destination sites

Note: Higher index value represents higher vulnerability.

In Figure 53, a closer look at displaced households destination sites, with worsening access to sanitation,
reveals more difficult conditions at destination sites electricity and drinking water facilities. Addressing
compared to source sites. Exposure to extreme these gaps requires targeted interventions focusing
weather rises from 82.86 to 85.00, while exposure to on improving basic infrastructure, enhancing privacy
insects and snakes remains relatively stable (70.00 and sanitation facilities, and ensuring reliable access to
at source, 70.71 at destination). Lack of privacy for electricity and clean water, particularly for displaced and
bathing increases from 53.81 at source to 58.33 at migrant households.
destination sites. Similarly, lack of sanitation facilities
3. Quantification of the food security index
rises from 50.71 to 59.05, while drinking water
facility inadequacies grow from 50.48 to 60.24. A The analysis of the food security index highlights
more pronounced difference is seen in electricity significant gaps in both food availability (the overall
access, with scores escalating from 65.00 at source supply of food in an area) and food access (whether
to 71.90 at destination sites, highlighting the severe households can actually get access to food due to
infrastructural deficits faced by displaced households awareness, distance, cost or other barriers). These gaps
in their new environments. affect non-migrant, migrant and displaced households,
and differ between source and destination sites for
Overall, the analysis reveals that displaced households
displaced populations.
face compounding vulnerabilities, especially at

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Figure 54. Food security univariate indices, by household migration status

100

81
80 75 74 73
69 71
64
Index (0–100)

60
50 52
45 46 43
40

20

0
Balanced food is Balanced food is Food is scarcely Food is scarcely
not available during not available during available during available during
droughts floods droughts floods
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Note: Higher index value represents higher vulnerability.

Figure 55. Food security univariate indices for displaced households

80 74
71
65 67
64
61
60
52
Index (0–100)

51

40

20

0
Food is scarcely Food is scarcely Balanced food is Balanced food is
available during available during not available during not available during
droughts floods droughts floods

At source sites At destination sites

Note: Higher index value represents higher vulnerability.

Figure 54 shows that households experience food Figure 55 provides further insights into food security
scarcity and a lack of a balanced diet during both among displaced households at source and destination
floods and droughts. During floods, the index value for sites. During floods, the index value for households
displaced households reporting a lack of a balanced reporting a lack of balanced food was slightly higher
diet was 52, compared to 43 for migrants and 46 for at source sites (52) than at destination sites (51). A
non-migrants. Similarly, during droughts, the index value similar pattern is observed during droughts, with more
for displaced households without access to a balanced households at source sites (64) lacking a balanced diet
diet was 64, significantly higher than that for migrants compared to those at destination sites (61).
(45) and non-migrants (50). Scarcity of food during
Food scarcity follows the same trend, with higher index
floods was most pronounced among non-migrants
values reported at source sites during both floods (71)
(73), followed closely by displaced households (71)
and droughts (74) compared to destination sites (67 and
and migrants (69). During droughts, food scarcity was
65, respectively). These patterns suggest that displaced
critical across all groups, with migrants reporting the
households remaining at source sites experience
highest index value (81), followed by non-migrants (75)
greater food insecurity, especially during droughts,
and displaced households (74).
likely due to constrained access to markets and support
systems — one of the reasons for displacement.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

However, there was marginal improvement in food risks at destination sites may manifest differently, with
security at destination sites. Interventions should focus displaced households having to navigate through
on improving food assistance mechanisms, ensuring exploitative labour conditions in unfamiliar environments.
timely delivery of balanced food supplies and building
Poor living conditions are a significant issue, with
resilient agricultural systems to address recurring food
displaced households reporting the highest score
insecurity during extreme weather events.
(66.61) at destination sites, signifying acute challenges
What does the intangible-functional loss and in maintaining basic living standards after relocating.
damage index reveal? In comparison, displaced households at source sites
scored 62.52, while migrants scored 60.50 and non-
The intangible-functional loss and damage index (see
migrants scored 60.85, emphasising the widespread
Figure 56) reveals differences in forced labour, poor
prevalence of poor living conditions across all groups.
living conditions and food security across non-migrant,
migrant and displaced households, with additional Food insecurity is widespread, with the highest score
differentiation between source (lower part of the figure) among displaced households at source sites (65.48),
and destination sites (upper part of the figure) for while migrants scored 59.50 and non-migrants reported
displaced populations. a slightly lower score of 60.95.
The forced labour index highlights significant Overall, the analysis indicates that displaced
vulnerability, with displaced households at source sites households, both at their source and destination
scoring the highest at 43.73, followed by migrants at sites, experience heightened vulnerabilities across
42.78 and non-migrants at 40.58. While displacement forced labour, living conditions and food security.
itself can increase vulnerability to forced labour, these These findings emphasise the need for interventions
figures suggest that displaced households face greater that address the structural and systemic barriers
risks of forced labour at source sites, potentially due to affecting displaced and migrant populations, focusing
reduced livelihood options, economic desperation or on improving labour protections, enhancing living
conflict-related conditions. In contrast, forced labour conditions and ensuring consistent access to food.

Figure 56. Intangible-functional loss and damage index

Temporal dimension of loss and damage

Short term Long term

At destination
42.38 60.85

Spatial dimension of loss and damage

Forced labour index Food security
Intangible loss and damage

Displaced at destination site Living conditions

57.24 Migrants Non-migrants 66.61

54.26 54.13
58.47 65.48 59.50 60.95
Displaced at source site Food security
At source

Forced labour index Living conditions

43.73 42.78 40.58 62.52 60.50 60.85

Functional loss and damage

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

4.2.3 Tangible-intrinsic loss and Conflict-related injuries are the most serious injuries
damage index among migrant households (61%) and displaced
households (57%). They are lower among non-migrant
The tangible-intrinsic loss and damage index captures households (17%). This highlights the heightened
the most severe and irreplaceable impacts of climate- vulnerability of migrants and displaced populations
induced events and conflict on communities. Unlike to conflict-related violence while relocating and after
functional losses, these damages are often permanent settlement. Disaster-related injuries, including those
and involve life, physical wellbeing and critical assets. caused by floods and droughts, are reported at much
lower levels across all groups. Non-migrant households
The index is constructed of three key sub-indices: the
report 17%, displaced households report 11% and
serious injury index, the loss of life index and the loss of
migrant households report the lowest level at 6%. This
assets index. Taken together, these three sub-indices
shows that while disasters pose significant risks, they
provide a comprehensive picture of the tangible and
are not the dominant driver of serious injuries in these
intrinsic impacts of loss and damage, highlighting the
contexts. Other causes of injuries dominate among non-
gravity and permanence of such impacts. In Figure 57,
migrant households (67%). Migrant households (33%)
we illustrate the structure and components of the
and displaced households (31%) report lower levels of
tangible-intrinsic loss and damage index, providing an
injuries in this category, indicating that these groups are
overview of the different dimensions assessed.
more vulnerable to conflict- and disaster-related injuries.
1. Quantification of the serious injury index
The analysis highlights the need for targeted
The serious injury index highlights the primary causes interventions addressing conflict-related risks for
behind serious injuries experienced by different migrant and displaced populations, alongside
household types. As shown in Figure 58 (see section strengthened disaster preparedness and response
3.3.3 on the internal conflict risk index for more analysis mechanisms. For non-migrant communities,
on this issue), the injury causes vary significantly across interventions should focus on broader safety measures
these groups. to address localised risks.

Figure 57. Construction of the tangible intrinsic loss and damage index

Tangible-intrinsic loss
and damage index

Serious injury index Loss of life index Loss of assets index

Injury caused by conflict Death caused by conflict Equipment loss and damage
Injury caused by droughts caused by floods
Death caused by droughts
Injury caused by floods Housing loss and damage
Death caused by floods caused by floods

Figure 58. Reasons for serious injuries among household members in the last three years, by household migration status

80
67
61
Percentage of households

60 57

40
33 31

20 17 17
11
6
0
Conflict Disasters Other
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

2. Quantification of the loss of life index This analysis reveals that conflict is a significant driver of
mortality for displaced households, while health-related
The loss of life index highlights the cause of the death
and other non-disaster causes dominate among non-
of household members over the past three years across
migrant and migrant groups. Addressing conflict-related
non-migrant, migrant and displaced groups. The data
risks, improving healthcare access and enhancing
in Figure 59 (see section 3.3.3 on internal conflict risk
disaster preparedness mechanisms are critical for
index for more analysis of this issue) shows the reasons
reducing mortality across these vulnerable populations.
for death of household members in the last three years.
3. Quantification of the loss of asset index
Disaster-related deaths, including floods and droughts,
account for a significant share of overall mortality. The analysis of the loss of asset index is derived from
Among displaced households, disaster-related two key components: damage to housing assets and
deaths account for 13%, which is higher than migrant damage to tools and equipment related to economic
households (9%) and non-migrant households (6%). livelihoods.
This suggests that displaced populations remain more
Damage to housing assets: as shown in Table 14,
vulnerable to environmental hazards.
damage to housing assets is most pronounced among
Conflict-related deaths are high among displaced non-migrant households, with 31% reporting damage.
households (58%), compared to migrant households In comparison, displaced households reported damage
(17%) and non-migrant households (9%). The at a lower rate (20%), followed by migrant households
disproportionately high share among displaced at 18%. However, the financial loss as a percentage of
populations highlights the risks associated with conflict annual household income presents a slightly different
exposure during and after displacement. In contrast, picture. The greatest losses were reported by non-
non-disaster and non-conflict-related causes of death migrant households at 7%, followed by displaced
(such as health conditions or accidents) dominate households at 5% and 4% of migrant households. This
among non-migrant households (85%) and migrant suggests that while non-migrants experience greater
households (74%), indicating that these groups rates of housing damage, the financial impact of damage
experience more typical mortality patterns. However, to housing is more significant for displaced households.
among displaced households, deaths from other causes
are significantly lower (29%), suggesting a shift in which
conflict becomes the primary driver of mortality, rather
than health related or accidental deaths.

Figure 59. Reasons for death of household members in the last three years, by household migration status

100
85
80
Percentage of households

74

58
60

40
29

20 17
13
9 9
6
0
Conflict Disaster Other
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Table 14. Damage to housing assets, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Damage to housing assets 31 18 20
(% of households)
Loss value (% of total household 7 4 5
annual income)

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Damage to economic livelihood tools and What does the tangible-intrinsic loss and damage
equipment: Table 15 sets out damage to tools and index reveal?
equipment essential for economic livelihoods. Non-
The tangible-intrinsic loss and damage index, as
migrant households reported the highest percentage
illustrated in the Figure 60, highlights significant
of damage to their tools and equipment at 16%, while
differences in the severity and distribution of loss and
displaced households reported 13% and migrant
damage across displaced, migrant and non-migrant
households reported the lowest at 12%. However,
households. These losses are categorised into three
the financial loss associated with damaged tools
key dimensions: serious injury, loss of life and loss of
and equipment present a different picture. Displaced
assets, with each group experiencing varying degrees of
households experience the highest financial impact at
vulnerability.
12% of their annual income, significantly higher than
7% for migrant households and 6% for non-migrant Serious injury is most prevalent among displaced
households. This suggests that while physical damage households (25.08), significantly higher than migrants
is lower among displaced households, the economic (14.89) and non-migrants (3.92). This indicates that
value of the damaged assets is disproportionately high. displaced households are at a heightened risk of injury
due to exposure to hazardous environments and limited
Overall, while non-migrant households experience the
access to healthcare services.
highest rates of damage to both housing and tools
and equipment, their resulting financial losses remain The loss of life index also follows a concerning trend,
moderate. In contrast, displaced households face a with displaced households reporting the highest score
comparatively lower incidence of damage but suffer at 17.46, followed by migrants at 7.43 and non-migrants
the highest financial losses. These findings highlight at 8.93.
the need for targeted interventions, such as housing
Loss of assets emerges as a critical issue, with
reconstruction programmes and economic asset
displaced households scoring 33.10, far surpassing
insurance schemes to mitigate these losses effectively.
migrants (23.50) and non-migrants (20.26). The higher

Table 15. Damage to tools and equipment related to livelihoods, by household migration status

NATURE OF LOSS NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

Damage to tools and equipment 16 12 13
(% of households)
Loss value (% of total household 6 7 12
annual income)

Figure 60. Tangible-intrinsic loss and damage index

Temporal dimension of loss and damage

Short term Long term
At destination

Displaced Migrants Non-migrants

Spatial dimension of loss and damage

25.21 15.24 11.04

Intangible loss and damage

17.46 7.43 8.93

Serious injury Loss of life
25.08 14.89 3.92
At source

Loss of assets
33.10 23.50 20.26

Intrinsic loss and damage

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

asset losses among displaced households indicates driven interventions by integrating support for them
both immediate destruction and long-term erosion of into disaster response and promoting community-
household stability and livelihoods. led support initiatives that reinforce social ties and
collective resilience.
Overall displaced households have the highest tangible-
intrinsic loss and damage score at 25.21, followed 1. Quantification of the loss of cultural
by migrant households at 15.24 and non-migrant identity index
households at 11.04. This picture highlights that
The loss of cultural identity is a significant intangible-
displacement exacerbates vulnerability, leading to higher
intrinsic impact of climate change, displacement and
short-term and intrinsic losses.
conflict, affecting the sense of belonging, traditional
The tangible-intrinsic loss and damage index shows knowledge and ability of the affected households to
an urgent need for targeted interventions: priorities continue their cultural practices.
should include improved healthcare services, livelihood
Figure 62 highlights the univariate indices of cultural
restoration and infrastructure resilience to reduce these
identity loss across non-migrant, migrant and displaced
tangible and intrinsic losses effectively.
households. Overall, displaced households report the
highest levels of cultural erosion across most indicators.
4.2.4 Intangible-intrinsic loss and Decline in fluency in the household’s traditional
damage index language shows high values across all groups, with
displaced households at 77, non-migrants at 74 and
The intangible-intrinsic loss and damage index examines
migrants highest at 80. Similarly, there was a significant
the non-material and personal impacts of environmental
decline in the consumption of traditional foods, with
shocks, climate-induced disruptions and conflict. Unlike
values of 79 among migrants, 77 among displaced
physical losses, these impacts affect cultural identity,
households and 74 among non-migrants. Other
social cohesion and mental wellbeing, leaving profound
significant declines include wearing traditional clothing
emotional and psychological scars on individuals and
(79 among migrants), traditional agricultural practices
communities. Such losses are often overlooked in
(79 among migrants) and traditional health knowledge
conventional damage assessments but carry long-term
(78 among migrants). While non-migrants show slightly
consequences that impact recovery and resilience-
lower values across most indicators, overall these indices
building efforts. As shown in Figure 61, this index
indicate that both migrants and displaced households
focuses on two critical dimensions: the loss of cultural
experience higher levels of cultural erosion.
identity index and the mental health problem index.
Figure 63 identifies the primary reasons for loss of
This index can serve as a tool for policymakers and
culture. The most significant contributing factor is
stakeholders to address these multidimensional
limited resources for preservation (7.79), followed by
impacts through culturally sensitive and community-
physical destruction due to climate events (7.55) and

Figure 61. Formulation of the intangible intrinsic loss and damage index

Intangible-intrinsic
loss and damage
index

Loss of cultural identity index Mental health problems index

Decline in: Difficulty in concentration

Fluency of traditional language Fatigue and decreased energy
Heritage sites Feeling guilt and worthless
Sense of connectivity Feeling hopeless
Traditional agricultural practices Increased crying spells
Traditional attire Loss of interest in life
Traditional foods Persistent sadness
Traditional governance systems Sense of isolation
Traditional health knowledge Suicidal thoughts
Traditional water management practices

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

85

Figure 62. Loss of cultural identity univariate indices, by household migration status
80
80 79
79 79
77 78
77 77
76 76
75 76 76
75 75
75 74 74 74 74
74
73 73
72
Index (0–100)

72
72
71
71
70

65

60
Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in Decline in
fluency of heritage sense of traditional traditional traditional traditional traditional traditional
traditional sites connectivity agricultural attire governance health water foods
language with the practices systems knowledge management
community practices
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced
Note: Higher index value represents higher loss.

Figure 63. Reasons for cultural loss

Lack of awareness of how to preserve culture 5.67

Limited resources for preservation 7.79

Mobility due to climate events 7.03

Mobility due to conflict 7.14

Physical destruction due to climate events 7.55

Physical destruction due to conflict 7.31

Social fragmentation due to conflict 6.21

0 2 4 6 8 10
Score on a scale of 0–10

physical destruction due to conflict (7.31). Factors 2. Quantification of the mental health
related to mobility such as conflict-related mobility (7.14) problem index
and climate-related mobility (7.03) also significantly
The mental health problem index highlights the
contribute. Social fragmentation caused by conflict
psychological toll experienced by households because
(6.21) and lack of awareness of how to preserve culture
of climate-induced displacement, resource scarcity and
(5.67) are lower but still notable contributors.
prolonged uncertainty. The data presented in Figure 64
Our analysis shows that the loss of cultural identity illustrates the prevalence of various mental health
is deeply intertwined with displacement, mobility and challenges across these groups.
systemic vulnerabilities. Efforts to address these losses
Displaced households exhibit the highest occurrence
need to focus on preserving traditional knowledge
of mental health issues across almost all indicators,
systems, supporting cultural heritage restoration and
reflecting the compounded stress of displacement and
mitigating mobility-related disruptions through targeted
prolonged instability. Persistent sadness is highest
interventions.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

among displaced households at 70, compared to 63 emotional wellbeing, cultural identity and social
for non-migrants and 62 for migrants. Loss of interest in cohesion. The data in Figure 65 highlights significant
life shows a similar pattern, with an index value of 70 for differences in these dimensions across displaced,
displaced households, while non-migrants and migrants migrant and non-migrant households, with displaced
report slightly lower values at 61 and 63, respectively. populations consistently showing the highest levels of
intangible-intrinsic loss.
Fatigue and decreased energy also show high
prevalence, with index values of 70 among displaced Displaced households report the highest overall index
households, 61 among migrants and 58 among value at 67.02, followed closely by migrant households
non-migrants. Feelings of hopelessness are more (64.56), while non-migrant households score relatively
pronounced among displaced households (63), lower at 61.96. This picture suggests that displacement
compared to 58 for both migrants and non-migrants. and mobility exacerbate intrinsic losses, disrupting
social structures, cultural practices and mental
More severe mental health indicators, such as suicidal
wellbeing.
thoughts, show relatively lower but concerning levels,
with displaced households at 32, migrants at 24 When examining specific sub-indices, mental health
and non-migrants at 22. Difficulty in concentration problems are significantly higher among displaced
and feelings of guilt and worthlessness follow similar households (58.83) compared to migrants (51.83) and
patterns, with displaced households showing the non-migrants (51.08). This indicates the compounded
highest scores at 57 and 63 respectively, compared to psychological stress faced by displaced households,
lower scores for migrants and non-migrants. driven by prolonged uncertainty, resource scarcity and
loss of community support systems.
Overall, the mental health burden is disproportionately
higher among displaced households, with higher levels In terms of loss of cultural identity, migrant households
of persistent sadness, hopelessness and fatigue. report the highest levels at 77.30, followed by displaced
Migrants also experience significant mental health households (75.21) and non-migrants (72.84). This
challenges, though slightly lower in comparison. These pattern highlights the erosion of cultural heritage,
findings highlight the urgent need for integrated mental language fluency and traditional practices, especially
health services, psychosocial support programmes among migrant and displaced populations.
and community-based resilience-building initiatives to
Overall, the intangible-intrinsic loss and damage index
address the mental health consequences of climate-
underscores the profound emotional and cultural toll of
induced displacement and associated stressors.
displacement and migration, emphasising the need for
What does the intangible-intrinsic loss and culturally sensitive interventions, psychosocial support
damage index reveal? programmes and initiatives aimed at preserving cultural
heritage and fostering social cohesion within affected
The intangible-intrinsic loss and damage index captures
communities.
the deeply rooted, non-material impacts of climate
change and associated stressors, encompassing

Figure 64. Mental health problem univariate indices, by household migration status
80
70 70 70
67
63 63 63 63 62
60 61 61
60 57 58 58 58 58
54 55 56
Index (0–100)

52
50
46 48
42
40 38 37
32

22 24
20

0
Difficulty in Fatigue Sense Increased Feeling Feeling Loss of Loss of Persistent Suicidal
concentration and of isolation crying guilt and hopeless interest libido sadness thoughts
decreased spells worthless in life
energy
Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Note: Higher index value represents higher vulnerability.

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

Figure 65. Intangible-intrinsic loss and damage index

Temporal dimension of loss and damage

Short term Long term

At destination
Displaced Migrants Non-migrants

Spatial dimension of loss and damage

67.02 64.56 61.96
Intangible loss and damage

58.83 51.83 51.08

Mental health problems

At source
Cultural identity loss
75.21 77.30 72.84

Intrinsic loss and damage

4.3 The cost of economic

Flood-related losses reach 27% of annual income for
non-migrants, 29% for migrants and a staggering 40%
and non-economic loss and for displaced households. Key drivers include crop loss,

damage for households

livestock sickness, housing damage and equipment
damage. For displaced households, equipment damage
alone represents 12% of their income, reflecting their
The assessment of loss and damage at the
heightened vulnerability because of their limited capacity
household level in Mopti reveals the devastating and
to replace tools that are essential for recovery.
disproportionate impacts experienced by non-migrant,
migrant and displaced households. While climate- Water scarcity contributes a smaller proportion of
related hazards such as floods, droughts, water scarcity economic losses, accounting for 4% of annual income
and land degradation affect all groups, the severity for non-migrants, 5% for migrants and 3% for displaced
and nature of these impacts vary significantly based on households. However, the associated health costs are
households’ socioeconomic status, resilience capacity significant. Migrant households, in particular, spend
and compounded vulnerabilities arising from the 2.62% of their income on healthcare due to water
intersection of climate hazards and conflict. scarcity, further straining already limited resources.
These loss and damage values are based on the most Crop yield reduction caused by land degradation
recent disaster event year, rather than an average over represents a loss of 11% of annual income for non-
multiple years. This reflects the specific impacts for that migrants, 15% for migrants and 35% for displaced
year and should not be seen as a worst-case scenario, households. This highlights the critical vulnerability
though it underscores the potential for much greater of displaced households to long-term environmental
losses in the future should current conditions persist. degradation, which directly erodes their primary sources
of food security and income.
Table 16 shows the economic and non-economic loss
and damage suffered by different household groups in Displacement-related income loss adds another layer of
in Mopti. vulnerability. For displaced households, the reduction
in household income represents 46% of their annual
Droughts impose the highest economic burden across
income. This reflects the severe economic shocks
all groups, accounting for 34% of income loss among
caused by forced migration and the difficulty of securing
non-migrants, 42% among migrants and an alarming
stable employment in displacement contexts.
61% among displaced households. The largest losses
among displaced households are crop loss (23%) and
employment loss (16%), underscoring their dependence
on agriculture and wage labour for survival.

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Table 16. Economic valuation of loss and damage suffered, by household migration status

NON-MIGRANTS MIGRANTS DISPLACED

(AMOUNT IN XOF)
Annual household 960,330 953,101 600,329 (US$991)
income (US$1,585) (US$1,573)
Types of loss and damage
Displacement Reduction in 277,923
household income
Drought Crop loss 118,431 124,727 136,095
Employment loss 82,846 116,640 96,210
Fish catch reduction 17,020 41,660 8,690
Livestock death 43,967 31,900 43,238
Livestock sickness 60,363 82,667 82,152
Flood Crop loss 104,379 106,133 73,833
Employment loss 14,682 17,053 5,400
Equipment damage 56,719 66,300 74,600
Fish catch reduction 7,582 27,267 3,057
Housing damage 62,863 41,967 30,524
Livestock sickness 14,654 16,467 49,790
Land Crop yield 102,042 139,093 207,824
degradation reduction
Water Agriculture water 4,948 15,637 4,950
scarcity purchase
Drinking water 5,468 4,309 4,186
purchase
Health costs 18,706 25,000 2,829
Livestock water 6,117 3,545 4,418
purchase
Total loss and 720,786 860,363 1,105,721
damage value (US$1,190) (US$1,420) (US$1,825)

Figure 66 illustrates the overall scale of these impacts. traditional languages decline. Educational disruptions
Non-migrant households face a 75% loss of their annual are common, with children often being pulled out of
income, migrant households suffer an even higher loss school, compromising their long-term prospects and
of 90%, while displaced households face catastrophic perpetuating intergenerational cycles of poverty.
losses of 184%, exceeding their annual income and
While climate hazards alone are devastating, their
indicating a crisis that leaves them with no means of
intersection with conflict in Mopti exacerbates
recovery without significant external support.
vulnerabilities, trapping households in cycles of
These economic losses are not one-off impacts. They poverty, debt and social exclusion. Conflict disrupts
trigger a downward spiral of indebtedness and asset livelihoods, dismantles community support systems
depletion, pushing households further into poverty. and intensifies mental health crises, creating an
Households’ inability to recover economically cascades environment where recovery becomes nearly
into non-economic impacts, including heightened impossible. It is important to note that the above
mental health challenges, loss of cultural identity and assessment does not include economic and non-
social fragmentation. Mental health crises, characterised economic losses resulting from injuries and fatalities
by persistent sadness, hopelessness and social caused by conflict and other hazards. If these were
isolation, are particularly pervasive among displaced integrated, the overall loss and damage figures would
households. Cultural identity erodes as traditional be significantly higher across all household categories,
agricultural practices, heritage sites and fluency in and particularly for displaced households.

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

Figure 66. Total loss and damage at household level, by household migration status

184%
75% 90%

Non-migrants Migrants Displaced

Total income = XOF 960,330 Total income = XOF 953,101 Total income = XOF 600,329
Total loss and damage = Total loss and damage = Total loss and damage =
XOF 720,786 XOF 860,363 XOF 1,105,721

The lack of adequate support and protection

mechanisms means households are not only losing their
income and productive assets but also their ability to
recover and rebuild. Economic losses cascade into non-
economic crises, with impacts on mental health, cultural
identity and education continuity. Without adequate
support, households will continue to face a vicious cycle
of vulnerability and poverty that will deepen with each
recurring crisis.
This assessment underscores the need for holistic
resilience-building strategies that account for both
economic and non-economic dimensions of loss and
damage, ensuring that no household is left behind in
these cascading crises.

www.iied.org 67
5
ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Recommendations
Our assessment of economic and non-economic loss
Promote locally led
adaptation to strengthen
and damage in Mali reveals the heavy burden faced
by non-migrant, migrant and displaced households.
These findings show that the overlapping crises of
climate resilience and
peacebuilding efforts
climate change and conflict are not only widespread but
also deeply entrenched, affecting different aspects of
household and community wellbeing.
Communities in Mali face overlapping challenges from
Well-designed social protection can act as both a safety climate change, conflict and economic instability, all of
net and a pathway to recovery, preventing households which undermine livelihoods, weaken institutions and
from falling deeper into vulnerability while helping them heighten social tensions. To build resilience, locally led
rebuild livelihoods and adapt to future risks. However, a adaptation (LLA) offers a more effective approach than
key issue is the weakness of social protection systems top-down interventions, which often fail to address local
in Mali. Our assessment showed very low SPI scores, realities. LLA empowers local institutions, collective
with non-migrant, migrant and displaced households action and community-based decision making, ensuring
scoring 4.00, 2.38 and 3.33, respectively, on a that adaptation efforts reflect the needs and knowledge
scale of 0 to 100. Although various social protection of those most affected.
programmes such as food aid, cash transfers,
LLA also aligns with adaptive peacebuilding approaches
agricultural extension and school meal programmes
(UNDP, 2022), which focus on strengthening social
are in place, they remain fragmented, inconsistent and
structures, local governance and resource management,
insufficient in addressing household vulnerabilities. To
rather than imposing external solutions. By leveraging
be truly effective, these programmes must integrate
community knowledge, traditional governance systems
climate resilience measures, such as shock-responsive
and local networks, LLA can help build long-term
assistance and access to climate-resilient infrastructure,
resilience to both climate shocks and conflict risks.
ensuring that they not only address loss and damage
but also reduce future risks. The recommendations in For LLA to be effective, it must promote livelihood
this section aim to tackle both immediate vulnerabilities diversification, climate-resilient agriculture and
and the structural drivers of risk in Mali. sustainable resource management to reduce
vulnerabilities. Practical approaches include supporting
While these recommendations have been suggested
drought-resistant crops, improving irrigation systems
in the context of Mali, they also provide valuable
and promoting sustainable grazing practices, all of
lessons for other FCAS facing similar climate and
which help communities adapt to environmental stress
socioeconomic vulnerabilities.
while reducing resource-based conflicts.

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However, adaptation requires not just local action through policies that support decentralisation, ensure
but also enabling policies and financial support. fair resource distribution and prevent exclusionary
Governments and donors must ensure that funding practices.
reaches local institutions, giving them the authority to
An LLA approach must also be inclusive, ensuring that
decide how resources are used. Equally important is
women, young people and marginalised groups play
the development of EWS that can help communities
an active role in decision-making. Providing women
prepare for climate shocks, improve disaster response
with land, credit, and agricultural training is only part
and strengthen adaptation efforts.
of the solution. It must be accompanied by leadership
Strengthening social cohesion is another key pillar opportunities, legal protections and safeguards against
of both climate resilience and peacebuilding. In Mali, gender-based violence. Without addressing social
community-driven initiatives can improve climate and institutional barriers, adaptation efforts will remain
adaptation while rebuilding trust among divided social inequitable and unsustainable.
groups. Collaborative resource management, such
In Table 17, we summarise these pathways to explain
as shared irrigation schemes or community-led water
how LLA can support adaptive peacebuilding in Mali.
conservation, provides opportunities for cooperation
and reduces tensions over land and water use. However,
these initiatives need strong government backing

Table 17. Pathways for LLA to support climate resilience and adaptive peacebuilding

KEY PATHWAYS EXAMPLES OF LLA CONTRIBUTION TO

INTERVENTIONS ADAPTIVE PEACEBUILDING
Addressing Livelihood diversification through Reduce economic insecurity and social
underlying small-scale enterprises, provision tensions, addressing root causes of
vulnerabilities of financial services for vulnerable conflict while building long-term stability
groups and promotion of sustainable
agricultural practices
Strengthening Community-led natural resource Promote trust, solidarity and collaboration
social cohesion management projects, shared water between social groups, reducing potential
access programmes and open conflict triggers
consultations to address community
grievances
Promoting Introduction of drought-resistant crops, Strengthen communities’ ability to
resilience and diversified ecologically sustainable withstand environmental shocks and
adaptive capacity agricultural practices and sustainable reduce reliance on harmful coping
livestock management, rehabilitation of mechanisms
degraded pasturelands, construction
of community water harvesting systems
and rehabilitation of degraded farmland
Enhancing Transparent resource allocation, Improve governance credibility, reduce
legitimacy and capacity-building for local governance, corruption and foster trust of community in
trust in local formalisation of land rights, and local institutions
institutions community-based decision making
Promoting Empowering women, youth and Build equitable community structures,
inclusive marginalised groups to participate in ensuring diverse representation and
decision making community-level institutions and take reducing marginalisation-related
up leadership roles grievances
Preventing Ecosystem restoration projects, Reduce exposure to recurring risks,
recurrence of integrated watershed management, preventing resource-related conflicts and
climate shocks construction of resilient infrastructure building long-term sustainability
and establishment of EWS for climate
shocks
Source: Adapted from Bharadwaj and Karthikeyan, 2023

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Strengthen climate Enhance finance for

information systems and resilience building efforts
risk management tools for To address the challenges of climate risks, conflict and
local-level decision making economic fragility, Mali requires significantly increased
financial investment from national governments,
Effective social protection programmes, resilience- multilateral development banks (MDBs), international
building measures and early responses to disasters rely climate funds and bilateral donors. However, lack of
on accurate, timely and localised climate data. However, financing remains a major barrier to scaling up effective
in Mali and other FCAS, significant challenges hinder interventions such as social protection and resilience
access to reliable climate information. These include building.
limited hydro-meteorological services, weak institutional
Currently, social protection programmes in Mali suffer
frameworks for data dissemination, and gaps in climate
from chronic underfunding due to low domestic tax
risk modelling. As a result, EWS are not accurate,
revenue generation, unsustainable debt burdens and
disaster response is delayed and governments often
limited access to international development and climate
take a reactive rather than anticipatory approach to
finance. Our analysis shows that social protection
managing climate risks.
spending in FCAS averages just 0.9% of GDP, far lower
To address these gaps, international donors must than the 1.3% of GDP spent by non-FCAS countries.
collaborate with local governments and NGOs to invest
Climate shocks further strain public finances by
in climate information and risk management systems. A
damaging infrastructure, which then requires rebuilding,
key priority is improving projections of climate impacts
disrupting economic activities and reducing tax
across different regions and timescales. This includes
revenues (Bharadwaj and Karthikeyan, 2023) while
identifying and registering vulnerable populations in
simultaneously increasing the need for emergency
advance (pre-identification and pre-registration of the
response and recovery funding (Bharadwaj and
most at-risk geographies and people) to ensure targeted
Karthikeyan, 2023). These financial pressures have
interventions before crises escalate.
pushed many FCAS, including Mali, into cycles of
Improving EWS requires both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ debt that further limit their ability to invest in long-term
approaches. A top-down approach involves enhancing resilience efforts. But despite their high vulnerability,
hydro-meteorological projections and climate modelling to FCAS receive significantly less climate finance than
improve risk anticipation and resource allocation. However, other developing countries. Between 2014 and 2021,
these models often fail to capture community-specific an assessment by UNDP found that ‘extremely’ fragile
vulnerabilities, localised risk factors and socioeconomic states received just US$2.10 per person in climate
conditions that affect resilience capacity. To bridge this finance, compared to US$10.80 per person in ‘other’
gap, bottom-up approaches must be strengthened fragile states. In the Sahel, adaptation finance per
through participatory processes that integrate community person ranges between US$2–13, well below the
knowledge, lived experiences and traditional practices. US$18 per person average for LDCs (UNDP, 2021a).
Our analysis further shows that FCAS require targeted
Strengthening EWS and risk management tools will
and context-specific financial support due to their higher
also enable the government to implement anticipatory
multidimensional risk levels.
and forecast-based financing mechanisms, such as
early action protocols, parametric insurance schemes To address these gaps, three critical financing pathways
and pre-arranged disaster relief funds, ensuring must be prioritised.
proactive resource allocation rather than reactive
• First, debt relief is essential to free up fiscal space
crisis management. Improved access to timely and
for resilience building. The burden of unsustainable
locally relevant climate information will empower local
debt limits FCAS governments’ ability to invest in
governments, community leaders and humanitarian
social protection, adaptation and climate resilient
actors to take early action, minimising loss and damage
infrastructure. Debt restructuring, supported by
while reducing long-term vulnerabilities.
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank
Building local capacity is essential to ensure that Group, IMF and Paris Club, must take into account
climate information systems are both technically the compound risks of fragility, conflict and
sound and accessible. In Mopti, local government environmental stressors.
officials, community outreach workers and grassroots
• Second, international climate finance must be
organisations must be given training and technical
significantly scaled up. The Fund for Responding
support to interpret and apply climate data effectively.
to Loss and Damage (FRLD) was established to
Without this, even the best climate information systems
assist particularly vulnerable developing countries
will remain underutilised.
in responding to loss and damage associated

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with climate change. The FRLD should prioritise Venton et al., 2012). For instance, during the 2008–
FCAS in its disbursement strategy, ensuring these 2011 droughts in Kenya, beneficiaries of the Hunger
regions receive the financial support needed to Safety Net Programme maintained their standard of
address both economic and non-economic loss living, while those without support decreased their
and damage. Other mechanisms, including the spending by 10% (Cabot Venton et al., 2012). Similarly,
GCF, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) the in Yemen’s Desert Locust Response Project, cash
Adaptation Fund and the Climate Investment Fund, transfers and medium-term recovery support helped
must also increase allocations to FCAS. Our analysis vulnerable farmers and herders mitigate losses caused
highlights the stark underfunding faced by these by climate hazards (World Bank Group, no date-c).
regions, with cumulative GCF funding for FCAS at These examples highlight the transformative potential
just US$2.1 billion, proportionally below the levels of social protection in preventing households from
allocated to other vulnerable countries such as LDCs descending into and becoming trapped in poverty.
(US$4.61 billion) and SIDS (US$1.8 billion). Climate
Traditional social protection systems, which are primarily
finance must support not only urgent adaptation
designed to address chronic poverty, are often ill-
needs but also broader resilience efforts, including
equipped to respond to rapid-onset crises. This is
EWS, sustainable agriculture and community-based
where shock-responsive social protection systems
adaptation initiatives.
become essential. These systems are designed to
• Third, increasing ODA is critical for countries like Mali, expand, adapt and deliver timely support during periods
where domestic resources are insufficient to meet of crisis, whether caused by floods, droughts or conflict-
both immediate and long-term needs. ODA must be related disruptions. Importantly, these systems must also
predictable, flexible and aligned with locally identified be responsive to the needs of migrants and displaced
priorities to ensure maximum impact. In fragile populations, ensuring that they are widely accessible
contexts, financing must bridge the gap between to those who are often excluded from existing support
humanitarian assistance and long-term development, structures. Evaluations show that such systems can
strengthening essential services such as education, prevent harmful coping mechanisms like child labour,
healthcare and social protection while also investing in asset liquidation and skipping meals. For example,
institutional capacity for resilience and self-reliance. Ethiopia’s safety net programme ensured that despite
recurring droughts, 62% of enrolled households avoided
At the national level, Mali must prioritise local, context-
selling assets and 36% preserved their savings (Cabot
specific interventions that strengthen institutions so that
Venton et al., 2012). As well as mitigating immediate
climate finance and ODA can be delivered to community-
losses, shock-responsive systems can address both
level institutions for implementing LLA efforts.
economic and non-economic vulnerabilities, including
Promote shock-responsive mental health challenges and disruptions to education

and anticipatory response

systems, contributing to social stability in fragile regions
(Bharadwaj and Karthikeyan, 2023).
mechanisms in social While shock-responsive systems focus on post-
protection programmes to crisis support, anticipatory response mechanisms

deliver better resilience

can provide support before a crisis fully materialises.
Anticipatory mechanisms rely on EWS, pre-arranged
financing and data-driven forecasting to trigger pre-
In FCAS settings such as Mali, social protection
emptive interventions. For example, studies show
systems can play a critical role in addressing both
that every US$1 spent on anticipatory action can
chronic vulnerabilities and sudden shocks. However,
save up to US$2.8 in Ethiopia and US$2.9 in Kenya
achieving the full potential of social protection
by reducing the need for expensive humanitarian aid
programmes requires coordinated action from national
and avoiding long-term economic losses. A study by
authorities, international donors and multilateral
the UNDRR found that every US$1 invested in risk
development partners to strengthen shock-responsive
reduction saves up to US$15 in post-disaster recovery
and anticipatory social protection mechanisms.
(UNDRR, no date-b). Anticipatory measures can
Social protection serves as a safety net to protect also prevent cascading impacts such as malnutrition,
vulnerable households from the immediate impacts school dropouts and mental health crises, which
of crises while promoting long-term resilience, social disproportionately affect vulnerable groups, particularly
cohesion and sustainable development. Evidence women and children. Without anticipatory social
from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme and protection, climate shocks can push households deeper
Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme demonstrates into cycles of poverty, exacerbating intergenerational
that well-designed social protection interventions help inequalities and reducing the prospects of long-term
households stabilise their livelihoods, reduce asset recovery.
erosion and maintain food security during crises (Cabot

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

To make social protection systems more effective in Enhance localised implementation capacity: local
FCAS contexts like Mali, key stakeholders, including authorities and community-based organisations must be
the national government, international development empowered and equipped with resources and tools to
agencies and donor organisations, need to prioritise the implement shock-responsive programmes. This includes
following actions: training local teams, simplifying administrative processes
and ensuring context-specific approaches designed to
Invest in EWS and data infrastructure: robust EWS
the needs of vulnerable populations in Mopti.
and climate information services must be established to
ensure timely identification of risks and trigger anticipatory Strengthen pre-arranged financing mechanisms:
actions. Investments should focus on community-based pre-arranged financing ensures that funds are
EWS, leveraging local knowledge alongside scientific immediately available when a crisis occurs. This
data to ensure early, targeted responses. requires multi-year, predictable financial commitments
from international donors and the establishment of risk
Ensure flexible and scalable delivery
financing facilities at the national and sub-national levels.
mechanisms: social protection systems must have the
capacity to scale up support during crises, including Integrate social protection into broader
pre-identified beneficiary lists and flexible cash and development plans: social protection systems must
in-kind assistance mechanisms. These delivery be aligned with broader climate resilience, disaster risk
systems must ensure transparency and accountability reduction and peacebuilding strategies. This integration
to minimise exclusion and mismanagement. Particular ensures synergies across sectors and promotes a
attention must be given to newly displaced households, holistic approach to addressing vulnerabilities.
ensuring that they are swiftly identified and included in
The government needs to be supported by international
beneficiary lists, possibly through flexible registration
donors, multilateral organisations and local actors to
processes or rapid assessments that can adapt to
act urgently to strengthen these systems as a critical
changing population dynamics.
component of resilience-building efforts. In Table 18,
Table 18. Types of social protection delivery mechanisms for supporting climate resilience and adaptive peacebuilding in Mali

PATHWAYS EXAMPLES OF ANTICIPATORY CONTRIBUTION TO

AND SHOCK-RESPONSIVE RESILIENCE AND ADAPTIVE
SOCIAL PROTECTION PEACEBUILDING
INTERVENTIONS
Anticipatory cash Pre-disaster cash transfers based on EWS Reduce reliance on harmful coping
transfers to help households secure food, shelter and strategies, protect household assets and
essential supplies before a crisis hits enhance food security
Food aid Timely food distribution during climate shocks Stabilise food security, prevent malnutrition
programmes and conflict-related disruptions to prevent and reduce community tensions during
hunger and malnutrition crises
Public works Employment-generation programmes during Provide immediate income support,
programmes or after droughts and floods that focus on soil enhance environmental resilience and
and moisture conservation, water harvesting create long-term adaptive infrastructure
and watershed management infrastructure
Livelihood Crop and livestock insurance to safeguard Protect income sources, reduce post-
insurance against economic losses due to droughts, shock indebtedness and promote long-term
schemes floods and market shocks livelihood sustainability
Education and Subsidised healthcare services, school meal Prevent long-term setbacks in health and
health support programmes and cash incentives to prevent education outcomes, especially for children
school dropouts during crises
Community-based Establishing local food banks, revolving loan Build community cohesion, promote shared
social safety nets funds and cooperative savings programmes responsibility and enhance localised
resilience capacities
Empowerment Financial support and targeted livelihood Strengthen social cohesion, promote
programmes opportunities for women, young people and gender equality and empower vulnerable
for women and marginalised groups populations to participate in recovery efforts
marginalised
groups

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 IIED WORKING PAPER

we provide more information on how different delivery and Karthikeyan, 2023). Public works programmes,
options for anticipatory and shock responsive social for example, not only address immediate livelihood
protection can support resilience and adaptive peace needs by providing employment during crises, but also
building efforts in Mali. contribute to building critical infrastructure, including
roads, irrigation systems and water harvesting structures.
If implemented effectively, shock-responsive and
These programmes have the highest coverage rates
anticipatory social protection systems have the potential
(20%) among populations in extreme poverty and deliver
to stabilise households during crises, prevent harmful
the highest benefit incidence (75%). Their dual focus on
coping strategies and foster long-term resilience.
providing immediate relief and creating long-term assets
By addressing both immediate needs and structural
can ensure sustainable benefits that extend beyond crisis
vulnerabilities, these systems can act as a bridge
management (Bharadwaj and Karthikeyan, 2023).
between humanitarian assistance and sustainable
development, transforming fragile communities into Similarly, food and in-kind assistance programmes
resilient, self-reliant and peaceful societies. are vital in regions like Mopti, where supply chains are

Invest in social protection

often disrupted by conflict and displacement. These
programmes ensure access to essential nutrition
delivery mechanisms that during crises, directly addressing food insecurity

work in FCAS
and preventing long-term health impacts, particularly
for children and pregnant women. School feeding
initiatives, though more targeted, play a crucial role
In FCAS, the effectiveness of social protection systems
in maintaining school attendance during crises and
hinges not only on their design but also on how well
addressing child malnutrition, contributing to long-term
they are delivered; they need to be delivered via
human capital development.
mechanisms that are proven to work under conditions
of fragility and instability. This requires concerted efforts In contrast, while cash transfer programmes are widely
from the government, international donors, multilateral adopted across many FCAS, their effectiveness is
development agencies, as well as humanitarian and often limited (Bharadwaj and Karthikeyan, 2023). Cash
development partners on the ground, to prioritise transfers also require higher per capita investments
and scale up social protection instruments that have to deliver meaningful outcomes and may not address
demonstrated success in FCAS contexts. immediate needs, such as food security or infrastructure
rehabilitation, as effectively as public works or food and
Our analysis of all FCAS shows that the highest
in-kind programmes. However, cash transfers can play
proportion of social protection funding goes towards
a significant role in protracted crises, providing flexible
food programmes (0.5% of GDP), followed by
support that allows households to meet diverse needs
unconditional cash transfers (0.3%), fee waivers (0.2%)
in volatile contexts. Their impact depends on improved
and public works (0.2%) (Bharadwaj and Karthikeyan,
targeting, delivery mechanisms and complementarity
2023). In comparison, non-FCAS countries allocate
with other interventions. Therefore, in the context of
higher proportions of their social spending to social
cash transfer programmes, governments, donors and
pensions (0.7%), unconditional cash transfers (0.4%)
development agencies must move away from a ‘one-
and fee waivers (0.3%). However, further analysis of
size-fits-all’ approach and prioritise instruments better
social protection programmes in FCAS highlights
suited to FCAS realities.
significant gaps in delivery (Bharadwaj and Karthikeyan,
2023). Coverage remains alarmingly low, reaching only Key actions for governments, donors and development
14% of the population in extreme poverty, compared to partners:
61% in non-FCAS settings. Institutional barriers, weak
1. Prioritise investments in proven instruments:
monitoring frameworks, limited funding and fragmented
governments and international donors should
data systems further exacerbate these limitations.
prioritise public works programmes, food and in-kind
Additionally, benefit adequacy, a measure of whether
assistance, and school feeding initiatives as core
social protection support meets the basic needs of
components of social protection strategies in FCAS.
households, is significantly lower in FCAS (3.5%)
These instruments have shown higher coverage,
compared to 37% in non-FCAS contexts. Despite these
better benefit adequacy and stronger returns on
constraints, our analysis reveals that social protection
investment, making them more effective in addressing
interventions in FCAS demonstrate higher benefit–cost
both immediate humanitarian needs and long-term
ratios, underscoring their strong returns on investment
resilience goals.
in poverty reduction and resilience building (Bharadwaj
and Karthikeyan, 2023). 2. A
 dopt a diversified mix of social protection
tools: a balanced mix of social protection tools
Public works programmes, food and in-kind assistance,
should be adopted to address both short-term
and school feeding initiatives have emerged as
climate impacts that cause loss and damage and
particularly effective in FCAS contexts (Bharadwaj

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

long-term resilience and development objectives. suffer losses amounting to 90% of their income, both
Public works programmes and food assistance can significantly higher than the 75% losses experienced
be paired with cash transfer schemes to provide by non-migrants. These economic losses are further
comprehensive safety nets. intensified by non-economic losses, including
psychosocial trauma, social fragmentation and cultural
3. Strengthen local institutional capacity:
identity erosion. For example, displaced children
investments must focus on building the capacity of
are frequently removed from school, perpetuating
local institutions and community-based organisations
intergenerational cycles of poverty and vulnerability.
to deliver social protection programmes effectively.
Local actors are often best placed to navigate the To address these disparities, governments and
complexities of fragile contexts, ensuring last-mile international agencies must invest in integrated data
delivery, transparency and accountability. systems that combine socioeconomic vulnerability
indicators with information on exposure to climate and
4. E
 nhance monitoring, evaluation and data
conflict risks. A unified vulnerability database can ensure
systems: robust data collection, monitoring and
accurate targeting and prioritisation of social protection,
evaluation frameworks must be established to track
resilience-building and adaptation programmes,
programme outcomes, identify vulnerable populations
reducing duplication and inefficiencies while maximising
and ensure accountability in resource allocation.
reach.
Transparent data systems can also support evidence-
based decision making for programme scaling and Migrants and displaced households in Mopti
adaptation. represent some of the most vulnerable and overlooked
populations. Displacement often results in economic
5. F
 oster collaboration across stakeholders:
loss, interrupted access to essential services and severe
effective social protection delivery in FCAS
psychosocial stress. Many adaptation and resilience
requires strong partnerships between governments,
programmes are designed with static geographic
international donors, NGOs and local actors.
boundaries, thereby excluding displaced populations
Coordination mechanisms should be strengthened
and migrants from accessing critical benefits when they
to avoid duplication of efforts and maximise resource
move across administrative regions. Similarly, families
efficiency.
left behind face heightened vulnerabilities without safety
Address inequity, exclusion nets or continued support.

and marginalisation in the Governments, multilateral institutions and humanitarian

delivery approach
agencies need to prioritise the portability of entitlements
and benefits across social protection, adaptation and
resilience programmes. By leveraging digital national
In FCAS such as Mali, addressing the compounded
registries and interoperable systems, entitlements such
impacts of climate shocks, conflict and socioeconomic
as cash transfers, health services, food assistance
fragility requires inclusive and equitable social
and adaptation resources can follow migrants and
protection, resilience-building and adaptation
displaced households across regions. This would
interventions. However, these programmes are often
ensure uninterrupted access to essential services and
hindered by systemic inequities, gender disparities,
enable displaced communities to recover and rebuild
weak institutional coordination and limited transparency.
their lives more effectively. Although a unified social
Effective resilience-building and adaptation strategies
registry system exists in Mali, it faces limitations such as
must actively address these structural inequities to
a small scale and incomplete and outdated information.
ensure that no one is left behind.
The Malian government needs to take urgent action to
Governments, international donors and implementing strengthen and expand the existing registry system.
agencies need to prioritise marginalised and vulnerable
Resilience and adaptation interventions must adopt a
groups in the design and delivery of resilience-building
rights-based approach, ensuring that every individual,
and adaptation interventions. Women, women-headed
regardless of gender, socioeconomic status, mobility or
households, older people, people with disabilities
geographic location, has guaranteed access to essential
and children in Mopti face disproportionate impacts
services, resources and decision-making spaces.
from recurring droughts, floods and displacement,
This approach must include ensuring access to food
compounded by conflict-related insecurities. These
security, shelter, education, healthcare and economic
groups often lack access to essential services, economic
opportunities, underpinned by legal protections and
opportunities and decision-making processes, increasing
accountability mechanisms.
their vulnerability to cascading risks.
In fragile regions like Mopti, where governance
Our analysis shows that displaced households
structures are weakened by conflict, decentralised
experience the highest economic losses, equivalent to
implementation mechanisms are essential for delivering
184% of their annual income, while migrant households

74 www.iied.org
 IIED WORKING PAPER

both social protection and adaptation interventions

effectively. Local governments, community-based
organisations and civil society actors must be
empowered and adequately resourced to deliver
context-specific solutions. Decentralisation can
promote trust, transparency and accountability, while
also ensuring last-mile delivery of critical services.
However, decentralisation must be accompanied by
clear accountability frameworks, financial transparency
and robust monitoring systems to prevent misuse of
resources and inefficiencies.
Fragmented and siloed management of resilience,
social protection and adaptation programmes remains
a particular challenge in FCAS contexts. In Mali,
numerous ministries, agencies and organisations
operate small-scale interventions, leading to duplication
of efforts, gaps in coverage and inconsistent programme
outcomes. The government supported by international
agencies and donors, must undertake a comprehensive
overhaul of institutional management structures to
streamline governance, improve coordination and adopt
integrated delivery mechanisms.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Conclusion
The findings from this study highlight the enormity of The FRLD must prioritise FCAS in its disbursement
the challenge facing FCAS such as Mali, where climate strategy to address the full spectrum of economic and
shocks, conflict and structural vulnerabilities intersect, non-economic loss and damage these regions face.
creating compounded risks and cascading impacts. Climate finance from mechanisms such as the GCF,
These crises perpetuate cycles of poverty, displacement the GEF and the Adaptation Fund must be significantly
and erosion of human dignity. Households in Mopti are scaled up and directed towards integrated, locally
bearing a disproportionate burden of global inaction, led interventions that address not only immediate
despite contributing minimally to the climate crisis. The vulnerabilities but also structural barriers to resilience.
scale of economic and non-economic loss and damage
The global response to the climate crisis must
suffered by these communities underscores the stark
not overlook countries like Mali. While Mali and
climate injustice at work. Vulnerable households are not
other FCAS bear the brunt of climate impacts, the
only losing their income and assets but also their mental
consequences of inaction will extend far beyond
wellbeing, cultural identity and opportunities for future
their borders. Climate risks such as extreme weather,
generations.
food insecurity and displacement, already severe in
The urgency to act cannot be overstated. Without FCAS, are becoming more widespread and could
immediate, targeted and sustained interventions, the increasingly affect other regions. Climate change is a
vulnerabilities of communities in FCAS will only deepen, global challenge and neglecting countries like Mali will
leaving millions trapped in a downward spiral of loss not only deepen existing inequalities but will ultimately
and fragility. Addressing these challenges requires undermine collective progress towards sustainability,
collective responsibility and global solidarity. National peace and equity.
governments need to prioritise inclusive and locally led
resilience-building initiatives, while international financial
institutions, donor agencies and development partners
must ensure that FCAS are prioritised in global climate
finance, debt relief mechanisms and adaptation funding.

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Annexes
Annex 1. Definition of fragile and conflict-affected
states (FCAS)
Conflict is a state of opposition or hostility between two or more parties, often arising from differences in interests,
values or resources. It can manifest in various forms, including verbal disputes, physical confrontations, political
disagreements or armed warfare.
Fragility refers to a context where the state or society faces significant vulnerabilities, often stemming from weak
governance, institutional fragility, social inequalities, and limited capacity to absorb and respond to shocks. Fragile
situations are marked by high levels of exclusion, grievances and inadequate provision of basic services, with states
often struggling to manage risks associated with social, political, economic, environmental and security challenges​.
Different institutions have characterised FCAS as follows:
• The World Bank describes FCAS as countries with weak or ineffective state institutions, where fragility,
conflict or violence exacerbate poverty, vulnerability and inequality. This characterisation is drawn from its
Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025 (World Bank Group, 2020), which identifies fragility
through institutional weaknesses, governance failures and inability to manage social, economic, political and
environmental risks. Countries in violent conflict are further classified based on the intensity of conflict-related
deaths, as outlined in its annual List of Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations.
• The UNDP views FCAS as contexts where persistent poverty, inequality, conflict, gender-based violence,
climate emergencies and economic challenges impede progress toward sustainable development goals.
This perspective is informed by the UNDP Strategic Plan 2022–2025 (UNDP, 2021b), which highlights weak
governance structures, inadequate institutional capacity and heightened vulnerability to shocks and crises in
such settings.
• The OECD defines FCAS as countries or regions facing serious long-term challenges in governance, institutional
capacity, development policies or violent conflict. This definition is based on the States of Fragility 2022 report
(OECD, 2022), which employs a multidimensional fragility framework assessing six dimensions: political, security,
societal, economic, environmental and human.
While the wording of these definitions varies, they converge on critical elements: institutional weakness,
vulnerability to shocks and an inability to address social, economic and political risks.

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

Annex 2. Indicators for the internal conflict and

governance instability index for Mali
To better understand and quantify these overlapping risks, we constructed the internal conflict and governance
instability index using data from five key indicators sourced from the Fragile States Index4. These indicators include:
• Conflict: the security apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks
and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups or terrorism.
• Social: the group grievance indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society —
particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics — and their role in hindering access to services
or resources and inclusion in the political process.
• Institutional: the human rights and rule of law indicator considers the relationship between the state and its
population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected.
• Political: the state legitimacy indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its
relationship with its citizenry.
• The refugees and internally displaced persons indicator measures the pressure upon states caused by the
forced displacement of large communities because of social, political, environmental or other causes.
The individual trends of these indicators are provided in Figure 67.

Figure 67. Indicators for the internal conflict and governance instability index for Mali

12

10

0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Security apparatus Human rights State legitimacy

Group grievance Refugees and IDPs Internal conflict and instability index

4 See: https://fragilestatesindex.org/

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Annex 3. Sample profile of the study area

The study was conducted in five communes — Sio, Konna, Fatoma, Socoura and Mopti — located within the Mopti
circle, an administrative division in the Mopti region of central Mali, situated within the Inner Niger Delta.

Figure 68. Location of the study area

Mali

Mopti
region

These communes, while geographically distinct, are home to diverse communities whose economies are primarily
driven by three interconnected production systems: pastoralism, agriculture and fishing. These systems frequently
overlap, highlighting the interdependence of resource use and the integrated nature of local economies.
The selection of the Mopti region for this study was informed by its acute vulnerability to recurrent droughts
and flooding, which accelerate environmental degradation and pose significant threats to local livelihoods. In
addition to climate-induced hazards, the region is marked by persistent insecurity and conflict. This intersection of
environmental stress and sociopolitical instability generates a reinforcing cycle, compounding the vulnerabilities
faced by local communities. Although traditional
Figure 69. Geographic distribution of the study area
governance structures and local leadership have
historically helped to manage resource-based disputes,
intensifying competition over resources driven by
environmental pressures has led to escalating conflicts,
further destabilising the region.
1 region
In Mopti, the convergence of climate change and
conflict places considerable strain on natural resource-
dependent livelihoods, eroding social cohesion and 1 circle
prompting the diversification of economic activities
(Cold-Ravnkilde and Ba, 2022). These overlapping
pressures exacerbate pre-existing inequalities 5 communes
(World Bank Group, 2020), constraining the adaptive
capacities of marginalised groups, particularly women
(UNDP, 2021b) and young people, while increasing 22 villages
vulnerability to gender-based violence and deepening
socioeconomic disparities.

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 ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

The sample profile for qualitative and quantitative data collection is detailed in Tables 18 and 19.
Table 19. Sample covered for quantitative data collection

PARTICULARS COMMUNE TOTAL % OF TOTAL

Sio Konna Fatoma Socoura Mopti
Non-migrants 34 15 26 36 42 153 38
Migrants 20 10 20 40 60 150 37
Displaced 21 6 18 28 32 105 26
Total 75 31 64 104 134 408
Table 20. Sample design for qualitative data collection

TOOL COMMUNE TOTAL

Sio Konna Fatoma Socoura Mopti
Focus group discussions
Mixed groups 5 2 4 5 6 22
Key informant interviews
Communication officers of local NGO 2
NGO representatives/Development organisations 2

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Annex 4. Regression analysis model for understanding

mobility-related decisions
To understand why some households in Mali choose migration or displacement as a coping strategy while others
remain in place, we used a logistic regression model. This model examines the relationship between household
decisions regarding mobility and key structural, environmental and social factors.
Model specification: the regression model is specified as:

ln
[ Px
1 – Px ] = β0+ β1X1i+β2X2i + .... + βk Xki

1: Non-migrant households (no members migrated)

2: Households with members who migrated internally
3: Households with members who were displaced
Independent variables: four key indices were used to capture the diverse factors influencing household mobility
decisions:
Inherent resilience index (IRI): this measures the structural and socioeconomic capacity of households to cope
with shocks (1 = low resilience; 2 = high resilience).
Climate risk index (CRI): this captures exposure to climate-related risks, including disasters and environmental
shocks (1 = low risk; 2 = high risk).
Internal conflict risk index (ICRI): this reflects exposure to conflict-related injuries, deaths and violence (1 =
low risk; 2 = high risk).
Social protection index (SPI): this assesses access to social protection services such as food aid, cash
transfers and education support (1 = low access; 2 = high access).
Purpose of the model:
• To identify and quantify the significance of structural, environmental, conflict-related and social protection factors
in influencing household mobility decisions
• To determine whether migration is primarily driven by climate vulnerability, conflict exposure or resilience deficits,
and to understand the role of social protection mechanisms in mitigating these risks, and
• To distinguish between households undertaking distress migration or forced displacement in response to
stressors.
By isolating the effects of these indices, the regression model provides evidence-based insights into the drivers of
migration and displacement in FCAS settings such as Mali. This allows policymakers and humanitarian actors to
design more targeted interventions that address the specific vulnerabilities and needs of each household category.
This model can serve as an analytical tool for bridging the gap between empirical data and actionable strategies for
resilience building, conflict mitigation and social protection.

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ADDRESSING CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-RELATED LOSS AND DAMAGE IN FRAGILE STATES: A FOCUS ON MALI

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www.iied.org 83
This paper examines the compounding impacts of climate
change, conflict and socioeconomic vulnerabilities on
households in Mopti, Mali. It analyses both economic and
non-economic loss and damage using the Comprehensive
Climate Impact Quantification toolkit and offers evidence-
based recommendations for building resilience in fragile
and conflict-affected settings.

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