239 Phil.

403

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 72492. November 05, 1987 ]
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO
TORRES AND ARTURO UMBAC, PETITIONERS, VS. SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITEE OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE AND ANTONIO S.
RAMAS UYPITCHING, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

CORTES, J.:

An attempt by the respondent Ad Hoc Committee of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod

of Dumaguete to punish non-members for legislative contempt was halted by this special civil
action of Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order
questioning the very existence of the power in that local legislative body or in any of its
committees. On November 7, 1985, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order:

. . . enjoining respondents, their agents, representatives, and police and other peace
officers acting in their behalf, to refrain from compelling the attendance and
testimony of Petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac at any and all future
investigations to be conducted by aforesaid respondents, and from issuing any
contempt order if one has not been issued yet or from executing any such contempt
order if one has already been issued.

Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated October 25, 1985 (Annex "A", Petition) sent by the
respondent Committee to the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the
Board of Directors and the General Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros Oriental II
Electric Cooperative (NORECO II), requiring their attendance and testimony at the Committee's
investigation on October 29, 1985. Similarly under fire is the Order issued by the same
Committee on the latter date, (Annex "D", Petition) directing said petitioners to show cause why
they should not be punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear at said
investigation.

The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with pending
legislation related to the operations of public utilities" (Id.) in the City of Dumaguete where
petitioner NORECO II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of business. Specifically,
the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II of
inefficient power lines in that city (Comment, Rollo, p. 50). Respondent Antonio S. Ramas
Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on Public Utilities and Franchises and Co-Chairman
of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee, signed both the subpoena and the Order complained of.
Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on the following grounds:

a. The power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient
power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National
Electrification Administration; and

b. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code
grants (the Sangguniang Panlungsod) any specific power to investigate alleged
inefficient power lines of NORECO II.

(Annex "C", Petition)

The motion to quash was denied in the assailed Order of October 29, 1985 directing the
petitioners Torres and Umbac to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt.
Hence this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order.

Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the
power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of
witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel
the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in
the investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to
NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 7-8).

Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its
jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It is also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if
not expressly granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49). Furthermore, the respondents assert that an inquiry into the
installation or use of inefficient power lines and its effect on the power consumption cost on the
part of Dumaguete residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
its committees.

1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative
power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local
government units, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of
law, possess delegated legislative power. While the Constitution does not expressly vest
Congress with the power to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has
nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and
dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]); Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in
the same way that courts wield an inherent power to "enforce their authority, preserve their
integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice. "
(Commissioner v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944, 950 [1916], and
other cases). The exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned for the first time
in the leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950]) where this Court held that the
legislative body indeed possessed the contempt power.
That case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called and
examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer
who delivered a portion of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the
Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same
time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned "until he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith."
(Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29,43 [1950]). Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

In upholding the power of Congress to punish Arnault for contumacy, the Court began with a
discussion of the distribution of the three powers of government under the 1935 Constitution.
Cognizant of the fact that the Philippines system of government under the 1935 Constitution
was patterned after the American system, the Court proceeded to resolve the issue presented,
partly by drawing from American precedents, and partly by acknowledging the broader
legislative power of the Philippine Congress as compared to the U.S. Federal Congress which
shares legislative power with the legislatures of the different states of the American union
(Id.pp.44-45). The Court held:

* * *

. . . (T)he power of inquiry - with process to enforce it - is an essential and

appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information - which is not infrequently true - recourse
must be had to others who possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered
is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to
obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50
A.L.R.,1) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to
punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication
exclude the power to punish for contempt by any person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6
Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242)

But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House,
unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to
inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)

* * *

The Court proceeded to delve deeper into the essence of the contempt power of the Philippine
Congress in a subsequent decision (Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]) arising from the
same factual antecedents:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered
implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative
 body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if
it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it
is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the
Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch
supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each
department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority
or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act
of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative
body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is
impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its
authority or dignity. . . (Arnault. v. Balagtas, L­-6749, July 30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358,
370 [1955]).

The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra, broke ground in what was
then an unexplored area of jurisprudence, and succeeded in supplying the raison d'etre of this
power of Congress even in the absence of express constitutional grant. Whether or not the
reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied mutatis
mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the respondent committee of a
city council is the threshold issue in the present controversy.

3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that
branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial
branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the
legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to
possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the
discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three
independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local
legislative bodies which are creations of law.

4. To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to
subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification
for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious
behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated
legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial
nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere
incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the
fundamental law did not expressly provide for but which the then Congress has asserted
essentially for self-preservation as one of three co-equal branches of the government cannot be
deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative functions to local legislative bodies.
These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an exception
to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor of local
autonomy. Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power
in any government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e.
compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally
construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly
presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed
these powers in all government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through their
representatives in the legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the local
legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation.

There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative
bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the
Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres
and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis
to claim that it can exercise these powers.

5. Even assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc
Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances
would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if
actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within
the jurisdiction of the legislative body (Arnault v. Nazareno, supra., citing Kilbourn v.
Thompson). As admitted by the respondents in their Comment, the investigation to be
conducted by the Ad-Hoc Committee was to look into the use by NORECO II of inefficient
power lines "of pre-war vintage" which the latter had acquired from the Visayan Electric
Company, and "to hear the side of the petitioners" (Comment, Rollo, p. 50). It becomes evident
that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of the electric service of NORECO II and,
necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such inquiry is beyond the jurisdiction of the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent committee.

There is no doubt that a city government has the power to enact ordinances regulating the
installation and maintenance of electric power lines or wires within its territorial jurisdiction.
The power subsists notwithstanding the creation of the National Electrification Administration
(NEA), to which body the franchise powers of local government units were transferred by
Presidential Decree No. 269. Section 42 of the Decree states:

SEC. 42. Repeal of Franchise Powers of Municipal, City and Provincial

Governments.-- The powers of municipal, city and provincial governments to grant
franchises, as provided for in Title 34 of the Philippines Statutes or in any special
law, are hereby repealed; Provided, That this section shall not impair or invalidate
any franchise heretofore lawfully granted by such a government or repeal any other
subsisting power of such governments to require that electric facilities and related
properties be so located, constructed and operated and maintained as to be safe to the
public and not to unduly interfere with the primary use of streets, roads, alleys and
other public ways, buildings and grounds over, upon or under which they may be
built. (This Section was not among those amended by Pres. Dec. Nos. 1370 [May 2,
1978] and 1645 [October 8, 1979]).

This particular power of the city government is included in the enumeration of powers and
duties of a Sangguniang Panlungsod in Section 177 of the Local Government Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, February 10, 1983), to wit:

SEC. 177. Powers and Duties. - - The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:

 * * *

(j) . . . regulate the digging and excavation for the laying of gas, water, power, and
other pipelines, the building and repair of tunnels, sewers and drains, and all
structures thereunder; the placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and
construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits,
meters and other apparatus, and the correction, condemnation of the same when
dangerous or defective;

* * *

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate the
installation and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient power
lines, in order to protect the city residents from the hazards these may pose. In aid of this
ordinance-making power, said body or any of its committees may conduct investigations similar
to, but not the same as, the legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature. As
already discussed, the difference lies in the lack of subpoena power and of the power to punish
for contempt on the part of the local legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons
who are willing to supply information which may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. The
type of investigation which may be conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include
within its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the
conditions of its electric franchise.

The power to inquire into the efficiency of the service supplied by electric cooperatives is within
the franchising powers of the NEA under Sec. 43 of Pres. Dec. No. 269, i.e.:

* * *

(2) to repeal and cancel any franchise if the NEA finds that the holder thereof is not
then furnishing, and is unable to or unwilling within reasonable time to furnish
adequate and dependable service on an area coverage within such area;

* * *

In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct hearings and investigations, issue subpoenas
and invoke the aid of the courts in case of disobedience to its subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54, P.D.
269). Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot look into any suspected
failure of NORECO II to comply with the standards of electric service prescribed by law and in
its franchise. The proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II if
there be sufficient basis therefor.

WHEREFORE, the subpoena dated October 25, 1985 requiring the attendance and testimony
of the petitioners at an investigation by the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee, and the Order issued
by the latter on October 29, 1985 directing herein petitioners to show cause why they should not
be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null
and void for being ultra vires. The respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent
Ad-Hoc Committee are without power to punish non-­members for contempt. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on November 7, 1985 enjoining said respondents, their
agents and representatives, and the police and other peace officers from enforcing the aforesaid
Order of the respondent committee is made permanent. Petition is GRANTED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on leave.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: November 13, 2014

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