DIVINE PREDESTINATION

TRACTATUS DE DIVINA PRAEDESTINATIONE ET

REPROBATIONE

BY THE
REV. FR. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

A.I. TRANSLATION
SONNET 3.7

COLLECTED FROM THE OPERA

OMNIA OF FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, VOLUME ONE,
THE EDITION BY D.M. ANDRÉ, CANONICO RUPELLENSI,
WHICH WAS A REVISION OF THE VENETIAN EDITION

LATIN ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN PARIS,

BY LOUIS VIVÈS, BOOKSELLER AND EDITOR,
AT 23 CASSETTE STREET.
1855.
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i PREFACE

PREFACE

This translation of Francisco Suárez’s On Predestination provides a rigorous

scholastic examination of the doctrine of predestination, one of the central and most
debated topics in Christian theology. Suárez, a prominent 16th-century Jesuit
philosopher and theologian, offers a comprehensive analysis of the necessity, causes,
and effects of predestination, as well as its relation to divine providence and the
doctrine of reprobation. The work is organized into six books, each dealing with a
different aspect of predestination, from the nature of divine foreknowledge to the
comparison between the predestined and the reprobate. Suárez carefully examines the
theological principles and philosophical foundations of predestination, drawing from
Scripture, Church tradition, and reason to defend the Catholic understanding of this
profound mystery. This translation seeks to present Suárez’s deep insights in a way that
is accessible to modern readers, preserving the precision of his scholastic method while
offering a clear presentation of his arguments. On Predestination remains an essential
resource for scholars of theology and philosophy, providing a thorough exploration of
God's providence and human freedom within the framework of Christian salvation.
ii PREFACE
iii CONTENTS

CONTENTS

Book One: On the Necessity and Nature of Predestination

I. On the necessity of predestination 1

II. That predestination is an immanent and eternal act 3

III. That predestination is a free act 6

IV. On the matter and object of predestination 10

V. On the term of predestination 15

VI. On absolute knowledge, which necessarily precedes predestination 22

VII. On the necessity of conditional foreknowledge before predestination 30

VIII. That the decree of glory is the first act in the predestination of humans 40

IX. That the same decree was first in the predestination of angels 65

X. That this decree is definite both as to the persons and as to the degrees of 72
glory

XI. That this decree is the love and election of predestination 75

XII. That all the predestined were elected at the same moment 79

XIII. On the will by which God prepares the means for the predestined 87

XIV. On the will by which God executes the effects of predestination 92

XV. Whether the will by which God intends and confers glory effects various 96
changes in the predestined

XVI. Whether in predestination there is a necessary act of command distinct 103

from the others

XVII. Whether predestination is an act of the intellect or of the will 112

XVIII. On the comparison of predestination with providence 117

XIX. On the comparison of predestination with grace and supernatural 123

governance
iv CONTENTS

XX. On the comparison of predestination with the book of life 129

Book Two: On the Causes of Predestination

I. On the state of the controversy and the multiple senses of the dispute. 139

II. On the physical causes of predestination regarding its effects. 141

III. Whether there is a moral cause regarding the effects on the part of the 145
predestined.

IV. Whether any action of the predestined precedes this life that might be the 147
cause of their predestination.

V. Whether the ground of predestination can be taken from conditional 151

merits. (Here infants are discussed.)

VI. On the meritorious cause arising from the good use of free will. 158

VII. On the dispositive cause arising from the moral use of free will. 185

VIII. The opinion of the Fathers, especially the Greeks, on the cause of 201
predestination based on the works of nature.

IX. An objection against the preceding resolution. 208

X. That a morally good work cannot exist except from predestination and 210
grace is presented in three ways and refuted.

XI. The same assertion is presented in a fourth way. 216

XII. The true contrary opinion is proved from Scripture. 222

XIII. The same opinion is supported by the authority of the Councils. 229

XIV. The same opinion is confirmed by the authority of the Fathers. 232

XV. The same opinion is demonstrated by reason. 239

XVI. The same opinion is proved from the inconveniences [of the opposing 246
view].

XVII. A response to the foundations of the contrary opinion laid down in 265
Chapter X.

XVIII. A response to the objection proposed in Chapter IX. 270

XIX. A morally good work of acquired virtue, even if effected by extrinsic 273
grace, is not the proper cause of predestination.
v CONTENTS

XX. A supernatural work proceeding from grace is not the cause of 278
predestination regarding all its effects.

XXI. Whether Christ, or even one pure man, could be the cause of another’s 294
predestination regarding all effects.

XXII. Whether a cause of predestination can be given on the part of the act of 297
the divine will.

XXIII. Whether, on the part of the predestined, there is any cause of 300
predestination considered in itself.

XXIV. Whether a pure man, or Christ, could merit predestination for others 316
regarding the free determination of divine election.

XXV. Whether there is any cause or ground for the election of the predestined 338
on the part of God.

Book Three: On the Effects of Predestination, and Their Harmony with

the Freedom of the Will

I. Whether predestination has any effects. 341

II. What conditions are required for a benefit to be an effect of 343

predestination.

III. Whether glory and perseverance are effects of predestination. 348

IV. Whether sanctifying grace is an effect of predestination. 351

V. Whether the merits of the predestined are effects of predestination. 355

VI. Which prevenient aids are effects of predestination. 361

VII. How natural goods exist as effects of predestination. 365

VIII. In what way evil and its permission are effects of predestination. 372

IX. That predestination does not impose necessity on justification. 380

X. That predestination does not impose necessity on good works. 384

Book Four: On God's Supernatural Providence Concerning the Eternal

Salvation of the Reprobate or Non-Elect

I. Whether God wills all to be saved. 390

II. What kind of will is the will to save all. 394

vi CONTENTS

III. Whether sufficient means are given to all adults. 400

IV. Whether provision is made for all infants. 407

Book Five: On Reprobation

I. Whether reprobation exists, and what it is. 414

II. Whether it resides in the intellect or in the will. 416

III. Whether God of Himself wills that some not be blessed. 418

IV. Concerning the acts of God's intellect and will regarding the reprobate. 425

V. That there is no cause given for negative reprobation. 431

VI. On the cause of positive reprobation. 435

VII. On the effects of reprobation. 439

VIII. On the concordance of reprobation with free will. 445

Book Six: On Certain Comparisons Between the Predestined and the

Reprobate, or Between Predestination and Reprobation

I. Whether the predestined in this life receive greater gifts of grace than the 449
reprobate.

II. Predestination and reprobation are compared in terms of certainty. 452

III. Whether the number of the predestined is greater than that of the 455
reprobate.

IV. They are compared to the whole providence of God. 458

vii PREFACE

PROLOUGE

Although predestination and reprobation are so closely connected and, in a certain

way, subordinate to one another that one can scarcely be perfectly understood or
explained without the other—and for this reason, they are usually treated together by
theologians—nevertheless, for the sake of greater clarity, we will discuss each separately
and then compare them with one another. Accordingly, we will divide this work into
three principal parts. The first will concern Predestination, since it is nobler than
reprobation and arises from the primary will of God, being intended for its own sake.
In this way, it is related to reprobation as an end is related to the means (for all things
exist for the sake of the elect, even the promise and creation of the reprobate) and as a
positive state is related to a privation. For this reason, it is necessary that this first part
be more extensive than the others. Therefore, we will divide it into three books: in the
first, we will discuss the essence of predestination; in the second, its causes; and in the
third, its effects. Then, so that the justice of divine reprobation may be better
understood, we will insert a fourth book, in which we will discuss the supernatural
providence of God concerning those whom He does not predestine. The fifth book,
therefore, will explain reprobation. The sixth book will compare predestination with
reprobation, so that in the one, divine mercy may shine forth more clearly, and in the
other, divine justice. In this way, with God’s help and according to our ability, we will
encompass the entire doctrine of this mystery in these six books. In presenting this
doctrine, we will strive to maintain the manner of speaking and disputing that the
rigorous knowledge of a science typically demands. For although this matter of
predestination is profoundly hidden, held by faith alone, and transcends human
understanding, nevertheless, presupposing the principles of faith, we must endeavor to
observe the method of science in explaining it, so that we may more effectively
investigate something of so great a mystery. This is not to scrutinize the divine counsels
as if they could be comprehended by human intellect, but rather to venerate the depth
of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, to receive His inscrutable
judgments with admiration, and, presupposing this faith, to seek with divine grace some
rational understanding and insight into this mystery.
viii PREFACE
1 BOOK ONE

BOOK ONE: ON THE

NECESSITY AND NATURE OF PREDESTINATION

In this first book, after first explaining the meaning of the term and addressing the
question of whether predestination exists, we will inquire into what it is and what
essence or formal rationale it possesses. Since, as we shall see, predestination consists in
an act or acts of the divine mind (understanding "mind" to encompass both intellect
and will), and since every act of the mind has an object or matter about which it is
concerned, we will consequently examine what kind of act predestination is, in what
matter it is concerned, whether it encompasses acts of the intellect and will, and which
acts these are, as well as in which of them the formal rationale of predestination is
principally situated. All of this will be covered in this first book.

CHAPTER I. THAT IT IS
NECESSARY TO AFFIRM PREDESTINATION IN GOD.

1. There have been those who denied that predestination exists in God, as can be
gathered from Prosper in his response to the objections of the Gallic monks (Chapter
1) and from Augustine in his second book On the Gift of Perseverance (Chapter 14).
For they thought that predestination was nothing other than fate, and that by affirming
it, the freedom of the will would be destroyed.
2. Nevertheless, it is certain as a matter of faith that predestination pertains to God.
This is taught by the aforementioned Fathers and is presupposed by the Council of
Trent in Session 6, Chapter 12, and Canon 16, insofar as it defines that no one can be
certain of their predestination unless it is specially revealed to them. This is also proven
from Paul in Romans 1 and 8, 1 Corinthians 2, and Ephesians 1, where predestination is
attributed to God under this very term, as well as under other names such as election,
purpose, and foreknowledge. The same is found in many other passages, which I will
cite later.
3. The term predestination is explained. The rationale, drawn from the matter itself,
will become clear from what is to be said. For now, it is only declared from the meaning
of the term. The word predestination is composed from the verb destino, which among
the Latins has various meanings. However, two or three are particularly relevant to the
present matter. Sometimes it means "to send," sometimes "to designate for some
office," and sometimes "to propose and establish in one’s mind." Indeed, St. Thomas (I,
q. 23, art. 1), followed by Durandus (I, d. 41, q. 1), derives the name of predestination
2 BOOK ONE
from the first meaning. However, Alexander of Hales (I, q. 28, Memb. 1) and others
think it should rather be taken from the last meaning. Yet in reality, there can be no
disagreement, because predestination does not signify an external sending or
transmission into eternal life, as all admit, and it is taken from Paul in Romans 8, where
predestination is distinguished from glorification and from those actions by which a
person is actually and externally (so to speak) transmitted into eternal life, such as
calling and sanctification. Therefore, even if predestination signifies transmission, it is
not transmission as exercised externally but as conceived in the mind, as St. Thomas
also noted in the second article, reply to objection 9.
4. Whether predestination exists.—From this, it is therefore evident that
predestination exists in God, for there are many who are transferred into eternal life by
divine power and assistance. It is necessary, however, that this occur by the will,
foreknowledge, and providence of God. Therefore, there precedes in God the rationale
or conception and will of that transmission which occurs in time. This is signified by
the term predestination. For to signify this, the particle pre- is added to the
verb destino. Concerning this, it must briefly be noted that it can signify either merely
the precedence of eternity to time or also some order or priority of reason among the
acts of divine knowledge and will. In this latter sense, it is taken by many theologians
when they treat of predestination, and rightly so, in my opinion. However, in this sense,
it is not a matter pertaining to faith, at least not explicitly defined as such, because this
division of signs in the divine mind and the priority or order of reason among the acts
of the will and intellect does not belong to the dogmas of faith but to purely
theological disputation. Moreover, in this sense, some Catholics have understood that
there is no absolute predestination or preparation of grace or glory with respect to any
human being before the absolute foreknowledge of future acts or future cooperation
of free will. Or at least, they have held that God does not have such a mode of purpose
or predestination concerning all who are saved in time. These opinions have not been
condemned by the Church thus far, nor do they merit any censure or note of error,
although they are false, as we shall see later.
5. Therefore, to ensure that the assertion posited has the certainty of faith, the
particle pre- must be taken to signify only the precedence of eternity to time. In this
sense, the reasoning given proceeds excellently, and it is not only certain but also
evident, presupposing the dogmas concerning the glorification of the just. And thus,
Alexander of Hales explicitly explained this particle in the cited passage (Article 1), and
Durandus (I, d. 40, q. 1) signified the same, saying that the rationale of destination to a
supernatural end preexists in God before things come to be, and because of this
precedence to the thing itself, it is called predestination. This he took from St. Thomas
3 BOOK ONE
(Article 1). Therefore, only under this signification and general rationale is it now
certain that predestination exists in God.
6. God alone can predestine. Indeed, as Durandus rightly noted, it is also concluded
from this that predestination, as we now speak of it, can pertain to God alone. For
predestination signifies the rationale of the order or infallible transmission of a rational
creature into eternal life. But God alone can order a created thing in this way to an end,
both because of the excellence of that end and because of the infallible and efficacious
preordination, which demands the infinite wisdom and omnipotence of God.
Therefore, predestination both exists in God and can pertain to Him alone.

CHAPTER II. WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS AN

IMMANENT ACT IN GOD, SUITABLE TO HIM FROM ETERNITY.

1. A reason for doubt may arise because predestination is defined by Augustine as the
"foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God," etc., in De Bono
Perseverantiæ, Chapter 14. Although foreknowledge is eternal, the preparation by which
the notion of predestination is completed seems to be temporal. The latter part of this
claim is proven by analogy: an architect who deliberates about constructing a building is
not said to prepare for the construction until he begins to gather the materials from
which it is to be made. Similarly, a king is not said to prepare for war until he gathers
money, purchases arms, and summons soldiers. Therefore, in the same way, God is not
said to prepare benefits for men until He begins to confer them. Thus, preparation, and
consequently predestination, is not said to be merely immanent and eternal but also
involves something temporal.
2. First Assertion. It must first be affirmed that predestination is an immanent act in
God, which intrinsically denominates God as the one who predestines and extrinsically
denominates the thing predestined. This assertion is found in St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, I, q. 23, a. 2, where he defends the idea that predestination
places nothing in the predestined but rather in the one who predestines. With respect to
the former part, it means that predestination places nothing formally in the predestined,
for it is not a form inhering in them. However, it does place something in them
effectively, as will be shown below when discussing the effects of predestination.
Therefore, predestination must intrinsically reside in God Himself as the one who
predestines. For it must intrinsically reside in something, and since it does not reside in
the thing predestined, it must necessarily reside in God. One might object that
predestination formally implies a relation of reason, since it does not intrinsically reside
in God or in anything else. I respond that predestination is something real in itself, even
though we cannot conceive or explain it except through the mode of a relation of
4 BOOK ONE
reason. For truly and in reality, God predestines, and predestination itself is a true real
cause of many effects. Finally, in this respect, the reasoning about predestination is the
same as that about the will and foreknowledge of God as they pertain to creatures.
Hence, it is also clear that predestination cannot exist in God except as an immanent
act, as St. Thomas noted in the aforementioned article, reply to the first objection. This
is both because predestination does not signify something in the mode of a first act but
in the mode of a final and vital act, like foreknowledge, election, and similar things, as is
evident from the very meaning of the term and the common understanding, and also
because (as I will soon explain) predestination implies something free. But nothing is
denominated as free in God except what pertains to Him in the mode of an immanent
act, for all other attributes pertain to Him by necessity.
3. Second Assertion. Secondly, it must be affirmed that predestination is an eternal
act and, according to its entire nature, is suitable to God from eternity. This is a certain
truth, gathered from Ephesians 1:4: "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the
world," and further below: "Who predestined us," certainly at the time when He chose
us. Hence, it is added below: "Predestined according to the purpose of Him who works
all things according to the counsel of His will." Paul also alludes to this in Romans 8:29:
"For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined," etc., and immediately calls these
predestined ones "the elect," saying, "Who shall bring a charge against God’s elect?"
Therefore, predestination is equally eternal as foreknowledge or election. Thus, also in 1
Corinthians 2:7, the incarnate Wisdom is said to have been "predestined before the ages
for our glory." In these passages, all the Fathers acknowledge that predestination is
eternal, as does Augustine in De Predestinatione Sanctorum, Chapter 10, and De Bono
Perseverantiæ, Chapter 14, as well as Fulgentius in Ad Monimum, Book I, Chapters 12
and 13.
4. The Reason for the Assertion. The reason for this assertion is clarified from what
was said in Chapter 1. The particle "pre-" signifies the precedence of divine
predestination to its effect, which is the transmission into glory, occurring in time
through grace. This precedence cannot be through finite duration but through eternity,
for nothing can pertain to God in time except extrinsic denominations or relations of
reason arising from the actual effect or existence of creatures. Predestination, however,
does not imply such a denomination, since it precedes the existence of the created
effect to which it has a relation. Therefore, it must necessarily pertain to God before
the beginning of time. Otherwise, God would change if He now predestined and had
not done so before, since predestining does not pertain to Him through the change of
a creature.
5. Objection. A twofold objection arises. One might say that predestination is part of
providence, but providence is not eternal but temporal, as is evident because
5 BOOK ONE
providence is subsequent to creation, for it provides for things already created, as
Nemesius said in De Natura Hominis, Chapter 42. But creation is temporal; therefore,
providence is temporal. I respond first that, whatever may be said about providence
insofar as it procures good for things already existing, predestination, by reason of the
precedence indicated by the particle "pre-," abstracts from the existence of the things
predestined, as St. Thomas rightly said, Summa Theologiæ, I, q. 23, a. 2, reply to 2, and
is therefore eternal. Secondly, it is said that providence, formally understood, is eternal,
as the same St. Thomas taught, Summa Theologiæ, I, q. 22, a. 1, reply to 2. For
although the execution of providence is temporal, to which Nemesius seems to have
referred, the will and reason existing in the mind of God, by which He governs all
things in time, is eternal, and this is called providence.
6. What Kind of Preparation Predestination Is. To the reason for doubt posed at the
beginning, it is responded that there is an equivocation in the verb "to prepare." There
is an external preparation, such as the disposition of some material or at least the
remote gathering of the material itself, as is usual in human preparation for some
building. Such preparation, insofar as it can be understood in some work of God, is
temporal, as the aforementioned reasoning proves. An example can be given in the
creation of man, for before it, God in some way prepared the material by forming the
body from the dust of the earth, which preparation was no less temporal than the
creation itself. There is another kind of preparation, purely internal, in the mind of the
governor or provider, as a man is said to be prepared to respond when he has foreseen
difficulties in his mind and prepared answers to them. Similarly, someone is said to be
prepared to give when he has the intention of the will to give at such a time.
Predestination is said to be a preparation in this latter sense, in the mind and will of
God, for He has foreknown all the means through which He can save His elect and has
prepared these means for them by the intention of His will. Such preparation is eternal.
This amounts to what St. Thomas said, Summa Theologiæ, I, q. 23, a. 2, reply to 3, that
there is a twofold preparation: one of the patient, the other of the agent. The former is
something in the material being prepared and is therefore temporal, while the latter is
only in the agent and consists in the preconceived reason of things to be done or the
intention of the will to act. Therefore, such preparation in God is eternal, and
predestination is of this kind.
7. Alexander of Hales adds, in Summa Theologiæ, q. 281, mem. 1, a. 3, a difference
between God and created agents: created agents need some external matter to act, and
therefore they are said to be prepared for work when they prepare or at least remotely
gather the material. But God does not need external matter to act; His power alone
suffices, for He is in sufficient first act and has from Himself all that is required to act
6 BOOK ONE
if He wills. Therefore, He needs no other preparation except the intention and
deliberation of His will, which is eternal.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER PREDESTINATION

PERTAINS TO GOD FREELY OR NECESSARILY.

1. Reasons for Doubt. A reason for doubt may arise because, in Chapter 1, we said
that predestination pertains to God by necessity. But what pertains to someone by
necessity is not free for them. We also said that predestination is eternal, but what is
eternal is immutable and necessary, and therefore not free. Furthermore, predestination,
as related to the intellect, pertains to the reasons for things to be done, which are in the
mind of God by necessity. As related to the will, it is a kind of love or the will to save
some men, which necessarily pertains to God, at least under the supposition that God
willed to create men. For how could His goodness not predestine some?
2. A twofold necessity can be understood in the act of predestination: one simply,
that is, without any supposition; the other hypothetically, under some supposition. The
former can be understood either as absolute necessity, as it pertains to God to be wise,
just, etc., or merely as a necessity of congruity or suitability, as we say the Incarnation
was necessary for the redemption of the human race.
3. First Assertion. First, therefore, it must be affirmed absolutely and simply that
predestination does not pertain to God by necessity but is a free act of God. This is a
matter of certain faith. It is taken from Romans 8:28: "We know that all things work
together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His
purpose," certainly according to the free purpose of God’s will, not from any necessity.
Hence, it is added: "For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to
the image of His Son," etc., indicating the difference between the true Son and His
brothers, for He alone is such by nature and by necessity, while they are predestined and
therefore by the free will of God. Hence, a little later, he calls the predestined "the elect
of God," saying, "Who shall bring a charge against God’s elect?" But election is a free
act; therefore, predestination is also free. This is most clearly confirmed by Paul in
Ephesians 1:11: "Predestined according to the purpose of Him who works all things
according to the counsel of His will," by which words he signified the free will of God,
as I have discussed in my commentary on that passage.
4. Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and others teach the same, saying: "God
predestined what He Himself was going to do." Damascene also speaks in this way
in De Fide Orthodoxa, Book II, Chapter 30. It is a matter of certain faith that what
God does, He does freely; therefore, what He predestines, He predestines freely.
Likewise, God’s providence is free; therefore, much more is predestination. Finally,
7 BOOK ONE
although predestination is eternal, it nevertheless implies a relation to temporal things.
But this relation does not pertain to God by necessity, for its term could simply not
exist; therefore, predestination does not pertain to God by necessity; therefore, it
pertains to Him freely. Indeed, as Augustine often taught, in this act the freedom of the
divine will is most clearly seen, for it was not only free for Him to predestine or not to
predestine but also, by His free will, to predestine one rather than another. Hence, this
work is called by Augustine, in De Predestinatione Sanctorum, Chapter 15, and often
elsewhere, the greatest work of grace and liberality.
5. Predestination Is Unknown in This Life. Hence arises (as we note in passing) that
although it is most certain that predestination exists in God, it is entirely uncertain to us
whether predestination pertains to this or that man. In this sense, the Council of Trent
defined, in Session 6, Chapter 12, and Canons 15 and 16, that no one can be certain of
his predestination without a special revelation. The reason is that this depends on the
free will of God, the determination of which we cannot know until we either see its
completed effect or have a revelation of it. But the effect of predestination is not
completed until glory, and therefore in this life, without revelation, it cannot be known.
This revelation is not ordinarily given, lest the predestined become negligent or the
reprobate despair, as St. Thomas said, Summa Theologiæ, I, q. 23, a. 1, reply to 4. This
must be understood of certain knowledge; for probable and conjectural knowledge can
be had through various signs of predestination, which we will enumerate later when
discussing its effects.
6. Second Assertion. Secondly, it must be affirmed that if we once suppose that
some men will attain eternal life with effect, predestination must necessarily exist in
God, so that although it is not absolutely necessary, it is necessary for such effects. In
this sense, we spoke in Chapter 1, and St. Thomas speaks in the same way, Summa
Theologiæ, I, q. 23, a. 1, as do Alexander of Hales and other scholastics. To prove this
assertion by reason, it must be understood of predestination absolutely considered,
abstracting from its mode or particular questions, namely, whether it is in some way
from foreseen merits or not, and whether it supposes an efficacious intention of giving
glory, which precedes the whole predestination in the order of reason, or is without it.
For in these peculiar modes or properties of predestination, it is more difficult to find a
necessary connection between such or such a mode of predestining and the ultimate
effect of predestination, and this matter depends on various questions to be treated
below. The assertion, therefore, must be understood of predestination simply
considered, as defined by Augustine in De Bono Perseverantiæ, Chapter 14, as "the
foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which most certainly and
freely whoever is freed is freed." Hence, he concludes there: "Predestination is as
necessary as foreknowledge is necessary." Therefore, if in future time some men are to
8 BOOK ONE
attain beatitude, it is necessary that eternal foreknowledge of such an effect precede in
God; therefore, predestination must also precede. Likewise, such an effect cannot come
to pass unless God has prepared it from eternity by His will; therefore, if the effect is
to be, the preparation of it must necessarily precede in God; therefore, predestination.
Finally, no thing can attain its end except through divine providence; therefore, much
less can men attain beatitude without the providence of God, accommodated to such
an end. But predestination is nothing other than such providence; therefore, without
predestination, men cannot attain such an end; therefore, predestination is necessary for
such an effect.
7. Objection and Response. Thirdly, it must be affirmed that although, speaking
absolutely and without any supposition, predestination was not simply necessary, it was
nevertheless necessary in some way, by a necessity of congruity and suitability with
divine goodness and wisdom. This is proven because it was most fitting and suitable
that God both create the human race and ordain it to a supernatural end. But it was
also most suitable that the human species, at least in some individuals, attain the end for
which it was created by God, lest it seem to have been created in vain or predestined to
evil, or lest God seem impotent to save it. Finally, it was fitting that God be perfectly
glorified by this creature of His in the state of beatitude; therefore, it was fitting and
most becoming that divine goodness glorify some men in time and consequently
predestine them in eternity. One might object: Did not God ordain many species of
angels to that beatitude, in which species He predestined no individual? Why, then,
could He not do the same with the human species? I respond that He could have, but it
was not fitting for the reason given. Nor is the reasoning the same for the angelic
species (if it is true that in each of them there is only one individual), for it could be
fitting from another perspective not to predestine all angels, and from that hypothesis,
not predestining one angel is the same as not predestining the whole species. Hence,
according to that opinion, the species of angels are compared to each other in this
matter as the individuals of men are. But if in each angelic species there are many
individuals, it is probable that from all the species of angels, some were predestined.
Just as it is also more probable that from all the hierarchies and all the orders of angels,
some were predestined, for this more clearly declares the wisdom, goodness, and power
of God and pertains to the greater beauty of the beatific state.
8. Whether Predestination Was Necessary in the State of Innocence. Someone might
press further, saying that God predestined no man in the state of innocence but
permitted the whole human species to fall and, as far as it was in it, to lose beatitude.
Therefore, we cannot say that it was more fitting to predestine some in that state;
therefore, neither can we say this absolutely of the human species in relation to
beatitude. I respond that it can be understood in two ways that God did not predestine
9 BOOK ONE
some men in the state of innocence. First, that He did not predestine them to obtain
the state of innocence in this life stably, as if preserving them so that they would not
lose that state. Second, that He did not predestine men of that state to attain beatitude
with effect. In the first sense, what is assumed is true, for God did not efficaciously
ordain other men besides Adam and Eve to have that state, nor did He ordain Adam
and Eve themselves, as far as perseverance in that state is concerned, for if He had
predestined them, it would have infallibly happened. From this sense, however, no
argument can be taken for predestination simply considered, which is to glory, for that
state of innocence was not the ultimate end for which man was created but was a
certain way tending to eternal and supernatural happiness. It is not unfitting that the
whole human species, in one of its individuals, placed in a certain easier way of
attaining eternal life, lost it, for it was not therefore abandoned as despairing and
reprobate. For God could lead it to happiness by another, harsher but perhaps more
useful way. The reasoning given, however, well proves that, supposing the institution of
human nature for eternal happiness and the fall of the whole nature from that first state
of innocence, it was most fitting that God redeem it and provide another way of
attaining that happiness. Indeed, God judged it more fitting (as far as can be
understood from His works) to save it in this way than to preserve it in the state of
innocence without sin.
9. Hence, if it is said that God predestined no man in the state of innocence because
He willed to transmit no one from that state of innocence to glory, we respond that it is
sufficient that He transmit some men to eternal happiness through another state of life.
If, however, someone presses further, saying that God had also decreed nothing about
this in that sign of reason in which He decreed to create men in that state of
innocence, we respond first that this is uncertain, at least as regards the efficacious will
to save some men, and perhaps those in particular who are now predestined, about
which more will be said below. As for the means, it is no wonder that in that sign He
did not decree them, for the means of that state were not future efficacious means for
leading men to glory. Hence, although we admit that in that sign God did not
efficaciously choose any man for glory, this does not pertain to the present cause, for
this election (according to another opinion) does not precede but follows
predestination and the foreknowledge of the means. And therefore, since the
predestination of efficacious means could not be consummated in that sign, neither
could election take place in the same sign. Nor can it be inferred from this that the
predestination of some was not most fitting in itself, for its fittingness does not consist
in being done in such or such a sign of reason but in being done or had in eternity.
10. If someone wishes to infer from this that predestination of men would not have
been future if the state of innocence had endured, and therefore, considered simply
10 BOOK ONE
and absolutely, it was not so fitting as the sweet order of divine providence and wisdom
requires, we respond by denying the assumption. For if the state of innocence had
endured, without doubt some men would have attained eternal life in it. This is proven
by the reasoning given, for this is most fitting and pertains most to providence in every
state. For those who would then be saved, predestination would also be necessary, for
they could not be saved without the foreknowledge and eternal will of God, and in
these consists predestination. Therefore, if God, by conditional knowledge, had
foreknown that man, created in that state, would not have fallen but would have
preserved it for his posterity, He would consequently have foreseen many ways of
calling and aiding men in that state by which they would infallibly be saved if they were
given to them, and He would efficaciously choose some multitude of men for glory and
ordain to give them those efficacious means. Now, however, because He did not have
such knowledge of the duration of that state, He completed or ordained His
predestination after the foreseen original sin. And thus the reasoning given also proves
that, supposing the foreknowledge of the fall of human nature, the predestination of
some, who would with effect attain the ultimate fruit of that reparation, was most
fitting in itself. It is therefore clear that the predestination of men or angels, considered
simply and absolutely, is most fitting and in some way necessary, according to the
congruent reasoning of divine providence, and can be called so.
11. The Arguments Are Resolved. The solution to the reasons for doubt is clear
from what has been said. For we do not say that predestination is necessary with a
necessity opposed to liberty but either under a supposition that does not remove liberty
but rather supposes its use or only according to congruity. Nor does being eternal
conflict with a free act, for the relation of reason by which a free act is completed (in
our way of understanding) can be eternal, for it is immutable once it exists, which
suffices for eternal duration. The final argument proves no more than a necessity of
congruity, for the reasons of things, as they are in the knowledge of God, before the
decree of the will, do not have the nature of predestination, as we will see later. The
will or efficacious decree to save some is not necessarily connected with the will to
create some by simple necessity but only by a necessity of congruity.

CHAPTER IV. WHAT THINGS

ARE PROPERLY SAID TO BE PREDESTINED.

1. Since in God there is no immanent act except that of the intellect or the will, it is
clear from what has been said in the second chapter that predestination is one of these
acts, or perhaps both together, as will soon be examined. Because it is common to the
acts of both faculties to have an object or matter about which they are concerned, and
11 BOOK ONE
from which they typically receive their specific character and determination, it seemed
more appropriate first to explain the matter about which predestination is concerned.
Then, we will examine what acts the intellect and will of the predestining God have
concerning that matter. From this, it will be easier to define in which act predestination
consists and what its specific character is. For immanent acts, at least according to our
way of understanding, usually derive their specific character from the matter about
which they are concerned and from the reason under which they tend toward that
matter.
2. Divine persons are not predestined—The matter of predestination is created.
Furthermore, since it has been said that to predestine is a free act of God, it plainly
follows that the matter of predestination is not the divinity itself, nor the divine persons
as such, or in relation to the properties or notions intimately connected with them. The
reason is that these pertain to God not freely but entirely necessarily. Hence, they do
not pertain to God through His free will but through His nature. However, what is
predestined depends on the free will of God, for this reason predestination is said to be
a free act. Therefore, the nature of a person or the divine properties are not
predestined. Hence, Augustine, in Tractate 105 on John, toward the end, discussing the
predestination of Christ, says: “Rightly is it said that He was not predestined according
to what He is, the Word of God, God with God. For why should He be predestined,
since He already was what He was, without beginning, without end, eternal? But what
was predestined was what was not yet, so that in its own time it might come to be, just
as it was predestined before all time to come to be.” And so I said that the divine
persons are not predestined as such, because they can be predestined according to the
assumed nature. Hence, Augustine adds in the same place: “Whoever denies that the
Son of God was predestined denies that He is the Son of Man.” And for the same
reason, I said that a divine person is not predestined in relation to the properties or
notions intimately connected with it, because in relation to an external nature, it can in
some way be said to be predestined; for example, that the Word was predestined to
become flesh. Although this designation more directly applies to the humanity, which
was predestined to be united to the Word, than to the Word itself. Therefore, the
proper matter of predestination is something created and future in time, as Augustine
says in the cited passage and in his book On the Predestination of the Saints, Chapter
10, where he states: “By predestination, God knew what He Himself would do.”
3. A thing is said to be predestined in two ways. Again, it must be understood that a
thing can be called predestined in two ways: first, only in relation to its being or coming
to be, as glory or faith can be said to be predestined. In this way, that passage in Acts 4
can be understood: “Herod and Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel,
gathered together to do what Your hand and Your plan had predestined to take place.”
12 BOOK ONE
Second, a thing is said to be predestined to something else beyond its own being, as a
man is said to be predestined to grace or glory. In this way, that which is said about the
wisdom of evangelical predestination in 1 Corinthians 2 can be understood: “What
God predestined for our glory.” Of these two, which are included in such a locution
under predestination, one is usually called the object, and the other the term of
predestination. For that thing which is said to be properly and immediately predestined
is called the object of predestination, while the effect or end to which it is said to be
predestined is called the term of such predestination. However, it must be noted that
between these two things, in different senses or kinds of causes, there can be a certain
reciprocity or mutual denomination. For while one thing is predestined to a certain
term, the term itself is also predestined to exist, and in its own way, it can be said to be
predestined in relation to another thing, of which it is the end. For example, a man is
said to be predestined to the beatific vision, but the vision itself can be said to be
predestined for the happiness of man, that is, to be the intrinsic form formally
beatifying man.
4. Resolution of the question. Nevertheless, properly and according to the received
usage of speech, predestination, as we are now discussing it, regards as its object, into
which it immediately falls, a person, and denominates that person as predestined to
some term. And so, formally responding to the proposed question, it must be said that
only a created person is the proper object of predestination, as we are now discussing
it, or is the thing that is said to be properly predestined. This seems especially pertinent
to the usage of the term, and so it is sufficiently proven from the usage and manner of
speaking of theologians. Moreover, a reason can be given from what St. Thomas notes
in the cited article 1, question 23. For predestination properly signifies the effective
ordination of someone to an ultimate end surpassing their nature. But no thing is
properly ordained to such an end except a created person, therefore. The major premise
is supposed from the usage of the term and from the fact that to a natural end, a thing
tends naturally and does not need to be transmitted by another through a special
providence superadded to nature, which predestination signifies or requires. The minor
premise, however, will be clarified in the following points.
5. First inference. From this, it follows that the denomination of predestination by
which a thing is said to be absolutely predestined to being or coming to be is less
proper and, strictly speaking, is not the predestination we are now discussing. This is
proven because by the fact that a thing is ordained to being or coming to be, it is not
ordained to something that surpasses its nature, for nothing is more demanded by any
nature than being and, consequently, coming to be. For this reason, St. Thomas said in
Chapter 1, Lecture 3 on Romans: “To be predestined is nothing other than to dispose
beforehand in the heart what is to be done concerning some thing.” However, one can
13 BOOK ONE
dispose concerning a future thing or operation in two ways: first, with respect to the
constitution of the thing itself, as an artisan disposes to build a house; second, with
respect to the use or governance of the thing. And to this second disposition, he says,
predestination pertains, not to the first. From this, he first concludes that what pertains
to the constitution of the thing itself is not properly predestined. Hence, since nothing
pertains more to the constitution of a thing than its existence, a thing is not said to be
properly predestined on account of its ordination to existence alone. But when a thing
is said to be absolutely predestined, this is said only on account of its existence.
Therefore, this is not the proper denomination of predestination, as we are now
discussing it. However, because it cannot be denied that there is in God an eternal
ordination of a thing to exist by an absolute decree of His will, to which in the intellect
corresponds an eternal reason or idea by which such a thing exists in time, the term
predestination is extended to signify this kind of act. But to avoid ambiguity in words,
in these matters we will use the term predestination rather than predestination. This is
what Cajetan signified in his commentary on 1 Corinthians 2, where he explains the
words, “What He predestined,” etc., as meaning, “He predetermined and proposed in
His eternal decree to bring it about.”
6. Second inference. Secondly, it follows that the proper predestination we are
discussing pertains not to accidents but to substances, and therefore only a substance is
properly predestined, while accidents are said to be predestined only in a broad sense,
insofar as every predetermination is called predestination. The reason is that
predestination properly pertains to a thing that is ordained to the attainment of an end,
and the end is proper to a substance, for accidents are rather means or instruments
through which a substance attains its end, or at most they are the formal attainment of
the end itself. Therefore, to be predestined simply belongs to a substantial thing, not to
accidents. Likewise, although accidents are ordained to a substance as to an end, for the
sake of which they exist, and thus in their own way they can be said to be preordained
and predetermined for such an end, yet that end is not above the nature of the
accidents themselves, for the whole being of accidents is placed in such an intrinsic and
connatural relation, and therefore that preordination is not properly predestination, as
we are now discussing it. This is so true that it even holds for supernatural accidents
themselves. For although these are supernatural to man, yet it is natural to them to have
an order to a supernatural end. Hence, grace is not properly predestined to glory, for by
the very fact that it is predetermined to exist, it is ordained to glory by its own nature.
But man, to whom both grace and glory are supernatural, is most properly said to be
predestined to glory through grace. Therefore, predestination properly pertains to
substances, not to accidents.
14 BOOK ONE
7. Third inference. Objection. Thirdly, from what has been said, it follows that it is
not proper for all substances to be predestined, but only for rational or intellectual
substances. For inanimate or irrational things are not capable objects of predestination,
as St. Thomas noted in the cited question 23, article 1, reply to objection 3. The reason
is that substances lacking intellect are not ordained to beatitude or to a supernatural
end, since they are not capable of it. You might say that sometimes an inanimate
substance is ordained to an effect surpassing its nature, as, for example, water for
washing the soul, etc. Therefore, it could with full propriety be said that water was
predestined from eternity to wash the soul in the law of grace, just as priests can be said
to be predestined to consecrate the body of Christ in the new law. I reply that it is true
that all these things are ordained by God from eternity through supernatural
providence, but not through proper predestination, as we are now discussing it. For it is
not necessary for that providence to descend to individual things in every detail through
a special predetermination or election, as occurs in the predestination of man,
according to the teaching of St. Thomas in the cited question 23, article 6. Moreover,
the ordination to a supernatural effect is not as to the ultimate end of such a thing, but
rather the whole is a certain means ordained to the beatitude of men. But
predestination, properly so called, as we are now discussing it, signifies the effective
ordination of a thing, which is said to be predestined, to the attainment of its ultimate
end, and therefore it applies only to an intellectual substance.
8. Predestination properly pertains to a person, not to a nature. Fourthly, it is
concluded from what has been said that predestination of this kind properly pertains
only to a person, not to a nature as such, even if it is rational or intellectual. In this
matter, two extreme opinions are to be noted. The first was that of Scotus in
Distinction 7, where he holds that the humanity or soul of Christ was first and chiefly
predestined to excellent beatitude, and that the reason for this was also predestined to
the hypostatic union. The second is that of some Thomists who say that a nature as
such, or humanity, is not capable of predestination. But since this matter properly
pertains to the topic of the Incarnation and has been treated in Part 1, Question 3,
Disputation 50, Section 3, I briefly hold that a nature, for example, humanity, is
properly predestined to the hypostatic union. However, we are not now discussing that
predestination but predestination to beatitude, and so we exclude nature as such from
it. For a nature is not ordained to beatitude per se, but the person subsisting in it is.
Because beatitude consists in operation, and operation is properly of the supposit, not
of the nature, as is more fully explained in the cited place.
9. I added in the assertion that this person must be created or creatable, because a
divine person (as I said) in itself is not capable of predestination, since it is essentially
and per se blessed. This is most certain in its proper nature, but in an external and
15 BOOK ONE
assumed nature, it seems that it can be predestined. And so Augustine speaks of Christ
in Tractate 105 on John, at the end, where, explaining the words, “Glorify Me, Father,
with the glory I had with You before the world existed,” he explains this as referring to
the glory and honor of Christ as man, which He had in predestination from eternity.
However, some do not wish to attribute this mode of predestination to Christ, because,
given the assumption of humanity, the whole glory is connatural to Him, and a thing is
not said to be predestined to a natural end or property but to a supernatural one. This
reason indeed proves that this predestination of Christ is of a higher order and is not
entirely distinct from that by which the natural Son of God is predestined but is joined
with it. However, it does not prove that it is not true predestination. But this is of
another consideration, as can be seen in the cited place of the third part. Here,
therefore, we are only discussing the predestination of created persons.
10. Angels are predestined. Finally, I speak absolutely of a created person and not
specifically of a human or angelic person, because both are capable of predestination,
as St. Thomas noted above in the cited article 1, since even angels are ordained to
supernatural beatitude. However, it is often objected that, according to Augustine, only
those who are subject to sin are predestined, for Augustine said: “Predestination is the
purpose of having mercy.” But the holy angels were never subject to sin, and those who
sinned are not predestined. For this reason, some distinguish a twofold predestination.
One is that which simply ordains to good, and they say this has place in the angels. The
other is that which liberates from the misery of sin, and they say this is proper to men.
This is roughly the opinion of Bonaventure in Distinction 40. But this distinction is not
necessary, for it is merely accidental to predestination whether a person was in sin or
not. And those words, “Predestination is the purpose of having mercy,” are not found
in Augustine, although he sometimes explains predestination by the term “liberating,”
but he is speaking of the predestination of men, and as St. Thomas notes, liberation
can also be understood as preservation.

CHAPTER V. WHAT THINGS

FALL UNDER PREDESTINATION AS ITS TERM.

1. Various questions. We have said that the matter about which predestination is
concerned includes two things: namely, the person who is predestined, which is called
the object of predestination, and the thing or good to which the person is predestined,
which is called the term of predestination. Since, therefore, in the preceding chapter, we
have explained the object of predestination, it remains for us in this chapter to discuss
its term. Many questions are usually raised about this, which we will briefly address
here: namely, whether the term of predestination can be the evil of fault or
16 BOOK ONE
punishment, or only some good that is desirable in itself; and whether it can be any
good, or only that which is supernatural; and among supernatural goods, whether it is
only beatitude or grace, or whether other good acts can sufficiently serve as the term of
predestination.
2. First assertion: The evil of fault is not the term of predestination. First, therefore,
it must be firmly established that the evil of fault cannot be the term of predestination,
and thus God predestines no one to the evil of fault. This is a matter of faith, defined
in the Second Council of Orange, Chapter 25, and is taken from the Council of Trent,
Session 6, Chapter 17. It is also extensively treated by Fulgentius in his first book to
Monimus. Augustine also teaches this in his book On the Predestination of the Saints,
Chapter 10, where he says that God’s foreknowledge extends more broadly than His
predestination: “For God predestines only those things which He Himself will do, but
He foreknows even those things which He will not do and does not predestine, such as
sins.” For this reason, in Book 5 of The City of God, Chapter 9, he says: “God is the
author of all powers, but not of all wills.” For He is not the author of evil wills, and
consequently He does not predestine them, nor does He, through His foreknowledge,
cause them to be future, but because they are future, He foreknows them, as he adds in
the same book, Chapter 10. The reason is that whether predestination pertains to the
intellect or the will, it certainly involves the will in some way, so that God is not said to
predestine except what He simply wills to happen. But God does not will sin to happen;
therefore, He does not predestine it, nor does He predestine a person to sin or to do
evil, for otherwise He would predestine sin itself. This is confirmed because permissive
will is not sufficient for predestination, but according to faith, God only permits man to
sin; He does not cause or induce him to sin. Therefore, He does not predestine sin.
Finally, we have shown in the second book On Divine Aid that God predetermines the
evils of fault, and all the arguments brought forth there confirm this truth.
3. Second assertion: God does not predestine to the evil of punishment in the
strictest sense. Secondly, it must be said that, although in some true sense it can be said
that God predestines some men to the evil of punishment, this is not the case in the
strictest and most proper sense in which we are now speaking. The first part of this
assertion is based on Augustine, who sometimes says absolutely that some are
predestined by God to hell, as is clear in the Enchiridion, Chapter 100, and in Book 15
of The City of God, Chapter 1, and Book 21, Chapter 24. This is how he is to be
understood if he ever says absolutely that some are predestined to destruction, as in his
book On the Perfection of Justice, as Fulgentius explained in his first book to
Monimus. Isidore also speaks in the same way in Book 2 of On the Supreme Good,
Chapter 6, and the Council of Valence under Lothair, Chapter 3, indicates this. But in
this kind of speech, it must be noted that the particle “pre-” refers to the precedence
17 BOOK ONE
of eternity over time, not to the precedence of the divine will over His foreknowledge.
For in this way, it is true what the Council of Orange and the Council of Trent defined:
that God, by His power, has predestined no one to evil. I understand this also to
include the evil of punishment and eternal misery, as I will show more fully in the
second part of this work. However, I interpret the word “by His power” to mean that
God, by His power and will alone, has ordained no one to eternal misery. This does not
exclude the fact that, out of justice, He has decreed to punish some eternally. But this
decree presupposes the foreknowledge of fault, on account of which man deserves
such punishment. Therefore, such a decree cannot be called predestination in relation
to foreknowledge, but rather in relation to eternity compared to such an effect. And
this is how the aforementioned Fathers speak, for they explicitly declare that such
predestination presupposes the said foreknowledge.
4. From this, the first part of the assertion is clear. For the aforementioned way of
speaking is true in the first sense. The reason for this is that God is truly said to
predestine those things which He has ordained by His absolute and efficacious will
from eternity and has decreed to bring about, at least in the sense that the particle
“pre-” signifies the precedence of eternity over time. But God, by His absolute will, has
decreed to punish those whom He foreknew would sin and persist in sin until the end.
Therefore, He is rightly said to have predestined them, as wicked, to punishment. And
this reasoning applies even more strongly to any other punishment.
5. The latter part of the assertion is also clarified by the same doctrine. For God is
said to predestine a man most properly when, out of Himself and His own
benevolence and affection, and not merely provoked by the foreknowledge of some
work of the man himself, He efficaciously ordains him to some end or term that is
suitable and beneficial to him. But that preordination to punishment is not of this kind;
therefore, it is not the most proper predestination. The major premise is first clarified
by Scripture, for whenever the word “predestination” is found in it, it is taken in a good
sense, as is clear from the often-cited passages. Therefore, this word has already been
used in this sense among the scholastics, the reason for which will become clear from
what follows. It is also clarified by a certain doctrine of Damascene in Book 2 of On
the Orthodox Faith, Chapter 29, which Chrysostom indicated in his first homily on
Ephesians. God wills something for men in two ways: either from Himself alone and
out of His own inclination, or as provoked and, as it were, compelled by men
themselves. In the first way, He wills good things for them; in the second way, He wills
the evils of punishment. Therefore, predestination, properly so called, pertains to the
first mode of willing, and thus it concerns good things and does not apply to the evil
of punishment.
18 BOOK ONE
6. Third assertion: The decree of predestination is absolute. Therefore, thirdly, it
must be said that the term of predestination is always some good to which man is
ordained out of God’s special affection. This assertion is taken from Scripture. For
wherever the word “predestination” is used, it is taken in a good sense. Augustine also
defines predestination in this way in his book On the Predestination of the Saints,
Chapter 10, and in On the Gift of Perseverance, Chapter 14, and this is also the usage
of the scholastics. This is clear from what has been said by a sufficient enumeration of
the parts, and it will become even clearer from what follows. Now, for greater
explanation, it must be added that the will of good can sometimes be absolute, and
sometimes it is only a simple affection, which they call velleity. Predestination does not
signify just any affection of good but an absolute decree of it, or it includes such a
decree. Hence, that passage of Paul in Romans 8: “Those whom He predestined, He
also called, justified, and glorified,” where he understands the predestined as absolutely
ordained to good and in such a way that they attain the end. Hence also that saying of
Augustine in Chapter 14 of On the Gift of Perseverance: “Predestination is the
preparation of benefits,” and thus it concerns good things by which they are most
certainly set free; therefore, it concerns an absolute will. Finally, the very name of
predestination implies this, and common usage has established it.
7. One might doubt this based on the words in Acts 4: “What Your hand and Your
plan had predestined to take place,” where the reference is to the Passion of Christ,
which God did not will from Himself but on account of the sins of men, and yet the
word “predestined” is used there. I reply that there is a certain evil of punishment that
is inflicted as pure vengeance, such as hell, and to this we say the name of
predestination is not properly attributed. But there is another evil of medicinal
punishment, which is ordained in relation to a greater good to be effectively attained,
and this, under such a consideration, falls under predestination, for it is one of the
means or remedies that God uses to obtain the salvation of the predestined. In this
order, the Passion of Christ is included; indeed, it is the greatest and, as it were,
universal remedy that God, out of His infinite goodness alone, predestined for men
already fallen in His divine foreknowledge.
8. The most proper predestination has a supernatural good as its term. Furthermore,
it must be added that the most proper predestination, which we are now discussing,
does not have just any good as its term but a supernatural good. Thus, St. Thomas, in
Article 1, and all the scholastics, and it is most consistent with the way St. Paul speaks.
For wherever he uses this word, he is either dealing with the goods of the grace of
union, as in Romans 1 and 1 Corinthians 2, or with the goods of sanctifying grace, as in
Romans 8 and Ephesians 1. The reasoning of St. Thomas is also excellent, because
natural goods are due to nature, and the ordination to a natural end arises from the
19 BOOK ONE
proper impulse and powers of nature itself; therefore, it does not require special
predestination but only common providence. However, the supernatural end is not
from the inclination of nature, nor is its attainment through its own powers; therefore,
for man to efficaciously tend toward it, it is necessary that he be ordained and, as it
were, transmitted by another, and this is done through predestination. Therefore,
predestination concerns supernatural goods.
9. Whether grace or glory is the term of predestination. Since in these goods grace
and glory are included (for we are not now discussing the hypostatic union), the
difficulty usually arises whether both or only one of them is the term of predestination.
And on this point, there is a diversity of opinions.
10. First opinion. The first opinion says that predestination has as its term, both
proximate and ultimate, only glory. This is the view of all those who hold that
predestination consists solely in the purpose of giving glory, such as Ockham, Gabriel,
William of Rubio in Distinction 40, Question 1, and Catharinus in his work On
Predestination, Book 1, last chapter, and Book 3, Chapters 2 and 3. The foundation for
this could be that by the force of that decree, man is sufficiently ordained to infallibly
attain glory; therefore, he is already predestined.
11. This opinion is rejected. This opinion, however, insofar as it is exclusive, is false
and contrary to the other theologians, and it is not very consistent with Paul, who in
Romans 8 indicated that predestination also concerns the means, which are calling and
justification. And in Ephesians 1, he explicitly said: “He predestined us for adoption as
sons,” which is accomplished through grace. It is also supported by what is said of Paul
in Acts 22: “The God of our fathers has appointed you to know His will and to see the
Just One,” etc. Augustine also most clearly taught this in the often-cited passages, where
he says that predestination is the preparation of grace and the benefits of God. And in
the Enchiridion, Chapter 100, he calls predestination “to grace.” We will cite other
passages shortly and give the reason.
12. Second opinion. There is, therefore, another opinion that says predestination
does not concern glory but only grace. This was held by Durandus in Distinction 41,
Question 1, Reply to Objection 1, and some moderns follow him, attributing it to St.
Thomas because he says in Article 4 that the love or election to glory is presupposed to
predestination, from which they infer that it does not pertain to it. They also cite
Augustine, who always defines predestination in terms of ordination to grace. Finally,
Durandus’s reason is that providence is not about the end but about the means, but
predestination is a part of providence; therefore, it is not about glory.
13. The second opinion is rejected insofar as it denies. I consider this opinion,
insofar as it denies, to be false. First, it is contrary to the common opinion of the other
theologians. Nor does St. Thomas contradict this, for in that article, he is speaking by
20 BOOK ONE
supposing that predestination formally pertains to the intellect, but when speaking of
the will, which predestination necessarily signifies or connotes, he does not deny that it
has glory as its term. Indeed, he often signifies that predestination includes the will to
give grace and glory. For in Article 1, he says: “The reason for the transmission of a
rational creature to eternal life is called predestination,” and in Article 2, he says:
“Predestination is the reason for the order to eternal salvation.” And further on, he
says: “The execution of predestination extends even to glorification.” Moreover, even if
we grant that glory, as intended through election or love, which St. Thomas places
before predestination, does not pertain to predestination but is presupposed to it,
nevertheless, it cannot be denied that some will to give glory pertains to predestination
or is included in it. For this is clearly taken from Paul in Romans 8, where he extends
predestination even to glorification. Hence, in Chapter 9, he says: “To show the riches
of His glory in vessels of mercy, which He has prepared for glory,” and in Acts 13, it is
said: “As many as were ordained to eternal life,” and therefore the Council of Trent,
Session 6, Chapter 12, and Canon 17, calls predestination “to life,” and Augustine, in
his book On the Predestination of God (if it is indeed his), Chapter 3, calls
predestination “the glory of glory,” but glory is not predestined except insofar as
someone is predestined to glory. Moreover, when Augustine said that predestination is
the preparation of benefits, he did not exclude glory, which is the greatest benefit;
indeed, he included it when he added: “By which they are most certainly set free,” for
whoever is set free is not perfectly freed from misery until he obtains glory. Indeed,
even when Augustine said that predestination is the preparation of grace, he included
glory, as Fulgentius elegantly explained in his first book to Monimus, Chapters 8 and
10, where he says: “Therefore, God always had in predestination all things: the
beginnings of calling, the increases of justification, and the rewards of glorification.”
And he gives the reason, because even eternal life, as Paul testifies, is a certain grace.
Finally, Augustine, in Book 15 of The City of God, Chapter 1, says that the City of
God is predestined to the kingdom of heaven.
14. Distinction of a twofold predestination. From this, some have taken the occasion
to distinguish two predestinations: one to grace, and the other to glory, as can be seen
in Turrianus in his book On Predestination. This distinction, if it had been made in
relation to different men, namely, the predestined and the reprobate, could be admitted,
provided that under predestination to glory, which alone is predestination simply, grace
is also included. For in this way, many reprobates can be said to be predestined to faith
and to grace to be obtained for some time in this life, which can be called
predestination in a qualified sense in relation to the other. However, this is not the
sense of the authors mentioned, but they distinguish these two predestinations even
within the predestined themselves, so as to posit a cause of predestination for some
21 BOOK ONE
and not seem to contradict Augustine, who denies a cause of predestination, as we will
see below.
15. The proposed distinction is rejected. For us, however, this distinction is not
necessary, and it is rightly not used by the scholastics. For although in God there is a
will to give glory and a will to give grace, which wills can be called many acts distinct in
reason, nevertheless, predestination, perfect and simply so called, is one, which, as
considered in the will, includes both acts; but as it pertains to the intellect, it signifies
one complete reason of all the means by which the predestined are efficaciously
brought to glory, out of the purpose of the divine will. The reason is that
predestination is a certain transmission existing in the mind or will of the predestining
God, but a perfect transmission does not regard only the ultimate term but also the
way, and not only the way but also attains the ultimate term intrinsically or inclusively,
so to speak. Therefore, predestination includes glory as the ultimate term and grace as
the way. Hence, that saying of Aristotle applies here: “Where one thing is for the sake
of another, there is only one.” For here, predestination to grace is for the sake of glory,
and predestination to glory is through grace; therefore, one complete predestination
includes both terms, one as ultimate, the other as proximate. Just as one motion is to
the ultimate term and to all the intermediate terms.
16. The many terms of grace are reduced to two headings. From this, it is
understood that the term of glory is one, but the terms of grace are many, just as in
motion there is one final term but many intermediate terms. Paul, in Romans 8, reduces
all the terms of grace to two headings: namely, calling and justification. Under calling,
he includes all the gifts of prevenient or exciting grace, by which God begins salvation
in the predestined; under justification, he includes all the gifts of assisting or
cooperating grace, by which God perfects the sanctification of the predestined and
preserves it until the end of life. Besides these, predestination is sometimes terminated
at other dignities or excellences pertaining to the order of grace, as the Blessed Virgin
can be said to be predestined to divine motherhood, the Apostles are said to be chosen
for the apostolate, etc. But these gifts do not per se pertain to sanctifying grace but
either to ministries or to gratuitous graces. Therefore, predestination to these gifts
could rightly be distinguished in reason from predestination simply, which is to grace
and glory. However, because in the predestined these gifts are also certain means by
which they are perfected unto eternal salvation (according to that saying: “For those
who love God, all things work together for good”), we include all these under the
adequate term of predestination.
17. The foundation of the first opinion is resolved. The foundations of the other
opinions are resolved from what has been said. To the foundation of the first, we say
that the ordination to the end, precisely taken, even if it virtually contains
22 BOOK ONE
predestination as in its root (for we suppose it to be an absolute ordination),
nevertheless does not formally contain it without the reason of the means approved or
determined by the will.
First response to the foundation of the second opinion. To the foundation of the
second opinion, it is said, first, that although the will of the end with respect to the man
who is predestined is prior, yet with respect to God Himself who predestines, it is the
will of a certain means by which He attains His glory and the communication of His
goodness, and this is sufficient for such a will to be included under predestination.
Second response: The difference between providence and predestination. Secondly, it
is said that if we attend to the force of the words, the difference between providence
and predestination can be established in this: that providence supposes things destined
to their ends and procures for them the attainment of those ends through suitable
means. But predestination, since it signifies the first destination in the mind of the
predestining God, includes not only the procurement of the means but also the
ordination to the end itself. This difference between predestination and providence will
be better understood from a comparison between them, which we will more
conveniently present at the end of this book.

CHAPTER VI. THAT KNOWLEDGE MUST NECESSARILY BE

SUPPOSED IN GOD BEFORE EVERY DECREE OF PREDESTINATION.

1. Having explained the matter about which predestination is concerned, in order to

present its rationale distinctly and in detail, it is necessary to examine all the acts of the
divine intellect and will that are involved in this matter of predestination and that must
or can intervene in this work. From this, it will become clearer in which act
predestination is situated. Such acts can be reduced to three orders: some that precede
and are presupposed to predestination; others that are subsequent and consequent to
predestination; and others that are intermediate, in which, or in some of which,
predestination must be placed. Let us say once and for all in this work that whenever we
speak of these acts as many, or suppose an order of priority and posteriority among
them, we understand this according to reason and our mode of understanding, with
some foundation in reality. For in reality, all these acts are one most simple act, eternal
and entirely simultaneous. Therefore, according to reason, it is certain that the intellect
precedes and the will follows. Hence, if any acts of the divine mind are presupposed to
the whole of predestination, they must primarily belong to the intellect and pertain to
knowledge. These acts, therefore, are to be explained in this chapter; we will consider
the will later.
23 BOOK ONE
2. First assertion. First, therefore, it is certain that before every act of predestination,
some knowledge must be presupposed in God, which either directs predestination
itself or (so to speak) invites the divine will to predestine by proposing objects and
things that can be predestined. This, at the very least, is what Paul signifies in Romans
8, where he says: “Those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to
the image of His Son.” For these two words, “foreknew” and “predestined,” are not to
be taken as synonyms, since they have distinct meanings in every proper sense and can
retain those meanings in this passage. Likewise, from the order of the text and the
manner of speaking, it is clear that foreknowledge is presupposed to predestination.
For in the rest of what Paul enumerates there, he maintains this order: he places first
what is presupposed to the other, such as predestination before calling, calling before
justification, and justification before glorification. Therefore, when he similarly places
foreknowledge before predestination, he places it as prior.
3. This also seems to be the sense of Augustine in his book On the Gift of
Perseverance, Chapter 14, where he defines predestination as “the foreknowledge and
preparation of the benefits of God.” For foreknowledge is undoubtedly presupposed
to preparation, since through foreknowledge alone, nothing is prepared until the will or
purpose of giving is added, as was explained in Chapter 2. Predestination formally
consists in this preparation, as we touched on there, and Augustine signifies this
elsewhere when he says that predestination is “the preparation of grace” (On the
Predestination of the Saints, Chapter 10). About this predestination, he immediately
adds: “Which cannot be foreknowledge.” Therefore, when in another place he says that
predestination is “foreknowledge and preparation,” he places foreknowledge as a prior
and necessary condition for predestination. Hence, in the same book On the Gift of
Perseverance, Chapter 17, he says: “His gifts, which God gives to whomever He wills,
He foreknew that He would give and prepared in His foreknowledge.” He foreknew
that He would give them after He prepared or purposed to give them, but He prepared
them in prior foreknowledge, not indeed consequent foreknowledge but clearly
antecedent to the preparation. Therefore, he adds: “To dispose in His foreknowledge,
which cannot err or change, His future works, is nothing other than to predestine.”
Therefore, the disposition in foreknowledge is predestination, and some foreknowledge
is presupposed to such disposition and thus to predestination.
4. The reason for the assertion. The same reason is further clarified. The reason for
the assertion must now be briefly assigned: since predestination, as we have seen,
consists in some voluntary and free act of God, but before every free and voluntary act,
some knowledge must necessarily precede, therefore before predestination, some
knowledge or science necessarily precedes in God. The minor premise is clear, both
from the definition of the voluntary (for it must be from an intrinsic principle with
24 BOOK ONE
knowledge) and from the nature of freedom, which arises from the indifference of
judgment and reason. Finally, it is clear from the general dogma that nothing is willed
unless it is foreknown, nor can it be free unless it is willed, for formal freedom exists
solely in the will. All these things also hold in God Himself, excluding imperfections,
that is, without distinction in reality, with virtual containment and eminence, and
consequently with presupposition according to the order of reason founded in reality. It
is further clarified because, in general, every intellectual nature first operates through
the intellect concerning any matter before it operates through the will. God Himself
first understands Himself before He loves Himself, and therefore the generation of the
Son is prior to the procession of the Holy Spirit. Thus, concerning the matter of
predestination, the intellect precedes, and therefore it is necessary that some knowledge
of this matter precede predestination.
5. Second assertion: The difference between simple understanding and
vision. Secondly, it must be said that the knowledge of simple understanding is
necessarily presupposed to predestination. I presuppose the common division of divine
knowledge into simple understanding and vision. As far as the present matter is
concerned, these differ in two ways. First, because through simple understanding,
possible things are known, even if they will never come to be, or (what is the same)
abstracting from absolute futurition in any difference of time. The knowledge of
vision, however, is terminated at things that will at some time come to be, and it
represents or beholds them as future.
Another difference. The reason for the assertion. The second difference, common
among theologians, is that the knowledge of simple understanding precedes every free
decree of God and is so natural that it necessarily belongs to God, even if God willed
nothing freely. The knowledge of vision, however, presupposes the free will of God
willing something, because without the free will of God, nothing can be future. From
this, therefore, the assertion is evident, because predestination consists in some free act,
as has been shown, but the knowledge of simple understanding is not free to God but
is in Him before every free act; therefore, it is prior to predestination. This is confirmed
because in God, natural things are prior to free things, at least in the order of
subsistence, since they can exist without free acts, for God cannot exist without natural
properties, but He can exist without free acts as such. It is further confirmed because
knowledge is presupposed before a free act; therefore, that knowledge cannot be free
but must be natural. But such knowledge in God is nothing other than simple
understanding; therefore, this is what is necessarily presupposed to predestination.
6. Third assertion: The twofold mode of divine intuitive knowledge. Thirdly, it must
be said that no knowledge of things that are absolutely future in some difference of
time in the person to be predestined is necessarily presupposed to the whole of that
25 BOOK ONE
predestination. Not everyone admits this assertion, but it is the more common opinion
of St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, and others whom I will mention shortly, and it will
be treated more extensively below when discussing the cause of predestination. To
prove this, I presuppose that God can foreknow something as absolutely future in a
certain time in two ways: either in the objective presence of eternity, in which God
beholds all the causes of things and all their determinations with all their circumstances,
or in the decree of His will, by which He wills that it come to be. For what He
absolutely wills is certainly future. These two modes of knowing, or two means of
knowing, apply most of all to good effects that can be predestined or predetermined by
God’s absolute will, which we are now discussing. These are related to the decree of the
divine will in such a way that they necessarily presuppose it, because the knowledge that
is in the decree necessarily presupposes the decree, as is clear in itself, since the decree
is the foundation and reason for such knowledge. The intuitive knowledge of the thing
itself, however, presupposes the decree even more, because it presupposes the
determination of all the causes by which the thing has its futurition, among which the
first is the divine will and its decree. Hence, even between these two modes of knowing
such future things, the one that is in the decree precedes according to reason, because
the decree is presupposed to the determination of all other causes through which the
thing is future and can be known as present in eternity.
7. The conclusion is proven. From this, therefore, it is concluded that the thing
which is ordained to exist through the decree of predestination cannot be foreknown as
future before such a decree, and thus with respect to that thing, the proposed assertion
is clear, namely, that the knowledge of such a thing as future is not necessarily
presupposed to its predestination, nor can it exist before it, because such a thing has its
absolute futurition from predestination. For by the force of the decree of
predestination, whatever it may be, the necessary aids and means are applied so that
such an effect will be future; therefore, the decree is presupposed to futurition as a
cause to an effect; therefore, it is also presupposed to the foreknowledge of futurition,
because a thing is absolutely future according to reason before it is foreknown as
absolutely future, both because the object determining the knowledge is presupposed to
it and because the thing is not future because it is foreknown, but rather the converse,
that it is foreknown because it is future. Since this foreknowledge, of which we are
speaking, is not the cause of the futurition of the thing, nor is it practical knowledge
but speculative or intuitive knowledge, which presupposes its object, therefore such
foreknowledge is not only not prior to the decree of predestination but is even
posterior to it. Nor do they exist entirely simultaneously or concomitantly, since one is
the reason and foundation of the other, as has been explained.
26 BOOK ONE
8. I always speak of the decree of predestination, abstracting from opinions. For
those who say that predestination is formally in foreknowledge itself or is
foreknowledge itself will not admit that the foreknowledge of future things is posterior
to predestination but will say rather that predestination itself is formally the
foreknowledge of future things and is entirely simultaneous. Nevertheless, they cannot
deny that such foreknowledge is posterior to the decree that is necessary for such
predestination. First, because, as I have shown, such foreknowledge is not of a future
thing as such before such a decree but after it. Second, because such knowledge cannot
have the nature of predestination except insofar as it is in some way free to God,
according to the principles stated above. But it is not free except insofar as it
presupposes a free decree of the will. Hence, those who say that predestination is
foreknowledge say that it is the knowledge of approval, which is free. The knowledge
of approval presupposes the will approving the foreknown effect, and by this
knowledge, God knows that the effect, pleasing and approved by His absolute decree,
will infallibly be future. From this, however, that such absolute foreknowledge of the
future effect through predestination is not prior but posterior to the decree of
predestination, it most clearly follows that it is not prior to predestination and is either
posterior to it, if predestination is understood to be in the will, or at least posterior to
the beginning (so to speak) of predestination, for it is indubitable that this beginning is
taken from the will, as we will see later.
9. A doubt arises whether predestination necessarily presupposes the knowledge of
something else. This is resolved. However, although these things are true with respect
to the same predestined effect, it can still be doubted whether the predestination of one
thing or effect necessarily presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of another thing or
future effect. St. Thomas seems to affirm this in Summa Theologiae, Part 3, Question
1, Article 3, Reply to Objection 4, where he says: “Predestination presupposes the
foreknowledge of future things.” But this cannot be understood with respect to the
same effect of predestination, as has been proven; therefore, it must at least be
understood with respect to the foreknowledge of one thing in relation to the
predestination of another. For it seems clear that he is speaking of the absolute
foreknowledge of a future thing, since from this principle he explains that Christ was
predestined, foreseeing the sin of Adam as future. And this seems not only not
inconvenient but even morally necessary, because God can be moved, and is moved, to
predestine one thing by the foreknowledge of another effect. For example, because He
foresaw that Peter would sin, He predestined him to repent before he died.
10. This is resolved. The cause of predestination is given on the part of Christ, but
not on the part of the predestined. I reply that this question can be treated either
concerning the whole of predestination or concerning one or another of its effects.
27 BOOK ONE
Concerning the whole of predestination, this question depends on another: whether
there is any cause or reason for the whole of predestination on the part of future
effects. For if such a cause is given, it is certainly necessary that the foreknowledge of it
be presupposed to the whole of predestination, because it must be presupposed to the
first decree of predestination. For that future thing, which is said to be the reason for
predestination, cannot be the reason for it unless it is foreknown, since it cannot
otherwise move the will. Therefore, the foreknowledge of it must be presupposed. But
if no such reason for the whole of predestination is given, then no foreknowledge of a
future effect is necessarily presupposed to the whole of predestination. For this
presupposition and order of reason must be founded in some relation that one thing
has to another per se. For if they are irrelevant to each other, such foreknowledge will
also be irrelevant to such predestination. But a relation per se cannot exist except one
of causality (under causality we include any occasion or motive that one thing provides
for willing or predestining another). Therefore, the resolution of this doubt depends on
the other question concerning the cause of predestination, which will be treated below.
For now, we briefly suppose that, on the part of Christ and His merits, a cause of our
predestination can be given, but not on the part of the predestined person himself or
any creature in relation to another. And therefore, our predestination indeed
presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of future things pertaining to Christ the Lord,
but not of those things that pertain to the predestined person himself or to other men
or angels.
11. A question arises. It can be specifically asked whether the whole predestination
of any man at least presupposes the foreknowledge that such a man will exist in the
nature of things. Some think this is necessary because grace presupposes nature, and
predestination is to grace, including glory under grace; therefore, it presupposes the
existence of nature, according to the teaching of Cajetan in Summa Theologiae, Part 3,
Question 1, Article 3. Likewise, because providence presupposes the existence of those
things to which something is provided, at least as present in eternity, since no one
provides except for future things. But predestination is a kind of providence; therefore,
it necessarily presupposes the foreknowledge of futurition, at least of the subject to be
predestined.
12. The resolution. It must be said, even from this chapter, that the foreknowledge
of something future in the predestined person is not necessarily presupposed to the
whole of predestination. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in the cited question 23,
Article 2, Reply to Objection 2. For this reason, he says with Origen, whom he cites,
that predestination can be of that which does not exist. This can be understood in two
ways: first, that predestination is of something not yet existing in itself and in its own
nature. This is how Alexander of Hales explains it in Summa Theologiae, Part 1,
28 BOOK ONE
Question 28, Member 2, Article 1, and it is evident in itself, because predestination is
eternal, and the existence of the predestined thing is temporal. Second, it can be
understood of the existence of the thing in God’s foreknowledge. In this sense,
Alexander says above that predestination is of something existing in foreknowledge.
However, a distinction is necessary, because the existence of the thing in foreknowledge
is taken either as antecedent to the decree of predestination or as consequent to it. In
the latter sense, it is true that predestination is always of something existing in
foreknowledge, because once predestination is posited, the thing is foreknown as future
by its force. But in the former sense, predestination is even of something that simply
does not exist or is not yet future in foreknowledge for that sign, but only of something
possible, which through predestination itself is ordained to exist. For through the same
will, the predestined person is ordained both to exist and to exist for such an end.
Therefore, the reasoning is not entirely the same concerning providence and
predestination, as will be more clearly explained in the penultimate chapter of this
book. Nor is Cajetan’s teaching necessary, as I have noted more extensively in the same
place in the third part. For although grace presupposes nature in the genus of the
subject or material cause and in the order of execution, in the order of intention and
predestination, it is not necessary to presuppose it, but it is sufficient if it is joined to it
in some way, as will be more fully explained in the penultimate chapter.
13. However, if the question is not about the whole of predestination but about one
or another of its effects, then it is not inconvenient that the predestination of a man to
one effect or benefit of predestination presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of
another effect. This is proven by the reason for the doubt stated above. And perhaps St.
Thomas spoke in the same sense in the cited place in the third part, although it can be
understood of conditional knowledge, which we will discuss in the next chapter. How
this foreknowledge maintains the aforementioned order with the decree of
predestination and is, as it were, mixed with it (so to speak), will be better understood
once the whole decree of predestination has been explained. For now, only two things
must be considered. One is that this whole order must be considered either between the
end of the whole predestination, which is glorification, and the means to it, or between
the means themselves, insofar as one is nearer to the end than another, such as
justification to calling, and consequently one is related to another as an end to a
proximate means or vice versa. For apart from this relation, to which every other can be
reduced, there remains no reason for an order per se among the effects or terms of
predestination, and thus there will also be no reason why the foreknowledge of one
should be presupposed to the predestination of another, or vice versa.
14. The twofold foreknowledge of future things. Beyond this, the twofold mode of
foreknowing future things must be kept in mind: either in the predestining decree or in
29 BOOK ONE
the things themselves according to the objective presence of eternity. For the
foreknowledge that is in the decree has an order with the decrees themselves, according
to the order that the decrees themselves have among themselves by reason. For
example, in predestination, the decree to give glory and the decree to give grace are
included, which are also distinct in reason. If, therefore, an order of intention is
maintained among these decrees, so that the decree to give glory is prior to the decree
to give grace, then the foreknowledge of future glory, by the force of the decree,
precedes according to reason the decree to give grace. But if among these decrees there
is no order of intention but only of execution, so that the decree of grace is prior to
the decree of glory, then the foreknowledge of future grace certainly precedes the
decree and foreknowledge of glory. The reason is that, given a free, absolute, and
efficacious decree of some effect, whatever it may be, that effect is infallibly future by
the force of such a decree, for this pertains to the efficacy of the divine will. As soon as
that effect is future by the force of its decree, God foreknows its futurition prior in
reason to any other free decree being understood: both because that knowledge is now
purely natural and necessary, given such a decree, and natural things are prior to free
things, and also because the subsequent decree depends (as we commonly say) on the
prior decree and on that foreknowledge. For example, if the decree of glory precedes
as the intention of the end, it is necessary that the intention itself and its efficacy be
foreknown, as it indicates the choice of means. For one who intends an end is not
understood to choose the means until he is understood to know that he has intended
the end and therefore must understand and apply the means suited to the intention, so
that the efficacy of that intention may be voluntarily brought to effect. For how could
one voluntarily apply the choice by the force of the intention unless he foreknew it?
But that intention, foreknown by God, includes the futurition of the intended effect.
Therefore, for this reason, it is necessary that between the decree concerning the end
and the decree concerning the means, this foreknowledge be interposed. But if the
efficacious decree concerning the end does not precede, then the opposite order will be
maintained. For example, if God first decreed to call Peter to faith by a fitting calling
before He had the efficacious decree by which He intended his faith, He also first knew
that such a calling of Peter would be future by the force of His decree, and then He
foreknew that faith would follow from it, and so on. For all these things hold both in all
the means with respect to the ultimate end and among the means themselves, insofar as
one is related to another as a cause to an effect or as a proximate end to a means.
15. Therefore, speaking of the other mode of foreknowledge, which is of the effects
themselves: since this knowledge presupposes the execution and efficacy of the causes
as objectively present in eternity, it is necessary that the foreknowledge of the prior
means in execution precede the foreknowledge and executive will of the subsequent
30 BOOK ONE
means, according to the same order of execution, because no one applies the second
means until he sees the effect of the prior means. And for the same reason, the
foreknowledge of future grace is prior to the will by which perseverance in it is given,
and the foreknowledge of future perseverance is prior to the will of giving glory as
executing it. All these things will become clearer in the following chapters.

CHAPTER VII. HOW CONDITIONAL

KNOWLEDGE OF CONTINGENT EFFECTS IS
NECESSARY FOR PREDESTINATION OR HOW IT RELATES TO IT.

1. This question presupposes that there is in God infallible knowledge of these

effects, abstracting from their actual future existence in fact, and knowing simply what a
free cause would do if it were placed in such an order of things and with such
circumstances. I have said much about this knowledge and presupposition in my
work On the Knowledge of God, Book 2. Below, when treating the means and effects
of predestination, I will add some things that will seem necessary. For now, without
further proof, I presuppose this, both because the discussion in this chapter will show
how necessary this knowledge is for predestination and consequently how true its
assertion or presupposition is, and also because there are now almost no one who dares
to deny this knowledge to God, which is sufficiently expressed in Sacred Scripture and
widely acknowledged by the holy Fathers. The only controversy usually concerns the
means by which such future things are known, which is no less debated among
theologians than the absolute knowledge of future contingent things. And from what
will be said, perhaps some resolution of this can easily be found.
2. The sense of the question is proposed. Therefore, with this presupposed, we
inquire into two other things that pertain to the present matter. The first is how this
foreknowledge is related to predestination, that is, whether it has any order per se with
it or whether it refers to it in no way, even though it otherwise belongs to God on
account of the infinite power of understanding that He has. For God knows many
things that are not necessary for predestination or that have no order per se with it. The
second point is whether this knowledge maintains any order of priority or posteriority
according to reason with respect to predestination, the resolution of which entirely
depends on the first.
3. The reason for the doubt. The reason for doubting the first point is that this
foreknowledge is neither predestination itself, nor a part or effect of it, nor its cause;
therefore, it has no order per se with it. For what other order per se can be conceived?
The antecedent concerning the first three parts is easily proven, because this knowledge
of contingents under a condition precedes the free decree of God and abstracts from
31 BOOK ONE
the actual future existence in some difference of time, and thus it is included under the
knowledge of simple understanding. Therefore, it cannot be predestination, which
denotes a free act, nor a part of predestination, which similarly must be free or
presuppose a free act. For the same reason, much less can it be an effect, because an
effect not only presupposes a free act of God but is also temporal, whereas this
knowledge is eternal. The last part is clear because this knowledge would be the cause
or reason of the decree of predestination itself, and this is not so, because the decree is
in God, and nothing that is in God has a cause. Nor can it have a reason on the part of
the foreknowledge of future effects, otherwise God would predestine a man because
He foresaw that he would make good use of the aids of grace, which cannot be said, as
I will show below.
4. The conclusion. It must be said that conditional knowledge of every contingent
effect to be predestined, namely, that it will infallibly be future if God provides this or
that aid, is absolutely necessary in God for the predestination and predetermination of
free effects, which by the force of predestination are absolutely and infallibly future.
Only those who completely deny that God knows these future things can deny this
assertion. But those who hold that God certainly knows them, even if they differ in the
manner or means by which He knows them, have no reason not to agree on the truth
of this assertion. To demonstrate the necessity of this knowledge for predestination
with a certain reason in every opinion, it is first necessary to presuppose that the decree
of predestination, as it pertains to the will, both with respect to glory and with respect
to grace, is explained and affirmed in various ways, which will be treated below, and
according to their diversity, there are various reasons for the necessity of this
knowledge and also different ways of explaining it. I will clarify this by going through
each mode of speaking.
5. The first mode of explaining the decree of predestination: The necessity of this
knowledge for true predestination. Some explain the decree of predestination as a kind
of singular predetermination, both of the glory of each predestined person and of its
quantity in particular, and also of each act or good by which such glory is to be
obtained. And then through an absolute preparation of all the aids by which such acts
are to be performed, from the first calling to the final consummation of the gift of
perseverance. This mode of speaking we greatly approve, as we will say below. Such a
mode of predestination cannot be understood or conceived without this
foreknowledge. The reason for this necessity is that no prudent person can establish by
an absolute decree of his will that something be done or propose to attain some end
unless he is first certain that he has the power to do what he wills or at least knows that
he has the means by which he can obtain such an end. For he cannot efficaciously
intend what he judges to be impossible for himself, nor can he prudently and without
32 BOOK ONE
rashness judge an effect to be possible for himself unless he foreknows the power in
himself or in the means that can be applied by him.
6. If the intention and will of the predestining or disposing agent is such that what
he establishes and predetermines by an absolute decree must infallibly be fulfilled, so
that frustrating such a will implies a contradiction, it is absolutely necessary that the
knowledge he is supposed to have of that power and efficacy of the means to such an
end be entirely infallible. For the will is blind and led by the intellect, and therefore an
intellectual agent could not securely establish through the will about such an effect,
absolutely effecting or attaining such an end, unless through the intellect it first judged
by infallible knowledge that such an end or effect could be obtained in such or such a
way. This is so true that even concerning those things that God effects by Himself, He
could not have an absolute will to effect them unless He first knew in Himself the
sufficient power to do them. In this knowledge, that conditional knowledge is included,
or they are entirely the same. For what is it to foreknow such means as being such that
through them such an end can infallibly be obtained, unless it is to know that if such
means are posited, that effect or end will infallibly come to be through them? But this is
the conditional knowledge we are discussing. Therefore, all who hold that God
predestines men to glory by an absolute predetermining decree, before the absolute
foreknowledge of all future merits, necessarily presuppose the conditional
foreknowledge of their free acts or means by which such glory can be obtained and will
infallibly be obtained if such means and aids are provided to perform that act. The
same, proportionally, is true if the predestination of those means is constituted by the
absolute predetermination of each free act, before all knowledge of vision, for the
same reason.
7. The difference between various modes of this foreknowledge. There is a notable
difference among those who hold this opinion concerning the manner in which God
moves the wills of men to perform the free act that God Himself has predetermined,
so that man performs it. For some say that God does this through a certain motion that
by its intrinsic virtue has the power to physically predetermine the will of man to that
act, so that, given that motion, it is impossible, in the sense they say, for the will of man
not to elicit that act to which it is moved. Hence it clearly follows that God, before He
gives that motion or establishes that He will give it, foreknows this conditional
proposition: "If I give such a motion to such a will, it will perform that act." And
because God makes all the free means of predestination to be performed by man by
efficaciously moving him through such a motion, it follows that before He
predetermines these means, He knows that they will infallibly be future under that
condition, if He gives such a motion or such efficacious aids to man. But we, who do
not admit such a mode of efficacy concerning the free act (because it is neither
33 BOOK ONE
necessary nor does it preserve freedom), but only establish the efficacy of prevenient
aid in a fitting calling, will also say that God foreknows the infallible efficacy of such a
calling if it is given, and thus He has conditional knowledge of the future act through
such a calling if it is given. We also say that this knowledge is necessary for the
predetermination of such an act and thus for the aforementioned mode of
predestination.
8. Another difference. From this, another difference between these opinions can
easily be understood concerning the mode of such knowledge. For those who hold the
first opinion do not really posit that knowledge of some contingent effect as such in
itself, but of the effect as necessary in some cause, from which it necessarily flows if
the cause is posited, that is, in that prevenient aid that is efficacious by itself and
physically predetermining. For they think it necessary that, given that aid, the act
follows as the term of the action follows the action. How this coheres with true
freedom and the contingency of that very effect with respect to its proximate cause,
some labor to explain, but whether they achieve this, we do not now discuss. Nor do we
discuss whether they sufficiently explain how those who lack such motion and do not
have it in their power freely lack the act that they cannot have without such motion. But
as far as that knowledge is concerned, they most easily give the reason for it, given that
principle, because it is purely natural knowledge and in the power of a cause acting
naturally and drawing the inferior cause, which it premoves. But we believe that this is
knowledge of a contingent effect as contingent and truly free, and therefore even given
all the causes and prerequisites, such effects can fail to occur, and yet God, by His
infinite power of understanding, infallibly foreknows what will be from such a cause if
it is posited with such aids or conditions. In this matter, we labor somewhat in
explaining the mode of such foreknowledge, but we overcome that difficulty both from
the infinity of the divine light and from the truth of such an object considered in itself,
and especially from the example of the foreknowledge of absolute future things, which
has almost the same difficulty. Once that difficulty is overcome, we easily compare the
freedom of acts with predetermination and predestination, and we show that this mode
of foreknowledge is sufficient and most apt for having such predetermination and
predestination. Thus, it is sufficiently clear how this foreknowledge must be
presupposed in both opinions for the aforementioned mode of predestination.
9. Why this knowledge is required without predetermination. Others do not think
that there should be posited in God the predetermination of any free act in particular
and with all its circumstances, nor of any effect that intrinsically depends on free acts.
Therefore, they consequently deny that predestination is made through the mode of
singular predetermination, nor through an absolute decree of giving glory that precedes
foreseen merits. Nevertheless, these authors, to preserve true and gratuitous
34 BOOK ONE
predestination, think that conditional knowledge is necessary. Not indeed so that God
efficaciously elects men to glory before foreseen merits, nor so that He predetermines
free acts, but so that by certain knowledge and mere will, through certain and
efficacious means, He directs man to eternal life, and thus there is room for voluntary
election to such an order of calling grace and subsequent aids, in which man is infallibly
justified and glorified.
10. The reason is clear, because without this foreknowledge, God cannot will to give
any aid as efficacious or as infallibly having an effect, because if God does not have that
knowledge, He knows no aid as efficacious or infallible before He sees its efficacy
through the knowledge of vision, which knowledge of vision presupposes the decree
of giving such aid. Therefore, before such a decree, God knows no aid as efficacious;
therefore, He does not will to give it as efficacious, because nothing is willed unless it is
foreknown. Therefore, there is no true predestination before the actual foreknowledge
of the good use of free will through the knowledge of vision. Nor does God, on the
part of His will, have greater benevolence toward the predestined than toward the
reprobate, because it can happen that He gives and offers equal aids to both, and then
He foresees in one that it has an effect and not in the other. Hence, it finally happens
that the distinction of the predestined from the reprobate is not from the direct
intention of God but only from the foreknowledge as consequent to the absolute
futurition of the effect. And similarly, it follows that so many or so few are saved, and
such or such perfection of each is not in the divine predetermination but only from the
foreknowledge and, as it were, subsequent approval and acceptance. All these things the
aforementioned opinions strive to avoid, and for this, they think the aforementioned
foreknowledge is necessary. In this, they indeed speak consistently, but undeservedly
and not sufficiently consistently, they deny the predeterminations of free acts and the
mode of predestination according to them, as I said in the third book On Divine
Aid and as we will see below.
11. The absurdity of Catharinus's opinion. Hence, Catharinus, who did not
acknowledge this conditional foreknowledge, greatly erred in the matter of
predestination. For he held that some are saved by efficacious predestination and divine
predetermination, while others are saved without it. Therefore, he said that the former
are predestined, while the latter are said to be saved without predestination, by the
common providence of grace. For on the part of the will of God, he did not believe
there was any difference between those who are thus saved and those who are
condemned. For to both, God gives (as he thinks) sufficient prevenient aids and offers
concomitant aids through the antecedent will. But these aids have an effect in the
former unto eternal salvation because they cooperate, while in the latter they do not
because they resist. But both are unknown to God (so to speak) by the force of His
35 BOOK ONE
will, or in that sign in which He has an operative will of salvation concerning both, until
through the knowledge of vision He sees the diversity and accepts it. Therefore, there
(he says) the proper predestination of those who are thus saved does not intervene, so
that he denies that God has a peculiar benevolence, greater toward them than toward
others who are not saved, which God has from Himself and antecedently, which the
term predestination signifies. But concerning the other elect, he says that they are truly
predestined; however, he admits that they are saved by a kind of necessity. And thus in
that kind of necessity, he must admit conditional knowledge, not indeed of contingent
effects as such, but of necessary effects in the cause inducing the necessity of such
effects. But how he connects this with the freedom of such effects or with the mode of
freely obtaining eternal happiness in these men, he never sufficiently explains, and
sometimes he seems to succumb and not to think well about their freedom. How many
absurdities and inconveniences this doctrine contains is sufficiently clear in itself and
will be evident from what follows. For now, they are only mentioned so that it may be
understood how great is the necessity of this knowledge for not erring in the matter of
predestination.
12. Another mode of explaining the necessity of this knowledge. Finally, others hold
concerning predestination that it is done through a certain efficacious intention of
God, by which He elects all who are to be saved to glory before all foreseen merits.
However, they deny that predestination is done by the absolute predetermination of all
free acts in particular, as they are future means to obtain the glory to which one is
elected. For they think that this kind of predetermination takes away freedom if it is
done with respect to an aid that by itself predetermines the human will to the
predetermined act. And excluding this mode of predetermination, they think it
impossible for God to have conditional and infallible knowledge of such acts in
particular, and without it, they think it impossible for the effect to be predetermined. In
this, they speak consistently and acknowledge the necessity of this foreknowledge for
true predestination.
13. If it is asked of them how God efficaciously provides His elect with the means to
glory so that they infallibly attain it, since He cannot provide what He does not have in
His foreknowledge, they respond that He does not provide them indefinitely and
determinately with this or that particular means, as if through it they would certainly be
saved. Rather, He provides one means through the antecedent will, so that if the elect
man consents, he will be saved through it. And then, if God foresees that free will will
consent, He already knows that His will will infallibly be fulfilled. But if He knows that
free will will resist, then He foresees another means, and if that does not succeed, He
provides another, and in this way He persists and continues, as it were, aiding
opportunely and importunely until He finally achieves the effect. This mode of
36 BOOK ONE
speaking is usually attributed to St. Thomas in De Veritate, Question 6, Article 3, where
he seems to explain predestination in this way.
14. Nevertheless, even if this mode were admitted, some conditional knowledge
would still be necessary for this mode of predestination. This is proven by the
reasoning above, that no one efficaciously and infallibly intends an end unless he is
certain of the means by which he will infallibly attain it. Therefore, in that sign in which
God has such an election of the predestined, He is understood to have in His
foreknowledge the means prepared by which He can most certainly save freely the one
He has chosen. Therefore, through such knowledge, He foreknows that if He gives
such means to that man, he will be converted, persevere, and be saved. Thus, He has
conditional knowledge. But the difference lies in the mode, because according to that
knowledge, this foreknowledge is not of the infallibility of any particular means
distinctly, but only in a general and confused way. Therefore, according to this opinion,
God does not foreknow: "If I give this or that aid here and now, this man will be
converted or perform such an act." Yet He knows that if He follows this man with
these aids (so to speak), he will eventually consent, and so on. For just as in the effect, it
is at least necessary that such an election be brought to its end, so in foreknowledge it is
necessary that the divine will can determine itself to such an election.
15. The critique of the preceding opinion. From the very explanation of this
opinion, it can easily be seen how unworthy it is of belief. For first, to attribute to God
that confused knowledge by which He knows that He can lead the human will to the
end He intends by this or that aid, even though He does not know determinately by
which aid He will achieve it or through which act men will be saved—who does not see
that this is very alien to divine perfection? Next, that mode of providing, as if trying
various means, so that if one does not succeed, another is applied, is also most
imperfect and hardly befitting God. Moreover, the certainty of that confused
foreknowledge, which is not founded on a distinct cognition and intuition of the future
determined effect, can scarcely be sufficiently grounded if it must be such that its
opposite implies a contradiction, which is truly necessary for divine predetermination to
take place. For it implies a contradiction that the will of God, predetermining
something absolutely, should not be fulfilled; therefore, it cannot rely except on
foreknowledge so certain that its opposite implies a contradiction. But that
foreknowledge, since it is not in the effect itself and in the objective presence of its
truth, must be only in the cause. But the cause is nothing other than a multitude of aids,
none of which is posited as efficacious by itself or as physically premoving the will,
whence it is not repugnant to any of them not to have an effect; therefore, it does not
imply a contradiction that from the whole collection, as far as it depends on the force
of the aids, the effect does not follow. Therefore, knowledge in such a cause is not
37 BOOK ONE
sufficient for the divine will to predetermine absolutely something that will not be
effected except through such means. Therefore, that confused foreknowledge must not
be admitted, but particular and distinct knowledge is necessary for divine pre-election,
predetermination, and true predestination to take place.
16. Therefore, I could never persuade myself that St. Thomas spoke in that sense
in De Veritate, so that he thought God proceeds to the execution of His intention like a
man, either in time or in the eternal disposition of His providence, establishing that He
will give one means, not knowing whether it will be efficacious, with the intention that
if it does not succeed, He will apply another. For this cannot be said, according to faith,
concerning temporal execution, because God already foreknew from eternity through
the knowledge of vision and absolutely which means would be efficacious or
inefficacious. Nor should it be said in the eternal disposition of divine providence,
because it would also be a very imperfect mode of providing, since it supposes a certain
mode of ignorance and consequently attributes to God a blind providence concerning
individual means, because He decides to apply such a means, not knowing for that sign
whether it will be efficacious or inefficacious, and thus He posits God as proceeding, as
it were, by trial in His providence, even in that by which He procures the principal
effects that are primarily predetermined. Finally, it denies to God the power to
predetermine and to will from Himself and efficaciously some free act of the human
will in particular and with all its circumstances. All these things seem absurd and very
contrary to Augustine in the Enchiridion, in the book On the Predestination of the
Saints, in On the Gift of Perseverance, and in many other places.
17. St. Thomas is explained. God does not ignore the defect of an inefficacious
means, but He applies an inefficacious means before an efficacious one on account of
His providence. Therefore, I think St. Thomas only wanted to explain how, with the
predetermination and determination of the end to be infallibly attained, there can be
freedom in the means. For indeed, such indifference can remain in them, so that
although one fails in its effect, another is applied, and so on, until some means effects
what is intended. He says that God observes this mode of providence with the man
whom He has infallibly ordained to attain glory, for He prepares so many aids for him
that he either does not fall or, if he falls, he rises again. However, St. Thomas did not
say or suggest that God, in that sign in which He disposes of these means in His
eternal providence, is ignorant of whether such a means will be inefficacious or
whether the man will fall, even if it is given. Rather, he says that God so conducts
Himself to preserve freedom and for other ends of His wisdom. Thus, although He
foreknows this, He nevertheless gives such a means and permits a fall in His elect,
because God Himself foreknew by what other means that evil could be repaired and
that it would be repaired with effect. Therefore, God provides one means for the failure
38 BOOK ONE
of another, not because He was ignorant of the future defect even before He decided
to give such an aid, but because it is expedient for the wisdom of His providence, and
He so conducts Himself in the indifference of means and the preservation of freedom
that predestination sometimes gives an inefficacious aid, as if He did not know the
future outcome of such a means if it is applied, and in due time He provides an
efficacious aid that infallibly works the intended effect, as if it were a necessary cause.
18. This knowledge is prior in the order of reason to the decree. Therefore, from
what has been said, the necessity of this knowledge for proper predestination and
divine predetermination is sufficiently proven. Hence it is clear that such knowledge,
according to the order of reason, is prior to the decree of predestination, because this
priority consists only in a certain order of necessary presupposition, in the way that the
intellect is said to be prior to the will. That this presupposition is necessary is proven by
all that we have said.
19. The reason for the doubt is resolved. This knowledge is not said to be initiated or
perfected in the predestined before the decree. This knowledge does not presuppose a
decree concerning the conditioned object. Nor does the reason for doubting the
contrary stand in the way, for we admit that this knowledge is not predestination itself
nor does it intrinsically pertain to it, because this knowledge is necessary on the part of
God and in its way natural, whereas predestination is a free act. Hence, until God is
understood to elicit some free decree, He is not understood to initiate, much less
perfect, predestination. I say this as far as it concerns God, because on the part of the
object, this knowledge has some contingency, insofar as its object could, absolutely
speaking, not be future, and if it were not future, such knowledge would not be in God
according to that peculiar respect. But given the truth of the object, such knowledge is
necessarily in God. Hence, because it presupposes no free decree in God, we say that it
is natural and necessary on the part of God and therefore does not intrinsically pertain
to predestination. We are not unaware that some say that this knowledge presupposes in
God some free decree concerning the conditioned object, but I presuppose that this is
false, as I have proven elsewhere and perhaps will say again in the course of this work.
And for the present matter, it makes no difference, because such a decree, since it is
conditioned on the part of the object and simply posits nothing in being, does not
pertain to divine providence per se, and therefore much less can it pertain to
predestination, and consequently, neither can that conditional foreknowledge be
predestination, even if it were founded on it. Hence, it is also clear that this knowledge
does not pertain in any way to the effects of predestination, either as an effect or as a
quasi-effect, since it precedes and is not free on the part of God. Therefore, it remains
that it is in some way a reason or prior condition for predestination.
39 BOOK ONE
20. The objection of some is resolved. This knowledge is not a necessary condition
on the part of man but of God. Nor does it follow from this that there is a cause or
reason for predestination on the part of man's merits, as some vehemently object. They
do not notice that the same argument can be made against those who admit this
foreknowledge in the premoving aid. For although it is imagined that such an aid is
given, it is never to be proposed as excluding the true reason of merits, as is certain
from faith. Therefore, God, before He predestines a man through such aids, foresees
that the same man will merit glory if such premoving aids are given to him. And yet it
does not follow that God predestines the man because of such merits, but rather that
He predestines him through such merits. Therefore, neither does it follow in our
opinion, because it matters little for the force of the inference whether that
foreknowledge is in the cause or in the truth of the future event. Therefore, that
knowledge is not prior to predestination as a necessary condition on the part of man
but on the part of God: that is, it is not necessary because it presents or proposes to
the divine will some reason on the part of man that moves Him by way of man's merit
to predestine him, because in a thing that neither is nor is known as ever future, such a
motivating reason cannot be founded. Therefore, it is only necessary that that object be
proposed to God as predeterminable, as infallibly future, and that it can have the nature
of an efficacious means in the mind of God, so that it may be chosen under that nature
or even intended as a proximate end. Hence, it does not follow that there is in that
object any other moving reason besides the final one, which is not repugnant to
predestination, as I will say below. For God predestines a man, not because he has or
will have merits, but so that he may have them and be holy, according to that saying:
"He predestined us to be holy."
21. The necessity of conditional knowledge is not for the effect but for
predestination. Finally, it must be added and very carefully considered that it is one
thing for this knowledge to be per se and simply necessary for the effects that are
predestined, considered per se, and another for it to be necessary for predestination and
consequently for the effects themselves, as they come to be from predestination. For so
far, we have only spoken of the latter, from which the former does not follow. Nor is it
strictly true, because predestination or predetermination is not necessary on the part of
the effect simply considered, so that the effects may at some time come to be. For evil
acts are not predetermined, and yet they come to be without predetermination.
Therefore, as far as it concerns their own part and the mere production of the effect,
good acts could in the same way come to be without predetermination and
predestination properly understood. Therefore, from the fact that this foreknowledge is
necessary for predetermination, it does not follow that it is necessary for the
predetermined effect itself, considered in itself. The reason a priori is that for the effect
40 BOOK ONE
to be future, it is sufficient that God wills to give to the created will all the principles
necessary for such an act, according to its exigency, and that He offers on His part the
necessary concurrence of the same order as the act, and that He permits the will to
operate, ready to aid it if it does not fail. For, these things being posited, precisely and
without any other addition, it stands that the effect will be future or will follow, with
free will cooperating. But all these things can be posited without the absolute
predetermination of the act itself, as far as it concerns the act considered in itself.
Hence, all these things being posited under a condition without any other
predetermination, or being posited or included in the condition, suffice for God to
foreknow what the will would do if such a condition were posited. Therefore, for the
futurition of such an effect on its part, such foreknowledge is not necessary. Yet this
foreknowledge is necessary for divine predetermination on the part of God Himself,
because nothing can be willed unless it is foreknown, as has been explained. For just as
in men, providence can be more perfect, and the preordination and election of the will
more secure, the greater the knowledge of the efficacy of the means (which knowledge
in naturally operating means arises from perfect knowledge of their virtue, but in
contingent means it usually arises from greater experience of the past and greater
power of conjecturing the future from the past or from other indications), so in God,
the highest and singular providence, by which the means are predetermined by absolute
decrees, presupposes knowledge of their future efficacy if such means are applied, in
which knowledge the said conditional knowledge is contained.

CHAPTER VIII. WHETHER THE

ABSOLUTE WILL TO GIVE GLORY TO THE ELECT IS
THE FIRST ACT THAT GOD HAS TOWARD THOSE WHO ARE SAVED.

1. The state of the question. Having explained the knowledge that must necessarily
be presupposed in the divine intellect before the whole of predestination, we must now
discuss the acts of the will. For just as formal freedom resides solely in the will, so too
it is clear that predestination either resides in the will or takes its beginning from some
act of the will. Since, therefore, glory or beatitude is the end of grace and all its gifts,
and the end is usually loved before the means, we must consider whether the first act
that the divine will has toward men, who at least will attain salvation with effect,
concerns glory itself prior in reason to the means of divine grace. To remove ambiguity
in terms, I presuppose that we are speaking of the absolute and efficacious will, and not
merely of the will of simple complacency. For no one doubts that some will must
precede, but this can be a simple affection or conditioned will, which God also has
toward those who are not saved. This is also called, in a certain sense, the will of
41 BOOK ONE
benevolence, because God has it from Himself, and through it He wills a great good for
man, as far as it depends on Him. What we are inquiring, therefore, is whether,
concerning men who are saved, God does not have only such a simple affection but
rather an absolute decree concerning their happiness, so efficacious that, once posited,
it is infallible that they will be saved. This decree of God is usually called in Scripture,
by antonomasia, "the good will of God," "His good pleasure," "election," and
"purpose." There is some controversy about whether these terms signify different
things, which we will discuss briefly in Chapter 10. For now, abstracting from that
question, we will use these terms indifferently.
2. The reason for the doubt. The reason for doubting is that either this love of God
is necessary for men to be saved, or it is not. The first cannot be said; therefore, such
love should not be posited in God. The minor premise is proven because if such love is
necessary for salvation, those whom God does not love in this way cannot be saved,
since they do not have from God all things necessary for salvation, without which they
cannot be saved. The consequence is proven because if such an act is not necessary,
first, it is posited without foundation, since it is neither derived from revelation nor
inferred from its effects. Second, it is superfluous, because God necessarily has another
will to give them glory on account of foreseen merits, since in time He confers it on
account of merits; therefore, from eternity He willed to give it on account of the same
merits already foreknown. Therefore, another act that precedes the foreknowledge of
merits is superfluous. Indeed, from this it seems further concluded that such an act is
impossible, because by its force no change occurs in the creature, since whatever is in
the predestined can happen without it. But in the divine will, no free act can exist
except through some change in the creature. This is clear because from such an act
arises some new relation between God and the creature, at least of relation. But a new
relation between two extremes cannot exist without a change in one of them. Yet
through such an act, God is not changed; therefore, the creature must be changed.
Therefore, if the act is not necessary for the change in the creature, it is not possible.
3. The first opinion. In this matter, the first opinion denies that God has a decree to
give glory that is both absolute and, in some sign of reason, either precedes or follows
the foreknowledge and will of merits and other graces conferred on the predestined.
Hence, the authors of this opinion say that, presupposing the knowledge of simple
understanding and the conditional knowledge of future contingents, God consummates
the predestination of each man to be saved by a single, most simple decree. By this
decree, He wills for him a certain series of means, through which, by the said
knowledge, He foreknew that the man would infallibly attain glory if such means were
conferred on him. Therefore, through this will, God wills grace and glory for the
predestined, but not glory prior in reason to the means of grace.
42 BOOK ONE
The first reason for the opinion. Their foundation is that God wills all these things
with a necessary connection. For He wills glory in such a way that He does not will it
without merits, and He wills merits in such a way that He does not will them without
His calling, aid, and our cooperation. Therefore, it is impossible for the absolute will to
give glory to the predestined to precede in any sign of reason. The consequence is clear,
both because what cannot exist without another is not simply prior, and also because
such a will, if conceived as prior, must necessarily be conceived as conditioned, namely,
if he will have merits or if he will cooperate until death.
4. The opinion is rejected. This opinion has no firm foundation and is not apt for
explaining the reasons of divine providence and predestination, which we cannot
explain without some order of priority and posteriority founded in the relation or
causality of the effects among themselves. Therefore, either this opinion denies in
general these signs of reason in the will and intellect of God, or it does not. The first is
against the common opinion of theologians, which, I think, has been sufficiently
proven in the first volume, third part, disputation 5, section 1. Nor do the said authors
seem to intend this, for they admit that Christ the Lord was predestined prior in reason
to other men, and in the reprobate, God first foresaw and consequently permitted their
sins before He willed their damnation. But if these signs are not denied in general, they
cannot be denied in the present matter, for under that decree are comprehended many
objects subordinated among themselves as end and means. Therefore, it is necessary to
understand that the end is intended prior in reason to the election of the means,
because the end is willed for its own sake, but the means are willed for the sake of the
end. Hence, in the order of intention, the means depend on the intended end, but the
end does not depend on the elected means. Therefore, it is necessary to understand that
the will of God, as it concerns glory, is prior in reason to His will concerning the
benefits of grace, which He elects as means. This is confirmed and clarified because
through that conditional knowledge, God knew not only one order of means by which
He could infallibly lead the elect to such glory but many, and perhaps infinite, orders.
Therefore, that decree, as determined to glory, is per se independent of the acceptance
of this or that order of means. Therefore, in itself, it is prior to the will to give such
determined means.
5. A response to the foundation of the opinion. Hence, it is easy to respond to the
foundation of that opinion, taken from the connection of the means. For we deny that
the will to give glory is necessarily joined with the election of such means, since another
election would suffice to fulfill that intention. Next, although the will of the means or
merits and graces is virtually included in that intention, it is not formally included,
which is sufficient for it to be prior in reason, just as in us the intention of the end also
virtually includes the will of the means, at least in general, and yet it is simply prior to
43 BOOK ONE
the election of the means. And in us, it can be prior in time due to our imperfection;
therefore, in God, it will be prior according to reason. Finally, for the same reason, that
decree, as precisely determined to glory, is not conditioned but absolute, because
although the effect of glory to be conferred in reality does not exist unless such a cause
or condition is posited, yet this very condition is also absolutely willed, at least implicitly
and virtually through that act. Or, to put it another way (and it amounts to the same
thing), that act concerning the end is such that it obliges the will to elect some
efficacious means by which that efficacious intention may be fulfilled. When, however,
the decree concerning the end is of this kind, and when the condition itself is
comprehended in this way under its object, the act cannot be called conditioned but
absolute with respect to its adequate object. Just as in natural effects, when God intends
rain, for example, and therefore ordains the causes that raise vapors and gather clouds,
that intention is absolute, according to the opinion of all, although the effect is not
posited without this or that condition. For that very intention so virtually includes this
condition that it infallibly infers from itself the necessary providence that such a
condition be posited, and this is a manifest sign of an absolute will. Thus, it is with that
decree concerning the predestined.
6. Objection. But they say that between the will of the end and the means, there is no
order of priority and posteriority, even according to reason, except where between the
intention and the election of the means there intervenes an inquiry into the means and
finally an election. But in God, this imperfection is not found; rather, before every will
of the end and the means, there is presupposed in Him the most perfect
comprehension and actual consideration of all the means by which man can be
infallibly led to glory if it is efficaciously elected. Therefore, just as in God it is not
necessary that the love of glory be prior in reason to the foreknowledge of efficacious
means, so too it is not necessary that this love, as terminated to the end, be prior in
reason to the love terminated to the means. This is confirmed and clarified because the
end in operables or lovables is related to the principles in speculables. But although
God knows the effect through the cause, He does not know the cause before the effect,
because He knows the effect in the cause. Therefore, similarly, although He wills the
end through the means and the means on account of the end, He does not will the
ends before the means. For just as in knowledge there is no causality, even according to
reason, between the knowledge of the cause and the effect, but the relation of cause
and effect is only in the objects themselves among themselves, so too between the will
of the end and the means on the part of the divine act, there is no causality, even
according to reason, but the whole relation is between the things willed themselves.
7. Solution. An attribute that is the reason for another is prior to it. I respond, first,
that it is false to assume that there must be a consultation between the intention of the
44 BOOK ONE
end and the election of the means for there to be an order of reason between them.
This is proven first. Indeed, in God, for one attribute to be prior in reason to another, it
is sufficient that, according to eminent containment and virtual distinction of reason,
one is the reason for the other, just as the intellect is prior in reason to the will, and
mercy is said to be prior to justice, nor is it necessary that something else intervene
between them. Therefore, also among free acts, for one to be prior to another, it is
sufficient that they can be distinguished in reason with a foundation in reality on
account of the distinction of objects and virtual contingency, and that one is the reason
for the other, even if no other third act, whether of the same or another power,
intervenes between them. Thus, the intention of the end and the election of the means
are related, whether they are entirely efficacious and absolute or in some way
conditioned, because the means, as means, are not elected except on account of the
intended end. And thus the reason for willing the means, on the part of the one
electing, is the intention of the end; therefore, it is necessary that the intention be
presupposed according to reason.
8. Nor does it matter that the end is willed dependently on the means, for every end
has this, that it is willed in some way dependently on the means. Therefore, either the
absolute intention of the end never precedes in us in the order of nature the election
of the means, which cannot be said, or this does not prevent the efficacious intention
of the end from preceding in God according to the order of reason. The reason is that
this dependence of the end on the means is in execution, not in intention. Therefore, it
does not prevent the end, which is not to be acquired except through the means, from
being intended in itself before the means are elected or accepted for it. This is
especially so because sometimes those means are multiple, and by the force of the
intention of the end, this rather than that is not necessarily elected, but from the
freedom of the will. Therefore, it is rightly understood that the will is efficaciously
determined to the end prior in reason to certain means. And it is sufficient, as I said,
that in that intention the will of the means in general is virtually included without
determination to these or those. Hence, when it happens that the means is only one,
this is accidental and does not take away that the reason for the intention is per se
independent of the determined will of the means, and this is entirely sufficient for the
propriety of reason.
9. Second, unless we say this, we will never be able to distinguish in God that one
thing is prior in reason to another on account of the mere relation of the end.
Therefore, we will not rightly say that God willed the glory and exaltation of Christ
prior in reason to His passion, because in reality He did not will the glory and exaltation
of Christ except as to be acquired through the passion. I am speaking of the glory of
the body, for He acquired it through His merits; therefore, God also so ordained and
45 BOOK ONE
willed it. Similarly, it follows that God did not will Christ to be a man prior to willing
the Virgin to be the Mother of God and sending the angel to her and that she would
give her consent, because He did not will the Incarnation except dependently on these
means, as it was to be posited in reality. And for the same reason, we will not be able to
say that God first elected the Virgin to be the Mother of God before He decreed to
sanctify her in her mother's womb and to preserve her as a virgin, innocent, and
humble, because He did not will that dignity for her except dependently on these means
and dispositions, indeed even on her free consent. But it is clear that all these things are
most rightly said, even though in them God does not proceed from intention to
consultation and thence to election. Therefore, that foundation is of no moment for
taking away the order of reason.
10. Third, I add that even in men, it is not necessary that consultation intervene
between intention and election for there to be an order not only of reason but also of
causality, nature, or time between those two acts. For they are really distinct, even if
consultation does not intervene, and they have an order per se, so that one arises from
the other. Therefore, this is sufficient for the order of nature. I explain this as follows.
Let us posit a most wise and prudent man who, before he establishes anything about
attaining or procuring some end, for example, about salvation, dignity, etc., knows very
well all the means by which such an end can be procured and at the same time knows
which means are better, more difficult, or more suitable. Therefore, this man, if he
begins to will, first establishes the end before the means, and in him the intention of
the end precedes, at least in the order of nature, the election of the means. Indeed, it
can rather happen that a quasi-speculative consultation precedes the intention of the
end really conceived, and that, having made a judgment about the whole utility or
suitability of the means, the will begins its deliberation both about the end and about
the means. And yet even then it begins with the end, and the intention of the end will
be prior in reason to the election of the means, because even then it is the cause or
reason for it. Such is the knowledge in God, which precedes all free acts, for it is
formally quasi-speculative, yet sufficient on the part of the objects, which it proposes to
excite the effect or to propose to the will the objects toward which it tends. Therefore,
the objects themselves, by their nature, demand it, for the knowledge that precedes
cannot prevent in God the order of reason in the acts of the will, because that order
neither is repugnant to God in Himself nor is otherwise repugnant to those acts for any
general reason, as has been shown in men.
11. Objection. It is satisfied. You will say that in God, not only does the knowledge
of the suitability or utility of the means precede, but also the conditional knowledge of
the future event by the force of such means, if applied, precedes, which knowledge in
man does not precede. I respond, first, that this is impertinent, because that knowledge
46 BOOK ONE
of future things under a condition does not help the intention or election in any other
way than by proposing such means, not only as useful possibly but also as certain or as
infallibly serving for the attainment of the end. But this does not take away that the end
is the reason for willing such means, whatever they may be and however they are
known. Therefore, it does not take away the order of reason, which is founded
precisely in such a reason for willing. Next, I add that even in man, a similar knowledge
proportioned to man can precede. For if the means is a natural cause acting, it can be
known with certainty what it will do if applied. If, however, it is a free or contingent
cause, it can at least be prejudged by conjectural and probable knowledge what such a
cause will do in such an occasion. This knowledge suffices for man for his election,
because it is for our uncertain providence, and thus the same proportion is preserved.
Finally, although it happens in man that this conditional knowledge, most certainly
known, precedes, if such an end is intended, it is entirely necessary to elect such a
means. Nevertheless, the human will determining both acts begins by intending the end,
and that intention precedes in reason the election of the means, however necessary,
because it is in its way the cause of it. And although it is imagined that it is not a proper
cause, but that man then wills the end and the means in one act, nevertheless, according
to the reason of such an act, it is first terminated to the end before the means, because
that for which each thing is such, that is more so, and that is also prior.
12. In God, there can be found knowledge that intervenes between the will of the
end and the means. Finally, I add that, although we gratuitously grant that some
knowledge must intervene between the will of the end and the means for there to be an
order between them, this is found in God in some way and without imperfection,
through the mere respect and relation of reason. I explain this as follows. In God, the
knowledge of absolute future things is after the free decree of God, and much more so
is all knowledge of vision, whether this is of creatures existing outside God or of the
free acts of God Himself as terminated to creatures. For God, after He wills freely to
produce something outside Himself, immediately knows that He wills it, seeing in
Himself the free decree, which He did not see before in reason, as now present and
elicited, in our manner of speaking. Thus, therefore, while He intends to give Peter
glory, He sees in Himself this intention. This vision and knowledge can most rightly
and deservedly be understood as mediating between that intention of the end and the
will of the means. Therefore, some knowledge already intervenes, which much more
constitutes the order of reason between that intention and the will of the means. The
minor is proven because the will of the means is not applied to such a will of the
means by the force of the end, considered in itself alone, but as willed, for the end does
not move absolutely to willing the means on account of itself except as already willed
for its own sake or in itself. Therefore, it is necessary that to the election as such, there
47 BOOK ONE
precede knowledge of the end, not only as good but also as already willed. Therefore, it
is necessary that there precede knowledge of the free intention itself, through which the
end is willed. Therefore, that knowledge intervenes according to reason between the
election and the intention.
13. From these things, therefore, the objection made is sufficiently answered. As for
the example of the knowledge of effects in the cause, it can first be said that the
knowledge of the cause is also prior in reason to the knowledge of the effect in it.
Next, it is said that the reason is not entirely the same, because the effects are entirely
determined in the cause, and therefore the cause, as such, is not known except with a
relation to the effects. But the end does not determine certain means from itself, as has
been explained. It must be known, however, that all that we have adduced indeed
proves that there is no reason for denying in God an order of reason between the
intention of glory and the election of grace, which is the means to glory. Yet it does not
prove that that intention must be efficacious, which remains to be disputed now with
other authors. There we will also examine another point of this first opinion, insofar as
it denies that the decree to give glory is posterior to the foreknowledge of merits and
the will to give the predestined grace and other means to attain glory, for this is proven
to us, as we will say in the following opinion.
14. The Second Opinion: The Will of Justice is Subsequent to the Will of
Mercy. The second opinion teaches that the absolute will to give glory does not exist in
God prior to the foreseen merits, and consequently not before the will to give grace,
from which those merits proceed. However, after this foreknowledge and the will
regarding merits and grace, there follows in God the will to give glory. Between these
wills, there is an order of reason, and in this order, the will to give glory is subsequent.
In this latter part, this opinion differs from the preceding one, and I find it very
pleasing insofar as we believe that God had some will to give glory to the elect after
their foreseen merits and after the will to give grace. I consider this to be the common
opinion, and it cannot be denied, as I will demonstrate below. Now, it is briefly shown
that we cannot deny the existence in God of a will to give glory, which is an act of
justice, whether commutative or distributive. Just as it is certain that there is in God a
will to punish and inflict eternal punishment, which is an act of vindicative justice, so
too this will to give glory cannot be had except after foreseen merits with final
perseverance in grace. This foreknowledge presupposes the will to give grace and
merits; therefore, such a will to give glory is subsequent both to that foreknowledge and
to the will to give grace. Thus, the will of justice is subsequent to the will of mercy, as
Augustine extensively argues in his work On Grace and Free Will, chapters 5, 6, 7, and
8. Similarly, in the damned, the will to punish, which is an act of justice, presupposes
the knowledge of future sins, and this presupposes the will to permit, which is not an
48 BOOK ONE
act of special mercy but of common providence. Whether this will to give glory, owed
on account of foreseen merits, pertains to predestination or follows from it, is a
question more about the manner of speaking than about the reality, which I will discuss
below.
15. The First Part of This Opinion, Which Denies an Absolute Will to Give Glory to
the Predestined Prior to the Absolute Foreknowledge of Their Merits, Must Now Be
Discussed. For there have been ancient theologians who held this opinion, among
whom Major is mentioned, though undeservedly, as I will say below. Argentina held this
view in 1 Sent., dist. 41, art. 2, where St. Bonaventure also strongly favors it, as does
Alexander of Hales in Summa Theologica, Part 1, q. 28, Memb. 2, art. 2, and some
modern theologians consistently defend it. They do not deny that the intention of the
end precedes the election of means in some order of reason, but they say that this
intention is not absolute, nor is it only about the predestined, but equally about the
reprobate, and the distinction between them lies in the will regarding the means.
However, they posit a difference between natural and free effects, or between ends
attained through natural causes or free causes. In natural effects, the absolute and
efficacious intention of God regarding the end precedes, by virtue of which the means
are applied, because the connection of the means to the end can be necessary. But
when the end is to be attained through merits or free means, they say it is repugnant for
the absolute intention of the end to precede. To confirm this opinion, they adduce
various testimonies from Augustine, which I now omit, along with other conjectures,
about which I have spoken more extensively elsewhere.
16. The First Argument for the Second Opinion. There are two fundamental
arguments. The first is that such an absolute will of God, preceding the absolute
foreknowledge of merits or free cooperation, would impose a necessity repugnant to
freedom. The consequence is proven because, given this will, it is impossible for the
effect not to follow; therefore, it follows necessarily. Nor is it sufficient to say that this
is only a necessity of consequence, or in the composite sense, which does not conflict
with freedom. For according to Anselm in his work On the Harmony of
Foreknowledge and Predestination, necessity from supposition is simply necessity when
the supposition is antecedent and precedes human freedom, because then it is not
within the power of the human. For if the consequence is necessary, and the
antecedent is not within my power, the consequent is also not within my power but
follows necessarily and simply. That absolute will of God is posited as preceding free
consent; therefore, it removes freedom.
17. The Second Argument. The second argument is that if God from eternity willed
efficaciously to give glory to some purely gratuitously and without foreseen merits, He
would also give it gratuitously and without merits in time, because He gives in time as
49 BOOK ONE
He decreed in eternity. But it is certain according to faith that glory is not given
gratuitously in time, especially to adults; therefore, neither was it so decreed in eternity.
18. The Second Opinion is Challenged. Regarding the conclusion of this opinion, I
will speak below. But its first foundation greatly displeases me, for it supposes this
principle: that God cannot absolutely predefine an act or effect to be freely
accomplished in time or through free means unless He first, according to reason, sees
absolutely that this effect will be future. This is primarily contrary to almost all
theologians, especially the ancients, as I will shortly relate. Secondly, I demonstrate by
various examples that this is false. First, it is certain that God, in the same moment in
which He predestined Christ as God-man, predestined Him to be glorious in soul and
body, as is taken from Augustine in Tractate 105 on John, at the end, even though in
time He did not have the glory of the body without His merits. Similarly, before God
foresaw the death of Christ as future, He preordained Him efficaciously as the
redeemer of the human race, although this office was to be fulfilled only through free
works. Therefore, there is in God a predefinition to the use of free acts before the
absolute foreknowledge of their future occurrence.
19. Second, the Most Blessed Virgin was chosen before the foreknowledge of all her
merits to be the Mother of God, although she did not obtain this dignity without her
free consent or without some merit, at least congruous merit. Compelled by this
example, the authors of the contrary opinion also admit here that this will of God was
not absolute but only a simple affection, by which He desired this woman to conceive
the divine Word, not by which He efficaciously predefined it. But certainly, they conflict
with the common manner of speaking of the saints, who call this will an election.
Indeed, the Church says: "God chose her and pre-chose her." But election (according to
the common sense received in moral matters) signifies an absolute will.
20. Then, before the foreknowledge of the merits or free acts of the Virgin, God by
His absolute will predefined the Word to take flesh, but He did not predefined this only
confusedly in general, but also particularly, that He would take this flesh, not from
nothing, but from a woman, and from such a woman, both because the perfect
disposition of divine providence demands it, and because the benefit of the
Incarnation was from the wisdom and charity of God alone, especially regarding its
principal circumstances, one of which is the conception from such a woman.
Therefore, God predefined and predestined all this from Himself. For this reason, I
have said elsewhere that the predestination of the Virgin to divine motherhood was
most closely connected with the predestination of Christ. Indeed, it is very probable
that in the same moment of reason, Christ was predestined as man and as the Son of
the Virgin, and simultaneously predestined to take flesh and to take it from the most
pure blood of the Virgin, and thus the predestination of Christ was terminated to the
50 BOOK ONE
Virgin, at least secondarily, as to the term of His relation, insofar as He is the Son of
Man. Or certainly, even if two moments of reason are distinguished—one in which
God willed the Word to become man, and another in which He willed to receive
humanity from such a woman—it is not probable that between these two moments the
foreseen merits of the Virgin intervened, and that on account of them God absolutely
decreed this mode of taking flesh, but just as He decreed the first from His will alone,
so also the second. For just as the first was the root of all the merits of all men, and
therefore its predestination could not fall under human merits, so the second is the root
of all the merits and all the graces given to the Virgin, and therefore its predestination
could not fall under her merit. And it is finally confirmed because God, by His absolute
will, predefined the time, hour, and moment of the Incarnation, according to that
saying of Paul to the Galatians (4:4): "When the fullness of time had come," which all
understand to have been predefined by God. Therefore, much more did He absolutely
predefined the motherhood of the Virgin, especially since the fact that the Incarnation
occurred at such a moment was no less dependent on the free consent of the Virgin
than that it occurred from her.
21. A Certain Evasion. It could be responded differently that God indeed predefined
and absolutely chose the Virgin as the Mother of God because these effects per se did
not depend on the free consent of the Virgin, nor did God in that moment predefined
to do these things through such consent, but absolutely. Hence, even if, per impossibile,
the Blessed Virgin had not given her consent, nevertheless, by the force of that decree,
she would have been made the Mother of God. And then her motherhood would not
have been in any way the reward of her merit, as it now is. Yet this would not have been
contrary to that decree by which the Blessed Virgin was predestined or chosen for
divine motherhood, because she had not been chosen for motherhood under the aspect
of a benefit. And thus, that predefinition, as such, is not about an effect per se
dependent on the free use of the predestined human. And therefore, it is not the same
reasoning as that concerning election to beatitude, because, as I will say below, God
never predefined to give beatitude except with a per se dependence on future merits,
and consequently with a dependence (I say) not of predestination itself, but of the
predestined effect itself.
22. An Argument Ad Hominem Against the Response. But against this, I object first
ad hominem according to the second argument used by the authors of that opinion:
because just as God confers benefits in time, so He predestines them in eternity. But
God in time conferred this benefit on the Virgin from some merit or free disposition
of hers; therefore, He predestined to give it in the same way. This argument proceeds
more firmly and without equivocation because we do not argue from the effect to the
act of predestination, which is a sophistical argument, as I will show below, but we
51 BOOK ONE
argue from the effect to the object of predestination, which seems to be the best
inference. For under the same aspect under which a thing is done or given in time,
under the same aspect it is predestined to be done or given regarding the object itself
and its reasons, because all of that must fall under predestination. Therefore, just as in
time the Virgin obtained motherhood through her free consent, so in eternity she was
predestined to have motherhood as a kind of reward for her merit. Further, even if we
concede that this whole was not predestined in the same moment, nevertheless, by the
very fact that we understand that God in some moment predefined absolutely that this
woman would be the Mother of God, we must understand that immediately in the
following moment and before the foreknowledge of all her merits, He predefined that
dispositions worthy of the Mother of God would be given to her, among which
dispositions not only habits of virtues but also good acts are included. For that mode
of executing the predestined Incarnation and motherhood through the free consent of
the Virgin proceeded primarily from the infinite wisdom and goodness of God. Hence,
it was equally predefined before the foreknowledge of all merit, as were the other
dispositions and circumstances, especially since there is no repugnance or difficulty in
this, as I will immediately say.
23. A Similar Argument Can Be Taken from the Will by Which God Decreed to Take
Flesh from the Seed of Abraham and Chose Him to Be the Father of Many
Nations. This election, however, He did not put into execution except through the free
consent and faith of Abraham, and yet there was an absolute predefinition and election
before His foreseen future faith or will. And in the same way, many similar examples
can be adduced, such as the apostles, to whom Christ said: "You did not choose me, but
I chose you" (John 15:16). For although we grant that this refers to election to the
apostleship, yet they did not receive it without free consent. Nevertheless, Christ the
Lord says: "You did not choose me, that is, first; but I chose you," as if to say, "and by
my election I made you choose me." And in the same sense, it is said of Paul: "This
man is a chosen vessel to me" (Acts 9:15). And John the Baptist or Jeremiah says: "He
set me as a chosen arrow" (Isaiah 49:2).
24. An A Priori Argument: The Efficacy of the Divine Will is Such That What He
Wills Infallibly Happens. Finally, the a priori argument is that God in His
foreknowledge has the means by which He can in time bring it about that what He wills
definitely and infallibly happens, and yet it happens freely. Therefore, it is not repugnant
to the divine power and will that, before He absolutely foresees something as future, He
simply and definitely wills that it be, and at the same time wills that it be freely. Rather,
as St. Thomas excellently said in Summa Theologica, Part 1, q. 22, art. 4, it pertains to
the efficacy of the divine will that what He wills both happens and infallibly happens as
He wills it. Hence, Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 98, says: "Who would be so
52 BOOK ONE
impiously foolish as to say that God cannot convert the evil wills of men, which He
wills, when He wills, and where He wills, into good wills?" And in On the Grace of
Christ, book 1, chapter 24, he says: "Let them understand that God can, by His internal,
hidden, wonderful, and ineffable power, work in the hearts of men not only true
revelations but also good wills." But what God can do by His full power, He can also
predefine by Himself and by His mere will. For neither does this exceed His power, nor
is it repugnant to His goodness, as is evident per se, nor does it violate human freedom,
because by such a decree God wills that man himself wills and freely determines
himself, without changing his mode of operation.
25. A Response to the First Argument of the Second Opinion: The Decree to Give
Glory is Not Simply an Antecedent Supposition. Hence, the first argument is easily
resolved, about which I will say more below when treating the harmony. Now, I briefly
respond that this will does not impose necessity on the human will because it does not
immediately and per se move it (we are speaking according to reason) but by applying
suitable means through which He knows that the human will will freely consent. And
therefore, such a decree of God is not simply an antecedent supposition because it
presupposes conditional foreknowledge of the human freely giving consent if such and
such means are applied to him, and it virtually includes respect to such means, not as to
the cause of the decree itself, but rather as to the effect or means to be applied by the
force of such a decree or will.
26. A Response to the Second Argument. Nor does the second argument have
greater force, but it commits an equivocation in the application of the term
"gratuitously." For it can fall both on the object of the divine will and on the very act
of the will of God, as freely terminated to such a person. We use it in the latter way; in
the argument, however, it is taken in the former way, as a transition is made from one
way to the other, which is not a good inference. I briefly explain this by a human
example: for when someone has the will to freely give a horse to a friend, then he wills
to give it gratuitously, so that the adverb falls not only on the act of the will but also on
the object. But the will to see the horse is not the will to give something gratuitously, yet
this will can be had gratuitously. A sign of this is that such a will is sometimes
considered a great benefit and a work of friendship, which is more clearly seen when,
between two who need or desire such a thing, I will rather sell to this one than to that
one out of mere liberty. And it will be a greater favor when I not only will to sell but
also to procure and help so that the other may have the means to buy.
27. Although God Freely Chooses Men for Glory, He Does Not Give It Gratuitously
but as a Reward. Therefore, this will of God must be understood in this way: for God
intends glory for the man He has chosen, not in any way, but as a crown and reward.
And thus, although He has this intention gratuitously toward him, yet He does not will
53 BOOK ONE
to give the object itself gratuitously but through merits, which He does not foresee but
rather prepares, in the order of reason, as we will see later. Therefore, these two are not
repugnant: that God in eternity freely chooses for glory according to the order of
intention, and yet in time He does not give it gratuitously. This can also be understood
from the examples given above concerning the glory of the body of Christ the Lord
and the dignity of the Mother of God. And finally, from what has been conceded, it is
thus convinced because other theologians concede that God at least by a simple
affection willed glory for the predestined before their foreseen merits. Therefore, God
had this affection gratuitously toward men, and yet by this affection He does not will,
even conditionally and in a certain respect, that man have glory gratuitously. For God in
no way desires this, as is evident even in the reprobate, to whom God antecedently wills
glory in that way, yet He desires that they merit it, not that they have it gratuitously.
Therefore, these two are plainly distinct.
28. The Third Opinion: God Had an Efficacious Proposal to Give Glory to Some of
Those Who Are Saved in That First Moment, but Not to All Who Attain Ultimate
Salvation. Among the Scholastics, Ockham held this in 1 Sent., dist. 43, and there
Gabriel, q. 1, art. 2. Catharinus extensively explains and defends it in Book 1 on
Predestination, the last chapter, and in Book 3 from the beginning.
29. This Difference Can First Be Established Between Angels and Men. About this, I
will speak in the following chapter; for now, I am only discussing fallen men. Therefore,
Catharinus and other authors I have cited establish these two orders among fallen men
who are to be saved, and they are moved to posit some men as pre-elected by the
manner of speaking in Scripture, which I will cite below. Also, from the diverse
dignities and prerogatives that God has conferred on some men and not on all who are
to be saved, as is especially evident in the Blessed Virgin, John the Baptist, the apostles,
etc. Finally, from the diverse ways of saving men, which are even confirmed to us by
experience: for God specially prevents some and almost continually confers singular
aids on them and perseveres until He leads them to ultimate and perfect salvation.
Therefore, it is a sign that He pre-elected them.
30. The Other Part, Namely, That Besides These, Some Are Saved Even If They
Were Not Pre-elected, Is Especially Proven by the Reason for Doubting Posited at the
Beginning. For that pre-election is not simply necessary for attaining salvation;
otherwise, those who were not so pre-elected would not have from God all things
necessary, and consequently, it would not be in their power to be saved. But if that
election is not necessary, nothing prevents some, not so elected, from being saved. And
if it is not repugnant, why would it not be so? For if the cause is sufficient to have this
effect without such an election, from such a multitude of men, it will have it in some.
Indeed, perhaps that is the great multitude seen by John in the Apocalypse, which no
54 BOOK ONE
one could number. Finally, from the things themselves, this seems to be made probable,
because many are saved with only the common and ordinary providence of grace.
Therefore, with respect to them, that peculiar intention and love is not necessary.
31. Catharinus's Opinion is Judged Erroneous by Soto and Other Thomists, but It Is
Excused in Part. From this opinion, Catharinus inferred two things. One is that not all
who are saved are predestined. The other is that the number of those to be saved is not
certain until they persevere in grace with divine help until death. These two things are
refuted as erroneous by Domingo Soto and other modern Thomists. But in both,
Catharinus erred more in words than in reality, speaking consequentially in his opinion,
which, although it is not true, as I will immediately say, is nevertheless not worthy of
such a grave censure. For he only called predestination this efficacious election to glory
before foreseen merits, and therefore he does not call those predestined who were not
so elected, even though they are to attain glory. In this manner of speaking, however,
that some who are not predestined are saved, he plainly disagrees with Augustine
throughout the book On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of
Perseverance, and even with the manner of speaking of Paul, as I will immediately say.
For this reason, St. Fulgentius, in On Faith to Peter, chapter 35, establishes as a rule of
faith: "Most firmly hold and in no way doubt that no one will attain salvation who is
not predestined." In the second inference, Catharinus did not think that the number of
those to be saved is not certain from eternity until they persevere in grace in time, as his
adversaries object, but he said that this number is not certain in the divine will, but only
in the foreknowledge by which God saw the cooperation of men. In this, he admits
that he disagrees with Augustine, and indeed he inveighs against his opinion with very
grave words, in which he exceeded and is most worthy of reproach. For, to omit other
things, Pope Celestine in his letter to the Bishops of Gaul, especially in the second
chapter, highly commends Augustine and his doctrine, especially as it pertains to the
grace of God. Therefore, this opinion must also be rejected by us.
32. The True Resolution. I say, therefore, that the first act of the divine will
concerning men to be saved was a love by which He willed and intended to give them
glory by an absolute and efficacious will. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in Summa
Theologica, Part 1, q. 23, art. 4, and in De Veritate, q. 6, art. 1, and in 1 Sent., dist. 40,
where it is defended by Capreolus, Hervaeus, and other Thomists, as well as by Scotus,
Durandus, and Giles, both there and in 1 Sent., dist. 41, q. 2. Major, in q. 1, art. 2,
Richard, in art. 2, q. 1, Gregory, in art. 2, and many other more recent authors, whom I
will add below when treating the cause of predestination, where I will also bring
forward many proofs from Scripture and the Fathers.
33. The Conclusion is Proven from Sacred Scripture. Now I prove this from Paul in
Ephesians 1: "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should
55 BOOK ONE
be holy and blameless before Him in love, who predestined us," etc., "according to the
purpose of His will." That Paul is speaking here of an absolute and firm decree is clear,
both from the exposition of all, and from the word "chose," which I have explained
above, and from the word "predestined," which he adds, and finally from that phrase,
"according to the purpose of His will." Moreover, that he is speaking of a purely
gratuitous election, which precedes the foreknowledge of future things, is excellently
gathered by Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 18 and 19, from
that phrase: "That we should be holy," etc. "Not," he says, "because we were going to
be holy, but that we might be holy." Indeed, that particle "that" denotes the end, and
consequently also the effect of that election, not its cause or reason.
34. The Exposition of Some is Rejected. Some, therefore, say that from this same
word it is gathered that Paul is not speaking of election to glory, but of election to
grace. But this is certainly of no moment. First, because from Paul's words it is clear
that he is speaking of perfect and consummate holiness, which is not separated from
glory, as is clear from that phrase: "That we should be holy and blameless before Him,"
etc. Second, because if Paul is speaking of election to any temporal grace, this cannot
be said, since this does not always have predestination infallibly joined to it, which Paul
immediately adds. Or if he is speaking of holiness with final perseverance, this is
consummate holiness, which infallibly has beatitude joined to it. And the same
reasoning applies to this, because this grace with final perseverance, in its execution or
in the thing itself, is not obtained without some cooperation of free will, nor without
some merit of man, either condign or congruous, at least with respect to some effects
of such an election. Therefore, the same reasoning applies to election to such holiness
and to glory. Indeed, in the order of intention, they are considered the same, because
neither is man chosen to be blessed without perfect holiness, nor to have consummate
holiness without beatitude, although in the order of execution each must be obtained
through other free means. And in the same way, the words of the same Paul in Romans
8 can be adduced to confirm this: "Those whom He predestined, He also called; and
those whom He called, He also justified; and those whom He justified, He also
glorified." For he is speaking of those whom He predestined to be conformed to the
image of His Son in glory, and not only in grace, and of these he subjoins the effects
which, by the force of predestination, God has worked in the elect: "That He might
make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He has prepared
for glory," as he immediately adds in chapter 9. Likewise, in 2 Timothy 1 and Titus 3,
and often elsewhere, he speaks manifestly of this gratuitous election of the predestined
to glory.
35. That in these passages Paul is speaking of all who attain ultimate salvation is clear
from the exposition of all and from the absolute manner of speaking, which we cannot
56 BOOK ONE
limit by our own judgment or make an exception to it. And the same is confirmed by
other testimonies of Scripture, in which those who are to be saved are simply called the
elect, as in Matthew 24: "So that, if possible, even the elect may be led astray," and
again: "But for the sake of the elect those days will be shortened." Likewise, what
Christ said to the apostles (John 15:16): "You did not choose me, but I chose you," is
understood by Augustine, in On Grace and Free Will, chapter 1, and he extends it to all
the predestined, in Tractate 86 on John, and Christ alludes to the same thing (John
13:18) when He says: "I know whom I have chosen," signifying that this election is the
root of all goods and especially of the gift of perseverance. And the same seems to be
more clearly indicated (Luke 12:32) when He says: "Do not be afraid, little flock, for it
is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom." Of this good pleasure He
gives thanks in Matthew 11:25-26, when He says: "I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven
and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and understanding and
revealed them to little children; yes, Father, for such was your gracious will." Therefore,
this election is from the good pleasure of the Father and purely gratuitous, and it is the
root of all the benefits by which salvation is prepared for the predestined, according to
that saying in Psalm 18:19: "He brought me out into a broad place; He delivered me,
because He delighted in me." Finally, from this the Church also, in a certain prayer, has
used this manner of speaking: "O God, to whom alone is known the number of the
elect to be placed in heavenly happiness." From this two things can be gathered. One is
that the elect are simply not called such unless they are chosen for eternal happiness.
The other is that no one is placed in eternal happiness unless they are so chosen.

The mind of Augustine is expended in support of the assertion.

36. Augustine's Mind is Examined for the Assertion. Second, it is without doubt the
opinion of Augustine, as almost all authors have hitherto judged, and in Book 3 on the
Helps of Grace, chapters 16 and 17, it is extensively explained and defended. Now I
will add a few things. One testimony is in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, where,
speaking of the predestined, he says that they were chosen to reign with Christ by the
will of God before all foreseen merits. Here he most clearly posits both the act of the
will before the foreknowledge of merits and its absolute perfection and its end, namely,
the kingdom of heaven. For some interpret "the kingdom of heaven" to mean
congruous grace, but this is neither according to the propriety of the word nor
according to the mind of Augustine. For from this election he thinks congruous grace
follows, as is clear from those words: "Therefore, whoever is separated from that
original damnation by the largess of divine grace, there is no doubt that the hearing of
the Gospel is procured for them, and when they hear, they believe, and in faith, which
57 BOOK ONE
works through love, they persevere to the end," and so on up to that point: "All these
things He works in those whom He has chosen in His Son," that is, whom He has
chosen by the election of grace, that is, by gratuitous and meritless election, as he
immediately declares. Hence he subjoins: "For they are not so called that they were not
first chosen; therefore, they were so called, that is, congruously called, who were
chosen." And this is what he subjoins: "But because they are called according to His
purpose, they are certainly chosen by the election, as has been said, of grace, not of
preceding merits." Finally, after he has treated much about the immobility and certainty
of that election, he concludes: "They are chosen to reign with Christ." Therefore, the
election was of grace and without merits. Finally, he consequently declares that election
to be of all who attain the kingdom of heaven, which he therefore calls the kingdom of
the elect, who say: "If God is for us, who can be against us?" (Romans 8:31) and that:
"Who shall bring any charge against God's elect?" (Romans 8:33) And finally,
concerning all these, he concludes that they receive the gift of perseverance, but those
who do not receive it were not chosen. Therefore, all who are saved are so chosen, just
as in Augustine all who are saved are predestined, as he openly teaches in On the Gift
of Perseverance, chapter 14, and it is gathered from the same book, chapter 22, where
he says: "If any obey, but are not predestined to His kingdom and glory, they have their
time." The same is gathered from On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 17.
37. Hence also it is that wherever Augustine treats of the special providence by
which God protects and governs the predestined and seeks the reason for the
difference, why God so deals with the predestined and not with others, he confesses
that he knows no other cause except the purpose of God's election. Thus, in On
Rebuke and Grace, chapter 8, he asks why, of two just men, God gives to one the gift
of perseverance, or takes him away before malice changes his understanding, but
preserves the other until he falls from justice and does not give him the gift of
perseverance, but permits him to die in sin. To this question he answers nothing else
except that the judgments of God are inscrutable, and the whole depends on divine
election. For God, according to the counsel of His will, chooses this one and not that
one, and therefore He has prepared this gift for this one and not for that one. But they
say that this is understood of election to grace, not of election to glory. But against this,
first, because he refers this in the same place to that election of which Paul speaks in
Ephesians 1, when he says: "He chose us in Him," etc., which we have shown to be
election to glory. Likewise, I ask, of what grace is the discourse when it is said that this
difference arises from election to grace? Is it of grace as it signifies holiness with the
effect of persevering in it until death, or of grace as it signifies congruous help to this
effect? The latter cannot be said, because it is not consistent with Augustine's
reasoning, who gathers the diversity of gifts from the diverse effects and ends which
58 BOOK ONE
God willed in these persons out of His liberality; otherwise, his reasoning would be
very frivolous. But if the former is said, that is what we intend. Both because (as I have
said) this sanctification until death is not done without the cooperation of free will, and
therefore the same or greater reasoning applies to it as to election to glory, and also
because such grace includes its end and consummation and consequently glory. Finally,
Augustine himself confirms this sense wherever he speaks of the purpose of God
concerning the predestined, from which purpose he says arises that high and secret
calling by which they are infallibly converted and unchangeably led to glory. For by that
purpose he always understands the gratuitous purpose of God to lead the elect to glory,
as can be seen in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 16 and 17, and in On
the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 6, where he thus understands that saying in Acts
13:48: "As many as were appointed to eternal life believed." The same in chapters 7 and
following, and in Book 8 of Questions, question 68, and in Epistles 46 and 106. Finally,
whatever is said in On Grace and Free Will, chapter 49: "He is without sin whom God
wills to be such." For this is a certain election which is not fulfilled without freedom.
Similar is what he cites from Ambrose in the same book, chapter 46: "And whom He
wills, He makes religious." And other places which we will bring forward below when
treating the cause of predestination.
38. Moreover, it is clear from Prosper's letter to Augustine, which is found before the
book On the Predestination of the Saints, that this was the opinion of St. Augustine at
that time concerning divine predestination and election, and that because of this the
minds of many were disturbed. Hence, at the end of the letter, supposing the same
sense as Augustine's and true, he asks Augustine to deign to explain further: "How
through this preaching of the purpose of God, by which the faithful are made who are
appointed to eternal life, no one of those who are to be exhorted is hindered, nor do
they have an occasion for negligence, as if they despair of being predestined." And
Prosper often repeats this in responding to various objections made against Augustine,
especially in chapter 7, in response to the objections of the Gauls. He calls this election
a preordination, from which flows the gift of perseverance. And in Book 2 on the
Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 26, he holds the same. Fulgentius also holds the same
in Book 1 to Monimus, chapters 8 and 13, where among other things he says: "Those
whom He predestined (that is, chose) to glory, He predestined to justice." Finally, Hugh
of St. Victor, in Question 225 on the Epistle to the Romans, understands this election,
according to the mind of Augustine, to be that purpose of God of which there is
frequent mention in Paul, from which proceeds that singular calling from the purpose,
which Augustine says is proper to the elect, in On the Predestination of the Saints,
chapter 3, and often elsewhere.
59 BOOK ONE
39. Another indication of Augustine's mind can be taken from the letter of Hilary of
Arles to the same Augustine. For he relates there that among the contradictions of the
Gauls against Augustine, one was that he divided all men, as it were, into two classes,
the elect and the reprobate, and distinguished them so from the sole will of God that a
passage from one to the other is not possible. Likewise, they did not bear that
Augustine understood those words of Paul in 1 Timothy 2:4: "Who wills all men to be
saved," of the will of good pleasure and efficacious, and therefore of the predestined
alone and not of all men, and interpreted them in various places. For they supposed, as
is true, that Paul there speaks of the will which God has from Himself, before all the
merits of men, and they did not want this to be particular to some, but universal to all,
and therefore not efficacious and absolute, but simple or conditional. They understood,
therefore, that Augustine posited this distinction of men from the sole will of God,
preceding the foreknowledge of merits, and thus chose some to glory by the sole
efficacious will of saving them, which is plainly election to glory. In this contradiction
and complaint of theirs, Hilarius never signifies that they imposed anything on
Augustine; nor does Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints respond by
denying what they related or supposed concerning his mind, but by confirming the
truth of that opinion from Holy Scripture. Hence, for this part also, Gregory can be
cited, in Book 5 on 1 Kings, chapter 4, toward the end, insofar as he expounds the same
place of Paul concerning the predestined, which predestination he wills to be first and
per se to eternal life, and thence to have established certain and infallible means for
attaining such an end.

The assertion is proven by reasons.

40. The First Argument: The Intention of the End is Prior to the Will Concerning
the Means. Election to Glory Proceeds from an Absolute Intention. The first and a
priori argument, which St. Thomas brought forward in Summa Theologica, Part 1, q.
23, art. 4, is that the intention of the end ought to precede the will concerning the
means. In us, indeed, at least in the order of nature, but in God in the order of reason,
as I have sufficiently declared against the first opinion. That such an intention in this
matter is absolute and efficacious is further proven. Because the intention ought to be
accommodated to the election of the means, or rather the mode of election indicates
the mode of intention. But God observes this in the election of the means concerning
those to be saved, so that He gives them efficacious means, so that they may be such
and that through them they may infallibly attain glory, as even the authors of the
second opinion concede. And this is the express opinion of Augustine in On the Gift
of Perseverance, chapter 14, and throughout the book On the Predestination of the
60 BOOK ONE
Saints, and in countless other places. Therefore, it is a sign that this election of the
means proceeds from an absolute intention. This is excellently indicated by those words
in Wisdom 4:11: "He was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding,"
and by what Christ says of His sheep in John 10:28: "No one will snatch them out of
my hand." Augustine, in Tractate 48 on John, declares that this is said by reason of
predestination. And the words of Christ cited above in Matthew 24:22 agree: "For the
sake of the elect those days will be shortened." For they indicate a special providence
toward them, as Bernard excellently declares in Sermon 68 on the Canticle and
in Sermon 12 on Psalm 91, joining to it that saying of Paul: "I endure all things for the
sake of the elect" (2 Timothy 2:10), and including that the whole providence of God is
in some way ordered to the salvation of the elect.
41. The Interpretation of Some on This Passage in Romans. Augustine's Better
Exposition. Finally, this also seems to me to be indicated by those words of Paul in
Romans 8:28: "For those who love God, all things work together for good," certainly
from the special care of God concerning them, which arises from the fact that they are
called according to His purpose. Some, such as Origen, Chrysostom, and Theodoret,
there, and Cyril of Jerusalem in the Preface to the Catecheses, expound this of the
purpose of the men themselves. But Augustine, much better, in Book 2 Against Two
Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 10, and often elsewhere, expounds it of the purpose
of God concerning those whom He so governs. This is manifest from the words which
Paul immediately subjoins: "For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined," etc.,
and of the same purpose he says in chapter 9: "That the purpose of God according to
election might stand, not of works but of Him who calls," etc., and in 2 Timothy 1:9:
"Who called us with a holy calling, not according to our works but according to His
own purpose and grace." As Augustine also explains, who speaks excellently of this
purpose in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 12, saying that from it flows the congruous
calling, justification, etc. The same in Book 2 Against Two Letters of the Pelagians,
chapter 9.
42. The Second Argument. And hence we can form a second argument, because it is
necessary to confess that God chose some before the absolute foreknowledge of future
things to glory, and there is no reason for excepting from this election any of those
who are to be saved. Therefore, all who are saved are so chosen. The major is
sufficiently proven by the examples adduced against the second opinion and by those
which the third opinion brought forward to prove its prior part. And from the effects
and mode of God's providence concerning some, it seems most evident. For some He
efficaciously prevents from childhood, or even before the use of natural reason, and
then by a special care He preserves them throughout the whole time of life without
grave sin. Others, who live badly throughout the whole time of life, He almost
61 BOOK ONE
miraculously converts at the end, so that they die in grace, of which we have a striking
example in the good thief, and similar things are infinite. Who, therefore, can deny that
this comes from a singular decree by which God absolutely willed to save these?
43. Why Catharinus Erred. The providence concerning some of the elect, although it
seems general, yet as it proceeds from God foreseeing, is special. No one is saved
without the gift of perseverance. It remains to prove the minor proposition against the
third opinion, in which Catharinus therefore erred because he neither believed nor
understood the conditional foreknowledge of future free acts, which God has prior in
reason to His choosing. But that being supposed, I see no reason for doubting even in
that part. First, indeed, because although the supernatural providence concerning some
to be saved seems to us general and common, yet as it proceeds from God under that
foreknowledge, it is very special, because through it to each is given that help which in
him will be efficacious unto death. Therefore, it is a sign that in all this comes from the
said purpose of the will of God. Hence, among men, no one is saved without a special
gift of perseverance, as Augustine extensively teaches in On the Gift of Perseverance,
as in chapter 1 he openly supposes and declares, and in On Rebuke and Grace, chapters
12 and 13, that gift God provides by His will without our merit. Therefore, although
the providence of God in some is more hidden than in others, yet the electing will was
universal to all who are saved.
44. This is Proven by the Example of Infants Who Are Chosen Without Foreseen
Merit. This pertains to the argument concerning infants, which Augustine often uses
in On Grace and Free Will, chapters 22 and 23, in On the Predestination of the Saints,
chapter 19, in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 9, and in Epistles 105 and 106. For
we see that, with the same merit of the parents and the same general institution of
baptism, one infant dies immediately, another, for whom baptism is prepared, dies
before it can be applied to him, and another is preserved until he is baptized. For this
diversity cannot, with respect to God, be by chance or entirely accidental, nor in a
matter so lofty and pertaining to the salvation of men can it be from general
providence alone without a secret ordination and election of those who are saved. For
although sometimes this diverse providence does not appear to us externally, at other
times it is clearly demonstrated, as can be shown by various examples.
45. The Third Argument: The Number of the Elect is Future by the Absolute
Intention of God. The End is Usually the First Object Proposed to the Will.
Generations Will Cease When the Number of the Elect is Completed. From these
things, a third argument can be formed. In the state of glory, the entire number of the
saved will exist by the direct and absolute intention of God. Therefore, it was necessary
that God should have this intention from Himself concerning all who were to be
citizens in that kingdom. The antecedent is excellently declared by Bernard in Sermon
62 BOOK ONE
78 on the Canticle, because that entire city was chosen to be one spouse of Christ,
which afterward through grace was so prepared as it was chosen, and this is consistent
with the perfection of that kingdom, in which nothing ought to exist except by the
singular predefinition of God. It is also declared a posteriori. For in every matter or
governance, the outcome of the thing declares the intention of the governor, and that
end, upon being finally attained, ceases the care and governance, and is usually the first
object proposed to the will and intention of such a governor, if he acts prudently. We
see, however, that the whole providence of God tends to this, that that city may be
completed in such a number, weight, and measure. Hence, all theologians say that then
the generations of things are to be ended and the governance of God concerning
them, when the number of the elect is completed. Therefore, it is a sign that the
absolute intention of God was placed not only in these or those persons of that city,
but in the whole of it, to be completed from the entire number of the saved.
46. The Response of Some: That the Will to Give Congruous Grace Was the First.
The Response is Challenged. Finally, I confirm this because if this was not the first will
that God had concerning the elect, I ask, what was it? Others respond that it was the
will to give congruous grace to these men, and those who think better in these opinions
say that this will infallibly distinguishes the saved from the unsaved. But against this, I
ask again what they understand by congruous grace. For either they are speaking of
grace congruous only to the first sanctification, or also of grace congruous to the
preservation of grace until the end of life. The former will is not sufficient, for God
had this will concerning many reprobates who not only once but often receive
congruous graces, by which they are truly justified for some time and sometimes attain
much holiness, but finally do not persevere. Therefore, by the force of such a will, the
predestined cannot be distinguished from the reprobate. The latter will, however, is first
without cause separated from the will to glory, because to will final grace to someone is
to will ultimate salvation and eternal life to him. And then also final grace is not
obtained without the cooperation of free will. Therefore, there will be the same
difficulty in this as in glory, and if this difficulty ceases in one, it will also cease in the
other. And therefore, there is no reason to deny the intention of glory, since it is the
end of the other means.
47. Not All Graces Are Given Without Our Disposition. Some say that this will was
concerning all prevenient graces, which God foresaw would be so congruous to such a
person that through them in the course of life he would infallibly attain glory, which
prevenient graces, since they are given by God alone, can be foreseen by His will alone.
But this is first only devised to avoid the difficulty without the foundation of authority
or reason. Second, since all these are means which are loved not for themselves but for
another, if God had such a will, this sufficiently shows that He much more had an
63 BOOK ONE
efficacious will to give glory. And besides, the difficulty is not avoided, because
although prevenient aids begin from God and, as far as the touch of the heart is
concerned, are made in us without us and without our free cooperation, yet not all
these graces are given to us without some disposition or merit on our part, and this is
necessary only in the first calling, because before it there is no principle of merit in us.
Yet after it, man can, with divine help, respond to the prior grace and through this
obtain something else from God, or dispose himself, or merit (at least congruously)
another inspiration or aid. And although God often confers more abundant prevenient
aids without regard to the disposition of man, even after the first calling, yet more
often He does not grant them except to those who pray and ask, from the prior grace,
as I now suppose from the matter of grace, and below, when treating the effects, I will
say something. Therefore, that will to give all prevenient aids necessary for the whole
life is not put into execution as to many of its effects except through the cooperation
of free will. Therefore, the same reasoning applies to it as to the will to give glory.

The reasons for doubting are satisfied.

48. The Decree of God is Not Intrinsically Necessary for Men to Be Saved. It is
Proven a Posteriori. It is Proven a Priori. To the reason for doubting posited at the
beginning, it must first be said that this purpose or efficacious decree of God to give
glory is not per se and intrinsically, and (so to speak) physically necessary, so that men
can truly attain eternal life. For this is at least proven a posteriori by the reason given
there, because otherwise those not so elected could absolutely not be saved, since such
an election is neither given nor is it in their power, as it is from the sole will of God,
without the merit or free disposition of man. And therefore, to this most of all applies
that saying: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows
mercy" (Romans 9:16). The a priori reason is that this decree of God, as such, does not
per se give man all the principles necessary for acting well, as is required to attain
eternal life, nor through it, as such, is the necessary concurrence offered for such acts.
But these alone are necessary so that man can perform such acts and consequently be
saved. The assumption will be more fully clear from what will be said below in chapter
15, and I have said much about it in Book 1 on the Helps of Grace, chapter 16, at the
end. Now it is briefly declared that although those principles of acting and concurrence
are supernatural, they are given or offered by the decrees of the divine will, which are
terminated to such effects or gifts and to their production or influx as to proximate
objects. But election to glory is not immediately terminated to such objects, as is clear
per se, and therefore from this part it is not necessary. Nor is it per se supposed as an
adequate and entirely necessary reason, both because a simple or conditional effect can
64 BOOK ONE
suffice, and also because those objects have in themselves that by which they can be
loved. Therefore, that act is not absolutely necessary on the part of the effects
themselves.
49. The Decree of God Concerning the Elect is Very Fitting to God and Necessary
for the Disposition of the Heavenly Kingdom. Nevertheless, we deny that this act is
superfluous or necessary for no reason. For on the part of the agent itself, or the
providence of God, it is very fitting or even necessary for the perfect mode of
preparing and disposing all things that pertain to the heavenly kingdom, as has been
declared. For just as for walking, on the part of the effect itself, the intention of an
honest end is not simply necessary, yet it is necessary on the part of the agent acting
with purpose, so that he may effect that end in a fitting manner, so in the effects of
divine providence or predestination, it is not simply necessary that they proceed from
this or that intention of God, yet it can be fitting or necessary on the part of God
Himself for a fitting or perfect mode of operating and intending.
50. The Other Arguments Are Answered. A Physical Mutation in the Creature is Not
Necessary for the Free Act of God, but an Objective Mutation Can Suffice. Hence, the
remaining arguments insinuated there are easily answered. One is that this doctrine is
not revealed. To this we respond that it is indeed not so expressly revealed as we have
expounded it, and therefore we do not say that it is of faith, yet it is gathered from what
is revealed and is much insinuated in Sacred Scripture, as has been expounded. Another
argument was that this act is not gathered from the effects. This we also deny, for from
the mode of God's providence concerning the predestined, this act can be sufficiently
probably gathered. Another was that in God there is an executive will, by which He is
understood to glorify man. But we say that through this the prior will, through the
mode of intention, is not excluded, because these two orders, of intention and
execution, are also in the divine will distinguished by reason, as I will declare below.
Finally, another was that this act seems impossible, because through it there is no
mutation in the creature. This objection can be made concerning any free intention of
God, even if it is conditional or a simple affection. I say, therefore, that it is not
necessary that through every free act of God some physical mutation be made in its
object, especially immediately, through such an act. But any objective mutation can
suffice, for this suffices for a new relation of reason. This, however, in the present case
is that by the force of such a purpose of God, the effect is thus infallibly defined as
future. And God Himself, by the force of such an act, remains immutably determined
to bring it about that such an effect exists. Hence, radically (so to speak), such an act
makes a mutation in the creature and efficaciously orders it to its end. Therefore, it is
neither impossible nor superfluous but most consistent with the perfection of divine
providence.
65 BOOK ONE

CHAPTER IX. GOD HAD AN

ABSOLUTE PURPOSE TO SAVE NOT ONLY MEN BUT
ALSO THE HOLY ANGELS, PRIOR TO ANY OTHER ACT OF HIS WILL.

1. How God, According to These Authors, Acted Concerning the Grace and Glory
of the Angels. Those who deny this purpose concerning men a fortiori deny it
concerning the angels. Some, even if they admit it in all or some men, absolutely deny it
in the angels. This is the opinion of Ockham, Gabriel, and Catharinus, cited in the
previous chapter for the third opinion. For they say that God, from Himself, generally
and (so to speak) uniformly, willed glory to all the angels by an antecedent will, which is
only simple or conditional, and He prepared sanctifying grace for them efficaciously for
a certain instant, namely, at the very moment of their creation, not indeed equal for all,
but with a certain proportion that pleased Him, according to the infinite reasons of His
wisdom. Similarly, He offered to all sufficient aids to persevere in the grace received and
to grow in it through their own merits, with the same proportion. But He did not will
to give glory to any of them by a definitive will until He saw the perseverance of some,
just as He did not will to exclude any of the angels from that kingdom of beatitude
until He foresaw the fall and obstinacy of some.
2. The Foundation of This Opinion from Augustine: That the Angels Could
Persevere with the First Grace Without a Special Gift of Perseverance. These authors
gather from Augustine that men could persevere in the same way. The perseverance of
the angels consists in a single act. This distinction between men and angels can be
founded in some way on Augustine in On Rebuke and Grace, chapters 10, 11, and 12,
where, among other things, he establishes a difference between men and angels: the
angels, having received the first grace, could persevere in it and never sin through their
free will, without a special gift of perseverance; but men, in fact, are not saved without
a special gift of perseverance. The reason for this distinction is easy, because in the
angels perseverance consists in a single perfectly deliberate act of obedience or
conversion to God; for having this in the second instant of their creation, they are
immediately confirmed in good and remain immovable, either by the condition of their
nature alone or by the law of God consonant with such a nature, namely, that through
such an act the way and merit of the good is consummated, and immediately in the
third instant they receive the reward of beatitude. Thus, they do not need a special
grace to persevere, because for a single perfect deliberation, the first grace, with the
common aid and concurrence due to grace, suffices. But the perseverance of man is
long-lasting and requires much time and many good acts, or the observance of many
precepts, and (what is most important) man is surrounded by various temptations and
66 BOOK ONE
the greatest difficulties. Therefore, he needs a greater and more special grace to
persevere than the angel. Indeed, Augustine adds that the angel only needs the help by
which he can persevere, or by which he perseveres if he wills; but man needs the help
by which he perseveres absolutely and simply. Hence, he indicates that such help for
man is such that it does not depend on the condition "if he wills," but rather makes it
infallibly fulfilled. From this difference, therefore, another is understood, which the
cited opinion intends, namely, that God efficaciously willed the salvation of the men to
be saved from Himself and before the absolute foreknowledge of future things, since
by the force of such a will He prepared infallible perseverance for them. But
concerning the holy angels, He did not have such a will, because He did not prepare
such perseverance for them, but only under the condition "if they willed." Therefore,
He willed glory to them only under the same condition and not absolutely. For the
quality of the means shows what kind of will preceded concerning the end, as has been
sufficiently declared in the previous chapter.
3. Men to Be Saved in the State of Innocence Are to Be Predestined in the Same
Way as the Angels According to This Opinion. In the state of innocence, men could
have persevered without a special gift of perseverance. From this foundation, it must
consequently be said that the same difference must be established between men who
would be saved during the state of innocence and those who are saved in fallen nature.
For if man had not sinned, there would not have been a distinction or election of the
men to be saved from the efficacious purpose of God purely gratuitous and preceding
the absolute foreknowledge of future things. But from the free perseverance in the
grace received, which would have been common to all men and almost natural, that is,
communicated with nature itself through ordinary propagation. For the mode of
perseverance establishes the same difference in Augustine, in the cited place, between
the nature of fallen man and the integral nature, which was in fact between men and
angels. For although the way of men, even in the state of innocence, would have been
longer than that of the angels, and therefore perseverance would also have had to be
consummated through some time and the observance of many precepts, in which there
would have been greater difficulty than in the angels, nevertheless in that state there
would not have been the peculiar difficulties of persevering that are found in fallen
man, and which arise from original sin and the struggle between the flesh and the spirit.
And therefore, if Adam had not sinned, men could have persevered through free will in
the same way as the holy angels, that is, without that special gift by which perseverance
itself is now infallibly given. And therefore, in that state, there would not have been that
pre-election of the saved any more than there was in the angels. And perhaps for this
reason, many hold and think it is Augustine's opinion that God did not have that
67 BOOK ONE
efficacious purpose of saving some men in particular before He foresaw the fall of the
first man, about which I will speak in the following chapter.
4. The Opinion of Some. However, among theological writers, there are not lacking
those who think it probable that a limitation should be applied to this opinion, so that
even in this matter a distinction is established between the holy angels themselves and
the blessed. For they say that God chose some angels for beatitude by that efficacious
purpose, purely gratuitous and preceding all absolute foreknowledge of future things,
but He ordained the rest to glory only by a conditional will; yet not all of those were
damned, but many were foreseen to persevere, and therefore God also willed to
efficaciously beatify them. Those who think thus bring forward no reason or conjecture
for themselves, but it can seem somewhat probable, lest the angelic nature be thought
to be ordained to beatitude with less providence or efficacy than human nature. Or
certainly, lest the whole angelic nature be exposed to the danger of ruin, as the whole
human nature was exposed in the first man, which would have been a much greater
inconvenience in the angels, because they were not to be redeemed, as men are, nor was
the reparation of the fallen so consonant with their nature as it is found in men.
5. The Distinction of Election Among the Angels is Rejected. However, we must
begin by rejecting this distinction among the holy angels. For it is not handed down by
any ancient author (as far as I know), nor does it have a foundation in Scripture or the
Fathers, nor do I see a sufficiently probable reason or conjecture on which it relies. For
although the angels are unequal in the perfection of nature, and therefore were also
created unequal in the perfection of grace, as to its degree, yet in the mode of
operating, meriting, and persevering, they have a certain equality or uniformity.
Therefore, on their part, no reason for such a distinction can be given, because it
cannot be taken from the mere diversity in the perfection of nature, as is clear per se;
otherwise, all thus elected would be from the seraphim, for example, or if they are
posited from different orders, they would be the highest of each order. But this cannot
be said, both because perhaps the most perfect of all the angels not only was not thus
elected but rather was damned, and also because election to glory is not made according
to the perfection of nature. Therefore, that diversity should have been taken from the
mode of operating, but in this, none is found. And thus Augustine, in the cited doctrine
concerning the mode of perseverance of the angels, speaks generally and in the same
way about all. Nor can a reason for this distinction be assigned on the part of God,
because God could not have ordained all in the same way to the kingdom of heaven.
6. All the Elect Angels Were Chosen by God with an Efficacious Will Before
Foreseen Merits. Grace and glory are supernatural in the same way for angels and men.
I add further that such a distinction between angels and men should not be admitted,
but it must be said that all the holy angels who in fact were saved were pre-elected by
68 BOOK ONE
God with that good and efficacious will by which He willed eternal beatitude for them
before He decreed to give them other gifts of grace or foresaw their merits through
absolute knowledge. This is undoubtedly the opinion of St. Thomas. For in Summa
Theologica, Part 1, q. 23, art. 1, ad 3, he declares that divine predestination is common
to angels and men, which the reasoning of the article also proves, if it is efficacious.
Because the end of eternal life is also above the power of angelic nature, and to it they
are specially destined by God, and therefore they are predestined when they are
efficaciously sent to it. But immediately in article 4, he proves absolutely and in general
that the said act of love precedes concerning all the predestined; therefore, it also
includes the angels, for he does not prove that precedence from any peculiar condition
of men, but from the very intrinsic order of intention and election. Especially because
the same St. Thomas, in Summa Theologica, Part 1, q. 20, art. 4, ad 2, says that if
human and angelic nature are compared in relation to grace and glory, an equality is
found in them, since the measure of man and angel is the same, as is said in Revelation
21. Certainly, as to the supernatural motion by which they need to be converted to God
as a supernatural end, as St. Thomas proves in Summa Theologica, Part 1, q. 62, art. 2,
and much more to attain that end. Hence, Augustine also says in City of God, Book 12,
chapter 9, that the angels who persevered in grace were more helped to do so.
7. Augustine's Arguments Concerning the Election of Men Proceed in the Election
of the Angels. The angels could neither believe nor operate unless aided. Therefore, if
all the testimonies of Sacred Scripture and all the motives by which Augustine in
various places proves the election of the grace of men who are effectively saved are
carefully considered, they proceed in the same way concerning the angels. For those
testimonies, "God works all in all," and "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who
runs, but of God who shows mercy," because He Himself works in us both to will and
to accomplish according to His good will—these, I say, and similar things are equally
true in angels and men, and yet these are the things from which Augustine usually
gathers predestination through the election of grace, that is, gratuitous, to glory itself.
That principle also, which he most uses throughout the book On the Predestination of
the Saints, that the beginning of faith and all good works is from God, is also most true
in the angels. For in them also it is true that none of them could believe unless taught
by God, nor come to the Son unless drawn by the Father. Hence, those questions in
which Augustine often hesitates: "Why does He draw this one and not that one? Why is
it so persuaded to this one that he is persuaded, and not to another?" can also be made
concerning two angels, good and evil, but Augustine does not dare to answer them
except by running to the secret mystery of predestination and the voluntary election of
God. Therefore, he would answer in the same way concerning the angels, for no
sufficient reason for the difference can be given.
69 BOOK ONE
8. Those Who Posit Predetermination in the Human Will Ought to Posit It in the
Angelic Will. I declare this finally in this way: Because if someone thinks that for each
supernatural act, a prevenient aid efficacious of itself is necessary to physically
predetermine the will, it is necessary that he think the same concerning angels and men,
because the same reason for that necessity is in both. For either it arises from the
dependence of the secondary cause on the first, and this is also in the angels; or from
the indifference of the human will, which cannot determinately operate anything unless
it is first determined by a higher principle, and this indifference is also found in the
angelic will; or it arises from the supernaturality of the acts, and this also has respect to
the angelic will. Therefore, if such an efficacious and predetermining aid is necessary in
men, the same is necessary in angels. Therefore, just as giving this aid to these or those
men and not to others depends on the sole will of God, so also giving it to these or
those angels. And in men, the voluntary conferral of such aid concerning the necessary
and sufficient means to attain beatitude manifests the gratuitous election of God to
glory, from which it comes that He wills to give such aids. But God willed to give a
similar aid to the holy angels and not to others; therefore, He also shows that He
gratuitously elected them to glory, for which He gives them such aid, but He did not
thus elect the other angels to whom He does not give it.
9. A Congruous Calling Was Necessary for the Angels. In a similar way, we can argue
if we hold that such a determination from God is indeed not necessary, nor is a
prevenient aid efficacious in such a way, but a congruous calling is necessary, which
supposes conditional knowledge, by which God foreknew what each will would will if
it were called in this or that way. For a similar congruous calling will be necessary for
the angels to operate, and a similar conditional foreknowledge of their future consent
will precede. Therefore, just as God gratuitously and by His mere will elects in men
such modes of calling, which He foreknew would be congruous, preparing them for
some and not for others, so also in the angels. For there is the same reason, both as to
that conditional foreknowledge, because God has it concerning every will, especially
created, as I now suppose; and as to the will of distributing the callings, because no
reason for such a distribution can be given on the part of the angels, since every reason
must suppose a congruous and efficacious calling to that reason, whatever it may be
imagined to be; and finally, as to the connection of the congruous calling with the prior
intention of giving glory, for the reason adduced above concerning men: that the
election of the means is proportioned to the intention of the end and vice versa.
Hence, when someone from certain knowledge and (so to speak) formal will elects an
efficacious means as such, it is a sign that he efficaciously intends the end. But God, by
preparing for the holy angels such a calling for the second instant of their way, elected
and willed it as congruous and efficacious; by the same reason by which He willed a
70 BOOK ONE
similar calling for the elect men. Therefore, in this respect, there is the same reason for
both.
10. It Is Shown That the Same Reason Applies to the Election of Men and
Angels. However, all the reasons adduced in the previous chapter come to this: for they
proceed equally in angels and men. First, because the heavenly kingdom is one,
consisting of angels and men, and therefore the whole, as coalescing from all its
members, is intended by a singular divine predefinition. Therefore, God had this
concerning both angels and men from Himself. Second, because in a most prudent and
wise governor and architect, the outcome or end of the whole thing or business shows
His definite will and intention. Therefore, in the business of both angels and men, a
similar will of God is shown. Finally, because even the holy angels needed their own
mode of perseverance, which they could not have without greater help from God, as
Augustine testifies in City of God, Book 12, that such help was prepared by God as
necessary. Therefore, such preparation shows in God an efficacious election, no less
than in men.
11. Those Who Would Have Persisted in Original Justice Would All Have Been
Elected to Glory by God's Efficacious Will. From these things, it is concluded a fortiori
that the same must be said concerning the state of men in original justice, for even if
that state had endured, all who would have been saved in it would have been pre-elected
efficaciously to glory by divine predefinition. For all the reasons given proceed much
more concerning men in that state, and they will be further confirmed from what will
be said in chapter eleven. Hence, if that state had been destined to endure, God would
have elected the men to be saved according to the foreknowledge accommodated to
that state. Indeed, the very perseverance of that state would have been from some
divine predefinition, which, if God had had, He would have accommodated the calling
and grace by which He preveniently acted on Adam, so that it would be efficacious and
congruous according to His conditional foreknowledge; and He would have also
prepared for Adam and all the other elect men a congruous help to persevere in grace
until the end of life, which would then have been fixed according to the condition of
that state. For in that state also, perseverance in grace could not be had without
supernatural help from God, as the Council of Orange defines in chapter 19, and
Augustine teaches in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 10. Therefore, perseverance in
every state, both of men and angels, depends on the divine will alone as to the order of
intention, although in execution, in every state of the same men and angels, it also
depends on their own will, as we will say in what follows.
12. A Response to the Argument from Augustine. To the argument posited at the
beginning and taken from Augustine's doctrine, although it is not easy to declare what
Augustine meant in establishing that distinction or in what it consists, nevertheless, we
71 BOOK ONE
have tried to explain it in some way in Book 3 on the Helps of Grace, chapter 15,
number 16. From what is said there, it can be understood that the difficulty of that
passage is not proper to our opinion but has a place in every opinion concerning
efficacious grace, or the conditional foreknowledge of God, or the mode of explaining
the gift of perseverance. For if the efficacy of grace is posited in physical
predetermination, it will be as necessary for angels as for men, as I have proven in the
cited place and a little before. The same is shown proportionally concerning the
congruous calling. For this congruity, even concerning men in fallen nature, does not
essentially require a greater aid for each act than is necessary per se in the reason of the
principle and actual influx or concurrence for eliciting such an act. For although the
corruption of fallen nature increases the difficulty of operating supernatural acts, yet
this difficulty does not always intervene in individual acts, nor is it regularly so great as
to take away the power simply to overcome it with the same aids with which it can be
done in the state of integral nature. Therefore, congruity, speaking per se, consists in
this, that God confers a prevenient aid at that time and occasion when He foresees it
will have an effect, with the free will simultaneously cooperating. But this congruity was
necessary both in angels and in men in integral nature, both for operating well and for
persevering in grace. Therefore, in this part also, there is the same reason for gratuitous
election to such a congruous calling, insofar as it is such, and consequently also to glory.
13. The Reason of Some Why Pre-election is Posited in Men and Not in Angels is
Rejected. A distinction could only be established according to that opinion which
admits neither physical predetermination nor conditional knowledge, and consequently,
not a foreseen and intended congruous calling in the way we have explained it. For
those who think thus have no reason to posit in angels or men in the state of innocence
any pre-election, nor any difference between the saved and the damned on the part of
the antecedent will and efficacious preordination of God before absolute
foreknowledge, but only from such foreknowledge. In fallen men, however, they can
admit it because of the special difficulty and danger arising from the corruption of
nature. Nevertheless, the foundation of that opinion does not seem probable to me,
especially in the doctrine of Augustine, in which we are now engaged and which we
intend to explain. Moreover, on the part of men in fallen nature, that difference cannot
universally subsist. For why also in this state will not many be saved with only the
ordinary aids of grace, since many (especially infants) are saved through the single act
of baptism, and sometimes adults through a single act of contrition or confession
made at the end of life, which can be had through the common aid of grace?
Therefore, such an aid can in many fallen men be efficacious and congruous in the
thing itself, even if it is supposed that God does not foreknow that congruity through
conditional knowledge until He sees its efficacy through the knowledge of vision. And
72 BOOK ONE
consequently, it is said that God did not antecedently intend that aid as efficacious, but
only consequently accepted it after He saw that it would be such. Therefore, in that way,
many fallen men could be saved even if they were not pre-elected. Therefore, in this
respect, that difference cannot be maintained according to that opinion. And otherwise,
that mode of pre-election without certain and definite foreknowledge of infallible
means has the imperfections which I commemorated above in chapter seven, because
according to that opinion, God must tend in uncertainty and, as it were, try applying
means until something succeeds, which is unworthy of God, as I said. Therefore, in no
way can a reason for the difference, in this respect, between angels and men, or
between men in different states of fallen or integral nature, be assigned.
14. Augustine's Mind is Opened, and the Difference Concerning Perseverance
Between Men and Angels is Assigned. You will say: What then about Augustine, or
what is the difference intended by him? I respond that concerning the matter of
predestination or election, I see none; nor even concerning the mode of giving to each
efficacious prevenient grace, whether for perfect conversion to God or for
perseverance accommodated to each person or state, and only this is necessary, that in
pre-election to glory, no difference should be established between them. But in the very
gift of perseverance, a difference seems to be established by Augustine, which can be
understood in two ways. One is that in fact, no aid was given to men to persevere in the
state of innocence, but only to be able to persevere; but in the state of fallen nature, it
is given to many men. But this distinction cannot be applied to the angels, for many of
the angels were also given aid to actually persevere, but not all. Therefore, another
difference is that the very aid to actually persevere is given through greater aids to fallen
men than was given to the angels or would be given to men in the state of innocence.
Whether this difference is universally true, we will say below when treating the gift of
perseverance; now it is not necessary for the present question.

CHAPTER X. THE GRATUITOUS

DECREE THAT GOD HAD CONCERNING THE
ETERNAL HAPPINESS OF MANY ANGELS AND MEN WAS
DEFINED AS TO PERSONS, DEGREES OF GRACE, AND GLORY.

1. The First Opinion. Some have held that although God, by an antecedent will by
which He willed from Himself to save men and angels, absolutely decreed that some
would infallibly be saved, and perhaps also prescribed a certain and definite number of
those to be saved, so that it could not be less, yet He did not in that moment designate
particular persons. Consequently, that will, by its own force, was not determined to
73 BOOK ONE
these persons until their free cooperation with prevenient grace was foreseen through
His knowledge. Thus, St. Thomas reports in Summa Theologica, Part 1, q. 23, art. 7.
2. The Preceding Opinion is Rejected. This opinion can in no way be proven, and for
this reason, it has long been outdated and rejected by all. First, because God in His
providence, and especially in its primary effects, does not predefine in a confused and
general way what is to be done, but entirely distinctly and perfectly. Second, because
otherwise it would not be true of any particular man or angel what Paul says: "It is not
of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy" (Romans 9:16).
Nor could it be said to anyone: "Who makes you differ?" because God, by the force of
His will, would absolutely not distinguish anyone, even in the order of election and
predestination, and thus this mercy would not depend on His will alone, but the use of
free will would always have to be joined and presupposed as foreseen. Finally, if what
was adduced in chapters 8 and 9 is carefully considered, all of it proceeds concerning
the election of persons in particular, whose election and love is proper. If the things
said about conditional foreknowledge are also considered, it will be clear that it
concerns persons and their works in particular, and therefore the decree of the will that
presupposes it was defined in the same way. And from this principle, the foundation of
that opinion is easily resolved, as has also been touched upon above and more
extensively in Book 3 on the Helps of Grace, and it will also be understood from the
following point.
3. The Second Opinion. With conditional foreknowledge posited, freedom is
preserved with predestination. Others, therefore, said that this decree was indeed
defined for certain and individual persons whom God resolved to save and lead to
beatitude, yet through it, as such, God did not define for each of those persons a
certain term or degree of grace or glory to which each would attain. But this was, as it
were, approved after foreknowledge, through a certain will of complacency. This also
seems to have been found out of fear of taking away freedom if all things were
predefined in particular. But those who think thus feared where there was no fear and
seem not to have recognized the most certain and infallible conditional foreknowledge
of all free effects in particular, with which posited, there is no difficulty in reconciling
freedom concerning all means with the end predefined in particular, as to a certain
degree and intensive perfection, indeed, and as to all circumstances.
4. The Conclusion. Therefore, it must be said that by that gratuitous and absolute
decree, God not only willed glory indefinitely to His elect but also prepared it for each
in a certain and definite degree, ordaining in the same act and manner that variety of
mansions which Christ said are in His Father's kingdom. Augustine signified this in
explaining these words of Christ in Tractate 68 on John, where he inquires how Christ
the Lord said: "In My Father's house are many mansions," and added: "I go to prepare
74 BOOK ONE
a place for you." And he responds that the mansions already exist in predestination and
election, but are prepared by governance. Thus also Bernard in Sermon 23 on the
Canticle says: "It is not given to all to enjoy the grace and secret presence of the spouse
in one place, but as it has been prepared for each by the Father, for we did not choose
Him, but He chose us and placed us, and where each one will be, there he will be." The
same was asserted by St. Bonaventure in Opusculum 2, treatise On the Seven Itineraries
of Eternity, distinction 1, section 2.
5. The Conclusion is Proven. This mode of election does not conflict with freedom.
The reason for this assertion is the same as for the preceding ones, for this mode of
election and intention does not conflict with freedom, nor with grace, nor with justice,
and is consistent with divine perfection and providence, therefore. The major, as to the
first part concerning freedom, is clear by the same reason, because God through this
intention does not change the human will, impeding its mode of operating, but rather
accommodates means that sweetly move it and infallibly. Likewise, either God
physically determines the will, preserving freedom, and thus through that means He will
be able to execute that definite intention, also preserving freedom, or He moves
efficaciously through congruous grace, with conditional foreknowledge posited, and
thus also through the same congruous calling, He will infallibly attain the same degree
of glory, however definitely defined in particular. Or if neither physical
predetermination nor conditional foreknowledge is pleasing, pre-election to glory must
be denied, not only to a definite degree but in any way. Or if it is said that a confused
foreknowledge of the means suffices, because if this means does not succeed, another
will be applied, the same can be said in both modes of election, although in neither
does it truly satisfy. Therefore, in no mode of speaking is there a probable reason for
fearing that freedom is harmed by election to a definite degree of glory more than by
election to glory indefinitely.
6. Nor Does It Conflict with Divine Grace or Justice. As to the other part
concerning grace, the matter is manifest with respect to the elect, for to them it is the
greatest benefit, but with respect to the non-elect, it will be clear below that sufficient
grace is not denied to them on this account, therefore from neither side does this
election conflict with divine grace. Nor with justice, because God is free and the
supreme Lord, and in conferring this benefit on one, He does not deny what is due to
another, therefore there is no injustice. Indeed, it pertains to the perfection of divine
providence, as is clear first, because God in His acts does not proceed confusedly, but
distinctly and in particular, for that other seems always to arise from imperfect
knowledge. Second, because God does not intend this good of the elect only as a
private good of this or that person, but as a common good of this heavenly kingdom,
and therefore He intends per se the various degrees and seats of it, therefore all of it
75 BOOK ONE
falls under the adequate intention of God. Third, the very variety of effects and means
shows us that such was the intention of God. Fourth, because, as I said, the same
reasoning applies to some and to all the elect. Who, indeed, would deny that the Most
Blessed Virgin was pre-elected to the highest degree of glory that she has? The same is
true in its own way of the apostles and other principal saints. Therefore, the same must
be said of all.
7. This Predefinition Also Concerns the Accidental Degree of Glory That Does Not
Suppose Sin. I only note that this is understood chiefly concerning the degrees of
beatitude as to its essence. And it can also be extended to accidental rewards that do
not necessarily suppose sin. But if there is in glory some accidental gift that necessarily
supposes sin, it could not fall under this first intention, because the permission and
foreknowledge of such sin must necessarily be supposed, as I will declare more
extensively below.
8. An Objection and Its Solution. However, someone might object that it follows
that a man sometimes arrives in this life at a state of grace in which he can no longer
grow, namely, if he attains a definite degree. Indeed, it also follows that God stands in
the way of a man becoming holier than he is in fact, because however much a man
strives, he will never be able to exceed the degree defined for him. But these things are
easy for one considering that the will of God is not fulfilled except through His wise
providence, by which He so disposes the actions and progress of each one's life that
life ends when his measure is fulfilled. And therefore, as to the first inference, the
consequence is absolutely to be denied, because as long as a man lives in this life, he can
grow in grace, and predestination does not hinder this, but rather helps it. But that life
ends simultaneously with the term of predestination does not conflict with that
principle. And in the same way, it must be responded to the other part, that in
execution, aids are always prepared for man by which he can operate and grow as much
as he wills, indeed, to respond adequately to the callings of God; and nevertheless,
these callings and aids are not given equally to all, but according to the measure of the
divine will and disposition of each one as to many of them, although not as to all, as
we will declare more extensively below.

CHAPTER XI. WHETHER THIS

DECREE TO GIVE GLORY TO THE PREDESTINED
WAS THEIR ELECTION OR LOVE, AND HOW THESE DIFFER.

1. It is Certain That This Decree is Love. This discussion pertains almost entirely to
explaining the various expressions and opinions of authors, yet in a matter so grave,
this must not be overlooked, lest ambiguity of words either cause confusion or create a
76 BOOK ONE
danger of error. Therefore, the Scholastic Doctors hold as certain that this decree is the
love of God and a very great one, as is clear from St. Thomas in Summa Theologica,
Part 1, q. 23, art. 4, and all who write there, and in 1 Sent., dist. 40 and 41. Nor can
anyone doubt this, because to love someone is to will good to them, but through this
decree, God wills the greatest good to the predestined, namely, eternal glory. Therefore,
He loves them, and thus that act is true love.
2. Reasons for Doubting. Rather, theologians doubt whether this love of the
predestined is greater than that by which God loves the reprobate at the time when he
is just, as can be seen in St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Part 1, q. 20, art. 4, ad 5, and
Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica, Part 1, q. 32, Memb. 2. And in summary, they
respond simply and absolutely that the predestined is loved more by reason of this will
or gratuitous decree to give glory, because God simply wills a greater good to him,
namely, eternal life. Yet, in a certain respect, or for that time when he is foreseen as just
and predestined in sin, the reprobate is loved more, because at that time he is accepted
for glory, to which, according to the present justice of that time, the predestined sinner
is not accepted.
3. But Against This. For through this act of love, the predestined is loved even for
that time when he is not just; therefore, already for that time, he is simply and
absolutely loved more. The consequence is clear, because that love in itself is simply
greater; therefore, for every time for which it denominates the man as loved, it also
denominates him as more loved. It is responded according to the mind of St. Thomas
above that the love of God is the cause of the goodness of the thing loved, and
therefore for whatever time God loves that person more, for the same time He confers
a greater good. But at that time when the predestined is not just and the reprobate is
just, God confers a greater good on the reprobate than on the predestined, because He
confers grace on the foreseen, which He does not confer on the predestined, and
therefore for that time, He simply loves the foreseen more, whom at that time He
makes better.
4. But I Press Further. For either it follows that God does not love the predestined
for that time, or the difficulty is not resolved. It is clear, because if He loves for that
time, then He also loves more for that time. The consequence is proven, because
through greater love for the same time, He loves. Likewise, because at that very time,
He loves for a greater good. But if this is not enough for Him to love more, because at
that time He does not confer that greater good on him, then it will not suffice for Him
to simply love (with a supernatural love, of course, which is the topic), because by the
force of that will, He confers no supernatural good on him, as I suppose. But if this is
finally conceded, it follows that that decree is not true love of God, contrary to the
hypothesis made. The consequence is clear, because through that decree formally
77 BOOK ONE
considered, God either never loves the man or always and continuously loves him,
because on God's part, that act always remains unchanged, and the change that occurs
in the man for different times does not arise from that act formally considered, a sign
of which is (because that man in every time and state, both of sin and of grace, always
remains predestined, or preordained by the force of that act to eternal life); therefore, if
this suffices for love, it always denominates him as loved, or if it does not suffice, it
never denominates him. But it seems further to be concluded from what has been said
that it does not suffice, because God does not love except the good, and because His
will does not presuppose the good, therefore He does not love except by making good;
but through that act, as such, God does not make the man good; therefore, through
that act, He does not love the man. The minor is proven, because while that act and its
formal denomination stand, the man is not good; therefore, through that act, God does
not make the man good.
5. Conclusion. A Distinction of a Twofold Love Toward Men. Nevertheless, it must
be said that that act is true love of God toward man, as is the common opinion, which
has already been sufficiently proven. However, we can distinguish a twofold love of
God. One, by which He only orders man to some good; the other, by which He confers
such a good on him. Just as among men, the purpose of giving some good to someone
is a certain love, even if it does not immediately move the faculty to confer that good.
And in God Himself, not only is the conferral of some gift a sign of present love, but
also the promise of conferring a good. Just as when God promised Abraham the future
generation of Christ from him, He thereby showed a special present love for him,
although He had not yet bestowed that good on him. Therefore, in God, there is a true
love preordaining man to some good, distinct in reason from that love which consists
in the actual conferral of such a good, and the former can be called the love of
purpose and intention, the latter of execution. Hence, when it is said that God does not
love him whom He does not make good, understood universally, it is simply false: for
He whom He has decreed to make good for some time, and thenceforth for all eternity,
He loves even for that time when He does not make him good, because even then He
orders him to such a good; therefore, He loves him at that time with an ordaining love,
not a conferring love of such a good at that time. Therefore, that purpose or decree of
saving someone is true love of God.
6. A Difficulty Concerning the Act of Election from St. Thomas. Concerning the act
of election, there is some difficulty because of St. Thomas, who in Summa Theologica,
Part 1, q. 23, art. 3, distinguishes between love and election, and says that love precedes
in God before election, although in man it sometimes happens that he chooses before
he loves. Just as when someone chooses someone to contract friendship with him. His
reason is that for one to be chosen over another, it is presupposed that he is good,
78 BOOK ONE
indeed better than the other, because election presupposes some inequality and excess
in the thing that is chosen. Therefore, if this one is chosen and not another, it is
presupposed that this one is good and not the other. But with respect to the divine will,
good is not presupposed for love, but rather proceeds from it; therefore, it is necessary
that love precede election. Explaining this doctrine, Cajetan adds that even in the
human will, election presupposes some love, at least of those properties or virtues on
account of which something is chosen, as in the example given, when someone chooses
another as a friend, it is always on account of some condition pleasing to him, which he
recognizes in that other.
7. Therefore, by One Act, He Loves and Chooses the Predestined. A Twofold
Meaning of Election. Nevertheless, I judge that there is one act of the will by which
God loves and chooses the predestined to the same term of glory, and by these words
only diverse relations are connoted. To declare this, I note that election is said in two
ways, namely, of one over another, which seems to be the primary imposition of the
word, and of one on account of another, in which way moral philosophers call the will
of the means on account of the end election, even if it happens that that means is
unique. In both ways, this love of the predestined can be called election. The first is
proven, because from infinite men whom God could have loved to beatitude, He loved
these and not others; therefore, by loving these, He preferred them to others; therefore,
by that very act of love, He intrinsically chose them. It is said to love insofar as He wills
good to them, but to choose insofar as He prefers them to others, which He does not
do through another act, but through the same. And it is confirmed by the example of
human election. For after several means apt for the proposed end have been proposed
through consultation, by the very fact that the will accepts one and not the others, it
loves and chooses such a means. Nor is it necessary for election that through a positive
and, as it were, direct will, the means that is not chosen follows, but it suffices that in
the act exercised, the will accepts this and not that; thus, therefore, it is in the present
case. Hence, according to the common language of Scripture, this love of the
predestined is called election: "He chose us in Him" (Ephesians 1:4).
8. The Second is Also Easily Clear from What Has Been Said Above. Because
although God wills glory to the predestined as their end, yet He willed this very thing as
a means to manifest His attributes and to communicate His goodness. Hence, His
goodness was the primary reason for loving the elect; therefore, such love is intrinsically
on account of God Himself; therefore, it is election in the other meaning as well.
9. A Response to St. Thomas. Therefore, I respond to St. Thomas that he never says
that these are several acts, although he speaks of them as several to explain the various
relations. Among which the first is to the object insofar as the will of God wills good
there; then another results, which is of preference over others; for under this aspect, St.
79 BOOK ONE
Thomas speaks of election. Nor do I judge it necessary that election presuppose
inequality, especially in the order of consultation and intention; for from equal means,
the will can accept one and omit the others. Which is especially necessary in the divine
will, as St. Thomas also confesses in art. 5. Finally, I also judge that in us, there is no
election that is not intrinsically some love. The reason is clear, because through election,
the will is borne to the thing it chooses as good and is united to it; therefore, it loves it
through the same mode. As in the example given, when someone chooses someone to
have him as a familiar friend, through that very election, he begins to love, although he
orders that love to another greater and more familiar friendship. And also conversely,
love, if it is of one out of many, is always election, only it can lack this denomination
when only one object is proposed to be loved for its own sake.

CHAPTER XII. THAT THE ELECTION OF ALL WHO

ARE TO BE SAVED WAS MADE IN THE SAME MOMENT OF REASON.

1. The first reason for doubt. In this chapter, the discussion is not about Christ the
Lord, but about the other predestined, both angels and humans. Hence, the first reason
for doubt is that the holy angels seem to have been elected to glory before humans.
This is proven because the good angels were elected before the evil angels were
foreseen to sin, but humans were not elected until the sin of the evil angels was
foreseen. Therefore, the major premise is certain because, before the foreknowledge of
the angels' sin, there was the permission of that sin, and before the permission, there
was the will to create and ordain them (namely, the evil angels) to glory, with a
preceding will. But the election of the good angels occurred simultaneously with the
ordination of the evil angels to glory; therefore, without doubt, it preceded the
permission and foreknowledge of the angels' sin. The minor premise is proven because
humans were elected to restore the seats of the angels, as some gather from Paul's
words in Ephesians 1: "to restore all things in Christ, which are in heaven and on
earth," and this is often applied to Psalm 109: "He will judge among the nations, He
will fill the ruins." Hence, St. Bernard, in his first sermon on Advent, draws from this
the reason why humans were redeemed and not angels: because the ruins of the angels
were restored through humans, whereas the fall of human nature could not be repaired
by any lower nature. Anselm also holds this reasoning in Book 1 of Cur Deus Homo,
chapters 16 and 17, and finally, Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 29, says: "The
children of the Church succeed to the seats of the angels, so that they may enjoy the
peace which the angels lost." Therefore, the election of humans presupposes the
foreknowledge of the angels' fall.
80 BOOK ONE
2. The second reason. The second reason for doubt is that even among humans, not
all seem to have been elected at the same time and in the same moment of reason. For
Adam was elected before the foreknowledge of original sin. In the major premise, I
assume that Adam was elected because he was saved, as stated in Wisdom 10, and I
have already said that all who are saved are also elected. Before sin, Adam also had
many effects of his election, for the grace and justice he received at his creation were
effects of his election, as I now assume, and this can easily be gathered from what was
said in the previous chapter. Therefore, he was elected before the foreknowledge of his
sin. The minor premise seems to be the clear teaching of Augustine in Book 2 against
the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 7, in On Predestination and Grace, chapter 3,
Book 1 to Simplician, question 2, in the Enchiridion, chapter 49, and often elsewhere.
St. Thomas also supports this in Part 1, Question 23, Article 1, reply to objection 3,
insofar as he says that the starting point of human predestination was the misery of sin.
This can also be explained by reason, because if man had not sinned, perhaps there
would not be as many humans as there are now, or perhaps not the same ones, or if
there were, not as many would be damned as now, since nature would have been intact.
Moreover, the glory of the blessed humans has been increased by the occasion of sin,
according to the saying: "I came that they may have life and have it abundantly."
Therefore, the election, as we have described it, could not have been before the
foreknowledge of original sin, because it was made for a definite degree of glory, which
could not have been determined before the foreseen original sin, since the degree once
determined would remain unchangeable and could not later be increased. This can also
be explained by the mode of providence and the communication of grace, which God
had in the state of innocence, because it was almost indifferent and equally common to
all humans. Therefore, it proceeded from an equal will to give glory to all. Hence, there
was not yet a distinction by an absolute election of some. Finally, Christ Himself was
not predestined except by the foreseen original sin, as the opinion of many holds. But
He was predestined before the election of other humans, because in Him they were
elected, as Paul testifies in Ephesians 1. Therefore, neither were the others elected
before the foreknowledge of original sin.
3. The third reason. The third difficulty may be that not even after original sin do all
the predestined seem to have been elected at the same time. First, because no one is
elected unless they are foreseen to exist in the future, but not all humans are foreseen to
exist at the same time, for they are foreseen in the order in which they will exist.
Second, because the generations of many are not from divine predestination but from
mere permission, since they occur with sin, and yet many humans thus born are elected.
Therefore, they are not elected until they are foreseen to exist in the future, and thus
not all are elected at the same time. Third, because often many are assumed to glory by
81 BOOK ONE
the occasion of the fall of others, as is not obscurely signified in Revelation 3: "Hold
fast what you have, so that no one may seize your crown." Therefore, before one is
elected to receive the crown of another, the fall of the other is foreseen. And this
providence of God is signified in Job 34, where it is said: "He will shatter many and
innumerable, and He will make others stand in their place." Thus, Matthias was chosen
in place of Judas in Acts 1, and the Gentiles were called in place of the Jews in Acts 13
and Romans 11. Therefore, the election of all humans to be saved could not have been
made in the same moment of reason.
4. The first conclusion: The election of all was simultaneous. The first reason.
Nevertheless, it must be said that the election of all the predestined after Christ (about
whom I am not now disputing) was simultaneous and in the same moment of reason. I
consider this to be the more common opinion of theologians, whom I will cite below.
It is proven first because, in the acts of the divine will, on the part of God Himself,
there is no order, for He wills all things simultaneously and in one simple act.
Therefore, order can only be considered on the part of the objects. But among the
elect, there is no order by which some are said to be elected before others. Therefore,
the minor premise is proven because this order can only be one of causality, and in the
present case, it must be the order of the end and what is ordered to the end, since we
are dealing with the order of intention. But one elect person is not the end of the glory
of another, nor vice versa, but all are immediately ordered to the glory of God and
Christ. Therefore, there is no order of priority among them.
The second reason. Secondly, from the often-made argument that God intends the
kingdom of the elect as one body or heavenly city. Therefore, He also simultaneously
intends all the members that constitute such a body, for from their multitude and
variety, the beauty of the whole body results.
The third reason. Thirdly, because neither were the angels elected before humans,
nor were some humans elected before others. Therefore, all were elected
simultaneously. The consequence is clear, and the preceding will be confirmed by what
is said and by the solutions to the arguments.
5. The second conclusion: The election of humans was before the foreseen sin of
the angels. Secondly, I assert that humans were elected to glory before the foreseen sin
of the angels, and thus they were not elected on the occasion of that sin but for their
own sake, just as the angels were. St. Augustine holds this in Book 12 of The City of
God, chapter 9, insofar as he judges the necessity of grace to pertain equally to angels
and humans and to be equally freely or gratuitously bestowed by God. More clearly, in
Book 11, chapter 9, Book 12, chapter 1, and Book 15, chapter 1, he distinguishes two
cities or societies, one of the predestined and the other of the reprobate, and he
indicates that the former is composed of angels and humans without any order
82 BOOK ONE
between them. Similarly, in Book 22, chapter 29, he says that the City of God equally
consists of angels and humans. This can also be gathered from Anselm in the
Elucidarium, where he says that as many humans are to be saved as there are blessed
angels. From this, it is well inferred that humans are not assumed only to fill the seats
of the evil angels, for the angels who fell were far fewer than those who remained.
Indeed, Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 29, considers it probable that the number
of blessed humans will be greater than that of the angels.
6. This is explained by reason. First, because human nature is equally capable (by
obediential capacity) of that supernatural beatitude as angelic nature, and by its nature,
it is directed to God alone as its ultimate end and rests in Him alone. Therefore, it is
ordered to that end for its own sake, just as angelic nature is. Hence, humans are equally
primarily elected to that end as the angels are. Moreover, although angelic nature
exceeds in perfection, human nature is more apt to show the power of divine grace,
which is one principal end of divine predestination. Therefore, there is in some way a
greater reason for humans to be elected for their own sake than for angels, and this
reason is further increased on the part of Christ the Lord (whom I assume to have
been the first elected and predestined by God, as the head of all, for whose glory all
others are elected). Since God ordained human nature rather than angelic nature for
that mystery, there seems to be no doubt that He also primarily elected humans, as
companions and brothers of Christ, independently of the sin of the angels, so that He
might be the firstborn among many brethren. For this reason, divine Wisdom also says
of Him, that is, of Himself: "My delight is to be with the sons of men." Therefore,
there is no order of reason between the election of humans and the sin of the angels.
Hence, this election does not presuppose the foreknowledge of that sin, and
consequently, there will be no order between the election of humans and angels on this
account.
7. Objection and response. You will say, therefore, neither was the election of
humans before that foreknowledge, nor is there any order of causality between the sin
of the angels and the glory of humans. I respond by denying the consequence, because
although no immediate order is seen here, yet mediately and by reason of another, such
an order intervenes insofar as the election of the good angels necessarily preceded that
foreknowledge, and the election of humans and angels was made simultaneously.
Moreover, it is probable that even the permission of the angels' sin was ordained by
God for the salvation of the elect humans, as I will explain below.
8. The third conclusion: The election of humans was before the foreseen sin of
Adam. Thirdly, I say that all humans to be saved were elected before the foreseen sin of
Adam as absolutely future, indeed even before the will to permit it. This conclusion is
drawn from St. Thomas, Question 23, Article 1, reply to objection 3, and from Article
83 BOOK ONE
4, if read carefully. The same is held by Scotus in Book 3, distinction 7, question 3, and
he also indicated it, though with some doubt, in Book 1, distinction 41. Hervaeus,
Giles, Gregory, Capreolus, and Marsilius also hold this in distinction 40. Echius, in his
book On Predestination, century 1, number 36, establishes as a rule: "No predestined
person is elected on the occasion of another's sin." This indeed seems most probable
to me, as I have said more extensively regarding the predestination of Christ in Part 3,
Disputation 5. Hence, the reason for the assertion is taken because the election of
humans in no way depends on the permission or foreknowledge of sin, since it is not
understood to occur in any way, either by reason or occasion of sin. Therefore, there is
no reason for it to presuppose that. Moreover, I take the argument from what has been
said: for the angels were not elected to glory on the occasion of any sin but for their
own sake. Therefore, the same is true of humans, since they are equally primarily and
principally elected. Finally, by permitting the sin of Adam, God disposed the salvation
of the elect to be achieved in the best and most wise manner and, as it were, prepared
the way for that glory of humans which He intended. Therefore, that intention is best
understood to be prior to this permission.
9. The first reason for doubt is resolved. A response to the holy Fathers. To the first
reason for doubt, I deny that humans were elected after the foreknowledge of the
angels' sin. I also deny that the primary reason for electing humans was taken from the
occasion of that sin but rather from the divine goodness, presupposing human capacity
and perhaps also on account of the merits of Christ. To those expressions of the
saints, I respond that they speak more of the effect and execution than of the first
election. For they consider beatitude as to be fulfilled from all the created angels, and
because some of them fell, they say that kingdom is fulfilled from humans. Not indeed
because God created humans or elected them only for that intention or on that
occasion, but because from the beginning He willed to constitute that kingdom in that
way. Augustine explains in this way in chapter 62 of the Enchiridion that saying of Paul
in Ephesians 1: "to restore all things in Christ," because, he says, "what fell in the angels
is restored in humans." Although Jerome and the Greeks, according to the propriety of
the Greek word, read and explain it differently: "to recapitulate all things in Christ," that
is, to bring all things to a head or to unite all things in Him as the true and supreme
head.
10. The words of Psalm 109 have a far different meaning: for "to fill the ruins" does
not signify to repair or restore them but rather to complete or increase them. For by
that metaphorical expression, the spiritual victories that Christ won over the nations are
signified. If those words are referred to the ruins of the demons, they rather signify
that those ruins were completed by Christ, who conquered the devil and cast him out
of the hearts of men. Finally, even admitting that allegorical sense, it only proves that in
84 BOOK ONE
the execution, Christ restored the seats of the angels by redeeming the elect humans.
Hence, it does not follow that humans were elected to glory because the evil angels lost
it.
11. The second reason is satisfied. The sense of the words of St. Thomas and
Augustine. A response to the confirmation. Christ was predestined before the foreseen
sin. To the second, I admit that Adam was elected to glory before the foreseen original
sin, and from this, I take the argument that the same must be said of the other
predestined, since there is no order among them. However, when St. Thomas signifies
that the starting point of human predestination was the state of sin, he speaks of
predestination with respect to the means by which humans are saved, not with respect
to the first intention or election of glory. And Augustine can be understood in the same
way. Or, if this is referred to the election of glory, it can be understood as by
anticipation, because those who were to be in the mass of perdition and were to be
freed from it by the efficacious means of predestination were elected. To those
conditional statements: "If Adam had not sinned, would the same humans have existed,
and would they have been saved in the same degree of grace and glory?" I respond first
that God could have governed human affairs even during that state so that ultimately
the same humans would be saved in the same degree of grace and glory as are now
predestined. For God has in the treasures of His wisdom and power infinite ways and
means by which He could do this. Secondly, it is said that those conditionals have no
bearing on the present matter. For original sin was permitted so that the divine plan and
election might be most wisely fulfilled in that way. To the confirmation concerning the
predestination of Christ, it is responded by denying the assumption, for Christ was also
loved before all sin was foreseen. Indeed, from this, we retort the argument, because
with Him and for His sake, many humans ought to have been elected for their own sake
and without the occasion of sin.
12. The third reason is resolved. The succession of time in the future existence of
humans does not constitute an order of election. To the third, it is responded by
denying that there was an order among the other humans. Nor does the order that
exists in the succession of times pertain to this, for otherwise all the predestined
pertaining to the written law would necessarily have been elected before those
pertaining to the law of grace, which is frivolous. Therefore, God simultaneously and in
the same moment of reason predestines many things, which He disposes to be fulfilled
successively. Nor is it true that humans were first foreseen to exist in the future before
they were elected, but rather (as I said above) by the very election, they were
predestined to exist by the same divine predestination. Nor does it hinder that many are
born sinfully, for God knows how to bring His predestinations to fulfillment by means
85 BOOK ONE
of permissions, which is very easy to understand, supposing conditional knowledge,
and this will often be touched upon in what follows.
13. The objection is rejected. Hence, it is inferred, responding at the same time to the
last objection, that no human was elected to glory or grace in that primary order of
divine intention on the occasion of the sin or perdition of another, but God primarily
elected them for their own sake and by Himself. For God predestined the number of
the saved by an absolute will, not only confusedly and formally (as they say) with
respect to the species of the number, but also distinctly and, as it were, materially with
respect to the singular persons who obtain salvation. For this (as I said above) is
signified by the Scriptures, and this is required by the perfection of divine grace and
providence. This could hardly stand or be understood if, in electing one, God awaited
the foreknowledge of the good or bad use of grace and free will by another. Nor is
there any reason to imagine such an order or expectation.
14. The scriptural passages cited to the contrary are explained. The scriptural
passages have various interpretations. For that saying in Revelation 3: "Hold fast what
you have, so that no one may seize your crown," some think is only a manner of
speaking and exhorting, as a mother is wont to incite her little son to flee, saying, "Hold
fast to the breast, lest I give it to your brother," as St. Thomas relates there, or whoever
is the author of those commentaries, and this does not displease him. But St. Thomas
observes a greater propriety in those words in Part 1, Question 23, Article 6, reply to
the first objection. Two things are contained in those words: one is a threat of losing
the crown. This would be easy if it only said: "Hold fast, lest you lose your crown." For
this can be said both to the foreknown, because even while he is just, he can be said to
have his crown, not in possession but by right and merit, which he loses by sinning, and
also to the predestined, because he is capable of losing his crown by himself, and so
that this power is not reduced to act, he is prevented by such admonitions of God. As
Peter also said to the elect: "Be all the more diligent to make your calling and election
sure by good works." This is also taught by St. Thomas in the cited places. The other
thing signified in those words is that one is often substituted in place of another to
receive the crown that another lost. This is indeed seen in the dignities of this life. For
David received the crown of the kingdom that Saul lost through disobedience. And
Matthias was substituted in the apostleship that Judas forfeited. And Job speaks
especially of these dignities in the cited place.
15. The response of some is refuted. Nevertheless, St. Gregory in Book 25 of the
Morals, chapters 7 and 8, elsewhere 9 and 10, also understands that passage concerning
grace and glory, confirming it by another testimony from Revelation 3. Jerome, Bede,
Haimo, and the Gloss on Revelation 3 also hold this. Augustine considered this so true
in his book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 13, that he said: "Another will not receive
86 BOOK ONE
unless this one loses." And from this, he gathers that there is a certain number of the
predestined, so that it cannot be increased, for one would not receive unless another
lost, lest the definite number of the elect be exceeded. This would indeed satisfy if the
number of the predestined were only formally predetermined by election. But since it is
also materially determined, it is difficult to understand how one is substituted in place
of another and how it is true that one would not have received the crown unless
another had lost it. For if he was elected before the foreknowledge of works, he would
certainly have had it even if others had not fallen, since his election had no respect to
the fall of others, neither formally, nor virtually, nor in any other way. Nor does that
response satisfy in this part, that predestination does not impose necessity, for the
predestined can absolutely lose his crown. For granted that this is true, yet it suffices
that when the predestined perseveres by grace, he is said to be substituted in place of
another to receive the crown that another lost. Nor does it suffice to say truly that God
permits the reprobate to fall so that another may receive the crown that he would not
have received, lest the number of the predestined exceed the definite number.
16. A better response to the holy Fathers and the scriptural passages. I say, therefore,
that those testimonies and all those modes of speaking are to be understood of divine
providence with respect to the wonderful and most wise mode that He observes in the
execution of the means, but not with respect to the primary election of the
predestined. For this is to be understood by the mode of a singular predetermination,
which God had from Himself alone and from His mere good pleasure, absolutely
intending such an eternal kingdom consisting of such persons and members. By the
force of this election, the number of the saved remains so certain, both formally and
materially, that it cannot be diminished. Yet it does not pertain to the efficacy of that
will that it cannot be increased, because God did not positively will to exclude all others
from the kingdom, as I will say below. And therefore, along with that election, God had
a true will to save others, yet not an absolute will but under the condition that it did not
depend on them. And therefore, in the execution, He gives them sufficient means to be
saved, which sometimes have such an effect that through them, they obtain a true right
to the eternal crown, even if they are foreseen not to preserve it until the end of life.
And hence, when they lose it, they are said to lose their crown, that is, due to their
merits if they die in grace. Moreover, when one of these falls, another is said to be
substituted in his place, because God is wont to govern and execute the salvation of
His elect in such a way that He first calls the reprobate, and when they misuse divine
grace, He defers them and transfers His special protection to others, not because He
loved them later or only on the occasion of the sin of others, but because in that way,
He more wonderfully and wisely shows His justice toward the evil and His grace toward
87 BOOK ONE
the good. And from these, it is easy to interpret the other testimonies of Sacred
Scripture and the Saints.

CHAPTER XIII. HOW THE DIVINE WILL PREPARED

THE MEANS BY WHICH THE ELECT ARE INFALLIBLY SAVED.

1. Two kinds of means that God prepares for the elect. Common means are prior
and first determined. We have spoken of the divine will insofar as it concerns the end
of predestination. Now it must be briefly explained how, or by what acts, God disposes
the way and the means by which the elect infallibly tend toward that end. In this, we can
first distinguish two kinds of means of this divine providence. Some are common,
prepared for the whole community. Such means can be considered in the angels as all
the graces and aids given to them at the moment of their creation, by which (according
to a probable opinion) they were so prevented that in that instant they did not sin at all,
and so moved that they were infallibly converted to God, disposed themselves to grace,
were sanctified, and merited their first glory. In humans, such means are found in the
law of grace: baptism and the other sacraments, the preaching of the Gospel with the
preparation of divine internal and necessary aid to obtain faith. These and similar
means can be said to be first determined and decreed for each age, because these
universal means are in some way prior. When the end is intended for the community,
the means provided for the whole community seem to occur first. Moreover, these
common means are in some way included in particular means, for regularly
justifications occur through the application of common means to particular persons.
Finally (to note this in passing), original justice, given to the whole human race in the
first parent before the fall, can be placed in this order of means, for through it God
began to dispose the salvation of the elect, as far as it was in Him.
2. Objection and response. You will say that these and similar means pertain more to
the general providence of grace than to predestination, because they are not founded
on the peculiar efficacious election of some humans but on the general will to save all.
Hence, such means are common to all. I respond that these are not contradictory, for
some things are provided for the predestined in such a way that they can also benefit
others. Thus, although the salvation of the predestined is not (so to speak) the adequate
end of such means, it is nevertheless the principal end, and this is sufficient for these to
be counted among the means of predestination and to be said in a singular way to be
for the sake of the elect. Just as Paul said that he endured labors for the sake of the
elect, although in reality he labored for all, so too with these means, and no more seems
necessary.
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3. Particular means are done by God alone or with the cooperation of free will. The
question concerns the means done with cooperation. Again, concerning particular
means, it must be noted that there are two orders of them: Some are done by God
alone without the cooperation of free will, such as the first call and other prevenient
aids that God confers on humans without any merit or disposition on their part. To this
order belong certain effects of God's singular providence concerning His elect, such as
removing an occasion of sin or offering an occasion of meriting, etc. Concerning this
whole order of means, there is no difficulty in affirming that God could have prepared
them by His efficacious gratuitous will. How and in what order He provided them will
be clear from what follows. Another order is that of particular means that include the
free cooperation of the will, such as supernatural human acts, under which I include all
effects that depend on them, such as the remission of sin in an adult and similar things.
Concerning these, there is great controversy among theologians about how they are
prepared through predestination.
4. The first opinion. The foundation of this opinion. The first opinion is that by the
force of the divine will disposing the means before the foreknowledge of them as
absolutely future, these means are prepared only by a certain confused reason and by an
inefficacious will, without the predetermination of such acts in particular. St. Thomas
seems to have indicated this opinion in Question 6 of De Veritate, Article 3. For he
says that the certainty of predestination consists in this, that God prepares so many aids
for the predestined that they either do not fall or, if they fall, rise again. Therefore, God
does not predetermine a certain means but one or another, so that ultimately some
means may have an effect. The chief motive of this opinion seems to be that in this
way, freedom can be reconciled with predestination. This can be confirmed by
experience, because not every call or prevenient grace given to the predestined has an
effect in them. Therefore, it does not proceed from an efficacious intention of their
conversion or consent.
5. The first opinion is rejected. This opinion has already been rejected above. First, it
seems to proceed by denying conditional knowledge, by which God, before the will to
give the call, foreknew whether it would be suitable or not, that is, whether the human
will would consent to it if it were given. For if this knowledge is presupposed, as it
ought to be, it is in vain to attribute to God that mode of providing means in a
confused way and under that distinction, so that if one means does not have an effect,
another is applied. For God does not operate in this way unless He is ignorant of the
efficacy of the first means. For this reason (as I said above), this mode of providence is
not consistent with divine perfection, which requires that all things be distinctly and
particularly disposed according to the dignity and capacity of each thing, from certain
knowledge.
89 BOOK ONE
6. A response to the foundation of the opinion. Nor is this necessary for freedom, as
will be said at length in what follows and has been touched upon above, where we also
explained the cited passage of St. Thomas. St. Thomas clearly held this in Summa
Theologiae I-II, Question 112, Article 4, saying: "If it is from God's intention that the
called person consents, he will infallibly consent, although freely." Finally, in the case of
the angels, it is clearly established that this mode of providence has no place, for in the
second instant in which the way of all the angels was determined, the will of the elect
was so prepared that they did not fall at all. For if they had fallen, they would not have
risen again; indeed, they were also prepared to have all the merit necessary to obtain the
degree of glory to which they were elected.
7. The second opinion. Therefore, the second opinion says that God by His absolute
will disposes the means and certain aids by which each elect person infallibly attains
salvation, and this in particular, that is, by designating such means and such acts. This
opinion adds that all these were ordained simultaneously, so that according to reason,
one is not determined by God before another, especially when the means depend on
our free will.
The third opinion does not satisfy the difficulty and the manner of speaking of
Augustine. These means maintain an order in their proximity to glory. This opinion is
similar to the one I first recounted in Chapter VIII, and the same must be said of it, for
it avoids the difficulty rather than resolving it. It is also contrary to the manner of
speaking of Augustine and almost all who say that God calls a person to believe, and
because He wills to give faith, He also wills to give such a call, as can be seen in
Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, Chapter 14. The reason is also clear, because
these means are not equally proximate to the ultimate end but maintain an order among
themselves, as Paul hinted in Romans 8. For justification is more proximate to
glorification than the call, and the call is more proximate to justification. Similarly, any
act that is a disposition to grace is more proximate to it than the excitation by which a
person is called to a free act. Therefore, just as the intention of the ultimate end
precedes all these means, so among the means themselves, the intention of what is
more proximate to the end precedes. For the more remote means are chosen for the
sake of the more proximate, and thus the latter is posterior in the order of intention,
although it occurs first in the order of execution. This is briefly explained in the case of
the good angels: because they were elected to such glory, they were also ordained to
attain such grace in their entire way, and for this reason, God willed that they should
have such or so many meritorious acts, and for the sake of these, He prepared such a
mode of illumination and inspiration for them. For they were also called by a suitable
call, which is from His purpose, as Augustine says. Finally, efficacious grace, as
efficacious, cannot be understood in any other way within the latitude of prevenient
90 BOOK ONE
grace as intended by God per se, but only as efficacious from its effect, namely, because
it has happened, which I now assume to be false.
8. The third opinion. For this reason, there is a third opinion, which, although it
agrees with the preceding opinions in this, that God does not prepare free acts by an
absolute will until He foresees them as absolutely future, yet to avoid some
inconveniences from what has been said, especially the last, it distinguishes various acts
in the divine will concerning these means. Hence, the authors of this opinion say first
that God has a certain absolute and universal will to give to this person all the
prevenient aids necessary and suitable for him, so that through them he may infallibly
attain glory in such a course of life. They say that this will concerns efficacious grace as
efficacious, in the manner of prevenient grace. Afterwards, they say that God has
disposed in particular such aids in order to such free acts, yet so that although the
intention of such acts precedes, it is not efficacious and absolute but only by simple
complacency, including a virtual condition. This last is asserted only to preserve human
freedom unharmed.
9. The absolute will of God concerning a particular act does not contradict freedom.
But this foundation being destroyed, the whole opinion easily falls. However, it has
been sufficiently shown (as I think) above that the absolute intention of God
concerning a free act (even in particular and with all its circumstances) does not take
away freedom, because that intention per se does not physically change or determine
the human will but applies the means that God knows to be suitable to freedom, as will
be touched upon more at length in what follows. Therefore, if it is true (as it really is)
that according to reason, the intention of such an act precedes in the divine will, there
is no reason why it should be inefficacious, especially since from that intention
proximately and infallibly arises the application of the call or efficacious aid, as
efficacious. But this foundation being posited, the first act of the will, which this
opinion imagines, is superfluous. For if that volition is understood to be about some
universal and confused object, it is not fitting for God, who (as I said) distinctly knows
and disposes all things, nor is it necessary for any end, since the will concerning each
aid suffices. But if such an act is understood to concern the collection or multitude of
such aids in particular, that act, although in reality one, is distinguished by reason from
the diversity of objects, and thus it is not distinct from those wills by which God is said
to dispose and will to give these aids in particular. Hence, it is necessary that even such
an act, insofar as it concerns prevenient aids, presupposes the intention of those acts of
the human will for the sake of which those aids are prepared. Finally, there is no reason
for an order between that universal act and the other particular acts, since their objects
are not compared as ends and means, nor do they have any other order of causality.
91 BOOK ONE
10. Conclusion. God also prepares the means that depend on freedom by an absolute
will. Therefore, it must be said that God by an absolute act of His will prepares for the
predestined even those means that are to be freely exercised or obtained by them. This
is the opinion of St. Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints, especially
Chapter 10, and On the Gift of Perseverance, Chapter 9 and following, and it is
undoubtedly that of St. Thomas in Summa Theologiae I-II, as cited above, and Part I,
Question 23. I have proven it at length in Book 3 of On Divine Aid, Chapter 17. The
sum of all is that this mode of providence does not contradict freedom, as is clear from
what has been said. It is also very consistent with the perfection of divine providence
and the special love with which He pursues the predestined. Therefore, there is no
reason to deny it. Moreover, because He who efficaciously intends some end first
intends, according to reason, the means more proximate to that end than the more
remote. We have shown that God efficaciously intends for the predestined the ultimate
end of glory, to which end the means that are done by human freedom with divine
grace, such as meritorious acts and proximate dispositions to justice, are more
proximate than those by which God alone moves a person. Therefore, God
efficaciously wills those means for the predestined prior in reason to willing to give
them the call or other preceding aids, which are more remote. Hence, it is finally
confirmed that just as the act of charity is compared to the aiding excitation by which
God efficaciously moves to such an act, so is the reward of glory compared to the act
of charity itself. Therefore, just as the intention of glory precedes the foreknowledge
of the act of charity or merit, so in God the intention of giving a person the act of
charity precedes the will or absolute foreknowledge of the suitable call, which is given
for the sake of such an act. Nor does any new difficulty arise against this that needs to
be satisfied.
11. God absolutely wills good acts independent of sin. God does not absolutely will
good acts dependent on sin except after the knowledge of sin. I note that among these
free acts, some are entirely independent of sin, because they neither necessarily
presuppose it nor include an intrinsic respect to it, such as acts of faith, hope, love, etc.
Others necessarily presuppose sin, such as the proper act of penance. In the former
acts, the stated opinion proceeds absolutely and without limitation, because God
primarily and per se intends these acts, and from Himself, by an antecedent and
efficacious will (according to the sense of Chrysostom and Damascene, explained
elsewhere), He wills and intends them because they are entirely good and presuppose
no evil. In the latter acts, God does not intend by an absolute will until He has absolute
foreknowledge of future sin, because God cannot will sin formally or virtually. He
would will it (at least virtually) if He absolutely predetermined an act intrinsically
92 BOOK ONE
respecting sin without sin being presupposed, as I will explain more at length below
when treating the effects of predestination.
12. The act of contrition is predetermined in reason before the means to it.
Although this is so, nevertheless, even in these acts or means, the stated opinion holds
true, with due proportion. For although God does not absolutely will the act of
contrition, for example, until He sees the sin that needs to be removed, which
necessitates it, nevertheless, He first predetermines and intends for the predestined the
act of contrition in reason before willing to give them the efficacious aid or other
means ordered to that act. For sin is not a means ordered to contrition but is the matter
and occasion inducing the necessity of it. The means to contrition are those that are per
se ordered to effecting contrition. Therefore, the foreknowledge of sin is presupposed,
and before it, the will to permit it precedes, but the will of such means is not
presupposed. Rather, in our way of understanding, it follows from the intention of
such an end.

CHAPTER XIV. WHETHER GOD HAS AN EXECUTIVE WILL

CONCERNING THE GOODS HE CONFERS ON THE PREDESTINED,
BEYOND THOSE PERTAINING TO THE ORDER OF INTENTION.

1. The first reason for doubt. The reason for doubt is that the absolute will of God is
in itself efficacious concerning those things He wills in this way: "For He has done all
that He willed" (Psalm 115:3). Therefore, if God has an absolute will by which He
decrees to give glory and grace to the predestined, by that same will He entirely confers
these goods. Hence, it is superfluous to posit another executive will, even one distinct in
reason, especially since this distinction would have to be taken from the objects, but
such a will concerns the same object. The second reason. Secondly, this difficulty,
touched upon earlier and not resolved, presses further: if both wills are necessary so
that humans attain salvation, those concerning whom God does not have these wills do
not have all that is necessary on God's part, and consequently, they cannot be saved.
But if both wills are not necessary, they should not be posited or distinguished. The
third reason. Thirdly, I confirm this as follows: it is impossible for God to have a free
decree concerning a creature that is not necessary for some real change in the creature.
But for one change or effect in the creature, one will suffices. Therefore, it is impossible
to multiply another will or other wills. The minor premise is clear from the efficacy of
the divine will. The major premise is shown as follows: the divine will does not have a
free decree concerning a creature through a change in itself. Therefore, it cannot have it
except through a change in the creature, because through such a decree, God has a new
relation to the creature, at least in reason. But it is impossible to understand a new
93 BOOK ONE
relation between two extremes without a change in one of them. Therefore, God
cannot have a free decree except insofar as it is necessary for some real change in the
creature.
2. The opinion of some. Because of this difficulty, some modern theologians deny
these two orders of intention and execution in the divine will and consequently deny a
distinction in reason between the aforementioned acts. Yet, from this principle, they are
divided into entirely contrary opinions. For some, because of this reason, either entirely
deny the intention of the end that precedes in reason the election of means in the
divine will, or at least deny that this intention is efficacious. But enough has been said
against these. Others, positing this intention in God, assert that through it, God
efficaciously determines the human will to execute what He has predetermined by such
a will, because this is the efficacy of the divine will. However, these authors can scarcely
reconcile the freedom of the will with divine predetermination, about which I will
speak below in its proper place. Therefore, I pass over these opinions.
3. The true opinion. It is proven. Therefore, it must be said that the will by which
God executes what He has predetermined in the order of intention concerning the
elect is distinct in reason from the will of intention and election. This assertion
necessarily follows from what has been said, because God wills in the order of
intention the glory of the predestined from His grace alone. But He gives this glory not
from liberality alone but from merits. He does not give it except through a will.
Therefore, it is necessary to understand in God a will by which He executes the giving
of glory as distinct in reason from the prior will by which He intends the same glory.
The same can be seen in the order of causes and natural effects, in which God intends
the end and for the sake of it applies the means by which He afterward executes the
intended effect, which execution He also does through His will. Therefore, it is
necessary that this will be in some way distinct. Finally, we cannot philosophize about
divine things except from human things, preserving proportion and attributing to God
whatever is of perfection, removing imperfections. But in us, we find these two orders
of intention or consultation and execution to be distinct and necessary for the perfect
mode of operating for the sake of an end, from the proper intention and relation of
the operator itself. However, the imperfection in us is that we do this through acts really
distinct and through a real change in our will and by a discursive process of
consultation and inquiry into the means. Therefore, excluding these imperfections, in
the one and most simple act of God's will, we must understand both reasons of acts,
since He operates most perfectly for the sake of an end. This, however, will be clearer
by resolving the three doubts proposed in the reasons for doubt.
4. The difficulty from the first argument is resolved. The diversity of acts concerning
the same object can be understood in God from proximate motives. The first doubt is
94 BOOK ONE
how this distinction of acts can be understood concerning the same thing willed by
God. To this, I briefly respond that sometimes this diversity can be understood from
the proximate motives for which God is understood to have such acts of will. For
example, in the same glory that God wills for the predestined, we understand in the first
intention of it that the reason for willing is the divine goodness alone. But with respect
to the will by which God in execution wills to give glory, the proximate reason is the
merits that are already seen in the predestined. Thus, St. Augustine, comparing various
passages, especially in Book 1 to Simplician, Question 2, and in On Rebuke and Grace,
Chapter 7, distinguishes two elections in God: one purely gratuitous, which He has
from the motive of mercy alone, and another of justice, which He has from the motive
of merits. Hence, the best reason is concluded for the stated assertion. For the will of
intention and execution, as they concern the glory to be given to the predestined, are
distinguished in God just as the attributes of justice and mercy or liberality are
distinguished in reason. Therefore, these wills are also distinguished.
5. This distinction does not apply to gifts given by God from Himself and through
Himself. And in this way, these two wills can easily be distinguished insofar as they
concern all the gifts of grace that depend on our free cooperation. For in all these, the
first love by which God efficaciously ordains the predestined to have such a good is
from liberality and mercy. But the will by which God actually confers such a gift always
respects the cooperation of free will as the reason for which, in some kind of cause, a
person receives such a gift, whether it is a meritorious cause or a dispositive cause, as a
condition without which it cannot be, or as a co-cause, which is only secondarily and
less principally cooperating with divine grace. But in those gifts that God will give
through Himself and only from Himself, this mode of distinction does not seem to
have a place, because the first call, for example, God decreed to give entirely
gratuitously and absolutely in the order of predestination, and He also gives it entirely
gratuitously in the execution itself, even without our free cooperation.
6. Another distinction of the act must be sought from the mode of tending to the
object. And therefore, I add another reason for distinguishing these two, which can be
taken from the mode in which the divine will concerns such an object and from the
diverse reasons that can be considered in it. For that gift is a certain lovable object to
which the will can be joined by affection, and it is also a certain thing that can be made
by such an operator, who can apply His power to execute such an effect. In the first
mode, the will of God concerns such an object when it proceeds only in the order of
intention. In the second mode, it concerns the object when it begins the execution. I
take this doctrine from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II, Questions 15 and 16,
especially Article 4, where he distinguishes consent and election on the one hand from
use on the other. For consent pertains to the order of consultation and signifies the
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acceptance of such a means through affection and complacency, or even through
election if it is compared with others, but not yet by the force of such an act, because
in it, the will behaves as a faculty operative externally. Use, however, follows after
election and begins the execution of the effect because it now concerns it as operable.
Therefore, we must understand the divine will in the same way.
7. The executive power of God is distinguished from the divine will and intellect.
Finally, this will be easier if we note that the power by which God executes external
actions is distinct in reason from His intellect and will, as I now assume from other
places. Therefore, through the will by which God predetermines or accepts such a
means within Himself, He is not understood to apply His power to operating but only
to loving that good with respect to such a person. But through the executive will, He
applies His power to executing what He has loved. Therefore, if God is going to
operate such an effect with a secondary cause, He applies His power as is due or
proportionate to such a secondary cause. Hence, if that cause is only going to operate
physically and not freely, He applies His power to a determined concurrence to one
effect. But if the secondary cause is going to operate freely, He applies it to a more
indifferent influx. Therefore, in this way, the distinction between these wills is rightly
understood.
8. The second reason is satisfied, and the necessity of both the will of intention and
execution is explained. The second difficulty was what the necessity of both wills is and
how the sufficiency of aid is preserved in those concerning whom God does not have
both wills. To explain this, I note that such a will can be necessary or at least fitting for
some work from a twofold source: namely, either from the part of the agent itself, so
that it may operate in a perfect mode. In the first way, the executive will of God is
entirely necessary for any effect, because it is either the proximate principle of such an
effect or at least immediately applies omnipotence, which is such a proximate principle.
Just as in a human being, with respect to all effects and actions that proceed from
powers subordinated to the will in acting, the act of the will by which it moves and
applies the executive power to operating is simply necessary for such an effect. But
from the part of the agent, so that it may operate in a perfect and rational mode, the
intention and election or acceptance of means for the sake of the end are necessary,
because without this, it would not direct its actions by a proper and intrinsic relation to
a determined end, although this is most necessary for the perfect mode of operating.
9. This doctrine is explained in every kind of agent. For first, in a human being, to
move the hand, for example, that act of the will by which the motive power of the
hand is applied to such an action suffices on the part of the effect. But on the part of
the human being himself, so that he may exercise such an act in a perfect and moral
mode, another act of the will is necessary, by which he directs that external action to
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some end. Again, in natural agents, such as fire heating, the proximate faculty effecting
heating suffices. Yet, for that action to be done in a perfect mode on the part of the
agent cause, some ordination to the end is necessary, and because the proximate agent
is so imperfect that it cannot have that intention of the end by itself, the philosopher
said that it is necessary for nature to be subordinated to a superior agent, by which it is
directed to the end. Finally, this is shown in God: For God wills to offer a person the
necessary concurrence for an act of sin, and He also wills to offer concurrence for a
good act. This will of God is, as it were, executive and necessary for the effect on the
part of that effect. Nevertheless, God wills concurrence for a good act for the sake of
the act itself, and thus from the intention of it. But He does not will concurrence for an
act of sin in this way, because on the part of the agent, it pertains to His perfection to
intend the good, not to intend evil. Therefore, the aforementioned twofold necessity is
rightly distinguished, and both the order of intention and execution are in the divine
will.
10. Objection and response. But someone may say that by this discourse, it is
ultimately shown that an intention of some end through a simple and inefficacious act
is necessary in God. I respond first that this is sufficient for us to distinguish the order
of intention from the order of execution, for we do not contend that an entirely
absolute and efficacious intention is simply necessary. Yet from this, we rightly conclude
further that it pertains to the perfection of the agent that it can, if it wills, intend the
end with an absolute and efficacious intention and from that special and efficacious
mode provide and prepare the means for such an end. And thus, we have also briefly
responded above to a similar difficulty concerning the election to glory, namely, if that
is necessary, how God provides sufficient principles to those humans whom He did not
elect in such a mode from the beginning. For the response is clear: that election is not
simply necessary on the part of the effects but only on the part of the agent, supposing
the special and perfect mode of providence that He willed to have with such humans,
although without it, He could have provided sufficient means of grace, as will be more
fully shown from what is said about the reprobate.

CHAPTER XV. WHETHER THE EFFICACIOUS

INTENTION OF GOD AND THE EXECUTION OF THE
MEANS NECESSARILY EFFECT CHANGES IN THE PREDESTINED.

1. The first opinion. This is the third difficulty, which the arguments demanded and
which was also touched upon earlier. It depends on another general question: whether a
free decree of God always and necessarily effects some real change in the creature, and
consequently, whether no free act in God can be understood without which every
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change in the creature could consist. For some authors hold this, based on the sole
foundation touched upon in the argument, and from this principle, they infer many
things very noteworthy in theology, namely: that God has some act of love entirely
necessary concerning possible creatures; that God cannot remit even venial sin without
effecting a real change in man formally incompatible with that sin; that God cannot
ordain one thing to another as an end unless it has a natural relation to such an end or
unless some real change is made in it by which it receives such an ordination; and
similar things, which are difficult. Therefore, concerning this principle, I will briefly
state what I think.
2. Conclusion. It is proven by induction. Therefore, I assert first that God can, by an
efficacious decree, ordain one thing to another as to an extrinsic end (that is, an end not
due to or connatural with that thing) without any special change made in the thing thus
ordained to the end, nor in the end itself to which it is ordained. I first show this by an
induction made in every order of effects. For God sometimes causes rain with the
intention of producing fruits, and at other times with the intention of punishing men.
In this effect, if we consider the whole real change that occurs in the rain, it can be the
same whether it is made for this or that end, although those ends are very extrinsic to
such an effect. Next, in moral matters, according to the opinion of all the saints, God
wills to permit sin with the intention of some good that He Himself can bring about
on that occasion, although such permission by its nature does not infer such a good nor
does it regard it from itself. Indeed (as we will see below), the permission of sin
(according to the common opinion) is sometimes the effect of predestination and is
intended by God so that through it, He may prepare the way for the attainment of
glory for some man. It is certain that for the sake of this end, the permission itself is
not really made in another way, nor does it demand such an end from its intrinsic
nature. This example can be confirmed by the fact that God sometimes wills the same
permission for the punishment of sin.
3. God could have created man with the same nature without ordaining him to a
supernatural end. Furthermore, faith teaches that the mystery of the Incarnation was
made for us men and for our salvation. Hence, it is also certain among theologians that
this mystery is in some way ordained to the salvation of men as to an end. But it is self-
evident that this end is not intrinsic to the Incarnation nor due to it. It is also manifest
that God could have made the whole of that mystery and the whole real change that
He now made in human nature to perfect it without intending that end or redeeming
men through Christ, but by creating and sanctifying others. Finally, in the matter at
hand, it is certain that God now creates man for the sake of a supernatural end, and He
could have created him with the same nature without ordaining him to such an end,
which I now assume from the matter of grace. Therefore, God had a free decree by
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which He willed to ordain man to such an end, although immediately from this decree,
no change is made in man.
4. Moreover, all theologians concede that beyond every will by which God confers
means on men to attain a supernatural end, He has a special act of intention by which
He wills glory to all men, at least by an inefficacious will. Therefore, I inquire what
special real change God makes in man through such an act. For if He effects none, this
is what we say about the efficacious intention, nor can any special repugnance be
assigned in it. Indeed, it is easier to understand in it, as I will immediately show. But if
some special change corresponds to that act, let it be specified what it is. I, however,
show that none can be, because either what is done through this intention is some
change pertaining to the order of nature, and this is not so, since the same rational
nature with all its connatural properties could be created by God without such an
intention, but only so that it might enjoy its natural end. Or that change is supernatural,
and this first of all is not always made in every man ordained to that end. For many
men are now procreated by God in whom no real supernatural change is made in the
whole time of life, as is clear in many infants, nor is it incredible that the same happens
in many adult unbelievers. And then, when such a change is made, it is not made
proximately and immediately through that intention, for that intention is general in
itself and the same with respect to all, and the change of grace is not the same in all.
Therefore, it is made in each one by the will of giving this or that grace, as the same
authors confess, which will would suffice to make the whole of that real change if only
the necessity of the effect itself is considered. Therefore, no special real change
corresponds to that intention in the effect, which immediately results from its force.
5. A response is addressed. The inefficacious will of God to save some is not natural.
It can be responded that the act by which the divine will inefficaciously wills some end
is not free but natural (for some authors also suggest this), because it is only a certain
complacency, and God cannot but be pleased in a good end. But this (as I think) cannot
be said. First, because when Paul says, "God wills all men to be saved" (1 Timothy 2:4),
he commends the benefit and free love of God toward men, as all the saints
understand, and yet he speaks of an antecedent will not entirely efficacious. Second,
because although that intention is not absolute concerning the end, yet by its force,
God wills to confer sufficient means to such an end, and thus insofar as it is from
Himself, He wills to give that end. Therefore, He does not will it necessarily but freely.
This will be clearer from what is said below concerning the reprobate. Therefore, God
has a free will concerning the end, from which no special change distinct from that
made through the conferral of the means results. Therefore, in the same way, He can
have an efficacious intention, because the reason for the contrary opinion proceeds
equally in both, and no special repugnance can be assigned here.
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6. The objection is answered. Finally, I show this by reason, because it pertains to the
perfection of the divine will not only to be able to will objects or effects freely and
efficaciously but also their ends and the ordination of one to another. Therefore, He
can do this freely without a special real change. The antecedent is clear, both because in
man, this pertains to perfection, and also because in this, a greater dominion of the will
over its actions or effects is shown. The consequence is proven because the ordination
of something to an extrinsic end does not per se posit any change in that thing, as can
be seen in human actions. You will say that although man does this through only an
extrinsic denomination or relation, God always does it through an intrinsic change, and
this is of greater perfection. I respond that it indeed pertains to perfection to be able to
do this through an intrinsic change when it is consonant with the end and the effect.
Yet, that such a change is made through the very intention precisely conceived and not
through the executive will does not pertain to perfection.
7. The objection is pressed further. Then it is said that although being able to make
that change when it is opportune is of perfection, yet when it is not necessary, not
being able to ordain a means to an end without it does not pertain to perfection but
rather to a limitation of dominion and power. First, because often the ordination to an
end neither requires nor admits such a change, as is clear in the examples given and in
what Scripture says: "For the sake of the elect, those days will be shortened" (Matthew
24:22). For what special change could be made in that predestination of time for the
sake of the elect, which could not be made without this end? Second, because either,
with that change made, the thing remains intrinsically and necessarily ordained to such
an end, or the end is still extrinsic. If the first is said, God never proximately ordains
something to an extrinsic end, nor does He have freedom for this. But if the second is
said, therefore, a new free ordination is necessary that does not add a special change.
Third, even in those things that seem per se ordained by their nature, such as grace and
glory, a will as it were elicited is necessary, directly tending to the end itself, because
God is not said to intend the end only because He wills the thing that by its nature
tends to such an end, for this is an imperfect mode of operating for the sake of an end.
Therefore, it is necessary that He wills the end itself directly and in itself. Hence, God
could give grace to someone without any purpose, neither efficacious nor inefficacious,
of giving glory, indeed with the purpose of never giving it, but only of conferring grace
for the sake of acts of virtue and its intrinsic perfection. Therefore, even in those
things that seem per se ordained, to give one for the sake of another is a special free
will of God, to which no new change corresponds.
8. The same doctrine is further confirmed. The response of some is refuted. And
although these things could suffice for the present purpose, yet to serve many matters, I
add further. In effects, especially moral ones, God can freely will many things that do
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not make a special physical and real change in things. This is clear first in quasi-privative
effects. For if a man is bound to God by a vow, God can by His free will remit the
obligation, from which no real change results in the man, and yet he truly remains free
from the obligation. They respond that the man is not freed from the obligation until
God reveals to him that He has remitted the vow, and thus the remission is not made
without a real change. But this is not rightly said, for although that revelation may be
necessary so that the man does not erroneously think he is still bound, yet it does not
formally remove the obligation but presupposes it removed. This is clear both because
this is what is revealed and also because formally, to will to remit is one thing, and to
will to reveal the prior will is another. Hence, that change does not correspond to the
prior will but to this posterior one. We, however, contend that the prior will is had
without a real change in the object.
9. Grace can be infused without the remission of venial sin, even as to guilt. But I
press further concerning the remission of temporal punishment due for sin. For God
can freely remit this by His free will, nor is revelation necessary there, even to remove
erroneous conscience. Hence, at the end of life, a man will find himself free from that
guilt, even if he was ignorant of it in life, and perhaps this is done in fact through the
election of a sacrifice or something similar. A similar argument is made concerning the
remission of punishment that is made for one on account of the satisfaction of
another. For God could not accept it for another but only for the one operating. But
now He accepts it so that it has that effect in another and not in the one operating.
Therefore, this must necessarily be referred to the free will of God with a diverse moral
relation, without any other real change in the creature. Finally, now through the infusion
of such grace in such a sacrament, venial sin is remitted. And yet the same grace with
the whole change could be infused without the remission of that venial guilt. For
neither can any implication of contradiction be assigned in this, nor any formal
repugnance between that grace and venial sin, so that it is entirely necessary that, with
that grace infused, this sin is expelled. Therefore, that moral effect is also made by a
special free decree of God without a new real change in the creature.
10. Another response is attacked. No less efficacious arguments can be taken from
positive effects. For sometimes God confers a benefit on a man asking, on account of
the petition, which relation to the petition is free to God, and yet on account of it, no
real change is made in the effect, because God could effect the whole of it with all its
intrinsic conditions without respect to the petition of the man. You will say that
without the petition of the man, God could absolutely give the same without such
respect, yet if He gives with the petition existing, He necessarily gives on account of it,
and thus He does not give in this way without any special change. But this is indeed
incredible. For with the petition existing, God can entirely not accept it nor confer the
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benefit. Therefore, He can also not accept the prayer as the reason for giving, and yet
give on account of His goodness and pure will. Similar arguments can be taken from
other effects that God confers, either on account of merit, especially of congruity, or
on account of some disposition, or on account of permission from some moral
obligation, or through some causes not physical but moral, as many think the
sacraments are. For in all these, a diverse relation and moral mode of operating from
the divine will is required, without new real changes.
11. An escape is precluded. And the reason for these things seems to be that God is
not only a perfect agent in the manner of a physical cause but also in the manner of a
moral cause. And therefore, He can exercise both causalities through His free will, both
from the part of affections and from the part of the mode. Therefore, He can effect
not only physical effects, which are made through such changes, but also moral effects,
which do not always require those changes. Finally, every created will, from reason and
freedom, has this mode of operating, which per se pertains to perfection. But that it
does this with imperfection and change in itself is accidental and arises from its
limitation. Therefore, this whole perfection must be attributed to God, excluding all
imperfection. For to say that this implies a contradiction is neither proven, as I will
immediately show, nor does it satisfy. Otherwise, one could say in the same way that
God is not a free agent because it implies a contradiction to have freedom without the
imperfection of mutability. Therefore, just as although human reason does not
sufficiently comprehend how those two convene in God, yet it neither denies nor can
deny that they do not repugn, because each per se pertains to absolute perfection, so
must it be thought in the proposed matter. This will be clearer by responding to the
foundation of the other opinion.
12. The difficulty proposed in the earlier chapter is answered. A relation of reason is
not of the intrinsic reason of the divine act. Therefore, to that first, it must be said that
God neither wills through a relation of reason, nor is such a relation of the intrinsic
reason of a free decree. Therefore, it matters little whether we can conceive such a
relation or not, so that God can freely will this or that. For God does not depend in His
free decrees on our mode of conceiving. The assumption is treated at length in
Disputation 30 of Metaphysics, Section 9, and is self-evident. For God truly and really
loves what He freely wills, but He does not have such a relation truly and really.
Likewise, it is impossible that what we feign and does not exist in reality is of the
intrinsic reason of divine love. Finally, God Himself knew His free decrees as they are
in themselves, feigning no relation of reason, for this arises from our imperfect mode
of conceiving. But the reason or nature of such a decree is rather to be judged from the
mode in which it is known by God than by us. Therefore, whatever is said about
relations of reason, free decrees that per se pertain to perfection must not be denied to
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God. Not indeed that to be terminated to this or that object freely adds perfection to
God, but that to the infinite perfection of His most simple act pertains the ability to be
terminated to all these objects without change or variation in Himself.
13. Because we cannot will something without a change in ourselves, from which
change the object is denominated as willed, therefore we do not understand God freely
willing except by analogy to us, and thus by conceiving as it were a new act immanent in
God or a new mode of the same act. Not that we objectively understand a new real
mode there, for thus we would conceive falsely, but that we apprehend the free love of
God as if it were such a mode. And this would suffice to understand the relation of
reason in the divine will, because truly from that real act that is in the divine will, the
creature loved is denominated extrinsically, and God Himself is denominated
intrinsically loving. This suffices to understand the relation of reason between those
extremes, whatever is said about real change. For this, when it results, does not
constitute God really loving but rather presupposes divine love from which it arises,
according to that saying in John 3:16: "God so loved the world that He gave His only-
begotten Son," and that in Ephesians 2:4-5: "Because of the great love with which He
loved us, God made us alive together with Christ." Therefore, in the very free charity
and love, the relation of reason is understood before the real change arising from it is
understood.
14. An objective or moral change in the creature suffices to found the relation of
reason in the intention of God. It is proven concerning the objective. Second, it is said
that to conceive that relation of reason, it suffices that on the part of the object or
creatures, some change can be understood by us, either objective according to the
relation to future existence or moral. I declare the first part, for by the very will of
creating, which God has from eternity, no real change is immediately made in the
creature from the same eternity, but because it is to be effected in its time, therefore in
that object, it is understood that some change has been made. For what was only
possible is now future. Therefore, I call this an objective change, which we can find in
all the free decrees of God that are terminated in some way to the real being of the
creature. For positing any absolute and predetermining decree of God, from its force, it
is true to say that that object is future, although not in the same way nor as proximately
as through the executive will, but because God from the force of such a decree
infallibly applies the means and causes through which that future is, which was
predetermined. This, in a similar way, those authors cannot deny who posit two free
decrees concerning the predestined: one universal, by which God wills to give all
congruous and necessary aids to glory; the other, by which He determines in particular
to give this or that aid. For from the force of both decrees, the same aids are future,
and this is thought to suffice so that both can be had, although the mode of influencing
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to the future of the thing is diverse according to reason as understood by them.
Therefore, they must admit the same in other acts. In the same way, we must
philosophize concerning the free and non-efficacious antecedent decree by which God
wills the effect not absolutely but under a condition dependent on the free cooperation
of the creature. For although from the force of that decree, it is not simply true to say
that the thing is future, yet it is truly said to be future if the man wills what before that
decree he does not have, and the man himself is said simply to be able to will that
which he also could not without such a decree. The same is manifest in the indifference
of freedom, through the proximate and ready potency to do or omit various acts. For
that could not be such unless God by His free will had offered sufficient concurrence
to each of those acts, by reason of which the will is now simply able to do all of them,
although in reality it will not do all but only one of them. Therefore, this mode of
change undoubtedly suffices to conceive those relations of reason, and we will easily
find it in the physical and real objects of such decrees.
15. The moral change is suggested. The other part concerning moral change is
posited on account of moral objects, such as the remission of punishment, obligation,
etc., and is self-evidently easy. For that change is such that, according to prudent moral
estimation, the man is now not a debtor, for example, as he was before. Therefore, this
also suffices to understand the diverse relation of reason. For just as this relation is not
in reality, so it is not necessary to posit or remove something real and physical in its
term, but it suffices if something moral intervenes in this way.

CHAPTER XVI. WHETHER AN ACT OF

COMMAND, DISTINCT IN REASON FROM ALL THE
ENUMERATED ACTS, IS NECESSARY FOR PREDESTINATION.

1. The reason for doubt. We have explained all the acts of the intellect and will that
seem necessary for divine predestination. It remains to see whether these suffice or
whether some other act is necessary, either in the intellect or in the will. The entire
reason for doubt arises from the act of command, which moral philosophers, as can be
gathered from St. Thomas and his commentators (I-II, q. 17), posit in human
deliberation and prudence as necessary for the execution of the means that have been
approved and chosen after deliberation. Therefore, a similar act seems to be required in
divine providence and predestination, preserving proportion and excluding all
imperfection of distinction or composition. For when these and similar imperfections
are removed, command per se indicates the perfection and power of the one
commanding. Hence, in Scripture, we read that God made all His works by
commanding: "God said, 'Let there be light,'" etc. (Genesis 1), and in Psalm 148: "He
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spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." Therefore, such
an act is necessary in God as the proximate reason for operating externally. Hence, with
the same proportion, it is necessary for the works of grace and consequently for
predestination, through which they are prepared. That it is distinct in reason from all
the enumerated acts is shown as follows: because command is a free act and therefore
distinct from every act of knowing that precedes the will. Again, it is not an act of the
will but posterior to it, because command is a kind of intimation of the will. For what
someone wills to be done, he intimates through command that it be done. Finally, it is a
practical act, moving and impelling, in which it is distinguished from every act of
knowledge of future things, which follows the will. Therefore, it is an act distinct in
reason from all those we have explained so far.
2. Some admit a command distinct in reason. Therefore, some theologians think that
beyond all the aforementioned acts, another must be added, which they call command,
and they place it in the intellect after every act of knowledge and judgment and after
every act of the will, necessary for external operation or effect. For they will that
external action proceeds more immediately from an act of the intellect than from an act
of the will, which act of the intellect (as they say) is not cognition or judgment (for
these precede the will) but a certain practical impulse, which is explained by the words,
"Do this," and by which the executive power or ministering power is applied to the
work. Therefore, they require this act also in the divine mind operating externally and
consequently say that this act pertains to eternal predestination, through which God
prepares benefits to be conferred on His elect in time. Indeed, they place the reason for
predestination chiefly in this act, because it is as it were the complement of it and the
proximate reason for causing the effects of predestination.
3. The foundation. The foundation of this opinion has been hinted at above.
Because we cannot judge divine things except from human things, excluding
imperfections, and because human providence requires an act of command, and
through it, it is as it were completed and terminated, therefore divine providence also
requires it, and much more so predestination, which is most efficacious, and this act of
command is required on account of the efficacy of the effect. Hence, it is argued
secondly that predestination is a practical act of the divine intellect, from which the
whole effect of predestination infallibly and efficaciously follows. Therefore, that act
presupposes in the will an absolute decree or election of such an effect. Therefore, it
cannot be unless that practical act, called command, is present, because after the will,
no other act can follow in the intellect.
4. Conclusion. A distinct act of command is not necessary for predestination. I,
however, first think that there is no act in the intellect, as far as it operates externally,
that is not through the mode of knowledge, cognition, or judgment. Hence, I
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consequently infer that without foundation, an act of the intellect that is merely
impulsive of another power or person is feigned in the intellect, beyond every judgment
or cognition, because such an act is superfluous and can scarcely be conceived by the
mind. From which I conclude that such an act is not necessary for predestination, and
therefore in the will, beyond the acts explained above, no other is required, and in the
intellect, beyond the knowledge that is necessary before the will, no such impulsive act
intervenes, but only the judgment about things to be done, according to the election of
the will already made and its cognition, which naturally follows it immediately according
to the order of reason.
5. The foundation. A twofold mode of operating in man. The first is command. This
command in the operator is the intimation of the will by which he obliges another.
While the prior parts of this assertion are general. And their fundamental reason is that
the intellect essentially and adequately is a cognitive power, and therefore it can have no
secondary act that is not cognition, apprehension, namely, or judgment. Likewise,
because that act is immanent, it must have some formal effect in the intellect itself, but
what is that effect if not cognition? But because those parts are common to every
intellect, it will be worthwhile to explain them in the human intellect and then ascend to
the divine intellect. In man, therefore, a twofold mode of commanding can be
understood. One is when he commands another to do this or that; the other is when
man is accustomed to command himself the executions of that means which he
chooses. The first mode is proper and without metaphor and consists in laws or
precepts and can properly be referred only to another person. For inanimate things are
not capable of this command, as is self-evident, nor even brute animals, because
although they sometimes seem to be moved by the command of man, it is not because
they perceive the reason of the command, but because by instinct of nature or by some
custom they apprehend something as suitable to pursue or as evil to flee when they are
excited, invited, or frightened in such a way. Therefore, this command in the operator
himself is really nothing else than the declaration or intimation of his will, by which he
can oblige another to do what he commands. For (according to the opinion of all) the
whole motive force of this command consists in the obligation it imposes, and
therefore its motion is called moral. But this obligation arises from the will, which can
and wills to impose the obligation, and therefore it can only be of a superior to an
inferior, otherwise the power to command would be lacking, without which there can
be no proper precept except usurped and of itself inefficacious, but there can be a
request or prayers. Beyond power and will, the intimation of this will is required,
through which intimation the reason of command or law is completed. Hence, such
command can pertain to the intellect insofar as it is necessary that the one commanding
himself knows his will and indicates it to the inferior through some speech or
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signification. In which no act of the intellect intervenes that is not through the mode
of cognition and judgment, nor is another impulsive act necessary. Indeed, it cannot be
understood what or of what kind it is or what formal effect it has in the one
commanding, whose act it is immanent, or what it effects in the one commanded, since
he is moved only by the will of the one commanding through the intimated speech.
6. The second mode of command. The freedom of the will is destroyed if this
distinct command is posited in the intellect. The second mode of command, by which
man commands himself, is only with respect to his own actions and their powers, which
are subject to the free motion of the will. And in this mode of commanding also,
beyond the act of the will, by which he efficaciously wills the use of the power subject
to him, and the cognition or judgment that precedes or follows such volition, no other
impulsive act on the part of the intellect can be conceived. Because before intention
and election, the practical judgment about the goodness of the end and the usefulness
of the means suffices. Hence, some Thomists, who posit a command distinct from
judgment for election, so that it efficaciously determines the will to the election of one
means over others, openly contradict St. Thomas, as can be seen in the cited question
17. And they posit something superfluous, which they cannot explain what it is, or they
even destroy the freedom of the will, because if that command efficaciously determines
the will, either it does so by its own force, and thus the intellect will be free in
commanding, not the will in obeying, because with such a command posited, the will
obeys by necessity, or it does so by virtue of some prior will, and about that we inquire
whether it requires another similar command, which if it is not necessary there, lest we
proceed to infinity, nor will it be necessary for election itself, but judgment will suffice.
7. Again, in the same way, we can argue about the motion of the lower powers after
election has been made. For as election is committed to execution, there follows in the
will an active use, which is nothing else than the volition of applying here and now the
executive power to the work, which volition needs the direction of the intellect, which
is also made through practical judgment, which judgment beyond that which preceded
election only adds the cognition of the election already made and all the circumstances
concurring for the due execution of such election. And perhaps St. Thomas called the
judgment proceeding from such cognition command, because from the force of the
election made, it has a certain special efficacy. Yet, in reality, it is nothing else than a
certain practical science or prudential cognition, and it does not move the will except by
reason of the proposed object. Hence, from the force of the intellect, there is only
motion as to specification, for as to exercise, the will rather moves itself by the force of
the prior election. A manifest sign of which is that if it wills to desist from the election,
the command will be rendered inefficacious. Therefore, whatever else is feigned beyond
this is nothing. Because another impulsive command is not necessary on account of the
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will itself, as the argument shows, nor on account of the executive power, because this
is immediately applied by the force of the appetite or will, nor does it perceive another
impulse.
8. Some Doctors posit command in the will. How St. Thomas and others posit this
command in the intellect. However, sometimes man, to excite himself to action, speaks
to himself and commands himself, "Do this," "Arise," etc. Yet, if one attentively
reflects on his acts, he will first understand that such a command, if it is efficacious,
presupposes the efficacious will of such an action commanded, which man recognizes
in himself, and through that command, he proposes it to himself more expressly, to
excite himself more. But if it is an inefficacious command, it is not properly a
command but a kind of exhortation of man to himself, to remember that it is
expedient for him, or something similar. Next, this whole kind of command in us is
through the intellect, yet not through that practical impulse that is not cognition, but
through mental and intellectual concepts not ultimately of some language or certain
words. A manifest sign of which is that no one exercises this interior act except through
mental words of that idiom which he knows. But those concepts are nothing but
certain cognitions of such words and their signification, and that speech tends only to
excite the will more through a more efficacious proposition of the object or the
remembrance of some resolution already made. Hence, this command is really not
directed directly and immediately to the will or the lower powers but to the intellect, for
when man speaks to himself, just as he speaks through the intellect, so he hears through
the intellect, and thus whatever impulse of this command is made through cognition.
And finally, this mode of commanding oneself is extraordinary and accidental, not per
se necessary for operation, as is self-evident, and therefore authors hardly mention this
command. And therefore, Doctors who do not acknowledge or admit that intellectual
impulse posit command in the will and not in the intellect. To this opinion incline St.
Bonaventure (III, dist. 17, art. 1, q. 1), Scotus (I, d. 38, q. 1; II, d. 6; Quodlib. 17),
Ockham (III, q. 16), Henry (Quodlib. 9, q. 6), Almain (Tract. 3, Moral., ch. 2), Medina
(Codex on Prayer, q. 2). But those who suitably defend the opinion of St. Thomas,
which is believed to be Aristotle's, positing command in the intellect, think that
command is nothing else than the practical judgment that precedes the election or
active use of the will, as is more fully discussed (I-II, q. 17).
9. The resolution of the question concerning the divine act of command to itself.
From these, it is easy to demonstrate this in God Himself, using the same distinction
about command to oneself or to others. For concerning the first, if it is referred to the
will of God, it is clear that it cannot be unless it is the executive will itself, which we
have already explained. Which rather seems to be able to be called command to the
creature, insofar as God through it wills something to be done, than to God Himself,
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although, as through such a will, the executive power of God remains as it were applied
to the work for such a time, under that reason, it can in some way be called command
to oneself, for that external execution is a free act of God, not elicitive but imperative.
About which mode of speaking there is no contention, when the matter is clear. But if
that act is referred to the intellect of God, it is most evident that it either is not in God
or is not unless it is either the practical judgment by which He is moved to will or
choose something freely, or that knowledge by which He knows the decree established
by Himself or the election made by Himself, and therefore judges it necessary to
execute what He has determined. It is further declared: for either this command to
oneself is necessary in the divine intellect on account of the will or on account of the
action of the executive power. But in neither way is it necessary beyond knowledge and
judgment, therefore, the major is proven, because command is ordered to free action,
which in God is not unless it is either the determination of the will itself or the
execution that arises from it, therefore, command can only be desired on account of
some of these parts.
10. Command to oneself is not required for the determination of the divine will. For
the decree of predestination, this command is not required. Therefore, that on account
of the very determination of the divine will, such a command can neither be useful nor
necessary, is proven, because the divine will is not determined by the intellect to its free
election or volition, but either entirely by itself, as to the first free decree, or by that first
it is determined to the second, and so consequently up to the ultimate executive will,
otherwise the free will of God would not be, and consequently, neither would God be
free, because the intellect would not be formally free, indeed, in God, it has no act
properly and formally or denominatively free, but at most objectively, as I have declared
above. But as the divine will determines itself, only the natural knowledge of simple
intelligence precedes in the intellect, such as has been explained by us in chapter six. To
which pertains the judgment about the suitability of objects or the usefulness of means,
from which God chooses according to the counsel of His will. Therefore, no other can
be understood in the divine intellect with respect to the divine will. For either that
impulse determines it, and this is repugnant to its freedom, as I have said. And besides,
about that impulse, it can be asked whether it is a free act or a necessary one: if free, by
what is it determined, or by what power is it freely elicited or commanded? If necessary,
therefore, the determination that follows from it is also necessary, and divine freedom
perishes. But if that impulse does not determine the divine will, what is its usefulness?
Because it cannot move the will in another way, since it is not cognition nor judgment,
as is supposed. Therefore, in the present matter, for all the acts of the will and the
whole decree of predestination, such a command is not necessary, but only that
knowledge which we have taught to be supposed above.
109 BOOK ONE
11. But after some free decree of the divine will, there immediately follows in God
(as I have also said above) the knowledge of vision about that decree, in which
consequently it is known to be future what has been predetermined by such an absolute
will. About which kind of knowledge, it is most certain that the knowledge of one
decree, which according to reason is prior, must necessarily be supposed before the
subsequent decree. As, for example, the knowledge of the intention of the end must be
supposed for the election of the means, because the will cannot choose the means
without a prior judgment, and the intellect does not practically judge the means to be
chosen until it knows the end already intended, for the intention is what moves to
election and does not move unless known, because it is necessary to know the
connection of the election with the intention already had, so that from the force of the
intention, the will is moved to election. Just as in the intellect, to be moved to the
conclusion, it is not enough that it already has the assent of the principles, unless it also
knows the connection of the conclusion with the principles. But there is a diversity,
because the will knows nothing, and therefore the intellect knows both for itself and
for the will. Therefore, if that judgment, which God has after the known first decree
about the end, about eliciting another about the means, if this (I say) judgment is called
command, I do not contend about the word, and I admit that such an act is necessary.
But this command is not an act distinct in reason from those posited above in chapter
six, as is sufficiently clear from what is said there.
12. And in this way, we must philosophize about all the decrees of the divine will up
to the executive will, before the knowledge of the election already made is required in
the divine intellect, with which is conjoined the judgment that such execution is
necessary, given such an election, which practical judgment is and can be called
command in that way. Yet, beyond that, no other act distinct in reason is necessary, by
which the will is impelled to posit such execution, indeed, nor can it be conceived or
explained what kind of act it is, as has been said about the other acts of the will: for the
same reason applies to all. And in the same way, given the executive will, the external
action follows by a certain natural necessity, at the time and in the manner in which it is
willed. But it follows from the very force of the will immediately, which has the power
to do whatever it wills, immediately, I say, with respect to the intellect and other acts of
the will: whether the will does it immediately through itself or through the executive
power distinct in reason. For this, applied, remains to be done by the force of such a
will, and thus applied, and the same will persevering, it naturally acts and as it were
despotically obeys the will: just as the power moving according to place in animals
naturally obeys the appetite.
13. Hence, it is sufficiently clear that that command of the intellect, through the
mode of impulse, is not necessary for proximately applying or impelling the executive
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power to act externally. But it can be doubted whether the cognition of one's own will,
which has already willed the execution, is per se necessary in God or in any freely
operating being, so that the executive power obeys the will. It is indeed necessary that,
given that will in God, God immediately beholds it and knows that He wills such
execution, because He cannot ignore anything within or outside Himself, whatever it is.
But this necessity arises from the infinity of the actual knowledge of God. But whether
such knowledge is per se necessary for the execution of that will can rightly be
doubted, because the executive power is not like the will, which is moved by the known
object, but is like an organ or instrument, which is necessarily applied and effects what
the principal agent wills. Hence, without any command or intermediate judgment, by
the natural sympathy of the powers, given the executive will, the action of the executive
power seems naturally to follow. As in an animal, from the appetite, the motion of the
body naturally follows, even if the animal does not know its own appetite. Which
indeed is probable, and with that posited, it is clear that no kind of command is per se
and immediately necessary in God for the application of His executive power to the
work, even if command is taken not for impulse but for practical judgment, for this
judgment will only be necessary remotely or mediately, insofar as it is necessary for the
will, but given the will, nothing else is necessary. Yet, it can also probably be defended
that the cognition of one's own will and determination to execution itself is necessary
for the perfect subordination of the executive and appetitive power, because in this way
it is understood to be done more voluntarily and more vitally (so to speak) while the
operator, knowing his will, immediately executes what he wills by reason of it. Just as it
is also necessary that knowledge precedes directing the execution itself: for the
executive power of an intellectual agent does not operate except as the knowledge itself
represents it to be done. Yet, although all these are admitted, an act distinct in reason
from natural and necessary knowledge, either simply or from the supposition of a free
act, is never posited in the divine intellect, which we intend here.
14. Concerning God's command to others. It follows that we speak about God's
command as it is referred to creatures themselves, but we are not presently speaking
about God's preceptive command, by which He imposes laws on rational creatures, but
about the operative command, by which He physically and efficiently operates both
inanimate and intellectual things. For the first command does not pertain to the present
matter, because we are not dealing with the precepts or laws that God imposes on His
predestined, which are regularly the same as those He imposes on the reprobate, but we
are dealing with the command by which God efficaciously moves His predestined to
fulfill His laws. Although also about the law properly taken, as it posits something in the
legislator Himself or is understood to preexist, it is sufficiently clear from what has
been said that it cannot be unless either the will to oblige the subjects to do this or that,
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together with the will to manifest to them such a will and as it were to promulgate the
law or dictate of the intellect, by which the legislator judges this to be necessary for the
honesty of the morals of His subjects, to whom He therefore wills it to be proposed as
a rule of their actions. About which matter more at length in the matter of laws.
15. What must be thought about God's operative command. Therefore, omitting this
kind of precept or law, the command by which God is said to effect things externally,
referred to the things themselves, cannot be proper but metaphorical, and in reality, it
cannot be anything else than the executive will, by which He definitely wills to make or
move such a thing. It is proven, because proper command can only be referred to an
intelligent thing, as is clear from its proximate affect and as it were correlative, which is
to obey: for only agents through intellect with propriety are capable of it. But this
command, about which we are speaking, is not in order to intellectual things as such,
but to all the effects of God: for it is posited on account of the efficacy of the divine
operation externally, and the testimonies of Scripture cited above proceed thus:
therefore, such a command cannot be posited with that propriety, which is in the
intellect. It is confirmed and declared, because to proper moral command corresponds
moral motion, through the obligation imposed on another and manifested through
such a command, but this is impertinent to predestination, as I have said, but only that
pertains to this, by which God efficaciously confers the effects of predestination also
with the physical efficacy necessary on the part of God: therefore, such a proper and
moral command is not necessary for this kind of providence. Which reason proves the
same about the work of creation and about any other work of God. This reason also
declares that those locutions of Scripture are not to be understood in that propriety in
which command signifies law and precept, but through them, the efficacy of the divine
power is metaphorically declared, to which all effects obey without resistance, because
they immediately receive being as He wills, or they also operate that, or they are
contained there where He wills, according to that saying in Proverbs 8:29: "When he set
a limit for the sea, so that the waters should not transgress his command," which law is
had in Job 38:11: "Thus far shall you come, and no farther," etc. For things cannot hear
this, as if God properly spoke to them. Therefore, it is a metaphorical locution, for
efficacy is signified, such as is also that locution of Paul in Romans 4:17: "He calls into
existence the things that do not exist."
16. How the cited passages of Scripture are to be interpreted. From these, the
response to the reason for doubt posited at the beginning is easy. For it has already
been declared what kind of command is required for human action and how we must
speak proportionally about divine things. We have also declared how the testimonies of
Scripture are to be understood. For those words, "Let there be light," either only
explain the efficacious will of God, which is elsewhere signified by the name of
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command, or they can also signify the practical judgment about the light to be created,
which is not distinct from the knowledge of God, nor through it does God speak to
the creature He is about to make, but He speaks to Himself, to induce His will to make
it, not otherwise impelling it than by judging and knowing.
17. The objection is answered. When and how this command in God is necessary or
free. But when it is objected that because command is a free act, etc., if by the name of
command the executive will itself is understood, thus the assumption is true, and no
difficulty remains. For those who speak thus consequently say that the intimation of the
will is rather the notification of the command than the substantial command. And what
pertains to the matter, that intimation, if it is with respect to itself, is only the cognition
of it; if with respect to others only, it is a certain locution, as has been explained. But if
by the name of command the practical judgment of the intellect is understood, which
seems to impose a law on the will, and for this reason is called command, it must be
said that this judgment or command, insofar as it precedes every will of God, is
necessary: for naturally it judges what is suitable, what it is expedient to do, what is
consonant with the divine goodness, etc., yet this judgment is not a necessitating
command but only proposing, nor does it induce obligation per se with respect to the
divine will, but only shows what befits it. But insofar as this judgment sometimes
supposes one free decree, by virtue of which it dictates about another decree to be had,
which has a necessary connection with the other, if it can in some way be called free,
that is, depending on a prior free act, and thus also such a command only holds as
moving through the mode of proposing and representing. But if it has some greater
force of impelling or sometimes even necessitating to the subsequent volition, it has it
by virtue of the prior volition, which imposes necessity on the will itself, so that if it
wills one, it also wills the other, which is necessarily connected with the prior. And thus,
never does command or its impulse go beyond the limits of judgment and will,
wherefore it cannot be understood as some act intellectually impelling and distinct from
cognition and volition, either in reason in God or really in us.
18. The remaining things touched upon in the foundation of the prior opinion will
be explained in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XVII. WHICH ACT OF THE

INTELLECT OR WILL OF GOD IS PREDESTINATION .

1. From the foregoing, it is clear that predestination must reside either in the intellect,
the will, or both faculties simultaneously, since in God there are no immanent acts of
any other power, as He is purely intellectual. Furthermore, it is evident that
predestination must consist in some act or acts, as we have explained, because through
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these—and not others—God is constituted as the predestining agent (to speak in our
customary terms). Given these premises, the debate seems more about terminology
than substance—namely, to which of these acts the word predestination most properly
applies. Nevertheless, since theologians hold varying opinions on this matter, it must be
briefly examined.
2. The First Opinion: Predestination as an Act of the Intellect. The first opinion
holds that predestination is an act of the divine intellect. St. Thomas Aquinas affirms
this (Summa Theologiae I, q. 23, art. 1, ad 2), stating that predestination is "a plan
existing in the mind of God," etc. He says the same about providence (q. 22, art. 1,
corpus; more clearly in art. 3). Capreolus follows this view (In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, art. 1,
concl. 1; art. 2, concl. 2), as do other Thomists, Durandus (In I Sent., d. 41), and
Richardus (art. 1, q. 1).
3. First Argument for This Opinion. This position is first grounded in Scripture’s
manner of speaking, which indicates predestination through acts of the intellect.
Romans 8:29 states: Those whom He foreknew, He also predestined, where one verb
seems to explain the other. More clearly, in Romans 11:2: God has not rejected His
people, whom He foreknew—that is, predestined, as Augustine explains (De Bono
Perseverantiæ, ch. 18), and the context of the passage suggests. Acts 2:23 speaks of
Christ as delivered up by the foreknowledge and plan of God, while Acts 4:28
expresses the same idea under the name of predestination (as I will discuss later).
Finally, Ephesians 1:11 says: Predestined according to the purpose—and purpose
pertains to the intellect.
4. Second Argument. Second, Augustine supports this view in De Bono
Perseverantiæ (ch. 14), where he defines predestination as "the foreknowledge and
preparation of God’s blessings, by which those who are to be saved are most certainly
set free." Throughout his discourse (up to ch. 17), he proves predestination solely by
God’s foreknowledge of the blessings to be conferred on the saved. Fulgentius
proceeds similarly (Ad Monimum, Bk. 1, ch. 8 and 11).
5. Third Argument. Third, because providence is an act of the mind, as Boethius
testifies (De Consolatione Philosophiae, Bk. 4, prose 6), since providence is an act of
prudence and reason. But predestination is a special kind of providence; therefore, the
same reasoning applies. According to St. Thomas, the rationale for both is that
providence and predestination involve ordering a thing or person through fitting means
to their end. Hence, Scripture also signifies predestination by the term ordination (Acts
13:48: As many as were ordained to eternal life believed). But to order one thing to
another is an act of reason and intellect; therefore, predestination pertains to the
intellect.
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6. Variations in Explaining the Intellectual Act of Predestination. However, these
authorities disagree on which specific intellectual act constitutes predestination.
Durandus holds it to be an act of knowledge preceding the will; the Thomists say it is
an act of imperium (command), which follows the will and is the proximate principle
by which God executes His will. Others say it is a practical judgment by which God
pronounces, as it were, a definitive sentence concerning the eternal happiness of the
saved. Still others claim that God’s very knowledge is predestination—not as preceding
His free decree, but as approved by it.
7. The Second Opinion: Predestination as an Act of the Will. The second opinion
locates predestination in the will. Bonaventure holds this (In I Sent., d. 40, art. 1, q. 2),
as do Scotus (q. 1), Gregory (q. 1), Aureolus (q. 4), Gabriel (q. 1, art. 4), and at length,
Eucharius (De Prædestinatione, Cent. 1, no. 17). This opinion is also supported by
Scripture, which often describes predestination through acts of the will. Ephesians 1:4
states: He chose us in Him, and later, Predestined according to His purpose. Now,
election and purpose signify acts of the will. Acts 4:28 speaks of what Your hand and
Your plan had predestined to take place (Greek: προώρισε, meaning predestined).
First Argument for the Second Opinion. Prosper (Ad Gallos, ch. 13) reads it thus:
Predestination, therefore, is the decree of God—and a decree is an act of the will, as in
Esther 13:9: There is none who can resist Your will if You decree to save us. Isaiah
14:27, where we read The Lord of hosts has decreed, and who can annul it?, has in
Greek: The Lord has willed it. Romans 8:29 also distinguishes predestination from
foreknowledge—namely, as the will or purpose, as the following verse clarifies: Those
who are called according to His purpose.
8. Second Argument. Second, we can prove this opinion from Augustine (De
Prædestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 10), where he distinguishes predestination from
foreknowledge: Predestination cannot be foreknowledge, but foreknowledge can exist
without predestination. He adds that predestination is the preparation of grace—which,
as we explained with St. Thomas, refers to preparation on the part of the agent, not the
patient. Although St. Thomas (art. 2, ad 3) refers this preparation to the intellect, it
seems more properly to belong to the will, because a voluntary agent is proximately
prepared to act through its purpose and will—especially when it does not need to
inquire into means by the intellect, since it naturally foreknows all things. In such an
agent, preparation is not necessary on the part of the intellect but only on the part of
the will. Preparation seems to signify a voluntary act beyond natural knowledge or
power. Hence, St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, and nearly all Scholastics cite Augustine
(De Prædestinatione Sanctorum) as saying that predestination is the purpose of
showing mercy—though these exact words are not found in Augustine but seem drawn
from the equivalence of preparation and purpose. Fulgentius also seems to understand
115 BOOK ONE
it this way (Ad Monimum, Bk. 1, ch. 7, 12), as does Prosper (ch. 8). Damascene (De
Fide Orthodoxa, Bk. 2, ch. 30) distinguishes predestination from foreknowledge, and in
ch. 26, he defines providence as an act of the will—as does Nemesius (De Natura
Hominis, ch. 43).
9. Confirmation. Hence, the reasoning of the first opinion can be redirected in favor
of this one: If providence pertains to the will, much more so does predestination. The
antecedent is clear because providence denotes not mere knowledge but care and
solicitude for those to be provided for—and this care belongs to the will. Moreover,
although knowing the order or proportion of means to an end pertains to the intellect,
effectively ordering means for the sake of the end belongs to the will (since this is done
by choice through intention). Providence consists precisely in this practical and
efficacious ordering. For this reason, Scotus (In I Sent., d. 6, q. 1; Quodlibet 17) says
that the practical order pertains to the will.
10. Third Argument. Furthermore, predestination implies on the part of the
predestiner a determination so efficacious that, once posited, the predestined effect
necessarily follows. Hence Augustine (cited above) calls it the preparation of blessings
by which we are most certainly set free. But this efficacy and determination come
entirely from the will, so that once the will is posited, the predestined effect is already
secured. Therefore, it is a sign that predestination consists in this act of will.
Fourth Argument. Additionally, no act of the intellect appears to which the notion
of predestination can properly apply. If it is an act of knowledge preceding the will,
this cannot be, because such knowledge (as such) is not free but natural, nor is it
determinately about these rather than those being saved. If it is a practical command
following the will, we have already said that this either does not belong to the intellect
or cannot exist there except as a judgment—which in God cannot constitute
predestination, since it can only be the knowledge of His free decree or its future
effects. But this knowledge presupposes predestination, for through it, the one to be
saved is known—hence, known as predestined. Therefore, the view that predestination
is "eternally written in the divine intellect as the decree to give the glory to the
predestined" seems to presuppose predestination and to be nothing more than a dictate
about giving reward in view of foreseen merits. Finally, predestination cannot rightly be
placed in the intellect as approving knowledge, because beyond knowledge, it only adds
a denomination from the act of the will accepting such means or persons for glory.
Therefore, predestination must much more be placed in this act of the will, since
through it, the means are chosen and efficaciously ordered to the end.
11. Variations in the Second Opinion. Even within this opinion, there are differences
in explanation. Some call the very act of election to glory predestination, because
through it, man is efficaciously and absolutely destined to glory. Others say
116 BOOK ONE
predestination consists only in the preparation of means, since providence concerns
means. Still others say predestination arises from all the aforementioned acts of the will
combined.
12. The Third (Mediating) Opinion. Cicero attributes providence to prudence. The
third opinion holds that predestination comprises both an act of intellect and will, and
thus is sometimes named from one, sometimes from the other. Alexander of Hales (I,
q. 26) thinks this about providence, and if read carefully, the same about predestination
(q. 28, mem. 1, art. 2–3). Marsilius (In I Sent., q. 41, art. 1, note 2) agrees, though in art.
2, he adds power (which pertains more to execution than predestination). Peter of
Tarentaise also holds this (In I Sent., d. 40, q. 2). This opinion is supported by
arguments from both preceding views, as well as Scripture and the Fathers. Paul joins
purpose with election and decree (Eph. 1:4–11). Acts 4:28 may signify this: What Your
hand and Your plan had predestined—for hand metaphorically signifies the will (as the
principle of action), while plan suggests that an efficacious decree intrinsically requires
prudence. The same applies to perfect providence, which requires both prudence
(hence Cicero calls it part of prudence) and the will, which applies and directs prudence
—indeed, even demands it, since perfect prudence presupposes a will rightly disposed
to the end. Since predestination signifies the most perfect and efficacious providence
for attaining such an end, it must include acts of both faculties.
13. Judgment on These Opinions. As I said, this controversy is largely about
terminology, so we leave it free for each to speak as they prefer—all the cited opinions
are probable. Only let it be noted that certain combinations of views may produce
propositions that sound offensive—for example, if one says predestination is only
election to glory or the will to give glory, and then denies that there is any pre-election
to glory before foreseen merits, they must consequently admit a cause of predestination
on man’s part. But such a proposition, stated absolutely, is offensive today and must be
avoided (as we will treat in the next book). Barring this difficulty, it matters little
whether predestination is ascribed to the intellect, the will, or both.
14. First Assertion. If predestination is referred to the intellect, it must be placed not
in an act of imperium (which is not knowledge or judgment but impulse or insinuation
—no such act exists in the intellect, as shown), but in a practical judgment about the
means by which the man elected by God is infallibly led to glory—a judgment approved
and accepted by the will, and thus including the knowledge of approval in relation to
the will, so that this knowledge adds something beyond mere antecedent knowledge.
15. Second Assertion. If predestination is ascribed to the will, it must be placed in
the entire preparation of grace and glory—understood in God from the first decree of
election to glory up to every volition of the means and the final effect (glory itself) to
be executed. For predestination, as perfect providence, includes or requires all these
117 BOOK ONE
acts of the will, as sufficiently explained above. Strictly speaking, this manner of
speaking best fits the term, since destination properly signifies intention or purpose.
Conclusion. Whatever the term’s exact meaning, our primary concern in explaining this
difficult matter must be the acts of the will, for in them lies the first origin of all
benefits conferred on the predestined. It is here we must chiefly consider whether
predestination is gratuitous, how it is the cause of predestined effects without impeding
human freedom, etc. Therefore, by predestination, we will always understand the decree
of the divine will to give grace and glory—whether the term can also be adapted to the
intellect or not.

CHAPTER XVIII. WHETHER PREDESTINATION IS A PART

OF PROVIDENCE, AND IN WHAT OTHER WAYS IT DIFFERS FROM IT.

1. Reason for Doubting. The common manner of speaking among theologians is

that predestination is a part of providence, as seen in St. Thomas (I, q. 23, a. 1; De
Veritate, q. 6, a. 1; In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 2), Capreolus (ibid., q. 1, a. 1, concl. 2),
Durandus (q. 1, n. 6), and Marsilius (q. 41). Yet this manner of speaking presents some
difficulty, because both providence and predestination are acts of the divine will or
intellect, and each is utterly simple. How, then, can the relation of whole and part be
found in them? I also inquire about what kind of "part" this is understood to be. For if
it is an integral part, this cannot be, since there is no quantity to which such a relation
of part would apply. Nor is it a subjective part, because there is no common rationale
here—rather, God’s providence is singular and most simple. Much less can other
relations of part and whole be accommodated here.
2. The First Way of Explaining It. Two ways of explaining this are possible. For
providence and predestination can be considered either (1) with respect to their objects
or the matter they concern, or (2) with respect to the divine act itself. From either
perspective, this relation can be explained. The first way is to say that predestination is a
subjective part of providence. For we conceive providence as a kind of genus or
common abstract rationale, of which predestination is a particular species. Just as we
distinguish in God many acts that are distinct in reason, so too can we abstract from
them a common rationale and conceive subjective parts under it. Thus, we distinguish
many ideas and abstract from them the common rationale of "idea," under which we
then distinguish, as species, the idea of man, lion, etc. So too in this case: we can
distinguish many providences, distinct in reason—natural and supernatural—and
among the supernatural, one is the sufficient providence for the non-elect, while
another is the efficacious providence for the elect, which is predestination. Thus,
predestination is called a part of providence as its species, for a species is a subjective
118 BOOK ONE
part of a genus. This manner of speaking is probable and easily defensible, since such
expressions about God are always understood while excluding imperfections. Hence, a
rational distinction between God’s acts suffices for this explanation.
3. The Second Way of Explaining It. The second way, indicated by St. Thomas and
more fully explained by Cajetan, is that predestination is, as it were, an integral part of
providence—not on the side of the divine act (due to its simplicity), but on the side of
the objects, in which there is a certain extension, multitude, and variety. Thus, the
relation of integral part and whole can easily be conceived in them. Predestination
differs from providence in that the matter of providence extends more widely,
encompassing all things, rational and irrational, natural and supernatural, and including
both sufficient and efficacious means. Predestination, however, concerns only a certain
part of this matter (as is clear from what has been said), because it regards only the
supernatural end as infallibly to be attained by certain intellectual creatures through
efficacious means. Therefore, with respect to its matter, predestination is rightly called a
quasi-integral part of providence. This manner of speaking is both true and easy to
grasp. It is further confirmed because, in this view, divine providence is regarded not as
some common rationale but as one singular and comprehensive rationale to which all
those objects are related as parts of the matter about which providence is concerned.
The reason for this unity is that providence regards all those things as interconnected
and ordered. Due to this connection, one providence concerning one part of the
matter cannot be so distinguished that it does not somehow include a relation to the
others. Hence, the whole collection of all those interconnected things or matters is like
one object of one most-simple providence. For from the union of an object
encompassing many matters, we derive the unity of a habit or mental act. And although
it cannot be denied that, through inadequate concepts, we can partition providence in
relation to diverse parts of material objects, we do not conceive these rationales as
many providences but as parts of one providence. Yet these parts are found in reality
only in the objects or matter, not in God’s act itself. According to this rationale of
"part," predestination is said to be a part of providence on the side of the objects, not
on the side of the act.
4. How Predestination Includes All Providence. From this, we may further infer that
predestination, in a certain way, includes the whole of providence—speaking generally
of predestination so as to include the predestination of Christ. For although the
inadequate object of providence directly includes more than the object of
predestination, nevertheless, the object of predestination is the principal and primary
one, and as it were the end to which all others are in some way ordered. Thus, just as in
the sciences the primary object (if it is such that other things are referred to it) is often
considered, in some way, adequate—if not directly and immediately, at least obliquely
119 BOOK ONE
and reductively—so too here, the object of predestination can in some way be called
adequate to the whole of providence. Consequently, predestination includes in itself the
whole of providence. This is supported by Paul (1 Cor. 3:22–23): All things are yours,
and you are Christ’s, and Christ is God’s. For this signifies that all providence tends
toward the salvation of the elect, and these toward the glory of Christ, and finally all
the elect, together with Christ Himself, are ordered to the glory of God. So too in
Matthew 24:22, the effect of providence—the shortening of the days of the
Antichrist’s persecution—is said to be for the sake of the elect. And Augustine (Enarr.
in Ps. 54) says of the wicked: They live so that they may be corrected or that the good
may be exercised through them. Now, their living is an effect of providence, which
Augustine reduces to predestination. Hence, theologians say that the world will endure
until the number of the predestined is fulfilled. Thus, predestination in some way
encompasses the whole of providence, although, simply speaking and with respect to
its direct objects, providence extends more widely, and so predestination is a part of it.
5. Two Other Differences (First Difference). Beyond this difference, two others
between predestination and providence may be noted, which will further clarify their
rationales. The first is that predestination entails the infallible attainment of the
particular end of the predestined, whereas providence does not necessarily include the
infallible attainment of the particular end of any creature to which it extends. This is
not because providence necessarily excludes such attainment, but because it does not
necessarily include it. For sometimes the end is attained, and sometimes it is not. St.
Thomas expressly establishes this difference (De Veritate, q. 6, a. 2; In I Sent., d. 40, q.
1; STh I, q. 23, a. 3), as do Giles (In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2), Durandus (q. 3), Capreolus,
Marsilius (In IV, q. 40), and Sylvester (Summa Contra Gentiles, q. 22, a. 2).
Proof of the First Part of the First Difference. The first part of this difference is
most certain, as is clear from all that has been said, from Romans 8, and from
Augustine’s words (De Bono Perseverantiae, c. 14), along with countless similar
authorities. The source of this certitude and infallibility in predestination will be
discussed at length later. For now, it is briefly stated that the absolute certainty of a
future event arises formally from the absolute decree of the divine will, while
presupposing God’s infallible knowledge of conditional future contingents (as has
already been discussed).
6. Cajetan’s Disagreement with the Second Part. Before proving the second part, I
will note Cajetan’s opinion (In I, q. 22, a. 1), who denies that providence differs from
predestination in this respect. He holds that it belongs to the perfection of divine
providence that it infallibly attains the particular end to which it orders any creature. He
claims that St. Thomas retracted his earlier view because he said there that God
provides for all things, and what He provides for, He provides infallibly. Cajetan’s
120 BOOK ONE
reasoning is that otherwise, divine providence would fail and be frustrated—which
would be an imperfection. For in every artisan or governor, it is an imperfection not to
attain the intended end and not to apply efficacious means to it. This failure, he argues,
arises either from ignorance of such means or from an inability to apply them (if
known). For if knowledge and power are present, the will cannot be lacking if the end
is truly intended. Therefore, if God intends the end of His providence, He either
infallibly attains it or is impotent or ignorant of the means—which is unthinkable.
7. The Proposed Difference Must Be Held as Certain. Nevertheless, the proposed
difference seems certain and is proven first by induction. For it cannot be denied that
God has a supernatural providence for those who are not saved, extending to them so
that they may attain the supernatural end for which He created and ordered them. Yet
in them, such providence does not have this effect—that is, the attainment of the
particular end. Therefore, this infallibility is not of the essence of providence. The
consequence is evident. The antecedent is most certain, as St. Thomas teaches (q. 23, a.
3), and is confirmed by common Scriptural texts: God wills all men to be saved (1 Tim.
2:4), He enlightens every man (John 1:9), etc. We will discuss this at length later (Book
IV) when treating supernatural providence for non-elect men. The same is seen in
natural agents, which often fail to attain their particular ends—hence arise monstrous
effects, called "sins of nature," which are causal with respect to the particular agent
because they occur outside its intention. Yet these natural agents tend toward their
ends, ordered by the First Agent, and from Him receive providence adapted to attaining
those ends. Therefore, even in them, providence does not entail infallible attainment of
the particular end.
8. An A Priori Reason Why Providence Does Not Include Infallibility. The a priori
reason is that infallibility can arise from two sources: 1. The intention of such an end in
God’s will. 2. The will to grant the means that God foreknows as most efficacious for
attaining it. Providence, in its full extent, does not have infallibility from either source.
The first part is proven because God does not always intend an end with an absolute
will, but sometimes with a simple affection or a will including some condition (which
He does not absolutely will and which depends on a created cause that can be
impeded). Such an intention of an end does not have an infallible connection with its
attainment, for this belongs only to an absolute will. This is clear in the case of the
reprobate, to whom God intends glory in a certain way. The same applies
proportionally to natural agents. The reason is that God is free and can intend
particular ends as He wills. Moreover, nothing more is owed to particular agents if they
are considered in relation to their connatural ends. For concerning the supernatural end,
not even the tendency itself toward it is owed but is added to nature by God’s liberality.
121 BOOK ONE
Therefore, God could, at His discretion, not confer such an ordination by an absolute
decree but only by a simple affection, without an absolute and efficacious intention.
9. Hence the Second Part Is Easily Understood. From this, the second part is clear:
God does not always will to give those means that He foreknows as efficacious. For a
means is rendered inefficacious in two ways: 1. By the intrinsic condition of the
particular agent, which is free and can resist. God wills to preserve this liberty and is
not bound always to prevent it in such a way that it is infallibly moved to one side, for
He sufficiently provides if He grants sufficient means. 2. By some extrinsic
impediment, as happens in natural things. God does not always will or need to remove
such impediments, since He is the universal provider. Hence, Dionysius rightly says (De
Divinis Nominibus, c. 4) that providence does not destroy nature but aids each thing
according to its nature’s exigency, allowing each to operate in a manner fitting its nature.
Therefore, providence does not have infallible attainment from any source.
10. Response to Cajetan’s Argument. Thus, the response to Cajetan’s argument is
easy: this does not arise from impotence or ignorance but from the freedom of the
divine will and because it is more fitting to things themselves and to the office of a
universal governor. Nor does it follow that God in no way intends such an end, but
only that He does not intend it efficaciously—which is true. Nor should it be said that
divine providence is frustrated, for what fails in one order of providence falls into
another. Thus, the sinner who fails to attain reward falls into punishment. As Augustine
says (Enchiridion, c. 11), God does not permit evils except to draw good from them—a
point also made at length by Damascene (De Fide Orthodoxa, II, c. 29).
11. Providence Never Fails Entirely Regarding the Universal End. Finally, it must be
observed that although providence sometimes does not attain a particular end, it never
entirely fails regarding the universal end of providence itself. For as the Church says,
God is not deceived in His providence. Whenever a particular cause is not to attain its
end, God does not ignore this, nor does it happen without His permission—which He
refers to another end, whether pertaining to the good of the whole universe or to the
manifestation of some divine attribute. Ultimately, He orders all things to His praise
and glory, the universal end of providence, which is always efficaciously intended. Thus,
only this was necessary for perfect providence, and it is most sufficient. In this way,
divine providence, simply speaking, is never frustrated. And in the same sense, it is true
what St. Thomas says: All things happen just as God provides them. For what is
providently willed efficaciously and by God’s absolute will happens just as it is
provided, whereas what is only antecedently or inefficaciously intended is provided
proportionally—as far as the sufficiency of means and God’s part is concerned, but as
to the effect, according to the creature’s cooperation.
122 BOOK ONE
12. The Second Difference Between Providence and Predestination. The second
difference is that providence presupposes, in the order of reason, the existence in
God’s mind or will of the thing to which it provides, whereas predestination does not
per se presuppose it but brings it along or includes it. I explain the first part: just as in
predestination we said there are two aspects on the side of matter—namely, the object
that is predestined and the end to which it is predestined—so too in providence there
are two: the subject to which providence is given and the good that is provided or
procured for it. This second aspect is not presupposed as future but is ordered to be by
providence itself. The first, however, is presupposed as future—or, as others say, as
existing in the presence of eternity. Nemesius (above, c. 42) rightly teaches this. For in
eternity, the rationale of providence is related to the future thing just as in time, the
execution of providence (which is governance) is related to the thing as existing. But
governance concerns only things already existing; therefore, providence concerns only
things that, according to the order of reason, are presupposed as future. This is
confirmed because providence is about means; therefore, it presupposes the ordination
of a thing to such an end, and hence also the will to create such a thing for such an end.
And this is to presuppose, in eternity, that thing as future.
13. Predestination Presupposes Its Term and Object Only as Possible. From this, the
second part (which we touched on earlier and now return to) is easily clarified:
predestination does not presuppose either its term or its object as future but only as
possible, and through predestination itself, it is ordered to be. I take this from St.
Thomas (De Veritate, q. 6, a. 1). It is best illustrated in the predestination of Christ,
who is the exemplar of all our predestination (Augustine, De Praedestinatione
Sanctorum, c. 15). For Christ as man was predestined to be the natural Son of God, yet
before this predestination, this man Christ as such was not presupposed as existing or
as future in God’s mind. Rather, through predestination itself, He was ordained to be
and to be such that He would simultaneously be the natural Son of God. Therefore, it
is not of the essence of predestination to presuppose the existence of its object. This is
also clear in our predestination: predestination does not presuppose but intrinsically
includes the ordination to an end preconceived in the mind of the predestinator. But
the ordination to an end does not presuppose that the thing ordained to the end already
exists, since it is through the same will by which it is ordained to be for such an end.
Since the end is first in intention, the thing cannot be intended before it is destined for
such an end. For we are speaking of the end for which the thing itself is first instituted
and of the first agent, who orders the thing to the end not only according to accidental
being but also according to its first substantial being.
14. An Objection Is Resolved. Hence, it is no objection if someone says that
sometimes a thing is instituted for one end and afterward ordered to another. For this is
123 BOOK ONE
true of a secondary end, not the primary one. But eternal beatitude, for which the
predestined are created, is their primary and proper end. Therefore, they are not first
ordained to being by the will to create them before they are ordained to be blessed by
the will to glorify them. You might say that for a thing to be created for such an end, an
ordination to it by a simple will suffices, and an efficacious destination is not required. I
reply that this is true concerning men in general (as is clear in the reprobate), but in the
predestined, there is not a twofold intention and ordination to that end—one
efficacious and the other inefficacious—but only an absolute destination. Therefore, by
this very destination, they are ordained to beatitude in the same decree by which they
are ordained to being.
15. The Will to Create and to Elect the Predestined Is One. It must also be noted
that just as the will predestining to an end does not presuppose the will to create the
predestined, so too, conversely, the will to create the predestined does not presuppose
the will to give him glory. Rather, by one simple act of will, such a person is ordained
both to be and to be for such an end. The reason is that glory or beatitude is not
predestined in the abstract (or, as others say, as a quod), but it is predestined to
someone as their form and perfection. This happens only insofar as a person is
predestined to it. But no one can be predestined to be blessed without being
intrinsically predestined to be. Therefore, these two acts of will cannot be prior to one
another in reason.
16. An Objection and Its Solution. You might object: Whatever is posterior in
execution is prior in intention, and conversely, what is prior in intention is posterior in
execution. But in execution, a thing’s being created and existing is prior to its being
beatified. Therefore, in intention, it was posterior. Therefore, God willed to beatify man
before willing to create him. I reply that this maxim holds true concerning the end and
the means that do not intrinsically constitute the end but are extrinsic efficient causes
of its attainment. It does not hold between the subject and its formal end, for both
together intrinsically constitute the total end. Thus, the person who is predestined and
the glory to which they are predestined are related: glory is the end for the sake of
which, while the person is the end to which glory is given. Hence, although in time the
person is made before glory, in eternity the glory is not loved before the person, nor is
the person loved before being ordained to be eternally blessed.

CHAPTER XIX. HOW PREDESTINATION

IS RELATED TO GRACE AND SUPERNATURAL GOVERNANCE.

1. Predestination seems to be related to grace as cause is to effect. How these two

differ from one another. — Another difference. This comparison has been deemed
124 BOOK ONE
necessary for an exact and proper understanding of predestination and will contribute
significantly to clarifying what we will say about the causes and effects of
predestination. Thus, Augustine, in his book On the Predestination of the Saints (Ch.
10) and On the Gift of Perseverance (Ch. 14), touching upon this comparison, says that
predestination and grace are related as cause and effect. For predestination (he says) is
the preparation of grace, whereas grace itself is the actual bestowal. Hence, he later
states: Therefore, for those predestined by God, what pertains to the good of grace is
His own preparation, but grace itself is the effect of predestination. From this teaching
of Augustine, we can gather a twofold difference between predestination and grace.
The first is that they differ as the eternal differs from the temporal—for predestination
is eternal, whereas grace is temporal, just as creation is. Thus, Augustine says in the
same place: When the Apostle says, “We are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus
for good works,” this refers to grace; but what follows—“which God prepared
beforehand, that we should walk in them”—refers to predestination, which cannot exist
without foreknowledge. This can also be illustrated analogously: for just as providence
is related to governance in general, so predestination is related to grace or the
supernatural governance proper to the predestined—both being compared as the
temporal to the eternal, as St. Thomas teaches (Summa Theologiæ I, q. 22, art. 1, ad 2).
For providence denotes the cause, whereas governance denotes the effect, since the
former signifies the eternal plan by which God governs, while the latter signifies its
execution, which occurs in time. Therefore, predestination is related to glory in the
same way—for as the whole is to the whole, so the part is to the part. Hence, the same
St. Thomas (q. 23, art. 2) says that predestination, formally considered, places nothing
real in the predestined, but causally it produces grace, which it does in time through
supernatural governance. From this difference, another seems to follow: namely, that
predestination is uncreated (being eternal), whereas grace is created (as something
temporal and made). Yet both distinctions involve some difficulty, which must be raised
and briefly resolved for a fuller explanation of this comparison.
2. The first difficulty concerns the first difference. The second difficulty. Regarding
the first difference, the primary difficulty is that predestination itself is a kind of grace
—for it is a certain natural benefit freely bestowed upon man, and this is grace. Here,
"grace" is not understood solely as sanctifying form but as encompassing all
supernatural gifts and benefits, to which glory is compared. Thus, grace includes not
only what inheres intrinsically in man but also many extrinsic goods, insofar as they
contribute to supernatural happiness. For Augustine, in his Exposition on Psalm 87 and
Homily 13 (Book 50), counted even having exhorters to good and lacking tempters to
evil among the gifts of grace. Therefore, although predestination does not inhere [in
man], it is true grace, because it is a great supernatural good freely given. Thus,
125 BOOK ONE
predestination and grace do not differ universally as cause and effect, but also as two
graces, one of which may be the cause of the other. In this way, predestination may be
compared to subsequent graces. Hence, not all grace is temporal—there is also some
eternal grace. A second difficulty arises concerning the same point, especially when
comparing predestination with the governance of the elect. For governance is twofold,
as may be gathered from St. Thomas: one active, the other passive. The question, then,
is: to which of these does the aforementioned difference apply? The passive
governance is clearly temporal and resides in those who are governed, for it is like a
passion received in the patient. But this is not our concern here, since we are treating
governance as it pertains to God—that is, active governance. Yet active governance
seems to be eternal, for it is not distinct from providence, as St. Thomas holds (I, q.
103, arts. 6–8). This is evident because by the same eternal act by which God from
eternity prepares benefits for the elect, He governs them in time. For God does not
have within Himself another principle of governing in time apart from what He
conceived or decreed from eternity. Therefore, this principle of governance—active
governance—is eternal and does not differ, even conceptually, from predestination and
providence, when these are taken proportionally. The third difficulty concerns the other
difference. A third difficulty arises regarding the other distinction—namely, that not all
grace is created. For predestination itself is a kind of uncreated grace, and the grace of
union is uncreated. Even the Holy Spirit Himself, insofar as He is conferred upon the
just in His own person, may be called a kind of grace—just as the divine essence, given
to the blessed as an intelligible form, is truly called an uncreated gift.
3. The term "grace" signifies three things. The first difficulty seems to arise from the
multiple meanings of the word "grace," as St. Thomas explains (I-II, q. 110, art. 1),
where he says that "grace" can signify: (1) love and benevolence; (2) a gift freely given,
distinct from that love and proceeding from it (so that the former may be called grace
remaining in the giver, the latter grace passing over into the recipient when grace is
conferred); or (3) the repayment of a benefit received (as when we speak of "returning
thanks"). Omitting the third meaning for now (which may be useful later), the first two
help resolve the present difficulty. For in the first sense, we must concede that
predestination is a kind of grace—as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, saying:
Sometimes the eternal love of God is called the grace of God, just as the grace of
predestination is so called, insofar as God predestines or elects some gratuitously, and
not because of merits. Thus, Ephesians 1 says: He predestined us for adoption as sons,
to the praise of the glory of His grace. Citing this passage, St. Thomas seems to
interpret it in the same sense, so that the word "grace" in this context signifies the
gratuitous beneficence that God shows through predestination as the greatest and most
singular grace.
126 BOOK ONE
4. In what sense Augustine used the term "grace" in the cited passage. But Augustine,
in defining predestination and in distinguishing it from grace, takes the term "grace" in
the second sense—not in its full breadth (for many gratuitous gifts do not pertain to
predestination), but insofar as it signifies the gratuitous gifts by which all who are saved
are most certainly saved. Understood in this way, grace is rightly distinguished from
predestination, as effect from cause and as the temporal from the eternal. For such
grace is transient—not immanent in God—and nothing transient outside of God is
eternal; it necessarily proceeds from eternal reasons and eternal love. This is also how
St. Thomas must be understood (I, q. 23, art. 2, ad 4).
Grace is also called an intrinsically inhering gift. — I note in passing that although
this grace is called "transient," it is not necessary that it always and universally pass into
the predestined themselves so as to be intrinsically received in them. For although the
grace principally intended through predestination is that which inheres intrinsically in
the predestined (as in Ephesians 1: He chose us in Him that we might be holy and He
predestined us for adoption as sons—since this adoption and true sanctification occur
through intrinsic grace, just as does that conformity with Christ of which Romans 8
says: Whom He predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son), nevertheless,
the grace that is the effect of predestination—and is called temporal—extends more
broadly. Sometimes it consists in external gifts, causes, or circumstances; other times in
the removal of evils or occasions of sin—all of which Augustine excellently includes
under the term benefits by which the elect are most certainly saved.
5. From this it is clear that predestination is related to the particular governance of a
predestined man just as general providence is related to general governance. For just as
governance includes all the actions and effects by which God furnishes creatures with
the means necessary or fitting for their ends, so this particular governance includes
every divine action by which He effectively leads the elect to the end of predestination.
It may also be called singular beneficence, since it embraces all the benefits by which all
who are saved are saved. Thus, just as governance is the adequate effect of providence,
so this beneficence is the effect of predestination; and just as governance is temporal
and providence eternal, so this beneficence is temporal, and predestination eternal.
6. Resolution of the second difficulty. Even God’s active governance is distinct from
predestination. The transient action by which God governs is directed toward creatures
and is temporal. — Concerning the second difficulty—whether the discussion pertains
to active or passive governance—one might briefly reply that it concerns the passive
and what is transient outside of God, just as was said of grace. For as Augustine spoke
of grace when distinguishing it from predestination, so too we may speak of
beneficence and governance, which are said to belong to God not intrinsically (so to
speak) but emanatively—that is, not because they are in God, but because they are from
127 BOOK ONE
God. St. Thomas seems to have held this view (Summa Theologiæ I, q. 23, art. 2, ad 3),
distinguishing predestination from governance (or grace) as active preparation from
passive reception. Yet even when speaking of active governance, we must acknowledge
some distinction between it and predestination—at least this: that the former is simply
eternal (as we have said of predestination), while the latter is simply temporal (as we
will explain regarding governance). To clarify this, note that three aspects may be
considered in active governance: 1. Transient action, by which the effects of
governance are produced in creatures. 2. The art of the divine intellect, which directs
that action. 3. The act of the will, which moves toward that action. Regarding the first,
it is disputed whether this action is in creatures or in God Himself. I hold that it is in
creatures. Thus, if "active governance" is taken as this action, it clearly differs from
predestination and providence—not only conceptually but also in reality—as the
created differs from the uncreated, and the temporal from the eternal. St. Thomas (loc.
cit.) calls governance the execution of providence yet adds that it exists passively in the
governed but actively in the governor. Hence, he either speaks of active governance in
this sense or does not definitively place this action in God as agent. Even so, active
governance, though uncreated (as existing within God and thus not differing from
providence in this respect), may still be distinguished conceptually by its relation to
creatures. For predestination (or providence) does not imply an actual influencing
relation, whereas active governance does. By reason of this diverse relation, they may
also be distinguished as the temporal from the eternal—since this conceptual relation to
creatures, as actually influencing them, is temporal. Similarly, active creation under that
designation is temporal, even if the real action itself is posited in God.
7. The directive art of the divine intellect is active governance itself; they differ only
conceptually. Concerning the second aspect—the art or plan in the divine intellect
directing this action—we must say without doubt that this same art is wholly identical
to providence and active governance. They differ only in that governance connotes an
actual relation of influencing causality, which providence does not. For example, the
same art enables a man both to know how to write and to direct his hand when writing.
In us, these may differ as habit and act—a distinction inapplicable to God. Some posit
in the intellect an imperium (command to execute) distinct from art, perhaps to
distinguish active governance from providence. But I deny such an act is distinct from
the practical judgment of art or prudence. Thus, I do not distinguish them as two
attributes or two acts in God’s mind. St. Thomas clearly held this (I, q. 103, art. 6),
stating that providence is the very plan of governance—at least regarding the internal
act posited in God. For by the relation of actual cause or action, they may be
distinguished conceptually—indeed, as the eternal from the temporal, just as with active
creation and all God’s external actions.
128 BOOK ONE
8. Predestination is conceptually distinct from governance insofar as the latter
implies an executive will. Regarding the third aspect—the divine will insofar as it
constitutes predestination, initiates it, or serves as the principle of external execution
and governance—two orders of acts may be distinguished in God’s will, as previously
stated: 1. The order of intention (pertaining to predestination). 2. The order of
execution (pertaining to governance). Thus, predestination and singular active
governance, both existing within the divine will, are conceptually distinct—not as
created from uncreated (since both are in God), nor as temporal from eternal (since
both are eternal), but as preparation differs from proximate principle of execution. This
executive will may be considered: In itself, as eternal, without temporal relation or
denomination. As actually influencing or denominated in the act of governing and
benefacting, by the action or relation existing in creatures. Under the first aspect, it
belongs to predestination (as part of God’s eternal preparation). Under the second, it
pertains to governance and beneficence (or grace). Thus, active governance is
conceptually distinct from predestination (or providence)—not as created from
uncreated (since God’s will is always uncreated), but by our relation or denomination.
By this, they also differ as the temporal from the eternal—temporal in denomination or
conceptual relation, not in entity itself, as has been sufficiently explained.
9. Resolution of the third difficulty. — Some opinions. Grace may be called both
uncreated and created. Uncreated grace is given conjoined with a created
gift. Concerning the third difficulty—the second distinction, that grace differs from
predestination as the created differs from the uncreated—some argue that there can be
no uncreated grace, appealing to Augustine’s phrasing in On the Predestination of the
Saints (Ch. 10). But I maintain, first and foremost, that when speaking of grace in its
fullest generality (abstracting from the two meanings noted earlier from St. Thomas),
some grace may indeed be uncreated. For St. Thomas explicitly calls God’s eternal love
itself "grace" (Summa Theologiæ I-II, q. 110, art. 1), and Gaspar Casalius speaks
similarly in On Quadripartite Justice (Ch. 4). Augustine’s testimony does not contradict
this, since he does not speak of grace in its broadest sense but in a more limited
signification, distinguishing it from predestination and eternal love, as the text shows.
Further, I add that even grace as a gratuitous gift can, in some way or partially, be
uncreated—not only in the grace of union (where the matter is clear) but also
in justifying grace. For theologians agree that the very person of the Holy Spirit is
a gift given to the just in a special way at their justification, so that not only created gifts
but also an uncreated gift are bestowed (as we will show at the end of this treatise). In
heaven, the divine essence itself is given to the blessed—not only as the terminating
object of vision but also as a co-principle aiding vision by way of an intelligible form.
Even in this life, grace’s aid may sometimes be God Himself, assisting and
129 BOOK ONE
strengthening our faculties directly. It is true, however, that this uncreated grace is never
given to us except conjoined to some created gift or mediated through it. Yet this does
not prevent the uncreated gift itself from being called "grace," since it is truly given,
freely given, and given from supernatural love. Thus, the Son of God Himself, insofar
as He is given to us by the Father’s singular love (John 3:16), is called by John
(1:16) Grace for grace—that is, the grace by which and for which we receive all other
grace (as I interpret it). Therefore, I affirm that not all grace (even when distinguished
from predestination) is a created gift—nor did Augustine ever deny this. Yet whatever is
uncreated receives the denomination of "grace" under some temporal relation or
aspect, so that it always differs from predestination as the temporal from the eternal (as
far as can be gathered from Augustine’s teaching). Hence, nothing is called "grace" in
this way unless it is either created or conjoined to a created gift—though this is not
necessary for predestination as such.

CHAPTER XX. HOW

PREDESTINATION IS COMPARED TO THE BOOK OF LIFE.

1. St. Augustine in Book 10 of The City of God, Chapter 15, indicates that
predestination itself is the book of life frequently mentioned in Scripture, stating: "This
book does not remind God lest He forget, but signifies the predestination of those to
whom eternal life will be given." St. Thomas, however (Summa Theologiae I, q. 24, art.
1, ad 4), holds that predestination is conceptually distinct from the book of life, because
predestination is presupposed by the book of life as its object or material content - for
in the book of life (that is, in God's knowledge) the predestined are "written" (that is,
known) as already predestined. As Augustine says in the cited passage: "God is not
ignorant, and He does not read in this book to know; rather, His infallible
foreknowledge concerning them (the predestined) is itself the book of life." Therefore,
to complete this discussion, it seemed necessary to make this comparison and at the
same time briefly explain the whole of St. Thomas's Question 24, along with the
metaphor of the book of life and various ways Scripture speaks about it.
2. The book of life signifies God's knowledge and foreknowledge. - The term "book
of life" appears in Scripture both with and without qualification. Beginning with the
metaphor of the book of life, it certainly signifies God's knowledge or foreknowledge.
To explain this, I note that Scripture often uses this metaphorical term "book"
sometimes absolutely without qualification (as in Daniel 12:1: "At that time your people
shall be delivered, everyone whose name shall be found written in the book"; and
Exodus 32:32: "If not, blot me out of the book which you have written"), but more
frequently with the qualification "of life" (as in Revelation 20:15: "If anyone's name was
130 BOOK ONE
not found written in the book of life, he was thrown into the lake of fire"). Sometimes
a double qualification is added (Revelation 21:27: "Nothing unclean shall enter it, nor
anyone... but only those who are written in the Lamb's book of life"). Occasionally we
find in Scripture "the book of the righteous" (Joshua 10), and sometimes the term
appears in the singular (as in the cited passages and others to be mentioned below),
while at other times in the plural - and whenever in the plural, it appears absolutely
without qualification (Daniel 7:10: "The court sat in judgment, and the books were
opened"; Revelation 20:12: "I saw the dead, great and small, standing before the throne,
and books were opened... And the dead were judged by what was written in the
books").
3. First opinion about the book of life - Our position. This has led to various
interpretations of the meaning of this metaphorical term, which we must briefly review
and establish the correct explanation to resolve our question. First, some have thought
that in such Scriptural passages the term "book" is not always taken metaphorically, but
sometimes literally as a material written book. Bede (on Revelation 20) understands the
books to be opened at judgment day as the books of Sacred Scripture, because then it
will be clear how truly Scripture spoke about that day. This interpretation seems
unsuitable for that passage, since it continues: "And the dead were judged by what was
written in the books, according to what they had done" - for people are not judged by
what is written in Scripture (since not all their deeds are recorded there, nor are the
corresponding merits for each deed), whereas both are written in God's mind.
4. Second interpretation. Burgensis (on Exodus 32) thinks the reference there is to a
book not metaphorically but properly so called - namely, a register where notable deeds
of Israel's leaders were recorded. This seems supported by Hilary on Psalm 68:29 ("Let
them be blotted out of the book of the living"), which some identify with "the book of
the righteous" mentioned in Joshua and Kings.
5. Rejection of this view. But even this interpretation seems unsatisfactory: first
because it speaks of "the book which you have written" - whereas that book of notable
men doesn't appear to have been specially written by God (indeed no material book was
then uniquely written by God, since Scripture didn't yet exist); second because God
immediately adds: "Whoever has sinned against me, I will blot out of my book" - where
the possessive "my" indicates a higher, uniquely divine book (called by antonomasia
"God's book"), which cannot apply to a material register.
Third interpretation. These words also imply that no one is blotted from this book
except through sin - which best fits the book of the righteous written in God's mind.
One could say the book is metaphorical yet not referring to predestination or
justification before God (since Moses' request would then seem excessive), but rather to
God's record of Israel's leaders, with Moses at their head - meaning: "Either do this, or
131 BOOK ONE
remove me from this office," whose removal would blot him from that book. This is a
plausible interpretation.
Augustine's fourth interpretation. Yet we shouldn't disregard Augustine's
interpretation (Question 247 on Exodus), taking it as the book of spiritual life and
understanding Moses' words hyperbolically: "Do this, or don't count me among your
friends" - not that Moses truly desired or chose this, but to show that failing to obtain
his request was as unthinkable as being deprived of God's friendship without cause.
6. Augustine's fifth interpretation - Unsatisfactory. Sixth interpretation - Unproven.
Truer explanation. We therefore maintain as more correct that this expression is
metaphorical. The metaphor itself has been variously explained. Concerning the plural
"books" mentioned in Revelation, Augustine (City of God 20.14) interprets the books
to be opened at judgment as the saints and elect themselves who will come to judgment
with Christ. They are called "books" because through their lives and observance of
God's commandments, it will be known and confirmed that obedience was possible for
humans, and by comparison with them others will be judged and condemned. Though
this metaphor is ingenious, it doesn't seem to fit the Scriptural passages where it
appears. In Revelation 20 it immediately continues: "And the dead were judged by what
was written in the books, according to their deeds." Therefore it concerns books in
which such deeds are written. Others understand these books as the consciences of all
who will be judged, in which each person's good and evil deeds will be manifested. This
metaphor is plausible and not rejected by Jerome (on Daniel 7), but not fully proven,
since in reality people's consciences don't retain perfect records of all their deeds, which
are easily forgotten. Though God will then by His omnipotence give each person actual
knowledge of everything they did in this life (cf. Romans 2:15-16: "Their conscience
bearing witness... on the day when God judges the secrets of men"), this would be less
"opening already written books" than writing or transcribing them anew in each
person's mind. Therefore "books" more properly signifies what remains indelibly
written in God's knowledge.
7. Why books are spoken of in plural, and what is written in them - Jerome's first
opinion. But why are "books" plural when God's knowledge is one and simple? And
what persons or things are described in these books? To the first question we may
generally answer that in reality there is one "book" because of God's utterly simple
knowledge (signified when Scripture uses the singular absolutely, as in Psalm 139:16:
"In your book were written all my days"). The plural exists by virtue of containing the
deeds of many persons and orders (both angels and men). Jerome specifically answers
both questions together (on Daniel 7) by saying there are two books: one of the good
with their good works, the other of the wicked with their sins. The first is the book of
life, the second consequently the book of death. Since Scripture doesn't attribute a
132 BOOK ONE
"book of death" to God (as we'll discuss with Thomas), Jerome adds that the book of
the good is in God, while the book of death is in the devil as their accuser (Revelation
12:10). Thus the names of the good are said to be "written in heaven" (Luke 10:20),
while of the wicked: "Those who depart from you shall be written in the earth"
(Jeremiah 17:13). But since Revelation says the dead were judged "by what was written
in the books," these books must all be in God - for as Augustine said, God doesn't read
any external book to judge. Therefore the books by which He judges aren't outside His
knowledge.
8. Second opinion. Consequently others simply affirm there is in God both a book
of the wicked as of the good, and of death as of life. Basil seems to indicate this (on
Isaiah 4), where after mentioning the heavenly Jerusalem's book where the elect are
spiritually written for life, he adds we must consider "whether some are written not for
life but according to Jeremiah's statement that deserters are written in the earth." Thus
we should understand two writings: one of those destined for life, another for
perdition. Basil doesn't clearly state both writings are in God, since citing Jeremiah he
says the wicked are written "in earth." Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 9 against Julian)
also mentions books of the living and perishing, which according to the above can be
conceptually distinguished and properly named. Euthymius (on Psalm 69:28) confirms
this, stating that Scripture's absolute use of "book" metaphorically signifies God's
general foreknowledge where both good and evil are written. Thus the same
foreknowledge is sometimes signified as one book (emphasizing its simplicity) and
sometimes as many (reflecting diverse objects and persons). Reason supports this, since
God undoubtedly foreknows the reprobate. Why then shouldn't His clear
foreknowledge of them be called a "book"? If so, we may rightly speak of a "book of
death" containing those foreknown only for the second death. Thomas responds that
the book metaphor fits the foreknowledge of the elect better than of the reprobate,
since while registers list those admitted to military service or citizenship, they don't
typically record those expelled. But against this, proper governance requires records not
only of those deserving reward but also of those meriting punishment, especially death.
9. Resolution. While there can be no dispute about the reality signified (God's
foreknowledge encompassing both elect and reprobate as distinct objects), and while
the book metaphor could theoretically apply to both, Scripture's actual usage more
probably restricts it to God's special foreknowledge of the elect. We do find God's
entire foreknowledge called "the book" absolutely (as in Psalm 69:28: "Let them be
blotted out of the book of the living"), which the Church's liturgy for the dead
paraphrases: "The written book will be brought forth, in which all is contained whereby
the world shall be judged." This book contains not only persons but all their deeds for
judgment. Yet sometimes "book" absolutely signifies only the foreknowledge of the
133 BOOK ONE
elect, as clearly in Daniel 12:1: "At that time your people shall be delivered, everyone
whose name shall be found written in the book." If this meant God's general
foreknowledge, it wouldn't be true that all written there would be saved. More often the
metaphor with qualifications (like "book of life") applies specifically to the predestined
(e.g., Philippians 4:3: "Whose names are in the book of life"), which would be no
special privilege if reprobates were also written there.
10. Hence I observe that the qualification "of life" doesn't signify (so to speak) the
parchment or material on which this book is written, but its object - those written
therein as destined for life. For calling it the "book of life" because written in Life itself
(God) would absurdly include the reprobate. Augustine's suggestion (City of God
20.14) that it means "the life each one lives" (i.e., their deeds) falters because: 1) this
would include the reprobate (contrary to Revelation 20:15, 21:27); and 2) we'll show
there are other "books" of earthly deeds distinct from the book of eternal life.
Therefore "book of life" is named from its terminus - the predestined written there for
eternal life.
11. When it is further added in the book that it is called "of the Lamb," perhaps
someone might suppose this is done to restrict the discourse solely to predestined men,
since the life of men is specially attributed to the Lamb because they are to obtain it
through the Lamb. But I hold that even the saved angels are predestined through
Christ, and therefore their names are also written in the book of the Lamb’s life.
Indeed, John’s discourse throughout the whole of Revelation 21 concerns the entire
heavenly City of Jerusalem, which consists of angels and men, and he calls it the Bride
of the Lamb. Concerning it, he concludes that none shall belong to it except those
written in the book of the Lamb’s life. Thus, this second addition is made to highlight
the singular glory of Christ, since all life and the entire glory of the blessed belongs to
Him by a unique title, because it is obtained through His merits.
12. Yet we never find in Scripture that the name "book," taken absolutely, refers
specifically to the foreknowledge of the reprobate, nor is it used with any particular
addition to signify a special book of death or of the wicked. This alone is what St.
Thomas meant when he said there is no "book of the dead." His reasoning is
sufficiently fitting here, because it is not customary to inscribe in a special book those
who are excluded from service, but only those who are admitted. When it is objected
that those who are punished are also sometimes recorded in a book, this too does not
seem particularly customary. If it occasionally happens among men, it is because they
need such a record to provide for something in the future or to use that writing as a
model for punishing similar offenses. But this reasoning does not apply to God, and
thus the foundation of that metaphor also ceases in this respect. Furthermore,
according to the phrasing of Scripture, God is said to know His elect in a special
134 BOOK ONE
way: The Lord knows those who are His (2 Tim. 2:19), to which also pertains Psalm
1: The Lord knows the way of the righteous, and Romans 11: God has not rejected His
people, whom He foreknew. But the reprobate are rather said to be unknown and
unrecognized, as in I never knew you (Matt. 7:23). Hence, concerning the reprobate, it
is said in Psalm 68: Let them not be written with the righteous. For God knows the
elect with a knowledge of approval and inscribes them in His own special book as
uniquely beloved by Him, to show that He has a particular care for them. The
reprobate, however, though they cannot escape God’s knowledge due to His infinity,
are not granted a special book, because His knowledge of them is a knowledge of
reprobation. Hence, they are rather said to be blotted out of the book (Exod. 32:33).
Finally, for this reason, the names of the elect are said to be written in heaven (Luke
10:20), whereas the reprobate are said to be erased from it and written in the earth (Jer.
17:13). Hence, Jerome (cited earlier) calls their book "earthly" and places it in the hand
of the accuser rather than of God.
13. Objection. In Revelation 20, the book—or rather, books in the plural—seem to
be attributed only to the reprobate, who are signified there by the name "the dead," for
it is said: The books were opened, and another book was opened, which is the book of
life. Therefore, the book of life is distinct from the other books. Thus, the elect are not
inscribed in those other books, for otherwise they would include the book of life.
Therefore, those books contain only the reprobate. Hence, Scripture grants not only a
book but even proper and special books for the reprobate. Response. First, it is false
that "the dead" here refers to the reprobate, for the passage speaks not of the spiritually
dead but of those bodily dead who are resurrected—whether to life or to punishment
—as is clear from the words: I saw the dead, great and small, standing before the
throne of God, and later: The dead were judged according to what was written in the
books. For not only the reprobate but also the predestined are to be judged. Likewise, it
is added: The sea gave up the dead that were in it, and Death and Hades gave up their
dead. These words describe the resurrection of dead bodies, as is self-evident and as
Augustine extensively explains (De Civitate Dei, Bk. 20, Chs. 14–15), along with other
commentators on this passage. Therefore, those books by which the dead are judged
pertain both to the predestined and the reprobate, for all are judged according to their
works.
14. Further Response. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that those books are in
some way distinct from the one called "of life." I explain how they are plural and
distinguished from the book of life as follows: There is one book of persons and
another of actions or works. The book of life is of persons, in which the elect and
predestined are inscribed precisely as such. Hence, by antonomasia, it is called simply
"the book," or "the book of God," or "the heavenly book," or "of life." In this book,
135 BOOK ONE
we may understand that the elect are inscribed before their merits are recorded in
another book, for by the force of gratuitous election alone, they remain inscribed in
God’s foreknowledge as destined for glory and fitting grace. Thus, just as election is not
based on merits, neither is this inscription. Yet because this election is not fulfilled
except through merits—since glory in effect is not given except on account of merits—
another book is necessary in which works are recorded, and in which demerits must
also be written, for exact judgment requires knowledge and comparison of all deeds.
Thus, the book of life is distinguished from the books by which judgment is rendered.
These may also be called one book in respect to the unity and simplicity of God’s
knowledge, yet they are named in the plural due to their various aspects, for they are the
"books of consciences," as Jerome says (commenting on Psalm 88). Although he means
(as I also noted above regarding Augustine) that each one’s conscience is his own book,
and thus these books are not so much in God as in the minds of those judged, we may
rightly understand that God’s knowledge of each conscience constitutes the books by
which He judges. They are called plural in respect to the plurality of consciences, just as
there are said to be plural "ideas." Another reason occurs: namely, that for judging
works, two books are required—one of facts, the other of law. For in His eternity, God
first inscribed the law, assigning rewards and punishments to works, so that whoever
sins thus is punished thus, and whoever sins otherwise is afflicted with such a penalty,
and proportionately for merits and rewards. Then, in another record, He foreknew the
individual works and deeds. These two books are opened in judgment so that the deed
may be proven from one and the sentence pronounced from the other. Gregory
(Moralia, Bk. 24, Ch. 6 [or 9]) and Augustine (De Civitate Dei, Bk. 20, Chs. 14–15)
explain this differently.
15. Resolution of the Entire Question. From all this, it follows that the "book of
life" metaphorically signifies the eternal knowledge God has of all who will obtain
eternal life. From this, it is easy to resolve the question we proposed and to compare
the book of life with predestination. They are so similar and closely connected that
Augustine could rightly speak of them as one and the same attribute. Yet in strict terms,
St. Thomas correctly said they differ in concept. Both points will be clear by examining
their agreements and differences. Agreements: First, all persons written in the book of
life are predestined, neither more nor fewer, and conversely, all who are predestined are
written in that book. This is clear from Daniel 12: Everyone shall be delivered who is
found written in the book. The exclusion is added in Revelation 13 and 17, where it is
said that all who worshipped the beast were those whose names were not written in the
book of the Lamb’s life. More plainly, in Revelation 20: Anyone not found written in
the book of life was thrown into the lake of fire, and in Revelation 21, it is said of the
heavenly Jerusalem: None shall enter it except those written in the Lamb’s book of life.
136 BOOK ONE
Therefore, all written in that book are saved, and those not saved are not written there.
But those not saved are not predestined, and all who are saved are predestined (as we
argued earlier against Catherine). Thus, predestination and the book of life are
reciprocal in this respect. They further agree in that, just as we said of predestination,
the book of life is an eternal, immanent act of God, entirely free—that is, not
necessary but dependent on God’s will. Hence, it either is predestination itself or
follows it as the nearest consequent in concept.
16. Indeed, if predestination is attributed solely to the will, the distinction in concept
is clear. For the metaphor of a book plainly signifies something pertaining to the
intellect. Just as speaking is a function of the intellect, so too is writing—hence
Aristotle also said that the human intellect is like a blank slate on which nothing is
depicted or written. It begins to be inscribed when images of things are imprinted on it,
and it begins to "write in itself" when it begins to know. Thus, the book attributed to
God lies in His intellect and is nothing other than a catalog of all the saved, inscribed in
the mind or knowledge of God. Therefore, just as the intellect is conceptually distinct
from the will, so too is the book of life distinct from predestination. And just as the
absolute foreknowledge of futures predetermined by God follows conceptually upon
the electing or determining will, so too does the book follow from predestination and is
necessarily joined to it. For by the very fact that God has chosen these for beatitude, He
has inscribed them in His knowledge as infallibly to be saved. But if predestination is
referred to the intellect, the distinction does not appear as necessary or as clear.
However, since St. Thomas—though he places predestination in the intellect—
nevertheless distinguishes the book of life conceptually from it, the distinction can be
explained thus: The book signifies only a kind of speculative knowledge or intuition of
those to be saved (for it is, as I said, like a catalog of such persons), whereas
predestination implies a practical judgment dictating and directing the execution of
infallible means ordained by the will for the salvation of the elect. Thus, the book of
life, perfected and completed (so to speak), presupposes predestination as constituting
its object. In strict terms, then, predestination and the book of life are compared in this
way—though, due to their close connection, they are sometimes regarded as the same.
17. Difficulty. One difficulty remains: The book of life does not seem as firm and
certain as predestination, and thus they do not appear as closely connected as we have
argued. The premise is clear because no one can be removed from
predestination: Those whom He foreknew, He also predestined (Rom. 8:29), and these
He will infallibly glorify. Hence, it is hyperbolically said in Matthew 24:24 that even the
elect, if it were possible, might be led astray—but because this will most certainly not
happen, it is added: Yet for the sake of the elect, those days will be shortened. Similarly,
1 John 2:19 states: They were not of us, for if they had been of us, they would have
137 BOOK ONE
remained with us. But concerning the book of life, those written in it seem capable of
being blotted out (Exod. 32:32–33; Ps. 68:29; Rev. 3:5).
18. Resolution. This doubt is easily resolved by noting that Scripture often expresses
negation through affirmation—as when God is said to "hate" those He does not love in
a special way. Thus, Ansbert and Haymo (on Rev. 3:5) say that to be "blotted out of the
book of life" means nothing other than not being written in it. This seems to be the
interpretation of Psalm 68:29: May they be blotted out of the book of the living and
not enrolled among the righteous—where the latter clause explains the former.
Therefore, the term "blotting out" is not taken in its proper sense (as removing what
was once written) but as signifying the negation of writing. In this, it does not differ
from predestination, for one may also be said to be "excluded from predestination."
Thus, in Revelation 3:5, The one who conquers will be clothed in white, and I will not
blot his name out of the book of life is equivalent to saying: He will attain the life for
which he is predestined. This is very like 2 Peter 1:10: Be all the more diligent to
confirm your calling and election.
19. Alternative Resolution. St. Augustine (on Ps. 68) understands the term "blotting
out" positively (so to speak)—i.e., as the erasure of what was once written. Yet he
clarifies that nothing truly written in the book of life is ever erased; only what was
inscribed according to human hope or opinion is "blotted out." Thus, those who hoped
or presumed to be written in the book later realize they were not, and so are "erased"
from the book written in their own minds, not from God’s knowledge. Ambrose (on
Rev. 3:5) and Rupert (on Exod. 4:29) interpret the phrase similarly. This aligns with
Scripture’s occasional manner of speaking of things not as they are in themselves but as
they are in human opinion—as in John 5:31, where Christ says: If I bear witness to
myself, my testimony is not true (i.e., in your judgment). In this sense, there is no
difference between predestination and the book of life, for one may also be "blotted
out of predestination" that was falsely promised to oneself by faith without works.
Thus, when God promises in Revelation 3:5 not to blot out the conqueror, He means
that such a one is truly and actually written in the book of life, not merely by human
hope or opinion. Such promises or threats imply no uncertainty in predestination or the
book of life but only that their execution depends on our works done with God’s grace.
This interpretation is plausible, though it explains the "blotting out" rather
metaphorically.
20. For this reason, St. Thomas (in the cited question, art. 3) says that some are
inscribed in the book of life in two ways: either for temporal grace alone or also for the
life of glory and perpetual grace. Those written in the latter way cannot be blotted out;
those in the former can. Hence, the "book of life" is sometimes taken strictly for the
book of eternal life (admitting no erasure) and sometimes broadly for the book of
138 BOOK ONE
temporal grace (admitting erasure). This is not a change in the book itself but in its
inscriptions—just as God is said to "not know" what He once knew because things
change (e.g., He no longer knows as just one who has lost justice through sin). Some
thus distinguish the "book of life" from the "book of the righteous," the former being
for the predestined alone, the latter for all who were ever just. Consequently,
predestination may be joined either (1) to the book of life strictly so-called (i.e., of
eternal glory) or (2) to a twofold predestination—one absolute (with the book of life
proper) and one conditional (for temporal grace or faith), from which one may fall, just
as names may be blotted from the book. Thus, there is no discrepancy here if the terms
are taken proportionally. This interpretation (followed by Anselm and Lyranus on Rev.
3) is also plausible.
21. The only difficulty with this exposition lies in the phrasing and usage of
Scripture, where it is categorically stated that all written in the book of life will be
saved (Dan. 12:1; Rev. 20:15, 21:27; Phil. 4:3). Hence, the "book of life" seems never to
denote anything but the book of eternal life—as Augustine, Ambrose, Rupert, and
other cited saints assume. St. Thomas (in the cited article) tacitly responds by extending
the book’s scope to include both the absolutely predestined and those ordained for
grace conditionally. While this doctrine is internally coherent and not incompatible with
the metaphor, in fact and in Scriptural usage, the "book of life" seems to be the catalog
of the predestined (as St. Thomas defines in art. 4). Thus, one of the first two
expositions must be retained.

[END OF BOOK ONE: ON THE NECESSITY AND NATURE OF

PREDESTINATION]
139 BOOK TWO

BOOK TWO: ON THE CAUSES OF PREDESTINATION

Having explained the nature and, as it were, the essence of predestination, it follows
that we should speak of its causes, effects, and properties. The order of doctrine
demands that we begin with the causes. All theologians who treat this subject dispute at
great length about this matter, for the principal hinge of this debate—both between
Catholics and heretics and among Catholics themselves—has turned on the question of
the cause of predestination. Augustine especially addresses this in the many books he
wrote on the subject. In his works, the discussion of the cause of predestination is so
intertwined with that of grace that they can scarcely be separated. Nevertheless, we will
strive, as far as possible, to distinguish them, referring what pertains to grace to its
proper place, though it will sometimes be necessary to touch upon it. First, then, after
proposing a division, we will clarify the state of the controversy and its various parts,
and then proceed to examine each point—first in dispute with heretics, then among
Catholics.

CHAPTER I. THE STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY,

AND THE MULTIPLE SENSES OF THE DISPUTE ARE SET FORTH.

1. Nearly all theologians who dispute this matter first note that the cause of
predestination may be investigated either (1) with respect to the very act of God, in
which we have said predestination formally consists, or (2) with respect to the effects
that predestination produces in the predestined. They assert that there can be no
question about predestination in the first sense—i.e., regarding God’s own act—
because, being something uncreated and eternal, it cannot have a cause. Hence, the
entire controversy must be reduced to the effects of predestination, which, since they
are created, require a cause, and it is this cause that is investigated here. This is the view
of St. Thomas (ST I, q. 23, a. 5 and 8; similarly in III, q. 24, a. 3 and q. 19, a. 5),
Bonaventure (In I Sent., d. 41, a. 1, q. 2), Richard [of Middleton] (ibid., a. 2, q. 1), and
others commonly cited there and in In III Sent., d. 7. Driedo (De Concordia, ch. 3,
intro., and ch. 4, ad 4) follows them. Thus, since (as Augustine testifies in De Bono
Perseverantiæ, ch. 14, and De Prædestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 10) the effect of
predestination is grace itself, or the gift of grace, to inquire into the cause of
predestination is nothing other than to inquire into the cause of grace or its bestowal.
This is clear because (as they argue) the question concerns only the cause of
140 BOOK TWO
predestination with respect to its effects, and all these effects are in some way contained
under the name of grace.
2. The Sense of the Controversy. For my part, I hold that this controversy has been
—and ought to be—disputed not only concerning the cause on the part of the effects
of predestination but also on the part of the divine act itself, which is predestination.
Otherwise, this discussion would belong entirely to the subject of grace, where the
causes of grace are treated. But because the effects of predestination themselves may
be considered in two ways—either (1) as given in time or (2) as prepared in eternity—it
is rightly asked whether they have a cause not only in the first sense but also in the
second. This latter question pertains properly to our present subject. Yet, due to their
connection, we cannot omit some discussion of both. We will therefore first speak of
the causes of predestination on the part of its effects, then on the part of the divine act
itself.
3. Twofold Cause: Physical and Moral. To clarify this further and to separate what is
certain from what is uncertain, let us distinguish a twofold cause: physical and moral.
A physical cause is one that gives being to an effect through itself and by a real influx
proportionate to it. A moral cause is so called for two reasons: (1) because it acts freely
(and thus is not opposed to a physical cause but adds the condition of liberty to it), or
(2) because it does not immediately influence the effect itself but morally applies or
induces a physical cause to act. Hence, a moral cause in this second sense presupposes a
principal and per se agent (intellect and will), which is induced or inclined to act by a
moral ground such as merit, petition, satisfaction, or the like. In the present matter, we
investigate both kinds of causes with respect to predestination, but chiefly the moral
cause. For the physical cause either pertains more to the subject of grace or presents no
difficulty here. To make this clearer and to complete our treatment, we will say a few
things about it.
4. Finally, it must be noted that there are four sources from which the cause of
predestination may be investigated or conceived: (1) on the part of God who
predestines, (2) on the part of the predestined human person, (3) on the part of Christ
the Lord, in whom and through whom we are all chosen and predestined, or (4) on the
part of any other third person who is not the head of all humanity (as Christ is) but a
fellow member of the same body. Here, we chiefly treat the cause of predestination on
the part of the predestined human person. This question has been most extensively
discussed by Augustine and the Scholastics, for the consideration of the other causes
either (1) presents no difficulty (as with the first, concerning God’s causality, and the
last, concerning a private third person’s causality) or (2) belongs to another subject (e.g.,
the question about Christ the Lord, which pertains to the Incarnation, where we treated
it at length in our commentary on St. Thomas’s ST III, q. 1 and 19). We will therefore
141 BOOK TWO
explicitly treat this second question here, touching on the others only as necessary. First,
we will discuss all that pertains to predestination on the part of its effects; then, what
may pertain to it on the part of the divine act itself.

CHAPTER II. WHAT PHYSICAL CAUSES

PREDESTINATION HAS WITH RESPECT TO ITS EFFECTS.

1. That There Is a Physical Cause of the Effects of Predestination. Since to inquire

into the causes of predestination on the part of its effects is nothing other than to
inquire into the causes of those effects themselves, it is first evident that all the effects
of predestination must necessarily have some physical cause. This is proved because all
the effects of predestination are something created and therefore require an efficient
physical cause from which they receive their being. Moreover, predestination itself is
the cause of such effects, as Augustine teaches and as we will explicitly discuss in the
following book. Yet predestination is either the first cause or the reason for the action
of the first cause, which does not immediately produce all these effects but operates
through secondary causes.
2. God Is the Primary and Efficient Cause of These Effects. Hence, secondly, it is
certain that the principal efficient and final cause of all these effects is God Himself.
This is a matter of faith, for God is the first and principal author of grace and glory,
according to the verse: The Lord will give grace and glory (Ps. 84:11). And since He
works all things for His own sake as their end (The Lord has made all things for
Himself, Prov. 16:4), with even greater and higher reason He has wrought those things
pertaining to the execution of the predestination of the elect for His own sake. For He
chose them to manifest His glory and grace and to be eternally praised and glorified by
them. Material and formal causality, however, have no place in God, and so we say
nothing of them here.
3. On Necessary and Possible Causes. Thirdly, it must be said that, apart from God
and the predestined human person themselves, no other physical cause is intrinsically
or per se required by the nature of the thing for these effects—though it is not
repugnant that God might use such causes. But when, how, or whether He uses them
for all or some of the effects of predestination does not pertain to the present matter
and involves various questions belonging to other subjects. This assertion pertains
chiefly to efficient causality and consequently to final causality. For material causality
will be addressed shortly, and formal causality presents no difficulty, as we shall see.
Concerning the efficient cause, I briefly explain: God alone is the author of grace, not
only as the first cause but also as the proximate, connatural, and principal cause, since
He alone can communicate the participation of His own divinity, which is
142 BOOK TWO
accomplished through grace. The other gifts of grace either dispose toward or
accompany this participation and thus have the same per se cause. Now, God per
se needs no instrument for His proper effects, nor the cooperation of any extrinsic
cause—especially since, apart from God Himself, no being exists that can by its nature
produce these effects. Therefore, by the nature of the thing, no physical cause of these
effects is necessary outside God. Only for some effects (those that are vital) may the
influx of the predestined human person himself be required, as we will soon explain.
Thus, every other extrinsic cause is per se and by the nature of the thing unnecessary.
That God can use such causes as instruments is beyond doubt. Here, however, the
question arises: Whether the humanity of Christ the Lord is a physical cause of all
these effects, at least from the moment of the Incarnation or the completion of the
Passion. Whether the sacraments of the New Law are physical causes of some such
effects that depend on them. These and similar questions are not to be treated here,
especially since they involve nothing peculiar to the predestined. God also employs the
ministry of angels and men to produce these effects in the predestined, and one may
further ask whether their causality is physical or merely moral. But this matters little, for
it is certain that such causality is only accidental in the physical genus and in terms of
real influx. Thus, I broadly understand Paul’s words: Neither he who plants nor he who
waters is anything, but only God who gives the growth (1 Cor. 3:7). It remains, then, to
explain what physical causality is per se required for these effects on the part of the
predestined human person—which we will briefly address by examining each kind of
cause.
4. How Man Is a Cause of These Effects. Fourthly, it must be said that man has a
material causality with respect to all the effects of predestination that occur in him—
whether habits, acts, or other internal aids of grace. For all these are received in the soul
or its faculties and, though by obediential capacity, are educed from it, since they
depend on it for their being and becoming. In this sense, Augustine said (De
Prædestinatione Sanctorum): To be able to have faith belongs to the nature of men; to
have it belongs to the grace of the faithful. Bernard (De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio)
likewise states: God is the one who gives grace, but free will is its receptacle. Similar
assertions are found in Prosper (De Vocatione Gentium, Bk. 2, ch. 3) and Fulgentius
(De Incarnatione et Gratia, ch. 22–24). It must only be noted that this capacity is such
that no debt (so to speak) arises from it with respect to the entire order of grace or all
the gifts of grace—that is, despite this capacity, it is not owed to human nature to be
elevated to the order of grace or to be made a participant in its gifts. I say there is no
debt—not only in terms of proper justice or merit (which is self-evident) but also no
debt of proportion or connatural exigency. (For example, we do not speak of the
properties of an essence as owed in the same way as the general concurrence of
143 BOOK TWO
secondary causes.) The reason is that such a debt would contradict the perfection of
grace, for then grace would no longer be grace but a debt owed to nature.
5. The Root of Grace’s Excellence. The root of this excellence of grace must be
taken from the end toward which the whole providence of grace tends. For this end is
supernatural and not owed to nature, and thus the means to it are likewise supernatural
and not owed to nature. These means are the aforementioned gifts of grace. A fortiori,
then, there can be far less of a debt regarding the congruent and efficacious aid that
infallibly leads to such an end—which is proper to the predestined. For if the sufficient
gifts themselves are not owed, much less are the efficacious ones. Moreover, if these
things were owed, they would be given to all. For God does not deny, without special
miracle, what is owed to nature—yet it is manifestly false that all receive such gifts. A
distinction must be noted here: sufficient grace, though in some sense owed to nature
considered in itself (and far less so to nature wounded by original sin), is nevertheless
not owed to nature as ordered to a supernatural end with an obligation to procure it.
But efficacious grace is owed to no one—not only with respect to nature considered in
itself but even as elevated and ordered to a supernatural end. (This is clear from the
fact that not all men or angels receive it.) The a priori reason is that ordination to such
an end per se demands only sufficient means; the rest depend on the divine will, which
applies the means according to His foreknowledge and will—and this cannot be owed
to nature under any title. Hence, this material causality does not pertain to the cause of
predestination under discussion.
6. Fifthly: Man’s Efficient Physical Causality. Predestination also has a physical
efficient cause on our part with respect to many effects—namely, those that consist in
the vital acts of man himself and are usually included under the name of actual grace.
Habitual grace is infused by God alone, though it requires disposition on the part of an
adult (which disposition, according to the more probable opinion, does not physically
produce the habits themselves, apart from the causality of the sacraments). But vital
acts cannot occur in us without us, as true philosophy teaches. Thus, although they are
principally given by God, man also has a secondary and less principal efficient causality
regarding them. A distinction must be made among these acts: Some are human and
free acts (e.g., acts of faith, charity, etc.). Others precede human consent and
deliberation (e.g., divine inspirations, touches of the heart, and similar movements in
which operating, prevenient, and exciting grace consists when it is intrinsic). Regarding
the former, man has not only physical efficiency but also moral causality, which consists
in free cooperation, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent (Session 6).
Regarding the latter, man does not morally cooperate and is thus said to be acted
upon rather than to act. Yet, according to the more accurate opinion,
he physically concurs, since these movements are truly vital, and such a physical influx
144 BOOK TWO
of the vital faculty belongs to the intrinsic nature of the act as vital. Thus, man can
have efficient causality regarding predestination and its effects—even with respect to
the first effect given in execution (e.g., some internal inspiration or illumination).
7. No Debt Arises from This Efficiency. From this efficient causality (or even from
the faculty possessing it), no debt arises with respect to such gifts. For: There is no debt
of connaturality, since this whole efficiency is supernatural, so that human faculties
concur only as elevated (and, in my opinion, through obediential active power, which I
discuss more fully elsewhere). Nor is there a debt of justice, merit, or any moral debt,
because if the efficiency is merely physical (and thus not free or moral), it cannot
ground such a debt. If it is also free, it always presupposes some grace given without
debt, as we will explain. Thus, this physical mode of causing, considered precisely, does
not pertain to the cause of predestination we are investigating.
8. The Final Cause. Sixthly, it is certain that predestination has a final cause with
respect to many of its effects, as St. Thomas acknowledges (ST I, q. 23, a. 5, corp. and
ad 1). Indeed, Durandus (In I Sent., d. 41, q. 2) held that all the effects of
predestination have a final cause in us—namely, the beatitude of the predestined, which
he does not count among those effects. Without doubt, it is true that all other effects
are ordered to beatitude as their end. Yet, since it is more accurate to include beatitude
itself among the effects of predestination (as we will see in Book III), it is more correct
to say that the whole of predestination (as comprising all effects) does not have its final
cause in us. Rather, its final cause is the divine glory, to which even the beatitude of the
predestined is ordered. Comparing these effects among themselves, one is ordered to
another as to an end—e.g., vocation is ordered to free disposition, this to justification,
and justification to the fruits of righteousness unto glory.
9. The Supernatural Character of This End. It must be noted that this end of
predestination—whether ultimate (with respect to all means) or proximate (of one
means to another)—is always supernatural. Hence, though it is realized in man, it is not
principally from man but from divine grace. Properly speaking, it does not causally
terminate in man as an effect produced by him; rather, as intended by God through a
love not owed to nature but arising from His gratuitous will, it has more the character
of an effect. This is especially true for the predestined, with respect to whom this
intention is absolute and efficacious (as we have said). Thus, by virtue of this final
causality, predestination has its foundation and origin not in man but in God.
10. Conclusion on Physical Causes. These points suffice regarding physical causes. As
for the formal cause, nothing further need be added, since the effects of predestination
that are intrinsically received in the predestined are certain forms or acts of the soul or
its faculties. Thus, they do not properly require other physical forms, for they
themselves are forms that adorn and formally perfect man. Sometimes, however, one
145 BOOK TWO
effect of predestination is called the form of others in a moral sense or metaphorically
—e.g., charity is called the form of faith and the other virtues, and the intention of the
end is in some way the form of choice. But these expressions do not pertain to the
present controversy.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER A MORAL CAUSE OF

PREDESTINATION CAN EXIST ON THE PART OF THE
PREDESTINED HUMAN PERSON WITH RESPECT TO ITS EFFECTS.

1. How God Is a Moral Cause. We narrow our discussion to the cause on the part of
the predestined human person, since we are treating only the moral cause—
distinguished from the physical cause—such as that which merits, impetrates, satisfies,
or morally disposes. These modes of causality do not apply to God as God (apart from
the mystery of the Incarnation), for they presuppose some imperfection in the
operating person, who must be a subject and inferior. Thus, although God may be
called a moral cause of these effects because He produces them freely, He remains
a proper and physical cause, and the condition of freedom is common to all God’s
works ad extra. Whether this freedom in the effects of predestination is such as to
exclude all debt (thus giving rise to the moral character by which the effect is
called gratuitous) depends on what will be said about the moral causality of man
himself toward these effects. Hence, we refer the whole dispute to this latter mode.
Whether such a cause can intervene on the part of Christ or another third person will
be discussed later.
2. Aristotle Reduces Moral Cause to Efficient Cause. It must further be noted that all
moral causality under discussion here is reducible to the efficient cause. Thus, Aristotle
classified the advising and petitioning cause among efficient causes. Although the final
cause seems in some way moral (insofar as it metaphorically moves and induces the
agent to act), it has its own proper mode of causality, for which it is numbered among
physical causes. For our purposes, the chief difference between the end and the moral
cause we investigate is that the end is not presupposed as existing to move the agent
but rather moves so that it may be brought into existence. The moral cause reducible to
the efficient, however, is presupposed as existing in some way, for it must move not so
that it itself may be attained but so that something else may be done on account of it.
Hence, it is a ratio agendi for the agent and thus reduced to the efficient cause. Such a
cause seems fourfold: (1) Meritorious (either de condigno or de congruo), which
morally causes insofar as it induces an obligation. (2) Satisfactory, of the same genus
but concerned with the special effect of remitting faults or punishments. (3)
Impetratory, which moves by asking and praying. (4) Dispositive—for though
146 BOOK TWO
disposition is usually reduced to physical material cause, here it is moral disposition and
thus a properly moral cause of the form given on account of it. Moreover, for such
disposition to exist, moral causality is required on man’s part, since he must produce it
not merely efficiently but freely. This does not suffice without the higher influx of
grace but is necessary according to Trent (Session 6, ch. 7). Hence, this dispositive
causality is not separated from moral causality (e.g., through merit de congruo or
impetration). Thus, we investigate all these causes under the name of moral cause,
which by itself or divine law induces a necessity or obligation of conferring the effect.
Under this generality, it may be called a meritorious cause.
3. Necessary Conditions for Such a Cause. From this, we deduce the conditions
required for something on man’s part to be a cause of predestination regarding its
effects: (1) It must be a free act of the predestined, since moral causality is founded on
liberty. (2) It must be a good act, for the effects of predestination are divine benefits,
and an evil act does not oblige God to confer benefits. (3) It must be proportionate to
the effect, both because this is universally required of a cause relative to its effect and
because such a cause must induce a debt of the effect, which it could not do without
proportion.
4. Fourthly, the cause must in some way be prior to its effect—a condition common
to all causes. What kind of priority this must be (whether in reality, execution, or God’s
mind) we will examine later. One noteworthy conclusion follows: an act that is the
cause of some effect of predestination cannot be the cause of all such effects unless it
itself lies outside them. For if it were the cause of all, it would also be the cause of
the first effect (which is one of them), and thus it could not itself be an effect (since
nothing is its own cause). But if it is the cause of some effects, though itself an effect
of predestination, it must be prior to its proper effects (at least in divine
foreknowledge), since a cause must precede its effect. This is especially true because
this cause is not final but reducible to the efficient, as it morally cooperates in
producing the effect.
5. Resolution of the Question. From this, it is certain that predestination,
regarding some of its effects as conferred in execution, can have such a cause on the
part of an adult human person (I add this to exclude infants, who lack the use of liberty
and thus the capacity for this causality, barring special privilege). This assertion is held
by all theologians and aligns with the faith. For example, glory is one such effect, and
man’s merits are its cause; likewise, the remission of sins has at least a dispositive cause
in man. It is irrelevant here that this cause is not from man alone but from God’s grace,
so long as it is not without man’s moral cooperation. Yet it is certain (per Catholic
doctrine) that such an act can be the cause of a further effect of predestination only
because it itself arises from divine grace (at least as exciting and assisting). The sole
147 BOOK TWO
remaining question is whether there can be in man a cause of this kind that is
the ratio of predestination regarding all its effects. Theologians reduce this to the first
effect conferred by predestination, since the rest flow or can flow from it. Thus, the
cause of the first is regarded as the cause of the rest.

CHAPTER IV. IF ANY ACTION OF A PREDESTINED

HUMAN PERSON PRECEDED THIS LIFE THAT MIGHT BE THE
CAUSE OF HIS PREDESTINATION WITH RESPECT TO ITS EFFECTS.

1. Since various opinions and doctrines have been held on this matter—some
heretical, others erroneous, and others disputed among Catholics—we will treat them
separately for clarity, beginning with the more absurd and antiquated views, which we
will briefly address for the sake of doctrinal completeness.
2. The Error Denying Freedom by Fate. Our present question concerns the moral
cause on the part of man, which necessarily presupposes human freedom, since
freedom is the foundation of all moral being and thus of moral causality. Hence, all
heretics who denied freedom could posit no moral cause of predestination or salvation.
The Manichaeans and Priscillianists, denying free will, attributed the cause of
predestination and reprobation to the diverse temperaments of our bodies, by which
we are necessarily drawn to good or evil acts. They further traced this diversity of
temperaments to astrological influences, as seen in Leo the Great (Epistle 91 to
Turibius, ch. 11), Gregory the Great (Homily 10 on the Gospels), Jerome (Letter 8),
Augustine (On Heresies, ch. 70), Prosper (On the Call of the Gentiles, Bk. 1, ch. 14),
and the Council of Braga (I, ch. 8), all of whom condemn this error. These heretics did
not assign a moral cause but a physical and natural one, seeking not to show that
salvation or damnation depends on human will but to excuse the damned (as
necessitated) and deprive the saved of all grounds for boasting.
3. Refutation. This error took many forms: some attributed the whole course of
human life to celestial causes, others to God Himself as coercing the will (a view still
current), and others to an intrinsic nature in some men determinately inclined to good
or evil. For our purposes, the error is essentially the same whether freedom is denied
due to stellar influence or any other extrinsic or intrinsic cause, as Origen noted (Peri
Archon, Bk. 3, ch. 1). The only difference is that heretics who say God alone removes
freedom by His motion attribute the diversity of human actions solely to divine will—
erring not in denying a created cause of predestination but in their account of causality,
as we will later discuss. Those who trace the diversity to a created cause (extrinsic or
intrinsic) seem to make it the primary ground of predestination. But in truth, they
either abolish predestination altogether or must ultimately recur to God’s will. For if a
148 BOOK TWO
good temperament necessarily brings salvation and this temperament arises from one’s
birth constellation, we must ask: Why is someone born under that constellation? If they
reply that this follows from the necessary course of fate and stellar motions, we ask
further: Why are the stars so arranged as to impose this necessity? Either this
arrangement is uncaused (or, as some said, fortuitous)—which abolishes predestination
—or God is its cause. But then we ask: What moved or determined God to establish
this stellar order? If He did so by natural or fatal necessity, predestination (a free act) is
destroyed; if freely, the whole ground of predestination must lie in His will. This
suffices to refute the error here, though elsewhere we dispute against fatalism and
intrinsic necessity in human acts. As for heretics who refer predestination solely to
God’s necessitating will, we will address them in the following book.
4. The Error of Pre-Existent Merit. Others, to avoid these errors, held that the cause
of the predestined’s happiness lies in their freedom and thus in some prior merit.
Finding no such merits in this mortal life, they invented a pre-existence of souls before
union with bodies, in which state they acquired good or bad merits. Those who received
souls with prior good merits were predestined on that account. Jerome (Letters 8 and
139, Commentary on Jeremiah 24 and 18, Against Rufinus) attributes this to Origen, as
do Epiphanius (Panarion, Letter to John of Jerusalem [Jerome, Letter 60]), Gregory
Nazianzen (Oration 31), and Theophilus (Paschal Letter, Bk. 1). It appears in Origen
(Peri Archon, Bk. 1, ch. 7–9; Bk. 3, ch. 10), where he says: God’s providence governs
immortal souls according to each one’s merits and causes... The dispensation of human
life is not confined to this age... The cause of each one’s past deeds precedes... Each
vessel is prepared for honor or dishonor by prior causes... ancient and preceding
reasons by which some are prepared for glory. He often repeats that the diversity of
bodies in this world arises from the diversity of merits in rational creatures before this
life.
5. Refutation: Souls Did Not Pre-Exist Bodies. In Origen’s view, I find great
obscurity and countless errors. First, he never clearly states whether these merits
preceded in souls or spirits separate from bodies. His language suggests they did, and
this is how he is commonly understood—hence the chief objection that he believed
souls were created before bodies and in that state acquired merits determining their
later union with bodies. But this is heretical, for the faith teaches that souls are created
when first infused into bodies (Lateran Council IV under Innocent III, Sess.
8; Clementina Unica; Council of Braga I, ch. 6; Leo the Great, Letter 91 to Turibius, ch.
10). Jerome (To Pammachius Against John of Jerusalem) and Augustine (On
Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 13) affirm this, as does Gregory of Nyssa (On the Making
of Man, ch. 28–29; On the Resurrection). Further, this error implies that God did not
primarily intend to create bodies but only as prisons for sinful spirits—a view
149 BOOK TWO
condemned in Firmiter (On the Trinity) and refuted by Augustine (City of God, Bk. 11,
ch. 23), Cyril of Alexandria (Commentary on John, Bk. 1, ch. 9), and Thomas Aquinas
(ST I, q. 65).
6. Yet Origen (Peri Archon, Bk. 2, ch. 2) insists no created spirit ever existed without
a body, nor could it. How, then, could he hold that souls existed before bodies, since he
admits they are rational, spiritual, and of the same nature as angels? Unless he meant
that no spirit must be united to a body unless as a punishment for demerits. But he
explicitly says (loc. cit.) that Jacob was loved by God before he had done good or evil in
this life (interpreting Rom. 9:11 thus)—yet not without prior merits, lest God seem
unjust in loving one and hating another without cause. Thus, he places the cause of
predestination in merits preceding this life, yet cannot consistently hold that souls are
united to bodies only due to prior demerits.
7. Origen’s Further Errors. Origen seems to have taught (from the cited texts) that all
spirits were always created with some bodies but pass from one body to another. He
posited many worlds before and after this one, with the same souls migrating through
diverse bodies according to their merits. Perhaps he thought souls first had subtler,
spiritual bodies and later received mortal ones—not always as punishment but
sometimes to attain higher goods for which they are predestined. This entails multiple
errors: (1) No created spirit is wholly incorporeal; (2) Human souls cannot exist without
any body; (3) Transmigration of souls (the same souls now in our bodies previously
inhabited others).
8. Fourth Error: Merits Before This Life. Origen’s fourth error (directly relevant
here) is that merits or demerits preceded in our souls before birth—contrary to
Paul: Before they had done good or evil (Rom. 9:11). Though Origen limits this
to good or evil in mortal bodies, Paul speaks absolutely, assuming no human merits
before this life. Hence he adds: Not by works but by Him who calls—which would be
false if works in a prior life existed. Nor could he infer but by the caller, for between
this life’s works and God’s call would intervene works of another life.
9. Fifth Error: Punishment for Pre-Existent Sins. We may add the error that God
punishes or rewards in this life for merits acquired before it—contrary to Christ’s words
about the man born blind (Neither he nor his parents sinned, but that God’s works
might be manifest in him, John 9:3) and Paul’s (Sin spread to all men who did not sin
like Adam, Rom. 5:14). More absurd still is making predestination the reward for pre-
existent merits, against Paul: Not by works but by the caller (Rom. 9:11); He called us
not according to our works (2 Tim. 1:9). If Origen says works of a prior life are
not ours, Paul refutes him by adding but according to His purpose and grace—
excluding any middle term between meritless gifts and gratuitous donation. This is
confirmed by 2 Cor. 5:10 and Rom. 14:10: We must all appear before Christ’s judgment
150 BOOK TWO
seat to receive what we deserve for deeds done in the body. Hence the Fathers conclude
that though God judges internal desires, He does not judge men except by deeds done
in this mortal body—not by works of a prior life. If God does not consider those
merits for glory, much less for predestination to it. For something may merit glory
without meriting predestination to it, but nothing can cause predestination to glory
without also causing glory itself, since predestination is glory’s surest cause.
10. Origen's Error in Denying an Immutable State as the Terminus of Merits. Sixthly,
we must carefully note that in the cited passages, Origen posits no firm and stable
terminus for human merits. He believed souls damned for sins in this life could later be
restored through repentance and good works, and that even in beatitude there is no
security - indeed, he thought it contrary to created free will for rational creatures to
become impeccable through beatitude. Thus he attributes countless vicissitudes of
states to them, where through repentance in another life following this one, the
wretched may become blessed. Beyond the absurd errors this contains (refuted
elsewhere), it involves a direct contradiction here. For if this were so, there would
properly speaking be no place for predestination to an inamissible life. I ask: does this
cycle have an end or not? If not, then although a man may pass into beatitude in this
life, he is not truly predestined, for he may fall again into damnation. And while we
might speak of some "predestination" to this amissible beatitude, it could not be
attributed to merits from a life before this one, since not one but many lives preceded,
some good and some bad. Though in execution one terminus might serve as the
ground for another, the whole succession contemplated by predestination cannot have
its cause assigned to man. Just as in the temporal succession of this life - where a man
is now just, now a sinner, now just again, always gaining or losing justice through his
free acts - yet the whole divinely-ordained succession of his life cannot be grounded in
man himself.
11. The Argument Strengthened by Considering the Beginning of These
Vicissitudes. Since Origen posits another life before this one, and another before that,
and so on, I ask: does this proceed infinitely through all eternity, or do we arrive at a
first world where souls were created and first began to act well or ill? If he takes the
first option, he errs against faith by making creatures eternal (which would be necessary
for an endless cycle). He also errs against philosophy and natural reason, which show
that a succession of worlds cannot be eternal without some particular, determinable
world having been created from eternity and persisting infinitely - which would make it
the first world, with the others necessarily finite in number. If Origen takes the second
option and admits a first world where souls first existed and acted (making their acts the
ground of predestination), we simply push the question back to that world: were those
good works done with or without grace? Without grace, how could they cause
151 BOOK TWO
predestination to glory? With grace, why did some souls receive efficacious grace for
such works and not others? Here Origen cannot appeal to merits from an earlier life,
since by hypothesis none existed. Thus his position is both riddled with errors and
useless for resolving our question.
12. The Foundation of Origen's Error. Origen's sole foundation was that otherwise
God would not preserve justice in predestining and distributing His gifts. Much will be
said later about this. Briefly, his conclusion - that justice would not be preserved - can
be taken in two ways: (1) contrarily/privatively (that God would act unjustly), which we
deny, since no injustice occurs when what is owed to none is given to one and not
another; or (2) negatively (that this act of predestination would not be an act of justice),
which we grant and even insist upon as belonging to grace's excellence. This does not
contradict Psalm 24:10 ("All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth/justice"), both
because this truth about God's external works need not extend to internal acts of love/
election/predestination, and because the justice found in all God's works often refers
not to what is owed the creature but to what God owes His own goodness. In this latter
sense, justice is found in predestination insofar as it befits God's goodness and wisdom
to predestine some. When we concede predestination is not an act of justice, we mean
in respect to the predestined man himself.

CHAPTER V. ON IF A MAN’S PRESENT

PREDESTINATION CAN BE BASED ON WORKS HE
WOULD HAVE DONE IN ANOTHER STATE, EVEN IF NEVER
REALIZED—FOCUSING ON THE PREDESTINATION OF INFANTS.

1. The Occasion of the Question from the Case of Infants. One of the principal
arguments Augustine customarily uses to exclude any cause of predestination on the
part of the predestined man is taken from the case of infants. For we observe in them a
remarkable diversity: not only are many saved while others are not, without their own
merits, but some, by a singular providence of God, are granted the remedy of salvation
—being preserved in this life until baptism, even if this requires miraculous
intervention or special provision of ministers or water. Others seem abandoned, being
snatched away prematurely before baptism is possible. This diversity must have been
foreknown and in some way predestined (or permitted) by God—predestined for those
saved, permitted for those damned. Yet in infants we find no diversity of merits from a
past life (which did not exist, as we have seen), nor from the present life (since they will
never use reason to merit), nor from a future life (since that state is not for meriting but
for receiving the reward of merits). Hence, the future actions of predestined saints in
that life are not the cause but rather the fruit and final effect of their predestination.
152 BOOK TWO
Augustine therefore concludes that infants manifest the clearest example of gratuitous
predestination without any moral cause on their part, as seen in On the Predestination
of the Saints, On the Gift of Perseverance, and throughout his works against the
Pelagians.
2. The Error of the Semi-Pelagians. To evade the force of this reasoning, the Semi-
Pelagians claimed that God knows not only what infants would do in their brief mortal
lives but also what they would have done had they lived longer and reached adulthood.
From these conditional works, they derived the cause of predestination for those to
whom the means of salvation are granted. For God, they said, foreknew the excellent
merits these infants would have had if they had lived and therefore predestined them
on that account. This is reported by Prosper and Hilary in their letters to Augustine
(written before On the Predestination of the Saints). Augustine himself addresses this
position in On the Predestination of the Saints (chs. 12–13), On the Gift of
Perseverance (chs. 9–10), and Letters 105 and 106, as does Prosper (On the Call of the
Gentiles, Bk. 1, ch. 7 [or 22]). Some assert that Pelagius himself held this view earlier,
but this is uncertain and not attested by the Fathers. Indeed, Augustine (On the
Predestination of the Saints, chs. 13–14) explicitly denies that Pelagius taught this or
that it follows from his doctrine, repeating this in On the Soul and Its Origin (Bk. 4, ch.
12). Whoever first held this view, they agreed with Origen in supposing that God’s
justice requires some diversity of merits in infants (lest God be charged with partiality)
and, finding no actual merits, resorted to conditional ones.
3. Nor was this limited to infants; the Semi-Pelagians also attributed the ground of
predestination in many adults to such conditional merits. For though they erred in other
ways (e.g., making the cause of all proper effects of predestination depend on an act of
free will absolutely foreknown by God prior to predestination, as we will see), they still
held that conditionally foreseen merits contributed in some way to predestination’s
cause. A twofold diversity may be observed among the saved and damned (though not
universally): (1) Some hear the Gospel or are sufficiently externally moved to faith,
while others do not; (2) Of those who hear, some believe and some do not—and
among believers, some repent, some persevere, and some do not. For this second
diversity, they placed the cause in some good disposition or effort of free will that
temporally or naturally precedes and was foreseen by God’s scientia visionis before
predestination. We will address this later.
4. For the first diversity (hearing the Gospel), they could not universally attribute it to
a prior good use of free will. Though they thought this sometimes occurred (as some
argued from Cornelius the Centurion, Acts 10), it is not necessary, nor did even the
Pelagians dare assert it. For the Gospel is often preached to the wicked (cf. I was found
by those who did not seek me), and among equally unbelieving nations, some hear it
153 BOOK TWO
sooner, some later, some never. They attributed this diversity to works these men would
have done if the Gospel had been preached to them: it is not preached to some because
they would not have believed, and to others because they would have believed—sooner
to some, later to others. Thus, this foreknowledge could only be conditional, since God
had not yet decreed to preach to them. Nor could He foreknow the good use or effect
of such preaching absolutely, for such knowledge presupposes the decree. Hence, it was
only conditional knowledge: If I preach to these, they will receive it well. Thus, they
made the natural good disposition toward the preached Gospel a twofold cause of
predestination: (1) conditionally foreseen as antecedent to preaching; (2) the ground for
subsequent grace, which they made consequent upon this preliminary good disposition.
All this is gathered from Augustine (cited above), for though not as clearly stated, this
was their view, rooted in the same fear of charging God with partiality.
5. Refutation of the Semi-Pelagian Error. In this Semi-Pelagian position, three or
four points may be noted. First, they attributed to God conditional knowledge of
future free acts prior to the decree of predestination. Some moderns have criticized the
Semi-Pelagians for this, even calling it a Pelagian invention to ascribe all good to free
will. Yet neither Augustine, Prosper, Hilary, Thomas, nor any ancient theologian
reproached them for attributing such knowledge to God but only for misusing it, as we
will show. This knowledge is not a Semi-Pelagian invention; it is taught in Scripture and
acknowledged by the Fathers (as shown elsewhere). Heretics do not defile Scripture by
abusing it for error, nor does the Semi-Pelagian misuse defile this knowledge itself.
6. Second, they held that the conditionally foreseen works (which they made the
cause of predestination to all grace and glory) would have been performed by free
will without the help of operative grace. In this, they coincided with the Pelagian heresy
and another part of their own error: that the moral good disposition toward externally
preached faith is the beginning of salvation and cause of the first assisting grace given
to man. This error will be expressly refuted later, and those arguments will apply a
fortiori here, so more need not be said now.
7. God Judges No One by Merits That Would Only Conditionally Exist. Third, the
Semi-Pelagians ascribed meritorious and moral causality to works that would never
actually exist or would exist only conditionally. This is the error most pertinent here and
most vehemently opposed by Augustine. His chief arguments are: (1) If God judged
men by works they would never do (but would have done if permitted), Paul falsely
said each will receive what he has done in the body (2 Cor 5:10)—for they would also
receive what they would have done. (2) Paul’s emphasis on not by works but by Him
who calls (Rom 9:11) would be meaningless, since the distinction could rest on works
they would have done if permitted. (3) It would be pointless to shorten the days of
Antichrist’s persecution for the sake of the elect (Mt 24:22), for the non-elect would
154 BOOK TWO
still be punished for sins they would have committed if it had continued—yet Christ
says the days are shortened so that the elect may be saved. (4) Premature death (by
which God takes the just lest they fall from grace) would not be a blessing, for they
would still be punished for sins they would have committed—contrary to Wisdom 4:11
(He was taken away lest evil change his understanding). Augustine often uses this text
(On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 8; Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, Bk. 2, ch. 7; On
the Soul and Its Origin, ch. 12; On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 14), showing it
is canonical and was similarly used by Cyprian (On Mortality). It is also cited by Jerome
(Against the Pelagians, Dialogue 3), Gregory the Great (Moralia, Bk. 27, ch. 2), Gregory
of Nyssa (On Infants Who Die Prematurely), and Prosper (On the Call of the Gentiles,
Bk. 1, ch. 21).
8. The Evasion and Its Refutation. The adversaries might argue that such
conditionally foreseen works—which would exist only if the person lived—are not
sufficient to oblige divine justice to render reward or punishment, but could still
provide grounds for denying grace (in the case of evil works) or inclining God to
confer grace (in the case of good works). Now, if they meant only that such
conditionally foreseen works could move God as an end—either to give grace for good
works or to remove the occasion of sin (even by cutting short life)—we would not
dispute this. For Paul says, He chose us to be holy (Eph 1:4), and Wisdom declares, He
was taken away lest wickedness alter his understanding (Wis 4:11), both showing this
proximate end of divine providence. In this sense, the Fathers sometimes use such
works to explain God's care for infants (e.g., Gregory of Nyssa). Augustine himself
occasionally appeals to this reasoning—for instance, to explain why Christ came at one
time rather than another (Against the Pagans: Six Questions, Q. 2)—though in On the
Predestination of the Saints (ch. 9) he calls it secondary to God's gratuitous election.
The same qualification applies to Gregory and other Fathers.
9. But the Semi-Pelagians could not mean this, especially for infants, since such
works would never actually exist in them and thus could not be intended by God as an
end. Their position was that God takes infants before adulthood because they would
have done good if they had lived—justifying them on account of those non-existent
works, not by preparing grace for works they will never do. Thus, these works function
not as the end of grace but as merit. Similarly, when God takes an infant who would
have sinned, He denies grace not to prevent sins (which will never occur) but because
they would have occurred. Hence, they made grace's conferral or denial a retribution
for conditionally foreseen but non-existent works, claiming this was the only just
explanation for infant salvation. Augustine rightly opposes this, arguing from Scripture
that God does not judge, punish, or reward based on such works. The a priori reason is
that conditional knowledge posits nothing in reality: these "works" are merely possible,
155 BOOK TWO
not actual, and thus cannot make anyone deserving of reward or punishment. It would
be unjust to impose real punishment for merely possible sins. Augustine notes that
when Pelagius was asked why God created men or angels He foreknew would sin, he
replied it would be unjust to punish them for sins that would never exist—a reply
Augustine praises. The same logic applies to non-existent good works. Moreover, God
foresees that every man would act well in some circumstances and badly in others; thus,
conditional merits cannot explain divine discrimination, which must stem from God's
good pleasure in giving efficacious grace to one and not another. Here there is no
injustice, for the predestined receive a great gift, while nothing owed is denied to others.
Indeed, if original sin is foreseen (as the Massilians conceded), this provides sufficient
grounds for justice, especially regarding non-predestined infants, as we will later show.
10. The True Reason for Diverse Providence Toward Infants. Thus, this error and its
foundation are sufficiently refuted regarding infants. Hence, the question of a human
cause of predestination has no place for infants who die before adulthood. Augustine
often concludes from this that the gratuitous, wholly free election of some infants to
glory and efficacious grace is undeniable, since no works of theirs—whether past
(which do not exist), conditionally future (which will never exist), or absolutely future
(which belong only to the next life, where there is no merit)—can be its ground. Yet
heretics (as Augustine notes in Letter 116) have claimed that infants perform good acts
in the womb, for which they are predestined—citing Jacob and Esau struggling in
Rebecca's womb or John the Baptist leaping in Elizabeth's womb. Some modern
heretics revive this view.
11. Infants Lack Free Acts. Augustine easily refutes this evasion: it is absurd to
attribute free human acts to infants, who lack the use of reason necessary for such acts.
To claim that all infants are supernaturally granted reason and interior preaching of
faith (without an external preacher) is arbitrary, contrary to the Church's teaching and
Paul's words: Before they had done anything good or bad (Rom 9:11). Hence Augustine
calls the twins' womb-struggle not a choice but a portent. As for John the Baptist, we
piously believe (with Ambrose and others) that his leaping was a free act, but one
wrought by miracle and special privilege—more an effect of singular predestination
than its cause (as we will show for adults). Even if we granted infants good acts in the
womb, these could not be the cause of predestination (for the same reasons that apply
to adults, as we will prove), since they would be effects of grace, not natural merits.
And if such acts are fictitiously ascribed to infants against all natural reason and
Scripture (indeed, against Rom 9:11), they still could not cause predestination, as we will
demonstrate.
12. Though the cause in infants themselves is thus settled, a difficulty remains:
whether those under whose care they are born and die—parents, guardians, or
156 BOOK TWO
benefactors—provide some cause for their predestination. Certainly, infants are saved
only through Christ's merits applied to them, and this application requires a free human
act by their caretakers. Thus, the adult's free will or cooperation is in some way a cause
of the infant's salvation—whether called meritorious de congruo (which, though not
necessary, is not impossible, as we will show), a ministerial cause (as in the sacraments),
or a sine qua non condition (which suffices here, since it is undeniably a moral and
contributory cause). It remains to explain whether this cause of salvation is also a cause
of the infant's predestination or election—or rather an effect of that election. This
question (which applies equally to adults) does not concern conditional merits but
merits in this life and will be treated later.
13. The Final Semi-Pelagian Error Refuted. Lastly, we address the fourth point in
their doctrine: that in adults, conditionally foreseen merits can be a cause of
predestination, at least regarding the external preaching of faith or supernatural
doctrine. They attributed to such merits the fact that the Gospel is preached to one
nation and not another. Beyond the error noted earlier (that this good disposition arises
from natural free will alone), they further erred in granting it a double reward: (1) an
antecedent absolute foreknowledge (predestination to hear the Gospel), and (2) a
subsequent absolute foreknowledge (faith itself). Because God foresaw that some
would receive the Gospel well if preached to them, He decreed to preach to them—
making the foreseen disposition the meritorious cause of external grace. After this
decree, He foresaw their good disposition (by scientia visionis) and gave grace for true
faith. This unduly exceeds justice (which they claimed to uphold) and makes the reward
precede the merit not only in time but in God's foreknowledge—contrary to merit's
nature, as we will show.
14. Finally, such works cannot distinguish the elect from the non-elect. For those
who would not believe (if preached to) are never actually guilty of unbelief (since by
hypothesis they are not preached to), and thus their non-existent unbelief cannot be
demeritorious. As for those who would believe, their foreseen faith (prior to God's
decree to preach to them) cannot be meritorious, since it is not yet absolutely future but
only conditionally so. It is at most a final cause: God gives preaching so that it may be
believed, but this presupposes His decree, which cannot be grounded in the end itself
as a meritorious cause.
15. Beyond these arguments, this position contradicts Scripture. We often read of the
Gospel being preached to those who would not believe—as Christ foretold (Matthew
10; Luke 9) and as occurred in Acts 13 and 18, and even in Christ’s own preaching to
the Jews (Matthew 11). Conversely, we see it not preached to some who would have
believed if given the chance (Ezekiel 3:6: If I sent you to them, they would listen to
you; Matthew 11:21: If the miracles done among you had been done in Tyre and
157 BOOK TWO
Sidon...—a passage Augustine extensively analyzes). One might object that the works
of the Tyrians and Sidonians would never have existed, whereas we are discussing
works that would someday exist. But this changes nothing: (1) Though we treat these
works materially as "future," formally they are only conditionally future (since at that
point, they are foreseen merely as possibilities), and it is precisely as such that the Semi-
Pelagians claim they ground merit. (2) Had God willed to preach to Tyre and Sidon,
those conditionally future works would have become absolutely future. The reasoning is
identical.
16. Rupert of Deutz (On the Glory and Honor of the Son of Man, Bk. 9) argues
that the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have performed true repentance but only a
human sorrow to avoid temporal punishment—hence God denied them greater graces,
which He would have given had they been disposed to true repentance; otherwise,
Christ could not truly say He willed their salvation. But this interpretation clashes with
the text and tradition. Christ explicitly mentions sackcloth and ashes (Matthew 11:21)—
the very signs of penitence—and Augustine (On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 6) insists
the Tyrians would have been saved, proving that conditionally foreseen works (never
actually to exist) cannot merit reward. Christ Himself testifies they would have repented
in humility, and Ezekiel’s they would listen to you (3:6) elsewhere in Scripture denotes
true faith. Moreover, Abailard (Question 83) rightly notes that the graces denied were
not merely sufficient but abundant—graces God does not give to all, however well they
might use them. Such graces arise not from God’s general will that all be saved (which
provides only sufficient grace) but from special love, which cannot be grounded in
conditional works.
17. Augustine (On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 9) recounts a Catholic disputant who
claimed God refused to preach to Tyre and Sidon because, though He foresaw
they would believe, He also foresaw they would later fall away—a view nearly identical
to Origen’s (Peri Archon, Bk. 3, ch. 1). Augustine refutes this as incoherent: (1) If
withholding the Gospel "spared" them graver sin, this was mercy, not punishment—
thus God excuses (rather than punishes) conditionally foreseen sins and denies rewards
for conditionally foreseen good works. (2) If God wished to prevent their greater fall,
why not grant them faith through preaching and then take them lest wickedness alter
their understanding (Wisdom 4:11)? Why should their hypothetical post-faith lapse
outweigh their actual merit in believing? (3) By their own logic, conditionally foreseen
faith could merit preaching, and actual faith could merit further graces—so how can
a later foreseen lapse nullify the prior merit?
18. This reasoning is self-contradictory: the same conditionally foreseen apostasy is
said both to demerit the preaching (which faith would merit) and to spare them greater
ruin. But if faith is as meritorious as infidelity is demeritorious, how can
158 BOOK TWO
the later foreseen infidelity void the prior merit of faith? Further, one could equally
claim God foresaw they would repent again after lapsing—leading to infinite regress in
inventing unfounded causes. Such arguments are absurd, arbitrary, and plainly contrary
to Catholic doctrine.

CHAPTER VI. AGAINST THE PELAGIANS AND

SEMI-PELAGIANS: THAT NO ACT OF FREE WILL, BY ITS OWN
POWER OR MERIT, CAN CAUSE PREDESTINATION OR ITS EFFECTS.

1. The State of the Question. We now treat human acts performed by the
predestined in this mortal life, which must be good and upright, for evil acts do not
merit grace or predestination but rather divine displeasure or reprobation (to be
discussed later). These acts are of two kinds: (1) Those proceeding from the natural
powers of free will (termed natural not as opposed to free but to supernatural—though
for brevity we call them moral); (2) Those proceeding from grace cooperating with free
will (both free and supernatural). We defer the latter to a later discussion and now
address the former. We make no distinction between acts preceding or following
predestination’s effects, for the present difficulty lies not in temporal priority but in
the natural quality of these acts. If their natural condition precludes them from causing
predestination’s effects, they cannot do so whether antecedent or subsequent—
especially since (as Chapter VII will show) no subsequent act can cause a prior effect of
predestination in the same person.
2. Pelagius’ Error. The first error here is Pelagius’ (detailed by Augustine in On
Heresies 88, Letter 89, On the Predestination of the Saints, and On the Gift of
Perseverance; by Jerome in To Thesiphon and Against the Pelagians; by Vincent of
Lérins in Against Profane Novelties ch. 34; and by Prosper in To Rufinus). Setting aside
his other errors, Pelagius held that God’s grace is unnecessary for good works,
disposing oneself for pardon, persevering without sin, or meriting glory by justice.
Though he called grace useful and sometimes given, he claimed it was granted
according to free will’s merits. Thus, he either denied predestination outright or reduced
it to God’s will to give glory based on foreseen merits of free will. Even when
conceding grace for easier good works, he made free will the cause of all its effects. For
infants, he denied original sin (On the Merits and Remission of Sins Bk. 1, ch. 18,
20; Letter 106; Councils of Milevis and Orange), granting baptism necessary only for
the kingdom of heaven (which he distinguished from eternal life). He never adequately
explained why some infants receive baptism and others do not, perhaps attributing it to
parental merit or human effort in administering baptism—under general, not
predestining, providence.
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3. Refutation of Pelagius. Some moderns misrepresent Pelagius’ error (e.g., by
equating efficacious grace with physical predetermination—a topic for another work).
Here, we follow Augustine’s account and the condemnations at Milevis (with Innocent
I’s letters) and Trent (Session 6). Augustine devoted most of Volume VII to refuting
Pelagius, especially on original sin and grace. For now, Paul’s testimony
suffices: Predestination and election are not from our works (Rom 9:11; Eph 1:4–5)—a
point to be expanded later.
4. The View of Cassian, Faustus, and the Gallic Monks. After Pelagius’ defeat, Gallic
monks like Cassian and Faustus arose against Augustine. While admitting grace’s
necessity for holy works, merit, and pardon, they reserved salvation’s initiative to free
will, making salvation depend on man. They held that man must first move toward
good by a natural impulse, which God then promotes—making this impulse the
primary human cause of salvation and merit for all grace. Like Pelagius, they called free
will itself grace freely given (Prosper, Letters). They variously defined this good
impulse: some as faith or will to believe (distinguished from works, citing
Augustine’s Propositions on Romans, Prop. 60ff.—which he retracted in On the
Predestination of the Saints, ch. 13); others as desire for salvation or freely made
prayer (Prosper and Hilary, Letters to Augustine). Faustus of Riez (On Grace and Free
Will Bk. 1, ch. 12; Bk. 2, ch. 9) and Cassian (Conferences 13.8) express this, grounded
(as will be shown) in the notion that God’s gifts must be merited.
5. Their Error on Perseverance. The Semi-Pelagians further erred by claiming man
could by free will alone not only begin but also persevere in faith (Prosper and
Hilary, Letters; Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance). Augustine writes: They assert
that to begin and abide in faith is ours, not received from the Lord—denying
that coming to faith and abiding in it are God’s gifts (On the Predestination of the
Saints ch. 1, 2, 17ff.; Letters 105–106).
6. Clarifying the Error on Perseverance. A doubt arises: Did they mean perseverance
in formed faith (with charity) or lifeless faith? For the former, perseverance is clearly
God’s gift proper to the predestined; for the latter, it is less certain (since reprobates
often persevere in dead faith). Augustine seems inconsistent: in On the Gift of
Perseverance ch. 17, he calls perseverance a gift to remain believing and faithful; in ch.
23, he denies it to those lingering in sinful pleasures. The Semi-Pelagians likely erred on
both counts: as they attributed faith’s beginning to free will, so too its continuance—
whether lifeless or living. But just as faith’s inception requires grace, so a fortiori does
perseverance (even in lifeless faith, i.e., avoiding heresy or apostasy). Whether this
requires only faith’s continuation with ordinary aids or a special gift is a permissible
dispute among Catholics (not Semi-Pelagian), but for our purposes, it suffices to show
that perseverance is a supernatural gift.
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7. Their Ambiguity on Merit and Perseverance. Another doubt: In what sense did
they deny that perseverance is given by God’s will alone, insisting it must be merited?
Prosper reports: They refuse to preach perseverance as what cannot be either humbly
merited or contumaciously scorned. They chiefly meant perseverance in grace without
damnable sin (not lifeless faith). Their claim could mean: (1) Perseverance requires
merit from free will alone; (2) It requires merit founded on prior graced acts. The latter
is unobjectionable (we may merit perseverance de congruo—a point compatible with
predestination’s gratuity, as we will show). The former is erroneous, but unlikely to be
their view, since they admitted grace’s necessity for post-faith pious works (On the Gift
of Perseverance). How, then, could they attribute perseverance in justice to free will
alone?
8. See the Council of Orange. I respond, insofar as I gather from Prosper, Hilary,
and Augustine, that the Semi-Pelagians did not attribute the entirety of perseverance to
the powers of free will, but rather the merit of the beginning of the whole of
perseverance. For they asserted not only that men merit faith or the strengthening and
permanence in faith through the will to believe, but also that they merit perseverance
through the natural will—or the affection, desire, or petition for persevering. Just as
they said, "Faith is given to those who will and knock," so too did they say perseverance
is given. In this sense, Hilary states that they taught: "The gift of perseverance is given
to those who will it, by virtue of their preceding free will," which they claimed is free in
this respect, namely, to will or not to will to receive the remedy. And in this sense, their
error pertains greatly to the present matter. For since perseverance in righteousness is
the principal means of predestination, by attributing the cause of this gift to free will
alone, they consequently placed the cause of the whole of predestination, with respect
to its effects, in human power. They assigned a cause for predestination not only
concerning its first effect—the gift of grace—grounded in moral acts, but also
concerning the subsequent gifts of grace necessary for perseverance. Thus, this error
of the Semi-Pelagians regarding the "beginning of salvation" must be understood not
only concerning the beginning of faith but also concerning the beginning of hope,
charity, penance, continence, and other virtues, through whose acts one perseveres in
grace. This must be carefully noted to understand various passages in Augustine and
other theologians.
9. There are, however, theologians who attribute a third error to the Semi-Pelagians
in this matter and, under this heading, label another opinion of certain Catholics as
Semi-Pelagian. They say, therefore, that the Semi-Pelagians also erred in this: that they
attributed to the freedom of the will the efficacy of grace concerning supernatural acts
themselves—what others call the "beginning of grace's efficacy." For by this, they also
assigned to free will the cause of predestination and the distinction between the elect
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and the non-elect. Yet neither Augustine, Prosper, nor Hilary ascribes this particular
error to the Semi-Pelagians. For the fact that free will cooperates in these acts, and in its
own way is their cause, influences them, determines them, and proximately initiates
them (whatever that "initiation" may be)—all this is a Catholic opinion and entirely
consistent with the faith. It would, however, be an error to say that free will alone
accomplishes these things, or any of them, without grace. But the Semi-Pelagians did
not say this, as Augustine expressly teaches in On the Gift of Perseverance (Ch. 21) and
often elsewhere. Nor do we read that they, from this perspective, posited a cause of
predestination with respect to its whole scope or the means by which grace efficaciously
moves free will. If any doctors lapsed in this matter, they were certain Scholastics, as we
shall see in Chapter VII. Therefore, we need not impose anything further on the Semi-
Pelagians beyond what Augustine and the other Fathers attribute to them—a point we
will dispute elsewhere at length.
10. Finally, one might connect with this Semi-Pelagian opinion another held by
certain Scholastics, who assign the cause of predestination—with respect to all its
effects—to good moral works preceding entire justification, performed solely by the
natural powers of free will. Yet lest we seem to conflate the opinions of Catholics with
errors condemned by the Church, and because we truly believe this opinion is not
entirely identical to that of the Semi-Pelagians (and involves its own difficulties,
demanding separate treatment), we defer it to the following chapter.
11. Here, therefore, we must engage only with the Semi-Pelagians. For concerning
the Pelagians, there is no need to say much: their error is utterly manifest, and they
erred more broadly concerning the whole order of grace than predestination alone.
Thus, their refutation belongs properly to the treatise on grace. Moreover, what we say
against the remnants of Pelagianism will a fortiori dismantle the entire Pelagian edifice.
To engage thoroughly and unambiguously with the Massilians (or the remnants of the
Pelagians), we must clarify two aspects of their position: First, what they meant by the
"beginning" of faith, good works, grace, or salvation—and what we must understand
by it, so that we oppose precisely what they asserted. Second, what kind of "cause" they
spoke of—particularly whether it was meritorious de condigno (strict merit) or
abstractly (whether de condigno or de congruo [fitting merit], or impetratory, etc.). For
this distinction greatly aids in manifesting the truth, evaluating arguments, and
separating erroneous from non-erroneous opinions. It also matters whether this cause
is so necessary and infallible that without it, no one attains the effects of predestination,
and that no one employs it who is not infallibly predestined. Clarifying this will greatly
aid in understanding the precise point of truth.
12. What the "Beginning of Salvation" Is and Its Varieties. To explain the first point,
I distinguish a twofold "beginning" in this matter: one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. I
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call intrinsic that which is like an internal foundation or first part of the thing whose
"beginning" is spoken of; extrinsic, then, is what precedes this first foundation and is
the cause for which it begins to exist. Hence, the former may also be called
the formal beginning, the latter the causal. For example, the Council of Orange (Ch. 5)
speaks of the "beginning of faith" and explains it as the affect of belief—which can be
understood as the proximate and efficacious affect, i.e., the efficacious will to believe,
capable of moving the intellect to believe as it ought. This I call the intrinsic beginning
of faith, because it morally constitutes one act with faith itself; and considering this act
as composed of will and intellect, the volition is, as it were, its first part and foundation.
But if by "affect of belief" one means only a certain inefficacious simple affect by
which faith begins to please and be desired (a "willing," so to speak, that is not yet a full
"willing"), it is clear that this is not the formal or intrinsic beginning of faith, for by its
power nothing pertaining to faith's formal constitution is established. If, however, this
affect (of whatever kind) is in some way the cause by which faith itself, or some internal
beginning of it, starts to exist in a person, it may rightly be called a "beginning" of faith
—though more extrinsic (i.e., causal) than formal. For every cause is a principle, and if
it does not intrinsically constitute the effect, it may be called extrinsic in some way.
Similarly, the Council of Trent (Session 6, Ch. 8) calls faith the "beginning of
justification." If this is understood of the whole formal justice, it must also be
understood as the intrinsic beginning. Hence, it simultaneously calls faith the
"foundation and root of all (i.e., the whole) justification." And in Chapter 7, it had said
that justice—which is the formal cause of our justification—includes faith, hope, and
charity. In this justice, therefore, faith is called the "beginning" because the others are
founded upon it, though faith itself also belongs formally to the integrity and, so to
speak, composition of this justice. But if by "justice" we meant only sanctifying grace,
faith would not be its intrinsic beginning, for it does not intrinsically compose grace,
nor even so found it that grace could not exist without faith (as it remains perfected in
glory and existed in Christ’s soul with infused knowledge but without faith). This is also
evident in the acts themselves: faith is the foundation of hope, not as internally
composing hope but as its cause and basis. Similarly, it is the foundation of charity. Just
as matter is the foundation of form (not a part of it, yet from both arises one essence),
so faith is the foundation of hope and charity, existing outside their formal ratio, yet
from all of them one justice is completed—in which faith is the internal beginning.
13. Which "Beginning of Faith" the Semi-Pelagians Spoke Of. It is not entirely clear
to me which "beginning" the Semi-Pelagians referred to. For when they speak of the
"beginning of faith" and attribute it to free will, they seem to mean faith itself—the
internal beginning of justice, as just explained—so that "the beginning of faith" is
equivalent to "the beginning which is faith." In this sense, Augustine seems to condemn
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their error throughout On the Predestination of the Saints, showing that faith is God’s
work and a gift of grace. To refute this error (so understood), we need not add much
here, both because it coincides with Pelagianism on this point and because Augustine’s
arguments are more than sufficient. If more is needed, it belongs to the treatise on
grace and faith.
14. Yet even if this error is condemned in this sense alone, it is not sufficiently
refuted with respect to predestination. For the question remains: Does predestination,
concerning that "beginning of faith" (however much it is an effect of grace), have an
antecedent cause on our part? I add that it is not entirely certain the Semi-Pelagians
held the error that Christian faith is not from grace. For they carefully distinguished
faith from the "beginning of faith," and concerning faith itself, they do not seem to
have denied that it is a work of grace—only concerning its "beginning." This is why the
Council of Orange (Ch. 5) distinctly defined: "Not only the increase of faith but also its
beginning—that is, the very affect of belief—is from grace." For the Massilians
admitted the increase of faith (as Augustine reports from Prosper and Hilary in On the
Predestination of the Saints, Bk. 1, Ch. 1–2). But when the Council explains the
"beginning of faith" as the "affect of believing," it indicates that the "increase of faith"
is not its intensification but the production of the act of believing itself with greater
perfection than natural motion alone could achieve. Thus, the Gallic bishops seem to
have held that the will to believe is natural, yet insufficient to generate perfect faith in
the intellect unless it impetrates the necessary grace—and in this sense, they called that
will the "beginning of faith." This error is condemned in the Council of Orange
according to its true Catholic sense. For some Catholics, favoring the Semi-Pelagians,
twisted this canon to false interpretations; but their refutation belongs to the treatise on
grace and faith. The matter, however, is clear enough from Augustine’s testimonies and
arguments. When Paul says, "Faith is the gift of God," he speaks not of faith strictly as
an act of the intellect but of the whole faith as a human act by which we willingly
subject the intellect to God’s obedience. Thus, elsewhere it is said, "All believed whose
hearts God opened"—for to "open the heart" is nothing else than to incline the will
and make it willing. Finally, the general testimonies we will cite to prove all works of
piety are from grace also prove this concerning the will to believe, which is most
necessary for piety.
15. For these reasons, it is scarcely credible that the Semi-Pelagians, by the "beginning
of faith" which they attributed to nature, understood that will which proximately
commands the act of infused faith and moves the intellect to believe as it ought. For, as
I will soon explain, they acknowledged grace as necessary even for the proximate and,
as it were, intrinsic beginning of all works of piety. They could hardly have been
ignorant that such a will is itself a work of piety, nor could they have given a reason
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why the will to repent or to hope should be initiated by grace, but not the will to
believe. Thus, they seem to have posited, prior to the complete act of believing (as it
ought, involving both intellect and will), another natural affect of belief—and perhaps
simultaneously an imperfect faith of a lower order—which would be not the intrinsic
but the extrinsic beginning of perfect faith and, consequently, of the whole of
salvation, insofar as it has the power to impetrate from God the grace necessary for
higher faith. Augustine seems to speak of this "increase" in On the Predestination of
the Saints (Ch. 2), where he reports the Semi-Pelagians as saying: "It is indeed ours to
have faith itself, but its increase is from God." For this "increase" does not appear to
consist in the intensification or greater perfection of the same act, but in elevation to a
higher act of faith. If this was the Semi-Pelagians' opinion, it is not sufficiently refuted
by proving that the act of believing as one ought, and the will proportionate to it,
cannot occur without grace. For the difficulty remains whether the grace given for such
believing and willing has some prior cause on our part—namely, that imperfect faith
and affect of belief which the Semi-Pelagians claimed we could produce by ourselves.
16. Some Theologians’ View of the Semi-Pelagian Error. Perhaps for this reason,
some are accustomed to refute the Semi-Pelagians on the grounds that they asserted
free will could, by its own powers, produce an act of faith—even if imperfect and
natural—concerning the matters of faith externally proposed to it, along with a natural
and imperfect affect proportionate to such faith, or at least some velleity or imperfect
desire to believe, as far as necessary. On this point, some attack as Semi-Pelagian those
who teach that free will without grace can have these imperfect affects and acts, not
only of faith but also of hope, charity, penance, etc. Against this opinion (as if it were
the Semi-Pelagians’), they commonly cite Scriptural passages attributing all good works
to grace. Since these are well-known, I will briefly touch on three. First, John
15:5: Without Me, you can do nothing—for even that faith and affect is something
good, and thus cannot exist without Christ, i.e., without His grace and influence, as the
Fathers and Councils (elegantly Trent, Ch. 6) explain. Second, 1 Corinthians 4:7: What
do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you boast
as if you had not? For man would have much to boast of if he could, by himself and
without God’s grace, believe or love in any way. See Augustine, On the Predestination
of the Saints (Ch. 4–5). Third, 2 Corinthians 3:5: We are not sufficient to think anything
as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. As Augustine often argues, every
good begins with a holy thought, which must necessarily precede every good and free
movement of the will. Therefore, if even that thought cannot be from us but from
God, neither can that faith be from us. Hence Paul says elsewhere: He who began a
good work in you will perfect it (Philippians 1:6).
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17. Imperfect Faith Can Exist Without Grace. But these authors fail to distinguish
two points essential to avoid grave error and the unjust condemnation of learned
Catholics under the shadow of Semi-Pelagianism. It is one thing to say free will can, by
its own powers, have an imperfect affect or act of faith; another, to say that through
such an act it can be the cause of grace and the help needed to believe perfectly as one
ought. The Semi-Pelagians asserted both, but their error lay only in the second—
indeed, they held the first because of the second. If the first is separated from the
second (as Catholics do), it not only ceases to be Semi-Pelagian but is the common
opinion of theologians and confirmed by experience. A heretic believes many mysteries
of faith not through grace but by his own will, because he believes imperfectly and in a
merely human way. We ourselves often perform similar acts—how often do we think
we believe or love as we ought, when plainly we do not? If such imperfect acts are
found in us, they are certainly not the kind required for piety and justice before God.
Thus, to say grace is unnecessary for these imperfect acts is not Semi-Pelagian, for the
Councils define only that grace is necessary to perform such affects as one ought. Nor
can any reason be given why free will cannot produce these imperfect acts, since they
do not exceed the natural order (a point we will expand on later concerning moral
works, for the same logic applies to each act). Still, the degree of perfection or
imperfection in such acts must be carefully observed, lest we attribute too much to free
will. But this belongs to the treatise on grace; here it suffices that these acts lack the
perfection the Councils require when they add as one ought. Augustine explains this
in On Rebuke and Grace (Ch. 2): "When they do these things as they ought—that is,
with love and delight in justice—let them rejoice that they have received the rain the
Lord gave, that their land might yield its fruit."
18. Therefore, those Scriptural testimonies, if adduced to prove such imperfect acts
cannot exist without grace, prove nothing. For they speak of works of piety that lead to
eternal life; works not of this kind are reckoned as nothing, as Augustine expressly
declares (On the Predestination of the Saints, Ch. 2, et al.). Otherwise, the same texts
would prove that free will cannot perform a single good moral work without grace—
which I will later show to be false. But when these testimonies are used to refute the
Semi-Pelagian opinion that posits in these acts the beginning of faith (at least
extrinsically and causally), they are most potent, and Augustine employs them thus (as
we will soon conclude and explain).
19. What the Semi-Pelagians Thought About the Beginning of Good Works. What
we have said about the "beginning of faith" applies proportionally to the beginning of
any work of piety and, consequently, even more to the beginning of salvation or
perseverance. For it may be doubted whether the Semi-Pelagians attributed to free will
the beginning of each pious work or only of faith. Hilary’s epistle suggests the latter:
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"They agree that no one can suffice for himself either to begin or to perfect anything."
Augustine echoes this in On the Predestination of the Saints (Ch. 1), summarizing their
common ground: "They have come to confess that God’s grace precedes the human
will and that no one can suffice for himself to begin or perfect any good work." In Ch.
2, he argues: If free will cannot initiate other pious works, neither can it initiate faith,
for the work of faith is not the least but among the hardest and most perfect. Yet
elsewhere, it appears the Semi-Pelagians did attribute to free will the beginning of all
pious works, reserving to God (or grace) only their progress or perfection. As noted
earlier, they even attributed perseverance in justice to free will—not denying the
necessity of grace’s help to persevere, but claiming that this help itself had some
beginning in us. For perseverance is not given except as the sum of the works by which
one perseveres, and this sum is granted only as each work is given (since the sum is
nothing beyond the works). Thus, as perseverance is from us, so are the pious works
themselves. Hence Cassian (Institutes of the Renunciants, Bk. 2, Ch. 13) lists fasting,
vigils, readings, etc., among the good works by which we impetrate God’s grace, adding
(Ch. 14) that these alone cannot achieve perfection without God’s help—yet they are
necessary to obtain it. "For what is given except to those who desire, labor, ask, seek,
and strive?" He concludes: "God is ready, offered only the occasion of our good will, to
bestow all these things." Here it is clear that for every virtuous work requiring grace,
some prior beginning is required on our part.
20. These positions can be reconciled in two ways. First, the Massilians may have
attributed to free will only the proximate beginning of grace (i.e., faith or the will to
believe), yet made this the remote principle of all other helps for further acts, since
faith impetrates all. Thus, they need not posit a new beginning for other good acts but
derive them from faith—not just any faith, but that already perfected by grace. This
alone sufficed for them to place the cause of predestination (for all its effects and
graces) in man, since at least remotely, that beginning of faith was the cause of all
subsequent effects.
21. A second reconciliation (closer, I think, to their mind) distinguishes intrinsic from
extrinsic beginnings. Augustine and Hilary report that they denied free will could
initiate pious works without grace, but they confessed (as Augustine says) that God’s
grace precedes our will. This "prevenient grace" is, in that order, the first principle of
pious works. Yet before it, they posited another extrinsic or causal principle, existing
outside and prior to grace, as the cause of all subsequent grace. They seem to have
posited this even for the helps preceding hope, charity, penance, etc., both because the
same logic applies and because their words imply it (e.g., Cassian and Hilary). After
stating that the Massilians required grace "not only to perfect but to begin" these works,
Hilary adds: "They do not think the terrified will of a sick man to be healed counts
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among the works of healing." And: "They do not deny grace if such a will (which seeks
the Physician but cannot yet heal itself) is said to precede." Thus, they placed the
beginning of salvation in "willing to be healed," which includes not only willing to
believe but to repent—and under this "willing," they included every imperfect affect,
desire, petition, or moral effort to obtain grace. Hence, they made such a cause of
predestination apply not only to the sum of effects by reason of the first cause, but to
each effect insofar as in each, that "willing" or "striving" (whether from supernatural
faith, natural faith, or human effort) could precede.
22. Refutation of the Semi-Pelagian Opinion. This opinion is effectively refuted by
the testimonies cited earlier, summarized thus: Free will, by itself and without God’s
grace, cannot effect anything that of itself contributes to eternal life or true justice. But
the beginning of salvation (whether intrinsic/formal or extrinsic/causal) greatly
contributes of itself and is of great moment in that order. Therefore, it cannot occur
without grace—and conversely, whatever can occur without grace cannot have the
force of such a beginning. The major premise is proven by Without Me, you can do
nothing and We are not sufficient to think anything as from ourselves. Though these
texts speak of works of piety, none can deny that an act capable of conferring as much
good as predestination (for all its effects) pertains greatly to piety and eternal life. The
minor premise is proven because an intrinsic supernatural beginning is of the same
order (as shown earlier, and as even the Pelagians admitted). An extrinsic beginning, if
it brings with it all the effects of predestination, is certainly of great moment and
contributes much to salvation. Thus, we cannot say of him who performs such a work
that he does "nothing" for salvation. But Christ says: Without Me, you can do nothing;
and Paul: We are not sufficient to think anything as from ourselves. Therefore, even
such a beginning cannot exist without God’s grace.
23. This is what the Council of Trent (Session 6, Ch. 5) teaches against this error:
"The beginning of justification in adults must be taken from God’s prevenient grace
through Christ Jesus, that is, from His call." These words exclude any other beginning
prior to grace, for either it could occur without grace (contrary to Christ and Paul), or if
grace were necessary, it could not precede the "call," since before prevenient grace (the
first, for we speak of its beginning), there is no grace. Similarly, the Council of Orange
(Ch. 3) defines: "If anyone says God’s grace is given in response to human invocation,
but not that grace itself causes us to invoke Him, he contradicts Isaiah and Paul: I was
found by those who did not seek Me." Hence, though invocation, petition, or desire
may be called an extrinsic principle of the help or work sought, such a principle (to be a
true beginning of grace) must itself come from prior grace. Canon 4 defines that God
does not wait for our will to be cleansed from sin, for if this "willing" is such as to
move God to grant purification (or its proximate disposition), it too must come from
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grace, since without [Him], we can do nothing in that order. The other canons of that
Council (assembled specifically against this error) proceed similarly. This, then, is the
first and solid foundation against this opinion.
24. How the Notion of Merit Destroys Grace. I turn to the second part of the
argument: the kind of cause or merit the Semi-Pelagians attributed to this "beginning"
they ascribed to free will alone. Augustine draws another principal argument from this,
repeatedly used against them: it destroys the nature of grace by asserting grace is given
due to our merits. For as Paul says (Romans 11:6): If by works, it is no longer
grace. The force of this argument depends on the point made earlier: No kind of moral
causality in our works destroys the nature of grace except merit (as will be clear later).
For only three kinds of moral causality apply here: disposition, impetration, or merit
(though these admit variations). Disposition alone does not negate grace, for grace is
infused into the sinner according to his disposition (Trent, Session 6, Ch. 7), yet
remains gratuitous. If this is true even of the ultimate disposition in a sinner, much
more so of remote or less proportionate dispositions (e.g., occasions). Likewise,
impetration does not negate grace, for a petition does not establish a debt but depends
on the giver’s liberality. Thus, when a sinner asks for grace, he asks for true grace, and
his asking does not destroy its gratuitous nature.
25. Merit of condignity is opposed to grace. Therefore, the entire force of this
argument revolves around causality by way of merit. Now, theologians distinguish this
merit as twofold: one of condignity, the other of congruity. Concerning the former, all
admit that it introduces a claim of justice and, to that extent, excludes the notion of
grace—I say, to that extent, because what is given on account of such merit, formally
and as such, does not have the character of grace. Yet if that merit were founded upon
prior grace, without which it could not exist, the merit itself may be called grace, and
under this consideration, even its reward retains the character of grace. In this way,
eternal life is also called grace by the Apostle in Romans 6 and by the Council of Trent
(Session 6, Chapter 16), because although it comes from merit, the merit itself arises
from grace. But if merit were of condignity and did not presuppose prior grace, but
were derived purely from the powers of free will, then whatever were rendered in
return for such merit would plainly have no character of grace but only of payment.
Merit of congruity, however, does not seem to exclude the notion of grace, because it
does not introduce a claim of justice but of fittingness or decency—and herein lies the
difficulty.
26. It was concerning this merit that the Semi-Pelagians spoke. For this reason, some
believe it necessary to say that the Semi-Pelagians posited a merit of condignity in that
initial act of faith or salvation. They think this is the only way to account for the
effectiveness of the argument used by Augustine and other Fathers (cited below)
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against them—namely, that they destroyed the notion of grace. Hence, Augustine often
equates the Semi-Pelagians with, or even considers them worse than, the Pelagians. For
he argues against them that their position entails God’s grace being given according to
our merits—a claim Pelagius was forced to retract, and which he deceitfully retracted or
condemned to avoid damnation. Likewise, John Merentius fiercely attacks Faustus in
the same way in his response to Hormisdas (Vol. 4 of the Bibliotheca). But the
Pelagians plainly held a merit of condignity in the works of free will with respect to
grace. And undoubtedly, this is the sense in which that proposition was condemned in
the Palestinian Council, for the very name of merit, simply understood, implies it.
Finally, this is also the necessary sense in which Paul’s argument in Romans 11 must be
taken: But if it is by grace, it is no longer by works. For the reasoning to hold, it must
refer to merit of condignity. This is how Cardinal Toledo explained it, interpreting the
Semi-Pelagian position and its condemnation in the same way. Nor does he think that
error extends to the idea that some merit of congruity toward divine grace, even
concerning its first assistance, may be attributed to the good works of free will. Vega
holds this view (On Trent, Bk. 8, Ch. 5), as do many Scholastics, as we shall see in the
following chapters—those who wrote after the Council of Orange and after the whole
dispute of Augustine, Prosper, and others against the Semi-Pelagians. For it is unlikely
that they either ignored the definition of such great Fathers or held an opinion contrary
to it; rather, they understood it as aimed solely at excluding merit of condignity from
the moral works of free will, which the Semi-Pelagians attributed to them.
27. Yet it is truly difficult to ascribe this meaning to the Semi-Pelagians solely to
make Augustine’s argument against them effective. First, because neither Augustine nor
Prosper anywhere explicitly attribute this meaning to them; rather, they speak
absolutely, or if they add anything, it is more to extend the argument to all merit. Such
is Augustine’s statement in On the Predestination of the Saints (Ch. 20): See whether
anything is accomplished in this way except that grace is given according to our merits
in some manner—and thus grace would not be grace. Here I emphasize the phrase in
some manner, for it extends merit to any kind of merit. Second, because Cassian seems
expressly to exclude merit of condignity (Conferences 13.9; Institutes 12.11, 14).
Among other things, he says: We affirm, according to the Savior’s words, that it is given
to those who ask, opened to those who knock, and found by those who seek—but our
asking, knocking, and seeking are not condign unless God’s mercy grants what we seek,
etc. Here he quite clearly excludes condignity on our part, even suggesting that our
initiative provides merely an occasion, saying: He is ready, upon the mere occasion of a
good will offered by us, to bestow all these things. Hence, Hilary in the cited letter
reports that the Gauls were accustomed to reply thus in their defense: Nor is grace
denied if such a will is said to precede—a will that seeks the Physician but cannot yet
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do anything of itself. Third, because there is no sufficient reason to presume that the
Massilians posited merit of condignity in this beginning. For Pelagius’s chief error lay in
this, whereas they disagreed with him on all other points—only seeking to free God
from charges of favoritism and to place salvation within the power of any adult. For
this, some difference on man’s part was sought, but certainly not merit of condignity;
any other kind would suffice.
28. Even imperfect merit is contrary to grace if it does not arise from grace.
Therefore, either accepting this latter view as more probable or setting aside that
controversy, we must say that Augustine’s foundational argument against them is
effective—namely, that they destroyed the notion of grace by positing merit for the first
grace arising solely from the powers of free will, whatever kind they posited, even if
only of congruity. This is proven first by the authority of Augustine himself and other
Fathers who followed him. For Augustine’s meaning is clear: he denies merit for the
first assisting grace just as he admits that a sinner may merit, through faith, aids for
repentance or obtaining charity. And concerning this same merit, he says that it destroys
the notion of grace in the gift given on account of it if faith comes from nature and
not from grace. But it is most certain that such merit is only of congruity, even in the
act of infused faith or any other act performed by a person in mortal sin under God’s
supernatural aid. Therefore, he holds the same regarding natural works if any merit of
grace, even merely congruous, is posited in them. This is especially clear from On the
Predestination of the Saints, On the Gift of Perseverance, Epistles 105, 106,
and Retractations 1.9, and even before the rise of the Semi-Pelagians, he had already
refuted that opinion in the same way (To Simplician 1.2; On Merit and the Forgiveness
of Sins 2.17; Against Julian 4.3; Against Two Letters of the Pelagians 2.17).
29. Second, nearly all later Fathers followed Augustine in this opinion and argument.
Prosper does so against the Collator (i.e., Cassian), especially his Conference 13 (Ch.
11–12), and in responding to the Gauls’ objections, particularly the fourth. Fulgentius
does so (To Monimus 1; On the Incarnation and Grace 18), as does Peter the Deacon
(On the Incarnation and Grace 8), Isidore (On the Highest Good 3), Anselm (On the
Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination and his Commentary on Paul), and
Gregory the Great (Morals on Job 33.20 [or 25]), commenting on Job 45: Who has
given to me first, that I should repay him?—where he attacks the Massilians’ opinion
without naming them. Yet he seems to use primarily the first argument above and
scriptural testimonies confirming it, though he also hints at this latter point, saying: If
we have given any good work to merit his grace, where is what the Apostle says: ‘By
grace you have been saved’? The same applies to his words in Morals 17.10 [or 11],
explaining Job’s Whose helpers… and connecting it with 1 Corinthians 3: We are God’s
coworkers. For the latter is true when due order is preserved, but the former is said
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against those who arrogate too much to themselves. Hence Gregory says: Those who
think lofty thoughts of themselves refuse to be humble coworkers of God, because
while they imagine themselves useful to God, they cut themselves off from the fruit of
usefulness. See also Morals 24.6 [or 12], Homilies on Ezekiel 9, and Dialogues 1.4.
Finally, Bernard excellently captures the force of this argument (Sermon 67 on the
Song of Songs): There is no room for grace where merit has already taken possession.
For if something is from oneself, to that extent grace must yield; whatever is ascribed
to merits is lacking to grace. As if to say: merit, in itself, excludes grace, considering the
proper natures of each. Yet because merit can be of many kinds, the more there is of
it, the less remains of grace. Again (Sermon 74), after commending grace, he adds: But
if someone says, ‘By God’s grace I am what I am,’ yet strives to seize some little glory
for the grace he has received, is he not a thief and a robber? Here he seems to allude to
1 Corinthians 3: Why do you boast as if you had not received? By that
diminutive gloriolam (little glory), he indicates that even if someone does not claim the
merit of justice but only some slight merit, he is still a thief and a robber if he fails to
acknowledge grace precisely as grace.
30. Third, the Council of Orange (Canon 6) not only defines against the opinion of
the Semi-Pelagians but also favors the argument taken from the opposition between
merit and grace—whether the merit be called condign or congruous, if attributed to the
powers of nature. For the Council made no distinction, and it is unlikely that it left this
loophole for the Semi-Pelagians. Thus, it states in the aforementioned sixth canon: If
anyone says that mercy is conferred upon us when we believe, will, desire, strive, labor,
pray, watch, study, seek, or knock—but does not confess that it is by divine inspiration
and the infusion of the Holy Spirit that we believe, will, or are able to do all these
things as we ought; or if he subordinates the help of grace to human humility or
obedience and does not admit that it is itself a gift of grace that we are obedient and
humble—he resists the Apostle, who says, ‘What do you have that you have not
received?’ (1 Cor. 4:7), and, ‘By the grace of God I am what I am’ (1 Cor. 15:10). Of
these two testimonies, the first pertains more to the initial point, yet it also confirms the
argument against the Massilians, insofar as Paul adds: If you have received, why do you
boast as if you had not received it? For the sense is: Why do you boast as if you had
not received it freely?—as the Council also indicates. Otherwise, the Semi-Pelagians
would not have contradicted Paul, for they admitted that all gifts of grace were received
from God and thus subtracted nothing from God’s giving or their reception from Him.
Yet because they claimed to receive grace by some merit of their own—a merit not
from grace but from nature—they consequently boasted of those gifts as if not
received, certainly not freely, and thus abolished true grace. The other testimony is even
clearer, for even the Semi-Pelagians insist that man is what he is (i.e., just and holy) by
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grace. Nonetheless, the Council says they contradict Paul by attributing to themselves
merit for that grace. Therefore, it holds that this contradiction arises from positing
merit, which is incompatible with grace.
31. The same Council confirms this in subsequent canons, especially Canon
17: Christian fortitude comes from charity, which has been poured into our hearts not
by the choice of our will but by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us, with no
merits preceding grace. And Canon 18: A reward is owed to good works, if they are
done, but the grace that is not owed precedes so that they may be done. Likewise, the
Council of Trent (Session 6, Chapter 5) teaches that the beginning of justification is
taken from prevenient grace—that is, from the calling by which they are called with no
merits of theirs existing. Here it easily implies that for the calling to have the character
of grace, it must be given with no merits existing. By saying no merits, it excludes all
merit, whether condign or congruous. This is also supported by Chapter 8 of the same
session, where the Council expounds Paul’s teaching that man is
justified freely, because none of those things that precede justification—whether faith
or works—merits the grace of justification. Here it seems necessary to understand that
the word freely excludes all merit, even congruous, both because this is Paul’s true
meaning (as we shall soon see) and because the Council denies all merit absolutely and
without distinction. But this passage presents a special difficulty, which we will treat at
the end of the chapter, lest we digress.
32. Fourth, from these Fathers and Councils is drawn the chief foundation of this
truth and its proof, which must be supported by Scripture. Concerning the
term grace, we may speak either absolutely, according to its full breadth, or as Scripture
uses and proclaims it—the grace of God in the salvation of men. In the first sense, we
cannot deny that a gift given without the debt of justice may be called grace in some
proper and strict sense, even if given to one who asks, seeks, or even merits it in some
congruous way. This is clear from common usage and human understanding: all
recognize that grace is shown to them whenever something not owed in justice is given
—especially by a superior to an inferior, since the superior is more clearly free from
such debt. The reason is that grace derives from giving freely (as Paul notes in Romans
4 and 11), and freely given means whatever is not given from a strict debt. But the
strictest debt is that of justice; therefore, whatever is given without such debt may
rightly be called freely given and, consequently, grace. In this way, every gift bestowed
by God freely (i.e., without merit of such justice) may be termed grace, as St. Thomas
indicates (I-II, q. 110, a. 1) and the Scholastics commonly hold (on Bk. II, Dist. 4).
Thus, even creation or other natural gifts may be called grace—a sense abused by
Pelagius at the Palestinian Council to deceive the Fathers, as Augustine testifies (Epistle
105, On the Grace of Christ, and elsewhere).
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33. Nevertheless, in Scripture, the term grace has a more proper and restricted
meaning. Thus, Augustine and four other bishops write to Innocent (Epistle 95, placed
before Innocent’s Epistle 27): Although the gift of creation may, not unreasonably, be
called grace, it is remarkable that we do not read it so named in any legal, prophetic,
evangelical, or apostolic writings. But that which Scripture simply calls grace is the grace
by which the predestined are called and glorified. Jerome agrees (Dialogue Against the
Pelagians 1; Epistle 159 to Cyprian). This is fitting because, strictly
considered, grace (insofar as it denotes not merely extrinsic love or benevolence—a
sense not at issue here—but a gift freely given by God) most properly applies to
supernatural gifts, not natural ones. Hence, Augustine and the Scholastics typically
distinguish grace from nature. Thus, creation is not properly called grace, for although
things were created entirely freely by God (so that their very being may be called a gift
freely bestowed), creation does not presuppose a person to whom the gift is made.
Therefore, it is not so much grace as something prior to grace. St. Thomas also notes
this (I, q. 11, a. 4, ad 4): In the work of creation, there is no proper mercy, except in a
secondary and proportional sense, since it presupposes no thing—and thus no proper
misery. Hence, proper grace presupposes some capacity and, indeed, the very thing to
which it may be given. Thus, when grace is said to be given freely, this freely does not
signify pure negation but a kind of privation (so to speak), because it presupposes in
the recipient some capacity for right or debt—so that freely negates debt in relation to a
capable subject, while capacity presupposes existence and, consequently, creation.
Moreover, proper grace presupposes a rational nature; thus, grace is not properly said to
be shown to brute animals but to rational creatures. Creation, therefore, which does not
presuppose but produces the rational creature, is not properly grace. Hence, even after
creation, whatever is owed to nature by natural consequence (e.g., preservation,
concurrence, or natural operations) is not properly called grace, for he who gives the
form gives what follows from the form. These are not considered new acts of liberality
distinct from creation, and thus, just as creation as such is not included under grace,
neither are its natural consequences.
34. From this, we further understand that grace, in the theological or dogmatic sense,
excludes not only the debt of justice but also that debt of connaturality by which things
are said to be owed to nature as connatural to it or naturally demanded, as if by its own
right. For even what is owed in this way is not, strictly and formally speaking, given as
grace. Indeed, morally speaking, natural goods seem not so much given as condoned
along with something else. Hence, if that other thing is not grace, neither are the rest
accounted grace. From this, we may further infer that if something is owed to nature by
virtue of works performed by its own and purely natural powers, it is not true grace in
the scriptural sense—whether that debt be called one of justice, moral congruity, or
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mere connaturality, because all this does not transcend the notion of a debt owed to
nature. This is clear in physical acts: when a man begets a man, though he cannot
complete the act of generation without God creating the soul of the child, yet because
that creation is connaturally owed once man disposes the matter of the human body
(insofar as he can by natural action), it is not considered a special act of God’s liberality
or grace. Similarly, in moral acts: when a man, by his natural powers, performs acts of
virtue or knowledge, habits follow—not without a new and free action of God—yet
these habits cannot be called grace, because their production, as from God, is owed to
man’s natural striving. Even natural beatitude would be owed to man for good works by
nature—not by a debt of justice (as I assume, since justice with God is not natural to
man) but by a general providence owed by the Author of nature, not only as Creator
but also as moral governor. This suffices to exclude it from being grace, since it is not
so much a new liberality as a natural consequence of a prior state, which itself was not
true grace, as we have shown. Thus, on this ground, it is incompatible with true grace
(as Scripture speaks of it) to be a debt arising from works performed by the powers of
nature alone—whether the debt be of justice or of some lesser kind—because any such
debt implies a natural connection and consequence between the gift and the original
condition of nature, with other naturally owed concurrences intervening. In this way, it
is sufficiently deduced that grace is incompatible with what arises from works of free
will alone, because either the gift given has a natural connection with those works or it
does not. If it does not, then it is in no way given on account of them; if it does, it is
no longer grace but a gift of nature. This is perhaps the sense of Paul’s words in
Romans 3–4 and Galatians 2–3: that men are not justified by works, at least those
elicited by natural powers—though this phrasing admits other interpretations, as we
shall soon discuss.
35. Conditions of a perfect gift. Further, it is peculiarly contrary to the notion of
grace to be given as a remuneration for work—even if such remuneration is not owed
by justice but by some title of service or gratitude. This can be explained by the civil
laws on pure donation. In Digest 1.1 On Donations, three things are required for a
proper gift: (1) the thing given must immediately become the recipient’s (otherwise, it is
a promise); (2) the gift must not be revocable to the giver (for if revocable, it is not
simply a gift but conditional or qualified); (3) the giver must be moved by no other
cause to give than to exercise munificence and liberality—that is, not to give for any
remuneration, even anticipatory or gratificatory, as Bartolus and Panormitanus explain
(Rubric on Donations), drawing from the Lex Aquilia (Digest On Donations) and the
decretal Per duas (Extra On Donations). Now, grace is a singular and perfect donation
of God’s benefits pertaining to salvation, as Augustine teaches (On the Predestination
of the Saints, Ch. 10). Between grace and predestination, the only difference is that
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predestination is the preparation of grace, while grace is the actual gift. Thus, Scripture
speaks of it as a perfect gift: To you it has been granted for Christ’s sake... to believe in
Him (Phil. 1:29); The love of God has been poured out into our hearts through the
Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom. 5:5), and similar texts. Therefore, the three
conditions of a perfect gift are found most fully and exactly in the gifts of grace.
36. Grace fulfills the conditions of a perfect gift. The first condition is clear, because
grace is a gift so bestowed that it becomes the recipient’s at that very moment—so
much so that it is within their power and dominion to reject or retain it, as Paul
warns: We urge you not to receive the grace of God in vain (2 Cor. 6:1). The second
condition is most certain, because God, as far as it depends on Him, irrevocably gives
sanctifying grace and the gifts necessary for it. Although He sometimes
gives gratuitously given graces temporarily and withdraws them at His discretion (and
does the same with some supererogatory or extraordinary gifts), yet with the gifts or
aids of sanctifying grace, He deserts no one—especially not the just—unless first
deserted by them, as the Council of Trent teaches. Thus, the donation of such grace is
irrevocable and therefore perfect. Paul may hint at this condition in Romans 11: The
gifts and the calling of God are irrevocable. Though Paul seems to speak specially of
gifts flowing from election and predestination (which God, once decreed, cannot
change, as the immediately preceding words suggest: According to the election of
grace... because of the fathers), yet the statement holds universally for justifying grace:
not because man cannot lose grace once received, but because (as St. Thomas notes
there) even a temporal gift and calling are not nullified by a change in God (as if He
repented) but by a change in man, who rejects God’s grace (Heb. 12:15: See to it that no
one fails to obtain the grace of God).
37. The third condition, most relevant to our purpose, is that grace is given with
perfect liberality, excluding all merit. This is chiefly gathered from the perfect notion of
donation, which Scripture everywhere attributes to grace, showing God’s supreme
liberality and freest will in distributing His gifts. In this sense, Paul says (Eph. 1:5–
6): He predestined us for adoption through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of
His will, to the praise of His glorious grace. These words signify that God willed this to
be the greatest glory and commendation of His grace—that He bestows it according to
the purpose of His will, to display His munificence, liberality, and freedom in giving,
without any cause on the part of the recipients. Hence, elsewhere, Paul cautions against
men usurping any little glory (as Bernard said) for themselves but ascribing all to God.
This is what he adds (Eph. 2:6–9): He raised us up with Christ... to show in the coming
ages the surpassing riches of His grace in kindness toward us in Christ Jesus. For by
grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of
God—not because of works, so that no one may boast. Here, the phrase and this is not
176 BOOK TWO
your own doing excludes not every cause on the recipients’ part, and in this lies the
perfection of this grace. In this sense, Paul calls it the gift of God (as if by
antonomasia) and finally not because of works—a negation broader than saying not
because of condign merits. This breadth was necessary to support his conclusion: so
that no one may boast. For if grace were in any way from works of nature alone, it
would not exclude all grounds for human boasting.
38. The same force lies in Paul’s words (1 Cor. 4:7): What do you have that you did
not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if you did not? This must refer
to reception by a perfect, supremely liberal gift, surpassing all debt of nature. No one
could ever boast of having something not received from God (at least as Author of
nature) or of performing moral good without God (at least as influencing cause). But
since Paul speaks of the goods by which the faithful are distinguished from unbelievers
or the just from the unjust, he means these must be acknowledged as singular gifts
received beyond all debt of nature. Hence, men ought not to usurp any glory for
receiving them—yet they would usurp no small glory if they could in any way merit
them by their own powers. This would detract from the glory owed to divine liberality
and perfect donation, as Bernard and Augustine (On the Predestination of the Saints,
Ch. 4ff.) extensively argue. Finally, for this reason, Paul (Rom. 9:15–16) traces the whole
root and origin of grace’s distribution to the divine will: I will have mercy on whom I
have mercy... So it depends not on human will or exertion but on God’s mercy. Thus,
Paul resolves grace ultimately into God’s will and mercy alone, because the first grace is
a pure donation, arising solely from the giver’s liberality without cause on the part of
the recipient.
39. Merit of congruity for the first grace is contrary to the notion of grace. From
these principles and testimonies, it is sufficiently clear that even merit of congruity
excludes grace (as Scripture speaks of it), for grace is given so freely that it excludes all
regard for any merit of the recipient and arises solely from the giver’s free munificence.
This must at least be true of the first grace or calling, which is the root of all other
graces, as Augustine excellently notes (To Simplician 1.2). Among other things, he
states: It is not to be thought that the words ‘It depends not on human will or exertion
but on God’s mercy’ mean we cannot attain what we desire without God’s help, but
rather that unless first called by Him, we do not will rightly. Similarly (83 Questions, q.
68), he writes: Though one may attribute to himself that he came when coerced, he
cannot attribute to himself that he was called. This true understanding of grace and the
term freely accords with Paul’s question (Rom. 11:35): Who has given a gift to Him that
He might be repaid? For if man, by his own powers, offers some service to God by
which he merits grace in any way, he would thereby give to God first and be repaid by
Him. Even apart from Scripture, this is self-evidently reasonable, because all merit
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(even of congruity) requires some proportion—whether founded on the condition or
dignity of the person acting, or at least on the work itself (to which one might add
God’s promise). But none of these is found in acts elicited by natural powers and
ordered to supernatural grace. Hence, the minor premise is proven: the person is
infected by original sin (since we speak of man not yet justified); indeed, even man in
pure nature is of himself disproportionate to such merit, lacking an ordination to a
supernatural end. Likewise, the work is wholly disproportionate, being of a lower order
and incapable of elevation or reference to a higher order or end by any other act.
Finally, no promise exists, as will be clearer later. Thus, there is no ground, not even the
least, for merit.
40. Impetratory merit is incompatible with the first grace. From all this, it is finally
concluded that not even impetratory merit may be admitted in any work elicited by
natural powers with respect to the effects of predestination. This is proven from the
two foundations already discussed: (1) Impetratory merit is itself a good thing, useful
and greatly conducive to eternal life; therefore, it cannot exist without the grace of
Christ by natural powers alone, as Christ Himself says: Without Me, you can do
nothing (John 15:5). (2) More specifically, impetratory merit (or impetration, for the
terms are here equivalent) only occurs through prayer, and prayer is not impetratory
unless it is at least founded on faith. Therefore, to be impetratory, it necessarily
presupposes some grace. Thus, the first grace cannot be impetrated by a petition made
by natural powers. This is precisely defined by the Council of Orange (Canon 3): If
anyone says that grace is given in response to human invocation and not rather that
grace itself brings it about that we pray worthily, let him be anathema. This is also
drawn from Paul (Rom. 10:14): How shall they call on Him in whom they have not
believed?—as Augustine expounds (Against Julian, Bk. 8). Likewise, from John 15:7: If
you abide in Me, and My words abide in you, ask whatever you will, and it shall be done
for you—where Chrysostom (Homily 75) rightly notes that prayer must be rooted in
Christ. Hebrews 11:6 also applies: Without faith, it is impossible to please God, as does
Romans 8:26: We do not know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit Himself
intercedes for us. The reasoning is clear: for prayer to be impetratory, it must first be
acceptable to God. Thus, (a) its object (the thing asked for) must be fitting; (b) its
manner must be confident and somehow founded in Christ. But these conditions
cannot be met unless prayer arises from faith and grace.
41. Second proof: Impetration undermines the gratuity of grace. A second proof
arises from the other foundation: such impetration would exclude the notion of grace,
because God would then give grace not from His magnificence and liberality but in
response to human invocation. One might object that among men, a benefit granted to
someone because they asked for it does not exclude its being entirely gratuitous. I reply,
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first, by denying the assumption: though it does not remove gratuity in the sense of
excluding a debt of justice or gratitude, it still diminishes the notion of a perfectly free
donation, since it arises not solely from the giver’s will and internal disposition but from
some cause on the petitioner’s part. Hence the common saying: What is asked for is as
good as bought. Second, I deny the parity of reasoning. Among men, the petitioner
(ordinarily speaking) is not thought to render service to the one petitioned but only to
express desire or need. Before God, however, prayer is true worship and service, and
under this aspect, it has impetratory force. Thus, what is impetrated from God partakes
of the nature of a retribution. Therefore, it must be founded on grace, for who has first
given to Him that he should be repaid? (Rom. 11:35). Finally, even the Pelagians called
this impetratory merit, and though they minimized it as very slight, yet to that extent, it
detracts from the perfection and truth of grace (as Bernard and Augustine held), and
thus it cannot be admitted.
42. Third proof: Impetratory merit either necessitates God or fails to explain
election. A third argument may be added: either (a) this impetratory merit infallibly
obtains its effect from God, or (b) it depends solely on God’s will and pleasure. The
Pelagians could not affirm (b), both because they founded this merit on the
promise Ask, and you shall receive (Matt. 7:7) and because it contradicts their own
principles. They would fall into the same dilemma: why does God grant one petitioner’s
request and not another’s? If He gives or withholds the effect arbitrarily, then He may
give to one and not another even if they ask equally—thus reintroducing
the acceptance of persons they accused Augustine of teaching. Ultimately, the reason
for the distinction lies not in man’s work but in God’s will alone, which they denied. If
they affirm (a), they attribute far too much to natural works. For why would God be
bound to infallibly grant such a petition? Either this arises from the very nature of the
act (which is absurd, since no proportion exists between such a petition and grace), or it
depends on a divine promise—which must be demonstrated, for Scripture’s promises
concern prayer founded on faith and Christ (as shown above and will be further proven
in the next chapter). A similar dilemma applies: either (a) this impetratory merit is a
necessary condition without which God calls no adult supernaturally (contradicting
clear Scriptures like I was found by those who did not seek Me [Rom. 10:20]), or (b) it
is not. The Massilians did not hold (a), as we shall show regarding dispositive causes. If
(b) is affirmed, then such merit cannot explain predestination or the distinction
between elect and non-elect, as will be discussed at length—for the reasoning is the
same in both cases.
43. Whether the Semi-Pelagian opinion is a condemned error. From all this, the
Massilian position is (I think) sufficiently refuted. Their foundation is overturned,
because in purely gratuitous gifts, acceptance of persons has no place—even if unequal
179 BOOK TWO
distribution occurs without any cause on the recipients’ part. Yet one might still ask: To
what degree of condemnation does this Semi-Pelagian opinion belong, particularly
regarding impetratory or congruous merit (as they termed it)? Concerning condign
merit, it is certain that the assertion is heretical (as all Scholastics uncontroversially
condemn it), for it belongs more to Pelagius’s errors than his remnants. It plainly
contradicts the Scriptural testimonies cited earlier and was condemned in many
councils: first at the Palestinian Council (as Augustine reports, Epistle 106), then at
Milevis under Innocent I (whose decrees were largely transcribed by the universally
received African Council, as Prosper notes, Against the Gallic Objectors, Ch. 9). The
same truth was confirmed at Orange and later at Trent.
44. Theological status of congruous merit. Regarding congruous merit, however, it
seems difficult to condemn the opinion as heretical. First, because many Scholastics
(whom we will cite later) plainly followed it. Second, because it is neither explicitly
drawn from Scripture nor expressly defined in councils under this specific
understanding, nor does it follow by evident consequence. Third, because it does not
obviously injure God’s grace, since even a moral good work is God’s benefaction
(though not strictly gratuitous). When performed by one who can do no more, it has
that general congruity found in all prudent governance: that whoever uses received
benefits well, insofar as they can, merits to be helped to do more—a congruity that
does not negate the later benefit being true grace. Finally, it is noteworthy that Trent did
not explicitly address this point, suggesting it did not judge it pertinent to the dogmas
of faith, though it treated all necessary doctrine on grace and free will against Pelagians
and Lutherans. Likewise, Orange’s intent is not clear in this specific sense, and some
doubt whether its definitions (as a provincial council) constitute certain matters of
faith.
45. The authority of the Council of Orange. To respond to this last point, I hold that
the Semi-Pelagian assertion (in their intended sense) must be affirmed as belonging to
condemned dogmas. For the Council of Orange (specifically convened against Pelagian
remnants after Pelagius’s condemnation) undoubtedly intended this. That these
remnants deviated from true faith is sufficiently indicated by its first canon: It has come
to our attention that some wish to think less cautiously about grace and free will,
contrary to the rules of the Catholic faith. Hence, its canons were issued as rules of
faith against that error. The council’s authority is beyond doubt. First, because it was
received by the universal consensus of the Church, and no Catholic doctor dared
contradict it. Those who seem to dissent either ignored it (making no mention of it) or
interpreted it differently, as we shall see. Second, its first canon states: Therefore, by the
authority and admonition of the Apostolic See, it seemed just and reasonable to us to
set forth for universal observance a few chapters transmitted to us from the Apostolic
180 BOOK TWO
See—collected by the ancient Fathers from the sure testimonies of Scripture on this
very matter—to instruct those who think otherwise than they ought. These words show
that the council needed no further confirmation, having already received its truth
through particular instruction from the Apostolic See. Thus, the Fathers subscribed to
the definition of the ancient Fathers and their own. Though it is unclear which pope
sent these chapters (whether Celestine, under whom the Semi-Pelagians arose, or Leo,
under whom the council was held), the doctrine of Orange is certain in faith regarding
its intent: to condemn the Semi-Pelagian error, especially in attributing the beginning of
faith, salvation, or perseverance to man. This was further confirmed by Trent (Session
6, Ch. 5).
46. Theological ambiguity regarding congruous merit. Nevertheless, I would not dare
to assert as a matter of faith that the definitions of the Councils of Orange or Trent
must be understood as excluding not only condign merit but also all congruous merit
when they say that the beginning of justification is conferred upon us without
merits. For after these councils, many grave doctors—undoubtedly great theologians,
who did not ignore them but carefully studied them—did not condemn this opinion as
heretical, nor even as erroneous or deserving censure. Vega (On Trent, Bk. 8, Ch. 4ff.)
argues that the term freely (when we are said to be justified freely or grace is given
freely) excludes condign merits, not congruous ones, and thus interprets Trent (Session
6, Ch. 8) in this sense. Toledo likewise explains (on Romans 8, note 31) that grace is
opposed only to merit based on justice, and thus does not negate grace if some human
cause is posited, provided it is not a merit of justice. Congruous merit, though a kind
of cause, does not introduce a claim of justice. Even the ancient Scholastics did not
hesitate to attribute congruous merit to morally good works. Therefore, it is difficult to
condemn this opinion as heretical in this sense, since it was not condemned in explicit
terms, and the implications are not evident.
47. Censure of the Semi-Pelagian doctrine. Even if the opinion regarding congruous
merit for the first vocation (founded on works of natural powers alone) is not outright
heresy or a matter of erroneous faith, I hold it to be entirely false and worthy of
avoidance—a doctrine that today offends many ears, and not without great reason.
First, because the two foundational arguments and Scriptural testimonies against this
opinion (in the explained sense) are most robust. Second, because the Council of
Orange absolutely condemns those who posit the origin of grace in our merits, and
Trent (with its distribution of grace) says it is given with no preceding merits. These
councils would have spoken very confusedly if they defined the matter so indistinctly
while allowing some kind of merit. This is especially true since it is highly probable that
their opponents did not posit perfect merit. Third, the same argument is drawn from
the Fathers (especially Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, and Bernard, cited earlier) and
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from St. Thomas (I-II, q. 112, aa. 2–3; Contra Gentiles, Bk. 3, Ch. 159), as well as other
Scholastics whom we will cite later.
48. Fourth argument: The nature of congruous merit. I ask: Does a morally good
work, elicited by natural powers, have this merit of grace (whatever it may be) by its
own nature or by divine ordination? If the former, it is contrary to reason and to Paul.
For how can an act of a lower order, by itself, merit a gift of a higher order? Or how
would this not give man grounds to boast as if he had not received? If the latter, it is
unintelligible that an act not intrinsically meritorious should become so by mere divine
ordination without any change in the moral quality or dignity of the work or the
worker. Though God’s ordination or promise may induce a debt of justice or fidelity, it
cannot suffice to confer the necessary value for merit unless the act is also morally
elevated. Moreover, such an ordination is asserted without foundation, as will become
clearer in subsequent chapters. Therefore, let it be held as certain that no meritorious
cause of predestination (at least regarding the first grace, on which the rest depend)
exists on the part of its effects. The objections raised or possible against this truth have
been partly resolved in this chapter and will be further addressed later.
49. Interpreting Trent on justification "freely given." One difficulty arises from Trent
(Session 6, Ch. 8), where it expounds Paul’s teaching that men are justified freely as
follows: We are said to be justified freely because none of those things that precede
justification—whether faith or works—merits the grace of justification. The question
is: In what sense does the council speak of justification here? Just as generation is
understood by philosophers in two ways—either precisely as the introduction of a
substantial form or collectively, beginning with dispositions and including the whole
preceding alteration—so justification may be taken either (a) strictly for the infusion of
justifying grace (since by this alone man becomes just) or (b) broadly for the whole
supernatural change preceding habitual grace (as Trent seems to use it in describing
justification’s progression in Ch. 7). But in Ch. 8, it likely does not use the broad sense,
for the beginning of justification so understood would be faith or the call to faith,
whereas the council presupposes that faith precedes justification when it says none of
those things that precede justification—whether faith or works—merits it. Thus, it
speaks of justification in the strict, formal sense (i.e., the infusion of grace). But when
it says faith does not merit justification, it must mean condign merit, since (as Augustine
teaches, Epistles 105–106; On the Predestination of the Saints, Ch. 3–4) we can merit
justification congruously or impetratorily by faith. Therefore, according to Trent’s
interpretation, when Paul says man is justified freely, he means not by condign merit—
and thus it would not contradict Paul to say man is justified or predestined by
congruous merit founded on moral works, since this would not oppose grace or the
term freely.
182 BOOK TWO
50. Resolution: Trent excludes all merit founded on nature alone. I reply that it is
indeed probable (given the argument made) that Trent here takes justification broadly,
including remote dispositions, and thus excludes all merit (both condign and
congruous) founded solely on works of free will without grace. For Paul speaks of such
works when he says man is not justified by works but freely. Hence, when Trent
lists faith among the things preceding justification, it does not mean infused,
supernatural faith (which is part of justification itself) but the faith spoken of by the
Semi-Pelagians, who called it from us and said we impetrate the rest through it—i.e.,
natural or acquired faith. Against them, the council says such faith (whether possible or
not—for it affirms nothing on this) does not merit justification. More likely, however,
Trent speaks of formal justification (as defined in Chs. 4–7), distinguishing disposition
from justification—a distinction that applies only to formal justification. The canons
(3–4, 7, 9) likewise take grace of justification in this sense when they say man cannot
believe as he ought without grace yet freely disposes himself for it. It would be strained
to exempt Ch. 8 from this usage, especially since it would be forced to restrict faith here
to acquired faith when the council elsewhere always speaks of true faith.
51. The council’s true meaning. The council’s sense is that the term freely excludes all
merit founded on natural powers alone, not on grace, without distinguishing between
congruous or condign merit—following Paul and prior councils (Milevis, Orange).
Indeed, Trent itself had already taught (Ch. 3) that the beginning of justification is
initiated in us with no preceding merits. Vega (Bk. 8 on Justification) consistently
interprets this as formal justification. Though he sometimes seems to say the council
excludes only simple merit (i.e., condign), he finally admits (Ch. 15) that it excludes all
and any merits of justification founded on natural powers alone. Therefore, when Trent
says justification is given freely because none of the things preceding it merit it, it refers
either (a) to what man can have by himself without grace (for though he cannot have
pious works or due faith this way, the Pelagians posited both as preceding justification
by natural powers alone) or (b) to true faith considered precisely as a work of free will
in an unjustified man—which, as such, has no meritorious force (even congruous) for
formal justification, except insofar as divine grace aids it. The term freely excludes all
merit conceivable from man’s side, not that which arises from God’s aiding grace, since
this too is entirely gratuitous.
52. Objection: Does Trent leave room for merit from aided works? One might
object: If Trent’s exposition of Paul’s "freely justified" does not certifiably exclude the
sinner’s condign merit for the first grace through works done with aiding grace (by
which he prepares for justification), then neither does it exclude congruous merit. The
reasoning is: (a) The council does not exclude merit from such works, else it would
exclude all merit (even congruous), since it absolutely excludes all merit of
183 BOOK TWO
justification founded on the works it discusses. (b) Just as freely excludes merit (condign
or congruous) not founded on grace, so it does not exclude merit founded on aiding
grace. Hence, if these words do not exclude congruous merit for justification (founded
on the grace of vocation and works done with its aid), neither do they exclude condign
merit for the same justification. This seems a grave inconsistency, undermining a most
certain dogma. Moreover, it would make initial justification no more properly grace
than growth in grace or glorification—at least in root, if not formally.
53. The first response is that, whether this dogma is proven from this conciliar
testimony or not, it remains most certain in itself that a sinner cannot merit the
remission of mortal sin de condigno, since he cannot make satisfaction for it de
condigno, as I have extensively demonstrated in the first volume, third part.
Consequently, neither can he merit de condigno the infusion of sanctifying grace, since
this is the formal cause of the remission of sins. From the unworthiness of the acting
person and from the debt of eternal punishment that he bears within himself, it is
sufficiently clear that a sinner cannot merit divine friendship de condigno, nor oblige
God by justice to confer any benefit upon him, much less sanctifying grace. Therefore,
it is necessary that formal sanctification be given gratuitously, not only remotely and in
its root (as glory is sometimes called grace), but proximately and formally—at least in
the sense that the term "freely" excludes proper retribution and justice. Hence, in
Scripture, the infusion of first grace is never called a "reward," as glory is called, which
is a sign that it is grace in a different way than glory is, and thus not only in its root but
in itself, because no merit de condigno precedes it, as it does glory. This is sufficiently
indicated by the Council of Trent in the subsequent chapters of the same session,
teaching that man can merit glory and an increase of grace, but not sanctifying grace
itself with regard to its first infusion.
54. I further add that this is also sufficiently gathered from the term "freely" used by
Paul in the phrase "justified freely." For although this may primarily have been said to
exclude all merit of the whole justification from its beginning to its completion, and
consequently to exclude all merit founded on works of nature and not on grace, it is
most rightly inferred from this that there can be no merit of grace in man, considering
his condition and dignity in himself, and thus, as long as he is understood to be in a
state of sin, he can merit nothing de condigno before God. Therefore, whatever grace
is conferred upon him to rescue him from that state is given entirely freely and formally,
and not only in the root of some prior grace. For although through works done with
the aid of grace or through supernatural faith, man may be said to merit something de
congruo, yet this merit is not from the intrinsic condition of the person, but only from
the dignity of the grace itself, arising from the extrinsic motion of the Holy Spirit.
Hence, this distinction can be established between merit de congruo founded on nature
184 BOOK TWO
alone and merit founded on the motion of grace: the latter does not prevent the
subsequent gift from being given simply freely to the man himself, whereas the former
excludes the possibility that the gift is perfectly and in every way gratuitous with respect
to man. For merit arising from nature would come from the man himself and his labor
or dignity, and thus would demand retribution with respect to the man himself; but
merit founded only on the congruity or dignity of the work and the grace participated
in does not rest on the person himself, but on grace alone. This is not the case with
merit founded on grace intrinsically sanctifying the person, for then the merit rests on
the eternal dignity of the acting person and induces a debt from justice.
55. Finally, we can add another explanation regarding the Council of Trent: it is no
wonder that it speaks of formal justification itself and excludes all merit of it, both de
congruo and de condigno, through any works preceding justification itself, whether
they are natural or supernatural and of faith—provided they precede justification in
time. For through acts of faith, hope, fear, imperfect contrition, almsgiving, or the like,
no matter how much they are done with the aid of grace and as they ought to be, man
never merits justification itself de congruo, nor even the efficacious aid for the ultimate
disposition to it. At most, he merits through one remoter disposition the aid for
another closer one, and through this further aid for another better one, and so on, until
he receives the aid for the ultimate disposition. And thus it is true that through no act
preceding justification in time, whether faith or works, does man merit justification
even de congruo, but something less than it. And this is sufficient for justification itself
to be given entirely freely with respect to such acts. As to how it is given freely with
respect to the ultimate disposition, which precedes not in time but in nature, the
Council did not explain this, perhaps because it includes that ultimate disposition under
justification itself. Yet even concerning that, it must be certain that the infusion of
sanctifying grace is not merited de condigno, as I have touched upon in the cited place
in the third part and will treat more fully in the fourth volume when discussing
justification, and more extensively in the matter of grace. Therefore, with respect to the
ultimate disposition, it is necessary to recur to the doctrine given in the preceding
paragraph: that with respect to it, the habit is infused freely, excluding a debt of justice
and all merit that rests on the condition and dignity of such a person, which alone is
opposed to perfect grace, which is infused entirely freely. And let this suffice
concerning the force and propriety of the term "freely," according to the usage of
Scripture and the Councils in this matter, the knowledge of which is very necessary for
the whole matter of grace and predestination.
185 BOOK TWO
CHAPTER VII. WHETHER MAN CAN BE A CAUSE, AT LEAST A
DISPOSITIVE ONE, OF HIS OWN PREDESTINATION WITH RESPECT
TO ITS EFFECTS THROUGH MORAL WORKS OF FREE WILL ALONE.

1. I presuppose that man, by his natural powers, can perform morally good works in
various acts. For although the discussion concerns fallen man in his earthly state, there
can still be different states or degrees in which the proposed question may arise in some
way. Thus, the question may be understood in reference to a man not yet supernaturally
enlightened but raised among pagans, using natural reason alone; or a man externally
called but not yet inwardly moved; or one already inwardly stirred but not yet believing;
or a believer not yet justified; or a justified man who does not yet act formally as one
justified or as one who believes supernaturally (since habits are used at will). Thus, even
if a man is endowed with supernatural gifts, he may still operate morally and naturally
by natural reason and free will alone. Indeed, sometimes a man may possess infused
habitual justice yet be unable to act through it, relying only on natural reason—as when
an infant baptized but raised among pagans begins to use reason without encountering
supernatural truths. Though he has the habit and faculty in actu primo, the lack of a
necessary secondary cause or condition prevents him from acting supernaturally.
2. The proposed question can be understood in different ways: concerning all effects
of predestination collectively or distributively (i.e., each individually); concerning all
effects by reason of one primary effect or each immediately; or concerning only some
effects. The effects of predestination are subordinated: the first leads to the second, the
second to the third, and so on (as Paul indicates in Romans 8:30: "Those He
predestined, He called; those He called, He justified; those He justified, He glorified").
If man's moral works are the cause of the first effect, they are at least mediately the
cause of subsequent effects (since the cause of a cause is the cause of its effects). This
mediate causality, though physically accidental, suffices for moral causality, which is our
focus. Alternatively, one might argue that free will can be an immediate (or at least
possible) cause of all or singular effects of predestination attainable in this life—except
glorification, which requires a supernatural disposition (e.g., the light of glory) beyond
natural moral preparation. For this life's effects, some hold that natural moral works can
dispose man not only to the first supernatural vocation but also proximately and
immediately to further graces, even the infusion of supernatural habits. Opinions vary
here, as we shall see.
3. The question concerns a dispositive cause that positively contributes to the effect.
Negative or privative causes (e.g., removing obstacles) will be treated later. The effects
of predestination differ: internal effects (received within the soul, pertaining to grace
proper) are the primary focus, while external effects must also be addressed. Among
186 BOOK TWO
internal effects: some are infused by God alone without the recipient's active
concurrence (e.g., infused habits); others occur without the immediate cooperation of
free will but require the soul's vital concurrence (e.g., illumination, inspiration, and
other prevenient graces under the general term vocation); others arise from God
cooperating with free will (e.g., supernatural human acts). External effects include
positive aids to conversion (e.g., preaching, admonishing), usually mediated by humans
or angels, and negative or privative effects (e.g., removing occasions of sin, restraining
demons).
4. Many of these effects by nature require no moral or free disposition from man.
External or negative effects can occur even in a sleeping or unaware person. Positive
external effects need only natural rational capacity. Thus, Catholic authors seldom
debate these. The chief controversy concerns internal graces. Here, we examine only
dispositions arising from free will's natural powers—not those derived from prior grace.
Such a disposition may be necessary (without which the effect never occurs); merely
moving (sometimes expected by God but not absolutely required); infallibly effective or
only sufficient (granted at God's discretion). A disposition is further distinguished as
proximate or remote—but what is remote for one effect is proximate for another. The
proximate effect is our focus, since remote effects depend on it.
5. Setting aside heretics (who add no new error here), Scholastic theologians
variously posit free will as a dispositive cause of predestination's effects. Gabriel [Biel]
(In Sent. IV, d. 41, q. un., art. 3, dub. 1) states clearly that predestination's means include
a "suitable disposition" from free will, which does not negate grace (since it is not
condign merit). He distinguishes between the unbeliever, who disposes himself by
conforming to reason and earnestly seeking truth (thereby meriting de congruo the first
grace), and the believer, who detests sin according to faith's norms. In In Sent. III, d.
17, q. un., art. 3, dub. 2, he asserts that man can love God above all things by pure
natural powers (both intellect and will) and infallibly obtain grace—not only prevenient
but even justifying grace, charity, and remission of sin. He avoids Pelagianism by
denying this act is meritorious or sufficient to fulfill God's law without grace. He cites
Scotus, Ockham, and Pierre d'Ailly as holding similar views. In In Sent. IV, d. 14, q. 1,
art. 2, he adds that a sinner can sufficiently dispose himself for justification and
remission of sin through detestation of sin conceived under God's general natural
influence. Scotus (ibid., q. 2) taught this disposition as a meritum de congruo for
erasing mortal sin and argued that without it, God's impartiality would be hard to
defend. Scotus does not clarify whether this applies to believers or unbelievers but
stresses that the act need not be founded on faith—it can arise from natural reason.
6. Durandus (In Sent. II, d. 28, q. 5) may be cited in support of this opinion insofar
as he states that man can prepare himself for grace without any special internal
187 BOOK TWO
movement of the will from God, through a naturally good act which his natural powers
can elicit. Thus, he posits a natural dispositive cause for predestination with respect to
some of its effects, maintaining a certain and infallible connection between this
disposition and those effects (or at least some of them). However, he denies that this
constitutes a cause of predestination as a whole, since he considers even this good
moral act to be an effect of predestination, arising from God’s special providence
toward the predestined. Nevertheless, although this latter qualification somewhat
safeguards the gratuity of predestination (a point I will address later), it fails to fully
preserve the true and gratuitous nature of grace in the remission of sins and the
justification of the sinner. Indeed, it leans heavily toward the error not only of the
Semi-Pelagians but even of Pelagius himself, who in this sense did not deny the grace
of remission but made it entirely dependent on the disposition of free will alone.
Against this error, Canons 1 and 2 of the Council of Trent, Canons 3 and 4 of the
Council of Milevis, and Canons 4 and 6 of the Council of Orange were directly
formulated.
7. Cajetan also closely approached this position (Opuscula, Vol. 1, Tract. 4, q. 1),
where he asserts that natural contrition is at least a non-ultimate disposition for grace,
becoming ultimate solely because God makes use of it—not by intrinsically perfecting
it but extrinsically, through the infusion of a habit or some special motion. Cajetan does
not clarify whether this natural disposition infallibly produces some effect of grace or
whether it is elevated to the status of an ultimate disposition merely by God’s will. He
seems to imply the latter, since he teaches that justification does not infallibly follow
from such a disposition as it comes from man (otherwise, man could be certain of his
justification). Moreover, he holds that this disposition (as attrition or a non-ultimate
disposition) does not become contrition or an ultimate disposition through any greater
perfection on man’s part but only through God’s extrinsic perfection.
8. Against Cajetan’s view, Soto and others argue that if this is the case, Cajetan does
not truly posit a cause on man’s part for why one person is justified rather than another
equally disposed. For it remains that among two equally disposed persons, one may be
justified and the other not, solely by God’s will to accept or perfect the disposition of
one and not the other. Yet, absolutely speaking and without comparison, Cajetan does
assign a cause to free will alone—either simply efficacious or at least sufficient and true
in the genus of moral disposition—indeed, efficacious as far as man is capable, since he
can do nothing more to be justified. Cajetan seems to admit this (I-II, q. 109, a. 6,
"Neque obstat"). Consequently, for many who lack such a disposition, it will be the true
reason why one man is justified and another is not. This is certainly enough for such a
man to be said to "begin his salvation by his own power" and to possess something he
188 BOOK TWO
has not received, of which he may boast considerably, distinguishing himself at least
from those who lack this disposition.
9. St. Thomas appears to have held this view at one point (In Sent. II, d. 28, art. 4),
where he distinguishes a twofold acceptance of grace: (1) any prompting of the will by
divine providence (which God freely bestows on all things as befits them) or (2) infused
habitual grace. If grace is taken in the first sense, he says, it is undoubtedly necessary,
since the will cannot act without some prompting. He adds that any prompting suffices
—whether human admonition, bodily illness, or the like—all of which are subject to
divine providence and ordained for the good of the elect. These words clearly show he
is not speaking of true, supernatural internal grace but in a very broad sense. For if one
were to interpret St. Thomas as listing these as ordinary instruments God uses to
confer supernatural internal excitation, the generality of his words would hardly allow
it. Moreover, he later argues that habitual grace is unnecessary for this preparation,
since the acts by which man prepares himself to receive grace need not exceed human
nature. Just as human nature is in material potency to grace, so the acts of natural
virtues serve as material dispositions to it. He concludes that man can prepare himself
for sanctifying grace by free will alone and even adds (in the reply to the fourth
objection) that man can prepare himself for faith by what is within natural reason.
10. Another difficult passage is St. Thomas’s (In Sent. II, d. 5, q. 2, art. 1), where he
reports the opinion that meritorious conversion to God requires a twofold grace:
habitual (informing) grace and another gratuitously given grace from which the act’s
substance is elicited. For non-meritorious conversion, this opinion seems to require
only the latter grace, though St. Thomas does not explicitly say so. He responds that
positing this gratuitously given grace seems unnecessary unless free will itself is called
grace or unless it refers to occasions God provides for conversion (e.g., instruction in
the law, chastisement leading to humility, etc.), without which grace cannot be obtained.
He concludes that free will suffices to elicit the act of conversion by which man
prepares and disposes himself for grace. He is clearly speaking of sanctifying grace and
the proximate disposition to it, as the article’s context shows. In the reply to the first
objection, he adds that although free will can produce the act’s substance, it cannot give
it the form by which it is meritorious.
11. Some Catholic theologians have held that although a disposition through natural
moral acts of free will is not ordinarily sufficient to obtain justifying grace, in rare cases
of extreme necessity it may suffice not only for assisting grace but even for sanctifying
grace and the remission of mortal or original sin. Vega (Lib. 6 on Trent, ch. 17, ad 20)
asserts this, adding that a man may be justified and saved without supernatural faith in
cases of invincible ignorance. In Lib. 13, ch. 25, he states that in such cases, sorrow for
sins as contrary to natural reason may suffice for justification. Javellus (Tract. de
189 BOOK TWO
Prædest., ad I p., q. 23, ch. 5) seems to agree, saying that a disposition arising from
natural knowledge and natural powers may sometimes suffice for justification—even
meriting it de congruo (though not de condigno, thus differing from Pelagius). He
attributes this to a "special aid," not supernatural but a special providence in the natural
order, as noted earlier in Durandus.
12. Other theologians, while denying that a disposition formed by free will alone is
ever a proximate and sufficient preparation for justifying grace (even supposing faith in
the intellect), nevertheless admit that for obtaining God’s excitatory aid (e.g., vocation
to faith or salutary repentance after faith), a moral disposition from free will’s good
works may suffice. Richard of Middleton (In Sent. II, d. 28), Gerson (Alphabetum 24,
M., and Alphabetum 61), and Soto (De Nat. et Grat., Bk. 2, ch. 3) hold this view. Soto
explicitly calls such natural moral works a "remote disposition" to charity, especially if
done with the intent of moving God to soften the heart for repentance—a goal man
can naturally set for himself. While Soto denies these works are necessary or sufficient
for sanctifying grace, he affirms they may serve as a dispositive cause in many
predestined persons, explaining why the reprobate are not predestined.
13. The Principal Foundation of This Doctrine. Among these theologians, there are
various foundations for this doctrine, according to their differing opinions. Omitting
others that are irrelevant here, the principal foundation must be that such a disposition
does not exceed the powers of nature and natural providence, does no injury to grace,
and is consonant with divine equity. Therefore, it ought not to be denied. The first part
of this premise seems evident because performing some morally good work does not
exceed the powers of nature, and this disposition is posited solely in morally good acts
possessing natural honesty. If this disposition does not exceed nature’s capacities, it can
be performed by free will with only the general concursus owed by God to nature.
Therefore, it can arise from common and natural providence alone, and thus, per se, it
does not pertain to predestination. Consequently, in this respect, there is no
contradiction in its being a cause of the whole of predestination with respect to all its
effects. That it is also not repugnant on the second count is clear, because such a
disposition, as such, has no merit—neither condign (as is self-evident) nor congruous,
since the latter requires either the dignity of the person acting or at least a proportion in
the work. Neither is found in the work under discussion. Hence, St. Thomas (In I Sent.,
d. 41, art. 3) states that a good work preceding grace is not meritorious of it but only a
disposition toward it. In his solution to objection 1, he says that some reason for
predestination regarding the effects of grace can be given on the part of man’s
disposition, though not a meritorious cause. He adds in the solution to objection 2 that
this disposition does not prevent the effect from being given entirely gratuitously.
Alexander of Hales (III p., q. 6, m. 1, § 2 and m. 5) holds the same. Indeed, Soto (De
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Natura et Gratia, Bk. 2, ch. 4) argues that there can be no merit of grace in a sinner,
even congruously, nor even through acts elicited under the aid of grace—even if they
are true and proximate dispositions. Thus, any merit would exclude the true notion of
grace, but not the notion of disposition.
14. Proof of the Final Part of the Foundation. The final part—namely, that it is
consonant with divine equity for God to regard such acts in a man as some disposition
—is proven first by Sacred Scripture, which promises the aid of grace to sinners who
act morally well and perform works of mercy. Frequent promises concern almsgiving
(Tobit 4 and 12, Sirach 37 and 29, Daniel 4: "Redeem your sins with alms"); Matthew 5:
"Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy"; and forgiveness is promised to
those who forgive injuries (Sirach 28, Matthew 6, Mark 11, Luke 6). In these passages,
Scripture speaks of honest and good works, whether done with or without grace.
Second, just as an intellectual or rational nature has an immediate ordination to grace
through an innate capacity (though an obediential one with respect to glory), so too do
morally good works proceeding from this nature have an immediate ordination to grace
with the same proportion, for the reasoning is the same. As nature is remotely capable
in itself (insofar as it can be), so its good work remotely disposes and accommodates
nature to the extent possible. Therefore, just as it is consonant with divine providence
to elevate rational nature to the order of grace, so too is it fitting for God to accept a
morally good action as some disposition preparing nature for the order of grace. This is
confirmed by the theologians’ teaching that God distributed grace to the angels
according to the proportion of their natural gifts—not because this was owed to
nature, but because it seemed consonant with divine wisdom. In this sense, greater
natural perfection can be called a greater aptitude for receiving greater grace. It is no
less consonant with divine wisdom for God to grant a greater favor of grace to a man
who better uses his natural powers to do good (while lacking the powers of grace).
Thus, such a good work can produce in man a greater aptitude to receive grace
mercifully from God—and this is to be a disposition, at least remotely and imperfectly.
Finally, in this sense, theologians commonly say: "To the one who does what is in him,
God does not deny grace." This reasoning applies equally to predestination as to grace,
both because (if this disposition prepares man for the whole order of grace from its
first effect) it does not itself arise from predestination (which concerns only the effects
of grace) and thus is presupposed to predestination, and therefore can be a reason for
it; and because no other cause of predestination can be given on the part of its effects
except by causing those effects in their actual execution. But this disposition, in its own
order, is a partial cause of the effects when they are carried out, as has been said—and
thus also of predestination.
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15. First Assertion. Nevertheless, I say first: A morally and naturally good act is not a
necessary disposition for obtaining the first grace from God. I hold this assertion to be
certain because it was defined at the Second Council of Orange (can. 4), which
condemns anyone who says that God waits for our wills to be cleansed from sin. This
condemnation cannot refer to a will already supernaturally moved by God, nor to
awaiting man’s cooperation in his conversion—for it is most certain that God, after
inwardly calling a man by His inspiration and illumination, waits for his consent to
justify him or infuse faith (as Scripture says: "The Lord waits to be gracious to you"; "I
waited for grapes, but it yielded wild grapes"). This is also clear from the Council of
Trent (Session 6, ch. 5–7 and can. 4) and from the final book on grace (De Auxiliis).
Thus, the Council of Orange speaks of the will of man not yet supernaturally called
and moved, and of awaiting some work done by man’s own power and liberty alone, by
which he prepares and disposes himself for God’s very stirring and the first aid of
grace.
16. The Semipelagians Did Not Teach That a Natural Act Is a Necessary Disposition
for Grace. In this sense, then, the Council defines that God does not wait for our wills
—because such a disposition is not necessary. If it were, He would indeed have to wait
for it. Scripture proofs (Isaiah 65:1, Romans 10:20) cited by the Council confirm this: "I
was found by those who did not seek me; I revealed myself to those who did not ask
for me." Even the Semipelagians do not seem to have held the contrary. Faustus (De
Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, Bk. 1, ch. 17) says: "If this mercy of God who draws us is
given only to the worthy, then God’s grace is subjected to human merit." Cassian
(Conlatio 13, ch. 8, nn. 15, 17) expressly proves that God often calls the utterly
indisposed and rebellious (e.g., Matthew, Paul). Daily experience confirms this, and the
reason is evident: (1) Such a disposition is not necessary by the nature of things, since it
belongs to a far lower order. (2) Nor is it required by God’s law, for nowhere is it
written or handed down. (3) Scripture and the Fathers (especially Augustine, cited in the
previous chapter) imply the opposite. Moreover, the will can accomplish nothing by an
act of the natural order (or one arising from natural providence alone) that grace and a
supernatural act could not do better. Why, then, would God always wait for this natural
disposition—especially since it belongs to the commendation of divine grace and the
demonstration of its efficacy to enlighten the blind, soften the hardened, and convert
the rebellious?
17. This Assertion Holds in Every State of Man. From this, it follows first that this
assertion applies proportionally to all the states of sinners enumerated above: (1) In the
unbeliever, whom God calls and stirs to faith (both externally and internally). To confer
this benefit, God does not wait for any good movement or prior effort of the human
will but preveniently calls him who has done no good—indeed, much evil (as Augustine
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often says of Paul, and as is evident in the infinite multitude of Gentiles). The canon of
Orange applies chiefly here: "God does not wait for his will," for if He waited for it for
the first illumination and calling, He would consequently wait for the entire cleansing
from sin, which depends on that illumination. (2) In the believer not yet truly
penitent for all his sins. To stir him to true repentance, God does not await or require
from him any good act of free will alone, for the good use of faith and received grace
(with its concomitant aid) suffices for God to grant new grace. Indeed (such is God’s
kindness), He does not always wait even for this remote disposition arising from faith
and the first aid to move the faithful to perfect contrition—sometimes doing so
sufficiently, sometimes efficaciously, since there is no per se order between these
imperfect and perfect acts, nor has God established a fixed law here (as is clear from
the treatise on justification).
18. A Doubt. One might doubt only concerning a man called externally to faith but
not yet believing. It seems he can, by free will and natural reasoning alone, reflect on
what he has heard—its coherence and the motives proposed to make it credible. From
such reflection, a natural desire may arise in him to hear the preaching again or to
question others for further instruction. This process seems so connatural that it appears
morally necessary unless God works a miracle. Thus, some good natural use of free will
seems necessary for man to prepare himself for the grace of faith. The same
proportion seems to apply to the believer regarding repentance. Ordinarily, man is
moved to repentance by a preacher’s voice, a pious book, or other external means—
which he voluntarily attends. By free will alone, he can choose to hear the sermon or
read the book. After hearing or reading, he can reflect on these things by natural
reasoning and affection, gradually stirring himself until divine grace intervenes,
arousing and elevating him to supernatural conversion.
19. Response. Whatever may be said about the possibility of such acts from free
will’s power, I now assert absolutely that they are not necessary for faith or justification
insofar as they are understood to be merely natural. All these things are done better and
more perfectly by the providence of grace, the inner motion, and the inspiration of the
Holy Spirit. We must generally believe that God acts thus—and that even in this kind
of supernatural providence, He does not wait for the efforts of free will to precede
Him. Scripture testimonies imply this (e.g., Acts 16:14: "The Lord opened Lydia’s heart
to pay attention to what Paul said"—where it mentions not only believing but even
"paying attention," strictly signifying those acts of prior reflection and consideration of
what is to be believed). The same applies proportionally to the sinful believer regarding
repentance. Whether such natural acts can sometimes precede, and if so, whether they
contribute anything, will be discussed later. From this, it is easily understood that the
same must be said of the justified man concerning perseverance (or not sinning). To
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receive a new aid of grace (which we suppose necessary), it is not per se required that
he dispose himself by natural good acts—both because supernatural acts suffice (for
which he is already capable through inherent gifts) and because GOD can confer such a
gift on whom He wills by His gratuitous favor alone, without such a disposition. By
what law, after all, has He bound Himself to wait for it?
20. From this it finally follows that the adequate reason for divine predestination
regarding its various effects and their unequal distribution among different persons
cannot be taken from works of this kind performed by those same persons—as
Augustine rightly concludes in his book On the Predestination of the Saints (Book
I, To Simplician, q. 2) and often elsewhere. For among two equally sinful persons, God
calls one and not the other; indeed, He often calls the one who sinned more grievously.
At other times, He calls both but one more efficaciously and to a higher degree or state.
Such variety cannot be grounded in works performed by these individuals. Nor can one
appeal to such works as future after their calling yet foreseen beforehand, for this
evasion was rejected above in Chapter 5 and is excluded even more decisively by the
same arguments: either because these works are equally unequal and disproportionate,
or because insofar as they are future, they are entirely useless for disposing man to a
present effect. Moreover, it often happens that such works will never be performed—
whether because the person dies immediately after conversion or because they are aided
to act always supernaturally. Hence, it is also clear that the grace of divine calling is not
equally proposed and prepared for all persons, even on God’s part and by His will (as
some claim). For if there were equality on God’s part while equality also existed on
man’s part, the effect would be equal, since there is no source from which inequality
could arise. Therefore, since variety exists in the effect, the reason for inequality lies in
the divine will, which distributes grace as He wills, when He wills, and where He wills:
"The Spirit breathes where He wills" (John 3:8).
21. Second Assertion. I say secondly: A morally good act performed solely by the
powers of free will is never a sufficient and primary disposition for that effect of
predestination which is the justification of the impious. This assertion, as a general rule,
is of faith, having been defined—as I noted earlier—in the Councils of Milevis,
Orange, and Trent. Briefly, it is evident because the justification of the impious first
requires the foundation of infused faith, which is the necessary disposition on the part
of the intellect alone. For concerning that faith which is God’s gift (Eph. 2:8; Phil.
1:29), Paul says in Hebrews 11:6: "Without faith, it is impossible to please God." If any
proximate disposition on man’s part can intervene for this faith, it is only the will or
affection to believe. Yet even this disposition is defined in the Council of Orange (can.
5) as owing its proper quality to the aid of grace. Therefore, a natural disposition of the
will is insufficient here. Herein lay the chief error of the Massilians, and any theologians
194 BOOK TWO
who unthinkingly adopt the opposite view unwittingly follow them. The same must be
said of the disposition required in the will after faith as the proximate and ultimate step
toward justification: namely, hope, charity, and penitence. These cannot be possessed as
needed for justification without the help of grace—as defined by Trent (Session 6, can.
3) and earlier by the Councils of Milevis and Orange. Hence, theologians who seem to
dissent from this rule might be excused if they erred without obstinacy, yet their
opinion cannot be defended from the charge of Pelagianism, let alone Semipelagianism.
Exceptions made by others—whether for cases of necessity or for justification with the
sacrament—are plainly false and untenable, since they rest on no solid reason or
authority weighty enough to warrant an exception to a general rule of faith (as
discussed more fully in Volume 4 on Penance).
22. Third Assertion. I say thirdly: A morally good act performed solely by the powers
of free will is not a sufficient proximate disposition for the first assisting grace—
whether per se and directly influencing it in its own order or for any supernatural grace.
Consequently, it cannot even be a remote disposition for sanctifying grace itself. This
assertion is less certain than the preceding ones, since it is not as clearly drawn from
Scripture, the Councils, or the Fathers. Yet in my judgment, it remains far more
probable and true. That this was the view of St. Thomas, Bonaventure, Alexander of
Hales, and other weighty theologians will be shown in Chapters 7 and 9 below. Here, it
is proven from the principles of faith, particularly regarding a person reaching the age
of reason who has heard nothing of the faith’s teaching and begins to perform some
good by natural reason before being illuminated externally or internally. In such a
person, the first assisting grace is the first illumination and inspiration by which they are
called to faith. For a morally good act performed by natural powers to be a direct and
per se disposition to that grace, it is insufficient that the act merely precede it (since not
every priority implies causality). Rather, it is necessary that the grace be given in
consideration of that act under some aspect of causality—otherwise, it cannot
meaningfully be called a disposition. I argue thus: God in no way gives grace in
consideration of that work; therefore, the act is not a per se disposition to it. The
antecedent is proven because this can be understood in two ways: (1) with infallible
connection, so that once the disposition exists, the grace is infallibly conferred; or (2)
without such a connection, so that the act merely provides a fitting occasion. Neither
mode can be fittingly affirmed.
23. The first mode is disproven because this infallible connection must arise either
from the nature of such an act and its intrinsic power or from a special divine
ordinance. The first cannot be asserted without falling into Pelagianism or its remnants.
First, because man would possess something exceedingly great in himself if he could
infallibly draw God to initiate grace in him by his own power. Second, because such an
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act would necessarily involve a significant degree of merit (at least congruous merit)
regarding this effect—so the effect could not be called "gratuitous" for one who, by his
own work and power, as it were compels God to grant it. Thus, it would no longer be
grace. Third, apart from the necessity of immutability (which presupposes divine
ordinance or will), no effect can be infallible in an absolute sense with respect to God's
will. If one claims it is not absolutely infallible but only infallible by God's common
providence as "due" to such a disposition, this contradicts the disproportion and
imperfection of a natural act compared to any supernatural gift of grace—as will be
more clearly shown in discussing the second main point.
24. Nor can it be said that this effect is infallible by divine ordinance or promise.
Where is such an ordinance or promise found? Some might argue it is implicitly
contained in passages where God declares He wills all men to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4),
enlightens everyone coming into the world (John 1:9), and does not abandon those who
seek Him (cf. Heb. 11:6)—texts we will cite in Chapter 9. But in these places, God
either makes no promise contingent on human works and simply reveals His absolute
will (which, by His immutability, will infallibly be fulfilled as He has ordained, whether
man acts well or not), or where a supernatural reward seems promised to human works,
it refers only to works of piety performed under grace. Otherwise, how are these texts
true: "Who has first given to Him, that it should be repaid?" (Rom. 11:35) and "What
do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Cor. 4:7)? Yet some object: Does not
Scripture unconditionally promise forgiveness of sins and God's mercy to almsgiving,
forgiving injuries, and other works of mercy—without distinguishing whether these
works are done with or without grace? We reply that all such promises at least
presuppose faith and apply only to the faithful—those who believe in God as they
ought. For "faith is the foundation of things hoped for" (Heb. 11:1). Divine promises
in Scripture are made to believers alone; thus, before faith, no grace is owed to human
works by virtue of divine promise. Scripture often indicates that mercy is not promised
to works unless they proceed from faith in some way—e.g., Matthew 10:40–42:
"Whoever receives a prophet in the name of a prophet... whoever gives a cup of cold
water in the name of a disciple..." The phrase "in the name of" shows these acts must
flow from a higher intention related to faith. Paul even teaches that such actions are
worthless without charity (1 Cor. 13:3), and Christ says, "Without Me you can do
nothing" (John 15:5)—that is, nothing not rooted in faith in His blood (Rom. 3:25).
25. Moreover, if such a promise were made to a natural moral act—making it a per
se and proximate disposition to the first grace given in consideration of it—then by the
same reasoning, the act would be a merit (at least congruous) of that gift. Consequently,
the gift would no longer be grace, since it would be given for a work (and not
gratuitously or for a work founded on grace). It is no answer to say the promise itself is
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gratuitous, for here we speak of intrinsic grace as the principle of the work. This would
imply that in the order of execution, free will initiates salvation by first giving
something to God so that He might repay it—a notion flatly contrary to Scripture and
the Councils. It also cannot be denied that, in this case, God would wait for the human
will to prepare itself for purification from sin—a position condemned absolutely and
universally by the Council of Orange (can. 4). Finally, this view would entail that grace
is given because a man desires, seeks, or strives by his free will—as if the work were the
reason for granting grace (which might otherwise be withheld). But this too contradicts
Orange (can. 6), which condemns the claim that grace is given to those who believe,
watch, or labor without grace, rather than grace itself being necessary for these acts to
be salvific. The Council (can. 7) further condemns the idea that nature’s power can
achieve anything pertaining to eternal life. Yet a disposition infallibly eliciting divine
grace would pertain greatly to eternal life; thus, admitting such a disposition is
irreconcilable with the Council’s teaching.
26. Important Note. These arguments decisively refute the notion for all assisting
grace and vocation—but even more so for efficacious vocation, especially that which
flows from God’s purpose and proper election of the predestined. As Augustine
emphasizes (Enchiridion, ch. 32), this is why Paul says, "It depends not on human will
or exertion, but on God’s mercy" (Rom. 9:16). Far from such vocation being infallibly
obtained by any human work, not even a work done under grace infallibly merits it by
virtue of a promise—for no such promise exists. Rather, a prior vocation by divine
purpose is required so that the elect may, through its fruits, in some way merit
subsequent efficacious calls. Otherwise, anyone disposing himself by natural power
would immediately become elect, justified, or saved—an obvious absurdity. Thus, even
if such a disposition could be a reason for obtaining some vocation (which is false), it
still could not be a reason for predestination regarding its proper effects. For it cannot
be the congruent reason for the first vocation (the primary effect of predestination on
which the rest depend). One might argue it could congruously merit vocation if timed
appropriately—but this is purely accidental from the agent’s perspective (since he is
unaware of the "congruity") and thus cannot be a per se disposition. Moreover, God is
not bound to infuse supernatural vocation at the exact moment of a good natural act—
He has made no such promise, and providence is not constrained by temporal
circumstances causally unrelated to the act. Finally (and decisively), congruity depends
not only on timing but also on the internal mode of vocation, which rests solely on
God’s will.
27. Another evasion. It is pressed further. It will indeed finally be said: Granted, for
all these reasons, that such a disposition cannot be posited as efficacious in such a way
that it infallibly attains its effect, yet at least it may be deemed sufficient in itself to
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move and incline God to confer such grace—and sometimes, indeed often, it may
obtain its effect. And for this reason, it may rightly be called a
disposition directly and per se, albeit a remote one with respect to the first grace of
calling. Let us therefore argue against the second part of the position stated above
concerning the manner of positing such a disposition—a position that coincides with
this response. And first, the argument recently made applies here: Even if all this were
granted, no cause or reason for predestination could be drawn from this source with
respect to its proper effects. For, given such a kind of disposition, God either does or
does not grant the first calling—whether congruous, incongruous, or even none at all—
since, with respect to any of these, that disposition is inefficacious and fallible.
Therefore, no reason for predestination can be derived from it. One might respond
that, in the first effect of predestination, two things can be considered: one is absolute,
namely, that this person is called by God; the other is comparative, namely, that this
person is called rather than another who has a similar disposition. It will then be said
that such a disposition is the cause of predestination with respect to the effect
considered absolutely, though not with respect to that comparison. But from this
follows that most serious absurdity which I inferred earlier in a similar case: namely,
that the good of the one who is predestined is ultimately resolved into the man himself,
whereas the lack of such good is attributed to God alone, who condemns a man
despite his similarly good disposition—contrary to the Scripture: Your destruction is
from yourself; your help is only from Me (Hos. 13:9). Likewise, that first consideration
taken per se is sufficiently troublesome, for it contradicts Paul’s statement: Before they
had done anything good or evil, Jacob I loved (Rom. 9:11), and other passages which
we will examine below.
28. Furthermore, even if that disposition is not, in its own kind and mode, an
efficacious cause, at least it suffices to say that God awaits the will of such a man and
takes from him some reason for promoting the goodness that He Himself initiated.
Likewise, it may be said that God gives His grace to such a man because he labors,
keeps watch, etc., since he is laboring and watchful. Again, it may be said that a good
work done by natural powers greatly conduces to the salvation of eternal life. But all
these claims openly contradict the fourth, sixth, and seventh chapters of the Council of
Orange. Moreover, the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, which that Council and
Augustine frequently use in this matter, exclude every disposition that precedes God’s
operation through grace. Such is the passage from Proverbs 19 (according to the
Septuagint): The will is prepared by the Lord—for "preparation" signifies a disposition.
Hence Augustine’s common saying: It is God who prepares the will to be assisted and
assists it once prepared. Likewise, 2 Corinthians 3: We are not sufficient to think
anything...—for every pious disposition of the will must necessarily begin with holy
198 BOOK TWO
thought, as Augustine extensively argues in On the Predestination of the Saints, Ch. 2.
Again: Without Me, you can do nothing (John 15:5). For to dispose oneself remotely to
justice and proximately to calling—even if not efficaciously, but sufficiently in itself—is
already a very great thing. Therefore, nothing of the sort can come from us. For this
reason (as many theologians have noted), the work of grace is compared in Scripture to
creation, as in Ephesians 2: Created in good works, which God has prepared, and Psalm
50: Create in me a clean heart, O God. For just as creation presupposes no disposition
on the part of the thing to be created, so too justification, taken from its first
beginning, presupposes none. Augustine also demonstrated this in On the
Predestination of the Saints, Ch. 15, using the example of Christ the Lord, whom he
calls the exemplar of our predestination—in whom no disposition preceded the first
gift of grace, which in Him was the grace of union.
29. A philosophical argument. Finally, we may adduce a philosophical argument:
because even a remote disposition must be proportionate and of the same order as the
form to which it is said to dispose. Likewise, we may apply to this point the argument
given by St. Thomas (I-II, q. 109, a. 6): because it belongs to the same agent to induce a
form, to dispose toward it, and even to initiate that disposition. But God, as a
supernatural cause, is the one who induces the form of grace; therefore, He is also the
one who principally disposes toward it—and thus He also initiates the disposition, not
man. Moreover, we may argue from inconvenience: because such a disposition cannot
be denied to involve some merit. For the disposition in question is not merely physical
but moral, and thus requires freedom and a goodness in some way proportioned to the
proximate effect for which it disposes (for how could it be a disposition if it lacks
proportion?). Therefore, it is contradictory to say that it is a true disposition yet not in
any way meritorious—at least de congruo. For such a disposition is in some way owed
such a form; therefore, the one who freely and rightly brings about that disposition is in
some way owed that same form by reason of such an act. But this is precisely meritum
de congruo and nothing else. Consequently, the arguments brought forth in the
previous chapter equally prove this assertion. For what is given to man in view of a
proportionate moral disposition is not given entirely gratuitously. Hence, if such a
disposition is admitted, the perfect notion of grace is undermined—since grace is in
some way subjected to human labor.
30. And these proofs that we have adduced concerning a man not yet called to his
end, if rightly considered, apply proportionately to a man existing outside the state of
sanctifying grace, operating solely by natural reason and the powers of free will. For by
such a work, he cannot dispose himself to any new supernatural grace or gift, since no
divine promise of supernatural goods has been made for such a work. Nor does the
work itself have any proportion with such grace, nor does it participate in it from the
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dignity of the person acting (since he is supposed to be in a state of mortal sin), nor
finally from Christ (since it is not done from Him or in Him). Therefore, even if a
sinner already has infused faith and hope and performs some morally good work with
them, unless he acts from them in some way, he does not truly dispose himself either
for an increase of that faith and hope or for receiving new supernatural aids by which
he might gradually prepare himself for infused repentance. For in such a man, with
respect to such a work, faith and hope exist only materially and accidentally, or
concomitantly. Hence, when Daniel said to the king, Redeem your sins with
almsgiving (Dan. 4:24), we must not think that he advised almsgiving—that is, works of
mercy—as the primary remedy. Rather, he first demanded from him true faith in God
and acknowledgment that he had offended Him by his sins, along with hope of
obtaining pardon from Him. And in this way, he counseled him to perform
almsgiving from this faith, hope, and intention, for the redemption of his sins. And in
the same way, similar scriptural testimonies must be understood.
31. The same holds a fortiori for a man called to faith but who does not yet believe,
but rather dissents and resists the truths of faith. For while he remains in such a state,
he cannot dispose himself to faith, since he is presupposed to be in the worst possible
disposition. If, however, he does not resist but deliberates whether he ought to believe,
he still requires God’s help to progress further. For if he does anything good in order to
be illuminated by God, he already begins in some way to believe and to act from God’s
grace, since that intention is not without some credence in God and hope that He may
enlighten him. Moreover, that intention is a work of piety, which cannot be done
without grace. Therefore, through such a good work, one may in some way be disposed
to receive further aids, as we will discuss more extensively in Chapter 20 below. But if
such a man, after that calling, performs good works in the same way he did before—
solely by natural reason—he does not morally dispose himself through them to
supernatural aids of grace. This is even more evident from what has been said about a
sinful believer, for in that case, the entire preceding call to faith relates to the
subsequent good work only materially and concomitantly.
32. A Doubt and Response. One might only raise a doubt concerning certain acts
that such a man can perform by the natural powers of his intellect and free will
regarding the matters of faith already proposed to him—whether by reflecting on
them, inquiring of others, listening, or meditating through purely natural reasoning, so
that he may better grasp them and ultimately deliberate more prudently. Indeed, he may
even arrive at a humanly acquired faith, believing and being affected by these things in a
merely human way. Yet it does not seem possible to deny that through these acts, such a
man is better disposed to receive the final calling and an affection for faith. However,
two points must be made: (1) Physical vs. Moral Disposition: If these acts have any
200 BOOK TWO
dispositive quality, it is more physical than moral. It is not inconsistent that one man,
through his natural properties, may in some way be more disposed to supernatural
actions than another—just as we said earlier about angels, that those more perfect in
nature were in some way more capable of higher grace, or that a man of sharper
intellect is more disposed to grasp the truths of faith more easily, or that a man of well-
balanced temperament is more apt for virtue. Thus, a man called to faith may, through
these subsequent acts, become more receptive and prompt in his physical capacity to
receive the illuminations of faith, even if he lacks a moral disposition per se ordered to
supernatural gifts. (2) Grace and Providence: Although these acts can be performed
without an internal grace proper to the supernatural order, they nevertheless cannot
occur without a special providential grace or without aids and concurrences not owed
to nature as such—and thus in some way gratuitous, since all such acts are grounded in
the first supernatural calling, which is already presupposed. Therefore, whatever
dispositive quality these acts have is not entirely without grace.
33. Another Doubt and Response: The Summation of the Chapter. It remained to
discuss the case of a just man who, not by justice but by nature alone, performs some
morally good work. But this raises a separate question: whether through such acts he
not only disposes himself but even merits—whether de congruo or de condigno—
which does not pertain to our present purpose. You might object that it does matter
greatly, for perhaps such a man could through these acts dispose himself to receive the
gift of perseverance—and thus to his predestination, at least regarding one of its
principal effects. I respond that such acts truly do not suffice for this. Yet if one were
to affirm this of them, he ought to attribute it not to nature but to grace. For the
dignity of sanctifying grace is so great that, just as it confers a singular dignity on the
person to whom it adheres, so too does it in some way extend that dignity to all his
good works—even if, in terms of physical efficiency, they are done by natural power
alone. Thus, if there were any merit or disposition here toward a proper effect of
predestination, it would derive not from nature but from grace (which is not
contradictory, as we will see later). Moreover, such works in a predestined man would
not occur without a special providence flowing from the power of his gratuitous
election to glory (as we will discuss later). Hence, they would first be effects of
predestination before being the cause of another effect—though it is self-evident that
one effect may be the cause of another, as we will touch upon subsequently. Final
Conclusion: From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that purely natural works cannot
be a dispositive cause either of entire predestination or even of any proper effect of it.
As for the theologians who held the opposite view, they must either be charitably
interpreted as speaking not of disposition but only of the absence of an obstacle (a
point to be addressed later) or excused on the grounds that they did not realize they
201 BOOK TWO
were inclining toward the Massilian error—which the wiser among them, upon
recognizing it, retracted. The foundation of this doctrine has been resolved from the
arguments given, and more will be said in what follows.

CHAPTER VIII. WHAT THE ANCIENT

FATHERS, ESPECIALLY THE GREEKS, AND AMONG
THEM CHRYSOSTOM, THOUGHT CONCERNING THE ORIGIN
OF GRACE OR PREDESTINATION FROM THE WORKS OF NATURE.

1. The opinion of some. This question has seemed necessary for the full treatment
of the present point, lest anyone take offense either when reading these ancient Fathers
or modern writers who believe that the Greek Fathers—especially Chrysostom—did
not hold a correct view on the origin of grace, due to certain undoubtedly obscure
passages in his works. This is particularly true of Homily 17 on John and Homily 12 to
the Hebrews, where, among other things, he says that God does not anticipate our wills,
lest He constrain our freedom, but rather waits for us to take the first step, and only
then does He add His gifts. For this reason, the Massilians chiefly used this argument
against Augustine, claiming that his doctrine appeared novel and contrary to the earlier
Fathers. They seem to have had Chrysostom especially in mind, for Cassian of
Marseilles, their principal authority, was a disciple of Chrysostom and openly professed
to follow his teaching—as is clear from his On the Incarnation. Moreover, from the
passages cited above, it is evident that Cassian says nothing more than Chrysostom.
Hence, if we wish to interpret Chrysostom correctly, we will be able to explain Cassian,
Faustus, and the rest in the same way.
2. The ancient Fathers held the correct view on the cause of predestination. First
argument. This opinion cannot be proven to me in any way. For aside from the fact that
it is inherently fitting to piety and reason to interpret the holy Fathers in an orthodox
manner whenever possible, many considerations now arise that make it seem incredible
that Chrysostom or the other Fathers held such a view. First, because the doctrine we
have defended is so clearly and manifestly taught by Paul (as we have seen) that these
Fathers—especially Chrysostom—could not have been ignorant of Paul’s meaning and
intent. And if they were not ignorant of it, they certainly did not contradict it.
3. Second argument. Secondly, because Pope Celestine, in his letter to the Gallic
bishops, while confirming Augustine’s doctrine, rebuked the opposition of the
Massilians as a harmful novelty contrary to the teaching of the Fathers. Nor is it likely
that he would have so readily approved Augustine’s doctrine if he had believed it to be
in conflict with the earlier Fathers.
202 BOOK TWO
Third argument. Thirdly, a similar argument can be drawn from the Council of
Orange, insofar as it carries the authority of Pope Leo. For it approves Augustine’s
teaching and, both at the beginning and end of its canons, declares that this teaching
was received from the Fathers. Vincent of Lérins likewise confirms this in
his Commonitorium Against Profane Novelties, in the final chapter.
4. Fourth argument. Fourthly, an argument is taken from the agreement of the
Eastern bishops at the Council of Palestine, which Augustine recounts in Letter 106,
chapters 11 and 12. There, he states that Pelagius’s already-emerging doctrine was
condemned, and the doctrine of the semi-Pelagians was preemptively condemned,
since the truths defined there were confirmed under anathema. Now, the Greek
bishops in their councils were especially accustomed to adhering to the opinions of the
Greek Fathers. Therefore, it is unlikely that they would have defined anything contrary
to their mind. This argument particularly supports Chrysostom’s orthodoxy, since he
was either still living at that time (and some think it probable that he attended that
council) or at least his teaching was widely circulated and held in the highest esteem.
5. Fifth argument. Fifthly, St. Augustine in the same Letter 106 (near the end) states
absolutely that the Catholic Church has always held this doctrine. And in On the
Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14, responding to an objection drawn from the
Fathers, he says: Why should we scrutinize the writings of those who, before this heresy
arose, had no need to engage with this difficult question?—implying that they certainly
would have done so if forced to respond to such arguments. Hence, he concludes that
the Fathers touched upon the subject of God’s grace only briefly and in passing.
Therefore, Augustine does not believe their teaching contradicts his own but rather that
it is implicitly and concisely contained within his doctrine. Accordingly, in other places,
he always interprets Chrysostom favorably—as seen in On Nature and Grace, chapter
64, and especially in Against Julian (Book 1, chapters 6–7; Book 2, chapter 6), where he
notably remarks that Chrysostom could speak freely in the Catholic Church at that time
because the Pelagians had not yet arisen, and he was rightly understood by the
orthodox.
6. Sixth argument. Sixthly, I add that St. Augustine often confirms his doctrine with
testimonies from the ancient Fathers. For in On the Predestination of the Saints (at the
beginning) and in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14, he cites Cyprian’s
dictum: There is no ground for boasting, since nothing is our own—and judges this
sufficient to confirm his entire teaching. Similarly, in On the Gift of
Perseverance (chapters 19 and 23), he cites Ambrose for general statements like: My
heart is not in my own power and To pray is a gift of spiritual grace. Again, in chapter
19, he quotes Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 44 on Easter) merely for similar general
phrases. We, likewise, can adduce Basil (Homily 22 on Humility): Nothing is left to you,
203 BOOK TWO
O man, in which you may glory—and further: God was not made known to you
through your righteousness, but you to Him through His goodness. Cyril of Jerusalem
(Catechetical Lecture 1) says: It is God’s part to bestow grace, but yours to acquire and
guard it—indicating that the first act is God’s alone, while the second is ours, though
not without God’s help (as Augustine explains similarly in Retractations, Book 1,
chapter 23). Cyril adds: Do not disdain grace, for it is freely given. Philo (contemporary
with Epiphanius and consecrated bishop by divine revelation) in Commentary on the
Song of Songs (Book 1, in the Sacred Library, vol. 1) says, regarding "Terrible as an
army set in array": Good works are necessary, but first the Bridegroom must descend
into the garden—for human frailty can do nothing unless divine grace precedes. And
further: Grace begins by drawing us. St. Diadochus (On Spiritual Perfection, chapter
89) excellently explains the process of grace and how all good things begin from it. To
these we may add Hilary (On Psalm 118, Octonary 4, on "Do not take the word of
truth from my mouth"): All things must begin from His goodness—and (Octonary 3,
on "Incline my heart to Your testimonies"): He first sets before us what comes from
God. Jerome, too, provides many passages (Dialogue Against the Pelagians, Book 1),
which we have touched upon earlier.
7. Turning to Chrysostom: In Homily 28 on Genesis (near the end), he excellently
explains how faith is persuaded in men by divine grace. After listing many obstacles, he
concludes: Prevenient grace removes all these. In Homily 38, he says: Otherwise, He
always anticipates our prayers—and shows how the faith and petition of the Canaanite
woman had its origin in grace. Likewise, in Homily 12 on 1 Corinthians (on "What do
you have that you did not receive?"): You have received—not this or that, but all that
you possess. For even your right deeds are not yours, but gifts of divine grace. Even
your faith arose from His calling. Similar passages appear in Homily 8 on the same
epistle (on "To each as God has apportioned") and Homily 8 on Philippians ("God who
works in you"): He supplies both the inclination of the will and its
execution. Likewise, Homily 38 to the People: You must humble yourself, for God has
inclined you to Himself beyond others—and further: Do not reckon it a wage, lest you
lose the wage. Confess that you are saved by grace, so He may confess Himself your
debtor. Other passages will be cited later. All these preceded Augustine.
8. Marcus Eremita, nearly contemporary with Chrysostom, is also claimed by the
Massilians due to a few ambiguous statements (which I will quote later from his On
Paradise). Yet in that work and in his preceding On the Spiritual Law, he splendidly
expounds the whole doctrine of grace. Early on, he writes: First of all, we know with
certainty that God is the author of every good—its beginning, middle, and end—a
theme he develops through the first eight chapters and chapter 40: God is the initiator
of every virtue; and chapter 47: Every good proceeds from God as its
204 BOOK TWO
dispenser. Chapter 53 contains a notable statement for our purposes: Every good work
performed by our nature can only restrain us from evil or vice; without the addition of
sanctifying grace, it cannot make us holy. Many other passages (e.g., chapters 56, 137,
and 168) reinforce this. From On Paradise, I cite only: What is given by grace must not
be measured by the degree or merit of prior weakness, for then grace would no longer
be grace.
9. To these we may add Cyril of Alexandria and John Damascene, who postdate
Augustine (though Cyril was nearly his contemporary). Cyril, in Commentary on John,
Book 1, chapter 20, explicating Paul’s "What do you have that you did not receive?" (1
Cor. 4:7), states: Not only existence, but well-being, and even the mode of being, are
received. Later, he adds: All things are given by the freedom of His generosity. In Book
4, chapter 24, he admirably expounds "You did not choose Me, but I chose you" (Jn.
15:16): "I," He says, "made Myself known to you when you were ignorant, moved by
mercy." With this example, Cyril shows God converting the unworthy and resistant. In
Book 5 on Isaiah 25, discussing "If anyone thirsts, let him come to Me" (Is. 55:1), he
writes: Let them receive—not by purchasing with money, but by the most lavish and
ready generosity. Yet he clarifies: The rest is bought through faith. Damascene (On the
Orthodox Faith, Book 2, chapter 30) writes: He is the principle and cause of every
good, and without His cooperation and aid, it is impossible for us to will or do good—
though it is ours to abide in virtue and follow God, who calls us to it.
10. The objections from Chrysostom’s passages are addressed. But what does this
matter to Chrysostom? I respond, first, since he is not self-contradictory and certain
statements must be reconciled with others, those that appear difficult ought to be
interpreted in light of the sound meaning of the rest rather than vice versa—both
because this can easily be done and because it is more consistent with reason and piety.
Secondly, because nearly the same careful interpretation required for Chrysostom is also
necessary for the other Fathers, as modern scholars both employ and admit. Yet I do
not see why they would believe this impossible in Chrysostom’s case. Therefore, I hold
that these Fathers followed Scripture, which sometimes ascribes all things to grace,
while at other times it seems to demand the beginning of good works from man (Is.
30: The Lord waits to show you mercy; 1 Sam. 3: Prepare your hearts for the Lord; Ps.
118: I rose before dawn and cried out). Many similar passages are also cited by the
Council of Trent (Session 6), which explains them thus: Through these, we are
admonished—or rather, stirred—to exercise our freedom, so that by rightly using one
grace, we may obtain another or dispose ourselves for it. Such words do not signify that
the beginning of salvation or predestination originates from us. I therefore judge that
Chrysostom and the ancient Fathers share the same meaning. But let us now examine
the individual expressions that seem to oppose this truth.
205 BOOK TWO
11. Various expressions of the Fathers are explained.—First expression. The first is
the oft-cited phrase: God does not anticipate our wills, lest He infringe upon our
freedom. But first, the same is found in Damascene (De Fide, Bk. 2, ch. 29–30; Bk. 4,
ch. 22), where he says God does not predefine or predestine these acts. Next,
Chrysostom (Hom. 2 on Ps. 50) explicitly states: God provokes us, saying, ‘Do your
part.’ And in Hom. 23 on Genesis (near the end), he correctly teaches about prevenient
grace. Most notably, in Hom. 44 on John, he says: It is the mark of a noble soul not to
reject divine inspirations—which he affirms are wrought by heavenly aid. I reply,
therefore, that this expression merely means God does not anticipate our wills by
determining them to one thing or (what amounts to the same) by physically
predetermining them. This aligns with St. Thomas’s response to Damascene: that he
spoke of necessitating predestination.
12. Second expression. Chrysostom’s second phrase is: God waits for us to begin,
that He may add perfection. Yet Nazianzen and Ambrose speak similarly, and
Augustine reconciled them to his own view. Ambrose (De Abraham, Bk. 2, ch. 7)
says: Present yourself with good zeal and ready faith, so that God may call you. Similar
remarks appear in his commentary on Ps. 118 (Octonary 10, opening) and on the
words, Let Your mercy comfort me. Nazianzen (Orat. 31), expounding Mt. 19:11 (Not
all can receive this saying, but those to whom it is given), adds: It is given to those who
will it. Hilary (in the cited passage) states: The beginning lies with us when we pray—
though he clarifies that the cry of prayer is not of the voice but of the spirit of
faith. More sharply, Jerome (Dialogue Against the Pelagians, Bk. 3) says: Ours is to ask,
His to grant; ours to begin, His to perfect. Likewise, Optatus of Milevis (Against
Parmenian, Bk. 2, near the end): Ours is to will, ours to run; God’s to perfect. Finally,
Marcus Eremita (De Paradiso, near the end): Let man first know and express his will—
adding, The work’s perfection is God’s, but the will is man’s.
13. Thus, all these Fathers intend only to teach that grace neither sanctifies nor
disposes an adult without his free cooperation, and they call this free cooperation—
which initiates the first morally good disposition in man—the beginning on man’s part.
This aligns with the Council of Orange (Canon 5), which termed the will to
believe the beginning of faith or salvation. Nor were these Fathers ignorant that divine
stirring and vocation precede even this human cooperation. Indeed, Ambrose (in the
cited passage) argues that It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs (Rom. 9:16)
was said precisely lest you justify yourself, attributing all to God who called you. Their
point, then, is not about the beginning of justification as a whole but of one or another
divine gift—e.g., calling prayer the beginning of the grace obtained through it. Thus,
they exhort men to begin so that God may follow—a point especially clear in
Chrysostom, who preached to the faithful, seeking to rouse their faith by God’s word
206 BOOK TWO
(as he often declares). He demands that they begin by consenting to grace—not
without grace’s aid, as he explains elsewhere (e.g., Hom. 2 on Ps. 50, where he says God
calls the unworthy to commend His grace; cf. Hom. 9 on Gen. 19, Acts, and Eph. 4).
14. I add that even St. Augustine sometimes speaks thus and requires this
interpretation. In 83 Questions (Q. 68), discussing He has mercy on whom He wills,
and hardens whom He wills (Rom. 9:18), he attributes this to hidden merits: in the
hardened, evil merits precede; in the recipient of mercy, most hidden merits precede
justification. Some claim Augustine retracted this when he revised his earlier view on
the merit of faith (in Retractations, Bk. 1, ch. 23). But in ch. 26, reviewing Q. 68,
he does not retract but confirms and explains his meaning: Before these good merits
(however hidden), vocation precedes without merit. Hence, incidentally, it is clear (and
noteworthy) that justification here does not mean the whole progress to righteousness
from its origin, but the infusion of grace and remission of sin—which man in some
way merits through repentance conceived from faith.
15. Third expression. Chrysostom’s third and most difficult phrase seems to ascribe
too much to natural reason and its works. In Hom. 42 on Genesis, he extols Abraham’s
holiness, claiming he advanced not by faith received from parents but by knowledge
implanted in nature. In Hom. 3 on 1 Corinthians, he says some philosophers not only
kept the precepts but even surpassed them by reason’s light. Yet Nazianzen’s Oration
on the Father is harder: after praising his pre-faith virtues, he adds, For these (I think)
he received faith as a reward. If Augustine cites him correctly, we must explain this. A
scholiast replies that he spoke of improper merit due to a certain disposition. But I
judge that Nazianzen did not mean faith was a reward owed to such works, but that
since these works were proportionately apt for some remuneration (per Aquinas, ST I-
II, q. 21), God chose—out of His grace and magnificence—to give faith instead of a
lesser reward.
16. Chrysostom, however, is more easily explained. He praises Abraham solely
because (1) his conduct through natural knowledge did not obstruct divine vocation (as
we will discuss later), and (2) since he lacked inherited faith, he readily obeyed divine
revelation and calling. Nowhere does Chrysostom deny—at least regarding the latter—
that this occurred with the aid of divine grace. Similarly, I interpret Gregory’s remark
(Hom. 13 on the disciples going to Emmaus): They were not illumined by hearing but
by doing. He does not mean their work merited illumination (since they lacked faith),
but that the act was apt for Christ to take occasion from it to enlighten them. As for
Chrysostom’s claim about philosophers keeping precepts by reason’s light, this refers
not to all precepts but to some; his phrase sometimes surpassed means they
performed some good acts beyond precepts (e.g., occasional chastity)—though
207 BOOK TWO
elsewhere (Hom. 8 on 1 Corinthians) he notes these were not always done rightly (i.e.,
with pure intent). Cf. Cassian (Conf. 13.5).
17. Fourth expression. Chrysostom’s fourth phrase is: God calls one whom He
foreknows will cooperate (Hom. 31 and 96 on Matthew; On Paul’s Conversion; De
Compunctione Cordis, Bk. 1). Cyril of Alexandria speaks more sharply (In John, Bk. 3,
ch. 39; Bk. 4, ch. 6–7): God calls those who are worthy. Augustine similarly says (Ep. 49,
Q. 2; Serm. 76). These Fathers refer not to natural works but to those wrought by grace
and vocation’s efficacy—thus, the phrase pertains less to our question than to another
opinion (treated later). Moreover, they speak not causally (i.e., God calls because He
foresaw consent) but presciently: knowing one would consent, He deems
them worthy of subsequent grace. This harmonizes with grace, for God’s efficacious
call (which Chrysostom says penetrates the soul) flows from His benevolence—indeed,
it is the grace Augustine extols. Finally, this foreknowledge may be
understood conditionally (consistent with grace) or absolutely (presupposing God’s
gratuitous decree). The latter aligns with Augustine’s predestination of what He
Himself would accomplish.
1 8 . F i f t h e x p r e s s i o n . C h r y s o s t o m ’s f i f t h p h r a s e : G o d d e m a n d s
repentance (which alone cannot remove sin) but forgives when grace and mercy
intervene (Hom. 17 and 42 on Genesis). Some infer he requires repentance elicited by
free will alone, which obtains forgiveness—as if grace-aided repentance would suffice
by i t s e l f. T h e y c l a i m C a s s i a n f o l l ow s t h i s ( C o n f. 2 0 . 8 ) . I r e p l y :
Chrysostom cannot mean natural repentance, for he cites sufficient, immediate
dispositions like David’s I have sinned against the Lord (2 Sam. 12:13) or the
thief ’s Remember me (Lk. 23:42), and texts like Return to Me (Joel 2:12). His point is
that even supernatural repentance does not formally justify without God’s new
mercy infusing righteousness—a sound doctrine I treated at length (Disputations, Vol.
1, Disp. 4, Sect. 8). Cassian, too, may be read thus.
19. Sixth expression. A sixth phrase (notably in Marcus Eremita) states that grace
presupposes a natural promptness of will—even calling the will a natural aid. The first
part resembles Augustine: To be able to have faith is of man’s nature; to have it is of
the faithful’s grace. Here, promptness is either the will’s natural capacity (indistinct from
the will itself) or its innate inclination to moral good (which grace presupposes, though
in fallen man it is hindered by original sin). The second part terms the will
an aid because without its freedom, grace does not perfect sanctifying works. Marcus
clarifies: Actual salvation-works require grace, but the will’s potency is grace’s
instrument for supernatural acts.
20. Lastly, critics note these Fathers emphasize free will while scarcely mentioning
grace—e.g., Clement (Stromata, Bk. 5), Damascene (De Fide, Bk. 2, ch. 26), and even
208 BOOK TWO
Augustine (De Libero Arbitrio, Bk. 3). Augustine later explains (Retract. 1.8*): Silence
does not imply exclusion; he was then disputing only that topic. Faustus adds (De Lib.
Arb., Bk. 1, ch. 6): To name one is not to deny the other (per Augustine’s rule). These
Fathers either argued against Manicheans or rebuked human negligence—hence
stressing freedom—though elsewhere they do affirm grace.
21. I add that Chrysostom (Homily on Adam and Eve) explicitly taught grace’s full
doctrine—so clearly that some suspect parts were added by Prosper. The letter of
Celestine quotes it verbatim, fueling doubts. Others hold Chrysostom, hearing of
Pelagius late in life, clarified his stance, which Celestine then adopted. While uncertain,
this is plausible.

CHAPTER IX. AN OBJECTION

AGAINST THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTION IS PROPOSED.

1. Against the arguments of the preceding chapter—and in favor of both the

Scholastics and the Massilians—one may object using the Pauline axiom: God wills all
men to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4). From this, it is inferred that God is prepared to give His
grace or illumination to every man who does not place an obstacle in the way.
Consequently, He gives it to everyone who, in the manner possible to them, makes
good use of their freedom and reason. Therefore, if a person unprevented by grace
does what good they can, they will obtain grace from God. Thus, at least dispositively
or congruently, they will merit the first aid of grace, and through this means, they may
obtain all the remaining effects of predestination. Hence, it is not contradictory for
there to be some cause of the whole of predestination—on the part of its effects—
founded on a purely natural and morally good act.
2. This assumption is proven because every adult (for we speak only of them) has the
power to attain salvation as long as they live—as we will show concerning the reprobate
in Book IV. But this cannot be within their power except through some exercise of
their freedom. Therefore, if they are not prevented by any grace, this power must be
founded on a good act possible for such a person. Yet such an act is possible for them
only through the powers of nature. Consequently, this act will be a sufficient
disposition and preparation to obtain prevenient grace from God. This is further
confirmed because, just as grace presupposes nature and has an intrinsic relation to it
(since grace perfects nature), so too the first grace—which presupposes no prior grace
—must be satisfied (so to speak) with that moral disposition which nature can elicit by
its own powers. To demand more would be unjust, for it would require of man what is
impossible. To regard this disposition as nothing seems unreasonable and contrary to
divine providence. For the weaker and more destitute a man is, if he does what he can
209 BOOK TWO
according to the powers he possesses, it belongs to the providence of the Author of
grace to esteem this effort (so to speak) and confer grace upon him—at least by
beginning the work of grace in him. For this seems owed by providence to man, who is
elevated to a supernatural end, since in that state he cannot tend toward it otherwise.
3. To this objection, some think no answer is possible except by asserting that man,
without the aid of grace, can do nothing morally good by natural reason and free will
alone—at least nothing that is not sinful. From this principle, the objection is easily
resolved: either man is prevented by some grace, or he is not. If by some grace, then
this is already an effect of predestination, and thus the operation proceeding from it
cannot be the cause of all predestination’s effects. But if unprevented by grace,
whatever he does by his freedom will be sinful and thus will hinder rather than aid
grace and the effects of predestination.
4. This response seems implied by those theologians who interpret the axiom "To the
one who does what is in him, God will not deny grace" as referring to a man already
prevented by grace, who uses it well as far as he can. For if unprevented, whatever he
attempts will rather impede grace. St. Thomas explains this axiom (ST I-II, q. 109, a. 6,
ad 2) in the context of man’s preparation to receive habitual grace. He says it must be
understood of a man doing what is in him through the prevenient aid of grace. Yet
elsewhere (ST I-II, q. 112, a. 2), discussing preparation for the first grace, he says no
preparation is required on man’s part, since it must come from grace’s aid. Thus (a. 3),
he concludes that no grace is infallibly given because man does what is in him by free
will, but only according to God’s motion and intention. This view is followed by
Cajetan, Conradus, Soto (De Natura et Gratia, Bk. 2, ch. 3), Capreolus (on Sent. I, d.
28, q. 1, a. 1), Ferrariensis (Contra Gentiles, Bk. 3, ch. 159), Bonaventure (Sent. III, d.
28, a. 2, q. 1), Gregory (I, d. 41), Marsilius (I, q. 41, a. 2; II, q. 28, a. 3–4), Antoninus
(IV, tit. 9, c. 5, §4), Alexander of Hales (III, q. 69, m. 5, a. 3), Gerson (Alphabetum,
letter M), and the Summa Halensis (Bk. 3, tr. 2, c. 4). Their precise stance will be
addressed later.
5. This response is further strengthened. The objection may also be refuted because,
unless dismissed in this way, it contains two errors: (1) That free will, by itself, can do
what is necessary for living honestly, absolutely and simply. (2) That free will, by its
natural powers alone, can so prepare itself for grace as to infallibly obtain it from God.
The first is clear because the axiom "to do what is in him" must necessarily be taken in
this sense. For while man can certainly do what is in him toward sinning, it is
blasphemous to say God gives grace to one who does so. Therefore, it must refer to
acting honestly. Yet to say man can, by free will alone, live a morally good and innocent
life is Pelagianism. Nor can it be said that the axiom only conditionally asserts grace
follows if man does his part, for conditionals posit nothing in reality. This is not the
210 BOOK TWO
mind of the doctors, nor does it serve the intended purpose—namely, to show it is not
impossible for unprevented man to obtain grace. Thus, it presupposes this as possible
and achievable by man’s natural powers. From this follows the second error: that such
an operation is deemed a sufficient and infallible disposition for obtaining grace—
which is directly affirmed in the axiom. For if this operation is supernatural, it is
Pelagian to say it is done by free will alone; if natural, it is Semi-Pelagian to call it
sufficient for obtaining grace.
6. To the objection, therefore, these authors consistently reply: In the predestined,
there is no morally good work that does not stem from predestination itself, and thus it
cannot be the cause of the whole of predestination. They further presuppose that the
adequate effect of predestination in this life is grace, and thus conclude that such a
work cannot exist except from grace. In the predestined, this grace is an effect of
predestination; in the reprobate (if they perform such a work), it is still from grace,
though not an effect of predestination. When asked how it is within man’s power to
have this grace, they answer: Because God is prepared to give it to all—and this is
proven solely from Paul’s words, God wills all men to be saved.

CHAPTER X. THREE WAYS OF

ASSERTING THAT A MORALLY GOOD WORK
CANNOT EXIST EXCEPT FROM PREDESTINATION OR GRACE.

1. Theologians formally dispute whether, in the matter of grace, man can—without

the aid of grace and by the powers of free will alone—perform a morally good work
that is simply honest (i.e., good in its object and circumstances). Yet we cannot avoid
carefully examining this principle here, since some today seem to teach that there is
such a necessary connection between gratuitous predestination and the necessity of
grace for every such work that one cannot defend the thesis that predestination has no
cause on our part (with respect to the collection of its effects) unless one
simultaneously defends the claim that a morally good work cannot be done without
grace. This seems to us harsh and problematic, for truth does not depend on falsehood,
nor certainty on uncertainty. Hence, this principle must be thoroughly examined here.
2. The first way of speaking (heretical). The first mode is explicated as heretical.
Various ways—or possible arguments—have been asserted to claim that man cannot
perform any good work by natural powers alone, without grace. The first is to
understand this of sanctifying grace, as many heretics of this age (with Luther, Art. 36)
have taught. This sense is heretical because it entails that all sinners, even if they have
faith and are Christians, sin in all their works since they act without sanctifying grace.
The consequence is utterly absurd and heretical, for it would mean that even in acts of
211 BOOK TWO
dead faith, servile fear, or attrition, the sinner sins—a position condemned by the
Council of Trent (Session 6, Canon 7). It is also self-evidently false, since sanctifying
grace (with its habits) remains in first act alone without actual influx and is not a
necessary circumstance for the moral honesty of a work. Thus, a work can be simply
good and honest without it, even if not as perfect as possible (for such perfection is not
required for the simple goodness under discussion).
3. The second way of speaking (also heretical). This view is rejected both as heretical
and as lacking foundation. The second mode was held by those who
thought faith necessary for the moral honesty of any human work, interpreting Rom.
14:23 (Whatever is not from faith is sin) and Heb. 11:6 (Without faith it is impossible to
please God) to mean that every good work pleases God. Modern heretics teach this,
marshaling Augustinian texts in support—though we cannot address these here, as they
fall outside our scope and belong to the treatise on faith. This position must be rejected
as heretical and baseless, for it implies that all works of unbelievers are necessarily
sinful, which contradicts Christ’s words in Mt. 5:47 (Do not even the Gentiles do the
same?). If one objects that Gentiles perform what is substantially good but lack
the circumstances for perfect goodness, Christ’s statement is unqualified: He
acknowledges that pagans can do what natural law dictates—and this includes acting
well in circumstances, not merely in substance. Moreover, infused supernatural faith is
not a necessary circumstance for the moral honesty of a natural work, as these belong
to different orders. Otherwise, an unbeliever’s efforts to examine or obtain faith would
themselves be sinful—an absurdity condemned by Trent (Session 6, Canon 7). While
faith is necessary for works to merit eternal life (as in Heb. 11:6), it is not required
for natural moral goodness, which suffices if the work conforms to right natural reason
(i.e., conscience). Thus, Paul’s "whatever is not from faith is sin" likely means "whatever
is against conscience is sin" (as the context and common interpretation suggest),
though the passage admits other readings.
4. The third way of speaking (obsolete). The third mode posited the necessity of
grace for every morally good work by understanding grace not as a habitual gift but as
a special motion of the Holy Spirit (given even to believers), an interior supernatural
grace by which God moves man to act morally well. This seems to have been Gregory’s
view (Sent. II, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 2), followed by Capreolus (a. 3), though neither
clearly defines this grace. Their arguments (to be addressed under the fourth opinion)
are general and applicable to any mode of grace required for such works. This opinion
is now obsolete and universally abandoned; many objections against it overlap with
those against the final view.
5. Critique of the third mode. I ask these authors: Do they hold that a morally good
act is per se and by its intrinsic nature beyond the natural powers of human free will?
212 BOOK TWO
To say yes is inherently implausible and contradictory. First, neither
the object, substance, nor mode of such an act contains anything surpassing natural
volitional power. The object (with due circumstances) is knowable by natural reason—
otherwise, it would not be the natural good under discussion. The act of will tending
toward an object as conforming to natural reason cannot, by that very fact, have a
substance or entity exceeding natural human capacity. Why or how would it? Nor does
it demand an intensity or mode beyond natural volitional power, for natural reason per
se does not require this.
6. Second, otherwise, such acts could not fall under natural precepts, for no nature
can be bound by its own power to what exceeds its natural capacity. It is insufficient to
say such acts are possible through grace, since nature dictates nothing about
supernatural grace and thus cannot oblige one to seek it—especially if nature is
considered in itself, as it must be for obligations arising from it. Yet these acts do fall
under natural law (both in substance and due circumstances); to omit them would per
se be sinful. Thus, their goodness must lie within natural power.
7. Thirdly, it follows that in no state, not even in that of integral nature, could man
have performed any morally good work without this true and supernatural grace. For
the natural powers intrinsic to the will and proper to it per se remain the same in every
state. Hence, if the act itself, by its own nature and by the force of moral goodness
alone, surpasses those powers, it does so in every state. But this conclusion is contrary
to the common teaching of the Councils, Augustine, and all who follow him, who
assert that every weakness or incapacity of human nature concerning the performance
of moral good—insofar as it is in accordance with natural reason alone—arises from
the fall of the whole nature, and no plausible reason can be given for any other origin.
8. Moreover, it cannot even be understood what such a supernatural motion would
be or for what purpose it would exist. For if it is an illumination on the part of the
intellect, it ought not to propose something supernatural (so to speak) nor a
supernatural motive for acting, since neither of these is necessary for the honest act we
are discussing. But if this motion is a supernatural inspiration immediately infused into
the will, first, it never occurs except on the presupposition of illumination. Therefore,
if supernatural illumination is not necessary, neither is inspiration. Second, such motion
is only necessary to uplift and assist the will where the effect exceeds its powers. But it
has been shown that this effect, strictly speaking, does not exceed the natural powers of
the will. Therefore, such motion is unnecessary. Finally, a clear sign is that the habit
corresponding to such an act is not infused per se but acquired. Yet such motion is
usually proportionate to the habit and of the same order, and perhaps supplies its place
when the habit is lacking. Hence, just as an acquired habit is not absolutely necessary
for such an operation but aids in performing it more easily, so too such motion cannot
213 BOOK TWO
be absolutely necessary but at most assists in facilitating the act—for we are speaking
of individual acts, since the case is different with a collection of acts.
9. But if it is finally said that this necessity of grace—or the impossibility of
performing this act by natural powers alone—does not arise per se from the mere
comparison between the will and such an act, nor from any disproportion found
between them, but rather from the union of the will with the lower appetite, the tinder
of sin, and other extrinsic obstacles, especially the instigation of demons—against this,
it must be said that from this perspective, it is rightly proven that grace is necessary for
performing morally good works over a long period without admixture of sin. However,
it is not proven concerning individual acts and moments. For that rebellion of the
appetite is not found equally in all acts, nor in all circumstances, nor in all persons or
temperaments. For in doing good to friends, relatives, and parents, sensuality does not
resist, nor does it always incline toward some excess beyond the limits of reason in each
and every act of kindness. The same holds for honoring parents, aiding the poor—
especially if the person is naturally inclined to generosity and compassion—and so on.
The same is nearly true of extrinsic obstacles, since they do not always occur in every
act or at every moment. Moreover, on account of these extrinsic obstacles, even
extrinsic protection and guardianship from God—whether directly or through angels—
would suffice, without the need for internal grace through the motion of the Holy
Spirit, which is our present topic. The same applies to the instigation of demons,
concerning which we will say more later.
10. Objection to the Foregoing Arguments. One objection proper to this opinion
arises, which is directed more against the force of the arguments made than against the
assertion itself. For if the arguments are valid, they could be applied without exception
to each and every moral act in accordance with nature, and thus they would prove that
even the love of God above all things, as the Author of nature, can be had without
internal and supernatural grace—just as perfectly and efficaciously as it could be had in
the state of integral nature. The consequence seems not only contrary to St. Thomas
but also to common doctrine, and there are learned men who think this touches upon
the errors of Pelagius. Therefore, the inference seems clear by applying the arguments
made, which anyone can easily do—and so I will not dwell on it.
11. Reply to the Objection. In the state of innocence, man could observe the law of
nature. But this objection touches upon a new and extensive matter foreign to this
discussion, and so I will not pursue it. However, I will briefly say two things. First, there
is a certain difference between fallen man and man in the state of integral nature
concerning this point: before the fall, man in the state of innocence could observe the
whole law of nature for a long time by natural powers alone, whereas now, in corrupt
nature, he cannot. Since, therefore, the love of God above all things includes either
214 BOOK TWO
formally or virtually the resolution to keep the whole law of nature and never to sin
against it, there must necessarily be some difference in the capacity for this perfect love
between these two states. Thus, in reply to the objection, the inference is denied insofar
as it claims such love can be had "just as perfectly and efficaciously." For although it is
true that such an act of love, in its entity and species, does not exceed the natural
powers of the human will considered in itself, and thus it is not impossible for it to
occur for some instant or brief time by natural powers alone, nevertheless it does not
follow that it can be done just as perfectly and constantly. For the perfection of that act
in its efficacy depends extrinsically on the state of man, since from this depends the
possibility of fulfilling all that the act includes—which is not found in other honest acts
of the lower virtues. Therefore, such an act in corrupt nature will be less efficacious, or
rather inefficacious, because per se and without grace, it will not be capable of fulfilling
all the precepts of the law of nature over a long time—a perfection it would have had
in integral nature.
12. This imperfection itself, however, can be understood in two ways. First, that the
will now eliciting such an act cannot be constant or long-persevering in the resolution
that such an act includes, because the actual act of love lasts only a short time, and once
it passes, it does not leave sufficient strength to keep the will in its duty of acting well
and honestly—whereas a similar act of love would suffice in the state of integral
nature. But if one considers rightly, this difference does not lie in any intrinsic
perfection of the acts themselves but in their duration, perseverance, or efficacy, which
is greater in one than in the other—not because one act is more perfect than the other,
but because one encounters greater resistance in the subject than the other. For
example, heat of the same degree in water and in iron does not differ in intrinsic
perfection or intensity, yet in water it will last less and have less efficacy due to the
greater resistance and contrary activity of the subject. The same, then, would apply to
those two acts if the only difference between them is the one described. And this is not
without probability. But since St. Thomas seems to intend something more when
speaking on this matter, another way of explaining the imperfection of that act may be
added.
13. In the state of fallen nature, the human will cannot exercise its powers absolutely
and efficaciously in the natural love of God. From the aforementioned difference on
the part of the subjects, it follows that in the state of fallen nature, the human will
cannot exercise its powers so absolutely and efficaciously in this natural love of God as
it could in integral nature. The reason is that just as nothing is willed unless foreknown,
so too, according to the measure and mode of natural judgment by which something is
proposed as possible or lovable, the will can extend itself by its natural powers to a
natural love of a natural object proposed to it. In the state of innocence, therefore,
215 BOOK TWO
since nature was whole and sound, the observance of the natural law was proposed
absolutely and simply—and at any time, not only as possible but even as easy—and
thus the will could also easily elicit a natural love of God, perfect and obedient, with
absolute affection and a resolution to please Him in all things, without temporal
limitation or any attached condition. Nor does it matter that this wholeness was not due
to nature but was conferred upon it by a gratuitously given gift, for that gift was not the
principle of this love but only a sine qua non condition, removing the impediments to
that love. Once these were taken away, the will could exercise that love by its own
powers, and it makes little difference whether the impediments were removed naturally
or miraculously. But in corrupt nature, that long and constant observance of the
commandments is proposed as impossible by the powers of nature in such a state, and
therefore the will cannot, by itself alone, will and resolve it with an absolute and wholly
efficacious affection—and thus neither can it love God as absolutely and perfectly as it
once could. Instead, it always includes, tacitly or explicitly, the condition of loving and
obeying insofar as it is able, as I have explained more broadly in Disputation 3 of the
fourth volume on Penance.
14. An objection is raised and refuted: Grace does not restore man to the integrity of
nature enjoyed in the state of innocence. You might say that at least once nature is
healed by habitual grace, justified man can now love God above all things with a natural
love, as a natural end, so that grace is not the principle of such love but only a sine qua
non condition—as we have already said—which, though supernatural, does not prevent
the act from being natural and performed by the powers of nature, since once the
impediment is removed, the will operates by natural powers alone. The reply is that
perhaps some would concede this, since in the justified man, the impediment of sin and
conversion to creatures—which made this love of God difficult—has ceased, and
because such love would now in some way arise from grace and charity. Yet this does
not seem proven to me. Therefore, I reply by denying the inference. The reason can be
given that although the soul is healed by grace as regards the death of sin, man is not
restored to that integrity of nature which he had in the state of innocence. The
possibility of observing the commandments by the powers of free will in that state did
not arise solely from the absence of sin but largely from the absence of the fomes [of
sin] and the due subordination of the faculties. Hence, there is no parity between the
two states in this regard. And from this it also follows that in the state of fallen nature,
even a just man cannot long observe the whole natural law without new and special
assistance from grace. Further, it follows that he cannot love God, as the Author of
nature, above all things with an act altogether absolute and efficacious unless he relies
on that necessary assistance for observing the whole natural law. But just as that
assistance is supernatural, so too the certain hope of obtaining it (as far as depends on
216 BOOK TWO
God) cannot be had except by faith and with the help of grace. And by similar
reasoning, the love that must in some way rely on these principles cannot be perfected
without grace. The nature of this grace, however, depends on another question
concerning the observance of the commandments, which is not to be treated here. And
so, regarding this third opinion, let these points now suffice.

CHAPTER XI. A FOURTH OPINION IS PROPOSED, DENYING THAT

MAN CAN PERFORM MORAL GOOD BY NATURAL POWERS ALONE.

1. Certain modern authors, then, affirm that a man lacking sanctifying grace, faith,
and any supernatural illumination or inspiration—indeed, lacking even a personal call to
faith—and relying solely on natural reason and reasoning, can, by doing what lies within
him, perform a morally good act, both in its object and in all its circumstances. Yet they
assert that such a man can never perform this act without some prevenient gratia gratis
data—that is, a divine motion toward some good work. They claim this is the true grace
given through Christ, of which the Councils speak when they require grace for right
action, and thus that it constitutes a true internal illumination and inspiration of the
Holy Spirit—not, indeed, of a supernatural order, yet not owed to nature and (in that
sense) above nature. Consequently, they say this grace is an effect of predestination,
though sanctifying grace alone is the true effect of predestination, according to
Augustine (De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, Ch. 10), and thus it cannot be the cause of
the whole of predestination on the part of its effects.
2. To clarify this opinion, three foundational points are laid down, from which it is
necessarily inferred. First, some moral works obtain from God a certain grace through
Christ, as is clear from the Scriptural promises attached to almsgiving and other similar
works cited earlier. Second, this is distinctly true of all moral works, for those who claim
that certain works of mercy or other acts of acquired virtues obtain no grace from God
unjustly distinguish between these works, whereas Scripture makes no such distinction
but speaks indiscriminately. Third, the moral work that obtains some assistance of
grace, or disposes toward it, does so by virtue of a prior grace, as we proved in Chapter
VII. From these points, the conclusion is evident: no morally good work is done
without grace. This is syllogized as follows: Every moral work that, of itself, obtains an
assistance of grace, does so by an assistance of grace. Every morally good work, insofar
as it lies within itself, obtains some assistance of grace from God. Therefore, every
morally good work is done by an assistance of grace. Or conversely: No morally good
work can exist that does not obtain some grace. Every work that obtains some grace
must necessarily come from grace. Therefore, every morally good work must
necessarily come from grace.
217 BOOK TWO
3. Moreover, weightier authorities among the ancient theologians are cited for this
opinion. St. Thomas (ST I-II, q. 109, a. 2) states in the body of the article that human
nature, whether in the state of integrity or corruption, cannot perform any moral good
without divine assistance moving it to act well. In the reply to the first objection, he
adds that all human deliberation must begin from some external principle above human
minds, since before any deliberation, there must precede some non-free intellectual
thought, which can only come from God. They argue that all St. Thomas’s eminent
disciples understood him this way—such as Capreolus (In II Sent., d. 20, q. 1, a. 1,
concl. 4), Diego de Zúñiga of Seville (In II Sent., d. 28, q. 2, a. 3, notes 2 and 6), and
Francisco Romaeus (De Libertate et Necessitate Operum, truths 14–15).
4. But as for St. Thomas’s meaning, it is clear that by "divine assistance" he
understands nothing other than the general concurrence of the First Cause. For in the
first article, he had said that man needs divine assistance to know any truth, in the same
way that the action of any created agent depends on God—both as the giver of form
and as the actual mover (for this is how St. Thomas designates the general concurrence
of the First Cause). Hence, he adds that man does not need a new illumination unless it
is for knowing truths that exceed natural cognition. In the second article, reply to
objection 3, he clearly shows that he spoke of the same divine assistance in both
articles. Thus, in the first article, reply to objection 1, he says that all truth, no matter
who speaks it, comes from the Holy Spirit infusing natural light and moving the
intellect to understand and speak truth. Therefore, in the same sense, he says in the
reply to objection 1 that the human intellect is determined by the Author of nature in
its first thought (which precedes proper deliberation)—namely, through the natural light
implanted by God, along with the common motion and concurrence owed by general
providence, as he expressly states in that article. Cajetan (In I-II, q. 109) understood St.
Thomas thus, rightly noting in the first article that when asking whether man can do
this or that without grace, the question concerns any grace that surpasses the whole
natural order. In the second article, while broadly treating this question, he refutes both
that opinion and its interpretation of St. Thomas. The same may be seen in later
commentators on this passage, such as Medina, Zumel, and Valencia.
5. Next, Alexander of Hales (Summa Theologica, p. 3, q. 69, membr. 1, a. 2—
formerly q. 61, uniq. memb., § Consequenter) is cited for the same opinion, where he
requires grace for right action. Some interpret this as referring to a collection of good
works, not to individual acts—i.e., that grace is necessary to act rightly without defect
or admixture of sins against the natural law. But it is clear from the title of the first
article that he is not treating the necessity of grace for right action but for salvation.
Thus, after listing various meanings of grace in the first part of that member, he
concludes: "When it is asked whether grace is necessary for attaining salvation, the
218 BOOK TWO
intention concerns gratia gratum faciens, by which man is made acceptable to God." He
then states the conclusion: "This grace is necessary both for willing and for attaining
eternal life." Now, it is most certain that this grace is not necessary for individual moral
acts; therefore, he cannot be speaking of these. But since sanctifying grace is necessary
for collectively observing the whole natural law and moral integrity (for "whoever
stumbles in one point has become guilty of all," Jas 2:10), this doctrine could, in
principle, be understood of moral good taken collectively—since this is necessary for
salvation. In truth, however, Alexander’s resolution applies even to the individual acts
he discusses—namely, meritorious acts by which eternal life is obtained. Thus, in the
reply to objection 1, he expressly states that man cannot perform a meritorious good
without God, and in the remaining replies, he always speaks of acts aiming at
something supernatural (e.g., likeness to God). Likewise, in the second part of that
member (Consequenter), the many testimonies he adduces plainly treat the necessity of
grace for supernatural acts. Though later, in the resolution (Dicendum ergo), he
concludes generally that free will does not advance in good—whether by avoiding evil
or doing good—except by the power of grace, and thus without grace, it cannot do
good or abandon evil. Here he seems to speak collectively of the good necessary for
salvation, not by reason of individual acts but by reason of their totality—unless this
too is interpreted as referring to meritorious good for eternal life.
6. Further, the Summa of the School of Auxerre (tract. 11, ch. 1, q. 4) is cited, where
it states that without gratia gratis data, we can do no good. But it is necessary to
observe that this term gratia gratis data is highly ambiguous, especially among the
Scholastics. Often it signifies those graces ordered primarily for the utility of others, not
the sanctification of the recipient—as in 1 Corinthians 12: "There are varieties of
graces..." Sometimes it signifies an actual motion of the Holy Spirit surpassing nature,
by which He turns souls to Himself—as in Bonaventure (In II Sent., d. 28, a. 2, q. 1)
and others there, where such grace is equated with exciting or assisting grace without an
accompanying habit. Finally, in a third sense, gratia gratis data refers to any divine
influence or cooperation, however proportionate and consonant with nature, because,
though it may be called "owed to nature" in a certain ordinary sense, strictly speaking, it
is given gratuitously. It is in this third sense that the Auxerre theologian takes the term
in the cited passage, as he himself explains in resolving an argument about the necessity
of divine cooperation: "If grace is broadly taken for anything gratuitously given by
God, we readily concede that free will cannot perform a good work without grace."
Thus, he means that even general divine influence is grace in this sense.
7. This opinion is also attributed to Jean Gerson in his treatise On the Spiritual
Life (Lecture 1, Alphabet 61, Letter G), where he appears to say that man cannot
perform any work of moral virtue without some interior assistance of God's grace
219 BOOK TWO
moving him. Gerson's words are: "The conformity which a free act has with the first
and highest moral goodness (that is, with praiseworthy moral rectitude) cannot be
elicited by bare natural will unless it has been granted the faculty and grace to produce
something beyond what merely concerns the substance of the act and not its other
circumstances.” In these words, he seems to require a twofold grace for a simply good
act: one for the substance of the act, another for observing its circumstances—as is
clear from his phrase "unless another grace is granted besides that one." But it is
evident that no proper grace through Christ is required for the substance of the act.
This indicates that this author, too, is speaking broadly of grace as including any
superadded natural influence, even that of general providence owed to nature in its
own way. Gerson explains this earlier in the same lecture: "Yet I do not deny that the
soul in its natural life can act morally well.” And later, concerning man created in pure
natural state without sin’s contagion, he says: "No one doubts that he could, by the
powers of free will, perform a morally good work with all its circumstances. Otherwise,
man would be more wretched than all living things, which can perform works
conformable to their nature with only the assistance of general influence.” Regarding
fallen man, he reports that some say he cannot attain moral acts—a position he rejects,
affirming: "He can perform them by the powers he actually possesses.” He concludes
by distinguishing grace: "If grace is taken as a gift bestowed above or beyond the
powers and industry of nature, then it is not necessary for every morally good work.
But if grace means every gratuitously given gift (just as life itself is gratuitous), then it
can be said to be necessary."
8. Therefore, among Scholastic authors, few (I think) will be found who defend this
opinion as thus explained. Yet Gregory [of Rimini] and Capreolus (cited earlier in the
first opinion) might be interpreted in its favor, for they never sufficiently explain what
kind of grace they require. Modern authors may also be cited for this view—those who,
while holding that God does not predetermine the human will to evil acts (even
materially), nevertheless maintain that He predetermines it to all morally good acts, and
that without this predetermination, man can do nothing, even within the order of
moral acts. These authors may rightly call such predetermination "grace," since it is
given by God’s liberality and is not strictly owed to nature. Indeed, many think Gregory
and Capreolus spoke of this—though this is uncertain, as I noted in On Divine
Aid (Bk. 2, Chs. 3 and 6), where I also identified modern authors holding this view and
showed that their distinction between good and evil acts cannot be proven. The
question of predetermination for any acts has been treated extensively in that work.
9. To understand the foundation of this opinion (as last explained), note that this so-
called necessary grace for good acts is posited only as a previously given
excitation suited to working good. It is called grace insofar as it is fittingly given to
220 BOOK TWO
effectively move the will to perform a good act, since this suitability is not owed to
nature—even if it does not elevate nature to physically eliciting or doing something
beyond the will’s natural active powers. Proponents argue that this excitation is
necessary, not from nature’s wound by original sin, nor from any disproportion of the
act to the will’s natural powers, but solely from the will’s dependence in good works on:
prior intellectual thought, and the indifference natural to the human intellect regarding
its first thought (by which I mean any thought preceding the will’s free use). For man
cannot freely apply himself to this first thought or voluntarily propose anything
excitatory to the intellect ("nothing is willed unless foreknown"). Thus, such thought is
necessarily natural (i.e., not free) and therefore comes from an extrinsic principle. That
this thought excites toward good rather than evil—and does so in a way fitting to the
will’s disposition (whether by natural inclination, habit, bodily temperament, or other
circumstance)—is not within man’s control, nor does it happen by chance under divine
providence. Therefore, such thought, as from God and His special providence, is grace,
since it is not a gift owed to nature (else it would be given to all by ordinary law).
Hence, this grace is necessary for every good work.
10. St. Thomas seems to use this reasoning (ST I-II, q. 109, a. 2) to prove that man’s
free will cannot perform any good without God’s prior motion as its Author.
Augustine, too, everywhere argues against the Pelagians that the beginning of all good
works is from God, since holy thought cannot originate from us but only from Him (cf.
2 Cor 3:5: "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as from ourselves,
but our sufficiency is from God"). He thus interprets Christ’s "Without Me you can do
nothing" (Jn 15:5) as meaning: "Without holy thought, we can do no good, and we
cannot have holy thought except from Him." Similarly: "He who desires to do good
[does so] assuredly by holy cooperation.” Augustine reasons thus in: On the
Predestination of the Saints (Ch. 2ff.), On the Gift of Perseverance (Chs. 7, 10), On
Grace and Free Will (Ch. 8), To Simplicianus (Bk. 1, Q. 2, near the end), Against Two
Letters of the Pelagians (Bk. 2, Ch. 8), On the Merits and Remission of Sins (Bk. 2, Ch.
17). In Letter 106, he lists among Pelagius’s errors that "God’s grace is not given for
each act." Letter 107 repeats this. Jerome (Letter to Thesiphon) rebukes the Pelagians:
"They so posit God’s grace that we do not rely on His help for each work.” He often
condemns this, saying: "We need God’s help in each work." Prosper [of Aquitaine]
follows Augustine on this (e.g., Answers to the Gallic Objections, Ch. 9), as do
Fulgentius (On the Incarnation and Grace, Ch. 12) and Peter the Deacon (On the
Incarnation and Grace, Ch. 6ff.). Bernard agrees (On Grace and Free Will, Ch. 10):
"The efforts of free will toward good are null unless helped, nonexistent unless
elevated.” Thus, this opinion is confirmed by reason, Scripture, and the Fathers.
221 BOOK TWO
11. It is further confirmed by Councils and papal decrees. The Council of Orange
(Canon 9) states: "It is a divine gift both to think rightly and to restrain our feet from
falsehood and injustice. For as often as we do good, God works in us and with us that
we may work.” Canon 20 adds: "Many good things are in man which he does not do;
but man does no good which God does not enable him to do.” Most gravely, Canon 29
declares: "No one has anything of his own except lying and sin.” After many Scriptural
testimonies, Canon 25 concludes: "We also wholesomely confess and believe that in
every good work, it is not we who begin.”
12. Pope Celestine I’s Letter to the Gallic Bishops (Ch. 8) states: "All the strivings,
works, and merits of the saints must be referred to God’s glory and praise, since no one
pleases Him except by what He Himself has given.” To confirm this, he cites Pope
Zosimus’s Letter to the Bishops of the World: "Moved by God (for all good things
must be referred to their Author, from whom they are born), we have brought all these
matters to the attention of our brethren and fellow bishops.” The African bishops
praised this (as cited there): "Because the will is prepared by the Lord, and that they
may do good, He Himself touches the hearts of the faithful by paternal inspirations.
For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God—so that we
may not think our free will lacking, yet in every good movement of the human will, we
doubt not that His help prevails.” Chapter 9 adds: "God so works in men’s hearts and in
their very free will that holy thought, pious counsel, and every movement of good will
are from God; for through Him we can do some good, without whom we can do
nothing.” The same doctrine appears in the letters of Innocent I and Leo I on this
matter. Finally, the Council of Trent (Sess. 6, Ch. 16): "The power of Christ always
precedes, accompanies, and follows all our good works."
13. This opinion is established by further reasoning. Beyond these authorities, the
opinion is confirmed by arguments drawn from the same patristic and conciliar
teachings: The argument from prayer: Augustine everywhere infers the necessity of
grace from the usefulness and efficacy of prayer ("no one asks another for what is
already in his power"). The Council of Orange and other Fathers adopt this reasoning.
But we must pray for God’s help in each work to perform it rightly; therefore, grace is
necessary for each act. The argument from temptation: The same Councils teach that
we cannot overcome any temptation without God’s grace; a fortiori, we cannot do any
good without divine grace. For doing good is harder than avoiding evil—especially
since no good work is immune to demonic temptation and obstruction. Thus, grace is
necessary both to prevent hindrance and to enable the act. The argument against Semi-
Pelagianism: The Saints and Councils teach that the beginning of grace (or
predestination) does not arise from free will (as seen against the Semi-Pelagians). But if
man could perform a morally good work by free will alone, he could thereby initiate his
222 BOOK TWO
salvation by good works when reaching the age of reason. Hence, grace’s beginning
would depend on free will. The consequence is proven because: Every morally good act
pleases God and is worthy of His favor and reward. Such a man would do what lies
within him; thus, by fitting providence, God would further his effort. This good act
could involve some natural love for God (through natural knowledge of Him) or a
desire to live honestly and avoid evil, perhaps with a petition to nature’s Author. How,
then, can these acts be denied some fitness to be salvation’s beginning? If they depend
solely on free will, grace is subjected to free will.

CHAPTER XII. THAT MAN, BY REASON AND

FREE WILL, CAN PERFORM SOME MORALLY GOOD WORK
HONESTLY—THIS TRUE OPINION IS CONFIRMED BY SCRIPTURE.

1. The common and received opinion is that man, even in the state of fallen nature
and existing in sin or habitual unbelief, can perform some morally good work of
acquired virtue with due circumstances without true and proper assistance of grace. For
although he cannot perform such good works over a long period without failing, he can
regularly perform one or another. This is the clear teaching of St. Thomas (ST I-II, q.
109, a. 2), which (as I said above) Cajetan understood in this way, as did subsequent
writers after him. St. Thomas expressly teaches the same (ST II-II, q. 10, a. 4), where,
discussing whether all works of unbelievers are sins, he states: "It is manifest that
unbelievers cannot perform good works that proceed from grace—that is, meritorious
works. Nevertheless, they can in some way perform good works for which the good of
nature suffices.” By "in some way," he means without any moral evil and in a natural
manner insufficient for merit. This meaning is evident, for he infers from it that not all
works of unbelievers are sins—an inference he could not rightly make unless he meant
that unbelievers can perform those works morally well by the good of nature. For if
they were not done well, they would already be sins. This is especially clear in the
thought of this holy Doctor, who recognizes no work as indifferent in its particular
instance. Therefore, he immediately explains that an unbeliever can act with a good end
and intention—not acting from unbelief as such, but from pure and right natural
reason, as he declares in the reply to the second objection. Hence, among St. Thomas's
disciples, this is the common and unquestioned opinion.
2. Bonaventure also clearly follows this (In II Sent., d. 28). For although he seems to
require grace, he speaks broadly in the sense explained above, as is clear from art. 1, q.
2, where he gives the example of the commandment to honor parents, which he says
can be fulfilled in substance by natural piety and devotion—and this he calls gratia
gratis data. Much the same is said in art. 2, q. 1, and in q. 2, where he states that man
223 BOOK TWO
can overcome some temptation, though not all, without any grace. In q. 3, concerning
man in a purely natural state, he says that he can perform some morally good work
without any grace—where he seems to take "grace" more strictly as a supernatural gift
or assistance. But at the end of the question, he carefully explains that if it is sometimes
said that man cannot perform any morally good work without grace, "grace" must be
understood to include the common influence gratuitously given by God. Indeed, more
strongly, he interprets Christ's words ("Without Me you can do nothing," Jn 15:5) in
this sense. I do not approve of this, but I mention it because it clarifies that author's
opinion. Alexander of Hales (p. 3, q. 61) is also often cited for this view, though he
never sufficiently explains his meaning, even if he favors this position rather than the
opposite in members 1 and 7. The School of Auxerre and Jean Gerson (in the places
cited above) teach it more clearly. Still more explicitly—and inclining to the other
extreme—are Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel [Biel], and their followers, as seen above. This
opinion is also much defended among modern writers, especially against the heretics of
this age who say free will in fallen nature is a mere name and so enslaved to sin that
without grace it can do nothing else, as may be seen in Driedo (On the Captivity and
Redemption of Mankind, tract 4, ch. 2), Huard (art. 7 against Luther), Roffensis (art.
36), and Bellarmine (On Grace and Free Will, bk. 5, chs. 2–3).
3. Augustine's Interpretation [of Romans 2:14] Is Not Admitted. These authors
commonly prove this opinion from Paul's words in Romans 2:14: "The Gentiles, who
do not have the law, do by nature what the law requires." Augustine usually understands
this passage as referring to Gentiles already enlightened by faith in Christ, who are said
to "do by nature what the law requires"—not because they do so without grace, but
because their nature, healed by grace, naturally does what belongs to the natural law
(i.e., what is consonant with nature), though not without the help of grace. This is
roughly Augustine's view (On the Spirit and the Letter, chs. 26–27), followed by
Fulgentius (On the Incarnation and Grace, ch. 16) and St. Thomas (ST I-II, q. 106, a. 4,
ad 1). But even Augustine does not absolutely adhere to this interpretation, for he
immediately adds another, which we will soon see. Nor does it seem to fit the context
or the words. First, Paul is not speaking of Gentiles already enlightened by Christ's
Gospel, but absolutely and in themselves, as they were before Christ's coming and as
they would be—as it were, the raw material for evangelical preaching, or the soil in
which the Gospel word was to be sown. He speaks similarly of Jews, not as believers in
Christ, but as professing their own law. For he speaks of both in the same
way: "Tribulation and distress for every human being who does evil, the Jew first and
also the Greek" (i.e., the Gentile—for these two words are equivalent in Paul, as
Augustine rightly notes). Finally, "Gentile" is the same as one living in uncircumcision,
without the yoke of the written law. And Paul had spoken this way earlier (Rom
224 BOOK TWO
1:13): "I often intended to come to you... that I might reap some harvest among you as
well as among the rest of the Gentiles," where "Gentiles" means all living in
uncircumcision, among whom he was bearing fruit.
4. Indeed, in Sacred Scripture, the term "Gentiles" is scarcely ever used for
Christians, but for uncircumcised idolaters (1 Cor 10:20: "What pagans sacrifice"; 1 Cor
12:2: "When you were pagans, you were led astray to mute idols"). They are expressly
distinguished from Christians along with the Jews (1 Cor 1:23–24): "A stumbling block
to Jews and folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ
the power of God and the wisdom of God." Therefore, the terms "Gentiles" and
"Jews," used absolutely by Paul, are not names for people already called to faith or for
Christians, but for two peoples about whom he intends to teach in that Epistle to the
Romans that both can be justified indifferently by living faith in Christ. This is
confirmed by the words the Apostle adds immediately in the same chapter (Rom 2:10–
11): "Glory and honor and peace for everyone who does good, the Jew first and also
the Greek. For God shows no partiality." He is speaking, then, of Jews and Greeks
insofar as all can be called to faith, and it can profit all if they accept it. Therefore,
when he compares Gentiles and Jews in their manner of sinning—without the law or
with it—he is not discussing Christian Gentiles or Jews, but each group in itself and
apart from faith in Christ. Hence, he speaks of Gentiles in the same way when he
says: "The Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature what the law requires." This
is both because he uses the term univocally and because he adduces this to show that
the sins he recounted in chapter 1 are not imputed to the Gentiles without cause, since
they had the law naturally implanted in them.
5. An Objection. But someone might say: Granted that Paul is not speaking of
Gentiles converted to faith in Christ but as they were in the state of the law of nature,
yet when he attributes to them the observance of the law, he is not speaking of
unbelievers and idolaters but of the faithful who could be just in that state. For the
name "Gentiles" is indifferent to the just and sinners. And although they were more
often wicked and idolaters (and so such evil works are attributed to them), nevertheless
some could have been just and observers of the natural law. Paul, then, seems to be
speaking of these in that passage, for he says of them that "the doers of the law will be
justified" and that "glory and peace" belong to "those who do good." Hence, he must
be speaking of the law of nature—not as dictated by the natural light of the intellect
alone, but as it was also dictated in that state by the light of faith, since it could not
otherwise suffice for obtaining glory, peace, or justice. Therefore, when Paul says
that "such Gentiles do by nature what the law requires," he does not say "by nature" to
exclude the spirit of faith or the help of grace, but to exclude the written law—in the
same way that that state is called the law of nature, not because it was of nature alone
225 BOOK TWO
without grace and faith, but because it had no other precepts beyond what nature
dictated—nature, I say, not bare, but ordered to God through grace. Thus, that law was
observed "by nature"—that is, with nature as guide, not pure but affected by the light
of faith.
6. The Objection Is Rejected. Although this teaching is true in itself, I do not think it
was Paul's intention in that passage. First, the word "by nature," strictly understood,
seems to exclude powers surpassing nature. For what Catholic would dare say that Job
and other just men of that time, though uncircumcised, believed and loved God above
all things "by nature"? Especially since, in common usage and even in the common
phrasing of Scripture, what is done "by nature" is done by the inclination and efficacy
of nature itself. Second, to discuss faithful Gentiles acting from faith did not pertain to
Paul's purpose in that passage. Rather, he considers both Gentiles and Jews as acting by
their own powers, without the support of faith and grace, to show how insufficient and
weak they were for living honestly and holily. He demonstrates this in chapter 1 by the
multitude and bitterness of the vices in which the Gentiles were entangled, and in
chapter 2 by the similar conduct of the Jews. Yet lest he seem to accuse the Gentiles
unjustly, since they did not have the law, he adds that they had their own mode of
natural law, which they sometimes observed "by nature." He is speaking of them, then,
not considering faith or grace in them, but nature alone. Hence, although it is true that
he speaks indifferently of Gentiles—whether just or wicked, faithful or unbelieving—
yet in those who were faithful, he does not consider the power of faith or grace, but
only the natural light and reason. This is especially so because those Gentiles who were
faithful, insofar as they were led by the spirit of faith, pertained not so much to the law
of nature as to the law of grace, as the Fathers teach and as we have shown in the
treatise on laws.
7. The true interpretation of Paul's text is that given secondarily by Augustine (On
the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 28), where he states: "Among the Gentiles devoted to
idolatry, certain actions have been rightly established to be heard and read—actions we
cannot only refrain from blaming but must justly praise. And even if we examine their
motives, we may scarcely find in them works worthy of praise. Yet the image of God in
the human soul has not been so completely erased by the stain of earthly affections that
no traces of it remain, whereby it may rightly be said that even in their impious lives
they do some things belonging to the law or have some right understanding.” Thus,
they can "do by nature what the law requires"—that is, perform some morally good
works that are simply honest—because what was impressed on them through God's
image at creation has not been wholly obliterated. It is true that Augustine (Against
Julian, bk. 4, ch. 3), while admitting this interpretation, adds that when Gentiles "do by
nature what the law requires," if they act without faith, they do not act well, since they
226 BOOK TWO
lack a good end. Yet this is not necessarily true in every case, for infused faith is not
required to act with an honest end. It suffices to will the external work itself for its
honesty and conformity with right reason, without any evil intention—which is within
man's free power. Indeed, even concerning God as the end of nature, some good
intention can be conceived naturally—such as intending His true worship and honor, or
something similar in accordance with natural reason. Finally, it cannot simply be said
that one "does the natural law" (as Paul states) if in the very act of seeming to fulfill it,
one violates it. Therefore, according to Paul's meaning, man can "by nature" (i.e.,
without grace) perform some simply good work in conformity with the natural law.
This interpretation is given by Origen, Chrysostom, all the Greek Fathers, Jerome, and
St. Thomas (with Cajetan and Soto). Jerome (Letter 151 to Algasia, q. 8) and Cyprian
(To Quirinus, bk. 3, ch. 99) also indicate the same.
8. An Objection. You might say: Then when Paul adds, "Glory and honor and peace
for everyone who does good" (Rom 2:10), this must also apply to those who keep the
natural law by nature. Likewise, "the doers of the law will be justified" (Rom 2:13) is
true even of Gentiles who observed the natural law by nature. But this contradicts
Paul's other testimony: "If justification were through the law, then Christ died for no
purpose" (Gal 2:21). For as Augustine argues (Letter 196): "If justice comes from
nature, Christ died for no purpose."
9. Reply to the First Part of the Objection. To understand the proper sense of the
first passage (Rom 2:10), consider the immediately preceding words, where Paul speaks
in a very different manner and requires such a mode of good works for meriting eternal
life—which clearly cannot be fulfilled without grace. He says: "To those who by
patience in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, He will give eternal
life." (Rom 2:7) Here he demands not just any good work but "patience in well-
doing." This phrase includes two things: Perseverance in good works, which requires
great endurance (cf. Lk 8:15: "They hold it fast in an honest and good heart, and bear
fruit with patience”). Integrity in observing the whole collection of precepts.
For "whoever keeps the whole law but fails in one point has become guilty of all" (Jas
2:10). Thus, one who occasionally keeps a precept cannot be said to "seek glory by
patience in well-doing," but only one who patiently strives to observe all. Moreover,
Paul adds a plainly supernatural intention: seeking "glory and honor and immortality"—
certainly before God. Such things cannot be attained without grace. Therefore, when he
immediately adds, "Glory and honor and peace for everyone who does good" (Rom
2:10), he means this in the way he has just described—not of one acting by natural
powers alone, but by faith and grace, without which no one can so act.
10. The case is different with the words we are now examining ("The Gentiles, who
do not have the law, do by nature what the law requires," Rom 2:14), because: First,
227 BOOK TWO
these are not connected to the preceding but serve a different purpose. Second, they
lack any mention of "patience" or supernatural intention. Third, they speak only of
Gentiles, not of Jews already enlightened by faith. Hence, the earlier passage does not
include the word "by nature," which appears here.
11. Reply to the Second Part of the Objection. Regarding "the doers of the law will
be justified" (Rom 2:13), note that although this is followed by "When Gentiles, who do
not have the law, do by nature what the law requires" (Rom 2:14), the latter does not
explain the former but serves to show that Gentiles were not without law. For Paul
continues: "They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts" (Rom 2:15).
When Paul says "the doers of the law will be justified," he means one who keeps the
whole law fully and perfectly. For who would call someone a "doer of the law" who
keeps it only occasionally but often violates it? Since "whoever keeps the whole law but
fails in one point has become guilty of all" (Jas 2:10), no one can be justified unless he
observes the whole law—which is impossible by natural powers alone but requires faith
and grace. But when Paul says Gentiles "do by nature what the law requires," he speaks
indefinitely—not of doing all the law or being justified by such works, but only of
showing the natural law written on their hearts, which suffices if they occasionally act
according to its light.
12. A Further Challenge and Response. You might object: "Then Paul speaks
ambiguously in the same context—now of unbelieving Gentiles, now of believers; now
of those acting by natural powers, now of those acting by faith and grace. This seems
inconsistent, making the whole passage uncertain.” I reply that Paul speaks indifferently
of Gentiles (even before Christ's coming), whether they had faith or not, as he often
does under the name "the uncircumcised." Among them, some could have been
capable of justice and eternal merit no less than the Jews—if they kept the
commandments as they ought. But how this could be done, and by what power, Paul
does not explain here, for his present purpose is only to distinguish Jews and Gentiles
regarding the written law. Thus, there is no ambiguity: among Gentiles (taken generally),
some could act by faith, others by natural reason alone. Even those with faith might
sometimes act only by natural reason—just as Christians today may sometimes act from
natural motives. Hence, Paul can rightly say "the doers of the law will be justified" of
those who keep the whole law by the spirit of faith, while "Gentiles... do by nature what
the law requires" refers to those acting by natural reason alone, whether they have faith
or not. This is the true sense of the passage.
13. Further Confirmation from Romans 1. The common opinion is further
confirmed by Paul in Romans 1, where he teaches that the Gentiles could have known
the true God by natural reason and were gravely culpable for not glorifying and loving
Him rightly. He says: "They suppress the truth in unrighteousness. For what can be
228 BOOK TWO
known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the
creation of the world, His invisible attributes—His eternal power and divine nature—
have been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without
excuse, for although they knew God, they did not honor Him as God or give thanks to
Him." (Rom 1:18–21) From this we gather: Firstly, these ancient Gentiles had sufficient
knowledge of God's truth for at least natural justice (i.e., moral goodness and honesty).
Otherwise, Paul could not say they "suppress the truth.” Secondly, this knowledge was
manifested to them not by faith or supernatural revelation but by "the things that have
been made"—the natural teaching of creation. Thirdly, this knowledge sufficed to
glorify God and give Him thanks, as proved by "they are without excuse." If their
knowledge were insufficient, they could rightly be excused. Thus, man can perform
some morally good work by natural reason and free will, even without grace—though
for perfect and meritorious works, grace is necessary. This is the true and Catholic
doctrine.
14. The common opinion is confirmed by reason. From this we conclude the
following argument: Since without grace, through the natural course of things alone,
man can possess whatever knowledge is necessary for acting rightly according to natural
moral goodness, and since once this knowledge is present, grace is not additionally
required on the part of the will, it follows that grace is not absolutely necessary for
individual morally good acts of acquired virtues. The major premise is drawn from
what was established in Chapter Ten, namely that the act in question does not exceed
the natural powers of the will and therefore does not require another principle for its
performance. Even the theologians with whom we are debating admit this, as is clear
from their stated position and will become even more evident from what follows. The
minor premise is expressly taught by Paul in the cited passages, for he appeals to
creation and the works of God precisely to show that this knowledge was attained by
nature without grace, as the Fathers understood—a point Bellarmine thoroughly
demonstrates in Book Four, Chapter Two, and Book Five, Chapter Two of On Grace
and Free Will.
15. This truth is perfectly confirmed by another testimony of Paul in Acts 14, where,
after speaking of God permitting the Gentiles in past generations to walk in their own
ways, he adds: "Yet He did not leave Himself without witness, for He did good by
giving you rains from heaven..." We will examine this testimony more fully in the next
chapter. For now, we simply note that Paul considers the natural testimony of creation
sufficient to prompt man to seek God in some way and to perform good. Concerning
this divine testimony, Paul further states in Acts 17: "That they should seek God, in the
hope that they might feel their way toward Him and find Him. Yet He is actually not far
229 BOOK TWO
from each one of us." Chrysostom and other Fathers interpret these passages as
referring to natural knowledge and the morally good actions that conform to it.
16. Finally, Christ’s words in Matthew 5 deserve to be cited for confirming this
truth: "If you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Do not even the tax
collectors do the same? And if you greet only your brothers, what more are you doing
than others?" By these words, Christ signifies that such love and kindness are indeed
good and can arise from natural reason and inclination, though they are not worthy of
reward, since they proceed neither from faith nor from grace—as St. Anselm, St.
Thomas, and other commentators explain. Among them, Maldonatus rightly observes
that Christ does not deny that those who love their friends will receive a reward (for
loving friends is an act of charity), but He does deny a reward if they act as the tax
collectors do—that is, if they act not for God’s sake but either from natural affection
for friends or for their own advantage. For God rewards not nature but grace. This is
also what St. Thomas signifies in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 27, a. 7, ad 1.

CHAPTER XIII. THE SAME OPINION

IS CONFIRMED BY THE AUTHORITY OF COUNCILS.

1. A twofold method of argument from authority may be employed. Thirdly, this

opinion may be supported by the authority and definitions of the Church. Here we
must distinguish between two ways of arguing from authority: one is called negative
authority, the other is directly demonstrative. In this chapter, we will use the former
method more than the latter, though testimonies from councils may also be adduced in
the latter way. For first, the councils nowhere teach absolutely that a special assistance
of grace is necessary for each and every morally good work. Second, if in one place or
another they speak indistinctly, in other places they expressly declare which good works
are meant when they speak indefinitely. Hence, to make the argument more forceful, it
may be called not only negative authority but also argument from contrary sense, or
from the principle that an exception confirms the rule in contrary matters—or that a
prohibition or condemnation with a stated limitation indicates that the proposition
taken without limitation is not included but rather excluded from that condemnation.
2. Thus, all the passages of councils in which the qualification "as is fitting" or some
equivalent is added can be cited to prove this opinion. For example, the Council of
Trent, Session 6, Canon 3, states: "If anyone says that without the prevenient
inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His help, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as is
fitting, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be
anathema." The addition of the phrase "as is fitting" was not without reason. For
whatever is signified by it as necessary on the part of the act, so that it may be a
230 BOOK TWO
sufficient disposition for obtaining the grace of justification—whether the discussion
concerns justification for the infusion of habitual justice alone or for the whole process
of justification from its beginning to the infusion of justice—it is certain that the
council intended to preserve from this condemnation those who say man can believe or
love without the helps of grace, though not "as is fitting" to obtain the grace of
justification. Indeed, the council seems to presuppose that man can do this, for
otherwise such limitation and restriction would not have been necessary. Someone
might say that man can indeed believe or love without the assistance of grace, though
not as is fitting for justification, but that for this very reason, if the act is human and
moral, it is evil and sinful. But this cannot be said, because the circumstance "as is
fitting," whatever it may be, is not intrinsically necessary for the moral goodness of the
act, as is self-evident. Therefore, the lack of it does not per se and intrinsically render
the act evil.
3. Next, consider Canon 1 of the same session: "If anyone says that man can be
justified before God by his own works, whether done by the powers of human nature
or by the teaching of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ, let him be
anathema." In these words, the council presupposes that man can perform some works
by the powers of human nature or by the teaching of the law alone, without the help of
grace, as Pelagius held. For if the help of grace is added to the teaching of the law,
there is no doubt that man can be justified by such works. But those works that the
council supposes can be done by the powers of nature or the teaching of the law are
not thereby evil but can be good, according to the mind and intention of the same
council. For who would ever say that man can be justified by evil works of free will?
The council in this canon condemns Pelagius for asserting this about good works done
by the powers of free will or the teaching of the law. But it does not condemn him for
saying that some such works can be done. Indeed, it seems to presuppose or permit
this. Rather, it condemns him for saying that such works suffice for justification.
4. To confirm this, consider that in Chapter 8, the same council explains that man is
said to be justified gratuitously because none of the things that precede justification—
whether faith or works—merit the grace of justification. Here the council does not
judge that all those works are evil, even if done without faith or grace, but that they are
not merits of justification. Hence, in Canon 7, it condemns those who say: "All works
done before justification, whatever their manner, are truly sins." This canon more
clearly concludes—if we suppose (as do the authors with whom we are disputing) that
in the doctrine and canons of the Council of Trent, the term "justification" refers to
the whole transformation of man from the first and most remote disposition, which
begins with the first good work done by grace, up to the infusion of justice—that it is
necessary to admit that before this entire justification, a good work can exist. For Trent
231 BOOK TWO
defines that not all such works are sins, and in the individual case there is no middle
ground between sin and a good work. Therefore, such a good work is not always done
by grace, for if it were done by grace, it would not precede justification understood in
this way but would begin it, as the authors themselves admit.
5. The sixth canon of the Council of Orange belongs to the same kind of argument:
"If anyone, without God's grace, wills, believes, etc., but does not confess that it is by
the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit in us that we are enabled to do these
things as is fitting, etc." Similarly, Canon 25 adds the phrase "as is fitting," which, when
added, clearly implies that in another, lower way—not evil but insufficient for the
matter of salvation—a good work can be done. Thus, I hold that in this place, the
phrase "as is fitting" is to be interpreted as meaning "as is fitting for the matter of
salvation," whether this refers to conferring or meriting salvation or to initiating it
through some disposition. Therefore, if the work is not done in this way, "as is fitting,"
though it is good, it can be done without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit,
or at least the council's intention does not oppose this. Similarly, Canon 7 of the same
council states: "If anyone by the strength of nature does some good that pertains to the
salvation of eternal life, etc." Here is the explanation of the phrase "as is fitting," added
with the same caution and limitation, so that the definition is not understood absolutely
of any good work. Hence, when it cites Christ's words, "Without me you can do
nothing," it tacitly explains this as referring to works pertaining to the salvation of
eternal life. And with similar reasoning, it explains Paul's words: "Not that we are
sufficient of ourselves to think anything as from ourselves, etc."
6. The interpretation of both passages and this entire limitation or determination of
the good work, from which we argue, is taken from the teaching of Augustine. For
in On the Spirit and the Letter, Chapter 29, he explains Christ's words, "Without me
you can do nothing," with reference to works of justice. And in On Grace and Free
Will, Chapter 8, he explains it with reference to works by which eternal life is given.
And in On the Predestination of the Saints, Chapter 2: "As to the religion and piety of
which the Apostle was speaking, etc." And in On the Gift of Perseverance, Chapter 13:
"As to the way of piety and the true worship of God, we are not sufficient of ourselves
to think anything." Hence, in Letter 106, at the beginning, he maintains the same
manner of speaking, saying: "So that unless grace assists, we can have nothing of piety
and justice, whether in work or in will." And in On Grace and Free Will, Chapter 4, he
says that care must be taken lest, in defending free will, no place is left for the help and
grace of God with regard to a pious life and good conduct, to which eternal reward is
due. But in other places, Augustine so emphasizes this that he sometimes seems to say
that without grace and charity, a good work cannot be done. Thus, in the same
book, On Grace and Free Will, Chapter 18, he says: "Whatever good a man may think
232 BOOK TWO
he does, if it is done without charity, is in no way done well." But these and similar
words must be understood of good works by which eternal life is given, as he had said
in Chapter 8. Hence, to "do well" here is the same as to "do meritoriously." And
Augustine seems to be explained in the same way in On the Grace of Christ, Chapter
26, when he says: "What good could we do unless we loved?"—namely, meritorious
good, for shortly before he had said: "What good merits could we have when we did
not love God?" Hence, after these earlier words, he adds: "Although God's
commandment sometimes seems to be done by those who do not love but fear, yet
where there is no love, no good is imputed"—certainly to merit. Thus, from these
passages, it seems clear that by "good work," Augustine means a work that is in some
way meritorious.
7. Some difficult words of Augustine are explained. But in this last passage,
Augustine adds some words that obscure the matter: "Nor is it rightly called a good
work (namely, a work done without charity), because whatever is not of faith is sin, and
faith works through love." He means, therefore, that every work that is not from faith
working through love is sin. But these words must be piously explained by all Catholics,
unless they wish to attribute to Augustine two condemned errors—namely, that every
work of faithful or unfaithful sinners is sin. He says, then, that the work is not rightly
called good, not because it is not good, but because it does not have the condition
befitting a Christian. Or certainly, because such a work is regularly not good—not
because it cannot be, but because man is so weak that if he lacks faith or does not act
from it, he usually acts with some evil intention or one not conformed to faith. In this
sense, Augustine's proof must be taken: "Because whatever is not of faith is sin"—that
is, what is opposed to or alien from the dictate of faith, as is ordinarily the case with the
work of an unbeliever or sinner. Although Paul's words in that passage may have
another, perhaps truer meaning, as I said above. That Augustine intends nothing else
even in that passage is clear, because after those words, he again adds: "They who wish
to confess truly confess the grace of God, by which the love of God is poured out in
our hearts, so that they do not doubt that without it, no good pertaining to piety and
true justice can be done." Here he applies the same limitation and restriction.

CHAPTER XIV. THE SAME OPINION

IS PROVED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE FATHERS.

1. Here too we may distinguish between the two aforementioned methods of

argumentation—namely, the directly demonstrative and the merely indirect. Concerning
the latter, we have already cited some passages from Augustine. To these we may add
many other Augustinian expressions that must be understood in this sense. For in
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his To Simplicianus (Question 2, near the beginning), he states: "Let no one think he
has received grace because he has done good works, but rather that he cannot do good
works unless he has received grace through faith." A man begins to receive grace when
he begins to believe in God, moved by either internal or external admonition to faith.
Here he does not deny that before receiving grace, men can perform some morally
good works, but he denies that they can so act as to merit grace. Concerning this proper
manner of acting rightly, he correctly says that no one can act rightly unless he has
received grace through faith. In this context, "to receive grace" does not mean the
reception of habitual sanctifying grace through infusion, for it is clear from Augustine's
teaching that such reception is not necessary for every merit of some grace. Moreover,
he immediately adds that a man begins to receive grace when he begins to believe in
God, which often occurs before sanctifying grace. Nor does "to receive grace" mean
merely to accept a call—that is, a touch of prevenient grace—for it can happen that
after such a touch or call, someone does not begin to believe in God. Therefore, "to
receive grace" means to accept the call or excitation of grace, which a man begins to do
when he starts believing in God. Hence, it is rightly said that a man cannot act rightly—
that is, meritoriously—until he has received grace through faith. Augustine himself
clarifies this shortly afterward, saying: "No one believes unless he is called. But God in
His mercy calls, bestowing this on no one as a reward for faith, since the merits of faith
follow the call rather than precede it." Unless, therefore, God's mercy precedes by
calling, no one can believe so as to begin to be justified and receive the capacity to act
rightly—certainly meritoriously, or as is expedient for eternal life. For a man receives
this capacity through the call. In the same sense, he adds: "On whom God will have
mercy by calling him, He will have mercy so that he may believe; and on whom He will
have had mercy so that he may believe, He will bestow mercy"—that is, He will make
him merciful so that he may also act rightly. This is certainly to be understood in the
same sense—namely, that he may perform works of mercy as is fitting in relation to
eternal life. Hence, he concludes that no one may boast that he has merited God by
works of mercy, for these very works of mercy come from that grace which alone can
merit something before God.
2. The same meaning must be attributed to what Augustine says in Letter 143 (near
the end), speaking of faith working through love: "Without which, and before which,
no good works of any kind are to be esteemed, since whatever is not from faith is sin."
In these words, I confess (as in the preceding passages) that the meaning is easy but the
reasoning difficult. For it is true, in the explained sense, that such works are not to be
esteemed good in the Christian forum (so to speak)—that is, with that goodness which
contributes to eternal life. But when he immediately adds, "because whatever is not
from faith is sin," he seems to fall into another extreme, for between sin and a work of
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piety there is a middle ground: a morally good work in accordance with nature. Yet
Augustine does not seem to acknowledge this middle ground, for he proves one
extreme from the other. But this reasoning must either not be admitted or must be
moderated and piously explained—either in the way stated a little earlier or certainly by
saying that such a work is sin improperly, because it is joined to sin, performed in a
state of sin, and alienated from grace, or because it is not an act of virtue simply and
thus is sin in the broadest sense. For in The City of God (Book 19, Chapter 25),
Augustine says that virtues, even if they are desired for their own sake, if they are not
referred to God, are to be judged not as virtues but as vices—indeed, as proud and
inflated. And in Against Julian (Book 4, Chapter 13), he says that without faith there is
no true virtue. Explaining this, he adds: "We have been rightly admonished to love
wisdom so that we may most eagerly desire to treasure it up for ourselves, and that we
may endure hardships and restrain lusts so that it may be more and more acquired and
not in any way diminished." When we do this, we have true virtue because what we do
is true—that is, it is in accordance with our nature for salvation and true happiness.
Hence, he concludes: "If, therefore, virtues are of no use to man for attaining true
happiness, they are in no way true virtues." He pursues this at length there.
3. Yet sometimes he suggests that they are not true virtues because they are sins on
account of the intention of an evil end or the omission of the due end. But this must
be understood as a general rule, not without exception, as I will show below. Thus,
Augustine judged the virtues of the Romans in The City of God (Book 4, Chapters
15ff.). Sometimes he also indicates that no good work is sterile (as Julian said)—that is,
not apt for merit. But this must be understood of a complete and integral good, which
makes the doer simply good. For he says: "It cannot be that we are sterily good, but we
are not good in whatever we are sterily." And further: "In no way, therefore, are men
sterily good, but those who are not good can be more or less evil." Thus, a good work
can be sterile, but a good man cannot be sterile, because no one can be simply good
without faith and grace. But if a man has faith and grace, he cannot but bear fruit,
provided he acts as such—which, morally speaking, he cannot but sometimes do.
Finally, for this reason, considering persons, Augustine in Retractations (Book 1,
Chapter 3) regrets having said in On Order that philosophers shone with the light of
virtue without true piety. And in On Continence (at the end), he said: "Continence
without faith is not true continence, because it is sin." Augustine did not say this
because no honest work could be found in these men, but because it was rare and thus
could not generate true and absolute virtue, or because it was so defiled by sins or evil
intentions that it was scarcely found pure.
4. A notable passage. This will become clearer if we proceed to another way of
demonstratively proving this truth from the Fathers, who expressly distinguish between
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two kinds of good works—those merely in accordance with nature and those in
accordance with faith. In this regard, there is a notable passage in Augustine's On the
Spirit and the Letter (Chapters 27–28), where, as I said above, he admits that Paul's
words—"The Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature what the law requires"—
can be understood of Gentiles who, by the powers of nature alone, do something good
through the dictate of natural reason even in the impiety of their life. For of them, he
says, "we read, know, or hear of certain deeds which, according to the rule of justice,
we cannot only refrain from blaming but must even rightly and deservedly praise." He
makes clear that he is speaking of good works not only in their object but also in all
their circumstances. For he adds: "Although if we examine the motives for which they
are done, we shall scarcely find any that deserve the due praise and defense of justice."
By saying "scarcely," he admits that it sometimes happens, and he tacitly explains other
passages that seem contrary, so that they may be understood of what more frequently
occurs. How this happens by the powers of nature, he explains by saying that the image
of God in the human soul has not been so completely erased by the stain of earthly
affections that no traces of it remain. And later, concerning the Jews, however corrupt
their morals, he says the same power of nature remained in them: "For they too were
men, and that power of nature was in them by which the rational soul perceives and
does something lawful." But piety, which transfers to another, blessed, and eternal life,
has an immaculate law. Finally, he writes: "Just as certain venial sins, without which this
life is not lived, do not hinder the just from eternal life, so some good works, without
which the life of any very wicked man is with difficulty found, do not profit the
impious for eternal salvation." What could be clearer?
5. There is another notable passage under Augustine's name in the Hypognosticon
(Book 3, near the beginning), where, having said that sin deprived man's free will of the
good of possibility but not of its name and reason, he explains what he means by "the
good of possibility": "We confess that all men have free will, which indeed has the
judgment of reason—not by which it is fit to begin or certainly to accomplish what
pertains to God, but only in the works of this present life, both good and evil." He
confesses, therefore, that man did not lose free will through Adam's sin as regards the
possibility of every good but retained it, at least in the works of this present life, even
good ones. You might say that he is speaking only of good works—not morally and
honestly good but only naturally good, that is, in accordance with what is suitable for
the convenience of nature. For this is indicated by the words and examples he adds,
saying: "By good, I mean what arises from the good of nature—that is, to will to labor
in the field, to will to eat and drink, to will to have a friend, to will to have clothing, to
will to build a house, to will to take a wife, to will to raise cattle, to will to learn the art
of various good things, to will whatever good pertains to this present life—all of which
236 BOOK TWO
do not subsist without divine governance but rather are from Him and through Him
and have begun to be."
6. An evasion excluded. Yet I say that Augustine is clearly speaking of all these things
insofar as they can be done morally well by natural reason. First, because unless such
works are morally good, they cannot be called simply good nor distinguished from evil.
Second, because by evil works he means those that are morally evil, as he shows by
examples and concludes by saying: "Whatever it is not lawful or expedient to do."
Therefore, conversely, by good works he means those that it is lawful to do and as it is
lawful—that is, expedient. For if done otherwise, it is not good to eat or drink, to have
a wife or a friend. Third, because even these morally good works done well arise from
the good of nature and thus also pertain to the good of this present life. For if they are
not done well, they redound to great evil and inconvenience in this present life.
7. Fourth, Augustine confirms this in another passage in On the Perfection of
Justice, where, responding to Celestius, who objected that Paul's words—"Let him do
what he wills"—prove that a good will can be had without grace, he says: "See, I beg
you, what it is to say that mercy is not necessary for one who wills and runs, which
mercy even prevents him that he may run. For the Apostle says of someone, 'Let him
do what he wills,' and there (as I think, where it follows) he says, 'He does not sin if he
should marry'—as if to will to marry were something to be had where there is a
laborious disputation about the help of divine mercy. Or does it profit there to will
anything unless God, by the providence by which He governs all things, joins male and
female?" Here it is clear that, according to Augustine's opinion, a man can will to marry
so as not to sin, as Paul says, without the special help of divine grace. But for that will
to be without sin, it must also be done well in its circumstances—that is, simply
honestly and morally well. Especially since in the individual case it cannot be done
otherwise than either sinning or acting simply well. Here we must especially note
Augustine's opinion that where there is a laborious disputation about the necessary help
of divine grace, such a will, even if honest and without sin, does not fall under such a
disputation, because it is not esteemed as something great (that is, as nothing) unless
something higher is found in it.
8. Yet I must not fail to further weigh those words of Augustine in which he
indicates, in both passages, that these very moral and natural goods are benefits of
divine providence and are to be attributed principally to God under this title, counted
among His gifts, and sometimes perhaps special—even if they do not pertain to the
gifts of grace. This is indicated in the first passage by the words: "All these things do
not subsist without divine governance, but rather are from Him and through Him and
have begun to be." Similar words are found at the end of the second testimony, by
which he responds to the tacit objection that man might think he can attribute some
237 BOOK TWO
good to himself that he has not received from God, since every good is always from
God, with due proportion—the good of the natural order from God as author and
provider of nature, but the good of grace by a higher reason. Among the goods of the
natural order, which are to be referred to God as provider of nature, Augustine counts
the morally good work considered precisely as conformable to rational nature. But he
calls those works simply good which contribute to true holiness, whence he concludes:
"There is, therefore, free will, and whoever denies its existence is not a Catholic; and
whoever says that without God man can neither begin nor perfect a good work—that is
(note the explanation), one that pertains to His holy purpose—is a Catholic."
9. There is also on this matter an illuminating passage in Augustine's Letter 103,
where he relates how Polemo, an intemperate and incontinent man, was converted to a
better mind by the works and persuasion of Xenocrates. He adds: "Not so as to be
acquired by God, but only to be freed from the dominion of lust." Yet concerning this
very effect, he immediately states: "Nevertheless, I would not attribute even this
improvement in him to human effort but to divine action." That he speaks here not of
the work of grace but of natural providence is clear from the reason he adds: "For if
there are any good things of the body, which is our lowest part—such as beauty,
strength, health, and the like—they are from none other than God, the creator and
perfecter of nature. How much more can no other bestow the goods of the soul? For
what more proud or ungrateful thought can the human heart conceive than to suppose
that while God makes man beautiful in body, purity of soul is achieved by man?" This
reasoning excellently proves that God, as author and perfecter of nature, bestows gifts
of this kind. Augustine immediately adds the testimony of Wisdom 8:21: "No one can
be continent unless God gives it." This Augustine, like all theologians, most frequently
explains as referring to the gift given through grace. But both can be comprehended
under the same text—namely, that the perfect gift of continence, free from mortal
fault, is a gift of grace, while the imperfect gift, regarding one or another act, is a gift of
God as author of nature. Thus Augustine usually interprets Romans 11:36—"All things
are from Him and through Him and in Him"—as referring to the gifts of grace, though
it also extends to the goods of the natural order, as Augustine noted in the cited
passage from On the Spirit and the Letter. He then adds: "If Polemo, having become
continent from being lustful, had known whose gift this was, so that, rejecting the
superstitions of the Gentiles, he might piously worship Him, he would have existed not
only as continent but also as truly wise and wholesomely religious—which would have
profited him not only for the honesty of this present life but also for future
immortality." Hence it is clear that Polemo was a pagan who gave no thought to the
true faith, and thus his continence (which undoubtedly could not have been very
perfect) pertained only to the honesty of this present life. It was, therefore, a gift of
238 BOOK TWO
God as author of nature, not of proper grace, which, according to Augustine, begins
with true faith and elevates continence to the fruits of eternal life.
10. Moreover, this was the common opinion of the Fathers who preceded Augustine
and of those who followed and most adhered to him in the doctrine of grace. As for
the Greek Fathers, the first part can be shown a fortiori from what was said in Chapter
Seven, where we chiefly cited Chrysostom and Mark the Hermit, who seem to attribute
so much to free will that some accuse them of inclining to the error of the Semi-
Pelagians. But we defend them from this error and have cited many passages where
they hold it as certain that man can perform some good by the powers of nature. To
the same effect, we cited Nazianzen, Clement of Alexandria, and Damascene—the
latter Greek though later than Augustine. Here we may add Chrysostom, Homily 67 to
the People, where he says that no one is so evil as not sometimes to do some good
under nature's guidance, for which he receives some reward from God in this life, since
he is to be punished in the next. The same is found under Chrysostom's name
in Homily 26 of the Opus Imperfectum on Matthew, where it is said that unbelievers
sometimes do some good, moved by natural good. Basil, in Homily 6 on Genesis 1,
says that there are in us some virtues according to nature, to which a natural inclination
belongs. Damascene also used this opinion in On the Orthodox Faith, Book 3, Chapter
14. Among the Latins, Jerome expressly taught this in his commentaries on Galatians 1
and 5. In the first passage, he says that men lacking faith sometimes act in a holy
manner—that is, honestly and without the stain of sin—and clearly indicates that they
do this without grace, by nature's guidance alone. In the other passage, he says that
without faith there can be good works, just as faith can be without charity, so those
good works can be without faith and dead. Ambrose, in On Abraham, Book 1, Chapter
2, held that the king of Egypt acted rightly with Abraham and abstained from adultery
under nature's guidance. Similar testimonies are frequent in the ancient Fathers.
11. After Augustine, Prosper, in Against the Collator, Chapter 26, acknowledges that
even after sin man has reason, by which he can perform some works that may adorn his
present life but cannot confer eternal life. Similarly, Fulgentius, in On the Incarnation
and Grace, Chapter 26, says that there can be in unbelievers or sinners some good
works which, because they are done neither from charity nor even from faith, do not
profit for salvation. More clearly, Gregory, in Homily 27 on the Gospels, distinguishes
natural love from the love of charity: "One thing," he says, "is what is freely bestowed
by nature, another what is owed to obedience from charity." He says both are good in
their order, since Christ especially commends the latter, while to the former, as he says,
"the sacred Scriptures do not contradict." Rupert embraced this distinction and
doctrine in his commentary on John 15, and it has been received by the usage of the
Church and common consent. Finally, and chiefly, Pius V and Gregory XIII approved it
239 BOOK TWO
in the bull against Michael Baius. In this bull, these Popes either confirm and approve
this opinion on the power of free will to perform some morally good work simply
good and honest without special assistance of grace, or at least greatly favor it.
However, we will more conveniently relate their opinion in Chapter Sixteen.

CHAPTER XV. THE SAME OPINION IS PROVED BY REASON.

1. This truth can be demonstrated in two ways: either indistinctly, through extrinsic
arguments that chiefly show the truth in itself to be credible, probable, plausible, and
favorable to nature (provided it does not oppose grace, as indeed it does not); or
directly, by demonstrating the truth a priori.
2. First Method. The first mode of proof is as follows: This opinion in no way
inclines to the error of Pelagius or his followers, while avoiding the opposite extreme
of Luther’s error—that after Adam’s sin, free will avails for nothing but sinning. It
follows a middle path, which is quite consistent with nature as such and as it comes
from God, redounds to the praise of its Creator, and does not prejudice Christ the
Redeemer or His grace. Therefore, it is altogether preferable. The first part of the
antecedent, concerning Pelagius’s error, is sufficiently clear from the doctrine of the
Councils and Fathers we have cited. None of them reproved the Pelagians or Massilians
for saying that man can perform some good work by free will, but rather because they
claimed man could fulfill all the commandments, live an innocent life, merit grace by his
own powers, or initiate the work of salvation—all of which are far removed from this
opinion. Although they sometimes reprove Pelagius for denying the necessity of grace
for each work, they plainly speak of works of piety and those conducive to eternal
salvation, as we have seen. Further clarification will be given in responding to
objections.
3. As to the second part concerning Luther’s error and that of modern heretics, it is
most certain that they, under the pretext of commending grace and Christ’s
redemption, so exaggerate Adam’s fall as to say it erased the image of God in human
nature and utterly destroyed the powers of free will, especially for doing good. Hence,
they bitterly inveigh against the Scholastic doctors for commonly asserting that in fallen
man, free will retains the power to perform some morally good work without sin,
provided he does what lies within him by rightly using natural reason and his freedom.
These heretics seem to have introduced this dogma to abolish all human merits, all
dispositions for grace, and consequently the necessity of good works—and finally, to
deny free will even in good or grace-enabled works. For they say man’s will, weakened
by sin, can do no good unless God uses it as an inanimate instrument; otherwise, it
240 BOOK TWO
necessarily does evil. Our opinion is so far from these errors that it agrees with these
heretics neither in substance nor even in manner of speaking.
4. Hence, the other part is manifest: this opinion holds a safe middle path, clearly
consistent with nature, since it pertains to nature’s perfection without exceeding its
limits, as will be shown. Nature has this perfection from God, without whose
proportional concurrence it cannot act, and it belongs to divine goodness and
providence not to deny this general influence on the nature He created, however
infected by sin. Thus, even if man can perform some good work by free will, he cannot
do so without God’s proportional concurrence, so all redounds to the praise of nature’s
Author. Finally, just as this does not prejudice God’s grace, so neither does it Christ’s
redemption. For as Augustine says (Letter 105), "Christ did not die for many so that
men might be created, but for the ungodly, that they might be justified." These words
signify that Christ’s redemption presupposes natural gifts and adds supernatural ones to
elevate and aid nature, removing the impediment of sin. Therefore, admitting that some
spark of natural, free, and moral good remains after sin does no injury to Christ’s
redemption.
5. Second Method. The second, demonstrative mode of proof is as follows: A cause
having sufficient powers for some effect can sometimes produce that effect by those
same powers, notwithstanding an obstacle that, though somewhat hindering, does not
intrinsically diminish those powers, introduce insuperable resistance, or remove or
always impede some condition absolutely necessary for the act. But free will in fallen
nature is so disposed toward morally good acts proportionate to nature. Therefore, etc.
The major premise is illustrated by the example of a rational power affected by a habit
inclining it to one side. This power has in itself and in its order sufficient strength for
an act opposed to the habit, though the habit somewhat hinders it from performing
such an act. Yet since this impediment does not intrinsically weaken the power, offer
insuperable resistance to its contrary inclination, or remove a condition necessary for
acting, the power can, despite the habit, elicit the contrary act by its own strength. The
reason is that a per se sufficient and unimpeded cause, having all requisite conditions
for acting, can produce its effect with the common influence of the First Cause.
Indeed, if it is not free, it will immediately produce the effect insofar as it can.
Therefore, if it is free, it can at least will to produce such an effect. But if it can do this
with the common influence, it does not need special grace to do so.
6. It remains to prove the minor premise—namely, that free will in fallen nature is
related to morally good acts (per se considered) as a cause having sufficient powers for
such an effect in particular, and not always facing insuperable impediment or lack of
some necessary condition for acting. This is proved because, first, the human will,
considered per se and intrinsically in its pure nature or in the state of integral nature,
241 BOOK TWO
has sufficient powers for a morally good and well-performed act. For we can consider
two faculties or powers necessary for such acts: one on the part of the will itself, really
and intimately proper to it, which we may call physical, since it truly and really
efficaciously causes the act; the other on the part of the intellect and its judgment or
proposal, which we may call moral, since it does not physically effect the act of will but
only metaphorically moves, excites, advises, and persuades. The physical power of the
will, intrinsic and connatural to it, is proportionate and sufficient for such an act;
otherwise, the act per se considered would not be natural to man or proportionate to
him but would surpass his nature. Therefore, human nature, whether integral or pure,
must have sufficient physical powers for such an act. For the same reason, it has
sufficient moral powers, since the will follows the intellect and keeps proportion with it.
Thus, the will can naturally will and accomplish only what the intellect can naturally
dictate and propose as doable by it and naturally fitting. Moreover, such judgment and
proposal of the object do not exceed the natural powers of the intellect itself. Hence
(note this well), although the intellect has moral causality with respect to the will, with
respect to itself it is compared as an effect truly and physically produced by it. To
produce this effect, the intellect, considered in its pure nature, has sufficient physical
powers, since such an effect does not exceed its natural capacity or due proportion—
just as we have said of the natural act of will compared to its physical virtues.
Therefore, just as the intellect by its nature has sufficient physical powers to produce
such an act, so it has sufficient moral power to induce the will by such an act. If it is
said that the intellect itself needs the proposal and excitation of the object, it also has a
sufficient natural mode for this through the external offering of objects (which
happens by the common course of nature) and through the internal power of the agent
intellect, with God cooperating by His general influence.
7. The powers of both will and intellect are not intrinsically diminished by the fall of
nature. Such powers—whether of the will or intellect—are not intrinsically diminished
by the supervening sin or fall of nature. For these powers are not something added to
these faculties beyond their entities but are the very realities of such faculties, just as the
power of heat to warm is nothing other than the entity of that heat. Now the entity of
the will or intellect is not diminished by sin—indeed, it cannot be diminished, since it is
not a quality capable of increase or decrease but wholly indivisible. It must either be
entirely removed (which has not happened and could not happen without monstrosity
or miracle) or remain whole, since an indivisible thing cannot be divided. If the whole
entity remains, it retains its whole power to act, for it is nothing other than that entity
itself. Just as heat of degree eight, while remaining at that intensity, cannot but retain
the natural powers it has to heat, and begins to lose or have diminished powers only
when its intensity decreases (and if it were not a remissible quality, its powers could in
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no way be diminished while its entity is preserved), so it is with the will and intellect of
fallen man. Since free will is nothing other than the faculty of will and reason, the
natural internal powers of intellect and will for doing good—both physically and
morally—remaining intact, the powers of free will regarding physical force must
necessarily have remained whole.
8. That an insuperable impediment to acting well does not always and in every act
occur to man even in the state of fallen nature can easily be shown. For either this
impediment is something positive and intrinsically, permanently existing in the intellect,
will, or another power of the soul—and this cannot be supposed, since by sin no such
positive thing or quality was added to these faculties, but only the gifts of grace and
original justice were lost. Thus, they remained in that positive disposition in which they
would be in a purely natural state. But it is certain that in pure nature, no such positive
disposition intrinsically belongs to these faculties.
9. Or this impediment is the rebellion of the sensitive appetite and the infirmity of
the corruptible body, which weighs down the soul, etc. But this disorder of the
faculties, contracted through original sin, although it so weakens the power of free will
for performing morally good acts in accordance with natural reason that without grace
it cannot fulfill them all without sometimes—indeed often—falling, yet it does not so
press and hinder in every act as always to introduce great difficulty, much less an
insuperable impediment. For it often happens that something is to be done honestly
which is not repugnant to the appetite or particular inclination of the species or
individual—such as giving alms to the poor, honoring parents, and the like. In such acts,
it often happens that there is almost no difficulty; in some, even if some repugnance of
appetite intervenes, it is not so great that it cannot be overcome by the force of reason
and freedom, as experience itself teaches. And there is no reason to persuade the
contrary. Therefore, nothing prevents man from sometimes in these occasions doing
what he can by the powers of nature to exercise a good and honest act.
10. Finally, this impediment is extrinsic, arising from the suggestion and temptation
of the devil. We will speak of this point below in responding to objections. For now, we
say only that this impediment does not always press for every act and at every instant,
or at least does not press so urgently that man using reason cannot morally reject the
devil’s suggestion for a short time sufficient for one or another act. Whether this is
because the devil himself does not have so much power and authority over man, or
because God does not permit him always to use his full power—in whichever way it
happens, no true internal grace, given through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (with
which we are now concerned), intervenes there. And so it is always true that,
notwithstanding this impediment, man can without grace perform some morally good
work.
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11. Objection. Someone might say that this reasoning rightly proves that man can
without grace perform a work honest in its kind, but not good in all its circumstances.
And this is not from a defect of physical power or from a positive impediment, but
from a defect of knowledge and from the privative impediment of ignorance, which at
least always hinders the due circumstance of the end, without which the act cannot be
simply good. This is nearly Gregory’s response. For he thinks that for the honesty of
the act, a relation to God as the ultimate end is necessary, and this cannot be had
without the knowledge of faith and the help of grace.
12. Refutation. But this errs in many ways. First, an actual relation of every good act
to God is not necessary for the act to be done well and to be simply good without any
stain of guilt, as I suppose is clear from I-II, q. 18. By actual relation, I mean that which
is founded on the proper act of the worker, directly willing that end and the relation of
the work to it—whether that relation is made when the good work is done (called
formal relation) or preceded and made in its virtue (called virtual relation). Therefore, a
quasi-natural and intrinsic relation of the act tending to an honest object suffices—for
by the very fact that it is for the sake of participated honesty, which is in the object and
is not interrupted or impeded by an extrinsic relation to an evil end, the act itself tends
to God as the ultimate end of all good, which is also sometimes called virtual relation
from the force of the work, not from another action of the worker. And so this
circumstance is never lacking if the proximate end is honest and no other evil end is
added, which can happen through the mere knowledge of the goodness of the object
with all the circumstances required for its intrinsic honesty, without a higher knowledge
of God.
13. Second, even if an actual relation to God were necessary, for natural honesty it
would suffice that it be made to God as the author of nature. For this relation,
sufficient knowledge can be had by the powers of nature, and given that knowledge, it
does not exceed the powers of the will to effect it in some act. For it is not necessary
that it be made to God as efficaciously loved above all things, but it is enough that it be
made to God as loved in some imperfect way or from some affection of worshiping
and honoring Him—which Paul in Romans 1 clearly supposes possible by the powers
of nature.
14. Third, if that relation is omitted through inadvertence or ignorance either of
God or of the obligation to employ that relation, I ask whether that ignorance is
vincible or not. For if it is invincible, the omission of such a circumstance will not be
culpable and hence will not make the act evil or hinder the goodness it can have from
its object and other circumstances. But if the ignorance is culpable, it supposes in man
the power to dispel it and sufficient strength to refer the act to that end—otherwise, the
omission cannot justly be imputed as culpable. Finally, the arguments made proceed
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equally concerning goodness from circumstances and from the object, since all that
goodness does not exceed the proportion of the natural powers of the will or the
dictate of natural reason.
15. This reasoning can be briefly proposed and confirmed in another form: If grace
is necessary for each morally good act, it is so either as a physical principle or only as a
moral help exciting the will and aiding it in the same moral way. Neither can be said;
therefore, etc. The minor premise regarding the first part, about a physical principle, is
clear from what has been said. For the will has sufficient physical powers to effect such
an act, both regarding its substance and the mode due to it from its own nature or from
the force of natural reason, which mode is enough for the act to be done simply well
and honestly. Similarly, the intellect has sufficient physical powers to dictate by the light
of nature and propose to the will whatever is necessary for the honesty of that act.
Regarding the second part, about moral help, it is also clear from what has been said
that such extraordinary help, exceeding the order of nature, is not simply necessary
unless moral impediments occur and man cannot morally overcome all unless aided by
another higher power. But these impediments do not occur in every morally good act,
as has been shown. Therefore, that moral help is not simply necessary for each act of
the natural order, although it is necessary for innocence or perseverance over a long
time.
16. A response has been given to all these points. However, other authors are
compelled to reply to these arguments (insofar as can be gathered from their reasoning)
by asserting that they rightly prove that the assistance of grace is not necessary for a
man to be able to perform a moral act of this kind, but that it is necessary for him
to actually perform it—just as God’s actual concurrence is necessary for a man to act,
though not for him to be capable of acting. The reason for this necessity has been
stated above, concerning fitting reflection: for without honest reflection, a man cannot
act morally well, and unless such fitting reflection is included in God’s conditioned
foreknowledge, the man will not in fact act, however much he may be capable of it.
Therefore, fitting reflection is necessary for the act itself, yet this reflection is not
something owed, nor is it granted apart from God’s providence. It is, therefore, freely
given and consequently a true grace. Thus, without some grace, a simply good work
cannot in fact be accomplished with effect. Hence, they also frankly admit that this
reflection is not called grace because it is supernatural in itself with respect to its
substance or intrinsic mode—for nothing of that sort can be plausibly conceived in it,
since this reflection has a natural object and attains it under a natural aspect, that is,
through a medium of the natural order. It is only proximately ordered to eliciting a
natural act of the will. Therefore, they say it is called grace solely because it is a certain
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gift freely given in relation to moral rectitude and perhaps also to attaining true sanctity
and eternal beatitude.
17. Examination of the Response. Now, to examine how plausibly this has been
asserted—since this entire freely bestowed gift is placed solely in that fitting reflection
—several points must be inquired into concerning it. First, since it often happens that
this reflection is aroused by the external presentation of an object, whether through
human words or the appearance of a visible object (such as a poor man, a dead person,
or something similar), I ask whether a special providence of God is necessary for this
object to occur at a fitting time and in a fitting manner—or whether it can sometimes,
even often, occur from the general course of secondary causes operating under God’s
general influence alone. In this regard, even if it is true that very often these opportune
occasions for morally good action arise from a particular providence, involving at least
the special guardianship of the holy angels, yet it does not seem doubtful that this is not
always necessary. For there is nothing in such an external object that cannot occur to a
man at an opportune time through the ordinary course of nature, merely by allowing
secondary causes to follow their own courses under the common influence of their
Author. Just as, likewise, the occurrence of objects inciting evil at a time when they
draw a man to consent does not arise positively from a special providence of God, but
from His general providence with foreknowledge, permission, and common influence.
And although it often comes about through the industry of evil angels, it is not with
the infallible certitude of future effect, as is the case with God. Nor is that means
always necessary, for such an occasion of scandal can be presented through the mere
course of secondary causes, with God permitting and foreseeing it. The same,
therefore, can hold for a good act—with this exception, that in the latter, there is not
only permission but also either a command, counsel, or approval of God through His
simple or antecedent will. Yet an absolute will specially procuring the occurrence of
such an object is not necessary, though it is possible, for no true reason for such
necessity can be given, nor is one given by other authors. Indeed, in this, they do not
seem to contradict us.
18. Further Inquiry. Assuming this, I further ask whether, given such an object, it is
necessary for that reflection to be produced or directed by God in a special inward
operation beyond the general concurrence owed—both to the external objects or
occasions arousing such reflection and to the intellect itself eliciting and judging
according to them. Or rather (assuming the presentation of such objects through the
ordinary course of secondary causes), whether that reflection and practical judgment
concerning the good work to be performed arise from the intellect with only the
general concurrence of the First Cause. In this matter, it must absolutely be said that it
is not necessary for this reflection to be produced by a special action of God working
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inwardly in man’s intellect. For in this reflection, there is nothing supernatural—neither
on the part of the intellect itself, nor in any intrinsic mode that can be understood or
plausibly conceived, nor from any extrinsic end or elevation to a supernatural effect—
since it is ordered solely to a morally good act of the will, being in substance and mode
entirely natural. Therefore, this reflection can be aroused and produced in man through
the ordinary course and influence of secondary causes, with God concurring only by
His general influence, both inwardly and outwardly. Hence, this reflection is not from
grace but from nature. Consequently, the work of virtue, which proceeds from this
reflection alone, along with the powers of free will and the general influx of the First
Cause, is not necessarily from grace.

CHAPTER XVI. THE SAME OPINION

IS SUPPORTED BY SHOWING THE VARIOUS
INCONVENIENCES THAT FOLLOW FROM THE CONTRARY VIEW.

1. The arguments made in the previous chapter seem to sufficiently demonstrate

that, given the initial disposition of the universe, the common course of secondary
causes, and God’s concurrence with His general influence and providence, this is
enough for the conception of a good reflection that suffices for morally good action
within the natural order to be accomplished by free will. Nevertheless, the proponents
of the fourth opinion teach that when such reflection is so effective as to move one to
a good work, it constitutes true grace, distinct from the gift of creation and all the
benefits of God that are owed or consequent upon creation. Their reasoning reduces to
this: the very original (so to speak) disposition of things, and the concurrence or
occurrence of such causes or objects in relation to such a man and his faculties, does
not take place without God’s foreknowledge and providence—He who has ordained
this order of things, foreseeing it as fitting for this man to act well at such a time. This
is enough for such reflection to be said to be beyond man’s natural faculty, since he
could not have prepared such reflection for himself or the causes that excite it. It is also
called an aid of grace because such a disposition and order of causes was not owed to
this man, and therefore neither was such reflection owed. Thus, it is freely given to
excite and assist him in acting well—and so it is rightly called an aid of grace, or a
gratuitous help. Now, it is certain that such reflection is necessary for any morally good
action. On this basis, they defend the claim that no morally good work can be done by
man without the grace of God.
2. This opinion, when explained in this way, may seem not to differ from ours in
substance but only in manner of speaking. For we frankly admit that a prior intellectual
reflection is necessary for a good act of the will. Likewise, this reflection—at least the
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first—is not within man’s power but must be excited from without. Further, this
excitation does not occur without God’s providence preparing its causes. And even (as
we more probably hold and accept as true) God foresees when and where such
reflection will arise in such a fitting way that, if it is presented to the intellect, it will
infallibly produce the effect of a good will. Moreover, we all agree that the actual
concurrence of the First Cause is necessary for these acts—something not even the
Semi-Pelagians denied, whatever the Pelagians may have thought. Finally, these authors
agree with us that no higher or special internal motion of God is necessary for such
reflection and good action beyond the aforementioned mode of providence.
Concerning this, we also affirm that the opportunity for morally good action and for
fittingly reflecting and judging about such a work is foreseen by God as His own special
benefit. Therefore, the controversy seems to be merely about the name—whether this
should be called an aid of grace or not. Nevertheless, we believe it must be said that
this benefit does not transcend the order of general natural providence and is therefore
insufficient for such an act to be called a result of the grace of Christ. Nor do the
Councils speak of this kind of grace but demand something greater when they require
God’s grace for acting well. And we judge this distinction to be most serious, as it is
necessary for understanding the Councils and the Fathers—and perhaps also for
avoiding many inconveniences that sometimes arise from improperly extended
statements.
3. First Inconvenience. The first serious inconvenience following from that opinion
is that such a mode of grace does not satisfy the proper and strict sense of the words
by which the Councils teach that grace is necessary for acting well. For if the Councils,
in their definitions, include each and every morally good work of whatever order or
kind, then some greater divine assistance must be conferred. Or if the Councils do not
encompass all these acts, then it is groundless and untrue to say that grace is necessary
for others. The antecedent is clear from the Council of Orange (chapters 5 and 6),
which requires illumination and inspiration through the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.
Chapter 6 states: To think rightly is a divine gift, and as often as we do good, God
works in us and with us so that we may work. Now, who would say that a natural
reflection arising from natural causes with only God’s general concurrence is called the
illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, or that it occurs through His infusion,
or that by reason of it alone God works in us so that we may work—or that He brings
it about that we act, as is said in chapter 20? Therefore, it is far truer that the Councils
do not include all good actions but only those pertaining to eternal salvation, as has
been said.
4. Second Inconvenience. Secondly, if someone contends that the aforementioned
fitting reflection, explained in the manner above, is rightly called the illumination and
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inspiration of the Holy Spirit, it follows—by the force of conciliar doctrine and
definitions—that no higher prevenient and assisting grace is necessary for believing,
hoping, loving, or repenting. No Catholic would say this, as I now assume. The
consequence is clear, since the Councils speak with the same tenor and universality
about all these matters, as is evident from the cited words: As often as we do good,
God works in us and with us so that we may work—and from the testimonies of
Scripture that the Council of Orange adduces: Without Me, you can do nothing (John
15:5); What do you have that you have not received? (1 Cor. 4:7); and No one has
anything good unless it is given from above (cf. James 1:17). Finally, the Council of
Trent (Session 6), speaking of the grace necessary for acts of faith, etc., declares it to be
through the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if mere fitting
reflection suffices for the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, a similar mode
of grace would suffice for believing, loving, and repenting as one ought. But the
consequent is entirely false and absurd, for it confuses the order of grace with the order
of nature and abolishes the necessity of infused habits per se. A special consideration
may be given to the testimony of Augustine (Epistle 106, near the beginning), where,
citing the example of the prodigal son who came to himself and said, "I will arise and
go to my father," he asks: When would he have had this good thought unless the most
merciful Father had secretly inspired it in him? For I weigh that word secretly, which
signifies that a reflection of the kind that can be naturally excited by external objects is
not enough unless the Holy Spirit inwardly and secretly works something higher.
5. Moreover, the absurdity of this consequence can be briefly demonstrated as
follows: When matters of faith are proposed, a man can give them some human faith if
he believes merely on human tradition—and this human faith can be a morally good
act. If this is so, then, according to the prior opinion, it would be from grace—and thus
from the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, since it would arise from some
fitting and gratuitous reflection (as explained). Therefore, one could without error say
that such faith is sufficient for salvation and comes from the infusion of the Holy
Spirit, as conceived through His illumination and inspiration. But this consequent is
utterly absurd. Indeed, I hear that some theologians, pressed by this reasoning, admit
that this kind of grace, illumination, and inspiration suffices for all morally good works
preceding the faith necessary for salvation—and even for the will to believe that
suffices for true faith, and for true attrition that, with the sacrament, suffices for
justification. Yet they dare not concede that this kind of grace suffices for the acts of
faith, hope, and charity necessary for salvation. While I praise their caution and
moderation in the latter point, I do not see how—since in the former they admit true
grace is necessary for those acts—they can consistently maintain the distinction they
make between such acts, nor how they derive it from the Councils. This is especially so
249 BOOK TWO
since the Council of Orange (chapter 5) speaks in the same way about the will to
believe and the act or assent of faith.
6. They might say that the Councils demand not only divine illumination and
inspiration for acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance but also divine assistance—as
the Council of Trent expressly states (Session 6, Canon 3)—and that this must be
understood as a supernatural assistance adding some efficacy beyond God’s general
concurrence. Otherwise, that definition would have no force in commending the grace
of God. But against this, a third objection arises: such assistance of the Holy Spirit is
necessary not only for acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance but also for others. For
whenever Augustine speaks of the grace necessary for acting well, he not only says that
prevenient grace, inspiration, and illumination are necessary but also insists on the
necessity of the assistance of divine grace—adding that it is necessary for every act of
piety, as he often repeats (Epistles 106 and 107), saying that without this assistance, man
can have nothing of piety or justice, either in deed or in will. Now, either Augustine is
speaking only of supernatural acts (which by antonomasia are called acts of Christian
justice and piety), in which case his doctrine cannot be extended to every morally good
act as requiring grace. Or he is speaking of all good acts, even those merely conforming
to natural reason—in which case one must say that even for each such act, the
assistance of divine grace is necessary. Consequently, everything that the Council of
Trent requires for faith, hope, etc. (namely, the prevenient illumination of the Holy
Spirit and His assistance) would be necessary for every good act. Therefore, either
fitting reflection is insufficient for morally good acts, or some distinct and proper
assistance of grace is required (which the said authors do not concede, nor is it likely)—
or else they must say (as indeed they do) that the very reflection, insofar as it precedes
the human will, is prevenient grace, and insofar as it accompanies and in its way
cooperates with it, is the assistance of divine grace.
7. But if this is said, it follows—as we inferred earlier—that no higher grace is
required for the will to believe beyond fitting reflection on matters to be believed,
which can be aroused and conceived through sufficient external presentation of the
faith. Consequently, this same grace would suffice for the act of believing. For (as I
said) the Council of Orange (ch. 3) speaks in the same way about the grace necessary
for the will to believe as it does about faith itself. Likewise, we are compelled to believe
nothing else about the act of faith except that it cannot be had without the illumination,
inspiration, and assistance of the Holy Spirit. Yet all this is said to be sufficiently
preserved by that fitting reflection with respect to a morally good act; therefore, it will
also suffice for the will to believe—and by even greater reason, for the very act of faith.
For the will to believe itself can also be called the assistance of grace for eliciting the
act of faith.
250 BOOK TWO
8. If someone wishes to assign a difference—on the grounds that for these acts of
faith and similar ones, assistance of a higher order is required, elevating the faculty to
perform them and thus physically aiding them so that they may be supernatural—he
would speak truly on other principles. Yet, reasoning consequentially, this cannot be
grounded in the doctrine of Augustine or the Councils if it is once granted that the
grace of illumination and the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which they require for
acting well, is sufficiently conferred through that fitting reflection alone. For they
require grace for believing and other acts in the same terms and no others. This
inconvenience, then, follows from that opinion: it provides occasion for denying
physically assisting grace, since it leaves no effective way to ground it in the doctrine of
Augustine and the Councils. For the Councils do not teach that those acts are
supernatural by this formal term, but only that they are from the infusion of the Holy
Spirit or that grace is necessary for each of them. Hence, that opinion also provides
occasion for denying truly supernatural acts, as I will say below.
9. Another Inconvenience: Pelagius’ Error. Fourthly, that opinion provides occasion
for the error of Pelagius, who indeed admitted that grace is necessary for believing and
acting well, but afterward explained that grace as nothing other than preaching,
revelation, Christ’s example and teaching, or the law, which instruct the intellect. For
afterward, the will by its own freedom either follows or rejects such reflection. Pelagius
would not deny that reflection arising from preaching, teaching, or another good object
is grace in the same way he called the teaching itself grace. Nor would he hesitate to call
it grace that excites the will to will and assists it when it wills—yet he is rebuked by
Augustine (Epistle 106 and often elsewhere) for deceitfully confessing the necessity of
assisting grace at the Council of Palestine while not acknowledging true and internal
assisting grace. But surely, fitting reflection, as explained above, stands on the same
footing as the law or teaching, for it is nothing other than a certain presentation of the
object and a dictate of conscience, which is like a private law, according to the Apostle
(Rom 2:14): Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do what the law requires... they
are a law to themselves... their conscience also bearing witness. If, then, that reflection
—which is otherwise natural and arises through natural secondary causes with only
God’s general concurrence—is said to be sufficient grace exciting and assisting, so that
the Councils’ definitions about the necessity of grace for acting well apply to it with all
propriety and truth, then by even greater reason, the reflection resulting from the
preaching of the Gospel or the presentation of the law will be called grace that of
itself sufficiently excites and assists.
10. An Evasion Is Cut Off. If someone says that reflection does not have the nature
of grace except insofar as it is fitting, Pelagius certainly would not deny that similar
fittingness can be found in the presentation of the law or the preaching of the faith.
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For Pelagius was not unaware that God foresees who will or will not believe if the
Gospel is preached with these signs, etc. (as is clear from the letters of Prosper and
Hilary to Augustine and from Augustine’s books On the Predestination of the Saints,
On the Gift of Perseverance, and On Grace and Free Will). Pelagius, then, admitted
that God foresees to whom preaching will or will not be fitting. Therefore, if all that
the Councils teach about the necessity of grace is sufficiently preserved by that fitting
reflection in such foreknowledge, I do not see why, with respect to faith and other
supernatural acts, it would not be sufficiently preserved by the fitting presentation of
objects—that is, what from God’s foreknowledge will have an effect—even though, in
reality, both the reflection itself and its effect arise from natural powers alone,
according to that opinion. But this destroys the reality of internal grace and differs in
no substantial way from Pelagius’ error. For then, no internal illumination or inspiration
will be necessary for believing beyond external preaching at an opportune time, along
with internal reflection and judgment, which can be conceived by natural reasoning
from such preaching. The same could be said of penance and other acts.
11. Another Inconvenience: No Internal Grace Needed for Individual Moral
Works. Fifthly, from the same principle it follows that no internal prevenient grace
impressed on the will itself is necessary for acting well, even if the good action is
believing, willing to believe, hoping, loving, etc. The consequent is false and entirely to
be avoided, as I now assume and have proven elsewhere—at least speaking of moral
necessity and ordinary power. I prove the sequela from this principle: when the
Councils and Augustine speak of the necessity of grace for each and every good work,
they speak generically and indifferently about good works and equally demand exciting
and assisting grace for all. If, then, under those good works they include each and every
moral work, even of the natural order, it must consequently be admitted that the same
kind of grace is necessary for such works as for the other acts. Conversely, that
prevenient grace which was not necessary for morally good works would also not be
necessary for faith or other acts, as far as the doctrine of the Councils requires—which,
as said, is given in the same way for all. But it is certain that for individually considered
morally good works, no internal prevenient grace impressed on the will itself is
necessary, since once the object is presented through fitting reflection, the will does not
need special elevation for such an act, which by its nature is proportionate to it. Hence,
since the Councils say that the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit are
required for good works, it must be said in that opinion (as its authors indeed say) that
for moral acts, the same fitting reflection takes on both roles. For insofar as it perfects
the intellect, it is called illumination; insofar as it invites and draws the will, it is called
inspiration. Thus, a way is opened for whoever wishes to philosophize in the same way
about all acts of grace, however necessary for salvation—denying that any peculiar
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motion of grace in the will itself is necessary for them, since the doctrine of the
Councils does not compel this, being wholly verified in other good acts without such
motion.
12. Sixth Absurdity. Sixthly, a way is opened for someone to deny that there are acts
truly and in themselves supernatural—not only with respect to their entity, substance,
and species (which is absurd enough now) but also with respect to any good, real, and
intrinsic mode. Or at least, one could deny that such acts are necessary for salvation,
which is also utterly absurd, as I assume. The sequela is clear because, as I said a little
earlier, the Councils do not define under this formality of words that supernatural acts
are necessary for salvation, but that the exciting and assisting grace necessary for
performing the acts required for salvation as they ought to be performed is necessary.
From this principle, we do not infer that such acts are supernatural. But if exciting and
assisting grace is necessary for performing each morally good act (since they are of
themselves of the natural order), then that inference cannot be made about any acts.
For even if someone says that the act of faith, for example, necessary for salvation, is
natural in its entity, species, and every intrinsic mode, he will nonetheless say it cannot
be done without inspiring and assisting grace and is supernatural only by relation to it.
Nor can this be disproven from the Councils’ definitions, given that foundation about
the necessity of grace for moral acts. Hence (as I hear), some concede that if someone
believes the mysteries of our faith by human faith as to substance—from paternal
tradition, acting morally well and according to human prudence in that belief—that
faith will be sufficient for salvation on the part of faith (i.e., if other precepts are
observed), because it is faith from grace, even if it is not supernatural in itself. How
absurd this is need not now be emphasized or proven. Therefore, others, as I said
above, have admitted this about the will to believe but not about the act of believing.
Yet, if they wish to speak consistently, they cannot deny it—and the same reasoning
applies to other acts.
13. An Evasion Is Rejected. Nor will it suffice to reply that concerning the objects of
the theological virtues, acts can be supernatural in themselves or in their substance. For
here we are not discussing whether they are possible, but whether they are necessary for
salvation—the latter pertains per se to the dogmas of faith, the former only in relation
to the latter. But from the stated principle, this necessity seems overturned, as has been
shown. If someone perhaps admits this, he can consequently say that supernatural
habits infused per se are not necessary—and thus remove the whole doctrine of true
and supernatural grace as superfluous, reducing the whole matter of the necessary
assisting grace for acting well and holily to that fitting reflection arising from God’s
gratuitous disposition and providence. At most, it could be added that in some matters,
divine revelation is necessary so that man can reflect and act fittingly about them. But
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all this is certainly not to be tolerated, for it plainly contains Pelagian doctrine, nor do
the Catholic doctors with whom we dispute concede it. What we desire is that they
teach us a firm and solid way to avoid these inconveniences.
14. Seventh Inconvenience. Seventhly, from that principle it follows that the necessity
of divine grace for acting does not arise from the supernaturality of actions, nor from
the excellence of the end to which man is ordered by grace, nor even from the fragility
of fallen nature due to original sin—but precisely from the condition of rational and
intellectual nature, which has a certain indifference or universality in the intellect’s
reflection and can be turned to good or evil by free will. And to be turned, it needs
prior reflection, which, absolutely speaking, is not in the free power of the agent; hence,
that it is fitting for acting well must be attributed to divine grace and liberality. And so,
according to this reasoning, grace would be necessary not only in fallen man but even in
integral nature for performing each and every morally good act, even from the dictate
of natural reason alone. Indeed, the same must be said not only of men but also of
angels, as the authors of that opinion consistently say. Indeed, some of them even say
that it implies a contradiction for a good act to be done without grace, just as it implies
a contradiction for the will to love without prior knowledge. For it is equally necessary
that a good movement of the will be preceded by good reflection, and also necessary
that it arise from God’s providence, since He cannot be ignorant of whether that
reflection is such as to have an effect and consequently whether it will be fitting.
Therefore, it is in no way possible for a created will to operate a good, however
proportionate to its nature, without God’s grace. But all this is very novel and alien to
the common sense of theologians.
Eighth Inconvenience. Eighthly, it follows that an intellectual creature cannot be
created by God without the aids of grace if it is to be governed prudently and
according to providence worthy of God. The consequent is false; therefore, so is the
antecedent. The sequela is clear: God cannot fittingly produce a rational creature
without providing it with the aids necessary for acting morally well—at least some
notions. Therefore, if those actions cannot be done morally well without the aids of
grace, God cannot create a nature without conferring grace upon it. But this is clearly
absurd, for then grace would no longer be grace, since it would be owed to nature. For
what aid could be more owed than one that God cannot deny according to a prudent
mode of governance?1
15. Response and Refutation. It might be said that a rational nature cannot indeed be
created without an aid sufficient of itself for acting morally well, but it can be created

1The Latin text numbered two paragraphs as "14"; the number has been removed from the
second instance to avoid confusion, but it has not been renumbered as "15" in order to maintain
consistency with the original text.
254 BOOK TWO
without an efficacious and fitting aid—and thus without grace—because that sufficient
aid is not grace but something owed to nature, whereas the fitting aid is grace, since
fittingness is not owed. But first, this is another novel and very strange aspect of this
opinion: that the same aid of the same order, if merely sufficient, is not gratuitous, but
if efficacious (i.e., infallibly effectual in God’s foreknowledge), is properly and strictly
called grace, of which the Councils speak. This does not seem rightly or consistently
said. First, if that efficacious aid is true grace, containing the proper illumination and
inspiration of the Holy Spirit, then the aid called sufficient in the same order must also
contain the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, since the efficacious aid
agrees with the sufficient and only adds that the illumination and inspiration are fitting.
But for the notion of grace, it is enough that it is the illumination and inspiration of the
Holy Spirit. Therefore, if the efficacious aid is grace, it seems necessary that the
sufficient aid also be grace, albeit of a lesser kind. Second, honest reflection, even if
through some defect in man it will not have the effect of morally good action, is a
certain benefit to rational nature and is not simply owed to this or that individual, since
it is not impossible for a man to go his whole life without any honest reflection
unmixed with some evil circumstance. Therefore, if the notion of an unowed benefit
suffices for the notion of grace in fitting reflection (even if in all other respects it is
natural), by the same reasoning it will suffice for honest reflection, sufficient of itself
for acting morally well, to be true grace—for if it is not owed to all individuals, it is
owed to none in particular. Hence, if rational nature cannot be created without this
benefit, it cannot be created without grace.
16. Further Refutation of the Response. Moreover, that response is further refuted
because, although in this or that individual, or with respect to some particular acts, God
could create a man to whom He does not give a fitting aid for acting morally well, yet to
deny such aid to every man and with respect to every good action seems foreign to
divine goodness and His wise providence. This is enough to show that this aid is not
gratuitous or of grace, but owed to nature. For something to be considered owed to
nature, it need not necessarily be given to all individuals; it is enough that it cannot be
denied to the whole species according to the exigency of such a nature. This is clear
from the example touched on earlier of honest reflection (setting aside whether it is
fitting or not, effectual or not), which is not considered grace but owed to human
nature—even though it is not necessary that all men receive or sometimes exercise it,
for it is enough that the whole nature cannot and ought not lack such reflection in all
individuals and at all times.
17. A More Suitable Argument. The a priori argument is that human nature can by its
natural powers produce such reflection and can be excited to it by objects according to
the natural course of things. Therefore, given the great variety of men and diversity of
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objects, it cannot but happen that good reflections are often excited in some men. It
belongs to God’s due providence to concur generally with these causes and objects.
Nor would it be consistent with divine goodness either to refuse to concur whenever an
honest reflection is to be excited or to specially prevent it by ensuring that some cause
or object always intervenes to mix in some turpitude. But if God does not specially
provide this and simply lets things follow their course, it is surely impossible that honest
reflections conformable to reason are not often excited in men’s hearts. Hence, such
reflection, insofar as it is in its order a sufficient aid for morally good action, is not
considered by its genus an aid of grace but of nature.
18. The same reasoning can be made about fitting reflection for the same morally
good action, which adds only on God’s part the will to give it in conditioned
foreknowledge as having the effect of morally good action. For similarly, it cannot but
happen that in the whole multitude of men, such reflection will often have this effect
unless specially prevented or forestalled by God. This seems true not only in the actual
disposition of things and secondary causes that God has established but also in any
possible disposition where secondary causes are left to their common course. For in
such variety of occasions and multitude of men, it is utterly impossible that in many
men, honest reflection and prudent judgment do not sometimes arise, followed by
good choice. Therefore, since it is repugnant to divine goodness to take care (so to
speak) to prevent by His providence that this good effect sometimes follows, it also
seems entirely foreign to divine providence to create human nature such that it never
has natural fitting reflection for acting morally well. Hence, on account of this
fittingness, it cannot truly be said that God cannot create human nature without gifts of
grace.
19. Another Response and Its Rejection. Another response might be that there is a
twofold grace: one elevating man’s natural faculties to perform acts surpassing nature’s
powers, and another exciting and assisting those same faculties to perform acts
conformable and proportionate to their natural powers—and that human nature could
be created by God without the former grace but not without the latter. But this too
does not resolve the difficulties raised. First, although that distinction may in itself have
a good sense, from the very opinion we are impugning, it is weakened and made
uncertain. For if man cannot do good without grace, how is it certain that among good
acts, some surpass man’s natural powers while others are proportionate to them, when
it is said absolutely of each and every one that man needs the aid of grace? Hence, a
twofold end of man—which man or angel can attain without the powers of grace—
could also be distinguished. For we know from no other certain source that the end for
which both man and angel were created is supernatural except that it cannot be attained
without the powers of grace. But if in the end itself this distinction has no place, there
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is no reason to admit it in the acts that are means to that end. Finally, that aid without
which a nature cannot be created when considered according to its species is
undeservedly called grace—even if it need not be conferred on each individual, as has
been shown.
20. Ninth Inconvenience. Ninthly, we can add another argument: it follows not only
that grace is necessary for every morally good act but even for indifferent acts (if they
can exist in the individual, as the same opinion-holders admit). The sequela is proven
because an indifferent operation at least has this property sufficiently fitting to man: it
lacks all moral evil and otherwise brings some advantage to nature—for example,
moderate pleasure or innocent recreation. Hence, an indifferent operation is
undoubtedly a benefit of nature compared to an evil operation. But this benefit is not
owed to the man so acting, because at the time a reflection suited to performing an
indifferent act is offered to him, a reflection inducing a base act could be offered
instead, and it is not in man’s power to ensure that the former rather than the latter
reflection or occasion is offered. Therefore, it arises from God’s unowed providence;
hence, it is an unowed benefit and thus true grace according to that opinion—albeit
lesser than the assistance for acting well. Indeed, by proportional reasoning, it would
prove that grace is more necessary for sinning venially than mortally, since the
reflection inducing mortal rather than venial sin arises from God’s providence, which is
not owed to that person. But no one would admit this; therefore, it is a sign that the
notion of an unowed benefit does not suffice for the true notion of grace.
21. Tenth Noteworthy Inconvenience. Tenthly, another inconvenience presents itself
that seems worthy of consideration. For from that opinion, as explained, it follows that
man, through acts elicited by the powers of free will, merits or impetrates truly
supernatural aids for supernatural acts—and even the first supernatural call to them.
But the consequent coincides in reality with the error of the Semi-Pelagians and is
against the intention of the Councils condemning that error; therefore, so is the
antecedent. The defenders of the contrary opinion do not admit this sequela, but it is
chiefly for this reason that they seem to defend their opinion—so that they can
attribute some merit of faith to morally good action while still not attributing the
beginning of salvation to free will but to grace. They say, then, that the beginning of
grace is taken from that fitting reflection necessary for the first morally good act of the
will, and since, given the first grace, man can through it merit the second, they
consequently say that through that first good act, man can merit the aid of grace for
another better act, and so on up to acts proximate to sanctification. They excuse
themselves from agreeing with the Semi-Pelagians on the grounds that they do not
attribute the beginning of this progress to nature but to grace on account of that fitting
reflection.
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22. But in truth, though the words are changed, we believe the matter is the same.
First, that preceding fitting reflection does not prevent such a good act from being
done by the powers of free will alone, for given that reflection, the will by its innate free
faculty, with only the general influx of the First Cause, elicits such an act. But this is to
act by the powers of nature alone. For certainly Pelagius taught nothing else; he did not
doubt that non-free reflection (at least in the first act) must precede free volition.
Indeed, before the will to believe, he admitted that supernatural revelation precedes—at
least in the presentation and application of the object, as I noted above. Yet because he
said that, given such presentation of a credible object, the will by its natural freedom,
with God’s general influx, can both will and not will to believe, he was condemned for
teaching that the will to believe arises from the powers of free will alone—even though
he did not say the reflection preceding that will is from free will. Therefore, a fortiori, a
morally good act truly arises from the powers of free will alone, whatever may be said
about that good reflection—all the more so since that good reflection can and often
will arise from the natural powers alone of the human intellect, prompted and excited
by external senses operating by natural powers and excited by objects according to the
course of nature, with only the general influx of the First Cause operating. How, then,
can an action be conceived that is more from the powers of free will alone?
23. Nor was Pelagius ignorant that such honest and natural reflection arises from
God's general providence. Nor, finally, were the Semi-Pelagians ignorant that God
foreknows what free will would do if placed in such disposition and order of things to
be excited to such reflection on such occasion. For it is certain that the Semi-Pelagians
acknowledged this kind of foreknowledge in God, though they did not make good use
of it. Therefore, those who say that man merits God's grace through these works
plainly say nothing different in substance from them. This is clear because if it were
explained to them that the grace required for these works is nothing other than that
disposition of things and causes from which such reflection was to be excited, they
would certainly not hesitate to admit such grace, since they even called the gift of
creation grace - because these modes of grace harmonize perfectly with free will
operating by nature's powers alone. Therefore, it must in no way be thought that the
beginning of grace or justification, of which the Councils speak, is taken from natural
reflection, however right according to nature's light and however fitting in God's
knowledge that it infallibly will have the effect of some morally good choice
conformable to natural reason. Thus when the Council of Trent (Session 6, Chapter 5)
says that the beginning of justification in adults is taken from God's prevenient grace, it
certainly does not understand by prevenient grace that good reflection, but the
supernatural call by which men begin to be called to faith and justice without preceding
merits, as it declares at the beginning of that and the following chapter. Therefore, on
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account of that reflection and its fittingness alone, it cannot be said that a morally good
work is necessarily from grace, nor does such an appeal to grace serve to avoid the
error of the Semi-Pelagians, but rather to foster and conceal it.
24. Eleventh Inconvenience. Eleventhly, from that opinion arises the occasion to say
that faith is not the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice of Christian man, because
before faith there precede many good works done from that grace which they say are
true and proper dispositions to faith and supernatural grace, and consequently from
such dispositions or good works can be said to be taken the beginning and foundation
of the spiritual edifice. For the spiritual edifice includes all works that in some way per
se contribute to eternal life, whether mediately or immediately, whether by their own
merit or by way of impetration or fitting disposition. Therefore the foundation of this
edifice is before faith, indeed even before the proper call to faith - which some
consequently concede. Yet this is not sufficiently consistent with Paul calling faith "the
foundation of things hoped for" (Hebrews 11:1), where the Fathers and commentators
understand faith to be the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice and of all merit.
And Augustine often says that the beginning of faith, and consequently faith itself, is
given to us gratuitously, through which we can merit and impetrate the rest. But if there
were some other prior foundation in which the merit of faith itself or the call to it
could be founded, faith itself could not be called the first foundation, nor would it be
the first grace or beginning of grace.
25. Evasion. It might perhaps be said that the act of faith is the first foundation of
the whole supernatural edifice because it is the first act of that order on which the
others rest, and therefore Paul said it is "the foundation of things hoped for," while the
other gifts of grace that precede faith are of an inferior order in their being, though
they agree in the notion of gratuitous gift, and therefore cannot so much be called a
foundation as a certain disposition that does not remain with the edifice nor
intrinsically belongs to it as a foundation does. Indeed some add that even the will to
believe, which is as it were the proximate disposition to the act of divine faith, is
contained in that inferior order of graces that are not supernatural in their being. Nor
does this seem inconvenient, because it is not necessary that dispositions that precede
be of the same order as the form.
26. This Evasion Is Blocked. But by consequent reasoning it could then be said that
acts of the natural order, even if not from grace, can be dispositions to grace - for why
could they not, if it is not necessary that they be of the same order? Likewise, it would
not be necessary that the proximate disposition to sanctifying grace be supernatural in
itself, if it is not necessary that the disposition be of the same order as the form that is
conferred by reason of it. Moreover, there is no foundation (as is clear from what has
been said) for distinguishing two orders of acts if for each and every one of them that
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aid of exciting and assisting grace is necessary which has been given to us on account
of Christ, because it has not been handed down to us otherwise than that those acts are
supernatural insofar as we are taught that none of them can be done without the aids
of grace. Finally, the spiritual edifice of Christian man must be founded in some
knowledge, because the will cannot build upon it without prior knowledge. Therefore
that knowledge is either natural or supernatural. The first cannot be said, otherwise the
beginning of grace would be from nature; but if the second is said, that knowledge
must be either of faith or at least of the proximate call and internal inspiration or
illumination of the Holy Spirit drawing the soul to faith, all of which is comprehended
under the foundation of faith. Therefore before this foundation there cannot be merit
or grace that could found the spiritual edifice of Christian man.
27. Twelfth Inconvenience - The Error of Michael Baius. Twelfthly, it follows from
the said opinion that man from his own nature, as from the power of divine providence
as it were connatural to him, does not have the power of free will except for sinning.
The consequent is utterly absurd and among other propositions was condemned by
Pope Gregory XIII in the bull against Michael Baius, one of whose opinions was this:
"No good use of free will, whether small or great, can be admitted except by Pelagian
error, and he does injury to the grace of Christ who so thinks and teaches." Others
were: "Free will without the helping grace of God avails only for sinning"; and "It is
Pelagian error to say that free will avails for avoiding any sin." These dogmas were said
by that author about fallen man and are condemned in that sense; but many more
damnable things are said about man in whatever state constituted, even of integral
nature, and about the angel, and about every possible rational or intellectual creature -
for all this follows from that opinion and is without doubt injurious to nature and its
Author. That this absurdity follows is manifest, because that opinion affirms that man
needs grace as absolutely necessary for each morally good act; therefore free will does
not have natural powers to perform even one morally good work without grace; but it
has been shown that consequently it follows that not even an indifferent act can be
performed without grace. Michael Baius saw this inference and tacitly admitted it in the
cited words. It remains, therefore, that free will by its own nature is only a power for
sinning.
28. An Attempt to Evade the Force of the Argument. Someone may try to evade the
force of this reasoning by responding first that this is no inconvenience, because in the
Second Council of Orange, canon 22, it is said: "No one has anything of his own
except lying and sin." But it is one thing to have something from another, another to
have in oneself and in one's nature powers and ability to perform something that is not
sin. For although free will can without grace perform some good work, nevertheless it
can be said to have that work from itself when it performs it, but from God not as
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author of grace but as author and provider of nature, to whom thanks are owed for
every good deed, because all things are referred to Him, yet each with due proportion.
But sin is said to be man's own because sin, as sin, is not from God but from free will -
indeed not even from free will by reason of that perfection which it has from God, but
by reason of the imperfection which it has from itself, namely that it is from nothing,
for hence it consequently has that it is defectible, as is the common doctrine of the
Fathers. Therefore the Second Council of Orange never said that free will does not
have natural power except for sinning, but said that it has nothing from itself except
sin, because all other things must be referred to God.
29. Another Evasion - Rejected. Another response could be made: that free will
indeed has from its own nature the power to act well, yet needs grace to use this power.
For the grace of fitting reflection explained above is not necessary to man for being
able to act well, but for actually acting well. But against this it first stands that it is not
consequently said, because if the power is natural and in its genus integral and
sufficient for such action, then the concurrence or providence of God necessary and
sufficient for the same action must be connatural, because nature (as they say) does not
fail in necessities. Then especially the following reasoning stands against that response.
30. Thirteenth Inconvenience. Thirteenthly, then, it is objected that from that
opinion it follows that the grace which Augustine requires as necessary for each good
work is not necessary for being able, but only for willing or actually doing good. The
consequent is false; therefore so is that from which it follows. The sequela is proven
because by the preceding reasoning this is already conceded in morally good acts, and
hence the argument is made (as has often been inculcated) that by consequent
reasoning the same can be said about any good act of whatever order, because
Augustine speaks generically about the necessity of grace for acting well, and from this
necessity alone we infer the impotence or insufficiency of nature for any good work.
Therefore, if with this necessity for the work there stands the absolute power from
nature, it can be said about any good act that it can be done by nature, though not
without grace. But the consequent is Pelagian.
30.5. The Foundation of Pelagius's Error. For it is clear from Augustine (On the
Grace of Christ, Book 1, Chapter 5) that the foundation of Pelagius's error was that he
placed the possibility of good will and operation in freedom, that is, the sufficient
power for performing supernatural acts, which he said was aided by law and teaching.
And therefore the Council of Trent (Session 6, Canons 2 and 3) not only says that
grace is necessary that man may act, but also that he may be able to act. And the same
is held by the Second Council of Orange, canon 7, and the Council of Milevis, Chapter
5, and the African Council, Chapter 80. And Christ the Lord did not say "without me
you will do nothing" but "without me you can do nothing" (John 15:5). If therefore
261 BOOK TWO
these expressions comprehend each and every morally good act, consequently it must
be denied that there is possibility in nature for them, and conversely it must be affirmed
that grace is necessary not only that we may do them but also that we may be able to do
them. Or finally it must be conceded, as we intend, that those expressions of Augustine
and the Councils are not extended to each and every moral act, and therefore without
foundation and with great inconvenience is it affirmed that grace is necessary for each
moral act.
31. Fourteenth Inconvenience. Fourteenthly, it follows from that opinion that only
that providence of the Author of nature from which a morally evil work or sin
effectively or infallibly follows is owed to man according to his nature considered in
itself. The consequent is false; therefore so is the antecedent. The sequela is declared
because from the power of rational and free nature, some providence and concurrence
of God is owed to man that he may use his freedom and proceed to some work, for to
every created nature some concurrence is owed for performing works consonant with
nature. But according to the aforesaid opinion, excitation or concurrence by which he
may act well is not owed to man; therefore only the aid by which he may act badly is
owed. The consequence is proven because either no deliberate indifferent act is given in
the individual (as is more probable), or though we admit that it can be given, by the
same reasoning by which aid is not owed by which a good act may be done, neither is it
owed by which an indifferent act lacking malice may be done, as we have argued above.
It remains, therefore, that only the aid by which we may act badly is owed.
32. Response to the Reasoning - Refutation. It may first be said that there is no
inconvenience in conceding this about fallen man, who through sin has become
unworthy of all good. But this has no place in that opinion which founds the necessity
of grace in the natural condition of the rational creature. Moreover, if natural aid for
acting morally well is owed to man considered in pure nature, it is also owed to fallen
man, because through sin—especially original sin—man is not deprived of the good of
the general concurrence or influx owed to nature. This is especially so because the state
of fallen nature is not a state of damnation, in which the damned might justly be
deprived of all concurrence for acting well.
33. Another Evasion - Clarified by Two Examples. Alternatively, it could be said that
no determined aid—namely, for acting well or for sinning—is owed to human nature,
but disjunctively, one or the other is owed. Therefore, with respect to each individual, it
pertains to grace that the aid given to him is in fact conjoined with good operation
rather than evil. Just as a man obliged to distribute money among the poor of his
choice does a certain favor to the one he chooses, because although he is bound to give
to this one or that one, he is not bound to give to this one determinately. Another more
fitting example might be that of an heir who, by the terms of a legacy, is bound to give
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one silver vessel from many left by the deceased. He does some favor if he does not
give the least valuable but one of greater worth.
34. The Evasion Is Rejected. We respond first that, although we grant that with
respect to each individual there is some liberal benefit from God, it does not exceed the
order of nature nor pertain to the order of grace. For who would deny that God
confers many benefits not only in morals but also in other natural goods, which no one
would say pertain to the goods of grace of which the Councils speak when they say
grace is necessary for acting rightly? For example, since it is contingent whether a man
is generated with such a concurrence of material and efficient causes that he is born
whole and with the best disposition of members or as a monster or maimed, etc., God
owed no one such an order and disposition of causes that He would concur in the
former rather than the latter mode for his generation. Shall we then say that man could
not be generated whole without the grace of God? Who ever spoke thus? For similar
grace is also given to brute animals. And similar benefits—whether relieving the
necessities of this life or avoiding things contrary to health, or fame, or honor, or
worldly goods—are daily conferred by God’s providence, which is of itself general and
as it were indifferent and is determined with some liberality to a mode and order of
causes fitting for man rather than unfitting. Yet this is not enough for such providence
to be said to pertain to grace properly so called.
35. Rather, we add from what has been said above that although with respect to
individual persons or particular events some liberality or choice of God purely
voluntary is necessary—which is discerned in the first disposition and constitution of
things under such an order of causes that it eventually happens that here and now such
a fitting rather than unfitting event occurs to me—nevertheless, with respect to each
species, such a kind of providence is owed as is not determined to evil or unfitting or
monstrous effects but at most is general and common. Hence it is necessary that
sometimes good or fitting effects arise unless they are prevented by the Author of
nature Himself with special care—which to do always and without any special cause,
especially in moral works, would not be consistent with wise governance. But the
Author of nature preserves this both in lower species of things and in man himself
with respect to goods fitting to nature, which are indeed not denied to the whole
species. Their distribution with respect to individuals is contingent, so that some
individuals obtain those goods and others do not, on account of the varied disposition
of causes or concurrences with which they happen to be produced or to operate. But
this contingency is not without the providence and will of God thus preordaining and
disposing the course of secondary causes. Yet this whole disposition and distribution
pertains to general providence. This, then, is observed in human nature considered in
itself with respect to moral good conformable to natural reason, and therefore from
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natural providence and concurrence it is owed to it, as far as concerns God, although it
is not owed to individual persons or their acts. And therefore, although the disposition
of causes from which it happens that Peter rather than Paul is moved to a natural good
act is from God’s free choice, yet it is not beyond or above connatural providence, or
that pertaining to the order of nature, but shows that even in this God uses His
freedom—namely, in distributing goods that pertain to the order of nature.
36. Final Argument Against This Opinion. Finally, all this is confirmed because from
the contrary opinion it follows that man cannot attain in this life knowledge of any
natural truth, whether of natural or moral philosophy, or mathematics, or any art or
political prudence, without proper and true grace. The sequela is clear because the
human intellect, even in natural matters, is exposed to deception and as it were
indifferent to true and false knowledge. But that it is determined to true rather than
false knowledge depends entirely either on extrinsic teaching or on objects occurring,
on phantasms and apprehensions arising therefrom. But that other motives occur which
induce true rather than false knowledge is not in man’s power but is of itself
contingent, though under divine providence it infallibly happens. Therefore, it is a
singular benefit of God, not owed to this individual, that such excitation to truth is
given to him; therefore, it is as properly grace as that which is required for a moral
work.
37. Response. They respond by conceding that none of these natural virtues can be
known without grace broadly taken for any benefit of God not owed to nature.
Nevertheless, it can be done without the grace of Christ, because Christ merited for us
only the aid of God offered to us for living rightly and piously. But that aid for
knowing or for purely speculative natural knowledge or works of art is not for living
piously and therefore is not given to us through Christ. For Christ did not die to make
us philosophers or craftsmen but to make us good and upright, as Augustine said in a
similar context (Epistle 105). Therefore, that aid cannot be called the grace of Christ
and consequently not grace absolutely, because grace simply so called by the Fathers is
only that which is given to us through Christ and His death, as Augustine signifies
(Epistle 95 to Innocent).
38. The Response Is Refuted. But this response does not weaken but rather confirms
all we have said. First, from the response itself it is clear that the difficulty is more
avoided with words than explained. For whether something is grace or not does not
depend on whether it is given through Christ or not, because to give through Christ is a
certain respect to an extrinsic cause, which supposes that the gift itself given on
account of Christ’s merit is grace in itself. Therefore, it has that it is grace from
elsewhere, independently of whether it is given or not given through Christ. Moreover,
these authors themselves teach in this very matter that neither to the angels nor to
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Adam in the state of innocence was grace given through Christ. Let them say, then,
whether they were converted to God as was fitting for justice or salvation without
grace. Furthermore, morally good works are considered either as ordered to eternal
salvation and in some way useful and actually conducive to it, or simply as conformable
to reason and fitting to nature. In the first way, we admit they fall under Christ’s merit—
yet in the same way philosophy and rhetoric, ordered to the same end, are from Christ’s
merits, and the aid given for learning them is given on account of Christ. But in the
second way, just as aid is not given on account of Christ for speculation, so neither is it
given for any moral action that does not conduce to eternal life, justification, and
remission of sins. For (from the same passages of Augustine) Christ died to make us
faithful and holy, not that we might obtain natural goods whatever they may be in
themselves considered and without order to supernatural things. Finally, that benefit
which does not pertain to the benefits of grace through Christ undoubtedly pertains to
the order of nature and is given from the power of natural providence with the fitting
distribution it demands in its own order, without which it cannot be, as I said above.
Hence, it is not a gift simply distinct from the gift of creation but connected with it in
the way explained above, and therefore it is not properly grace, whether through Christ
or without Christ. But all this is common to that aid or excitation given for knowing
how to give prime matter and for willing to give alms, taken in itself without order to
eternal salvation. Therefore, one is no more grace than the other, but both pertain to
the grace of creation and general governance. And that one is given for perfecting the
intellect in natural things and the other for perfecting the will in only one minimal
natural perfection is a very material difference that contributes little to the notion of
grace.
39. Objection. One objection remains that seems to weaken many of the arguments
made. For if they were effective, they would prove not only that grace is not necessary
for each and every morally good work but even that no good work of the natural order
can exist for which grace is necessary—indeed, not even for always acting morally well
collectively (as they say), that is, never interposing any sin. The consequent is false
because at least for eliciting love of God above all things as Author or end of nature,
and other arduous works, and for keeping all the natural precepts collectively, grace is
necessary, as I now assume. The sequela is proven because if grace is necessary for one
moral act, almost all the arguments we have made apply to it, because from it can be
inferred that the necessity of grace for some act is not on account of the act’s
supernaturality, and therefore from the necessity of grace it cannot be inferred that
there are supernatural acts, and thus the principal foundation from which we gather
them is removed, and consequently the firm foundation is overturned by which we
assert it is certain that there are infused habits, and so consequently many of the things
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said can be applied. The response is that the sequela is denied, because by the
arguments made above we did not prove absolutely that a moral work cannot be from
grace or that grace cannot sometimes be necessary for some morally good work, but
only that on account of the mere necessity of that fitting reflection, it cannot be said
that grace is necessary for it. Hence, since it has been shown that on account of such
reflection no other special internal motion is required for each morally good work, it is
absolutely concluded that grace is not necessary for each work. Nevertheless, for some
excellent or very arduous work, and for keeping the collection of natural precepts or
performing moral works frequently without the stain of sin, grace is necessary.
According to the doctrine of the Councils, this consists not only in that natural honest
reflection but also in the special illumination, inspiration, and protection of God. And
concerning this kind of grace, the same reasoning does not apply to these weightier
actions or perseverance in them as to each and every action, because in those effects
there is by far greater and special difficulty that cannot be overcome without God’s
special aid. But that necessity of grace for some moral works is as it were accidental on
account of extrinsic impediments of corrupt nature, whereas there is another necessity
per se for other good works that arises from the loftiness of the end to which they
must be proportioned, and from this necessity it is very well inferred that such works
are in themselves and intrinsically supernatural. But what kind of grace is necessary for
some morally good works and how it is distinguished from the grace necessary for each
supernatural work is a matter for another consideration.

CHAPTER XVII. A RESPONSE TO THE FOUNDATIONS

OF THE OPPOSING POSITION LAID OUT IN CHAPTER TEN.

1. The first foundation is resolved. The first and principal foundation of the
opposing position is based on the claim that a fitting thought is necessary for acting
morally, and that such a thought is not owed to nature, and therefore is grace. To this, a
manifold response can be drawn from what has been said. One response is that this
thought—whether owed or not—falls within the bounds of natural providence and is
thus a natural benefit, yet not true grace. Nor is it sufficient to say that this natural
providence arises from the intention of granting glory to the predestined, and is
therefore considered grace. This (I say) does not suffice, because even creation itself is
given to the predestined with that intention, as I have said above, and yet it is not, for
that reason, grace in the proper sense. Likewise, it is not necessary for such a thought to
arise from that intention, as is clear in the case of the reprobate. If it is said that in
them it is given by an antecedent will to grant glory, even this is not strictly necessary, as
is evident in the case of man in a purely natural state. Moreover, the principle necessary
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for action must be judged based on what is intrinsic, not on God’s extrinsic intention.
Therefore, if such a thought in fact confers some benefit in relation to a supernatural
end, it may indeed be said to arise from supernatural providence, yet it is not properly
grace except by extrinsic denomination. Similarly, even salvation, bodily goods, or
temporal advantages are sometimes given or withdrawn by supernatural providence, yet
they are not, for that reason, the proper grace with which we are concerned.
2. The same foundation is resolved differently. Another response is that this thought
is owed to nature considered in itself, even if it is not owed to this particular individual,
and therefore it is not true grace—for grace is owed neither to the individual nor to the
species in any way. Thus, human nature could have been created without the entire
order of grace. This can be clarified by the example suggested earlier. For one who is
bound by justice or the duty of his office to distribute money among the poor is not
said simply to give it or to confer grace upon each poor person, even if he voluntarily
chose these individuals rather than others to bestow such alms upon. There is,
therefore, a certain benevolence in the choice of persons, but the gift itself, considered
in itself, is owed, and thus it is not properly and truly grace. This is especially so
because, given the original institution of things and the common course of secondary
causes, such a thought will already be owed to that individual, since it follows from the
general course and concurrence of secondary causes, along with the general influence
of the primary cause, unless it is extraordinarily impeded. This, however, is sufficient
for such an action to be called owed according to the order of nature. For the fact that
this original institution of the order and causes of the universe—rather than another—
was voluntarily established by God pertains to the gift of creation, of a universe
composed in this manner rather than another. It does not, therefore, pertain to the
order of sanctifying grace with which we are concerned. Hence, the effects that follow
from such an institution of things, along with the common course of secondary causes
(both free and natural) and the general influence of God, belong to natural benefits,
not to the order of grace. That such is the case with this fitting thought has already
been sufficiently demonstrated.
3. The interpretation of St. Thomas’s mind. Nor did St. Thomas, in the passage cited
(I-II, q. 109, a. 2), indicate anything contrary to this doctrine. For in the body of the
article, he treats absolutely of all acts of the will and teaches generally that every
volition of the good requires the help of God moving it—by which he understands the
general concurrence of the primary cause, as has been shown above. Later, in the
response to the first objection, he specifically attributes the first volition concerning the
end to an extrinsic principle, namely God, and thus reduces all movements of the will
to the motion of God, not only by reason of the general concurrence (through which
God immediately influences all acts of the will, as discussed in the body of the article)
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but also by another special reason—namely, because the will is moved to all acts
concerning the means by the intention of the end, and to the intention of the end it is
moved by God Himself. Thus, at least the ultimate resolution of the will’s movements
is in God. Although it is obscure and disputed in what way the intention of the end is
from God beyond the general concurrence, it is nevertheless certain that St. Thomas is
not speaking there of the motion of grace but in general terms. For if his reasoning is
sound, even the intention of an evil end—insofar as it does not arise from a prior act
of the will—is from God as the extrinsic agent. Therefore, that motion is of the natural
order if it is given for producing a natural act in accordance with the demands of
nature; or it will be a supernatural motion if given for acts of a higher order. Hence,
Cajetan rightly notes there that this doctrine coincides with what the same St. Thomas
had taught in the same book (q. 9, a. 4) concerning the motion of the will in general.
4. What the cited authors say—that this motion of God is a thought moving the will
to the intention of the end, which naturally occurs before the deliberation or counsel
of the will—is (I say) not consistent with the mind of St. Thomas. For this thought
pertains to motion on the part of the object, whereas St. Thomas speaks of motion on
the part of the faculty, as is clear from the aforementioned q. 9, a. 4. Likewise, because
this thought is not always traced back to God as the proximate cause but to external
objects, whereas St. Thomas holds that God immediately gives this motion. Others,
therefore, say that this motion is a physical determination, which God alone specially
brings about concerning the intention of the end. But this is also false, because if such
predetermination is necessary, it will also be necessary for acts concerning the means—
or if it is repugnant to freedom, it will also be repugnant for the intention of the end,
since that too is a free act. Likewise, it will especially be repugnant concerning the
intention of an evil end, even though St. Thomas’s reasoning applies to that as well. For
the same reasons, this motion cannot be understood as some peculiar actual and vital
instinct that God specially impresses concerning the intention of the end—both
because this is repugnant in the intention of an evil end, and because in purely natural
acts (even good ones), this special motion is not necessary, as has been proven.
5. It must therefore be said that in natural acts, this motion is nothing other than the
natural inclination of the will toward the good befitting its nature, whereas in
supernatural acts, it is either an infused habit or some divine supernatural inspiration.
Hence, speaking of acts of the natural order, St. Thomas says in the aforementioned q.
9, a. 4 that the intention of the end is attributed to the author of nature just as the
motion of a heavy object is attributed to its generator. This analogy holds only in this:
that both motions proceed proximately from the inclination of nature, given by its
author—though with a difference in the vital and free mode of operation. Therefore,
this attribution or reduction of such an act to the author of nature is not by reason of
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any grace but solely by natural providence. A sign of this is that it is common even to
the evil intention of the end—not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it tends toward
some good as such. For that also arises from the general impulse of nature toward the
good, though because it does not arise necessarily but with freedom, it can, by defect of
the proximate cause, be directed wrongly.
6. A response to the passages from Augustine. Concerning the passages from
Augustine that are cited regarding holy thought—on account of which he attributes to
God the beginning of all good works—we briefly say two things. First, Augustine is
speaking of holy thought that leads us to works of piety conducive to eternal life.
Second, under "holy thought" he includes the entire supernatural vocation—that is, not
only the illumination of the mind but also the inspiration and inward stirring of the
will. Both of these points have been proven above and will be further clarified by what
follows. Hence, the other testimonies of the Fathers and Councils, which require grace
for each good act, are explained (as we have seen) concerning acts of Christian piety—
or, what is the same, good acts performed as is necessary for salvation, whether for
meriting it or in some way beginning it. Thus also is understood the word of
Christ: Without me, you can do nothing—namely, nothing useful for eternal salvation,
for He was speaking of this matter, as Augustine noted. And this is the phrasing of
Scripture, whereby anything that does not contribute to eternal life is said to be
nothing, according to 1 Corinthians 13: If I have not charity, I am nothing. If I
distribute all my goods… but have not charity, it profits me nothing.
7. It may further be added that it is probable the Pelagians also denied the necessity
of God’s general and actual influx for works in accordance with nature, believing that
the necessity of such concurrence was incompatible with free will. In this sense, the
Councils and Fathers sometimes taught that natural good works cannot be done
without the help of God—as St. Thomas also states (I-II, q. 109, aa. 1–2)—that is,
without God’s cooperation. Yet although perhaps one or another testimony from the
Council of Orange or Jerome, or a similar source, might be explained in this way, not all
can be—especially those that speak of the necessity of assisting and prevenient grace
through divine inspiration and illumination. For these clearly presuppose that the
powers of free will are insufficient for the acts in question, not only because they
depend in operation on the first cause, but also because, as the proximate cause, free
will is inadequate. Therefore, when they speak of the necessity of grace for each act,
they undoubtedly refer to works of piety, as has been shown.
8. A response to the first argument. To the first argument, drawn from the necessity
of prayer, it may first be said that true prayer—of which the Saints and Councils speak
—is one of the works of piety, which cannot be performed without God’s grace, as the
Council of Orange expressly teaches (can. 3), stating that grace is not given in response
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to human invocation but rather grace itself causes us to invoke. The reason is that true
prayer must arise from faith, as Christ frequently affirms in the Gospel and as Paul
teaches in Romans 10: How shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? But
prayer arising from faith is itself from grace. Paul confirms this in Romans 8,
saying: The Spirit helps our infirmity. Explaining how the Spirit helps, he adds: For we
know not what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit himself asks for us with
unspeakable groanings—that is, He teaches and enables us to ask, according to
Augustine’s exposition (De Trinitate, Bk. 2, ch. 6). In the same sense, Paul adds that the
Spirit asks on behalf of the saints according to God—that is, He makes them pray in a
manner pleasing to God. It is of this prayer that Augustine speaks when he draws from
it an argument for the necessity of grace. But this prayer could not be made by man in
a purely natural state, nor by an unbeliever, since it is founded on faith. Therefore,
either man in a state of pure nature or an unbeliever now cannot perform a morally
good work—which is utterly absurd—or else such prayer is not necessary for each
individual morally good work, and Augustine’s reasoning cannot be applied to the
present matter.
9. A second response. Secondly, we say: even if grace were not necessary for a
faithful man to perform each morally good work of the acquired virtues, he should still
pray to God for special assistance in each good act—or that the work be done not
merely naturally but in some way meritoriously. Or certainly, even if the help of grace is
not strictly necessary for each of these works, it is at least necessary to avoid sinning,
even against the natural law. Since it is contingent in each act whether one sins, and man
cannot know where he might fall into sin against natural reason, he ought to pray in
each instance that it not happen. Hence, if a man without faith could have some
knowledge and an imperfect hope of divine help—as a Jew now has—he ought also,
insofar as he is able, to pray for the same reason, though such prayer in itself has no
merit.
10. This is clarified by the example of a sick man, which St. Thomas uses in this
matter. For although without another’s help, he could walk a short distance or take
individual steps, yet because he cannot complete the whole movement alone and may
fall at any step, he seeks continuous assistance for all. So too must a man dispose
himself concerning each good work, on account of the danger present in each. This is
especially so because, in God’s conditional foreknowledge, such help may be necessary
for this or that work to be successfully performed, even if it is not absolutely necessary.
For God foresees that without such help, the work will not be done, even though it
could absolutely be done. Thus, although generally speaking, a prudent request for help
is not always due to absolute inability or strict necessity but may be for greater ease and
facility (as is evident in human affairs), yet with respect to God, this convenience is
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always reducible to some necessity—since in His foreknowledge, what is not strictly
necessary for the possibility of an act may be necessary for its actual existence.
11. Whether grace is necessary to overcome any temptation against the natural law or
for each temptation. The first opinion. Another opinion. A third opinion. The second
argument raises the question of whether man can overcome any temptation against the
natural law or whether grace is necessary to overcome each temptation. For there are
many learned men who, while admitting that grace is not necessary for each morally
good work, believe it is necessary to overcome each temptation—at least insofar as
temptations can be intensified and pressed by the craft and efficacy of the devil. This
grace is either positive, enabling one to overcome a severe temptation permitted by
God, or at least negative—since not permitting the devil to tempt as much as he could
is itself a grace. Others, at the opposite extreme, contend that man can resist any
individual temptation, however severe it may seem, by the power of free will alone—
though he cannot persevere long in this victory without the help of grace. Still others
answer that lighter and ordinary temptations, taken individually, can be overcome by
man through free will by simply not consenting. This is certainly sufficient for
performing some morally good work. For (as I have said) we are not here discussing
every possible work, including the most difficult, but indefinitely about some good
work—and such a work can even occur without any temptation.
12. If it is objected that no work exists which, grace being removed, cannot become
difficult or even impossible if God permits man to be tempted by the devil to the
utmost, I reply first that this may not be so, because many good works are so easy in
their object and circumstances that, so long as reason remains intact, the devil cannot
impose such difficulty. For if he so disturbs or distracts the mind that man cannot pay
attention, there will be no culpable act or omission. But if man can sufficiently attend,
the matter itself will often not present such difficulty. Secondly, it is said that even if we
concede there is some grace in God not permitting man to be more severely tempted in
each good work than he actually is, this does not contradict the truth we defend. For
that grace is extrinsic and not a direct cause but only removes impediments, whereas
here we are discussing the internal grace of illumination, inspiration, and divine
assistance—which grace is the direct and proper cause of the acts for which it is given.
To the third argument, we shall respond in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XVIII. A RESPONSE TO THE

PRINCIPAL OBJECTION RAISED IN CHAPTER NINE.

1. Concerning the principal objection raised in Chapter Nine—the occasion for all
that we have said—many theologians do not consider it problematic to concede that in
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some, indeed many, adult human beings, certain morally good works precede any
internal prevenient assistance that constitutes true and supernatural grace. For since
such a work is possible by reason and free will alone, it has no intrinsic connection with
prevenient grace. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in its actually occurring
beforehand.
2. Furthermore, many have taught that when a man does what lies within him to act
morally by his natural powers (which are all he possesses at that time), God confers His
grace—not sanctifying grace, but the first supernatural assistance or call to faith. St.
Thomas explicitly teaches this (In II Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1; d. 28, q. un., a. 4; De Veritate,
q. 14, a. 11, ad 1) in discussing the child of unbelievers raised in the wilderness who,
upon reaching the use of reason, follows the guidance of right reason. Of such a one,
he says that God will supernaturally enlighten him—a point he confirms in Contra
Gentiles (Bk. 3, ch. 159) and in the Summa Theologiæ (I-II, q. 89, a. 6). The same view
is held by the author of the Summa Halensis (Pt. 1, q. 29, m. 3, a. 1, ad 1; Pt. 2, q. 19,
m. 8, § 1; Pt. 3, q. 60, m. 5, a. 3, ad 5–6), Gerson (Alpha et Omega, lett. M, no. 24; lett.
G, no. 61; and in his Treatise on the Spiritual Life, lect. 1), and commonly by
theologians commenting on Book II, Distinction 28—including Albert the Great (a. 1,
ad 4), Giles of Rome (a. 2, § 2, ad 2), Richard of Middleton (a. 1, q. 2), Nicholas of
Orbellis (a. 2), and Gabriel Biel (In II Sent., d. 22, q. 2, a. 3, dub. 1), among others cited
in Chapter Seven. Among modern Thomists, this position is followed by Soto (In IV
Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 3), Victoria (Relectio on the Child Attaining the Use of Reason, Pt. 3,
no. 14), and Canon (Relectio on the Sacraments in General, Pts. 1–2). Medina considers
it probable (In I-II, q. 89, a. 6, last dub.; q. 109, a. 6, dub. 3, ad 2–3), as do Viguerius (In
Theological Institutions, ch. 10, § 4), Zumel (In I-II, q. 112, a. 3, disp. 5), Vega (In the
Tridentine, Bk. 13, ch. 12, Way 3), Corduba (extensively in Bk. 2, On Ignorance, qq. 4–
5), Driedo (Treatise on Concord, Pt. 2, last ch.; On the Captivity and Redemption of
the Human Race, Tr. 2, ch. 2), Ruardus (Art. 7, § "Doctors"), Albert Pighius (On Free
Will Against Calvin, fol. 99), and many others who wrote against the heretics of their
time.
3. Whatever the truth of this opinion—which we need not defend or explain here to
resolve the proposed difficulty, as I will shortly show—it is nevertheless unlikely that so
many grave theologians dangerously erred in this doctrine or that it cannot be
understood in a sense wholly foreign to Pelagian error. I do not doubt, therefore, that
they held that the whole of this first grace, even if given to a man acting morally well, is
not given on account of the merits or disposition of such a work but purely by God’s
grace. At most, that good work might serve to prevent sin, which could otherwise be an
obstacle to divine illumination. This is the sense I explained in Book Three of On
Divine Helps (ch. 2), and I find it taught by Mark the Ascetic in the words cited above
272 BOOK TWO
(ch. 8) from his On Paradise (ch. 53). Nor does this sense exclude another—that of
"doing what lies within one" by supernatural help, for the same words can be applied in
different senses to different graces. Thus, with respect to justifying grace and its
attainment, it is necessary that man do what he can by prevenient grace—or,
equivalently, that man already preveniently assisted supernaturally must, if he wishes to
advance, act by the help he has received. But with respect to the help itself, if man is
not yet supernaturally prevenient, he cannot act by it. Therefore, in the latter case,
"doing what lies within him" means ensuring he places no obstacle, and to this end,
doing some good insofar as he can.
4. This position does not imply that predestination has a cause on the part of the
predestined for all its effects. Hence it is also clear that even if this opinion is admitted,
it does not follow that predestination has a cause on the part of the predestined for all
its effects. For such a good work is not the cause of the first assisting grace; rather,
God confers it by His free will—either from that will by which He desires all men to be
saved or, in the case of the predestined, from that will by which He chose them. If you
say that at least it is an accidental cause (as removing an obstacle), so that such a man
seems to be the cause of the first help given to him, I reply that even in this way, he is
not the cause of that effect as it pertains to predestination. First, because that first
illumination is given to the predestined not only as sufficient grace but as efficacious
and congruous grace—to which such a work contributes nothing, even accidentally—
but proceeds immediately from divine election. Second, if by that good work the man
is preveniently kept from placing an obstacle to his call, this itself is due to
predestination, as I will explain more fully below.
5. Nor do the other alleged difficulties follow. Thus, the difficulties raised against this
opinion also vanish. For it does not suppose that man can live innocently or often act
well without grace’s help without frequently sinning unless divinely preveniently
assisted. It supposes only that he can do some good—which, though slight, may at least
serve to prevent sin for the time being. And then it holds, in trust in God’s mercy, that
such a man will not be left without help—not because of his work (which bears no
proportion to grace) but because God is inclined of Himself to give all men sufficient
and necessary remedies for salvation.
6. A response to the principal objection. Finally, I add that we need not adopt this
entire opinion to resolve the proposed difficulty, and so for now we neither prove nor
reject it—for it depends on many principles requiring examination in the treatise on
grace. I say, rather, that from Paul’s words, God wills all men to be saved (1 Tim. 2:4), it
more probably follows that God gives all adult men some beginning of salvation—
indeed, some call. Hence, although before this supernatural call, a man may perform
some good work (and may do so before being called by God), it does not follow that he
273 BOOK TWO
is called because of that work but because of God’s general benevolence toward men
and for Christ’s sake. Nor is it necessary that this good work concurs by removing an
obstacle, for even if the man sinned grievously, God would still enlighten him out of
that general will—as may piously be believed. Since the time for giving this first
illumination is not fixed uniformly for all men but is given at the opportune or divinely
appointed moment, whether a man has previously acted well or ill neither hastens nor
delays that predetermined time. Nor in appointing it did God have regard for man’s
work but for the order of His wisdom and the counsel of His will.
7. There is no connection between the cause of predestination on our part and the
power of free will to perform some morally good work without grace. Thus, it is finally
clear that there is no connection between these questions—the cause of predestination
on our part and the power of free will to perform some morally good work without
grace. For even if such a work is done before any supernatural grace, it cannot in any
way be the foundation of grace itself, much less of predestination to it. This is true of
every help, especially of congruous and efficacious help, which is ordinarily the effect
of predestination. All this will be further confirmed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XIX. THAT NO MORALLY GOOD WORK

OF THE NATURAL ORDER OR OF ACQUIRED VIRTUE, EVEN
WHEN PROCEEDING UNDER EXTRINSIC GRACE, CAN BE THE
PROPER CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION OR OF ANY OF ITS EFFECTS.

1. Thus far, we have discussed good works insofar as they can be performed by free
will without grace. Now we must discuss works done with grace. Since grace is
necessary not only for supernatural works but also assists in the morally upright
performance of natural and moral acts, in this chapter we will examine moral and
natural works that proceed in some way from grace, and afterward supernatural acts. In
doing so, we will further clarify and confirm several points made earlier. We presuppose
that our discussion concerns a cause that is not entirely improper or accidental but in
some way intrinsic and moral—such as a proportionate disposition, some degree of
merit (at least congruous), or impetratory power. We further presuppose that a work of
acquired virtue can be "from grace" in two ways: (1) because it proceeds from some
special providence and divine impulse moving or assisting man to perform it, though
nothing supernatural—whether physical in its substance or intrinsic and real in the act
itself—results from this, nor any moral relation to a supernatural end; (2) because man
is morally assisted so that the work itself, remaining within the natural order and
performed with due circumstances concerning an object conformable to natural reason,
is elevated by grace to include some supernatural quality, at least morally.
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2. First assertion: A moral work done with grace, though of the natural order in its
species, can be a cause of some effect of predestination. The first part of this assertion
is supported by reason. When a moral work is done with grace in such a way that, while
remaining of the natural order in its species, it receives some supernatural modality, it
can be a cause of some effect of predestination—though not of the whole of
predestination in all its effects. The latter part will be more clearly established from
what we will say about supernatural acts. Briefly, we note that such a work presupposes
some efficacious grace suited to the end of predestination and thus already presupposes
some effect of predestination. Therefore, it cannot be the cause of the whole of
predestination. The antecedent is proven because this work cannot be so performed
unless preceded by some illumination of faith and a supernatural intention directing
and elevating the act in some way to the supernatural order—for no other intrinsic
supernatural modality can be conceived in such an act.
3. The second part—that such an act can be a cause of predestination regarding
some of its effects—is proven first from Scripture, where moral works (especially
works of mercy) are said to be highly useful for obtaining the remission of sins (Dan.
4:27; Tob. 4:11; Lk. 6:37). These and similar texts are at least true of such works insofar
as they are done with some supernatural modality. Thus, if performed in sanctifying
grace and charity, with a supernatural motive and reference, they merit some effects of
predestination condignly. If done only with assisting grace and faith, they merit
congruously or impetratively, or as a proportionate disposition for further grace
pertaining to predestination’s effects. This does not contradict the gratuity of
predestination, since this is already grace upon grace, and the origin of all causality is
true supernatural grace, as we presuppose.
4. Second assertion: A moral work performed by free will through natural powers
alone cannot be a cause of predestination regarding any supernatural effect. If a moral
work has only what can be done by natural powers and receives no supernatural
modality (physical or moral) from any gift of grace, it cannot be a cause of
predestination regarding any supernatural effect—much less the first supernatural
grace, vocation, divine illumination, or inspiration. This assertion clarifies the
controversy treated in previous chapters: whether a morally good work can be done
without grace and wherein lies the real difference (as opposed to mere verbal
distinctions). Those who hold that a moral work cannot be done well without grace—
and by "grace" understand only a naturally fitting thought—and then attribute to such a
work the merit of the first supernatural vocation and illumination, seem to differ from
the Massilians (i.e., semi-Pelagians) only in words, calling "grace" what they more
fittingly termed a "natural benefit." In reality, they incline toward the semi-Pelagian
opinion when they say that an alms, for example, done without faith and from purely
275 BOOK TWO
natural motives, is congruously meritorious, impetratory, and dispositive for
supernatural vocation simply because it proceeds from God’s gratuitous gift offering
man a fitting occasion and concurrence for such a work.
5. Against this opinion, we prove our assertion first from the Council of Trent
(Session 6), which declares that the beginning of justification is taken from divine
vocation, with no preceding merits. It explains (in Chapters 5 and 6) that this vocation
is whereby man is moved to believe what God has revealed and to other supernatural
acts that follow. Paul (2 Tim. 1:9) likewise distinguishes this holy calling from our works,
showing it to be a supernatural gift elevating man to supernatural objects. Christ (Jn.
6:45) calls this the Father’s drawing and teaching—which, as Augustine explains (De
Prædestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 8), belongs not to the natural school where man learns
from sensible objects but to the supernatural. Therefore, natural moral knowledge does
not pertain to vocation, nor can it merit or dispose for it. Before true vocation, there is
no merit of it, however the act is conceived. The definitions of the Council of Orange
likewise require grace pertaining to the supernatural order and elevating man to operate
within it—as we have shown at length earlier and will further clarify by examining the
phrase as one ought.
6. This is confirmed by Augustine (whose doctrine the Council undoubtedly
followed). In Ad Simplicianum (1.2), he states that man cannot work well unless he has
first received grace through faith. Thus, the thought posited as preceding the first
vocation to faith is not what the Fathers require for merit before God regarding
supernatural gifts. Augustine teaches that Cornelius already had faith when, through
prayers and alms, he merited to receive the Gospel (De Prædestinatione Sanctorum, ch.
7; Quaest. in Leviticum, q. 84). Bernard (Sermon 78 on the Canticles), Hugh of St.
Victor (On Romans, q. 266), and Thomas (II-II, q. 10, a. 4) confirm this. Since without
faith it is impossible to please God (Heb. 11:6), and Cornelius pleased God by his
works (Acts 10:4–5), those works must have proceeded from faith. This testimony and
reason equally prove that works not proceeding from faith cannot so please God as to
be apt for obtaining vocation to faith. Augustine (Hypognosticon, 3) states plainly: In a
man not believing, there are no good works—a point we have often demonstrated.
Prosper (Against the Collator), Fulgentius (To Monimus), and Gregory Nazianzen
(Oration 13) likewise teach that as faith without charity is dead, so every action without
faith is unfruitful.
7. Finally, we argue thus: If a work is not intrinsically better or of a different moral
condition on the part of man or of grace inhering in him, it is not more meritorious or
dispositive for supernatural gifts because it proceeds from an extrinsically assisting
principle rather than from general concurrence. But this is the case here: A morally
good act of acquired virtue is not morally better simply because it proceeds from
276 BOOK TWO
special divine providence, nor can it be explained how it would be so. The relation to an
extrinsic cause does not of itself make the effect better. Therefore, the act is not
physically or morally better—and thus not more proportioned to merit or disposition—
merely because of its relation to such help. Moreover, if we consider the human agent,
he who does an equally good work with less assistance contributes more of his own. It
is thus unlikely that another merits more before God simply because he acts with
greater help yet performs no better work.
8. Closing off an objection. Finally, we examine the phrase as one ought used by the
Councils, for through it they signify some condition or perfection of the act that makes
grace necessary. When the Councils say, If anyone says that a man can repent as one
ought, etc., they do not mean as one ought merely in the sense of a supernatural mode
on God’s part alone—otherwise, it would be a mere negation, equivalent to saying, If
anyone says a man can repent by special help without grace, let him be
anathema. Rather, they indicate that the act itself must possess some proper quality or
perfection requiring grace to excite and assist it. This same perfection is required for the
act to be meritorious or dispositive toward grace. Therefore, if the act is not
intrinsically better, it matters little for the aforementioned effects whether it proceeds
from some special help. By this reasoning, I have elsewhere proven that a true act of
repentance—whether contrition or attrition—must in itself be supernatural. The same
applies to other acts.
9. Refuting an evasion. One might object that a morally good work can never occur
without a fitting thought. But this is irrelevant, first because we have shown that such a
thought is not true grace, and it seems absurd to base the entire dispute—and the
doctrine of the Council of Orange and Augustine against the Massilians—on this mere
term. Second, this fittingness does not always add greater perfection or power to the
thought but only a relation to a future effect foreseen and perhaps specially intended by
God—which is insufficient to make the act morally better or more valuable. Thus, if
the act itself lacks proportion to such merit, neither will it gain it by proceeding from a
so-called fitting thought. Moreover, the phrase as one ought cannot mean
merely morally good—for it was already obvious that grace is not needed for evil
works. When the Councils say grace is necessary to act well as one ought, they
distinguish certain special good works requiring grace from other common good acts.
10. Response and rebuttal. It may further be argued that some heroic moral works
are never done without grace, and perseverance in them always requires special help to
avoid sin. Thus, these works might merit or dispose for grace. But this does not
undermine our reasoning, since free will alone could never produce anything so perfect.
I reply that the same principle applies proportionally here. If a morally remarkable and
difficult work proceeds from true supernatural grace, it belongs not to the latter
277 BOOK TWO
assertion but to the former, making the objection irrelevant. If, however, it proceeds
not from supernatural grace but from greater providential assistance—merely morally
aiding or guarding fallen man’s weakness—then the work is not truly heroic in the
absolute sense of virtue. And whatever its quality, it cannot merit supernatural grace.
Even an angel or unfallen man could perform such a work without special help, yet it
would never merit the first grace, which always retains its gratuitous character and
cannot be obtained by natural works. The same holds for perseverance in such works: A
man without faith is never given grace to persevere without relapse, and even if given
proportionate help, it would not suffice to merit higher grace, for such help does not
presuppose faith and, though broadly called grace, is not sanctifying grace (as St.
Thomas states, II-II, q. 136, a. 3, ad 2).
11. A man before faith cannot merit any true grace. From this, we conclude not only
that a man before faith cannot in any way merit true grace but also that the same must
be said of a believer preparing for repentance while in sin. For even in him, works of
free will alone—if in no way proceeding from faith and supernatural grace—cannot
directly suffice. The first part is proven by all we have cited, confirmed by this
reasoning: If a man before faith could, through a good work proceeding from prior
divine help, merit supernatural gifts, he could merit the very preaching and revelation of
faith—a claim not even the Pelagians dared make. Likewise, given external preaching,
he could, through imperfect desire for faith or salvation, or through natural but
incomplete faith, merit the interior grace to believe as one ought—a doctrine
condemned even in the Semi-Pelagians. This follows because such acts are good and
proceed from upright thought, which could far more plausibly be called grace than
could natural moral thought excited by natural objects. If a natural moral work can
merit supernatural grace because it proceeds from such thought, why could not natural
acts concerning materially supernatural objects merit higher interior grace?
12. The assertion is proportionally proven for the believer. In the believer, faith is as
if it were not, since it exerts no influence. Moreover, the general principle holds here
too: Without supernatural grace, no work can of itself conduce to eternal life—yet
obtaining the supernatural call to repentance greatly conduces to it. Further, such works
are no more efficacious for congruous merit in a sinful believer than for condign merit
in a just man; but in the just man, they are not condignly meritorious of sanctifying
grace or eternal life (as the common teaching holds, requiring that the work proceed in
some way from faith and grace). The Council of Trent (Session 6, ch. 16) strongly
supports this. Finally, a believer acting without faith’s influence does less than a pagan
acting well without faith; thus, he has no claim to merit supernatural grace by such
works. Hence, when Scripture says these works avail before God for supernatural merit
or remission of sins, it always adds something signifying they must proceed from faith
278 BOOK TWO
or a supernatural motive (as noted earlier). Thus, Clement of Alexandria rightly
concludes (Stromata, Bk. 4) that a work’s merit depends on the manner and rationale of
its performance.

CHAPTER XX. SUPERNATURAL

WORKS PROCEEDING FROM GRACE ARE NOT THE
CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION WITH RESPECT TO ALL ITS EFFECTS.

1. A supernatural work, because it proceeds from prior grace, is the cause of

subsequent grace. Having discussed works of the natural order, it now remains to speak
of works of the supernatural order, which in reality and in their execution proceed
from some supernatural grace—at least from vocation and the cooperation of grace.
Concerning these works, it is certain that one work, insofar as it proceeds from prior
grace, can be the cause and reason for subsequent grace, and in this way, the work itself
can provide a partial cause for some effect of predestination. For the first effect can be
the cause of the second, the second of the third, and so forth. From this, it might seem
easy to resolve the entire question of predestination—namely, that it cannot have a
cause. For the first supernatural work necessarily proceeds from some grace, namely
from vocation; therefore, it proceeds from some prior effect of predestination, since
that grace from which it proceeds is itself an effect of predestination. Consequently,
that work cannot be the cause of that grace, because it cannot be the cause of its own
cause. Therefore, it cannot be the cause of the whole of predestination with respect to
all its effects.
2. The argument renders the question ambiguous. A work proceeding from grace can
be meritorious in three ways. This argument seems to demonstrate its intended
conclusion. Nevertheless, among theologians, there are various opinions on this matter,
founded perhaps more on differing ways of speaking about predestination or its effects
than on the reality itself, provided we agree on the meaning and effects of
predestination. Therefore, a work proceeding from grace can be understood in three
ways as meritorious with respect to all the effects of predestination. First, concerning a
work that follows upon one grace and precedes another; second, concerning a work
that accompanies some grace precisely as concomitant; third, concerning a work that
follows upon grace as a real consequent, while presupposing that it will arise from that
grace. And according to these three modes, there seem to have been three opinions
among theologians on this matter.
3. The first opinion. The first opinion holds that man can merit his predestination
with respect to its effects, because through some work proceeding from grace, he can
merit from God all the effects of grace pertaining to predestination. If one objects that
279 BOOK TWO
such a work does not merit the grace from which it proceeds, the response is that this
grace is not an effect of predestination, and therefore, although the work does not
merit that grace, it can merit all the effects of predestination. They argue that this grace
is not an effect of predestination because it is common to both the reprobate and the
predestined, and thus it is a sign that it does not come from predestination but from the
general providence of grace. It does not matter that this grace is an efficacious
vocation, for even an efficacious vocation with respect to some effect can exist in the
reprobate. That it does not proceed to further effects in them is due to their own fault,
whereas in the predestined, it does proceed further because of their cooperation with
grace. Therefore, in them, there is simply a cause of predestination with respect to its
effects insofar as they are such.
4. A foundation is established for this position. This position can easily be defended
by those who do not believe that God effectively chose the predestined for glory prior
to foreseen merits. Consequently, they cannot say that the effects of grace that occur in
the predestined arise solely from an antecedent will to save all, and thus are not effects
of predestination. Therefore, they hold that this grace can be the principle by which
one merits the effects of predestination. In this vein, Ockham and Gabriel [Biel] seem
to have thought (in [Commentary on the Sentences] I, dist. 14) concerning those whom
they believe are saved even if they were not pre-elected—or, as they say, even if they
were not predestined before merits. Although Catharinus, in his books on
predestination, holds the same view, he does not wish to call those who are saved
without pre-election before foreseen merits "predestined," and thus he does not posit a
cause of predestination in them, since he does not admit predestination in them.
However, if forced to admit predestination in such cases, he would have to hold the
same view regarding its cause. Nevertheless, these authors do not seem to acknowledge
any other effect of predestination that falls under merit except glorification, though
they consider this sufficient, since they define predestination as solely the efficacious
decree to give glory. But St. Bonaventure (I Sent., d. 41, art. 1, qq. 1–2) seems to admit a
cause of predestination even with respect to the effects of grace, which he places in
some merit, at least congruous merit. Concerning this merit, he says (IV Sent., d. 15,
art. 1, q. 5) that it must proceed from some aid of grace, and thus elsewhere he seems
to presuppose that this aid is not an effect of predestination, for he says that a work
proceeding from this aid can be the cause of predestination with respect to its proper
effects of grace and glory. Alexander of Hales (I Part., q. 28, membr. 3) seems to have
inclined toward this opinion, as will be noted below. Javelli, in his treatise on this matter
appended to the first part of [his commentary on] St. Thomas, also seems to follow this
line of thought.
280 BOOK TWO
5. Augustine’s distinction between the predestined and the reprobate. The foundation
of this opinion depends on another argument concerning election based on foreseen
merits, and thus, if that is removed, this opinion lacks plausibility. For granted God’s
efficacious intention to save the predestined, it is certain that all gifts of grace that
proceed from that intention are effects of predestination. But in predestined
individuals, every grace by which they are effectively saved proceeds from the
efficacious intention to save them; therefore, it is an effect of predestination. Hence,
even the first aid and the first vocation are effects of this kind. Yet the predestined
cannot merit that first aid through a work proceeding from it, as the aforementioned
authors admit; therefore, they cannot merit their predestination through such a work.
This argument, considered absolutely, has a strong foundation in Paul (Rom. 8:30), who
says: "Those whom He predestined, He also called; those whom He called, He also
justified; and those whom He justified, He also glorified." For in these words, he clearly
teaches that in the predestined, the entire sequence of graces, beginning with vocation
itself, consists of effects of predestination. Indeed, Augustine places the principal
distinction between the predestined and the reprobate in this high and secret vocation.
Therefore, since all the merits of the predestined arise from vocation, and vocation is
an effect of predestination, the predestined cannot be the cause of all the effects of
predestination through a work proceeding from that very vocation.
6. The second opinion.—There is, then, a second opinion, which considers two
aspects in a good work proceeding from supernatural vocation: one is the influx of
grace, the other is the cooperation of free will. It acknowledges that the work, insofar
as it is from grace, is not the cause of predestination, since it is an effect of it. Yet it
nevertheless affirms that the cooperation of free will—not as prior or subsequent to
efficacious grace, but as simultaneous with it—is in some way the reason for
predestination, not as proper merit but at least as a sine qua non condition. For this
cooperation, as such, is not grace but the proper influx of free will; therefore, it is not
an effect of predestination but of the person himself. Hence, in this respect, there is no
obstacle to its being in some way a cause of predestination. Moreover, this cooperation
is at least a condition without which no grace is efficacious; therefore, without it, no
grace is an effect of predestination. Thus, it is in some way the reason for all the effects
of predestination as such—at least as a sine qua non condition. This seems to have
been the reasoning of Aureoli (I Sent., d. 40, art. 1; d. 41, art. 1) and Echi (in
his opusculum on predestination, Centuria 3, no. 2 ff.). Henry [of Ghent] (Quodlibet 4,
q. 11; Quodlibet 8, q. 5), attributing the same mode of causality to free will, seems to
place it not in positive cooperation but in the mere non-resistance or non-repugnance
of free will. And some modern writers appear to have recently revived this opinion in
the latter sense, saying that God gives the predestined the efficacious aid proper to
281 BOOK TWO
them because they freely do not resist the sufficient aid, which is also given to the
reprobate and thus does not seem to be an effect of predestination but of the general
providence of grace.
7. This opinion is rejected.—Cooperation can contribute in three ways.—First way.
—Nevertheless, this opinion is in no way plausible or probable based on the arguments
presented. First, concerning the positive cooperation of free will with the aid of grace,
it cannot be denied that such cooperation is in some way the cause of some effects of
predestination. But it cannot in any way be called the cause or concomitant condition
on account of which all the effects of predestination are given. Both points are clarified
as follows: This cooperation can be considered either (1) in relation to the term
produced by it and the effects resulting from that term, or (2) in relation to the influx
of actual grace cooperating with and assisting free will itself, or (3) in relation to the
preceding grace that necessarily comes before such an influx of free will, either
temporally or at least in nature. In the first way, the influx of free will is the cause of
the act or term produced by it, with a causality that is in some way physical—namely, in
the way that action is the cause of its term. For the influx is related to the act in this
way, since the influx is nothing other than the action by which that act of love or
another similar act is produced by free will. Thus, free will itself is the physical cause in
its own genus of that influx insofar as it is from free will, just as the principle of acting
is the cause of the action and, consequently, through that action, is the cause of the
term by way of principle. The action itself is a cause in a broad sense, by way of action.
Because this act can be meritorious or a disposition for other effects of grace leading to
the ultimate effect of predestination, morally speaking, this cooperation of free will
toward such an act is the cause or co-cause of subsequent effects of grace, and thus it
can be the cause of many effects of predestination.
8. Second mode of contribution.—Furthermore, the cooperation of free will,
considered in relation to the causality or co-causality of assisting grace, can rightly be
called a sine qua non condition, without which such actual aid of grace would not be
given to man. Hence, insofar as this actual aid is an effect of predestination, it can be
said that, in this respect, there is some reason, cause, or condition on the part of man
for his predestination with respect to some effect of it—and consequently also with
respect to other effects that follow from it. However, there is no proper causal
relationship here, not even a moral one, concerning the actual influx of cooperating
grace. For in reality, there is no distinction between the influx of free will and
cooperating grace; rather, it is one indivisible action proceeding simultaneously from
both principles. Therefore, there cannot be a causality of one influx upon the other as
distinct realities, nor can free will itself be called the cause of the actual influx of grace,
formally speaking of that influx as grace, since under that respect, it does not come
282 BOOK TWO
from free will but from grace. Thus, free will is said to be a co-cause of grace, without
which grace itself does not flow into such an act. For the same reason, the influx of
free will itself can be called a sine qua non condition for the actual influx of such grace.
Yet this is not sufficient for that cooperation of free will to be called a sine qua
non condition for the whole of predestination with respect to all its effects, because
beyond this effect or aid of grace, other things are necessary for the complete effect of
predestination. And this cooperation cannot be called a necessary condition for all
other effects, as will be clear from the following point.
9. Third mode of comparison.—Thirdly, the comparison can be made with respect
to prevenient grace, which must necessarily be presupposed before this cooperation of
free will. But in relation to this grace, cooperation cannot be a cause or concomitant
condition, because it follows upon grace—indeed, it is truly an effect of that very
prevenient grace, not only as it passes into assisting and cooperating grace (in which
way it can at least be called a co-cause) but also as prevenient and exciting grace. For
God, in calling man, is the cause drawing and inclining him to consent. Therefore,
through vocation, He is the cause of consent, even as it comes from free will. For
although He is not a necessitating or absolutely predetermining cause of the will, such
that it cannot resist, He is nevertheless, in Himself, a cause that leads and moves.
Hence, when free will yields to the calling grace, such an effect is rightly attributed to
vocation as its cause. Thus Scripture speaks: I will make you walk in My statutes (Ezek.
36:27); I will give you a new heart (Ezek. 36:26); All who were appointed to eternal life
believed (Acts 13:48). These and similar passages are spoken with reference to vocation
and prevenient aid. Therefore, the cooperation of free will cannot be a cause or
presupposed condition on the part of man for all the effects of predestination.
10. Two ways to evade the force of the argument.—First way.—The second way is
excluded.—The force of this argument can be evaded in two ways. First, by denying
that prevenient grace, as such, is an effect of predestination. But this falls into the first
opinion already refuted, and its falsity will become clearer from what will be said below
concerning the effects of predestination. Second, by conceding that this prevenient aid
is given on the condition of such cooperation. But this falls into the third opinion, soon
to be discussed and refuted. For although this cooperation can be the reason for such
aid by way of the end and effect for which it is given, it cannot be so by way of a
condition or disposition required or simultaneously posited on the part of man.
11. Objection and response.—You might say that although this cooperation is not a
necessary condition for prevenient aid in itself, it is nevertheless a necessary condition
for that aid as efficacious, because without it, the aid cannot be efficacious. Therefore,
under this aspect, such aid is not given except with this condition. But under this aspect
of efficacious aid, it is an effect of predestination and not otherwise. Hence, this
283 BOOK TWO
cooperation can rightly be called a sine qua non condition for the first aid of grace as
an effect of predestination. I respond, first, that this prevenient aid is an effect of
predestination not only under the aspect of being efficacious but also absolutely and in
its entirety, because the whole proceeds from the efficacious intention to give glory to
such a man. Nor is it to be understood as given under one aspect before another, as if it
could have a cause on the part of man under one aspect but not another. Second, either
this aid is called efficacious solely from its actual operation—that is, because it actually
brings about its effect (and thus it is considered not as prevenient but as assisting)—or
it is considered as prevenient. But we are considering it in the latter sense, and thus we
inquire into its cause on the part of man and find none. Therefore, if this aid is called
efficacious as prevenient, it does not intrinsically include the cooperation of free will
(so to speak) but only terminatively, because it looks to that cooperation as something
to be actually attained. Thus, it does not regard cooperation as a cause or simultaneous
condition but as a future end and effect. Consequently, the influx of free will as
simultaneous with grace cannot be the reason for the whole of predestination with
respect to its effects.
12. The same reasoning refutes the negative condition.—A similar argument can be
made concerning that negative or privative condition called non-resistance or non-
repugnance. For this also necessarily presupposes some prevenient grace or vocation to
which man is said not to resist or to resist. Before any vocation or impulse, even if man
does not act, he cannot be said to resist by doing nothing—both because he cannot yet
act, not having been stirred, and because he has nothing to resist. Therefore, this non-
resistance presupposes the vocation of grace; hence, it cannot be the reason or
concomitant condition for it, since it is simply posterior. But that vocation is an effect
of predestination, as has been shown, because it proceeds from the efficacious
intention to save the elect. Therefore, this non-resistance cannot be called the reason
for all the effects of predestination.
13. Second argument.—Beyond this argument taken from the comparison with
prevenient aid, other, clearer ones can be made concerning subsequent or concomitant
graces. Therefore, I argue secondly that this non-resistance is either prior in nature and
causality to positive cooperation (both of free will and grace) or entirely concomitant.
The latter cannot be consistently maintained, because if, at the same instant of nature,
the will is already cooperating, it cannot be understood as not resisting through mere
privation but through a positive form that formally excludes resistance. But if this non-
resistance is prior, it either comes from free will alone suspending a contrary act by its
own power (which seems to be within its natural capacity)—and thus some privative
use of free will by its own power alone, without the help of grace, would be the reason
for the whole of predestination (which cannot be maintained, as is clear from the
284 BOOK TWO
arguments against Pelagius and his followers)—or this use comes from some aid of
concomitant grace. In this case, the same arguments apply to this privative use as were
made concerning positive cooperation. And there is the added difficulty of
understanding what kind of use this is and what sort of aid of concomitant grace is
necessary for it.
14. Third refutation of the same.—Hence, I argue thirdly that at that prior instant in
the order of nature in which the will is said not to resist, it either can already positively
cooperate at that same instant or it cannot. If it cannot yet operate at that instant, it
cannot be said to resist or not resist at that time, because resistance, to be free, must
presuppose the power to resist or not resist at the very instant in which one is said to
resist or not resist. Therefore, it presupposes the power to act or not act. But if, at that
same instant, it has the power to act or cooperate with God’s aid, then by the very fact
that it does not cooperate, it resists—at least by not doing what is in its power with that
aid. Indeed, on its part, it renders the call of grace inefficacious at that moment. For an
efficacious intention of the end is thwarted not only by deviation to another end or by
dissent from the means ordered to that end but also by not using the necessary means
for that end. Therefore, that mere privation or absence of action—both cooperating
and resisting vocation—cannot be the reason for obtaining new efficacious aid or other
effects of predestination. On the contrary, it is of itself a sufficient cause for God to
deny further grace. I omit many other arguments that could be made against this
opinion thus understood concerning negative preparation or condition, since I have
treated the matter at length in Book III on Divine Aid, Chapter 13.
15. The third opinion.—I come now to the third opinion, which places the reason
for predestination—with respect to the first effect of grace—in the good use of that
same grace, a use that is future and comes from free will not alone but aided by grace
itself. I say "with respect to the first effect of grace" because for subsequent effects,
there is no need to recur to a subsequent or later use but rather to a concomitant or
prior one, as is clear from the arguments against the first two opinions. For once
vocation is presupposed (which necessarily precedes every free use of grace), actual
assisting grace is given to man not without his free influx. Thus, on the part of man,
some necessary condition for receiving such grace can be understood—one that
accompanies it and is entirely simultaneous with it. When man, with God's help,
performs a good act, he can in some way already merit or obtain further grace through
that act, and so proceed step by step to the end of predestination. Therefore, the whole
difficulty lies in vocation itself, as touched upon in the previous opinions. To this, the
third opinion responds: Before giving such a vocation, God foresees whether man will
make good use of it or not. And when He sees a future good use, He gives man the
vocation by reason of that use and as its reward. Thus, the first reason for
285 BOOK TWO
predestination, with respect to its first supernatural effect, is placed in the future good
use.
16. The error of the Massilians.—Some think this was the opinion of the Massilians,
and in part, perhaps it was. Yet they erred more gravely—first, because they did not
speak of the good use of freedom with the aid of grace but were content with the use
of free will by its own powers alone, as if from this the reason for vocation could be
derived; second, because they spoke not only of a good use that would actually occur in
the future but also of one that would never occur but would have occurred if man had
lived. For from this, they derived the reason why an infant is anticipated by the grace of
baptism, in which it immediately dies and attains the ultimate effect of predestination.
But this third opinion does not admit these two points. In the first sense, this opinion is
usually attributed to Albert [the Great] (I Sent., d. 41, art. 2, ad 3). But I find nothing in
him relevant to the present matter. Moreover, Alexander of Hales is referred to as
holding the same opinion (I Part., q. 28, membr. 3, art. 3), where he inquires whether
the foreknowledge of a future good use is the reason for predestination and answers
affirmatively. Hence, he seems to incline toward this opinion, especially in responses to
objections 9 and 3. Yet it is difficult to believe he speaks in the sense explained—that
the first vocation is given to the predestined on account of merits that would proceed
from that very vocation, with free will cooperating, so that the vocation itself is the
reward of such merit or future good use arising from it. For the same Alexander (III
Part., q. 60, membr. 5, art. 2, § 3) teaches that the principle of merit does not fall under
the same merit, and thus the first grace is not given on account of merit—which is
especially true of the absolutely first grace, such as vocation. But if in reality it is not
given on account of merit, much less can it be predestined on account of merit, as I
will soon explain. Therefore, perhaps Alexander speaks there of the future good use of
grace in time with respect to eternity—that is, of merits foreseen before the will to give
the reward of glory or that grace which can fall under some merit. Hence, although in
his response to objection 2 he speaks absolutely about the conferral of grace, he need
not include the first vocation under "grace" but only that grace which precedes any
possible merit.
17. The opinion of some theologians.—Whatever may be said about the opinion of
the ancients, some theologians contend that this opinion should be ascribed to all who
assert that before God elected anyone to beatitude or decreed to give this or that
vocation to each, He foresaw how each would use such a vocation in each opportunity.
From this, they gather that these theologians place the foreknowledge of a future good
use of grace before predestination and thus hold that this foreseen good use is the
reason why God wills to give all grace, even the first and fitting vocation, and so is the
cause of predestination. And it is clear, because we said above that this conditional
286 BOOK TWO
knowledge of a future good use was the sine qua non condition without which the
divine will to give such aids would not be predestination but general providence.
Likewise, from what has been said, it follows that the future free cooperation under
such a condition was the sine qua non condition without which there would not be in
God such conditional knowledge, because a thing is not future because it is foreknown,
but foreknown because it is future. Therefore, futurity is presupposed as a necessary
condition for foreknowledge, and foreknowledge for predestination. Hence, from the
first to the last, the future good use is the reason for the whole of predestination, at
least as a necessary condition. But this involves an equivocation, because this
knowledge is posited by us only as a necessary condition on the part of the
predestining God—not as moving Him to predestine by way of merit but as enabling
Him to intend gratuitously the end of predestination through such means—which is
very different.
18. First assertion: The first vocation and beginning of salvation are imparted to us
gratuitously.—Therefore, it must first be said that the first aid of grace or supernatural
vocation, even if fitting or of whatever kind, is not given to man in time on account of
foreseen merits, even if those merits are supernatural and future. Although this
assertion may not seem as certain as the similar one against the Semipelagians, it is
nevertheless sufficiently certain from the definitions of the Councils, which say that this
first grace is given gratuitously, because the beginning of justification does not fall
under merit. Nor do they distinguish between merit founded on grace or on nature
alone, or between antecedent or subsequent merit, but they exclude merit absolutely.
This must be understood of all merit, because otherwise it would not be given
gratuitously if given on account of foreseen merits. Just as with respect to Christ, the
first justification and remission of sins were not given gratuitously to the ancient
Fathers, because they were given on account of Christ's future and foreseen merits.
That the first vocation and beginning of salvation are given gratuitously and without
merit is taught by the Council of Orange (can. 25) and the Council of Trent (Sess. 6,
chap. 5). It is especially noteworthy that in chapter 8, the same Council declares that
justification is given to man gratuitously because no merit precedes it—thus clearly
supposing that the merits which follow are not merits of the preceding grace from
which they proceed. Augustine extensively confirms this doctrine in On the
Predestination of the Saints and in Epistles 105 and 107.
19. The rationale for this assertion is established.—The a priori reason is that the
principle of merit does not fall under merit. But that vocation is the foundation of all
future merit arising from its good use, because true merit (which we are discussing and
which this opinion concerns) is founded on prevenient grace and consequently also on
assisting grace. Therefore, that first grace cannot in reality be given on account of
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future merit arising from itself. The major premise is common among theologians, as I
cited above from Alexander [of Hales], and the same is clear from St. Thomas and the
commentators (I-II, q. 114, a. 5). It is also evident from the absurdities that would
follow: otherwise, it could be said that the first sanctifying grace and remission of sins
are given on account of condign merit—not antecedent but subsequent and foreseen as
future. Likewise, the grace of union could have been given to Christ's humanity on
account of His infinite future merits. But these are absurd, for if it were from works, it
would no longer be grace (Rom. 11:6). The reason for this axiom is that no effect is the
cause of its own cause. But merit is an effect of that grace from which it proceeds;
therefore, it cannot be the cause of that grace, nor can it be merit of it, because merit is
the cause of the reward. The major premise is clear because an effect is posterior to its
cause, and the cause is prior. The same thing cannot be both prior and posterior in
relation to itself, especially in the same genus of efficient cause, where the cause is prior
in the order of nature or presupposition in existence. But merit depends on grace as on
an efficient cause, and merit is the cause of the reward, also in the genus of efficient
cause.
20. Objection.—It may be said that the causality of merit is not properly efficient but
only metaphorically and morally, and thus it is not necessary for merit always to precede
the reward in actual existence. It is enough that it be foreseen as future. And so a work
foreseen as future from such a principle can be the merit on account of which that very
principle of grace is conferred on man. At the same time, in execution, that grace can
be the proper physical efficient cause of such a meritorious work. A common example
is that a king can give someone weapons and a horse with which to serve as a soldier
and yet give them as the reward and payment for future labors of military service. For
he can give an anticipated payment for future labor, even if that labor in reality will
come from the very thing given as payment, as from an instrument or principle of such
work. We also know that many graces were given to men on account of Christ's merits
before they occurred, simply because they were foreseen. And it is probable that the
ancient Fathers merited congruously the Incarnation of Christ, even if the Incarnation
itself, as foreseen, was the first principle and foundation of all the merit of any men.
21. Response.—It is answered that we are not now disputing whether it was
absolutely possible for the first grace to be given as a reward for a future good use with
the aid of that same grace. Some affirm this, either because it is not repugnant (since
grace would not cease to be grace if given on account of merits) or because a thing
cannot be both cause and effect in the same genus with respect to itself, nor
simultaneously prior and posterior. To me, these arguments do not show a
contradiction. Not the first, because although the gift of first grace is essentially a
supernatural gift or aid, it is not essential to it to be given gratuitously and without
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regard to any merit, for this depends on the giver's freedom. For now, the first habitual
grace is not given to the sinner purely gratuitously, since with respect to the Redeemer it
is given on account of His justice, and with respect to the recipient, on account of
some disposition or congruous merit founded on prior assisting grace. Yet God could
give it without regard to either, purely out of liberality, and then it would receive
another denomination as a gratuitous gift. Therefore, although the first aid of grace is
now, with respect to the recipient, an utterly complete and most perfect grace in the
nature of a gratuitous gift, God could give it in another way and change that
denomination of gratuity in that gift. Nor is the second argument more demonstrative,
as the counterargument proves. For although broadly speaking those causalities are of
the same genus, yet in mode and species they are diverse, and thus there is no
contradiction in those two being causes of each other in these diverse ways. On this
matter, I have said something in the treatise on the Incarnation, and more must be said
in the treatise on merit. But whatever may be said about that question of possibility, it is
certain de facto and according to the ordinary law that the first vocation is pure grace.
This truth being supposed, it is rightly inferred that it is not given on account of any
merits. Indeed, even the ordinary law that merit must in reality precede the reward has
been in part dispensed with only in Christ on account of the special reason and infinity
of His merit. This is not to be drawn into a general consequence or extended without
compelling authority.
22. Second assertion.—I say further that no cause or reason for the whole of
predestination—with respect to all the effects of grace that occur in the predestined—
is founded in the good use of that same grace. This is proved because what is not given
on account of merits cannot be predestined on account of merits, since predestination
is as the giving is, and the giving is as it was predestined to be given. Although the
converse inference does not hold—if the conferral of some gift in time is on account
of merits, it does not follow that its predestination from eternity was on account of
foreseen merits (as touched upon above and to be shown expressly in the following
chapters)—nevertheless, the inference holds in the opposite direction: the giving in
time is gratuitous and occurs without regard to merit; therefore, from eternity, the
predestination or will to give such a gift was gratuitous and not in view of merit. The
reason is that to will to give is prior to giving, and the will relates as the commanding
act to the commanded act—the will as cause, the giving as effect. Hence, it can rightly
be that such an act of the will includes the will to give and to procure merit for
someone, yet this will is gratuitous and not on account of merit. Indeed, the merit itself
can be procured through means that are not from merit but are given gratuitously. But
conversely, if the giving in reality occurs gratuitously and without merit, it must be that
the will to give was also gratuitous and without merit. For if God in time will give
289 BOOK TWO
gratuitously and without merit, it is necessary that from eternity He willed to give
gratuitously and without merit, positing this mode on the part of the object, because
He must from eternity will not only the action but also its mode, since both pertain to
His direct and efficacious will. Therefore, it is further necessary that on the part of the
act, He willed to give purely gratuitously and not from the motive of any foreseen
merit. This consequence is proved, in which lies the whole reason for the difference,
because the will is the efficient cause of the giving itself. Therefore, if on the part of
man there were merit of the divine will to give him some gift, a fortiori there would be
merit of the very gift and its conferral. For what is the cause of the efficient cause and
primary origin (so to speak) of the conferral of such a gift is a fortiori the cause of the
will to give. Thus, prayer that impetrates the will to give impetrates the giving. Indeed,
the giving cannot be better impetrated, because it cannot otherwise occur except by the
will to give, nor can it not occur if the efficacious will and power are supposed.
23. Objection and response.—You might say that conversely, whoever merits the
donation necessarily merits the will to give, since the donation cannot occur without
that will. I respond that it is rightly inferred that some executive will is on account of
merit, but not every will from which that donation originates. For there can be some
will prior to merit, as has been explained. Conversely, if the donation in reality is
gratuitous, no will from which such giving proceeds can be on account of merit. For if
the first root were from merit, the whole consequent would be from merit. Therefore,
by this reasoning, from the certain principle that the beginning of salvation is not from
merit, it follows with equal certainty that the predestination of that beginning is not
from merit. And in this sense at least, it is most certain that the whole of
predestination, with respect to the effects of its grace, is not on account of foreseen
merits—even those future merits arising from that grace itself.
24. Indeed, if the matter is carefully considered, this is even more evident concerning
predestination itself than concerning the giving, in relation to such future merits arising
from grace. For with respect to the giving of the first grace, it might not imply a
contradiction for it to be given as the reward of its own future effect—if in reality it
were not given absolutely but dependently on the future effect and as if under its
condition—so that the subsequent work would not be considered worthy of another
reward but sufficiently repaid by that anticipated reward. But with respect to
predestination, or the first will to give such a gift, it seems to imply that it is held on
account of future merit, as I have explained more fully elsewhere. For in order for
some will to be held on account of merit, the merit must at least be foreseen as
absolutely future, and thus its principle must also be foreseen. But it cannot be future
unless by the will of God to give that gift from which such merit will arise. Therefore,
before the foreseen merit, such a will in God must necessarily be supposed. Hence, this
290 BOOK TWO
will cannot be on account of merit—neither in reality (for it is not yet) nor as foreseen
(for it is prior to the foresight). But that will is predestinating. Therefore, the
predestination of that gift cannot be on account of merits that will arise from it.
25. Jerome’s exposition.—Thus, this truth is excellently confirmed by Paul’s words in
Ephesians 1:4: He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should
be holy and blameless before Him in love. Jerome’s emphasis on this passage, along
with Augustine’s (On the Predestination of the Saints, chaps. 17–18), is that God did
not choose us because we were holy, but that we might be holy. Holiness, therefore, was
the end of the election, not its reason—or they are different, involving opposed
relations and requiring mutually repugnant conditions. For the end is not presupposed
as future in order to be intended; rather, it is ordained to be future by the intention. But
what moves by way of merit is presupposed as already present or at least as future and
foreknown. Therefore, when God chose us that we might be holy, He had not yet
foreseen us as future saints; rather, by choosing us, He ordained this very thing. The
Council of Orange (can. 25) likewise reads and weighs Paul’s words in 1 Timothy 1:16: I
received mercy, that in me first Christ Jesus might display His perfect patience as an
example to those who were to believe in Him for eternal life. For Paul does not
say, because I was faithful, but that I might be faithful. Since this phrase (that I might be
faithful) is not explicitly found in Paul, the Council seems to have added an implicit
interpretation. For Paul says: I received mercy because I had acted ignorantly in
unbelief, and the grace of our Lord overflowed for me with the faith. Therefore, to
receive this grace, he obtained mercy, not because he already had faith. Hence, Paul
adds another equivalent statement: For this reason I received mercy, that in me first
Christ Jesus might display His perfect patience. He was called to faith, then, to display
God’s grace and liberality toward rebels. For He calls them that they might
become faithful and holy, not because they were going to be so. Therefore, not on
account of future works—even those arising from grace—for such works presuppose
faith and confer true holiness. Thus, those works are in some way at least the proximate
or intermediate end of predestination, not its reason or merit.
26. Final assertion.—From this, I conclude that although before predestination there
must necessarily be presupposed in God, in the order of reason, the foreknowledge of
future works arising from grace (under the condition if such grace is given), there is no
presupposition of an absolute foreknowledge of them. Therefore, such works can be—
and necessarily are—the cause of predestination (with respect to the first effect of its
grace) by way of an end, but not by way of merit or a condition moving God to give
such an effect. This assertion has been partly proved already, and it is easy to infer one
part from the other. For first, before the will to give the first grace or vocation, there
must be presupposed in God the foreknowledge of a future work arising from such
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vocation if it is given—as touched upon in the first book and demonstrated more
generally in other books on God’s knowledge, from Scripture and the Fathers. For me,
Paul’s words (He chose us that we might be holy) sufficiently prove this. For if God
chose the predestined for holiness, He surely foreknew by what means He would
infallibly lead them to holiness; otherwise, the election would have been without
prudence. Therefore, before that election, such foreknowledge must necessarily be
presupposed. As shown in the first book, this must necessarily be said in every opinion.
Nor does it follow from this foreknowledge that the good thus conditionally
foreknown is the merit of the prevenient aid given for it or of its predestination. It
follows only that it is the reason by way of an end. For God wills to give man such aid
so that he may have a pious use of his freedom; therefore, He gives such aid on account
of such use as its proximate end. This must be said no matter what one holds about
efficacious grace. For whether a means is efficacious in this or that way, or more or less
so, does not change the relation of means and end. Therefore, conditional
foreknowledge of merits does not imply another kind of causality on their part with
respect to predestination—whether that foreknowledge is in the aid alone or in the
truth of the future event itself.
27. However, an absolute foreknowledge of such merits cannot precede the whole
of predestination in any opinion. For that foreknowledge similarly presupposes an
absolute foreknowledge of the future grace or vocation from which those merits will
proceed. Such knowledge presupposes, on the part of its object, the absolute futurition
of such an effect. But the futurition of the effect presupposes the absolute futurition
of its principle or cause. That cause is the first grace or vocation, which is to be given
by God alone through His absolute will. Hence, for it to be absolutely future, such a
will must necessarily be presupposed. Therefore, that absolute foreknowledge
presupposes the efficacious will to give such grace, which pertains to predestination.
Hence, that absolute foreknowledge cannot precede the whole of predestination. The
reason for the distinction between these two modes of knowledge is that absolute
foreknowledge of future merits arising from grace presupposes the will to give grace
and thus presupposes predestination in some respect. But conditional knowledge does
not presuppose such a will in God as already had but only if it is had. This conditional
does not yet posit such a will in reality, and thus such foreknowledge does not
presuppose predestination in any respect. Rather, it is presupposed for predestination
and is necessary and sufficient for the relation of an end. But it cannot suffice for
another kind of moving by way of merit or the like, as has been sufficiently argued
against the Semipelagians.
28. Objection and resolution.—But it is objected that the future good use of grace is
a condition for such an effect to be had, and such knowledge is a necessary condition
292 BOOK TWO
for predestination to be made by the will. Therefore, the future good use is a necessary
condition for predestination and thus is its cause or motivating reason. The response
denies the last consequence because the term condition is taken variously and
equivocally in the antecedent and consequents, so that one may not infer from it a cause
or motivating reason for predestination. When it is said in the antecedent that the
futurition of a contingent effect is a necessary condition on the part of the object for
knowledge of such a future, this is most true if understood of a necessary condition on
the part of the terminative object of such knowledge. For that knowledge is purely
speculative or cognitive of truth and thus presupposes truth in the knowable object to
which it may be terminated. That truth depends on that condition—or rather consists
in it—because from the fact that a thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false. In
this sense, the saints often say (as I have cited in the books on divine aid) that God
knows future things because they are future—which is much more certain in the case
of future evils, as the Council of Valence under Lothair indicated (chaps. 2–3). On this
matter, see the scholastics with the Master [Peter Lombard] (I Sent., d. 38), especially
Gregory [the Great], Richard [of St. Victor], and Bonaventure (I Sent., d. 40, art. 2, q.
1), [William of] Auxerre (Summa Aurea, I, q. 5, chap. 9), Alexander of Hales (I Part., q.
24, no. 5), and Bellarmine (On Grace and Free Will, IV, chap. 13). But that condition is
not a proper cause, just as the term of a relation is not its cause. Nor can it be called a
motive, because the divine intellect does not need an external motive to know whatever
is knowable. For this, the infinite power of representing in the divine essence, with its
infinite light, is sufficient.
29. How conditional knowledge is a necessary condition for the decree of
predestination.—Again, when it is said that such conditional knowledge is a necessary
condition for the decree of predestination, this is entirely true of a condition necessary
on the part of the will so that it may be directed to its object. For the will needs
foreknowledge of that object, since it cannot be directed to what is unknown. Hence, it
is also necessary that every reason for desiring or willing the object be presupposed as
foreknown. Therefore, for something to be prescribed by an infallible decree, it is
necessary that it be foreknown as so efficacious that if it is applied, the effect will
infallibly follow. Because the decree of predestination includes an absolute and entirely
certain direction to the end through such a means, it presupposes, as a necessary
condition on God’s part, that foreknowledge by which He knows that such a means of
vocation will infallibly attain its effect if applied. For this reason, it can rightly be said
that the decree of predestination could not be such—that is, predestinating—unless
that foreknowledge were presupposed. Without it, there could only be a decree of
general providence, which does not necessarily have an infallible direction to the end.
Yet it must not therefore be said that predestination has all its certainty or infallibility
293 BOOK TWO
from foreknowledge. For we must consider the absolute certainty of the future event—
namely, that this one will be saved or converted—and this does not arise formally and
proximately from foreknowledge but from the absolute decree of God’s will, who is
able to do what He wills and immutably does what He absolutely decrees. Still, it can be
said radically that the infallibility of predestination arises from that conditional
foreknowledge as from a necessary condition, so that the divine will can issue forth into
that absolute decree.
30. But from this, it is not rightly further inferred that the future good use of grace,
as foreseen under a condition, is a cause or motivating reason. It is only a sine qua
non condition, without which God would not choose such a means to save the
predestined—because without that condition, it would not be an efficacious means, that
is, one infallibly beneficial, and thus not suited to the end of predestination. With that
condition, however, it is a proportionate means. But that proportion or condition, as
foreknown under the said condition, is not presented to the will as already done or
simply to be done but rather as possible. For all such conditional foreknowledge does
not simply transcend the order of possible things and thus is included under the
knowledge of simple intelligence. Therefore, it does not move divine justice, gratitude,
faithfulness, or any other remunerative virtue of good deeds in its proper way. Rather, it
moves divine mercy, goodness, and liberality in its proper way. Hence, it is not a cause
or motivating reason on account of which God predestines, though it is a necessary
condition in the order of intention and election on the part of the predestining God, so
that He may will and choose in a perfect and prudent manner.
31. The principal resolution of the question is established and confirmed by reason.
—Finally, from what has been said, the general response to the proposed question is
concluded: namely, that on the part of the good use of grace or the cooperation of free
will with divine grace, no cause or motivating reason can be given for the whole of
predestination with respect to its effects. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, the clear
teaching of St. Augustine, and all who follow his doctrine—as can be gathered from
what has been said and will be even clearer from the following twenty-first chapter. It is
also concluded by reason from what has been said: because all cooperation of free will
with grace in some way presupposes an effect of grace (since it is in no way from
cooperation but is rather the root and cause of cooperation itself), although one
cooperation arising from preceding grace can be the cause of further grace or
excitation, it cannot in the same way be the cause or reason for the preceding aid. If
another cooperation precedes that aid, another excitation must necessarily precede this
cooperation, and so on. One must necessarily stop at the first calling grace, which has
no prior cause in any work or free cooperation of the will. That grace, therefore, must
be entirely gratuitous, since it cannot depend on subsequent cooperation. Hence,
294 BOOK TWO
predestination, as it embraces all effects of grace up to that first one, cannot be
founded on any good use or cooperation with that same grace. Nor does any new
objection or difficulty arise here.

CHAPTER XXI. WHETHER, ON THE PART

OF CHRIST OR ANOTHER MAN, THERE CAN BE A CAUSE OF
ANOTHER’S PREDESTINATION WITH RESPECT TO ALL ITS EFFECTS.

1. Having seen that no one can merit or obtain his own entire predestination, it
remains to examine whether at least one person can merit it for another. Now, merit
with respect to others exists in a singular and excellent way in Christ, and thus this
question is usually treated peculiarly concerning Him. I have discussed it in Tom. 1, Pt.
3, Disp. 1, Sects. 3–4. Yet since even a mere man can in some way merit for another, St.
Thomas also touched on this question (Iª, q. 23, a. 8). Therefore, we will briefly address
both parts. This question is closely connected with matters to be treated below
concerning how one can merit predestination for another even on the part of the
divine act or election—questions I distinguished above, though they are often confused.
Since this will contribute significantly to comprehending the whole matter, we will
separate them here for completeness. However, we will be briefer here, since almost the
entire difficulty of the present question depends on the other, as we will see. But to
clarify this and treat the difficulty more distinctly, it will not be useless to say a few
things about the proposed question.
2. Christ the Lord merited for the elect all gifts of grace that are effects of their
predestination.—As far as Christ the Lord is concerned, it is certain that He merited for
the elect all gifts of grace that are effects of their predestination. This is sufficiently
proved at least by Paul’s words in Ephesians 1:5: He predestined us for adoption
through Jesus Christ. For this to be true, it is at least necessary that the means of
predestination be conferred on us through Christ’s merit. Paul also signified this earlier
in the same chapter, saying: He has blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in
the heavenly places. And a little later, he indicates that even the first vocation is given in
Christ—that is, by His power and merit: In Him we were called, etc. By called (he says
metaphorically), that is, we received the call by God’s gratuitous election and will, yet in
Christ—that is, on account of His merit and power. If the call is in Him, it necessarily
follows that the other gifts are also from Him. Thus, the Councils of Milevis, Orange,
and Trent teach that all gifts of God’s grace by which men are either preveniently aided
or assisted in attaining eternal salvation—from the beginning of justification to its
consummation and perseverance in it—are given to us through Christ. Hence, they call
this the grace of Christ or the grace of God through Christ. Although some ancient
295 BOOK TWO
theologians occasionally doubted this truth, it is now impermissible to doubt it, for it is
most certain. The a priori reason is drawn from the supreme perfection of divine
providence, the excellence of His love for men (especially for His Son Jesus Christ our
Lord), and the infinity of His merits, as I have more fully explained in the cited passage.
3. The stated conclusion applies not only to effects of grace received in the
predestined themselves but also to effects in others.—From this, it is gathered that the
stated conclusion is true not only concerning effects of grace received in the
predestined themselves or occurring proximately about them—whether positive and
internal (like inspirations, illuminations, cooperations, infused acts and habits, etc.),
positive and external (like the administration of sacraments, preaching God’s word,
objects suitably exciting to good, etc.), or external and privative (like preventing
temptations, removing occasions of sin, etc.)—but also concerning effects of grace
occurring in others insofar as they greatly contribute to the salvation of the
predestined, as we will soon say. This is proved because that effect of grace given to
one, which benefits not only him but also another, is an effect of Christ’s merits. For
universally, all gifts of grace conferred on all men—indeed, even on all angels—are
from Christ’s merit, as shown in Tom. 1, Disp. 42. Therefore, grace or aid given to one,
insofar as it benefits another and is an effect of his predestination, is also an effect of
Christ’s merits. This is confirmed because the benefit of grace intrinsically (so to speak)
conferred on Stephen, so that it extrinsically profits Paul, is a great benefit for Paul,
contributing to his soul’s salvation. Thus, it falls under Paul’s general rule: He has
blessed you in Christ with every spiritual blessing. For this must be understood with the
same universality—that whatever gift of grace, with respect to any person, takes on the
nature of a spiritual benefit conferred on him, proceeds from Christ’s merits. You
might say, then even the Incarnation itself would be an effect of men’s predestination,
since for us men and for our salvation He came down from heaven. But if so, Christ
would not be the cause of our predestination with respect to all effects of grace arising
from it, since Christ is not the cause of His own Incarnation. The response denies the
first consequence, because the Incarnation is either not per se primarily ordained for
the redemption or salvation of other men but for itself and the excellent
communication of divine goodness, or insofar as it is ordained for men’s salvation, it is
not peculiarly from predestination but from God’s general will to redeem men. Thus,
while it is the cause of all effects of predestination for individual men, it need not itself
be from Christ’s merits—as will be further explained in the final chapter of this book.
4. One man can merit predestination for another.—Finally, it must be said that one
mere man can in some way merit for another his predestination with respect to the
effect of grace in him—even the first effect in or about the predestined himself—but
no such man can simply merit the whole predestination of another with respect to all
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its effects pertaining to divine grace, nor in the way Christ merited it for them. The first
part is common and is taught by St. Thomas (Iª, q. 23, a. 8; IIIª, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; De
Veritate, q. 6, a. 6), where in the response to objection 3, he admits the latter
proposition—that one can merit for another both the first and final grace, yet not the
whole predestination. And in the response to objection 2, he teaches that Paul’s
predestination was brought about in this way through Stephen’s prayer. This was also
Augustine’s opinion (Ad Simplicianum, I, q. 2; Sermons 1 and 4 on St. Stephen). From
this example, it is clear that Paul’s vocation was an effect of Stephen’s prayer. Hence,
Augustine says generally in On the Gift of Perseverance (chap. 22): If there are any not
yet called, let us pray that they may be called—for perhaps they are so predestined as to
be granted through our prayers. Now, vocation is usually the first effect of
predestination in the predestined himself. Therefore, one can be the cause of another’s
predestination with respect to such a first effect. The reason is that although this effect
is the first in the one who receives it (since it presupposes no grace in him and thus
cannot fall under his merit), in another it presupposes grace and thus can fall under
another’s merit. For a man in God’s grace can merit not only for himself but also for
others, at least congruously.
5. A person can merit a gift of grace for another in two ways. Through the Blessed
Virgin, benefits of grace are granted to us.—The second part is clarified first because
one can merit a gift of grace for another in two ways: (1) immediately and in itself (as
Stephen merited Paul’s vocation), and (2) in its root (as the same Stephen merited for
Paul all the good works he performed after his vocation, since all originated from the
vocation). However, Stephen did not merit for Paul all the spiritual graces he later
received in the course of his life immediately and in themselves, because he did not
pray for each of them in particular, nor is it necessary that God gave Paul each and
every grace in view of Stephen’s merits. The same reasoning and proportion apply to
any mere man with respect to another—even if the discussion concerns the Blessed
Virgin interceding or obtaining merits for others. For although the saints sometimes
hyperbolically say that all graces are granted to us through the Virgin’s intercession,
there is no fixed law that this means is necessary, though it can be most useful and
pleasing to God for each and every grace—which is what the saints chiefly intend.
6. The difference between Christ the Lord and a mere man as causes of men’s
predestination.—A second difference is established. This, then, is the first difference
between Christ and a mere man: Christ, by a certain and infallible law of God, is the
cause of the whole predestination of other men in such a way that all and each of its
effects are conferred not only in their root but immediately and in themselves in view
of His merits—so much so that even the glory each one merits for himself de
condigno is also given proximately and immediately, and for a higher reason, on
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account of Christ’s merit. All this has been shown in the cited Tom. 1. But no mere
man can thus merit all the effects of predestination for another, and thus no one is
properly said simply to merit predestination for another. Hence, St. Thomas most
fittingly said that one’s predestination can be aided by another’s prayers but
not caused by them. Another difference is that a mere man merits for another not de
condigno (let alone by strict justice) but only de congruo, as is clear from Iª-IIª, q. 114.
But Christ merited predestination for us not only de condigno but even by strict justice,
as is extensively shown in IIIª, q. 1, a. 2 and q. 19.
7. Another difference.—Finally, another difference can be assigned: a mere man (e.g.,
Stephen) merited Paul’s vocation in such a way that the very prayer by which Stephen
merited it was nevertheless an effect of Paul’s predestination—since in the order of
reason, it preceded in God’s mind all Stephen’s merits, as we will shortly see. Thus,
although that vocation could be the first of those effects of Paul’s predestination
received in Paul himself, it is not simply the first, because Stephen’s prayer is prior and
is counted among the effects of Paul’s predestination—not those occurring in him but
those occurring peculiarly for him. The same reasoning applies to any predestined man
compared to another mere man. But Christ merits for another a fitting vocation (which
is an effect of predestination) in such a way that His merit or the principle from which
it proceeds need not be an effect of Paul’s or another’s predestination, because Christ’s
merit is a more universal cause, arising from a higher predestination, as will be more
fully explained in the final chapter.

CHAPTER XXII. IF A CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION

CAN BE GIVEN ON THE PART OF THE DIVINE WILL'S ACT.

1. Properly speaking, there is no cause of divine predestination. Two aspects can be

considered in God's free act.—Thus far, we have discussed the causes of predestination
with respect to its effects. Now we must examine whether predestination can have any
cause or reason on the part of the divine act itself as it remains in God. If it can, we
will then inquire what that cause might be. In this matter, it is first certain that if we
speak properly and strictly of a cause really influencing, there can be no cause of divine
predestination—just as there can be none for reprobation or any divine act. The reason
is that an act of the divine will is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and thus it can
have no true and real cause, whether eternal or temporal. This is what St. Thomas and
all theologians presuppose as manifest in this matter. However, speaking more broadly
of "cause" as including any objective reason or condition, the question does apply to
predestination on the part of the divine act. For predestination consists in acts of
God's foreknowledge and free will, as seen above. In God's free act, we can consider
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two things: (1) the existence of that act with respect to its whole real being—and under
this aspect, it is not considered here, nor does any question arise, because such an act as
such is not free but necessary and thus can have no cause or reason on the part of a
freely operating creature; (2) the act as freely terminated to a created effect—and with
respect to this determination (whatever it may be), the question arises whether it has
some objective or motivating reason on the part of man.
2. Reason for the doubt. That it can have such a reason seems provable.—First,
concerning the foreknowledge of future things: God foreknows them because they are
future, as the Fathers commonly say (cited in On Divine Aid, Bk. 1, Ch. 13, and Bk. 3,
Ch. 5). Therefore, the very futurition or truth of such a future proposition is the
objective reason why divine knowledge is terminated to such an effect. If the thing is
future by divine predestination, then the divine will itself is the objective reason of
divine knowledge. In this sense, Hilary says (On the Trinity, Bk. 9) that God foreknows
future things because He wills them, as I have noted and explained at length (On the
Foreknowledge of Future Things, Bk. 1, Ch. 5). Augustine especially insists on this in
this matter, as Prosper understood his meaning—though to have it more confirmed, he
asks Augustine himself (Letter to Prosper, before On the Predestination of the
Saints): Is foreknowledge subordinate to predestination (as the Massilians said), or is
predestination subordinate to foreknowledge (as Augustine held)? Augustine confirms
the latter view throughout On the Predestination of the Saints (especially Chs. 9–
10), On the Gift of Perseverance (Chs. 18–19), Letters 105 and 106, and elsewhere.
Hilary held the same in his Letter to Augustine. They do not think foreknowledge must
always be founded on predestination but only sometimes—especially in the
predestined. For the same Fathers agree that foreknowledge can sometimes concern
things not predestined if they are future by mere permission, as Augustine teaches (On
the Predestination of the Saints, Ch. 10; City of God, Bk. 5, Chs. 9–11).
3. Reasons.—Again, on the part of the will, an objective reason for God's free
determination can be given. On this, I have said much elsewhere (Pt. 3, Tom. 1, on Q.
19; Relection 1), and it is also treated (Iª, q. 19, a. 5). Yet since it is a necessary
foundation for this matter, it must be briefly confirmed and explained. St. Thomas
holds (Iª, q. 19, a. 5, ad 3; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. 1, Ch. 82, response to objection
4; Chs. 86–87*) that one free volition of God can be the reason for another in our way
of understanding, just as one attribute is the reason for another. Capreolus (I Sent., d.
41, q. 1, a. 2), Durandus (I Sent., q. 2, no. 5), Gabriel [Biel] (I Sent., unica q.), Gregory
[of Rimini] (I Sent., q. 1, art.), Marsilius [of Inghen] (I Sent., q. 41, a. 1), and Alexander
[of Hales] (I Part., q. 28, membr. 3, art. 3) agree. The reason is that God wills one
object as an end and another as a means to it; thus, the end is the reason for willing the
means. Likewise, God wills something under a condition on the creature's part that He
299 BOOK TWO
would not will otherwise; hence, that condition is in some way the objective reason for
such a will. The antecedent is clear in natural things: when God creates a rational soul
in human generation, He creates it only insofar as the body, now perfectly disposed,
requires and justly demands it. Thus, the body's disposition is the objective reason
inclining God's will to create the soul here and now. This is even clearer in moral
matters: God wills to give what is asked because it is asked under His promise; He also
wills to confer a reward on account of merits. Thus, these objectively determine God's
will to confer the reward. This is clearer in the infliction of punishments, which God
does not will per se but as provoked by us, as Damascene says (On the Orthodox Faith,
Bk. 2, Chs. 29–30). Therefore, man's demerits objectively determine God's will to
punish them. We say "determine" not by imposing necessity but by moving and
inclining as far as it depends on them, as St. Thomas says (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk.
1, Ch. 82).
4. Evasion. Rejection.—The usual response to these and similar arguments is that
they rightly prove one effect of the will to be the cause of another but not the objective
reason of the divine will, which by one utterly simple act wills one thing for the sake of
another or as a disposition to it, etc. But this cannot satisfy, because this causality of
one effect with respect to another exists only by means of the divine will, inclining it to
such an effect. For example, prayer is the cause of the effect asked for, not because it
directly and immediately effects it (as is self-evident) but because it inclines the divine
will to produce it—which Scripture sometimes expresses by saying, God hearkened to
the voice of a man (Judg. 13:9). This can be understood from human examples: when
someone asks another for alms, he is the cause of the alms insofar as he inclines the
other's will, nor can such causality be otherwise understood. St. Thomas explains this
similarly (IIª-IIæ, q. 83, a. 1). The same holds for all moral causality, such as in merit,
demerit, and even moral disposition. Therefore, if God wills the causality of these
effects among themselves, He also wills that in one of them (e.g., merit) there be a
sufficient reason why His will is determined, at least in the order of execution, to
willing the other effect.
5. A priori reason.—The a priori reason is that not only does this not conflict with
divine perfection, but it is most consonant with and necessary for His infinite
perfection. The first part is clear: (1) from the example of knowledge, where this is
found without any imperfection; (2) because by one utterly simple act, God can will all
these things under whatever reason is found in the things themselves and conformable
to divine wisdom. Hence, the second part is also clear: it pertains to God's perfection to
regulate (as we may say) His free acts by His divine wisdom, as St. Thomas rightly says
(Iª, q. 21, a. 3). It also pertains to His perfection to exercise distributive or punitive
justice, faithfulness, mercy, liberality, and similar virtues in His free acts. But this cannot
300 BOOK TWO
be done without considering in the objects various conditions and reasons that demand
this or that mode of willing. This is what we mean by saying that in the objects
themselves are found some reasons for divine volitions. Nor do I find any difficulty in
this truth, for this is not true causality (as if repugnant to God) but a condition
presupposed on the part of the object, which implies no repugnance, since such a
condition is not absolutely presupposed for every divine volition but for one as distinct
in reason from another.
6. Conclusion from these points. In the divine executive will, a cause of
predestination can be given. What remains controversial.—From these principles, we
conclude in the present matter that it is necessary to inquire whether, on the part of the
divine will or foreknowledge as terminated to the effects of predestination, there is any
cause that is the objective reason on the part of man. On this question, all theologians
seem to agree that with respect to the divine executive will, a reason for predestination
can often be given, because there can be a cause of some effects of predestination that
occur only through the divine will as terminated to them. Therefore, the same cause of
glory or grace (i.e., the merit of glory or the disposition for grace) will be the reason for
the divine will as determined to bestow them. In this sense, Augustine says (Ad
Simplicianum, Bk. 1, q. 2) that some eternal election to glory is from the foreknowledge
of merits. Likewise, the ultimate disposition for grace, foreknown by God, was the
reason why He decreed from eternity to infuse justifying grace, and so for other means
that can have such a reason. Two points, however, remain controversial: (1) whether in
all the means of predestination some such reason for the divine will can be found; (2)
whether in those very effects where it is found, this is the first reason for their
predestination, or whether this cause itself arises from another prior predestination of
such effects. These two points will be treated in what follows.

CHAPTER XXIII. WHETHER A CAUSE OR

REASON FOR PREDESTINATION CAN BE GIVEN ON THE
PART OF THE ELECT MAN, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF OR WITH
RESPECT TO THE FREE DETERMINATION OF THE ETERNAL ACT.

1. Wherein lies the principal difficulty.—First, it must be presupposed (with

Durandus, I Sent., d. 41, q. 2) that although there is dispute among authors about which
act of intellect or will predestination formally consists in, when discussing the cause of
predestination as such, all agree that the inquiry must be referred to an act of the will.
The reason is that the intellect's foreknowledge of a thing as absolutely future is only by
way of simple awareness—whether as approving knowledge (as some hold) or by way
of command (as others say). It always presupposes an act of the will, and given that, it
301 BOOK TWO
has no other reason except either the truth of the future thing or the efficacy of the
decree itself. Therefore, if the decree has any cause or reason on the part of man,
predestination as it is in the intellect will have the same. But if such a decree has no
cause on the part of man, the ultimate resolution of predestination is not in man's
work but in God's decree. Finally, if predestination can have any reason, it will chiefly
be insofar as predestination is free in God, and in this is found something that is the
reason for God's free determination. But freedom is formally in the decree of the will,
and once this is posited, the rest pertaining to the intellect necessarily follows. Hence,
this dispute is rightly referred to the cause of the decree itself.
2. There is no dispute about a cause founded in an act done by the powers of free
will alone.—Second, I presuppose that here there is no question about a cause that
could be founded in a natural act done by the powers of free will alone, since it has
been shown that such an act is not the cause of any effect of grace. From this, it
evidently follows that it is not the cause of predestination or of God's decree to confer
some effect of grace. This inference has been incidentally demonstrated above and is
now briefly clarified a contrario. For whoever is the cause of predestination is also the
cause of its effects, because predestination itself is the cause of such effects, and the
cause of the cause is also the cause of the effects. Although in natural things this
causality is accidental, in moral matters (with which we are concerned) it is per se.
Indeed, in this matter, causality can scarcely be otherwise understood, because prayer or
merit is the cause of some effect insofar as it impetrates or inclines the divine will to
produce it. But the first and principal will of God is predestinating. Therefore, whoever
is the cause of the determination of such a will is the cause of its effect. Hence, a
contrario, if one cannot be the cause of a predestined effect, much less can he be the
cause of the predestination itself.
3. From this, it further follows that this question does not apply even to a work done
by grace with respect to the divine decree as terminated to giving the first fitting
(congrua) vocation. For such a work can in no way be the cause or reason for such a
decree or its determination. This is proved by the same argument: since it has been
shown that such a work cannot be the cause of this effect (namely, vocation), neither
can it be the cause of its predestination. This reasoning (as I note in passing) proves
this not only for vocation as given to the predestined but also as often given to the
reprobate. For even to them, it is given by God's eternal decree, which must be entirely
gratuitous, without foundation in any future work foreseen in such a reprobate from
that vocation. For no one can merit such a vocation by such a work; much less can he
merit the preparation or decree to give it. Indeed, this can further be applied to the
decree to give sufficient (though not fitting) vocation, since even this is a gift that falls
under no merit.
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4. First opinion. Given these points, there are various opinions on this question.
Though they differ little in reality, they vary greatly in their manner of speaking about
the cause of predestination. Many understand by "predestination" only the election to
glory, or God's efficacious will to give someone glory. From this principle, some
absolutely say that in all the predestined, there precedes some cause foreseen by God,
on account of which the divine will is determined to predestine them. So hold William
of Rubio (I Sent., d. 41, q. 1, aa. 1–2), Major (d. 40, q. 2), and Osorius (On Justice, Bk.
9). Others hold that in some singularly pre-elected by God, there is no cause of
predestination, because God decreed absolutely from Himself and before any foreseen
cause in them to give them glory. Yet they believe these are few compared to all others
who are saved. Hence, excepting these, they say that in all others, there is a cause of
predestination. This was the opinion of Ockham and Gabriel (I Sent., d. 1, q. 1).
Catharinus (On God's Predestination, Bk. 1, last ch.; Bk. 3, chs. 1–2*) differs from them
not in reality but only in manner of speaking, for he does not call every efficacious will
of God to give someone glory "predestination" but only when God has such a will
from Himself and without foreknowledge of merits. He thinks the prefix pre- in
"predestination" signifies not only eternity's precedence to time but also the will's
priority (according to reason in the signs of eternity) to God's knowledge. Thus, he
says, God's efficacious will to give someone glory is destination, but it
is predestination when that will precedes the foreknowledge of merits. Hence, as to
manner of speaking, he denies that in the predestined there is a cause on their part why
God predestined them, since by the prefix pre- (so explained), such a cause is excluded.
Yet he consequently says (here erring greatly in manner of speaking) that very many are
saved though not predestined; thus, he could deny a cause of predestination in them,
since what does not exist has no cause in them. But in reality, he concedes that in all
these, there is a cause on their part why God efficaciously wills to save them, elects
them, and from eternity efficaciously destines them to glory.
5. Second opinion. Other doctors call "predestination" the will to give not only glory
but simultaneously sanctifying grace with the gift of perseverance to the attainment of
beatitude. Yet they do not include under predestination the first aid of grace or first
vocation (even if fitting) in order to its proximate effect—whether faith, penance, first
justification, or any temporal grace and sanctity—because these effects can be found in
the reprobate and thus do not proceed from predestination but from general
providence. Given this principle, they teach that there is a cause of predestination on
the part of all who are saved, because God does not efficaciously will to give someone
glory until He foresees that he will persevere in grace to the end of life; nor does He
will to give him the gift of perseverance until He sees him making good use of prior
gifts of grace. Then He predestines him when He wills to give him this perseverance to
303 BOOK TWO
glory. Bonaventure seems to have taught this (I Sent., d. 41, aa. 1–2), though obscurely,
and Alexander [of Hales] (I Part., q. 28, membr. 3, art. 3) and Albert [the Great] (I
Sent., d. 41, art. 2, concl. 3) indicate the same. This opinion cannot apply to infants (as
Bonaventure also understood), because in them no use of grace is foreseen; hence, in
them, it must be said that there is no cause of predestination on their part. Thus, this
opinion proceeds only for adults. And since in them there is no meritorious cause de
condigno for the gift of perseverance (but only de congruo), while for beatitude there
is merit de condigno, they must speak absolutely of a dispositive, impetratory, or
meritorious cause, abstracting from merit de congruo or de condigno.
6. Third opinion. Other doctors, understanding "predestination" as God's efficacious
will or absolute decree to give man grace and glory (including under grace every grace
from the first vocation to the last aid given for persevering in grace to life's end), teach
that there is no cause on the part of the predestined man, nor any reason why God has
such a decree regarding them. Among these doctors, there is some diversity. For some
admit that in that decree, by reason of the distinct objects and benefits of grace to
which they are ordered, many decrees are virtually contained. Thus, Paul (Rom. 8:29–
30), under the simple name of predestination, comprehends this whole matter: Whom
He foreknew, He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son... whom
He predestined, these He also called; and whom He called, these He also
justified. These authors think the same order of reason is kept among those decrees as
is kept among the effects themselves or the objects of such decrees. Thus, just as
vocation precedes justification, so God first willed by reason to give vocation before
justification, first decreed to infuse righteousness in such a degree before decreeing to
give such an increase or perseverance in it, and first determined this before decreeing to
confer beatitude (which they hold to be the last decree of predestination). Hence, they
conclude that if we speak of these decrees as distinct in reason, the first has no cause
on the part of man, because before that decree, nothing can precede that is its cause.
Whatever follows from or after it cannot be its cause—all of which has been
sufficiently proved above. But for all the other decrees, they say a cause can be given on
the part of man—whether dispositive, impetratory, or meritorious (de congruo or de
condigno, respectively). The reason is that each later decree in reason presupposes some
foreseen effect of free will already stirred and supernaturally aided by the effect of the
first decree. For the decree to justify man presupposes his foreseen disposition
conceived through the vocation given by the first decree and the aid accompanying that
vocation, and so on for the rest. Nor do they admit any other order among these divine
decrees. Hence, strictly speaking, only the first decree is purely gratuitous; the rest are
from some merit of man founded in prior grace and already foreseen by God.
304 BOOK TWO
7. Objection against the said opinion. If it is objected that it follows there is a cause
of his predestination on the part of man (since predestination chiefly consists in the
decree to give glory and perpetual sanctity never to be lost, as gathered from Eph. 1),
Turrianus (On Election) responds by adapting the term "predestination." Sometimes
(he says) it signifies only the efficacious decree to give glory (which in On
Predestination and Grace [attributed to Augustine, ch. 3] is called predestination of
glory and remuneration). Sometimes it signifies the decree to give persevering and
stable grace, as in Eph. 1:5: He predestined us for adoption as sons. Given this
distinction, Turrianus says there is a cause of predestination to glory on the part of
man (as the objection proves) but not of predestination to grace. This author differs
from Gabriel and others (cited in no. 4) not in reality but only in his use of the term.
Moreover, speaking consequently, he could and should distinguish predestination to
sanctifying grace and to calling grace, admitting a cause for the former (especially
predestination to persevering and stable sanctity until death), since (according to this
opinion) this is not predestined except after some foreseen merit of man (at least de
congruo), or at least (according to others) it is not absolutely decreed before the
foreseen full free cooperation of man by which he will persevere effectively. Hence,
according to this opinion and distinction, only predestination to the first fitting
vocation has no cause on the part of man.
8. Others (to whom this distinction seems unnecessary and who thus refuse to use it)
simply deny the consequence, because "predestination" simply speaking does not
signify some singular decree of God as distinguished in reason from the rest but
signifies, as it were, the collection of all those decrees—from the decree of vocation to
the absolute and efficacious decree of glory. Now, no cause on the part of man is given
for this collection, since none is given for the first decree, which is, as it were, the
foundation of the rest. Hence, they say it must simply be denied that there is a cause of
predestination, though they readily admit a cause for election to glory or to one or
another grace that presupposes another gratuitous election to prior grace. The
defenders of this opinion think it was the mind of Augustine and St. Thomas—indeed,
of all the Fathers who confess that on the part of man there can be a cause of all
graces and effects of predestination up to glory itself, except for the first vocation or
first aiding grace. For as we said above, it rightly follows negatively: No cause is given
for such an effect of grace; therefore, none is given for predestination as terminated to
such an effect. So they think it rightly follows affirmatively: A cause is given for such an
effect of grace and predestination; therefore, a cause is also given for predestination as
terminated to such grace (which is more properly called election to such a gift of grace
or glory).
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9. The reason for this inference is that election or predestination cannot have a cause
or reason of the divine decree in itself but only by reason of or through an effect.
Therefore, if a cause of the effect is given, a cause of God's predestination is given
insofar as it is terminated to such an effect. The antecedent is clarified because in the
divine decree by which He predestines, two things can be considered: (1) The real and
uncreated act of God—and it is clear this can have no cause or reason outside God,
since as such it is simply necessary. (2) The free determination of such an act to such an
effect—and this adds to God only a respect of reason resulting in Him from such an
effect. Therefore, if any cause can be given in man why God's act has such a respect, it
is only insofar as a cause of such an effect can be given. Just as in creatures, nothing can
be the cause of a relation except insofar as it can be the cause of its foundation or
term, so whatever is the cause of some effect of predestination is the cause of
predestination itself—that is, of God's will as terminated to such an effect. Many
scriptural texts are also cited for this opinion, but I omit them because they prove
nothing except that we can merit glory and increase of grace. Some passages from the
Greek Fathers are also cited—partly explained above and partly to be touched on
briefly later. But if one considers rightly, even this manner of speaking differs nothing
in reality from the preceding opinions insofar as they do not admit God's efficacious
decree concerning glory, perseverance, or sanctifying grace except after foreseen
absolute merits or man's free disposition and by reason of it. They differ only in their
use of the term "predestination."
10. There is finally another opinion, which I think differs from the preceding only in
manner of speaking. It agrees with it in placing the whole reason for gratuitous
predestination in the gratuitous vocation, which cannot be from any merits. It also
agrees in manner of speaking in denying any cause of predestination simply speaking
on the part of man. Yet it differs in two other points: (1) It does not admit in
predestination that distinction of decrees even according to reason but says there is one
simple decree establishing man in such an order of things that he obtains both fitting
vocation and grace with perseverance to glory inclusive. Evidently, no cause on the part
of the predestined man can be given for this decree, for what can be foreseen in such a
man as absolutely future before he is decreed to be established in some order of things?
(2) In this simple decree is included (according to this opinion) not only predestination
but also election to glory and to every grace. Hence, this opinion infers that just as there
is no cause of predestination, so neither is there a cause of election—whether to glory
or to grace—because these are nothing beyond that simple decree, nor are they
distinguished in it as something prior or posterior, since they are not to be distinguished
even in reason.
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11. But as I said in the first book, it is unclear how the distinction in reason between
those decrees can be denied, since they have not only distinct material objects but also
proximate motives by reason of which one is an act of justice rendering a reward,
another is of special fittingness and congruity in giving form according to disposition,
and another is purely gratuitous and liberal from divine goodness alone. Likewise, no
one can deny that God in time will confer glory on account of merits; therefore, neither
can he deny that He had some internal decree to give glory on account of future merits,
which necessarily had to be foreseen before such a decree, since such a determination
of the decree in some way rests on the merits. Who would deny that such a decree is
distinct in reason from the decree to establish man in such an order of things, since the
latter neither presupposes absolute foreknowledge of future merit in such a man nor is
an act of justice (as the former is)? The same argument can be made for the decree to
give any grace after the first, which God gives in time by reason of some merit or
disposition. For it cannot be denied that God had an eternal decree to give that glory in
such a way and by such a title, though He has no similar decree for the first grace.
12. If this opinion does not mean to deny these decrees but says they do not pertain
to predestination but rather to its execution, and that predestination consists only in
that first decree to establish man in such a state of things, etc., in reality it speaks truly,
and we will not disagree with it in denying a cause of predestination. Yet we do not see
why it should be denied that in that decree of predestination is formally and expressly
contained the efficacious will to give the predestined beatitude as his ultimate end and
all gifts of grace as means to it—even with their order among themselves as proximate
end and means—since the decree is formally and most simply determined to all these
with such a respect or motive. If it formally and most simply contains all these, it must
necessarily be confessed that in it can be distinguished many decrees distinct in reason
pertaining to the order of intention—no less than the decree pertaining to execution is
distinguished from this decree of predestination, or no less than in execution are
distinguished the will to glorify, sanctify, remit sins or punishments, call, etc., or finally,
no less than many ideas and the like are usually distinguished.
13. Resolution of the opinion.—Therefore, in this opinion as explained, I see
nothing reprehensible except its confused manner of speaking and its lack of rational
distinction among those decrees—which is of little consequence. According to other
modes of explanation, one point is gravely and censurably reprehended by many—
namely, the assertion that there is a cause on the part of the elect for their efficacious
election to glory. Abulensis (Gen. 25, qq. 3–4) calls this utterly false and contrary to
Scripture, and Soto agrees (On Rom. 9). For my part, though I find nothing in this
opinion (as explained) condemned by the Church or pertaining to the error of Pelagius
or his remnants (since it does not ascribe merit of grace or predestination to free will
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operating by natural powers alone, nor does it admit merit for the whole of grace or its
beginning), I nevertheless do not consider it true, because it falsely denies that God's
efficacious decree precedes in the order of intention even concerning beatitude,
perseverance, and justice to be conferred on the predestined through free acts—as has
been sufficiently said in the first book. Nor do I think the authors of this opinion can
give a sufficient reason even for their manner of speaking and explaining why a cause
of predestination should not be admitted with respect to the free determination of the
divine act. What, then, we ought to hold—and what seems more consonant with
Augustine and St. Thomas—I will explain in the following assertions.
14. First Assertion.—I say, therefore, first: Predestination has no cause or reason on
the part of the predestined—not only concerning the decree to give him the first fitting
(congrua) vocation but also concerning the efficacious decree to grant him eternal
happiness and sanctity. Consequently, I judge that neither Scripture nor Augustine is
satisfied if we merely say that man cannot merit fitting vocation or predestination to it,
and that God had no other special providence with the predestined except what is
purely liberal and gratuitous. This, the said opinion is compelled to affirm. I prove this
first from Scripture’s frequent and customary manner of speaking. Below I will examine
one or another testimony in particular; for now, it suffices generally that Scripture says
God predestines or elects (equivalent here according to the first supposition) to
perpetual holiness before Him, ordains to eternal life, and so loves the predestined that
no one can snatch them from Christ’s hand. All these and similar expressions are,
without foundation and contrary to the propriety of the words, restricted to the sole
benefit of vocation.
15. Second, I show that this is against Augustine’s mind, first from Pope
Celestine’s Letter to the Bishops of Gaul. After teaching (against the Pelagians and
Semipelagians) that the beginning of salvation is not from us but from God, he adds at
the end: As we do not dare to despise the deeper and more difficult parts of the
questions that those who resisted the heretics treated more broadly, so we do not need
to assert them. Without doubt, these questions are none other than those about
predestination and reprobation, which Augustine (whom he implicitly refers to) had
most extensively and recently disputed. Hence, it may be gathered that in Augustine’s
view, the question about the merit of first grace is different from that about the merit
of predestination. For while the Pope approves Augustine’s opinion on the former
question, he abstains on the latter—though he does not dare oppose him. The same is
gathered from Prosper’s Letter to Augustine near the end, where, after teaching or
supposing as certain that the beginning of grace is not from us, he asks Augustine to
explain more fully his opinion about predestination without foreknowledge of works.
For it seemed to many that the earlier Fathers taught that God predestined to glory
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those whom He foresaw would do good with the help of grace—the contrary of which
Augustine taught, as Prosper understood. The same is plainly gathered from Hilary’s
letter.
16. We can also cite testimonies from Augustine himself, but since I have treated
these above (Bk. 1 and more fully in Bk. 3 on Divine Aid), I will only note one
from On the Gift of Perseverance (ch. 9). There, Augustine posits two men called by
equally fitting vocation to faith and holiness for some time, one of whom perseveres
and is saved, while the other does not and is damned. He asks the root cause and
answers: Because they were not distinguished by any other distinction—namely, from
the mass of perdition. I ask, then, what is this other distinction? It could not be from
their works, for if Augustine thought so, he would more easily have answered that the
reason was that one cooperated and the other did not. Likewise, all works preceding
their fall are supposed equal in them. Therefore, God had some gratuitous distinction
or predestination regarding one that He did not have regarding the other. Hence, this
was not only for fitting vocation, since He had also gratuitously predestined another to
a similar vocation. Augustine then adds that the difference was that one was
called according to purpose, the other not. I inquire, then, what or of what thing
this purpose is. It cannot be only the purpose of calling fittingly in order to present
faith or holiness, since in this way both calls were from purpose. Therefore, Augustine
supposes that regarding the predestined, God had another kind of purpose and
predestination to eternal goods, from which arose such a vocation, which Augustine
calls according to purpose. This purpose is nothing but that of glory or perseverance,
about which Augustine had earlier spoken when comparing those two men. Why one is
given perseverance to the end and the other is not—God’s judgments are more
inscrutable. Thus, he also held that regarding this distinction, no cause is given on the
part of man—which must be understood concerning predestination, since in execution
some reason can be given from man’s cooperation with grace. This is what he says
above: They were not called according to purpose; they were not chosen in Christ.
17. Confirmed by reason.—Third, I show and clarify the same truth by reason: It is
not repugnant for there to be a merit or cause of some effect that is neither the cause
nor the merit of the predestination of that effect. Therefore, it is without foundation to
say that the predestination of all effects that can fall under merit must necessarily fall
under the same merit. The antecedent is clear from examples: Christ merited the glory
of His body (as is certain) but not the predestination to it. Similarly, the Blessed Virgin,
according to common teaching, merited de congruo the dignity of Mother of God but
not the predestination to it. One man merits perseverance for another but not
predestination to it, as I will show (Ch. 24). In other modes or kinds of causes, many
causes of effects of predestination can be found—such as death, birth, or similar
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effects, which are truly from predestination and preordained means ordered to it. Yet
the causes of such effects or means are not causes of their predestination; rather, those
very causes are effects of the predestination of their effects insofar as they are prepared
or permitted by it.
18. A priori reason.—Hence, the a priori reason is that the effect is posterior to
predestination itself. Further, by distinguishing in reason between the executive will and
the predestining will in God’s will, the executive will is posterior in reason. Therefore, it
is not repugnant for something to be the cause or reason of the posterior and not the
prior. If this is not repugnant, then we must think that not all effects of grace given to
the predestined from merit are also predestined from merit, because this is more
consonant with Scripture and divine grace. Otherwise, the proper distinction between
the predestined and the reprobate in predestination would have to be ascribed to the
merits of the predestined. But the consequence seems little consonant with Paul (1 Cor.
4:7: Who distinguishes you?) and Eph. 1, where he wills predestination to be perfect
grace or liberal benevolence—for this is the sense of the Apostle’s words: He chose us
in Him that we might be holy before Him, and we were called by lot, predestined
according to His purpose. He confirms this because the principal difference between
the predestined and the reprobate is in the gift of perseverance. For in other preceding
goods, they may be equal; indeed, sometimes the reprobate receives greater ones.
Therefore, this distinction is also from God’s singular benevolence and not from man’s
merit.
19. Response to an objection.—It will not satisfy to say that this is because
perseverance itself does not fall under merit. First, although perseverance does not fall
under merit de condigno, it can be impetrated by a man already justified—as St.
Thomas teaches (Iª-IIæ, q. 114, a. 8), and Augustine (On the Gift of Perseverance, chs.
6–7). Therefore, all that one exceeds another in could be from his works done by grace.
Second, if perseverance is given purely gratuitously to one rather than another, then
predestination is not only for fitting vocation but also for perseverance—and this not
from merits but from God’s election, which is our point. Paul confirms this excellently
(Rom. 11:4), citing 1 Kgs. 19:18: I have kept for myself seven thousand men—and
silently weighs the force of I have kept, i.e., by my own benevolence. Hence, he
infers: So too at the present time, a remnant has been saved according to the election
of grace. On this, see Augustine (Sermon 7 on the Words of the Lord).
20. Second assertion.—From this, I infer and say that on the part of the predestined,
no cause of predestination is given with respect to eternal predestination to glory,
perseverance, sanctifying grace, or supernatural good acts—even if for such effects as
given in time, some cause or reason can be given on the part of man. This is the
opinion of St. Thomas (Iª, q. 23, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. 3, chs. 161, 163),
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Cajetan and other modern Thomists, the Master [Peter Lombard] (I Sent., dd. 40–41),
Scotus, Durandus, Gregory [of Rimini], Capreolus, Giles [of Rome], Richard [of St.
Victor], Major of Seville, St. Antoninus (IV Part., tit. 14, c. 12, §4), Abulensis (On Matt.
20, q. 111), commentators on Rom. 9, Corduba (Bk. 4, q. 56), and excellently
Bellarmine (On Grace, Bk. 2, ch. 14 ff.). It is undoubtedly Augustine’s opinion in often-
cited places (see also Sermon 7 on the Apostle’s Words; Preface to the Last
Psalm; Exposition of Ps. 30). There, expounding Into Your hands I commend my lot,
he speaks of the lots of grace and glory (Eph. 1; Col. 1) and calls the lot the election to
salvation. In Sermon 2, he says it is God’s will to give man grace and perpetual charity
—called a lot because it befalls man without any reason on his part.
21. I have adduced many scriptural proofs for this truth above; now I will only cite
the celebrated passage Rom. 9:11–13: Before they had done anything good or evil...
Jacob I loved. Concerning this, first note that it is doubtful whom Paul meant
by Jacob and Esau. Many moderns think he speaks not of the persons but of the
peoples descending from them, for he immediately cites Gen. 25:23: The older shall
serve the younger—yet Esau in person never served Jacob, but the Edomite people
(from Esau) served the Israelite (from Jacob). Hence, Gen. 15 says Rebecca was
told: Two nations are in your womb. But though it is true that the peoples are included
in this distinction, the persons of Jacob and Esau are by no means excluded, for Mal.
1:2–3 says chiefly of them: Jacob I loved... Esau I hated. Paul also infers that Esau was
reprobated and adds: He has mercy on whom He wills, and hardens whom He wills—
plainly speaking of individuals. Finally, the words Rebecca conceived children by one
act are literally understood of the persons—the common interpretation, as is clear from
Chrysostom and the Greeks, Anselm, St. Thomas, Jerome (On Mal. 1), Augustine
(Questions on Genesis, q. 83), and Anastasius of Nicaea (Questions on Scripture, q.
30). It matters not that Esau did not bodily serve Jacob; it suffices that Jacob was
preferred in the birthright (Gen. 27:37: I have made him your master).
22. Some interpretations.—Next, note that some have interpreted these words as
referring only to love or preference for temporal goods and the paternal inheritance.
For in Mal. 1, the hatred of Esau is explained by I made his mountains a waste... his
heritage a desert for jackals—signifying temporal devastation. But whatever is said
of Malachi, it is certain that Paul speaks of the difference of divine grace and election,
which he confirms by that example—either explaining what was contained figuratively
in it (for the New Testament often cites Old Testament events this way) or declaring
that Malachi’s words were also said in this sense, as Francis Ribera excellently explains
there.
23. Exposition.—Again, some commentators, though admitting that Paul speaks of
the goods of grace and the will to give them, deny that he speaks of predestination and
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reprobation but only generally of the greater or lesser abundance of grace’s gifts, which
we see God confer on different peoples and nations—for to some the faith is preached,
to others not, etc. They admit this difference must be ascribed to God’s will, from
which it does not follow that the predestination or reprobation of individuals must be
ascribed to the divine will in the same way. Nor was this necessary for Paul’s intention,
who only contended against the Jews that the Gentiles were elected and called to faith
by God’s good pleasure, just as they themselves were elected in Jacob by God’s pure
love.
24. The preceding exposition is rejected. The true and genuine interpretation is
given. But this exposition presupposes another, which was rejected in the first point.
Hence, just as it was shown there that Paul speaks not only of peoples but also of the
individuals Jacob and Esau, so it is certain that he speaks not only of the distinction
between peoples (though this is included) but chiefly of the predestination of one and
not the other. This is the common interpretation. And it is evident from those earlier
words, such as According to the election, the purpose of God might stand. For with
these words, Paul usually explains predestination itself, as is clear from the preceding
eighth chapter and from the first chapter of Ephesians. Likewise, because love and
hatred, strictly speaking, refer to individuals, it cannot be said that Esau was hated if he
was to be saved. Therefore, the other is simply called "beloved" because, just as in this
life he was destined to be the firstborn, from whom Christ would be born, so for the
other, he was destined for eternal happiness. Finally, Paul sufficiently clarified this by
adding the example of the potter, who makes some vessels for honor and others for
dishonor from the same lump. For by these words, it is manifest that the predestined
and the reprobate are signified. Otherwise, one who receives great benefits of grace,
even if ultimately damned, would be a vessel for honor; and conversely, one who
receives little, even if saved, would be a vessel for dishonor—which cannot be said. The
same is confirmed by the passages from which Paul drew this example: Isaiah 45,
Jeremiah 18, and especially Ecclesiasticus 33, where the Wise Man introduces another
example concerning the differences of days, which Jansenius excellently explains in
relation to the matter at hand.
25. The distinction between Jacob and Esau, and between vessels of wrath and
mercy, as signified by the Fathers. Lastly, it must be observed that some of the ancient
Fathers, especially Chrysostom and the Greeks, as well as Ambrose (if the
commentaries on Paul are truly his) and Jerome, signify that this difference between
Jacob and Esau, and between vessels of wrath and mercy, though made before their
merits, was commanded for execution in time, yet not without the foreknowledge of
merits. But this interpretation must either not be admitted or explained as referring to a
foreknowledge that does not precede but follows the divine election. First, because
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otherwise Paul’s astonishment would be without cause—for what mystery is there in
the fact that God’s beloved is chosen before the works of man? The mystery, therefore,
is that before even foreseen merits, He loved one and not the other, as Augustine
rightly considers in Epistle 105 and often elsewhere. Likewise, why does Paul
respond, Who are you, O man, to answer back to God?, when he could easily have
given a reason based on foreseen works? Moreover, how would it be true that It
depends not on human will or exertion, but on God’s mercy—which Augustine, in To
Simplician, rightly declares must be understood as depending solely on God’s mercy?
For the following words confirm this: I will have mercy on whom I have mercy. But if
that mercy were based on foreseen works, it would no longer be solely God’s. Likewise,
for this reason, he absolutely said not because of works. Finally, otherwise, vessels
would not be formed from the same lump, since through works they would have
diversity and varying dispositions. And so Paul attributes everything to the power and
will of the potter, which must necessarily be understood with respect to the eternal
disposition and preparation on God’s part. For in execution, it is true that this
difference does not occur without a diversity of merits. But because these are given and
follow from gratuitous predestination, everything is attributed to the mercy of God.
26. The rationale for the assertion is given. The rationale for the assertion, then, must
be taken from the principle stated above: that the love for glory precedes all the means
of predestination as the efficacious intention of the end. From this, it clearly follows
that predestination to glory itself has no cause on the part of the predestined, since no
absolute foreknowledge of merits precedes it. Then, by the force of this intention, all
fitting means are prepared. Therefore, even the predestination of those means precedes
the absolute foreknowledge of them. Hence, etc. Nor does any new difficulty arise
against this truth, apart from those pertaining either to reprobation or to the harmony
of predestination with free will, which will be discussed below.
27. The third assertion is established. This assertion is reconciled with common
doctrine. Hence, thirdly, it is concluded and stated: Not only is there no cause or reason
on the part of man for the whole of predestination with respect to the definitive decree
of God’s will (as it is ordered to all the effects of predestination, whether distributively
or collectively), but also no such cause can be given in relation to that act as ordered to
any effect of predestination. This may seem contrary to the common doctrine, which
holds that there is no cause for predestination with respect to the whole collection of
effects, especially in relation to the first effect, yet there can be a cause in relation to
individual effects and all of them up to the last, except the first. But in truth, this
assertion is not contrary to that doctrine, for the latter is understood concerning the
execution of predestination, whereas the assertion concerns the preparation on the part
of God’s will. For just as in glory we distinguish two things—namely, the bestowal of
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glory and the preparation on God’s part through an act of efficacious love, which
relates to the means by way of intention (though it is called election in comparison to
persons not so loved)—so we distinguish those two things in the bestowal of grace and
in the individual graces subordinated among themselves. Hence, just as there is no
cause for predestination to glory, though there is a cause for glory itself, so there is no
cause for predestination to perseverance in grace, though there may be some
impetration or other similar cause for such an effect. For the proportional reasoning is
the same: Just as glory is first in intention, through which it is predestined or
predetermined in its own way, so sanctification is prior in intention to the disposition or
merit of it. And the disposition itself is prior in the same order of intention to the
calling to it, and so on. Therefore, the reasoning is the same.
28. The foundation. This is easily clarified and proved by a certain induction, whether
we begin from vocation and proceed to glorification or vice versa. For first, the purpose
that God had in giving a man the first fitting vocation did not have its foundation in the
merits of man, as all agree. From this, it follows that the eternal purpose by which God
first decreed to give this man the act of faith was not based on foreseen merit of the
same order, because such merit would have had to be founded on faith—since before
faith there is no merit—but it could not be founded on faith, because faith itself flows
from the purpose of giving faith, not the other way around. And the same,
proportionally, applies to the other supernatural acts, which are the efficacious means
through which the predestined are saved. This reasoning presupposes that God
predetermined these acts in themselves by an absolute decree, not only from eternity
but also prior in reason, before He foresaw in that same eternity that they would
absolutely come to be. We have shown this to be true and more consistent with the
perfection of divine providence in the third book On Auxiliis. But this cannot be
maintained according to the contrary opinion, which is forced to say that God did not
absolutely predetermine these acts in Himself but, by an antecedent will, willed and
gave means suitable in themselves for them to occur, and at last foresaw that free will
would cooperate with them, and then, as it were, approved or accepted them. And thus,
a man is not predestined to have faith or contrition unless his cooperation is already
foreseen, even as absolutely future. And so such acts are not future because they are
predetermined, but rather they are predetermined because they are future. All of this is
not proven to us, nor does it seem sufficiently consistent with Scripture and Augustine,
as we have tried to show in the cited passages of On Auxiliis and in the first book of
this work.
29. Furthermore, we hold the same concerning the infusion of grace and other
supernatural habits, and concerning perseverance in them until the end of life. For
although in time God infuses this grace upon one who disposes himself, and because
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he disposes himself with the help of grace, yet from eternity He did not predestine it in
this way, but rather the opposite: Because God predestined to sanctify this man, already
an adult, at such an age, time, etc., He also preordained to give him a disposition fitting
for sanctification. And so, although the attainment of justice comes from the
disposition, the predestination of justice is not from a foreseen disposition but is rather
the origin of such a disposition. And in a similar way, because God willed that the
predestined man should end his present life in grace, He prepared for him, by an
absolute decree, both grace itself and the fitting means to infallibly persevere in it for
some time until death. And if perhaps a man merits by congruity the gift of such
perseverance, that merit is not the cause but rather the effect of the predestination of
the man to perseverance in grace, though it is in some way a cause of the execution.
For God gave the man such merit because He had predestined him both to persevere
and to obtain the gift of perseverance through such means. Finally, we reason in the
same way concerning glory: God decreed before all else to save the predestined and
make him blessed, and therefore He prepared all the other means, from the first to the
last, by certain and infallible decrees. Hence, no cause for predestination to glory can be
given on the part of the predestined, though a cause for glorification can. And the
reason for all this is that the order of intention is prior to the order of execution, and
predestination, as it pertains to the will, is placed in the decrees belonging to the order
of intention.
30. In what sense authors speak in this difficulty. Therefore, when authors are
accustomed to say that a cause for predestination can be given in relation to individual
or later effects, but not in relation to the whole collection or the first effect, they are
speaking of the effects only as considered in execution, not according to the order of
intention—or (and it amounts to the same) they are speaking of those effects with
respect to their being, not with respect to their formal predestination. For it must rather
be said that there is no dispositive or meritorious cause on the part of man for the
preordination of any effect of predestination, but only a final reason. And so merits are
predestined because glory is predestined, and grace is predetermined so that the merits
which are presupposed as predestined may be born from it, and so on. Nor is that
inference, which some modern authors use, valid—namely, that if there is a meritorious
cause on the part of man for some effect of predestination, then there is a cause for
the predestination of that effect or for the divine election as ordered to that effect. For
it does not follow that if there is merit for glory, there is merit for predestination to
glory, because (as I have said) the effect in itself, or in execution, is something posterior
to its predestination. And from the fact that there is a cause for the posterior, it does
not follow that there is also one for the prior, since that very cause may take its origin
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from that prior. For merits, which are the cause of glory, take their origin from
predestination to glory.
31. A difficulty against this opinion. Enough has been said. Only one difficulty
remains in our opinion: because predestination implies infallible providence of the
means by which the elect are most certainly and thus efficaciously—that is, with effect
—brought to the kingdom of heaven. But such providence cannot be infallible unless
the foreknowledge of man’s free cooperation is presupposed, for without it, man will
not be saved, and consequently, the means will not be efficacious without it. Therefore,
they cannot be infallibly preordained except from infallible foreknowledge of such
cooperation. Hence, that cooperation is presupposed as a necessary condition for the
predestination of that effect which will come to be through it. Therefore, it is
presupposed as a kind of foreseen merit, which at least by congruity could be the cause
of one or another effect of predestination. I respond: If the argument were valid, it
would also apply to predestination with respect to the first vocation. For such a
vocation, as it falls under predestination, is formally preordained as fitting or
efficacious, and consequently as infallibly having its effect (because in this respect, the
ordination of predestination is most distinct from common providence). Therefore, the
predestination of that vocation, as such, also presupposes the foreknowledge of future
free cooperation, as shown above. Hence, the same inconvenience follows concerning
that first effect as ordained by predestination. Or if it does not follow concerning that
effect, neither is it rightly inferred concerning the others.
32. It must therefore be said that the only inference is the presupposition of
conditional foreknowledge of free cooperation, which does not suffice for that
cooperation to be a meritorious or dispositive reason but only for it to be intended as a
proximate end in relation to other means that must precede it in execution—that is, in
relation to the vocation and excitation itself. For God calls the predestined so that he
may be converted with effect and so that he may freely cooperate, for this cooperation
is included under conversion as a partial action. And consequently, it also follows that
this cooperation is elected and predetermined by God as a means or part of the means
necessary for the end of glory, which is already presupposed as intended. But this
relation of end or means does not take away gratuitous predestination, because the
ordination of God to give such a means, as it will be efficacious, is from the gratuitous
will of God alone. For (as we have said above) that cooperation, only as foreseen under
a condition, cannot induce a debt but is only a necessary condition so that such a means
may be constituted in the nature of an infallible means and consequently may be
chosen by predestination, though the choice always remains in the liberality of God
alone, as Augustine rightly teaches in To Simplician, Book 1, Question 2, and in On the
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Gift of Perseverance, Chapter 14, and Prosper in Reply to the Eighth Objection of the
Genoese.
33. A further difficulty is pressed. A response is given. But you will insist: Although
before the decree by which God determines, for example, that Peter should believe or
grieve for sin, free cooperation is only foreseen under a condition, yet once that decree
is posited, that foreknowledge passes into an absolute one, and God foresees that this
man will have some merit through such faith or repentance. Therefore, that foreseen
merit will be the reason for giving him such a vocation and for predestining it, for that
decree and that foreknowledge are prior in reason to the decree about giving such a
vocation. The response is that this kind of foreknowledge is also insufficient, at least
according to the ordinary law, for meritorious or dispositive causality, but only for the
reason of an end or means. For by that knowledge, the man is not foreseen as already
acting in himself, nor as having all the principles and gifts necessary for meriting, but
only that effect is foreknown as future from the efficacy of the divine will, from whose
liberality those gifts (so to speak) are still awaited, which are to be the future principles
of such merit or disposition. And therefore, the decree that God has in the later sign of
reason about giving such a vocation to a man in no way arises from the merit of the
man himself, however much God already foresees in His decree that the man will have
such merits, because He does not yet see those merits as done and exhibited by the man
in the presence of eternity. Indeed, He does not even see the man as already graced or
elevated to act supernaturally. Therefore, that decree and foreknowledge in it moves
only as the intention of the end to give means consonant with the predetermined end.

CHAPTER XXIV. IF A MERE MAN, OR EVEN OUR

LORD, COULD MERIT ANOTHER’S PREDESTINATION WITH
RESPECT TO THE FREE DETERMINATION OF DIVINE ELECTION.

1. The affirmative opinion and its foundation. There are not lacking modern
theologians who teach that, just as a just man can merit for another certain gifts of
grace, so also can he merit for another his entire predestination, even with respect to
the election to glory itself. Their argument is constructed from several principles. The
first is that the efficacious election of the predestined to glory is not the first act of
divine will concerning the predestined but rather the last. The second is that one man
can merit for another the first call of grace and, consequently, God’s decree to confer
that fitting call, at least with respect to the free determination of the divine will toward
such an effect. The third is that, by the same reasoning, one man can merit for another
all the other effects of predestination that follow vocation, even with respect to their
predetermination in the will of God—both because, just as one can merit for another a
317 BOOK TWO
fitting vocation, so also can he merit perseverance and consequently the other effects,
and because, even if he does not immediately merit the other effects, he does so
virtually or is in some way their origin and cause. For by meriting a fitting vocation, he
virtually merits actual conversion, which is the preparation for subsequent effects, and
so on up to glorification. The fourth principle is that the prayer or merit of one for
another predestined is not counted among the effects of his predestination, nor is it a
grace given to the one for whom prayer is offered, but to the one who prays. For the
prayer of one is not for another predestined the principle of good works but rather
obtains for him such a principle. Only that which is the principle of good works is
properly grace and an effect of predestination. From these principles, it is concluded
that one man can merit for another his entire predestination with respect to its effects
and consequently also with respect to the election to glory or grace. For election to
glory is not presupposed before the other effects of grace are foreseen, and election to
glory is nothing other than the efficacious will to give that fitting grace, which one
clearly merits who merits a fitting vocation.
2. The aforesaid opinion is refuted. This opinion is both novel and singular, and
therefore, just as we have said above that one mere man cannot merit for another all the
effects of his predestination, so now we say of the same man that he cannot merit for
another divine predestination with respect to the efficacious preordination to glory or
grace, as regards the absolute decree to give it. This is the clear teaching of St. Thomas
in Summa Theologica, I, q. 23, a. 8, and of the common interpreters there, as well as
Durandus in Sentences I, dist. 41, q. 3, no. 4. Gregory expressly teaches this
in Dialogues, Book 4, ch. 8, where he explains that predestination is aided by the
prayers of the saints, not because prayer is the reason or motive on account of which
God predestines another, but because even the predestination of the eternal kingdom is
so disposed by almighty God that the elect attain it through pious labor, insofar as by
asking they merit to receive what God had disposed to give them before the ages. He
proves this by the example of Isaac, who prayed to God for the conception of Rebecca
and obtained it, even though the propagation of Abraham’s line through Isaac had
already been promised and thus predestined.
3. Prosper holds the same in On the Calling of the Gentiles, Book 2, ch. last (or
penultimate), where, having said that the election of the predestined is according to the
purpose and grace of God, he adds: Against this most splendid light of invincible
truth, some are accustomed to say intemperately that it is superfluous to labor for the
merit of good works, and that it is vain to persist in prayers by which God is to be
besought, if the election of Christian grace stands in His immutable purpose. To this
objection, he responds in summary that divine election does not exclude the means
which, in His foreknowledge, He foreknew and by the same election to grace, or
318 BOOK TWO
predestination, prepared. God, therefore, he says, gives to those whom He has chosen
without merits that by which they may be adorned with merits. And it is vainly said that
there is no reason for the elect to act, since they act for this end—that they may be
made elect, that is, such as they were ordained or predestined to be by election. He
thinks the same must be said concerning prayers, for prayers also presuppose the
purpose of election and flow from it, so that through them execution may be
commanded. Hence he adds below: That the solicitude of prayers is not dissolved by
the purpose of divine election, I will evidently prove by one testimony, omitting others
for brevity’s sake. The example is of Tobias the younger, concerning whom he
supposes it was predestined by God that he should have Sara as his wife, yet he is
admonished by the angel to ask for her, etc. (Tobit 6). Finally, he concludes: Although,
therefore, what God has decreed cannot by any means fail to be done, yet the efforts of
prayer are not removed, nor by the purpose of election is the striving of free will
relaxed, since the effect of fulfilling God’s will is so predetermined, etc. Augustine
plainly presupposes this in On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 22, when he says: If there
are any not yet called, let us pray that they may be called; perhaps they are even
predestined to be granted to our prayers.
4. Scriptural testimonies are adduced. Moreover, if the testimonies of Sacred
Scripture, by which Augustine, Prosper, and other Fathers prove gratuitous
predestination and election, are weighed, they demonstrate not only that it is gratuitous
with respect to the one predestined but also with respect to others (I now except Christ,
of whom I will speak shortly). First, it is proven that Christ attributes the election of
men to no one other than Himself when He says: You did not choose me, but I chose
you. Those words, therefore, plainly show that all are chosen by God’s will alone.
Hence, just as it is rightly gathered from this that God chose no one on account of a
good will and petition foreseen in him, so also not on account of another’s petition—
otherwise He would not have done it by His will alone or primarily from Himself. Paul
says the same in Ephesians 1: He chose us in Him before the foundation of the
world, and below: Predestined according to the purpose of Him. Therefore, the entire
election of men is from the purpose and good pleasure of God alone. But if it had
some regard for the merits or actions of any man, this can be attributed to Christ alone,
of whom Paul speaks singularly (in Him). Therefore, He did not choose Paul in
Stephen, that is, on account of Stephen’s prayer, but only in Christ. Indeed, even in
Christ He chose us according to the counsel of His will, as we will soon explain.
Therefore, He did not choose Paul from the counsel of Stephen’s will or prayer, but
rather from the same counsel of the divine will Stephen prayed that Paul might obtain
the benefit of grace, to which he had been elected.
319 BOOK TWO
5. It is strengthened by inconveniences. This can also be confirmed by
inconveniences, for it would follow that the Blessed Virgin and the ancient Fathers
merited the predestination of Christ the Lord and the election of His humanity to the
hypostatic union—which cannot be said, as Augustine presupposes as certain in On the
Predestination of the Saints, ch. 24, and as is shown in the matter of the Incarnation.
The consequence is plain, because those Fathers by their prayers obtained that
Incarnation, and as ancestors of the Virgin, they obtained many preceding means
toward it, such as her conception, and Abraham merited the procreation of Isaac, and
so on. Hence, in general, from that opinion it follows that as often as someone obtains
for another some gift or benefit of God, he also obtains for him predestination to it.
And thus the parents of the Virgin merited for her, at least remotely and mediately,
election to divine maternity, because she was not first elected as mother before she was
preordained to exist. If, therefore, her parents obtained that she be predestined to
existence, then at least remotely and fundamentally they merited the other things that
followed from it. And in the same way, Stephen would have merited for Paul election to
the apostleship. For if he merited for him election to glory, why not also to the
apostleship, which is subsequent?
Whence it further follows that each one merits for himself election to all those
goods or to any dignity which he obtains for himself either by prayers or in some way
merits by preceding grace. For example, the Blessed Virgin merited for herself election
to the dignity of Mother of God, because that dignity, as exhibited in reality,
presupposes grace in the Virgin, by which grace she in some way merited that dignity
for herself—and therefore also election to it. And so Abraham would have obtained for
himself election as progenitor of Christ, because he merited for himself the promise of
that benefit. The consequence is plain, because if it is asserted that one who merits for
another his vocation also merits for him his election, the sole reason is that the vocation
of one presupposes grace in the other, by which he can in some way merit for another
the vocation that is the first grace with respect to the one called, yet with respect to the
other it is as it were a second grace. But in a similar way, the dignity of motherhood
presupposes grace in the Virgin, with respect to which that dignity is a second grace.
But these and similar things are false, as I suppose from other passages, and it is enough
for us that they are foreign to the common opinion of the Doctors.
6. An a priori reason is given. Finally, the a priori reason is that the prayer by which
one obtains for another his vocation is an effect of predestination—not only of the
one praying but most of all of the one for whom prayer is offered. Therefore, it is not
the cause of the whole predestination. The antecedent is proven generally in the
following book by showing that not only the actions of the predestined or their
principles but also every action of any man that specially cooperates toward the
320 BOOK TWO
salvation of another is an effect of the predestination of the one who is saved through
another. Now, this is briefly shown in two ways. First, from the principle laid down in
the first book: that election to glory is the first act of divine will concerning the
predestined, and therefore all the predestined were chosen in the same sign of reason
for eternal salvation. From this, it clearly follows that one man could not merit for
another his election, because the election of all was made at once, before all their
foreseen works. And then, whatever one merits, obtains, or works for another that
effectively conduces to the execution of election is an effect of that very election, in the
way that means are effects of the intention of the end. Rather, although that intention
of giving glory to Paul did not precede by an efficacious and absolute decree,
nevertheless it cannot be denied that God inspired Stephen with that prayer out of the
intention and desire to save Paul, whatever that desire was—that is, whether it was by
an efficacious will or only by a simple and antecedent one. For that prayer was
undoubtedly from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and the effect of Paul’s conversion
and salvation was most excellent. Therefore, it is incredible that it was not intended by
the Holy Spirit, at least by a simple effect. Especially since the intercessor himself, such
as Stephen, usually intends and desires this, and this very intention is from the Holy
Spirit. Therefore, the Holy Spirit has it much more profoundly. But this is sufficient
according to the opinion of these Doctors, so that Paul’s very vocation may be an effect
of his predestination—namely, that it proceeds from God’s simple desire to save Paul.
Therefore, the same will suffice for the prayer offered for him by another, for the fact
that this prayer is in another does not prevent it from being an effect of Paul’s
predestination.
7. This is secondly proven because the grace given to someone is not only a benefit
to him but also to another if it is given on his account and for his advantage. For the
grace given to a preacher, such as Philip, to enlighten another, such as the Ethiopian
eunuch, in a fitting manner, is undoubtedly a benefit and supernatural grace conferred
on the eunuch. Therefore, if that eunuch was predestined, as must be believed, clearly it
was an effect of his predestination. Therefore, similarly, the prayer of one for another is
a benefit of grace conferred by God on the one for whom prayer is offered, even if it
does not inhere in him. For the benefits of grace extend more widely. Hence, if the one
for whom prayer is offered is elect, and that prayer effectively cooperates toward the
ultimate effect of election, undoubtedly election is not from prayer, but rather prayer is
from election. The same is true of any other merit of one for another. Therefore, such
prayer or merit cannot be the reason for another’s entire predestination, neither with
respect to all its effects nor with respect to the free determination of divine election.
8. The foundation of the contrary opinion is explained. A response to the
foundation of the contrary opinion is easily given from what has been said. For of the
321 BOOK TWO
four principles it assumes, the first is false, and the argument drawn from it is neither
rightly nor consequently inferred, as we have seen. The second principle, though true
with respect to the merit of another’s vocation, is not so with respect to the decree by
which such a vocation is predestined, for as such, it is ordered as the proximate end on
account of which the spirit of such prayer is given to another. Nor is that consequence
valid: One merits for another his vocation; therefore, he merits the first determination
of the divine decree predetermining such a vocation, as has been sufficiently treated.
The third principle, though admitted with respect to the execution of the effects of
predestination that follow vocation in time, is irrelevant, because in divine
preordination, those effects are prior to predestination. And so it does not follow that
such prayer is the reason for predestination with respect to the very determination of
God’s act. Moreover, not all those effects are effects of that man’s predestination, for
the prayer of another and the grace for it are also effects. And thus that prayer cannot
simply be the cause of all the effects as they are conferred in execution. Hence, the
fourth principle is simply false. And the reason by which it is proven is of no weight.
For why are so many principles of good works effects of predestination? The opposite,
therefore, we will show below. Or why also is that prayer not said to be the principle of
another’s good works, at least remotely, in the way that it is usually said that the cause
of the cause is the cause of the caused? For though such causality is physically
accidental, morally it is of great moment and is regarded as quasi-per se.
9. A new difficulty arises. A probable opinion. But from this arises another difficulty
pertaining to the other part proposed in the chapter’s title. For it follows that even on
the part of Christ the Lord, there is no reason or cause for the election of the
predestined, as it is a free decree determined to efficaciously willing the salvation of
such men. The consequence seems to be against Paul in Ephesians 1, where he says: He
chose us in Him before the foundation of the world. The consequence is proven
because even Christ’s merit or His intercession for the elect is an effect of their election
and predestination. For why is Stephen’s prayer for Paul an effect of Paul’s
predestination, and Christ’s prayer for Paul not an effect of Paul’s predestination?
Therefore, just as Stephen did not merit for Paul his election, so neither did Christ. And
it is confirmed because we have said above that the election of all the predestined was
made before foreseen original sin. But concerning Christ the Lord, the probable
opinion affirms that He was not predestined before foreseen original sin. Therefore, it
plainly follows that the rest of men were neither elected nor predestined on account of
Christ’s foreseen merits. And though Scotus and others hold that Christ as man was
predestined before foreseen original sin, nevertheless the same Scotus (Sentences III, d.
19, q. 1) says that He was not ordained to merit before the election of the predestined.
And so the election of the predestined could not have been on account of Christ’s
322 BOOK TWO
foreseen merits. This also seems to be said in our opinion, where we asserted above
that the election of men was made before foreseen original sin. From this it also
follows that Christ was not elected before other men but at most simultaneously with
them in the same sign of reason. From which it also follows that the election of men
did not presuppose foreknowledge of Christ’s merits, just as His own election did not
presuppose His foreseen merits.
10. The ancient Scholastics speak obscurely on this question. For although nearly all
teach that Christ was the cause of our predestination, they immediately clarify this by
distinguishing between predestination with respect to its effects and predestination with
respect to the act of the divine will or intellect. In the first sense, they explain, it is
understood when Christ is said to be the cause of the predestination of other men, for
with respect to the very act of God, they hold that He cannot be the cause. Thus St.
Thomas proceeds in Summa Theologica, III, q. 24, a. 4, and in Sentences III, d. 10, q.
3, a. 1, q. 3. Indeed, if the doctrine of the same saint in Summa Theologica, I, q. 23, a.
8—especially in the reply to the first objection—is carefully examined, though it is
general, it seems also to include Christ’s merit and prayer. For when the argument is
proposed that predestination is eternal, whereas the prayers of the saints are temporal,
and therefore predestination cannot be aided by the prayers of the saints, he responds
that this argument rightly proves that predestination is not aided by the prayers of the
saints as regards the very preordination. But if this is true of other saints, the same
reasoning applies to Christ, since His prayers were also temporal.
11. Alexander of Hales proceeds in almost the same way in Summa Theologica, III,
q. 3, membr. 5, as does Bonaventure in Sentences III, d. 11, a. 1, q. 3, Albert the Great
in d. 10, a. 3, Richard of Middleton in a. 4, last q., and Durandus in q. 3, who in the
solution to the second objection adds that Christ was not the cause of our
predestination with respect to all its effects, because among these effects he places the
Incarnation itself. Likewise, Gabriel Biel in Sentences III, d. 19, a. 2, concl. 4, though he
disagrees with Scotus in assigning the instants or signs of reason in eternal
predestination or election, nevertheless agrees in the conclusion that Christ is not the
cause of our election on the part of the divine act. For that act, he says, is so simple
that neither in reality nor in reason can many distinctions be made in it, and therefore
no cause or reason can have a place in it as terminating in one object rather than
another. Hence he also uses that common distinction of theologians concerning the
cause of predestination with respect to the act or with respect to the effects, and he
agrees with others in denying a cause on the part of the act, though for a different
reason. Nor does this opinion or distinction seem sufficiently explained concerning the
will only with respect to the real act itself, for in this way the distinction and resolution
would be insufficient. Moreover, the reason many use—that the temporal cannot be the
323 BOOK TWO
cause of the eternal—would not be adequate, because the temporal as foreknown from
eternity can be a cause, i.e., the reason for an eternal free determination, if otherwise,
on account of the identity of the act or its priority or simultaneity in the sign of
eternity, it is not repugnant.
12. Among the moderns, however, some teach more clearly that the election of men
was made on account of Christ’s foreseen merits. I have followed their opinion in De
Incarnatione, disp. 41, sect. 4, at the same time explaining the sayings of the ancients in
accordance with it, yet so explaining that opinion that I have thought the option (so to
speak) of the elect must be reserved to the divine will alone—that is, that these are
predestined rather than those, for this I did not think could be attributed to Christ’s
merits, even if that election, as it is the benevolence and benefit of the elect, must be
attributed to them. And I have defended this not as certain in faith, nor as the constant
opinion of theologians or the Fathers, but as a pious and probable opinion. And now I
judge that nearly the same must be held, though something further must be explained
and some objections satisfied.
13. Two things are noted in the recent opinion. For I see that two things in what I
have just related have been noted by later writers as worthy of correction. First, they
assert that the election of the predestined, not only as it is the love and beneficence
toward them but also as it is the election from the mass of perdition (certainly in
comparison to others who are not so loved), is on account of Christ’s merits. Then they
judge that this assertion is not only a probable opinion but also Catholic doctrine, in
which they signify that it is a matter of certain faith. And they are founded especially on
the passage of Paul in Ephesians 1: He chose us in Him before the foundation of the
world, that we should be holy, etc. For since in these words Paul clearly teaches that we
are chosen in Christ, they say it cannot be denied that our election was on account of
Christ’s merits. Nor do they think it lawful to interpret that passage concerning election
insofar as it is love without relation or comparison to others, both because this is to
abuse the word and because they think the Greek Fathers hold the opposite, especially
Photius in Oecumenius on Ephesians 1, where, explaining He has blessed us with every
spiritual blessing, he says: He blessed through the Son, He chose through the Son, He
made us beloved through the Son. And they confirm this with those words of the same
Paul: He predestined us to adoption through Jesus Christ. And from 2 Timothy 1: He
called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own
purpose and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus before eternal times. From this
passage the reason is also taken: Because God in time gives the elect every grace up to
glory (so to speak) on account of Christ’s merits, therefore from eternity He decreed to
give it to them on account of Christ’s merits; therefore He chose and predestined them
324 BOOK TWO
on account of Christ’s merits. For what God executes in time and the manner in which
it is to be executed, He predestines from eternity.
14. The assertion is examined. A twofold sense of the phrase on account of merits is
opened. But first let us examine the assertion itself, then inquire into the degree of its
certainty. And in the assertion, indeed, a twofold ambiguity and equivocation of words
must be opened and avoided, lest perhaps, while we exaggerate our election in Christ
and through Christ, we rather remove it from the middle. For first, above in the first
book and in this second, we have noted that there is a great equivocation in this
inference: God from eternity willed to give in time grace or glory on account of merits;
therefore He predestined, loved, or chose on account of merits. For if the sense is that
the phrase on account of merits refers to the object or effect of predestination, the
inference is excellent, for the sense is that God from eternity predestined that such
grace or glory in time would not be given except on account of such merits. But
another sense is that the phrase on account of refers to the will of the predestining
God Himself, as from eternity determined to effectively confer such grace or glory on
such a man, so that the very determination of the divine will, as predetermining or
intending such an effect effectively, was on account of merit. And in this way the
inference is not good, as I have shown above. For God in time does not give glory to
adult elect except on account of their merits, nor sanctifying grace except through their
free disposition. Hence it is certain that from eternity He decreed to give it thus in time
and not otherwise. And nevertheless, it is most true and sufficiently certain that the first
efficacious decree of God, by which He loved, chose, and predestined men to glory,
was not on account of their merits, and the first intention of sanctifying them was not
from their foreseen disposition, but rather because God had chosen them for true
holiness and had prepared and at last provided their disposition.
15. The force or strength of a certain consequence is explained. Therefore, when it is
inferred by a similar consequence that on account of Christ’s foreseen merits God had
the eternal will to save the predestined in time and to grace them, because in time He
gives all these things on account of Christ’s merits and from eternity He not only
disposed the effects but also the manner of executing them, in this sense indeed the
inference is good, and the doctrine can deservedly be called Catholic. For it evidently
follows from two certain principles. One is that grace and glory are given to us in time
on account of Christ’s merit. The other is that whatever God does in time, and the
manner and reason of doing it, is from eternity established or decreed by the will of
God, in the way that the effect demands. Hence, if our grace and glory in time is the
reward of Christ’s merits, certainly from eternity God willed that it should be the
reward of such merits, and therefore He disposed that Christ should merit them for us.
This, therefore, is the sense intended by the said authors, and they deny any other
325 BOOK TWO
election of men on account of Christ’s merits, because they admit absolutely no other
gratuitous election or predestination of men. Hence it happens that they attribute to
Christ and His merits alone the fitting vocation and consequently that will of God
which decreed from eternity to give man such a vocation. For the other gifts of grace
and glory He not only predestined and decreed to give on account of Christ’s merits
but also on account of the merits of the man receiving them—which they must say
especially concerning glory and consequently concerning the increase of grace, namely,
that God from eternity did not predestine someone proximately and immediately to
glory or to so much sanctifying grace on account of Christ’s merit alone but on account
of the merit of the man himself, because it is thus given in time and is predestined
from eternity in the same way as it is given in time.
16. The proper conclusion. The reason for the conclusion. But we not only admit
this truth insofar as it pertains to the matter itself but also add further that not only
that election to glory, which we have called above from justice, but also that which is
purely gratuitous with respect to the elect man was on account of Christ’s merits,
insofar as it is benevolence and love of such a man, as we will soon explain. And we say
the same of every gratuitous decree of God to give grace to the predestined from the
first to the last. And in this sense we probably understand the cited testimonies of Paul,
which the last opinion adduced, concerning which we will add a few things shortly. The
reason can be given thus: Either we hold that the election of the predestined was made
after foreseen original sin, choosing and separating them from the mass of perdition, or
we judge that men were elected before all foreseen sin, just as the holy angels were
elected. According to the first opinion, it is easy to understand that Christ’s merits were
foreseen before the election of men, whether Christ Himself is held to have been
predestined before the foreknowledge of original sin or after it. For in either way Christ
is the first of all the predestined in the mind of God and the first beloved and chosen,
and therefore His merits could have been foreseen before the election of other men.
17. But if we rather approve the other opinion, which we have delivered above, that
the men who are to be saved were pre-elected by God before foreseen original sin, by
much greater reason we must confess, and we believe it to be true, that Christ the God-
man was by Himself first predestined before all occasion of foreseen future sin. For
Paul in Colossians 1 plainly teaches that Christ Himself was the first of all the elect and
beloved of God and holds the primacy in all things, even in the mind and intention of
God. And this is very consistent with His excellence and majesty, as is treated more
fully in Summa Theologica, III, q. 1, a. 3. This being posited, it is also easy to
understand that Christ’s merits preceded in the foreknowledge of God the election of
other men, because in the very predestination or love of Christ, His merits are
understood as predetermined, and therefore in the same sign they are foreseen as
326 BOOK TWO
absolutely future. If, therefore, in that sign in which God elected the predestined, He
already has the future merits of Christ present, then on account of them He could love
whomever He loved; therefore it was so done, because those merits are worthy of every
possible reward according to the ordinary law of God, and because in this way the
divine work itself is in a higher way and redounds to the greater glory of Christ and
men.
18. Another difficulty. The difficulty is untangled. But there remained another
difficulty there, because those merits of Christ could not have been foreseen as
founded in Christ’s Passion, for in that sign Christ is not yet understood as ordained to
death, for this He drew from sin or the occasion of sin. But Christ merited for us only
through the Passion and the works ordered to it. It must be said briefly that in that sign
Christ’s merits were foreseen simply and absolutely, neither including nor excluding the
Passion, but insofar as they can be in any work of such a person; or certainly they were
foreseen as founded in the outstanding love of Christ for God and men, which love
could be had both in passible flesh and in impassible, and through it Christ in fact
merited for us, and not only through His own works of the Passion, though through
these the redemption was consummated.
19. The second conclusion. Christ truly and properly merited for us our
predestination. It is proven by analogy. But we say further that, as Christ is truly and
properly said to have merited for us our predestination and election or love to glory and
to sanctifying grace in such a degree and with the gift of perseverance, it is not enough
that He merited for us the first grace of a fitting vocation, which we receive in
ourselves, nor the free determination of that eternal decree by which the divine will
confers this effect in time, but it is necessary that that first efficacious intention of
saving and glorifying the elect, which God decreed concerning them purely gratuitously,
had regard to Christ’s foreseen merits. But if God did not have this regard, certainly He
did not predestine men to glory on account of Christ, though He decreed to give it
through Christ. First, it is proven by analogy: Because God through Stephen’s prayer
gave such a vocation to Paul in time, and consequently on account of the same
foreseen reason He had from eternity the decree by which He commanded that effect
to be executed in time, and nevertheless this is not enough for Stephen to be said to
have merited Paul’s election or predestination, as has been seen; therefore neither will it
suffice in the present case, for the reasoning is the same, as we will immediately explain.
20. The Reason a priori. Second, there is the a priori reason: because to merit that
which is prior, it is not enough to merit that which is posterior; but the will to call, even
in such a manner, is posterior to the election to glory. Therefore, the merit of that will
alone is not sufficient for the merit of this election. The minor is explained: because
before the will to give man such a vocation, there precedes—in the order of reason—
327 BOOK TWO
the efficacious intention to give glory, through which intention man is peculiarly loved;
and in it consists either the formal predestination itself or certainly the root of the
whole predestination. Therefore, if God did not have that intention toward me on
account of Christ’s merits—even if He willed to call me thus on account of Christ’s
foreseen merits—He did not predestine me on account of them with respect to the
whole of predestination, nor with respect to what is formal and principal in it.
Especially because that vocation is not properly an effect of predestination except
insofar as it proceeds from such an intention—on account of which Augustine is
accustomed to call it a vocation according to purpose. For otherwise, a similar fitting
vocation, with respect to the proximate effect, is often given to the reprobate; yet
because it is not according to purpose, it is not an effect of predestination. But to merit
predestination, it is at least necessary to merit that vocation not only materially (so to
speak), but formally under that respect—as an effect of predestination, and therefore
as proceeding from such a purpose. Therefore, it is necessary to merit that purpose
with respect to the free determination to elect such a man to eternal life. Hence it is
more clearly evident that, for Christ to be called the cause of our predestination or
election to glory, it is not enough that He merited for us that executive will by which
God decreed to give man glory on account of his already foreseen merits. Because
before that will, the man was elected, and consequently also predestined, to glory—at
least in the order of intention.
21. Third conclusion. First confirmation. - Thirdly, we say that it is not plausible that
the election of predestined humans was made based on the foreseen merits of Christ,
under the formal respect and comparison of election, and love of these rather than
those, and the separation of these in particular from the mass of corruption. This is
proven first because, for election in this sense to be made from the merits of Christ, it
is necessary that Christ's merits were already foreseen as applied in a special way to
these humans rather than to those. But this cannot be said with probability, therefore.
The major premise is proven because if they were foreseen only in general, as merits to
be offered for the salvation of humanity, by virtue of those merits God's will was not
determined to these rather than to those. Indeed, by virtue of those merits, God could
effectively ordain humans to beatitude without making any election among them; and
conversely, given that merit of Christ thus foreseen, God could have effectively
preordained no one to glory, but all only sufficiently, because neither such merit nor
anything else imposed upon him the necessity of such an election. Finally, not only as
regards the exercise (so to speak) but also as regards the specification or determination
to elect these rather than those, that election was free for God, notwithstanding such
foreknowledge of Christ's merits, because merit thus foreseen is in itself indifferent.
Therefore, it would have been necessary to foresee the merit as applied to these rather
328 BOOK TWO
than to those. But this cannot be said, because this itself greatly depends on divine
vocation, therefore.
22. Response. It is refuted. They respond by denying the major premise, because to
merit election and separation, it is enough that Christ's merit was absolutely foreseen as
offered to the Father for the salvation of humans, and that in view of it the Father
elected some. Because this suffices for the grace of election to be given on account of
Christ, and for Christ's merit to have been a necessary cause for them to be elected. But
this is another equivocation, on account of which this point is disputed in name only.
For in this assertion we are no longer treating election insofar as it concerns the benefit
done to the one who is elected, but we are formally treating that comparison, and the
determination of the divine will to this one rather than that one. As, for example, if a
testator instructs the heir to give a hundred virgins of this city in marriage at his
expense, it is clear that such a donation is an effect of such a testament, and the will by
which the heir executes the instruction is an effect of the testator's will, and in this
sense it can be said simply that such virgins owe such a benefit to the testator.
Nevertheless, the heir has conferred something of liberality and grace there that did not
emanate from the will of the testator, namely, that those hundred virgins are these
rather than others, for this depends solely on the heir's will. Hence, if the testator had
not absolutely bequeathed that a hundred virgins, but that such should be given in
marriage, etc., without doubt he would have conferred a greater grace upon them, and
would have been the total cause of their election, as they are compared with others and
preferred to them; which cannot be said in the former manner of testament. So
therefore in the present case it must be said that if the eternal Father, in that sign in
which he elected the predestined, only had foreknowledge of Christ's merits as to be
offered for the salvation of humans absolutely, and not for these rather than for those,
on account of Christ he indeed had that decree by which he loved such humans and in
reality elected them; nevertheless, the particular determination to these rather than to
those he did not have from Christ's merits, but from his will alone. Just as, given the
same principle, it follows excellently that it was not from Christ's merit, but from God's
will, that the multitude of the elect was in such a number, and not in a greater or lesser
one, and that it was to such degrees of grace and glory, and not to others, and similar
things, of all of which the reasoning is the same.
23. An evasion is sought. - But it is not found. But they respond differently by
denying the minor premise, namely that in that sign Christ's merits were not foreseen as
applied by him and offered specially for these humans, so that they might be elected to
such a vocation and congruous grace; for we read that this was done in time in John 17,
when Christ particularly asked for the gift of perseverance for the disciples, and added,
"I do not pray for the world, but for these whom you have given me," signifying his
329 BOOK TWO
particular will and application of his merits. And similarly in Luke 22, he said to Peter:
"I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail." But in this response there is
always labor in equivocation, and we adhere to the same dogma, that election to glory
does not precede the executing will in the order of intention and predestination.
Therefore, although it is true that Christ prayed in time particularly for the predestined,
and applied his merits to them in a singular way for the execution of their election, and
hence it is rightly inferred that this prayer of Christ or application was foreseen from
eternity, before the executive decree of predestination; nevertheless, it is not rightly
inferred that Christ's merit was foreseen as applied before the election of the
predestined. For it is to argue from eternity to the first sign of eternity, which is
frivolous; for even the merits of the predestined themselves were foreseen from
eternity, and it does not follow that they were foreseen in the first sign, before the
predestined one was elected to glory.
24. It is also declared by reason, because the fact that Christ prayed in a particular
way for such humans and applied his merits to them efficaciously had its first cause and
origin in the divine will, such that it was not the choice of Christ's human will. For who
would dare even to think that the profound mystery of the election of humans, and the
whole reason and mode of the predestined as to their number, and the difference of
mansions, and degree in grace and glory, was ordained by God's will as approving and
conforming itself to Christ's human will, and not rather that Christ specially applied his
merits to the execution of such effects, and to the consummation of such saints, and in
such number, weight, and measure, because he knew that it was thus predefined and
preordained by God's will? Certainly the Apostle refers this to the counsel of the divine
will, in Ephesians 1, and therefore in Romans 8 he exclaims: "O the depth of the riches
of the wisdom and knowledge of God."
25. Escape. It is refuted. But, they say, even if the election of the predestined did not
precede in foreknowledge, before Christ's merit was foreseen as specially applied for
them; nevertheless Christ in that application conformed his will to the divine will,
because he foreknew that it was God's will that he should pray thus for them. But I ask,
of what will of God do they speak: either of a simple affection and inefficacious desire,
or of a will of good pleasure and efficacious. They cannot say the first with probability
and consistency of doctrine. For either that affection is free in God, or natural; if
natural, why is that simple affection posited toward these rather than an efficacious one,
or what change does that simple affection cause in the creature, so that a special
relation of reason results in the divine affection, more toward these persons than
toward those? For they are accustomed to use this argument especially against the
efficacious decree of electing the predestined without merits, as was seen above. But if
that will of God, which Christ as man knew, was a will of good pleasure, it presupposes
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the election of the predestined, or at the very least begins their predestination, because
it prepares for them one of the first and supreme benefits by which they are most
certainly delivered, namely, the particular prayer of Christ and the application of his
merits. Therefore, such a will of God could not arise from the special prayer or
application of Christ's merits, as it is from his human will, because rather it is the cause
of such prayer and application; therefore, before the whole predestination of the elect,
that peculiar prayer of Christ is not presupposed as foreseen.
26. Corroboration. It is confirmed, because when Christ prayed efficaciously for
these rather than for those, he undoubtedly did this from a peculiar motion of the Holy
Spirit, as even the authors of the contrary opinion do not dare to deny, because in all
matters, and especially in such serious ones, Christ acted from a peculiar and
efficacious, or congruous, motion of the Holy Spirit. Why, therefore, did the Holy
Spirit so move Christ's soul, if not because he had already decreed to save those men?
Therefore, that decree was not in view of that peculiar prayer of Christ, but rather was
the cause of it. Likewise, that inspiration made to Christ's soul was a very great benefit
for the predestined man, and an effect of his predestination, as has been proven, but
that was not from a peculiar prayer of Christ; therefore, neither does election to glory,
or to all benefits of grace, presuppose the foreknowledge of that peculiar prayer or
application; therefore, the fact that God elected these rather than those cannot be
referred to Christ's merit and human will.
27. Another confirmation. It is confirmed furthermore, because this negation,
namely that God has not efficaciously pre-elected all men, or that some predestined are
not, can in no way be attributed to Christ's merits, or be referred to his will as to a first
root, even a negative one; therefore, neither is the election of men, as it is formally
election, from Christ's merits; therefore, much less as it is the election of these rather
than those is it from the same merits. The antecedent as to the first part is self-evident,
because Christ did not come to destroy men or to delay their salvation, but he came
that they might have life and have it more abundantly. Hence he did not merit for them
except what is good and useful for eternal salvation; but not to be pre-elected and not
to be predestined is not good for man, nor useful for salvation, indeed of itself it rather
removes certain and infallible means of salvation, or at least does not provide them, nor
does that negation contribute to those means: therefore it is not apt to fall under
Christ's merit. From this the other part is also easily evident, namely, that that negation
is not to be reduced to Christ's human will, because that lack and its effect principally
depends on the divine will. But indeed, those things which depend on the divine will
can also depend only on Christ's will through merit, or impetration, or some other
similar causality or reason, which cannot be accommodated to such an effect or
privation; therefore, that negation cannot be reduced to Christ's human will as to a
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cause. And it is confirmed because that negation would not pertain to Christ's office,
which was that of universal redeemer, but to the superior universal providence of God;
therefore it drew its origin and reason from the divine, not from Christ's human will.
The first principal consequence of the argument is proven, because election, as
election, expresses a relation to that negation; for if all were efficaciously loved to glory,
there would not be election, but only love. And similarly, if God had decreed that all
should be not only sufficiently but also efficaciously redeemed, there would not be a
separation of some from the mass of perdition, but a restoration of all; therefore, the
fact that that decree of God was by way of election and separation, according to this
relation and formality, is not from Christ's merits. And from there the other inference,
which presupposes the notion of election, is easily evident.
28. It is pressed. A response is given to the first. But they press: Christ the Lord
merited that these should be efficaciously redeemed, but for others he did not merit
that his redemption should be efficaciously applied to them; therefore, just as that
affirmation is the cause of affirmation, so this negation is the cause of this negation;
therefore, by accommodating individuals to individuals, from Christ's merits and from
the way in which he offered his merits it arose that these were predestined and not
those, and consequently that these rather than those were elected. I respond first to the
first part of the antecedent, by distinguishing it concerning efficacious redemption as to
execution, or as to preparation or predestination. In the first sense I concede that part,
and I confess that that affirmation of Christ's merits was the cause of such preparation.
But I add that Christ merited for these men the efficacious application of his merits
because they had been elected by God, and because Christ knew that it was the Father's
will that he should pursue them with special benevolence. This Christ signified in that
entire prayer, in which he prayed in a special way for the predestined, John 17: "I have
manifested your name to the men whom you have given me out of the world: yours
they were, and you have given them to me," and below: "I do not pray for the world,
but for these whom you have given me," and below: "Holy Father, keep them in your
name whom you have given me." Where he often repeats those words, "Whom you
have given me," to signify that he prayed for them with a special and efficacious prayer
because he understood that they were specially loved and elected by the Father. The
general reason also requires this, because Christ as man in all actions followed the
Father's will; therefore much more in this most serious matter of procuring men's
salvation with greater or lesser efficacy.
29. The other part of the argument is explained. To the other negative part of the
argument, having conceded that part of the antecedent, the consequence is denied,
because "your destruction is from you, only in me is your help." Which, just as it is true
with respect to God as God, so it is with respect to Christ's merit; for it itself is the
332 BOOK TWO
cause of the whole good use of grace that is in us; however, that, or the lack of it, is
not the cause of our abuse of grace, but we are the first origin and cause of it. Hence
that affirmation is not so adequate a cause of affirmation that negation is also of
negation, because for the negation of the good use of grace, the freedom of the will
suffices, to which sufficient help founded on Christ's merit is never lacking, and the fact
that it is not efficacious is not because Christ merited it, as far as he is concerned, but
because man impedes it. And finally, the fact that Christ did not offer his merits so
efficaciously for these men has its foundation in the prior negation of God, because,
namely, he did not specially pre-elect them.
30. It is further confirmed. - But we can press further. Because it follows that Christ
the Lord's merit for election is an effect of election and predestination of them, and
therefore Christ is not the meritorious cause of the predestination of the elect, just as
we were saying a little earlier that Stephen's prayer was not the cause of Paul's
predestination, because it was one of its effects. The consequence is evident, because
Christ merited in such a way for the predestined because he knew that it was thus the
good pleasure of the Father, as he himself professes elsewhere, saying: "I confess to
you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, etc." But this was the good pleasure of the
Father because from his free will he had elected such men, simultaneously willing that
that election should be carried out through this means of Christ's merits; therefore that
merit of Christ was an effect of such election.
31. Because of this argument, the aforementioned authors deny that Christ's merit
presupposes the election of men in God's mind, or that it proceeded from a particular
ordination of the divine will, but rather only from Christ's human will. And
consequently, they deny that Stephen's prayer is an effect of Paul's election. But this
latter point has already been sufficiently refuted, and the former point (as I was saying a
little earlier) is in itself incredible and alien to Christ's own manner of speaking and to
the perfection of his works, which is chiefly derived from conformity to the divine will.
It also seems contrary to the profundity of divine providence. For how can it be
credible that the eternal disposition of heavenly beatitude and of all the means by
which it is to be effectively obtained was not devised (so to speak) by divine reason and
predetermined by divine will prior—in the order of reason—to any created will, even
Christ's, being called upon for the execution of that providence?
32. I respond, therefore, by distinguishing the consequent: for in Christ we may
consider the supreme love of God and a general disposition to seek the Father's glory
in all things; and we may also consider the special actions of praying for this or that
person, in this or that manner, and of offering some action of his to confer this benefit
on these persons rather than on those. If, therefore, the consequent is understood as
referring to merit founded in Christ's prior acts, then the inference is denied: for such
333 BOOK TWO
merit is not an effect of the special election of the predestined, but is innate and
connatural (so to speak) to Christ himself. Hence, by the very fact that God predestined
Christ to be the natural Son of God and the head of all angels and men, He
predestined Christ to love God supremely and to merit well and infinitely for God, on
behalf of all angels and men. From these, God willed that those whom He wished
should be effectively destined to eternal salvation because of Christ's merit in a certain
prior sign of reason; but in another, later sign, He ordained that Christ should pray
more specially for such men and for their effective salvation, or do something similar.
And thus, if that consequent is understood as referring to this special action of Christ,
we concede that it is an effect of the predestination of such men or angels. However,
we deny the other part of the inference, namely, that it follows that Christ is not the
cause of the predestination of the elect, because before this effect, sufficient merit is
presupposed in Christ as foreseen for such predestination or election. And therefore it
is not similar to Stephen's prayer for Paul.
33. Final confirmation of our position. Evasion. - Finally, our position is confirmed
because just as Christ the Lord merited all grace and all supernatural aids given to the
ancient saints who preceded the Incarnation, so too he merited for them their
predestination and their efficacious ordering to glory, and yet he did not merit for them
their election over others according to the proper relation and comparison that these
words imply. Therefore, he conducted himself in the same way toward the other
righteous and saints who lived after his coming in the flesh. To this, the aforementioned
authors seem to respond by admitting the antecedent and denying the consequence.
And they give the reason that Christ could merit for later saints that pre-election or
preference over others by specially praying and interceding for them; but Christ could
not merit in this way for the saints who preceded him, because he could not pray for
them in this manner by way of petition or supplication, since prayer in this mode is not
made for something already done and past. Nor could he merit it by giving thanks for
such a benefit conferred on them rather than on others, because this thanksgiving
presupposes the benefit already conferred and is in some way an effect of it, because its
subject matter and the object moving one to that thanksgiving is a benefit already
conferred.
34. Objection. Response. But against this, first, if someone decides to confer an
anticipated benefit on someone because he foresees that the person will be grateful,
then the act of thanksgiving, foreseen as future, would already be the reason for willing
to give such a benefit. Therefore, in the same way, Christ's thanksgiving, foreseen by the
Father, could be the reason for choosing the ancient Fathers in that manner, if it was
not repugnant for other reasons. They respond that grace and aids could indeed be
given to the ancient Fathers because of the foreseen merit of Christ based on his future
334 BOOK TWO
thanksgiving for the same benefit, because it is not properly an effect of it, but only
presupposes it as an object or necessary condition. However, Christ could not so merit
that, for the same act of thanksgiving, such grace would be given to this person rather
than to that one, because for this it would be necessary for God to foresee that Christ
the Lord would give thanks more for such a benefit conferred on Peter than if it had
been conferred on Paul; otherwise, there would be no reason on Christ's part why it
should be given to Peter rather than to Paul, if Christ was foreseen to be equally
grateful for either. But inequality in this regard could not be foreknown on Christ's part,
because Christ would have been equally grateful for a similar benefit bestowed on any
other men. Therefore, the foreseen thanksgiving could not be the reason for that
comparison. It is as if I foresaw, or hoped, making a comparison between Peter and
Paul, that Peter would be more grateful to me—that hope could indeed move me to
confer the benefit on him rather than on Paul. But if I expected nothing of the sort,
but rather conceived the same hope for both, I could not derive from this a reason for
bestowing a benefit on one rather than on the other. So it must be said of Christ.
35. Resolution. However, although it is true that the future thanksgiving would have
been equal on Christ's part, given equal benefit and person, nevertheless one could
conceive of some inequality in the very human and free affection of Christ, such that
God would foreknow that it would have been more pleasing to Christ as man that
Jacob should be sanctified rather than Esau—that is, that it would have been more
conformable to his will, because he as man would have been more inclined toward
Jacob than toward Esau. I readily acknowledge that, considered absolutely, this may
seem to be asserted without reason. Nevertheless, arguing ad hominem, I do not see
why one who holds that Christ's human will was the first root and cause why God
elected the good thief to an efficacious calling rather than the other, because Christ
himself had a certain greater affection for the one than for the other—why (I say) the
same could not and should not be said about Christ's affection for men who existed
before him, namely, that by way of desire or simple affection he willed from himself
efficacious aids for this one rather than for that one, and that God was moved by this,
through foreknowledge, to make that distinction. And if this cannot be plausibly
conceived, it is not because Christ could not have had this varied affection through the
freedom of his human will, but because that is not the first root of the mystery of
divine election and predestination with regard to the determination of persons. Or also
because that affection ought not to have been in Christ merely human, but from a
higher motive of the divine will, which had disposed things as it wished. And thus the
election, with respect to that comparative aspect, is always reduced to the divine will
alone.
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36. Objection from Paul to the Ephesians. Three interpretations. But they object to
us the testimony of Paul to the Ephesians, chapter one: "He chose us in him before the
foundation of the world." This testimony, however, either proves too much against
these same authors, or it is irrelevant to the point of the present assertion. For Paul
there is speaking not only about men who lived after Christ, but simply about all who
are to obtain salvation through Christ, whom he says were chosen in Christ before the
foundation of the world. Therefore, those words must be verified concerning the saints
of the Old Testament. Therefore, either they prove that Christ merited that these rather
than those were chosen, even in the case of those saints, or if they do not prove it for
them, neither do they prove it for the others, because the words are universal and
equally comprehend all. There are, therefore, three interpretations of these words, even
supposing that the phrase "in him" refers to Christ as man and signifies some causality,
which is far more true and in accordance with the opinions of the Fathers, as we have
shown against Adam in the cited place.
37. First interpretation. Not accepted. The first interpretation is that only the final
and exemplary cause is signified by that phrase, so that the sense is: he chose us for
Christ's glory, or in him as in the most perfect head and exemplar. In this sense, it is not
only not proven from that word that Christ was the meritorious cause of election with
respect to the comparison of one with another, but also not even with respect to the
free determination of God's efficacious love for such a person. However, this
interpretation does not please us, because it is more usual for Paul to signify the
meritorious cause by that manner of speaking, as we showed in the same place.
Second interpretation. Finally, the other interpretation is unfavorable. The second
interpretation is that the phrase "in him" does not refer to election on the part of the
divine act, but on the part of the object of such an act, so that the sense is that God
did not have respect to Christ's merits in that determination of his act to choose such
men, but by his own will he chose them; simultaneously, however, he willed that this
election, both to grace and to glory, would be fulfilled in and through Christ. In this
sense, the Greek Fathers seem to interpret those words, and the scholastics do not
dissent when they say that Christ merited predestination for us on the part of effect
and means, but not on the part of the act.
The third interpretation is that, because of Christ's foreseen merits, God
efficaciously willed to give glory to such men, which will is their highest love, and is in
reality election by the very fact that it does not extend to all, but only to these, leaving
others in the mass of perdition. And in this respect, God is said to have chosen men in
Christ, even if he did not merit either the abandonment of the others or the love for
these rather than those with regard to that comparative relation.
336 BOOK TWO
38. The degree of certainty of the assertion is explained. Whoever would think
contrary to this truth would affirm something not only rash but erroneous. From these
considerations, it is easy to resolve what was proposed in the second place above,
namely, what degree of certainty this assertion has: "Christ was the meritorious cause
of the election and predestination of men." For the aforementioned authors assert that
it is Catholic doctrine, because they speak of election to glory from merits already
foreseen, and they rightly assert this, because this is an election of justice, concerning
which it is most certain that it is through Christ, and to deny this seems to me not only
rash but also erroneous. For to will to give such a reward to a man having such merits is
through Christ, and with respect to Christ this act is one of strict justice. Otherwise, the
effect itself could not be given through Christ, which nevertheless cannot be denied
according to faith. Hence no Catholic, as far as I know, has ever denied this. For Adam
and others who deny that the election of the predestined to glory was made in view of
Christ's merits are speaking of gratuitous and liberal election with respect to the elect
themselves, which they believe, with Augustine, precedes by way of intention the whole
predestination.
39. The same judgment is to be made concerning the assertion denying that Christ
merited predestination for us. And the same must be said concerning election to all
grace, from the first calling to final perseverance. For in whatever degree it is certain
that all this grace is given to the predestined in time through Christ, in the same degree
it is certain that God had some eternal will, in view of Christ's merits, by which he
willed to give such grace to his elect; because (as shown above) this effect cannot be
separated from God's will. Hence, those who deny that election to grace is simply from
Christ's merits, on the ground that the first calling or other dispositions to grace are not
given to us through Christ's merits, teach an assertion that is not only rash but also
erroneous, contrary to Paul as above, and contrary to the doctrine of the Councils, as I
showed in the cited place. And in this respect, Adam can rightly be reprimanded, who
explained his position thus in Philippians 1 and 2, and 1 Peter. And the same judgment
is to be made concerning the assertion denying that Christ merited predestination for
us. For if it speaks of predestination with respect to effects, and relies on the error that
Christ did not merit for us the special and internal graces which are the effects of
predestination in the elect, the doctrine is erroneous and more than rash. But if it is
denied only because they also place the Incarnation itself or other similar benefits
among the effects of predestination, then it is not a matter worthy of censure, but a
matter of opinion and almost a matter of manner of speaking, although the affirmative
position is far more probable.
40. But if the discourse is about election to glory that is purely gratuitous with
respect to the elected man, as it is understood in God before the foreknowledge of the
337 BOOK TWO
works and merits of the same elect person, then there is no greater certainty in that
assertion than that of the more probable opinion. For, first of all, the doctors with
whom we are disputing constantly defend that no one is so elected to glory by God's
will alone, liberally and gratuitously. Therefore, they themselves cannot assert that
Christ merited for them such an election to glory that was prior to the foresight of their
merits, since there is no such election. Therefore, they can in no way condemn those
who, while positing such an election in God, deny that it was from Christ's merits.
Furthermore, the assertion is not defined, nor is it gathered with sufficient certainty
from Scripture, as was just seen and will be said again shortly. Nor, finally, are there
lacking grave authors who have thought this way on a probable basis. Nor is the
contrary assertion so received that it is asserted by other theologians as certain, but only
as more pious and more probable. Finally, that position depends on uncertain
principles, which are entirely matters of opinion, namely, whether the election of the
predestined was made before or after the foresight of original sin, and whether Christ's
predestination preceded the foreknowledge of original sin; likewise, whether all the
predestined were simultaneous with Christ without any priority of reason, or whether,
although Christ's predestination preceded in some sign, that is sufficient for his merits
to have been foreseen before our election, which could be the cause or reason for our
election—all of which were more fully treated and explained in the said first volume.
41. The way is closed to the objection. Nor does the statement "he chose us in him"
stand against this judgment, because, as I said, that phrase "in him" can either express
another type of final or exemplary causality, not meritorious, or it can express the cause
through which the election is to be fulfilled, not on account of which it is primarily
made. And that statement "He predestined us through Jesus Christ" can be understood
as that which is among the objects of predestination, not what is its reason. For God
could have predestined man's salvation by his mere will, although he predestined it to
be given through Jesus Christ, just as he gratuitously and without one's own merits
predestined men to obtain glory through merits. And thus it is also excellently said that
God "calls us with his holy calling according to his purpose" (2 Timothy 1), which he
distributes from mere will, "and grace," which he gives us gratuitously, although he
gives it from Christ's merits, and from eternity decreed to give it thus, on account of
which Paul concludes concerning that grace that "it was given to us in Christ before
secular times." And although the two former passages are better and more probably
explained concerning the meritorious cause of our very election and predestination on
Christ's part, nevertheless, since that sense has not been defined by the Church nor
received by the common consensus of the Fathers, it does not make the matter certain,
but at most more probable. But the last passage is quite congruently explained thus, and
on the other hand, it sufficiently proves that the distribution of congruous calling, as
338 BOOK TWO
far as that comparison—that it is given to this one rather than to that one—is not from
Christ's merits, but from God's liberal purpose.

CHAPTER XXV. WHETHER THERE IS ANY CAUSE OR

REASON ON GOD'S PART FOR THE ELECTION OF THE PREDESTINED.

1. In this difficulty four points must be distinguished. Reason for the doubt. - Until
now we have spoken about the causes of this election that can be conceived outside of
God as God; now it remains to inquire very briefly whether any reason for this election
can be given or conceived on the part of God himself and his wisdom and goodness.
In this matter, four points must be distinguished. First, that God efficaciously chose
some so that they would infallibly be saved; second, that he did not choose all who were
to be created in this way, but only some of them; third, that these were in such a
number and not in a greater one; fourth, that these were these particular persons and
not those. I will speak briefly about each, noting that here we are seeking some reason
beyond the mere freedom of the divine will. For it is evident that God did all these
things by his freedom alone, etc., by the counsel of his will; but whether pure freedom
was the only reason for all just decrees, or whether God had another reason beyond
this, this is what we are investigating. For it seems to pertain to the highest wisdom and
goodness that in all free determinations and their circumstances, one is guided by some
special reason, and that will alone is not the only reason, for this seems to be the more
rational and prudent mode of operation. On the contrary, however, it appears that such
a reason cannot always be found or conceived.
2. First assertion. Regarding the first point, it must be said that God did not lack
several reasons why by his efficacious will he destined some to the infallible attainment
of glory from himself and before their foreseen merits. Those who think that this
election was not made in the case of angels, nor would it have been made in the case of
humans in the state of innocence, give as the entire reason for this assertion the fall of
human nature through original sin, and the weakness and fragility of powers that it
contracted from this. Because unless God had chosen some from the corrupt mass to
be infallibly saved in such a degree and extent of perfection, few or none would be
saved, and even these with many imperfections and lapses, and hardly anyone would
arrive at an excellent degree of sanctity; and therefore it was most fitting that God,
according to the measure of his wisdom, should choose both a copious number and
distribute degrees of glory with the most becoming and fitting variety and excellence.
This reason should not be despised, and it is in agreement with Augustine, in the book
On Correction and Grace, chapters 11 and 12.
339 BOOK TWO
3. Election per se has its place in angels. - But supposing (as we believe) that election
per se has its place in every state, both of angels and of men, it is necessary to derive its
reasons from other divine attributes that shine forth and are manifested in God's works
in themselves, and we touched upon these above in the first book, explaining the
necessity of divine predestination. The principal one, however, is the display of divine
grace, freedom, and dominion. This is touched upon by Paul in the words: "To the
praise of the glory of his grace." For in nothing does God show more that he confers
these supernatural gifts not from any debt or merit of man than by efficaciously
choosing whom he wills for glory. Furthermore, because it was fitting for the perfection
and beauty of the heavenly kingdom that from direct and efficacious divine intention
the whole should be constituted in such number, weight, and measure, from such
members, under such a head, established in such degrees or mansions, "that God might
show the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy," as Paul says in Romans 9.
Moreover, on the part of divine mercy and goodness, a reason can be given, because
this act is of the greatest mercy and greatly shows forth divine goodness, for it is
ordered to a great communication of it. It also declares a great perfection of divine
wisdom and prudence, as it joins the infallibility of the divine decree with the mutability
of human freedom in such a way that the former does not destroy the latter, and the
latter does not impede the former.
4. Second assertion. Concerning the second point, it must be said that on God's part
and from his infinity, some causes or reasons can be given why he did not efficaciously
preordain all men or angels to attain eternal salvation, but only chose some from all.
Thus teaches St. Thomas in the aforementioned question 97, article 5, ad 3. And for
now, that general reason concerning the manifestation of grace, and of God's supreme
dominion and liberality, is sufficient. For all these things would not be shown so
evidently and wonderfully in the love of all as in the love of some over others, without
any reason or inequality on their part. Additionally, for the special manifestation of
vindictive justice, it was necessary not to love all in this way. But this already pertains
more to the reasons for reprobation than for predestination, and therefore it will be
treated better below in the fifth book.
5. Third assertion. Regarding the third and fourth points, it must be said that no
reason can be given by us, even taken from God's part, beyond his free will, why he
chose men or angels to be saved and efficaciously called in such a number rather than
in a greater or lesser one, and why rather in these particular persons than in others,
either from those possible or from those he now creates who are reprobate.
Theologians also agree on this, for although they may perhaps differ in words or in the
way of explaining this election immediately in relation to glory or to efficacious or
congruous grace, nevertheless they absolutely agree in this: that that gratuitous election,
340 BOOK TWO
which has no reason on the part of men, also has no other reason on God's part that is
known to us besides the divine will. For no one has yet given such a reason; therefore, it
is a sign that it cannot be known by men. Likewise, what reason can be given by men
why God, out of the infinite angels he could have created, willed to create these rather
than others? Likewise, why out of the infinite possible humanities did he choose this
one rather than another for the hypostatic union? Was there not possibly another one
just as perfect in natural qualities, and just as capable of that benefit, and just as apt and
suitable for all the ends of that mystery as that one? Likewise, why, in creating men and
angels, did God will to create them at this moment rather than at another, in this order
of things rather than in another? Or why (which is St. Thomas's example) out of two
portions of prime matter in the first creation, did he create this one under the form of
fire and that one under the form of water, rather than the reverse? Certainly, just as in
these and similar cases no reason can be given by man, so neither can one be given for
the gratuitous election of the predestined regarding the number of persons, both
formal and material.
6. But it can be doubted whether this is so because in reality there is no other reason,
or whether it arises from the weakness of human understanding, which does not
comprehend all the reasons of divine providence. For some think that there really is not
lacking some reason on God's part, even if it now escapes us. For Augustine in the
Enchiridion, chapter 95, says: "Then there will not be hidden what is now hidden," that
is, in beatitude, namely, why one was taken rather than another, when there was one
cause for both. But St. Thomas, in the first part, question 23, article 5, ad 3, clearly
teaches that in reality there is no other cause or reason besides the will of God. Because
the reason and examples adduced seem to show not only that no other reason is known
to us, but also that none can be found in reality itself. Because if on the part of those
among whom the election is made there is complete equality in relation to all possible
ends of divine providence, then also on the part of all God's attributes there will be
equality, with the sole exception of his will, because it alone is free. And there is no
doubt that God, by his freedom, can choose one of two objects that are completely
equal in every respect, and not the other, because this pertains to the perfection of
freedom and is not irrational, since reason itself dictates that it cannot and should not
be done otherwise. Hence it seems most probable to me that this is what happened in
the matter of divine predestination. Nor does Augustine indicate the opposite, but only
says that this very thing that is now hidden or obscurely known—namely, that God's
will alone was the reason for this variety—will then be seen clearly and without doubt.

[END OF BOOK TWO: ON THE CAUSE OF PREDESTINATION]

341 BOOK THREE

BOOK THREE: ON THE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION,

AND THEIR HARMONY WITH THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

After the discussion of causes, the discussion of the effects of predestination

follows in a fitting order: through which the things said about causes will also become
clearer. For our knowledge of causes is in great part derived from knowledge of effects.
Therefore we shall first speak generally about effects, then individually about each one,
first about the supernatural effects of grace and glory, afterward about the goods of
nature, and finally about evils, or permissions of them, if perhaps they can in some way
proceed from predestination. And finally we shall exclude false effects, and we shall
explain the true harmony of predestination with freedom.

CHAPTER I. WHETHER PREDESTINATION

HAS ANY EFFECTS, AND IN WHAT GENRE OF CAUSE.

1. The conclusion of St. Thomas. Established by reason. The difficulty remains in

two points. St. Thomas discusses this question in the First Part, question 23, article 2,
under another title, namely, whether predestination places anything in the predestined,
and he responds that formally it places nothing, but causally it places something: the
first part of which has been sufficiently explained in Book 1, but the latter pertains to
the present discussion. For the meaning of it is that predestination is the cause of
certain effects which God brings about in the predestined person himself. And all
theologians agree with this assertion in Book 1, distinctions 40 and 41, and it is
explicitly stated by St. Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, and
On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14. And they all derive it from Paul in Romans 8,
as we shall explain more extensively in what follows. The reason, moreover, is that in
order for humans to attain eternal salvation, it is necessary that many benefits be
conferred on them and many effects be produced in them, as is self-evident. But God is
the cause of these effects through intellect and will, just as He is of all other effects.
Therefore He is the cause through those acts in which predestination consists. For it
has been shown that predestination consists in acts of intellect and will, through which
God efficaciously decrees something to happen in relation to supernatural Beatitude:
rightly, therefore, predestination is said to be the cause of such effects. Two things,
however, remain to be clarified, one on the part of the cause, the other on the part of
the effect. On the part of the cause, it must be explained in what genre of cause
342 BOOK THREE
predestination is the cause of those effects which are attributed to it; on the part of the
effect, what conditions are required for it to fall under predestination.
2. Concerning the first is the first assertion. Concerning the first, it should be noted
that we can speak of predestination either with regard to its effects, or with regard to
the act of knowledge and will of God, in which it formally consists. In the first way, it
should be said that one effect of predestination can be the cause of another, according
to all genres of causes, in accordance with the requirements of the gifts or things
themselves which are conferred through such causality. This is easily proven by
induction, because glory, which is the ultimate effect of predestination, is the final cause
of other effects: and justification is the end of calling; but conversely, merits are in their
own way the efficient cause of glorification, and grace is the final cause of justification
and the remission of sins, and contrition, as it is a disposition for justice, is reduced to a
material cause, and so with others. Therefore, every genre of causality intervenes in the
effects of predestination. Therefore, on the part of effects, predestination has effects in
every genre of cause. The reason, moreover, is that just as all genres of causes
contribute to natural effects, so also to the effects of grace and glory. And therefore,
just as God has provided in the order of nature the effects of all causes, and all causes
necessary for such effects, so in the order of grace He has preordained similar effects
and causes with proportion: all these things, therefore, fall under predestination.
Therefore, predestination has effects according to every genre of cause.
3. Concerning the other is the second assertion. Objection. It is excluded.
Concerning the latter part, it should be said that predestination, as it formally exists in
God, is the cause of its effects in the genre of efficient cause. This is proven, because
God Himself is the cause of these effects in the genre of first and chief efficient cause:
but He is such a cause through those acts by which He preordains or predestines such
effects: therefore those acts are the efficient principle of such effects: but
predestination is placed in those acts: therefore. Likewise, predestination is not an
intrinsic cause, as is self-evident, and consequently it is neither formal nor material. Of
the extrinsic causes, the final cannot be attributed to predestination, for God does not
confer such effects in order to predestine them, or because of predestination as
because of an end: therefore only the efficient cause remains. You might say that God
also effects the predestined effect in order to fulfill His will, and in that respect it has
the character of an end. I respond that the fulfillment of God's will does not pertain to
formal predestination, but to the effect of predestination, and thus it only proves from
this that predestination is the efficient cause of the predestined effect. Besides, that end
seems more reflexive than direct, unless it is reduced to the general end of divine
works, which is the manifestation and display of divine power and other attributes: for
God wills His predestination to be infallibly fulfilled so that His power and goodness
343 BOOK THREE
may be displayed: but this display is an effect of predestination, not predestination
itself. Therefore, predestination is not a final cause, but an efficient cause of its effects.
4. A certain difficulty is proposed. Reason for doubt. Decision. The first part is
explained. Someone might doubt how this applies to the will that predefines free acts,
or effects dependent on them, to which we said predestination properly pertains, and
which we distinguished from the executing will. And the reason for doubting is that to
effect something externally pertains to the executing will. I respond briefly that both
wills pertain to complete predestination, and both have in their own way effective
causality regarding the effects of predestination. The first is evident because, although
predestination begins, in our manner of speaking and understanding, from the
predefining will according to the order of intention, nevertheless it also requires the
executing will, by which God from eternity is prepared to produce infallibly in time
such an effect, or as far as He is concerned already produces it, although the production
externally begins in time.
5. The latter is explained. The second point is explained, because in God's effective
causality we should understand whatever is of perfection in physical, moral, and
artificial causality, all of which pertain to the genre of efficiency. The executing will,
therefore, as it were proximately applies or influences physical causality. But the
predefining will, insofar as it intends the end and chooses the means, pertains to moral
causality: because (as I explained above) this will is required on the part of the one
operating, so that he may operate in a suitable manner for an end. Hence, by virtue of
that will, the execution of means follows, albeit more remotely or mediately. Just as in
us, the intention of the end has a certain efficacy: even concerning the execution itself,
insofar as it effects the choice, and through the choice progresses all the way to use.
Finally, artificial causality pertains to knowledge, as applied through the will, which we
also said is in its own way included under predestination.

CHAPTER II. WHAT CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY

FOR A BENEFIT TO BE AN EFFECT OF PREDESTINATION.

1. Two arguments making the question doubtful. The first. Response. Against this
evasion the latter reason for doubting arises. In order to have a certain general
foundation for defining in particular which benefits conferred on the predestined are
effects of predestination, it is necessary first to inquire universally about all the
conditions through which the proper character of such an effect may be known, and
consequently by which an effect may be distinguished from a non-effect of
predestination. There can be two reasons for difficulty. The first is that either all
benefits which God confers on the predestined are effects of his predestination, or they
344 BOOK THREE
are not. The first cannot be said, because otherwise creation, conservation, and all
effects of providence concerning the predestined would be effects of predestination,
which cannot be said, as I suppose. But if the second is said, it is necessary to assign
the conditions by which the effects of predestination are distinguished from other
benefits. Some say that all benefits of grace conferred on the predestined are effects of
predestination, but not natural benefits. But against this arises the second difficulty,
because many benefits of grace are common to the reprobate and the predestined;
therefore, they are not per se effects of predestination; therefore, neither will they be so
in the predestined.
2. First conclusion. Nothing can be an effect of predestination that is not an effect
of God. First, it must be established that nothing can be an effect of predestination
that is not an effect of God. Thus, the first condition necessary for an effect of
predestination is that it be included among the proper effects of God. This is proven
first from Augustine, who very often says that God predestined what He Himself was
going to do, in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10. Where he consequently
says that foreknowledge extends more widely than predestination, because God
foreknows even those things which He Himself does not do, such as sins; but He does
not predestine except what He does. The reason, moreover, is that predestination either
is an absolute and efficacious act of the divine will and good pleasure, or it includes
such an act: therefore, what proceeds from predestination, as its effect, proceeds from
that will of God; therefore it is an effect of God, because God causes His effects
through this kind of will. Therefore, an effect of predestination must be an effect of
God.
3. Second assertion. An effect of predestination pertains to God's supernatural
providence. I say secondly. An effect of predestination must pertain to supernatural
providence and consequently be contained in some way under the order of grace. This
is taken from the same Augustine, in the cited place, saying: "Predestination is the
preparation of grace, but grace is the effect of predestination itself." And it can be
sufficiently proven from the definition of predestination given in the first book. For we
said that predestination includes ordination to a supernatural end, according to the
particular use of that term in this matter; therefore its causality is in relation to the
same end; therefore its effects must pertain to the order of grace. However, in what
way it ought to participate in the nature of grace will be evident from the following
chapters.
4. Two matters are called into question. But here two things are usually inquired
about: one is whether it is necessary for such an effect to pertain to the grace of
Christ's redemption, that is, to be an effect of His death; the other is whether it is from
the merit of Christ. For some think the first is necessary, because wherever Augustine
345 BOOK THREE
treats of the effects of predestination, he attributes them to the grace of Christ, as can
be seen in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, and On the Gift of
Perseverance, and most clearly in letter 95. "This," he says, "the Apostolic doctrine calls
by the name of grace, by which we are saved and justified through faith in Christ." And
in the Councils of Milevis and Orange, in the same way there is discussion about the
necessity of grace through Christ; therefore, it is of the nature of an effect of
predestination that it be a benefit of grace to be conferred through Christ. But for
Augustine, it is the same for an effect to be from the merits of Christ and for it to be
from His death and redemption, because through that, or in relation to that, He
completed all His merit.
5. Conclusion of the incidental doubt. I say, however, that it is not necessary for an
effect of predestination that it be an effect of the death, passion, or redemption of
Christ, speaking formally. For I think there is a great distinction to be made between
Christ's merit simply speaking, and His death, passion, blood, and redemption. For I
believe that He did not merit only for those whom He redeemed, or for whom He died,
and consequently His merit is not limited to His death or passion as such, but is found
also in acts that abstract from the mortal state, such as love, prayer, mercy, and the like.
Hence, although the necessity of death and passion arose from sin, just as the necessity
of redemption as redemption, yet the usefulness and excellence of merit could be
considered per se, and extend more widely. So I believe that the grace and justice given
to Adam in the state of innocence was an effect of predestination, although it was not
from Christ's death or redemption as such; for as Augustine says in the book On
Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, "Adam, in those goods of the state of innocence, did
not need Christ's death." And the same must be said of the angels, who were shown
above to be predestined; therefore, there were effects of predestination in them,
although they were not redeemed, nor did Christ properly die for them. Furthermore, it
was shown above that predestination as such does not presuppose sin, which
redemption and death presuppose; therefore, neither do the effects of predestination as
such, that is, taken in their formality and generality, express a relation to Christ as
redeemer. Although with respect to fallen man such effects are from redemption,
concerning which man Augustine was speaking in the said Letter 95 and other places.
6. The other matter that is questioned. Decision of the doubt. The other doubt is
whether, at least abstracting from death and redemption, and speaking simply of merit,
it is of the nature of an effect of predestination that it be grace not only of God but
also of Christ, that is, proceeding from faith in Christ or from His merits: for this is
more frequently read in Augustine so that he often emphasizes against Pelagius, that
one must acknowledge not only grace, but the grace of Christ, and through Christ. But
it must be said that it is one thing to speak formally of the nature of predestination
346 BOOK THREE
according to itself, or as possible, and another to speak of fact. In the first way, it is not
of the nature of the effect of grace given through Christ. Because it is enough that it
be an effect of supernatural providence, in relation to the attainment of eternal life, to
be obtained with effect, as we shall soon say. For God could have predestined men or
angels, and given them effects suitable to that end out of His mere will, without relation
to the merit of Christ. Indeed, many think that this is how it actually happened in the
case of angels. And concerning Adam I think it more true that the first grace, which he
had in the state of innocence, was an effect of his predestination, although concerning
it there is controversy as to whether it was from the merits of Christ. But speaking of
fact, we believe it more probable that every effect of predestination, both in angels and
in men, is an effect of the merits of Christ, either as redeemer regarding the effects of
reparation, which are conferred on fallen men, or as head and universal fountain of
justice, regarding all, as was touched on above, and is proven more extensively in the
first volume of the third part. Therefore, in fact it is rightly said that for an effect of
predestination it is necessary that it be in some way the grace of Christ, or from it.
7. Third conclusion. Reason for the conclusion. Thirdly, it must be said. Not all
effects of grace or supernatural providence are effects of predestination, but it is
necessary that it be conferred from the efficacious intention of leading such a man to
eternal life. Thus, this is the first difference between grace, or calling, conferred on the
predestined and on the reprobate, that with respect to the reprobate it is not given from
the efficacious intention of his salvation, but in the predestined it has its origin from
there. Augustine signifies this whenever he establishes a difference between callings, of
which one is born from God's purpose, and not the other, for by God's purpose he
understands the said intention, as we showed in book one. The reason, moreover, is
that the first foundation of all predestination is that intention, as we saw above;
therefore, it is necessary that all effects of predestination proceed from it. Likewise, for
this reason theologians say that the end, although it is last in execution, must be first in
intention, because the intention of the end is the root of all providence, which is
ordered to the attainment of such an end: therefore, the effects of that providence
must necessarily be effects of that intention. But this providence in the matter of the
salvation of the elect is predestination, and the effects of this providence are those
through which such an intention is carried out; therefore, it is necessary that the effects
of predestination presuppose that intention, and proceed from it.
8. General means and benefits, and causes of grace which are common to the
predestined and the reprobate are not effects of predestination. From this we
understand in passing that general means, benefits, and causes of grace, which are
common to the predestined and the reprobate, as such are not effects of
predestination. Of this kind are Christ's Incarnation, Passion, the institution of the
347 BOOK THREE
Sacraments, and the like. The reason is that these are not particularly ordained from the
efficacious intention of saving the predestined, but from the general providence of
grace, and the antecedent will of saving all. It is different, however, regarding the
particular application of these means, with particular usefulness and actual efficacy for
obtaining final salvation, for such application proceeds from the particular efficacious
intention of giving glory, and therefore is an effect of predestination.
Final conclusion. Finally, it must be said that it is of the nature and necessity of an
effect of predestination that it contribute in some way to the attainment of eternal
salvation with effect. For if the conferral of grace does not reach all the way to the
attainment of glory, it is not an effect of predestination properly and perfectly
speaking, which we are now dealing with, as can be seen in the reprobate, who
sometimes attain true justice, as the Council of Trent defines, session 6. But it is not
necessary that the effect of predestination itself remain perpetually in glory; otherwise
only the habits of grace, which are infused with it in this life, would be effects of
predestination, because in this life hardly any other gifts of grace are given that last
perpetually in beatitude; but that is plainly false, as we shall see. It is therefore enough
that the benefit of grace contribute with effect to obtaining glory, whether immediately,
like the gift of perseverance and final grace, or mediately, insofar as one effect of grace
is a means to another, and so consequently until obtaining the grace that reaches all the
way to the state of glory. Thus efficacious calling, for example, does not indeed last
perpetually in itself; however, because it contributes to a perpetual effect, it is an effect
of predestination. But if some help of grace were given to the predestined which in
fact had no efficacy or fruit in relation to glory because of the resistance of free will,
that would not be an effect of predestination, but of the common providence of grace,
as it is in the reprobate.
Objection. Rejected. You might say: It can happen that this very help is given to the
predestined from the special providence and intention of God; therefore, it can be
from predestination. I respond that if God did not give these helps with certain
foreknowledge of their efficacy or effect, that could indeed happen, for then it would
be fitting for God to apply one means to attain the intended end in such a way that if
that did not succeed, another would be added. But in our opinion this does not have a
place, because God in His predestination, from an absolute intention of the end,
applies certain and infallible means, which He has in His conditional foreknowledge;
therefore, when such means are not of this kind, they do not proceed from that
intention, and thus are not effects of predestination. But this is to be understood when
the means is entirely frustrated of every effect that efficaciously contributes to the
attainment of glory; for if it is not entirely frustrated, provided either its power remains
in another, or if it is some reason or moral occasion of another grace producing man
348 BOOK THREE
with effect to eternal life, that is enough for it to be an effect of predestination. All
these things will become clearer by descending to particular effects.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER GLORY AND

PERSEVERANCE ARE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION.

1. The effect of glory is the last in execution, but the first in intention. We begin with
the effect of glory because, although it is the last in execution, it is nevertheless the first
in intention and superior in dignity. We join perseverance with it because these two are
so interconnected that they cannot be separated. Durandus, therefore, in Book 1,
distinction 14, question 2, number 10, believed that glory and beatitude are not effects
of predestination. The reason is that predestination pertains only to means, not to ends:
glory, however, is the end, not a means of predestination. Hence, just as for this reason
he believed (as I related above) that beatitude, or glory, is not included under the object
or matter with which predestination is concerned, so in the present case, for the same
reason, he excludes beatitude from the effects of predestination.
2. Assertion established—Foundation laid—Some people's interpretation—Said
interpretation rejected. It must be said, first of all, that essential glory and consequently
all goods that follow from it in eternal life are effects of predestination. This assertion
belongs to St. Thomas, in the aforementioned question 26, articles 2 and 8, and is
common among theologians in Book 1, distinctions 40 and 41. Its foundation is
primarily taken from the words of Paul to the Romans, chapter eight: "Those whom he
predestined, he also glorified." This reading alone has been retained in the recently
published Vulgate Latin by Pontifical authority, for another reading had "Magnified."
And therefore some have interpreted that passage not concerning the glory of
beatitude, but about a certain distinction through fame and good reputation. For thus
Christ prayed: "Glorify me, Father." John 17. And the Greek word corresponding to
both passages is the same. But this interpretation contradicts the Fathers and the
intention of Paul, both because he speaks of the glory that is properly due to
justification and is especially intended through predestination; whereas that accidental
and extrinsic glory either does not pertain to the order of predestination—since it can
exist in the reprobate and may not exist in some who are predestined—or, if it is taken
as pertaining to the accidental glory of beatitude, it presupposes essential glory and
arises from it. Therefore, if accidental glory is an effect of predestination, much more
so is essential glory.
3. Another interpretation. Others have interpreted this passage concerning the
increase of grace and virtues, and divine adoption, because the Greeks, such as
Chrysostom in homily 15, Theophylact, Ecumenius, and Theodolus in the exposition
349 BOOK THREE
of that Epistle which is found in volume 1 of the Library of the Saints, explain it thus:
"Magnified through charisms and gifts, and through adoption." Nevertheless, none of
these Fathers excluded glorification; indeed, when they speak of adoption, they seem to
understand perfect adoption, which is through consummated grace. Concerning this,
Paul says in the same place: "We groan inwardly as we wait for adoption as sons of
God." For initial adoption (so to speak) occurs through justification, and had already
been named by Paul. Therefore, Anselm and St. Thomas explicitly join both together,
namely, the increase of virtues with perseverance until glorification. And Augustine
specifically expounded it concerning beatitude in Book 1 of Predestination of the
Saints, chapter 17, and sermon 47 on the Words of the Apostle, as did Fulgentius in
Book 1 to Monimus, chapters 8 and 11, and Cajetan, Adam, and other expositors
follow them. Finally, other words of the same Paul immediately in chapter 9 are
consonant, where he calls the predestined: "Vessels which God prepared for glory."
Concerning which, in 1 Corinthians 9, he said: "Eye has not seen, etc., what God has
prepared for those who love him."
4. The reasoning of the assertion is established—An example is provided. The
reason is that in every deliberation, the attainment of the end itself is the ultimate
effect and most intended through the entire progression or execution of the chosen
means; this is precisely how glory itself stands in predestination. This can easily be
shown by the example of a person intending and seeking health, for health itself is the
most important effect of that pursuit. Likewise, because glory is the effect of grace and
merits, and these proceed from predestination, as we shall say shortly, so does glory
itself. Hence, although Durandus denied that glory is contained in the object of
predestination, because he places predestination only in the providence of means,
nevertheless he should not have denied that it is an effect, because even though
providence concerns means, these very means bring about the attainment of the end.
Therefore, it necessarily follows that such providence is the cause of the attainment of
the end itself—just as the physician's art is the cause of health by applying the means to
it, even if it does not create the intention of health but presupposes it. All the more so
because, as has been shown above, glorification falls under the object and matter of
predestination.
5. Second assertion. Secondly, it must be said that final grace, as it is final, is an effect
of predestination. This assertion follows from the preceding one, for glory is
consummated grace; but for grace to be consummated, it is necessary that it persists
until the end of the present life, which is to be final grace. Therefore, just as glory is
born from predestination, so also is it born that the grace of this life endures until its
end, which is to be final. And this can be confirmed from Paul to the Ephesians,
chapter 1, saying: "He chose us in him, that we should be holy and blameless before
350 BOOK THREE
him in love." For we are holy and blameless before God through grace, which then
especially begins to have that status and perfection when it is final: this happens at the
end of the present life, which is the beginning of the future life. For as long as this life
lasts, grace does not make us entirely blameless in the sight of God. Finally, final grace
as such is a benefit of grace and supernatural providence, and is not common to the
reprobate but proper to the predestined, and contributes much—indeed, is necessary—
to effectively attaining eternal life. Therefore, this benefit is conferred on the
predestined by virtue and benefit of that love by which God pre-elected him to
beatitude; it is therefore an effect of predestination. Gabriel and Ockham are usually
cited against this assertion because they place predestination solely in the efficacious
will to give glory, and therefore they recognize no other effect of predestination besides
beatitude. But that opinion is plainly false, as we shall see in what follows. And perhaps
on this point it is not contrary, because (as I was saying) final grace must necessarily be
comprehended under glory, for it is consummated at the end.
6. Third assertion. Without the gift of perseverance, no one can enjoy eternal glory. I
say thirdly, the gift of perseverance is one of the most important effects of
predestination. This assertion also follows from the preceding ones, and it is primarily
intended by Augustine in the books on the Predestination of the Saints, on the Gift of
Perseverance, and on Correction and Grace, chapters 12 and 13. The same is
presupposed by Prosper and Hilary in their said Epistles. And the reason is that this is a
supernatural means and completely efficacious for attaining eternal glory: for (as
Augustine says) through it is given not only the ability to persevere, as was given to
Adam, but the act of perseverance itself: "but he who perseveres to the end will be
saved." I also add that it is a necessary means, without which no one is saved, as is taken
from the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 13, and canon 22. Therefore, all the
conditions necessary for an effect of predestination are maximally applicable to this
gift. And it is confirmed because this gift, beyond sanctifying grace, consists in special
internal and external aids of grace, by which God guards and directs the elect, so that
he does not deviate from the way of salvation, at least finally. But it has been shown
that final grace is an effect of predestination, and below we shall show these aids to be
effects of predestination; therefore, so is this gift.
7. Objection—Response. You might say that this assertion only has a place in adults,
for infants, since they cannot morally act nor sin, do not seem capable of similar aids,
nor do they need the gift of perseverance. I respond that, according to their capacity,
this is also accommodated to them, because the nature of perseverance in them is death
itself in grace, according to that saying: "He was taken away lest wickedness change his
understanding." For that also proceeds from that love by which God loved such
persons to such a degree of beatitude, and it does not happen with respect to them
351 BOOK THREE
without God's special care and providence, and therefore it pertains to the effect of
their predestination.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER THE FIRST

JUSTIFICATION AND ALL HABITUAL GRACE GIVEN IN THIS
LIFE TO THE PREDESTINED IS AN EFFECT OF HIS PREDESTINATION.

1. First opinion. This opinion is commonly held. Those who place predestination
solely in the efficacious will to give glory absolutely deny that justification is an effect of
predestination. Thus all those who think that future justification and grace are supposed
to be foreseen before predestination must necessarily hold this position, as we reported
above regarding Gabriel, Ockham, Major, and others. But this opinion both rests on a
false foundation, as has been proven above, and cannot be defended in general. For
Paul in Romans 8 expressly places justification among the effects of predestination,
saying: "Those whom he predestined, he also justified." And Augustine, in
Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, and On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14,
says that grace is an effect of predestination, which he especially understands
concerning sanctifying grace.
2. Two types of justification of the predestined. The former is stable. The latter is
temporal. The former is an effect of predestination. Therefore, so that what is certain
and what can be called into controversy may be more clearly evident, let us distinguish
two types of justification of the predestined. One can be called stable and firm,
according to Paul's phraseology, because once accomplished it is never lost again. The
other can be called temporal, according to Augustine's manner of speaking, because its
effect lasts for some time, but is eventually lost. The former is necessary in every
predestined person, because it is necessary that at some point in this life they attain
grace, which they preserve for some time until death; otherwise they will not be saved.
The other justification, although not so necessary, nevertheless undoubtedly has a place
in the predestined, because they can lose grace once acquired, according to the certain
doctrine of faith. Concerning the first justification and grace, it is at the very least
certain that it is an effect of predestination, because at least Paul's words must be
verified of it. Likewise, because it is a singular and proper benefit of the predestined,
and simply necessary for the execution of their election (hence it proceeds from it):
therefore it is an effect of their predestination. Finally, the reasons we will offer in the
following point convince this all the more strongly. Even if we were to grant that the
efficacious election to glory does not precede in the order of intention, nevertheless the
will to give a person such justification, so that he may never fall from it again, is a
virtual will to give him glory and sufficient that it should rightly be considered to
352 BOOK THREE
pertain to predestination; therefore this is enough for it to pertain to the effect of
predestination.
3. Concerning the other justification, there is a twofold question—The opinion of
some. Concerning the other justification and grace, which is lost through sin, there
remains a difficulty: whether it too is an effect of predestination in all the elect. And
indeed, if it were true that grace lost through sin is not restored through penance, it
could be said with probability that the effect of predestination is not lacking, because
ultimately it does not contribute to the effective attainment of glory or its increase; but
it is like the grace that is given temporarily to the reprobate. We, however, suppose that
all that grace is repaired through penance (we are not speaking of the same grace
numerically, but in degree), and even with this supposition, the difficulty posed
proceeds. For some say that although that grace, as repaired through penance, is an
effect of predestination—for this is evident from what has been said—it is not so as it
preceded and was lost.
4. Foundation. An example is provided for this opinion. Their foundation is that
predestination, on the part of its effects, consists in a certain series of means by which
the elect is infallibly led to eternal life. Therefore, it is essential to predestination that
this series of means be continuous, so to speak—that is, that it not be interrupted by
mortal sin. Therefore, whatever grace the predestined has obtained, if he loses it
through sin, it was not an effect of predestination. The first consequence is proven
because God does not permit the sin of the predestined with the intention of repairing
it, as was touched upon above and will also be discussed in what follows. Therefore, by
virtue of that sin and by virtue of the entire providence that preceded it, that grace is
entirely lost and remains without the fruit of eternal life. But the fact that it is repaired
is, as it were, from a new providence and a new divine will. Therefore, as it preceded, it
is not an effect of predestination, but is merely temporal grace, just as that which is
sometimes given to the reprobate. It is an effect only insofar as it is repaired. They
confirm this with the example of Adam: the grace he had in the state of innocence, as
it preceded sin, was not an effect of predestination, although it was so as it was later
repaired. This assumption is clear because every effect of Adam's predestination was
given to him from Christ's merit, insofar as it had the nature of redemption and was
founded on his death; but the grace that was given in the state of innocence either was
not at all an effect of Christ's merits, as some maintain, or at least not of Christ as
redeemer, which is certain. Therefore, etc.
5. Conclusion. Common interpretation—The conclusion is strengthened by reason.
Nevertheless, I think it must be said that all that grace, even as it precedes sin, is given
from predestination and is an effect of it. This is primarily more in agreement with Paul
saying: "Those whom he predestined, he also justified." This the Fathers and expositors
353 BOOK THREE
understand without distinction concerning the justification of the predestined, even
concerning that which takes place in the predestined through baptism. For even if we
accept that term "justification" indefinitely, it is equivalent to a universal and
indifferently comprehends every justification that occurs in the predestined. Next, I
argue by reason: that grace which preceded, in itself or in its effects, permanently
remains and has the effect of glory; therefore, nothing is lacking to it to be an effect of
predestination. The consequence is clear because the remaining conditions are not
lacking in it, as is evident in itself. The antecedent, however, is proven because that
grace was regularly the principle of merits, or at least conferred a right to glory, which
right is not entirely lost through subsequent sin, but is impeded. Therefore, when the
sin is removed, that same right which had previously been acquired, and merits, if there
were any alive, remain in divine acceptance, and because of them the eternal reward of
glory is given. Therefore, the fruit of that prior grace remains unto eternal life;
therefore, it was an effect of predestination.
6. Further confirmation. The evasion is rejected. It is confirmed because, for some
grace to be an effect of predestination, it is not necessary that it itself remain in itself
in eternal life; otherwise, efficacious calling would not be an effect of predestination
because it does not last in eternal life. It is sufficient, therefore, that its effect endures
for it to be an effect of predestination, as we also said above. All the more so because
such grace formally lasts forever; for although it does not last in the same numerical
entity, this is material and matters little to the effect of predestination. You might say
that it does not last forever except as restored. But on the contrary, because this
restoration is not made, properly speaking, except by virtue of prior grace and its
infusion, and of merits, either of the person himself or of Christ, which were applied
to him. For penance for the sin committed only contributes to that restoration as an
accidental cause removing the impediment. Therefore, this restored grace per se rests
on the prior benefit or merit; therefore, that prior benefit and consequently even the
prior grace was an effect of predestination. Finally, God's intention of bringing this
elect to such a degree of glory does not achieve its effect without that grace as it
preceded, because if it had not preceded, such grace, sufficient for such glory, would
not be given to that person when he does penance. Therefore, that grace concurs as a
means to achieving the ultimate effect of divine election; therefore, it is an effect of it
and of predestination.
7. I further add that the lost grace and justice could be an effect of predestination,
even if it were not to be recovered through penance, provided that it somehow
contributed to attaining that degree of beatitude which is in fact obtained. This is easily
apparent from the principle established, that an effect of predestination is not only the
grace that remains in eternal life, but also that which in any way contributes to the
354 BOOK THREE
attainment of eternal life, even if that grace itself passes away. It can be understood
that grace once possessed contributes in many ways to the attainment of eternal life,
even if it is not restored. First, it can contribute as an occasion exciting a person to
have, when he later rises again, more merits that remain unto eternal life, either because
he is thereby excited to greater sorrow and penance, or to greater thanksgiving for such
great benefits received, or to other similar acts. Especially, the memory of that grace
and the loss incurred could serve to strive more fervently to repair the damage with
new diligence and fervor, just as a merchant who has lost his wealth, although he
cannot recover that same wealth, diligently seeks to acquire other similar wealth, to
which he can be moved by love, and esteem, and memory of his former wealth. Hence,
for applying that diligence, it is often very helpful to have once experienced the former
state and wealth; in this way, then, it could be understood in the present case. Moreover,
past justification often contributes so that a person after falling may more easily return
to his heart and not become hardened in sins. It also tends to leave a certain facility in
good works, either through an acquired habit or through good phantasms that remain
despite sin. Therefore, by reason of this utility, it could be an effect of predestination,
for all this eventually bears some fruit for eternal life. But all these things are now
joined with the restoration of all preceding grace and merits, and this itself increases
gratitude to God. Therefore, for many reasons, such grace must be counted among the
effects of predestination.
8. The foundation of the contrary opinion is refuted. The example is answered. Nor
does the foundation of the contrary opinion stand in the way. For first, I deny the
consequence; otherwise, not even one's own merits would be effects of predestination,
which certainly is not plausible, as I will now say. Nor do I see what necessity there is
for that continuity of means understood in that sense. For this would only be necessary
if supervening sin completely and perpetually extinguished whatever had been built; but
now (as I have said) it is not so. Therefore, we easily understand that God, from the
special providence of his predestination, gave such grace to the elect, because although
he knew it would be impeded by sin, nevertheless he also foreknew it would ultimately
have eternal fruit. Hence, although we concede that God does not permit the sin of the
predestined from the intention of restoration (of which more later), we nevertheless
say that he does not permit it without the purpose of restoration. For he does not
permit that evil which will be eternal, but as temporary, for he always retains the formal
or virtual will to remove it, which is sufficient for him to have given the prior grace
from predestination. To the confirmation or example, the assumption is denied. For I
have said above, and it is true, that Adam's first grace in the state of innocence was an
effect of his predestination, which the reasons made here equally prove. I also said that
it is not essential to predestination that it be formally from redemption, but it is
355 BOOK THREE
sufficient that it be from the grace of Christ, which extends more broadly than
redemption; and such was that first grace of Adam, concerning which elsewhere.

CHAPTER V. WHETHER ALL SUPERNATURAL ACTS

IN ANY WAY MERITORIOUS, WHICH THE PREDESTINED
PERSON PERFORMS, ARE EFFECTS OF HIS PREDESTINATION.

1. First opinion—Its reasoning—The first opinion absolutely denies that human acts,
however supernatural and useful they may be for effectively attaining eternal life, are
effects of predestination. The reason given is that only those things are effects of
predestination which proceed from God's absolute preordination and pre-arrangement,
but human acts, even supernatural ones, do not proceed from such divine intention.
Therefore, the major premise is clear, since predestination indicates an efficacious and
infallible providence, not only from foreknowledge but from divine preordination, as
St. Thomas teaches in Part I, question 23, articles 7 and 8, and in question 6 of De
Veritate, article 3, and often elsewhere. Therefore, effects that do not arrive from this
kind of divine providence cannot be called effects of predestination. Of this kind are
all effects that occur without a special preordination of God. Now, many hold that all
free effects are of this kind, because they think such preordination is incompatible with
freedom. Hence, all who defend that position could be cited in support of this opinion,
although not all of them explicitly assert it.
2. Second opinion—The second opinion distinguishes between acts that are remote
dispositions to justification on the one hand, and those that are either the ultimate
disposition to grace or the fruits of justice already acquired on the other. It denies that
the former are effects of predestination, but affirms this of the latter. Bonaventure
seems to have held this opinion in Book 1, distinction 41, article 1, question 2, for he
posits only two effects of predestination, namely justification and glorification. Under
justification, however, he seems to include the ultimate disposition to it and the
subsequent works by which one perseveres and grows in the justice already obtained.
But the prior dispositions, even though he admits they proceed from auxiliary grace, he
thinks are not effects of predestination because he says they are its cause, at least as
merit de congruo, for in this way a person can merit de congruo, from auxiliary grace,
justification and all other things that accompany or follow it.
3. St. Bonaventure excluded from this opinion—However, I do not find this opinion
or its foundation explicitly in Bonaventure or any other author. For it is difficult to give
a reason why the effects of predestination in this life should begin only from
justification itself, insofar as it includes the infusion of habitual grace, and why all
preceding graces should not be effects of predestination. For if someone were to say
356 BOOK THREE
that those prior effects are common to the reprobate, we would say the same about
justification itself. And if justification has something special in the predestined, on
account of which it can be an effect of predestination, the same could easily be
considered in the prior and remote dispositions. If one were to say that the effects of
predestination pertain only to those graces which God alone produces, then neither the
ultimate disposition, nor merits, nor the fruits of justice would be effects of
predestination, because God does not produce these alone, but with us—in the same
way He also acts in remote dispositions. Someone might say that an effect of
predestination should be permanent in itself, and therefore in this life it should be
habitual, or at least something that leaves behind some habit or its increase, which does
not apply to remote dispositions; but this is a rather weak foundation, as will become
clear.
4. Third opinion—Its reasoning—The third opinion makes a different distinction,
not between acts, but in the consideration of any supernatural act. It considers two
aspects in such an act, namely the concurrence of God or the influence of grace, and
the cooperation of free will. It says, therefore, that the supernatural acts of the
predestined, as regards the influence of grace and God, are effects of predestination,
but as regards the cooperation of free will, they are not. Indeed, from this cooperation
some reason or condition of predestination can be derived. This is the opinion of
Henry in Quodlibet 4, question 19, and Quodlibet 8, question 5. We now presuppose
the first part as true, as it will be proved all the more strongly by what follows. The
reason for the second part could be that the cooperation of free will as such is not an
effect of God; therefore, it is not an effect of predestination. The consequent is
evident from what was said in the first chapter. The antecedent, however, is clear,
because that cooperation precisely as such indicates a relationship to free will, and
proceeds from it alone. Just as, conversely, the influence of grace is from grace alone,
and not from free will; for the reasoning is the same.
5. The truer opinion—The true opinion, however, is that all supernatural works of
the elect that effectively contribute in any way to the attainment of eternal life are
effects of predestination, in respect to everything found in such works and under every
relation, whether to God, or to some prior grace, or to free will. This truth is
presupposed by other theologians who teach that no reason for the whole
predestination, as regards all its effects, can be found on the part of the predestined
person, based on work proceeding from grace, under whatever aspect it is viewed. They
infer this because every such act and whatever is in it is an effect of predestination.
This truth must be proved by reason, point by point and part by part.
6. Supported by reason—And first, that it is not repugnant for a free act as such to
be an effect of predestination can easily be proved against the first opinion. First,
357 BOOK THREE
because it is not repugnant to freedom for such acts to be preordained by God. Indeed,
it is more likely that all acts that effectively lead to eternal life are preordained in
themselves and antecedently by God through an absolute and efficacious decree, as we
have shown in the books on Divine Assistance. Second, because whatever might be said
about the special predestination of such acts in themselves, for them to be effects of
predestination, it is enough that they are gifts of God given to man from the special
intention of making him blessed, and that such intention is efficaciously fulfilled. For
even if the opinion were true that from such an intention there does not necessarily
follow the predestination of such a means in particular, or disjunctively of this or that,
so that if one does not succeed, another has the effect, nevertheless whenever such an
act occurs, it would be an effect of predestination, because it is an effect of that
intention of giving glory, through a special grace proceeding from the same intention,
which is ultimately efficacious and contributes something to the attainment of eternal
life. Therefore, this would be sufficient in a strict sense for it to be an effect of
predestination. Hence, formally speaking, something is not called an effect of
predestination because it proceeds from a special absolute will by which that effect or
act is preordained in particular with all its circumstances, for this is another question
about the predestination of the act itself, which we are not now addressing, but about
the predestination of the person. Therefore, a supernatural act is said to be an effect of
predestination either because the means or principles necessary for it are given from the
efficacious intention of saving the person, or certainly because they come from such a
providence of God toward the person, by which he is finally led with effect to ultimate
salvation. For this providence is predestination, and from it, without doubt, such acts
proceed as regards all that is in them, as will be clear from the following point.
7. Second assertion—I say, therefore, secondly, that supernatural acts are effects of
predestination not only in respect to the influence of grace, or of God in them, but
also in respect to the cooperation of free will. This is proved because these acts are
simply gifts of God according to all that is in them; therefore, in the predestined
person, they are in the same way effects of his predestination. The consequence is clear,
because these gifts are means by which salvation is so prepared for the predestined that
he infallibly attains it. Therefore, they are effects of predestination, according to
Augustine's definition: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's
benefits, by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated" (On the Gift of
Perseverance, chapter 14). The antecedent, moreover, is clear from the same Augustine,
who says throughout that when God confers a reward for our works, He is rewarding
His own gifts (On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 20; On the Gift of
Perseverance, chapter 13; On Grace and Free Will, chapters 5, 15, and 16). This manner
of speaking was also used by Pope Celestine I in his first Epistle. Therefore, our very
358 BOOK THREE
merit is God's gift, but merit as such includes the free cooperation of man. This
reasoning applies both to merit de condigno and de congruo, and to any free
supernatural disposition; for all these are gifts of God and include free cooperation.
8. Second, the free cooperation of man itself is efficaciously intended, preordained,
and prepared by God through predestination. Therefore, it is an effect of grace
prepared through predestination and accommodated to obtaining such cooperation.
Therefore, it is an effect of predestination. The consequence is evident from what was
said in chapter one. The major premise is also certain, because God simply wills to
convert the predestined person, or that he believe, or that he do penance; therefore, He
directly and efficaciously intends his cooperation, because he cannot be converted
except by cooperating. This is explained as follows: in these acts, God not only wills to
concur with them, but He simply wills that man have them, and that he will, and that he
be determined to such an object in such a way and at such a time, by cooperating with
His grace. Therefore, the cooperation of the predestined person is intended and willed
by God as one of the necessary means for attaining the end of predestination. The
minor premise should also be most certain, because this cooperation itself is an effect
of efficacious grace, which without doubt is an effect of predestination, as we shall
soon say. The assumption is explained, first concerning moral causality: for God,
through vocation and exciting aids, draws man morally to will and cooperate, and in this
way He makes us will and do, as Augustine often says. Therefore, our very cooperation
is an effect of exciting grace, which by its nature transitions to aiding grace when the
effect follows. Concerning physical causality, it is proved because that cooperation is
something real pertaining to piety and very necessary for salvation; therefore, it cannot
be from us without God and His grace, according to the saying: "Without me you can
do nothing," and "What do you have that you have not received?" These sayings are
true even according to real and physical efficiency.
9. Henry’s foundation rejected—Wherefore (to respond to Henry), although that
cooperation is from our will, and under that term and denomination it only expresses a
relation to our will, nevertheless that entire relation, if it is real, and its foundation, is an
effect of God's grace, and consequently, in the predestined, it is an effect of
predestination. For that cooperation is something in the nature of things; therefore, it
cannot exist without God's influence. Hence, since it is for a supernatural act, that
influence will be of grace. Indeed, in that cooperation, the will does not operate by its
own natural power, but through obediential potency and as a free instrument elevated
by divine power. Therefore, in that very cooperation, God is the principal agent, and
He operates through supernatural providence with certain and infallible attainment of
the end; therefore, through predestination.
359 BOOK THREE
10. Objection—Response—You might say: if the cooperation of free will is through
the action of God Himself, as author and supernatural provider, then God's action
precedes our cooperation in the order of causality and nature, which we do not admit.
Also, if that cooperation is an effect of grace, then it is absolutely true to say that God
causes our cooperation; therefore, He makes us cooperate; therefore, He determines
our will to cooperate—all of which contradict our doctrine on the aids of grace. To the
first part, I respond by distinguishing the consequent, for it has two senses, and in one
the inference should be admitted, in the other denied. Thus (as we have said elsewhere),
there is a twofold grace that concurs with man's act: one in the manner of a principle,
the other in the manner of a concurrence. Regarding the first, it is true that God,
through a new action, effects our very cooperation in us and with us; for thus, through
vocation, God causes our willing, or that we will, as Augustine often says. For what is it
to cause that we will, if not to cause us to cooperate? Likewise, our cooperation is a
thing distinct from operating grace, which is the principle of our act. Therefore, it is
most properly its effect, through an action distinct from the operating grace itself,
through which God operates in us the free act. Regarding the second grace, it must be
said that in reality it is not distinguished from our cooperation, but only in reason and
denomination. Hence, it is true that that very cooperation is God's action, and in this
sense it is produced through God's action, or rather it is God's action, in the way that
an action is produced by itself, and in the way that one and the same action can be both
of the instrument and of the principal agent. Therefore, in form, the response is that a
twofold action is involved in our works of grace: one that is prevenient, and of this it is
true that it precedes our cooperation in the order of nature; another that is cooperating,
and of this we deny that it is prior in nature according to proper causality, because it is
not really distinct from our cooperation.
11. To the second part of the objection, while granting all the other points, the final
consequence is denied: because through prevenient grace, or that which is the principle
of the free act, God most properly produces our cooperation when it occurs, and
similarly causes us to cooperate, not by efficaciously predetermining, but first by
inducing and afterward by aiding. But through concurrence, He does not so properly
cause us to cooperate, but rather produces the cooperation itself in the manner
explained. This is sufficient for that cooperation to be an effect of predestination,
because it need not have the same relation to God and to the will of man, nor receive
the same denomination from both, but it is enough that whatever is in that act is in
some way from grace prepared through predestination.
12. Third conclusion—Proved first—Thirdly, it must be said that every supernatural
act which effectively contributes to the predestined person's attainment of some
habitual grace is an effect of predestination. This is proved first because it is more
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probable that every such act, at least in the elect, is specially preordained by God—a
preordination that pertains to predestination and from which the cooperation of free
will derives its origin. Second, because it has been shown that all habitual grace of the
predestined person endures unto eternal life, and therefore contributes to or in some
way pertains to the ultimate effect of predestination. Therefore, if an act is such that it
effectively contributes to obtaining some habitual grace, through that grace it
contributes to the attainment of ultimate happiness in that degree in which it is
predestined. Thus, this is sufficient for it to be an effect of predestination.
13. Hence it is clear that all acts meritorious de condigno of an increase in grace are
effects of predestination: because the effect of such merits in the predestined is never
frustrated, since in them that condition which the Council laid down is always fulfilled:
"If they depart in grace." Consequently, the effect always corresponds to them, and
they always remain alive in God's sight, for although they may be mortified for a time,
they ultimately revive forever. This reasoning proves the same regarding the ultimate
disposition to grace, for through it we merit at least de congruo that same grace, and de
condigno glory, and that effect is infallible. The same is true of the worthy reception of
a Sacrament, for that also has a perpetual effect of grace.
14. The same must be said about remote dispositions to grace—I add, moreover,
that the same must be said about remote dispositions to grace, if they are such that they
actually cooperate in some way to the attainment of justifying grace, either by imploring
from God greater assistance or lesser dispositions, or in some other way preparing the
path, or giving a moral occasion either for attaining justifying grace or for progressing
in it. For it is not necessary that an effect of predestination cooperate immediately to its
ultimate effect, but it is sufficient if it leads immediately and in any way, for this is
enough for it to be an efficacious means, and consequently one proceeding from
efficacious intention and providence—and this is what it means to be an effect of
predestination.
15. Hence it is probable that when Paul said: "Those whom He predestined, He also
called, and those whom He called, He also justified," he included under vocation all
remote dispositions, and under justification all proximate ones, with all the merits by
which a person is daily more justified. Or if by vocation we understand only the first
calling, which is the beginning of justification, then under justification are
comprehended all acts of piety proceeding from that vocation and preparing the way
for justice, for the Council of Trent, session 6, chapters 5, 6, and 7, clearly indicated
that all these pertain in some way to justice.
16. Finally, from this it is probable that all supernatural acts which the predestined
person performs in this life are effects of predestination, because either all contribute
in some way to obtaining essential beatitude according to some degree of it, or certainly
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there always corresponds to them in glory some accidental reward, even if perhaps they
were performed outside the state of grace. For predestination is not only to bare
essential glory, but to glory adorned with its accidents and properties. Therefore, all acts
that contribute to glory are effects of predestination, especially those that lead to
essential glory.
17. Final conclusion—Finally, it must be said that sometimes the good act of one
person is an effect of the predestination of another. This is easily established from
what was discussed in the previous book. And it can be explained by those words of
Paul in 2 Timothy 1: "I endure all things for the sake of the elect, that they also may
obtain salvation." For the patience and will given to Paul to endure those labors were
effects of the predestination of those who profited by those means and were saved.
Thus also the administration of a Sacrament, insofar as it is an action of the minister,
can be, and frequently is, an effect of the predestination of the one who is saved
through the Sacrament, as is self-evident. In this way also, theologians say, and St.
Thomas discusses in the aforementioned question 23, article 8, that predestination is
aided by the prayers of the saints, because by the prayers of Stephen the efficacious
calling of Paul was obtained from God. Therefore, those prayers were an effect of
Paul's predestination, for from the intention of saving Paul, God inspired that prayer
and gave the assistance necessary for it. Nor does it matter that it was also an effect of
Stephen's predestination, because it could have been done from special providence
toward both. And this is confirmed because that prayer was not the cause of Paul's
entire predestination, as we showed above; therefore, it must have been an effect. The
consequence is clear, because that prayer would not have been an effect if Paul's
predestination, as regards its effects, had begun with his calling. In that case, Stephen's
prayer would have been the cause of the first effect of Paul's predestination, and
therefore of the whole. For this is a common inference among theologians, because
from the first effect the second is derived, and from the second the third, and so on to
the last, when they have among themselves the connection of cause and effect, as the
calling is related to conversion.

CHAPTER VI. WHICH CALLING AND

PREVENIENT HELPS ARE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION.

1. Reason for doubt. Paul clearly taught that calling is an effect of predestination in
Romans 8, saying: "Those whom He predestined, He also called." The difficulty,
therefore, is only about which calling is being discussed and what is included under
calling. The reason for doubt on the first point is that there is a twofold calling: one
efficacious or congruous, the other inefficacious. Both of these have a place in the
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predestined and in the reprobate. Since it is established that neither calling is an effect
of predestination in the reprobate, we must examine why it should be an effect of
predestination in the predestined, and whether this is true of every calling, or only of
the efficacious one, and whether of every efficacious calling, or only of some.
2. Indeed, in Augustine we often find that the calling which is "according to purpose"
is an effect of predestination, as can be seen in Book 2 Against Two Letters of the
Pelagians, chapter 10, and On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 16 and 17, and
Book 1 To Simplician, question 2. Prosper imitates him in his books On the Calling of
the Gentiles, as does Fulgentius in Book 1 To Monimus, and Anselm on Romans 8, and
it is derived from those words of the same chapter: "All things work together for good
to those who love God, to those who are called to be saints according to His purpose."
For these words are understood, not of man's purpose, but of God's, as has been
explained more fully elsewhere, and as the same Apostle explained more clearly in 2
Timothy 1: "Who has called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but
according to His own purpose and grace."
3. True explanation. What this purpose of God is, Augustine never sufficiently
explained. For it can be the purpose of giving glory, or of giving the proximate effect
of calling, such as faith or repentance, etc., or only of giving such a calling which God,
through conditional foreknowledge, foresaw would be congruous if it were given. And
therefore there are various opinions about this, which have been touched upon above.
Nevertheless, it seems to me much more probable, from the mind of Augustine in the
cited places, that this should be understood as the purpose of election or love for glory.
For Augustine wants that calling according to purpose to be proper to the predestined,
which cannot be true unless it proceeds from such a purpose. For the purpose of
giving a calling which will be congruous and efficacious for its proximate act is
common to the reprobate; for God often calls them in this way, and it is certain that He
does not call them without foreknowledge, nor without that purpose. Similarly, the
purpose concerning the free act itself, for which the calling is given, has a place in the
reprobate; for although someone may not be efficaciously preordained to glory, he is
often efficaciously destined to temporal justice and to faith, and thus is often called
from God's efficacious purpose to believe or to do penance. For it is credible that when
God called Judas to the Apostolate, He called him in a congruous way from His
purpose, that he might consent and effectively become a disciple of Christ, even
though he was not effected to persevere in that state. Therefore, only calling from the
efficacious purpose of glory or final grace (which amounts to the same thing) is the
proper effect of predestination.
4. Every calling of the predestined which is efficacious in relation to some act or
consent is an effect of his predestination. And from this it further follows that every
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calling of the predestined which is efficacious in relation to some act or proximate
consent is an effect of his predestination. This is proved because such calling is always
from the purpose, not only of the proximate effect of calling, but also of the ultimate
effect of the whole predestination, that is, from the purpose of election to glory.
Because that consent for which such efficacious calling is given is also efficaciously
prefinished for the sake of glory. This is confirmed because such calling always
effectively contributes, at least mediately, to obtaining the effect of glory, and this is
sufficient for it to be an effect of predestination, as has already been explained. The
assumption is clear, because every good act of the predestined, especially one
proceeding from a special supernatural calling, always has some fruit unto eternal life,
either by way of merit, or by way of proximate or remote disposition, as has already
been explained. And this is confirmed by that saying of Paul in Romans 8: "All things
work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to
His purpose." For if this statement of Paul extends to other inferior goods, and even to
evils, as many think, it will much more certainly apply to all supernatural acts that
proceed from calling, and therefore to every efficacious calling to some supernatural
act.
5. Probable opinion. The elect are often called inefficaciously. Inefficacious calling in
the predestined is an effect of predestination—Proved—Moreover, I add that it is
probable that every supernatural calling of the predestined, even if it is not actually
efficacious in relation to obtaining the consent or act to which the person is called, is an
effect of predestination. This may seem difficult because Augustine seems to posit only
efficacious and congruous calling as an effect of predestination. But first of all, it is
certain that the elect and predestined are often called inefficaciously: for example, Paul,
before he was called by that most efficacious and congruous calling, had perhaps often
been called by a common and sufficient calling. The same is credible of many Jews who
heard Christ preaching and calling, and resisted Him, and afterward were converted
through the Apostles and saved because they were predestined. And in our case it
happens daily that God calls us to perfection or to the religious state, and we often
resist, but finally consent, either to another similar calling, or at least to one which is
sufficient for attaining eternal salvation. Therefore, there is often inefficacious calling in
the predestined. But that such calling is nevertheless an effect of predestination is
shown first because such calling also proceeds from the efficacious intention of giving
glory, and therefore from purpose: so it is an effect of predestination. The consequence
is clear from what has been said, because election to glory is the source and origin of
the whole predestination.
6. The antecedent, moreover, is clear from a certain teaching adduced above from St.
Thomas, that God often calls the predestined not to fall, not absolutely and
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determinately, but as it were conditionally or disjunctively, either not to fall, or if he
should fall, to rise again. For according to this teaching, even when the calling not to
fall is not entirely efficacious and congruous, it is given from the purpose of
predestination, because it is given from the intention of its ultimate effect, as far as
depends on God, and with the intention of making up for the deficiency if an
impediment should be placed on the part of the person. As in human providence,
when from the efficacious intention of health I take medicine in case it may be
beneficial, although I do not know with certainty that it will be beneficial, and even if
with the effect it is not beneficial, nevertheless the taking of it is an effect of such
intention. God, however, although He does not ignore whether such calling will have an
effect, but foreknows that it will be impeded by the predestined person, nevertheless on
His part gives it from the absolute intention of saving that person, desiring as far as it
depends on Him that this intention be carried out through such calling.
7. Efficacious argument—Furthermore (and this is an efficacious argument), such
calling in the predestined is never without some fruit in relation to the attainment of
eternal life, and this is sufficient for it to be an effect of predestination. The antecedent
is explained because although that calling does not obtain its proximate end or effect, as
is supposed, nevertheless it can in some way prepare the way, so that that calling, which
the predestined person now despises, afterward brought back to memory through
another congruous calling, may be an incentive to humility, gratitude, or some other
similar good, which in that way is efficaciously obtained and remains unto eternal life.
In these ways, therefore, and similar ones, even those callings which seem inefficacious
cooperate for eternal good in those who are called to be saints according to God's
purpose, and consequently are effects of predestination. Now such a calling, considered
in this way, can be said to be in some sense congruous and efficacious, because
although it does not have congruity in relation to the proximate act for which it was
given, in respect to another fruit which it finally obtains, it is congruous and in its own
way efficacious, and under this aspect it can be included under calling according to
purpose.
8. Final resolution. Hence I finally conclude that all prevenient and exciting helps
which are given to the predestined, however common and merely sufficient they may
seem, are effects of predestination and of their election. This is proved because these
helps consist in divine illumination, in which divine calling is placed, as the Council of
Trent, session 6, chapters 4, 5, and 7, declares. If, therefore, such helps are efficacious,
they pertain to congruous calling; if they are inefficacious, they at least pertain to
calling, which we have shown to be an effect of predestination in the elect. Thus the
same must be judged concerning all the aforementioned helps. Indeed, not only
concerning internal helps, but also concerning external ones the same must be said,
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such as the preaching of the Gospel, external signs, miracles, examples, the application
of good objects, and any other divine guardianship. For although without the internal
spirit of grace these are not sufficient, as Augustine extensively discusses against
Pelagius in the book On the Grace of Christ and in Letters 90 and 95, and as the
Council of Milevis defines in chapter 4, nevertheless they are supernatural benefits and
necessary in their order for works of piety. Therefore, when they are given in such a
way that they are effectively beneficial for salvation, they are from predestination,
according to Augustine's rule in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14. Moreover,
although these do not always profit proximately or immediately, they finally bear fruit in
some way in the predestined, for whom all things work together for good. Therefore, it
is probable that all these things come to them from the special providence of
predestination, and consequently are effects of it.
9. Objection. Response. You might say that it is not necessary that all these benefits
always have some mode of efficacious cooperation in relation to the attainment of
eternal life, even in the predestined. For why could there not be in the predestined
some calling or excitation which neither then, when it is given, has some free and good
effect, nor afterward cooperates toward it, but so passes away and is given over to
oblivion as if it had never been? For it does not seem possible to prove the opposite by
any efficacious reason. I respond by conceding that we cannot certainly demonstrate
that all these prevenient helps which are given to the predestined are effects of
predestination, properly and strictly taken, because it is not impossible that some
proceed from the general providence of grace alone, if they are in no way efficacious,
that is, effectively conducive to the fruit of eternal life, which in some cases is not
repugnant, as the objection raised proves. However, we say that it is not incredible that
all these helps are in some way useful to the predestined for eternal life, not only in
themselves, which is clear, but also with effect, because this is easy for God, and is
consistent with His love and providence toward the predestined, and is in harmony
with that statement of Paul: "All things work together for good to those who love
God." Hence, at least it seems certain that regularly and ordinarily this is so, and
therefore a general rule can be simply established that these helps are effects of
predestination, whether this rule sometimes admits some rare exception or not, which
is uncertain.

CHAPTER VII. WHICH NATURAL GOODS ARE

EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION, AND HOW THEY ARE SO.

1. The opinion of some. First argument. Some maintain that no natural good or
benefit conferred upon the elect is an effect of their predestination. This opinion can
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be supported first from Augustine, in "On the Predestination of the Saints," chapter 10:
"The predestination of God, which is concerned with good, is the preparation of
grace; but grace itself is the effect of predestination." But natural goods are distinct
from the gifts of grace; therefore, natural goods are not effects of predestination.
Furthermore, Augustine, in refuting Pelagius, everywhere distinguishes the benefit of
creation from the benefit of grace and predestination. For Pelagius, to conceal his error,
called nature itself and natural gifts "grace" because they are freely given by God.
Hence, although in reality he said that all gifts of supernatural grace, even the first
calling, fall under merit proceeding from free will operating by its natural powers alone,
nevertheless he evaded the issue by saying that this merit comes from grace, because it
comes from free will, which he called grace. Augustine, however, to refute this error,
distinguishes these two things, saying that grace should not be subjected to nature or
free will, but conversely, as is clear from "On the Predestination of the Saints," chapter
2, and Letters 90, 95, and 105, and the entire first book "On the Grace of Christ."
From these arguments, it seems to follow that no natural benefit can be counted among
the gifts of grace, and consequently, neither among the effects of predestination,
because all such benefits belong to natural gifts, which are given or co-created with
nature itself.
2. Second corroboration. Secondly, because otherwise the entire argumentation of
Augustine collapses, and it would follow that moral acts proceeding from good natural
disposition would be meritorious of all supernatural grace, even of the first calling to
faith. The consequence is evident, because through an act proceeding from prior grace,
we can merit posterior grace, and through one effect of predestination previously
bestowed on us, we can merit another. But those acts proceed from a prior effect of
predestination, namely, from the natural gift of good temperament or facility of
intellect. Therefore, such acts can be said to be from prior grace for this reason;
consequently, they can be meritorious of all subsequent effects. But this cannot be
maintained, because otherwise God would give a person efficacious calling to faith
because of good intellect or disposition apt for virtue, which is plainly false and
extensively refuted by Augustine in book 1 to Simplicianus, question 2, based on
Philippians 2: "God has chosen the weak things of the world to confound the strong,"
and similar passages. The consequence is evident because the effects of predestination
are so connected that one is given by reason of another. Therefore, if that natural
disposition is an effect of predestination, since it is prior in the order of execution, the
other subsequent effects will be given by reason of it.
3. The contrary opinion pleases others. Supporting reason. Others consider the
contrary opinion to be universally true, namely, that all goods given to the predestined,
if they are such that they contribute in any way to his eternal salvation, are effects of
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predestination, even if they do not exceed the order of natural goods. This seems to be
the common opinion of theologians, which St. Thomas teaches in explaining the words
of Romans 8: "All things work together for the good of those who love God." And in
the same sense he said in the First Part, question 23, article 8: "Under the order of
predestination falls whatever promotes a person to salvation." The reason is that these
goods, considered under this aspect, pertain to supernatural providence, as is evident,
and in the elect they belong to those benefits by which they are liberated and saved.
Therefore, the preparation of such goods under that aspect is part of predestination.
Consequently, these goods, when carried out in execution, are effects of predestination.
4. This is chosen as true. Natural goods are reduced to five categories. And this
opinion, speaking absolutely, seems right to me, though it needs some clarification. To
provide this, let us reduce natural goods to four or five categories and speak about each
one. The first is being itself, or the substance of the predestined person, and
consequently his creation or generation. The second is having such natural powers as
inevitably accompany that nature and substance in such a degree of natural perfection.
The third is receiving such a temperament of body, with such a complexion, or
proportion of humors, which helps more or less toward virtue. In this good, there can
be some variety, even maintaining the order of nature with respect to the same
individual person. For although according to the principles of Philosophy, each
individual requires something determinate in this kind, nevertheless it does not consist
in an indivisible point but has latitude, within which the same person can have a
temperament more or less apt for virtue. The fourth kind of natural goods contains
various circumstances of this life from its beginning to its end, such as being born at
such a time or place, or from such parents; likewise, being educated with these or those
circumstances, being preserved or dying at this time rather than that. The fifth kind of
goods consists of moral honest works themselves and the natural occasions that incite
to them. Regarding these goods, it should be considered that they can contribute to the
end of predestination in two ways, or in either one of them, namely, either as a subject
in which other effects of predestination are to be received, or as a means somehow
useful to the end of predestination.
5. First conclusion about the first category. I say, therefore, first: the entire being of
the predestined person, even as to the substance of his nature, and as to his creation or
generation, is an effect of predestination. I take this proposition from St. Thomas, First
Part, question 23, article 8, insofar as he says that the conception of Jacob was an effect
of his predestination, for the same reason applies to the rest. It is also explained by
reason from a principle established above. For I said that by the same act of divine
election by which the predestined is foreordained to be blessed, he is also efficaciously
ordained to exist and to be created or generated, because the existence or creation of
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such a person is willed for the sake of that efficaciously intended end. Therefore, just as
glorification is the ultimate effect of such predestination, so the procreation of such a
person is, as it were, the beginning of the execution of the same predestination; for the
creation itself is done for the sake of such an end and by virtue of that intention.
Moreover, there seems to be no doubt that the generation of one person can be an
effect of the predestination of another, as the conception of the Virgin was an effect
of Christ's predestination, because through that conception the way was prepared for
the execution of the latter. Therefore, by the same reasoning, the generation of one
person can be from the predestination of that same person. Finally, it is plausible that
other works of creation, disposition, or governance of the universe are effects of the
predestination of the elect, as St. Thomas clearly believes in the cited passages, and as is
gathered from the text: "For the sake of the elect those days will be shortened."
Furthermore, death and its circumstances, or birth, can be effects of predestination, as
I will soon say. Why, then, would generation itself not also be an effect, insofar as it
serves the execution of predestination?
6. The foundation of the previous opinion is dismantled. The work of creation
considered in itself does not pertain to predestination. Nor does the foundation of the
previous opinion proceed against this. Otherwise, it would also prove that no natural
good whatsoever is an effect of predestination, which is plainly false, as will be shown.
It must be said, therefore, that the work of creation considered in itself does not
pertain to predestination, and this is what Augustine chiefly intends. However, insofar
as it establishes the intended end of predestination and other benefits of grace (not as
their merit, but as their subject), and insofar as it is done from that special intention, it
is comprehended under the benefit of predestination. Just as in human acts, abstinence,
for example, does not in itself pertain to religion, nevertheless, insofar as it is done
from a vow and from the intention of fulfilling it, it pertains to religion. Nor does it
follow from this that a moral work proceeding from nature alone could be meritorious
of subsequent gifts of grace, as if it proceeded from some benefit of predestination,
because it does not proceed from it as such. For although the procreation of nature
from such an end pertains to predestination, nevertheless the nature itself, considered
in itself, does not pertain to that order. Therefore, if afterward it operates, not
according to what it has from that end, nor from any aid given in relation to it, but only
according to what it has in itself and would have even if it were not created for that
end, then it does not operate as pertaining to predestination, but only as belonging to
the order of nature.
7. Second conclusion. Strengthened by reason. I say secondly, natural perfections that
follow by necessity of nature from such a body and soul are not special effects of
predestination, differently than the existence or creation of such a person is an effect
369 BOOK THREE
of predestination, but by reduction or concomitance, they are computed as quasi one
effect with nature itself. This is proved because by the same act of election or love by
which Paul, for example, was efficaciously foreordained to be blessed, and consequently
also to exist, by the same act (I say) he is ordained to have all properties that necessarily
follow from such a nature, like intellect, will, and similar faculties. For one who wills the
form also wills what follows from the form, and because by the same action by which
the nature is made, these properties are co-made. Therefore, much more by the same
will by which the person is preordained to exist, such properties are co-ordained (so to
speak). Therefore, there is no other predestination of the person to having such
properties than that by which he is predestined to exist. For this reason, we say that
these perfections are not special effects of predestination, but are concomitantly joined
with nature or person itself and are computed as one and the same effect with it.
8. Natural properties do not fall under predestination as means, but as subject, or
condition. Objection. Resolution. From this it follows that these properties also do not
fall under predestination as means to it, but as proximate subject, or condition
necessarily following the subject. This is evident because the predestination of these
properties is contained in the very first efficacious ordination of such a person to such
an end. Also, when Paul is preordained to beatitude, it is not only Paul's substance
considered quasi-metaphysically that is preordained, but as physically capable of
ultimate happiness, which includes his properties, especially will, which are, as it were,
the proximate subject of receiving beatitude. You may object: later, in the course of life,
such a perfection or property of intellect often greatly contributes to the effect of
predestination; therefore, such a natural perfection was also given as a means apt for
attaining the end of predestination. I answer that, given the antecedent, it does not
follow that such properties, as conferred on such a person, were given from
predestination as means to its execution, but only that after they are given, or foreseen
to be given, they are ordained to serve the execution of predestination. And so the use
of such faculties, rather than the faculties themselves, is an effect of predestination.
9. Third conclusion. Explained in Christ's humanity. Further explained in the Most
Blessed Virgin. Confirmed by reason. I say thirdly, the good complexion or disposition
of nature, which does not follow from natural resultance alone, but is provided by
God's special care, even if it is natural in itself, is an effect of predestination, not only
as a subject, but also as a means. This is exemplified first in Christ's humanity, which,
on account of the union with the Word, for which it was predestined, was fashioned
and disposed in the best way and by the most special providence of God, even in
bodily matters. Hence, it can deservedly be said that that benefit was an effect of the
predestination of that humanity to the hypostatic union. Also, because Christ was
predestined to be the Redeemer, he received a passible body, according to the text: "But
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a body you have prepared for me." Therefore, that disposition of the body, which was
otherwise natural, was also an effect of Christ's predestination to the office of
Redeemer. The same should be believed about the Most Blessed Virgin, for she was
also conceived by special providence and received the best temperament by virtue of
that predestination by which she was chosen to be the Mother of God. The same is
plausible concerning some saints procreated by special miracle and providence, or
obtained from God through pious prayers, as St. Thomas, in the cited article, indicated
about Jacob. The reason is that such a benefit is an effect of God, and in the cases
mentioned, it is not merely natural, for insofar as it is done by special providence of
God and in order to a supernatural end, it pertains to the benefits of grace, and it is
useful and actually contributes to obtaining the supernatural end intended by God.
Therefore, it has all the requisites to be an effect of predestination and to be counted
among its means.
10. Good temperament or apt complexion serves predestination. For this reason,
even good temperament or complexion apt for virtue, insofar as it depends on special
providence and is given and procured for the elect so that they might effectively use it
well for salvation, can rightly be called an effect of predestination. This is proved
because this is a benefit from God, and it does not follow from nature, even this
individual nature, by natural necessity, but depends on circumstances which God has
provided by special providence and will, by virtue of another love by which he
preordained such a person to eternal life. Therefore, such a benefit is an effect of
predestination. And by the same reasoning, the circumstances of birth or conception
can pertain to the effects of predestination, insofar as the attainment of such a
temperament, more apt for virtue, depends on them. The same is true of education
accommodated to virtue, of preservation, and of progress until death. For all these
things presuppose that first will to save this person and are ordained to fulfill it.
Therefore, it is a sign that they proceed from that intention and, under that aspect,
pertain to the providence of grace, not common, but special, and accommodated to
such a person, and are consequently effects of predestination.
11. Calling or grace is not given to a person because of intellect, but is a disposition
making the person fit for such grace. Nor does it follow from this that vocation or
congruous grace is given to a person because of good intellect or disposition, etc., but
rather it follows that either intellect or such a disposition was given to such a person so
that they would be capable or fit to receive such grace. For it is not necessary that
among all effects of predestination there be this connection, that the second is given
because of the first, as because of merit, or as because of a proper end, but two means
or two effects can be given because of a third one, while between themselves they have
only proportion and some connection in order to produce that effect. Just as light, for
371 BOOK THREE
example, and species are given for vision, while between themselves they are only
joined to complete the integral principle of vision. So in this way, an accommodated
nature is given through predestination as a subject or foundation; and to it is joined,
from the same predestination and liberality of God, an accommodated aid, by which it
is elevated and constituted as, so to speak, an integral principle of meritorious work, or
work disposing one to other effects of predestination. Nor is this foreign to
Augustine's doctrine; for in the book "On the Gift of Perseverance," chapter 14, he
says that in the intellects of some men, there are these or those properties, by reason of
which they are so disposed that if certain signs are applied to them, they are moved to
faith and not with others, and God applies to them such accommodated signs if he
loves them, not indeed because of their intellect or disposition, but from his grace and
liberality, accommodating (so to speak) grace to nature, not from the merit or debt of
nature, but from God's benevolence.
12. Final conclusion. Different authors explain this conclusion. Finally, it must be
said that good moral acts, although they are of the natural order, if they effectively
contribute to attaining eternal life, are effects of predestination. This assertion is
common, concerning which one may consult Durandus, in 1, d. 4, q. 2, and there,
Capreolus, Gregory, and others. However, the way of explaining is not the same among
all. For some think that all moral works that in some way conduce to effectively
attaining the end of predestination are from grace, and therefore are from
predestination, because grace that is thus efficacious is an effect of predestination. The
antecedent is proved, because moral works, when they are from free will alone, are
worth nothing in the order of eternal life, as was proven above. Therefore, to be worth
something, they must be from grace, and thus they will also be from predestination.
However, this reasoning is not universal, because a morally good act can be useful to
the effects of predestination not only by way of merit, or impetration, or disposition
(which are the causalities the given reason addresses), but it can also benefit by
impeding an evil act, through which an impediment could be placed to the grace of
God. And this is enough for such works to be effects of predestination. Moreover,
although such a work is done through natural causes and free will, with general
concurrence, nevertheless, under that aspect, it can proceed from special and
supernatural providence of God, and from the efficacious intention of saving such a
person. Therefore, this is enough for it to be an effect of predestination. Similarly,
other temporal goods, insofar as they can be and in fact are going to be instruments of
virtue, can be effects of predestination, just as they can fall under merit, according to
St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 114, last article, and under infused hope, from the same, 2-2, q. 17,
art. 2. Therefore, much more can good moral acts be effects of predestination.
372 BOOK THREE
Likewise, temporal disadvantages are often effects of predestination, as we shall soon
say; therefore, so is a good moral act.
13. And against this I find no difficulty of any moment. Soto is sometimes cited in
opposition, book 1, "On Nature and Grace," ch. 20. But there he says nothing about
predestination, but only treats of the necessity of grace for these acts, and denies that
they can be from grace, but only affirms that they can be done without grace. Thus he
also does not deny that they are sometimes from predestination, either because they
proceed from special grace, or because in whatever way they are from special
providence and the intention of salvation.

CHAPTER VIII. WHETHER EVIL OR

ITS PERMISSION IS AN EFFECT OF PREDESTINATION.

1. Two points are established as certain. — First. — The death of a martyr is an

effect of his predestination. - Two things are certain. The first is that evils of
punishment can be effects of predestination, and they are such when they truly and
effectively contribute to the attainment of eternal life. This is proven because these
evils are simply good, and therefore they are not merely permitted, but sometimes even
intended and ordained by God in the state of fallen nature. Thus, they are absolutely
effects of God and of His providence. Therefore, from this perspective, they can be
effects of predestination. Moreover, these evils pertain to the benefits conferred by
God through Christ, according to Philippians 2: "For unto you it is given for Christ, not
only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him." Therefore, when these evils occur in
such a way that they become an occasion or matter of merit, or of some other fruit of
grace enduring unto eternal life, they clearly arise from that will by which God chose
the predestined person, and consequently are effects of predestination. This is
confirmed, for the passion and death of a martyr is an effect of his predestination,
because it is a singular and efficacious means of his salvation. Therefore, the same must
be said of any evil of punishment through which God advances His elect toward
salvation. Likewise, the remission of the punishment due for sins, insofar as it is
conferred upon the predestined in this life so that he may sooner fly to heaven, is an
effect of his predestination; yet this remission is very frequently obtained through evils
of punishment. Finally, even the punishment of one person can be an effect of the
predestination of another, if it benefits the latter, as is evident in the case of Christ's
passion. Thus, in this assertion there is no difficulty beyond what we shall discuss
concerning the evil of guilt.
2. The second point established as true. The second certainty is that sin, or the evil
of guilt, is not an effect of predestination, because it is not an effect of God, according
373 BOOK THREE
to the faith defined in the Council of Trent, Session 6, Canon 7. And I hold this to be
true not only of sin as sin, but also of the act of sin to which malice is intrinsically
joined. For although God concurs with that act, He does not from Himself intend or
predefine it, as I have extensively discussed in the second book on Divine Aid, through
the first five chapters. Therefore, concerning such an act, I consider it most true that it
is not an effect of predestination, because that which is not in some way predestined
and willed from the end of predestination cannot be an effect of predestination.
3. In what the difficulty consists. First opinion. The opinion is proven. The second is
corroborated. However, a difficulty remains concerning the permission of sin, which
God can directly will and intend: whether it is sometimes an effect of predestination.
For some hold that it can in no way be such. First, because the permission of sin
cannot be called grace, nor a benefit prepared for us from the merits of Christ, which,
however, is required in every effect of predestination. Second, because the permission
of sin cannot be willed from the intention of giving glory to the predestined, which we
have also said is necessary in every effect of predestination. The assumption is proven
because either that permission would be chosen from that intention immediately or
mediately. Not the first, because the permission of sin is not a means immediately
connected with that end, nor does it confer a utility that proximately and per se leads to
it. But no means is immediately chosen by virtue of the intention of any end unless it
has an immediate relation and utility to it. Nor mediately, because if there is any means
between the permission of sin and glory, it is the commission of sin and penitence for
it, which per se and immediately can contribute to grace and glory. Therefore, it will be
necessary from the intention of glory to immediately will penitence, and then, so that
penitence may have a place, to permit sin. But we have said above that penitence cannot
be predefined in this way before the permission of sin. Therefore, it is impossible to
choose the permission in this way from that intention.
4. First assertion. Supported by reason. I say, nevertheless, that the permission of sin
both can be and often is an effect of predestination. This opinion is more frequently
followed in this time by modern theologians, and Anselm and St. Thomas insinuated it
when explaining those words in Romans 8: "For those who love God, all things work
together for good," where the Gloss added, "even sins," and Adam said that this
interpretation should not be proudly rejected, although Paul in his primary intention
speaks of tribulations and evils of punishment. The point is clarified by reason from
the conditions stated above. For, first of all, permission, in the way it can occur, is an
effect of God, because it is good and directly willed. I say "in the way it can occur"
because, formally speaking, permission consists in the privation or negation of that aid
which God foresaw would have been efficacious for avoiding sin. And just as God's will
is the adequate cause of giving such aid, so also of not giving it, for He freely and
374 BOOK THREE
voluntarily does not give it. Thus, in this way, permission is an effect of God. And if
permission sometimes includes something positive, such as the application of such an
object or occasion, with the foreknowledge that man will use them badly, God is also
the true cause of that positive effect, and can properly and per se will it, not directly
intending the fall of man, but only foreseeing and not impeding it, as Augustine rightly
says in book 11 of Genesis ad litteram and often elsewhere.
5. Second assertion. Secondly, permission can be useful for the salvation of the
predestined person himself. This is established first of all from Damascene, book 2 of
Faith, chapter 29, where he says that God sometimes wills to permit sin for His own
glory, sometimes for the good of others, but often for the good of the sinner himself.
Paul seems to have touched on the first end in Romans, chapter eight, saying: "That he
might show the riches of his grace on vessels of mercy, he endured with much patience
vessels of wrath." In this way, He also permitted Adam's sin, so that He might manifest
His wisdom in procuring human salvation. Augustine infers the second end in the book
on Grace and Free Will, chapter 20, from 2 Kings 16: "The Lord has ordered him to
curse, etc. Perhaps the Lord will look upon my humiliation." For Augustine notes that
God permitted that sin of Shimei for the exercise of David's patience and humility.
Thus also Ambrose, sermon 47 on the faith of Peter, says that God permitted Peter's
fall for the good of the Church. Concerning the third member, which concerns us,
Augustine says in City of God, book 14, chapter 13: "I dare to say that it is useful for
the proud to fall into some open and manifest sin, from which they may be displeased
with themselves." And he collects passages of Scripture. And in the book on Nature
and Grace, chapter twenty-eight, he thus explains those words in 1 Timothy 1: "I
delivered him to Satan, that he may learn not to blaspheme." For he does not
understand this passage in terms of bodily vexation by the devil, but of spiritual
vexation, which the devil inflicts by temptation when he is permitted, or when man is
deprived of God's special protection. Gregory has similar things in homily 21 on the
Gospels. Finally, Bernard says in sermon 54 on the Canticles that God sometimes
withdraws or holds back grace from the elect, lest they be carried away into pride.
Therefore, the withdrawal of grace is sometimes useful (which is wonderful) for the
very end of grace, either so that perseverance in it may be more certain, which is more
necessary than increase, or so that what seems to be impeded in one way may be
increased more by another way. Therefore, permission has the second condition
necessary for an effect of predestination.
6. The third and fourth conditions are convertible with each other, namely, that an
effect of predestination should be grace and should be given from the intention of
glory, for if it has this latter quality, it will also have the former when properly
understood. For it is not necessary for an effect of predestination to be such a benefit
375 BOOK THREE
of grace that it is something supernatural in its entity and substance, as was shown in
the preceding sections; nor that it be something positive, for to prevent evil is also a
great benefit, morally speaking. Therefore, it is enough that it be an effect of God,
ordered from supernatural providence to a supernatural end that is to be attained in
reality, with such a means contributing in some way. But permission of sin has all these
qualities if it is willed from the efficacious intention of glory.
7. Therefore, it only remains to be proven that God permits sin in the predestined
from the very intention of glory, or of grace, or of virtue. This, however, is shown
from what has been said, because God does not permit sin except for the sake of the
utility or good that can be drawn from it, as is frequent in Augustine in the Enchiridion,
chapter 11, on Correction and Grace, chapter 8, and in other places cited above. But
one of these goods is the spiritual advantage of the predestined person himself.
Therefore, from the intention of this, God can will the permission of sin; therefore, He
does so will. For this is the way most consonant with divine wisdom and goodness. And
for explaining this, there is an excellent passage from Augustine, in the book on Nature
and Grace, chapter 24. There, speaking of David's sin, he says that God permitted it so
that there might be against pride that kind of medicinal disturbance, for he had said,
"In my abundance I shall not be moved forever," and he was attributing to himself
what he had from the Lord, wherefore it had to be shown to him from where he had it,
etc. And he adds in chapter 25: "The proud mind does not understand this at all, but
great is the Lord who persuades, as He knows how." Where it is especially notable that
he later calls permission itself persuasion, by which name Augustine is accustomed to
call prevenient grace and vocation itself.
8. Objection. But they say that God does not will the good that can be drawn from
sin with an absolute and predetermining will, except presupposing the foreknowledge
of the same sin as future, according to Augustine in the cited places, especially in
Genesis ad litteram. But the will to permit sin precedes the foreknowledge of the same
sin as future. Therefore, that permission cannot proceed from the intention of such
good.
9. Resolution. I respond that the foreknowledge of future sin can be understood to
precede the intention of that good of which sin will be an occasion in two ways: either
concerning merely conditional foreknowledge, or also concerning absolute
foreknowledge of future sin. In the first way, what is assumed is true, and Augustine
should be understood this way whenever he seems to presuppose such knowledge. And
a clear sign of this is that he asks why God would have willed to create angels whom
He foreknew would sin. For that question, if understood about absolute knowledge,
would involve a contradiction, because that knowledge would already presuppose the
will to create such angels. Therefore, it must be understood as concerning conditional
376 BOOK THREE
foreknowledge, which precedes the decree of the will both to create the angel or man
and to permit sin in him. This knowledge, therefore, does not stand in the way; indeed,
it is necessary for the permission of sin to proceed from the intention of that good
which is afterward drawn from sin.
10. But if that is understood about absolute knowledge, it is certainly false. For
before this knowledge, God has the will to permit sin, therefore He wills such
permission from some motive and good end. For permission, although it is not evil, yet
is not per se and intrinsically so good that it is lovable for its own sake, but of itself is a
quasi-indifferent object, which is rendered honest by its end. But God does not will
permission except in a most wise and honorable way. Therefore, He wills it from some
honest end intended per se, which pertains to the manifestation of His glory, for God
intends this end through His entire will. Therefore, such an end can also be the eternal
good of the predestined person himself. This final consequence is proven because
there is no greater repugnance in this end than in others, nor less convenience or
wisdom in intending and obtaining it through this means.
11. An incidental doubt. This final point, in which the difficulty lies, will be made
more evident by examining the argument of the contrary opinion, because if it were
effective, it would proceed in the same way regarding the intention of divine glory, or
the manifestation of His grace, through the permission of sin. I therefore concede
what the argument rightly proves, that the permission of sin is not a means immediately
connected with the glory of the predestined, but is connected through other acts of
virtues, especially the act of penitence, humility, or some similar act. I say, however, that
this good is also intended by God before He wills to permit sin, and consequently
before the absolute foreknowledge of future sin. However, the nature of this intention
of God concerning such a good to be obtained on the occasion of sin is not explained
in the same way by everyone.
12. The opinion of some. Some consider this true even concerning absolute
intention through a predefinitive decree of penitence, for they hold that the act of
penitence can be predefined and intended before the absolute foreknowledge of sin,
and consequently before the will to permit it. Because God would not therefore be
compelled to procure or will sin. For in order that such an intention of penitence be
fulfilled, a permissive will is sufficient, given conditional foreknowledge. For it is
immediately infallible that the sin will occur, which is enough for that intention to be
infallibly fulfilled. And therefore it also does not follow that the will for penitence is a
virtual will for sin, because by virtue of such a will, sin is only involved insofar as it is
necessary for penitence to occur, for which it is sufficient that the permission of sin be
virtually included there. Otherwise, even the will for penitence existing in God after the
absolute foreknowledge of sin would be a virtual will for sin, because penitence always
377 BOOK THREE
expresses the same relation to sin. And thus no reason remains why the act of
penitence cannot be predefined before the absolute foreknowledge of future sin.
13. This opinion is not approved. - First. Second. The matter is clarified by a moral
example. Nevertheless, this opinion cannot please me, as regards those goods which
necessarily presuppose sin, such as penitence. First, because this order does not seem
consonant with divine wisdom: for these goods, which necessarily require evils of guilt,
are not per se and of themselves absolutely lovable; indeed, as such, they are considered
to be goods only in a qualified sense, and therefore God does not will them from
Himself, or by an antecedent will, but only given the necessity on the part of man. Just
as a wise physician does not absolutely will to apply medicine until the illness requires it.
Second, and principally, because such a will would be a virtual will for sin, as I explained
above and which is now clear from the difference that is morally discerned when sin is
or is not presupposed. For after sin exists, or is foreknown to be future, to will
penitence for it is only to will its destruction; but the will for the destruction of sin is in
no way a virtual will for sin, but rather a hatred of it. However, when sin is not
presupposed, the will for penitence is not only a will for the destruction of sin, but also
for its placement, because what does not exist cannot be destroyed, and therefore if it is
not presupposed to exist, in that will it is included and intended that it first exist, so that
it can be destroyed. This can be explained by a moral example: for the will, for instance,
to counsel some evil, even the smallest, is always evil if in the other person to whom
the counsel is given, the will for some evil is not presupposed; but if the intention of
some greater evil is presupposed in him, the will to counsel the lesser evil will not be
evil, because then it does not tend toward evil, but toward avoiding the greater evil.
14. Conclusion. Corroboration. But indeed, when the good is such that it does not
necessarily presuppose sin, although it can also come about through the occasion of
sin: then it can be excellently predefined and intended by God with an efficacious
intention, before the absolute foreknowledge of sin, which is afterward permitted for
the sake of such good. I say, therefore, that this is what happens in that permission of
sin which is an effect of predestination. For, if one considers carefully, one will find
that, besides penitence, there is always some good proximately intended by God
through the permission of sin, which does not have a necessary connection with sin,
because it can also exist without sin, and sin also does not express an intrinsic relation
to it, although it can be an occasion of it. This is clear first in the good of humility or
the diminution of pride, for which God is especially wont to will this permission, as is
clear from the previously cited passages. For this good per se does not require sin,
especially as actually committed, as is self-evident: for the power of sinning would be
sufficient, if man were to know it attentively and exactly, to keep him in the office of
humility. The same is true of absolute hatred of sin, and of the purpose to avoid it and
378 BOOK THREE
remove occasions of it, etc., which are goods especially intended through the
permission of sin and which per se and intrinsically do not presuppose it as actually
committed.
15. An objection. But someone will object that none of these goods is so
immediately connected with the permission of sin that it can be obtained through it
without the intervention of sin: therefore, sin is a certain means between the
permission of sin and the good intended through it. Therefore, the permission cannot
be intended for the sake of that good except through this means, which is repugnant to
God. Additionally, that good is not to be elicited except presupposing sin; but given this
presupposition, that good cannot be fruitful or useful for eternal life unless the sin is
first deleted through penitence. Therefore, penitence is also another means interposed
between that good and the permission of sin. Therefore, it is always necessary to
proceed from the intention of that good, through the will for penitence, to willing the
permission.
16. Rejection. Evasion. It is answered that the same argument could be made
regardless of the end for which God wills to permit sin, and therefore either it must be
denied that God can permit sin for the sake of some good end, which can in no way be
said, or that argument is not effective. This is clear in that end of showing His grace,
which Paul asserted. For this showing of grace does not occur unless sin follows, which
God freely remits to whom He wills. Therefore, sin intervenes between permission and
the showing of grace. You might say this is accidental, and in relation to us, for in itself
grace is sufficiently shown precisely in the permission itself, insofar as God gives
congruent and efficacious grace to whom He wills, and denies it to whom He wills,
permitting sin: which difference could be shown in the permission itself, if it were
known in itself, even prescinding from the sin that follows.
17. But indeed the same response could be given in our case, for permission alone, if
it were known in itself, could suffice to lead man to humility and the fear of God, and
similar ends intended through such permission. Hence we will also say that it is
accidental that sin follows. Furthermore, that response is not adequate and universal:
for when God, through the permission of sin, intends to show His grace, that is not so
much in relation to the blessed as to us wayfarers. For that means was hardly necessary
for the blessed, since they know grace itself in itself. But we wayfarers cannot know
that difference unless there is a variety of good and bad actions in human beings
themselves. Furthermore, in the end of redemption, for example, for which God
permitted the sin of the Jews, not only the permission but also the action itself was
necessary for that effect to be finally obtained; and many similar examples can easily be
offered.
379 BOOK THREE
18. The first part of the objection is satisfied. I say therefore to the first part of that
objection that although sin actually committed is sometimes necessary for obtaining
that good which God intends on the occasion of sin, it is not necessary that God
intend or will the sin itself, but only its permission. First, because sin is not the work of
God, but of man: God, however, only intends at that time what He Himself is going to
do. Furthermore, because such sin, at least as it is sin, is not a means to such an end,
but rather, as far as it is concerned, would be capable of impeding such good.
Therefore, it is only a certain occasion, which, because God (from His infinite power
and goodness) uses well to effect some good: and therefore although that occasion
intervenes between the permission and that good, it is not necessary that it be first
intended, but foreseen and accepted, or ordained to that end. From this it also follows
that permission, considered in itself, is not always an efficacious means to such an end,
but at most a sufficient one, and of itself so different that, as far as the will of God is
concerned, it is not necessary that the permitted action follow once the permission is
given, but only from God's infallible foreknowledge is it certain that that action will
occur when permission is given. But when the means is of this kind, it is not necessary
that before its election all the means, and either the occasions or actions that can
intervene between that good and the attainment of the intended good, be willed, but it
is enough that after the permitted sin has been foreseen, the rest be arranged.
19. The response to the latter part is evident. - And from this the response to the
other part concerning penitence is evident. For I say that it too is not a means per se
and absolutely necessary for such an end, but only from the supposition of the damage
inflicted by sin: and therefore it can be called a remedy rather than a simply necessary
means. But things that are of this kind are not prepared by an absolute will and
predefinition until their merit, or necessity, exists or is foreseen. And therefore God,
when He permits sin in the predestined, has only a conditional will, or one prepared to
give him penitence, if he should need it: but after He sees sin in him, He then
absolutely wills his penitence, because then He recognizes that means as necessary for
the end intended by Him.
20. And these things are sufficient concerning effects, from which each person can
understand by himself what I referred to above concerning the signs of predestination,
for the effects themselves are signs of this kind. But because the same effect, which in
one person is from predestination, in another is not from it, therefore such signs do not
afford certain knowledge. But when many are joined together, and for a long time, and
with great fruit, they make a very probable conjecture. On this subject, Bernard can be
read, sermon 1 on Septuagesima, and Vega collects many things in book 12 on the
Council of Trent, from chapter 10 to 20.
380 BOOK THREE
CHAPTER IX. FROM PREDESTINATION DOES NOT
FOLLOW THE NECESSITY OF HAVING OR PRESERVING GRACE.

1. Thus far we have explained the true effects of predestination; it remains for us to
exclude certain false effects, and on that occasion to explain the harmony between
predestination and the freedom of the will. For all these false effects tend to suggest
that predestination imposes a necessity—either of having grace, or of doing good
works, or of not sinning—a necessity (I say) that is incompatible with freedom. These
effects truly not only do not follow from predestination, but are so opposed to it that
predestination would destroy itself if it were to produce such an effect. For it would
remove the true nature of merit and reward, which are the most important ends and
means of predestination. Therefore, these false effects cannot be better excluded than
by demonstrating the harmony between predestination and the use of freedom. This
effect, or necessity, can be considered either in relation to sanctifying grace, or in
relation to individual good works, especially those necessary for salvation, among which
we include abstention from sins. In this chapter, we will discuss the first necessity, and
in the following chapter, the second. Since freedom consists in the power to act and not
to act, or to have and not to have holiness, and since it is manifest that from the power
of predestination all the elect are given the ability to become and be children of God,
the entire difficulty is how there remains in them the power that they might also
become and be children of the devil, and reject from themselves the grace and sonship
of God, since the predestined person cannot fail to be saved. This difficulty may be
partly in reality, partly in manner of speaking, and we shall briefly explain both.
2. The opinion of Wycliffe and Waldensis. Rejected as heresy. Concerning the justice
and grace of the predestined, some have erred by saying that the predestined person in
this life is always and necessarily in grace. So holds Wycliffe, as Waldensis reports in
book 2 of "De Sacramentalibus," chapter 160. He might have been moved by the
argument that the predestined person is especially loved by GOD, and whoever is loved
by God is just. But this is a manifest heresy, for it follows from it that an unbaptized
infant, if predestined, would already be just, and an unbeliever would please God even
without having faith, if predestined. Finally, it follows that no predestined person would
be conceived or born in original sin, all of which are contrary to the faith. These are
also contrary to predestination itself, because not all who are saved at the end of life are
preordained to obtain perpetual sanctity from the beginning of life. Nor is the
foundation of any significance, because although the predestined person is loved
according to divine preordination and foreknowledge, yet not always according to
present justice, or what is the same, according to the actual execution of predestination.
381 BOOK THREE
For a person is not made just by predestination except insofar as it is executed with
respect to the effect of grace.
3. Another error. Refuted. There was another error of those who said that although
the predestined person may sometimes be in sin, nevertheless once justified, he never
again falls from grace. This was held in our time by Calvin, and was the ancient error of
Jovinian, who was chiefly moved by that passage in 1 John 2 and 3: "Whoever is born
of God does not sin, nor can he sin, because his seed remains in him." On this one
may see Bellarmine, book 7 of "De Justificatione," chapters 14 and 15. And it is refuted
specifically in the matter of charity and grace, where it is shown that charity and grace
once possessed can be lost. We have evident examples in Scripture, concerning David,
Peter, etc. Likewise, otherwise either the non-predestined would never be truly just,
which is heretical, or the predestined would always have infallible perseverance in grace
joined with justice, through a special gift distinct from justice, which is groundless and
without foundation, and contrary to the sense of the whole Church. Moreover, from
that error it follows that everyone who sins mortally is either reprobate or was never
just; and to say either of these is heretical.
4. The reason a priori. Various expositions on the passage from John. The reason a
priori, which is relevant to the present matter, is that such an effect is not necessary for
the end of predestination; for even if the just person falls again and again and rises, he
can ultimately be saved. Therefore, not all who are predestined to eternal life are also
predestined to preserve grace without interruption from the moment they first receive
it. Indeed, St. Prosper, in book 2, last chapter of "De Vocatione Gentium," says that it
was done by the counsel of God that the predestined are permitted to sin and fall from
justice, and sometimes to remain in that state for a long time, so that the mystery of
predestination might remain hidden, and no one might despair or be too confident. On
this one may also see Augustine, "De Correptione et Gratia," chapters 6 and 13, "De
Praedestinatione Sanctorum," chapter 14, "De Bono Perseverantiae," chapter 6. That
passage from John has various explanations, but two are more probable, and either can
be chosen. One is: "Whoever is born of God, if he acts as such, does not sin." The
other is in the composite sense: "Whoever is born, as long as he preserves justice, does
not sin mortally, nor can he, as long as he retains it, because justice and sin are formally
repugnant to each other."
5. Third opinion. There is a third opinion of certain Catholics who say that the
predestined are necessarily saved through God's absolute and antecedent love, and
consequently are necessarily justified and remain in justice. So hold Ockham, Gabriel,
and Catherinus. But some do not admit this kind of predestination in order to avoid
this kind of necessity, for they think it repugnant to freedom, at least in part, like John
of Bologna, in book 2 of "De Praedestinatione," part 2, opinion 3. The mode of
382 BOOK THREE
speaking of Augustine seems to favor this, in "De Correptione et Gratia," chapter 12:
"It has been provided for human infirmity, that it might be acted upon inescapably."
Likewise in book 5 against Julian, chapters 3 and 4, and Fulgentius, book 1 to Monimus,
chapters 11 and 12. Indeed, the mode of speaking of Scripture also seems to favor it,
Matthew 25: "So that even the elect would be led into error, if it were possible," as if
the opposite were necessary. This is how 2 Timothy 2 is explained: "The firm
foundation of God stands, the Lord knows those who are His," and similar things are
found in John 6 and 10, and 1 John 2, on account of which Fulgentius said, in "De Fide
ad Petrum," chapter 35: "Hold most firmly that none of those who are predestined can
perish." The reason is that God's will is an efficacious cause, which being posited, it is
impossible for the effect not to be posited.
6. This opinion can be understood either of some true necessity, which changes the
manner of operating and producing the effect, and consequently removes freedom,
either as to exercise or as to specification, which is properly called the necessity of the
consequent; or it can be understood of the necessity of consequence alone, which is
also said to be in the composite sense, and does not repugn any freedom. The authors
cited speak in the former sense, in which I consider that opinion to be false.
7. First assertion. I say therefore first, that from divine predestination or election
there does not follow any true necessity of having or preserving grace. This is proven,
because two things are required for the predestined to be saved. One is that in this life
he attain grace (for I suppose that it is not acquired after this life if it is not obtained
during the present life). The other is that for some time in this life he persevere in
grace, so that from some justification until death he does not sin mortally. But neither
of these need occur in the predestined with any true necessity (and I suppose we are
speaking of adults, for infants are not capable of freedom, or of necessity properly
opposed to it). The first is proved, because the justification of an adult, according to
the doctrine of faith, does not occur without his free and human disposition; therefore
the justification of the predestined also occurs in this way; therefore predestination
does not impose necessity in relation to justification.
8. Evasion. Precluded. Perhaps it will be said that this at most proves concerning
necessity as to exercise, but not concerning necessity as to specification, because with
the latter there remains sufficient freedom for a moral act and merit. But against this is
the fact that for justification it is necessary to exercise such a disposition; therefore, if
for this reason some necessity is to be inferred, it will be not only as to specification,
but also as to exercise. And to make the matter more urgent, let us suppose a
predestined person placed in the last article of death, and still existing in sin, for whom
to be saved, it is not enough not to sin, but it is necessary here and now to be
converted; therefore, if he is necessarily to be converted, that is not only a necessity as
383 BOOK THREE
to specification, but also as to exercise. Hence, others convinced by this reason confess
that both necessities follow from such a mode of predestination, and therefore it is not
to be admitted. But Augustine expressly refutes this in the places often cited. And from
the following chapter it will be clear that predestination does not impose necessity on
individual actions, even if they are to be performed at a predetermined mode and time.
9. The second point concerning perseverance does not in the first place require
necessity as to exercise, as the same authors confess; but to place in the predestined
necessity as to specification for that final time alone is not an error, because it does not
openly conflict with any dogma. Yet it seems false to me, because even without this
necessity such an effect can be infallibly brought about by God, as will be clear from
the following chapter; therefore such necessity is not to be posited without other
foundation, since it is preternatural, and otherwise is not owed by reason of any
superior excellence or dignity, as I will explain more in the following chapter, where I
will also briefly address the difficulty concerning confirmation in grace, whether it is
conferred on all the predestined for some time.
10. Second assertion. Secondly, I assert that predestination infallibly infers grace and
the perseverance of the predestined in it for some time until death, by the necessity of
consequence alone, which in no way impedes freedom. This is proven by the
testimonies added above. And to indicate this certainty and infallibility, Scripture is
accustomed to present the effects of predestination as already accomplished, according
to that passage in Romans 8: "Those whom he predestined, he called, justified, etc."
This was noted by St. Gregory, book 5 on 1 Kings, chapter 4. The reason for the first
part is that the divine will absolutely cannot be frustrated. But the reason for the latter
part is that the divine will so moves the created will that it accommodates to it
proportionate means, by which it may be moved both freely and infallibly; for this
pertains to the infinite wisdom and power of God, as was touched upon in the first
book, and will be explained again in the following chapter. Hence it is also confirmed,
because freedom is not removed in general except insofar as it is impeded in individual
acts; but predestination does not impede freedom in individual acts, as I will now show;
therefore, it does not simply impede in obtaining or preserving grace, through which
glory is acquired.
11. Objection. But so that the manner of speaking and responding in form to this
common difficulty may be more clearly explained, I object, because given
predestination, one cannot be damned; therefore given predestination, one does not
have the freedom to be damned, and that supposition has already been made; therefore
in fact one no longer has this freedom. The first consequence is clear, because freedom
consists intrinsically in the power of acting and not acting; therefore, if given the
supposition there is no power, there is also no freedom. But that there is no power is
384 BOOK THREE
clear, because the supposition is already posited and so a composite sense is made, in
which it is true to say that it is impossible for the predestined to be damned. Since that
supposition precedes the use of freedom, because God, before all this foreseen use,
effectively destines man to glory, it seems to follow from that supposition a necessity
simply and inducing absolute impotence to the contrary effect, and therefore repugnant
to freedom.
12. Solution. I respond that before all else, the first antecedent must be distinguished,
for even given predestination, the verb "can" can be taken either in the divided sense or
in the composite sense, and in the divided sense the antecedent is false, but in the
composite sense it is true. These are the common words by which this difficulty is
solved, but the understanding should be that when it is said, "The predestined can be
damned," the composition can be made as it were in the object of such power, namely
that freedom extends to this, that it can join predestination with damnation; and in this
way the proposition is false and impossible, because it repugns divine foreknowledge
having will adjoined. But in another way it can be taken, that that supposition is taken
only on the part of the subject and person; because, namely, even if the person is
supposed to be predestined, he still truly retains the power of sinning and persevering
in sin, if he wishes, although this power is never to be reduced to an act contrary to
predestination. And in this sense the proposition is true. And the reason for it is that
that supposition does not change the proper mode of acting of this power; nor is it
antecedent in every respect, because it is not applied to the work except from
foreknowledge that the will is going to operate freely, if it is moved in this or that way.
Having thus explained the antecedent, the consequence is simply to be denied, because
for freedom absolutely and simply, this power which is called in the divided sense is
sufficient, because truly and really there remains in the predestined the power for either,
notwithstanding the predestination of God. But if there remains something obscure
here, it will be explained more fully in the following chapter.

CHAPTER X. THAT PREDESTINATION DOES NOT

IMPLY NECESSITY OF NOT SINNING OR OF DOING GOOD
IN PARTICULAR ACTS; WHEREIN THE HARMONY BETWEEN
PREDESTINATION AND FREE WILL IS FURTHER EXPOUNDED.

1. Predestination does not remove freedom. We presuppose the Catholic doctrine

against heretics, especially Luther and Calvin, that predestination does not remove
freedom, even of the supernatural acts through which it is executed: for this place does
not require that we dwell on proving this truth. Hence it is manifest that it does not
pertain to the efficacy or effects of predestination to impose necessity in the manner of
385 BOOK THREE
performing all and each human act, or any of them, by which the ultimate effect of
predestination is perfected and obtained, otherwise predestination would remove
freedom. What we are now addressing is how these two are reconciled, since
predestination is infallible and immutable, and therefore is a necessary cause, that is,
necessarily inferring the effect.
2. The opinion of some. Some have said that the harmony consists in this, that God
does not predestine or predefine individual acts, which are the means of predestination,
by an absolute decree of His will, which in reason would precede the absolute
foreknowledge of such acts as future: but only absolutely decides to save and justify
man. And by the force of this decree He offers means by which one is infallibly saved,
not, however, in such a way that this infallibility consists in some certain act determined
in particular with all its circumstances, but in this, that God so directs the will of the
predestined that in this or that act he finally cooperates. And thus it happens that God
never moves the will of the predestined in particular from a predefined decree, so that
here and now he absolutely wills, but from an antecedent will, or simple affection, that
such an act be done: and if the will of the predestined does not resist, but cooperates,
then that means is certain; but if God foresees that the predestined will resist on that
occasion, He provides another, in which He moves, and so on until He obtains the
effect.
3. This way of speaking is rejected. We have disapproved this manner of speaking in
the third book on Aids [of Grace], and above, in the first book, we touched upon
something which it is not necessary to repeat here. This opinion is therefore displeasing
first and most of all because it supposes that the predefinition of a free act in particular
and with all its circumstances is repugnant to freedom, and hence that a free act cannot
be provided for or predestined by God in this way, which seems contrary to the
perfection of divine providence and contrary to the manner of speaking of Scripture
about the power of God to change the hearts of men, even those operating freely.
Secondly, because it supposes in God a knowledge so limited and imperfect that He
cannot foreknow by what means the human will can be drawn so that here and now,
and in particular, it both infallibly and freely wills. For if He foreknows this, He will
easily be able to predestine absolutely that the act be done in particular and be done
freely. Thirdly, because that confused mode of predefining a free act is imperfect and
unworthy to be attributed to God: indeed it can never attain that degree of certainty
which is necessary for God's absolute decree concerning the end to be obtained by that
means. All of which we have pursued more extensively in the cited places.
4. Another way of speaking. Foundation. Others, therefore, in order to avoid this
extreme, fall into another, saying that not only has God predefined within Himself each
act by which the predestined are to be saved, but He has also preordained to give for
386 BOOK THREE
each a previous motion so efficacious in itself that the human will cannot resist
consenting to it, but is physically predetermined to consent here and now and in such a
way, both as to the specification and as to the exercise of the act. The foundation of
this opinion in the present matter is that for the certainty and efficacy of
predestination, such a motion is necessary. But otherwise it is also customarily founded
on this, that such a manner of premoving pertains to the proper and necessary causality
of the first cause. However, some do not explain the harmony between this motion and
freedom, but say that it is to be admired and held by faith, even if it is not understood.
Others say that although that motion is so efficacious, nevertheless from the wisdom of
GOD it is so sweet that although it predetermines the will to one thing by its power
and efficacy alone, it nonetheless causes it to operate freely. Others resort to the object.
And they say that by virtue of the object thus proposed through the intellect, the will is
moved indifferently and without necessity, and this is enough for the act to be free,
even if the will itself is determined to one thing by an extrinsic agent. Finally, others
take refuge in the composite and divided sense. And they claim that necessity from a
supposition, even antecedent to the use of freedom, does not remove the freedom of
the act, but it is enough that the will in itself, taken nakedly without such a supposition,
is undetermined to such an act.
5. This opinion is rejected. This opinion is not to be treated and examined by us in
depth at this point, for we have done so extensively in the books on Aids [of Grace],
and perhaps another time and occasion will arise to treat it more precisely. Now,
therefore, we only assert that this opinion is not necessary for the matter of
predestination, because the certainty of predestination can be preserved in another
easier way, more in agreement with divine providence and wisdom, as we will explain
shortly. And if it is not necessary, we do not think it should be admitted, because it has
no foundation in the Scriptures or in the holy Fathers or in ancient theologians, and it
so depresses the freedom of the will that it can hardly be conceived by the human
mind, and therefore it is also not suitable for resisting heretics. For to say that this
harmony is ineffable and cannot be explained by us does not satisfy, both because faith
does not teach that which makes the harmony inexplicable according to these authors,
and also because if someone were to say that God necessitates the will, and yet does
not remove freedom, and that we must believe the harmony of actual necessity
simpliciter with actual freedom, he would not only be saying something inexplicable,
but also something openly contradictory. It is therefore necessary that this opinion
declare how it is not the same to say that predetermination to one thing, brought about
from outside, is joined with the indifference of freedom, since that predetermination
seems to be necessity simpliciter, since it is brought about from outside. Therefore, that
such a motion is called sweet will indeed make the act proceeding from it voluntary, but
387 BOOK THREE
not free. But the mere proposition of the object, indifferent in itself, is indeed sufficient
for potential freedom, but not for actual freedom, if necessity is impressed from
elsewhere from outside. Therefore, since we do not find a way of composing freedom
with a supposition antecedent to its use and physically determining the faculty of
operating to one part, we do not use that opinion to resolve this difficulty.
6. Assertion. It must therefore be briefly said that predestination does not impede
freedom in individual good acts, even if it predefines them, because in execution and
externally it does not move to perform them effectively except through efficacious
grace. This efficacious grace so moves the will that it does not impede its freedom, even
as to use and actual determination, because it moves the will in a congruous way from
conditional foreknowledge, and therefore nothing remains in predestination that would
oppose this freedom. The first part is from St. Augustine, wherever he speaks of this
matter. For in this sense he says that those who are called according to purpose do not
reject the calling, nor do they resist. And it is very much to be noted in him that he does
not say they cannot resist, but that they do not resist. Although, if sometimes he were
to speak in the former way, he would have to be interpreted according to the composite
sense explained above through conditional foreknowledge. The reason for this part is
that this efficacious grace is necessary for the end of predestination, otherwise it could
fail. And it is also a suitable means, because once it is posited, it is infallible that the
effect will be posited: therefore. The other part is briefly proved, because the efficacy
of this grace does not consist in physical predetermination, which the will cannot resist:
because the Council of Trent, session 6, defines that the will so operates, given God's
excitation, that it can resist it. Therefore it consists in congruous motion
accommodated to the will according to God's foreknowledge.
7. Objection. Response. But someone will say: Therefore this grace of GOD is not
efficacious in itself, but receives efficacy from man's will: which seems very absurd,
since from the efficacy of such grace arises the consent of the will; otherwise man
could glory in it, as having it from his own efficacy, and not from the grace of God.
The consequence is proved, because unless man's will cooperates, God's grace will not
be efficacious, therefore the efficacy of grace is from the will. I respond by conceding
the first consequence as to the former part and denying it as to the latter: because free
will is not compared to exciting grace, which is what we are talking about, as its cause,
nor does it confer anything upon it, so that it can therefore be said to render it
efficacious. Hence to the proof, the consequence is also denied: for it only proves that
free will is a co-cause with this kind of grace for providing consent, which is far
different.
8. A notable point is added. But in order for the matter itself to be better
understood, it should be noted that the efficacy of grace is sometimes taken for its
388 BOOK THREE
actual efficiency: for every cause is denominated actually efficient, or efficacious, from
its actual efficiency, which is nothing other than its action. But sometimes it is taken for
the power which such grace has to move free will and to effect that it effects, according
to that: "I will make you do," and that: "It is He who works in us to will," because
through this grace God makes us will, as Augustine explains. Efficacy, therefore, taken
in the first way undoubtedly depends on free will, because there is one action which in
itself arises from free will and grace: and in this way free will can be said to elicit the
action of grace concomitantly, that is, by co-effecting one action with it. However, it
will not be said to give grace its efficiency, because that action insofar as it is effected by
grace is not from the causality of free will, although in reality that action does not exist
without the causality of free will.
9. But speaking in the latter way (in which we speak, with Augustine) of efficacious
prevenient grace, thus in no way does grace have its efficacy from free will, but rather
grace itself elevates free will and gives it the power to act, which power such grace has
from itself and from its own perfection. But because such grace, insofar as it is
efficacious, not only signifies the power of acting, but of acting in such a way that it
infallibly has action joined to it, this grace does not have from its physical power alone
and that which is connatural to it, but it has it from the manner in which it is given by
God from such purpose and conditional foreknowledge, because He had already
foreseen that that grace would have effect, if it were given with such circumstances.
And therefore even as to this it has efficacy from God Himself, although not without
respect to free will, and thus the harmony is also easily apparent, for this grace, however
efficacious, insofar as it is prevenient, does not have physical repugnance with the
dissent of free will, which would intrinsically arise from the entities or things
themselves, which alone could harm freedom, but it has it from the presupposition of
the future effect in God's foreknowledge, which does not oppose freedom, as has often
been explained.
10. From this it is easily understood that predestination does not diminish freedom,
even with respect to perseverance in good acts without the admixture of mortal sin.
This is proved in the same way, because this effect also is only brought about through
efficacious grace multiplied. For just as God moves to the first act, so also He moves to
the second and others consequently: therefore just as in individual cases grace operates
efficaciously and freely, so also in the collection, or continuation, of them: nor do I find
any new difficulty in this.
11. Question. One might only doubt whether it should be conceded that every
predestined person is for some time confirmed in grace. For this seems to follow from
what has been said, because every predestined person receives for some time the gift of
perseverance, which is given to him so that he might infallibly not fall from grace: but
389 BOOK THREE
confirmation in grace seems to be nothing else. Nevertheless, authors do not
commonly speak in this way and try to establish a distinction between the gift of
perseverance and confirmation in grace. And some say that confirmation adds
revelation, through which a person is made certain that he will persevere. But this is
very uncertain, for how is it established that not only the apostles, whom we believe to
have been confirmed in grace, but also any others whatsoever had this revelation? Or
what does such a revelation contribute to the operation of grace, so that it pertains to
confirmation? Others say that to those confirmed, concurrence for sinning is denied,
and therefore they not only will not sin, but also cannot sin; which is not necessary for
the gift of perseverance, or in all the predestined. And indeed it can easily be believed
that after our Lord Christ, this was so done in the Most Blessed Virgin, because of her
exceptional dignity, to which that entire perfection was in a certain way owed, and was
as it were connatural. But concerning others who are confirmed, there is no sufficient
foundation for asserting this, and besides it is neither necessary nor connatural.
12. We can therefore say that the gift of perseverance is in itself conferred through
ordinary aids and gifts of grace, with God merely providing and ensuring that they are
given at suitable times and in such a number or multitude of aids as suffice for such an
effect. But confirmation in grace adds proper and special gifts and aids, through which
God prevents a person in individual acts and especially in occasions of sinning, and
moves his will morally with the greatest efficacy, not only according to foreknowledge,
but also according to the power of the aids, which, although they do not determine the
will so that it also physically cannot resist, nevertheless morally induce it with the
greatest efficacy. This efficacy, together with the other congruity from foreknowledge,
provides confirmation. Thus confirmation in grace adds something beyond the
common gift of perseverance, by reason of which it does not necessarily follow from
predestination, although it can serve it, while freedom is also preserved.

[END OF BOOK THREE: ON THE EFFECTS OF PREDESTINATION,

AND THEIR HARMONY WITH THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL]
390 BOOK FOUR

BOOK FOUR: ON GOD'S SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE

CONCERNING THE ETERNAL SALVATION OF THE REPROBATE OR
NON-ELECT

This is the second part of this work, in which we undertake to speak about
reprobation. Since the ultimate effect or end of reprobation is the perpetual deprivation
of beatitude, to understand how the reprobate deviate from the attainment of
beatitude, it is first necessary to understand how they are directed or ordered toward
that beatitude through divine providence, which is to be treated in this book. And since
providence presupposes some intention or will for an end proportionate to itself, we
shall first discuss the eternal will that God had concerning the ultimate salvation of all
those whom He did not effectively choose for glory; then we shall discuss the means
that He prepared for them for that end.

CHAPTER I. HOW CERTAIN IT IS THAT GOD

WILLED TO SAVE ALL PEOPLE, EVEN THOSE NOT PREDESTINED.

1. Gregory simply embraced the negative position. This question is founded on the
passage of Paul in 1 Timothy 2: "God wills all men to be saved and to come to the
knowledge of the truth." Here Paul seems to define the question and teach the
affirmative position as certain by faith. Nevertheless, Gregory, in book 1, distinction 46,
near the end, simply denies that God willed to save those whom He does not in fact
save, because what God wills happens, especially when it is principally to be done by
God Himself. This opinion is supported by Augustine, who sometimes tends to restrict
that testimony of Paul to the predestined alone, explaining it either through distributive
accommodation, that is, it should be understood about all who are saved, because no
one is saved unless God wills him to be saved; or so that the distribution is only for
categories of individuals, because God wills some from every kind or state of men to
be saved, as he explains in the Enchiridion, chapter 103.
2. Conclusion. It is corroborated by the testimony of Paul. But nevertheless, it must
be said simply that God from eternity willed to save all people whom He decreed to
create, and the same should be thought concerning angels. This is proven from the said
testimony: for if the context of Paul is sincerely examined, it is clear that he speaks
universally of all people. For he first beseeches that prayers be made for all people and
adds: "For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who wills all men
to be saved." But it is clear that Paul's intention is that we should pray for all people
391 BOOK FOUR
simply, without any limitation; therefore, with the same universality he speaks of all
people when he adds as the reason that God wills all to be saved. This he further
confirms and declares in the following words, saying: "For there is one God, and one
mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a
redemption for all of us." In these last words, it is most certain that he speaks of all
simply, for it is a matter of faith that God is the redeemer of all people; therefore, in
the same way he speaks of all in the preceding words. The consequence is evident, both
because the context and uniformity of words and the efficacy of the discourse
demands it, and also from the reason that is implied in the words themselves. For God
wills all men to be saved in the same way that He willed to redeem all, since redemption
is only for the salvation of men. But the will to redeem all men is not limited to all the
predestined, nor can it be limited in any of the said ways; therefore, neither should the
will to save all men be so limited.
3. Augustine’s exposition. But an objection is raised against this exposition. I know
that the same Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 15, although he
understands that distribution simply of all men, nevertheless explains by a certain
metaphor that God wills all men to be saved, not because He Himself has such a will,
but because He makes us will and desire that all be saved, for this manner of speaking
is common in Scripture. But this exposition is opposed, first, by the rule of Augustine
himself, that a metaphorical locution, even if used elsewhere, should not easily be
accommodated to another passage unless the necessity of the letter demands it, but the
property and simplicity of words should be maintained as far as possible, because
otherwise we would have nothing certain from the words of Scripture. But here there is
no necessity of resorting to metaphor, as will be evident. Indeed, I add that this
metaphor is not consistent with the context, because Paul says that we should pray for
all because God wills all to be saved. Therefore, Paul induces us to desire the salvation
of all from the fact that God wills it. Hence, he attributes this will to GOD, not because
He creates it in us (otherwise he would already presuppose what he is trying to
persuade), but because He has it in Himself.
4. Second, because if God makes us will and desire the salvation of all men, it is
certainly because this is in accordance with His will; therefore, this effect of God,
namely that He makes us will the salvation of all, presupposes a similar will in Him.
Third, because Paul also shows this very will of God from the fact that there is one
God of all, who gave one mediator and redeemer for all; therefore, he speaks of the
will of God Himself. Finally, it must be added that the metaphor or property of words
in one passage should be taken from the harmony with other passages, as far as
possible; but in other passages such a metaphor is not implied in a similar locution, but
rather the property of words, as will be clear from what follows.
392 BOOK FOUR
5. The true sense of Paul's words. The true sense of Paul, therefore, is what the
words simply and properly understood convey: that God, as far as He is concerned,
wills and desires the salvation of all, so that on His part He denies to no one the
providence necessary [for salvation], nor does He leave the way of salvation simply and
of itself impossible. And this sense has been followed in that passage by Chrysostom,
Ecumenius, Theophylact, and other Greeks; Ambrose, Jerome, and other Latins in the
same place; Prosper, book 2, On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapters 19 and 25,
elsewhere 7 and 8; Athanasius, book 3, On the Assumption of Man. Also Chrysostom,
Homily 1, on the Epistle to the Ephesians, but especially Damascene, book 2, On the
Orthodox Faith, chapter 29; St. Thomas, Part 1, question 19, article 6, and Contra
Gentiles, book 3, chapter 159. And this opinion is now commonly accepted. Augustine
finally followed it in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 33, where he asks, if
the will to believe is a gift of God, why is it not given to all men, since God wills all
men to be saved; and he answers: "God indeed wills all men to be saved and to come to
the knowledge of the truth, but not in such a way that He takes away their free will, by
which they are most justly judged according to whether they use it well or ill; when this
is the case, unbelievers act against the will of God when they do not believe His
Gospel, etc." And in the book against the articles falsely attributed to him, the second
was that God wills all to be saved, to which he responds: "It must be most sincerely
believed and professed that God wills all men to be saved, since the Apostle, whose
saying this is, earnestly commands, what is most faithfully observed in all churches, that
supplications be made to God for all men, etc." These words are found in Prosper's
response to the objections of Vincent, response two.
6. And this truth is confirmed by other testimonies of the Scriptures, in which God
confesses that He does not will the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted
and live, Ezekiel 18 and 33. Also in those where He says that He stands at the door and
knocks, Apocalypse 3, and illuminates every man coming into this world, John 1, and
similar passages, which clearly show this divine will. Interpreters also gather this from
that passage in Hosea 13: "Your destruction is from yourself, only from me is your
help." For it is the same as if He had said, "I willed to help you, I willed to bring you to
salvation, and therefore your destruction had its origin in you, not in me." This certainly
would not be true if God of Himself did not will to save even those who perish.
Therefore, although it is not entirely certain that those words of Paul admit only this
sense, namely that God wills in some way proper to Himself the salvation of all men
without exception or limitation to the predestined—because the expositions given by
Augustine are made somewhat probable by his authority—I think this should be
understood provided that the other sense is not excluded as true and most literal, which
is effectively proven by everything we have adduced.
393 BOOK FOUR
7. Explained by reason. Hence, it is also clear that the conclusion we have proposed
should be accepted as certain and beyond all opinion, because it is sufficiently
expressed in Scripture and received by the common consensus of the Holy Fathers. By
reason it is declared, because God created the entire human nature (and the same
applies to the angelic) for a supernatural end; therefore He willed that, as far as in Him
was, all men should attain that end. The consequence is proven, because the divine will
acted differently toward human nature than if He had willed to create it in pure naturals
and only for natural beatitude; but the difference can be in nothing else except that
now, beyond the will to give man or angel such a nature, He also had the will to give
them such beatitude, as far as in Him was, from which end He excluded no individual
on His part, as will soon be declared.
8. A difficulty arises. Prior opinion. For here it may be asked whether God had this
will to save all men before foreseeing the fall of Adam, or also after it. For some say
that God willed to save all men only in the former way, according to the first institution
of human nature, in which Adam received justice for all men, by which they could be
saved; but that God did not have a similar general will concerning all men after He
foreknew them fallen in Adam, because He does not offer sufficient means by which
they might be saved to all, as seems manifest in many infants, and seems probable
concerning some adult unbelievers. And Driedo insinuates this way of speaking, On the
Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race, tract 1, chapter 4, to point 2.
9. Resolution of the difficulty. Nevertheless, I consider it certain that God had this
will in both moments and concerning men in both states. For concerning the former,
this is proven by the argument made about the ordination of the whole nature to that
end. And it is also declared by the effect, because God created the whole human nature
in Adam, and gave to him as head justice for all his posterity, with no individual
excepted; but that justice with the helps due to it was a sufficient principle for attaining
supernatural beatitude; therefore, it is a sign that it was given out of a will to save all.
This is confirmed, because if anyone had been excluded from that will, he would
equally have been excluded from participation in original justice, even if Adam had
persevered in it; therefore, he would not then contract original sin in Adam, nor would
the lack of original justice have in him the character of privation, but of mere negation;
but this cannot be affirmed of any man who draws his origin from Adam; therefore, no
one can be excluded from that general will of saving men. And this argument, applied
with proportion, proves concerning the evil angels, for if God had not had this will
toward them, He would not have ordered them to supernatural beatitude; therefore, it
would not have been a fault in them not to tend toward it through due means, which
cannot be said.
394 BOOK FOUR
10. But concerning the latter moment, or state of men in fallen nature, this is proven
by the passage of Paul in 1 Timothy 2. For there he clearly speaks of all who have
already fallen, for he commands that prayers be made for all of them, as they now are,
and for those for whom Christ offered Himself as redeemer. And the Fathers cited
above speak especially of this will, thus explaining Paul's words. The same is taken from
St. Dionysius, chapter 2, On the Divine Names, and 9, On the Celestial Hierarchy;
Irenaeus, book 4, Against Heresies, chapter 71, where he cites other passages of
Scripture, and the Scholiast there collects other passages of the Fathers, and I will refer
to more in what follows. Finally, it is proven a posteriori from the universal redemption
of Christ the Lord, for God, after foreseeing original sin, ordained Christ for the
redemption of all men, but this ordination, or this universal means, was an effect of
that universal will by which God willed, as far as in Him was, the salvation of all men;
therefore, He had this will even after foreseeing original sin. The consequence is
evident: the will of God, insofar as it preceded the absolute foreknowledge of original
sin, did not of itself demand the redemption of all, and with that prior will standing,
God could have not sent a universal redeemer; therefore, in our way of understanding,
He had a new will of freeing all men from the fall, and to that end of giving a universal
redeemer. But how this will has place in all will be clear from what follows.

CHAPTER II. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF GOD'S

WILL TO SAVE ALL PEOPLE, AND WHAT IS ITS PROPER OBJECT.

1. It is certain that this will was not an absolute and efficacious decree of the divine
will, which some call the will of good pleasure simply speaking, and others call the
consequent will. For what God wills in this manner is infallibly fulfilled. For it is written
concerning this will: "The Lord has done whatever he willed," and "Who shall resist his
will?" But it is evident that this will is not fulfilled in all people; therefore, it cannot be
such an absolute or predetermined will.
2. A certain opinion. From this, some have inferred that this will does not exist
through a proper and formal act of willing that is in God, because God does not have
an imperfect act of will, which is called a velleity, and a perfect and absolute act does
not exist, as we have said. Therefore, it is not properly an act of willing. They say, then,
that it is a will of sign, which is only metaphorical or interpretative. That is, God
conducts himself with all people as if he had that act of will. This is the opinion of
Cajetan on 1 Timothy 2, and Marsilius 1, d. 45. But others say that God does not have
such a formal and proper act of will that is directed toward the happiness of all people
in itself, for the reason given that God does not have a will that does not achieve its
effect—for a will that can be frustrated in its effect is imperfect and does not exist in
395 BOOK FOUR
God. They add, nevertheless, that God has a will to give sufficient means, which is
proper and formal in God, and from this God is called willing the salvation of all. This
is the opinion of many scholastics in 1, distinctions 45 and 46. The reason is that this
will has an effect, and thus is perfect in its own way, and therefore has a place in God,
and is a virtual will of the end, at least in the means and universal causes, such as
original justice, Christ's redemption, the Sacraments, the Word of God, general helps,
etc. And therefore, by reason of this will, God can rightly be said to will the salvation
of all.
3. First assertion. I say, however, first, that God has within himself a proper and
formal act or affection of will, by which he wills and desires the salvation of all people.
This is proven first by an argument taken from the cited words of Paul, adding the
general rule of Scripture that its words are to be understood in their proper sense,
where the matter or circumstances of the letter do not compel us to metaphor. This
especially applies when Scripture often speaks this way and nowhere explains the
metaphor, as is found here, as has already been shown and will be made clearer in what
follows. Furthermore, the Fathers mentioned above hold this view, especially
Chrysostom, homily 7 on 1 Timothy and homily 1 on Ephesians, and Damascene, book
2 of The Faith, chapters 20 and 30. Finally, it is explained by reason, because the will
that is called metaphorical always presupposes some proper will; therefore, even if in
the present case we admit a metaphorical will concerning the salvation of the
reprobate, the proper will should not be denied.
4. Proven by reason. I explain the antecedent: a metaphorical will is called a will of
sign, that is, some external sign that indicates something that God wills; but this sign
always presupposes in God some affection. For example, God's precept is called a will
of sign of God because it signifies that God wills what he commands, which must be
true according to some proper will; otherwise, it would not be a true sign. But that will
is not always efficacious concerning the work itself that is commanded, but is either a
complacency in the goodness of such a work, or a will to oblige someone to do it. And
this is always found in all signs of the divine will. So, therefore, if concerning the
salvation of the reprobate there is some will of sign, or some sign of the divine will,
since it is necessary that it be a true sign, it indicates in God some true will from which
proceed those signs that indicate to us that God, as much as is in him, wills the
salvation of such people.
5. Second assertion. I say secondly: This will of God is not only about the means or
effects of grace that will truly come about for these people, but also about eternal
blessedness itself, even if they will not attain it; indeed, in our manner of
understanding, it first concerns that, and then other things. This view, expressed in
these assertions, is (as I think) that of St. Thomas, Part 1, question 19, article 6, ad 1,
396 BOOK FOUR
and Durandus 4, distinction 47, question 1. This second proposition is proven because
God confers on these people the gifts of grace, whatever they are, for this end: that
through them they may attain eternal life, if they wish, or as much as is on the part of
God himself. Therefore, it is necessary that there be supposed in God some intention
of that end; but intention is a true will that concerns the end itself. The first antecedent
is self-evident and is frequently found in Scripture. The consequence, moreover, is clear,
both because an operation for an end expresses a relation to the end, which indicates an
origin from the intention of the end, and also because God gives to these same people
the principles and helps by which they can be condemned—indeed, in fact, while they
use them badly, they are condemned—and yet he does not give them for that end,
because he does not intend it. Therefore, for God to give something for an end, it is
not enough to will that object which can lead a person to that goal, but it is necessary
that God intend such an end, to which the other object is referred.
6. Evasion precluded. Nor is it enough to say that the means of grace by their nature
tend toward that end, so that God, in conferring them, can be said to give them for that
end. First, because this manner of operating for an end is not characteristic of an agent
acting by purpose, and therefore should not be attributed to God. Then, because there
are many means which are referred to that end not by their nature, but by God's will,
such as, for example, the Passion of Christ, the institution of the Sacrament, and
similar things, which, if God had willed, could have been ordained solely for the
salvation of the predestined. Finally, because, as I mentioned above, God could have
given even faith and charity to people so that they might act rightly in this life, without
the will to give glory and without an ordination to that end on God's part. Therefore,
that special intention is necessary on God's part. This is included in the very fact that
God willed to ordain human nature in all its individuals to the attainment of
supernatural blessedness, and he did not abandon that intention because of the
supervening sin of the first man.
7. Some noteworthy considerations. In order to better understand this act and to
resolve the foundations of other opinions, several questions must be considered. First,
whether this act is free or necessary in God. For some theologians indicate that it is a
necessary act, for they think it should be posited in God solely because the blessedness
of any person, apprehended not only as possible but also as future, cannot displease
God, since it is good, nor can the divine will remain merely negative or suspended, as it
were, regarding such an object, as they suppose. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary
that God will such an object. But this act cannot be anything but a simple complacency,
since it is not an efficacious act; therefore, it is a necessary act, since God necessarily
has knowledge or representation of such an object. This opinion also follows from
another principle, that God cannot have a free act concerning a created object unless by
397 BOOK FOUR
virtue of such an act some change immediately results in that object; but from this act
no change results in the object, therefore it is not a free act.
8. I, however, judge that such an act is free for GOD. This opinion is (as I think) that
of the theologians and Fathers whom I referred to in the preceding chapter. For they
do not deduce this will in GOD from any natural necessity, but from revelation and the
manner of speaking of Scripture, and from effects which, just as they are freely done,
so they show the free will of God. Likewise, if this will were necessary, it would not be
a special benefit of God, nor would man be bound to give thanks to God for this love
which he had toward him, ordaining him to supernatural blessedness. Indeed, it further
follows that God could not have created man without ordaining him to supernatural
blessedness, which I assume to be false from the material on grace. The consequence is
clear, because in creating him, he could not have failed to have that act of complacency
concerning his blessedness apprehended as possible, even if it would never come to be,
as is evident from the aforementioned opinion and by applying its reasoning. But
through this will alone God is said to ordain man to that end, for if another is required,
it is free, and it is that about which we are treating. A similar argument is that according
to that view, God wills the blessedness of the reprobate no more than that of the
demon, because even the blessedness of Lucifer, apprehended either as possible or
(which amounts to the same thing) as possibly existing, abstracting from whether it will
be future, does not displease God, because it is good in itself, therefore it pleases in the
same way; and similar examples could be multiplied. The reason a posteriori is that
whatever may be said about that simple necessary complacency, whether it is truly
asserted or not, beyond it an act is necessary by which God truly intends such an end
for this person. But this act cannot be necessary for God, for by virtue of it he does
something ad extra, if the creature does not place an impediment. But no act of will
that of itself brings about an operation ad extra can be necessary for God, as is
manifest in itself, and this reasoning will be clearer from the following question.
9. Second difficulty. Prior opinion. Secondly, it can be asked whether this will in God
is only a simple complacency, or is also an act in the manner of prosecution. For
Gregory and other theologians mentioned above use this distinction, and it can help to
explain the matter. For in the will an act can be understood by which the goodness of a
thing pleases, whether it is known to be possible or existing, yet in such a way that the
one who takes pleasure in it does not intend to make or procure it, and such is called
simple complacency; but when the will in some way proposes to make or obtain that
thing, it is said to pursue the thing by such an act, and such is intention and the other
acts that follow from it. Some, therefore, suggest that this will of God is only in the
first manner, because if it were of itself ordained to a work, it would either be absolute,
and thus always have an effect, or it would be conditional, and thus would not be a true
398 BOOK FOUR
will at present, but would be in the future when the condition would be fulfilled, as
when someone says, "If Peter were to come, I would do this," at that moment he does
nothing, but when the condition is fulfilled, the action would have to be performed.
10. Assertion. Confirmed by reason. Further confirmed. Nevertheless, I assert that
such a will is in the manner of prosecution and, as far as is in itself, leads to operation.
This is proven because every intention of an end is an act of this kind, for once that is
established, it is necessary that the will choose means and execute them, as much as the
intention requires, as is evident from the First and Second [parts of the Summa
Theologiae], and this is to be a prosecutive act. But this act of the divine will is a true
intention, as has been said, therefore [it is prosecutive]. And this can be clarified from
the difference between man as he is now created and as he would be created in a purely
natural state. For then in God that simple natural complacency could be understood;
but God, by virtue of it, would not confer any supernatural means on man thus created
—indeed, he could have an absolute purpose not to give anything of this kind. But now
he so wills that end for men that, by virtue of this will, he necessarily gives some
supernatural means, as will be more fully evident in what follows. Therefore, such a will
is not pure complacency, but a prosecution in some way ordained to the effecting of
the thing. This is confirmed and clarified, for if in God there is some simple
complacency that does not presuppose the knowledge of vision of a thing as already
existing or future, it is only about a possible thing. For although it is said to be about
something apprehended as existing, in reality this is only insofar as existence itself is
apprehended as possible, and thus it is represented to God only through the knowledge
of simple intelligence. Hence, by virtue of that complacency, such a thing is not
ordained to exist, and therefore such complacency can perhaps be a necessary act. But
the will about which we are now treating is not like this; rather, through it God wills, or
as Chrysostom says, desires, that such blessedness of man should exist, and therefore,
as far as is on God's part, such a good is ordained to exist. Therefore, this act has more
than simple complacency.
11. The contrary argument is answered. Hence, in response to the contrary
argument, I say that will is an act efficacious in some respect, insofar as it obliges God
(so to speak) to provide the means that pertain to him; it is not, however, an entirely
absolute act, but includes a condition in its object, as theologians commonly teach,
indeed, even the Saints, Ambrose, Chrysostom, and others on 1 Timothy 2, who say
that God wills to save man if man wills, or differently from Chrysostom on Romans 9,
God wills, as far as is in him. Nor does it follow that this act is not a true will at present,
because the condition is not placed on the part of the subject, which is how it usually
suspends an act, but is placed on the part of the object to limit it. For although God
now wills such an object to exist, he does not will it in every way, nor without that
399 BOOK FOUR
limitation, but only as much as the sufficient providence of God himself can require.
Whether, however, that will should be called one of good pleasure or not may be a
question of manner of speaking, for this term is taken by some for the absolute and
efficacious purpose of God, in which sense it is clear that it is not a will of good
pleasure. More broadly, however, and quite properly according to the force of the word
"Good pleasure," whatever pleases God and what he desires to happen, as far as is in
him, can be said to be [a will of good pleasure]. In this way, therefore, that will is
included among the wills of good pleasure, and thus it is not necessary that every will
of good pleasure has an effect, but [only] an absolute one always does; a conditional
one, however, only when the condition is fulfilled. Nor does it follow that this will is
imperfect, because it is not in God due to an inability to have a greater will, if he
wishes, but from freedom, and therefore it pertains rather to the perfection of God
that he can will in this way.
12. A final difficulty arises. Finally, it can be asked whether this will is equal with
respect to all in whom it does not have an effect. For the cited Fathers seem to speak in
this way, and therefore they compare God to the Sun, which is equally prepared to
illuminate all, as can be seen in St. Ephrem at the beginning of his works. They also
compare him to a doctor, who is prepared to heal all, [as in] Ambrose on 1 Timothy 2.
On the contrary, however, is the fact that the effects, or means, that are given to these
people are not equal, as experience shows; but it was said above that the difference in
the choice of means indicates a diversity of intention, because they maintain a
proportion among themselves.
13. Resolution of the question. I respond that the matter is uncertain, and either part
can easily be defended. For first, that equality of which the saints speak is not to be
understood simply, because they speak absolutely about all men, but only with respect
to this: that God, as far as is in him, excludes no one from the Kingdom by an
antecedent will. And then, within that manner of willing under a condition, there is no
contradiction in God, as far as is in him, willing to give ten degrees of glory to this one,
and a hundred to another, etc. This indeed is plausible in the case of reprobate angels,
assuming the common opinion that God gave them grace according to the proportion
of their natural gifts; for from this it is probable to infer that with the same proportion
he ordained them to glory, and thus it is also commonly believed that unequal seats
were prepared for them, which the predestined men have finally assumed. But in men
there is not entirely the same reason, because they do not have that inequality in nature,
nor does God observe such a proportion in giving them grace. Neither does the reason
mentioned above about the inequality of means in these men compel us, because that
inequality could arise from other causes: for perhaps many helps are given to the
reprobate on account of the predestined, rather than directly and per se for them.
400 BOOK FOUR
Perhaps, therefore, God willed from himself to save these indifferently, although (as I
said) the other can also be easily defended.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER GOD HAS PROVIDED SUFFICIENT MEANS

TO ALL NON-ELECT ADULTS FOR ATTAINING ETERNAL SALVATION.

1. Reason for doubt. The reason for the difficulty is that what God proposes from
eternity to be done by Himself in time is done with effect; but in time, sufficient grace
is not given to all non-elect, even though it can be given by God alone. Therefore, this
is a sign that it has not been provided from eternity for all. The consequence is evident.
The minor premise is confirmed by induction, because neither is sufficient grace given
to the reprobate who have once been justified to persevere in justice until death, nor is
the spirit of repentance given to all sinful believers so that they may be justified, nor are
unbelievers supernaturally illumined in a sufficient manner, which is indeed necessary
for salvation. The major premise is also proven because what God provides to be done
through secondary causes can be impeded, with God permitting it; but what is to be
done by God Himself could not be impeded by anyone if He had decreed and
provided to give it. Therefore, it is a sign that He has not provided what He does not
give.
2. Assertion. Nevertheless, it must be absolutely said that God has provided for all
these people means that are in some way sufficient for them to attain salvation. This is
the common opinion of theologians, whom I cited in chapter two both for our opinion
and for the contrary one, and the conclusion is understood to be about all who fell in
Adam, for there is no difficulty concerning the prior state. It is proven, first, because
Scripture speaks of these people whenever it makes these universal propositions
without exception: "God enlightens every man coming into this world" (John 1).
Although this is understood by some to refer to the natural light of reason, it is really to
be understood of the light of grace and faith, as is taught from the common opinion
of the Fathers by Jansenius, Toledo, and Maldonatus, and as is sufficiently clear from
the subject matter and context. Also relevant is that saying of Christ the Lord in
Matthew 11: "Come to me, all you who labor," etc. And that of 2 Peter 3: "Not willing
that any should perish." Chapters 12, 13, and 14 of Wisdom can also be consulted,
where this truth is taught in various ways and words.
3. Secondly, from these and other passages, Prosper proves this truth extensively in
his book 2 On the Calling of the Gentiles, from the beginning, and especially in chapter
8, formerly 20, and the following ones. And he has the same in his Response to the
Objections of the Gauls, in response 8, and to the Objections of Vincent, responses 2
and 7, which book is usually attributed to Augustine under the title To the Articles
401 BOOK FOUR
Imposed on Him. The same Augustine also favors this in book 3 On Free Choice,
saying that it is imputed to men that they despise God when He is willing to heal them.
This is confirmed in book 1 On Nature and Grace, chapter 67. Chrysostom also taught
this in homily 55 on Genesis and 7 on John. Cyril, in book 1 on John, chapter 11, and
excellently Basil in his Rules Discussed More Fully, rule 2. And many other things to
confirm this can be drawn from Scripture and the Fathers from Cardinal Bellarmine,
book 2 On Grace, chapter 5.
4. Thirdly, I show this from that principle: God abandons no one unless He is first
abandoned by that person, which was Augustine's view in his book On Nature and
Grace, chapter 26. And on this Prosper agrees, in the aforementioned response 7 to
Vincent, and Fulgentius, book 1 to Monimus, chapter 13, and finally the Council of
Trent approved it, session 6, chapters 11 and 13. Although the Council speaks only of
the justified, because it is more certain for them. But other Fathers speak more
generally, and it should be applied proportionally to individual states or orders of men,
as I will explain in what follows. Now from that absolute statement, I conclude thus:
Because if God from Himself had denied sufficient help to some people, He would
certainly have abandoned them before being abandoned by them, because there is no
greater abandonment in this life than the denial of sufficient help; and if God wills this
from Himself, He does not expect a cause from the part of man. Therefore, man does
not first abandon God. Indeed, man cannot truly be said to abandon God, because for
man to truly abandon God, sufficient help must be presupposed. Finally, this can be
confirmed by the argument made above about the universal redemption of Christ the
Lord, which I will better explain along with others and the manner of this sufficiency
by responding to the reason for doubt posed at the beginning, from which this truth
will also be confirmed.
5. In the presented argument, three difficulties are touched upon. Therefore, three
difficulties are touched upon in that argument. The first is about the reprobate who
have once been justified, because they are not given the gift of perseverance; for
whoever receives this gift perseveres, according to Augustine throughout his book On
the Gift of Perseverance and On Correction and Grace. But these people do not
persevere, therefore they do not receive this gift; therefore they lack a means necessary
for salvation, because such is that gift, for without it no one is saved, nor can be saved,
as Augustine holds in his book On Correction and Grace, chapter 12, and the Council
of Trent, session 6. Therefore, these people receive neither the power nor sufficient
help to obtain salvation.
6. To the first difficulty, a response is given. To this difficulty, we first concede that to
persevere in grace, a special help of God is necessary, which is called the gift of
perseverance according to the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 22, and the Council
402 BOOK FOUR
of Orange, canons 10 and 17. Then we say that this gift on God's part is prepared for
all the just, if they do what they can with the help they already have and should do to
obtain it. And thus in this respect also, all have sufficient help prepared for salvation.
The Council of Trent taught this clearly, session 6, chapter 13. And it follows from the
said principle, which is especially true in just men, because they are not abandoned by
God, according to that of Psalm 36: "The Lord loves judgment, and will not forsake his
saints." And 2 Chronicles, chapter 15: "If you seek him, you will find him; but if you
forsake him, he will forsake you." And the reason is manifest, because to persevere is
nothing other than to keep the commandments and not sin; but the just man always has
sufficient help not to sin, otherwise it would not be imputed to him.
7. Objection. It is resolved. You will say that he indeed has sufficient help to avoid
individual sins, but not all of them over a long time, which is necessary for
perseverance. I respond, first, that perseverance for a very brief time can be sufficient
for eternal life, as if justification occurs at the end of life. Then, the just man receives
help to avoid, for example, the first sin, in such a way that if he does what is in him at
that time and prays to God, he receives greater help to continue perseverance, and if he
always prays, he will also always find greater help prepared, and thus it is always in his
power to obtain this help, even for all sins collectively and for a long time. Indeed, even
the predestined often obtain this gift in practice in the aforementioned way, although
sometimes they are also more liberally prevented by God, as is established in the First
Part of the Second Part [of the Summa Theologiae], question 114, last article, where we
discuss this matter more extensively, and we have said something in book 3 On Helps,
chapter 11.
8. Second difficulty. The second difficulty is about reprobate sinners, even believers,
who are so abandoned in this life that they cannot be converted, as Augustine speaks of
Pharaoh, in his Unfinished Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, proposition 62,
where he says that his inability was so great that disobedience was no longer imputed to
him. And by the same reasoning, this will have to be said of all the blinded and
hardened, and consequently of all the reprobate, at least for some final time of life.
Because sufficient help for the conversion of a sinner begins with the excitation of
grace; but this excitation is not always given, but at certain times, therefore there is
some final one, therefore after that the sinner remains without sufficient help for the
rest of his life.
9. This difficulty is resolved. This difficulty will be briefly resolved, because the
principal part of it has been treated extensively in the material on penance. I say,
therefore, first, that all believing sinners have for some time in this life help so sufficient
for justification, and consequently for salvation, that it stands only by them that they do
not attain salvation, and this is enough in strictness for it to be truly said that GOD
403 BOOK FOUR
wills to save them and provides for them the means necessary for salvation. Then it is
said that even for the whole time of this life, the reprobate have in some way this
sufficient help, because although they do not actually receive it in themselves at any
instant or any part of time, God on His part is prepared to give it through the ordinary
and suitable means of His providence, which is enough, as I said extensively in the
volume on Penance.
10. The last part of the same difficulty is resolved. Hence to the last part of the
proposed difficulty, which proceeded against this, it must be conceded that there is
some final excitation in this life, which is regularly common to the reprobate and the
predestined. Hence, the reprobate cannot complain on this account about the
insufficiency of help, for sometimes, and often, they have sufficient [help], and they
impute it to themselves if they resist it. For it pertains to God's providence only to give
this kind of call at opportune times. Hence, just as in the course of life it happens that
between the first and second excitation, no opportunity occurs, so at the end of life,
from that instant in which the last excitation is given until the instant of death, an
opportune occasion for calling may not occur. And perhaps, because God foresaw this,
He therefore did not establish to give another call, since otherwise He is prepared from
Himself to call on every opportune occasion, and hence it is that that excitation was the
last.
11. And in almost the same way it must be said of the other part, which pertains
especially to hardened, blinded men, etc. For on God's part, sufficient help is denied to
no one at an opportune time, and when an impediment is not put; but it is man who
resists and becomes unable to attain salvation because he wishes it. As Augustine often
speaks, especially On Correction and Grace, chapter 12, and following. And thus in
these also it holds true that they are not abandoned by God, except because they first
abandon God: which is always to be understood of actual desertion and on the
supposition of a voluntary impediment, but not of complete desertion on God's part,
such that God would decide either not to call some men, even at an opportune time, or
not to help them to avoid sin and not to put an impediment, if they themselves wish it.
For in this way God abandons no one in this life, as we piously believe, concerning
which matter it has been discussed extensively in the cited place on Penance.
12. Third difficulty. The third difficulty is about unbelievers never called to faith. For
there are many such people, for whom God does not seem to have provided a way or
ordinary means by which they may obtain a supernatural call, because neither can they
prepare themselves for it, nor is it offered externally, because no preacher was sent to
them: "But how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore, a call has not been
provided for them according to ordinary law; but without a call they cannot be saved;
therefore, sufficient provision has not been made for their salvation.
404 BOOK FOUR
13. There are various ways of speaking in this difficulty. Reason. There are various
ways of speaking in this difficulty. Some think that all these people never receive a
supernatural call or illumination in themselves, and therefore all of them, considered
individually with the occurring circumstances, cannot believe, because of impediments.
Nevertheless, God with an antecedent will willed the salvation of all of them, and
provided general remedies for them, sufficient in themselves. But if perhaps these
cannot be applied in particular, God is not bound to help in a miraculous way: and it
would be a miracle if either faith were revealed without the ministry of men, as Paul
says in Romans 10: "How shall they hear without a preacher?" Or if some person were
brought there in an extraordinary and miraculous way. This opinion can be founded on
Augustine in book 4 against Julian, chapter 8, and other places, in which he equates
children and adults regarding this matter, and it is clear that God has not provided for
many children in any other way, as we will see in the following chapter. Prosper holds
the same in book 1 On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 13, and in book 2 through
many chapters. Nor does St. Thomas disagree in the Second Part of the Second Part,
question 2, article 5, ad 1, when he says that some are deprived of help or a call to faith
because of the impediment of sin, and sometimes because of original sin alone. Finally,
the reason is that from the general statements of Scripture: "God enlightens every
man," and similar, nothing more is gathered than that God provides this for all through
general causes. Hence they are understood of both children and adults, as Maldonatus
noted on the cited words of John 1. But other more special promises made for these
adults are not found.
14. Rejection of the aforementioned opinion. This opinion does not contain error or
rashness; nevertheless, it does not find my approval, both because theologians more
frequently hold otherwise, and also because it is excessively rigorous. For Scripture
signifies more about divine providence concerning adult humans. Since they can,
through their own acts, both be saved and be condemned, it seems to pertain to God's
providence that He would assist not only in general but also in particular each
individual, if they themselves have not placed impediments.
15. The second opinion. Therefore, there is a second opinion that is completely
contrary, namely that there is no human being using reason who is not at some point
illuminated in this life, such that by virtue of such an interior calling, one could, if
willing, immediately believe through a faith sufficient for salvation, and therefore
supernatural, both from the perspective of its material object and its formal object.
This opinion seems able to be derived from the Fathers referenced at the beginning of
this chapter, for they have statements that seem to persuade this view with probability.
And the reason is that it is not contradictory—indeed, it seems it could easily happen
through the ministry of angels, whom God has given as guardians of such persons,
405 BOOK FOUR
however unfaithful they may be, with a view to their beatitude—therefore it should be
believed that it happens this way.
16. This is not admitted. This opinion displays a certain piety, but it cannot be
sufficiently established, nor easily believed. For I suppose that faith concerning some
supernatural object is necessary for salvation. But it seems clear and certain that there
are many people to whom such an object is not revealed in this life, as Scripture
indicates concerning many nations of peoples, and as men experience. Nor can it be
said that they receive such a revelation, although afterward they completely forget it,
because although a person can be ignorant of the interior mode of operation in his acts
—that is, whether it is natural or supernatural—nevertheless, he cannot be ignorant of
the objects proposed and apprehended, at least for that time during which they are
actually proposed to him. Hence he can also retain them in memory, even if he has not
given faith to them; otherwise such a revelation would be useless, for if it is ignored, it
serves little or nothing for faith, and much less could it induce obligation.
17. Some explain this opinion. Others therefore explain this opinion by saying that all
unbelievers receive an interior calling of grace, so that they can believe supernaturally, at
least those things which can be known naturally about God, such as that God exists and
that He should be worshipped. Not because that faith suffices for salvation, but
because if a person receives it, through it he will dispose himself to be illuminated also
concerning supernatural objects, and thus finally be justified. And this opinion is
commonly attributed to St. Thomas, but his view is different, as I shall soon relate.
However, this can be attributed to Prosper, in book 1 of The Calling of the Gentiles,
chapter 5, where he says: "These Gentiles received prophetic voices and legal precepts
in the obedience and testimonies of the elements." He alludes to that statement of Paul
in Acts 14: "For He did not leave Himself without testimony," signifying that God used
these creatures not only to provide natural knowledge, but also to elevate humans to
supernatural knowledge of those same things that can be known through creatures, in
which manner some also expound chapter 2 of the Epistle to the Romans.
18. Even as thus explained, it is not approved. But even this opinion, though it may
perhaps be probable, is difficult for me to believe, both because I can scarcely believe it
can be understood that someone is elevated to believe supernaturally some object,
otherwise natural, unless he also receives a supernatural revelation of the same object;
and also because many Gentiles are found who were completely ignorant of all things,
even those which can be naturally known about God, such that they had neither
apprehension nor conception of them.
19. Assertion. Therefore it must be said that although a human cannot by his own
powers prepare himself for divine calling, he can nevertheless place an impediment to it
by sinning, and this is the reason why many unbelievers do not actually receive a
406 BOOK FOUR
supernatural calling, that is, one proximately sufficient for an act of supernatural faith.
Nevertheless, God, for His part, is prepared to call and illuminate all. Hence, whoever
does not place an impediment will in fact be illuminated or called, either externally
through humans—with God so arranging human affairs that this can happen without a
miracle, through another kind of gratuitous providence—or certainly by illuminating
internally through the ministry of angels, which is not entirely miraculous, but pertains
to supernatural providence, as is taken from Augustine in On Various Questions to
Simplicianus, question 2. In this manner, therefore, these people receive from God
sufficient help, at least by antecedent will.
20. But if someone should say that this very thing, that is, not placing an
impediment, is not within the power of these persons, it must be answered that for this
very purpose they are helped by God through some providence of grace, through
which, although they are not elevated to operate something above nature, they are at
least helped not to violate the natural law, and by completely resisting this grace, they
become incapable of a higher one. But if they were to use this grace, although they
would not merit a supernatural calling, nor dispose themselves to it, they would at least
not impede it, and thus at an opportune time a sufficient calling would be given to
them. And this opinion thus explained is that of St. Thomas in On Truth, question 14,
article 11, in reply to objection 5, and is taken from Against the Gentiles, book 3,
chapter 159, and from the First Part of the Second Part, question 89, article 6; of
Alexander of Hales, part 3, question 69, member 3, article 1; of Adrian, Quodlibet 4,
article 1; and from other theologians cited in book 2, if they are interpreted in a good
sense. This opinion is also that of St. Prosper in his book On the Calling of the
Gentiles, especially in chapter 8, otherwise 20, and the following ones. It is also
gathered from the expressions of Scripture cited above, and from that statement of the
Gentiles which Paul always attributes to their fault, as in Ephesians 4: "Alienated from
the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their
hearts." The only objection that might be raised here is that it would follow that
ignorance of faith is not invincible in all these people, but of this elsewhere. Now,
briefly, the consequence must be denied, because although they in fact place an
impediment, nevertheless they themselves are ignorant of this very fact, namely that
this is an impediment, and therefore they do not sin specifically in this. And in this way,
in these persons that principle is also preserved, namely that they are not deserted by
God unless they themselves desert God.
407 BOOK FOUR
CHAPTER IV. WHETHER GOD HAS
PROVIDED SUFFICIENT MEANS OF SALVATION FOR ALL
INFANTS WHO DO NOT REACH THE USE OF REASON IN THIS LIFE.

1. Reason for doubt. Concerning infants, there is a particular difficulty regarding

those who appear to be so destitute of the remedy for salvation that it cannot be
applied to them through human industry or diligence. This is what happens, first of all,
to all those who die in their mothers' wombs; then to those who are born in such
circumstances and condition that, before water can be found, for example, or a minister
called who knows how to baptize, they die. Finally, the same reasoning applies to all
who, without anyone's fault, depart this life without the Sacrament due to some
accident. Concerning these, an argument can be formed as follows: all of them lack the
remedy, and not because of their own will, since they are not capable of it, nor because
of the will of a parent or another person, because in their case it was not will but
human inability, since no fault or negligence of a parent or another intervened, as we
suppose. Therefore, this effect cannot be attributed to anything except the will of God,
who so arranged things that such a remedy could not be applied to such an infant, as
Augustine suggests in On Nature and Grace, chapter 8, and On the Gift of
Perseverance, chapter 12, and also in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 12. Therefore, we
must simply admit that God has in no way provided these little ones with a sufficient
remedy.
2. This is confirmed by comparison with adults. For if God were to deny all help for
salvation to an adult who placed no impediment, we would plainly say that by His will
alone He does not give it, and consequently that He has not provided him with
sufficient means. But now, since He does not deny it except to one who places an
impediment, we say that on His part He gives to all, and has provided for all. But these
infants do not place an impediment by their own will, as is evident, nor by the will of
their parents, because it is not placed in their will; indeed, often when they do as much
as they can, the ability to apply the remedy is lacking. Therefore, this cannot be
attributed to human will, but to the divine will, which of itself did not wish to provide
them with a sufficient remedy against original sin, solely because of the wickedness of
original sin.
3. On account of these arguments, Gregory, in 1, distinction 46, question 1, taught
absolutely that God positively and of His own accord did not wish to save many
infants, so as to provide them with a sufficient remedy against original sin. Driedo also
inclines to the same opinion in On the Captivity and Redemption of the Human Race,
treatise 5, chapter 3. St. Thomas is also cited for this opinion in 4, distinction 9,
question 1, in response to objection 1, as well as Gabriel in distinction 4, question 2,
408 BOOK FOUR
article 3, doubt 2, and Richard in 1, distinction 46, article 7, and Soto in book 2 of On
Nature and Grace, chapter 10, at the end. But in truth they do not say this, but rather
suppose the opposite, as I will soon explain. However, this opinion can be confirmed
because, although God instituted the general remedy of baptism, if God nevertheless
so arranged things that, even if parents do all they can, they cannot apply baptism, nor
does God confer special help for this purpose, it cannot be said that God has provided
those infants with a sufficient remedy. For baptism is not a remedy except as it is to be
applied, and as such it is impossible, because its application is impossible. Therefore, it
cannot be said that such infants had sufficient help, since they had it neither in
themselves nor in their parents.
4. Assertion. But although perhaps a large part of this controversy is in the manner
of speaking, I believe it should be said simply that God, on His part, willed eternal
salvation for these infants, and consequently provided for all of them, without any
exception, means that are in themselves somehow sufficient for eternal salvation. I
believe this to be the more common opinion of theologians, which I explain as follows.
For its first part pertains to another general dogma discussed above: "God desires all
men to be saved," under which all infants are comprehended by theologians by the very
fact that they are not excluded. Indeed, St. Thomas, Scotus, and others cited above
write about this, as do commonly the rest in 4, distinctions 4 and 6, and in 1, questions
45 and 46. Particularly concerning infants, Bellarmine speaks this way in book 2 of On
Grace, chapter 5, at the end, and Vega in book 5 on the Council of Trent, chapter 6, at
the end. And it seems to be the express opinion of Prosper in book 2 of On the
Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 8, otherwise 32. This view is especially founded on that
testimony of Paul: "God desires all men to be saved," along with everything that has
been said above about this and similar texts.
5. Evasion. Refutation. Some respond that those words of Paul should be limited to
adults, because Paul immediately adds, "and to come to the knowledge of the truth,"
which can apply only to adults. But this is of no moment, for Augustine, in book 4
against Julian, says even of little ones who are justified and saved: "They come into the
Kingdom of God, where there is certain knowledge of the truth." And in other places
he often teaches that baptized infants believe by habit, although they do not believe by
act. Therefore, in the same way, they can be said to come to the knowledge of the
truth. Nor is the word "coming" an obstacle, which seems to signify a voluntary
reception of faith. For even infants are said to come through the will of their parents,
according to the manner of speaking of the Church. Thus, the latter words do not limit
the former, which in strictness and propriety are universal. Moreover, the
considerations made above extend to infants, namely, that when Paul says we should
pray for all, or that Christ is the redeemer of all, he includes infants under that
409 BOOK FOUR
distribution. And thus the expositors have understood that passage, as did Augustine,
above: "Are not infants human beings," he says, "so that it does not pertain to them
what was said: 'He desires all men to be saved'?"
6. Response. From this principle, then, and from the first part of the assertion, we
conclude the latter part. For whoever wills an end, if he acts prudently, also wills
sufficient means for the end, at least in the way in which he wills the end; otherwise,
either formally or virtually, he would both will and not will. Therefore, if God of
Himself willed the end of eternal beatitude for all infants, He also willed and prepared
sufficient means, as far as He is concerned. Some respond that this assumption is true
of an efficacious and absolute intention of the end, but not of a will that is only simple
complacency, such as that will by which God desires all to be saved. The assumption is
proven thus: when someone in a shipwreck throws goods into the sea out of fear of
death, he has indeed a simple desire not to throw them, which we are accustomed to
express with the words "I would not want to throw them," but nevertheless he applies
no means towards not throwing them; rather, he is wholly engaged in throwing the
goods overboard. Therefore, it is a sign that a simple desire does not entail the
application of means. Therefore, although God with a simple desire wills the eternal
salvation of these infants, it is not inferred from this that He gives them sufficient
means for the same salvation. Indeed, together with the former desire there exists an
efficacious and absolute will of not applying necessary means, as the example given
clearly shows.
7. Rejection. This response, however, is foreign to the mind of the ancient
theologians, for they all believe these wills to be connected with each other, and
therefore almost all infer the latter from the former, as we saw in the preceding chapter.
Gregory, indeed, who dared to deny the latter, consequently also denied the former.
And this is explained first by reason: For if that will which God has concerning the
salvation of these infants does not of itself entail the conferral or offering of sufficient
means, then God wills these infants who have lapsed into original sin to be saved no
more than He willed the evil angels after their fall into sin to be saved, because He can
also take simple pleasure in that object, namely, the sanctification and glorification of
those angels, because viewed in itself it is excellent. Although, therefore, He did not
wish to apply any means to that effect, He can still have that simple complacency—thus
the reasoning is the same. A similar argument is that, in the same way, it could be said
that God wills the hypostatic union of all natures, of men and angels, because if for the
truth of that statement a desire or complacency so simple suffices that it neither entails
means nor in any way inclines to the work, but regards only the goodness or beauty of
the object in itself, then certainly with greater reason, God takes pleasure in that
410 BOOK FOUR
universal object of the hypostatic union and is simply inclined to it, more than to the
universal salvation of all infants.
8. Response to the contrary argument. Furthermore, in that response and in the
example adduced in it, a certain equivocation lies hidden, and a transition is made from
a simple and conditional will of giving means, as far as is on God's part, to an absolute
and efficacious will. For we do not say that God absolutely and efficaciously wills to
give with effect to all these infants all the means proximately sufficient for salvation, but
only that He is prepared, as far as He is concerned, to give them, and consequently wills
this at least with a simple desire and a will that includes a condition. And we say that
only this will necessarily follows from the prior will of saving all, even if an efficacious
will of giving means does not follow, as is self-evident. And the example given only
proves this last point.
9. In this example it should also be considered that in that imperfect will of throwing
goods overboard, which is called a velleity or simple desire, a condition is included
formally or virtually, on account of which it is also called a conditional will, because its
object is this: "I will not throw the goods overboard, if I can escape danger with them."
Under this consideration, therefore, that will has the character of an intention, not
absolute and efficacious, but with that limitation: "if I can be saved." And thus, by
virtue of that intention, means are applied that can serve that end under the same
condition, for whoever has that desire tries in every way to escape danger while
retaining the goods, as much as he can. But it does not pertain to that intention to apply
means towards not throwing the goods overboard when there is danger to life and ship,
because that desire does not extend with such perfection to that end. But at most there
is inferred from that intention a certain preparation of the mind to apply those means
and resist the throwing, if the danger ceases, so that the condition is fulfilled. This
consideration holds true in every similar desire that concerns an object that is simply
possible and that in itself can be obtained through means, and it is most true.
10. In this way, therefore, we must philosophize about that simple desire of the
divine will concerning the eternal salvation of these infants, for it has the character of a
certain intention of that end, insofar as it can be attained through means. However, it is
not an absolute intention, but includes some condition, which we explain in these
words: "I will, as far as is from me, or on my part." Under this condition, that will is
efficacious, or has the power of being efficacious, when the condition is fulfilled,
because a conditional, once the condition is fulfilled, transitions into an absolute. Hence
it happens that this will necessarily produces two effects: one is that if there are things
necessary for salvation that depend on God alone and are accommodated to the
capacity of infants, so that they can be conferred on them in some way, these are
necessarily offered to them and, insofar as they are capable, conferred on them. Thus
411 BOOK FOUR
Christ died for them, and equally for them as for others He offered His redemption.
Likewise, for them He instituted baptism, and as far as is in Him, conferred it, and
similarly for other means of this kind. And the reason is that in these means the
condition is fulfilled, as far as is in God, since they depend only on Him; therefore, with
respect to them, that will transitions into an absolute and efficacious one.
11. The other thing that the said will produces is that, in those means that depend on
secondary causes, such as the application of baptism and similar things, God, by virtue
of that will which is supposed to be in Him, cannot by special or direct providence
impede that application or execution of such means, otherwise He would already be
acting against that condition, "as far as is in Him." Hence, rather by virtue of this effect
He is compelled (so to speak) to offer, as far as is in Him, ordinary help or concurrence
necessary on His part for such an application. And this is enough for Him to be said,
of Himself, to will to furnish also these means, at least with antecedent and simple will,
proportionate to the intention of the end. However, He is not compelled, by virtue of
that desire concerning the end, to change the order of other causes, so that such means
are applied with effect, because this exceeds the limitation of that desire and the
condition included in its object.
12. And indeed Paul not obscurely confirms the former part of this discourse, when
immediately after those words he adds: "For there is one God, and one mediator
between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a redemption for all
of us." As if he were saying, therefore He gave Himself in redemption for all, because
He wills all to be saved. From this also is concluded the argument made above in a
similar case: Christ redeemed these infants sufficiently; therefore, He also offered His
death for them, which in its own kind is a remedy of itself sufficient for salvation, and
through it He merited for them, as far as in Him lies, the other sufficient means by
which salvation is customarily applied.
13. Evasion. Rejection. Some respond that Christ is said to be the redeemer of these
infants, not because He offered His passion for them, but because the price of His
passion was in itself sufficient even for them, and their cause was common with other
humans. But this is not enough for Christ to be truly and properly called the redeemer,
even as to the sufficiency, of such men: which is against the common opinion of
theologians. Prosper expressly teaches this in response to the first objection of Vincent,
and to the ninth of the Gauls, and it is taken from 1 John 2: "He is the propitiation for
our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the whole world," and 2 Corinthians 5:
"God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself," and Romans 5: "As through one
man's offense judgment came to all men, resulting in condemnation, even so through
one Man's righteous act the free gift came to all men, resulting in justification of life."
The consequence is clear, because it is not enough for the price to be sufficient unless it
412 BOOK FOUR
is offered; for even for the demons the value in Christ's Passion was sufficient, and
nevertheless Christ was not their redeemer, even as to sufficiency. And it would matter
little that the cause was common, if the offering of the price had not been common for
all. For instance, if a thousand men were captive for the same cause, and someone rich,
capable of redeeming all, would offer the price only for five hundred, and would in no
way wish to free the others, he would not be called their redeemer, even as to
sufficiency. Indeed, then there would be a clear exception and limitation, and purely
voluntary.
14. They respond that Christ indeed with a simple desire wished that His merits
would benefit these infants also, but the Father did not accept this, nor ordain it. But
this is not correctly said. First, because God with the divine will, no less than Christ
with the human will, willed the salvation and redemption of all, according to John 3:
"For God so loved the world," and 1 Timothy 4: "God is the savior of all," that is, as to
sufficiency, "especially of those who believe," as to efficacy. Hence, if Christ had that
will, as indeed He did, in this He conformed Himself to the divine will, through which
He had received the office of universal Redeemer, which He was executing through
that general offering. Hence, not only for infants who were after the coming of Christ
Himself did He offer His passion, as some wish, but also for all who were from the
beginning of the world, because He was the universal redeemer of all, and that offering
was necessary for redemption, as has been said. Nor does it matter that the fruit of the
passion could not be applied to them, for it is enough that in their times salvation was
prepared for them on account of Christ, as far as is on God's part, and from the
universal means that were instituted for this purpose, in which almost the same
reasoning applies to adults who had been condemned in earlier times. It is sufficiently
established, therefore, that general remedies necessary for salvation, which depend on
the will and institution of God and Christ alone, have been given to all infants.
15. The other part, concerning means that depend on secondary causes and are
applied through them, has been sufficiently explained above. For it contains two parts:
one is that God did not have an efficacious and absolute will of giving such means,
which is evident from the effects themselves, and is well proven by the arguments made
at the beginning. However, it is of no relevance to the present case, because from the
intention of the end, which is only antecedent and inefficacious, such a will of means
does not follow. The other part is that God with a similar antecedent will, and as far as
is on His part, would desire such means to be applied even to these infants, not indeed
in every possible way, for this would pertain rather to an efficacious will, but through
ordinary causes, for this is enough for the antecedent will of God, as a general provider.
This, therefore, is enough for God to be said to have provided sufficient remedies even
for these infants, and on His part to have placed an impediment for none, although He
413 BOOK FOUR
permitted it in many in whom He foresaw that it would happen from other causes. This
will become clearer by responding to the objections made at the beginning.
16. The first was about infants who die in the womb, on account of which Cajetan
thought that those infants could be saved without baptism through the prayers of their
parents, or through another remedy. And Gabriel and others indicate that this can be
hoped for from divine piety. It is certain, however, that they are not saved by law, nor
do they have another remedy, and this is what St. Thomas and Richard teach, and
extensively Soto and Vega. Here, however, Vega adds that they are not deprived of all
remedy, both because they could be saved by the baptism of blood, if the mother were
killed for Christ, and also because parents can obtain from God by prayers that they
come into this light before they die. I say, however, that it is enough that God wished
baptism to be so instituted that, in whatever way it is applied to them (whether by
cutting open the womb of the mother by right or by wrong, while she is living or after
her death, or in any other case), it would benefit them, and that He ordained causes in
which there would be power of itself sufficient for this effect. For, although in
particular it happens to be impeded, it does not pertain to general providence to change
the course of these causes, which (as I said) is enough for the antecedent will of God.
And the same must be said of any other case in which the application of baptism is
morally or humanly impossible, for that impediment, as such, is always from divine
permission, not from direct ordination. This permission presupposes foreknowledge,
and adds the will not to remove those impediments, but to order them to the higher
ends of providence. And this is all Augustine says in the cited passages.

[END OF BOOK FOUR: ON GODS PROVIDENCE CONCERNING THE

REPROBATE]
414 BOOK FIVE

BOOK FIVE: ON REPROBATION

Since reprobation and predestination are in their own way opposites, and in that
opposition reprobation is compared to predestination as privation is to habit, from
what we have said about predestination, it will be easy to briefly explain everything that
pertains to reprobation, because privation is easily discerned from habit, and one
opposite through another. Therefore, all those things that we have said about
predestination, we shall encompass in this book. We shall speak first about the acts that
contribute to reprobation and in which it consists, then we shall explain its causes and
effects.

CHAPTER I. THAT REPROBATION EXISTS IN GOD, AND WHAT IT IS.

1. Theologians use the term "reprobate" to refer to all men or angels who do not
attain eternal beatitude. This word in this meaning may not be found expressly in
Scripture; for wherever mention is made of the reprobate, the word can be taken
simply to mean the wicked, as in Ecclesiastes 9: "Many men, admiring the beauty of a
woman, become reprobate," that is, wicked. Similarly in 1 Corinthians 9: "I discipline
my body, etc., lest I myself should be reprobate." Although this passage could be
understood perfectly well in the Scholastic sense, as Anselm explains. Whatever may be
the case regarding the term, the reality itself is certain as a matter of faith, namely, that
there are many reprobate men to whom it is said in Matthew 25: "Depart, you accursed,
into everlasting fire." These are also called in Romans 9 "vessels of wrath," and in 2
Timothy 2: "vessels unto dishonor." Why God has permitted these men to be
condemned, we shall see later.
2. Whether reprobation exists. Hence considering the reality itself, it is equally certain
that reprobation exists, since a reprobate is constituted or denominated as such through
reprobation. To reprobate is to reject something, especially in comparison with
something else. Therefore, two aspects can be understood in reprobation. One is the
external separation and rejection of the reprobate, as is said of Christ in Psalm 117:
"The stone which the builders rejected," and in Mark 8 and Luke 17: "It is necessary
that he suffer many things and be rejected by the nations." And in this way, the external
reprobation of those who are damned will take place in the final judgment, either
particular or general. Hence it is a matter of faith that reprobation, as regards this
aspect, exists. However, this external reprobation presupposes an internal one, which
occurs through judgment and will, according to Isaiah 7: "That he may know to reject
415 BOOK FIVE
evil and choose good." For reprobation is the work of an intellectual agent, and
therefore must arise from intellect and will. And thus it is also established that
reprobation is found in the divine mind, because it is God himself who reprobates
externally; but he reprobates from internal judgment and will, and therefore
reprobation is signified in Scripture by the name of hatred, foreknowledge, or other
similar terms, as we shall see. We are therefore dealing with this internal reprobation,
for the other pertains to the execution of divine providence.
3. From this it follows first that this reprobation is eternal, just as we said of
predestination. This is proven because whatever God executes in time, he decreed and
conceived mentally from eternity, since he cannot will or understand anything anew. But
God executes this reprobation in time; therefore, its rationale preceded from eternity in
God's mind. From this it is also concluded that this reprobation exists formally only in
GOD, while in the creature, that is, in reprobate men, it places only an extrinsic
denomination. Formally (I say) because effectively it places certain intrinsic effects in
creatures, as we shall see later. The reason is that nothing is eternal except in GOD; but
reprobation is eternal, therefore it exists intrinsically only in God.
4. In God there is not reprobation properly speaking. Some theologians add,
however, that even in GOD there is not reprobation properly speaking, but only
metaphorically, in the way that the will of the sign is metaphorically called will, as can
be seen in Aureolus in Book 1, distinction 41, article 3, proposition 4. The reason may
be that acts of hatred or similar acts, which reprobation can signify, are not in GOD
properly speaking, but metaphorically. However, whatever may be the case regarding
particular acts, which we shall see later, nevertheless, speaking absolutely and simply, it
is entirely certain that reprobation exists in GOD properly and not only metaphorically.
First indeed, because it is probable that reprobation pertains more to foreknowledge
than to will. Next, because it was shown above that metaphorical will always
presupposes in God some proper will. Finally, because the effects of reprobation are
most properly from God and from his providence; therefore they cannot but
presuppose some proper knowledge and will, from which they proceed, because this is
necessary for all God's effects and pertains to perfection and involves no imperfection.
5. Reprobation consists in some immanent act of God. Thirdly, it follows from what
has been said that reprobation is placed in some immanent act of God that is in some
way free, whether it be of intellect or will or both. This is proven because, absolutely
speaking, reprobation could not exist in God; for if he had willed, he could have so
arranged all things that no man or angel would be damned. Therefore, reprobation does
not belong to God out of simple necessity, but freely. But nothing in God is free and
eternal except an immanent act of God, with a certain respect to the creature; therefore
reprobation is such. Moreover, an immanent act in God is only of intellect or will, as is
416 BOOK FIVE
self-evident; therefore. However, the name of reprobation can be accommodated to
either act. For reprobation is opposed to approval; but we approve something first
through a judgment of reason, by which we judge correctly concerning its goodness,
truth, or dignity; and conversely, we reprobate that about which we judge otherwise.
And so in common usage we are said to reprobate that opinion which we judge to be
false. In this way also can be understood that verse of Psalm 32: "He reprobates the
thoughts of peoples." Through the will also we are said to approve something when we
choose it as suitable. And conversely, the rejection opposed to this election is usually
called reprobation. And in this way, the reprobation of evil is opposed to the election
of good, in those words of Isaiah 7: "That he may know to reject evil and choose
good." Therefore, in divine providence this name of reprobation can be
accommodated to either act. For in God there is both an eternal judgment concerning
the evil merit and unworthiness of wicked men, and there is a will to render condign
punishment; therefore either act can be called reprobation. And it is certain that in the
matter of reprobation both are required, as will be further evident from what will be
said.

CHAPTER II. WHETHER REPROBATION

IS PRIMARILY AN ACT OF INTELLECT OR OF WILL.

1. Common distinction of reprobation into negative and positive. This question does
not seem of great importance, because it seems to pertain more to the use of the word
than to any new reality. However, so that we may know how we should speak, we must
presuppose a certain common distinction of a twofold reprobation, positive and
negative. The present question concerns positive reprobation, for this without doubt
consists in a positive act; for negative reprobation is preserved per se and strictly in the
absence of some act. What that act is, the absence of which is called negative
reprobation, will be established in the following chapter. For from what will be said
there, it will be easily understood that this negative reprobation is nothing other than
the absence of divine election or of the singular love of the predestined. Hence it will
also be easily established that, just as the election of the predestined is in the will, so
this negative reprobation must be placed in the will, because privation and habit are
proximately concerned with the same thing. Therefore, in the present chapter we are
dealing only with positive reprobation.
2. Some people's view. Another view. A third view. This way of speaking is chosen.
Some have said that reprobation consists equally in both acts of intellect and will,
because it cannot exist without both. Alexander of Hales, Part 1, question 29, member
2; Richard, in Book 1, distinction 41, art. 3, quest. 1; Marsilius, question 41, art. 1, notes
417 BOOK FIVE
4 and 5. Others attribute reprobation principally to the will, like Durandus in Book 1,
dist. 40, q. 2, and others whom I will refer to in the following chapter. And St. Thomas
seems to favor this view in q. 6 on Truth, art. 1, at the end. I will state the foundation
shortly. Others, however, place reprobation principally in the intellect. This is more the
opinion of St. Thomas, Part 1, q. 23, art. 2 and 3, and all his disciples. And the usage of
theologians favors this, for perhaps for this reason they call the reprobate, as if by
antonomasia, the "foreknown." And I also prefer this way of speaking, for two reasons.
The first is that the verb "to reprobate" itself is more properly and principally said of
the judgment of the intellect; for it is the intellect that first reprobates someone, while
judging him to be wicked and unworthy of beatitude. Secondly, because of the thing
itself, for I think that the Divine intellect has the primary parts in this matter of
reprobation, and the will has an absolute decree concerning it only when in a certain
way obliged, as it were, by the judgment of the intellect; therefore reprobation will
rightly be said to pertain principally to the intellect.
3. Objection. But someone might object: opposites are concerned with the same
thing; but reprobation and predestination are opposites; therefore they should be
placed in the same power and in the same order. Likewise, reprobation is a part of
providence, just as predestination; so either providence is principally in the intellect or
in the will. If the first, then reprobation will also be principally there, but by the same
reasoning so will predestination. If the second, then both should also be placed
principally in the will; therefore we do not rightly divide them.
4. Solution. I respond that a distinction between predestination and reprobation
should be noted, and kept before our eyes in this whole matter. For in predestination
we have distinguished two orders, namely, of intention and of execution. The former
can properly be called the preparation of the end and means, in which preparation the
proper notion of predestination is placed. But the latter order of execution is more
connected with the effect of predestination, and can properly be called approval, which
as such begins from the divine judgment foreseeing merits and is consummated in the
will to give the reward for them. Reprobation, therefore, properly taken for positive
reprobation (for we shall speak below about negative reprobation, if there is any) is
opposed to predestination insofar as it is approval, not insofar as it is preparation. For
in reprobation there is not found an antecedent intention of God by which he wills
damnation as an end, toward which he directs proper means, as we shall now show, but
there is found a judgment concerning a man's evil merit and his unworthiness, and a
will to render what is due to him; and therefore it is not necessary that if predestination
begins from the will, positive reprobation also begins from there, but just as approval
begins from judgment, so does reprobation. And by this the main difficulty has been
answered.
418 BOOK FIVE
5. Response to the confirmation. To the confirmation it should be conceded (indeed
it follows from what has been said) that reprobation is a part of providence, not
properly a subjective part, but an objective one, and as it were integral, as we have
explained about predestination. Because it pertains to divine providence not only to
confer benefits and rewards on those who deserve well, but also punishments on those
who act badly; for both are necessary for perfect governance, although in different
ways. For the former is in itself fitting and necessary, but the latter is on the
presupposition of some evil, because it is not good in itself and simply, but to vindicate
some other greater evil. St. Thomas adds, however, in Part 1, q. 23, art. 3, that it also
pertains to the universal providence of the supreme governor directing things to their
ends to permit some to fall short of attaining their end, because it pertains to universal
providence to allow things to operate in a way natural to them, and consequently to be
impeded or to fail, if this is in accordance with their nature. We shall see other reasons
for this permission later.
6. Hence it happens that not only does proper positive reprobation pertain to
providence, but also that which is necessarily presupposed for such reprobation, such as
the permission of sin. But in different ways, for this permissive providence by its nature
is not necessarily founded on any absolute foreknowledge of future things, but on the
divine will, as we shall see; but reprobation always presupposes absolute foreknowledge
of some effect of which God is not the cause. And for this reason, whether all
providence is principally attributed to the intellect or to the will, nevertheless this part
of it, which is positive reprobation, has its primary parts in the intellect. For there is no
inconvenience in the fact that with respect to some whole, regarding one part of it, one
act is more principal, but with respect to another part, another act is prior and chief, as
is manifest in itself. But in order that all these things may become clearer, the acts of
the divine will and intellect that intervene in reprobation must be explained in
particular.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER GOD OF

HIMSELF WILLED TO EXCLUDE ANYONE FROM THE
HEAVENLY KINGDOM IN THE FIRST SIGN OF REASON, IN
WHICH HE DECREED CONCERNING THE SALVATION OF MANKIND.

1. The First Opinion. Some theologians maintain that God preserved the same order
in his will with the reprobate as he had with the elect. And thus, in the same sign of
reason in which God efficaciously chose some for glory, he also willed absolutely and
simply that others would not attain glory. This is the view of Durandus, in 1, d. 40, q. 2,
number 6, and Corduba indicates it, book 1, qu., q. 56, note 2, opinion 5, although with
419 BOOK FIVE
some doubt. Some modern theologians also defend it, and the heretics of our time
have especially embraced it, particularly Calvin and Beza, who attribute it to Augustine,
book 1, to Simplicianus, q. 2, and book 11, Genesis ad Litteram, chapter 10, and to
Prosper, book 1, on the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 21, but wrongly, as I will clearly
show below. The principal foundation is drawn from those words in Romans 9: "Jacob
I loved, but Esau I hated." For that hatred was opposed to love, and no less efficacious
than that love: because it is just as absolute an act of the divine will as the act of love:
therefore it infallibly brings about and virtually contains reprobation: for just as that
love concerns the good of glory, so hatred concerns the evil of the absence of glory.
And yet about both it is said equally, "before they had done anything good or evil."
Therefore, God had both acts in the same sign of reason.
2. From this a reason can also be formulated, for the will of God does not remain
suspended, nor does it behave merely negatively concerning any object. Therefore,
those to whom he did not efficaciously will to give glory in that sign, he absolutely
willed not to give it: because the negation of one will is (so to speak) the positing of
another. And this is confirmed, for just as God of himself willed to give glory to the
predestined to demonstrate his grace, so he willed not to give it to others, either to
demonstrate his power and justice in them, or to demonstrate grace in others. For Paul
indicated the former purpose in the same ninth chapter, saying about Pharaoh: "For
this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you," that is, his
might: and more universally about the reprobate he adds: "What if God, desiring to
show his wrath and to make known his power," etc. The Apostle proposes the latter
purpose when he says: "The potter is free to make a vessel for honor or for dishonor
from the same lump," and thus God made the reprobate "to show the riches of his
grace in the vessels of mercy." Therefore God of himself, and thus in the first sign of
reason, when he had seen no inequality in men, had preconceived these purposes of his
general providence, and by virtue of these purposes alone, just as he chose these, so he
willed to cast the others out of the kingdom.
3. The Second Opinion. The second opinion is more moderate, that God did not
behave this way toward all the reprobate, but toward some he had this will, which they
prove not so much from Scripture as from effects. For some are so abandoned by God
that not only are they not saved, but they cannot even be saved, with proximate power
and in particular, as is especially evident in those infants to whom baptism cannot be
applied by human means: and the same is true in its own way for adults, to whom the
light of the Gospel does not come, nor perhaps supernatural divine inspiration. For (as
I have often said) means show the intention of the end: but these means are such that
they have infallibly joined to them exclusion from the Kingdom: therefore it is a sign
that God intended it by an absolute will, at least concerning such men.
420 BOOK FIVE
4. The Third Opinion. Finally, others moderate this view, saying that God of himself
willed absolutely to exclude no one from the Kingdom, neither before nor after
foreseeing the fall of human nature in Adam; yet there is a certain diversity between
these two signs or these two states. Before foreseeing original sin in human nature, God
not only excludes no one from the Kingdom by his absolute will, but rather has toward
all an affection of simple will to save all: he behaved in the same way toward the angels
before the foreknowledge of sin. But after foreseeing the fall of human nature,
although he still did not will to cast anyone out of the Kingdom by an efficacious will,
nevertheless he did not have that simple affection of desiring eternal blessedness for all
of them, but toward many he had this kind of simple affection of will to give them the
kingdom, as much as is from himself. But concerning some, they say, after foreseeing
original sin, God had a simple will, and as it were a desire, to cast them out of the
Kingdom, because of original sin, and from this will he prevented the remedy against
that sin from being able to be applied to them. This they especially affirm concerning
those infants to whom such a remedy cannot be applied. And the foundation is,
because this inability, or impediment, which occurs in time, does not happen without
divine providence, which is not only permitting, but also ordaining, because that effect
often occurs without sin, and whatever is not sin is not only permitted, but also
ordained by God: therefore it is a sign that this means is willed by GOD for that end,
intended at least through a simple will.
5. To explain the truth, therefore, I posit, or suppose, that we can speak of all, either
before or after foreseeing Adam's sin. And in the prior consideration I also include
angels among human beings, because there is one reason for all. But under the latter,
the sin of Adam (which is proper to human nature) can be considered either precisely
as it was in Adam, in whom we all sinned, or as already communicated and participated
in by individuals through the proper original sin of each. These two considerations can
contribute to other effects to be treated below, but in the present question they have the
same reasoning: and therefore we will comprehend both reasons absolutely under the
fall of human nature.
6. First Assertion. I say therefore first: Before foreseeing the Angelic or human sin
respectively, God did not have an absolute decree of excluding any intellectual creature
from the heavenly Kingdom. I consider this truth so certain that I judge the contrary
improbable and alien to sound doctrine. St. Thomas teaches it, q. 6, on Truth, art. 1, in
the final response, Scotus in 1, dist. 41, q. 1, at the end, where he says that nothing else
can be thought without cruelty. The same is taught by Basolis, dist. 40, q. 1, Ferrara 3,
against the Gentiles, chap. 161, and Corduba above is not opposed to this view, which
Catherinus defends, book 2, on Predestination, at the beginning, so that he says the
opposite is horrible and strikes the ears of all the pious: and that Augustine himself
421 BOOK FIVE
detests it as impious in book 6, Hypognosticon. Also Horatius, book 3, of Catholic
Places, chap. 8, for this reason says about Calvin that he constructs God as atrocious
and ferocious. Stapleton, in chapter 9, Epistle to the Romans, verse 20, § Now
therefore, and § Indeed, and following, and below verse 30, says that this was the
execrable sense of Calvin, who accuses God of iniquity and injustice. Similarly,
Viguerius, in Theological Institutions, chapter 20, § 8, verse 2, says that that view
repugns divine justice. Many similar and more harsh statements against this view are
made by Joannes a Bononia, in his book on Predestination, scattered throughout. And
Flaminius Nobilius, book 1, on Predestination, chapter 7. I do not refer to these in
order to approve all these exaggerations and censures, and make them my own (for I
entrust judgment of them to others) but only to propose the sense of Catholic
theologians, which cannot but greatly move the reader.
7. This position is proven first from those words in Wisdom 1: "God did not make
death, nor does he delight in the destruction of the living," with similar texts adduced
above, in which Scripture always signifies that God of himself wills death, especially
spiritual death, or damnation, to no one, which would not be true if of himself, and not
provoked by creatures, he had such a decree. Some say that those testimonies are to be
understood in terms of the punishment of hell, which includes pain and other
disorders and miseries that are in hell, but not in terms of the simple absence of the
beatific vision. Because that vision is not owed to human nature: and therefore God
could by his liberty deny it to whomever he wished. But this response is false, because
the first and principal punishment, in which the second death of the soul consists, is
the perpetual privation of that beatitude, and consequently also of divine grace, and in
the same consists proper damnation as to its substance. Hence infants who die without
the application of a remedy against original sin are truly damned and die the second
death by reason of this privation alone. For such a lack does not now have the character
of negation in any human being, but of privation and punishment, because although
eternal beatitude is not owed to nature considered in itself, nevertheless it is owed to
nature as elevated to that end, if sin does not obstruct it, from the divine ordination.
8. Secondly, this truth is taken from the Council of Orange, canon 25, and the
Council of Trent, session 6, canon 17, insofar as they condemn those who say that God
predestined some to evil, as he predestined others to good. Although this is understood
by some as predestination to the evil of fault (which could be sufficient for us, as I will
soon say), nevertheless the Councils, if read carefully, also speak of predestination to
eternal damnation, namely that God decreed it by his will alone, without preceding
guilt. This was clearly declared by Prosper in response to the objections of the
Vincentians, response eleven. Hence also the Fathers, whom I referred to at the
beginning of this work, who sometimes distinguish predestination to life and to death,
422 BOOK FIVE
establish a difference, because God has the former of himself, but by no means the
latter, until he foresees the sins of men, as can be seen in the Council of Valence under
Lothair, chapter 5, and in Fulgentius, book 1 to Monimus, chapter 13, and Augustine
clearly holds the same view on the predestination of the Saints, 11, where he cites that
from Psalm: "I will sing of mercy and judgment to you, O Lord," because
predestination to life is from mercy, the other from judgment; and therefore in epistle
105 and 106, and book 3 against Julian, chapter 18, and book 11 Genesis ad litteram,
chapter 11, and often elsewhere he says that God is not an avenger before man is in sin.
9. Reasoning. Hence thirdly, I argue thus by reason: if God had the will to exclude
some from the Kingdom, he either wanted to do this by power alone, or by justice. The
first cannot be said according to faith, otherwise such men would have to be excluded
from the Kingdom even if they had not sinned at all, because God absolutely willed it
from power and dominion alone. But if the second is said, since that justice is
vindictive, God does not will it of himself, but because of the sins of men, according
to the doctrine of Damascus, book 2, on Faith, chapter 29, and for the reason touched
on above, because if God absolutely wanted to exercise this justice, without foreseeing
guilt, he would virtually will and ordain the guilt itself, which is repugnant to God.
10. Hence in this there is a difference to be noted, and a similarity between the will to
give glory and to exclude from it, if both are supposed to be prior to the foreknowledge
of future works. For just as the intention of giving glory as a crown of justice virtually
includes the will to give good merits, and therefore by virtue of it, it is necessary that
God give and procure them, so an efficacious will to exclude from the Kingdom would
virtually include the will to give and procure bad merits, which are necessary for that
exclusion to be made from vindictive justice, as it is said to be preordained. However,
these virtual wills differ in that the former is consonant with divine goodness, but the
latter by no means. For God not only cannot will or procure bad merits for man, but he
cannot even permit them from that affection so that man falls and loses the kingdom,
because such an intention considered in itself is not worthy of God, as is evident.
11. Second Assertion. I say secondly: After the foreseen sin of Adam and the original
sin, which all men contract from him, God did not immediately, because of that alone,
and in that same sign of reason, exclude from the Kingdom by an absolute decree of
his will all men who are in fact damned, indeed not even any of them. The theologians
and doctors cited above also intend this assertion, for they speak of men constituted in
the present state of fallen nature, about whom, as I think, the Councils and saints also
speak, on account of which I believe this assertion is no less true than the preceding
one. But in order to prove it, especially as to the last part, in which we say that God
excluded no man from the kingdom by a definite council, it is necessary to distinguish
between original sin as precisely contracted, or as lasting in man throughout the whole
423 BOOK FIVE
time of life until death, and as thus foreseen. For considering original sin in this latter
way, there is no doubt that God willed from eternity to exclude many men from the
kingdom because of original sin alone: however, not in that first sign of reason, in
which he foreknew the fall of Adam, but after he foreknew that those men would
persevere in it until death. For according to faith, God does this in time: but whatever
he does in time, he decreed from eternity. And that will is most just, pertaining to
vindictive justice, supposing the covenant made with Adam. But now we do not
consider original sin in this way, but in the former way, that is, as precisely contracted,
and stopping at that sign of reason in which such a fall of human nature was
foreknown, in which men were strictly foreseen as fallen in Adam. For after that
knowledge, according to our manner of understanding and speaking, God decreed to
redeem the entire human race as to sufficiency: therefore, we say that in that same sign,
God in that sign excluded no one from the Kingdom because of the fall of Adam
alone, thus foreseen.
12. The Assertion is Proven. The assertion is proven first, because in that sign God
willed, as much as is from himself, to save all fallen men: but with that will there is a
repugnance in the decree of excluding from the kingdom all who are not saved, if it is
attributed to God from himself alone, with only the foreknowledge of original sin. This
is proven, for a simple will of some good, and an absolute nilling of the same good, are
not repugnant when neither is had from the liberty of the willer alone, without any
other cause or condition; however, that with the same condition posited on the part of
the person, someone should will as much as is from himself to confer some good on
that person, and at the same time absolutely and simply will not to give that good to
that person, is a manifest repugnance. Because he who absolutely does not will, simply,
and as much as is from himself, does not will; but to will from oneself, and not to will
also from oneself, is a repugnance. So it is in the proposition: for with original sin
posited, God absolutely willed to give the remedy of salvation to all, and thus to free all
from that fall, as much as was in himself: therefore it cannot happen that in the same
sign of reason, and without any other condition or cause foreseen, he simultaneously
efficaciously willed not to admit to the Kingdom such a multitude of men, because
these two wills plainly repugn, as has been explained.
13. And this reasoning not only proves the first part of the assertion, namely, that
God did not have such a will concerning all men who in fact are not saved: but it also
proves the second, that he did not have such a will concerning any of them. Because it
has been shown above that concerning all fallen men, with no one excepted, God had
that will of saving each one on his part, notwithstanding original sin: therefore this will
does not admit another concerning anyone: therefore God had such a will concerning
no one at all. Furthermore, if God had willed not to admit some to the kingdom after
424 BOOK FIVE
foreseeing original sin, therefore he would have had that will as punishment for
foreseen original sin: for such a will is said to be from vindictive justice, and therefore it
is placed after original sin was foreseen, and not before. But that cannot be universally
true, because many reprobates are not cast out of the Kingdom because of original sin,
as is clear about all those for whom original sin is remitted in this life, who are not
punished for it, especially by the eternal punishment of the future life: therefore God
could not have had that punitive will concerning them. For what does not happen in
time, God did not efficaciously will it from eternity: otherwise the absolute divine will
would not be fulfilled, which is repugnant.
14. Objection. Response. You will say, some are damned because of original sin
alone: therefore at least those could have been excluded in that sign. I respond by
denying the consequence: because that sin, as precisely contracted, is never in time a
sufficient reason for the privation of beatitude in perpetuity, but as lasting in man until
his death: therefore because of it as thus foreseen, God did not have such a will.
Otherwise, by virtue of that will, God would be obliged to prevent that sin from being
taken away from those men, and to ensure that it lasted until death. Hence, God would
also have virtually willed that duration through such will, all of which are absurd, and
this will be established more strongly from the following assertion.
15. Third Assertion. It is proven. I say thirdly, God from himself and by a simple will
did not desire to deprive any man of eternal glory, even after foreseeing original sin.
This assertion is against the third opinion, and although this assertion does not seem as
certain as the preceding ones, because theologians do not speak so explicitly about it:
nevertheless it seems to me entirely true and follows with the same proportion from the
foundations posited. First, because with that affection of God to save all and each, as
much as is from himself, which Chrysostom also called an ardent desire, with this (I
say) repugns not only an absolute will, but also a similar desire to the contrary, or of a
contrary object, when both are had with the same knowledge and the same causes and
reasons. Especially since we said above that this desire for salvation is not in God just
any kind of complacency, but a true prosecution by way of intention, efficacious as to
this, that it obliges God to give means sufficient of themselves: therefore it cannot
happen that God simultaneously and of himself had a similar intention concerning the
contrary evil of the same person. Hence the authors of that third opinion place this
desire for the damnation of some, especially infants, because of original sin alone,
because they think that God did not have a desire for their salvation, nor conferred on
them any sufficient means. However, as this foundation is false, as I have shown above,
it is equally false that God had such a desire for the damnation of those men.
16. It is Corroborated. And it is confirmed, for if there were any reason for placing
this act in God, it would be especially because in time many are in fact prevented from
425 BOOK FIVE
being able to obtain a remedy for original sin. But from this no argument is drawn,
because it is not necessary, indeed not credible, that such an impediment proceeds from
the direct intention of God procuring this, so that such men do not obtain remission
of original sin. Otherwise, the impediment to salvation as such, and the perpetual
duration in the state of sin, would have to be attributed to God not only as permitting,
but also as procuring, which seems to me most absurd and contrary to those general
rules: "Your destruction is from yourself, only from me is your help." And that God
deserts no one until he is deserted.
17. Nor does it matter that such an impediment often comes from an effect that is
good in itself and without fault, which effect God not only permits but also wills. For
although this may be true of that effect considered in itself, or in order to other ends
of the universe, nevertheless as it is an impediment to salvation and remission of sin,
or, what is the same, as it is an occasion for duration in the state of sin, thus it is only
permitted, because it somehow involves the malice of fault. Finally, if God had such an
affection, in vain would we say that it is simple and not absolute will. Both because it
would include neither virtually nor formally a condition, for none can be assigned: and
also because by virtue of it God is said to apply means by which such a man infallibly is
not saved, which is a sign of absolute will: if therefore he does not have this, neither
does he have a simple affection or desire.
18. To the Arguments. The foundations of the second and third opinions have been
resolved from what has been said. But to respond to the foundations of the first
opinion, it is necessary to explain what act of will God had concerning the reprobate in
that sign, which we will better expound in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV. WHICH ACTS OF THE

DIVINE INTELLECT OR WILL INTERVENE IN REPROBATION.

1. The endpoint of reprobation is some evil - Two kinds of evil, namely, of guilt and
of punishment. Two certainties are established. The endpoint of reprobation is some
evil of the person who is reprobated: for among other things, reprobation is
distinguished from predestination in that the latter terminates in good, while the former
terminates in evil. Just as predestination properly taken pertains only to supernatural
good, so reprobation is said to be in relation to the evil opposed to it, and therefore
both are considered to belong to the order of supernatural providence: predestination
as perfecting and, as it were, completing that order; reprobation as falling short of it in
its object or endpoint. From this it follows that here we are only concerned with acts of
God's intellect and will that relate to the evil of the reprobate person: for regarding the
acts by which He wills good for that person, we have already spoken in the preceding
426 BOOK FIVE
book. This evil is of two kinds, namely, the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment,
concerning which two points must be assumed as certain. First, that prior to every act
of the divine will, there precedes foreknowledge of both evils, both as possible and as
future under certain conditions. For God foreknows every sin that the reprobate person
will commit if he is left to his own freedom in this or that occasion without any more
special grace, and consequently He also foreknows the duration of that sin and the
punishment that will follow from it, if such a condition is also permitted. However, this
entire foreknowledge does not pertain intrinsically to reprobation, for God has similar
foreknowledge regarding many of the predestined; it is therefore presupposed only for
the entirety of providence.
2. The second point proposed as certain. Where the difficulty lies. Second, it is
certain that the divine will behaves in such a way regarding those two evils, of guilt and
of punishment, that it in no way wills the evil of guilt per se and directly, because this
conflicts with His goodness, which is certain as a matter of faith, as I have treated more
extensively in Book 2 on Divine Aid. However, God directly wills the evil of
punishment, though He does not will it of Himself, but on the basis of justice,
supposing guilt, as has often been said. Although God does not will the evil of guilt,
nevertheless He permits it. It remains to be seen, therefore, what acts of will God has,
both concerning the evils of punishment and concerning the evils of guilt, which are to
be found in the reprobate.
3. The opinion of Aureolus. Here we may first refer to the opinion of Aureolus in 1,
d. 41, art. 3, who says that God does not have any proper act of His will concerning the
evil of the reprobate, but whatever is attributed to God as willing or not willing such
evil is attributed only metaphorically: because He behaves in external effects as if He
willed it. Durandus partly followed this view in 4, d. 17, q. 7, saying that in God there is
no proper displeasure with sin, nor anger against the sinner. And they seem to base this
on the fact that these acts concerning evil include imperfection. However, although
there may be doubt about certain acts specifically as to whether they are found in God
according to their proper meaning, such as, for example, hatred or anger, about which
we shall touch on something below, nevertheless, regarding the act of will absolutely, it
cannot be denied that God properly and without metaphor has some act of will
regarding the reprobate. For at the very least He has an efficacious and absolute will to
deprive that person of beatitude and to punish with eternal punishment, at least after
foreseeing his sins, because this effect is caused by God in time: therefore He willed it
from eternity. Likewise, that act includes no imperfection whatsoever, but rather has the
perfection of vindicative justice. Therefore, regarding this act there can be no doubt.
But whether He also has others, and in what order of reason, is now to be discussed.
427 BOOK FIVE
4. The second opinion. The foundation is established. There is therefore a second
opinion of Scotus in 1, dist. 41, near the end, saying that God in the first and second
sign, in which He willed both glory as an end and efficacious grace as a means for the
predestined, behaved merely negatively toward the reprobate. Here he consequently
indicates that God had no positive act of will concerning them until, having foreseen
sin, He willed to punish them. And in this sense he distinguishes two reprobations,
negative, which precedes the foreknowledge of sin, and positive, which follows it. His
foundation is: because God in the first sign, for example, did not have the will to give
glory to the reprobate, otherwise they would be elect: nor did He will to deprive them
of glory, because He does not will this of Himself, as was proved above: therefore He
behaved merely negatively. Nor is this considered inappropriate in one sign of eternity.
For when the divine will is said not to remain as if suspended, so that it determines
nothing about some effects, whether they are to be future or not, this is to be
understood according to the real duration of eternity. But in this way in the present
case God's will does not remain suspended: because in a later sign from eternity He had
the will not to give beatitude to these people, but in the prior sign to prescind from
either act is not inappropriate. Some modern thinkers attack this opinion of Scotus, but
I also believe he was speaking in a true sense.
5. The opinion of Scotus is explained. And first of all, he does not deny there that in
that first sign God had concerning the reprobate that antecedent and simple will of
saving them, which he admits in other places, as we have seen above: but he only deals
with the efficacious will of giving or taking away glory, and regarding this the reasoning
given convinces us that God had neither concerning the reprobate in that sign.
Secondly, I consider it more probable that God in that sign, in not electing the
reprobate to glory, had a positive act of will of not electing them, or of willing not to
elect them: a fact that did not escape Scotus. For in 1, d. 47, he expressly posits this act
as probable: yet he calls it reflexive. Hence when elsewhere he says that God behaved
negatively, he means regarding direct acts, yet this negation itself is willed through a
reflexive act. The reason for this is that although the will can not will this or that
through mere suspension of the act, as philosophers admit in us, nevertheless then that
omission or absence of act is only virtually or interpretatively voluntary, namely because
the will can will and does not will with awareness. But if a positive will of not acting or
not electing is added, then that omission will be directly and formally voluntary. But this
mode of acting or not acting is of itself more perfect. Therefore it is more probable
that God acts in this way in not electing the reprobate. Especially because, by that
infinite act of His will, God can formally and expressly will this negation, without any
change or addition, but in the same way in which He wills other things.
428 BOOK FIVE
6. Thirdly, it must be said that God did not prepare for these people that special
providence of grace which He confers on the predestined, and consequently before the
absolute foreknowledge of future actual sins He did not elect them to congruous grace,
and He willed this very negation by a positive act. This is proved because what God
does not give in time, He does not prepare from eternity: but to these people He does
not give in time this special providence, as we suppose, therefore He did not prepare it
for them from eternity. Furthermore, what God does not do in time, He willed from
eternity not to do, not only through the absence of an act, but also through direct
volition, from the reasoning given above: therefore God also had this will concerning
these people. But this will does not necessarily presuppose guilt on the part of the
person, because it is not a punishing will, but a will of a certain general providence of
grace: therefore it is not necessary that it presuppose the absolute foreknowledge of
future things, therefore God had it in that prior sign after the will of not pre-electing
the same people to glory.
7. The view of some. This opinion is considered probable. Some, however, think that
God did not have this will until He foresaw the sin of Adam, which is probable,
especially on account of the opinion of Augustine, about which more below. However,
this opinion should not be based on the idea that sin is the reason or necessary
condition for such a will: for in the angels who were not predestined, God had a similar
will, without the foreknowledge of any sin. A sufficient reason for this will, therefore, is
that God owes His grace to no one and can distribute it as He wishes. Nor did the will
of the end alone oblige Him to confer greater grace, as is clear from what was said in
the preceding book. Therefore, supposing that opinion, its reason must be taken from
the mode of providence which God willed to have with people. For before foreseeing
original sin, He made no distinction in the ordinary providence of grace, but provided
sufficiently for all through original justice, but having foreseen its loss, He willed to give
special congruous grace to those elected to glory: but to others He did not will to
prepare it.
8. Something worth noting. However, in this it must be carefully observed that when
we say that God willed not to give congruous grace, it is not to be understood that He
directly willed that the grace which He gives should not be congruous, because this
either pertains to the fault of the person, namely to the bad use of grace and the
resistance of free will, or certainly in the case of children (extending the expression to
them) pertains to an impediment to salvation: but God directly wills or intends neither,
as was said above. Therefore, two things are included in that will. One is: that although
God foresees that other graces would be congruous for these people if they were given
to them, nevertheless He does not will to give them, because He does not owe them
and according to the common mode of providence, which He does not will to change,
429 BOOK FIVE
the occasion to bestow them does not present itself. The other is that God foresees that
graces in the ordinary course, as they are to be conferred on those people in such a way,
are not going to be congruous for them, and nevertheless He wills to give only those
and permits the remaining defect. And in these acts is contained the reprobation which
is usually called negative and might conveniently be called non-predestination, because
through it God does not yet exclude the person, but only does not specially elect him to
glory or grace.
9. A passage of Paul is explained. Concerning this reprobation, we must understand
the passage of Paul, which I referred to this place above, in Romans 9: "But Esau I
have hated." For there "hatred" does not signify proper and formal hatred, concerning
which it is said in Wisdom 10: "You hate nothing of the things which you have made":
because in this way it is impossible for God to hate His creature, especially before He
foresees any evil of guilt in it, as is supposed in that passage of Paul, according to the
exposition given above. In those words, therefore, "hatred" signifies nothing other than
the voluntary absence of that special love, with which God pursued Jacob and the
predestined. For this word is often used to signify this in Scripture, Luke 14: "Whoever
does not hate his father or mother, etc.," that is, whoever does not love them less than
me. Just as God is also said to harden, only because He does not specially show mercy,
as Augustine said in 1, to Simplicianus, q. 2. It is true that Augustine sometimes
explains that passage concerning the hatred of vindicative justice on account of original
sin, which he says was foreseen in Jacob and Esau: because Paul only says: "Before they
had done anything good or evil," not before they had contracted anything evil. This
exposition is probable, but not necessary, as we shall see more extensively in chapter
seven.
10. Difficulty remains in Paul's words. Response. But there is still a difficulty in other
words of Paul also referred to above: "I have raised you up for this purpose, that I
might show my power in you." And, "If God, wanting to show His wrath, etc." For
from these it seems to be inferred that, prior to the said negative reprobation, God had
the intention of some evil concerning these people. Nevertheless, it is to be answered
that God did not have such an intention, nor is this inferred from Paul's words, but
rather the opposite, as is clear from those words, "He endured with much patience the
vessels of wrath." Therefore he first supposes that people made themselves vessels of
iniquity and that God waited for them. Where we should also add that from Romans 2:
"Do you not know that the kindness of God leads you to repentance?" Therefore He
did not endure in order to punish, but in order to spare: but seeing that people in their
impenitence were treasuring up wrath for themselves, He finally willed to punish them.
Hence that particle "that" in that passage does not signify the final cause, but only the
consequence of one thing given another. This is frequent in Scripture, when the
430 BOOK FIVE
circumstance of the place and matter demands it, John 10: "That those who see may
become blind." And Isaiah 6, and Luke 8, "That seeing they may not see, etc." And this
is the common exposition of the Fathers regarding the said passages of Paul.
11. Finally, after the said negative reprobation there followed in the order of reason
positive reprobation, which seems to be contained in three acts. The first is the act of
absolute foreknowledge, by which God foresaw that sin or those sins future in such
people until the end of life, concerning which nothing new needs to be added. The
second act is also of the intellect and consists in practical judgment, and as it were in
God's final sentence, by which God decrees that this person is worthy to be excluded
from the Kingdom and to be punished with a condign eternal punishment. For given
the laws of divine justice and the aforesaid foreknowledge, this judgment naturally
follows, which is also necessary so that the will can rightly will. And some place positive
reprobation in this act, because according to the ordinary law, by virtue of it a person
will infallibly be damned, and this is probable. However, because God's effect is not
simply future until God wills it, and because, notwithstanding that judgment, God
could, by absolute power, not punish the person: therefore for the completion of
reprobation a third act is necessary, which is the absolute will of damning the
reprobate, which is the most powerful act of vindicative justice.
12. A doubt. An opinion. Another opinion. An opinion is chosen. Concerning this
will, it is usually doubted whether it is true and proper hatred of God toward such
people. St. Thomas in 1, Contra Gentiles, ch. 99, generally believes it is not proper
hatred, but metaphorical. Others, however, contend that it is proper hatred, because it is
the will of evil, as such punishment is truly evil. I think, however, that the matter
pertains to a manner of speaking. And I am pleased with what St. Thomas says in 1, p.
q. 20, art. 2, that it is not hatred of the person, because it is not from displeasure with
the person himself or his nature, but it is hatred of the sinner as a sinner, for the
contrary reason.
13. Another doubt. The latter manner of speaking is preferred. In a similar way, it is
usually doubted, since Paul often calls this act the wrath of God, whether that
appellation is proper or metaphorical. For Lactantius, in his book On the Wrath of
God, expressly contends that God has true and proper wrath against sinners. Because
wrath is nothing other than the appetite for vengeance on account of an injury or harm
inflicted by another. St. Thomas, however, in 1 p., q. 20, art. 1, ad 4, says that wrath is
not properly attributed to God, because it presupposes sadness, according to what
Aristotle says in 2 Rhetoric, ch. 2 and 4: "He who is angry, grieves." And this opinion is
more accepted: because wrath even in us does not occur without some commotion of
the soul. The difference is also in the meaning of the word. However, since this is to be
taken from common usage, therefore the latter manner of speaking is preferred.
431 BOOK FIVE
Provided that we admit that wrath is not used metaphorically of God in the same way
as sadness, repentance, and the like. For sadness is neither in God, nor does it signify an
act that is in God, but some effect similar to that which usually arises in us from
sadness. But through wrath we signify some proper act of God having an analogical
agreement with the wrath of man in that which is intrinsic to it, namely, in the appetite
for vengeance. And it only differs in that in God it does not have that cause which it
has in us, namely sadness, and because by virtue of that word that act is signified under
a denomination from such a cause, therefore insofar as this is concerned, that act is said
not to be proper wrath, but proper vengeance.

CHAPTER V. THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR NEGATIVE

REPROBATION ON THE PART OF THE FOREKNOWN PERSON.

1. The error of the Manicheans. Having explained the nature of reprobation, we

must briefly discuss its causes and effects. It is clear from what we have said about
predestination that here we are only dealing with the cause on the part of the person,
by which he may in some way have merited his own reprobation, though we will also
discuss incidentally the cause on the part of God. First of all, I omit the error of the
Manicheans, who attributed the entire cause of those people who are damned to some
supremely evil principle; and of the Priscillianists, who attributed this to fate and to
some natural necessity; likewise Calvinists and their followers, who so attribute this to
the divine will that they make it the first cause and root of all guilt and perdition of the
reprobate. For these errors are disputed against in detail in other places: and what we
have said in the first and second books on Divine Aid can be consulted.
2. The negative opinion. Among Catholics, therefore, many have denied that there is
a cause of reprobation on the part of the person. St. Thomas seems to be of this
opinion, in First Part, q. 23, art. 5, for in the solution to the third objection, he seems to
equate reprobation with predestination in this respect. Ferrariensis also holds this in 3
Contra Gentiles, ch. 161, Durandus in 1, dist. 41, q. 2, especially num. 14, Gregory, art.
2, conclusions 4 and 5, Marsilius, quest. 41, art. 2, Driedo in Concordia, Part 1, ch. 3,
Adam on Romans 9, and many of the modern writers. The foundation is the passage
sufficiently treated in Romans 9. And the reasoning, which is taken from what has been
said about predestination, is this: If there were a cause of reprobation on the part of
the person, it would be in his free power to be reprobated or not to be reprobated;
therefore, in the same power would be to be predestined or not to be predestined: for
these two are considered to be immediate: for all who are not reprobated are
predestined; therefore, a person could be the cause of his own predestination, namely,
by being the cause of his non-reprobation. Another reason is also added, because a
432 BOOK FIVE
person is not the cause of the first effect of reprobation, or of the permission of sin,
or of the negation of congruous aid: therefore he is not the cause of the whole
reprobation, and consequently not of reprobation, simply and absolutely.
3. The second, extremely contrary opinion. Others held an extremely contrary
opinion, namely, that there is a cause on the part of the person for the whole
reprobation, even regarding the negation of predestination. This is held by all the
authors who affirm that there is a cause in the predestined for their predestination, such
as Henry, Ockham, Gabriel, and others: and they speak consistently. They think that
God by His will did not make a distinction of election among people equal in
themselves, but elected to glory those whom He foreknew to be in some way more
disposed: therefore, conversely, He left some behind because of some cause on their
part, which was either their fault or the lack of that disposition.
4. The middle opinion. Some, however, especially among modern authors, admit a
cause of reprobation, although they deny it for predestination, and they say that it is
original sin. Because this of itself was a sufficient cause for divine abandonment:
therefore those whom God abandoned, He abandoned for this cause, although He did
not will to abandon many others having the same cause, which in them must be
attributed to divine mercy, but in others to just judgment. And thus, absolutely
speaking, there is a cause of reprobation in those who are abandoned, although
comparatively speaking there is not, namely, why these rather than those are abandoned.
And in this way they interpret the opinion of St. Thomas and they think it is also that
of St. Augustine: because in many places he seems to speak thus of the separation of
the elect from the mass of perdition through mercy, and of the abandonment of others
in their fall through judgment.
5. First conclusion. However, having established the principles already handed down
by us, the resolution of this question is easy: For we must speak differently about the
cause of positive reprobation, and differently about the cause of non-predestination, or
negative reprobation; we are now dealing with the latter, and we will speak about the
former in the following chapter. I say, therefore, first, that on the part of the reprobate
there is no cause of negative reprobation, nor a reason for God's will not to pre-elect
such a person efficaciously to glory. In this respect the first opinion, which is also
followed by Scotus and others, is true. And it is rightly founded on the passage of Paul
in Romans 9: "Before they had done anything," etc., up to that: "But Esau I hated,"
with the exposition given above by us. And according to this assertion is understood
that exclamation of Augustine: "Why He draws this one, and not that one, do not
judge," etc., tract. 26, on John; and Epistle 165: "Why He frees this one and not that
one." And On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 8 and 13. For if we look at these effects in their
execution, a cause seems to be given on the part of people. And therefore some are not
433 BOOK FIVE
moved by this exclamation of Augustine, for that one is drawn because he is moved by
God, and he allows himself to be moved, but the other is not drawn because, although
he is moved by God, he resists. However, although this is true in the execution,
nevertheless looking back to God's preparation and pre-election, it is a matter of great
wonder that He pre-elected this one rather than that one, of which Augustine finds no
cause in people. Soto learnedly noted this understanding in Book 1, On Nature and
Grace, ch. 15.
6. Objection. It is weakened. Second objection. A response is given. You will say,
from this it is only proved that there is no comparative cause of one over another, but
not that absolutely there is no cause of non-election. I answer that this must be proven,
by adding the reasoning. Because in that sign in which the predestined were elected,
they had no fault foreseen by God: therefore the rest, who were not elected, had no
foreseen fault in that sign in which they were not elected: therefore on their part they
had no cause of their non-election. The first consequence is clear, because in that sign
in which the distinction was made between them, they were equal among themselves, as
Paul's example of the potter and the clay also proves. And this is clearly confirmed in
the angels, in whom no fault preceded the divine permission, and a fortiori, neither
preceded the will of not electing to glory; regarding people, however, those who think
that the election of the predestined was made after foreseeing original sin might think
differently, as we will soon say in a similar case, but we have shown above that even the
election of people was made before foreseeing original sin: therefore even in people no
fault was presupposed in that sign in which God willed to elect these, and not others.
The second consequence is also clear: because on the part of people, or angels, no
cause or reason for such a divine will can be thought of other than fault. Someone
might say, a sufficient cause is that in such a creature there is no reason why God
should elect it. I respond that here we are not speaking of such a negative reason, but
of some moral cause, which has been added on the part of the creature and could
move God to such a volition. Especially since God elects no one because He is obliged,
or because such an election is owed to the creature because of its natural capacity: but
where affirmation is not the cause of affirmation, neither can the opposite negation
properly be called the cause of negation.
7. An objection from the words of St. Prosper. Prosper's meaning is explained.
Against this assertion, however, can be objected the words of Prosper in his third
response to the Gauls, where he speaks of the reprobate thus: "They did not have the
necessity of being punished because they were not predestined, but they were not
predestined because they were foreknown as going to be such from voluntary
prevarication." He has similar things in his seventh response. I say, however, that he
used the negative term for the positive, for from the context it is clear that he is
434 BOOK FIVE
speaking of positive reprobation itself. For, because that is always joined with the
negation of predestination, therefore one is often used for the other outside of
rigorous disputation.
8. Second assertion. From this I further assert that it is not necessary that there be a
cause on the part of the reprobate why God should not will that congruous grace be
given to him, or means infallible in His foreknowledge for obtaining salvation. This can
be proved by the same argument, because no fault is necessarily presupposed on the
part of the creature for this will of God. Likewise, because the first permission of sin
cannot have a cause on the part of the reprobate, as the first opinion rightly states, and
is clearly evident from what was said in the preceding chapter: but in permission is
included the negation of the said aid. Finally, in angels this is manifest, because in the
same sign in which God willed to give to these angels this prevenient grace, but to
those that one, no fault had preceded in the elect angels: therefore neither in the others,
for they were equal in that sign regarding merit or demerit.
9. About people, however, it can probably be said that original sin was a sufficient
cause for not giving this grace to those to whom God did not wish to give it: because
we said above that the distribution (so to speak) of prevenient grace, even in the divine
will, was made after the foreknowledge of original sin. And although this was equal in
all, and therefore could not be a reason for giving congruous grace to these rather than
to those, nevertheless it was of itself an absolutely sufficient reason for denying
congruous grace to those to whom God might wish to deny it: therefore it is credible
that God also looked to this reason when He had that will. For thus that will will not be
from absolute power, but also from justice, and when it can be done conveniently, God
wills or operates according to every principle of virtue. And this is what Augustine
often insinuates in the separation of people from the mass of perdition, whose
passages I shall soon refer to.
10. Objection. It is resolved. You will say: Many reprobate people have original sin
remitted: therefore in them this sin cannot be the cause of this negation of congruous
grace, because God does not punish remitted sin. I respond by denying the
consequence, because although God does not punish remitted sin with the privation of
glory, or of justifying grace, or of necessary and sufficient aiding grace, nevertheless He
often denies more abundant grace, or special and unowed providence, because of a sin
once committed, even if it has already been remitted. For it is clear from the matter of
penance that not all punishment is always remitted with guilt, which is especially true of
the punishments of this life and extraordinary ones, and it is clear in fact that, when
original sin is remitted through baptism, the punishment of death is not remitted, nor
are other penalties of this life. Therefore God could absolutely inflict this punishment
on whomever He wished because of such a fault, which punishment would never be
435 BOOK FIVE
taken away, even if the fault is remitted. Just as it also happens that some just man, who
used to receive many special aids from God, is deprived of that special grace because
of an actual sin, and although afterwards he is restored to justice through penance, he is
not therefore immediately restored to the former intimacy, or special protection of
God.
11. Doubt. It is explained. But finally someone might ask whether there is any cause
for this will, or negative reprobation, at least on the part of God. I respond that if we
speak in particular of these people, or angels in comparison with those, there is none,
or certainly none that can be assigned by us, as has been said concerning predestination;
for the reasoning is the same, because in the persons there is equal dignity, or indignity,
and whatever God works in one to manifest His attributes, He could have worked in
another. However, in general God undoubtedly had many reasons why He did not will
to elect all in the same way, and consequently willed not to elect some. These reasons
are to be taken either from the manifestation of divine grace in the elect, or on the part
of freedom, so that God might leave creatures to operate freely in all ways and might
show the fragility of their natural powers. But another reason, which is commonly
taken from the manifestation of God's vindicative justice, should not be understood as
meaning that, before the absolute foreknowledge of future sin, God had the intention
or absolute will of manifesting this justice, because, as has been said, God does not
have this will of Himself, otherwise He would virtually will the fault itself. God only
had that will after foreseeing the fault, but beforehand He foreknew that He could draw
this good from sin, if it were done by the person, and He only had a conditional will of
dealing thus with the person, if he should sin.

CHAPTER VI. WHETHER THERE IS A CAUSE

FROM THE PART OF MAN FOR HIS POSITIVE REPROBATION.

1. The Prior Position. Those who posit in God a positive will of excluding from the
Heavenly Kingdom all the reprobate prior to foreseeing their future evil merits,
consequently say that there is no cause of positive reprobation from the part of such
men, because this reprobation consists mainly in that will. And thus many understand
the first opinion related in the previous chapter. However, the foundation of this
opinion has been sufficiently refuted there, and that opinion thus explained is in no way
to be approved.
2. First Conclusion. I say therefore first, that there is a cause of positive reprobation
from the part of the reprobate. In this, the second opinion presented in the preceding
chapter, which Scotus and others follow, holds true. And this is the manifest position
of Augustine, in Epistles 105 and 106; and in book 3 against Julian, chapter 8, on the
436 BOOK FIVE
Good of Perseverance, chapters 8 and 14, and often elsewhere; of Prosper, in
responses 3 and 7 to the Gauls, and response 11 to Vincent; of Fulgentius, book 1 to
Monimus, chapter 13 and following, who teach that God predestines no one to the evil
of eternal punishment except on account of sin. This is also held by the Council of
Valencia under Lothair, chapter 3. To this also pertains the doctrine of Damascene
often cited, book 2 on Faith, chapter 29, that God does not of Himself will evil to
men, but is provoked by them. It is also gathered from all the Scriptures that teach that
God condemns no one except on account of his sin. For although we said above that
in predestination or election to glory there is no valid inference from the cause of the
reward to the cause of predestination or election, nevertheless here there is a valid
inference from the cause of eternal punishment to the cause of reprobation to such
punishment.
3. Corroborated by Reason. And the reason is that God prepares reward out of
mercy and confers it out of justice, but punishment He cannot prepare out of mercy,
and therefore neither does He prepare it of Himself by an absolute will. Therefore He
prepares it only through just condemnation, and positive reprobation is consummated
in this preparation. Therefore, just as there is given a cause of condemnation, so also of
reprobation. This is finally manifest in the acts in which we said above this reprobation
is placed: for the absolute foreknowledge of future sin supposes from the part of the
object that it is going to be future. Similarly, the final sentence which is pronounced
against the reprobate is founded in his demerits. And from there finally follows that
absolute will of depriving him of the Kingdom and of punishing him. Therefore, all
those acts in which positive reprobation can consist have a foundation from the part of
the man to be reprobated.
4. Second Conclusion. I say secondly: Original sin is not the adequate cause of the
reprobation of all those who are in fact damned. This assertion is most evident in the
case of the evil angels, who were reprobated without original sin. Moreover, it is also
certain to me in the case of all those men for whom original sin has been remitted in
this life. For what is the cause of reprobation is also the cause of eternal punishment,
and conversely, what is not the cause of eternal punishment is not the cause of
reprobation. But original sin, which is remitted in this life, is not the cause of eternal
punishment, therefore neither is it the cause of the reprobation of those men to whom
it is sometimes remitted. The minor premise is most certain, because when original sin
is remitted, the eternal punishment due to it is remitted; and once such guilt and
punishment are remitted, they never return, because the gifts of God are without
repentance. Therefore, original sin once remitted is not punished with eternal
punishment; therefore it is not the cause of eternal punishment. The major premise of
the principal argument is easily established from what has been said, because in this
437 BOOK FIVE
respect the rationale of reprobation is the same as that of condemnation, since
reprobation is not done by God except by way of condemnation, for it is an act of
vindicative justice, having for its intrinsic term and, as it were, object, eternal
damnation. For although God has other acts of vindicative justice concerning sins,
willing to inflict other punishments in vindication of them, nevertheless until He
absolutely wills eternal punishment, He does not reprobate a man; and this punishment
He cannot will for anyone on account of original sin which He has remitted, or is going
to remit.
5. An Evasion. It is Precluded. And this reasoning not only proves that original sin is
not the adequate cause of the positive reprobation of those men to whom it is
remitted, but also that it is not even a partial cause, nor is it at all a cause of such
reprobation. This is proved by applying the same discourse with proportion, because
those men are in no way damned on account of original sin, even as a partial cause,
therefore neither are they reprobated, because in this matter the rationale of
reprobation is the same as that of damnation, as has been explained. It may be
answered that original sin, even if it is to be remitted, is the font and root of all the sins
that are afterwards committed; likewise it is the motivating cause on account of which
God justly wills not to give those men congruous helps for not committing such sins,
or for not persevering in them until death. In this will God perseveres, even if He
remits original sin. To this, however, it is answered that even if all this is conceded, it
does not follow that original sin is the proper partial cause of reprobation when it is
remitted, but at most it is a certain remote occasion, and removes a prohibition. For
that negation of congruous help is not the cause of sin; therefore neither is it the cause
of reprobation, of which sin is the proper cause; therefore neither can original sin that
has been remitted be called the cause of reprobation, even if it has been the cause of
that negation of help.
6. Third Assertion. I say thirdly: In infants to whom original sin has never been
remitted, the cause of positive reprobation is original sin itself, not insofar as it is
precisely contracted, but insofar as it endures and perseveres until death, and is foreseen
by God under that condition. The first part is clear, because the cause from the part of
the reprobate man of his reprobation is the same as that of his damnation, as has been
often said; but in these infants the whole cause of their damnation is original sin;
therefore the same is the cause of reprobation. And from this the second part is easily
proved, because sin is not the cause of damnation except under that condition, if it
perseveres until death, which is included in that conditional sentence pronounced by
Christ: "Unless one is born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the
kingdom of God." Therefore, similarly, original sin is not the cause of reprobation
except supposing that condition foreseen, namely, that it is going to persevere until
438 BOOK FIVE
death. For it has already been said often that, with respect to this, the rationale is the
same for the cause of reprobation and of condemnation. This we shall presently
confirm regarding actual sins.
7. The Opinion of Some is Not Approved. Nor should the opinion of those who
except certain infants from this general rule be approved, because that exception is
founded on no probable reason, and the reason given applies equally to all. For, as was
seen above, God did not have an absolute will of excluding any infant from the
Kingdom by virtue of original sin alone, until He foresaw that, from other general and
ordinary causes, it would happen that they would die in that sin and without the
application of the remedy, which God decreed to permit from His general providence
and free will; this permission pertains rather to negative than to positive reprobation.
But positively, God never willed antecedently, so to speak, and of Himself, not to apply
such a remedy to any infant, or that that infant should persevere in original sin until
death, and therefore neither did He will to reprobate any positively until He foresaw his
perseverance in original sin, as has been said. Hence the assertion can be extended to
adults, in whom original sin is sometimes the cause of reprobation, at least partially,
insofar as they persevere in that sin along with others until death, and not otherwise,
because, as I have said, if it is remitted before death, it will in no way be a proper cause,
even if one is reprobated on account of other sins.
8. Final Assertion. Finally, therefore, I say that in adults the cause of reprobation is
final sin, whether one or many, whether original or actual mortal, or both together, if
they are not remitted until death. Thus teach the authors cited above, and especially see
Bellarmine, book 2, on Grace and Free Will, chapter 16, and Horantius, book 5 of
Catholic Loci, chapter 9, who say that this is Augustine's opinion. The reason is the
same, because the cause of positive reprobation is the same as the cause of damnation;
but adults are not condemned on account of original or actual sins unless that
condition is fulfilled: If they persevere in them until death; which is contained under
that other condition: Unless you do penance, you will all likewise perish. For just as
merits are not in effect the cause of glorification except under that condition placed by
the Council of Trent, If he departs in grace, so neither is any sin the cause of an adult's
perdition except under the said condition of its duration until death; therefore under
the same condition it is the cause of reprobation, and not otherwise. But just as the
adequate cause of condemnation arises from the whole accumulation of sins that are
not remitted before death, so also the cause of reprobation includes all of them, and
that accumulation is signified by the name of final sin. And just as we were saying about
infants, so with much greater reason it must be said about adults, that God cannot will
of Himself the perseverance of an adult man in the state of mortal sin until death,
because this would be to will of Himself the evil of sin, as Augustine rightly signified,
439 BOOK FIVE
on Correction and Grace, chapter 13, and Prosper in response 2 to the objections of
the Gauls. Therefore God foresees the state of the adult in sin until death, and then
reprobates him, and in this way final sin is the cause of reprobation.
9. Paul’s Words are Elucidated. Nor do those words of Paul urge against this
doctrine, "Before they had done anything good or evil, etc.," because, as I have said,
they are sufficiently explained concerning negative reprobation, or non-predestination.
But some insist by urging those words, "He made some vessels for honor, and some for
dishonor." For these seem to signify positive ordination. And therefore Augustine,
epistle 106, thinks they necessarily presuppose sin, at least original. But truly this is not
sufficient in men, as I have shown, and in angels it has no place. Therefore, those words
also must necessarily be understood negatively or permissively, that is, He made vessels
for dishonor, namely, He did not make them for that honor for which He prepared
others, or He made vessels which He foreknew by their own works would be for
dishonor, and He freely permitted this. For Scripture is accustomed to speak of
permission as if it were a positive action or command, to declare its certainty and that it
depends entirely on the divine will.

CHAPTER VII. ON THE EFFECTS OF

REPROBATION, ESPECIALLY THE PERMISSION OF SIN.

1. First, it is certain that reprobation has some effects, because reprobation is part of
providence, and God's providence has some effects directed outward. Indeed, from
certain effects we are compelled to attribute to God this part or aspect of providence.
Hence, secondly, it is also certain that the effects of reprobation are effects of God,
because God is the very principle of His providence, and is the author of those effects
of which providence is the cause. Therefore, nothing can be an effect of reprobation
that is not also an effect of God.
2. Sin cannot be counted among the effects of reprobation. From this, thirdly, all
theologians conclude with the Master in Book 1, distinction 40, and St. Thomas, Part 1,
question 23, article 3, that sin cannot be an effect of reprobation, because it cannot be
an effect of God, and nothing comes from reprobation that is not from God. Hence all
establish this difference between predestination and reprobation: that while merits are
the cause of the ultimate effect of predestination, and demerits are also the cause of
the ultimate effect of reprobation, nevertheless merits are effects of predestination, but
demerits are not effects of reprobation. This is because merits proceed from divine
intention and preparation, but demerits do not proceed from God in this way, as this
would be repugnant to His goodness and will.
440 BOOK FIVE
3. Nor is it necessary in this matter to distinguish between sin that is only guilt, or
that which is also a punishment for a prior guilt, as some have distinguished, but not
correctly. This is because sin under no aspect can be an effect of God, and
consequently neither of reprobation. For even if we granted that in some sin an
additional relation or denomination of punishment is added, such a punishment, taken
in particular, would intrinsically include the nature of guilt, which God can neither will
nor ordain to exist. And therefore, even admitting such a punishment, it should rather
be denied that God is its cause. But it is more true that guilt itself is not a punishment,
but rather the permission of guilt, or the negation of congruous help to avoid guilt,
which is far different, as I will now say. And in the same way we must speak of
ordination in the state of guilt and of duration, for all these things, insofar as they
formally include the evil of guilt, cannot be effects of God, and consequently neither
of reprobation. However, the permission of these is from God; but whether it is also
from reprobation, we shall see. And on this point, one can refer to what I have treated
extensively in book 9, on Auxiliis, chapter 4.
4. The effects of reprobation are reduced to two categories. The permission of sin is
an effect of reprobation. Fourthly, I gather from what has been said that all effects of
reprobation can be reduced to two categories, namely, the evil of punishment, and the
permission of the evil of guilt. Not that every evil of punishment or every permission
of the evil of guilt is an effect of reprobation, for it is self-evident that this is not so,
but conversely, that every effect of reprobation must necessarily be contained under
one of the said categories. The reason is that reprobation is directed to evil, and every
evil is either of punishment, which can be directly from God, or of guilt, which can at
least be permitted or not impeded by God. It remains to be seen, therefore, which evils
from these, or which permissions, arise from reprobation. First, then, and principally,
there is doubt concerning the permission of future sin. In this matter, the first opinion
simply affirms that every permission of a sin of the reprobate is an effect of his
reprobation. St. Thomas indicates this in the cited article 3, ad 2, and article 5, ad 3, as
do Durandus, in Book 1, distinction 41, question 2, Gregory, question 1, article 1,
Marsilius, question 41, article 1, and Driedo in Concordia, part 1, question 3. The
foundation can be that this permission is an effect of divine providence, and is not an
effect of predestination; therefore, it is of reprobation. Because the whole of
providence concerning men is concluded in these two parts. This can be confirmed,
because although this permission is not the cause of sin, and consequently is not also
the cause of the ultimate effect of reprobation, nevertheless it is somehow an occasion,
or speaking more properly, it is removing that which could impede those effects.
Therefore, as such, it falls under the providence of the whole of reprobation, for this
441 BOOK FIVE
providence encompasses not only the proper causes of reprobation, but also everything
from which reprobation can in some way follow.
5. This opinion is challenged. This opinion, however, has a special difficulty
regarding the first permission, which supposes no guilt in man, for it cannot have the
nature of punishment, nor pertain in any way to vindicative justice; but the whole of
reprobation pertains to this justice, as we have said. Therefore, that permission can in
no way pertain to reprobation. And this is confirmed especially in the first permission
of sin in human nature, for that was common to the reprobate and the predestined, just
as that sin also of itself equally harmed all. Therefore, that permission could not be an
effect of reprobation.
6. The second opinion. On account of these things, there is a second opinion, which
distinguishes between the first permission and subsequent ones: and concerning the
first, it confesses that it is not an effect of reprobation for the reasons given; but
concerning the others, it affirms that it is. Because the second permission (and so of
others) already supposes guilt on the part of man, whence it can be a punishment for
prior sin, according to that of Romans 2: "For this reason God gave them up to
dishonorable passions." Therefore, it can be an effect of reprobation. And this is
confirmed, for such permission begins already to pertain to the hardening of the
sinner, but hardening is an effect of reprobation, as is taken from Romans 9, and as
Augustine often teaches, especially On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 14. "Just as,"
he says, "the effect of predestination is the application of grace, so of eternal
reprobation it seems in some way to be hardening." Where that particle "in some way"
is to be noted, which seems to have been placed for this purpose, to indicate a
difference. For predestination is the proper and direct cause of grace, but reprobation is
not in this way the cause of hardening, but only because it does not impede it, insofar
as it is the cause of not showing mercy, as the same Augustine said in book 1 to
Simplician, question 2. But that "not showing mercy" is to permit; therefore,
reprobation is the cause of this permission.
7. This opinion is not admitted. A twofold permission of sin is distinguished. This
opinion, however, first of all has no place in the reprobation of angels, in which there
was not a first and a second, but a single permission, because they were damned on
account of the first sin. Furthermore, it does not seem to have a place in infants, who
are reprobated on account of original sin alone, for just as in them there is only one sin,
so there also seems to be only one permission. But in these, a twofold permission can
be distinguished: one of falling or contracting original sin (these, although they could
be distinguished in strict terms, nevertheless according to the common law, and setting
aside privilege, are not separated, and so I now consider them as one); the other,
therefore, is the permission to remain in original sin until death. It can, therefore, be
442 BOOK FIVE
said that although the former is not an effect of reprobation, the latter is an effect. But
this has a place indeed regarding negative reprobation, as I will say presently, but not
regarding positive reprobation, of which the said authors speak. And moreover, their
opinion cannot proceed concerning the permissions of those sins which are wholly and
completely remitted to many reprobates in this life. For I have said above that an effect
of predestination must necessarily be such that, in reality and in fact, it contributes to
eternal beatitude. Therefore, by a similar reason, and preserving proportion, it will
pertain to the effect of reprobation that the harm resulting from it lasts perpetually. But
sins that are completely remitted do not inflict perpetual harm; therefore, the
permissions of them, even if they are after others, will not be effects of reprobation.
8. Others distinguish differently. For this reason, others distinguish concerning
permission. For either the sin resulting from it is the cause of eternal damnation or it is
not. If the first, that permission is an effect of reprobation for the reasons given
before, and because nothing is lacking in it for the true nature of an effect. Concerning
the latter, however, they deny it for the last reason given. But still the first member does
not seem able to stand. Because even if the guilt subsequent to the permission is the
cause of eternal damnation, nevertheless the permission itself is not guilt; and although
it does not impede the cause, still the permission is not willed by God with this
intention, that guilt and damnation should finally follow. But we have said above that it
belongs to the nature of an effect of predestination that it be done from the intention
of eternal salvation, to which predestination tends; therefore, it will also belong to the
nature of an effect of reprobation that it be from the intention of eternal damnation,
in which the proper and ultimate effect of reprobation consists. Therefore, not even
that permission can be an effect of positive reprobation.
9. It must be distinguished differently. It seems to me, therefore, that we must
distinguish differently concerning reprobation itself. For there is positive reprobation,
and negative reprobation, both voluntary to God through a positive act, which we
above called non-predestination. First, therefore, it must be said that the effect of
positive reprobation does not begin from the permission of sin, but from the
punishment that remains in the future life on account of sin, or from another that is
necessarily connected with it. The first part concerning permission necessarily follows
from what has been said. For we have shown that this reprobation begins from the
foreknowledge of final sin; therefore, whatever on God's part precedes this
foreknowledge cannot be an effect of reprobation, because an effect does not precede
its cause. But the will of permitting sin, and the permission itself, as foreknown,
precedes the foreknowledge of future sin, because there cannot be sin unless it is first
permitted; therefore, the permission of sin cannot be an effect of positive reprobation.
And this reasoning proves universally concerning the permission of every sin, because
443 BOOK FIVE
it proves concerning the permission of the last and final sin, therefore a fortiori
concerning others. Furthermore, the reason given above is effective for me, because
there is no effect of this reprobation except what is done by God from the already
deliberate intention of condemning a man on account of his sins, just as it has been
said (with proportion preserved) about predestination. But the permission of sin does
not proceed from this divine intention, since this intention is founded on the guilt of
man, not considered in any way, but as already desperate and final. Therefore, it is not
an effect of reprobation.
10. In this life there is no effect of positive reprobation. From this it is understood
that in this life there is no effect of this positive reprobation, but its effects begin in the
future life as soon as man begins to be punished, or to be handed over to torturers to
be punished. This is touched upon in the second part of the assertion. And it is
confirmed, because after the aforementioned foreknowledge of final sin, the divine
judgment follows against such a guilty person or sinner, and then the will to punish
him; but before this will, the effects of this reprobation do not begin; therefore, they
begin from it. But from this will there follows per se only the punishment of the other
life, which is purely vindicative. For the punishments of this life, as far as is on God's
part, can be medicinal, if man wishes to convert; therefore, only the punishment of the
other life is an effect of reprobation.
11. Only death in such a state can be excepted from this rule, which death happens in
this life and is usually a punishment for preceding sins. For this reason I added the last
part of the assertion, because this punishment is so connected with the eternal one that
it can be counted almost as the same with it. However, it is necessary to note that such
a death sometimes comes about from a special ordering and causality of God, as, for
example, in Dathan and Abiron, and then such a punishment is in the most proper
sense an effect of positive reprobation. For we understand that before that was
foreseen, God decreed to condemn this man on account of such sins, and to this end
ordained that death, which is like handing over a man, still living, into the hands of the
enemy and torturer. But regularly it does not happen in this way, but death in such a
state comes from general causes, with God permitting it. And then the absolute
foreknowledge of final sin as such does not precede such permission, because through
that death itself the sin becomes final. Hence, only conditional foreknowledge
precedes, by which God foreknew that that sin would be final if He permitted and did
not impede such a death of man. And therefore then that death or punishment is not
properly an effect of positive reprobation, because before that death permitted and
foreseen as absolutely future, the sentence is not yet understood, nor the decree of
condemning such a man.
444 BOOK FIVE
12. The permission of sin is an effect of negative reprobation. Two things are
included in the permission of sin. Secondly, it must be said that the permission of the
special and proper sin of the reprobate man is an effect of negative reprobation, or
non-predestination. I understand the opinion of St. Thomas and others in this sense.
But that it may be understood and proved, it should be noted that two things are
included in the permission of sin. One is positive, namely, the concurrence which God
wishes to give to the will for effecting the act of sin, if it wishes; and as for this,
permission is never properly said to be the effect of any reprobation, because it is an
effect of common providence, which God, as the first cause and universal governor, in
a way owes to secondary causes. Likewise, it is clear that this is not an effect of positive
reprobation, as has been shown, nor even of negative reprobation, because from
negation per se nothing positive follows.
13. A twofold will of God is considered. Secondly, in the permission of sin there is
the negation of help, which God sees would be congruous for impeding such a sin, if
He wished to give it, and nevertheless He does not wish to, or rather wishes not to give
it. Here again a twofold will of God can be considered. One is that which proximately
and immediately regards the permission itself, or the negation of help as its object; and
in this it is evident that such a negation is the effect of such a will, in the way that a
negation can have a cause, not through positive influx, but through the withdrawal of
influx. And this would be sufficient for the proof of the conclusion, because that will
of not giving such help pertains to negative reprobation, as has been explained above;
therefore, if permission in this respect is an effect of this will, it is also an effect of
negative reprobation. The other will is more remote, namely, the will of not preelecting
this man to glory, and concerning this there could be greater doubt, whether this causal
statement is true: God permits this man to sin because He did not elect him to glory.
For since that prior negation is not an intention of the end, but rather a negation of
intention, it does not seem to have any causality in the posterior negation.
14. Nevertheless, St. Augustine often speaks in that way, as can be seen in On the
Good of Perseverance, chapter 14, where he says that efficacious calling is not given to
the reprobate because he was not distinguished from the mass of perdition in a higher
way. And it is probable, because this mode of causality is not positive, but negative, that
is, in the way that negation is the cause of negation when affirmation is the cause of
affirmation; but so it is in the present case. For election to the end is the reason for
giving efficacious or infallible means to it; therefore, the negation of that election will
be, in its way, the reason for not giving means that are known to be congruous and
infallible for attaining that end; and in this there remains no new difficulty.
15. I said, however, that this is to be understood concerning the special and proper
permission of the reprobate, on account of what was touched upon in referring to
445 BOOK FIVE
other opinions. For the common permission of original sin, or of the sin of Adam,
cannot be truly attributed to the reprobation of anyone; and others also can be from
common providence, especially when the sins that are committed given such
permissions contribute nothing in fact to the effect of reprobation, for in this respect
the reasons given against the second opinion proceed correctly.

CHAPTER VIII. WHETHER REPROBATION IN

ANY WAY REMOVES THE FREEDOM OF THE REPROBATE.

1. In this question, the discussion concerns only adults. The question applies only to
adults, as is self-evident, because children do not have the capacity for freedom. And as
far as the matter itself is concerned, it presents no difficulty, given what we have already
stated. For we are dealing either with freedom regarding the power to do good, or with
the power to avoid evil, or even to commit evil, or to omit necessary good. Regarding
the power to commit evil or not to do good, there is no dispute: for such acts
undoubtedly exist in the reprobate; therefore, so does the power to perform them.
Hence, one might rather ask how, with respect to these acts, there is not necessity.
2. Therefore, regarding the other power of doing good and avoiding evil, that it is
not taken away by positive reprobation is clearly proven from what has been said:
because this reprobation presupposes the misuse of that power, since it presupposes
foreseen fault; therefore, it is impossible that it takes away the power for such use,
otherwise it would destroy itself. Likewise, in this regard, the same reasoning applies to
this reprobation as to God's foreknowledge, because this reprobation presupposes
absolute foreknowledge of the future event; but foreknowledge does not remove
freedom or any power, because it presupposes the future effect and sees it as it will be.
Therefore, similarly, etc. Finally, this reprobation does not have in this life any effect in
the person himself with respect to his human acts, as was shown above; therefore, it
cannot give or take away power, nor change the free manner of operating in this life.
3. The same can easily be demonstrated regarding negative reprobation, or the
negation of predestination, because on account of it, a person is not deprived of
sufficient help to do good and avoid evil, as has been shown in the preceding sections.
Therefore, freedom not to sin is not taken away on the part of grace. Furthermore,
through the will not to choose or not to give congruous calling, God does not work
anything positive in the human will, because God's volition is only about a certain
negation; therefore, by virtue of it, the natural mode of action of the human will is not
changed; therefore, it is neither necessitated nor determined not to do good, or to do
evil. Therefore, freedom remains intact, notwithstanding reprobation. Here, however, a
lengthy dispute would arise with those who teach that the physical predetermination of
446 BOOK FIVE
the human will, accomplished by God alone, is necessary for the works of sins. But I
have decided not to treat that controversy in this work; see what was said in the second
book on Aids [De Auxiliis].
4. Since, therefore, these matters that pertain to the substance of the issue are true, a
difficulty remains in the manner of speaking: whether it is absolutely true that it is
within the power of the person who is damned not only not to be damned, but also not
to be reprobated, and even not to lack predestination. For the affirmative position
seems to follow clearly from what has been said. And, to understand the difficulty, the
verb "can" should be taken not only in the divided sense, but also in the composite
sense. However, in this regard, there is a difference between positive and negative
reprobation; for in positive reprobation, absolute foreknowledge of the future event is
presupposed, namely, perseverance in sin until death, and consequently, God's absolute
will to damn the person is also included. Therefore, in this reprobation, it is manifest
that, given that supposition, the contrary outcome cannot be combined with it. Hence,
it follows that in the composite sense taken from the part of the object, as I explained
above, those statements are false, and this without prejudice to freedom, because the
supposition that is posited is entirely consequent and in no way antecedent, and thus
does not remove any freedom from the subject itself.
5. The same is proven regarding negative reprobation. But in negative reprobation, it
seems to be otherwise, because it neither presupposes absolute foreknowledge of the
future event, nor an absolute will to damn the person; therefore, by virtue of this
reprobation, it is not repugnant, nor does it imply a contradiction, that together with it
there be posited, in reality, the future salvation of the person, since this is neither
against God's foreknowledge nor against the divine will; therefore, speaking of this
reprobation, all those expressions are to be admitted, even in the composite sense, with
the composition being placed in the object. But if this is admitted, it further follows
that it is within the power of the non-predestined person to make himself predestined,
according to what is usually attributed to Augustine (but is not found in him): "If you
are not predestined, act so that you may be predestined." For the inference is evident: if
it is within a person's power not to be reprobated, then it is also within his power to be
positively predestined, because these two are directly opposed, and the absence of
reprobation is not removed except by positing predestination. But the consequent
contradicts what has been said above. Because if it is within a person's power to make
himself be predestined, then it is within his will, as Augustine argues in a similar
argument in 1 Retract., chap. 21, and often elsewhere; therefore, a person through his
will can give a cause for his predestination. For this reason, he can in some way give a
cause for his justification and glorification, because through his power and will, with the
help of divine grace, he can do something by which he is justified and glorified;
447 BOOK FIVE
therefore, if he can do something by which he is predestined, he could be the cause of
his predestination, the contrary of which has been stated.
6. Various ways of speaking about these expressions. Modern theologians dispute
among themselves about these expressions, and some think they should be denied
altogether for the reason given, and because we have said that negative reprobation
does not have a cause on the part of the person, but depends only on the free will of
God; and that which is of this nature is not placed within the power of man. Others,
however, think it necessary to admit those expressions, because otherwise a person's
perdition would not ultimately be resolvable to himself, but to God, who did not
predestine him, and it would be the same not to be predestined by God as to be
reprobated, because salvation would be made equally impossible given non-
predestination as given positive reprobation. Nor do they think that from this it follows
that a cause can be given for the whole predestination, because prevenient help from
God is always presupposed, so that we can say that it is within the power of such a
person not to lack predestination. But it only follows that it is within the power of the
person to make such help pertain to predestination, and to attain its effect. This,
however, seems entirely true to these authors, because it is within a person's power to
make that help efficacious, since it is within a person's power that it either has an effect
or not; but if it is efficacious, it will be the help of predestination; therefore, it is within
a person's power to make it such.
7. This latter opinion is correctly and consistently defended by those authors who do
not admit conditional foreknowledge; and among them, Catherinus especially followed
it. Who consequently asserted that many who were neither pre-elected, nor efficaciously
called by God's determined intention so that they would infallibly be converted, are in
fact converted and saved. However, this opinion presupposes many things that we
cannot in any way approve. One is that there is no certain foreknowledge of future
contingents under a condition. Another is that some people who were not pre-elected
to glory before the absolute foreknowledge of future works are in fact saved. The third
is that God does not absolutely and particularly predefine the conversion and
perseverance of those who are to be saved, before the absolute foreknowledge of it.
For unless all these things are presupposed, or their contraries are accepted as true, that
opinion involves a contradiction, as the reasons given show.
8. Conclusion. I say, therefore, that it is not within a person's power, with divine non-
election, or with non-predestination, or (which is the same) with negative reprobation,
to actually place or combine his eternal salvation. This resolution will easily be
established by further explaining the foundation of the former opinion, and by
satisfying the foundation of the other. So that the reasoning of that opinion may be
understood, one must keep in mind the distinction between positive and negative
448 BOOK FIVE
reprobation. Because not being positively reprobated is within a person's power in the
same way as not being condemned, or being saved, because we have already shown that
in this matter an excellent argument is drawn from damnation itself to positive
reprobation, because the latter is not directly opposed to predestination, but to
approbation, or glorification. But negative reprobation is directly opposed to
predestination, and therefore one cannot be in the free power of man any more than
the other. From this it clearly follows that, given the supposition of non-predestination,
salvation—which happens only to the predestined—cannot be combined with it.
9. The difficulty is resolved. To the difficulty posed, the response is that although
absolute knowledge in God is not presupposed, nor a decree to expel such persons
from the Kingdom, conditional knowledge is presupposed, which, joined with the will
to permit the fall, or not to give such help as is foreknown to be congruous, passes into
absolute knowledge, and this is enough for the effect to be infallible. Nor does it follow
from this that God, of Himself and by His will, reprobates such people by positive
reprobation, but only that He does not predestine them of Himself, and wills to permit
sin, which is true and has no inconvenience. Finally, it matters little that it is within a
person's power to actually operate with God's justifying help, and that if he does so, the
help will already be congruous and efficacious. For since God has foreseen that the
person would not use such power, it is infallible, along with that power, that such help
will not be congruous or efficacious. It is not, however, within a person's power to
make God prepare for him that help which He knows will be congruous, but this
depends entirely on God's free will.

[END OF BOOK FIVE: ON REPROBATION]

449 BOOK SIX

BOOK SIX: ON CERTAIN

COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE PREDESTINED AND THE
REPROBATE, OR BETWEEN PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION

After having spoken individually about predestination and reprobation, it remains for
the completion of this work that we compare them with each other, or the persons
who are determined to be predestined or reprobate, with respect to certain conditions
or properties that contribute to a more perfect knowledge of supernatural providence.
In the persons of the predestined and the reprobate, three things occur in which they
can be compared, namely, the gifts of grace in this life, the certainty of eternal
salvation, and the number or multitude of people of each order. In Predestination and
reprobation, we can consider those things in which they seem to agree and differ, and
how they compare to the whole of supernatural providence.

CHAPTER I. WHETHER THE PREDESTINED ALWAYS RECEIVE

GREATER GIFTS OF GRACE IN THIS LIFE THAN THE REPROBATE.

1. Reason for doubt.—The reason for doubt is that the gifts of grace are either
sanctifying grace with infused habits, or acts of virtues pertaining to cooperating grace,
or the callings and aids of operating grace. In all these things, however, the reprobate
sometimes appear to exceed the predestined. The first point is evident, since sometimes
a reprobate attains greater sanctity in this life for a time than a predestined person does
in his entire life. This will easily become apparent by comparing an adult who operates
virtuously for some time in life, but who later dies in sin, with an infant who is baptized
and dies with only baptismal grace. Hence the same is evident regarding good acts: for
sometimes someone is saved with only one act of contrition or attrition, while others
are damned who throughout their lifetime performed many outstanding acts of virtue.
From this it is also clear that the same should be said about the aids of operating grace:
both because those acts proceed from aids of this kind, and also because the reprobate
are sometimes efficaciously called to a state of perfection—for example—to which a
predestined person is not called; therefore, etc. On this account, Soto (On Nature and
Grace, Book 1, chapter 16) and Vega (On the Council of Trent, Book 6, chapter 9)
seem to affirm this view absolutely. And especially those hold this opinion who think
that there is a cause of predestination, or that some who are not pre-elected are saved,
particularly those who simultaneously deny conditional foreknowledge and do not
admit physical predetermination.
450 BOOK SIX
2. The counterargument. On the contrary, the primary reason in the order of
execution why this man is saved and that one is not, is that God wished to grant special
mercy to this one and not to the other, according to that passage: "He has mercy on
whom he wills, and he hardens whom he wills" (Romans 9). This mercy, however,
consists in the conferral of some special grace, while hardening consists in the denial
of similar grace, as Augustine taught in On Various Questions to Simplicianus, Book 1,
question 2. Therefore, the predestined and the reprobate are always so unequal that the
predestined person excels in a special gift of grace. This excellence seems to consist in
two things. One is that the will of the predestined is prepared in a certain special way in
which the will of the reprobate is not prepared, as Augustine extensively discusses in
On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 6, 8, 10, and 16, and often elsewhere;
Prosper in On the Calling of the Gentiles, Book 2, chapter 8 (alternatively chapter 23),
and in his Responses to the Genoese, Response 3, and to the Gauls, Response 5.
Gregory holds the same view in Homily 30 on the Gospels. The other is the gift of
perseverance, which is given to the predestined but not to the reprobate: it is a special
gift of grace, as Augustine extensively discusses throughout his book On the Gift of
Perseverance. This was also taught by Innocent I in Letter 91 among Augustine's letters,
and by Celestine in his Letter to the Bishops of Gaul, chapter 7, and finally by the
Council of Trent, Session 6. For these reasons, other modern theologians also hold this
view.
3. To briefly provide the true resolution of this question, we must distinguish those
things that necessarily and intrinsically follow from predestination from those that are
somewhat accidental, insofar as they do not follow from the nature of predestination as
such. This is because, although they may follow from this or that predestination that is
more or less perfect, they are nevertheless not intrinsically necessary for predestination
as such. Of the first kind are some justification (under which I include another
efficacious calling, insofar as it is necessary for justice) and perseverance in justice until
death: for these two are sufficient for predestination to be fulfilled. Of the latter kind
are more abundant gifts of grace, whether habitual or actual, because without these a
predestined person can be saved, unless the end of his predestination is so excellent
that it requires all these gifts. Therefore, the comparison, to be doctrinally sound and
capable of falling under scientific study, should be made in those things that are
intrinsic, for in those things that are accidental, there can be great variety.
4. First conclusion. Hence, first of all, it must be said that in the latter gifts of grace,
a reprobate can surpass many predestined persons. This is proven by the argument set
forth at the beginning in the reason for doubt. And it is furthermore proven by
induction. For Lucifer was created with greater grace than any of the holy angels. In
humans, it is also manifestly clear. The reason has already been touched upon: since
451 BOOK SIX
those gifts are not necessary in that abundance and perfection for predestination as
such, they need not be given to all the predestined; and since they alone are not
sufficient for eternal salvation without perseverance, they can, according to God's
judgment, be communicated to the reprobate. For although they are not absolutely and
simply predestined, they can nevertheless be pre-ordained and predetermined to attain
some degree of grace in this life. Therefore, nothing prevents a reprobate from
surpassing a predestined person in these benefits.
5. Second conclusion. Secondly, it must be said that a predestined person always
receives some gift of grace that is not communicated to the reprobate, by reason of
which other gifts, even if they do not seem greater or even appear lesser in their entity,
are more efficacious in the order of attaining salvation, and thus greater in the nature
of grace and benefit. This assertion is proven by the arguments proposed in the latter
place. And it is further explained briefly. For first of all, the predestined perseveres in
grace until death, and the reprobate does not: but this is a special gift of God, as is
certain and has already been briefly proven. However, it should be noted that from this
it does not follow that the predestined necessarily excels in some intrinsic gift that
inheres in him: for this is not always necessary for perseverance, beyond the common
grace of justification; but a special providence of God is sufficient, either removing
wicked occasions and impediments to salvation, or ordaining in any way that death may
befall a man in a good state, according to that saying: "He was taken away, lest
wickedness should alter his understanding." And thus an infant is saved with only
baptismal grace and receives the gift of perseverance, not through a new intrinsic gift
inhering in him—because it can be neither a habit nor an intensification of one, as is
self-evident, nor an actual motion, because an infant is not capable of it, nor does he
need it—but it will be a special providence of God concerning his death, which in fact
benefits him more for attaining eternal salvation than many good works and a great
increase of grace benefit an adult who ultimately does not persevere. And the same
difference between adults can easily be considered.
6. Secondly, to this distinction belongs a calling that is efficacious in some special
way, which is given to the predestined and not to the reprobate, about which Augustine
often speaks in the cited passages and in other places, and he calls it profound and
mysterious. A notable example of this is found in the angels: for in the first instant of
creation, all received a congruous calling to dispose themselves to initial justice; but in
the second instant, in which they were to deliberate perfectly to consummate their path,
an efficacious calling was given to the predestined, but not to the others; and from the
difference in this gift arose also the difference in eternal salvation. Among humans, this
can also be considered, especially in two individuals who are near death and in a state
of mortal sin, for to one an efficacious calling to repentance is sometimes given, to the
452 BOOK SIX
other it is not given, and immediately both die. Therefore, this diversity is necessary,
because actual conversion (according to true doctrine) does not occur without an
efficacious calling.
7. Question. But here a question arose as to whether it is necessary in these events
that the predestined exceed the reprobate in some greater intrinsic aid of grace, or at
least in some greater providence by which the impediments to conversion are removed,
so that it is simply true to say that the predestined receives a greater aid in that
occasion. But since I have discussed this matter thoroughly in Book 3 On Aids,
chapters 20 and 21, I respond by distinguishing between actual concomitant aid, which
functions as a concurrence or actual influx, and prevenient aid, which functions as a
principle. For regarding the former, it must be said that the predestined always excels in
some aid of this kind, when other things are equal, because he always excels in some
conversion or final good disposition, which is not achieved without this aid, nor is this
aid given without that disposition. But regarding the other prevenient aid, it is not
intrinsically necessary, because if such a greater aid were necessary intrinsically and on
the part of the principle for actual conversion, then whoever did not have it would not
receive sufficient aid for conversion, since he would lack something intrinsically
necessary that is not in his power, since it is said to pertain to the grace of calling.
Likewise, either the one who receives greater aid can nevertheless not be converted, or
he cannot. The second cannot be said, according to the Council of Trent, Session 6,
Canon 4, because such premotion would remove freedom, since it is antecedent. But if
the first is maintained, then with that same aid, one person may be converted and
another may not: therefore, a greater aid is not required in the one who is converted.
8. Nevertheless, as I indicated in the last part of the conclusion, such aid in the one
who is converted has the nature of a greater benefit and a greater grace. For these two
are very different: to be greater aid and to be a greater benefit. For greater aid signifies a
greater and more powerful principle for operation, which a congruous calling does not
always have, as I have shown. But a greater benefit only means that such aid is given out
of greater love of God, and therefore it is conferred at that opportunity and time
which God foreknew would be suitable, so that in it the aid would infallibly have its
effect: in this, the predestined surpasses the reprobate as regards that calling on which
ultimate salvation depends.

CHAPTER II. HOW THE NUMBER OF

THE PREDESTINED AND THE REPROBATE IS CERTAIN.

1. We presuppose that both numbers are certain. For concerning the Predestined,
Paul says in 2 Timothy 2: "The firm foundation of God stands, the Lord knows those
453 BOOK SIX
who are his." And the Church says in a certain prayer: "O God, to whom alone is
known the number of the elect who are to be placed in eternal happiness." And the
same reasoning applies to the number of the reprobate, because the knowledge of God
is eternal regarding both good and evil things that are to happen in time, which are
certain to him from eternity. Hence in this matter there cannot be dissension among
Catholics, although some attribute the opposite to Catherinus and the Massilians. But
they spoke in another sense, as will be evident.
2. It may be objected, however, that predestination and reprobation are not certain
and infallible; therefore, neither can the number be certain. The antecedent is evident
because what is infallible is inevitable, what is inevitable is necessary, but these cannot
be attributed to predestination or reprobation; therefore, neither can that. I propose
this only to explain the terms. For certain and infallible connote a relation to
knowledge, and therefore they can and should be attributed simply and without
distinction to predestination and to the number of the predestined. Inevitable and
necessary, however, connote a relation to causality and effect, and therefore they are not
to be admitted without a distinction between the composite and divided sense, in the
sense declared in the previous discussions. Hence, that which is certain is not always
simply inevitable in relation to its proximate cause, but only by supposition that the
cause is already foreseen as doing this, which is that supposition about which Aristotle
said: "What is, when it is, must necessarily be."
3. Doubt. First opinion. Given this, therefore, theologians debate about the mode of
this certainty. In this regard, Catherinus distinguished between the number of the
predestined and of those to be saved, and concerning the former, he said that it is
certain in the decree of the divine will—indeed, and that it is necessary, as we saw
above. Concerning the latter, however, he said that it is not certain in the will of God,
but only in the foreknowledge of all human actions, from the beginning of life until the
end. The Massilians seem to have held this view, as is gathered from the Letter of
Hilary to Augustine, in these words: "They likewise do not accept that there should be a
definite number of those to be elected and received"—namely, in the decree of God's
will, as Augustine taught. Hence, these authors say the same a fortiori about the number
of the reprobate.
4. This opinion is refuted. But this opinion first of all assumes a faulty division into
the number of those to be saved and of the predestined, against which I have shown
above that all who are to be saved are predestined. Furthermore, it assumes two false
principles: one is that not all who are saved are pre-elected; the other is that God does
not foreknow future contingents conditionally before he decrees anything concerning
the salvation of men. Therefore, it is not necessary to say more against this view.
454 BOOK SIX
5. Other modern thinkers, sharply attacking this opinion, have fallen into another
extreme, saying that both numbers, both of the predestined and of the reprobate, are
certain in a decree of God's will that preceded all foreknowledge of future events, both
absolute and conditional. However, this opinion has been sufficiently refuted above:
because neither could God suitably have such a decree concerning the reprobate before
absolute foreknowledge, unless we wish to make God the author of all evil, nor does
such a decree concerning the predestined have a place before conditional
foreknowledge, unless the freedom of the will is injured. Finally, each person, according
to the mode of predestination that he conceives, also admits such a foundation of this
certainty: and therefore it is not necessary to go through individual opinions or to
refute them, because they are to be refuted from their foundation, that is, from the
mode of predestination.
6. First assertion. We, therefore, from the mode of predestination that we have
established, consequently say that in the number of the predestined two things can be
considered, namely, that it is not greater and that it is not lesser. So I say first: By virtue
of that decree by which God elects such persons to glory, it is certain that the number
of the predestined will be in such a multitude and not in a lesser one. This is proven
because, since it is an absolute decree, it cannot fail. This certainty, however, does not
conflict with the freedom of the predestined, because of the conditional knowledge
that it presupposes, as I have often explained.
7. Second assertion. Secondly, I say, as to the other part, namely, that this number will
not be greater, certainty is to be taken from another act of will by which God decided
not to elect more, nor to prepare efficacious means for others, because before this will,
in no principle is the absence of a greater number infallible. Hence it follows that in
this latter will, given also the conditional foreknowledge and the will to create such a
multitude of angels or men, the number of the reprobate is also certain, not because of
the efficacy that such a will positively has regarding the effects of reprobation, or
regarding sin, which is the cause of them, but because of conditional knowledge, with a
decree to permit the condition, as has also been explained above.
8. From this, finally, is understood the difference that St. Thomas (article 7)
establishes between the number of the predestined and of the reprobate. For he says
the former is certain from a certain particular predefinition of God—and thus he
rightly called God's pre-election. He also says the latter is not certain from such a
predefinition. But it may be asked whether it is from any predefinition. In this matter, a
distinction must be made (with Cajetan) concerning the reprobate, whether they are
men or angels, or whether they are reprobate. For in the first way, their number is
certain from some predefinition of God, that is, from some absolute will of God: for
that effect is such that God will bring it about, and for the most part He alone will do
455 BOOK SIX
so; hence it is also such that, of itself and absolutely, He can will it. However, I do not
think that there is equality in this between the reprobate and the predestined (although
Cajetan holds the opposite), for the number of the predestined is predefined for its
own sake, but that of the reprobate is for the good of the predestined themselves, as
St. Thomas expressly taught there, and it was the opinion of Augustine in Against
Julian, Book 4, chapter 4. Therefore, that prior will is rightly called a singular
predefinition. But that such men or angels are reprobate, their number is not certain
from a predefinition of such an effect, but from permission, given conditional
foreknowledge, as has been explained above. I say, however, that this number is not
certain from a predefinition of such an effect, for if anyone should call "predefinition"
the will that God had of not pre-electing these men, nor preparing for them congruous
aids, then that number is also certain by virtue of such a predefinition. However, this
manner of speaking is improper and very unusual, because since that will is not about a
positive effect, but only about a certain negation, it is considered to pertain rather to
permission.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER THE NUMBER OF THE

PREDESTINED IS GREATER OR THE NUMBER OF THE REPROBATE.

1. All who depart from life with mortal sin are reprobate. First comparison. I assume
that all who die or end their life in mortal sin are reprobate. This is to avoid having to
refute here the errors of those who assert that either all or some of the damned will
eventually be saved, and consequently would already be predestined, which would not
insignificantly increase the number of the predestined. But what we have established is
a matter of faith, and those errors are refuted specifically in the material on Purgatory
and in other places. Given this, therefore, several comparisons can be made here. The
first is among the angels alone, whether more were predestined than reprobate. To this,
theologians commonly respond affirmatively with St. Thomas (First Part, question 63,
article 9, reply to objection 1), which, according to one probable interpretation, is
signified in Revelation where it says that the Dragon drew a third part of the stars with
him. I will suggest the rationale below.
2. Second comparison. The second comparison is among human beings, speaking
absolutely of all who have been and will be from the beginning of the world until the
end. And in this way, it is the common and true opinion that the number of the
reprobate is greater. This is taken from Matthew 7: "Narrow is the way that leads to life,
and few there are who enter by it." For this reason, the elect are usually signified in
Scripture by the name of "few." This is how many understand Psalm 17: "From the few
of the earth divide them," and Ecclesiasticus 17: "Of your negligence be purified with
456 BOOK SIX
few." Hence in 4 Esdras, chapter 8, it says: "This world God made for many, but the
future for few." And further, more clearly: "Many indeed have been created, but few
will be saved." Although this book is not canonical, it nevertheless has great authority.
And in the same place, it is explained by an example: "Just as the earth," it says,
"provides much material from which earthenware is made, but little from which gold
and silver are made," etc. For perhaps for this reason in Scripture the elect are called
golden vessels and are compared to gems and precious stones, because just as these are
rare, so also are they.
3. Furthermore, this can easily be shown, as it were, by induction. For if we consider
the state of humanity until the coming of Christ, knowledge of God and sanctification
was rare in it. But after the coming of Christ, countless peoples either do not believe or
have not yet heard the Gospel, and of those who do believe, a great part is condemned,
as I will state immediately. Therefore, considering everything, without doubt the
number of the reprobate is much larger. St. Thomas gives the reason for this (First
Part, question 23, article 7, and First Part of the Second Part, question 71, article 2,
reply to objection 3): first, from the condition of human nature, which is composed of
appetites that are in some way contrary, and the objects that can incline to evil are more
familiar and proportionate. To this is added the disorder left by original sin, on account
of which we were saying above that original sin is in some way a cause or occasion of
the reprobation of many people. Then the reason can be taken from the height and
excellence of the end to which man is ordered through means that also greatly exceed
the powers of man, especially fallen man. These reasons are most excellent on the part
of man; nevertheless, on the part of God this plan of His wisdom is profound, nor can
we say anything else except that through this God wished to show the excellence of His
grace in the elect, as Paul indicated.
4. Third comparison—First opinion. The third comparison is among the faithful or
Christian people, whether more are saved than damned, or conversely. In this matter,
there are different opinions. Some piously believe that more of these are saved, which
Sylvester held in Rosa aurea, concerning the Septuagesima Sunday, at the end. And the
parable of Matthew 21 is often brought forward for this, where at the banquet of the
Father of the family, only one was found without a wedding garment; but in Matthew
[25], of ten virgins, five were foolish and five were wise. The congruence, moreover,
can be that among Christians, more die having received the Sacraments, by the power
of which they are easily justified; therefore, it is probable that more of these are saved.
5. The opposite is more true.—The contrary opinion is more common, namely, that
among Christians, more are reprobate than predestined. This Gregory clearly affirms in
Homily 19 on the Gospels, and Augustine in Against Cresconius, Book 3, chapter 66,
and Book 4, chapter 53, thus explaining the parable of the wheat and the chaff. For by
457 BOOK SIX
the threshing floor (as he says) the Church is signified, and by the chaff the reprobate
are signified; but it is evident that the multitude of the chaff is greater than that of the
wheat. Chrysostom holds the same view in Homily 40 to the people and Homily 65 on
Matthew. The Glossa and commentators commonly hold this regarding those words of
Matthew 12 and 22: "Many are called, but few are chosen," and regarding the parable
of the sower where only a fourth part of the seed brought forth fruit, Luke 8. Finally,
Cajetan, explaining the said parable of the Virgins, says that even of those who live
moderately in the Church and have some care for their conscience, half are damned,
which is very rigorous. The reasons or signs of this excess are taken from experience
itself and daily usage and propensity to evil ways. For without doubt, more among
Christians live badly, and they rarely persevere in the state of grace, and it is very
probable that they die as they live.
6. It is indeed a doubtful matter. But it seems to me that a distinction should be used.
We can also understand by the name of Christians all those who glory in the name of
Christ and profess to believe in Him, even though among them there are many heretics
and apostates and schismatics. And speaking in this generality, it is probable to me that
the number of the reprobate is greater, and in this way I understand everything that is
brought forward in the second opinion. And it can be confirmed because heretics and
apostates have always been in great number, because with the addition of the number
of impious faithful dying badly, it clearly exceeds the number of those dying in a holy
manner. But if by Christians we understand only those who die within the Catholic
Church, it seems more probable to me that more of them are saved, in the law of
grace. The reason is that, first of all, of those who die before adulthood, a very great
multitude departs with Baptism; but of adults, although the greater part of men more
often sin mortally, nevertheless they more often rise again, and thus they pass through
life falling and rising. But finally, at the end, there are few who are not prepared for
death through the Sacraments and who do not grieve for their sins, at least through
attrition; but this is sufficient for them to be justified at that time. And after they are
justified, they easily tend to persevere without new mortal sin during that short time;
therefore, considering everything, it is probable that more of these Christians are saved.
7. Fourth comparison. A fourth comparison can be made between the whole number
of the reprobate and of the predestined, as it consists of angels and men. Likewise, a
comparison can be made between angels and men, either among the reprobate
themselves or among the Predestined. But I think this entire comparison is unknown to
us because it has no foundation either in Scripture or in the Fathers, and conjectures
can only be weak. And everything depends on that question of whether the number of
angels that God created is greater or lesser than the entire number of humans to be
multiplied until the day of judgment. On this question, I cannot affirm anything certain
458 BOOK SIX
or sufficiently probable; however, it is usually treated in the material on angels, and
therefore I omit it.

CHAPTER IV. HOW THE

PLAN OF DIVINE SUPERNATURAL PROVIDENCE
IS FULFILLED THROUGH PREDESTINATION AND REPROBATION.

1. In this chapter I will reduce to a brief summary what has been said in the
discourse of this work, and I will set forth the entire plan of supernatural providence
concerning intellectual creatures, and incidentally I will indicate several other points in
which predestination and reprobation agree or differ. First, however, it must be
supposed that this plan of providence is not understood to exist in God until He is
understood to have some free decree: because providence expresses a relation to future
effects, which are free and consequently come from God's will and His free decree.
Therefore, providence does not begin until God is understood to have some free
decree.
2. Divine providence presupposes perfect knowledge of all possible things. Next, it
must be established that divine providence presupposes perfect knowledge of all
possible things, because will presupposes cognition. Since providence either includes or
presupposes a free decree of the will concerning creatures, it is necessary that it
presuppose knowledge and cognition of them. Therefore, it at least presupposes the
knowledge of simple intelligence of possible things, for this is most necessary and is
the first of all knowledge that God has of creatures.
3. God’s providence presupposes foreknowledge of future effects. It must be added,
moreover, that God's providence also presupposes conditional foreknowledge of all
future effects, or those that would emanate from any cause, even a free one, if it were
applied to operation with these or those circumstances. For this knowledge belongs to
God from the infinite perfection of His intellectual light, and it is necessary for the
exact perfection of His providence; otherwise He could not, of Himself, dispose and
predefine those things that depend on created free causes, nor could He move man's
free will efficaciously and with absolute intention to a free act in particular while
preserving its freedom, which is absurd. Nor is it necessary now to treat of the mode
of this foreknowledge, namely, whether it exists in physical determination that is
possible, or in another way: for this question belongs to another consideration. Now,
however, we only suppose that which cannot be denied by anyone: that before any free
decree, God has in His foreknowledge means by which He certainly knows that if He
wishes to apply them, such or such free effects will infallibly and efficaciously come
about; and consequently, that these means are such that they do not remove freedom,
459 BOOK SIX
nor impede its use. But whether physical predetermination is such, belongs to another
matter.
4. Theologians posit certain signs of reason in the mind of God. Finally, from what
has been said, it is supposed that, in order to explain the manner of divine
predestination and reprobation, certain signs of reason in the mind of God are rightly
distinguished by the more serious theologians. For although in God Himself there is
nothing prior or posterior according to reality, nevertheless, in the objects themselves
some order is found, by reason of which, just as in God we distinguish several acts
according to our reason, so we also conceive one as prior to another. For example,
because a creature is prior, and more necessarily possible than future, the knowledge of
simple intelligence is understood to be prior to the will or knowledge of the future
thing. Likewise, because the will is not carried except toward a known thing, the
knowledge of a thing is considered in some way prior to the will for it. And finally,
because God works most perfectly for an end, the intention of the end is conceived as
rationally prior to the choice of means, and because He rewards on account of merit,
and punishes on account of offense, foreknowledge or judgment of merit or offense is
understood to precede the will to give reward or punishment. And thus Augustine
speaks throughout, especially in question 2 to Simplician, and in the entire book on the
Predestination of the Saints, and Prosper in his letter to the same Augustine.
5. A double order of distinction, one of intention, one of execution, is posited in
God. From this, finally, we gather and suppose that in the divine will a double relation
or order must be distinguished: one is of intention and the other of execution. For in
those things that are subordinated to each other as end and means, the end is prior in
intention and posterior in execution; the means themselves are also subordinated to
each other: hence that which operates more proximately to the attainment of the end is
also prior in intention and posterior in execution, than the more remote means.
Because, therefore, God operates in the most perfect way for an end, before the will by
which He executes the means, He is understood to preintend the end, and consequently
the intention of such an end is understood to be prior to its attainment. And because
the execution itself of the end is through God's will, it is necessary to distinguish in the
divine will itself the intending will from the executing will: and the same reasoning
applies to individual means, as they observe a similar subordination among themselves:
and thus it happens that the series of intention is distinct from the series of execution
and prior in reason. This is especially necessary to observe in order to understand
predestination: because the plan of predestination pertains most of all to the order of
intention: for from predestination arises such an execution of means, which has the
attainment of the end infallibly joined to it.
460 BOOK SIX
6. First conclusion. With these things posited, we assert first that divine
predestination took its beginning from the efficacious intention of God, by which He
determined to ordain or destine a certain number and kind of men or angels to obtain
the reward and inheritance of blessedness, in such perfection or degree and order,
infallibly. That God intended this end, is clear from what has been said, because He
willed to confer means on them for the sake of it. But that this intention was absolute
and efficacious, the mode of providence concerning the predestined sufficiently shows
and declares, because it is efficacious and of special love toward them: for intention is
proportionate to the choice of means, because it is the foundation or reason for it. And
Paul calls this act of God's will in Romans, chapter 8: the "Purpose of God, according
to which those saints are called," for whom all things work together for good. He calls
the same act the love of God, "because he loved Jacob," in Romans 9. Finally, he calls
the same act election, "by which he chose us in Christ, that we should be holy and
immaculate in his sight in charity": in Ephesians 1. Hence all the predestined, or all who
are to be saved, are called in Scripture, as if by antonomasia, the Elect who cannot
perish, as is taken from Matthew 25, and Augustine expounds in "On Rebuke and
Grace," chapters 7 and following, "On the Predestination of the Saints," chapter 10,
"On the Gift of Perseverance," chapter 14.
7. God conferred on the beloved angels and men means of grace which He knew
would be efficacious in them. Secondly, from this intention God willed to confer on all
and each of the angels and men so beloved those means of grace which He had
foreknown through conditional knowledge would be efficacious in them, or would
infallibly have the intended effect, if they were given to them. For any wise governor, or
prudent artisan, or agent acting with purpose, operates in this way: much more,
therefore, does God, whose intention and absolute will cannot be frustrated. And from
this arises that common providence concerning the predestined, which Christ signified
when He said: "No one shall snatch them out of my hand," and when He said: "So that
even the elect would be led into error, if it were possible." And, "for the sake of the
elect those days will be shortened": and there are many similar passages in Scripture.
And this can almost be known by experience from attentively considered effects of
divine grace.
8. Hence it is also understood that in the universal creation, disposition, and
governance of things, God chose that series and mode which would be most suitable
and convenient for the infallible attainment of the intended end, concerning the
ultimate salvation of the elect. For thus the Fathers often say that all things are for the
elect, just as Paul said: "I endure all things for the sake of the elect, that they too may
obtain salvation." Who also in 1 Corinthians 3 seems to have said for this reason that all
things are of the predestined or elect, or of those who attain justice and persevere in it,
461 BOOK SIX
because all things were created and disposed by God for this end. Since, therefore, God
foreknew through the knowledge of simple intelligence various and innumerable ways
by which He could dispose and govern the things of this universe, He chose that which
He saw to be most suitable for the salvation of the elect. And in it He not only
disposed extrinsic and universal causes sufficient in their order, but also in particular
chose and established the mode of applying such causes to each elect person, through
auxiliaries both internal and external, which He foreknew would infallibly have their
effect. And thus He consummated the predestination of all the elect, the execution of
which begins in time with a calling proportioned to each, which is followed by
justification and its fruits, which are good merits, with the gift of perseverance until the
attainment of glory. All of which are distributed to individuals according to the
purpose of God's election, if we consider the primary root and intention, although in
reality and in the order of execution, after the first calling, the rest are more frequently
given according to each one's disposition conceived from prior grace.
9. Third conclusion. God created not only angels and men for beatitude, but also
many others who do not attain beatitude. Third, God determined to create not only
those angels or men whom He efficaciously loved and pre-elected, but also many others
who in fact do not attain eternal beatitude. Concerning these, God so conducted
Himself that He also willed in a certain first sign of reason, by a true and proper act of
intention, to create and ordain them for the attainment of beatitude. For it is certain
that God of Himself wills all to be saved, and hence all men are ordained to grace and
glory, and none is created to enjoy merely natural goods, or beatitude. Therefore, this
ordination to the supernatural end preceded from the aforesaid will, which
consequently must necessarily be a true and proper act of God's will. However, it is not
altogether absolute and efficacious, because God did not simply determine to beatify
such men, otherwise it would happen so, but He only willed it with this limitation and
condition, namely, as far as is necessary on His part, or unless men themselves, or
angels, should place an impediment.
10. Such an act in relation to God Himself is absolute. Wherefore, although such an
act was not simply and in all ways absolute and efficacious in relation to the end
considered in itself, and with respect to all causes and conditions on which its
attainment can depend: nevertheless, in relation to God Himself it was in some way
absolute, because truly on His part He intended such an end for those men and
consequently, by virtue of that act, God gives, or offers to those same men means in
some way sufficient, and on God's part per se necessary for attaining that end.
Otherwise, such an act would in no way be a true will and intention of such an end: for
he who wills the end, necessarily wills (with proportionate will) the necessary means,
and those sufficient of themselves for such an end. Hence when Paul said that God
462 BOOK SIX
wills all men to be saved: by the name of salvation he comprehends not only beatitude,
but also justice, remission of sin, and other means that are necessary in the said way for
that end.
11. Wherefore no one can doubt that such an act of will in God is free, because it is
true supernatural love of such persons: but it is clear that God does not of necessity
love any created person with supernatural love, even if He has the will to create it,
because He could create it only for its natural beatitude, in no way elevating it to a
supernatural end or order. Likewise, because God is compelled by no necessity to give
supernatural means of salvation to anyone: therefore neither does He necessarily have
that will which, once posited, it is necessary that He confer such means: therefore that
act of God's will was free.
12. Fourth conclusion. God willed to give sufficient means in both states. From these
things, therefore, it is concluded fourthly, that God, in a certain second sign of reason,
which we can also consider in the reprobate, willed to provide for them necessary and
in some way sufficient means, by which they could attain salvation, if it did not stand by
them. This is sufficiently clear from what was just said in the preceding point. I said,
however, in some way sufficient because these means are neither equal in all the
reprobate, nor sufficient in the same way, especially after original sin. For it must be
considered that God had this kind of will both before the foreseeing of original sin,
and after it had been foreknown, and in both states He willed to give sufficient means,
albeit diverse. For in the former, namely before the foreseeing of original sin, He willed
to give to all original justice in Adam, if he had chosen to obey: but in the latter state,
namely after foreseeing the fall of human nature, He willed first of all to offer to all
and to institute for all general means, such as are Christ's redemption, the institution of
Baptism and other Sacraments, and similar things. Then He willed of Himself not to
impede the application of such means, but rather to provide His help and cooperation
for it, as much as was in Him, and according to the exigency of free or natural
secondary causes, insofar as they can concur in some way or be necessary for such an
effect.
13. God, however, foresaw that in many people, especially infants, such application
would be impossible due to the defect of secondary causes, and nevertheless He
permitted it, which He could do, notwithstanding His prior will, because, as we have
said, it was not absolute, nor did it oblige God to work miracles, or to change the order
of secondary causes. In other men, however, He foresaw that there would not be
lacking the power, but the will to receive the application of such means. In some,
however, He foresaw that the application would not be lacking, which would be
sufficient for justification; but perseverance would be lacking, not from defect of divine
help, but from defect of free cooperation. And in each case He permitted defects of
463 BOOK SIX
this kind, in some more, in others fewer, providing greater helps to these, fewer to
those, indeed in all in some way sufficient, but in no one of them efficacious for
ultimate salvation, according to the counsel of His will and wisdom. Wherefore,
although through conditional knowledge God foresaw many means and helps, by which
these men would infallibly be saved, just as they would have been given, nevertheless
He did not wish to give them, but only those which He foresaw, according to the
common order of things, would be impeded, or would not have been accepted, and in
this He made all the reprobate equal in a certain way. And in this will that reprobation,
which they call negative, was consummated.
14. Final decision. Finally, after these two signs, which pertain to the order of
intention, concerning both the predestined and the reprobate, we understand a third
sign pertaining to the order of execution and common to both, with proportion
preserved. In that sign, therefore, God foresaw the callings of each of the predestined
and their good cooperations, dispositions and merits, with perseverance until the end
of life, and then at last He willed to bestow on each one the ultimate reward worthy of
their merits, namely by an effective will ad extra, through which in time He executes
such an effect, by applying to it His omnipotence and other necessary causes. And in a
proportional manner He foresaw the sins of the reprobate and their duration, or
obstinacy in them until death, and therefore He willed to exclude them from the
kingdom, and to punish them with due penalties in hell, in which will proper
reprobation, which they call positive, began. This third sign could easily be divided into
more, according to the various acts of intellect and will, which we distinguish in it with
some order, yet for the sake of brevity we include all these things under one sign: both
because that division and distinction is easy in itself, given what has been said; and also
because it is not now necessary for resolving any serious question, or explaining any
difficulty.
15. How predestination differs from reprobation. Predestination alone includes the
whole of providence in some way. From all these things it is understood first, how the
complete plan of divine and supernatural providence is formed from predestination
and reprobation. For reprobation can be taken properly and precisely insofar as it
denotes either the negation of some good, or the ordination to the evil of eternal
punishment; and if it is taken in this way, it does not constitute with predestination an
adequate account of supernatural providence: because that antecedent will by which
God wills men, even the reprobate, to be saved, and the disposition of means which
arises from it, pertains to supernatural providence: and yet it is neither predestination,
since it does not include the infallible attainment of the end, nor reprobation, since it is
ordained per se to conferring good, and not to evil. Therefore, for it to be true that the
whole of supernatural providence is contained in predestination and reprobation: it is
464 BOOK SIX
necessary to include under reprobation the whole of supernatural providence which
God has concerning the reprobate: for insofar as that act is inefficacious, and includes
the permission of sin and damnation, and concerns the same person and the same end,
it can be comprehended under reprobation, although such a signification of that name
is improper and too broad. I further add, however, that predestination alone in a certain
way includes the whole of God's providence, and especially supernatural providence:
for although providence directly and immediately concerns more things than
predestination, as is known per se, and therefore predestination has been said to be a
part of providence, nevertheless mediately, and as if indirectly, predestination
encompasses the whole of providence: because whatever falls under providence is
ordained to the good of the predestined, as was noted above with Augustine, who
often said that reprobation itself, or providence concerning the reprobate, is referred to
the salvation of the predestined.
16. Multiple differences between reprobation and predestination. They agree in this,
that each includes supernatural providence. Secondly, from what has been said, multiple
differences between predestination and reprobation can be gathered: for they agree in
this, that each pertains to supernatural providence, which in predestination is manifest:
because it is an efficacious ordination to a supernatural end through certain and
infallible means. In reprobation, however, insofar as it supposes ordination to the same
end through sufficient means, it is also manifest that it pertains directly and per se to
supernatural providence: but insofar as it includes either the permission of the evil of
guilt, or the ordination of the evil of punishment, it is referred to the same order in the
way that privation and habit pertain to the same order: for that permission includes the
negation of some efficacious grace, and that punishment consists most of all in the
privation of supernatural beatitude. Finally, for perfect providence not only reward is
required, but also punishment: but supernatural providence is perfect in its order, and
therefore it includes the ordination of both. Thus, therefore, not only predestination,
but also reprobation pertains to supernatural providence, though in a different way. For
predestination is from the direct and primary intention of God: but reprobation is from
a will that is, as it were, secondary, namely insofar as it includes ordination to the evil of
punishment, which God does not will, except as if compelled by the evil of guilt, which
precedes in man.
17. Most important difference. And this is the most important difference between
predestination and reprobation, and it arises from their proper objects. For
predestination is to good, which God wills per se and of Himself: but reprobation is to
evil, which God does not will of Himself, but provoked by man. Hence this difference
only proceeds concerning reprobation most properly and positively, which includes the
will to inflict the evil of eternal punishment. For if we consider the antecedent will of
465 BOOK SIX
God, by which He ordains these creatures to a supernatural end, with sufficient
providence, so that they can attain it, this also is per se and directly from the intention
of God: for it arises from His benevolence and mercy. Moreover, even the permission
to fall short of that end is per se from the free will and intention of God, because it
does not suppose guilt in man, from which it could arise. For although such permission
does not pertain to the benefit of that person whose evil is permitted, it nevertheless
pertains to the universal order of God's providence, and can be ordained to the good
of the predestined, and contains no deformity in itself: and therefore it can per se
directly fall under the divine will.
18. Another distinction. Hence another difference is also understood, for no cause
of the whole of predestination can be given on the part of the predestined, both
because it begins from the efficacious love of God, by which He pre-elected the
predestined to glory, and also because the beginning of grace cannot be from man, but
from God. But predestination begins to be carried into execution in the very beginning,
which is taken from the congruous calling, and therefore the whole of predestination
cannot presuppose the merits of man. But of the whole of reprobation there is given a
cause on the part of man, because the beginning of guilt is from man, and foreseen
guilt is the reason for ordination to punishment, in which the account of reprobation
consists. This difference, however, proceeds between positive reprobation and
predestination, but it does not have a place in the supernatural providence which God
has concerning the reprobate, by ordaining them to a supernatural end. For this also
cannot have a cause on the part of man, because in the order of intention it proceeds
from the antecedent love of God, and in execution it has its beginning from grace. In a
similar way, that difference does not have a place in negative reprobation, for neither
can a cause of this be given on the part of the reprobate, because permission always
precedes, which cannot be founded on guilt.

[END OF BOOK SIX: A COMPARISON BETWEEN PREDESTINATION

AND REPROBATION]