2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Essays on China
and U.S. Policy

ED I T E D B Y Lucas Myers
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Essays on China
and U.S. Policy

E D ITE D BY Lucas Myers

2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Essays on China
and U.S. Policy
Essays by

Michael Beckley Kristen Hopewell

Ling Chen Austin Strange
Aynne Kokas Emily Wilcox
Jiakun Jack Zhang Darcie DeAngelo
David J. Bulman Tyler Harlan
Dimitar Gueorguiev Juliet Lu
David M. McCourt Renard Sexton
Deborah Seligsohn Diana Fu
Macabe Keliher Austin Horng-En Wang
Emily Matson Adrian Rauchfleisch
Kacie Miura Audrye Wong
Joseph Torigian
Meir Alkon

Edited by
Lucas Myers

www.wilsoncenter.org
This publication was made possible (in part) by a grant from
Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and
views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

©2022 The Wilson Center

Woodrow Wilson International

Center for Scholars
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1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027

www.wilsoncenter.org
THE WILSON CENTER, chartered by Congress as the official memorial
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Ambassador Mark Green, Director, President, and CEO

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Chair: Bill Haslam, Former Governor of Tennessee

Vice Chair: Drew Maloney, President and CEO, American Investment

Council

Private Citizen Members: Nicholas Adams, The Foundation for

Liberty and American Greatness (FLAG); Thelma Duggin, President, The
AnBryce Foundation; Brian H. Hook, Vice Chairman of Cerberus Global
Investments, Former U.S. Special Representative for Iran, and Senior Policy
Advisor to the Secretary of State; Timothy Pataki, Trustee, Wilson Center;
Alan N. Rechtschaffen, Private Investor, Senior Lecturer of Laws, New York
University; Hon. Louis Susman, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Kingdom, Senior Advisor, Perella Weinberg Partners

Public Members: Antony Blinken, Secretary, U.S. Department of State;

Lonnie G. Bunch III, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Miguel Cardona,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; David Ferriero, Archivist of the
United States; Carla D. Hayden, Librarian of Congress; Adam Wolfson,
Acting Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities
Contents

1 Foreword
Stephen Del Rosso

3 Introduction
Abraham M. Denmark

7 Section I: The U.S.-China Trade War, Multinationals, and

China’s Economy

9 Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Slowing Growth Is Making

China More Dangerous
Michael Beckley

31 Changing State-Business Relations under the

U.S.-China Tech War
Ling Chen

53 TikTok, Mulan, and the Olympics: Contesting Content Control

through Trade in the U.S.-China Relationship
Aynne Kokas

77 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

Jiakun Jack Zhang

99 Section II: The Decline of Engagement and the Impacts

of U.S.-China Competition
 Contents

101 “Common Prosperity” and China’s State Capitalist Welfare State:

Implications for U.S. Policy
David J. Bulman

133 Understanding Hawkishness in Chinese Public Opinion

Dimitar Gueorguiev

161 Knowing the PRC: America’s China Watchers between

Engagement and Strategic Competition
David M. McCourt

193 The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the U.S.-China

Health Relationship
Deborah Seligsohn

223 Section III: The Party’s Governance, History,

and Xi Jinping

225 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

Macabe Keliher

261 From Regional to National: Northeastern Scholars and the

National Discourse on the War of Resistance against Japan
Emily Matson

283 The Domestic Sources of China’s Maritime Assertiveness Under

Xi Jinping
Kacie Miura

307 Xi Jinping and Ideology

Joseph Torigian

339 Section IV: China and Its Relations with Developing

Countries and the Global South

341 China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability

Meir Alkon

viii
 Contents

375 The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global Development:

Agriculture and Fisheries Subsidies
Kristen Hopewell

399 Influence Nodes: China’s High-Profile Global Development

Projects
Austin Strange

425 Learning Diplomacy: China’s South-South Dance Exchanges of

the 1950s and 1960s and Their Relevance Today
Emily Wilcox

449 Section V: Southeast Asia and China

451 Peaceful Minefields: Environmental Protection or Security Risks?

Darcie DeAngelo

475 Green Cooperation: Environmental Governance and Development

Aid on the Belt and Road
Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu

501 Finding a Balanced China Policy: Constraints and Opportunities

for Southeast Asian Leaders
Renard Sexton

521 Section VI: China’s Impact on Democracy, Civil Society,

and the Diaspora

524 Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead? How the United
States Should Navigate
People-to-People Exchange in a New Era
Diana Fu

ix
 Contents

552 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

568 The Diaspora and China’s Foreign Influence Activities

Audrye Wong

596 Afterword
Robert Daly

x
Foreword
Stephen Del Rosso is the Director of the International Peace and
Security Program at the Carnegie Corporation of New York

Since the first publication a year ago of the research produced by the Wilson
China Fellows, the world seems to have grown more troubled and dangerous.
In the shadow of COVID-19 and its variants, growing tensions between the
United States and China have contributed to a sense of geostrategic unease
and peril. The economic dimension of the Sino-American rivalry and calls for
the decoupling of these two massive and intertwined economies have added
another destabilizing element to the equation. Combined with America’s
equally challenging relations with Russia and China’s “no limits” partnership
with that other nuclear power—exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—
uncertainties in world affairs abound.
The knock-on effects of these developments on American scholars of China
are both serious and regrettable. While there is growing demand for their work,
the increasingly restrictive domestic political environment in China has limited
the ability of American researchers to work in the country, interact safely with
their Chinese counterparts, and gain access to archival material. All this, of
course, has been exacerbated by visa and pandemic restrictions, and a security-
heavy discourse in China and the United States that has politicized research and
contributed to an environment of mutual mistrust suspicion. As attention on
China grows throughout the American policy and expert communities, as well
as the general public, the constraints to gaining knowledge and insights about
this increasingly consequential country appear formidable.
And yet, in the best tradition of American scholarship and resourcefulness
these researchers have persisted despite the headwinds. Utilizing a variety of
methods, from accessing open source material to carrying out remote surveys,
and, in some cases, managing to run the gauntlet and conduct field research in
China, American scholars of China have found ways to ply their trade when
nuanced and empirically-grounded understanding of this rising power is

1
 Stephen Del Rosso

needed more than ever. The Wilson China Fellows program is one of the key
initiatives supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York to further this
goal. It is also an exemplar of the deceptively simple but impactful mandate of
the Corporation’s founder, Andrew Carnegie, to promote the “advancement
and diffusion of knowledge and understanding.”
We hope you find this volume both timely and enlightening.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

2
Introduction
Abraham M. Denmark is the Vice President of Programs and Director
of Studies; Senior Advisor to the Asia Program; and Senior Fellow in the
Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Wilson Center.

With the conclusion of another successful year of the Wilson China

Fellowship, it is important to reflect upon the momentous changes facing the
international system and the United States. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
has attracted global attention, the Biden administration has continued to
focus on the Indo-Pacific—speaking to the significant opportunities for
engagement across the region and the profound challenges posed by China.
Clearly, Washington continues to need sound analysis of China and the
implications of its rise.
As Wilson Center President and CEO Ambassador Mark Green
stated in the 2nd annual Wilson China Conference, “The Wilson Center
was chartered by Congress some five decades ago for… the purpose of
‘strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the
world of public affairs.’”1 The Wilson Center and its Wilson China Fellows—
with the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York—work
to advance that mission and shed light on the important questions facing
policymakers in Washington.
Featuring twenty-five scholars, the second class of Wilson China Fellows
undertook a wide range of research projects designed to improve policymaker
understanding of the crucial issues surrounding China’s rise and its impact on
U.S.-China relations. Divided into broadly themed sections, this publication
features the following scholars and their projects:
Several scholars examined the U.S.-China trade war, multinationals,
and China’s economy. Michael Beckley explored the security implications
of a Chinese economic slowdown. Ling Chen’s analyzed the “tech cold
war” between the United States and China, and the future of state-
business relations. Aynne Kokas looked into how Chinese government

3
 Abraham M. Denmark

content control regulations shape the U.S. market as Chinese influence on

the U.S. entertainment industry increases. Jiakun Jack Zhang challenged
conventional wisdom surrounding the efficacy of tariffs and the implications
for the U.S. economy.
Others aimed to understand the decline of engagement and the impact
on U.S.-China relations. David Bulman discussed China’s burgeoning
state-capitalist welfare state under the new concept of “common prosperity,”
as well as its implications for competition with the United States. Dimitar
Gueorguiev surveyed public opinion in China to interrogate assumptions
about hawkishness within Chinese public opinion. David McCourt
conducted a study into the U.S. “China watcher” community and its
changing views of U.S.-China relations. Deborah Seligsohn outlined the
history of U.S.-China cooperation under the World Health Organization
and its lessons for today’s pandemic.
This class also featured several scholars who adopted a longer-term view
to understand Chinese history, memory, and the Party itself. Macabe Keliher
delved into Hong Kong’s political economy both in driving protests and
mobilizing state interest in the crackdown over the past three decades. Emily
Matson undertook a historiographical approach into the role of Northeastern
Chinese scholars on the recent Communist Party decision to shift the official
starting date of the Second Sino-Japanese War to 1931 from 1937. Kacie
Miura critically examined whether Xi Jinping’s China is as unitary as many
view it to be, while Joseph Torigian researched the role and influence that
ideology plays on Xi himself.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its deepening ties to the Global
South constitute another area of intense scholar and policymaker interest.
Meir Alkon analyzed China’s overseas investments, host country politics,
and its efforts to “green” the BRI. Kristin Hopewell looked into the impact of
China’s trade policies and subsidies on global development in the agricultural
and fisheries industries, while Austin Strange examined China’s high profile
development projects. Emily Wilcox discussed and explored the role of dance
in Chinese cultural diplomacy and its outreach to the Global South.
Southeast Asia, as the destination of increasing Chinese economic and
political investment, plays a key role in the question of China’s impact on
its regional neighborhood. Darcie DeAngelo told the story of U.S. and

4
 Introduction

Chinese minefield clearance efforts and the implications for their regional
soft power. T yler Harlan and Juliet Lu embarked upon a joint
project highlighting China’s efforts to increase green cooperation within
the BRI. Renard Sexton surveyed views of the South China Sea
disputes within Southeast Asia.
Finally, another contingent of our scholars discussed the rise of China and
its impact on democracy, norms, global governance, and diaspora Chinese
communities. Diana Fu asked the question: Is China’s civil society really
dead? Austin Wang looked into the #MilkTeaAlliance to better understand
popular support for democracy and opposition to China throughout the Indo-
Pacific. Audrye Wong examined the Chinese government’s foreign influence
activities and the Chinese diaspora.
Each essay in this collection adds to the growing body of work on China
in the United States. Perhaps more importantly, they serve to bridge the gap
between academic and policymaker understandings of the rise of China.
As the challenges of the 21st Century continue to take shape, from climate
change to the rising salience of great power competition, policymakers both
within the United States and abroad will face a deepening array of issues. The
rise of China may be the only challenge that reaches across and impacts each
and every one of these challenges. For policymakers to craft and execute policies
that address these issues, they require the knowledge and understanding of
the academic community. Going forward, the Wilson Center will continue to
work to meet this need, as will our Wilson China Fellows.
We are immensely proud of the quality of our scholars and the importance
of the work they have completed. We hope you find these essays as valuable
as we do.
The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

5
 Abraham M. Denmark

Notes
1 Ambassador Mark Green, “Remarks at the Wilson China Fellowship Conference
2022,” The Wilson Center, February 14th, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/
wilson-china-fellowship-conference-2022

6
Section I

The U.S.-China Trade War,

Multinationals, and China’s
Economy
U.S.-China competition increasingly covers all spheres of the bilateral
relationship, including the economy, trade, and technology. During the
Trump administration, the United States launched a trade war against China
in response to alleged unfair trade practices. Under the Biden administration,
these tensions with Beijing have only continued to simmer.
Most notably, a conversation around decoupling and shifting strategic
supply chains away from China has emerged in recent years. China’s growing
authoritarianism and international assertiveness drive this conversation, as
numerous examples of Beijing’s censorship damaging U.S. companies attest.
These developments raise important policy questions about the rise of China,
the future of the global economy, and the impact of increasing competition on
economic, trade, and technology policies.

This chapter explores these issues and more,

featuring essays from the following fellows:
Michael Beckley, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Slowing Growth
is Making China More Dangerous”
Ling Chen, “Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China
Tech War”
Aynne Kokas, “TikTok, Mulan, and the Olympics: Contesting Content
Control through Trade in the U.S.-China Relationship”
Jiakun Jack Zhang, “The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon”

7
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Desperate Times, Desperate

Measures: Slowing Growth
Is Making China More
Dangerous
Michael Beckley is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts
University, a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute, and 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Michael Beckley

Abstract
Most debate on U.S.-China policy focuses on the dangers of a rising,
confident China. But the United States actually faces a more volatile threat:
an insecure China mired in a protracted economic slowdown. China’s
growth rates have fallen by half over the past decade and are likely to
plunge in the years ahead as massive debt, foreign protectionism, resource
depletion, and rapid aging take their toll. Past rising powers that suffered
such slowdowns became more repressive at home and aggressive abroad as
they struggled to revive their economies and maintain domestic stability and
international influence. China already seems to be headed down this ugly
path. Slowing growth makes China a less competitive long-term rival to the
United States, but a more explosive near-term threat. As U.S. policymakers
determine how to counter China’s repression and aggression, they should
recognize that economic insecurity has spurred great power expansion in
the past and is driving China’s belligerence today.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Policymakers should think about U.S.-China competition as a decade-
long sprint rather than a decades-long marathon.

● The United States and its allies must prevent China from achieving near-
term successes that would radically alter the long-term balance of power.
The most pressing dangers are a Chinese conquest of Taiwan and Chinese
dominance of critical goods, services, and technologies.

● The United States and its allies must use tools and partnerships that are
available now rather than devoting resources to cultivating assets that will
require years to develop.

● The United States and its allies should focus on selectively undermining
Chinese power rather than changing Chinese behavior. Instead of trying
to cajole and persuade Beijing, they should focus on conducting targeted
attrition on Chinese capabilities. This approach is obviously risky, but not
as risky as business as usual with Beijing.

10
 Desperate Times, Desperate Measures

● The United States and its allies must move fast, but also avoid provoking
Beijing into a violent response. Washington should eschew impassioned
calls to pursue regime change in China, a full technological embargo,
across-the-board trade sanctions, or major covert action programs to
foment tensions and violence in China.

11
 Michael Beckley

Introduction
Most debate on U.S. China policy focuses on the dangers of a rising, confident
China.1 But the United States actually faces a more volatile threat: an insecure
China mired in a protracted economic slowdown. China’s growth rates
have fallen by half over the past decade and are likely to plunge in the years
ahead as massive debt, foreign protectionism, resource depletion, and rapid
aging take their toll. Past rising powers that suffered such slowdowns became
more repressive at home and aggressive abroad as they struggled to revive
their economies and maintain domestic stability and international influence.
China already seems to be headed down this ugly path.
As China’s economic conditions have steadily worsened since the 2008
financial crisis, China’s government has cracked down on dissent and dialed
up nationalist propaganda. At the same time, it has invested heavily overseas to
generate demand for Chinese exports and secure scarce resources for Chinese
firms. To protect these investments, China also has gone out militarily,
tripling its procurement of long-range naval ships, quintupling its patrols in
major sea lanes, militarizing strategically placed features in the South China
Sea, and increasing its use of maritime coercion—ship ramming and aerial
intercepts—by nearly an order of magnitude.
The standard narrative in Washington attributes this surge in assertive
behavior to China’s growing power and ambition. In reality, it reflects
profound unease among China’s leaders, who are facing their country’s first
sustained economic slowdown in a generation and see no end in sight. China
has experienced several recessions since the Reform and Opening period in
the late 1970s, but China’s government was able to rekindle rapid growth
each time through stimulus spending or economic reform. But now stimulus
is increasingly ineffective, and China’s leaders have ruled out reform as too
politically risky. Consequently, they are resorting to a classic authoritarian
strategy: tightening their grip on power while carving out privileged economic
zones overseas.
Slowing growth makes China a less competitive long-term rival to the
United States, but a more explosive near-term threat. As U.S. policymakers
determine how to counter China’s repression and aggression, they should
recognize that economic insecurity has spurred great power expansion in the
past and is driving China’s belligerence today.

12
 Desperate Times, Desperate Measures

These findings contribute to theoretical and historical debates on the

origins of great power conflict and the rise and fall of great powers. The
current scholarly literature on those subjects is vast but rests on several
simplistic assumptions: great powers are either rising or falling, rising
powers expand, falling powers retrench, and conflict is most likely when
there’s a power transition, a phenomenon that Harvard professor Graham
Allison has popularized as the “Thucydides Trap” though his analysis is
essentially a regurgitation of power transition theory—a well-established
literature stretching back decades.2 The findings in this paper overturn these
assumptions. I show that there is much more volatility in every country’s
trajectory. Rising states often experience extended economic slowdowns.
Those states can and often do expand rather than retrench in the face of
growing headwinds. I further show that wars can occur even when there is
no power transition and, often, precisely because a rising state perceives that
it will fail to overtake the leading power. These dynamics have been the
primary driver of major power conflict in the modern era and are at the core of
contemporary U.S.-China competition.

China’s Economic Slowdown

In March 2007, China’s then Premier, Wen Jiabao, delivered a shocking press
conference in which he said China’s growth model had become “unsteady,
unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable.”3 From that year until 2019,
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates dropped from 15 percent
to 6 percent, the slowest rate in 30 years and marking the longest sustained
growth deceleration in the post-Mao era. The COVID-19 pandemic has
dragged China’s growth rates down even further.4
A growth rate of 6 percent would still be spectacular, of course, but many
economists believe China’s true rate is roughly half that.5 More important,
GDP growth is not necessarily a sign of wealth creation. If a country spends
hundreds of billions of dollars on useless infrastructure, its GDP will rise but
its stock of wealth will remain unchanged or even decline. To accumulate
wealth, a country needs to increase the output it produces per unit of input,
a metric that economists call total factor productivity. Over the past decade,
China’s productivity has deteriorated by a full percentage point each year and

13
 Michael Beckley

more than 10 percent overall and essentially all of its economic growth has
come from capital inputs, spending more money and taking out more credit.6
The tangible signs of China’s unproductive growth are easy to find. China
has built more than 50 ghost cities—huge metropolises filled with empty
offices, apartments, malls, and airports.7 More than 20 percent of homes sit
unoccupied.8 Excess capacity in major industries tops 30 percent as factories
sit idle and goods rot in warehouses.9 China’s government estimates that it
spent at least $6 trillion on “ineffective investment” between 2009 and
2014 alone.10 The unsurprising result of this waste is massive debate. China’s
debt ballooned eight-fold in absolute size from 2010 to 2019 and was more
than three times the size of China’s economy on the eve of the COVID-19
pandemic, which has pushed Beijing’s finances further into the red.11
Worse, the very elements that powered China’s economic ascent are fast
becoming growth-sapping liabilities dragging the economy down. In the
1990s and early 2000s, China enjoyed expanding access to foreign markets and
technology and a secure geopolitical situation rooted in a friendly relationship
with the United States. China enjoyed near self-sufficiency in food, water, and
energy resources and a manageable level of pollution. Most important, China
was reaping the benefits of the greatest demographic dividend in history, with
ten working-age adults per senior citizen aged 65 or older (roughly twice the
global average ratio).12 China’s government seemed to be skillfully harnessing
all of these advantages, slowly transitioning from a Maoist dictatorship to a
business-friendly autocracy.
But now China is losing access to foreign markets and technology;
since the 2008 financial crisis it has been hit with thousands of new trade
and investment barriers by the world’s biggest economies.13 The surge of
anti-China protectionism has accelerated greatly since 2017, when the
United States started waging a trade and tech war against China. The
world’s wealthiest democracies, led by the G-7, are adopting new labor and
environmental standards that implicitly discriminate against China. They
also are looking to reduce China’s presence in their supply chains and are
colluding to cut China off from advanced technology. For example, the United
States, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Taiwan recently cooperated to
prevent China from gaining access to advanced semiconductors and the
machines that manufacture them.

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 Desperate Times, Desperate Measures

At the same time, China has started suffering severe water scarcity—
Beijing has less water per capita than Saudi Arabia—and it is now forced
to import more food and energy resources than any other country, having
decimated its own natural endowments.14 To top it off, China is starting to
experience what will be the worst aging crisis in history, in which it will lose
200 million workers and gain 200 million seniors over the next 30 years,
thanks to the one-child policy.15 The most recent estimates, including those
from Chinese researchers, suggest China’s population could be cut in half
perhaps within the next 30 years and certainly by the end of the century.16
Demographers project that China will have to triple age-related spending as a
share of its economy, from 10 percent of GDP to 30 percent of GDP, by 2050
to keep large numbers of senior citizens from dying in abject poverty.17 To
top it off, China’s government is sliding back into economically devastating
neo-totalitarianism.18 Xi Jinping is a dictator that has clearly shown he will
sacrifice economic growth to maintain political power. Even though private
firms generate most of China’s real wealth, Xi has funneled subsidies to
inefficient, and even loss-making, state-owned firms while starving private
firms of capital. He also has carried out a brutal anti-corruption campaign
that has discouraged economic experimentation by local governments and
objective economic analysis.19 And he has pushed through an array of new
regulations that have crimped China’s tech sectors. Any Chinese company
that does anything remotely related to the internet is required to hand over
its data and get Beijing’s blessing before making major strategic moves or
obtaining a loan.20
China hopes to maintain solid economic growth by boosting its economic
self-reliance and technological innovation through a policy called “dual
circulation,” in which China relies more on its home market for demand while
siphoning technology and key resources from friendly countries in Eurasia,
Africa, and Latin America.21 At the same time, China has invested heavily
in R&D. These efforts have paid some dividends. China leads the world in
certain manufacturing industries—for example household appliances, textiles,
steel, solar panels—and it boasts the world’s largest e-commerce market and
mobile payments system. Yet in high-technology industries that involve the
commercial application of advanced scientific research (e.g., pharmaceuticals,
bio-technology, and semiconductors) or the engineering and integration of

15
 Michael Beckley

complex parts (e.g. aviation, medical devices, and system software), China
generally accounts for small shares of global markets.22 China also still relies
on imports for an array of linchpin technologies, including 80 percent of its
computer chips, high-end sensors, and advanced medical devices and 90
percent of its advanced manufacturing equipment.23 This lack of progress,
despite hundreds of billions of dollars spent on R&D over the past decade
and the world’s most aggressive use of economic espionage during that time
as well, do not bode well for China becoming a high-productivity economy
anytime soon.
Every country that has experienced anything close to China’s current
debt accumulation, productivity collapse, or rapid aging has suffered a lost
decade or more of near-zero economic growth. How would China handle
such a dire situation?

The Historical Record

When fast-growing great powers slow down, they typically do not mellow
out. More often, they crack down on domestic dissent while expanding
abroad to tap new sources of wealth and deter foreign rivals from exploiting
their economic vulnerabilities. Over the past 150 years, nearly a dozen great
powers grew economically at 3.5 percent annually or faster for at least a decade
followed by another decade in which their average growth rates fell by at least
50 percent. None quietly accepted a new normal of slower growth.24
When U.S. growth slowed in the late-nineteenth century, for example,
the United States suppressed domestic labor strikes, hiked tariffs on foreign
goods, and pumped investment and exports into Latin America and East
Asia, annexing territory there, and building a massive navy to protect its far-
flung assets. It also seized key strategic points, including the Panama Canal
route, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines and waged war against Spain and
sent troops to China, all while warning other great powers to stay out of the
Western Hemisphere.25 During its own late-nineteenth century slowdown,
Russia centralized authority in the Tsar’s hands while building the Trans-
Siberian railway and militarily occupying parts of Korea and Manchuria with
170,000 troops.26 By 1905, some 70 percent of the Russian empire was living
under martial law. The Russian military grew, especially the navy, which saw

16
 Desperate Times, Desperate Measures

its budget rise by 40 percent from 1901 to 1905. Russia’s expansion ceased
only when Japan defeated it in the Russo-Japanese War.
When economic crises threatened Japan’s rise and Germany’s recovery
during the interwar years, both countries turned to authoritarianism and
went on rampages to seize resources and smash foreign rivals.27 When France’s
postwar boom fizzled in the 1970s, it tried to reconstitute its economic sphere
of influence in Africa, deploying 14,000 troops in its former colonies there
and carrying out a dozen military interventions over the next two decades.28
When Japan’s era of rapid growth ended in the 1970s, it transformed itself into
the world’s largest foreign investor and a major military power: it provided
struggling Japanese firms massive loans to help expand their global market
share; quintupled foreign investment from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s,
purchasing controlling stakes in raw materials firms in developing countries
and high-technology companies and real estate in developed countries; acquired
hundreds of advanced combat aircraft, ships, and submarines; and began
patrolling sea lines of communication up to 1,000 miles from the Japanese
coast.29 When Russia stagnated after the collapse of world oil prices in 2009,
it jailed dissidents and banned foreign NGOs while pressuring its neighbors
to join a Russian-dominated regional trade bloc. This coercion intensified a
crisis with Ukraine that culminated in the Maidan Revolution and Russia’s
annexation of Crimea.30
These and other examples show that rising powers can become prickly and
aggressive when their economies run out of steam. Rapid growth fuels their
ambitions, raises their citizens’ expectations, and alarms their rivals. Then
stagnation dashes those ambitions and expectations and gives their enemies
a chance to pounce. Consequently, their leaders become extremely fearful of
a rise in domestic unrest and a decline in international power and prestige,
and they search feverishly for ways to restore steady growth and keep internal
opposition and foreign predation at bay. A prolonged economic slump
threatens a great power’s security as well as the legitimacy of its leaders and the
patronage networks they rely on to remain in power. For these reasons, when
a rising great power experiences a severe and sustained economic slowdown,
its leaders can be expected to become determined, even desperate, to boost
growth or generate alternative sources of regime security. If rapid growth gives
countries the capability to expand their interests, a slowing economy provides

17
 Michael Beckley

a powerful motive to make secure those interests quickly, before the country’s
window of opportunity slams shut. It is the long ascent followed by the specter
of a sharp decline that makes the situation so dangerous.
In theory, slowing great powers have alternative options to economic and
military expansion. They could for example, try to revamp the economy by
enacting major reforms, for example, invest more heavily in education and
R&D to spur innovation and boost productivity. A slowing great power also
could try to stimulate domestic demand by providing more social services
to citizens (e.g. healthcare, childcare, and pensions), thereby encouraging
citizens to spend, rather than save, more of their incomes. But such major
reforms are typically expensive, require raising taxes, and could take years
to boost the economy. Thus, leaders typically look for other, less politically
wrenching, options. International expansion often appears to be an attractive
option, because it can potentially open up new sources of wealth, rally the
nation around the ruling regime, and ward off rival powers. It offers the
prospect of a single great solution to what ails a slowing regime. Historically,
the question has been, not whether a rising power would expand abroad
during a slowdown, but how.

Risk Factors
Great powers have two basic pathways to expand. One is to rely on global
markets by opening up to foreign trade, investment, or immigration. The
other is to engage in mercantilism, protecting national firms with subsidies
and trade barriers while using various elements of state power (e.g. aid, loans,
bribes, arms sales, technology transfers, military coercion and conquest) to carve
out exclusive economic zones abroad. In practice, great powers typically rely
on some combination of markets and mercantilism. In most cases, however, it
is possible to identify a general tendency toward one or the other.
Two main factors shape a rising power’s response to hard economic times.
The first is the level of openness in the international economy.31 How open are
foreign markets? How safe are international trade routes? If the international
economy is open, a slowing great power can potentially rejuvenate its economy
through peaceful free trade and investment, as Japan did after its postwar
economic miracle came to an end in the 1970s. If the international economy

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is closed, however, then the great power may have to shove its way into foreign
markets and physically secure critical resources, as Japan did in the 1930s.
The second key factor is the degree of state ownership and intervention
in the great power’s economy.32 If the government has a direct stake in the
survival of major firms, and if major firms have substantial influence in the
government, then the government will be especially inclined and capable of
shielding firms from foreign competition and helping them move overseas
when profits dry up at home. State-led economies are unlikely to liberalize
and rely on free markets during a slowdown, because that would require
eliminating subsidies and protections for state-favored firms—risking a surge
in bankruptcies, unemployment, and popular resentment and disrupting the
crony capitalist networks that the regime depends on for survival. Instead,
state-dominated regimes usually engage in mercantilist expansion during
slowdowns, using money and muscle to carve out exclusive economic zones
abroad and divert popular anger toward foreign enemies.
Over the past 150 years, the most violent expanders were authoritarian
capitalist countries suffering slowdowns during periods of declining economic
openness. All of the state-dominated economies that faced closing markets
abroad (Imperial Russia, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union,
and contemporary Russia) resorted to military coercion and conquest—the
most intense forms of mercantilism—to try to carve out exclusive economic
spheres, deny rivals an exclusive economic zone, divert domestic discontent
toward foreign enemies, or all of the above. The other formerly rising powers
that suffered an economic slowdown faced a more varied set of circumstances
and, perhaps as a result, employed a more mixed bag of mercantilist and
market-based strategies while expanding abroad. China today is clearly an
authoritarian capitalist state, and while the global economy remains more open
today than in previous eras, China’s access to foreign markets and resources
are coming under increasing threat from a global rise in protectionism and the
trade war with the United States.

Chinese Assertiveness
As China has faced slowing growth and rising protectionism over the past
decade, it has tightened authoritarian controls while greatly expanding its global

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economic and military footprint. Domestically, it has erected the most advanced
propaganda, censorship, and surveillance systems in history; doubled internal
security spending; expelled foreign NGOs; detained one million Uighurs in
internment camps; and concentrated power in the hands of a dictator for life.33
Internationally, China has tripled foreign direct investment and quintupled
overseas lending to gain privileged access to foreign markets, resources, and
technologies.34 To protect its vast overseas assets, China has adopted a new
military strategy focused on “open seas protection,” launched more warships
than the total number of ships in the British navy, flooded sea lanes with
hundreds of government vessels and aircraft, militarized features in the South
China Sea, and dramatically increased its use of coercion—especially sanctions,
ship-ramming, and aerial intercepts—to defend its maritime claims.
Many observers believe these actions reflect China’s growing power
and confidence. In fact, they are rooted in economic and domestic political
insecurity. When China’s economy was booming in the 1990s and early
2000s, China loosened political controls and adopted a peaceful rise strategy,
which sought to mollify other countries through economic integration
and multilateral confidence building mechanisms. China’s hard turn to
dictatorship and mercantilist expansion, by contrast, has occurred as China’s
economy has suffered its most protracted slowdown in a generation; labor
protests have proliferated; Chinese elites have moved their money and
children out of the country en masse; China’s president has given multiple
internal speeches warning party members of the potential for a Soviet-style
collapse; and China’s government has outlawed negative economic news and
peddled conspiracy theories blaming setbacks, such as the 2015 stock market
collapse and the 2019 Hong Kong protests, on Western meddling.35 These are
not the hallmarks of a confident superpower. Rather they reflect a sense of
urgency in Beijing, one that could impel China to make a mad dash to achieve
its vaunting objectives—to conquer Taiwan, control the East and South
China Seas, and restore China to its rightful place as the dominant power in
Asia and most powerful country in the world—before decline sets in.
Indeed, China has in recent years thrown off any semblance of restraint
and started expanding aggressively on multiple fronts and brandishing every
coercive weapon in its arsenal. Friendship diplomacy has given way to “wolf
warrior diplomacy.” Perceived slights from foreigners, no matter how trivial,

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are met with vicious, North Korean–style condemnation. “We treat our friends
with fine wine, but for our enemies we have shotguns,” explained Gui Congyou,
China’s ambassador to Sweden, in 2019, after a Swedish literary group dared
award a prize to an imprisoned Chinese publisher. Western powers once
thought they could tame China by integrating it into the liberal order. But last
year, President Xi Jinping declared that anyone that tries to control China will
have their “heads bashed bloody against a Great Wall of steel.” A combative
attitude pervades every part of Chinese foreign policy—and it is confronting
the United States and its allies with their gravest threat in generations.
This threat is most apparent in East Asia, where China is moving aggressively
to condoslidate its vast territorial claims.36 Beijing is churning out warships and
has flooded Asian sea lanes with government vessels. Since September 2020,
it has carried out the most provocative show of force in the Taiwan Strait in
decades. Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more
than 50 combat aircraft, loiter in the strait almost daily and simulate attacks
on Taiwanese and U.S. targets. Chinese officials have told Western analysts
that calls for an invasion are growing more common within the CCP. Pentagon
commanders worry that such an assault could occur by the middle of this
decade. A major clash between nuclear-armed great powers hasn’t looked this
likely since the early 1980s. The world’s most important maritime crossroads is
on the brink of becoming a warzone, and China’s entente with Russia raises the
specter of simultaneous conflicts in Europe and Asia.
China has gone on the economic offensive, too. Its latest five-year
economic plan calls for achieving primacy over what Chinese officials call
“chokepoints”—goods and services other countries can’t live without—
and then using that dominance, plus the lure of China’s domestic market,
to coerce countries into concessions.37 Toward that end, China has loaded
up more than 150 countries with more than $1 trillion of debt. Beijing has
massively subsidized strategic industries to gain a monopoly over hundreds
of vital products including medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, rare earths,
and industrial goods, and it has installed the hardware for digital networks
in dozens of countries.38 It is using economic coercion with increasing
frequency. Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Japan, Lithuania,
Mongolia, Norway, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United
States—plus dozens of private companies and individuals—have recently

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experienced China’s economic wrath. In many cases, the punishment has

been vastly disproportionate to the supposed crime. After Australia requested
an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19, for example,
China slapped steep tariffs on nearly all the country’s major exports. Like
Imperial and Nazi Germany, China has become what the economist Albert
Hirschman called a “power trader,” a country that uses commerce as “an
instrument of power, of pressure, and even of conquest.”39
China also has become a serious antidemocratic force, developing Orwellian
tools of tyranny and selling them around the world.40 By combining surveillance
cameras with social media monitoring, artificial intelligence, and biometric,
and speech- and facial-recognition technologies, the Chinese government has
pioneered a system that allows dictators to watch citizens constantly and punish
them instantly by blocking their access to finance, education, employment,
telecommunications, or travel. The system is an autocrat’s dream. With
computers and cameras managing day-to-day surveillance and propaganda,
security forces are free to focus on the physical elements of autocratic rule, such
as detaining and beating dissidents. Whereas dictators once had to choose
between internal security and economic development, now they can have both,
because China’s “smart city” technologies not only help control populations but
also enhance infrastructure and make the trains run on time. After beta-testing
its system against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, where smart cities coexist
with concentration camps, China has started supplying and operating aspects of
it in more than 80 countries.41
If China’s growth slows further in the coming years, as is likely, then China’s
government will probably double down on the repressive and aggressive
policies of the past decade. The regime has already stoked Chinese nationalism,
promised Chinese citizens national rejuvenation, staked out uncompromising
positions on territorial disputes, issued deadlines for reunification with
Taiwan, and sunk more than half a trillion dollars of taxpayer money into
risky bets on foreign infrastructure. In addition, powerful interest groups—
most notably, state-owned enterprises and the military and security services—
have developed a vested interest in maintaining China’s current strategy,
which funnels money into their coffers.42 Great powers typically struggle to
extricate themselves from foreign entanglements, especially when expansion
serves elite interests.43 China looks unlikely to buck this historical trend.

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Conclusion
China’s economic insecurity poses grave dangers to the United States and its
allies. As China’s leaders lose the ability to rely on rapid growth to bolster their
domestic legitimacy and international clout, they will become more eager to
appear tough in crises, squelch dissent, and boost China’s economy by any
means necessary. Rampant espionage, protectionism, a splintered internet,
naval clashes in the East and South China Sea, and a war over Taiwan are only
the more obvious risks of a desperate and flailing China.
These threats are near-term concerns. Many analysts describe U.S.-
China competition as a marathon that will last for decades and a new cold
war in which both sides will have time to marshal their resources, invest
in long-term innovation, and gradually assemble international coalitions.
But history and China’s recent behavior suggest that the sharpest phase
of competition will occur this decade, the 2020s, as Beijing tries to rush
through closing windows of strategic opportunity before its economic
problems set in. The most important mission for the United States and
its allies, therefore, must be to prepare to blunt this coming upsurge of
Chinese aggression.
That in turn requires adopting what Hal Brands and I have called a “danger
zone” strategy, which would entail three basic elements.44 First, the United
States and its allies must prevent China from achieving near-term successes
that would radically alter the long-term balance of power. Second, the United
States and its allies must use tools and partnerships that are available now
or will be in the near future rather than devoting resources to cultivating
assets that will require years to develop. Third, they must focus on selectively
undermining Chinese power rather than changing Chinese behavior. Instead
of trying to cajole and persuade Beijing, they should focus on conducting
targeted attrition on Chinese capabilities. This approach is obviously risky,
but not as risky as business as usual with Beijing.
Washington’s top priority must be to save Taiwan from Chinese aggression.
If China absorbed Taiwan, it would acquire an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” to
project military power into the western Pacific and threaten to blockade Japan
and the Philippines as well as gain access to the island’s world-class technology.
China also would shatter the credibility of U.S. alliances in East Asia and
eliminate the world’s only Chinese democracy.

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Taiwan is a natural fortress, surrounded by rough waters and coastline,

but Taiwanese and U.S. forces currently are ill equipped to defend it, because
they rely on small numbers of advanced aircraft and ships tethered to large
bases—forces China can now cripple with air and missile attacks. Some
American policymakers and pundits are calling on Washington to formally
guarantee Taiwan’s security, but such a pledge would amount to cheap talk
if not backed by a revamp of actual military capabilities. Instead of issuing
threats, Washington should deploy large numbers of missile launchers and
armed drones near, and possibly on, Taiwan. These forces would function as
high-tech minefields, capable of destroying significant portions of a Chinese
invasion or blockade force early in a war. It is a strategy that capitalizes on
the fact that China needs to seize and maintain control the seas and airspace
around Taiwan to conquer the island, while the United States just needs
to deny China that control. If necessary, the United States should reduce
funding for costly power-projection platforms, such as aircraft carriers, to
fund the rapid deployment of missile launchers and smart mines near Taiwan.
The United States also needs to help Taiwan revise its military structure to
fight asymmetrically. Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept envisions enormous
arsenals of missile launchers and drones; an army that can deploy tens of
thousands of troops to any beach at a moment’s notice backed by a million-
strong reserve force trained for guerrilla warfare. Yet Taiwan is dragging
its feet on implementing this new concept and some of its top-brass may
be trying to table the initiative in favor for more traditional, symmetrical
defense concepts. The United States should encourage a Taiwanese transition
to an asymmetric strategy by offering to subsidize Taiwanese investments in
asymmetric capabilities, donating ammunition, and expanding joint training
on air and coastal defense and antisubmarine and mine warfare.
Finally, the United States should try to multilateralize the Taiwan conflict
by enlisting other countries in Taiwan’s defense. Japan has already signaled
that it would regard a Chinese conquest of Taiwan as a mortal security threat
and has drawn up joint battle plans with the United States to prevent it.
Perhaps Japan could be called on to block China’s northern approaches to
Taiwan in a war. Australia’s defense minister has said it is “inconceivable”
that his nation would not join the fight as well. Now that AUKUS has linked
the United States and Australia closer together militarily and will soon equip

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Canberra with advanced long-range missiles, perhaps Australia could be called

on to strike Chinese vessels operating in the South China Sea or assist in a
multilateral blockade of China’s energy imports in the event of a war. India
might be persuaded to allow the U.S. Navy to use the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands to enforce such a blockade, and European allies could impose severe
economic and financial sanctions on China in case of an attack on Taiwan.
The United States should continue to reach out to partners to commit publicly
to joining a conflict over Taiwan. Even if the measures they would implement
would not be decisive militarily, they could enhance deterrence by raising the
possibility that China might have to fight a multifront war.
The United States must simultaneously work to prevent China from
monopolizing the commanding heights of the global economy. History shows
that whatever country dominates the critical goods and services of their era,
dominates that era. In the nineteenth century, Britain was able to build a vast
empire in part because it mastered iron, steam, and the telegraph faster than
other great powers. The United States rose above other nations in the twentieth
century in part by harnessing chemicals, electronics, and information technologies.
China today is trying to dominate modern strategic sectors—including artificial
intelligence, biotechnology, semiconductors, and telecommunications as well as
strategic goods like rare earths and services like 5G telecommunications—while
relegating other economies to subservient status. The role for other countries
in the global economy, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang reportedly told former
U.S. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster in 2017, will “merely be to
provide China with raw materials, agricultural products, and energy to fuel its
production of the world’s cutting-edge industrial and consumer products.”
To avoid becoming vassals in a Chinese economic empire, the United
States and its allies need to take steps to speed up their economic development
and resilience in key sectors while slowing China’s down. They should
expand the lists of technologies that they currently restrict from exporting to
Beijing to cover semiconductors, AI chips, and computer numerical control
(CNC) machines. They also should form an unofficial “economic NATO,”
a grouping of democratic economies, anchored by the G-7, that could defang
Chinese economic coercion by pledging to mutually assist one another should
a member become the target of Chinese economic pressure. Members could
open up their markets to goods from other members that are shut out of

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China and find alternative sources of supply when members are cut off from
their Chinese suppliers. The longer-term goal would be to develop supply
chains among democracies that don’t involve China.
Given the United States’ domestic problems, some policymakers want to
dial back competition with China now so that the United States can focus
on repairing its democracy, economy, and public health. Those are important
tasks, but the United States does not have the luxury of a respite from
competition with China. As China grows more aggressive, the United States
must plug holes in its defenses, and do so now.
Yet urgency is not the same thing as recklessness. The United States and
its allies must balance strength and deterrence with caution to avoid goading
China into a war. The United States, for example, should not impose a
full-scale technological embargo against Beijing or pursue comprehensive
decoupling from Beijing. Nor should it try to foment domestic instability
within China through covert action programs, as was considered in the early
years of the Cold War with Moscow. The United States and its allies also
should encourage or ignore Chinese initiatives in areas that don’t affect their
vital interests. That includes most projects in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
If China wants to lavish funds on bridges to nowhere in Central Asia or
invest in aircraft carrier battle groups that will not have a strategic impact for
decades, the United States should not stand in its way.
Making it through the 2020s won’t bring an end to U.S.-Chinese
competition, any more than surviving the early Cold War won that struggle.
The goal should be to make it through to a less volatile and intense form of
Sino-American rivalry. Such a competition may still rage across regions and
last for decades. But the risk of a shooting war might dissipate as the United
States shows China that the status quo can’t be overturned through a smash
and grab operation. The United States and its wealthy democratic allies have
ample resources to win a long competition with China, but to get there they
may first have to weather an intense series of crises this decade.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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Notes
1 For examples, see Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace the
American Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021); Pavneet Singh, Eric Chewning,
and Michael Brown, “Preparing the United States for the Superpower Marathon with
China,” Brookings Institution, April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/preparing-
the-united-states-for-the-superpowermarathon-with-china/; Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-
Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New
York: St. Martin’s, 2016).
2 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). On power transition theory, see A.F.K.
Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968); Jack Levy, “Declining Power and the
Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics, October 1987, 83; A.F.K. Organski, World
Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968).
3 Quoted in Tom Holland, “Wen and Now: China’s Economy Is Still Unsustainable,” South
China Morning Post, April 10, 2017.
4 Keith Bradsher, “China’s Economy Is Slowing, a Worrying Sign for the World,” New York
Times, January 16, 2022.
5 Sidney Lung, “China’s GDP Growth Could Be Half of Reported Number, Says US
Economist at Prominent Chinese University,” South China Morning Post, March 10, 2019;
Yingyao Hu and Jiaxiong Yao, “Illuminating Economimc Growth,” IMF Working Paper No.
19/77, April 19, 2019; Wei Chen, Xilu Chen, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Zheng Song, “A Forensic
Examination of China’s National Accounts, NBER Working Paper, No. w25754, 2019; Luis
R. Martinez, “How Much Should We Trust the Dictator’s GDP Estimates? University of
Chicago Working Paper, August 9, 2019.
6 The Conference Board, “Total Economy Database,” Accessed May 2021.
7 Guanghua Chi, Yu Liu, Zhengwei Wu, and Haishan Wu, “Ghost Cities Analysis Based on
Positioning Data in China,” Baidu Big Data Lab, 2015; Wade Shepard, Ghost Cities of China
(London: Zed Books, 2015).
8 “A Fifth of China’s Homes Are Empty. That’s 50 Million Apartments,” Bloomberg News,
November 8, 2018.
9 Nathaniel Taplin, “Chinese Overcapacity Returns to Haunt Global Industry,” Wall Street
Journal, January 10, 2019; Overcapacity in China: An Impediment to the Party’s Reform
Agenda (Beijing: European Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016).
10 Koh Qing, “China Wasted $6.9 Trillion on Bad Investment post-2009,” Reuters, November
20, 2014.
11 Global Debt Monitor, Institute of International Finance, July 16, 2020.
12 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2019.
World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.
13 Global Trade Alert. https://www.globaltradealert.org
14 China Power Team, “How Does Water Security Affect China’s Development?” China Power,
August 26, 2020. Accessed August 18, 2021. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-water-
security/; Jing Li, “80 Percent of Groundwater in China’s Major River Basins Is Unsafe for

27
 Michael Beckley

Humans, Study Reveals.” South China Morning Post, April 11, 2018; David Stanway and
Kathy Chen, “Most of Northern China’s Water is Unfit for Human Touch,” World Economic
Forum, June 28, 2017; Tsukasa Hadano, “Degraded Farmland Diminishes China’s Food
Sufficiency,” Nikkei Asia, April 4, 2021.
15 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019).
World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.
16 Wei Jiang, Fang Xu, and Xiao-jin Liu, “Economic Policy, Uncertainty, Monetary Policy,
and Economic Growth,” Journal of Xi’an University of Finance and Economics, no. 4 (2021):
40-53; Stein Emil et al., “Fertility, Mortality, Migration, and Population Scenarios for 195
Countries and Territories from 2017 to 2100: a Forecasting Analysis for the Global Burden of
Disease Study,” The Lancet, 396, no. 10258 (October 2020); 1285-1306.
17 Yong Cai, Wang Feng, and Ke Shen, “Fiscal Implications of Population Aging and Social
Sector Expenditure in China,” Population and Development Review, 44, no. 4 (December
2018): 811-831.
18 Daniel H. Rosen, “China’s Economic Reckoning: The Price of Failed Reforms,” Foreign
Affairs, July/August 2021.
19 “China Is Conducting Fewer Local Policy Experiments under Xi Jinping,” The Economist,
August 18, 2018.
20 “What Tech Does China Want?” The Economist, August 14, 2021.
21 James Crabtree, “China’s Radical New Vision of Globalization,” NOEMA, December
10, 2020; “China’s “Dual-Circulation” Strategy Means Relying Less on Foreigners,” The
Economist, November 7, 2020.
22 National Science Board. Science and Engineering Indicators 2020 (Arlington: National
Science Foundation, 2020).
23 Nina Xiang, “Foreign Dependence the Achilles’ Heel in China’s Giant Tech Sector,” Nikkei
Asia, January 31, 2021.
24 For the data underlying this section as well as a longer description of selection criteria
and specific cases, see Michael Beckley, “When Fast-Growing Great Powers Slow Down:
Historical Evidence and Implications for China,” Working Paper, January 2022.
25 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-
1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963); Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of
Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), chaps. 2-4; David Healy, U.S.
Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1970); Benjamin O. Fordham, “Protectionist Empire: Trade, Tariffs, and United States
Foreign Policy, 1890-1914,” Studies in American Political Development, October 2017, 170-
192; Marc-William Palen, “The Imperialism of Economic Nationalism,” Diplomatic History,
January 2015, 157-185.
26 Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-
1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Peter Gatrell, Government, Industry and
Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Dale
Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2015); Brian Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Stephen Anthony Smith, Russia in

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Revolution: An Empire in Crisis, 1890 to 1928 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
27 Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War, chaps. 4-5; Adam Tooze, The Wages of
Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York: Penguin, 2008).
28 John Chipman, French Power in Africa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Pierre Lellouche and
Dominique Moisi, “French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle Against Destabilization,”
International Security, Spring 1979, 108-133; Andrew Hansen, “The French Military in
Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2008.
29 Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations throughout History (New York: Norton,
1997), 366; Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese
Security Policy,” International Security, Summer 2004.
30 Robert Nalbandov, Not by Bread Alone: Russian Foreign Policy under Putin (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2016); Anders Aslund, Russia’s Crony Capitalism: The Path
from Market Economy to Kleptocracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019); Kathryn
Stoner, Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2021).
31 Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War.
32 See Patrick McDonald, The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and
International Relations Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
33 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Internal Security & Grand Strategy: China’s Approach to
National Security under Xi Jinping,” Statement before the U.S.-China Economic &
Security Review Commission, January 2021; Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security
Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” China Brief, Vol. 18, No. 4 (March 12, 2018);
Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Domestic Security in China under Xi Jinping,” China
Leadership Monitor, March 1, 2019; Simina Mistreanu, “Life Inside China’s Social Credit
Laboratory,” Foreign Policy, April 3, 2018; Richard McGregor, Xi Jinping: The Backlash
(London: Penguin Ebooks, 2019), chap. 2.
34 Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, “China’s Overseas Lending,”
NBER Working Paper 26050, July 2019.
35 Chris Buckley, “2019 Is a Sensitive Year for China. Xi Is Nervous,” New York Times, February
25, 2019; Chris Buckley, “Vows of Change in China Belie Private Warning,” New York Times,
February 14, 2013; Sui-Lee Wee and Li Yuan, “China Sensors Bad Economic News Amid
Signs of Slower Growth,” New York Times, September 28, 2018; David Shambaugh, “China’s
Coming Crack Up,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2015; Robert Frank, “More than a third
of Chinese millionaires Want to Leave China,” CNBC, July 6, 2018; Robert Frank, “Half of
China’s Rich Plan to Move Overseas,” CNBC, July 17, 2017; Christian Henrik Nesheim, “2
of 3 Investor Immigrants Worldwide Are Chinese, Reveals Statistical Analysis,” Investment
Migration Insider, February 25, 2018; Javier C. Hernandez, “Workers’ Activism Rises as
China’s Economy Slows. Xi Aims to Rein Them In,” New York Times, February 6, 2019;
“Masses of Incidents: Why Protests Are So Common in China,” The Economist, October 4,
2018; Chen Tianyong quoted in Li Yuan, “China’s Entrepreneurs Are Wary of Its Future,”
New York Times, February 23, 2019.
36 Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (W.W.
Norton, 2022).

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37 Paul Mozur and Steven Lee Meyers, “Xi’s Gambit: China Plans for a World Without
American Technology,” New York Times, March 20, 2021.
38 Lingling Wei, “China’s New Power Play: More Control of Tech Companies’ Troves of
Data,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2021; Emily Weinstein, “Don’t Underestimate China’s
Military-Civil Fusion Efforts,” Foreign Policy, February 5, 2021.
39 Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1945), 53.
40 Ross Andersen, “The Panopticon Is Already Here,” The Atlantic, September 2020.
41 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Dealing with Demand for China’s Global Surveillance Exports,”
Global China, April 2020.
42 Linda Jackobson, “Domestic Actors and the Fragmentation of China’s Foreign Policy,” in
China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2016), ch. 6.
43 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2005); Jack Synder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and
International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
44 Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “Into the Danger Zone: The Coming Crisis in U.S.-China
Relations,” AEI Report, January 4, 2021.

30
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Changing State-Business
Relations under the
U.S.-China Tech War
Ling Chen is an Assistant Professor at the School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a 2021–22
Wilson China Fellow
 Ling Chen

Abstract
The rise of China’s high-tech giants, such as Huawei and ZTE, has aroused
much anxiety in policy circles, leading to a recent “tech-cold war” between
the United States and China. How does the movement of Chinese firms up
the technology ladder influence U.S.-China relations? More specifically, can
the United States weaponize its position on the supply chain effectively to
contain China? Have China’s businesses collapsed after the launch of the tech
war? This paper starts with the state-business alliance behind China’s joint
venture period and the engagement with the global value chain period, when
the incentives of the state and firms were often misaligned. Then it proceeds
to analyze how the interruption of the global value chain acted as an external
shock that reshuffled state-business relations by aligning the incentives of
the state and businesses under the structure of a new technology innovation
system. It evaluates how such state-business relations, in turn, influence the
effectiveness of U.S. policies in the short and long run. In the short run, the
tech war directly reduced the Chinese products relying on U.S. chips, but in
the long run, it facilitated the re-alignment of state and business in hardware
tech industries and also propelled China into a period of self-sufficiency, an
import-substitution industrialization (ISI) period that it originally skipped.
Furthermore, businesses in the United States and other regions (especially
in East Asia) have adopted various strategies to recover broken value chains
via relocation. This means that U.S. policymakers may have overestimated
the leverage of their technological advantage and weaponization and
underestimated the interdependence along the value chain.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● U.S. policymakers need to look into the long-term effects of the tech
war instead of only short-term goals. A long-term strategy, other than
blocking or disrupting the supply chains, is needed for promoting
national technological competitiveness. Specifically, the United States
should continue to encourage R&D in cutting-edge technology within the
electronics and IT sectors (hardware as well as digital). More importantly,
the U.S. should continue to attract talent from all around the world
and improve its immigration policies. To combat the recent trend that

32
 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

scientists, engineers and scholars emigrate to other countries or return

to their home countries, the United States should design policies that
make it attractive for existing talent to stay and for new talent to come to
the United States in order to sustain the long-term strategy of boosting
technology competitiveness.

● The U.S.-China tech war may galvanize China to unify state and business
interests and accelerate their technology development by concentrating
resources that were previously misallocated elsewhere. The effect of the
tech war may be counterproductive for the United States.

● The ability of the United States to weaponize the supply chain is

constrained by business interests both inside and outside of the United
States as these businesses can relocate supply chains to the Asia-Pacific
region and seek non-American equipment.

● In order to maintain its advantages on the supply chains, the United

States does not only need a technological advantage in core components
but also the ability to scale up the fabrication of these components with
U.S. companies in order to address the problem of lacking capability
of electronics production. Otherwise, the ability to fabricate core
components could be used as a bargaining chip by other countries to
weaken the goal of the U.S. strategy.

33
 Ling Chen

Introduction
The rise of Chinese tech firms and the U.S.-China technology rivalry has
certainly received much attention. Yet thus far, few academic works provide
frameworks to systematically capture the influence of such a tech cold war.
To fully understand the impact of China’s technological development and
whether the U.S. response is effective, one has to incorporate perspectives
from weaponized interdependence, global value chains, and government-
business relations.
Without a doubt, the United States has been trying to weaponize its ad-
vantages in supply chains (e.g. core technology in chip-making) in order to
restrict China’s access to key components. Global value chains and produc-
tion networks in high-tech, digital industries have been among the key areas
where asymmetries of power and weaponized interdependence exist.1 The hi-
erarchical order is often ranked by a firm’s position on the value chain. Higher
positions usually involve more proprietary knowledge, higher profit margins,
higher barriers to entry, and more bargaining power.2 Therefore, the United
States blocked international firms from selling their own products or U.S.-
designed components to Chinese firms that are blacklisted, such as Huawei
and ZTE.
A crucial question, however, remains: will such a strategy of weaponization
be feasible and effective in the context of China’s industrial and technology
development? Existing literature has yet to offer adequate answers to this
question. The “weaponized” interdependence framework captures how
asymmetrical power allows states to leverage their advantages in global
networks, but often assumes that businesses will go along with the state’s
agenda. In contrast, studies of global value chains and production networks are
helpful in specifying firms’ upgrading strategies in each node of production,
but they are less sensitive to politics and the role of the state. In fact, the
development and manipulation of supply chains for political purposes are
always closely associated with both state and business actors. Bringing state-
business coalitions into the analysis is thus essential. As my own earlier work
and other studies have shown, the building, consolidation, or fragmentation
of state-business coalitions have a substantial influence on economic policies
domestically and abroad.3 Although there are obvious differences between
democracies and authoritarian regimes, the state-business coalition has gained

34
 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

much more influence in a globalized era where politics and economics are
increasingly bundled.4
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of such weaponization as well as the
implications for U.S. policies, one has to explore and understand the evolving
state-business coalitions in China before and after the tech confrontation and
the disruption of the supply chain. The next section started with the state-
business relations before the US-China trade war.

State-Foreign Joint Ventures Under “Market

in Exchange for Technology”
When China initially open up for foreign investment, the major approach of
striking an alliance is forming joint ventures between Chinese state-owned en-
terprises and foreign firms facilitated by the state under the rubric “market in
exchange for technology (以市场换技术).” The term originated from China’s
automobile industry in the early 1980s and was later widely used as the central
tenet in support of policies for encouraging inward foreign investment in most
manufacturing industries. The main argument was that by allowing foreign in-
vestment to enter the domestic market, China could use its huge domestic mar-
ket as a powerful bargaining chip for the introduction of advanced technology.5
The China Joint Venture Law stipulated that such technology and machin-
ery should be advanced and “appropriate to China’s needs,” and that when for-
eign investors intended to cheat the Chinese partner with “backward” tech-
nology and machinery, they should be compensated.6 The 1986 “Decision of
the State Council to Encourage Foreign Investment” further provided these
enterprises with lower charges of basic utilities, priority loans from the bank,
and a wide range of tax exemption policies.7 Any joint ventures with at least 25
percent of the shareholding from a foreign firm can be categorized as foreign-
invested firms (FIEs). Typical JVs between China and United States included
Shanghai GM, and beyond the United States in the hardware high-tech sec-
tor, there were many examples, such as Beijing Panasonic, Shenzhen SEG
Samsung, Shanghai Philips, and the investments of Huajing and Huahong in
the “908 Project” and “909 Project.”8
Joint ventures, however, turned out to be difficult marriages, due to a range
of factors such as conflicting firm cultures and the divergent business goals

35
 Ling Chen

in profits or amount of production. But most fundamentally, the key logi-

cal assumption behind “market in exchange for technology” was challenged.
Foreign firms followed the plan from their parent company and prioritized
their dominance of China’s market. They had no intention of conducting real
R&D in their China branches. Yet the China side assumed that the market
would provide enough leverage and incentive for technology transfer. When
the China side sought to establish their own R&D branch within the joint
venture, it was discouraged from the foreign side. But more often than not, the
Chinese SOEs also did not have enough incentives to push forward for learn-
ing as they were accustomed to the state handing them the resources without
taking their own initiative to learn.9 The slow-moving feature and the lack
of incentive to improve efficiency means that once the production line was
finally in place, technology already marched to a new generation where the
older generation of products was hard to find a home.10
The Chinese state and municipality governments certainly participated in
many negotiations to place pressure on the foreign side for technology trans-
fer, but they themselves also came to realize that direct technology transfer
or R&D in key technology was unlikely to be done through the JV format.11
Therefore, the state often acted as a thankless matchmaker or broker between
domestic firms and foreign partners, although such marriages often turned
out to be too difficult to produce results.
Because the state’s focus was on acquiring modern technology from foreign
firms through forming joint ventures with state-owned firms, they paid little
attention to indigenous private firms or start-up firms during this period and
did not set them as a priority for overall state policy. However, the latter in
general had far more incentives for technology learning and innovation than
the former. Therefore, it can be argued that the state’s effort was wrongly
placed on the JVs between domestic SOEs and foreign firms.

Fragmenting State and Business: Global Value

Chain and the Barrier to Indigenous Innovation
Between the 1990s and the mid-2000s, as China further opened up and
decentralized authority of foreign investment and trade to localities, China
was further integrated into the global value chain. As localities started to

36
 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

build thousands of development zones for FDI attraction, governments at

the central and local levels also started to form coalitions with foreign firms.
Government officials provided a wide range of preferential policies in terms
of tax breaks, funding, utility, and land discounts. Bureaucrats from various
departments went out of their way to attract investment in a beehive campaign
mode.12 China thus rose to be the largest manufacturing house and exporter
in the globe. It was also during this wave of global offshoring that technology
hardware industries or the ICT industry (such as computers, tablets, mobile
phones, etc) rose to be the major exporting sector in China and across the
globe. Lead firms such as Apple, Intel, Foxconn, Nokia, Samsung, and Philips
all outsourced or offshored their production.
By the mid-2000s, however, most of China’s engagement with the global
value chain was at the bottom segment, focusing on processing and assembly,
generating razor-thin profits and relying on sweatshops. The situation raised
alarms among observers and the Chinese central state (ministries and central
leaders), who proposed an “indigenous innovation” program in 2006 that
sought to promote the indigenous innovation of Chinese domestic firms and
pushed them up the value chain.13
Since then, China experienced a complicated period during which
government officials in different bureaucracies started to cultivate and
advance the interests of their own business clients. On the one hand, with the
fall of JVs and the increase of wholly-foreign owned enterprises with direct
offshoring, officials in the internal commerce coalition sought to cultivate
a friendly environment for foreign firms and encourage expansion of their
investment and production. On the other hand, officials promoting domestic
technology and indigenous innovation also sought to promote domestic firms
(which were their clients) with available resources in preferential policies. As a
result, the types of global value chains that took shape across China generated
very uneven regional patterns, with some much more suitable for indigenous
technology progress than others.
The overall ecology of production in the tech sector before the 2018 trade
and tech war, however, was heavily influenced by the hierarchical logic of
production along GVC created by firms in western countries, especially the
United States. In such a hierarchical order, the higher a firm’s position on the
value chain, the higher a profit margin a firm could receive and the stronger its

37
 Ling Chen

bargaining power over prices. Higher positions on the value chain also mean
more proprietary knowledge and a higher barrier of entry for competition.
An upper-level producer, unless upgraded to an even higher position, has
incentives to refrain from transferring proprietary knowledge to firms at
lower levels so as to prevent sublevel suppliers from directly competing with
itself. A firm that sought to outsource production activities down the value
chain would have fewer obstacles than a firm that sought to move up the value
chain. The hierarchical order that was broken down in a corporation was re-
established at the global level. In such a hierarchical order, U.S. firms (together
with other OECD countries) occupied the top of the value chain, whereas
Chinese firms which sought to climb up the tech ladder had to fight an uphill
battle. It was much easier for them to expand their production lines at the
bottom of the value chain rather than climb upward to compete with their
western clients.
Although, as mentioned above, indigenous firms may have the support from
the officials who seek to provide domestic tech upgrading, the overall ecology
of production works against Chinese firms from making direct progress on
key technology. Bureaucrats in charge of promoting tech innovation in the
electronics and IT sector had complained about the lack of incentives from
the firms’ side, even when they actively provided funding for firms to apply for
patents or conduct R&D.14 While most firms acknowledged the importance,
both the risk and the cost of developing technology and creating new markets
against the competition from global incumbents were too high.
Therefore, when Premier Li Keqiang launched the “Made in China
2025” plan, it was as much a compromise as an ambitious plan. While ob-
servers tend to place the plan in the same category as those that sought to
turn China into a technology powerhouse—such as the “indigenous inno-
vation” and the mid-to-long-term science and technology development plan,
the essence of “Made in China 2025” was different. Among other aspects,
the plan emphasized advanced manufacturing instead of cutting-edge in-
novation (thus not “Innovated in China 2025”). Instead of getting rid of the
label of “Made in China,” which is often associated with cheap, low-quality
production, “Made in China 2025” sought to take advantage of China’s
manufacturing capacity in the GVC and boost some key industries such
as new materials, equipment, and green energy. The plan included objects

38
 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

broader than conducting R&D in crucial, key technology, as the latter did
not always succeed.
Firms such as Huawei and ZTE grew from small to large under such an
environment in the electronics and IT sector. With state-owned, private,
and foreign firms all entering the sector, the structure of the value chain
was such that major semiconductor chips, memory cards, touch screens, and
Bluetooth systems were designed and produced in foreign countries, with
Chinese firms all located at the bottom of the value chain. While most of the
firms in the electronics and IT sector devote resources to conduct R&D, at a
percentage often higher than other industries, the decisive role of the global
value chains and power asymmetry still pushed the Chinese firms to the
bottom, where competition was extremely fierce. In order to carve out mar-
kets at the lower niches that were not directly in competition with foreign
companies and thus also reduce the dependent relationship, Chinese firms
fought aggressively with each other for market share in domestic China and
abroad (such as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa). For example, some
of the seemingly ambitious concepts associated with Huawei, such as “wolf
culture” and “mattress culture” were all developed to describe the aggressive
battles that the firm had to fight with its competitors, the most important
of which was ZTE. Internal interviews indicated that the competition be-
tween the two firms was so intense in the decades from the late 1990s to the
late 2000s that sometimes if one side lost a market to another, the former’s
regional market manager would be fired.15
Emerging at the same time were numerous start-up tech firms during this
period supported by policy packages in the high-tech zones. While some in-
deed involved cutting-edge technology, especially those who returned from
Silicon Valley, it was hard for them to scale up without industrial buyers.
Most demands still went to incumbent firms in OECD countries with ma-
ture products. Thus the approach of engaging with GVC while pushing for
technology upgrading and innovation through competition seemed to be a
plausible strategy for domestic firms in China, but in reality, the focus almost
became horizontal expansion at the same node of the value chain. This was the
case even for firms such as Huawei and ZTE, who were aware of the impor-
tance of technology.

39
 Ling Chen

The U.S.-China Tech War in Two Rounds

Precisely because of such a hierarchical structure and unequal power, the
United States was able to weaponize its global supply chains. In April 2018,
the Commerce Department banned U.S. chip exports to ZTE, claiming
the Chinese communications company had violated a 2017 settlement
on illegal ZTE exports to Iran and North Korea. Afterward, the United
States also issued a ban on exporting chips to Huawei and other Chinese
companies. The first round came in 2019, when the United States prohibited
firms from providing hardware and EDA software to Huawei and Chinese
companies on the U.S. Entity List. However, the first round had many
loopholes with the hardware, as third parties can still provide Huawei with
U.S. products. It was also during this time that Huawei started to stock
up chips. The second round of the tech war made sure that no part of the
supply chain touched China and no third-party firms could use American
equipment to manufacture components for exporting to China. This was
a much stricter ban and had major disruption on the global supply chains,
and such disruption has fundamentally reshuffled state-business relations.
In addition to the export ban, the Federal Communications Commissions
(FCC) also issued a ban on U.S. telecommunication industries purchasing
products from Chinese companies (Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision,
Dahua) inside the United States.

China’s Counter Strategy and New

State-Business Relations
The launch of the tech war and the cut-off of supply chains for businesses
such as Huawei and ZTE have given rise to techno-nationalism in China. As
mentioned above, before the tech war and under the “Made in China 2025”
plan, China avoided head-on competition in tough tech components such as
computers and mobile phone chips. Instead, it sought to use manufacturing
to break into emerging areas where China still can be a leader, and aimed to
establish China as a major global competitor in advanced manufacturing. Yet
after the tech war, the often taken-for-granted supply chain was no longer
there, and the focus on core, crucial technology has re-emerged in national
policy and narratives. Furthermore, unlike the 1990s, forming joint ventures

40
 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

in chip manufacturing was no longer an attractive option. Rather, directly

conducting R&D and exploring chip-related technology in hardware industries
were strongly encouraged, as these were identified by the central leadership
as the choke points for China’s technology survival. A nationwide system of
innovation has been developed.
After the Chinese tech firms were put in the spotlight in U.S.-China
competition and their success or failure was interpreted as a matter of
national survival. The Chinese state leadership recognized the importance
of supporting high-tech firms and digital technology. The pressure from the
United States has galvanized Chinese businesses and the state to carry out
more intensive R&D and raised a strong sense of urgency. China started to
build a national ecosystem that runs at multiple levels and connects numerous
actors for technology innovation.
At the national level, the state has provided support for businesses to make a
faster technology leap in chip-making, investing $29 billion in initial funding.16
In late 2020, the Politburo held a collective study of quantum technology and
emphasized the importance of having a major breakthrough in core and
crucial technology. The 14th Five Year Plan also devoted significant attention
to creating a nationwide system ( juguo tizhi) that supports science and
technology development, which is the only place where a “nationwide” system is
mentioned in the plan. Although the support of science and technology is not
new and can be traced back to the establishment of the country, the emphasis
in recent years has been on the “central role” of businesses and firms rather
than pure research institutions or government agencies such as the ministry
(bureaus) of science and technology.
Vertically, this means that the local governments (at the provincial, city
and the district levels) would provide capital investment for major projects,
offer funding or rebates for R&D cost, implement tax breaks, and attract
talent from a highly-educated pool. Horizontally, this means that with firms
occupying the major role in research and innovation, the system connects
interactions with numerous other entities, including high-tech development
zones, high-tech parks, incubators, research institutions, and universities. In
some selective cities, the administrations of high-tech industrial parks have
risen to be on par with city governments, and sometimes they were referred to
directly as high-tech district governments.

41
 Ling Chen

At the same time, firms are embedded in the ecosystem through multi-
tiered institutions, seeking to avoid the previous situation of applying one
method to all kinds of entities (yi dao qie). Among high-tech firms, some firms
are much larger and stronger, such as Huawei, and others are smaller, start-up
firms. Among the smaller firms, there are initial start-up tech firms, gazelles
(those that passed the initial risky periods and have entered high-growth
periods) and unicorns (those that were valued at over $1 billion). The tiered
ranking has been used by local governments and industrial parks. Different
tiers of firms involve different evaluation criteria for acquiring government
funds, and the higher the stakes are, the more comprehensive the evaluations
are. For higher stake projects, the evaluation process involves departments such
as bureaus of finance, science and technology, and environmental protection, as
well as independent experts from these areas.
Therefore, at least in the area of promoting high-tech firms (but not nec-
essarily in other areas), local governments are still responding strongly to
central government signals. For example, as soon as chip-making became a
trend since the start of the U.S.-China tech war (similar to what solar panels
and electrical vehicles used to be), local governments were reported as giv-
ing up on real estate sectors (which contained many bubbles) and invested
billions in chip-making so as to gain central funding and to increase invest-
ment and revenue.
An important difference before and after the tech war was not only China’s
enhanced effort in developing chip technology, but the re-alignment of in-
terests among different parties. As mentioned above, prior to the U.S.-China
tech war, competition between Huawei and ZTE was fierce. Yet in face of a
bigger challenge from the United States, overcoming the technology bottle-
neck became the priority. Huawei not only front-loaded orders with TSMC,
but also started chip fabrication using Chinese equipment vendors (such as
Shanghai IC R&D center). The company also invested in domestic EDA
(Electronic Design Automation) startups to deal with the technology pressure
for chip design.17 Between 2018-2020, Huawei cut 1,600 personnel in non-
R&D areas and acquired 2,500 personnel in R&D.
In addition to firms that were directly impacted by the tech war, such as
Huawei, there were also many startup firms. Many of these high-tech startups
focused on cutting-edge technology during the Hu-Wen era and before the

42
 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

tech-war experienced a significant change. When core tech components were

readily available from the United States (such as Intel or Qualcomm) prior
to the breakdown of the supply chain, it was hard for these Chinese startups
to convince any customers to purchase their products. As one manager
interviewee asked, “Why would I bother taking risks to try out unstable
new products rather than purchasing chips from established chip makers?”
Startup firms lacked any feedback for technology improvement or opportunity
for scaling up their markets. With the tech war taking place, Chinese firms
immediately started to look for their potential domestic backup suppliers
and turned to these high-tech startups that they previously ignored, which
directly stimulated the demands for products from these startups.
The acceleration of development in high-tech hardware did not imply the
immediate success of China in this regard, especially given the uncertainty,
risks, and difficulties associated with these industries. The recent collapse of
the 100 billion yuan HSMC chip project in Wuhan was a clear case where
both local governments and the experts in chip-making were cheated by a
team of outsiders who persuaded the district government of Wuhan to make
the investment but covered the actual debt in the money-raising process.
When the project was found to be fraudulent and collapsed, the team took
part of the money and fled.18 Similar processes took place in Anhui province
and other localities.19 This phenomenon, later regarded as cheating to obtain
government subsidies (pian bu), showed that in order to make the state-led
development work, it is important to have basic knowledge in semiconductor,
electronics, AI and other industries in the decision-making process for local
officials when making investment and allocating resources.
Despite these initial problems and even considering a high proportion of
failed projects, the emergence of such a multi-layered nationwide innovation
system that expanded vertically and horizontally at a rapid speed will over-
all likely accelerate the pace of innovation in areas deemed as crucial tech-
nologies, such as integrated circuits, AI, and quantum technology. Although
under the Xi regime, key decisions such as approving developing zones and
other major economic and social initiatives were more centralized, in terms
of supporting hardware tech firms’ innovation behavior, the Chinese state has
been consistent. And although other policy areas can experience policy dis-
ruptions due to changes of priorities, the state has carved out a relatively safe

43
 Ling Chen

FIGURE 1: Number of high-tech enterprises, R&D personnel and expenses

Number of High-tech Enterprises

40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
R&D Personnel and Expense
25,000

20,000

R&D personnel (thousand per year)

15,000
R&D internal expense (100 million)
10,000

5,000

0
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

Source: China High Tech Industries Statistical Yearbook; China Science and Technology
Statistical Yearbook

44
 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

space for hardware high-tech industry, with support in the format of capital,
fixed assets and tax breaks.
Crucial to this consistency and relative stable space for high-tech devel-
opment in hardware is China’s understanding of the “high-tech” industry.
Unlike western countries, which often equate tech firms with online-platform
companies or digital giants such as Amazon, Google or Facebook, China’s un-
derstanding and pursuit of core, crucial technology lie in the hardware tech
parts, and their ideal role models are companies such as Apple and Intel. An
overview of China’s high-tech industry catalog also conveys a similar mean-
ing: technology needs to be combined with industries that produced tangible
products. Companies with digital technology such as Alibaba, JD, Didi and
Tencent developed fast, but they did not fall into the usual category of high-
tech industries in China. The rise of digital companies deserved a separate
space for study, but these companies, with access to digital data and private
information and succeeded mainly due to their first-mover advantages in col-
lecting rents, were major targets of state control, rather than a major target for
high-tech development.20
Observers have recently pointed to China’s crackdown on tech firms to
point out that there are risks associated with increased state control. As men-
tioned above, one has to pay attention to China’s definition of “high-tech”
firms, which specifically focuses on hardware technology and such definition
is different from the west. Firms such as Huawei, ZTE, SMIC fall into that
category. Not all internet firms or their affiliated firms undoubtedly fell into
that category (e.g. Alibaba and Baidu), except for specific sub-divisions that
invested in R&D in technology (e.g. AI). However, for any parts that are di-
rectly related to online platforms only, hence involving data management and
security, or sectors that come with potential bubbles such as finance (e.g. Ants
Group) or real estate, regulation was quite different. In the hardware technol-
ogy, which is the focus of the paper, the state issued more supportive policies
to attract business investment and encourage R&D, rather than direct crack-
down. Therefore the potential pitfalls involved in supporting these sectors are
the usual ones associated with government intervention in industrial policies,
corruption and information asymmetry, as mentioned above through the
local examples. For digital and online platforms, the risks are new for the state
and the regulations are considerably tighter.

45
 Ling Chen

Implications for United State’s Policy Effectiveness

The launch of the tech war had the overall goal of containing China’s
technology competition or convergence with the United States, with both
economic and security concerns. Thus far, U.S. strategy has mainly been
cutting off supply chains. The most recent move was placing restrictions on
start-up firms worldwide (such as Xpeedic) to provide or invest in technology
for EDA tools in China. While the cutting off of the supply chain may work
to reduce products from Chinese firms in the short run, the long-term effects
were more worrisome.
In the short run, the disruption of the supply chain has been effective in
directly reducing Chinese products that involve using these core components.
Huawei’s mobile phones sales plunged in 2020 and 2021 and its smartphone
market shares shrank in China, showing the direct influence of the U.S. ban
on chips.21 In fact, the export ban was said to produce a harder than expected
hit on Huawei’s revenue.22 To mitigate the influence, Huawei sold its Honor
brand to a consortium of businesses backed by Shenzhen. Therefore, despite
Huawei’s shrinking markets, if one combined both Huawei’s and Honor’s
shares in 2021 (20 percent), it still surpassed Apple (16 percent) in China’s
domestic markets, but definitely was superseded by Vivo and OPPO, two
other Chinese smartphone brands.
We do need to be more concerned, however, with the longer-term influence
from the weaponization of the supply chain and evaluate its effectiveness. First
of all, the longer-term influence on China is quite mixed and complicated.
Comparted to the JV period, when the state chose an inappropriate ally, and
the GVC period immediately before the tech war, when businesses that cared
about core technology development were embedded in the wrong structure,
the urgency for investing in and developing choke point technology seemed
to be quite convincing and attractive to the business community and local
governments. Furthermore, the cutting-off of the supply chain also forced
businesses to be more reliant on the state. Both the pull and push sides
propelled a re-focus on hardware technology. Although success or failure was
highly unpredictable, at least the rise of techno-nationalism (or tech alarmism),
state-business alliance, and reshuffling of the structure of production were all
in place. In the process of economic and technology catch up, the East Asian
developmental states of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan had all experienced

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 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

an import substitution industrialization (ISI) stage, where infant industries

were protected from international competition. China’s domestic reform
and opening to outside almost took place at the same time, which meant the
country skipped this stage in the post-Mao era. The disruption of the supply
chain and return to self-sufficiency may entail the start of a delayed ISI stage,
even though it is currently termed as a dual circulation strategy.
China, however, is fundamentally different from its East Asian neighbors.
Although the United States had witnessed the rise of tech firms in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan, and even offered economic and security aid during
the cold war period, the rise of Chinese tech firms has different implications.23
These firms were reported to be connected and supported by the Chinese
authoritarian state, and China now plays an opposite geopolitical role
compared to its East Asian neighbors. Furthermore, the hardware technology
that China seeks to develop currently is closely connected to 5G and AI
technology that Chinese firms will continue to develop and has gone beyond
“shallow” products into “deep technologies” that affect countries’ economic,
political, and security matters.24 This means that the Chinese firms’ move
up the value chain will further intensify the threat perception of U.S. policy
elites and their desire to weaponize the supply chains. This policy would in
turn push China to develop indigenous technology domestically, leading to
stronger techno-nationalism and state-business collaboration, thus wiping out
foreign firms’ influence in telecommunication and unleashing a vicious cycle
in U.S.-China relations.
Second, businesses in the United States and other countries may not be
aligned with the U.S. government. Historically, the U.S. government does
not necessarily have easy control of businesses’ behavior during sanctions.25
As mentioned in the previous GVC stage, U.S. firms were beneficiaries due to
their top positions on the value chain, which allowed them to reap huge profits
from providing core components, and the China market was still attractive.
Companies like Flex, Broadcom, and Qualcomm were the largest revenue
makers from Huawei, earning around 6.2 billion yuan each year. Meanwhile,
firms like NeoPhotonics were the most dependent on Huawei, with 48 percent
of the company’s revenue deriving from Huawei. Not surprisingly, U.S. firms
worried about unfair competition with foreign rivals that were not banned
from conducting trades with Chinese firms and urged the U.S. government

47
 Ling Chen

to approve non-sensitive component sales.26 For example, the Huawei ban

alone is estimated to result in a $30 billion revenue loss on the U.S. part. 27
Therefore, at least in the digital and telecommunication industries, the initial
reaction of the U.S. firms was that they had an interest in continuing to trade
with Chinese firms due to their different positions on the supply chain. More
recently, according to interviews, U.S. firms learned to accept the fact of the
tech war and were exploring markets outside of China and shifting their
supply chains in case the tech war lasts for a long time. However, this process
was going to take a long time without guaranteed success.
Because of business interests, the long-term monitoring cost was also
substantial. The major unit in charge of the Entity List and the export ban
is the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under the Department of
Commerce, which may not be able to watch over all transactions and products.
Thus from time to time, the major tech firms were supposed to submit their
supply chain information for the state’s review, which may be against the will
of the businesses.28 While various industrial associations may be able to help,
prioritizing certain firms while excluding others was against the principle of
open trade, standard development and neutral technology that most industrial
associations advocated for.29
The picture is also quite different when supply chains beyond the United
States and China are taken into consideration. Although political leaders in
European countries seemed to be more on board with the U.S. tech war in
the Biden administration compared to the Trump era, overall uncertainty is
high. Particularly, perceiving possible disruption in the GVC involving the
United States and China, companies will try to take supply chains to regions
out of the United States and into other regions to maintain production
stability, especially the Asia Pacific region. In fact, the very success of Apple
itself during the Covid period precisely lies in its increase of supply chains in
Asia rather than in the United States. The equipment producer, KLA, also
attempted to offshore to Southeast Asia by not using American equipment.30
This implies that direct offshoring of production to Asia or China without
selling core components to Chinese companies can become the dominant
trend, through which U.S. companies’ success becomes tightly bounded with
development in Asia by using non-American equipment, thus starting their
de-Americanization process. Another important player is of course Taiwan’s

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 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

TSMC, which has been wedged between the politics of the United States
and China. Although TSMC could not sell chips to firms on the entity list
anymore, there has been major talent flowing from TSMC to the Chinese
mainland in several major semiconductor projects in Shanghai and Wuhan.31
South Korea is another example. The country’s four big companies,
Samsung, Hyundai, SK Group and LG, are under pressure to manufacture
semiconductors and batteries in the United States, largely due to the shortages
of chips partly resulting from the stocking strategy in the tech war, the
outbreak of Covid-19, and the fundamental lack of ecosystem for electronics
production.32 The Korean firms, in turn, have lobbied to get export licenses to
supply U.S-.blacklisted Chinese companies, such as Huawei and chipmaker
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC).33 Under such
pressure, the U.S. Department of Commerce did grant them licenses, which
directly countered the United States’ own goal of blocking Chinese companies
from having the key components.
These factors jointly suggest that in the current era, the U.S. government
cannot single-handedly block off everything to create an export vacuum for
Chinese firms because there are business players both in and outside of the
United States that still seek to recover the broken supply chain. While the
United States did maintain its overall technology advantages, the recent chip
shortages indicate that technology advantages themselves are no guarantee
of effective weaponization of the supply chain, as the United States also
depends on business actors to manufacture high-tech products. The level of
interdependence along the supply chain was higher than expected by U.S.
policymakers. The United States could increase its control over the business if
it seeks to continue weaponizing the supply chains. However, over the short-
to mid-term, this is unlikely to succeed and may cause further backlash from
businesses. Furthermore, as shown in this paper, continued sanctions will
propel China to accelerate its pace of core technology development.
Therefore, a long-term strategy is needed for promoting national techno-
logical competitiveness other than blocking or disrupting the supply chains.
More specifically, the United States should significantly increase R&D in
cutting-edge technology in sectors such as electronics and IT (hardware as
well as digital). More importantly, the U.S. should continue to attract talent
from all around the world and improve its immigration policies. Against the

49
 Ling Chen

recent trend that scientists, engineers and scholars emigrate to other coun-
tries or return to their home countries, the U.S. had to design policies that
made it attractive for talent to stay and for new talent to come in in order
to sustain the long-term strategy of boosting technology competitiveness. In
addition, the U.S. does not only need a technological advantage in core com-
ponents but also the ability to scale up the fabrication of these components
with U.S. companies.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global
Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security, 44:1 (2019), 42–79.
2 Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon, “The Governance of Global Value
Chains,” Review of International Political Economy, 12:1 (2005), 78–104; Ling Chen,
“Varieties of Global Capital and the Paradox of Local Upgrading in China,” Politics &
Society, 42:2 (2014), 223–52.
3 Margaret Pearson, “The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms
of the Emerging Regulatory State,” World Politics, 57:2 (2005). 296–322; Ling Chen,
Manipulating Globalization: The Influence of Bureaucrats on Business in China (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 2018); Meg Rithmire, “Varieties of Outward Chinese
Capital: Domestic Politics Status and Globalization of Chinese Firms,” (2020); Min Ye,
The Belt Road and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998–2018 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2020).
4 Geoffrey Gertz and Miles Evers, “Geoeconomic Competition: Will State Capitalism Win?”
The Washington Quarterly, 43:2 (2020), 117–36.
5 Chen, Manipulating Globalization.
6 National People’s Congress, The Joint-Venture Law of People’s Republic of China, Beijing:
National People’s Congress, 1979; State Council, The Implementation Codes of the Joint-
Venture Law of People’s Republic of China. Beijing: State Council of China, 1986.
7 State Council, The Implementation Codes.
8 Yugui Zhang, “Qiu jie ‘shichang huan jishu’ zhizao ye kunju [Finding solution for the
‘exchanging market for technology’ dilemma],” Zhengquan shibao, August 28, 2008.
9 For problems of SOEs, see Jean C Oi, “Patterns of Corporate Restructuring in China:
Political Constraints on Privatization,” The China Journal, 53:22 (2005), 115–36; Edward

50
 Changing State-Business Relations under the U.S.-China Tech War

Steinfeld. “Market Visions: The Interplay of Ideas and Institutions in Chinese Financial
Restructuring.” Political Studies, 52:4 (2004), 643–63.
10 Qili Hu, Xinlu licheng: 909 chaoda guimo jicheng dianlu gongcheng jishi [The history of
integrated circuits industry: the super large integrated circuits project report] (Beijing: China
Electronics Industry Press, 2006).
11 Author’s Interview April, 2021.
12 Yuen Yuen Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Ithaca ; London: Cornell University
Press, 2016).
13 Hu Jintao, “Jianchi zou zhongguo tese zizhu chuangxin daolu, wei jianshe chuangxin
xing guojia er nuli fendou [Adhere to the road of indigenous innovation with Chinese
characteristics and exert every effort to build an innovation oriented country]” (The speech
on the National Convention of Science and Technology, January 9, 2006).
14 Author’s interview, April, 2010.
15 Author’s Interview, June, 2021.
16 Yoko Kubota,“China Sets Up New $29 Billion Semiconductor Fund,” Wall Street Journal,
October 25, 2019.
17 Douglas Fuller, “China’s Counter-Strategy to American Export Controls in Integrated
Circuits,” March 1, 2021.
18 Xiaofen Qiu and Jianxun Su, “In-depth investigation of the 100 billion fraud in a Chip firm,”
January 28, 2021, https://finance.sina.com.cn/tech/2021-01-28/doc-ikftssap1547906.shtml.
19 Ye Feng and Congying Feng, “How a Jiangsu Businessman Gained Government Subsidies in
the Past Ten Years,” Southern Weekly, December 13, 2020.
20 Noah Smith, “Why is China Smashing Its Tech Industry?”, Noahpinion, July 24, 2021,
https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/why-is-china-smashing-its-tech-industry.
21 Josh Horwitz, “Huawei Smartphone Shipments Plummet Amid U.S. Sanctions,” Reuters,
January 28, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-smartphones-huawei-tech/
huawei-smartphone-shipments-plummet-amid-u-s-sanctions-idUSKBN29Y023.
22 Sijia Jiang, “Huawei Says U.S. Ban Hurting More Than Expected, To Wipe $30 Billion Off
Revenue,” Reuters, June 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-usa-
revenue/huawei-says-u-s-ban-hurting-more-than-expected-to-wipe-30-billion-off-revenue-
idUSKCN1TI0KL.
23 Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number One (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); Alice
Amsden, The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
24 Thomas, Friedman,“Huawei Has a Plan to Help End Its War With Trump,” New York Times,
September 10, 2019. Security is always a concern for the U.S., even though not completely
confirmed by evidence, see Joseph Menn, “White House-Ordered Review Found No
Evidence of Huawei Spying: Sources,” Reuters, October 18, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-huawei-spying/exclusive-white-house-review-finds-no-evidence-of-spying-by-
huawei-sources-idUSBRE89G1Q920121017. However, technology advantage on the supply
chains is the pre-condition for the weaponization strategy to work.
25 For example, Ana Swanson, “Nike and Coca-Cola Lobby Against Xinjiang Forced Labor
Bill,” New York Times, November 29, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/29/

51
 Ling Chen

business/economy/nike-coca-cola-xinjiang-forced-labor-bill.html.
26 Jenny Leonard and Ian King 2019. “U.S. Semiconductor Companies Urge Trump to Hurry
Huawei Licenses,” Bloomberg, September 12, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-09-12/u-s-semiconductor-companies-urge-trump-to-hurry-huawei-licenses.
27 Sijia Jiang, “Huawei Says U.S. Ban Hurting More than Expected, to Wipe $30 Billion off
Revenue”.
28 U.S. Industry and Security Bureau, Notice of Request for Public Comments on Risks
in the Semiconductor Supply Chain, Industry and Security Bureau, Semptember
24, 2021. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/09/24/2021-20348/
notice-of-request-for-public-comments-on-risks-in-the-semiconductor-supply-chain.
29 Author’s interview, November, 2021.
30 Douglas Fuller, Paper Tigers, Hidden Dragons: Firms and the Political Economy of China’s
Technological Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
31 Xiaofen Qiu and Jianxun Su, “In-depth investigation of the 100 billion fraud in a Chip firm”.
32 U.S. Department Of Commerce and U.S. Department Of Homeland Security, “Assessment
Of The Critical Supply Chains Supporting The U.S. Information And Communications
Technology Industry,” Feburary 24, 2022. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/
ICT percent20Supply percent20Chain percent20Report_2.pdf.
33 Song Jung-a, “South Korean Chip Companies Step Up U.S. Lobbying
Efforts,” Financial Times, January 2, 2022, https://www.ft.com/
content/62c12877-4594-478d-b0cc-ae6158ba71ad.

52
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

TikTok, Mulan, and the

Olympics: Contesting
Content Control through
Trade in the U.S.-China
Relationship
Aynne Kokas is an Associate Professor of Media Studies at the
University of Virginia and a Senior Faculty Fellow at the Miller Center for
Public Affairs and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Aynne Kokas

Abstract
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s entertainment
sector has radically grown in its influence in the United States. China
became the largest global theatrical distribution market. At the same time,
Chinese social media platform TikTok moved from a fringe app to one of the
most dominant players in the U.S. social media landscape, despite national
security concerns voiced by both the Trump and Biden Administrations. The
following paper outlines Chinese government content control regulations
shaping the U.S. market as Chinese influence on the U.S. entertainment
industry increases. It then identifies the most prevalent forms of content
control and the corporate rationale for such actions. Finally, the paper offers
policy proposals that reflect potential options for the U.S. government to
reshape this dynamic. Ultimately, the paper argues that for the United States
to effectively contend with the challenge of Chinese firms influencing content
in the U.S. entertainment industry, the United States must grapple with the
relationship between free markets and freedom of expression domestically.

Implications and Key Takeaways:

● The United States needs to reevaluate the relationship between freedom
of expression and the free market. Chinese firms controlling content via
algorithm as well as Hollywood studios following international content
control restrictions reflect a prioritization of free market interests. U.S.
consumers are alienated from how and why the media they consume gets
to them. This is not an issue of U.S.-China relations, but rather an issue of
lack of transparency in the U.S. tech sector.

● The United States should expand state-level data security regulations

nationally to protect consumers of digital entertainment in the United
States from predatory data usage by both domestic and international firms.

● Building on national data security regulations domestically, the United

States should work with allies and partners to establish multilateral
alliances for data storage and security standards.

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 TikTok, Mulan, and the Olympics

● Next, the U.S. government should recognize that tech algorithms offer
a strategic national security asset as the Chinese government has done.
They ensure both protection of long-term economic gains and military
strength. It is thus important to work with tech firms to identify ways to
limit the export of critical algorithms.

● To track content control practices, the United States should implement

new regulations requiring content reporting and takedown notices from
non-U.S. actors.

● The U.S. government should explore limiting investment by Chinese

media and tech firms operating in the United States. Such financial
pressure may offer the chance to renegotiate access for U.S. media and
tech firms in China.

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 Aynne Kokas

Introduction
Entertainment changed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Consumption of
filmed entertainment dropped as theaters closed out of pandemic precautions,
while social media platforms like TikTok saw a 75 percent growth in new
users. Yet this practice of substituting one form of entertainment for another,
while seemingly just another pandemic adaptation for most consumers, had
significant implications for China’s ability to shape the U.S. entertainment
landscape and draw clear national security benefits from that influence.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States faces a new
entertainment environment. The Chinese market is the largest theatrical
distribution market in the world. As I argue in my book Hollywood Made in
China, Hollywood studios must cater to the financial interests of Chinese
government regulators alongside global audiences to make their profits. With
China’s ascendance as the largest market globally, Hollywood studios now have
a clear financial incentive to work with Chinese regulators, even as that market
has increasingly complex conditions for access. Yet operating in parallel with
China’s increasing influence in the shrinking US theatrical entertainment
market is the power of Chinese-owned social media entertainment platforms.
TikTok, WeChat, and others are shaping users’ entertainment experience.
They harvest transfer valuable data resources available to Chinese government.
This occurs through national security audits, civil-military fusion, corporate
pressure, a seminal practice in advancing China’s global digital sovereignty I
refer to as “trafficking data.”1
At its core, the challenge of content control via trade is an issue at the
very center of U.S. interests in an economy with free trade and freedom of
expression. It operates at the center of what Karl Popper described as the
“paradox of tolerance” where unlimited tolerance leads to the disappearance
of tolerance because it enables the emergence of authoritarian practices.2 The
following paper outlines Chinese government content control regulations
shaping the U.S. market as a result of U.S. tolerance of and support for a free
and open market economy as well as freedom of expression by U.S.-based
content producers. It then identifies the forms of Chinese content control in
the United States that are most prevalent with relevant examples. The paper
follows the standards of content control with corporate rationale for such
actions. Finally, the paper offers policy proposals that reflect potential options

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 TikTok, Mulan, and the Olympics

for the U.S. government to reshape this dynamic, recognizing the importance
of preserving an environment of tolerance both in the present moment and in
the long-term.
Entwined financial interests in media and entertainment production
infrastructure in China and the United States have yielded a system where
Chinese national champions can grow domestically. Restrictions on U.S.
firms in China have led to reduced access to the Chinese market. China’s
national theatrical distribution market size enabled it to grow into the
largest market in the world following a rapid progression of investments in
film distribution capacity.3 In 2020, China became the largest film market
in the world,4 a position it retained in 20215 as the U.S. recovery from the
COVID-19 pandemic lagged behind China’s.6 Meanwhile, patriotic fare such
as the Korean War epic Battle of Lake Changjin powered China’s roaring box
office performance.7 Without the protections of the U.S.-China Film Treaty,8
which expired in 2017 under the Trump Administration, U.S. films had
limited access to the Chinese film market in 2021, with no Marvel Cinematic
Universe films released in China.9,10
In parallel, PRC-based entertainment and communication platforms grew
domestically in the U.S. and China. At the same time, U.S. tech firms saw a
decrease in their already anemic Chinese market share. TikTok and WeChat
survived Trump Administration Executive Orders11, 12 to continue their
operations in the United States with the support of enthusiastic users of the
platforms as well as the U.S. legal system.13 Beijing-based platform TikTok,
a subsidiary of Beijing-based Bytedance and the international counterpart of
Chinese social media platform Douyin, grew from over 11 million monthly
users in in 2018 to over 100 million in 202214 in the United States. By
contrast, Microsoft’s LinkedIn, the last US social media platform standing in
China, exited the market at the end of 2021.15
China’s rise in the media and technology sectors aligns with long-term
goals expressed in the 12th, 13th, and 14th five-year plans.16 They also align
as parallel parts of a vision for China to become a “qiangguo” (great power)
across different areas of strategic competition. The Chinese government
has singled out film and tech as two areas of interest for this great power
competition: the film and tech realms. Specifically, the goals are for China to
become a “dianying qiangguo” (great film power) and a “wangluo qiangguo”

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 Aynne Kokas

(great internet power) by 2030.17 With that vision in mind, the Chinese
government’s efforts to influence content in the media and tech sectors in the
United States appear to be not merely a financial strategy for global companies
seeking to expand their wings but an explicitly conceived framework for great
power competition.

Data Control as Content Control

Data control practices implemented by the Chinese government first created
punishing restrictions for foreign firms operating in China that impacted their
international business. This was followed by explicit efforts to control digital
content outside China’s borders. In 2017, the Chinese government instituted
a Cybersecurity Law (wangluo anquan fa) that asserted that all “critical
information” should be controlled by Chinese state-owned firms.18 Linking
issues of content control and data security, regulators have also used the
phrase “core socialist values” (shehui zhuyi jiazhiguan) to nationalize foreign
corporations’ data storage facilities through the law.19 The law structured
China’s data as a fixture of its national security apparatus. It established the
government’s role in the governance and control of critical national data.
Corporations like Apple, operating in China but generating data locally,
partnered with Chinese state-run corporations to store their data.20 Apple set
up a data-sharing partnership with Guizhou Yunshang in Guizhou province
after being the subject of a lawsuit immediately after the law took effect and
moved its China iCloud data to Guizhou Yunshang servers.21 Still, in a move
that proved to be prescient of future Chinese government efforts, there were
reports of the iCloud data of U.S.-based iCloud accounts being swept up in
the Apple data transfer.
In 2020, following the implementation of the 2017 Cybersecurity Law, the
Chinese government introduced a draft of the 2021 Data Security Law. The
2021 Data Security Law expands on the 2017 Cybersecurity Law by laying out
a more precise data access procedure.22 This process formalizes government
access to data, which the Chinese government introduced via its principles of
military-civil fusion and the 2017 Cybersecurity Law. It creates a framework
through which the government can access data generated by a company
in China via national security review. It also empowers and mandates all

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government agencies to develop their data audit procedures according to

the industrial sector they represent. But perhaps most importantly, the Data
Security Law makes these laws apply to all Chinese companies everywhere,
not just to firms operating in China.
This global reach has multiple implications. First, the national security
review of data becomes explicit—not just for local firms but also for
international firms with data stored in China. Corporations must be willing
and able to make their data available for a national security review at any
time.23 The Data Security Law further expands China’s extraterritorial
enforcement of its data oversight mechanisms. This law subjects corporations
to national data gathering, linking corporate data with data gathered by the
nation. It implies that data collected by any Chinese firm worldwide becomes
subject to Chinese national security review oversight.24 The Data Security
Law’s extraterritorial scope reflects the increasingly international scope for
Chinese jurisprudence.
In parallel, the Chinese government implemented national security
oversight over algorithms developed by Chinese firms that the firm seeks
to export to another country. Chinese tech firms that are China-dominant
in their data gathering have a clear market incentive to localize their global
data in China. Such an approach enables them to develop the most efficient
algorithms they can with larger volumes of data because of the difficulty of
exporting algorithms due to national security controls.
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2020. Hong Kong national
security law integrates control of content, infrastructure, and extraterritorial
oversight. Article 38 of the law also provides for extraterritorial enforcement
of national security review, which applies to the Special Administrative
Region’s technology sector.25

How U.S. Corporate Dependence on the

Chinese Market Enables Content Control
While China’s content control regulations are national laws, when combined
with trade in the media and technology sectors with the United States, they

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 Aynne Kokas

functionally become international content regulations. The following sections

examine how trade within the United States and China shapes content offer-
ings by the U.S. media and technology firms in China and the United States.
The first way China’s content regulations become global is the depen-
dence of U.S. firms on China for market access. This takes place in both di-
rect and indirect ways. Firms might shift the type of content they create to
access the Chinese market. In practice, this can mean adjustments strictly for
the Chinese market such as changes in the endings of Fight Club or Winnie
the Pooh for Chinese market access. The Shanghai-set animated block-
buster Abominable (Jill Culton and Todd Wilderman, 2019) was released in
September 2019 with high expectations for its global market performance.
The film, about a young girl from Shanghai’s emerging middle class and her
abominable snowman pal, offers a global, cosmopolitan view of China’s film
industry. That is, until the film displayed a map of China’s contested South
China Sea maritime claim. This moment would eventually cause Vietnam,
Malaysia, and the Philippines to ban the movie. Critics in the United States
roundly panned the visible influence campaign in the film, but it went on to
achieve box office success.26
However, market concerns with respect to content control are not the only
limitations. There are also broader considerations concerning market access.
For example, both Disney27 and Universal have significant capital investments
in China in theme parks. The firms are minority stakeholders in both
enterprises and depend on their relationship with the Chinese government
to continue operating in China. These two major Hollywood studios face
a consistent bind between maintaining their political relationships within
China and the type of content that they release globally. Objectionable content
presents a challenge not just for Chinese regulators in content industries but
also for theme park operators.28
This comes out most clearly in the case of NBC Universal, which is the U.S.
broadcasting home of the 2022 Beijing Olympic Games. NBC Universal must
contend with the risk that its coverage runs afoul of Chinese regulators not
just concerning access to the 2022 Olympic Games, but also in questions of
access to the Chinese market for the company. To mitigate these risks, NBC
will not send reporters unfamiliar with the constraints of operating in China
to Beijing, instead covering much of the Games from a studio in the United

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States. NBC reporters based in Beijing will also cover the Games from outside
the Olympic bubble. However, NBC’s access to the Games and the stability of
its theme park investment both are vulnerable due to the sensitive nature of
the Olympic Games in China’s international image.
Unlike in the media industries, market dependence in the tech sector
takes the form of desired access to the Chinese tech sector and the modes
of access for Chinese firms operating in the United States. U.S. tech CEOs
have historically been willing to make significant market access concessions to
access the Chinese market. Mark Zuckerberg met with then-Chinese internet
regulator Lu Wei and had Xi Jinping’s speeches on his desk. He later asked Xi
to name his first-born child (an honor Xi immediately declined). In addition
to storing its data on Chinese-government-run servers, Tim Cook legitimized
China’s Wuzhen Internet Conference, a Chinese-led site for consensus-
building around digital standards, by speaking at the conference in 2017. 29
However, with increasing Chinese government data security regulations, the
space for U.S. firms willing to share data with Chinese regulators has shrunk.
Instead, an emergent challenge is the advocacy of U.S. firms for Chinese
tech platforms operating in the United States to ensure continued finan-
cial success. WeChat has been documented to restrict content on the plat-
form and surveil users, not just in communications between the United
States and China, and not just on Chinese run accounts, but in both coun-
tries.30 One of the central arguments against the Trump Administration’s
Executive Order 13943 banning financial transactions with WeChat was
that it would create a financial penalty for U.S. firms operating in China
that depend on the firm to do business with their customers in China.
However, the current landscape means that U.S. firms rely on WeChat
to retain market share in China. Of course, such dependence on WeChat
did not occur in a vacuum. Instead, it resulted from systematic support
for Chinese tech national champions and the suppression of foreign tech
firms operating in the market.31 For companies like Walmart and General
Motors, this means retaining market share in one of the most dominant
global markets for their products.32
In the case of TikTok, there were examples of users being pulled from
the platform, limitations on LGBTQ content, biased portrayals of Hindu/
Muslim conflict in India, censorship of discussions of Xinjiang and Hong

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Kong, and more. However, in a similar vein, U.S. industry associations like
tech advocate NetChoice stood with TikTok following the issuance of the
Trump administration’s Executive Order because of concerns that other com-
panies in the United States already depended on the firm for marketing and
advertising across a wide range of industries. Such market dependence is no
longer dependence on the Chinese market but rather on firms born and bred
out of China’s legal framework for cyber sovereignty.

Corporate Rationale for Content Control

These forms of content control come with different forms of corporate
justifications. It is essential to understand the rationale for policy purposes
because of the close entanglement of the U.S. media and technology sectors
with the U.S. regulatory apparatus.

Rationale 1: Responding to Chinese Censors

Reflects Cultural Sensitivity
One important rationale is the issue of cultural sensitivity. Both Hollywood
Studios and U.S. tech firms have suggested that controls on content
are essential to reflect international norms. For example, in the Marvel
Cinematic Universe films Dr. Strange and Iron Man 3, filmmakers adjusted
their characters to correct the Orientalist portrayals of characters from the
original comic source material. The “Ancient One” in Dr. Strange, a Tibetan
character, was shifted to a Celtic figure. The “Mandarin” from Iron Man 3 was
repurposed as a character who was an out-of-work actor portraying a character
with this name, but no other characteristics. Stripping Orientalist source
material from new films is an important practice. However, the MCU created
follow-up films rife with other forms of stereotyping, from Asian martial
artists in Shang Chi and the Legend of the Ten Rings to blatant parodies of
Eastern Europeans in Black Widow.
In Mulan, Disney argued that choosing not to speak out about lead actor
Crystal Liu’s decision to offer her public support for Hong Kong police
officers who were beating protesters, and or about the company’s decision to
work with government offices in Xinjiang associated with reeducation camps
were efforts to respect the decisions of local actors. While this may have been

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true, it is a self-serving justification that side-stepped thorny political issues.

Disney did, however, speak out about concerns related to Xinjiang when
it became clear that there would be a marketing blackout in China—and
financial consequences—for the film due to bad press in the United States.33
Similarly, TikTok and WeChat’s claims that their algorithm are just sensitive
to China’s cultural environment works within a Chinese context, but does
not hold water in a U.S. context.34

Rationale 2: Corporations must be “apolitical” or “universal”

A second rationale for content control by U.S. companies when seeking
to justify content control practices in relation to Chinese firms and the
Chinese market is the claim that businesses who seek to serve all customers
must remain variously “apolitical” or speak “universally.” Such an approach
reflects the challenging situation U.S. corporations operating in China and
Chinese firms operating in the United States face. The diverging regulatory
environments of the two countries are increasingly difficult to navigate for
global firms. Media and technology firms operating in the United States have
responded with different strategies.
DreamWorks Animation pulled out of its Chinese joint venture, Oriental
DreamWorks, because of concerns about political risks related to content
production in China.35 This approach reflects a way in which the firm deemed
the political risk of operating its Chinese studios also to be an economic risk.36
The company was concerned that the shifting regulatory environment in
China would prevent long-term growth for the company’s interests in China.
In contrast, Disney chose to continue working with partners in Xinjiang
even as it built reeducation camps and rumors of detentions escalated. Disney
did not comment on the scandal surrounding its cooperation with government
agencies in Xinjiang until its CFO responded to investors’ queries that the
film had “generated a lot of issues.”37 However, Disney’s still depended on its
capital investment in Shanghai Disney, an even greater concern given China’s
more successful coronavirus recovery and, by extension, more robust theme
park industry.
Netflix has sought to justify its—largely unsuccessful—efforts to enter
the Chinese market by making cuts to films through the idea that films are
censored for many different contexts. Reed Hastings, CEO of Netflix, has

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justified cuts made to film and television for China as similar to “airplane”
cuts that might be appropriate for general audiences. For its part, the Motion
Picture Association of America has given cover to both approaches. Its current
chair Charles H. Rivkin noted that the main goal of the Motion Picture
Association is to tell “universal stories.”38 Such a rationale enables firms to cut
content that they would not distribute globally.
TikTok has further advanced this idea of “universality” to justify political
decisions made by the platform. TikTok has explicitly noted that the platform
will eschew political speech. However, as social media becomes a central form
of communication, this stance becomes complicated to defend. The platform
served as the main communication vehicle for a protest against the Trump
campaign that left an entire stadium empty for a Trump rally as TikTokers
claimed tickets they never intended to use. The platform has also received
criticism for its censorship of content relating to LGBTQ+, Hong Kong, and
Xinjiang in line with Chinese government standards.
WeChat has also received criticism for its censorship of accounts in North
America. However, upon closer examination of WeChat’s terms of service, the
firm offers a new framework for presenting a rationale of political neutrality
while also following apparatuses for content control from China. WeChat’s
terms of service note that any platform users will be required to follow local
laws. This applies to both users of the platform and the laws to which the
platform is subject. By this logic, while the phrasing is neutral in the terms
of service, it also extends the reach of Chinese government content control
practices into the United States.

Rationale 3: Freedom of Speech

Beyond questions of cultural sensitivity and maintaining an apolitical cor-
porate stance are the complex questions of freedom of speech that emerge
with platform dependence on Chinese tech. WeChat offers a helpful case for
understanding this dynamic. The Citizen Lab and other organizations have
demonstrated censorship in North America on WeChat. At the same time,
because of the restrictions on both foreign and domestic platforms operating
in China,39 WeChat still offers the only reliable pathway for real-time com-
munication between communities in the United States and China. Northern
District of California Judge Magistrate Laurel Beeler ruled in favor of the

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WeChat Users’ Alliance following the Trump Administration’s Executive

Order banning WeChat. 40 Her ruling was precisely because it was the only
platform these users could rely on to communicate with friends, colleagues,
and loved ones in China. 41 Beeler’s ruling helpfully allowed people to re-
main connected to their friends, family, and business associates in China.
However, it also offered a free speech justification for preserving access to
a platform that constrains user expression, and support to a platform that
is the only available communication venue because of Chinese government
trade restrictions.
The legal structures of the Chinese market make it nearly impossible for
foreign competitors to operate there or for Chinese platforms to allow the
open exchange of ideas. Yet without such platforms, there would be no space
for any exchange. This tension sits at the crux of Chinese government content
control efforts. It is challenging to ensure the flow of media between China
and the United States, recognizing that such a flow depends on the robust
commercial relationship between China and the United States. Yet, at the
same time, the flow of media and communication is also essential to main-
taining the free speech of Americans when engaging with people in China.

Degree of Threat: Influence over Filmed

Entertainment vs. Social Media
While both filmed entertainment and social media fall under the rubric of
entertainment content, they present significantly different risk profiles. Both
Chinese government influence over social media platforms operating in the
United States and influence over the content of Hollywood studio films
present a soft power challenge concerning the type of content that individuals
around the world consume. Content control in filmed entertainment
demonstrates the potential damage of the trade asymmetry between the
United States and China on two dimensions—the ability to control content
and shape industrial practices.
However, the acquisition of user data presents a much more significant
potential security threat. It is not just concerned with the soft power issue of
engaging content, but coercive, or sharp power attempts to conduct phishing
operations, coerce individuals and groups, and grow China’s civilian and

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military AI capabilities. As I argue in my forthcoming 2022 Oxford University

Press book, Trafficking Data: How China is Winning the Battle for Digital
Sovereignty, social media is increasingly becoming critical communications
infrastructure for everything from disaster preparedness to social activism.
Such influence occurs regardless of the stated corporate mission of an
individual platform.42 As the entertainment mix of the United States shifts
from consumption offline to consumption entwined in networked platforms,
the implications of content control by Chinese government regulations
expands. Offline entertainment offers soft power, but online entertainment
enables coercive control of infrastructure.

Policy Recommendations
To tackle the policy challenges presented by content control of the media
and communications industries in the context of U.S.-China trade, I first
urge the reconsideration of the relationship between content producers and
distributors and the free market. Most of the challenges described result from
the inherent tension between maximizing market size and enabling clear
expression. What this paper has demonstrated is how the value of maximizing
market size has repeatedly taken precedent over both freedom of expression
and transparency about the process of generating content. While the U.S.-
China relationship magnifies such challenges, it is also a symptom of domestic
dysfunction within the United States. Thus, for any of the policy suggestions
below to work, it is essential that the United States internally revisit how
much power corporate market growth aspirations should have in shaping
speech from Hollywood to Silicon Valley.

Expand State-level Data Security Regulations Nationally

To better monitor how platforms move and use data with the support of
users, it is also essential to enact national data security regulations. Models
exist in different states to draw from, as California,43 Virginia,44 Utah,45 and
others offer different forms of data privacy regulations that allow users to
access, correct, and delete personal data they choose not to share. This is an
important response to risks of content control by the platforms and empow-
ers users to monitor their data. While such a proposal has been suggested

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widely, one of the central challenges in its implementation is both a lack of

capacity and willingness to implement such practices on a national level. As
such, the barrier to implementing such a policy emerges both from the chal-
lenges of executing it and the challenges of passing such legislation across a
country with diverse interests in and awareness of privacy and security in
the tech sector.

National Security Control of Algorithms

A final, albeit more controversial, possibility to address content control
concerns is through national security control of the export of algorithms.
China used this strategy to take upon the threat that TikTok would move
the development of its algorithm abroad. Such a move practically requires
that user data storage and the development of algorithms only happen in
countries with standards that the United States deems to be protective of free
speech. Such an approach is a much more complex option than those policy
proposals suggested previously. It would need to be executed with nuance
and in partnership with industry needs. However, as TikTok and WeChat
become more integral players in the U.S. information ecosystem and U.S.
tech firms continue to operate in China, it may become necessary to have
more transparency over how algorithms gather, share and distribute data. At
a minimum, it is important to have more government visibility into what laws
they follow when they do this.

Build Multilateral Alliances for Data

Storage and Security Standards
To address the inherently global nature of data movement, it is important for
the tech sector is to work across governments in the United States, Europe,
Japan, Australia, Brazil, India, and Singapore, as well as other developed
nations. Such collaboration should focus on standards for the movement
and storage of data across borders. At present, global dominance by U.S. tech
companies as well as differences in how corporations must treat data both
within and between these countries presents a challenge to cooperation.
The U.S. government could improve its credibility with allies and partners
by strengthening data storage and security protections required of U.S. tech
companies. Similarly, U.S. tech firms could offer more transparent data

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storage and security practices through voluntary industry-wide standards-

setting. However, thus far, both federal government data storage and security
standards and industry-wide standards have met with resistance from
industry partners due to the financial value firms accrue by exploiting user
data. While collaborative standards-building practice presents a significant
challenge due to radically different approaches to data storage and security
across developed tech markets, it remains an important aspiration. At this
point, the United States lacks nationwide data storage and security standards.
Such an international effort would need to operate in parallel with a national
movement to reform U.S. data storage and security standards.

Reporting Content and Takedown

Notices from Non-U.S. Actors
In response to the internationalization of Chinese government content
controls, one important step would be to prevent U.S.-based media and
technology firms from following foreign laws to remove content or share
information with foreign governments while operating in the United States.
This would need to apply to U.S. and Chinese firms with U.S. operations.
While the United States has little leverage in changing Chinese laws, it can
enforce corporate practices domestically.
Media and tech firms in the United States should be required to report
content takedown notices and requests for information from international
government officials and the specific law that the government officials cite.
This is particularly important to prevent U.S. firms and those operating in
the United States from just complying with general requests that are not
grounded in legal jurisprudence. It also will allow for tracing particularly
damaging laws and more focused policy initiatives. Of course, this is a
highly sensitive subject, closely tied to questions of freedom of speech in the
United States. I would argue that an initial first step should focus on report-
ing takedown notices rather than further devolving policymaking to tech
firms. Higher quality data about the scope and scale of international take-
down notices offers a first step to understanding the scale of the problem. It
also forces tech firms to move away from transparency reporting that con-
ceals their flaws. Such an approach would require infrastructure to moni-
tor such practices. Such reporting could be directed to the Committee on

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Foreign Investment in the United States, the SEC, or another agency with
the capacity to take on this burden.
Domestic rule-making offers one path to constrain Hollywood studio fi-
nancial interests from following Chinese government content regulations.
However, there are several challenges that this proposal poses. First, this ap-
proach works contrary to one of the great strengths of Hollywood studio film-
making in building American soft power—its relative independence from the
U.S. government. Second, U.S. government interventions in Hollywood have
a dark history grounded in the Hollywood blacklist denying employment to
individuals deemed to be Communist sympathizers. Any U.S. government ef-
forts must be narrowly grounded in tracking specific content takedown prac-
tices requested by Chinese government officials. While such practices would
not capture concerns about the influence of Chinese regulations on the film
development process, U.S. content creators need to retain creative autonomy
if the regulations are to preserve the core values of freedom of speech they are
meant to protect.

Reporting Local Law Adherence to International

Content Control Regulations in the United States
For both the film and social media entertainment sectors, a further
requirement could include reporting which “local laws” any firm following
laws outside of the United States in their U.S.-based media and technology
activities are subject to with respect to content censorship. Such a policy is
risky because it would increase firms’ reporting requirements and has the
potential to become unwieldly. Such legislation would also be so general
as to capture not just pressures from Chinese regulations but from other
countries around the world. One possible approach to mitigate the scale and
paperwork burden of such a requirement would be to implement it for a short
period of time or as a pilot in one industrial segment to carefully assess what
type of laws are most commonly impacting the content of U.S. firms. Such
an approach offers a valuable monitoring function for determining the size
and scope of content control practices. By monitoring international content
control practices over time, it becomes possible to mitigate international legal
pressure through targeted local laws.

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Limit Investment by Chinese Media and Tech

Firms Operating in the United States
To create leverage for renegotiating the U.S.-China Film Treaty and the
conditions under which U.S. tech firms operate in China by limiting the
types of investments that Chinese firms can make in the United States in
sectors that do not allow for U.S. investment in China. Such a move presents
challenges because it risks further decoupling the U.S. and Chinese economies.
It presents economic risks to U.S. corporations and investors. It also presents
the possibility of further damage to the U.S. investment environment if the
Chinese government penalizes U.S. corporations in response.
Then-Vice President Biden negotiated the treaty with then-Vice President
Xi to allow a floor of 34 films to be admitted into China. Since the expiration
of the treaty in 2017 under the Trump administration. Hollywood studios
have been increasingly at the mercy of Chinese censors. For example, in
2021, no Marvel Cinematic Universe films were admitted into the Chinese
market.46 The limitations on Hollywood studios have the potential to drive
firms to make increasingly undesirable content trade-offs to access what is
now the largest market in the world.
The U.S.-China Film Agreement came about following the United States
suing China in the WTO under violation of terms for A/V market access in
2007.47 Particularly due to the Chinese market’s strength relative to 2012,
renegotiating an entry guarantee for U.S. films will be difficult at this junc-
ture due to the lack of an incentive to admit the films for market growth
purposes. It may be necessary to consider making a formal complaint in the
WTO. Of course, such a move is complicated within the U.S.-China trade
relationship. It would need to be balanced against other trade interests.
While this multilateral/bilateral approach may help address some narrow
challenges in the film industry, the issue of content control through trade is
much more expansive.
Renegotiating the treaty would be difficult. The rise of China’s media
and tech industry domestically and internationally, the United States has
lost much of its leverage to make market access demands. The failure to re-
negotiate the U.S.-China Film Treaty in 2017 when China’s film market was
still smaller than the United States’ is a failure of U.S. foreign policy under
the Trump administration. With China’s theatrical market larger than that

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of the United States for two years in a row, the United States currently has
little leverage in negotiating this point. One possible point of influence would
be to prohibit the investment by Chinese film studios like Alibaba Films or
Tencent Films in the U.S. market until the renegotiation of the U.S.-China
Film Treaty. Unfortunately, such an approach harms these companies’ U.S.
partners, employees, and investors even as it offers potential options for mar-
ket access, and indeed, there may not be a net financial gain for the U.S. film
industry from blocking Chinese investment as a tool to enhance Chinese
market access. As with all these policy approaches, any approach will be im-
perfect because of the asymmetry between the U.S. and Chinese regulatory
landscapes paired with their economic interdependence.
The suggested policy proposals have clear downsides despite their ability
to address the issues of data and content control through trade. The challenge
of implementing any of these solutions underscores how the US and Chinese
industrial ecosystems entwine. Ultimately, U.S.-China trade offers a hotbed of
challenges for freedom of expression in the United States. U.S. firms depend
on the Chinese market to sell films, television shows, cars, consumer goods,
and a whole host of other products and services that require either direct
market access or access to platforms based in China. However, the Chinese
government has implemented increasingly tight controls over content and
data over the past six years.
What remains is the need to restructure the U.S. media and tech landscape
to protect consumers. This includes refining laws, enhancing trade protec-
tions, and requiring transparency from companies operating across borders.
Such efforts demand greater clarity over what Chinese law firms operating
in the United States follow and why. It requires more consumer protection
of data that corporations share. Firms operating in the United States may
need to exhibit greater transparency in their data gathering and use practices.
However, these latter options should be held in reserve if other approaches
fail to yield results. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, trade in media and
tech between China requires a large-scale reassessment of how to effectively
balance freedom of speech and corporate interests in the United States.

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Notes
1 Aynne Kokas, Trafficking Data: How China is Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022, 2022). https://global.oup.com/academic/
product/trafficking-data-9780197620502?cc=us&lang=en&.
2 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
September 15, 2020). https://www.google.com/books?id=R9PXDwAAQBAJ.
3 Rebecca Davis, “China’s Box Office Hit New Heights in 2019, as Hollywood’s
Share Shrank,” Variety, 2020, https://variety.com/2020/film/news/
china-box-office-2019-review-ne-zha-wandering-earth-avengers-1203455038/.
4 Hong Yaobin, “China Becomes World’s Biggest Movie Market, War Epic ‘The Sacrifice’ Aims
to Be Next Big Hit,” CGTN, October 20, 2020.
5 Patrick Brzeski, “China Retained the Global Box Office Crown in 2021,” The Hollywood
Reporter, January 3, 2022, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/
china-tops-global-box-office-2021-1235069251/.
6 Liz Shackleton, “China box office topped North America in 2020 thanks to quicker
post-lockdown recovery, strong local titles,” Screen Daily, January 13, 2021, https://www.
screendaily.com/features/china-box-office-topped-north-america-in-2020-thanks-to-quicker-
post-lockdown-recovery-strong-local-titles/5156165.article.
7 Sara Merican, “Battle At Lake Changjin’ Is China’s All-Time Highest-Grossing Film,” Forbes,
November 29, 2021.
8 Office of the Vice President, “United States Achieves Breakthrough on Movies in Dispute
with China,” The White House, February 17, 2021.
9 Sara Fischer and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “China builds its own movie empire,” Axios,
January 22, 2022, https://www.axios.com/china-builds-its-own-movie-empire-f22b9298-
b592-405e-a83c-c2ee99878abf.html.
10 Box Office Mojo, “Chinese Box Office For 2021,” 2021, https://www.boxofficemojo.com/
year/2021/?area=CN&ref_=bo_yl_table_18.
11 The White House, “Executive Order on Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok,” The
White House (Washington, DC), August 6, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-tiktok-and-taking-
additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency.
12 The White House, “Executive Order on Addressing the Threat Posed by WeChat,”
Executive Office of the President, August 6, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/08/11/2020-17700/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-wechat-and-taking-
additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency.
13 Laurel Beeler, “U.S. WeChat Users Alliance, et al., v. Donald J. Trump, et al,” Beeler, Laurel
(San Francisco), October 23, 2020.
14 Brian Dean, “TikTok User Statistics (2022),” Backlinko, 2022, https://backlinko.com/
tiktok-users.
15 Karen Weise and Paul Mozur, “LinkedIn to Shut Down Service in China, Citing
‘Challenging’ Environment,” The New York Times, October 14, 2021, Technology, https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/10/14/technology/linkedin-china-microsoft.html, NYTimes.com.

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16 Xinhua, ““Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan dishierge wunian guihua gangyao quanwen”
国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要(全文) [Outline of the 12th Five-Year
Plan for National Economic and Social Development],” March 16, 2011, http://www.gov.
cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm.; Hong Yu, “Reading the Twelfth Five-Year Plan: China’s
Communication-Driven Mode of Economic Restructuring,” International Journal of
Communication 5 (2011), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292409746_Reading_
the_Twelfth_Five-Year_Plan_China’s_Communication-Driven_Mode_of_Economic_
Restructuring; Xinhua, ““Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhiding shisanwu guihua de jianyi”
中共中央关于制定“十三五”规划的建议 [The CPC Central Committee’s Proposal on
Formulating the 13th Five-Year Plan],” (Beijing, China), November 3, 2015, http://www.gov.
cn/xinwen/2015-11/03/content_2959432.htm; Yu Hong, “Reading the 13th Five-Year Plan:
Reflections on China’s ICT Policy,” International Journal of Communication 11, no. 0 (April
2017), https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/6366; Karen M. Sutter and Michael D.
Sutherland, “China’s 14th Five-Year Plan: A First Look,” January 2021, https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11684, Zotero.
17 Xinhua, ““Xiangzhe wangluo qiangguo xinshidai angshou maijin dangde shibada yilai
woguo wangxin shiye fazhan zongshu” 向着网络强国新时代昂首迈进——党的十八
大以来我国网信事业发展综述 [March forward toward the New Era of Network Power
-- Summary of the development of China’s Network and Information Industry since the 18th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China],” gov.cn 2017, http://www.gov.cn/
zhuanti/2017-11/28/content_5242678.htm.
18 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 全国人民代表大会常务委
员会, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wangluo anquanfa” 中华人民共和国网络安全法
[Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China], “Zhongguo rendawang” 中国人大网
[China National People’s Congress Network] (Beijing, PRC, 2016), http://www.npc.gov.cn/
npc/c30834/201611/270b43e8b35e4f7ea98502b6f0e26f8a.shtml.
19 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 全国人民代表大会常务委员会,
Cybersecurity Law.
20 Aynne Kokas, “Platform Patrol: China, the United States, and the Global Battle for Data
Security,” The Journal of Asian Studies 77:4 (2018).
21 Eva Dou and Alyssa Abkowitz, “Apple to Build China Data Center to Meet New
Cybersecurity Law,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2017, Tech, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
apple-to-build-china-data-center-to-meet-new-cybersecurity-law-1499861507, www.wsj.com.
22 Cyberspace Administration of China 中共中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室,
“Wangluo anquan shencha banfa” 网络安全审查办法 [Measures for cybersecurity review],
(Beijing, China 2020).
23 Cyberspace Administration of China 中共中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室, Short
“Wangluo anquan shencha banfa” 网络安全审查办法 [Measures for cybersecurity review].
24 Samm Sacks, Qiheng Chen, and Graham Webster, “Five Important Takeaways From China’s
Draft Data Security Law,” New America (July 2020), http://newamerica.org/cybersecurity-
initiative/digichina/blog/five-important-take-aways-chinas-draft-data-security-law/;
Cyberspace Administration of China 中共中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室, Short
“Wangluo anquan shencha banfa” 网络安全审查办法 [Measures for cybersecurity review];

73
 Aynne Kokas

Council of Chairman 委员长会议, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shuju anquanfa caoan”

中华人民共和国数据安全法（草案） [Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of
China (Draft)], (China: Zhongguo rendawang 中国人大网, 2020).
25 The National People’s Congress 中国人民代表大会, ““Shouquan fabu zhonghua renmin
gongheguo xianggang tebie xingzhengqu weihu guojia anquanfa”（受权发布）中华
人民共和国香港特别行政区维护国家安全法 [(Authorized to promulgate) Law of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China on
Safeguarding State Security],” XinhuaNet (June 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-
06/30/c_1126179649.htm.
26 The Numbers, “Abominable (2019) - Financial Information,” 2019, https://www.the-
numbers.com/movie/Abominable-(2019)#tab=summary.
27 Adam Jourdan, “Disney’s China fairytale begins with $5.5 billion park opening,” Reuters,
June 15, 2016, Media Industry, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-disney-china-
idUSKCN0Z114U, www.reuters.com; CNBC, “China approves Universal theme park in
Beijing,” CNBC, October 13, 2014, https://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/13/china-approves-
universal-theme-park-in-beijing.html.
28 Aynne Kokas, Hollywood Made in China (Oakland, CA: University of California Press,
2017).
29 Apple, “Tim Cook’s remarks at the 4th World Internet Conference,” Apple
Newsroom, December 4,, https://www.apple.com.cn/newsroom/2017/12/
tim-cooks-remarks-at-the-4th-world-internet-conference-in-english/.
30 MIles Kenyon, “WeChat Surveillance Explained,” The Citizen Lab (May 2020), https://
citizenlab.ca/2020/05/wechat-surveillance-explained/.
31 Lai Lin Thomala, “China: WeChat usage among American companies by
purpose 2020,” Statista 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1167530/
china-wechat-and-tencent-usage-among-american-companies-by-purpose/.
32 Christian Shepherd, Yuan Yang, and Kirin Stacy, “How WeChat crackdown threatens
U.S. companies,” Financial Review, August 9, 2020, https://www.afr.com/world/asia/
how-wechat-crackdown-threatens-us-companies-20200809-p55k02.
33 Rebecca Davis, “Disney CFO Admits Filming ‘Mulan’ in Xinjiang Has
‘Generated A Lot of Issues’,” Variety, 2020, https://variety.com/2020/film/news/
disney-cfo-filming-mulan-in-xinjiang-problematic-1234766342/.
34 Jeffrey Knockel et al., “We Chat, They Watch: How International Users Unwittingly
Build up WeChat’s Chinese Censorship Apparatus,” The Citizen Lab (May 2020), https://
citizenlab.ca/2020/05/we-chat-they-watch/.”
35 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, “Form 10-K Dreamworks
Animation Skg, Inc.,” (2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1297401/000129740116000026/dwa-12312015x10xk.htm.
36 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, “Form 10-K Dreamworks Animation
Skg, Inc..”
37 Davis Disney CFO Admits Filming ‘Mulan’ in Xinjiang Has ‘Generated A Lot of Issues’.
38 Asia Society, MPAA’s Charles Rivkin’s Opening Address at the 2017 U.S. - China Film Summit
(Los Angeles, CA: Asia Society, 2017).

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 TikTok, Mulan, and the Olympics

39 Tom Wheeler, “China’s new regulation of platforms: a message for American

policymakers,” Brookings Institution (September 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/techtank/2021/09/14/chinas-new-regulation-of-platforms-a-message-for-american-
policymakers/; Beina Xu and Eleanor Albert, “Media Censorship in China,” (February
2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china.
40 The White House, “Threat Posed by WeChat.”
41 Maya Tribbitt and Michael Tobin, “WeChat Users in the U.S. Fear Losing Family Links
With Ban,” Bloomberg (August 11, 2020). https://www.bloombergquint.com/technology/
wechat-users-in-the-u-s-fear-losing-family-links-with-ban; Daniel Wu, “Wechat Fallout:
Bay Area Chinese-Americans Fear Losing Touch with Friends, Family,” The Mercury
News, August 14, 2020, Business - Technology, https://www.mercurynews.com/
chinese-americans-fear-losing-touch-with-friends-family-after-wechat-order.
42 Kokas, Trafficking Data.
43 Kokas, Hollywood Made in China.
44 David W. Marsden, “Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act,” SB 1392 (2021), https://lis.
virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?211+sum+SB1392S.
45 Utah State Legislation, “Utah Consumer Privacy Act,” (2021), https://le.utah.gov/~2021/
bills/static/SB0200.html.
46 Fischer and Allen-Ebrahimian, “China builds its own movie empire.”
47 Kokas, Hollywood Made in China; World Trade Organization, “China - Measures Affecting
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual
Entertainment Products - Joint communication from China and the United States,”
November 5, 2012.

75
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

The U.S.-China Trade War

and the Tariff Weapon
Jiakun Jack Zhang is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the
University of Kansas, Director of the Kansas University Trade War Lab, and
a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Jiakun Jack Zhang

Abstract
Managing the U.S.-China Trade War ranks among the most difficult for-
eign policy challenges for the Biden administration. It should not be weighed
down by misguided Trump-era thinking on the strategic virtues of tariffs. The
Trump administration cast tariffs as a panacea for all the economic challenges
facing the United States and employed them to achieve contradictory strate-
gic ends. Tariffs have distributional consequences, and their efficacy must be
evaluated by the net effect on the whole U.S. economy. Research suggests that
section 301 tariffs have caused great collateral damage to U.S. businesses and
consumers without generating the leverage over China or reducing trade defi-
cits as advocates hoped. This is because large companies are not responding
to tariffs by abandoning China but by passing on the costs or circumventing
tariffs. Tariffs have instead become a regressive “hidden sales tax” that places
a disproportionate burden on the less affluent by contributing to rising con-
sumer prices and on small and medium enterprises that struggle to remain
competitive. Tariffs have trapped the United States and China in a massive
economic war of attrition that grows costlier by the day without yielding mea-
surable strategic benefits.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Despite the economic toll on both economies, tariffs have achieved few of
the strategic ends articulated by the Trump administration. The United
States should scale back section 301 tariffs in favor of policy instruments
that cause less collateral damage on the American economy or are more
effective at achieving desired strategic ends.

● Rolling back tariffs does not mean capitulating to China but a change in
U.S. tactics. U.S. efforts to increase investment in science and technology,
to strengthen foreign investment screening, and to add companies
with links to the Chinese military to the entities list, all serve strategic
competition much more so than tariffs.

● The United States should seize the opportunity afforded by growing

inflation concerns to reframe the characterization of tariffs as not “tough

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 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

on China” but bad for the American economy. It could also pair tariff
reductions with Chinese cooperation on the Russia-Ukraine War.

● The United States could also do more to address structural imbalances by

strengthening export competitiveness. This involves traditional measures
such as maintaining a competitive exchange rate and negotiating trade
agreements but could involve new policies such as taxing capital inflows
and use the revenue to subsidize exports.

● The failure of section 301 tariffs is a cautionary tale against an all-or-

nothing approach to strategic competition with China. The Trump
administration hoped tariffs would achieve an expansive and contradictory
set of strategic goals and overplayed its hand. Tariffs can be a source of
leverage, but they are best threatened and not used. The costly tariff
stalemate could have been avoided had it made a more focused set of asks.

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I. Introduction
Tariffs are inflicting real economic costs on the United States while their
purported strategic benefits remain illusory. In 2018, the Trump administra-
tion imposed section 301 tariffs on China to combat the forced transfer of
technology from American firms, to stop cyber-intrusions to access U.S. busi-
ness information, and to curb Chinese industrial policies such as the Made in
China 2025 initiative. Members of the administration also vocally advocated
the strategic virtues of tariffs in reducing economic reliance on a geopolitical
rival. They claimed the long-term, strategic gains from encouraging compa-
nies to bring jobs back to this country by raising import costs1, and reducing
the trade deficit2 justify the short-term pain of tariffs. Some even saw tariffs on
China as a “poor man’s TPP,” by making China a less attractive destination
for foreign investors relative to U.S. allies.
The Biden administration’s approach to managing the U.S.-China Trade
War has been rightfully criticized as “Trump lite”.3 Average U.S. tariff lev-
els on Chinese goods have increased over six-fold since 2018 and cover two
thirds of imports. Researchers have noted that this “trade war stands out as
among the largest and most abrupt change in U.S. trade policy history, par-
ticularly when juxtaposed against the leading role historically played by the
U.S. in driving tariff reductions.“4 Most of these new tariffs remain in place
today, over two years after the signing of Phase One deal on January 15, de-
spite mounting evidence that the trade war has hurt the U.S. economy with-
out achieving its original aims.
This essay will focus on tariffs. Even though the U.S.-China Trade
War has metastasized into a “tech-war”5 and may be escalating towards
a “New Cold War,”6 tariffs are where the short- and medium-term costs
of the trade war are the most evident. Tariffs are political crowd-pleasers
because they give the executive the appearance of decisive action and al-
lows for selective redistribution of revenues to cronies, but they are quite
counterproductive in actuality by imposing higher costs on society as a
whole.7 They are a blunt instrument that have elevated uncertainty and
raised costs for businesses but have not caused large and consequential
MNCs to exit China. 8 Instead, they serve as a regressive tax as higher costs
are passed down the supply chain to the businesses and consumers who
can least afford to pay them.9

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 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

Both the United States and China are losers from the trade war, with the
costs falling disproportionately on those who can least afford them. While
well intentioned and impressive sounding, claims about the strategic virtues
of tariffs for the United States are contradicted by the weight of evidence. The
Trump administration tried to use of tariffs to achieve contradictory goals,
the resulting strategic muddle was further exacerbated by how businesses have
responded to tariffs in unanticipated ways.
The Biden administration has advocated a trade policy that supports the
middle class through stable well-paying jobs in order to further help the
United States “build back better” from the COVID-19 pandemic. Tariffs
at best do not contribute to these goals and at worst undermine this vision.
Section 301 tariffs have not resulted in measurable reshoring of industry or
a reduction of the trade deficit but they have exacerbated supply chain dis-
ruptions and inflated consumer prices. Tariffs, and the byzantine process for
tariff relief or exemption, chiefly benefit the politically connected and deep
pocketed, while the rest of the country bare their costs.

II. The Road to Decoupling: An Intellectual Framework

The rise of China, a geopolitical competitor that is also a leading U.S. trade
partner, has challenged the conventional wisdom that views economic inter-
dependence as a force for good in and of itself. But it was not until the out-
break of the trade war in 2018 that economic decoupling between the U.S.
and China went from unthinkable to inevitable. This push for economic de-
coupling marks a stark reversal of the half-century consensus among U.S. poli-
cymakers that freer trade will encourage China’s peaceful integration into the
liberal international order.

2.1 The Emergence of Economic Nationalism

The outbreak of the U.S.-China Trade War can be traced to efforts by both
countries to reduce perceived vulnerabilities that stem from asymmetric eco-
nomic interdependence. Scholars have long recognized that economic inter-
dependence creates both mutual benefit and mutual vulnerability, and that
coercive power can emerge from asymmetrical interdependence.10 China’s ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 created political

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backlash in both China and the United States, where fear about economic
dependency stoked the embers of economic nationalism in both countries.
In China this political backlash took place earlier and caused the govern-
ment to embrace indigenous innovation (自主创新) to reduce asymmetrical
dependence on foreign technology in the mid-2000s.11 In the United States, it
gained momentum after the Global Financial Crisis as the growing trade defi-
cit with China and its growing purchase of U.S. debt became framed increas-
ingly as a national security issue rather than an economic one. Both trends
were driven by the domestic political and economic transformations that fol-
lowed China’s WTO accession, which created winners and losers through in-
creased international competition. The economic losers from growing interde-
pendence were able to succeed politically by shifting national discourse from a
liberal narrative that emphasized the mutual benefits of interdependence to a
nationalist one that fretted about mutual vulnerability.
These parallel trends in China and the United States would converge with
the election of Donald Trump and touch off a series of events that transformed
trade from a cornerstone of peace in the U.S.-China relationship to a source
of uncertainty and instability. Trump’s China-bashing campaign brought the
issue of asymmetric interdependence with China into mainstream American
politics. In 2016, 63 percent of Americans surveyed by the Chicago Council
favoured friendly cooperation and engagement with China but by 2020, this
percentage dropped to 47 percent.12 The percentage who believed that China
practiced unfair trade increased from 58 percent in 2006 (prior to the Global
Financial Crisis) to 68 percent in 2017 (after the election of Trump) and to 73
percent in 2020 (after the trade war).

2.2 Misplaced Anxiety Over Asymmetric Interdependence

The United States and China remain highly interdependent across multiple
economic dimensions but the relationship is imbalanced in several notable
areas. The tragedy of the trade war stems from nationalists in both coun-
tries choosing to focus on different dimensions of the relationship that are
unquestionably asymmetric rather than examining it as a whole. Beijing and
Washington are racing to wall-off access to their domestic market and reduce
dependency on foreign suppliers to address perceived national security vulner-
abilities. These efforts to mitigate perceived asymmetries and enhance security

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in one area, such as Chinese efforts to reduce reliance on U.S. technology or

U.S. efforts to screen Chinese investments, threaten overall interdependence
and contribute to an economic security dilemma.
In 2020, trade between the two totaled $615.2 billion, which contributed
to a $310.3 billion trade deficit for the United States. The financial relation-
ship is even larger, totaling a staggering $5 trillion. China holds $1.07 trillion
in U.S. debt, which makes it the second largest foreign debtor at 15.5 percent,
behind only Japan at 18 percent. Another $2 trillion are Chinese listings in
U.S. stock exchanges. Foreign direct investment (FDI) from China accounted
for a much smaller share of U.S. FDI inflows, at $38 billion, far behind Japan
who is the largest foreign investor in the U.S. at $647.7 billion. The United
States is one of the largest sources for FDI in China, investing over $123.9
billion in 2020. The United States and China are also linked by a robust
education and talent pipeline: China is by far the largest source of interna-
tional students to the United States at 380,000 (the next highest is India at
190,000). There are over 2.5 million Chinese immigrants living and working
in the United States, around 10,000 American students in China and as many
as 100,000 American expatriates that live and work in China.
The ability to “weaponize” asymmetrical interdependence to gain politi-
cal leverage is not as straightforward as it would initially appear. For example,
the United States runs a large trade deficit with China but this paradoxically
gives asymmetric leverage to the United States because China depends more
on U.S. markets than we rely on theirs. American tariffs on China were sup-
posed to work because China needs to sell more to the United States than the
United States needs China. In other words, they wouldn’t work if the United
States didn’t run a trade deficit with China.
Furthermore, the trade deficit is what contributes to an investment surplus
that reduces the cost of sovereign borrowing for the United States and makes
China one of the largest holders of U.S. debt. While China’s accumulation of
U.S. debt has also sparked anxiety about asymmetric interdependence in the
United States, the scholarly consensus is that this leverage is more theoretical
than practical.13 As one senior Chinese official put it, “U.S. Treasuries are the
safe haven. For everyone, including China, it is the only option…we know the
dollar is going to depreciate, so we hate you guys but there is nothing much
we can do.”14 So, China may enjoy asymmetrical advantage in debt, but it is

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 Jiakun Jack Zhang

because it is the largest holder of U.S. foreign exchange (dollars used to pay
for Chinese goods). This, in turn, gives the United States the asymmetrical
power to put more tariffs on China than China can retaliate back with. So
does asymmetric interdependence actually favor the U.S. or China in aggre-
gate? Both and neither.
The economic security dilemma is also playing out in the area of foreign di-
rect investment. The Chinese government has long been concerned about the
asymmetry created by foreign companies gaining market share in China and
reliance on foreign technology. Beijing has erected barriers for foreign busi-
nesses while adopting policies to encourage Chinese firms to invest abroad.
These industrial policies are at the heart of Washington’s justification for the
trade war. They, in turn, brought Chinese style obsession over national secu-
rity to the U.S. foreign investment screening process, resulting in the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA). China re-
sponded by updating its own rules for national security review of foreign in-
vestment (外商投资安全审查办法) in 2020.

2.3 Sleepwalking towards Decoupling

Economic linkages between the United States and China are often asymmet-
rical when viewed individually, but it is not at all clear how such asymmetry
translates into coercive leverage overall. What is clear is that the wave of eco-
nomic nationalism unleashed by the trade war and Donald Trump’s “America
First” foreign policy threatens all economic ties with China, not just those
that create asymmetric vulnerabilities. This tragic slide towards decoupling
was not inevitable, but rather the product of a series of miscalculations by dif-
ferent actors in the United States and China.
What becomes clear in retrospect is that different actors in the leadup to
the trade war all came to see tariffs as the means to achieve wildly different
ends. Donald Trump believed that tariffs could reduce the trade deficit and
bring back the jobs he promised to his supporters. Protectionists supported
tariffs because it shielded their industries from Chinese competition while
punishing China for its unfair trade practices. Multinational businesses,
which benefited from trade with China did not share these goals, but they
saw tariffs as a convenient way to pressure Beijing to level the playing field in
their favor. While protectionists did not much care about how China might

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respond, Trump and the multinational advocates of tariffs expected China

to capitulate rather than jeopardize its profitable economic relationship
with the United States. But the result was a maximalist set of demands that
exceeded the economic pain of tariffs and Chinese leaders, overconfident in
their ability to outmaneuver Trump, saw retaliatory tariffs as preferable to
acquiescence. This mutual confidence led to bargaining failure and resulted
in the largest trade war in history, an economic war of attrition that contin-
ues to grind on today.
The following sections will review the strategic logic of U.S. tariffs as
well as China’s retaliatory tariffs. This will be followed by an analysis of the
short- and medium-term impact of these tariffs on the United States and
Chinese economies to determine whether they achieved the intended strate-
gic objectives.

III. Strategic Logic of U.S. Tariffs

The logic of section 301 tariffs suffers from muddled strategic thinking. Their
adoption by the Trump administration seemed to reflect the need to do some-
thing to address long-standing trade tensions with China despite unresolved
disagreements about the desired ends tariffs were supposed to bring about.
Tariffs raise costs for imported goods, thus their effects depend on which eco-
nomic actors end up shouldering these costs and whether they change their
future behavior in response.
If the net effect of these changes is beneficial to the United States, then
they can be considered strategic. However, a systematic review of their antici-
pated effects reveal that they are far from the miracle silver bullet for stra-
tegic competition with China that many policy-makers believe they are. The
Trump administration have, at different times, characterized tariffs as achiev-
ing strategic ends that sometimes contradict each other:

Punishment: Tariffs that function as payback against Chinese “economic

aggression” and undercut Chinese competitiveness. This logic was particu-
larly prominent in the initial two of four lists of U.S. tariffs, which targeted
$50 billion worth of products from industrial sectors that contribute to or
benefit from Made in China 2025.15 This logic assumes zero-sum competi-

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 Jiakun Jack Zhang

tion with China. For this logic to be true, the costs of U.S. tariffs are taxes
on Chinese exports paid by U.S. importers. If all exporters in China were
Chinese, the distributional impact of tariffs would be straightforward. They
should raise costs for all China-based producers creating goods for sale in the
U.S. market, making them relatively less competitive than U.S.-based pro-
ducers. But in a world of global value chains and MNCs, things get compli-
cated. In 2018 alone, over 40 percent of Chinese exports was conducted by
foreign companies. This means that a sizable number of U.S. and allied com-
panies are also hurt by tariffs. Additionally, U.S. firms that import Chinese
components also face higher costs, potentially becoming less competitive
relative to European and Asian competitors that can import Chinese com-
ponents more cheaply. It is not clear whether tariffs are really undercutting
Chinese or American competitiveness.

Leverage: Tariffs would push more companies to divest from China and re-
shore supply chains to the United States unless China makes difficult reforms.
This logic assumes cooperation with China is possible and that imposing some
costs on China will make it more willing to negotiate. The central assumption
of the leverage strategy is that tariffs will induce some MNCs important to
the Chinese economy to leave the country. But this assumes that MNCs will
leave China rather than simply pay the cost of tariffs. This does not appear to
be the case, especially for larger MNCs, which have the market power to pass
the cost of tariffs on to customers and a variety of means to avoid duties by ex-
ploiting loopholes in trade law. As a result, small and medium enterprises are
the most sensitive to tariffs and their pain doesn’t generate the kind of leverage
that would get China to engage in structural reforms.
Additionally, there’s some tension between using tariffs for punishment or
for leverage, since the former requires narrow targeting to avoid non-Chinese
companies while the latter requires imposing significant costs on foreign
MNCs. If punishment featured more prominently in the targeting of List
1 and 2 tariffs, the logic of leverage was more central to List 3 and 4 tariffs.
These later tariffs covered a much broader number of product lines and were
intended to increase pressure after China imposed retaliatory tariffs rather
than capitulating. This difference in intent is why thousands of U.S. compa-
nies have sued the Trump administration for List 3 and List 4A tariffs because

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 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

of the expansion of tariffs for reasons untethered to the unfair Chinese prac-
tices it originally investigated and why the WTO has found the U.S. in breach
of trading rules.16

Protectionism: Tariffs shield domestic producers from foreign competition

and offer selective compensation of political supporters. This logic is driven by
domestic political considerations and has special resonance with Congress be-
cause it promises job creation. Politicians have historically imposed tariffs as a
means of curating political favor with local interest groups interested in “buy-
ing” protection through campaign contributions. The Trump administration
liked to tout the new revenues generated by tariffs and the jobs created in the
steel industry. Nevertheless, it spent more on compensating farmers who suf-
fered from Chinese retaliatory tariffs,17 and U.S. manufacturers as a whole
shed more jobs than gained them because of rising input costs.18
This gap highlights the central problem with the siren song of protection-
ism: it creates a deadweight loss on the economy as a whole while benefiting
politically connected interest groups. This is why political economists have
long believed that the executive branch would oppose tariffs because it has
to consider the welfare of the nation as a whole while the legislative branch
would be inclined towards enacting more to satisfy their local constituents.
Additionally, the logic of protectionism likely undercuts punishment as well
as leverage because the targeting of tariffs could not be strategic if driven by
parochial domestic interests.

Structural deficit: Tariffs are a means to reduce the trade deficit with
China and reverse U.S. dependency on foreign debt. This logic seems to be
favored by former President Trump and USTR Lighthizer who see the trade
deficit as the U.S. trading future wealth (through borrowing) for short-term
consumption.19 According to an account of trade negotiations, the Trump ad-
ministration refused a Chinese offer in March 2018 to head off the trade war
by reducing trade barriers and demanded instead that Beijing quickly cut its
$375 billion trade surplus with the United States by $100 billion.20
While it is true that the trade deficit leads to a financial account surplus,
which reduces the cost of U.S. foreign borrowing, it is unclear whether tar-
iffs will help reverse these structural imbalances. U.S. tariffs on China may

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 Jiakun Jack Zhang

reduce imports but they have also prompted retaliatory tariffs and raised the
cost of U.S. firms producing goods for export. Both will reduce U.S. exports.
Tariffs have also prompted some trade diversion to countries like Vietnam,
expanding the U.S. trade deficit with those countries. This means that tariffs
on China is unlikely to change the overall trade deficit. This is exactly what
we see empirically, the U.S. trade deficit grew to record levels in 2020 and
will reach new heights in 2021 despite high tariffs. The bilateral trade deficit
with China did shrink in 2019 but so did pressure to reduce the growing trade
deficit with Vietnam. A better way to address structural imbalances would be
to tax capital inflows and use the revenue to subsidize exports.

IV. Strategic Logic of Chinese Tariffs

In contrast to the muddled strategic logic of U.S. tariffs, Chinese retalia-
tory tariffs had the singular purpose of undermining political support for
the trade war in the United States and pressuring the Trump administra-
tion to rollback tariffs. Chinese tariffs were designed to maximize leverage
to force the United States to reverse its policy. This meant targeting products
produced in Republican-supporting counties, particularly those in closely
contested Congressional districts. 21 Over the decade preceding the trade
war, China had become the largest importer of U.S. agricultural products.
These products tend to be produced in rural districts and states that favor the
Republican party and voted for Donald Trump. In response to U.S. tariffs,
China levied retaliatory tariffs on almost all U.S. agricultural products, such
as soybeans. Other retaliatory tariffs targeted industries such as automobile
manufacturing, iron and steel, and oil and gas extraction. In 2019, it even
went as far as to instruct its state-owned enterprises to halt all purchases of
U.S. agricultural goods. 22
Researchers estimated that as many as 61 percent of jobs affected by retalia-
tory tariffs are in counties that voted for Donald Trump.23 Even so, whereas
the EU targeted its tariffs to minimize the harm to its own consumers, China
showed no such concern. Rather than acknowledging the underlying issues
raised by the USTR’s Section 301 Report, which had widespread support
in the U.S. business community, Chinese leaders turned the bombast of the
Trump administration to its own propagandistic ends by framing the trade

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 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

war in nationalistic terms. According to Davis and Wei, leaders in Beijing

saw China as an equal to the United States and resented Washington’s pres-
sure tactics.24 This uncompromising approach played into nationalist narra-
tives about U.S. curbing Chinese development. Much of the Chinese com-
mentary in the lead up to the trade war also urged the government to “seek
peace through war” (以战争换和平) in the face of pressure from the Trump
administration. That is, China should be prepared to place retaliatory tariffs
on U.S. exports to counter Trump’s tactic of proposing high tariffs and then
negotiating exemptions one by one.25 They perceived a gap between Trump’s
and the U.S. business community’s goals on trade as a source of leverage in
U.S.-China trade negotiations. Many Chinese analysts believed the U.S. busi-
ness community and their allies in Congress would put pressure the Trump
administration to stop the trade war from escalating. Thus, as this war of attri-
tion drags on towards a fourth year, both economies are hurt but nonetheless
have incentives to hold out until the other side gives in.

V. Short-term Impact: Economic Pain and Uncertainty

5.1 Tariff Impact on the United States

Economists estimate that tariffs have cost U.S. consumers and businesses who
buy imported goods $51 billion, or 0.27 percent of GDP.26 Even after account-
ing for tariff revenue and gains to domestic producers, the aggregate real in-
come loss was still $7.2 billion, roughly equivalent to the entire annual eco-
nomic output of a medium sized American city like Topeka, KS or Columbia,
MO. Additionally, American importers bore more than 90 percent of the cost
of U.S. tariffs27, putting lie to the claim that China will pay for them. This is
because most U.S. importers and could not find new suppliers in the short-run
and had little choice but to rely on Chinese suppliers. Instead, U.S. businesses
were forced to cut wages, slash jobs, and accept lower profit margins.
Higher tariffs were associated with a 1.4 percent decline in American
manufacturing, contrary to exaggerated claims about re-shoring. Trade fric-
tions have also dampened the valuation of listed companies that trade with
China and depressed investment in the United States because lower returns
to capital weaken incentives to invest.28 Chinese retaliatory tariffs have also

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taken a toll, particularly on Republican-leaning counties that export goods

to China. One study estimates that the trade war cost nearly 300,000 jobs
between 2018-2019.29
A significant portion of these higher costs have been passed on to retail-
ers and eventually to consumers in the form of inflation. Treasury Secretary
Janet Yellen has conceded that tariffs are inflationary.30 Though other factors
such as COVID disruptions and changing consumer demand also play a role
in inflation, 25 percent tariffs on Chinese goods act as a hidden sales tax that
contributes to rising prices in the United States.

5.2 Tariff Impact on China

Tariffs also took a toll on Chinese consumers and businesses. They did so by
reducing the volume of trade between the United States and China while in-
centivizing some countries to reallocate exports into the United States and
away from China.31
One study found that export-intensive areas of China with the largest U.S.
tariff shock saw a 2.5 percent reduction in income per capita between 2018
and 2019.32 Another study found that Chinese firms that were more exposed
to American tariffs posted 3 percent fewer ads and hired fewer workers in the
months following tariff increases.
Vortherms and Zhang found that the trade war accelerated foreign firm
exit in China, but through elevating political risk more than the targeting of
tariffs.33 Their research reveals that multinationals left China at a rate of 11.4
percent in 2019 compared to an average of 7.1 percent prior to the outbreak
of the trade war. The firms that exit are more likely to be smaller and newer
to China and not concentrated in manufacturing or information technology
that were targeted by tariffs.
Additionally, Chinese consumer prices nearly doubled in the wake of its
imposition of retaliatory tariffs from 1.56 percent in 2017 to 2.9 percent in
2019. Prices for popular commodities such as pork more than doubled, a sig-
nificant enough increase to convince the government to exempt American
pork and soybeans (used in animal feed) from tariffs.34

5.3 Short-Term Net Assessment

Despite the economic toll on both economies, tariffs have achieved few of

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 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

the strategic ends articulated by the Trump administration. They have im-
posed some costs on Chinese manufacturers yet perhaps more importantly,
also have on U.S. manufacturers. Given the evidence of near complete pass
through, it is hard to argue that the total economic costs are borne dispro-
portionately by Chinese companies. This makes tariffs hard to justify as an
instrument of punishment.
Setting aside the fact that the trade deficit is a flawed measure, tariffs only
managed to reduce the trade deficit with China slightly in 2019 before surg-
ing to a new record in 2020. Though it is hard to disentangle the roles played
by tariffs and by the pandemic in these figures, the undisputed fact is that
U.S. tariffs have led to trade diversion from China to countries like Vietnam.
The U.S. trade deficit with Vietnam grew alarmingly enough that the Trump
administration labeled it a currency manipulator in 2020, hardly a success if
deficit reduction was the original goal.
Tariffs have also yielded very limited political leverage for either side. U.S.
companies aren’t divesting from China as much as U.S. policymakers would
like — or pushing back against tariffs as much as Chinese policymakers had
hoped.35 This is because the United States and China are both large domestic
markets, so even though the scale of the trade war is immense, the impact
on the daily lives of consumers is muted and distant. The rhetoric used by
their governments to justify tariffs remain popular with nationalists in both
countries, explaining why popular pressure to roll back tariffs have failed to
materialize. However, this armed stalemate nonetheless favors Beijing more
than Washington because it has given Xi Jinping a freer hand to pursue the
same kind of technological self-reliance policies that tariffs were supposed to
put an end to.

VI. Medium-term Impact: The Rich Get Richer

Defenders of tariffs might dismiss their high costs and limited success thus far
to argue that their strategic benefits will take time to materialize. This sounds
like the kind of wishful thinking used to justify the lack of strategy in other
wars of attrition such as the ones in Vietnam and Afghanistan. It also leaves
unchallenged the faulty logic of economic nationalism that gave rise to the
trade war in the first place.

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 Jiakun Jack Zhang

Tariffs harm those who can least afford it while benefiting those indus-
tries that least need it. Research by Zhang and Vortherms have found that
larger and older multinationals are less likely to close their China operations
compared to smaller firms during the trade war.36 This is why only 4 percent
of AmCham China members, who tend to be large multinationals, consid-
ered moving out of China in 2019.37 A similar survey by AmCham Shanghai
in 2021 show five-year optimism rebounding, finding that only 1.6 percent
of companies plan to move production out of China in the next three years
and none planning on relocating production back to the United States.38
China continues to attract record volumes of foreign direct investment, de-
spite trade tensions and pandemic disruptions. These figures do not suggest
that tariffs will produce a sudden change of heart in global business lead-
ers in the future. In fact, foreign multinationals have been cooling on China
even before the trade war and have been diversifying their supply chains.
They remain in China not because they don’t know better but because they
are taking a calculated risk to serve China’s growing domestic market. These
large multinationals also have sophisticated ways to evade or recover tariffs.
Instead, tariffs are having an impact on small and medium enterprises in
both the United States and China.

6.1 Small and Medium Enterprises are the biggest losers

Neither the United States or China are likely to win from the persistence of tar-
iffs, but the biggest losers will be small and medium enterprises in both coun-
tries. These smaller, less productive firms account for a large share of the busi-
nesses engaged in trade but a small volume of trade itself. They lack the capacity
to find alternative suppliers or hire expensive lobbyists during the trade war.
Unlike larger competitors, they also do not have the leverage to pass these costs
on to customers or the resources to mitigate them. In other words, even though
tariffs affect firms of all sizes, the firm-level capacity to deal with them varies
greatly. The most profound effect of tariffs on the medium rung is likely to be
within and across countries. For example, aiming to reduce the U.S.-China
trade deficit with tariffs ignores the possibility of a larger Chinese firm mov-
ing operations to Vietnam through investment and continuing to ship to the
United States, while a smaller Chinese firm goes out of business. At the same
time, a major U.S. retailer will leverage its supply chains to replace or use its mar-

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 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

ket power to pressure Chinese suppliers to eat the cost of tariffs, while a minor
U.S. retailer that lacks market power will likely go out of business. Neither the
United States or China win here, in both countries it is only the bigger and more
global firms that get stronger while smaller ones go out of business.
The popular backlash to trade with China was fueled by a frustration
that “Wall Street” benefited more from the relationship than “Main Street.”
It would be ironic if the smaller firms on main street lose out twice, first by
being slow to enter the China market and again by being slow to adjust to
the harsher economic realities of tariffs. Furthermore, the creation of byzan-
tine tariff exclusion processes, while effective as a political pressure valve, only
exacerbates this problem. Since the introduction of section 301 tariffs, the
number and amount of money spent lobbying the USTR have increased sig-
nificantly. The tariff exclusion process has made lobbyists and their big money
clients richer while disadvantaging small businesses.39

6.2 Towards a Trade Policy for the Middle Class

Framing the trade war in terms of economic nationalism conceals the true dis-
tributional consequences of tariffs. Policy makers in both countries would do
well to remember that the winners and losers from trade are often distributed
within national borders rather than across them. Rather than letting trade
policy be set by a vocal minority who are losers from free trade, the United
States should embrace a positive-sum view of trade policy and look out for the
aggregate welfare of their respective nations.
A more productive approach would see foreign economic policy as an
extension of domestic policy rather than the other way around. Over three-
quarters of U.S. managers interviewed in a national survey say that their com-
pany has been harmed by tariffs and only 16 percent say that they have been
helped.40 In the same survey, 69 percent of managers say that suppliers have
raised prices over the past year as a result of the trade war. Instead of asking
Americans to endure tariffs because of some vague notion of economic com-
petition with China, the United States should assess whether tariffs working
for the majority of Americans. This approach has several advantages.
First, it would lower prices for businesses and consumers in the face of rising
inflationary pressure. The majority or products covered by section 301 tariffs,
from medical devices to mattresses to furniture, are not vital to “strategic com-

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petition” with China. Furthermore, tariffs are a greater burden on those with
lower disposable incomes. Reducing or eliminating tariffs should make many
household essentials more affordable for less affluent American households.
Second, it would resonate with a bipartisan desire to make trade work for
the middle class. The Biden administration sees the acceleration of corporate
consolidation as stifling competition and driving up consumer prices. Tariffs
and the tariff exclusion process disproportionate hurt small and medium en-
terprises that are the backbone of the American middle class.
Third, the trade war reveals that well intentioned government policies to re-
direct economic flows do not work as intended. This is because businesses are
the primary decision makers in trade and they do not always respond to govern-
ment policies in ways that policymakers intend. U.S. businesses trade with or
invest in China not because they are foolish or shortsighted but because makes
economic sense to operate there, they have not responded to U.S. tariffs by aban-
doning China. They also know the risks of operating in China more clearly than
policymakers and they should be consulted in crafting foreign policy.
Finally, a bottom-up foreign policy that did not begin with the assump-
tion of zero-sum competition might actually get more done. Politics is the
art of compromise. It is easier to agree to disagree on some issues in order
to make progress on others such as intellectual property or corporate taxa-
tion than to frame compromise as point scoring in some geopolitical con-
test with China. While this makes trade policy more dramatic, such a frame
makes actual problem solving harder. The United States and China have
intractable national security concerns with each other but they still stand
to gain from cooperation on a host of mundane policies that benefit their
interdependent economy.

VII. Conclusion and Recommendations

The U.S.-China Trade War and the widening strategic competition between the
two countries are about more than tariffs. But this analysis of how the muddled
strategic logic tariffs failed to deliver a good outcome for the United States is
a cautionary tale against an all of nothing approach to strategic competition.
Tariffs were not a panacea for all the economic challenges facing the United
States and righting all the wrongs that China is accused of.

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 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

The United States should recognize the economic costs and strategic trade-
offs associated with using section 301 tariffs. Research suggests that tariffs are
not doing as much as policymakers seem to think in forcing MNCs to choose
between the United States and China, nor have they produced the desired mac-
roeconomic outcomes such as deficit reduction. But they have been hugely dis-
ruptive and are having a significant distributional impact among the MNCs
that operate across the two countries. Tariffs are thus not helping win the com-
petition with China but rather inadvertently creating winners and losers among
U.S. businesses that operate in China, with smaller and newer firms losing to
larger conglomerates. A trade policy for the middle class is not well served by a
regressive tax that passes on the costs of tariffs to those who could least afford it.
Rolling back tariffs does not mean capitulating to China but a change in
U.S. tactics. The United States must also reframe the characterization of tar-
iffs as not “tough on China” but bad for the American economy. The Biden
administration inherited Trump framing based on flawed economic analysis
and mischaracterization of the policy to voters. Indeed, it is remarkable how
fast the Belt Way consensus shifted from favoring free trade to favoring tariffs.
The lack of leverage may dispel the notion that tariffs are a smart way to com-
pete with China. Rising consumer prices and supply shortages might offer a
politically opportune time to reframe the narrative around tariffs.
The United States has at its disposal an array of alternative tools41 besides
tariffs for economic competition with China that may result in less collateral
damage on the U.S. economy. Tariffs are a weapon of economic statecraft. But
a weapon that is difficult to target and prone harm one’s own side is not a very
effective one. Any form of economic coercion is a double-edged sword: these
tools tend to inflict collateral damage on one’s own economy while hurting that
of the target, but tariffs are the bluntest weapon of all. U.S. efforts to increase
investment in science and technology, to strengthen foreign investment screen-
ing, and to add companies with links to the Chinese military to the entities list,
all serve strategic competition much more so than tariffs. The United States can
continue to safeguard its security interests by investing in its military readiness
and working with allies to deter Chinese aggression. It must ignore the siren
song of protectionism and remain open to the global inflows of trade, invest-
ment, and talent that are at the heart of American competitiveness. Finally, tax-
ing multinational profits or providing subsidies to strategic sectors would both

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 Jiakun Jack Zhang

more directly incentive firm behavior than tariffs. However, the politics of pick-
ing which sectors or technologies are strategic and how much to tax MNCs will
be bitterly contested in a polarized domestic political arena.
The trade war has made the United States more like China than policy mak-
ers may realize, and not always in a good way. Washington has followed Beijing
in treating trade and investment as national security vulnerabilities that need
to be actively managed. U.S. policymakers are increasingly attracted to the idea
of industrial policy. Having long complained about China’s manipulation of its
economy, the United States demanded that it manipulate trade flows to reduce
the bilateral trade deficit in the Phase One Trade Deal. Two years later, China is
dramatically short of its purchase commitments because even Chinese officials
lacked the ability to bend market forces during a global pandemic. China has
also become more like the United States, abandoning its practice of keeping a
low profile while striving for achievement in favor of a more openly confronta-
tional foreign policy. This is a recipe for disaster for the world economy.
Leaders in both countries should reflect on the fact that China has gained
ground on the United States economically, not by declaring itself to be economic
competitors with the United States, but by simultaneously welcoming trade and
investment with the world and working tirelessly to give its firms market advan-
tage. Opening and reform lifted China out of poverty not through central plan-
ning but rather by allowing for local experimentation, not by treating economic
development as a means to some geopolitical end, but as an end in itself. Today,
both the United States and China face daunting social and economic challenges
at home. The least their leaders can do is to make sure that strategic competition,
and the accompanying temptation to weaponize economic interdependencies,
do not exacerbate these domestic challenges.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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 The U.S.-China Trade War and the Tariff Weapon

Notes
1 Robert Lighthizer, “America Shouldn’t Compete Against China with One Arm Tied Behind
Its Back,” New York Times, July 27, 2021.
2 Robert Lighthizer, “Robert Lighthizer on the Need for Tariffs to Reduce America’s Trade
Deficit,” The Economist, October 5, 2021.
3 Jeff Bader, “Biden’s China Policy Needs to Be More Than Just Trump Lite,” Brookings
Institution, January 25, 2022.
4 Pablo Fajgelbaum and Amit Khandelwal, “The Economic Impacts of the U.S.-China Trade
War,” NBER Working Paper No. 29315 (2021).
5 David Lynch, “How the U.S.-China Trade War Became a Conflict Over the Future of Tech,”
Washington Post, May 22, 2019.
6 Hal Brands and John Lewis Gaddis, “The New Cold War: America, China, and the Echoes
of History
7 Scott Lincicome, “It’s Time We had a Talk about Tariffs,” Cato Institute, September 29, 2020.
8 Jack Zhang and Samantha Vortherms, “Unstoppable Force Meets an Immovable Object: U.S.-
China Supply Chains in the Age of Decoupling,” Wilson Center Asia Dispatches, August 10, 2021.
9 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War
on U.S. Prices and Welfare,” CEPR Working Paper, March 2, 2019.
10 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence (Boston, MA: Little
Brown, 1977); Hirschman, Albert O. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 105
(University of California Press, 1980).
11 Jiakun Jack Zhang, “Business, Lobbyists, and the U.S. Congress,” In The Political Logic of the
U.S.-China Trade War, edited by Shiping Hua. Lexington Books, 2021.
12 2020 Chicago Council Survey, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/
public-opinion-survey/2020-chicago-council-survey
13 Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power
Politics,” International Security 34:2 (2009), 7-45.
14 Henry Sender, “China to Stick with U.S. Bonds,” Financial Times, February 11, 2009.
15 USTR press release: https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/
june/ustr-issues-tariffs-chinese-products
16 Reuters, “Some 3,500 U.S. Companies Sue Over Trump-Imposed Chinese Tariffs,” Reuters,
September 25, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-china-tariffs-idUSKCN26H03S
17 Benn Steil and Benjamin Della Rocca, “115 Percent of Trump’s China Tariff Revenue Goes to
Paying Off Angry Farmers,” CFR, December 20, 2018.
18 Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce, “Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on
Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector,” Federal Reserve Division of Research &
Statistics, December 23, 2019.
19 Robert Lighthizer, “Robert Lighthizer on the Need for Tariffs to Reduce America’s Trade
Deficit,” The Economist, October 5, 2021.
20 Wei, Lingling and Bob Davis, Superpower Showdown: How the Battle Between Trump and Xi
Threatens a New Cold War (United States: Harper Business, 2020), 204.
21 Sung Eun Kim and Yotam Margalit, “Tariffs as Electoral Weapons: The Political Geography

97
 Jiakun Jack Zhang

of the U.S.–China Trade War.” International organization 75:1 (2021), 1-38.

22 Congressional Research Service, “China’s Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agriculture: In Brief,”
Congressional Research Service, September 24, 2019.
23 Joseph Parilla and Max Bouchet, “Which U.S. Communities are Most Affected by Chinese,
EU, and NAFTA Retaliatory Tariffs,” Brookings Institution.
24 Wei and Davis, Superpower Showdown: How the Battle Between Trump and Xi Threatens a
New Cold War, 213.
25 Jiakun Jack Zhang, “Chinese Perceptions of Trump’s Trade Policy,” European Council on
Foreign Relations, 2018.
26 Amit K. Khandelwal et al, “The Return to Protectionism,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 1:56 (2019), 56.
27 Cavallo, Alberto, et al. “Tariff Pass-through at the Border and at the Store: Evidence from
U.S. Trade Policy.” American Economic Review: Insights 3.1 (2021): 19-34.
28 The Economist, “New Research Counts the Costs of the Sino-American Trade War,” The
Economist, January 1, 2022.
29 Ryan Haas and Abraham Denmark, “More Pain Than Gain: How the U.S.-China Trade War
Hurt America,” Brookings Institution, August 7, 2020.
30 Reuters, “Yellen Says Cutting Some Tariffs on Chinese Goods Could Ease Price Pressures,”
Reuters, December 2, 2021.
31 Pablo Fajgelbaum, Pablo, et al, The US-China Trade War and Global Reallocations, No.
w29562, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021.
32 Davin Chor and Bingjing Li, Illuminating the Effects of the US-China Tariff War on China’s
Economy, No. w29349, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021.
33 Samantha Vortherms and Jiakun Jack Zhang, “Political Risk and Firm Exit: Evidence from
the U.S.-China Trade War,” Available at SSRN 3916186 (2021).
34 Gerry Shih, “China Chops Tariffs on Pork as Soaring Prices Make It Tougher to Bring Home
the Bacon,” Washington Post, December 23, 2019.
35 Jiakun Jack Zhang and Samantha Vortherms, “U.S. Tariffs On Chinese Goods Didn’t Bring
Companies Back to the U.S., New Research Finds,” The Washington Post’s The Monkey Cage,
September 22, 2021.
36 Jaikun Jack Zhang, Rigao Liu, and Samantha Vortherms, “In the Middle: American
Multinationals in China and Trade War Politics,” 2022.
37 Scott Kennedy and Shining Tan, “Decoupling Between Washington and Western
Industry,” CSIS, June 10, 2020. https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/
decoupling-between-washington-and-western-industry
38 AmCham Shanghai, “AmCham Shanghai Releases 2021 China Business Report,” AmCham
Shanghai, September 23, 2021.
39 Lydia DePhillis, “How Trump’s Trade War is Making Lobbyists Rich and Slamming Small
Businesses,” ProPublica, January 6, 2020.
40 Lindsay Dolan, Robert Kubinec, Daniel Nielson, and Jiakun J. Zhang, “A Field Experiment
on Business Opposition to the U.S.-China Trade War,” 2022.
41 Schmidt Futures, “Economic Interdependence and Supply Chain Complexities,” U.S.-China
Future Briefing Book, March 2021, https://www.ypfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/
USCF-Briefing-Book.pdf

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Section II

The Decline of Engagement

and the Impacts of U.S.-China
Competition
From President Nixon’s outreach to China in the 1970s to the Obama ad-
ministration, U.S. policy predominantly favored engagement with Beijing
in the belief that sustained ties would moderate China’s behavior over time.
However, with the Trump administration’s elevation of “great power competi-
tion” and President Xi Jinping’s increasing assertiveness and authoritarianism,
many policymakers in Washington now identify Beijing as a strategic com-
petitor for the foreseeable future.
This profound rethinking towards China raises a number of important
questions about the future of U.S.-China relations and the wider interna-
tional order. What explains this shift in views? Does competition mean there
is no room for cooperation? What kinds of impacts will this have on issues
where the United States and China share mutual interests, such as pandemic
response? Can China’s social and political system compete with the attractive-
ness of American soft power?

This chapter explores these issues and more,

featuring essays from the following fellows:
David J. Bulman, “‘Common Prosperity’ and China’s State Capitalist
Welfare State: Implications for U.S. Policy”
Dimitar Gueorguiev, “Understanding Hawkishness in Chinese Public
Opinion”
David M. McCourt, “Knowing the PRC: America’s China Watchers be-
tween Engagement and Strategic Competition”
Deborah Seligsohn, “The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the
U.S.-China Health Relationship”

99
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

“Common Prosperity” and

China’s State Capitalist
Welfare State: Implications
for U.S. Policy
David J. Bulman is the Jill McGovern and Steven Muller Assistant
Professor of China Studies and International Affairs and U.S. Director of
the Pacific Community Initiative at the School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 David J. Bulman

Abstract
China and the United States will increasingly compete over socioeconomic
models, with major implications for the development of world order in the 21st
century. An underappreciated aspect of this competition revolves around the
ways that economic models ensure suitable levels of equality as well as growth.
The Communist Party of China (CPC) has indicated its intentions to develop
its own approach to the public financing of a welfare state. Specifically, the
CPC has advocated a common prosperity agenda based on redistribution to
address deep-rooted challenges of inequality, financed by a stronger state sec-
tor that contributes more to transfers and redistribution, creating a “state capi-
talist welfare state.” If successful, this model could help put China on a path
towards sustainable economic growth. The CPC believes that this version of
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” will resonate abroad and improve
China’s soft power. If successful, this policy direction has major implications
for the Chinese economy as well as the attractiveness of the China model. This
chapter discusses China’s vision, current implementation, and related implica-
tions for U.S. policy.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Do not make policy based on assumptions of China’s economic failure.
Demography is not destiny, and U.S. policy should not be based on an
assumption of future U.S. dominance.

● Pressuring market reform in China via bilateral trade and investment

policy will become increasingly ineffective. Multilateral trade
inducements have proved more effective in the past. If the United States
seeks to shape Chinese economic reform and engage fairly with China
in the global trading system, it should engage with partners on WTO
reform and negotiate entry into CPTPP.

● The State Department should take China’s soft power challenge seriously
and seek to better understand public opinion abroad. Do not assume U.S.
soft power superiority.

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 “Common Prosperity” and China’s State Capitalist Welfare State

● The United States should continue to use the DFC and USAID to
compete with BRI, but propaganda to undermine China’s investments
is ineffective. Instead, the United State should promote its own shared
prosperity language abroad. The United States has a more equitable
economic model than China does today, and rather than opposing
China, working together with China, especially through international
organizations, allows the United States to highlight confidence in its
economic model advantages.

● U.S. policymakers should not assume continued domestic support for

policies perceived as furthering decoupling or economic containment
of China. These policies are economically costly and difficult to reverse
when public opinion shifts.

● The United States should fund further public education on China,

including language and area studies. Congress should provide additional
funding to the Department of Education’s Title VI and Fulbright-Hays
programs, and the Biden administration should revive the Fulbright-
China program.

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 David J. Bulman

Introduction
Since the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China (CPC) in October 2020, the CPC and General Secretary Xi
Jinping have increasingly emphasized “common prosperity” (共同富裕). In
2021, “common prosperity” became a core political slogan, with Xi using the
term in his speeches at least 65 times.1 According to Xi, common prosperity
seeks to address inequality: “We must not allow the gap between the rich and
the poor to grow wider, the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer,
and an insurmountable gap between the rich and the poor must not appear.”2
To do so, the common prosperity agenda calls for using taxes and fiscal trans-
fers to support low income populations, expanding the middle class through
salary increases, tax deductions for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs),
reforming the household registration system, training new skilled workers,
improving social protection and education, and cracking down on “illegal”
high incomes.3
Yet concrete policies to achieve common prosperity goals remain vague, al-
lowing for wide variance in external interpretation of the CPC’s actual ambi-
tions. Economically, China in recent years has experienced a strengthening
of the state sector, expansive industrial policies, and a freezing or reversal of
many market reforms. Politically, the CPC has centralized power, taken over
government functions, and become increasingly repressive. Understandably,
then, many observers interpret “common prosperity” as another mechanism
for CPC control over the economy, particularly the private sector, pointing
to the recent regulatory anti-trust crackdown on large technology companies
and the promotion of “tertiary distribution” (第三次分配), a euphemism for
semi-coerced private sector charitable donations.4 This interpretation sees the
redistributive aspects of common prosperity as mere rhetoric, perhaps justi-
fiably given China’s persistently high levels of multi-dimensional and multi-
scalar inequality.
The interpretation of common prosperity through the lenses of party con-
trol and private sector suppression has been prominent in Washington, DC,
policy-making circles. Over the past year, in nearly two dozen formal inter-
views and informal discussions with Biden and Trump administration of-
ficials at the State Department, National Security Council, Department of
Defense, and Department of Commerce, not a single official took seriously

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 “Common Prosperity” and China’s State Capitalist Welfare State

the possibility that “common prosperity” would effectively achieve China’s

stated economic redistributive goals. Policy planning documents, includ-
ing but not limited to the Biden administration’s Interim National Security
Strategy5 and the Trump State Department’s “The Elements of the China
Challenge,”6 similarly do not take seriously Xi’s redistributive socialist rheto-
ric. Instead, these officials and these planning documents see common pros-
perity through the same prisms of Xi’s centralization of party power and ideo-
logical straitjacketing.
These interpretations may well be correct—indeed, CPC rhetoric fre-
quently serves political and propaganda purposes—but this paper argues
that it is important to take the CPC’s own language seriously and consider
the consequences if the common prosperity agenda achieves its stated goals.
Common prosperity is the CPC solution to the “principal contradiction”
in modern China between “unbalanced and inadequate development and
the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.” 7 It is a long-term economic
project that seeks to address persistent and deep-rooted economic challenges
with inequality and domestic imbalances in order to enable China to become
a high-income economy. It is also a project that requires significant increases
in public expenditure, and the CPC has made clear over the past several years,
prior to the recent “common prosperity” propaganda push, that it intends to
fund increased social expenditure, social insurance, and income redistribu-
tion, not through a modern taxation system, but through state-owned enter-
prise (SOE) share transfers and dividends. The use of state asset ownership
in a predominantly market economy to develop a non-tax-based redistribu-
tive welfare system—what this paper calls a “state capitalist welfare state”
(SCWS)—has important implications for China’s future economic develop-
ment. It necessitates a larger and more profitable state sector, helping to ex-
plain the trajectory of SOE reforms, but also makes China’s future growth
trajectory more sustainable.
Common prosperity and SCWS also have important implications for the
global attractiveness of the “China model” and thus U.S.-China competition.
Since Xi’s 19th Party Congress speech there has been more explicit CPC at-
tention to developing and exporting a “China solution” (中国方案). As the
theorist Jiang Shigong notes, having adopted Western lessons, Xi’s CPC is
now seeking to define an alternative socialism with “Chinese characteristics”

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whose export can serve as a global public good.8 A key part of this global influ-
ence agenda is promoting CPC efforts to “build a socialism that is superior
to capitalism” (建设对资本主义具有优越性的社会主义).9 Successful
SCWS development would make China more attractive, not only to develop-
ing economies, but also to middle- and even high-income economies strug-
gling with similar questions related to the efficiency-equality tradeoff.
Implementing the common prosperity agenda remains difficult and un-
certain, and as discussed in the conclusion, common prosperity may prove to
be no more than a tactical propaganda campaign. Yet more progress has been
made at addressing poverty and inequality through the use of state assets than
has been broadly appreciated. By interpreting “common prosperity” only from
the perspective of party dominance, U.S. policymakers risk underestimating
the possibility that the emerging SCWS system could bolster China’s eco-
nomic resilience while also setting China up as a true soft power competitor.
Taking these developments seriously would necessitate a different balance of
global hard and soft power investments by the United States.

Common Prosperity’s Economic Rationale

Multi-dimensional inequality increasingly undermines China’s economic
prospects, and common prosperity can be interpreted as a response to this
challenge. After four decades of nearly double-digit economic growth, China
has become an upper middle income country with the world’s second larg-
est economy. Yet structural and demographic changes have led to decreasing
returns to capital and slower economic growth while exacerbating inequal-
ity and pressuring fragmented and underfunded social security and welfare
systems. China’s high levels of inequality have increasingly become a barrier
to future growth. On the one hand, inequality and persistent poverty under-
mine human capital development and thus prevent the work force productiv-
ity gains that become increasingly essential as China’s population ages and the
workforce shrinks. Additionally, inequality undermines domestic consump-
tion and rebalancing, forcing China to continue to rely on debt-financed in-
vestment with decreasing returns. In this sense, inequality-related challenges
may undermine party legitimacy even if they do not cause social unrest as
often perceived.10 In publicly explaining the common prosperity agenda, Xi

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himself has argued that the Soviet Union’s collapse was due to its lack of atten-
tion to the people.11
In terms of human capital development, health and education shortcom-
ings for rural and migrant youth—driven by broader regional and urban-rural
income inequality—threaten to undermine the productivity of China’s future
workforce. Nearly 90 percent of the rural labor force lacks a high school educa-
tion; rural children suffer disproportionately from anemia (25 percent of rural
youth) and intestinal worms (40 percent of rural youth); and half of all rural
infants are cognitively delayed and thus unlikely to reach an adult IQ of 90.12
Based on global comparisons of educational attainment, Hongbin Li and co-
authors estimate that China’s rural/migrant education gap will push China’s
annual GDP growth down to a maximum of 3 percent, and likely much low-
er.13 Improving rural and migrant health and education outcomes to address
this deep challenge to future growth requires considerable additional public
financing and fiscal transfer mechanisms. The poverty alleviation push under
Xi should be seen in this context, as should the more recent focus on rural
revitalization. Although in the 1980s and 1990s, China relied on a “trickle-
down regional economic development strategy,” since 2013 China’s “precision
poverty alleviation” (精準扶貧) strategy targeting poor households rather
than poor villages has increasingly relied on targeted interventions financed
by fiscal transfers.14
Common prosperity also seeks to address China’s imbalanced economy to
enable domestic demand to become a sustainable source of growth. China’s
consumption share of GDP remains only 54 percent in 2020, and the CPC
has raised “rebalancing” concerns since at least Wen Jiabao’s “Four ‘Uns’”
speech in 2007.15 Although the economy has still grown rapidly over the past
15 years, productivity has shrunk and become a drag on growth over this pe-
riod; growth itself has only been sustained by high levels of debt-fueled in-
vestment which the CPC acknowledges are unsustainable. But inequality
with minimal redistribution undermines efforts to rebalance the economy
towards consumption. Population aging adds to this difficulty, as the current
pension system cannot support high levels of retiree consumption, a challenge
that will become more problematic as China’s old-age to working-age popula-
tion ratio rises from 18.5 percent in 2020 to 58.3 percent in 2060, exceeding
OECD levels.16

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China’s high levels of inequality and aging are extreme, but today’s high in-
come countries all faced similar pressures to address these two trends through
greater public expenditure and redistribution, even if the degree to which they
did so differed. No resource-scarce country with such high levels of inequality
has ever made the transition to high income.17 Economic growth alone can-
not solve current entrenched inequality in China; instead, the state will have
to play a greater role through growing expenditure. On average, as a share of
GDP, OECD countries spend 2.6 times more on health, 1.4 times more on
education, 1.9 times more on social protection, and 1.4 times more on general
public services; a combined 15 percent of GDP more on these four catego-
ries.18 Yet despite assertions of a “socialist” market economy, China’s overall
public financial system remains regressive on net.
The CPC recognizes the challenges this poses for China’s high income
transition and the need for a greater state role. Overall, the past two decades
have seen a remarkable increase in social expenditure. Despite attention to
state-financed R&D and growing defense spending, these budgetary catego-
ries have stayed constant or declined as a share of total expenditure.19 Rather, a
growing share of expenditure has been taken by social expenditure. According
to IMF data, functional government spending on education, health, housing
and community amenities, and social protection rose from 5 percent of GDP
in 2005 to 17 percent in 2018.20 Poverty alleviation funds from the central
budget skyrocketed, doubling between 2012 and 2018 and reached 146 bil-
lion RMB (20.6 billion USD) in 2020. On the surface, on the back of this
growing expenditure and assistance, China in the Xi Jinping era has success-
fully addressed many challenges related to demographics and distribution.
The Gini coefficient has peaked, extreme poverty by the CPC’s own definition
has been eradicated, rural-urban gaps have shrunk, and wage-based inequality
has declined.21
But the common prosperity agenda recognizes that considerably more so-
cial expenditure is necessary to achieve China’s economic goals. Despite peak-
ing, inequality remains persistently high across multiple dimensions. And de-
spite assertions that China eliminated poverty in 2020, the CPC continues to
focus on China’s poor; Premier Li Keqiang famously noted that 600 million
Chinese continue to live on less than 1000 RMB per month. The common
prosperity agenda, focused on increased taxes and fiscal transfers to support

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low income populations and improving social protection and education, re-
quires significantly greater fiscal expenditure.
Social security provides the starkest example. China’s existing pension sys-
tem does little to address old-age poverty and actually exacerbates inequality.
At a simplified level, two components comprise the public pension system:
employment-based pension systems for urban formal workers and a social
pension system for rural and informal urban residents. The urban employ-
ment-based pension system, covering less than 30 percent of the current work-
ing-age population, is relatively generous but increasingly underfunded; the
social pension system has expanded rapidly over the past decade, but remains
extremely limited in terms of benefits. This dual approach leads to consider-
able inequality given that social pension annual benefits are only ~2 percent
of GDP per capita, 25 times lower than public unit pensions at 50 percent of
GDP per capita. And employment-based pensions themselves are highly re-
gressive, with bottom quartile recipients receiving only 2 percent of those in
the top quartile.22
The multi-pronged pension system that China has developed and im-
plemented is laudable in terms of its rapid expansion of coverage, but the
generosity of benefits remains extremely low for rural and informal urban
residents, and the current system is already financially unsustainable. Even
without increasing benefits, population aging will drive the system to insol-
vency. If China hopes to increase social pension generosity, this insolvency
will come much sooner. Even with no increase in generosity, population
aging will result in spending increase from under 4 percent of GDP to over
10 percent of GDP from 2015-2050. 23 And contributions will only reach
2.8 percent of GDP, leaving a gap of 7.3 percent of GDP. 24 A widely dis-
cussed 2019 report released by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and
the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security’s National Council
for Social Security Fund forecast that the pension balance would become
negative by 2028, and reserves would dry up by 2035, with payment short-
falls accumulating to 11 trillion RMB by 2050. 25 Today, pension benefits al-
ready exceed revenues in many provinces. And these shortfalls refer only to
the formal urban system. All of these estimates assume that social pension
expenditure remains miniscule. Nearly 40 percent of the working age pop-
ulation contributes to the social pension contributory system, with small

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government contributions, but the low generosity leads to low overall expen-
diture (0.3 percent of GDP in 2014). Raising social pension benefits to just
10 percent that of urban workers (from 2 percent today) would result in an
additional 3 percentage point of GDP gap in 2050; equalization of benefits
would yield a 41 percentage point gap.
The common prosperity agenda explicitly seeks to address the shortcom-
ings of China’s existing social security system. In Xi’s words, China “still
needs to attach great importance to and make practical improvements on
the weak links of the system, as the principal contradiction in Chinese so-
ciety has evolved…Social security is the most imminent and realistic issue
the people care about.” 26 In February 2021, Xi announced a far-reaching—
if vague—reform plan to broaden the range and strengthen the benefits of
the system, arguing that doing so was imperative for state security (是治国
安邦的大问题). 27 Although the reform plan was vague, it made clear that
system generosity and reach both had to expand, necessitating considerably
more public financing.
Pensions are just one piece of the common prosperity agenda, albeit one
of the most expensive and consequential. Health, education, housing, and
targeted poverty funds are all included in common prosperity rhetoric,
and all require significant increases in state expenditure that the state has
increasingly committed itself—rhetorically at least—to financing. China
hopes to avoid the fate of other communist countries that experienced eco-
nomic stagnation and service quality deterioration following periods of in-
creasing the generosity of social guarantees. 28 But if the CPC truly envisions
tackling inequality and redistribution by reaching OECD-level fiscal expen-
diture norms, this will require over 15 percent of GDP in additional annual
fiscal expenditure. 29

Financing Common Prosperity: The Emerging

State Capitalist Welfare State
How will China finance this ambitious common prosperity agenda? It has
become increasingly clear that one way the CPC intends to achieve this goal
is by funding social expenditure and income redistribution not through a
modern taxation system, but through SOE profits via share transfers and

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dividends. The use of state asset ownership in a predominantly market econ-

omy to develop a non-tax-based redistributive welfare system—a “state capi-
talist welfare state” (SCWS)—has important implications.
Until relatively recently, China appeared to follow the playbook of other
successful high income economies by expanding broad-based taxation to
enable higher levels of social expenditure. As Zhu Rongji pushed through
massive SOE restructuring in the late 1990s, a basic welfare system emerged.
SOE restructuring paved the way for WTO entrance and a private-sector-
led economy. By the mid-2000s, private sector entry and creative destruc-
tion drove economic growth. A modern taxation system based on a value-
added tax (VAT), corporate income tax, and, to a lesser extent, progressive
personal income tax, financed rapidly expanding social, health, and educa-
tion expenditure. With regard to social security, international organiza-
tions promoted common global frameworks for social security development
through technical assistance, policy dialogues, and recommendations, many
of which China adopted.30
But SCWS as envisioned by the CPC marks an end to that convergence
and a return to an earlier model of SOE-based public finance. Yet this is not
the danwei-based iron rice bowl, but rather a more sophisticated and poten-
tially sustainable SOE-based public finance 2.0. China’s tax-based revenue has
already shrunk significantly in relative terms—from over 93 percent of rev-
enue in 2001 to less than 83 percent in 2019—while social expenditure con-
tinues to rise.31 The CPC could have instead chosen to have a more progres-
sive income tax-based fiscal system to be more in line with advanced economy
trends, but China seems unlikely to move towards OECD levels of personal
income taxation.32
Instead, China has made clear its intentions to finance redistribution
through state asset transfers rather than broad-based taxation. The basic idea
is to boost SOE assets and profits and transfer these profits to state coffers. The
system itself is in part designed on James Meade’s idea of “social dividends.”33
The system also has clear echoes in the Singaporean model. Non-tax rev-
enue dependence for social welfare provision will depend on enhanced SOE
strength and profitability, and SCWS thus has two key and inseparable com-
ponents: SOE revitalization and SOE profit transfers.

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Revitalization and evolution of state capital

SCWS requires profitable state-owned enterprises. It is common to hear that
SOE reforms have reversed under Xi as the state has advanced while the pri-
vate sector retreats (国进民退). Although partially true, this is an overly sim-
plistic interpretation. Rather, SOE reform has taken three broad directions
under Xi: 1) continued removal of purely state-controlled enterprises from
competitive industries along with efforts to strengthen the private sector in
these industries; 2) maintaining—and expanding—state ownership of strate-
gic and public-focused industries; and 3) increasing state investments in the
private sector as a tool of industrial policy and to bolster state profits, which
consequently obfuscates the private/state distinction.
The CPC has sought to exert heightened oversight and control over the
private sector in recent years, and, as discussed above, common prosperity is
often interpreted in these terms. Yet despite greater oversight and central con-
trol, the private sector continues to expand faster than the state sector and
continues to drive China’s investment, employment, growth, and exports.34
The number of SOEs in competitive sectors has continued to shrink, albeit at
a reduced pace. Premier Li Keqiang has personally led a campaign to reduce
red tape for private sector firms, and central regulators and the PBOC have
attempted to channel preferential tax and lending policies towards the pri-
vate sector to spur growth. Perhaps ironically, part of the turn to state-asset-
dependent financing modalities for common prosperity have arisen because
of efforts to cut private sector corporate income and labor taxes, which has
necessitated finding new revenue sources.
Yet two countervailing trends show that in other ways, the state sector has
indeed advanced. First, many sectors have been deemed strategic or public,
with SOEs expected to dominate these sectors and act as implementers of gov-
ernment policy. With little consistency over time, policy uncertainty has risen
over what constitutes a strategic or public sector. The most recent example
may be commercial housing. With Xi’s repeated assertion that “houses are for
living in, not for speculation,” along with the Evergrande debacle and broader
property sector corrections, SOE developers have become key players by tak-
ing over debt-laden but still viable commercial projects. State developers will
likely face pressure to build low-income affordable housing.35 SOEs will play
a stabilizing role in real estate markets, guaranteeing state profits while also

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ensuring that people have access to housing.36 This is a clear example of the
state advancing at the expense of the private sector, with common prosperity
goals and stability in mind.
The final SOE evolution under Xi relates to state investments. State capi-
tal has expanded far beyond majority purely state-owned firms: the “investor
state” has risen.37 When “mixed ownership” reforms were touted in 2013, they
were seen as a way to reinvigorate SOEs with private sector stakes and dyna-
mism. But actual implementation has more frequently meant state investments
in private firms. At times, this serves as a form of industrial policy, as with
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) investments
in nearly 5000 emerging “little giants” since 2019.38 But another key aspect is
increasing returns for state capital investment bodies, which have proliferated.
This trend accelerated during the pandemic-related economic downturn, with
floundering private sector firms seeking state bailouts/investments.
In sum then, SOE evolution seeks to combine private sector dynamism
with state control and state profitability. This is a tall order, and, as discussed
below, even if implemented “successfully” would still lead to considerable ef-
ficiency losses as compared to a market reform scenario. But the strategy has
succeeded in giving the state new levers of policy control as well providing a
new source of revenue: in 2021, SOE profits were higher than private sector
profits for the first time since 2008.

SOE asset transfers: the case of social security funds

Reform-era China has a relatively long—if until recently underwhelming—his-
tory of efforts to transfer state assets to support the public budget, social security
funds in particular. Efforts began in earnest in 2001 with measures to trans-
fer 10 percent of SOE initial public offering proceeds to the National Social
Security Fund.39 In 2007, central SOEs, which had been exempt from paying
dividends previously, began paying 10 percent dividends in profitable industries,
though strategic sector SOEs remained exempt. In 2011, top dividend rates in-
creased to 15 percent, a rate well below that facing most global SOEs.
Under Xi, asset and profit transfer efforts have become more ambitious,
particularly with regard to social security financing, an area with great financ-
ing needs. The Office of the National Working Commission on Aging esti-
mates that elderly care will consume 26 percent of GDP by 2050, up from 7

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percent in 2015.40 Any increase in social pension generosity—as envisioned by

common prosperity—will drive these figures considerably higher. But urban
employment pensions cannot simply be funded from greater contributions, as
contribution rates (at 28 percent of wages on average) are already well above
advanced (20 percent) and emerging market economy (15 percent) averages.
The system already has high minimum thresholds, and there is already consid-
erable evasion by small companies and those with high turnover.41 And gradu-
ally raising retirement ages, as mooted in 2021, will simply be offset by rising
life expectancies, especially at the envisioned pace of change.
Consequently, in addition to expanding individual contributions, China
plans to reform its pension system by increasing share transfers from SOEs
to allow local and central governments access to SOE dividends to shore up
social security funds. The most recent and ambitious step is transferring state-
owned assets directly to social security funds. The policy began in Shandong
in 2015 with 18 companies picked to transfer 30 percent of their total capital
to the newly created provincial social security council (山东省社会保障基
金理事会). Later more companies were added, but the transfer share was re-
duced to 10 percent.
Following Shandong, in November 2017 the State Council issued the
“Implementation Plan for the Transfer of Some State-owned Assets to Firm
up Social Security Funds” (划转部分国有资本充实社保基金实施方案).
The Ministry of Finance in 2019 followed up with more specifics on transfer-
ring SOE shares to social security funds, pressuring reforms that had lagged
after the initial 2017 announcement. The transfer of financial and non-finan-
cial SOE shares proceeded rapidly after mid-2019. In 2019 alone, over 1 tril-
lion RMB of SOE shares were transferred to the fund.42 By January 2021, the
Ministry of Finance announced completion of the program, with 10 percent
of all 93 of the largest state owned companies transferred to the national pen-
sion fund, worth 1.7 trillion RMB.
Yet this 1.7 trillion RMB transfer only covers central firms, and is not
enough to fill expected pension gaps, which are themselves concentrated at
the sub-national level given China’s highly decentralized fiscal system. The
State Council made clear that provincial and sub-provincial SOEs should also
transfer shares. Implementation varies: although SOE share transfer were in-
tended to be completed by 2021 in all provinces, over half of China’s provinces

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have yet to set up a social security council and transfer shares.43 But assum-
ing these efforts continue, these transfers could make a considerable dent in
expected pension shortfalls. There are several unknowns regarding dividend
payout ratios (currently at 15 percent, much less than the 50-60 percent level
of US industrial firms)44; the share of assets transferred to social security funds
(currently 10 percent but originally envisioned at 30 percent); and future SOE
profits (currently 5 percent of GDP and rising). Reasonable estimates could
yield between 0.3 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP in additional revenue for
social security funds each year.
More broadly, increasing SOE profits and dividend payout ratios could
yield an additional 2-3 percent of GDP in revenue for general government
budgets across administrative levels, held in related State Capital Management
Budgets (国有资本经营预算). These funds would not be earmarked for any
specific purpose, but could help finance other aspects of the common prosper-
ity agenda.

Implications for U.S. Policy

Implementing the common prosperity and SCWS agenda is far from cer-
tain.45 Challenges with firm capture, central-local relations, and elite politics
could all conspire to make the common prosperity reality far less than the
vision. Indeed, the reason that common prosperity in 2021 focused on anti-
trust regulation and tertiary distribution may be that these were low-hang-
ing fruits politically. But assuming that China successfully implements this
agenda, what are the implications? Below, I focus on three implications for
U.S. policy:

1. Economic competition. Common prosperity and SCWS imply a less

dynamic but potentially more sustainable growth trajectory, but also
militate against further market reforms. By boosting domestic demand
and enabling dual circulation and self-reliance, common prosperity and
SCWS make China more robust to external economic pressure.

2. Global soft power. Common prosperity and SCWS imply a potentially

workable version of market socialism that the CPC believes would

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resonate globally, boosting China’s soft power. Given growing global

discontent with inequality and capitalism, the CPC may not be
mistaken, despite soft power shortcomings stemming from China’s
authoritarianism.

3. Domestic support for China policy. The Beltway consensus spurring more
combative or “decoupling”-type policies towards China, particularly
in the economic realm, is facilitated by growing anti-China sentiment
among the American public. Common prosperity and SCWS could
change American perceptions of China and reduce support for current
policy directions.

Implications for U.S.-China Economic Competition

Current DC perceptions of China’s economic prospects appear to fluctuate
between two extremes. One increasingly common view sees China’s cur-
rent demographic and debt challenges as insurmountable. From this vantage
point, concerns about competition with China are either overblown, or China
is a “peaking power” that is likely to become increasingly externally aggres-
sive before its relative power declines.46 In contrast, other U.S. policies cor-
respond with a view of China as an emerging techno-industrial superpower
whose state interventions will enable cutting-edge innovation and supply
chain dominance. From this latter perspective, the United States should seek
to contain China or decouple from China before it is too late.
Yet successfully implemented SCWS is likely to chart a middle path for
the Chinese economy. SCWS would help China overcome its demographic
and debt challenges, boosting domestic demand through redistribution and
improving human capital through increased education and health expendi-
tures. This will help China escape the middle income trap. It will also reduce
external dependence and make China more self-sufficient. China’s economy
would continue to grow, and per capita income would continue to converge.
But SCWS would also coincide with slowing growth in China. Beyond
short-term pandemic effects, China’s current economic slowdown can be arith-
metically explained by two factors: declining (total factor) productivity growth,
and the reversal of China’s demographic dividend. The key determinant of

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p­ roductivity decline has been capital misallocation that prevents the exit of un-
derperforming firms and the entry of productive firms.47 SCWS will not solve
this problem, and could exacerbate it. The extent of efficiency costs will depend
on broader SOE reforms. Moving towards a state investment system modeled
on Singapore’s Temasek would enable more efficiency than keeping SOEs dom-
inant in production itself. The bigger question is China’s far more numerous
local SOEs, many of which operate un-competitively within competitive, non-
strategic sectors; allowing these firms to close would boost overall productivity
and allow new entrants. SCWS would not depend on profits from these loss-
making firms and thus would not necessarily impact local government willing-
ness to shut them, yet as state capital bails out large state- and private-sector
local firms, closing these firms may become even more difficult.
In terms of overall growth, then, China, with a shrinking population and
continued support for “zombie” firms would experience slowing yet positive
growth. Although China has a market-based economy and is adapting its state
sector to fit—China is not becoming a command economy again—prospects
for further market reform and privatization are distant. China will double
down on industrial policy and state guidance. Because of the boost to domes-
tic demand and continued state control over key “strategic” sectors, as well as
continued industrial policy to shore up key technology sectors, China will be
more self-reliant and less susceptible to external pressure in the form of either
carrots or sticks. If SCWS succeeds, then, China would have slower growth
that is more balanced both internally and externally.
These growth trends have implications for U.S. policy. First, in contrast to
many existing discussions, U.S. policymakers should not design policies based
on assumptions of China’s economic failure. Demography is not destiny,
and U.S. policy should not be based on an assumption of future dominance.
Similarly, however, U.S. policymakers should not assume that China will rap-
idly become the world’s largest economy. Second, pressuring market reform in
China will become increasingly ineffective. Recent bilateral sticks, most no-
tably the trade war initiated in 2018, have proven ineffective, but multilateral
trade inducements have provided effective carrots for China’s reform in the
past. If the US seeks to shape Chinese economic reform and engage fairly with
China in the global trading system, the windows for WTO reform and join-
ing CPTPP to incentivize change in China are closing.

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Implications for China’s Global Leadership and Soft Power

In the context of growing global discontent with inequality and capitalism,
SCWS—and the CPC’s explicit intentions to export this emerging brand
of market socialism—also has implications for U.S.-China soft power and
ideological competition. The development of a uniquely Chinese sustainable
welfare state will help shape the global attractiveness of a “China Model.”
Yet today, this aspect of global competition gets short shrift. Dominant per-
spectives in U.S. policymaking communities on the ideological nature of
U.S.-China ideological competition focus on political system competition.
According to one view, China does not pose an ideological challenge given
that China’s authoritarian/totalitarian state capitalism has few adherents.48
An alternative view takes the authoritarian challenge seriously, particularly
given the end of the “third wave of democratization” that has coincided with
China’s rise.49 Edel and Shullman argue that the CCP is exporting authori-
tarianism “not through seminars on Marxist ideology…but through a broad
range of antidemocratic activities.”50
A contrasting view of the ideological competition from an economic per-
spective acknowledges that China has now begun to challenge U.S. domi-
nance as a potential socioeconomic system competitor, but sees this com-
petition through the lens of state control and technological capability, not
through the lens of soft power attractiveness. The threat focuses on industrial
policy and state ownership in a market economy, as well as China’s efforts
to export this model through global financing as part of the Belt and Road
Initiative. But there is a tendency to overstate the potential influence of the
“China model” when analyzed through these prisms of techno-industrial
policy and development finance. Although techno-industrial policy will help
shape U.S.-China competition, China’s approach is neither successful enough
nor original enough to pose a broader threat to the liberal economic order.
By focusing on the competitive challenge posed by China’s hard power and
not acknowledging the deeper goals—and potential socioeconomic effective-
ness—of Xi’s redistributive push, U.S. policymakers may underestimate the
soft power challenge posed by China’s rise. This economic ideology challenge
should be seen through the lens of rising global discontent with capitalism as
well as through China’s explicit promotion efforts. In terms of China’s promo-
tion efforts, SCWS is a key element of the “China Solution” that the CPC has

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promoted since the 19th Party Congress, and whose export the CPC believes
can serve as a global public good.51 The idea of funding redistribution through
SOE shares has precursors in the West and in Singapore, and China’s efforts
are based on Western social science ideas, but the CPC believes its ideas will
resonate abroad.
China’s redistributive turn would likely find a receptive audience, coming
at a time when global perceptions of capitalism have never been so negative.
One Edelman survey in 28 countries finds that 56 percent of respondents
think capitalism as it exists today does more harm than good in the world,
and only 18 percent say the “system is working for me.”52 The world is increas-
ingly favorable towards socialist ideas; most country publics see redistributive
socialism as beneficial, even when they negatively associate socialism with as-
pects of social and political totalitarianism.53
Comparing large-scale rigorous time-series polling data in Latin America
(AmericasBarometer), Africa (Afrobarometer), and Asia (Asian Barometer)
yields several interesting and cross-regionally-consistent findings related to
the potential attractiveness of “Chinese socialism.”54 As has widely been re-
ported, publics in most countries hold increasingly “unfavorable” opinions of
China, and much of this low opinion arises due to perceptions of China’s au-
thoritarianism. However, publics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America already
generally perceive Chinese influence as equal or more positive than U.S. in-
fluence. And today, although China is still not the top external “model” for
development, it comes second after the United States and has been closing the
gap. For instance, in the latest Afrobarometer (2019/2020), the China model
(23 percent) is second after the United States (32 percent).55 In other words,
China is already more attractive than often perceived, despite China remain-
ing a relatively non-prosperous and unequal country.
There are also indications in the Barometers surveys that SCWS could
make the China model more attractive. The cross-regional polling data re-
veals both increasing redistributive preferences as well as growing correlations
between these redistributive preferences and support for the China model.
Controlling for individual country effects, all three regions exhibit a con-
sistent trend towards more support for redistribution, unsurprisingly given
the global shift towards pro-socialist attitudes and discontent with inequal-
ity. Moreover, respondents with greater redistributive preferences are already

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more likely to see the China model as desirable, despite China’s high levels
of economic and social inequality. In all three regions, there is a growing as-
sociation between left ideological preferences and support for the “China
model,” which also correlates with trust in China. A decade ago, in Asia at
least, concern with inequality predicted less support for the China model, but
this has reversed across regions, either as a result of discontent with “Western”
capitalism and its effects on inequality, or as a result of perceptions of greater
Chinese success confronting inequality.
In sum, Xi’s aspirations of re-establishing China as a global socialist
model may seem improbable given China’s high levels of inequality, but
left-leaning populations in the developing world already perceive China
favorably. If China successfully implements SCWS and common pros-
perity, China would become even more attractive, not only to developing
economies, but also to middle-income economies struggling with similar
questions related to the efficiency-equality tradeoff. This is much more of
a competitive soft power threat than authoritarianism itself, which detracts
greatly from China’s attractiveness.
In terms of policy recommendations, U.S. policymakers should take
China’s soft power challenge seriously and seek to better understand public
opinion abroad. One reason for the perceived lack of soft power resonance
regarding China may come from U.S. policymakers’ greater familiarity with
elite positions; socioeconomic elites in the developing world, as shown in the
Barometers surveys, tend to have much more negative opinions of China and
more favorable views of the US than general populaces.56
Additionally, U.S. policymakers and diplomats should improve U.S.
messaging abroad and promote America’s own shared prosperity language.
Currently, the State Department competes with China abroad through pro-
paganda efforts that aim to portray BRI and Chinese investment negatively.
This propaganda is ineffective. The United States has an equitable develop-
ment model and provides considerably more global aid than China, and U.S.
policymakers at the State Department and USAID, as well as through rep-
resentation at international organizations, should focus on these American
advantages. Rather than opposing China, working together with China, both
bilateral and through international organizations, allows the US to highlight
confidence in these advantages. This does not preclude highlighting China’s

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human rights violations and CPC authoritarianism. Indeed, the United States
has a major advantage arising from “moral asymmetry.”57 But that advantage is
squandered through inconsistency and conflating China’s positively-perceived
economic engagement abroad with CPC authoritarianism.

Implications for public support for U.S. policy towards China

Among the American public, attitudes towards China have hit unprecedented
lows.58 These negative attitudes give policymakers space to impose more con-
frontational policies on China, especially in the economic sphere; indeed,
conventional wisdom has it that being “soft” on China would be politically
disastrous for either party. Yet SCWS may affect American opinion on China
in unexpected ways, limiting policy choice.
Consistent with the global polling data cited above, inequality in America
has triggered growing discontent and rising support for redistribution across
ideological and party lines. Both liberals and conservatives now agree that in-
equality of income and opportunity have reached levels that undermine the
American economy.59 And American support for socialism has grown, largely
driven by liberal youth, but also among conservatives,60 likely because “social-
ism” now tends to activate ideas of government-led redistribution rather than
government ownership of the means of production.61
But is there any reason to think that this evolving sentiment would af-
fect attitudes towards China and preferences regarding U.S. policy towards
China? To assess how the American public perceives China’s economic system
and whether “socialist/redistributive” developments in China would affect
perceptions of China as a threat, I commissioned a nationally-representative
survey of 1,016 Americans by Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Additionally, to com-
pare preferences between the public and the policymaking community, I ran
an identical survey for alumni of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS). SAIS alumni predominantly work in govern-
ment or private/non-profit/think tank communities connected to interna-
tional affairs, with over 40 percent of 560 respondents having worked (or cur-
rently working) for the U.S. government.62
Analyzing and comparing these two surveys highlights stark differences be-
tween the foreign policy community and the American public, and highlights
ways in which SCWS development in China might make Americans less will-

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ing to support policies based on perceptions of China’s economic threat.63 First,

in terms of how they perceive the Chinese economy, the American public is sig-
nificantly more likely to think of China as a command economy than the for-
eign policy community; and significantly more likely to think China’s growth
has been based on unfair trade, rather than market reforms or globalization.64 In
terms of the perceived threat emanating from China’s economic rise, although
the two samples have no differences in overall favorability towards China, the
foreign policy community is much more likely to see the economic threat in
military terms, while the public is more likely to see the threat in terms of com-
petitiveness and American job loss. Relatedly, the public is much more likely to
see the primary goal of economic interactions with China as American job cre-
ation, whereas the foreign policy community would like to pursue political and
military goals using economic levers. Although the foreign policy community
strongly believes that political reform (democratization) in China would lessen
the threat from China, the public does not, instead expressing concern only
with the overall size of the Chinese economy.
Summarizing these findings, the public sees China as having a command
economy; thinks this leads to unfair trade; and sees the threat from China
as one to economic competitiveness of the United States, but does not worry
about the security risks surrounding economic integration. The foreign policy
community is more knowledgeable about China’s actual economic model but
sees economic interactions through security lenses. The public is less likely
to be concerned about ideology and much more likely to be concerned about
Chinese economic effects on American jobs.
Moving beyond baseline differences, the surveys sought to explore how
perceptions of economic redistribution in China affected the public’s policy
preferences. Controlling for baseline favorability towards China, perceptions
of trade effects, ideology, party, age, race, and gender in order to provide a bet-
ter indication of the pure effect of redistribution perceptions and perspectives,
respondents who (incorrectly) think that China has a more generous safety net
than the United States have lower threat perceptions. Relatedly, respondents
who think China has a command economy are more supportive of contain-
ment policies, while those who think that China’s efforts to share prosperity
helped grow its economy are less likely to support containing China. In other
words, across ideological and demographic lines, perceiving China as having

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a more equal economy and less of a command economy leads to lower threat
perceptions and lower support for confrontational economic policy.
To further explore the potential effects of changes to China’s economic
model, I added experimental cues to each survey. In each survey, one-quarter
of respondents received a cue emphasizing bipartisan consensus on China’s
unfair trade practices (“unfair trade”); one-quarter received a cue emphasiz-
ing bipartisan critiques of China’s human rights practices, including the geno-
cide in Xinjiang (“Xinjiang genocide”); one-quarter received a cue highlight-
ing China’s goals and progress in fighting poverty and inequality (“common
prosperity”); and one-quarter received no cue (“control”). Following these
prompts, respondents were asked about threat perceptions regarding China
and policy preferences.
The results are striking. For the public, receiving the “common prosper-
ity” cue makes respondents considerably (nearly half a standard deviation) less
likely to see China as a threat. The “Xinjiang genocide” cue makes respon-
dents significantly more likely to see China as a threat, though the magnitude
of the effect is smaller. The unfair trade cue has no effect, possibly because this
information is already internalized by respondents. Looking at frame effects
on specific policy preferences, the “common prosperity” frame causes respon-
dents to be less supportive of decoupling and containment. Unexpectedly,
party and ideological leanings do not shape the impact of these frames; in-
stead, Republicans and Democrats both have lower threat perceptions after
hearing about China’s redistributive goals and poverty alleviation (though
their baseline threat perceptions differ significantly). These findings indicate
that perceptions of China’s redistributive socialism trigger lower levels of sup-
port for policies that are perceived to punish China economically, and they
imply that increased knowledge of China’s redistributive goals and common
prosperity agenda would decrease support for many current policies seen as
limiting bilateral economic interaction.
In terms of policy recommendations, it is important that U.S. policymak-
ers not assume continued support for policies that are perceived as attempting
to contain China economically or decouple from China. Today’s conditions
lead to support for these policies, but conditions are likely to change, while
these policies themselves can have more lasting consequences and become dif-
ficult to reverse.

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Additionally, greater public education about China is essential; the United

States should fund language training and study of China. The American pub-
lic is generally not very knowledgeable about China, as seen by the high share
who perceive China as continuing to have a command economy and the fact
that only 47 percent of respondents can identify Xi Jinping as China’s leader
from a list of names. On the one hand, therefore, China’s propaganda efforts
to highlight its common prosperity successes in the United States may be inef-
fective. Yet as China becomes more important globally, it is likely to have more
success touting its model abroad, including in the United States. Even during
the Mao years, CPC propaganda had a major effect on U.S. domestic politics,
where Mao found support among alienated minority groups, feminists, and
idealistic youth.65 And the survey results show that framing has a large in-
fluence on public policy preferences. Baseline knowledge of China, and even
being able to identify Xi Jinping as China’s leader, mitigates the impact of
the experimental cues. The more Americans know about actual conditions in
China, rather than propagandized stories from the CPC or fear-mongering
distortions by U.S. politicians seeking political gain, the more rational public
policy preferences will become.

Conclusions
China and the United States will increasingly compete over socioeconomic
models, with major implications for the development of world order in the
21st century. An underappreciated aspect of this competition revolves around
the ways that economic models ensure suitable levels of public goods provi-
sion, insurance, and equality to enable continued growth. Since the global
financial crisis, Americans—and others around the world—have increasingly
questioned whether a liberal capitalist economic model meets these needs.
In China, the CPC has made a conscious decision to develop its own ap-
proach to the public financing of a welfare state. Specifically, the CPC has
advocated a common prosperity agenda based on redistribution to address
deep-rooted challenges of inequality, poverty, and aging. This agenda will be
in part financed by a stronger state sector that contributes more to transfers
and redistribution. If successful, this model could help put China on a path
towards sustainable economic growth. The CPC believes that this version of

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“­socialism with Chinese characteristics” will resonate abroad and improve

China’s soft power. China’s success in this vision, still far from assured,
would make its economic model a true global competitor. Understanding
China’s vision—and its implementation to date—is thus a pressing research
challenge, as is gaining a better understanding of U.S. policymakers’ percep-
tions and potential responses.
At one level, the United States should welcome China’s development of
a more equitable economic model. But China’s illiberal system poses a deep
challenge to global liberalism and human rights. Ideally, the United States
could demonstrate its own liberal meritocratic capitalism solution to problems
of inequality, but conclusions that “we need to get our own house in order” are
generally unhelpful, even if true.
The analysis presented here points in three general directions for U.S. pol-
icy focused on bilateral economic competition and the role of U.S. pressure;
policy towards developing countries; and the framing of the “China chal-
lenge” domestically. Although specific policies are summarized above, let me
repeat the broad implications in these three areas:

1. The role of economic pressure, carrots, and sticks to achieve market

reforms and fair trade practices in China. The United States should
not make policy based on assumptions of China’s economic failure and
U.S. future dominance. Some argue that the United States should not
pressure market reforms in China because wasteful subsidies and state
intervention actually help limit Chinese economic growth and power.66
This is shortsighted. Instead, there is an urgency to pressure market
reforms now as opposed to waiting until it is too late. SCWS would
make China more self-reliant while also establishing a state-dominated
system at odds with American comparative advantage and free market
preferences. Efforts to make China bear the costs of state intervention
could lead to more viable approaches to state investment, competitive
neutrality, and a more stable global trading system. Pressuring market
reform in China bilaterally will become increasingly ineffective, but
multilateral trade inducements may still work. The United States should
therefore engage with partners on WTO reform and negotiate entry
into CPTPP.

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 David J. Bulman

2. U.S.-China soft power competition in the developing world. U.S. soft

power competition with China, particularly in developing countries, has
increasingly revolved around the economic impact of BRI investments and
foreign aid. U.S. policymakers should take China’s soft power challenge
seriously and seek to better understand public opinion abroad. And at the
UN, and even the World Bank, the United States has ceded ground to
China in terms of developmental and shared prosperity language. By all
means, the United States should use the DFC and USAID to compete
with BRI, but propaganda to undermine China’s investments is ineffective.
Competition over aid and investment makes the United States look
weak and makes aid look transactional. Instead, the United States should
promote our own shared prosperity language abroad. The United States
has a more equitable economic model than China does today, and rather
than opposing China, working together with China, both bilateral and
through international organizations, allows the United States to highlight
confidence in its economic model advantages.

3. Framing China policy domestically. The Cold War pitted communism

versus liberal capitalism, with “communism” equivalent to command
economy socialism combined with totalitarian governance. But in today’s
emerging cold war, markets have already won. American perceptions
of command economy totalitarianism are very negative, but when
confronted with redistributive socialism in China aimed at addressing
poverty and inequality, they become much less supportive of many
current policies towards China. U.S. policymakers should therefore not
assume continued support for policies that are perceived as furthering
“decoupling” or “containment.” Policymakers should also devote greater
effort to public education on China given that framing has a large
influence on public policy preferences.

Acknowledgments
The author gratefully acknowledges the financial and intellectual support
provided by the Wilson Center, and is grateful to Zhuoran Li for research

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assistance and SAIS Development & Alumni Relations for survey assistance.
Data analyzed in this chapter were collected by the Asian Barometer Project,
which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received
major funding support from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, Academia
Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office
(www.asianbarometer.org) is solely responsible for the data distribution. The
author appreciates the assistance in providing data by the institutes and indi-
viduals aforementioned. The views expressed herein are the author’s own.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 Bloomberg News, “Xi Doubles Mentions of ‘Common Prosperity,’ Warning China’s
Rich,” Bloomberg News, August 22, 2021. Accessed on March 15, 2022. https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-22/xi-doubles-mentions-of-common-prosperity-
warning-china-s-rich. For the rise of “common prosperity” headlines in the People’s
Daily, see also David Bandurski, “A History of Common Prosperity,” China Media
Project, August 27, 2021. Accessed on March 15, 2022: https://chinamediaproject.
org/2021/08/27/a-history-of-common-prosperity.
2 习近平 [Xi Jinping], “把握新发展阶段，贯彻新发展理念，构建新发展格局 [Grasp
the New Development Stage, Implement the New Development Concept, Construct the
New Development Structure],” 求是 [Seeking Truth], September 2021. Accessed on March
15, 2022. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-04/30/c_1127390013.htm. As early as
March 2018, Xi defined “common prosperity” as a set of social programs, including childhood
and universal education, a living wage, health insurance, pensions, housing, and assistance for
the disadvantaged. Redistributive elements were added in January 2021. See Minxin Pei, “The
Origins and Implications of Xi Jinping’s ‘Common Prosperity’ Agenda,” China Leadership
Monitor, December 1, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.prcleader.org/pei-4
3 Xi Jinping introduced this agenda most clearly during his August 2021 speech at the 10th
meeting of the Central Finance Commission.
4 See, for example, Li Yuan, “What China Expects From Businesses: Total Surrender,”
New York Times, July 18, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/09/24/business/china-business-memoir.html. Lingling Wei, “Xi Jinping Aims to
Rein in Chinese Capitalism, Hew to Mao’s Socialist Vision,” Wall Street Journal, September
20, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022.

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 David J. Bulman

5 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” The White House,
March 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf
6 Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State, “The Elements of the China
Challenge,” Department of State, November 2020. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.
state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf
7 Xi Jinping. “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All
Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a
New Era.” Speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
October 18, 2017. Accessed March 15, 2022. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/
Xi_ Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.
8 强世功 [Jiang Shigong], “哲学与历史—从党的十九大报告解读’习近平时代’
[Philosophy and History: Interpreting the ‘Xi Jinping Era’ through the 19th Party Congress
Report]”, 开放时代 [Open Times], 1 (2018).
9 习近平 [Xi Jinping], “关于坚持和发展中国特色社会主义的几个问题 [Several Issues
Regarding the Upholding and Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics],” 求
是 [Seeking Truth], March 31, 2019. Accessed March 15, 2022. http://cpc.people.com.cn/
n1/2019/0331/c64094-31005184.html.
10 Martin Whyte, Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive Injustice
in Contemporary China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
11 习近平 [Xi Jinping], “把握新发展阶段，贯彻新发展理念，构建新发展格局 [Grasp the
New Development Stage, Implement the New Development Concept, Construct the New
Development Structure],” 求是 [Seeking Truth], September 2021. Accessed on March 15,
2022. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-04/30/c_1127390013.htm.
12 Scott Rozelle and Natalie Hell, Invisible China: How the Urban-Rural Divide Threatens
China’s Rise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020).
13 Hongbin Li, Prashant Loyalka, Scott Rozelle, and Binzhen Wu, “Human Capital and China’s
Future Growth,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31:1 (2017): 25–47.
14 Camille Boullenois, “Poverty Alleviation in China: The Rise of State-Sponsored Corporate
Paternalism,” China Perspectives, 3 (2020): 47-56.
15 The four “uns” referred to: “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.” See:
International Monetary Fund, “IMF Survey: China’s Difficult Rebalancing Act,” IMF Survey
Online, September 12, 2007. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.imf.org/en/News/
Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/socar0912a
16 Other countries face similar future old-age dependency ratios, but no other country will
experience such a rapid aging of its population over this period; China reaped the benefits
of a demographic dividend for 30 years in the post-Mao era, and it now faces a turbocharged
reversal. See: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World Population Prospects
2019,” United Nations. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://population.un.org/wpp/
Download/Standard/Population/.
17 David Bulman, Maya Eden, and Ha Nguyen, “Transitioning from Low-income Growth to
High-income Growth: Is There a Middle-income Trap?” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy,
22 (2017), 5-28.

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18 Author calculations based on: International Monetary Fund [IMF], “Government

Finance Statistics,” IMF Data. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://data.imf.
org/?sk=a0867067-d23c-4ebc-ad23-d3b015045405
19 National Bureau of Statistics of China [NBS], “National Data: Annual,” National Bureau of
Statistics of China. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.
htm?cn=C01
20 IMF, “Government Finance Statistics”
21 Zhang Junsen, “A Survey on Income Inequality in China,” Journal of Economic Literature,
59:4 (2021): 1191-1239.
22 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2014: Fiscal Policy for Inclusive
Growth (Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2014).
23 Mauricio Soto and Sanjeev Gupta, “Social Security Reform for Sustainability and Equity,”
Chapter 5 in W. Raphael Lam, Mr. Markus Rodlauer, and Mr. Alfred Schipke, Modernizing
China: Investing in Soft Infrastructure (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund,
2017), 143-161.
24 Consequently, the system’s actuarial imbalance (i.e., the present discounted value of benefits
minus contributions) is nearly 125 percent of 2015 GDP. Other researchers find similar
estimates. See, e.g.: Yan Li, and Xiaojing Zhang, “China’s Sovereign Balance Sheet Risks
and Implications for Financial Stability,” in Udaibir S Das, Jonathan Fiechter, and Tao
Sun, eds., China’s Road to Greater Financial Stability: Some Policy Perspective (Washington:
International Monetary Fund, 2013).
25 郑秉文 [Zheng Bingwen], ed., 中国养老金精算报告2019-2050 [China Pension Actuarial
Report 2019-2050] (Beijing: China Labor and Social Security Publishing House, 2019).
26 Xinhua, “Xi Focus: Xi Stresses High-quality, Sustainable Development of Social Security,”
Xinhua, February 27, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2021-02/27/c_139772013.htm
27 Ibid.
28 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, Development, Democracy, and Welfare States.
Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2008).
29 Author calculations based on 2017 data. China’s general government expenditure on
social protection, health, education, and general public services is 16.7 percent of GDP; the
OECD average on these categories is 31.6 percent of GDP. For underlying data see: IMF,
“Government Finance Statistics.”
30 刘冬梅 [Liu Dongmei], “论国际机制对中国社会保障制度与法律改革的影响——以联合
国、国际劳工组织和世界银行的影响为例 [Study on the Impact of International Regimes
on China’s Social Security System and Legal Reform: Taking the Impact of the UN, ILO, and
World Bank As Examples],” 比较法研究 [Journal of Comparative Law], 5 (2011), 22–36
31 NBS, “National Data: Annual.”
32 Personal income tax accounts for 24 percent of total revenue in the OECD, but only 7.5
percent in China. For China data, see: NBS, “National Data: Annual.” For OECD data, see:
OECD, “Tax revenue,” OECD Data. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://data.oecd.org/tax/
tax-revenue.htm.

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33 刘琼芳 [Liu Qiongfang], “社会分红理论与民生财政的内在契合性——基于国企

红利分配的思考 [Inherent Incompatibility of Social Dividend Theory and Finance
Regarding People’s Livelihood—Reflections Based on Dividend Distribution of State-
owned Enterprises]” 福建师大福清分校学报 [Journal of Fuqing Branch of Fujian Normal
University], 39:2 (2021), 196-203.
34 For data through much of 2021 see: Tianlei Huang and Nicholas R. Lardy, “Is the Sky Really
Falling for Private Firms in China?” Peterson Institute for International Economics China
Economic Watch, October 14, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.piie.com/blogs/
china-economic-watch/sky-really-falling-private-firms-china#_ftn1.
35 The Central Economic Work Conference in December 2021 stressed rental housing development
and construction of government-subsidized housing projects. See Wang Ying, “Hopes for Housing
Turnaround In the Air,” China Daily, January 10, 2022. Accessed March 15, 2022. http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/a/202201/10/WS61db71baa310cdd39bc7ff9f_2.html
36 Bloomberg News, “Xi Reshapes China Property Market Paving Way for State Dominance,”
Bloomberg News, January 13, 2022. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2022-01-13/china-s-property-market-is-set-for-state-dominated-age-of-rust
37 Meg Rithmire and Hao Chen, “The Rise of the Investor State: State Capital in the Chinese
Economy,” Studies in Comparative International Development 55:3 (September 2020), 257–277.
38 Bloomberg News, “China’s ‘Little Giants’ Are Its Latest Weapon in the U.S. Tech War,”
Bloomberg News, January 23, 2022. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2022-01-23/china-us-xi-jinping-backs-new-generation-of-startups-in-tech-war.
39 国务院 [State Council], “国务院关于减持国有股筹集社会保障资金管理暂行办法
[Interim Measures of the State Council on the Management of Reducing Held State Shares and
Raising Social Security Funds]” Document No. 22 [2001] of the State Council, June 6, 2001.
40 Xinhua, “Elderly to Take Up One-third of Chinese Population by 2050,” Xinhua, July
20, 2018. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/20/
WS5b51ff41a310796df4df7c78.html.
41 One survey finds that only 27 percent of companies paid their social security contributions
in full. See: Gabriel Wildau and Yizhen Jia, “China Steps Up Social Security Collection As
It Cuts Corporate Taxes,” Financial Times, September 12, 2018. Accessed March 15, 2022.
https://www.ft.com/content/bf3700dc-b582-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe.
42 Tang Ziyi, “China Transfers $157 Billion in SOE Equity to Social Security Fund,” Caixin
Global, December 26, 2019. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.caixinglobal.com/2019-
12-26/china-transfers-157-billion-in-soe-equity-to-social-security-fund-101498354.html
43 The original data for the development of share transfers by province were collected from
public company registration records using Qichacha.com, which lists the companies whose
shares were held by the relevant provincial council, how much was transferred in RMB and
percentage terms, and the date of transfer.
44 See discussion in: Chunlin Zhang, “Effective Discipline with Adequate Autonomy: The
Direction for Further Reform of China’s SOE Dividend Policy,” World Bank Policy Note No.
52254, November 27, 2009.
45 I do not by any means want to downplay implementation difficulties. Indeed, my current
book project analyzes these very difficulties.

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 “Common Prosperity” and China’s State Capitalist Welfare State

46 Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, “China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the
Problem,” Foreign Policy, September 24, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://
foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/. Andrew S. Erickson
and Gabriel B. Collins, “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy,
October 18, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/18/
china-danger-military-missile-taiwan/
47 Loren Brandt, John Litwack, Elitza Mileva, Luhang Wang, Yifan Zhang, and Luan Zhao,
“China’s Productivity Slowdown and Future Growth Potential, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 9298, June 2020.
48 Thomas Christensen, “There Will Not Be a New Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, March 24, 2021.
Michael McFaul, “Cold War Lessons and Fallacies for U.S.-China Relations Today,” The
Washington Quarterly, 43:4 (2020): 7-39.
49 Seraphine F. Maerz, Anna Lührmann, Sebastian Hellmeier, Sandra Grahn, and Staffan
I. Lindberg, “State of the World 2019: Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows,”
Democratization 27:6 (May 2020), 909–927
50 Charles Edel and David O. Shullman, “How China Exports Authoritarianism,” Foreign
Affairs, September 16, 2021.
51 强世功 [Jiang Shigong], “哲学与历史—从党的十九大报告解读’习近平时代’
[Philosophy and History: Interpreting the ‘Xi Jinping Era’ through the 19th Party Congress
Report]”, 开放时代 [Open Times], 1 (2018).
52 Edelman, Edelman Trust Barometer 2020, January 19, 2020. Accessed March 15, 2022.
https://www.edelman.com/trust/2020-trust-barometer.
53 IPSOS Global Advisor, Attitudes Towards Socialist Ideals in the 21st Century, Ipsos, May
2018. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/
documents/2018-05/global_socialism_survey-ipsos.pdf
54 Different waves of Afrobarometer surveys, including methodology and questionnaires, can
be found at: https://afrobarometer.org/. Different waves of the AmericasBarometer survey
including methodology and questionnaires, can be found at: https://www.vanderbilt.
edu/lapop/about-americasbarometer.php. Different waves of the Asia Barometer surveys,
including methodology and questionnaires, can be found at: http://www.asianbarometer.
org/survey.
55 In Latin America, the ALBA countries (Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica,
Ecuador, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Grenada and
the Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis) already perceive the China model on par with the
United States.
56 Consider the much more negative opinions of China in the ISEAS elite survey than in
AsianBarometer and that within the Barometers surveys higher “social status” and income
are associated with less favorability towards the China model. Sharon Seah, Hoang Thi Ha,
Melinda Martinus, and Pham Thi Phuong Thao, The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey
Report, (Singapore: ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021).
57 Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “U.S.-Chinese Rivalry Is a Battle Over Values,” Foreign
Affairs, March 16, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
united-states/2021-03-16/us-china-rivalry-battle-over-values.

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 David J. Bulman

58 Mohamed Younis, “China, Russia Images in U.S. Hit Historic Lows,” Gallup, March 1, 2021.
Accessed March 15, 2022. https://news.gallup.com/poll/331082/china-russia-images-hit-
historic-lows.aspx.
59 In 2021, Axios|Momentive polling found that over two-thirds of Americans wanted the
federal government to “pursue policies that try to reduce the gap between the wealthy
and the less well-off in America,” with the share rising over 5 percentage points among
Republicans and 7 percentage points among Democrats. Laura Wronski, “Axios|Momentive
Poll: Capitalism and Socialism,” Survey Monkey. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.
surveymonkey.com/curiosity/axios-capitalism-update/.
60 Wronski, “Axios|Momentive Poll”
61 Frank Newport, “The Meaning of ‘Socialism’ to Americans Today,” Gallup, October 4,
2018. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/243362/
meaning-socialism-americans-today.aspx.
62 Although far from a perfect proxy, survey views are highly consistent with small-n findings
in formal and informal interviews, providing a degree of justification for policymaker
representativeness.
63 Findings from both surveys are summarized in broad terms here. Additional survey
information, including methodology and questionnaires, as well as detailed results, is
available at https://davidjbulman.com/data/.
64 In order to look at differences driven by the foreign policy community, the analysis controls
for other personal characteristics that are over-represented in the SAIS alumni panel and that
affect perspectives on China: education level, party affiliation, age, ideology, and race.
65 Julia Lovell. Maoism: A Global History (New York: Knopf, 2019).
66 McFaul, “Cold War Lessons and Fallacies for U.S.-China Relations Today.”

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Understanding
Hawkishness in Chinese
Public Opinion
Dimitar Gueorguiev is an Associate Professor of Political Science at
the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Director of Chinese
Studies at Syracuse University, and a 2021-22 Wilson China Fellow
 Dimitar Gueorguiev

Abstract
As tensions and competition between the United States and China rise,
hawkish sentiments are gaining prominence in both countries. What do such
trends mean for future diplomacy and cooperation? In this report, I share
findings from recent surveys on Chinese public opinion concerning Sino-U.S.
relations. The surveys show that hawkishness, which I define as strategic pes-
simism towards cooperation, is correlated but distinct from widely used at-
titudinal measures of favorability. The survey data also suggests that Chinese
respondents are less emotional in their positions than what we see on the
Chinese internet and media reporting. Furthermore, the surveys reveal that
hawkishness in the Chinese public is more a reflection of internal factors than
a reaction to external pressure. Overall, the survey results suggest a relatively
coherent and cautiously optimistic Chinese public that sees options for diplo-
macy even as greater competition and rivalry seem inevitable.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Hawkishness is distinct from favorability and the two concepts should not
be treated interchangeably. It is possible for U.S. policymakers to influence
Chinese public opinion with a focus on maintaining optimism about
the future rather than worrying about whether positions will be viewed
positively or not. For instance, holding out the possibility for mutually
beneficial engagement for the future while simultaneously pushing back on
Chinese economic opportunism in the present is a viable policy approach.

● Chinese netizens are not sensitive to moralistic rhetoric and U.S.

policymakers need not assume that moralizing rhetoric coming from
Chinese elites animates public sentiment. For U.S. policymakers the
implication is that making moral appeals should be done with specific
audiences in mind. While a domestic American audience may appreciate
a morally driven approach, Chinese audiences will likely require a
different angle. U.S. efforts to get Chinese leaders to condemn Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, for example, might be more effective in underscoring
the economic and reputational risks faced by China rather than appealing
to moral obligations.

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● While Chinese netizens are outwardly incensed by value-based criticism

of China, they are unlikely to change their views on Sino-U.S. relations
in response to criticism. The implication here is that U.S. policymakers
need not worry that promoting democratic values and priorities will
necessarily result in a public backlash within China. At the same time,
such criticisms are unlikely to yield sympathy or change in attitude
within China.

● Many Chinese netizens perceive Western countries as fearing China’s

rise and harboring intentions to contain China’s future growth and
influence. U.S. policymakers can pursue counter-narratives that
communicate American confidence as well as openness to a more
influential China. The heart of the challenge here is to signal confidence
and strength in America’s negotiating position without creating a
sense of urgency for China to pursue aggressive policy goals for fear of
diminishing leverage in the future.

● Chinese netizens remain open to diplomacy even as they anticipate

rising competition. Unfortunately, Chinese incumbent leaders have been
articulating a bleak narrative concerning the future of relations with the
West under the competition framework and it is becoming increasingly
important to offer counter narratives. These narratives need not be
encompassing in scope, but there are narrower arenas such as energy
security, trafficking, or money laundering, where earnest and open-
minded negotiation could serve as testament that diplomacy remains a
viable approach.

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 Dimitar Gueorguiev

Introduction
Are U.S. and Chinese national interests incompatible? Are their differences
irreconcilable? It was not long ago that diplomacy and engagement were the
norm in the relationship.1 It was a belief in common interests that encouraged
American trade representatives to endorse China’s bid for WTO accession
and a preference for diplomacy that prompted Chinese officials to downplay
crisis situations, such as the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
or the EP-3 plane collision in 2001. Increasingly, however, soft-spoken diplo-
macy has given way to hard-nosed scolding and the space for cooperation has
narrowed. To be sure, the geopolitical environment and balance of power have
shifted over the last ten years and with them so have the strategic calculations
that drive foreign policy postures. Such shifts in strategic mindset, however,
are likely to both affect and reflect shifts in public opinion.2
In this report, I consider some of the ways that growing rivalry in U.S.-
China relations is being internalized within the Chinese public mood. While
public opinion is unlikely to be the main driver behind foreign policy, public
opinion is almost always a consideration for political leaders, both democratic
and authoritarian. Moreover, modern diplomacy is more public and decentral-
ized, meaning that leaders and policymakers have more tools for influencing
and mobilizing public sentiment.3 The changing nature of public discourse
is also making it difficult to distinguish between genuine public sentiment,
vocal extremism, and state-guided nationalism. This attribution challenge
presents itself in both open societies, like the United States, as well as closed
ones, like the People’s Republic of China.
Public opinion is also an area of strategic imbalance. Whereas Chinese
policymakers have near unfettered access to the American public mood, less
is known about how Chinese citizens view their political or economic op-
tions. This disparity arises due in large part to difficulties in accessing the
Chinese public; namely, the censored nature of China’s internet media and
restrictions on public polling that make it difficult for non-state actors to
survey citizens. These barriers have left Chinese public opinion relatively
understudied. Gaps in our understanding of the Chinese citizen are also a
function of skepticism over the influence public opinion plays in China’s au-
thoritarian policy space. Nevertheless, both academic and mainstream com-
mentary on China routinely references rising nationalism and hawkishness

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within the Chinese body politic as cause for concern in the bilateral relation-
ship.4 Further research is thus warranted to avoid under or over-estimating
the role of public hawkishness.
The rest of this report is divided into three sections. First, I summarize
some of the relevant literature and arguments linking public opinion to for-
eign policy, with a focus on the U.S.-China relationship. Second, I introduce
data from two online surveys designed to capture Chinese netizen opinions
on relations with the West and the United States. I analyze this data to ex-
plore covariates and potential catalysts for hawkish sentiment among Chinese
netizens. In the third section, I outline implications and policy recommenda-
tions that emerge from the research.

Public Opinion and the Bilateral Relationship

In less than a decade, relations between the United States and China have
undergone a sea change from dialogue grounded in engagement to confron-
tation centered on competition. The transformation, though often discussed
within the framework of foreign policy and interstate relations, has had a no-
table spillover into the realm of public opinion. In general, what we have seen
is that public sentiment has soured on both sides of the relationship and that
mutual enmity is intertwined with domestic political factors including parti-
san divides and support for central authorities.5
In a recent Pew Research poll, 76 percent of American respondents re-
ported negative attitudes toward China—the highest percentage since Pew
began collecting such data in 2005, when 35 percent reported a negative
sentiment. 6 This finding is echoed by a recent Chicago Council report on
partisan sentiments toward China.7 According to the Carter Center and
RIWI, a little over 60 percent of Chinese respondents hold “unfavorable”
or “very unfavorable” views of the United States. 8 Likewise, surveys from
UC San Diego’s China Data Lab reveal that average Chinese netizens have
a relatively low (4.77 on a 10-point scale) level of favorability toward the
United States.9
Such trends coincide with growing hostility in diplomatic relations. In
the United States, a “China threat” narrative emerged early in the Trump
administration and Covid-19 only furthered the rift. In China, a growing

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sense of national pride and assertiveness has paved the way for aggressive,
so-called “wolf-warrior,” diplomacy. Unsurprisingly, the souring public
mood in the United States reflects some of the deeply entrenched partisan
divides of American politics. According to a recent study by the Chicago
Council Survey, 42 percent of Republicans considered China an adversary,
as compared to 17 percent of Democrats. Similarly, whereas 67 percent of
Republicans viewed limiting China’s global influence as a top policy prior-
ity, only 37 percent of Democrats thought so. One important implication
that emerges from such partisan differences is that average American views
on national security and foreign policy are not uniform and sensitive to po-
litical narratives and elite cues.
The picture in China is murkier. As a one-party state, the Chinese body
politic does not exhibit distinct political groupings or divides. While there
are likely to be particularistic interest groups within the state and factional
groupings centered around core elites, such domestic-level concentrations are
not known to overlap with foreign policy in predictable patterns. One of the
few patterns that have emerged is that higher levels of foreign policy hawkish-
ness have trended together with increased levels of support for the Chinese
government.10 Due to the sparsity of data and general opacity in China’s po-
litical fault lines, it is unclear to what extent these sentiments are related and
whether increased hawkishness amongst the Chinese public is helping buoy
support for the regime.
In the absence of abundant data points and unfettered debate, it can be
tempting to generalize based on the information available. Familiar and out-
spoken nationalists, like China’s deputy foreign spokesperson, Zhao Lijian,
enjoy a public pedestal and have proven highly effective in exploiting it.11 But do
they speak for the broader public? Based on research in democracies, we know
that those with more extreme views tend to be more outspoken and that their
opinions tend to have an outsized effect on the public discourse.12 Research on
Chinese internet discourse suggests some of the same dynamics might be at
work, whereby more radical nationalist voices drown out moderates. This same
research also notes the presence of nuanced perspectives and agendas within the
Chinese public that do not fit into simple dichotomies13. According to some
studies, actual levels of nationalism are relatively constant,14 while hawkishness
is concentrated in smaller segments of the online community.15

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Furthermore, because the Chinese discourse environment is so heavily in-

filtrated by the state, it is reasonable for netizens to feel greater ease in post-
ing hawkish comments than dovish ones. Someone who is overly aggressive in
their nationalism might get censored for errors in etiquette reasons, but those
who propose engagement are likely to be censored for errors of spirit.16 To the
extent that this kind of biased expression occurs, it can also lead to a form
of systemic social desirability bias that crowds out pro-engagement voices.
Bias might also encourage public displays of patriotic nationalism, whereby
citizens want to be seen expressing or supporting hawkishness nationalism.
Likewise, webhosts and media outlets will prefer publishing and promoting
hawkish content that gets more views without attracting attention from au-
thorities. Put simply, there is a political and economic logic that favors hawk-
ishness because nationalistic content is safer and thus more likely to attract
readers, likes, and shares.17
It is also worth questioning whether Chinese nationalism, rising or not,
implies a higher risk for conflict. Hawkishness is commonly understood as a
preference for aggressive and confrontational policy. If the Chinese public is
hawkish, and leaders are responsive to public opinion, then we might conclude
that the greater risk for conflict is intuitive. Yet, as Duan Xiaolin points out,
the link between public opinion and policy preferences remains unclear and
Chinese nationalists are a diverse crowd with many holding strong preferences
for avoiding conflict.18 This should not be surprising. On a very general level,
the public should always prefer diplomacy over conflict. Indeed, the idea that
hawkish nationalism represents a preference for confrontation is misleading
in so far as it prioritizes means over ends. As theorists point out, proud na-
tionalists who have confidence in China’s rise also have time on their side and
should thus be uninterested in a confrontation in the present.19 Instead, I will
consider hawkishness as a form of pessimism for diplomacy, either due to an
inherent preference for confrontation or insecurity about the future. In effect,
what this means is that someone can be hawkish on foreign policy not because
they hold hostile attitudes but because they lack faith or confidence in diplo-
matic alternatives.

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 Dimitar Gueorguiev

Public Opinion in China

China’s hawkish foreign policy posture and aggressive public nationalism are
relatively recent developments. During the 1980s and 90s, Chinese diplomats
were notably cautious and pragmatic. This was due to overriding objectives,
like attracting foreign investment and securing entry into the WTO. It also
helped that most Chinese citizens of the time were focused on domestic is-
sues, allowing leaders to pursue international cooperation and diplomacy, in-
cluding typically sensitive issues like territorial disputes, with relatively fewer
domestic audience constraints.20
A more assertive foreign policy position in the Chinese public emerged
gradually, beginning in the mid-1990s, around the time a popular book titled
“China Can Say No” was published and during a period of highly visible sa-
ber-rattling over the Taiwan Strait. Na
tional pride surrounding the Beijing Olympics and disillusionment with
the liberal economic model following the global financial crisis of 2008 only
further emboldened the voice of those calling for China to push back against
Western influence and stake its own claim on the international stage. The rise
of “wolf-warrior” diplomacy is thus seen as part of a broader assertive awaken-
ing in China’s foreign policy.21 That said, neither novelty nor strategy should
be overstated in describing China’s growing assertiveness. As Peter Martin ar-
gues, the “wolf warrior” approach has long been baked into the career culture
of Chinese diplomats.22 Nevertheless, there seems to be a greater tolerance
within the current Chinese leadership to take up more confrontational posi-
tions on issues evoking strong nationalist sentiments.23
Some caution that the link between nationalism and hawkishness is
overstated and that critical portions of the causal linkage are plausible but
not demonstrated. 24 Not only does China lack an institutional mecha-
nism, like elections, for translating public opinion into political pressure,
the Chinese state also wields vast capacity to shape and direct the public
discourse. This is especially true regarding foreign policy issues—an area in
which the public relies overwhelmingly on heavily curated official media for
information. When it comes to official diplomacy or state-level discussions,
Chinese media outlets are prohibited from publishing original content and
are instead limited to stories, headlines, and quotes, published by Xinhua.
Moreover, vast censorship capacity combined with economic leverage gives

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 Understanding Hawkishness in Chinese Public Opinion

the central and local governments indirect influence over the broader media
market and even over individual netizens online. On the rare occasion that
sensitive stories, debates, or commentaries slip through the cracks, there is
an army of “fifty centers,” netizens who are paid to post pro-government
content, on the ready to shape and distort public discourse in ways that are
favorable to the state. 25
Given the amount of sway the CCP holds over media and public discourse,
it is plausible that Chinese leaders can both amplify and mollify hawkish pub-
lic sentiments. The fact that in many cases leaders have looked the other way
suggests that public hawkishness is desirable, or at least instrumental for the
regime. It is possible, for instance, that ginning up hawkishness is a way of
boosting domestic regime support. At the same time, it is also argued that
popular nationalism serves as a constraint on China’s leaders, who feel com-
pelled to adopt more confrontational postures so as to avoid being called out
as soft or insufficiently patriotic.26 This apparent contradiction resonates with
a broader narrative in which the CCP is characterized as objectively strong but
politically brittle, and that the CCP’s contemporary legitimacy rests on the
perception that they are acting to promote China’s national interest whether
that be economic, military, or otherwise.27

Unpacking Public Hawkishness

How hawkish is the Chinese public? Government influence over Chinese
public opinion makes it difficult to tease out genuine public sentiment. The
lack of nuanced insight can also feed into generalizations about the Chinese
public as being uniformly nationalistic and hawkish. We know this to be false,
as previous research has shown that only certain portions of the population
are more inclined toward hawkishness. Jessica Chen Weiss, for instance, finds
that those born after the 1980s are particularly prone to consume and express
hawkish sentiments.28 Younger generations are more reliant on the internet
and social media for their news diet. The young have also lived through fewer
of the hardships experienced by their parents and grandparents and have not
experienced periods of sustained international conflict.
Heterogeneity aside, it is hard to ignore the widespread backlash coming
from Chinese voices whenever the international community raises issues on

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matters such as China’s human rights record, its environmental commit-

ments, or its handling of the Covid-19 outbreak.
One possibility is that Chinese public opinion is sensitive to elite cues
and that rising public hawkishness is a direct reflection of the aggressive
posturing and nationalistic rhetoric coming from China’s senior diplomats
and leaders. Such an interpretation, however, only further disempowers the
Chinese citizen vis-a-viz the state and discounts legitimate grievances and
concerns about the international environment. Another possibility is that
Chinese citizens see the world from a more realist, zero-sum perspective
whereby mutually beneficial engagement with an adversary may seem like
an improbable idea. A third and related possibility is that Chinese audiences
may not hold overtly hawkish positions but are emotionally or morally in-
censed by criticism directed toward China. As Jackson Woods and Bruce
Dickson show, Chinese nationalism is grounded in a collective sense of vic-
timhood concerning China’s history with the West. 29 Still, it is possible that
some portion of public opinion is performative and that Chinese citizens
are not as hawkish in private as they are in public.

Data on Chinese Public Opinion

To further probe Chinese public sentiment on the Sino-U.S. relationship, I
conducted two rounds of online opinion polls targeting Chinese netizens.
The first wave of the poll took place in April of 2021, involving around 3000
respondents. The second wave took place in late September and early October
of 2021, involving around 2500 respondents. Sampling for the surveys was
done anonymously with the help of Chinese recruiters who sampled netizens
from across all of China’s provinces and major cities.
Unsurprisingly, descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that the sample is
younger, better educated, and more affluent than the average Chinese citizen.
That said, internet-based surveys have been shown to mirror scientific sam-
ples, at least in terms of substance if not in composition.30 Moreover, the on-
line platform has been shown to work better for sensitive questions than face-
to-face enumeration.31 Online polling and recruitment allow for respondent
anonymity as their identities are unknown to the researchers who are the only
ones with access to response data.32 The feasibility and anonymity features of

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TABLE 1: Survey Sample Distribution

Wave 1 Percent Wave 2 Percent CNNIC2020

Age
18–25 1351 40.23% 1180 45.40% *
26–30 783 23.32% 623 23.97% *
31–40 696 20.73% 553 21.28% 20.40%
41–50 384 11.44% 160 6.16% 18.70%
51–60 130 3.87% 66 2.54% 12.50%
>60 14 0.42% 17 0.65% 10.30%
Education
Junior 170 6.15% 170 6.15% 59.70%
High
Secondary 639 23.12% 639 23.12% 21.50%
Bachelor 1,816 65.7% 1,816 65.7% 10.00%
Graduate 139 5.03% 139 5.03% 8.80%
Gender
Female 1,805 53.75% 1,403 50.76% 49.00%
Male 1,553 46.25% 1,361 49.24% 51.00%
Income
<20K 999 29.75% 754 27.28% *
20k-30k 251 7.47% 155 5.61% *
30k–60k 696 20.73% 647 23.41% *
60k–150k 1,133 33.74% 983 35.56% *
>150k 279 8.31% 225 8.14% *
Total 3358 2764

p-values report difference in proportion tests across treatment categories. CNNIC2020 refers
to the 2020 annual report statistics from the China Internet Network Information Center.

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online recruitment are why the method is becoming increasingly common

when running survey experiments in restricted information environments.33
Overall, the picture emerging from both survey waves, summarized in
Table 2, suggests a more moderate view on Sino-U.S. relations than one might
conclude from observing public discourse in Chinese censored media envi-
ronment. Looking at the categorical scale of hawkishness, used in Wave 1, we
see that, while a vast majority view the relationship as tensely “competitive,”
they nevertheless view relations as “manageable.” Still, it is notable that only
a small portion of the public, less than 15 percent, consider the relationship
to be a “compatible and cooperative one.” Looking at the 10-point scale used
in Wave 2, we see that a slight majority of respondents lean in a cooperative
direction, not an overtly hawkish one.
Comparing across covariates in Table 3, I find that hawkishness is, unsur-
prisingly, negatively correlated with the U.S. Feelings Thermometer. In other
words, netizens who are hawkish also tend to be less favorable toward the
United States. Consistent with previous surveys, respondent Age is also nega-
tively correlated with hawkishness, meaning that younger respondents are on
average more hawkish. I also find some evidence, in Wave 2 of the survey, that
more educated respondents are less hawkish. Other variables, such as income
level, urban residency, time abroad, and CCP membership do not appear to
have notable correlations with hawkishness. Perhaps more interestingly, I find
that Satisfaction with the central government is negatively correlated with

TABLE 2: Hawkish Sentiments

Chinese views on Sino-US relations Wave 1 Wave 2

Freq. % Mean Std.
Incompatible, destined for conflict 413 13.79
Competitive, but manageable 2,169 72.44
Compatible, with room for cooperation 412 13.76
Incompatible (*10-point scale) *4.2 *2.4
Total 2,994 2390

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 Understanding Hawkishness in Chinese Public Opinion

TABLE 3: Hawkish Covariates

Hawkish Covariates (1) (1)

Wave 1 Wave 2

-0.128*** -0.459***
USA Feeling (5-point)
(-11.82) (-8.66)

-0.0360*** -0.197***
Govt. Satisfaction (10-point)
(-6.54) (-7.43)

0.00209 -0.00389(-
Age
(1.85) 0.61)

0.0498** -0.297**
Male
(2.61) (-3.09)

0.00574 -0.250**
Education
(0.36) (-3.07)

0.00300 0.0354
Income
(0.39) (0.89)

0.0154 0.0181
Urban hukou
(0.76) (0.18)

0.00860 0.0136
Time Abroad
(1.00) (0.29)

-0.0182 0.176
CCP member
(-0.71) (1.30)

2.386*** 7.493***
Constant
(24.80) (19.08)

N 2975 2387

t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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hawkishness. This suggests that while respondents are likely forming their for-
eign policy opinions based in part on how they feel about their own govern-
ment, there is no evidence that public support for the Chinese state translates
into support for confrontational foreign policy. This makes sense. If citizens
have high faith in their leaders, then they may also have confidence that their
leaders would be able to succeed in diplomacy as well. Likewise, because gov-
ernment satisfaction is correlated with optimism about China’s political econ-
omy, it makes sense that those who see China’s economic power growing with
time would see less need for confrontation in the present.
A nuanced take on hawkishness may also reflect the paradigm through which
respondents view the Sino-U.S. relationship. Table 4, for instance, shows that a
vast majority of respondents (roughly 80 percent) view rivalry with the United
States in terms of material, economic stakes. Far fewer (roughly 13 percent) inter-
pret tensions in terms of a security rivalry, and even less (roughly 7 percent) per-
ceive a moral conflict. This is reassuring insofar as an economic rivalry scenario
is most amenable to diplomacy, especially when compared to moral-based and
emotionally driven conflicts.34 The findings also suggest that Chinese Netizens
are perhaps more pragmatic in their foreign policy outlooks than much of the
social media milieu and frequent “wolf warrior” outbursts suggest.
It is possible that respondents hold baseline perceptions grounded in prag-
matic and economic interpretations of rivalry but are nevertheless susceptible
to elite signaling that emphasizes less tractable security or moralistic frames.
To explore this possibility, the first survey wave included an experiment in-
volving select phrasings from Chinese President Xi Jinping which respectively
underscore zero-sum, non-zero-sum, and moral-based tensions in China’s
relationship with the West and the U.S. The three treatment conditions are
summarized below:

● (Zero-Sum) In a recent speech, China’s president explained that “the East

is rising, and the West is declining.” Do you agree with this position? (在
近期的讲话中，中国领导人提出了“东升西降”的说法。你同
意吗?)35

● (Non-Zero-Sum) In a recent speech, China’s president explained that

“we should reject the outdated Cold War and zero-sum game mentality,

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TABLE 4: IR Paradigms

Chinese interpretations of Sino-US

tensions (Wave 1) Freq. Percent Cum.

Economic conflict (non-zero-sum) 2,349 79.49 79.49

Security conflict (zero-sum) 387 13.10 92.59

Moral conflict (moralist) 219 7.41 100.00

Total 2,955 100.00

adhere to mutual respect and cooperation.” To what extent do you agree

with this position? (在近期的讲话中，中国领导人提出了“要摒弃
冷战思维、零和博弈的旧理念，要坚持互相尊重与合作”的观
点。你同意吗?)36

● (Moralistic) Inspired by Xi Thought, China’s state council recently

directed citizens to uphold traditional values and defend China’s honor
from moral attacks from abroad. To what extent do you agree with this
position? (国务院近期提出了新时代公民要坚持传统美德和抵制国
外道德攻击。你同意吗?)37

If respondents are sensitive to these signals, we should expect them to shift

preferences in-line with the treatment they were shown. As Table 5 summa-
rizes, however, we see little indication that respondents are internalizing such
signals to update their perceptions of the underlying rivalry. In no instance is
there any indication that the randomly assigned rhetoric treatment has any
measurable impact on respondents’ qualitative assessments of rivalry, nor does
there appear to be any impact on overall hawkishness. Taken together, the
findings suggest that respondent sentiments are relatively stable and not par-
ticularly sensitive to domestic framing. Again, this finding stands in contrast
to conventional interpretations of Chinese public opinion on foreign policy as
being pliant and politicized.

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External Factors
In addition to domestic factors, Chinese citizens presumably form some of
their attitudes toward the United States in response to policy and rhetoric
coming out of Washington D.C. In particular, the popular victimization
frame suggests that respondents might feel under threat from or that they
are being unfairly treated by the United States. It has, for instance, become
commonplace for Chinese diplomats to aggressively protest and deny external
criticism of China—especially when it concerns issues that considered to be of
internal concern, such as human rights or ethnic policy. In other words, hawk-
ishness in Chinese public opinion might operate in part as a reactionary and
emotional response to external criticism. By the same token, we might expect
that praise for China’s achievements, in addition to criticism, might endear
citizens in a more positive direction.
To explore these emotional factors, I embedded an experiment in both
waves of the survey whereby respondents were primed with one of three state-
ments attributed to western governments indicating criticism, either over
China’s perceived economic opportunism and human rights abuses, or praise for
developmental achievements, and then asked to write down some of their feel-
ings in response to the statements.

● Western governments often criticize China over its human rights record.
In a few words, please describe how such criticism makes you feel (西方国
家经常批评中国的人权问题。 请用几个形容词来描述你对这种
批评的感受):

● Western governments often criticize China over its economic policies. In

a few words, please describe how such criticism makes you feel (西方国家
经常批评中国的经济政策。请用几个形容词来描述你对这种批
评的感受):

● Western governments often criticize China, but they also praise China’s
achievements in reducing poverty and promoting development at home
and abroad. In a few words, please describe how that makes you feel (西方
国家经常批评中国, 但同时也赞赏中国国内外的发展和扶贫的成
就。请用几个形容词来描述你对这种批评的感受):

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 Understanding Hawkishness in Chinese Public Opinion

TABLE 5: Xi Rhetoric Treatment

(1) (2)
Treatment Controls
Xi Realist Treatment - -
0.0628 0.0738
Realist Rhetoric
(0.47) (0.55)
-0.0823 -0.0870
Moralist Rhetoric
(-0.61) (-0.64)

-1.797*** -2.852***
Constant
(-18.90) (-4.38)

Xi Moralist Treatment - -
-0.00426 0.0132
Realist Rhetoric
(-0.02) (0.07)
0.103 0.121
Moralist Rhetoric
(0.60) (0.70)

-2.408*** -1.739*
Constant
(-19.30) (-2.17)

Xi Neo-Liberal (Baseline) - -
N 2955 2947

t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The random nature in which these statements were presented to different

portions of the sample means that we can attribute differences in downstream
outcome variables to the distinct set of sentiments provoked by the statements.
There are several potential mechanisms that could be at work here. An updat-
ing logic suggests that different frames of criticism and praise will impact how
Chinese respondents perceive external pressure and that this will motivate
them to then update their perceptions of Western motives and the bilateral
relationship with the United States. An alternative, emotional mechanism,

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operates in a simpler manner whereby external criticism provokes hawkish-

ness as a reactionary response without changing the respondent’s underlying
assumptions about Western motives for criticism.
While there are numerous ways in which one might characterize the mo-
tives of a foreign state, a close reading of media reports alongside discussions
with colleagues and former students, resulted in four distinct ways that ex-
ternal pressure tends to be internalized and interpreted by Chinese observ-
ers. These interpretations are summarized in Table 6 based on how frequently
they were chosen by respondents. Interestingly, most respondents interpret
Western criticism as motivated by a fear of China’s rise. Only a handful in-
terpreted criticism as it is presented by Western governments: as a desire for a
more liberal China.
These interpretations, however, are not fixed. Comparing across interpreta-
tion likelihood, conditional on treatment assignment, summarized in Table
7, we see that criticism on the human rights issue moves respondents to think
that Western governments either misunderstand China or that they harbor
an anti-China bias. Interestingly, mixed praise and criticism also encourage
respondents to consider Western criticism as a misunderstanding. This is im-
portant because the misunderstanding interpretation is most strongly associ

TABLE 6: Perceptions of External Criticism

Perceived U.S. Motives Wave 1 Wave 2

Freq. % Freq. %
Desire for a more liberal China 52 1.73 49 2.01

A desire to contain China 765 25.45 615 25.19

A misunderstanding of China 149 4.96 96 3.93

Anti-China bias 283 9.41 217 8.89

Fear of China’s rise 1,757 58.45 1,464 59.98

Total 3,006 100.00 2,441 100.00

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TABLE 7: Criticism Treatment

(1) Wave 1 (2) Wave 2

A desire for a more liberal China
-0.139 0.231
HR criticism
(-0.42) (0.52)
-0.175 1.042**
Mixed Praise
(-0.50) (2.68)
-3.425*** -3.943***
Constant
(-15.44) (-11.71)
A desire to contain China
0.141 -0.193*
HR criticism
(1.40) (-1.65)
-0.184 -0.270**
Mixed Praise
(-1.64) (-2.30)

Constant -0.834*** -0.715***

(-11.66) (-8.83)
A misunderstanding of China
0.749** 0.553**
HR criticism
(3.29) (2.15)
0.840*** -0.093
Mixed Praise
(3.64) (-0.32)
-3.035*** -2.921***
Constant
(-16.51) (-14.23)
Anti-China bias
HR criticism 0.482** 0.214
(3.19) (1.15)
Mixed Praise 0.0368 0.266
(0.21) (1.45)
Constant -2.027*** -2.079***
(-17.56) (-14.93)
Fear of China’s rise (Base Outcome)
N 3006 2441

t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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Pragmatism
If Chinese netizens are less hawkish, less politicized, and less sensitive than a
“wolf- warrior” narrative implies, then perhaps they should be more open to
pragmatic approaches to foreign relations, which consider opportunities for
coexistence even as they brace disagreement, competition, and even conflict.
As summarized in Table 8, Chinese netizens are generally pragmatic about
future cooperation. Looking across both survey waves, over 80 percent of re-
spondents thought that it is either “mildly” or “definitely” worth listening to
arguments about future cooperation on things like conflict resolution, trade
promotion, climate change, and denuclearization.
In Table 9, I also explore several plausible covariates of pragmatism. The
hawkishness measure and the U.S. Feeling thermometer are both associated
with pragmatism in an intuitive direction. Importantly, both measures are
highly significant, indicating that, while they likely capture related disposi-
tions, they nevertheless encapsulate distinct foreign policy calculations. As
noted earlier, it is possible for someone to have positive feelings toward the
United States, while still holding hawkish positions in their overall outlook
of the Sino-U.S. relationship. Likewise, it is entirely possible and intuitive
to imagine confident regime supporters to be less hawkish in their outlook

TABLE 8: Open-Minded to Cooperation

Pragmatism Wave 1 Wave 2

Freq. % Freq. %
Total nonsense 33 1.10 37 1.49

Not very helpful 348 11.63 291 11.74

Possibly worth listening to 1,793 59.91 1321 53.29

Definitely worth listening to 819 27.36 830 33.48

Total 2,993 100 2,497 100

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TABLE 9: Pragmatism Covariates

Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) Internal (2) External (3) Internat (2) External

-0.312*** -0.313*** -0.099*** -0.099***

Hawkishness
(-14.95) (-15.02) (-17.67) (-17.69)

0.071*** 0.070*** 0.055*** 0.054***

USA Feeling
(5.66) (5.62) (3.74) (3.71)

0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076** 0.074**

Male
(3.54) (3.56) (2.88) (2.82)

0.010 0.008 0.016 0.015

Education
(0.59) (0.50) (0.74) (0.70)

0.001 0.001 -0.045*** -0.045***

Income
(0.12) (0.07) (-4.50) (-4.51)

Urban -0.014 -0.015 0.030 0.030

Registration (-0.64) (-0.68) (1.10) (1.09)

-0.012 -0.012 0.013 0.014

Time Abroad
(-1.26) (-1.27) (1.02) (1.06)

0.066** 0.063** 0.061* 0.058

CCP Member
(2.30) (2.20) (1.67) (1.59)

Government 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.000 0.000

Satisfaction (7.57) (7.50) (0.04) (0.03)

-0.026 0.093
Liberalize China
(-0.31) (0.95)

-0.052** 0.057*
Contain China
(-2.07) (-1.82)

Misunderstand 0.051 0.017

China (1.01) (0.25)

-0.065* -0.077
Anti-China Bias
(-1.74) (-1.62)

3.503*** 3.065*** 3.508*** 3.501***

Constant
(36.86) (27.36) (46.91) (34.11)

N 2952 2916 2387 2338

t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

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 Dimitar Gueorguiev

precisely because they envision a future in which China continues to grow its
relative power.
As anticipated, those respondents who perceive external pressure from the
United States as motivated by a desire to contain China, are the least prag-
matic about the future. The remaining variables do not reveal a clear picture of
the correlates of pragmatism. The only consistent variable is the male gender,
but this may simply reflect a different baseline interpretation of pragmatism.
Other variables, like CCP membership and government satisfaction, correlate
positively with pragmatism, but the relationship is not always significant.

Conclusion
Taken together, the findings presented in this report suggest that Chinese ne-
tizens have relatively pragmatic and stable interpretations of China’s rivalry
with the United States and that these interpretations are an amalgam of inter-
nal attitudes and domestic calculations as well as perceptions about the exter-
nal environment.
On the internal side, I show that hawkishness, which I define as pessi-
mism about the prospect for cooperation cannot be reduced to simple nega-
tivity toward the United States, even if the two attitudes are correlated. This
contrast is also relevant when juxtaposed with the idea that Chinese nation-
alism is endogenous with regime support. My findings suggest this is only
partly true. Respondents who express greater satisfaction with the Chinese
government are also more likely to hold negative feelings toward the United
States, but they are not more hawkish. While this may seem counterintuitive,
it also suggests a more rational calculus at work in shaping respondent ex-
pectations for cooperation and conflict. Views on cooperation, for instance,
appear to be not simply a function of feelings but also of diplomatic efficacy
and time horizons. It is thus unsurprising, for instance, that respondents
with high regard for their leaders also place greater confidence in their ability
to effectively manage diplomatic relations with the United States. It is also
unsurprising that respondents who are optimistic about China’s economic
future are less inclined to risk it with confrontation in the present. The idea
that hawkishness in the Chinese public mood is more rational than ideo-
logical is further supported by the observational and experimental findings

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concerning popular paradigms in Chinese foreign policy thinking. First, the

survey results show that most respondents view tensions with the United
States from a non-zero-sum paradigm that prioritizes economic competition
rather than zero-sum realism or moralistic emotion. Second, experimental
treatments designed to signal the preferred paradigm of China’s preeminent
leader, Xi Jinping, do not appear to significantly align respondents with the
proposed paradigm. Taken together, the findings again suggest that, for most
Chinese netizens, views on relations with the United States are relatively sta-
ble and grounded in economic thinking.
The surveys also offer some insight into how Chinese netizens perceive ex-
ternal pressure. For an overwhelming majority, U.S. criticism is seen as moti-
vated by a fear of China’s rise, followed by a containment motive. These per-
ceptions dovetail with recent studies of nationalism suggesting that Chinese
citizens hold conflicting emotions of national confidence and national victim-
hood.40 A smaller proportion views external pressure as being biased or mis-
guided. Only a handful of individuals deem Western pressure as benevolent.
These interpretations are formed, at least in part, in response to how Western
countries engage China. For instance, offering mixed praise for China’s
achievements alongside criticism appears to soften interpretations while criti-
cism alone seems to increase the belief that China is being placed under unfair
and malign scrutiny. Such tendencies should not be overstated, however. For
instance, while criticizing China on the issue of human rights appears to pro-
voke some emotional backlash, the most common reaction among Chinese
respondents is to discount the criticism as a misunderstanding.
Looking further down the thought process, the survey results show that
Chinese respondents remain generally open-minded about future opportuni-
ties for cooperation even in an age of heightened competition.41 While hawk-
ish respondents are clearly less optimistic, I find that government satisfaction
is positively correlated with pragmatism. Notably, CCP members are slightly
more pragmatic than non-CCP members, reinforcing the idea that respon-
dents with greater satisfaction or connection with the government are gener-
ally optimistic about the prospects for diplomacy.
Finally, perceptions of the external environment appear to have only a lim-
ited impact on pragmatism. A belief that the United States is aiming to con-
tain China’s rise is negatively and significantly correlated with ­pragmatism.

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Even so, the relationship here is modest and the difference in effect, as com-
pared to more benevolent interpretations of Western criticism, is small. Given
that the Western criticism experiments did not have a large impact on percep-
tions, it again appears that Chinese respondents have relatively stable interpre-
tations of U.S. foreign policy as well as rational beliefs about the prospects for
diplomacy that are less sensitive to external criticism or individual interpreta-
tions of that criticism.

Policy Implications
Implications from the research are four-fold. First, the survey evidence sug-
gests that Chinese netizens, even if they might be nationalistic, are not pro-
foundly hawkish in their foreign policy outlook. By and large Chinese ne-
tizens see rivalry with the United States in terms of economic competition.
The silver lining in all this is that Chinese netizens remain open to diplomacy
alongside competition. Diplomats and strategists would be wise to engage
and sustain this attitude. Even on the most sensitive of issues, such as Taiwan,
there is a strategic interest in keeping time horizons long and not playing into
what appears to be an alarmist narrative from China’s leader that “the world
has entered a new period of turbulence and change.”42
Moreover, the survey results suggest that Chinese netizens are not easily
moved by moralistic and rhetorical appeals, either foreign or domestic. For
U.S. policymakers, this means that the Chinese public has an opinion when it
comes to policy and that it is not simply reacting to cues from China’s political
leaders. In other words, the Chinese public is a distinct audience that could be
factored into the broader diplomatic strategy. Identifying areas of divergence
between elite preferences and public opinion will not be easy, but it is a task
worth investing in. Take, for instance, criticisms of China’s response to Covid-
19, which arguably served to galvanize Chinese nationalism. While these crit-
icisms have focused largely on lack of transparency, few have appealed to the
intense hardship Chinese citizens continue to endure under Beijing’s “zero-
covid” policy.
The surveys also show that Chinese netizens, even if they tend to vocally
protest foreign criticism, are unlikely to change their views on Sino-U.S. re-
lations in response to criticism. Practically speaking, this implies that U.S.

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policymakers need not fear that promoting democratic values and priorities
will necessarily result in public backlash within China. At worst, Chinese
observers appear to deflect such criticism as “misunderstanding.” Consider,
for instance, the recent Summit for Democracy hosted by the United States,
“to renew democracy at home and confront autocracies abroad” in December
of 2021. Chinese diplomats and media personalities were furious about the
summit and netizens were vocal in their criticism.43 Yet, the survey evidence
provided here suggests that such displays may be more performative than gen-
uine. From a policy perspective, endeavors like the Summit for Democracy
can thus be disentangled into distinct audiences. While American voters and
international partners may see U.S. claims on democracy as a commitment on
values or rallying of like-minded partners, Chinese recipients likely see it as a
smokescreen for economic rivalry.
Indeed, the surveys suggest that Chinese netizens already perceive the
United States as being both fearful of China and intent on containing China.
The task for U.S. strategists could thus turn to counter-narratives that com-
municate confidence on the part of the United States, and openness toward
a more influential China. The point here is not that U.S. policymakers ought
to be more careful in their messaging. Their primary audience is domestic. At
the same time, the findings do indicate that taking note of the Chinese pub-
lic as a constituency reveals opportunities and points of leverage that might
otherwise go underutilized. Economic sanctions, a key tool for Washington
in its attempts to pressure Beijing, are a good case in point. If sanctions are
perceived as broad attempts to contain or undermine China’s economy, they
will likely provoke a nationalist backlash and raise pessimism among Chinese
citizens. If on the other hand, sanctions are more surgical in their targeting
and specific in their duration, they are less likely to feed into dominant narra-
tives about the unfair treatment of China.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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Notes
1 Anne F Thurston, Engaging China: Fifty Years of Sino-American Relations (Edited Volume)
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2021).
2 Bruce Russett, “Doves, Hawks, and U.S. Public Opinion,” Political Science Quarterly 105:4
(1990), 515–538.
3 Philip Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)
4 Susan L Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York, Oxford University Press, USA, 2008);
Suisheng Zhao, “From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping’s China,”
The Washington Quarterly 44:4 (2021), 141–161.
5 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing.”
International Security 41:3 (2016), 7–43; Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of
Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22:82
(2013), 535–553; James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State (New York:Columbia University
Press, 2011).
6 Aidan Connaughton, “Ahead of 2022 Beijing Olympics, Fast Facts on Views of China—Pew
Research Center,” Pew Research Center, 2022. Accessed on 02/15/2022. https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/ 02/01/fast- facts- about- views- of- china- ahead- of- the-
2022- beijing- olympics/ .
7 Craig Kafura et al, “Divisions on U.S.-China Policy: Opinion Leaders and the Public,” The
Chicago Council, 2022. Accessed on 02/15/2022. https: //www.thechicagocouncil.org/
research/public- opinion- survey/divisions- us- china- policy- opinion-leaders-and-public
8 China Perception Monitor, “The Pulse: U.S.-China Relations,” China Perception Monitor,
2021. Accessed on 02/15/2022. https://uscnpm.org/the-pulse/
9 Lei Guang, Margaret Roberts, Yiqing Xu, and Jiannan Zhao, “Pandemic Sees
Increase in Chinese Support for Regime, Decrease in Views Towards the U.S.,” China
Data Lab, 2020. Accessed on 3/15/2021) http://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/viz- blog/
pandemic-sees-increase-in-chinese-support-for-regime-decrease-in-views-towards-us/.
10 Ibid.
11 Alex W Palmer, “The Man Behind China’s Aggressive New Voice,” The New York Times, July
7, 2021.
12 Sounman Hong and Sun Hyoung Kim, “Political Polarization on Twitter: Implications for
the Use of Social Media in Digital Governments,” Government Information Quarterly 33:4
(2016), 777–782.
13 Christopher Cairns and Allen Carlson, “Real-World Islands in A Social Media Sea:
Nationalism And Censorship On Weibo During the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Crisis,” The
China Quarterly 225 (2016), 23–49; Guobin Yang, “Political Contestation in Chinese
Digital Spaces: Deepening the Critical Inquiry,” China Information 28:2 (2014), 135–144.
14 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing,”
International Security 41:3 (2016), 7–43.
15 Jessica Chen Weiss, “How Hawkish is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising
Nationalism” and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China 28:119 (2019),

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679–695; Kecheng Fang and Maria Repnikova, “Demystifying “Little Pink”: The Creation
and Evolution of a Gendered Label for Nationalistic Activists in China,” New Media &
Society 20:6 (2018), 2162–2185.
16 The most recent example of this has been shutdown of the Chinese language version of the
U.S.-China Perception Monitor (中美印象) website after it published an essay from Hu Wei
arguing against siding with Russia in its war in Ukraine.
17 Fang and Repnikova, “Demystifying “Little Pink”: The Creation and Evolution of a Gendered
Label for Nationalistic Activists in China,” 2162–2185.
18 Duan Xiaolin, “Unanswered Questions: Why We May Be Wrong about Chinese Nationalism
and its Foreign Policy Implications,” Journal of Contemporary China 26:108 (2017), 886–900.
19 David M Edelstein, Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers (New
York: Cornell University Press, 2017).
20 Peter Hays Gries. China’s New Nationalism. University of California Press, 2004.
21 Yun Sun, “Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, or
Shaped by It?”, Brookings, 2011. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/
chinese- public- opinion- shaping- chinas-foreign-policy-or-shaped-by-it/.
22 Peter Martin, China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2021).
23 Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,”
535–553.
24 Duan “Unanswered Questions: Why We May Be Wrong about Chinese Nationalism and its
Foreign Policy Implications,” 886–900.
25 Margaret Roberts and Margaret E Roberts, Censored (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2018).
26 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower; Christopher R Hughes, “Nationalism and Multilateralism
in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for Southeast Asia,” in Order and Security in
Southeast Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 132–148.
27 Elina Sinkkonen, “Nationalism, Patriotism and Foreign Policy Attitudes among Chinese
University Students,” The China Quarterly 216 (2013), 1045–1063.
28 Weiss, “How Hawkish is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising Nationalism” and
Chinese Foreign Policy,” 679–695.
29 Jackson S Woods and Bruce J Dickson, “Victims And Patriots: Disaggregating Nationalism
in Urban China,” Journal of Contemporary China 26:104 (2017), 167–182.
30 Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory a. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz, “Evaluating Online Labor Markets
for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk,” Political Analysis 20:3 (2012),
351–368; S. Clifford, R. M. Jewell, and P. D. Waggoner, “Are Samples Drawn from Mechanical
Turk Valid for Research on Political Ideology?”, Research & Politics 2:4 (2015); Xiaojun Li,
Weiyi Shi, and Boliang Zhu, “The Face of Internet Recruitment: Evaluating the Labor Markets
of Online Crowdsourcing Platforms in China,” Research & Politics 5:1 (2017), 1–8.
31 Kristina Kays, Kathleen Gathercoal, and William Buhrow, “Does Survey Format Influence
Self-Disclosure on Sensitive Question Items?”, Computers in Human Behavior 28:1 (2012),
251–256, 254.
32 While sampling is facilitated by Chinese-based recruiters, survey activities take place on an

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independent and encrypted survey platform housed outside of China. Privacy and anonymity
information is provided to respondents as part of the survey on-boarding process.
33 Haifeng Huang, “The Pathology of Hard Propaganda,” The Journal of Politics 80:3 (2018),
1034–1038; Dimitar Gueorguiev, Daniel McDowell, and David A Steinberg, “The Impact of
Economic Coercion on Public Opinion: The Case of US–China Currency Relations,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 64:9 (2020), 1555–1583; Bing Mei and Gavin TL Brown, “Conducting
Online Surveys in China,” Social Science Computer Review 36:6 (2018), 721–734.
34 Todd H Hall, Emotional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).
35 Jin Chul, “The Contradiction between Xi Jinping’s Worldview of “Rising in the East and
Descending in the West” and Reality (习近平的“东升西降”世界观与现实的矛盾),”
Voice of America Chinese, 2021. https://www.voachinese.com/a /xi-nationalistic-rhetoric-and-
its-implications-20210314 / 5813777.html
36 Xi Jinping, “Full Text: Special Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the World
Economic Forum Virtual Event of the Davos Agenda”, China.org.cn, January 26, 2021.
http://www.china.org.cn/world/2021-01/26/content{\_}77154294.html
37 The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued
the “Implementation Outline for the Construction of Citizens’ Morality in the New Era”
available at http://www.gov.cn/ zhengce/2019-10/27/content{\_}5445556.htm
38 Expected probabilities generated using the delta method marginal probabilities calculator in
Stata following a multinomial regression model.
39 This finding is based on an ordinary least-squares regression of the Hawkishness dependent
variable on the categorical treatment assignment. No statistical differences observed.
40 Woods and Dickson, “Victims and Patriots: Disaggregating Nationalism in Urban China,”
167–182.
41 In both survey waves, an overwhelming majority indicated that arguments for cooperation
were “possibly” or “definitely” worth listening to.
42 Quote from Xi Jinping speech delivered during the 5th session of the 13th CPPCC meeting
on March 8, 2022, available at: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-03/11/content_5678396.
htm (visited on 03/09/2021).
43 Mareike Ohlberg and Bonnie S. Glaser, “Why China Is Freaking out over Biden’s
Democracy Summit,” Foreign Policy (2021). https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/10/
china-response-biden-democracy-summit/.

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Knowing the PRC:

America’s China Watchers
between Engagement and
Strategic Competition

David M. McCourt is an Associate Professor in the Department of

Sociology at the University of California-Davis and a 2021–22 Wilson
China Fellow
 David M. McCourt

Abstract
Common pronouncements that Washington enjoys a “new consensus” on
China mask wide variations in assessments of the China challenge. America’s
China watchers disagree on a host of issues: How much of a threat is China? Was
“Engagement” a failure? What even was Engagement? This paper maps out the dis-
tinct positions on the shift to Strategic Competition. It centers America’s China
watching community as a worthwhile object for understanding Engagement’s
demise. Against the prevailing explanation—that China changed rendering
Engagement unworkable—I show that no amount of “re-litigating” Engagement
will get us to a genuine consensus on what must come next—nor, again, should it.
I then analyze the four major groups among America’s watchers and their views
on China and U.S. policy—the Strategic Competitors, the Engagers, the New Cold
Warriors, and the Competitive Coexisters. Finally, I identify the gaps between these
groups, as a first step not toward consensus but productive disagreement.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Undoubtedly an asset, America’s vibrant China watching community
features a tendency toward polarization and politicization. The U.S.
government and the community should endeavor to counter such trends;

● Congress should continue to support the development and funding of

opportunities for the study of Chinese language and culture, including
reinitiating the China Fulbright program, and funding people-to-people
exchanges and cultural diplomacy;

● The USCC and CCE should be supported, and they should continue to
hear from a broad swathe of U.S. China experts in their testimony;

● Think tanks should follow suit: promoting dialogue among China

experts across the spectrum of views described below at public events and
during collaborative work;

● Finally, the government promote Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues with
the PRC.

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 Knowing the PRC

Introduction
Common pronouncements of a “new consensus” in Washington on China
ignore wide variation among America’s China watchers.1 America’s China
watchers disagree on a host of issues: How much of a threat is China, and
what kind? Is China rising, or about to collapse? Was America’s policy of
“Engagement” a failure, or reasonable at the time? Was Engagement even a
thing? What does Strategic Competition entail? Proclamations of consensus
are over-stated, if not inaccurate.
The lack of consensus should be unsurprising and is no bad thing.2 U.S. for-
eign policy does not reflect pure rational calculations of threat or opportunity.
Shifts in strategy are result of messy policy struggles that will not—nor should—
cease. Baked into the concept of the national security community is that as a
“clearing house” or “market” of ideas, as the community tests, checks and filters,
policy recommendations and their intellectual bases, leading to better policy.3
To that end, in this paper I adopt a sociological perspective, foregrounding
shifting social positions in the China debate, and the processes by which the
community of China experts discuss, interpret, and frame China as an object
for U.S. policy, I map out the distinct positions on Engagement and Strategic
Competition within the China expert community. The topographical meta-
phor is deliberate. While individual experts view the world distinctly, nodal
views emerge, clustering around a small number of positions. Those positions,
in turn, contain holes and create blind spots. For example, a specific view
might be strong on description—“China’s human rights record is terrible,” or
“China’s middle class still represents an important market for American busi-
ness”—but weaker on prescription, or what to do.
I identify four primary groupings within the debate: the Strategic
Competitors, the Engagers, the New Cold Warriors, and the Competitive
Coexisters. The Strategic Competitors seek a new, more hard-headed, approach.
Viewing the U.S. and China as locked in a long-term competition—geopo-
litical, economics, and technological—they hope to operationalize Strategic
Competition as policy. The Engagers defend the record of Engagement with
the PRC. Typically more senior, with long-standing personal and professional
ties to China or China policy, Engagers adopt a long view, and remain opti-
mistic about cooperation. The Competitive Coexisters are mid-to-early career
experts grappling with how to promote cooperation within a competitive

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 David M. McCourt

c­limate. Rejecting many of the assumptions of the Strategic Competitors,

they focus on specific policy questions, particularly in business and technol-
ogy. The New Cold Warriors take a more strident line. Convinced that China
not just a competitor, but rival, even enemy, the Cold War is more than a met-
aphor. It is a framing definition of a global existential struggle for the hearts
and minds of people around the world, necessitating the expenditure of all
necessary military and economic resources.
Identifying these groups highlight gaps between their social locations and
policy prescriptions. The question of how to promote human rights in China,
in the context of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and whether to formally
repudiate America’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” towards Cross-Strait re-
lations, each represent critical “wedge” issues. With the New Cold Warriors
scathing in their rejection of Engagement and the Engagers trenchant in their
defense, the Strategic Competitors seek to frame policy as distinct from what
came before. In so doing, they are aware—with the Competitive Coexisters—
of the reality of doing business with China, diplomatic and otherwise.
I begin by centering America’s China watching community as a worth-
while object of analysis. Against the prevailing explanation—that China
changed rendering Engagement unworkable—I show that no amount of “re-
litigating” Engagement will forge a real consensus on what must come next,
nor, again, should it. I then analyze four major groups among America’s China
watchers, before identifying important gaps. I highlight these gaps in the
conviction that “consensuses” on any topic in the U.S. national security com-
munity should raise red-flags for those tasked with making policy. I conclude
with some brief policy-recommendations, centered on expanding the range of
voices heard in the debate, while fostering a broad community of knowledge-
able China experts.

America’s China Watchers and the

Rise and Fall of Engagement
What is China? With a population of 1.4 billion and a land area of 10 million
square kilometers, the answer is far from obvious. Is it the actions of the CCP?
Or the hopes and dreams of ordinary citizens? There is no simple object for
the referent “China.”4

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Despite this, an array of individuals profess authoritative insight.5 From

positions in the academy, the government, business, the media, and think
tanks, they analyze China’s economy, politics, military, society, and history,
interpreting its past and, for some, divining its future. Some adopt the label
“China watcher,” a term harking back to before the opening when sinologists
peered behind the “bamboo curtain.”6 The closing off of diplomatic exchanges
between 1949 and 1972 limited the number of knowledgeable Americans to a
handful of former diplomats, businesspeople, missionary children, and schol-
ars. Since then, the number of credentialed China experts has grown to many
thousands—from former diplomats to younger think tankers, from Wall
Street analysts to new media commentators.

Institutionalizing Engagement
From the early 1970s, America’s China watchers interpreted China as a
multi-faceted opportunity. They saw the PRC as a geopolitical partner
against the Soviet Union, a collaborator in growing cultural and educa-
tional exchange, a vast economic opportunity, a new world for scholarly and
journalistic discovery. At base, they knew China as something that needed
to be engaged.
Such understandings manifested at the policy level as “Engagement.” 7 The
term is a recent invention—first emerging during the run up to WTO mem-
bership during the 1990s, and later a way of negatively characterizing China
policy since the 1970s.8 Nevertheless, as a useful shorthand, “Engagement”
conveys how successive policymakers shared the view that China was an
enormous opportunity to be tapped, and sought to persuade the public of
the same. The precise nature of that persuasion varied and is today a topic of
contention, especially over whether Engagement was explicitly to the expecta-
tion—promise even—of liberalization in China.9
One tactic was to suggest that China could be brought into the Western-led
international order as a “responsible stakeholder,”10 and that greater integration
might even lead to changes in China in a more liberal, democratic, direction.
From the mid-2010s, China morphed in the American imagination. Out
went the vision of a complex object necessitating scholarly scrutiny and diplo-
matic engagement, and in came the idea that China was a bad international
actor, the essential nature of which was settled and which no amount of

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e­ ngagement could alter. While far from uniform, and not uncontested, a para-
digm shift saw the vision of China as country to engage replaced by a one of a
long-term adversary. It was increasingly accepted that China had reached the
“end of reform,” as a “third revolution” in the nature of the Chinese state—to
a personalistic dictatorship—had taken place, a dictatorship playing a “long
game” to supplant America as the global hegemon.11 While some remained
hopeful, many came to feel hopelessness, even despair.
What explains the transformation? Why did the growing Chinese econ-
omy—a place for the West’s largest firms to find growth after the exhaustion
of the North American, European, and other global markets—stop represent-
ing an opportunity and begin representing a challenge? When did Chinese
outbound investment come to be seen as a vehicle for destabilizing political
influence? In short, how did engagement and cooperation stop making sense?
For whom, when, and why?

China Changed
The typical answer is that China changed—its economic growth outstrip-
ping expectations, its interconnectivity altering political economies across the
globe, a widening definition of its core interests unsettling security architec-
tures in East Asia and beyond. From the first shoots of liberalization in the
1980s, China changed—or reverted—into an authoritarian state, one willing
to stamp down on the freedoms of its citizens—Uighurs, Hong Kongers, ten-
nis players—and make commercial exchange with Western companies dif-
ficult if not impossible. Beyond China, critics point to the militarization of
the South China Sea, ongoing threats against Taiwan, and attempts to spread
Chinese influence abroad—from United Front campaigns in Australia,
Europe, and the United States, to the sprawling Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). The widespread belief that Beijing hid the outbreak of COVID-19, add
to the impression that China is a bad international actor.
In the context of a bellicose and authoritarian China, a cooperative frame
no longer fit with reality. It seemed naïve at best, at worst corrupt—intellectu-
ally and otherwise. As Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner pithily noted in March
2018: “America got China wrong.”12 In such an environment, few could
continue to advocate in good faith for exchanges of various types with the
Chinese government and civil society.

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Other explanations complement the “China changed” story. China’s rise

and, for some America’s decline multiplies the effect of changes in China,
from irritant to threat. Likewise, commentators note the importance of the
election of Donald Trump in 2016, under whom the American government
effected the shift to strategic competition. A long-time critic of U.S. trade pol-
icy toward China, Trump made much of standing up to China and bringing
back American jobs. In office, he normalized tough rhetoric, and rather than
prevent officials from developing initiatives likely to annoy the notoriously
prickly Chinese, he empowered policymakers across government departments
to root out Chinese influence campaigns, and to investigate security vulner-
abilities tied to Chinese information technologies.
Developments in American thinking—and the strategy-making it under-
pins—appear therefore as straightforward responses to changes in China. Set
against macro-historical shifts in global power, and changes in U.S. domes-
tic politics, the sort of pro-globalization arguments of the 1990s now seem
arcane. Indeed, nothing could seem more obvious that U.S. China strategy has
changed in response to changes in China.

Engagement Reconsidered
The problem is that the world does not work that way. Knowledge production
and strategic thinking are far from automatic—especially in messy liberal de-
mocracies like the United States. Scholarly communities, like the China field,
are diverse arenas, featuring individuals personally, politically, and profession-
ally invested in the knowledge they produce, and have produced over their
careers. The changing of minds is an exception, rather than the rule.
The idea that China’s transformation led automatically to developments at
the level of American strategy, is thus a useful—even convenient—shorthand.
And not entirely inaccurate as many China experts have changed their views.
But it is not an adequate account of what has transpired, nor, therefore, guide
to what might come next. An adequate account would make plain which in-
dividuals and groups altered their interpretation, how, when, and in response
to what specific realizations or combination thereof—be it PRC designs on
Taiwan, the militarization of the South China Sea, human rights violations,
or some combination thereof. An adequate explanation would also make
plain the sources of such knowledge, again, of how China is made known. An

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adequate explanation of recent shifts in predominant interpretations of China

would make clear their specific provenance—be it an area of governmental
strategy-making or sector of the think tank space. Finally, an adequate ex-
planation would account for the positions of those who—despite prevailing
wisdom—still see China as more complex object than the military-security
framing suggests, an object still necessitating engagement.
Attempts to understand Engagement’s downfall are rendered difficult by
two tendencies in the policy and academic debates, however. A first tendency
is to present “Engagement” as a singular phenomenon—typically a coherent
strategy, policy, or approach. Take, for example, the United States Strategic
Approach to the People’s Republic of China of May 2020,13 which begins:

Since the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) es-
tablished diplomatic relations in 1979, United States policy toward the
PRC was largely premised on a hope that deepening engagement would
spur fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC and lead
to its emergence as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder,
with a more open society.

Note here the slippage between “policy,” “strategy,” and “approach.”

Which, precisely, is it? While some slippage may be desirable—allowing of-
ficials to evade the specific usage of strategy in Department of Defense-speak
as the rational alignment of national security mean to ends—such slippage
impedes scholarly analysis. First, historically it suggests a degree of coherence
difficult to sustain over four decades. Can Nixon’s approach to China and
Obama’s pivot really be lumped in as the same kind of object? Second, it sug-
gests a degree of concreteness typically lacking in international affairs. Has
Engagement really ended? What about top-level climate change meetings?
Are these not examples of engagement?14
A second problematic tendency is to assess Engagement’s record exclusively
within the frame of U.S.-China relations.15 China is only one aspect of U.S.
policy, and its history cannot be told solely with reference to major events in
Sino-U.S. relations. Most starkly, the primary rationale behind the opening to
Beijing was to further confrontation with the Soviets. While China is a con-
sistently prominent concern, it is rarely top priority—others, from elections

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to impeachments to pandemics, intervene. The Global War on Terror, for in-

stance, re-organized U.S. foreign policy away from a nascent pivot to Asia, for
the better part of 15 years.16
Together, these tendencies suggest the current debate mischaracterizes its
object, lumping together different contexts and concerns, themselves shifting
over time. For one a former long-time State Department official: “I do not
recall any debate over “engagement” per se with China; for that matter, the
word “engagement” rarely entered into the language of the 70s and 80s.”17 As
this interviewee elaborated: “The term ‘engagement’ only began to be heard
frequently during the [George H.W.] Bush administration, as President Bush,
National Security Adviser Scowcroft and Secretary of State Baker sought to
enunciate a new rationale for maintaining close ties with China—despite the
Tiananmen Square atrocity, despite the halting of political ‘reform,’ despite
the vanished Soviet threat.”18
The upshot is not that Engagement “did not exist,” but rather that since it
has no singular referent, no amount of re-litigation will set the historical re-
cord straight. “Engagement” is not a single thing, but a polysemous artifact of
the struggle among America’s China experts to shape U.S. policy. Of greater
import than defining Engagement is mapping the varied ways participants in
that struggle use the term as part of their political projects. It is to that task
we now turn.

Methodical note
This paper forms part of a broader project on the American China watch-
ing community and its impact on the recent evolution of U.S. foreign and
security policy toward the PRC. The main project data is a set of 135 origi-
nal semi-structured interviews with a range of U.S.-based China experts, in-
cluding policymakers, diplomats, think tankers, academics, researchers, and
journalists. U.S. data is augmented with 32 interviews with experts located in
Australia (16) and the United Kingdom (16)—connected yet distinct China-
watching eco-systems that, taken together, highlight some of the specificities
of the Washington policy milieu. In addition, the paper draws on an exhaus-
tive survey of secondary academic writings, think tank reports, media articles,
and government strategy documents and speeches.

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 David M. McCourt

Engagers, Anti-Engagers, Strategic

Competitors, and More
What are the major social groupings among America’s China watchers? What
do those groups believe? Why? In what follows I describe four broad groups in
the current debate: groups I label Strategic Competitors; Engagers; New Cold
Warriors; and Competitive Coexisters.
Any such mapping exercise necessarily does violence to reality. These catego-
ries should be considered “ideal types”—necessarily simplified accentuations
of reality, not to be confused with empirical reality itself, to be judged on their
usefulness for analysis and comparison.19 Where some individuals might fit in
more than one group, the aim is not to discern where they really belong, but to
identify them as outliers, and hone of our understanding of why they are so.
In the following descriptions, I name names only when individuals’ views
are public. The aim is not to initiate the sort of “food fight” popular inside
the Beltway. Again, the aim is not to identify “panda huggers” and “dragon
slayers”—since those labels are far from helpful—nor to question people’s
motivations and investments. It is to recognize “who is where” in the debate,
why, and what is policy perspectives are missed as individuals and groups fre-
quently talk past less than to one another.

The Strategic Competitors

“Strategic Competitors” can be defined as experts seeking to develop a new,
more robust and hard-headed, approach to U.S. relations with the PRC.
Viewing Washington as locked with Beijing in a long-term competition across
geopolitics, economics, and technology, these mostly mid-to-early career ex-
perts, not associated with the policy of Engagement, hope to contribute to
policy formulation and implementation in the post-Trump era. At the core
of the Strategic Competitors are those who theorized and then effected the
shift away from Engagement, first from within the Trump administration,
later continuing under Joe Biden. The group also includes those within in the
broader China watching community supportive of the new frame. The group
is broadly speaking bipartisan, despite the clear importance of the Trump
presidency for the change in rhetoric and approach. What unites the group
is less ideology than policy-focus—the urgency of conceptualizing and opera-
tionalizing a new approach to Sino-U.S. relations.

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 Knowing the PRC

The Strategic Competitors’ lodestar is Matthew Pottinger—Senior Asia

Director on Trump’s National Security Council and later Deputy National
Security Director. A former U.S. marine and journalist, Pottinger was
brought into the Trump administration by short-lived NSC Director Michael
Flynn. Together with a team of deputies at the NSC who shared his sense of
urgency, Pottinger managed not only to stick around in the notoriously tu-
multuous Trump White house, but develop a strategic throughput for a new
American approach to relations with Beijing. The most important statements
of the Strategic Competition approach can be found in the National Security
Strategy of December 2017, the May 2020 United States Strategic Approach to
the People’s Republic of China, and the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-
Pacific, declassified in January 2021.20
Although Pottinger and his team were at the heart of Strategic
Competition, the Strategic Competitors group is wider. Their military-security
view of the China challenge resonated with others inside and outside govern-
ment. For example, organizations like the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission (USCC), the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments and Project 2049, and its Director Randall Schriver—are in a
similar place, and have been for some time. So too, crucially, are a group of
Democratic-affiliated experts and organizations—many with connections to
the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)—including current NSC
China Director Kurt Campbell, and other members of Biden’s team, such as
Ely Ratner and Rush Doshi.
Despite the turnover of administration, therefore, Strategic Competition
remains the operating mode within government. As such, it has challenged
America’s China watchers to adapt to the new reality: either rethink their
own views, defend the old approach, or advocate a perspective yet-more criti-
cal of China and the CCP. In this sense, the Strategic Competitors group in-
cludes—and has drawn inspiration from—long-standing experts who have
changed their interpretations of the wisdom of Engagement, including Jerome
Cohen, Michael Pillsbury, Orville Schell, David Shambaugh, and Winston
Lord. Previously associated with America’s embrace of China, in different
ways they have all become China skeptics.
Like Engagement before it, Strategic Competition occupies the main-
stream view within the Washington think tank space—the intellectual center

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 David M. McCourt

of gravity—as evidenced by its position at core think tanks such as the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)’s China Power Project, CNAS,
and even Brookings and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The group
also includes mid- and early-career experts from these organizations and oth-
ers—like Jude Blanchette—especially those younger military-security special-
ists, like Elsa Kania, Elbridge Colby, and Hal Brands. Several China-skeptic
journalists also fall into this category, such as John Pomfret and Bill Bishop.
The boundaries of the Strategic Competitor position are nevertheless
fuzzy; the aforementioned might well disagree with their inclusion. Here the
comparative function of the ideal-type becomes evident—again, the identifi-
cation of boundary cases not to classify them fully, but to highlight why they
do not fit. Take, for example, a China expert such as Liz Economy—formerly
of the Council on Foreign Relations, now at Stanford University. Is Economy
a Strategic Competitor? Forthright scholarship focused particularly on
Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s role in the PRC’s global ambitions would suggest a
closer affinity to the Strategic Competition position than Engagement.21 Yet,
Economy has not been as critical of longstanding policy as others, highlight-
ing what ties the center of the Strategic Competitor group together.
Beyond the question of inclusion, then, the degree of “groupness” of the
Strategic Competitors is also debatable. No suggestion of homogeneity is
implied here. What is implied is a shared social location within the China
field. The expression of that social location is the belief that Engagement did
not work—that U.S. policy was predicated on economic and political open-
ing that has not obtained, and a mistaken belief that America could “change
China,” rendering Engagement in need of replacement. Some focus more
on the rise to power of Xi Jinping, some on the fundamental nature of the
Chinese Communist Party, some say another successor might have gone the
same way. For all of them, however, the United States is locked in a long-term
competition with China, not of its own choosing, but China’s. The United
States, they believe, must recognize this and mobilize all its economic, mili-
tary, and diplomatic resources for the challenge.
The social basis for the Strategic Competitors’ beliefs is thus primarily
their position vis-à-vis policy. In short, Strategic Competition is a “get tough”
with China position for those invested in making and theorizing U.S. policy,
particularly in the military and security spheres. The view’s typical expression

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are the myriad reports, papers, panels, and events on how better to compete
with China, from tech, 22 to security and diplomacy, 23 and including a strong
emphasis on human rights.24 This may sound self-evident, but is in fact any-
thing but—foreign policy often remains non-militarized or un-securitized.
The Strategic Competition view thus makes the most sense for those not in-
vested in going to China or investing in China, their career and personal in-
vestments being mostly Washington DC security space—primarily, but not
exclusively, at the “revolving door” intersection between the government and
think tanks.25

The Engagers
The Strategic Competitors exist in opposition to a group they replaced at the
levers of power: the Engagers. Engagers can be defined as China experts who
seek to defend the record of America’s Engagement with the PRC. Typically
more senior, with long-standing personal and professional ties to China or
U.S. China policy, the Engagers a longer time view, and remain optimistic
about what cooperation with Beijing can achieve.
At the heart of the Engager group is a set of former policymakers and
diplomats—notable among them Charles “Chas” Freeman, Susan Shirk, J.
Stapleton Roy, and Jeffrey Bader—who worked to maintain a degree of co-
operation between the United States and China, despite the shifting pendu-
lum of Sino-U.S. relations and occasional crisis. Beyond them, the Engager
group includes individual like Jan Berris and David “Mike” Lampton, expe-
rienced China watchers associated with the cultural exchange organization
the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (NCUSCSR). It also in-
cludes others coming to the same place on China, but from distinct profes-
sional viewpoints. One thinks here of think tankers like Carla Freeman at
John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Service (SAIS)
and Cheng Li at Brookings, or individuals like Charlene Barshevsky and Steve
Orlins from the U.S.-China Business Council. Finally, a core constituency of
the Engager group are academics, including MIT’s Taylor Fravel from, as well
as security specialists such as like Lyle Goldstein and Michael Swaine.
For the Engagers, “Engagement” was not a failure. It was justified from
the 1970s onwards, first as a means to counter the Soviet Union, and later to
raise living standards both here and in China, while promoting international

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peace and security, as—for them—it remains.26 In the Engager’s view, at no

point was a policy aimed at arresting China’s rise morally or politically defen-
sible. What the Strategic Competitors get wrong, in their view, is to confuse
outcomes in China—which Engagers agree have not been what Americans
would hope—with the intentions of American diplomacy, given that such
intentions are not promises. Precisely what, they ask, should American have
done differently? WTO membership stands here as a signal event the United
States might not have pushed so heavily. Engagers counter, however, by asking
whether successive governments themselves have been sufficiently committed
to such global institutions, and might have done more to hold Beijing’s feet to
the WTO fire.
For the Engagers, moreover, the terms of the debate appear are not only
stacked against the policies many had a hand in effecting, they are intellec-
tually incoherent. As one senior ex- diplomat to me, “the current rhetoric…
about the ‘failure’ of ‘the engagement policy’ is a gross misreading of the inten-
tions and substance of U.S. policy.”27 For Staple Roy, as a political argument,
the notion that Engagement failed “is the contention that Presidents Nixon,
Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush #41, Clinton and then Bush #43 and Obama all
misconceived ‘the national interest’ and proceeded willy-nilly into something
called an ‘engagement’ strategy toward China?”28 Just as importantly, perhaps,
Engagement was not really “a thing.” In their terms, what is now known as
Engagement was simply the prudent conduct of U.S.-China relations. For
Roy, “Since there was never an ‘engagement’ strategy with uniform contents
and goals, it is equally absurd to maintain that ‘it’ was a ‘failure.’”29
The Engagers laid out their views in an open letter to the Washington Post
in July 2019,30 arguing that Trump’s militarized anti-China rhetoric, together
with the trade war, risked creating the type of zero-sum security dilemma di-
plomacy the United States should be trying to avoid. Against the Strategic
Competitors’ argument that previous U.S. policies sought to “change China,”
the Engagers charge that, in reality, it is the Strategic Competitors who are
failing to accept China as it is. For the Engagers, while the Chinese govern-
ment are engaging in policies and actions we find abhorrent, engagement re-
mains the best way to keep America safe while advancing its interests.
Like the Strategic Competitors, what distinguishes the Engagement group
within the broader China field is its relationship to policy—in this case, past

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policy. In short, the Engagers believe what they believe because they have been
involved professionally in engagement—especially diplomacy, and cultural,
economic, and educational exchange.31 Many have spent their lives engaging
China, rendering it difficult for them at a personal level to accept the claim
that Engagement failed. Some, when pushed, might agree that competition is
a workable framework as a policy evolution, not a genuine revolution, since—
again—there was no long-standing Engagement (with a capital “E”) Strategic
Competition replaces. As Stape Roy told this forum in 2021, “the U.S. policy
of engagement has been discredited by knowledgeable foreign policy special-
ists who claim engagement was based on wholly unrealistic expectations that
it would produce positive change in China. There is no question that engage-
ment did facilitate Deng Xiaoping’s reform and openness policies that pro-
duced several decades of rapid economic development in China, resulted in
the globalization of its economy, and imbedded hundreds of thousands of
western educated young Chinese in governing and educational institutions
throughout the country.”32
The Engagers’ beliefs are also explained as much by what the Engagers are
not as what they are. The Engagers are not, for example, professionally in-
vested in human rights in China. This makes it possible for them to separate
the CCP government as agents of human rights abuses from the CCP as a
necessary interlocutor. While human rights-focused members of the China
community might prefer to isolate Beijing internationally, the Engagers view
some degree of engagement as inevitable. Finally, with some exceptions, the
Engagers are not professionally invested with China’s near neighbors—Korea,
Japan, and—of course—the disputed Taiwan. This pushes in the same direc-
tion—of the need to engage with China diplomatically and personally, not as
an ever-present “problem,” but on its own terms and as a global player in its
own right.
To summarize so far: the Strategic Competitors and the Engagers are two
distinct social groups located within the China policy debate. The groups are
not homogenous, nor are they closed or fully institutionalized. There are thus
points of overlap with the broader China watching community, which fea-
tures two further relatively distinct groups.

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The Competitive Coexisters

The next group are the Competitive Coexisters. The Competitive Coexisters
are mostly mid-to-early career China watchers grappling with how to promote
cooperation within a competitive climate. Rejecting many of the assump-
tions of the Strategic Competitors, they focus on similar policy questions,
particularly business and technology. Critical of the rhetorical and concep-
tual basis of Strategic Competition, yet recognizing that 2022 is not 2002,
the Competitive Coexisters seek a broader understanding of the U.S. national
interest, and display a marked skepticism not only toward politics in the PRC,
but in America also.
While, like in the case of the Strategic Competitors, there is some overlap
with the Engagers, the group is distinct, being mostly younger, and focused
less on defending the old Engagement than with theorizing a new approach.
In the think tank space, the group includes the Wilson Center’s Robert Daly,
Oriana Skylar Mastro at Stanford, New America’s Samm Sacks, and Damien
Ma from the Paulson Institute. The Competitive Coexisters also has a strong
base in new media, such as Kaiser Kuo's “Sinica” podcast, Jeremy Goldkorn’s
SupChina, and roving China watcher Graham Webster.33
The question of the group’s borders exact constitution remains, once again,
an open question. One illustrative case is that of Susan Thornton, former Acting
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Is Thornton an
Engager or a Competitive Coexister? Well known for adopting a more diplo-
macy or engagement-first position on U.S.-China relations than the Trump ad-
ministration she served under, Thornton accepts the reality of, but challenges
the rhetorical and conceptual basis of, Strategic Competition. In a recent New
York Times op-ed, Thornton notes that “The Biden administration has said that
the era of engagement with China is over…and is building coalitions to deter
and contain China militarily and issues frequent public critiques of Chinese ac-
tions. So unless something changes and more compelling incentives appear, I do
not expect China to alter its behavior.” For Thornton, leverage with Beijing will
only be developed if Biden “recognize[s] and give[s] due weight to the concerns
of allied and get[s] true—not half-baked—agreement on the agenda with them
first. This takes time, hard work and compromise.”34
Or, as another example, is Brookings’s Ryan Hass a Competitive Coexister
or a Strategic Competitor? Associated with Engagement due to government

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service under Obama, Hass remains active in seeking to shape the prevailing
policy narrative, in so doing he adopts the language of competition to look
forward from the Trump administration’s “experiment,” rather than back-
wards toward Engagement.35 For Hass, “The more Washington approaches
its competition with China from a position of confidence in its own relative
strengths, sets clear-eyed objectives, and executes a coherent strategy that en-
joys support from allies and the American public, the better it will be able
to craft policies that tangibly improve the security and prosperity of the
American people.”36
A final example of the Competitive Coexisters’ fuzzy boundaries comes
from a group of allies—whether aware of it or not—with a new set of voices
in the Washington landscape: the “restrainers.” The Quincy Institute
on Responsible Statecraft and the military-security think tank Defense
Priorities provides organizational hubs, where Michael Swaine and histo-
rian Stephen Wertheim are advocating for a reduced defense spending bur-
den and theorizing what it means for U.S.-China relations.37 The Atlantic
Council’s Emma Ashford adopts a similar viewpoint, as do IR realists such
as Harvard’s Stephen Walt and—from the UK—Patrick Porter. Individual
others, like career intelligence officer Paul Heer, share points of overlap with
the Competitive Coexisters.
While demarcation lines can be debated, what conjoins the Competitive
Coexisters’ position is the view that the rejection of Engagement was a po-
litical or tactical move by the Strategic Competitors, rather than a ratio-
nal policy response to changing conditions in China. Like the Engagers,
Competitive Coexisters worry about threat escalation, the securitization of
China in the American political mind, and the creation of faits accompli, in
which future leaders are locked into conflict even where they might hope to.
For the Competitive Coexisters, like the Engagers, China is more than the
Chinese Communist Party and its military-security apparatus. Competitive
Coexisters deeply care for Chinese people too, having often strong connec-
tions to real Chinese people. As one told me, “I have friends there, friends I
would give a kidney to.”38 Like the Engagers, the Competitive Coexisters do
not deny China is going through a period of increased authoritarianism. But
unlike the Strategic Competitors, the Competitive Coexisters do not see the
change as having been inevitable, nor a return to openness impossible.

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While they differ in their views of the necessity for the change in China
policy developed by the Trump administration, in general the Competitive
Coexisters see the “competition” frame as vague and unhelpful—smuggling
in imagery of great power struggle ill-suited to the reality of a multipolar, glo-
balized, world. Moreover, the imagery ignores important domestic challenges,
reflecting a willingness of the Competitive Coexisters to cast a critical gaze at
America when considering China. The generational difference between the
Competitive Coexisters and the Engagers here becomes salient. Where many of
the Engagers came of educational and professional age during the heady years of
opening to a still exotic China—roughly the 1970s through the early 1990s—
the Competitive Coexisters did the same in a very different domestic and inter-
national context. The Competitive Coexisters thus view current debates against
a backdrop of post-9/11 cultural malaise, including a marked concern about the
future of democracy and the socio-psychological effects of technological change.
For the Competitive Coexisters, “foreign policy begins at home.”39 Against
arguments that the United States should invest domestically to compete with
China—from childcare to infrastructure to vital manufacturing materials and
components—for many Competitive Coexisters, the United States should
do those things because they are good regardless. Competitive Coexisters are
also marked by concerns over possible implications of a new Cold War with
China, particularly anti-Asian sentiment in the United States and possible
violence.40 Others marry concerns over prudent policymaking towards Beijing
with a wish to promote female voices in the traditionally male-dominated na-
tional security space.41
The Competitive Coexisters hold their views for reasons the inverse of
the Strategic Competitors. The Competitive Coexisters are still invested
in Engagement, not competition. They do, practically, interact with the
Chinese—from think tankers, to diplomats, to people. They are not, at pres-
ent, positioned to make a specific policy intervention—although those that
might in future administrations may be inclined towards some form of roll-
back, which, in U.S. foreign policy parlance, will likely be cast as a “reset,”
which—we know from Russia policy—are notoriously difficult to effect. For
now, the Competitive Coexisters form a distinct, younger, group, within the
mainstream debate, but are no longer—as were the Engagers—at the center of
the China policy debate.

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The New Cold Warriors, or Anti-Engagers

The final group are the Anti-Engagers or New Cold Warriors. The New Cold
Warriors take a more strident line than the Strategic Competitors. Convinced
that China not just a competitor, but rival or—for some—an enemy, the New
Cold Warriors are on board with Strategic Competition as a frame for U.S.-
China relations because it is explicitly couched as a rejection of Engagement,
the long persistence of which many consider a dangerous failing on that part
of America’s foreign policy elite. For the New Cold Warriors, the Cold War
is not for just a metaphor,42 but a very real analogy to what they see as a new
period of global existential struggle for the hearts and minds of people around
the world in which the United States and China are now embroiled, neces-
sitating the expenditure of all necessary military and economic resources on
the part of Washington.
The New Cold Warriors includes strong military-security “hawks” and
some neoconservatives, one might think here of Robert Kagan and several
prominent ex-military and former intelligence officers, such as Brigadier
General Robert Spalding.43 Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo might
be considered part of this group, despite having been central to Trump’s ap-
proach to China and thus de facto a Strategic Competitor. The group includes
those with a professional interest in Taiwan and the military security threat
from China—here Ian Easton from Project 2049 comes to mind.44
The new Cold Warriors is thus a broad group, spanning the partisan spectrum
and the China watching community. It includes long-standing public critics of
the CCP—such as Gordon G. Chang—and journalists critical of U.S. China
policy, such as the Washington Post’s Josh Rogin.45 Advocates of a human rights-
focused foreign policy, such as Peter Mattis of the Jamestown Foundation and
AEI’s Michael Mazza, are on similar ground, as are several younger Congressional
staffers and politicos.46 A final, important, anchor is Committee on the Present
Danger-China, which collects a group of strong China critics with a civiliza-
tional view of the threat posed by Beijing—such as former Trump advisors Steve
Bannon and Peter Navarro.47 The CPD-China in turn connects organizationally
current China critics with long-standing opponents of U.S. policy, self-labelled
the “Blue Team”—a playful inversion of the military tactic of “Red Teaming.”48
For the new Cold Warriors, the new approach brought in by Trump fo-
cuses U.S. attention on developing a robust China policy, while offering the

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rhetorical space for calling what—for them—China is: a threat. In short,

the new Cold Warriors believe much of what the Strategic Competitors
believe, but cast in darker and more urgent terms. For them, China is a
bad international actor, a serial human rights abuser, and a clear military
security threat to American hegemony—particularly evident in the naval
sphere. Before Strategic Competitor Rush Doshi’s work on China’s “long
game” to challenge U.S. power, and Michael Pillsbury’s own Hundred Year
Marathon, new Cold Warriors like Navarro had come to the conclusion that
China has a real plan to emerge as a global great power by 2049, the 100-
year anniversary of the CCP’s victory in the Chinese civil war.49 Former
naval intelligence officer James Fanell, for instance, warned with growing
urgency of the PLAN’s growing strength, rendering the next 10 years a “de-
cade of concern” in U.S.-China relations.50
The new Cold Warriors share with the Strategic Competitors much of
their assessments of what China’s rise and changes in Beijing’s recent behav-
ior mean and require from America. But their support for U.S. policymak-
ers is dependent on the maintenance of tough rhetoric—and policies—on
China. Biden’s recent use of terms such as “responsible” or “managed compe-
tition” are alarming for those who, rhetorically, would prefer “containment”
or “decoupling.” For the new Cold Warriors, their views can be harder be-
cause they are, for the most part, not in positions close to policymaking at
the major executive branches. Instead, they are closer to Congress, public
opinion, and some hawkish think tanks. They are rooted primarily in non-
China-focused organizations—such as Project 2049, human rights groups,
and defense organizations.

Holes, Gaps, and Silences: Policy Implications

The above mapping exercise of the social worlds of U.S.-based China exper-
tise aids in the identification of both areas of agreement, and some of the
holes, gaps, and silences in their respective interpretations of China. Each of
the groups described above captures some of the “elephant” of China in U.S.
foreign policy, but not all of it. Baked into their interpretations and policy-
recommendations are specific understandings of China—its relations with
the CCP regime, the broader region, and the international community, for

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example—and America—a liberal hegemon tasked with underwriting global

order, or a normal great power managing international affairs in a newly-
multilateral world. Identifying gaps is not intended to imply they are easily
overcome. There are points of genuine disagreement. But it does help iden-
tify wedge issues from semantic ones. For the sake of space, I collapse the
four groups into two, exploring first the merits and demerits of the Strategic
Competitors’ position alongside that of the New Cold Warriors, and sub-
sequently, the Engagers and Competitive Coexisters, focusing particularly
on the policy discussion. I then explore three specific policy areas: human
rights, including the CCP’s persecution of Uighurs in Xinjiang, evidenced
by discussion of China’s hosting of the 2022 winter Olympics; the defense of
Taiwan; and military-security affairs in the South China Sea.

What the Strategic Competitors/

New Cold Warriors Cannot See
Many interviewees for this project accepted that, in the end, the Strategic
Competitors had done the United States a positive service by raising China’s
salience in U.S. national security conversations. This was especially true of the
broad group of New Cold Warriors, but also of many Competitive Coexisters.
Many agree that the time had come by 2018 to “get serious” about China.
Yet, by adopting the rhetorical strategy of politicizing Engagement, in so
doing exaggerating the coherence of U.S. policy toward China around its
most naive and optimistic interpretation, the Strategic Competitors leave
a hole at the heart of their position. Engagement with the PRC is not only
inevitable, but morally and politically necessary. Put differently, where the
Strategic Competitor position is strongest is in the urgency of the descrip-
tion of a China the United States can no longer reasonably expect to join the
“rules-based international order” on America’s terms. Where the position is
weakest is on the question of what, precisely, competing with China means,
and what space is left within the approach for the sort of diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military interaction that must take place to address areas of com-
mon concern unless a complete “decoupling” it to be the aim of U.S. policy.
Yet, as Engagers are keen to point out, even at the height of the Cold War, the
United States maintained lines of communication and some, minimal, diplo-
matic engagement, with the Soviet Union. Given China’s deep enmeshment

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in the international economy and global governance architecture—and, of

course, its nuclear arsenal—the sort of decoupling some New Cold Warriors
would prefer are not viable options.
Like Engagement before it, Strategic Competition will become going for-
ward simply “U.S.-China relations,” and getting on with it will be the name of
the (policy) game. However, the politicization of Engagement renders “getting
on with it” more problematic, for three reasons.
The first problem is rhetorical: the engagement component of strategic-
competition-as-U.S.-China-relations will have to be rhetorically justified, as
evidenced by the Biden administration’s use of the phrase “responsible” or
“competition,” which reflect initial adjustments faced with this challenge.
The word “engagement” might be off the table for now, but it should not stay
that way as meaningful synonyms are in short supply—“interaction” is vague,
while “cooperation” is even worse from a China-skeptic’s perspective. It turns
out, perhaps, that the “engagement” is usefully innocuous.
The second problem concerns the expert struggle itself. The politicization
of the manufactured notion of capital-e Engagement, contains within it a re-
jection of the Engagers as a social group of experts, many of whom are older
sinologists, steeped in Chinese language and culture. Yet, the prudent man-
agement of U.S.-China relations going forward, even in a competitive mode,
will still require experts knowledgeable in China, many of whom might have a
tendency toward a more Engager-type position. In short, the U.S. government
still needs China expertise, without the suggestion such expertise is, by its
very natures, politicized. As criticisms of “groupthink” and the advocates for
“red teaming” grasp, consensuses are not necessarily positive states of affairs.
The military-security knowledge common among the Strategic Competitors
is, to be sure, useful, but the U.S. government is not only the military, and
China experts of various types will be important actors in years to come.
The third hole in the Strategic Competitors’ position is political. Robust
rhetoric of competition and rivalry with Beijing has served since 2016 to justify
Engagement’s replacement. It has also empowered strong China critics, notably
in the media but also—crucially—in Congress, which has significant power
in driving China-focused legislation, notably that aimed at China’s human
rights abuses and America’s commitment to the defense of Taiwan. While
Congress should, of course, have a role in foreign policy, as the longevity of the

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1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment shows, once legislation or sanctions are put in

place by Congress, there are notoriously difficult to remove. They institution-
alize hostility and tie the hands of future administrations hoping to improve
relations. The danger of the Strategic Competitors’ position—both rhetorically
and practically—is to lock in hostility from the United States’ side of the rela-
tionship, regardless of what happens in China.

What Engagers and Competitive Coexisters Do Not See

A similar exercise illuminates the holes, gaps, and silences in the position oc-
cupied by the Engagers and the Competitive Coexisters. These lacunae revolve
around changes in the People’s Republic and the level of objectivity of the
threat from China felt by the Strategic Competitors and New Cold Warriors.
In short, China is now a rich and militarily powerful state with well-docu-
mented ambitions for regional and global influence. Beijing is seeking to exert
its power in ways overt and covert. The work of Clive Hamilton and col-
leagues on the actions of the United Front in Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States cannot be brushed to one side.51 Neither can
the Chinese deployment of a style of “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy in its global
interactions—a new forceful brand making compromise difficult to achieve.52
Engagement is an outmoded approach given this new reality.
But it is not only China that has changed in ways militating against the
sort of old fashioned engagement of the 1990s and early 2000s. The United
States has too, in ways acknowledged by the Competitive Coexisters but per-
haps underplayed. Engagement is weakened internally too.
The United States is now a deeply polarized society in which any consensus
on foreign threat or challenge is likely to elicit an outsized response. The new
right is louder, brasher, less concerned with anything smacking of the nuanced
and diplomatic—if China is bad, they would argue, it should be called out
openly, without reservation. Many younger people to their left are more con-
vinced of the virtues of democracy and that “a threat to freedom anywhere
is a threat to freedom everywhere.” Moreover, they are less tolerant of poli-
cies aimed at fortifying America’s multinational corporations, especially Wall
Street—a vital constituency for Engagement.
Much as some Engagers might think, therefore, the Strategic Competitors
are not naïve “dragon slayers.” While certainly focused on military-security

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matters, Matthew Pottinger and his team are well respected China experts.
The center of gravity of the China watching community has moved closer to
their position on what China means for the United States, with greater prom-
inence of defense generalists in the debate.
Most importantly, however, the Strategic Competitors successfully changed
U.S. policy ways that are not possible to simply reverse. The Engagers are no
longer in the drivers’ seat, and neither are their younger kin, the Competitive
Coexisters. After resentment of the fact has faded, engagers must act as a rea-
sonable “opposition,” which means framing both China and the United States
differently than they currently do. This fact explains why many commentators
have gotten on board the strategic competition train. But, as noted above, that
train will inevitably hit bumps that may push it off the tracks. When the ride
gets bumpy, the Competitive Coexisters need to be ready with a new way of
talking about a different China, for a different America.

Wedge Issues: Human rights and Taiwan

Two prominent challenges illustrate the policy gaps that emerge between
the main groupings in the U.S. China watching community. Human rights
and the defense of Taiwan each represent wedge issues that highlight genuine
disagreements.
On human rights, how far should the United States go to force a change
in Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang? China’s hosting of the 2022 Winter Olympics
highlights the dynamics of the debate. For New Cold Warriors like Randall
Schriver, China’s actions in Xinjiang render it unworthy of the honor of host-
ing the winter games. An “elegant solution,” consequently, presented itself in
the summer of 2021, when the games could have been removed from China,
and folded into the delayed 2020 Tokyo summer Olympics.53 While this ini-
tiative did not gain significant traction, it demonstrates the lack of concern
New Cold Warriors have in angering Beijing, which they see as a political tac-
tic used by to advance its geopolitical interests. For New Cold Warriors, the
only acceptable outcome is for the games to come out of China, or the United
States to reconsider its participation.
Given Congress’ strong views and activity on the issue of human rights, no
U.S. administration can genuinely avoid taking a strong stand on the topic in
the making of China policy. The Biden administration’s diplomatic boycott of

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the games is thus an attempt to plot a middle ground position, reflecting the
position shared by Engagers and Competitive Coexisters that human rights
concerns be recognized, but not allowed to dominate U.S.-China relations.
A boycott grasps the opportunity of protest, without punishing U.S. athletes,
corporations, and damaging U.S.-China relations too far. As Engager Chas
Freeman has noted, moreover, China was unlikely to have allowed high-level
representation in any case, rendering a diplomatic boycott relatively costless.54
Taiwan represents a second, and likely more crucial, wedge issue—crucial
on account of its potential to lead to active hostilities between Washington
and Beijing. Should the United States formally renounce its long-standing
policy of “strategic ambiguity,” a central pillar of Sino-U.S. relations since
the late 1970s? For Engagers especially, strategic ambiguity continues to serve
U.S. national interest, helping to sustain a peaceful status quo, and underpin-
ning a working relationship with Beijing and Taipei, and facilitating cross-
Strait relations.55
For Strategic Competitors and New Cold Warriors, by contrast, Taiwan’s
democratic development, together with Chinese moves toward unilaterally al-
tering the status quo, have changed the nature of the American interest.56 For
them, the time is now ripe to replace ambiguity with strategic clarity—mak-
ing it clear the means the United States would use in the event of Chinese
attempts to change the status quo. In his Strategy of Denial, China watcher
Elbridge Colby makes a forceful case for an Asia-focused U.S. grand strategy,
with defending Taiwan at its heart.57 The United States, Colby argues, does
not seek conflict with the PRC, but must prepare for one if it is to secure its
real goal of a “decent peace.” For Project 2049’s Jae Chang, Taiwan is a “mod-
ern day Fulda Gap”—a bulwark against the PRC’s domination of East and
Southeast Asia.58
Early in 2021, the Biden administration began to adopt the phrase “re-
sponsible competition” in relation to its China policy. Some China watch-
ers and politicos voiced concern the President was backing off Strategic
Competition, backsliding toward Engagement. Secretary of State’s Anthony
Blinken’s comment that the United States will be “competitive when it
should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be,”
solidified the fear.59 Yet bold statements, like NSC Asia Director Kurt
Campbell’s pointed assertion that “Engagement is dead” proved that

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r­ esponsible competition is less a new rhetorical departure than only one at-
tempt among many we are likely to see over coming years of threading the
aforementioned needle in U.S. China strategy.60
While the challenge for U.S. policymaking is not merely rhetorical, and
should not be confused as such—as just described, there are genuine wedge
issues that divide Strategic Competitors and Competitive Coexisters, issues
the Biden administration is tasked with addressing—the perspective adopt-
ing here suggests that together, Biden’s China team—Biden himself, National
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Campbell, Laura Rosenberger, and others like
Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner—re-
alize that the relationship has to be managed on an ongoing basis, that there
is no conceivable without interaction. They also appear to realize that while a
definite “strategy” might be a good basis for that management, the attempt to
define one—as did Pottinger and company—comes with political pitfalls. It
might be best therefore not to announce a specific shift, since any new label
would need to distinguish itself from Strategic Competition, which most are
on board with. Although unlikely to all be on the same page,61 they appear
committed to treading the fine line between rhetoric overly confrontational
and accommodationist. With “engagement” still off the table, images of re-
sponsibility, management, co-existence, and competition—presented with
strong valence—are the overlap point on the Venn Diagram.

Conclusion and Implications for Policy

Perhaps more than he realized, China watcher Elbridge Colby puts his finger
on the core issue facing America’s China watchers at the present time. What is
a “decent peace” for the United States vis-à-vis the PRC?62 Is the peace we have
with Beijing “decent?” If not, why not? In essence, the groups identified here
disagree on the answer and where to look for one. While policy implications
do not flow directly from the sort of sociological enterprise engaged in here,
nurturing a community able to answer that question is a policy implication of
the first order.
To that end, this paper recommends the main organizations of the China
watching community and the U.S. government endeavor to foster a broad
conversation across the groups surveyed here. Doing so requires renewed

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commitment on the part of the executive and legislative branches to support

critical language training, educational and cultural exchanges, and the sort
of people-to-people ties nurtured to positive effect during the latter stages of
the Cold War with the Soviet Union.63 Public diplomacy and Track 1.5 and
2 dialogues also provide knowledge and training of U.S. China experts, and
personal contacts, beyond the specific issues discussed.64 At the same time,
think tanks, Congressional committees, and the two main Congressional
China commissions should keep the door open to the broadest possible range
of voices from the U.S. China community. Together, such efforts should—to
the greatest extent possible—hinder the emergence of polarization, politiciza-
tion, and group-think, while arming the United States with a knowledgeable,
diverse, and vibrant community of true China experts.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 See David Brooks, “How China Brings Us Together,” The New York Times, February 14,
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/opinion/china-economy.html; Bernie Sanders,
“Washington’s Dangerous New Consensus on China,” Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2021; https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-17/washingtons-dangerous-new-consensus-
china; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/why-china-may-be-last-bipartisan-issue-
left-washington-n1261407; The Straits Times, “U.S. Consensus on China: The Fine Print,”
The Straits Times, November 1, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/us-consensus-
on-china-the-fine-print. All online sources accessed December 2021.
2 And, I will argue, is a good thing. Also Yasmeen Surhan, “Consensus Isn’t Always a Good
Thing,” The Atlantic, October 5, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2021/10/perils-washingtons-china-consensus/620294/
3 For a critique, see Daniel Drezner, The Ideas Industry (New York: Oxford University Press,
2017).
4 Harold Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1980); Richard Madsen,
China and the American Dream (Berkeley: UC Press, 1995).
5 See Robert Ash, David Shambaugh, and Seiichiro Takagi, eds. China Watching: Perspectives
from Europe, Japan and the United States (London: Routledge, 2006); David Shambaugh, eds.
American Studies of Contemporary China (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993).

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 David M. McCourt

6 Robert Austin and Anthony Clurman, The China Watchers (New York: Pyramid, 1969).
7 See Orville Schell, “The Death of Engagement,” The Wire China 7 June 2020, https://www.
thewirechina.com/2020/06/07/the-birth-life-and-death-of-engagement/;
8 While admittedly a crude measure, a Google NGram of “Engagement” and “Engagement
with China” provides some evidence. https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=%22
Engagement%2BChina%22&year_start=1970&year_end=2017&corpus=26&smoothing=3
9 See William Overholt, “Was US-China Engagement Premised on Chinese Political
Liberalization?”, The Hill, October 14, 2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/
international/576263-was-us-china-engagement-premised-on-chinese-political-liberalization
10 As then Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick expressed in a 2005 speech to the
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, https://www.ncuscr.org/content/
robert-zoellicks-responsible-stakeholder-speech
11 Carl Minzner, End of an Era: How China’s Authoritarian Revival is Undermining Its Rise
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution:
Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York: Oxford University, 2019); Rush Doshi,
The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2021).
12 Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning,” Foreign Affairs 97:2 (2018), 60-70.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning
13 See https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-
Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf
14 Respectively, “Biden, Xi Meet in Virtual Summit,” Washington Post, November 16, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-to-meet-with-chinese-president-in-virtual-
summit/2021/11/14/6f59b36c-45bb-11ec-973c-be864f938c72_story.html; “China Warns
U.S. Strained Relations Could Sink Climate Cooperation,” New York Times, February 2,
2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/02/world/asia/climate-china-us-kerry.html
15 See, for example, Schell, “The Death of Engagement.”
16 See Nina Silove, “The Pivot Before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance
in Asia,” International Security, 40:4, (Spring 2016), 45-88. https://muse.jhu.edu/
article/617461#info_wrap
17 Interview A.
18 Ibid.
19 See Richard Swedberg, “How to Use Max Weber’s Ideal Type in Sociological Analysis,”
Journal of Classical Sociology 18 (3), 181-96. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1468795X17743643
20 https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf
21 See Elizabeth Economy, “Xi Jinping’s New World Order: Can China Remake the
International System?” Foreign Affairs 101:1 (2022), 52-67. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/china/2021-12-09/xi-jinpings-new-world-order
22 See Sarah Miniero, “How the U.S. Can Quickly Build Greater Resiliency in Space,” Center
for a New American Security, December 14, 2021. https://www.cnas.org/publications/
commentary/how-the-u-s-can-quickly-build-greater-resiliency-in-space
23 Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng, “A New Arsenal for Competition,”
Center for a New American Security, April 24, 2020. https://www.cnas.org/publications/

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 Knowing the PRC

reports/a-new-arsenal-for-competition
24 Jessica Batke and Mareike Ohlberg, “China’s Biosecurity State in Xinjiang is Powered by
Western Tech,” Foreign Policy, February 19, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/19/
china-xinjiang-surveillance-biosecurity-state-dna-western-tech/
25 See David M. McCourt, “Framing China’s Rise in the United States, Australia, and the
United Kingdom,” International Affairs 97:3 (2021), 643-55. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/
iiab009
26 For an insightful set of reflections on Engagement, including contributions by many Old
Engagers, see Anne F. Thurston, ed. Engaging China: Fifty Years of Sino-American Relations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2021).
27 Interview B.
28 Roy, “Engagement Works.”
29 Ibid.
30 See M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael Swaine, Susan Thornton, and Ezra Vogel,
“China is Not An Enemy,” Washington Post, July 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-
11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html
31 In the economic sphere, see a recent industry open letter asking Biden to promote U.S.-China
commercial relations, The U.S.-China Business Council, “Industry Letter on U.S.-China
Trade and Commercial Relations,” The U.S.-China Business Council, November 12, 2021.
https://www.uschina.org/advocacy/regulatory-comments-on-china/industry-letter-us-china-
trade-and-commercial-relations. In education, see the report on U.S., Chinese, and Indian
perspectives on trilateral cooperation, Teresita C. Schaffer, “American, Chinese, and Indian
Trilateral Perspectives: Conclusions & Recommendations,” U.S.-China Education Trust,
December 2021. https://uscet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Trilateral-Perspectives-
Report-USCET.pdf
32 J. Stapleton Roy, “Keynote Remarks by Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy at
the Wilson Center China Fellowship Conference 2021,” The Wilson
Center, February 3, 2021. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/
keynote-remarks-ambassador-j-stapleton-roy-wilson-center-china-fellowship-conference-2021
33 See https://supchina.com; https://gwbstr.com/
34 “This is How Biden Can Get the Edge over Xi Jinping,” New York Times, October 21, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/opinion/biden-china-xi-jinping.html
35 Ryan Hass, “Lessons from the Trump Administration’s Policy Experiment on China,”
Brookings Institution, September 25, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/
lessons-from-the-trump-administrations-policy-experiment-on-china/
36 John R. Allen, Ryan Hass, and Bruce Jones, “Rising to the Challenge: Navigating
Competition, Avoiding Crisis, and Advancing U.S. Interests in Relation to China,”
Brookings Institution, November 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/research/rising-to-the-
challenge-navigating-competition-avoiding-crisis-and-advancing-us-interests-in-relations-
with-china/
37 https://quincyinst.org/; https://www.defensepriorities.org/
38 Interview C.

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 David M. McCourt

39 As outlined by CFR President Richard Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home (New York:
Basic Books, 2014).
40 Russell Jeung and Jessica Lee, “Rivalry Without Racism: Can America Compete with
China and Avoid Fuelling Anti-Asian Hate?” Foreign Affairs, July 28, 2021, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-28/rivalry-without-racism
41 Anne-Marie Slaughter and Samm Sacks, “Changing the Face of Sino-American Relations,”
Project Syndicate, April 2, 2021, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/us-china-
alaska-summit-diplomacy-women-by-anne-marie-slaughter-and-samm-sacks-2021-04
42 Hal Brands and John Lewis Gaddis, “The New Cold War: America, China, and the Echoes
of History,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/united-states/2021-10-19/new-cold-war
43 Robert Kagan, The Jungle Grows Back (New York: Vintage, 2019); Robert Spalding, Stealth
War (New York: Portfolio, 2019).
44 Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat (Eastbridge, 2019).
45 See Josh Rogin, Chaos Under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the Twenty-First Century
(New York: Mariner, 2021).
46 Respectively, Peter Mattis, “From Engagement to Rivalry: Tools to Compete with China, The
Texas National Security Review, 1:45 (August 2018), 80-94, https://tnsr.org/2018/08/from-
engagement-to-rivalry-tools-to-compete-with-china/; https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/12/
vol-6-issue-24/#MichaelMazza12152021
47 https://presentdangerchina.org/
48 Michael Waller, “Blue Team Takes on Red China,” Insight on the News, June 4, 2001, 23-25.
49 Peter Navarro and Grey Autry, Death By China: Confronting the Dragon (Upper Saddle Rive:
Pearson, 2011).
50 “China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure: Pathway to Hegemon,.”
Fanell’s testimony a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence on May 17, 2018, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/
IG00/20180517/108298/HHRG-115-IG00-Wstate-FanellJ-20180517.pdf
51 Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion (Sydney: Hardie Grant, 2018); Clive Hamilton and Mareike
Ohlberg, Hidden Hand: How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World (New
York: OneWorld, 2020).
52 Peter Martin, China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2021).
53 Randall G. Schriver and Surya Narayanan, “An Elegant Solution for the
Olympics,” Project 2049, July 8, 2021. https://project2049.net/2021/07/08/
an-elegant-solution-for-the-olympics/
54 ANI, “Athletes Will Be Able to Take Part in 2022 Beijing Olympics Despite Boycott:
Ex-U.S. Diplomat,” ANI, December 7, 2021. https://www.aninews.in/news/world/
us/athletes-will-be-able-to-take-part-in-2022-beijing-olympics-despite-boycott-ex-us-
diplomat20211207084144/
55 Steven Goldstein, “In Defense of Strategic Ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait,” The
National Bureau of Asian Research, October 15, 2021, https://www.nbr.org/publication/
in-defense-of-strategic-ambiguity-in-the-taiwan-strait/

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 Knowing the PRC

56 See Richard Haass and David Sacks, “The Growing Danger of U.S. Ambiguity on
Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs. December 13, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/2021-12-13/growing-danger-us-ambiguity-taiwan; Quint Forgey and Alexander
Ward, “Lawmakers: End ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Toward Taiwan,” Politico, October 7,
2021, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2021/10/07/
lawmakers-end-strategic-ambiguity-toward-taiwan-494626
57 Elbridge Colby, The Strategy of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021).
58 Jae Chang, “Coordinated Competition in the Indo-Pacific,” Project 2049, July 1, 2021,
https://project2049.net/2021/07/01/coordinated-competition-in-the-indo-pacific/
59 Cheng Li, “Biden’s China Strategy: Coalition-Driven Competition or Cold-War-Style
Confrontation?”, Bookings Institution, May 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
bidens-china-strategy-coalition-driven-competition-or-cold-war-style-confrontation/
60 The Straits Times, “Biden’s Asia Czar Kurt Campbell Says Era of Engagement with Xi’s
China is Over,” The Straits Times, May 27, 2021. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/
united-states/us-says-looking-at-quad-meeting-in-fall-focused-on-infrastructure
61 Katrina Northrop, “Biden’s Beijing Bind: Why is the President’s China Policy So Elusive?”
The Wire China, December 5, 2021, https://www.thewirechina.com/2021/12/05/
bidens-beijing-bind/
62 Colby, Strategy of Denial.
63 Support for critical languages appears to have cross-party support, if for somewhat
different reasons. See Michael R. Pompeo, “Here’s Why Proud Americans Should Learn
Mandarin, Other Languages” Newsweek, October 15, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/
heres-why-proud-americans-should-learn-mandarin-other-languages-opinion-1539222
64 For an analysis of early trends after the opening, see David M. Lampton et al. A Relationship
Restored: Trends in U.S.-China Educational Exchanges 1974-1984 (Washington DC:
National Academy Press, 1986). The success of “ping-pong diplomacy,” is, of course, legendary
in the field. See Nicholas Griffin, Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Secret History Behind the Game
That Changed the World (New York: Skyhorse, 2015).

191
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

The Key Role of

Multilateral Coordination
in the U.S.-China Health
Relationship
Deborah Seligsohn is an Assistant Professor in the Department of
Political Science at Villanova University and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Deborah Seligsohn

Abstract
For decades, the WHO played a useful role in easy tensions during difficult
times in the U.S.-China health relationship. That process failed during COVID-
19, leaving the United States without an effective way to interface with China
in a crisis. An international organization can suffer from agency slack or a lack
of independence. But despite these potential pitfalls, it can provide useful ser-
vices to its member states. Often overlooked are the ways an IO can help nations
address bilateral concerns. It can coordinate, provide international recognition
that encourages improvements, and it can ease sovereignty concerns. This paper
examines the history of successful partnership and the problems that led to the
failures of 2020. It makes recommendations for how to move forward.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● The United States should increase its support for the WHO, including
an increase in basic budgetary support by itself and work with other
developed nations to increase support, as well.

● The United States should support the strengthening of International

Health Regulations, recognizing that greater scrutiny will also come to
the United States.

● The United States should seek to develop for coronaviruses, and for
other key viruses identified by the global public health community, an
international surveillance regime similar to the influenza program the
United States has supported since its inception. This should be for the full
range of countries with a coronavirus risk.

● The United States should recognize that China is now a peer country
producing public health and scientific excellence.

● The United States should fully staff its health activities in China,
including CDC, NIH and FDA. It should also seek to resume
cooperation agreements with Chinese scientific entities and focus on
ensuring joint use of data.

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 The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the U.S.-China Health Relationship

● Much of the world still needs to be vaccinated. The United States

should look at how to ensure that its efforts and those of the Chinese are
complementary in getting maximum effective coverage, not competitive.
This may well require additional research on using multiple vaccine types.

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 Deborah Seligsohn

Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have profound and negative ef-
fects around the world. Not only has it brought death and suffering to
millions, but it has caused economic dislocation to hundreds of millions,
reduced global interaction and brought significant political stress to many
countries, arguably including the United States. International cooperation
on COVID-19 has been weak, despite multiple promises by most leading
countries to do more. COVAX, the global effort to provide vaccines to poor
countries, has only delivered half its promised doses, and most recently has
reported it can’t do more without an immediate cash infusion.1 And as the
world continues to struggle mightily with new COVID variants, there seems
to be little global effort to conduct the kind of surveillance for altogether
new coronaviruses that there is for influenza, despite the fact that COVID
was the third of these novel coronaviruses to emerge on the Asian landmass
in the 21st century. As shown by the emergences of MERS in Saudi Arabia,
and the global struggle to control COVID, these are not solely Chinese
issues. However, it is impossible to foresee a situation where China is not
critical to the global control of respiratory illness. It is simply too large, has
too many people in close proximity to animals, and is too integral to global
production capacity of vaccines, medicines and medical equipment, not to
be one of the most essential players.
The United States has long been a leading advocate for efforts to control
the spread of infectious disease with active involvement dating back to over a
century, especially in the Western Hemisphere.2 By World War II the United
States was the largest global health donor, first contributing over 70 percent
of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)’s
budget and then committing to almost 40 percent of the World Health
Organization (WHO)’s budget in the early years after the war.3 While there
was some isolationist pushback in Congress to the original WHO treaty, the
U.S. administration was central to the design of the organization. By the early
1950s addressing global health disparities through UN agencies was seen as
a key element of the U.S. efforts to counter communism. Ironically, the most
significant impact of Congressional concern was a special provision that al-
lowed the United States to withdraw from the treaty with only one year’s
notice, a provision that was actually used during the Trump administration,

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 The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the U.S.-China Health Relationship

although with less than a year to go in that administration, withdrawal was

never actually effected.4
From the beginnings of the WHO, the United States had more capacity
than the international organization and U.S. funding was essential to its op-
eration. Thus, the United States could have chosen a different route, focusing
resources on a unilateral overseas strategy of bilateral aid. But instead, support
for WHO and working through WHO on key programs was a critical ele-
ment of U.S. international health policy, particularly on infectious diseases
ranging from small pox to influenza. And yet, when it came to COVID, the
first year of the pandemic was marked by growing U.S. skepticism toward the
WHO and toward international health efforts in general and a substantial
reduction in U.S. material support for the WHO. 2020-2021 was the first
period in the organization’s history where the United States was not its larg-
est donor.5 The question then arises, what value did the United States gain by
working through the WHO, an organization where the United States, while
influential, could not dictate terms, rather than working independently and
bilaterally? Conversely, was the failure to leverage the WHO during COVID
a loss for the United States? And finally, looking forward, now that the United
States has decided to reengage with the WHO, are there ways that that the
United States can use multilateral participation as a way to advance its bilat-
eral health relationship with China in ways that promote global health?
This essay will examine the role that multilateral engagement played in ad-
vancing U.S. health goals related to China, specifically related to infectious
respiratory diseases. Because of China’s large population of both humans and
animals and the many opportunities they have to interact, Chinese health
authorities’ active involvement in collecting information on disease threats,
whether it be the annual changes in the influenza virus or the emergence of
new pathogens, has long been recognized.

The Relationship between the WHO and Member States

The WHO is a member-directed institution and yet often must confront in-
dividual members about health problems they might prefer not to divulge to
a global audience. It is both a highly technical agency with its own staff, and
it requires assistance from its member states to provide critical staffing and

197
 Deborah Seligsohn

infrastructure not just for emergencies but for its ongoing efforts. While the
major focus of previous studies has been on whether the WHO has autonomy
or is governed by the member states, with a focus on how the WHO carries
out its role, the focus here is on the reverse, the role an IO can have not just in
furthering its own goals (though they may coincide), but in facilitating rela-
tionships among member states. Specifically, I am looking at how interaction
and support for the WHO has supported U.S. priorities, although this analy-
sis is likely applicable to other members, especially those who actively support
WHO programs, as well.
The WHO as a one vote per member organization has long been responsive
to its developing country members’ needs. While some developed countries,
and particularly the United States are focused largely on infectious diseases
that cross borders, developed country members have advocated efforts related
to poverty, pharmaceutical access, and other issues with broad social and eco-
nomic implications.6 The public health literature focuses on the tensions in
WHO priorities in terms of the voting membership, which with 192 members
is heavily weighted toward the developing world, and budgetary constraints.
In particular, as the agency grew to rely on extra-budgetary or project fund-
ing from the 1980s onward, it had to become increasingly responsive to the
specific demands of donors.7
By contrast the international relations literature has framed the conflict-
ing pressures at WHO either as a principal-agent conflict, where the voting
method leads to agency slack8 or from a constructivist viewpoint, where the
same WHO professional staff are acting as “norm entrepreneurs.”9 In both
cases, the basic question is how much WHO itself is shaping international
health policy and acting as an independent institution. As Walt documents,
this framing does not address the fact that a great deal of global health as-
sistance capacity now resides in some of the member countries. Moreover,
the WHO actively works to develop the member country expertise it then
depends on through its support for domestic public health infrastructure and
the network of Collaborating Centers and Essential Regulatory Laboratories.
More broadly the literature also takes seriously the services that interna-
tional organizations (IOs) can provide to their member countries, including
the provision of a centralized locus for cooperation and/or coordination and
through IO independence, the ability to be able to act unilaterally on behalf

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 The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the U.S.-China Health Relationship

of global interests (Abbott and Snidal 1998), thus suggesting that IO inde-
pendence is not always agency slack. However, these discussions simplify
the complex nature of interactions between a highly technical agency that is
in fact heavily reliant on information and cooperation from all its member
states and on the even greater technical resources of its more prominent mem-
bers. Moreover, it tends to put the IO in the center of the analysis. This essay
turns that around to look at a bilateral relationship that in many ways was
prioritized by both countries above the success of the IO, and yet, using the
IO was critical to bilateral success. Without a successful intermediary at key
moments, the bilateral relationship suffered greatly, to the detriment of both
countries and the world.

The Groundwork: Influenza Cooperation

within the WHO Network
WHO founded the international influenza surveillance network in 1952, with
the United States as a founding member.10 The United States and other major
members were interested in ensuring globally effective surveillance and data
analysis. When China began to be more active in international organizations
in the 1970s, its surveillance was weak. Influenza surveillance is critically im-
portant, because even in the midst of a coronavirus pandemic, the international
medical community continues to view seasonal influenza as a major health con-
cern and pandemic influenza as an ever-present risk. Indeed, there have been
new flu viruses of concern during the past two years.11 The speed and sever-
ity of the 1918 flu pandemic and the fact that influenza viruses mutate much
more rapidly than coronaviruses keep influenza high on epidemiologists’ lists
of concerns.12 Many, but by no means all, influenzas of concern arise in China.
Concern about developments in China has been heightened since the series of
highly pathogenic H5N1 or bird flu outbreaks that occurred in Southern China
and Hong Kong and then spread to Southeast Asia in 1996 – 2005 period.13
U.S. CDC began to explore the possibility for influenza surveillance co-
operation with China in 1978 even before relations were normalized and
the U.S.-China Science and Technology Umbrella Agreement were signed
in 1979. Exchanges increased in the late 1980s and the first formal agree-
ment was signed in 1989 between the U.S. CDC and the Chinese Institute

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 Deborah Seligsohn

of Virology.14 Under the agreement the United States helped the Chinese set
up sentinel surveillance, i.e. a network of healthcare providers to collect influ-
enza samples, and upgrade laboratory capacity. Once basic lab work was com-
pleted in China all the samples were sent to be analyzed at the U.S. CDC in
Atlanta, which was also designated a WHO Collaborating Center. Initially
the Chinese sent the U.S. CDC hundreds of samples a year.15
The WHO influenza program was organized around National Influenza
Centers and then much more sophisticated Collaborating Centers, The
Chinese Institute of Virology (which in 2002 became part of the brand-new
China Center for Disease Control and Prevention or China CDC) was al-
ready designated a WHO National Influenza Center and thus the logical
partner for U.S. CDC. Essential Laboratories and Reference Laboratories
were in a much more limited number of locations. The United States, United
Kingdom, Japan, and Australia all hosted Collaborating Centers where flu
samples were analyzed and recommendations made, for epidemic and pan-
demic preparedness and for the composition of the annual flu vaccine.16
WHO’s influenza program is both one of its most effective and long-
standing efforts and highly dependent on member country capacity. The pro-
gram provides coordination, data compilation and knowledge sharing. Each
country designates a National Influenza Center, but these obviously have
different levels of capacity and expertise. WHO then designates key nodes
as Collaborating Centers to conduct more sophisticated laboratory analysis
and compile data. The influenza program also operated as the WHO’s key
pandemic detection program, since everyone involved pre-SARS, and even
most post-SARS, expected the next respiratory pandemic to be an influenza
virus.17 As both the United States and Japan became interested in supporting
global influenza surveillance capacity, the WHO became the obvious venue
for working out and deconflicting their assistance efforts. In 1998, the two
countries agreed to fund their bilateral efforts through the WHO.18
WHO’s role is more than facilitating aid coordination or compiling data.
The China case, in particular, demonstrates how important an international or-
ganization is for providing an incentive structure for countries to upgrade their
domestic infrastructure. U.S.-China cooperation to develop the Chinese influ-
enza program progressed steadily through the 1990s with the United States as-
sisting with laboratory capacity and helping the Chinese increase the number

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 The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the U.S.-China Health Relationship

of surveillance sites, although the overall scale was still rather modest. This was
partly attributable to a bureaucracy that didn’t promote its best young scientists
quickly,19 and partly that all of China’s public health infrastructure was quite
small and had not yet been formed (until 2002) into a government public health
agency as opposed to a research institute.20 In 2004 the United States and China
agreed to a major increase in ambition with a new bilateral agreement focused
specifically on elevating the Chinese contribution to the WHO system. A major
goal was for China CDC to become a WHO Collaborating Center, a result
achieved in 2008. Sentinel surveillance also grew dramatically, from a hand-
ful of sites in the 1980s to 3565 in 2006 all the way to 28,685 in 2014. At the
same time the number of labs able to run state-of-the-art PCR tests rose from
approximately one in each of China’s 31 provinces to almost 400.21 The WHO
program created clear metrics for success that gave Chinese medical could advo-
cate for internally. Indeed, a popular slogan in the years leading up to the 2004
agreement was that China should “get on the international track” (yu guoji jie-
gui), a slogan that realized its apex use during China’s admission into another
key UN-affiliated organization, the World Trade Organization.22
Both countries have benefited directly from the bilateral relationship, and
from the WHO’s role in coordinating, facilitating and providing imprimatur.
The improvements in China led to a more complete set of samples and rapid
analysis to inform the annual influenza vaccine. Chinese public health overall
benefited from improvements in lab capacity and those 400+ PCR-equipped
labs, which not only aid in addressing the ordinary burden of disease, but con-
tributed to China’s rapid effort to bring COVID-19 under control in 2020.
The United States also gained directly from working with China. For de-
cades the Chinese sent flu samples to the U.S. CDC in its role as a WHO
Coordinating Center. WHO brought considerable extra prestige to the rela-
tionship and helped smooth any concerns over sovereignty and data sharing.

CRISIS Response: the WHO role during emergencies

Bird Flu
Influenza mutates constantly, and thus catching every one of these changes
is essential for preparing for the annual influenza season and the appropriate

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vaccine. In addition scientists are on the lookout for large changes, a major
shift in type that means a much larger portion of the world’s population is
immunologically naïve and susceptible to the disease. This is what occurred
in 1918 and then again in 1957, 1968 and 2009. The first of these was aston-
ishingly deadly, killing an estimated 50-100 million people, 23 and both 1957
and 1968 were severe.24 While the H1N1 pandemic of 2009 turned out to be
milder than most with global deaths estimated at 189,000, 25 the concern re-
mains that a more hazardous influenza might emerge. China is always at high
risk because of the heavy concentration of people, poultry and pigs in close
proximity, which the viruses move between.
A more fatal influenza was identified in Hong Kong in 1997, the H5N1
bird flu. This flu had jumped directly from birds to humans and was incredibly
lethal, killing one-third of those infected. The concern was whether it would
lead to sustained human-to-human transmission. Most of the cases seemed
to come directly from contact with infected poultry. A massive cull of Hong
Kong’s poultry markets and new regulations on how to manage them seemed
to control it.26 However, Hong Kong is a populous city on a tiny landmass. It
imports almost all of its food, mainly from China. The suspicion, later con-
firmed, was that the disease had originated in Southern China.27 The WHO
and the U.S. CDC wanted a greater understanding of the origins of the dis-
ease to try to prevent further outbreaks. This kind of outbreak, where sus-
tained human-to-human transmission has not yet occurred, is controlled by
widespread poultry culls of the type that Hong Kong conducted in 1997. I
was living in the Southern Chinese city of Guangzhou at the time, and no
culls were conducted, nor was the outbreak ever acknowledged to have af-
fected the mainland side of the border. However, the general public stopped
eating chicken in fear.28
Despite almost two decades of cooperation, including some staff in Beijing,
the U.S. CDC found it much easier to work within a WHO-requested “mis-
sion” than to try to investigate this outbreak on their own. Investigation, in con-
trast to capacity-building, will raise many more sovereignty concerns. To achieve
its aims WHO treaded lightly. There was no public accusation of hidden cases,
but rather a polite request to visit Southern China to see if they could learn more
about the disease’s origins. The Chinese government allowed a mission to travel
to Southern China in 1998 with U.S. CDC representatives as part of the group.

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But that visit was described to me as a “complete whitewash” with the markets
selling live birds shut down, and the group’s request to see typical poultry pro-
duction denied. Instead they were shown a video of a high-tech facility, not at all
the average for late 1990s Guangdong.29 Much of what we know about the na-
ture of these southern food markets as the sources for H5N1 and then later for
SARS was due to the quiet work of researchers in Hong Kong, who went regu-
larly across the border in the wake of the original bird flu outbreak and collected
samples from local markets. By 2006 Guan Yi and his colleagues had collected
over 50,000 animal samples from six provinces.30
Despite the challenges of trying to obtain clear information in China, the
need was only more obvious, and thus U.S. CDC continued to work both di-
rectly and with WHO to obtain more information. By 2002 the H5N1 bird
flu started to emerge in nearby SE Asian countries, but before bird flu could
command full expert attention, a new and more infectious disease emerged.

SARS
In the fall and winter of 2002 rumors began to emerge of a new and scary
disease in South China. This was before widespread internet use in China,
and the rumors spread by text message on cell phones. Friends warned each
other not to go to hospitals. This new disease was ultimately named SARS and
the virus that caused it SARS-COV-1. But no one knew that at the time, and
the national government in Beijing didn’t know anything. Local authorities in
Guangdong did their best to keep the news from the Central Government, a
pattern that repeated when SARS moved to other provinces, and then appar-
ently at the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.
WHO received a note from an unofficial source informing it of the rumor
about this disease on February 10, 2003, illustrating the importance of an in-
ternational organization as a more neutral conduit than another government
would be. The WHO formally requested information from the Chinese gov-
ernment, but was told it was “under control.” Quickly, however, cases began to
emerge in Hong Kong and SE Asia, as well as in Toronto, and WHO decided
to send a team in investigate. U.S. CDC’s influenza effort was led by Dr. Keiji
Fukuda, who fortuitously was working on influenza issues in the region. Many
at WHO and in the international medical community thought the mysteri-
ous disease was likely to be a novel influenza, and Dr. Fukuda was invited to

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join the WHO team. Even with the WHO imprimatur getting access to the
area with the outbreak took some time. The team arrived in China February
23 and did not visit Guangzhou until March 4.31 (WHO issued its first alert
for SARS on March 13).
WHO was legally limited, since existing International Health Regulations
(IHRs) had mandatory reporting requirements for only three diseases and
did not have explicit rules for travel restrictions. These gaps were addressed
after SARS with a significant revision to the IHRs in 2004.32 WHO Director
General Gro Harlem Brundtland used the lack of rules to respond flexibly
and threaten additional action.33 Throughout March as additional countries
reported cases and global concern grew, Brundtland and her representative in
Beijing, Dr. Henk Bekedam, continued to urge greater transparency from the
Chinese government and to offer assistance in combatting the disease.
U.S. CDC again became involved when a second WHO team was as-
sembled with two CDC members of four total and began its visit to Beijing
on March 23. The team was forced to wait until April 3 to get permission
to visit Guangdong. The likely trigger for permission was WHO headquar-
ters issuing its toughest travel warning yet on April 2. However, by the time
the team arrived in Guangzhou the outbreak was indeed under control and
their question was what was happening in Beijing.34 It again took a number
of days to get inside Beijing’s hospitals. The team visited from April 10-15, but
only heard about SARS cases at a military hospital on the final day of their
visit. Beijing’s outbreak had first been revealed by a retired military doctor and
whistleblower, Dr. Jiang Yanyong.
Beijing ultimately announced its epidemic on April 20 and began to take
vigorous steps to get the outbreak under control, including putting Vice
Premier Wu Yi in charge of the Health Ministry, firing the Beijing Party
Secretary and otherwise signaling its intention to hold the bureaucracy to ac-
count. At the same time Beijing began to welcome international assistance in
the form of many more WHO missions, of which perhaps half the experts
were U.S. CDC.
During the SARS period U.S. CDC and WHO worked closely together
and with WHO in the official leadership role. DG Brundtland had the
power to threaten the Chinese economy through her travel warnings, and
these ensured that the Chinese paid attention to her concerns. Moreover,

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travel warnings were issued for many countries, so the Chinese could not
argue they were singled out. Despite the fact that the United States is a
much stronger and wealthier institution, the United States deferred to the
WHO to take action first and then followed with its own travel warnings.
The Chinese government response was slower and more halting than WHO
wished, due in part to central government reluctance, but in even greater part
to the internal local and provincial cover-ups that made the Chinese central
government unable to track their own epidemic for many months.
Once Chinese cooperation was assured, WHO needed the U.S. CDC as
much as the reverse. Some 40 U.S. CDC staff were seconded to the WHO
Beijing office to provide technical assistance after April 20. They entered
China with UN documentation, rather than U.S. official passports. CDC
Atlanta also assisted in sequencing the SARS genome.35 For the Chinese in
crisis, dealing with an international organization was both more urgent and
more palatable that asking for bilateral assistance. This outbreak required so-
cial distancing and contact tracing, but it resolved relatively quickly. By July
2003 SARS had been eradicated worldwide.36

Post-SARS: The Golden Period for

International Cooperation
After SARS, health cooperation blossomed. The return of H5N1 in 2004
and 2005, (which still was not transmitting rapidly human-to-human, but
was moving rapidly through poultry stock, was highly lethal and carried the
potential that a small mutation might make it more infectious), kept interna-
tional focus on China and infectious disease. The China CDC, only founded
in December 2002, right before SARS, began to expand in earnest and was
focused on rapid detection of outbreaks. They reported these H5N1 outbreaks
immediately to WHO and shared information with both bilateral and mul-
tilateral partners.
The United States began to increase its long-term on-the-ground health
presence in China as well as high-level attention. Both CDC Director Julie
Gerberding and HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson visited Beijing in 2003.
The new agreement on flu was signed in 2004, contemplating additional staffing
and support. The two countries began to negotiate for broader cooperation in

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emerging disease detection. In 2005, President George W Bush and President

Hu Jintao met twice, first at the UN and then when Bush visited Beijing in
November. They signed an agreement to cooperate on avian influenza, both
bilaterally and with the relevant IOs, including WHO and the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FA0).37
China CDC was vigilant and prompt in reporting cases of H5N1. The
major issue of concern for epidemiologists was that while the China CDC
was identifying the human cases of avian influenza, the agricultural authori-
ties weren’t catching the bird outbreaks. It should have been much easier
to find the birds, because thousands would get sick at once, but instead as
a number of people noted to me at the time the humans were acting as the
canaries. As a result, in reporting to Congress the United States still found
China “uncooperative” in the sense that WHO was not receiving needed
bird samples.38
Much of U.S.-China bilateral cooperation did not intersect that closely
with the WHO’s main efforts. But as one top Bush era official described the
attitude of that time: “The presumption was that the Chinese were good
actors that they were playing by the international rules that they were meet-
ing international standards, both for quality and for ethics.”39 The United
States had a CDC secondee working on childhood vaccinations at WHO’s
Beijing office for decades. WHO continue to have its very broad mandate,
which the U.S. supported and for some of these years assigned an expert
in tobacco control to WHO, as well. But the major U.S. bilateral effort fo-
cused much more narrowly on infectious disease. This included robust HIV/
AIDS programs that had gotten underway just before the SARS outbreak.
CDC’s Global AIDS Program originally located itself in the same building
as WHO Beijing but found to their surprise that they had much less coordi-
nation and interaction than expected.40 Nevertheless, for both HIV/AIDS
and influenza there were clear WHO counterparts. The focus the United
States put on emerging infections was different. WHO did not have such a
specific program. Thus, while relations were amicable throughout the Bush
and Obama years, the U.S. bilateral program operated mainly without rely-
ing on WHO’s diplomatic resources.

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A Weakening of Relations
The complex web of a relationship between the United States, China, and the
WHO began to fray in the later years of the Obama administration. While
there was a strong commitment to the importance of a China relationship
through 2016, there was already less optimism than there had been in earlier
years.41 There was a shift toward relying only on the bilateral relationship, and
then disappointment with the results.
Bilateral cooperation during Ebola outbreak in West Africa had given the
Obama administration hope that the bilateral relationship could be further
developed to collaboratively address multilateral aims. WHO’s response
was widely criticized,42 while the United States sent extraordinary numbers
of staff and equipment to assist, including some 4000 from the U.S. CDC
alone,43 and the Chinese also had teams in West Africa.44 The two countries
had limited interaction with WHO. In Sierra Leone, the two countries’ teams
worked together, and they subsequently agreed to cooperate in helping to es-
tablish an Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.45
From numerous interviews with officials from that time, the United States
was already becoming concerned about Chinese cooperation in the Africa CDC
project in the latter years of the Obama administration. One issue that came
up in a number of anonymous interviews was the Chinese desire for samples.
While the U.S. CDC had received many samples from China over the years
and access to samples is often a key goal for U.S. CDC, there was considerable
and growing suspicion of Chinese purposes in gaining samples. There came to
be a view that the Chinese were trying to obtain DNA to “track individuals.”46
There doesn’t appear to be evidence that the Chinese were using DNA to track
anyone in Africa, but this issue became mixed with the actual cases of Chinese
companies’ sales of facial recognition and other types of surveillance equipment
to African dictators.47 At the same time there was also some concern about
whether DNA collected in Africa might be used by Chinese biotech companies.
These links were all vague, and certainly can’t be documented using any public
sources. However, they contributed to a growing sense of unease surrounding
the relationship. But in the Obama administration, these concerns were bal-
anced with concern for maintaining health ties with China.
In the early days of the Trump administration the health relationship ap-
peared to be on track. Trump’s short-lived first HHS Secretary, Tom Price,

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v­ isited China, and his second, Alex Azar, also discussed the possibility of a
visit. But by 2018 the relationship was deteriorating with those in the field
receiving little interest from Washington.48 While U.S. health personnel
in China continued to reach out to their WHO and bilateral counterparts,
where there were actual WHO counterparts (which there weren’t on the
emerging infections portfolio),49 these also diminished because others did not
want to be affected by the increasingly negative overall relationship between
China and the United States.50 The overall science relationship got further
bogged down by an eighteen month lapse in the renewal of the umbrella gov-
ernment-to-government cooperative agreement that only got renewed shortly
before the COVID-19 outbreak.
CDC programs were also cut. Both the Global Disease Detection Program
and the Field Epidemiology Training Programs were slashed.51 At the same
time a number of key NIH agreements also lapsed.52
Working in China also became more complex over this period. In April
2018, the Chinese State Council enacted regulations requiring international
research go through government data centers before it could be used by for-
eign researchers.53 In speaking to experts with decades of experience in mul-
tiple U.S. scientific agencies, they identified the changes in China as real, but
believed that the best way to address them successfully was through govern-
ment attention and action. Both NIH and NSF had successful collaborative
programs, including on infectious disease that they were able to maintain.
Government-to-government agreements have long been used to protect sci-
entists from accusations of improper data handling. The CDC approach in-
cluded both agreements and the physical presence of its scientists within the
China CDC structure. With less support from Washington, reduced staffing
and a lapsed umbrella agreement, much of this structure was declining, just as
it was becoming more complex to work in China.

COVID-19–Starting from Behind

When a new virus emerged in central China that would rapidly lead to the
worst pandemic in 102 years, the United States while not blind, but was se-
verely limited when compared to its capacity a few years before. COVID-19,
not yet identified, began circulating in Wuhan some time in November or

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early December, and by late December the Wuhan government had put a no-
tice on its website, which WHO’s Beijing office spotted December 31. WHO
requested information from the Chinese government in Beijing on January
1st and alerted the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN)
on January 2.54 By January 3, the Directors of the China CDC and U.S. CDC
were speaking by phone,55 and on January 6 U.S. CDC Director Robert
Redfield sent an offer of assistance to the China CDC.56
There followed a period where the Chinese government reported some lim-
ited number of cases to the WHO and then stopped. But the Chinese pub-
lished the full COVID-19 genome on January 1157 and by January 22, 2020,
it began reporting numbers regularly to WHO and allowed a WHO team to
visit Wuhan.58 By late January, the Chinese government had set up an effec-
tive program to control the disease, essentially closing down the entire prov-
ince of Hubei, where Wuhan is located, setting up separate fever hospitals,
and sending in some 9000 epidemiologists to assist with tracking and tracing.
They also rapidly imposed lockdowns in the rest of China, with the result that
the vast majority of cases for the first two years were in these early months in
Wuhan and surrounding Hubei province. Until the omicron variant entered
China in 2022, some 70 percent of China’s 100,000+ cases were in Hubei
province.59 As a result, while China looked at first like it was doing badly, it
then did quite well for two years. While without doubt the Chinese missed a
number of early cases, it is now generally accepted that globally health systems
are identifying no more than one-fourth of those infected.60
At the same time, the United States was having a difficult time incorpo-
rating information that was coming from China into its own response. The
remaining U.S. personnel on the ground had little access to information with
no regular contact with a China CDC that was both politically cautious and
working round the clock.61 It is unclear whether Redfield and those who
advised him within U.S. CDC underestimated Chinese capacity or made
a clumsy attempt to get a virus sample. Their offer to help map the genome
was not needed—the Chinese published it shortly thereafter—and because
of Chinese participation the NIH Human Genome Project, Chinese institu-
tions’ capacity was well-known in the United States.
Similarly, the United States seemed to be skeptical of WHO expertise. The
U.S. CDC chose not to use a WHO-developed test62 and then later did not

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appear to use information gleaned by the U.S. expert on the second WHO
mission to China in February 2020.63 The United States had relied heavily
on this type of expert during the early months of the SARS outbreak,64 but in
this case there was little evidence that any of the lessons learned, such as the
importance of fever hospitals and isolating patients before they were symp-
tomatic were transferred. While the U.S. CDC sent 4000 staff to West Africa
during Ebola, and they knew from the WHO teams that China had sent
9000 contact tracers to Wuhan, no similar effort was organized to shore up
support for New York and other hard-hit cities early in the pandemic. In fact,
instead of using the insights available through participation in the WHO, the
Trump administration first denied the problem, and then when it finally had
to recognize it, chose to blame China,65 blame WHO66 and complain about
the lack of unilateral access to China in January.
The United States also led the call for an investigation into the origins
of SARS-COV-2. Determining viral origins is complex biological investi-
gation, not a legal inquest, and it often takes years or even decades. SARS
link to the civet cat was not determined until after the disease had been
eradicated, 67 and HIV/AIDS origins were not narrowed to central Africa
until decades into the epidemic.68 A group of five of the world’s top vi-
rologists published a paper in Nature Medicine in March 2020 that de-
bunked the widespread rumor of a bioengineered SARS-COV-2 (where
Chinese had blamed the U.S. Army and the United States had blamed a
Chinese lab), suggested a lab leak was unlikely and that the most likely
scenarios were a recent jump to humans from animals or an earlier jump
with a subsequent mutation. Since then the debate has become even more
heated, but the best estimate of virologists is that animal origins are most
likely. 69 Moreover, looking at who the Chinese government chose to pun-
ish in Hubei and Wuhan—over 300 people,70 and none from the Wuhan
Institute of Virology—it does not appear that the Chinese government sus-
pected the lab in any way. In fact, from the rapid response to the outbreak,
including decontaminating the markets (a standard procedure for outbreaks
in China) it appears that the local government believed there was an animal
origin, but did not have a more precise sense than that. What is clear at this
point is that efforts from the first WHO mission to look at origins stalled
in the subsequent political controversy, and that the more time elapses, the

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less likely that definitive evidence will be found. It may be, but as with HIV/
AIDS, it may be approximate.
WHO, like any member-serving agency whose budget depends entirely on
its members, has been perceived as highly solicitous of its largest members.
What this tends to mean is that U.S. politicians tend to think the organiza-
tion treated China too lightly, while the Chinese perceive the WHO as bow-
ing to U.S. pressure.71 Numerous career interlocutors pointed out to me that
while the WHO is solicitous of China, it is even more so of the United States,
given its position as one of the founders and historically the largest donor.
The United States was demanded this WHO investigation even after it an-
nounced its planned departure from the organization. Since President Biden
recommitted the United States to the WHO, his administration has not been
visibly supportive of the WHO effort to look into virus origins. In fact, the
administration announced its 90-day intelligence review of the origins right
after the WHO mission’s return,72 contributing to the controversy that has de-
railed the WHO process. The intelligence review turned up no new informa-
tion, with most members of the intelligence community having no opinion on
the origins, and the few they did being split. When the intelligence commu-
nity released more information in October of 2021, they acknowledged that
it was highly unlikely that the origins would be determined.73 But the review’s
release was accompanied by a highly critical press release from the White
House, condemning Chinese lack of transparency and accusing the Chinese
of “withholding information.” 74 The problem with this framing is that while
there has been poor communication between China and the United States,
it does not appear that the Chinese are hiding information they have. There
is no indication that they know the origins of the disease. The U.S. response,
demanding an international inspection of the Wuhan lab, draws Chinese ire,
since it is highly unlikely that the United States would invite such an inspec-
tion of one of its government research facilities. In fact, unlike in the 1990s
when a number of China CDC personnel spent months at CDC Atlanta
learning how to run a public health lab, U.S. facilities now are far more closed,
and Chinese are required to get clearance months in advance and are limited
in what they can access.
Thus, with COVID-19 the United States did not use the WHO as an ef-
fective partner. In multiple cases, the United States has found the WHO too

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slow in its responses. The United States wanted greater pressure on China in
the early days of COVID-19. WHO followed its usual approach of negotiat-
ing with the affected country—it has no power to simply barge in—and ac-
tually received a much more rapid response than was the case during SARS.
However, COVID-19 turned out to be a much more rapidly progressing dis-
ease. Similarly, WHO did negotiate a mission to look into COVID origins,
and that mission came out with a significant workplan. But the United States
wanted an answer to COVID origins in 90 days, and chose to go it alone.
The United States had significant experience working with the WHO to
address global health needs and to deal with the complexities of promoting
global health bilaterally. Over the years, the WHO had helped in coordinat-
ing, in providing international recognition and prestige and in reducing sover-
eignty concerns. In pushing the WHO so hard on the COVID origins ques-
tion, the United States has not advanced the science, and it has run directly
into the sovereignty issues that WHO as a member organization tries to deal
with diplomatically. There isn’t a simple answer to how to work with China
on global health or any other issue. But there are a set of issues, and health
is one, where we can’t achieve health and safety for ourselves, much less for
others around the world, without cooperating. The evidence of the last several
decades is that an international organization can be an effective partner, and
without it the chances of success are even lower.

Conclusion
Working with multilateral organizations can be challenging. They need to be
responsive to all their member states, but they convey real advantages. Especially
in challenging times they have more access precisely because other countries are
members, even if this means compromise. Neither a multilateral organization
nor the United States is going to use threats of force for a health question, so the
truth is the only tool any country or IO has is diplomacy. What is clear is that
the WHO actually does gain important information from member countries. It
is also often able to gain access for U.S. experts during health crises from H5N1
to COVID. It provides an incentive structure for other countries, including
China, to improve their health efforts, and this has been remarkably effective in
China, as demonstrated by its improved influenza surveillance.

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While COVID has certainly been a challenge, the Chinese moved much
more quickly than during SARS. Regrettably, the disease moved even more
quickly. But that does not obviate the fact that both U.S. bilateral efforts and
WHO engagement over the decade plus since SARS meant that the Chinese
response was swifter and more effective than it had been 17 years earlier.
The United States and China now have a much more contentious overall
relationship, and so the question is how best to use this experience for the
current moment. We cannot assume that relations will operate as they did in
the past, but given that the bilateral relationship is rocky, engaging through
multilateral partners seems all the more urgent. The truth is that the United
States was asked to join each WHO team. The failures to use this information
effectively were domestic. Thus, to expand on the policy recommendations
presented at the beginning of this paper:

● The United States should increase its support for the WHO, including
an increase in basic budgetary support by itself and work with other
developed nations to increase support, as well. WHO’s major challenges
with efficacy are due to under-funding. Working with peer nations
with difficult relationships mean that having a respected and effective
international organization is even more important.

● The United States should support the strengthening of International

Health Regulations, recognizing that greater scrutiny will also come to
the United States. To have better compliance by other nations will mean
that U.S. failures, in particular the failure to better protect U.S. citizens
from disease and death during the COVID pandemic, will be subjects
addressed by the international community.

● The United States should seek to develop for coronaviruses, and for
other key viruses identified by the global public health community,
an international surveillance regime similar to the influenza program
the United States has supported since its inception. Given that novel
coronaviruses have emerged in as geographically disparate locations
as Saudi Arabia and China, and that SARS-COV2 has now produced
multiple variants, some type of global surveillance system similar to

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influenza appears critical. The United States worked directly with China
to enhance both its collection and lab capabilities within the WHO
umbrella. A similar effort is needed for coronaviruses. Presenting this
as global or regional will reduce the risk that such a proposal is viewed
as simply criticism of China. Focusing purely on China makes no sense
either technically or politicall

● The United States should recognize that China is now a peer country
producing public health and scientific excellence. While there are many
gaps in China’s performance, there are also gaps in U.S. performance (as
witnessed by our COVID response), and thus we should not expect that
uniform excellence is the mark of a peer country. To this end it means we
should actively seek to learn as much as we seek to teach, and encourage
scientific cooperation that enhances our own capacities

● The United States should fully staff its health activities in China,
including CDC, NIH and FDA. It should also seek to resume
cooperation agreements with Chinese scientific entities and focus on
ensuring joint use of data. The United States currently has unfilled
positions at its mission in China, so increasing staff would not require
new bilateral agreements. But new bilateral agreements will also be
essential. In speaking with those who have worked on these in recent
years, there is still interest in collaborative work in China. The need is for
support from Washington.

● sMuch of the world still needs to be vaccinated. This is an effort where

U.S.-China cooperation within a global umbrella could make substantial
progress. There is a real need to work with the Chinese to ensure their
large production capacity is used effectively. Areas of joint study could
include heterologous vaccination regimens (a Chinese vaccine followed by
an mRNA) as well as whether there are some possibilities for enhancing
local vaccines’ efficacy. Global vaccination should be framed as a global
public good, not a competition, just as it has been in the eradication of
smallpox and the ongoing effort to eradicate polio.

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● China is now facing a new and challenging period in facing the virus,
the United States should reach out with respect and concern. If the U.S.
government can refrain from accusing China—for instance once again
questioning data, when we ourselves have real data gaps—and instead
address the fact that it is now facing real challenges, there may well be an
opportunity to improve our work together. The Chinese are going to need
to think in new ways about testing, vaccination and treatments, issues the
United States has been facing for the last two years.

COVID-19 has brought challenges not seen in public health in a century.

It unfortunately arose at a low point in U.S.-China relations. The overall re-
lationship is likely to continue to be rocky. As the United States has recently
seen in other conflicted situations, this makes the need for partnership even
great. Over the years, WHO has been an effective partner for the United
States. It will not do everything the United States wants, because it has to
be responsive to its member countries, but it is effective and has always wel-
comed U.S. expertise. Through WHO teams and programs it has provided
the United States with its best window into China when there is a health
emergency. China is not the only country with disease risk, but because of
the concentration of people and animals it will continue to be one major con-
cern. We, thus, need to work both to improve our health relationship with the
Chinese and to support the international organization whose mission it is to
promote global health. COVID-19 is not the last pandemic we will face.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

215
 Deborah Seligsohn

Notes
1 Donato Paolo Mancini, “Cash Shortages Mean Covax Cannot Accept New Doses, Says
Executive,” The Financial Times, January 25, 2022. Accessed March, 15, 2022. https://www.
ft.com/content/d8506581-81a3-4cd2-bf3c-073eca9a0ae4
2 “History of PAHO,” Accessed March, 15, 2022. https://www.paho.org/en/who-we-are/
history-paho
3 Details on WHO’s predecessors and founding come from the first two chapters of Cueto,
Marcos, Theodore M. Brown, and Elizabeth Fee, The World Health Organization: A History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). However, the specific number for the U.S.
contribution to WHO is misstated and I have corrected it from the original source: Rusk,
Howard A, “World Health Organization Needs Active Help of U.S.,” The New York Times,
April 4, 1948. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/1948/04/04/archives/
world-health-organization-needs-active-help-of-u-s-ratification.html
4 Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Withdrawal from the World Health Organization:
Process and Implications,” October 21, 2020, Accessed March 15, 2022. https://sgp.fas.
org/crs/row/R46575.pdf cites the date for withdrawal as July 6, 2021. In the event, the
Biden withdrew the request on January 20, 2021, appointing Dr. Anthony Fauci as the U.S.
Representative to the World Health Assembly. Christina Moralies, “Biden Restores Ties with
the World Health Organization that were Cut by Trump,” The New York Times, January
20, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/world/biden-
restores-who-ties.html
5 Francesco Guarascio and Emma Farge, “Exclusive: U.S. Funding to WHO Fell by 25 percent
During Pandemic,” Reuters, January 25, 2022. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.reuters.
com/world/exclusive-us-funding-who-fell-by-25-during-pandemic-document-2022-01-25/
6 Theodore M. Brown, Marcos Cueto, and Elizabeth Fee, “The World Health Organization
and the Transition From “International” to “Global” Public Health,” American Journal of
Public Health 96:1 (2006), 62-72. Accessed March 15, 2022 https://ajph.aphapublications.
org/doi/pdfplus/10.2105/AJPH.2004.050831 Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson,
“Dutiful Agents, Rogue Actors, or Both? Staffing, Voting Rules, and Slack in the WHO
and WTO,” Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge, UK (2006).
Gill Walt, “WHO under Stress: Implications for Health Policy.” Health Policy 24:2 (1993),
125-144. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/
pii/016885109390030S
7 Walt 1993.
8 Cortell and Peterson 2006.
9 Sara E. Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott, and Simon Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International
Norms and Global Health Security, (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2015); Kathryn Sikkink,
“Codes Of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/UNICEF
Code,” International Organization (1986), 815-840. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.
jstor.org/stable/pdf/2706830.pdf?casa_token=gaHbORyKhcQAAAAA:Nc6AIXv85_
DLaytU2FCdU2T-b5W-bEyqdfXg0uIEI0GOz2kdVNOW3Qdv_fuTJ-ptXC_3KQnKdL
DekAgiTYum33I5f7bJ2nq0SXOb-oK_OAGv9zI7HtA

216
 The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the U.S.-China Health Relationship

10 Alan J. Hay and John W. McCauley, “The WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and
Response System (GISRS)—A Future Perspective,” Influenza and Other Respiratory
Viruses 12:5 (2018), 551-557. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
pdfdirect/10.1111/irv.12565
11 Michelle Roberts, “Flu Virus With ‘Pandemic Potential’ Found in China,” BBC, June 30,
2020. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-53218704. Honglei Sun,
Yihong Xiao, Jiyu Liu, Dayan Wang, Fangtao Li, Chenxi Wang, Chong Li et al. “Prevalent
Eurasian Avian-Like H1N1 Swine Influenza Virus With 2009 Pandemic Viral Genes
Facilitating Human Infection,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117:29 (2020),
17204-17210. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32601207/
12 Thedi Ziegler, Awandha Mamahit, and Nancy J. Cox, “65 Years of Influenza Surveillance
by a World Health Organization—Coordinated Global Network,” Influenza and Other
Respiratory Viruses 12:5 (2018), 558-565. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://pubmed.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/29727518/
13 Paul K.S. Chan, “Outbreak of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus Infection in Hong Kong in
1997,” Clinical Infectious Diseases, no 34. Supplement_2 (2002), S58-S64. Accessed March
15, 2022. https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/34/Supplement_2/S58/459477; Yi Guan,
G. J. D. Smith, R. Webby, and R. G. Webster, “Molecular Epidemiology of H5N1 Avian
Influenza,” OIE Revue Scientifique et Technique (2009). Accessed March 15, 2022. https://
dunapress.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/0A-LIGACAO-2-1.pdf
14 Yuelong Shu, Ying Song, Dayan Wang, Carolyn M. Greene, Ann Moen, C. K. Lee,
Yongkun Chen, Xiyan Xu, Jeffrey McFarland, Li Xin, Joseph Bresee, Suizan Zhou, Tao
Chen, Ran Zhang, and Nancy Cox, “A Ten-year China-U.S. Laboratory Collaboration:
Improving Response to Influenza Threats in China and the World, 2004–2014,” BMC
Public Health, vol. 19 (2019) (Supplement 3), 520. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://
bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12889-019-6776-3.
15 Anonymous audio interview, July 30, 2020.
16 Ziegler et al 2018.
17 One question that arises, and a number of former policymakers have confirmed as a potential
issue, is whether the wealth of expertise in influenza hasn’t overweighted the focus toward
that one class of viruses. While influenza is of great concern, it is clear that coronaviruses and
perhaps some other categories require equivalent attention.
18 Anonymous audio interview July 30, 2020.
19 Anonymous audio interview July 30, 2020.
20 Jeffrey Koplan video interview July 13, 2020.
21 Shu et al, 2019.
22 Hongying Wang, “Linking Up with the International Track: What’s in a Slogan?’ The China
Quarterly, No. 189, 2007, 1–23. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.cambridge.org/core/
journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/linking-up-with-the-international-track-whats-in-a-slog
an/45F9F14E9F10201308A4352E7E7501DE
23 Niall PAS Johnson and Juergen Mueller, “Updating the accounts: global mortality of the
1918-1920 ‘Spanish’ Influenza Pandemic,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine (2002), 105-115.
Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44446153.pdf?casa_token=6xQ

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 Deborah Seligsohn

1hTqlUSgAAAAA:KVFUht3fHj9HAQkY8MxR4mUgeq2YiT8F5HEsj8aiFsXQjs
ZhNgnENcBhId_andgT9X1gEIYF3ksnO5rBNV5D9A_t7MLun1KVMhZkDIsWQH1O
Gvbmjro
24 Ziegler et al 2018.
25 Lone Simonsen, et al, “Global Mortality Estimates for the 2009 Influenza Pandemic from the
Glamor Project: A Modeling Study,” PLOS Medicine, 10:11 (2013): e1001558. doi:10.1371/
journal.pmed.1001558 Accessed March 15, 2022. https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001558
26 Ziegler et al 2018.
27 Robert G. Webster, Malik Peiris, Honglin Chen, and Yi Guan, “H5N1 Outbreaks and
Enzootic Influenza,” Biodiversity 7:1 (2006), 51-55. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14888386.2006.9712795
28 Eating cooked chicken is not a bird flu risk, and even handling previously slaughtered chicken
is a very low risk behavior, but the rumors of the outbreak and lack of any information from
government or media led the local public to try to protect themselves in any way they could.
29 Anonymous audio interview July 30, 2020.
30 Nicholas Zamiska, “Bird-Flu Rift Shows China’s Travails,” The Wall Street Journal,
November 8, 2006. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB116292692200415797
31 Alan Schnur, “The Role of the World Health Organization in Combating SARS, Focusing
on the Efforts in China,” in Arthur Kleinman and James L. Watson, eds., SARS in China:
Prelude to Pandemic? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 31–52; Kirsten
Lundberg “Credible Voice: WHO—Beijing and the SARS Crisis.” Mailman School of Public
Health, Columbia University Case Series, Case No. MSPH-13-0004.0 (February 2013),
1–21. Accessed January 28, 2022. https://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/caseconsortium/
casestudies/112/casestudy/files/global/112/WHO percent20SARS_wm.pdf
32 Sara E. Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott, and Simon Rushton, Disease Diplomacy: International
Norms and Global Health Security (Baltimore, JHU Press, 2015).
33 Brundtland video interview August 26, 2020.
34 Lundberg 2013.
35 Personal recollections as U.S. Embassy Science Counselor 2003 – 2007. Fukuda audio
interview July 22, 2020. Kurt Tong (U.S. Embassy Science Counselor 2000-2003) audio
interview July 10, 2020. Anonymous video interview January 24, 2022.
36 World Health Organization (WHO),“Update 95—SARS: Chronology of a Serial Killer,” No
date. Accessed July 21, 2020. www.who.int/csr/don/2003_07_04/en/
37 Tiaji Salaam-Blyther and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “U.S. and International Responses to the
Global Spread of Avian Flu: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, January
11, 2006. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=459679
38 Salaam-Blyther and Chanlett-Avery 2006.
39 Anonymous video interview January 24, 2022.
40 Anonymous audio interview July 8, 2020.
41 Anonymous video interviews December 29, 2021 and January 3, 2022.
42 Adam Kamradt-Scott, “WHO’s to Blame? The World Health Organization and the 2014 Ebola

218
 The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the U.S.-China Health Relationship

Outbreak in West Africa,” Third World Quarterly 37:3 (2016): 401-418. Accessed March 15,
2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2015.1112232 Lawrence
O. Gostin, Devi Sridhar, and Daniel Hougendobler, “The Normative Authority of the World
Health Organization,” Public Health 129:7 (2015), 854-863. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://
scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2510&context=facpub
43 Beth Bell, Inger K. Damon, and Daniel B. Jernigan, et al, Overview, “Control Strategies, and
Lessons Learned in the CDC Response to the 2014–2016 Ebola Epidemic,” MMWR Suppl
2016; 65(Suppl-3), 4–11. Accessed March 15, 2022. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.
su6503a2
44 Christina Larson, “China Ramps Up Efforts to Combat Ebola,” Science, November
3, 2014. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.science.org/content/article/
china-ramps-efforts-combat-ebola
45 USTR Archives, Office of the United States Trade Representative, “U.S. Fact Sheet for the
27th U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade,” November 2016. Accessed
January 30, 2022. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2016/
november/us-fact-sheet-27th-us-china-joint.
46 Direct quote from video interview, January 3, 2022, but was also suggested by several other
Obama and Trump era officials.
47 Joe Parkinson, Nicholas Bariyo, and Josh Chin, “Huawei Technicians Helped
African Governments Spy on Political Opponents,” The Wall Street Journal,
August 15, 2019. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/
huawei-technicians-helped-african-governments-spy-on-political-opponents-11565793017
48 Anonymous audio interview, January 7, 2022.
49 RJ Symonds audio interview, January 18, 2022.
50 Anonymous audio interview, January 7, 2022.
51 Anonymous audio interview, January 14, 2022.
52 Anonymous audio interview, January 17, 2022.
53 Dennis Normile, “China Asserts Firm Grip on Research Data,” Science, April
9, 2018. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.science.org/content/article/
china-asserts-firm-grip-research-data
54 World Health Organization (WHO), “Timeline of WHO’s Response to
COVID-19,” June 29, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. www.who.int/news-room/
detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline.
55 , Glenn Kessler, “Did Trump Offer Experts to China to Help
with the Coronavirus?”, Washington Post, April 3, 2020. Accessed
March 15, 2022. www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/03/
how-much-pressure-did-trump-put-china-access-concerning-coronavirus/
56 FOIA (Freedom of Information Act), Letter by Robert R. Redfield to Dr. George Fu Gao,
January 6, 2020. HHS-CDC-20-0895-A-000012. “CDC Communications Reflecting Early
January COVID-19 Call Between Director Redfield and Chinese Authorities,” American
Oversight, June 24, 2020, 1-28. Accessed January 30, 2022 at www.americanoversight.org/
document/cdc -communications-reflecting-early-january-covid-19-call-between-director
-redfield-and-chinese-authorities.

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 Deborah Seligsohn

57 Jon Cohen, “Chinese Researchers Reveal Draft Genome of Virus Implicated in Wuhan
Pneumonia Outbreak.” Science, January 11, 2020. Accessed March 15, 2022. www.
sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/chinese-researchers-reveal-draft-genome-virus-implicated-
wuhan-pneumonia-outbreak.
58 World Health Organization (WHO), “Mission Summary: WHO Field Visit to Wuhan,
China 20–21 January 2020,” January 22, 2020. Accessed March 15, 2022. www.who.int/
china/news/detail/22-01-2020-field-visit-wuhan-china-jan-2020.
59 Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center COVID-19 Dashboard. The 100,000 figure is
through January 2022. By March 15, 2022 as omicron spread through the country, China had
report 756,261 cases, with 620,000 in the previous month. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
60 Steven J. Phipps, R. Quentin Grafton, and Tom Kompas, “Robust Estimates of the True
(Population) Infection Rate for COVID-19: A Backcasting Approach.” Royal Society Open
Science 7:11 (2020): 200909. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://royalsocietypublishing.
org/doi/10.1098/rsos.200909 Heather Reese, A. Danielle Iuliano, Neha N. Patel, Shikha
Garg, Lindsay Kim, Benjamin J. Silk, Aron J. Hall, Alicia Fry, and Carrie Reed, “Estimated
Incidence Of COVID-19 Illness And Hospitalization—United States, February–September,
2020,” Clinical Infectious Diseases: An Official Publication of the Infectious Diseases Society
Of America (2020): ciaa1780. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/33237993/
61 Anonymous interviews, January 2022.
62 Shawn Boburg, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Neena Satija and Amy Goldstein, “Inside the
Coronavirus Testing Failure: Alarm and Dismay Among The Scientists Who Sought
to Help,” The Washington Post, April 3, 2020. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://
www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/04/03/coronavirus-cdc-test-kits-
public-health-labs/https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/04/03/
coronavirus-cdc-test-kits-public-health-labs/?arc404=true
63 World Health Organization (WHO), “Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” February 16–24, 2020. Accessed March 15, 2022.
www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-
report.pdf?sfvrsn=fce87f4e_2.
64 Tong audio interview July 10, 2020.
65 Jeff Stein, Carol D. Leonnig, Josh Dawsey and Gerry Shih, “U.S. Officials Crafting
Retaliatory Actions Against China Over Coronavirus as President Trump Fumes,” The
Washington Post, April 30, 2020. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2020/04/30/trump-china-coronavirus-retaliation/
66 Andrew Jacobs, Michael D. Shear and Edward Wong, “U.S.-China Feud Over Coronavirus
Erupts at World Health Assembly,” The New York Times, May 18, 2020. Accessed March 15,
2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/health/coronavirus-who-china-trump.html
67 Ming Wang, Meiying Yan, Huifang Xu, Weili Liang, Biao Kan, Bojian Zheng, Honglin
Chen et al, “SARS-CoV Infection in a Restaurant from Palm Civet,” Emerging Infectious
Diseases 11:12 (2005), 1860. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/16485471/
68 Jacques Pepin, The origins of AIDS. Cambridge University Press, 2011.

220
 The Key Role of Multilateral Coordination in the U.S.-China Health Relationship

69 Edward C. Holmes, Stephen A. Goldstein, Angela L. Rasmussen, David L. Robertson,

Alexander Crits-Christoph, Joel O. Wertheim, Simon J. Anthony et al. “The Origins of
SARS-Cov-2: A Critical Review,” Cell 184:19 (2021), 4848-4856. https://pubmed.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/34480864/; Michael Worobey, “Dissecting the Early COVID-19 Cases in
Wuhan,” Science 374:6572 (2021), 1202-1204. https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.
abm4454; Gigi Kwik Gronvall, “The Contested Origin of SARS-CoV-2,” Survival 63:6
(2021), 7-36. https://jhu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/the-contested-origin-of-sars-cov-2;
Jonathan E., Pekar, Andrew Magee, Edyth Parker, Niema Moshiri, Katherine Izhikevich,
Jennifer L. Havens, Karthik Gangavarapu et al, “SARS-CoV-2 Emergence Very Likely
Resulted From at Least Two Zoonotic Events,” (2022). https://zenodo.org/record/6291628#.
YjFkjS-B10s; Michael Worobey, Joshua I. Levy, Lorena M. Malpica Serrano, Alexander
Crits-Christoph, Jonathan E. Pekar, Stephen A. Goldstein, Angela L. Rasmussen et al, “The
Huanan Market Was the Epicenter of SARS-Cov-2 Emergence,” (2022). https://zenodo.org/
record/6299116#.YjFkty-B10s All of the above accessed March 15, 2022. Also, see discussions
on the podcast This Week in Virology, Episode 760: SARS-CoV-2 origins with Peter Daszak,
Thea Kølsen Fischer, Marion Koopmans; Episode 774: Kristian Andersen, Robert Garry, and
the deleted SARS-CoV-2 sequences. https://www.microbe.tv/twiv/archive/
70 Xinhua, “China Penalizes Derelict Officials in Coronavirus Fight,” Xinhua, February 5, 2020.
Accessed January 28, 2022. Link is now broken. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-
02/05/c_138755872.htm. This report is just from the early days of the pandemic. Each
subsequent wave has seen more officials punished for infection control failures.
71 Amy Maxmen, “WHO Chief Tedros Looks Guaranteed For Re-Election Amid COVID
Pandemic,” Nature, January 6, 2022. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.nature.com/
articles/d41586-022-00019-4
72 The report is World Health Organization. “WHO-convened global study of origins of SARS-
CoV-2: China Part,” (2021). Access March 15, 2022. https://www.who.int/publications/i/
item/who-convened-global-study-of-origins-of-sars-cov-2-china-part
73 Nomaan Merchant, “U.S. Intel Doesn’t Expect To Determine Origins of COVID-19,
The Associated Press, October 29, Accessed March 15, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/
coronavirus-pandemic-joe-biden-science-health-china-2fe4518ac7aef9b54ea4329385d121c4
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/Unclassified-Summary-of-
Assessment-on-COVID-19-Origins.pdf Accessed March 15, 2022.
74 White House, “Statement by President Joe Biden on the Investigation into the Origins of
COVID-⁠19,” August 27, 2021. Accessed March 15, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/27/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-the-
investigation-into-the-origins-of-covid- percentE2 percent81 percentA019/

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Section III

The Party’s Governance, History,

and Xi Jinping
Since Xi Jinping assumed the triad of crucial positions—General Secretary of
the CCP, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of
the PRC—atop the Chinese political hierarchy in 2013, many commentators
and analysts have noted a reassertion of the Party’s dominant role throughout
Chinese society. There are few if any signs of a reversal in these trends as Xi
gears up for a third term in leadership. Over the past decade, these efforts have
manifested in efforts by the Chinese government to control historical mem-
ory, repaint the Party’s past, alter policymaking practices, and assert greater
control over many facets of life in China, most notably in Hong Kong.
These developments naturally raise many questions about China’s future.
Is Xi Jinping the primary driver of authoritarianism in the Chinese mainland
and Hong Kong? How much can be explained by Xi’s own background and
personality? Have the Party’s narratives and historical memory been altered in
line with changes in the CCP? Is power and decision-making solely up to Xi
and collective leadership cast aside, or do other actors play a role?

This chapter explores these issues and more,

featuring essays from the following fellows:
Macabe Keliher, “Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of
Democracy”
Emily Matson, “From Regional to National: Northeastern Scholars and the
National Discourse on the War of Resistance against Japan”
Kacie Miura, “The Domestic Sources of China’s Maritime Assertiveness
Under Xi Jinping”
Joseph Torigian, “Xi Jinping and Ideology”

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Hong Kong’s Political

Economy and the Crisis of
Democracy
Macabe Keliher is an Assistant Professor at Southern Methodist
University and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Macabe Keliher

Abstract
Over the past two decades protests in Hong Kong have numbered in the tens
of thousands to peak in 2019. Despite the incessant calls of Hong Kong citizens
for a greater say in shaping everyday life and the national future, the Hong Kong
government has responded violently and in July 2020 introduced a rigid National
Security Law outlawing all forms of dissent, which it has used to prosecute po-
litical activists and critics. Scholars and observers have viewed these events as the
failure to fulfill constitutional promises of democracy under an increasingly au-
tocratic government. This report argues that existing analyses overlook the role of
the political economy both in driving protests and mobilizing state interest in the
crackdown; furthermore, they do situate Hong Kong and China within an inter-
national context of democratic backsliding and authoritarianism. Analyzing the
nature and development of Hong Kong’s political economy and its legal structure
over the past three decades, the report shows how the concentration of capital in
contemporary Hong Kong has alienated people from economic life and offered
little hope of a future. The manipulation of political democracy and deterioration
of civic life by Beijing has only exacerbated the situation.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Engage China on its stated commitment to democracy in Hong Kong
by pushing for greater pluralism and the implementation of economic
democracy.

● Negotiate rights of development and production including access to finance,

defending small business, and removing barriers of intellectual property.

● Institute global rights of labor and push for the implementation of social
inheritance.

● Foreclose Chinese retorts to U.S. criticism of anti-democratic practices by

pursuing democratic reforms and developments at home.

● When necessary isolate China internationally by pursing a robust

program of global democracy.

226
 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

Introduction
In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, protests, demonstra-
tions, and marches recurrently filled the Hong Kong streets. The casual
observer might readily point to 2014 and 2019 as the key episodes of un-
rest, for these were the years that captured the world’s attention. The former
witnessed the occupation of three downtown districts for seventy-nine days
and came to be known as the Umbrella Movement in reference to the ubiq-
uitous protest tool of the umbrella, which was used to fend off the onslaught
of police pepper spray. The latter protests of 2019 and early 2020 quickly be-
came even more prominent due to their size, continuity, and scale of police
violence, all of which dwarfed previous demonstrations in Hong Kong. On
June 16, 2019, for example, estimates of two million people—over a quarter
of the Hong Kong population—marched in protest of government policies;
in subsequent months demonstrators smashed up the legislative building,
occupied the airport, and engaged in pitched battles with the police on col-
lege campuses and city streets.1
These movements did not appear out of nowhere. Tens of thousands of
marches, demonstrations, and protests have taken place every year over the
past twenty years. According to Hong Kong police statistics, there were 5,656
such protests in 2010 and well over 6,000 annually through 2015. That num-
ber jumped to 13,158 in 2016 and stayed well above 10,000 through 2019.2 At
somewhere on the order of an average over 30 demonstrations, marches, and
protests happening every day, day after day, one must conclude that the Hong
Kong people living in the early part of the century found something terribly
wrong with their society and were constantly engaged in active opposition and
a search for methods, practices, and ideas to do something about it.
The issues at stake ranged from school curriculum to personal freedoms
and universal suffrage. Consider the controversies that sparked major protests
in the first decades of this century. In 2003, over half a million people turned
out to object to the introduction of a national security bill that would “pro-
hibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion” against China. People
here saw the potential of the proposed law as limiting freedoms of expression
and introducing vague demands of subservience to a distant sovereign. The
bill was withdrawn and the Chief Executive (the equivalent of a president) re-
signed. In 2010, tens of thousands of demonstrators marched under the slogan

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of democracy while calling for the release of Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese activist
who Beijing sentenced to eleven years for “inciting subversion of state power.”
In 2012, high school students led nearly 100,000 in protest of proposed edu-
cation reform, which would impose a Chinese nationalist and moral curricu-
lum that demonstrators assailed as “brainwashing education.” That summer
they marched across the city and in August occupied the government head-
quarters building for over a week. In 2014, a movement was sparked by over
rules for the selection of the Chief Executive; protestor demands were best
encapsulated by the yellow banner they hung on Lion Rock overlooking the
Kowloon Peninsula that read, “I want real universal suffrage.” Protests begin-
ning in 2019 were set off by the introduction of further security legislation
that would have allowed the extradition of criminal suspects to China. Given
the threat of political prosecution Hong Kong citizens turned out in over-
whelming numbers.
In short, the people of Hong Kong demanded a larger voice in social issues
affecting their lives and a say the national future. Time and time again they
took to the streets in collective action against social and political restrictions
to call for democratic mechanisms and institutions to take the place of tightly
controlled processes and illiberal practices.
All this came to an abrupt end on July 1, 2020. On that day, the Hong
Kong government, under sway from Beijing and the Chinese Communist
Party, issued the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
National Security Law (NSL), which, among other things—indeed the most
immediate for protestors—criminalizes anti-government speech or expres-
sions that advocate Hong Kong independence. Under the new security law
over a hundred activists, politicians, and journalists have been arrested and
some are now serving sentences for crimes of “incitement against the govern-
ment” for simply speaking against the law.3 More severely, one protester was
sentenced to nine years in prison for “incitement to secession” for carrying a
flag calling for the liberation of Hong Kong and “engaging in terrorist activi-
ties” for driving his motorcycle into a group of police officers during a protest.4
Meanwhile, the publisher of Hong Kong’s largest daily newspaper has been ar-
rested for criticizing the NSL and encouraging foreign sanctions; in addition,
the entire active political opposition was arrested and now being prosecuted
on grounds that organizing a primary election was an act of subversion.5

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The government has taken ever further measures to give itself broad
anti-democratic powers. Special national security branches in the Justice
Department and police force have been set up with the capacity to, among
other things, conduct secret surveillance and warrantless searches, seize pass-
ports, and confiscate property. Overseeing these divisions and their practices
is The Office for Safeguarding National Security, which operates in secrecy.6
Political advocates and activists have been overwhelmingly if not solely tar-
geted, and in order to ensure that they are prosecuted accordingly, the legal
system has come under increasing manipulation through the removal of
judges deemed unfavorable the NSL rulings and the capacity to transfer cases
out of Hong Kong to mainland China. Similarly, bail has been denied defen-
dants without due qualification, and Beijing has threatened to intervene if
procedures do not go according to its wishes.7
To explain this dual development—protest and Chinese authoritarian-
ism—a small body of literature has emerged proffering an analysis focused
on a combination of two key factors: the lack of political participation, and
China’s infiltration into Hong Kong politics and society. On the one hand,
the rallying cry of demonstrators for universal suffrage provides an easy nar-
rative of the decades of protest movements and can readily encompass both
democratic aspirations and the failed promise of the Basic Law to provide
universal suffrage. At the same time, increasingly authoritarian actions by
the Chinese government provide a ready explanation of why those aspirations
remain unmet: In short, Beijing fears that a democratic Hong Kong would
quickly release itself from political control and become an independent Hong
Kong. Beijing’s political influence in Hong Kong is further manifest through
an influx of mainland Chinese immigrants and capital that create an ethnic
tension and highly polarized sociopolitical environment, as witnessed in the
2019 demonstrations.
Such studies provide invaluable insight into the current situation yet are
beset by two shortcomings, one local and one global. The local problem is that
these explanations touch on the immediate political context but do not probe
the structure of Hong Kong society. The interface of the political structure
with the political economy is the product of a social framework that impli-
cates aspects such as democratic limitations and high housing prices, and it
stretches decades into the past, not years. Many of the existing studies take

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note of contradictions in the political economy, to be sure, such as the exac-

erbated inequality, but the economic analysis is often subordinated to the im-
mediacy of either democracy or China. In doing so, political narratives and
analysis leaves a false impression that universal suffrage or Hong Kong inde-
pendence will solve all problems. Recognition of this first problem dissolves
the easy solution, to be sure (e.g. more democracy or affordable housing), but
promises greater insight into the structure of society and thereby points to a
larger critique that forces us to ask what democracy really looks like and what
kind of society we want to build.
The second shortcoming is one of global perspective: Hong Kong is not
unique. For the past two decades the world has experienced both an in-
creasing number of protests, of which those in Hong Kong are just a part,
and mounting democratic backsliding. In 2019, for example, mass protests
erupted in at least 114 countries around the world, and since 2009 the number
of protests globally have increased on an average of 11.5 percent per year. The
size and frequency of these recent expressions transcend those of other eras,
even those of the 1960s and 70s. In the fall of 2019 in Santiago, Chile, for ex-
ample, marchers numbered well over a million people, accounting for nearly a
quarter of the city’s residents, and in the United States over 16,000 protests in
every state from 2017 to 2020 have drawn a total of nearly 11.5 million people
for the largest protests in U.S. history. These national and global actions have
brought down heads of government in Lebanon, Iraq, Bolivia, Algeria, Sudan,
and Malta, while other regimes, such as Chile and Iran, deployed military and
police violence.8
At the same time, reactionary right-wing authoritarianism is on the rise.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2021 Democracy Report found that de-
mocracy worldwide is at an all-time low and under increasing censorship
accompanied by an acute curtailing of civil liberties.9 Mounting local and
global discontent has led to authoritarian tendencies, where public anger
towards socioeconomic inequality and deprivation is manipulated to sup-
port dictator-like leaders around the globe who form international support
networks to share strategies, offer instruction and tactics, and provide eco-
nomic and technical assistance.10 The result is a proliferation of hybrid re-
gimes that use democratic-like institutions to prop up authoritarian leaders:
elections might be regularly held, as in Russia, but incumbents abuse state

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resources and can deny opposition candidates media coverage or harass and
jail them.11 Further actions include suppression of civil society and indepen-
dent media, accompanied by judicial manipulations, military politicization,
and constitution revisions. Democracy is gradually whittled away until only
a hollow shell remains.12
Hong Kong is part of these global trends of discontent and democratic
backsliding. From mass protests to the use of elections to empower authoritar-
ianism, as well as the arrest of opposition candidates, the issuing of “patriot”
qualifications and oaths for political office, the arrest of independent publish-
ers and seizure of independent media assets, subtle judicial interventions, and
penetrations into civil society—these developments mirror what is happen-
ing elsewhere from Latin America to Eastern Europe. If this is the case, then
localized explanations are insufficient not just in understanding Hong Kong
but also international social developments. The position one takes and how to
respond is contingent on this perspective.
What follows develops an analysis of contemporary Hong Kong along these
lines. It reaches back into the recent past to chart the trajectory of the Hong
Kong political economy that has brought society to this breaking point, and
implicates both Hong Kong capitalists and Beijing in these developments.
Doing so further helps situate Hong Kong with the global political economy of
neoliberal trends and democratic backsliding. The report begins with an analy-
sis of the drafting of the Basic Law in the 1980s and how this constitutional
document helped structure the economy. Section two turns to the political and
economic developments of the past three decades, which saw a rollback of gov-
ernment services and privatization of key sectors such as housing. This both
corresponded with and facilitated a concentration of capital in the territory,
whereby a handful of conglomerates took control of the economy as manufac-
turing fled to mainland China. The third section outlines Beijing’s actions and
interest in Hong Kong since the handover, noting the subsumption of civic life
and manipulation of politics. The conclusion warns against making universal
suffrage the solution to Hong Kong’s dilemma and points out the errors of cur-
rent U.S. policy. The final section outlines a comprehensive approach to the sit-
uation of Hong Kong and the rise of authoritarianism worldwide. It proposes
policies for greater civil and economic democracy to empower individuals and
diverse groups to partake in the co-creation of their worlds.

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I. The Problem with the Basic Law

Hong Kong society is structured by the Basic Law. The Basic Law is akin to a
constitution, but it is not a traditional constitution. It was drafted in the 1980s
by Hong Kong capitalists at the invitation of Beijing to serve as the framework
for the governance of Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty after the 1997
handover.13 Rather than communicating general principles encapsulated in
political institutions, however, it offers a series of precepts that seek to protect
private capital from government control. These elements are articulated in the
following claims: state protection of private property, state facilitation of free
markets, balanced budgets, and administrative and judicial autonomy.14
Of foremost concern of the framers was the need to protect existing as-
sets and ensure that law would guarantee private property. This is laid out as
a “General Principle” in Article 6: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall protect the right of private ownership of property in accordance
with law.” This is further enumerated in Article 105: “The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall, in accordance with law, protect the right of in-
dividuals and legal persons to the acquisition, use, disposal and inheritance of
property and their right to compensation for lawful deprivation of their prop-
erty.” Of significance here is not only the fact that property is secured but also
that the state has been employed to ensure that it is secured. The law is mobi-
lized under the authority and power of the state to protect private property.
For property to continue to have economic meaning it must be able to be
exchanged. The Basic Law enshrines a state policy that encourages the unob-
structed movement of capital. Article 115 states: “The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall pursue the policy of free trade and safeguard
the free movement of goods, intangible assets and capital.” Complementing
this is article after article working to mobilize the state and outline a legal
regime that creates a market favorable to capital and the production of value.
Consider the following:

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

shall provide an appropriate economic and legal environment for the
maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial
center. (Article 109)

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 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

shall provide an economic and legal environment for encouraging
investments, technological progress and the development of new indus-
tries. (Article 118)

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall

formulate appropriate policies to promote and co-ordinate the develop-
ment of various trades such as manufacturing, commerce, tourism, real
estate, transport, public utilities, services, agriculture and fisheries, and
pay regard to the protection of the environment. (Article 119)

Of concern in these articles is how the Basic Law mobilizes the state and
constructs law to conjure up a market within a certain economic environment
that is of benefit to certain groups with certain interests and who have an or-
thodox if not limited vision of markets in Hong Kong society.
The third key precept for the creators of the Hong Kong Basic Law was a
balanced budget. The idea is that for markets to work efficiently in the distri-
bution of resources the government needs remain out of the market directly
and not engage in deficit spending. Hence Article 107: “The Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall follow the principle of keeping the ex-
penditure within the limits of revenues in drawing up its budget, and strive to
achieve a fiscal balance, avoid deficits and keep the budget commensurate with
the growth rate of its gross domestic product.”
All this could only work if Hong Kong remained autonomous in its capac-
ity to govern, legislate, and adjudicate. China should not be able to interfere.
Article 2 thus clarifies, “The National People’s Congress authorizes the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy
and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including
that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law.”
While Article 8 reassures, “The laws previously in force…shall be maintained.”
Chapter two of the Basic Law is devoted to further clarification of this “high
degree of autonomy,” articulating Hong Kong’s control in all areas save for-
eign affairs (Article 13), defense (Article 14), and reinterpretation of the Basic
law (Article 11). Thus, Hong Kong was “vested” with independent executive
power (Article 16), legislative power (Article 17), judicial power (Article 19).

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 Macabe Keliher

In fact, Article 22 specifically states, “No department of the Central People’s

Government and no province, autonomous region, or municipality directly
under the Central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own in accordance
with this Law,” unless they “obtain the consent of the government of the
Region and the approval of the Central People’s Government.”
These enshrined concerns of property, exchange, budgets, and law are pre-
cisely the problem with the Basic Law and its formulations. Framers tried to
capture the general institutions behind what we now know to be contingent
and somewhat arbitrary success of Hong Kong at that particular point in
time, and to do so out of concern that China would interfere.15 The goal was
not general prosperity for future generations, but rather ensuring that social-
ism did not come to these shores and seize capital. Thus, the constitution that
emerged was not to lead society into the future but to freeze it in the past on
the assumption that the world from here on out would be free trade for all
to see so long as overenthusiastic states could be kept at bay. Unfortunately,
the world changed and China changed and such thinking has only worked to
retard social, political, and economic development.16

II. The Economic Program in Hong Kong

The Basic Law and the interests that structured its formation have guided gov-
ernance in Hong Kong. Chief Executives have been drawn from the business
community, advisory committees have been staffed by business leaders, and
the legislative agenda has been set by business interests. Administrative action
and civil service employment have worked to frame the principles of the Basic
Law, namely capital and its accumulation, and the government has been run
in a way that is consistent with Article 107 (i.e., austerity and tax cuts).
In the name of fiscal conservatism, the Hong Kong government has con-
sistently pursued a policy of cutting government spending. This began almost
immediately with the Enhanced Productivity Program in 1998 to privatize
the public sector while cutting off administrative funds and staff to carry out
the functions of government and the enforcement of regulations and law.
Under the program, agencies operating expenses were slashed by 5 percent,
yet at the same time they were expected to take on more responsibilities and

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 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

functions. When new positions or appointments were needed managers were

instructed to turn to the private sector and hire contractors.17
Further cuts continued in social services across the board, including health
care, child care, education, and social security. Whereas the colonial state had
built a robust system of social welfare including public housing and health
care (largely in response to housing riots in the 1960s), the HKSAR began
chipping away at it in the name of privatization and competition.18 Tung’s suc-
cessor, Donald Tsang, a career civil servant who had early tenures as Treasurer
and Financial Secretary in the Colonial government was eager to please the
business community. He put it this way: “The government must never try
to assist the poor using its own resources, for this is doomed to failure, just
like pouring sand into the sea to reclaim land.” By 2016, one in five people
in Hong Kong were on verge of living below the poverty line. Determined
to further reduce spending, however, a few years later the government raised
the threshold for social security assistance—a last resort safety net to provide
funding for those without sufficient income to meet their basic needs—con-
demning tens of thousands more to dire poverty.19
Public housing also came under attack. Whereas the colonial government
was committed to providing good, affordable housing, HKSAR aimed to
turn everything over to the private sector. In 1997, almost half of the Hong
Kong population lived in public housing, but over the next five years new sup-
ply would be cut by 62 percent. The stated rationale was to reduce government
subsidized competition in the housing market, which, according to the Chief
Secretary, “competes unfairly with the private sector market.”20 This develop-
ment actually led to a sharp drop in the supply in private housing between
1997-2012, all while average prices rose by 47 percent.21 At the same time, the
government sold off prime real estate earmarked for public housing construc-
tion. In 2000, for example, there were over a thousand building sites slated for
the development of three-quarter of a million homes over the next eight years.
These were all liquidated and when a housing crises was recognized in 2011
the government found that there was no land on which to build.22
The consequences of these policies have reverberated throughout society.
From health care to libraries, budget cuts have undermined social institu-
tions and the ability for Hong Kong citizens to fully partake in social and
economic life. 23 Most egregious for government function has been cuts to

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 Macabe Keliher

the civil service leading to widespread public safety incidents. Insufficient

resources and personnel in the Marine Department, among others, led to a
collision between passenger ferries in 2012 killing thirty-nine and injuring
ninety-two. The lack of housing inspectors has led to a rise of faulty electrical
wiring and fittings, leaky pipes causing frequent flooding, and overcrowd-
ing creating slum-like conditions, or what the Development Bureau called
“urban time bombs waiting to strike and cause injuries and fatalities.” The
Urban Renewal Authority estimates that over 600 buildings annually be-
come decayed and in immediate need of renewal. Without attention some
30,000 buildings will be unfit for habituation by 2046. 24
Many commentators point the finger at Hong Kong’s leaders.25 Critics readily
draw a line from the decisions and actions of the Chiefs Executive since hando-
ver to implement austerity and serve business interests over public welfare to the
decline of institutions, degradation of infrastructure, and ultimately death. The
problem with this analysis is not so much that it discounts the prevalent politi-
cal and legal structures but rather it simply ignores them. This analysis seems to
say that all choices are personal—that one can choose to do good and make life
better for people, or one can choose to serve capital. It moralizes politics without
providing an account of how things got this way and why they operate as they
do. The so-called mismanagement of Hong Kong is not just a failure of leader-
ship but also a success of capital in capturing the political and legal institutions
through the legislature and Basic Law. This capture has not only enabled capital
to effectively reproduce itself through overtly pro-business, neoliberal ideology
and practice in government, but also—and I do not exaggerate—orchestrate a
complete takeover of all of economic life in Hong Kong.
One place to start in analyzing this slide is deindustrialization. In 1980,
Hong Kong—and the East Asia region in general—was at the tail-end of a
decades-long post-war manufacturing boom. When China’s economic re-
forms began to take hold in the 1980s and accelerate in the 1990s, however,
manufacturing migrated north to Shenzhen and other areas in Guangdong
that offered free land, ample investment capital, and a pass on environmental
and labor regulations. In the mid-1980s, manufacturing accounted for more
than a quarter of Hong Kong’s GDP. Today it is less than 1 percent. In 1981,
over 41 percent of the population was employed in manufacturing. By 2011,
that number had fallen to 4 percent and has continued to decline.26

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 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

This demise of manufacturing has been offset by the growth of financial,

business, and consumer services. Rather than producing goods, Hong Kong
began to transform itself into a processor of raw materials and produced-goods
going in and out of China on the one hand, and a financial center that funded
the manufacturing boom taking place in the Pearl River Delta on the other.
Hong Kong began servicing import and export trades and catered to travelers
moving throughout the region, and did wholesale operations and warehous-
ing of goods. In 1981, wholesale and retail, import and export trades, and res-
taurants and hotel sectors employed 19.2 percent of the workforce; by 2011
it had grown to over 30 percent. Similarly, financing, insurance, real estate,
and business services went from under 5 percent of the workforce in 1981 to
almost 20 percent by 2011.27
The consequences of this shift have not been widespread social prosperity,
however, but escalating inequality. Hong Kong domestic growth has been phe-
nomenal, to be sure, with GDP gains of nearly 70 percent in real terms from
2000-2014—and that is in the midst of numerous economic and financial cri-
ses. Likewise, unemployment has continued to decline from over 8 percent
in 2003 to just over 3 percent in 2015. However, the gains here have gone to
an economic elite who extract rents. Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient—the gold
standard of inequality—was one of the highest in the world in 2020 at 0.539,
up from 0.525 in 2001, where 0 represents perfect equality of income among
citizens and 1 a situation where one citizen owns all the income. The United
States, by contrast, recorded 0.485 in 2020, still its highest in fifty years.28
The lack of social mobility has become particularly galling as it has taken
place within a generation. In 1991, 84 percent of university graduates found a
middle-class job, but by 2011 that number had dropped to 75 percent. Once
upper and lower middle class jobs are differentiated—that is, managers, ad-
ministrators, and professionals in the former and associate professionals in
the latter—the decline was more extreme, from over 60 percent of graduates
in 1991 obtaining work in upper middle class jobs to less than 40 percent in
2011. Meanwhile, a growing number of graduates had to settle for non-middle
class jobs in clerical, service, and retail positions.
At the same time, the cost of living has increased. Property prices have shot
up 126 percent since the handover, and a mortgage can consume 70 percent
of individual’s income. Indeed, at around $2,500 per square foot, housing

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 Macabe Keliher

in Hong Kong is consistently the most expensive in the world.29 Consumer

prices have also followed suit with astronomical increases. Petrol prices, for ex-
ample, have surged 108 percent in the past seven years (2013-2020) to clock in
at over $8 a gallon in April 2020, or 131 percent higher than the international
average.30 Food prices also remain some of the highest in the world, with fresh
food costing two and a half times more in Hong Kong than Britain.31
Jobs have become fewer, pay stagnating, housing lies out of reach, prices
are rising, and debt is accumulated. A big part of the story of this concen-
tration of economic power revolves around land and land developers. In the
1960s a handful of developers began to consolidate control of land and corner
a market that was being restricted by the colonial government. As political
instabilities rocked China in the late 1960s and 70s, and uncertainties sur-
rounded both handover negotiations and the outcome of Chinese rule, British
companies began to divest their portfolios. These assets were snatched up by
local developers as they increased their holdings from 1.6 million square me-
ters in 1979 to 11.5 million square meters in 1997. By 2009 the largest single
developer, Henderson Land, held nearly 20 million square feet of developable
floor area plus over 30 million square feet of agricultural land, increasing this
amount to 44.5 million square feet by 2015.32
Rather than developing this land, however, Henderson and its few other
competitors bank it. They sit on land and wait for prices to rise then release
home sales slowly so as to ensure that prices remain afloat. In addition to en-
suring high rents, this strategy has the advantage of pushing out smaller devel-
opers who cannot afford to sit on land waiting for prices to rise, nor who have
the connections and know-how to mobilize bankers, investors, and auctions
markets. In recent years, the ranks of developers have shrunk, as only a few
big, capital-rich companies from mainland China have been able to enter.
Developers own far more than land—they control most of the Hong Kong
economy. Supermarkets, utilities, transportation, banking, broadcasting, and
telecommunications all fall under their purview. In fact, they are conglomer-
ates with oligopolies in these areas. They provide most services for consumers
and collude to block competition, raise prices, and extract maximum rents.
When French hypermarket Carrefour tried to penetrate the Hong Kong mar-
ket and break the supermarket duopoly of Wellcome and ParknShop, the con-
glomerates who also own all the real estate, made sure that Carrefour could

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 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

not find enough premises to open stores. They also control and collude with
wholesalers, who refused to supply the new entrant. With their position se-
cured, the two chains increased prices by an average of nearly 4 percent during
a two-year period when overall retail prices fell by over 5 percent. Commercial
sectors from textbooks, motor vehicle instruction, building services, and even
noodles have all been subject to cartel activity from these conglomerates, ac-
cording to official reports.33
This type of concentration frames the general economic trends of Hong
Kong over the past three decades. As government services were rolled back
and privatized, a few large conglomerates emerged to dominate the economy
in the wake of deindustrialization. The concentration of capital has meant the
ability of these few corporations to insulate themselves from competition and
raise prices while limiting variety throughout the territory. At the same time,
they have come to set the terms of economic life in Hong Kong: manufactur-
ing jobs disappeared, replaced by low-end service sector work largely in some
subsidiary of one of these corporations. In the end, a home and middle class
life lies largely out of reach and the future that most youth stare at is not just
dull but bleak.

III. Chinese Politics

Throughout these developments China has not been a neutral actor. Despite
the outlines of autonomy in the Basic Law, Beijing has intervened strategi-
cally to shape local politics. Ensuring a chief executive favorable to the re-
gime and its agenda has been key for Beijing, as has been the courting of law
makers and creating electoral conditions to ensure that China remains in
control of politics.
Beijing’s meddling goes much deeper than politics, however; it seeps into
the economy and penetrates into society to touch all aspects of life. Sociologist
Ching Kwan Lee likens this percolation to a “recolonization,” whereby the
Chinese Communist regime has simply replaced Great Britain as the colonial
master and set about imposing institutions, practices, and laws favorable to
its political and economic classes.34 In contrast to the overt stacking-of-the-
deck in the election of the chief executive, however, a much subtler form of
influence transpires in other realms, which at once captures and reconstitutes

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 Macabe Keliher

existing institutions while imposing new ones and thereby further integrating
Hong Kong with mainland China until the two are no longer separate as two
distinct systems.
Take the matter of press freedom as an illustrative example of how this
works. In the early 2002 Beijing began to co-opt owners of Hong Kong media
outlets with lucrative mainland investment opportunities and formal politi-
cal titles, such as positions on city, provincial, or national committees. By the
mid-2000s, most media organizations in Hong Kong were owned by those
with robust economic interests in mainland China and held seats on the
People’s Political Consultative Committee in Beijing. Simultaneously, main-
land Chinese investors and businessman began taking over Hong Kong media
companies. Chinese businessman Wang Jing became the largest shareholder
in Asia Television in 2000, Ku Zhouheng bought up the daily paper Sing Pao
in 2014, media tycoon Li Ruigang took over the majority of shares of the dom-
inant broadcaster Television Broadcasting (TVB) in 2015, and Jack Ma, CEO
of e-commerce giant Alibaba, bought up the largest English-language daily
paper in Hong Kong, the South China Morning Post in 2015, among other
high profile cases. Cumulatively, by 2017, 35 percent of Hong Kong’s mass
media had majority ties to mainland Chinese capital.35
This Chinese takeover of Hong Kong media translates directly into censor-
ship and self-censorship. Reporting on pro-democracy legislative activity and
legislators actions has been muted, and coverage of protests has cast doubt on
demonstrations if not hostility at times. Accounts abound of the mass media
overtly blaming protesters for police violence, which has contributed to the
plummeting of Hong Kong’s ranking in the Reporters Without Borders free-
dom of press index, falling from 18th in 2002 to 73rd in 2019, now sitting
below Mongolia, the Ivory Coast and Tunisia.36
The real-estate industry has entered into what is often called an unholy al-
liance with Beijing. Around the time of the handover in 1997 Beijing began
to court real-estate tycoons in order to shore up political support among the
Hong Kong financial elite and to solicit capital and technology to help mod-
ernize the mainland economy. What they got in return was not only risk-free
economic opportunity to access Chinese markets and fulfill Hong Kong gov-
ernment contracts but also political power. Members of the real-estate elite
put on various committees, including the Election Committee, to determine

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who would administer Hong Kong and be in charge of the purse strings,
thereby making the Chief Executive respondent to this elite. The political em-
powerment of the real-estate elite further enabled the suppression of demo-
cratic calls for higher taxation and stronger labor unions or labor standards
that threaten their economic interests.37
This political and economic subsumption has been accompanied by an in-
flux of Chinese travelers and immigrants challenging the pace of life. Chinese
tourism in Hong Kong has increased exponentially since the introduction
of the Individual Visitor Scheme in 2003, which allows mainland Chinese
people to travel to Hong Kong individually as opposed to in tour groups. In
2002, there were 6.8 million mainland tourists accounting for 41 percent of
all tourist arrivals. By 2018, there were 51 million accounting for over 80 per-
cent of all tourism in Hong Kong.38 Moreover, each day up to 150 mainland
Chinese can receive a one-way entry permit to legally reside in Hong Kong,
which has amounted to over half a million Chinese immigrants every decade
since handover.39 According to the 2016 census just over a third of the Hong
Kong population was born in China, the majority of whom have been living
there for less than seven years.40
Beijing’s interest in Hong Kong is both financial and political. Financially,
Hong Kong has long served as a conduit for domestic and foreign capital to
move in and out of China. Capital controls in China and limits on foreign in-
vestments have made a financial center like Hong Kong necessary to facilitate
the flow of money. Moreover, the Hong Kong financial markets have enabled
Chinese companies to set up operation shells to both raise capital and invest
internationally. For example, 60 percent of China’s outward FDI is in Hong
Kong, which presumably then moves to investments elsewhere.41 In this way,
Hong Kong has served as a financial center for China, facilitating capital flows
and investment, and until recently, Hong Kong has been the entry point for
sensitive technology that foreign companies are banned from selling to China
and the port of export for Chinese products to evade tariffs on Chinese goods.
Politically, two key issues inform Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong: territo-
rial integrity and political factions. The former is more straightforward and
can be summed up with the understanding that Beijing wants to ensure that
Hong Kong remains part of China. To cede further political or territorial
autonomy, not to mention outright sovereignty, would challenge Beijing’s

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political legitimacy in China and threaten its hold over other areas vying for
greater autonomy, most notably, Xinjiang and Tibet. Similarly, claims over
Taiwan could no longer be credibly made.
The issue of political factions within the CCP is more complicated and
possibly of greater consequence. Due to the lack of transparency, information
about the Party leadership and its interests are part guesswork and part specu-
lative. The best independent analysis relating Party factions to developments
in Hong Kong point to attempts by the Xi Jinping faction to wrestle control
from the Jiang Zemin faction and to shore up command by imposing supra-
authority that will enable Xi to dictate terms. The Jiang faction has been in
control of Hong Kong both politically with members posted to positions in
the territory, and also financially with members having links to corporations
and investments. Since 1997, for example, three out of four heads of the central
coordinating group for Hong Kong—the key group overseeing Beijing’s Hong
Kong policy—have been appointed from the Jiang faction. Similarly, up until
at least 2019 all liaison office directors for Hong Kong belonged to the Jiang
faction, and the intelligence networks were under control of his appointees.42
The Jiang influence in Hong Kong is a threat to Xi Jinping. The danger
is not only that a faction hostile to Xi’s leadership and policies will control
Hong Kong, but that Hong Kong will be used as a base to disrupt and sabo-
tage Xi’s government. Over the past decade developments within Hong Kong
point to internal provocation, violence against Falun Gong by front groups,
including anti-Japanese demonstrations over the Senkaku Islands, and the use
of Hong Kong ships to create international tension over contested territorial
waters. While these acts are often attributed to Beijing or aggressive pro-Bei-
jing groups, analysts see them working against Xi in attempt to create distur-
bance and force him to make a mistake internationally or domestically, leav-
ing him open to criticism and thus weakening his hold. Even the escalation of
the recent protests and the street-level violence can be seen as an attempt to
push Xi into an unwelcome corner and sully his image and ability to act politi-
cally. In this view, Xi would have preferred a status quo in Hong Kong but the
Jiang faction caused disruption.43
According to some analysts, the overbearing response of the Beijing gov-
ernment—not just towards the protests but also to assert internal political
control—is a product of this struggle. Xi has moved to put his people in place

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while at the same time created extra-legal organizations in the form of a na-
tional security apparatus that gives him control. This national security appa-
ratus includes the National Security Law and enables Xi to operate beyond
judicial scrutiny with no constraints in action or budget.44 In short, Xi’s inter-
est in flushing out a rival Party faction has led him to create a supra-authority
organization in the form of a national security apparatus that is wielded to
stifle dissent, both external and internal.

IV. Conclusions: The Future of Hong Kong

and the Future of Democracy
Contemporary Hong Kong is a case of the universal in the particular. While
Hong Kong is a striking example of neoliberal socio-economic practice, it is
hardly unique.45 Economically, the specific case here is a stark manifestation of
the development of trends in the global political economy over the past forty
years. In the 1970s and ’80s, free market advocates and politicians began to
advance ideas and implement policies that both empowered capital and mo-
bilized government in service of capital. This led not only to the slow disman-
tling of social programs and protections, but also to the use of government
powers to create an environment within which global capital could thrive.
Through military, legal, and political means a certain set of ideas about mar-
kets, property rights, and individualism were implemented around the world.
This blurring of the division between public and private finds governments
overtly working on the behalf of corporations to extenuate an economic sys-
tem that favors global capital over labor, private companies over society and
social welfare, and economic concentration over economic democracy. It is a
system that is perpetuated by the attenuation of politics and capital, whereby
the rich purchase beneficial economic policies that further insulate their posi-
tion and wealth. Through political influence they obtain lower taxes, larger de-
ductions, fewer regulations, and corporate protections, among other things.46
At the same time, Hong Kong political and social developments corre-
spond to international trends of protest and increasing autocracy. Growing
economic disparity and lack of political and economic opportunity has
driven people worldwide to protest their situations and their governments.
Meanwhile the protection of privilege and wealth has simultaneously led to

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 Macabe Keliher

the rise of increasing autocratic responses and the consolidation of political

power. From this perspective, even if Beijing’s response is a consequence of
internal politics, the form that it takes is guided by this international context.

The future of Hong Kong

The rallying cry of Hong Kong democrats and activists has been universal suf-
frage, or the ability for ordinary men and women to exercise greater control
over their lives by casting a vote for a representative who will recognize and
fight for their interests, needs, and aspirations. What becomes clear is that
certain interests have leveraged power and position to recast politics in their
name and articulate law in their benefit. These developments shaped the na-
ture of economic power in order to favor concentration and gross accumula-
tion. Over time this resulted in a small group of people who own the major-
ity of wealth and pull the levers on political outcomes. It should thus be no
surprise that this economic and political elite in collusion with Beijing resist
structural change and challenge to the political order. Like any ruling class
throughout history, their power and position is both confirmed and secured
within the existing social, political, and economic arrangements. Their laws
articulate those structures and try to encrust their relations in an increasingly
hard shell with greater measures to suppress outcry and dissent.
With this structure in mind, democracy idealized, in real terms, might
look like the following. Direct elections of the chief executive and free elec-
tions of the entire legislature would shift the political context by placing le-
gitimacy and sovereignty into the hands of the voters. This would displace
Beijing and perhaps even challenge the political location of sovereignty by
making the holder of political office (especially the chief executive) directly
answerable to the people and not the 1,500 person hand-picked, pro-China,
business-stacked election committee. Furthermore, the business elite would
find their megaphone reduced to but a shout, if not muted, as their influence
over the government wanes and their position in the legislature diminished.
Antimonopoly laws would be passed, breaking up the conglomerates’ stran-
glehold on the economy. Meaningful competition laws would be enacted,
enabling new entrants to easily enter the market and free consumers from
the tyranny of cartel prices. Adequate public housing would get built giving
citizens a suitable adobe and lowering the exorbitant prices of private homes.

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 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

Democracy would even lead to a forward looking constitution not subject to

the follies of the economic orthodoxy.
There are two problems to this told fortune of democracy-cum-universal
suffrage—one explicit and the other immanent. The first is widely recognized
and well-rehearsed among most commentators: democracy is an unlikely pros-
pect, precisely because of what it might actuate; too many entrenched political
and economic interests are threatened by the possibility, and they have shown
that they are more ready to fight to the death—or rather attack to kill—than
to give up these interests. The new national security law has not only been
used to arrest and charge protesters for exercising speech, but proactively em-
ployed to disqualify candidates from seeking legislative seats and, most radi-
cally, to arrest individuals on suspicion of “inciting secession.”47
The second problem is perhaps more acute but rarely apprehended: The
implementation of universal suffrage will not fulfill the hopes and aspira-
tions of Hong Kong democrats but instead only further existing trends of
late capitalism. This is to say the political institution of electoral voting as
practiced in Western liberal democracies today is in crisis. Demagogues have
risen to power by exploiting divisions in the name of the people and are in-
creasingly enacting authoritarian measures to consolidate their power, from
annulling democratic norms to stifling the press and free speech. They have
done so on the back of electoral democracy and facilitated democratic back-
sliding. Here electoral democracy is increasingly used to justify and legiti-
mize authoritarian governments, and methods of doing so are being further
devised, developed, and shared among these governments in what some now
call Autocracy Inc.48
At the same time, entrenched political elites use the state to create con-
ditions that favor certain economic interests. The distinction between the
political and economic elite is collapsed, making it impossible to tell where
the policies and practices of government end and the interests and benefits
of its leaders—both elected and self-appointed—and their inner circle and
financial enablers begin. This trend is most pronounced in more authoritar-
ian countries, such as China and Russia, where the line between business and
politics is so blurred that it barely exists in many instances, but flourishes in
traditionally robust democracies, such as the United States, where money can
buy votes, support favorable policies, and literally write legislation.

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 Macabe Keliher

From this perspective, Hong Kong is only an extreme case of a general

trend—an advanced manifestation of the future that awaits contemporary
society. Universal suffrage alone, it seems, cannot save us. Thus the question:
What is the future of democracy?

The future of democracy

The international alarm raised at these developments has been matched only
by the incompetency of the American response: Harsh rhetoric, economic and
individual sanctions, and democracy summits excluding perpetrators, all of
which has been insufficient in reversing the global trend. The U.S. isolation
of Venezuela and Nicaragua, for example, resulted not in changed behavior
and the re-instillation of freedoms but rather support from China and Russia,
who helped in developing further repressive techniques.49 Likewise, the U.S.-
hosted Democracy Summit in mid-December 2021 was met with joint con-
demnation from Russia and China, who mocked it as a farce and attacked the
stated meaning of democracy articulated in the summit. “Democracy is not a
prerogative of a certain country or a group of countries, but a universal right of
all peoples,” wrote the Russian and Chinese ambassadors to the United States
in a co-authored article appearing before the summit. They went on to make
the case that democracy was flourishing in Russia and China and floundering
in the United States.50
The ineffectual promotion of democracy has played out in a similar script
in Hong Kong. In the face of the violent response to the 2019 protests and
the issuing of the National Security Law, U.S. Congress and government
sought to punish Hong Kong. As protests heated up in 2019, Congress con-
sidered two bills, one requiring a review of Hong Kong’s autonomous trading
privileges, which would further lead to sanctioning Hong Kong and PRC of-
ficials overseeing the violent crackdown, and the other bill barring the sale
of munitions to the Hong Kong Police. In the summer of 2020, the U.S.
State Department moved to end Hong Kong’s exemption from U.S. export
controls, effectively closing China’s back door to equipment and technology
deemed sensitive. Shortly after, the US.. president issued an executive order
on Hong Kong normalization eliminating special treatment for Hong Kong
in areas of trade, taxes, and immigration and visas. All goods made in or origi-
nating from Hong Kong for export now must be labeled as made in China. In

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August, Washington imposed financial and immigration sanctions on thirty-

five Hong Kong and PRC officials involved in Hong Kong suppression.51 At
the time, even more extreme measures were on the table, such as ending Hong
Kong’s access to U.S. dollars, which would have forced Hong Kong out of the
international currency system.52
Not only did these sanctions fail to achieve any measure of greater free-
doms for the Hong Kong people but in fact led to the reverse: greater repres-
sions and further attempts to redefine democracy by the PRC. In immediate
response to the United States, China leveled its own travel restrictions on
two U.S. Senators who had pushed sanctions and critiques.53 Over the next
year, Beijing continued to clamp down on both electoral democracy and
freedoms of speech and press in Hong Kong. A political primary organized
by an oppositional party was deemed illegal and organizers arrested, despite
the fact that nearly 80 percent of registered voters cast ballots. Legislative
elections were postponed, and when they were finally held all candidates
had to be approved by Beijing. Establishment candidates won overwhelm-
ingly and the election was declared a success despite an extremely low voter
turnout of around 30 percent. Two independent media outlets were shut
down and their editors arrested on grounds of sedition. A pro-democracy
statue was removed from the campus of Hong Kong University. This list
goes on as the Hong Kong government under Beijing has only become em-
boldened in the face of U.S. criticism.
Beijing’s defiance recently culminated with a white paper on Hong Kong
democracy. Released on December 20, 2021, the day after elections for the
Legislative Council, it reads as a polemic for the promotion of Chinese rule in
Hong Kong, which is credited with putting Hong Kong democracy on track.
In this telling, democracy is embodied by the Chinese Communist Party,
which helps facilitate the realizations of the Chinese people through demo-
cratic means. Britain had thwarted progress under colonial rule and agitators
later subverted progress towards universal suffrage with their social disrup-
tions. The NSL, it reads, is meant to save democracy. In the final analysis, the
paper reads, “The people of China have always yearned for democracy, and
the CPC has always stayed true to the mission of delivering their dream. Over
the past century, the CPC has led the Chinese people on a long and arduous
journey to establish a model of democracy with Chinese characteristics, and

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it has enabled 1.4 billion Chinese, one fifth of world population, to run their
own country with extensive and substantive democratic rights.”54
China is here working to establish what it calls a “new model of democracy”
based on not empowerment but rather “what works.”55 If true democrats are
going to forge a path forward to help co-create a world of greater opportunity
and engagement, where ordinary men and women are able to lift themselves
up in the realization of their aspirations and co-create their own futures, then
something else and something more needs to be done.

V. The Policy Response

Given the legal and political violence that Beijing and the Hong Kong govern-
ment are willing to wield to ensure control, very little if any domestic space
is left for alternative voices or ideas and all avenues for increasing pluralism
appear to have closed. Protests are banned and even gatherings are watched
closely. Opposition symbols are removed, outspoken critics and scholars are
attacked, and professors forced to resign.56 Similarly, the political opposition
has been jailed or silenced and even senior government officials veering from
an official line are coming under fire.57 American and international condem-
nation only invites fiery rebuke from the government and has the adverse ef-
fect, stigmatizing any progressive voice as “imperialist.” In short, there appears
to be little hope for opposition or change.
In addressing the situation, American policy makers and supporters of
Hong Kong must think about Hong Kong developments as part of the global
trends outlined above. Although we are unable to respond directly to Hong
Kong’s situation, we are able to begin rethinking democracy and how it is
implemented and actuated worldwide. The broad, international response
outlined below aims to shift the global structural framework away from re-
actionary movements and autocracy and towards democracy as a system of
empowerment.
In this spirit, this final section proposes a number of policies that should
be considered as a full package. They are meant to be taken up not in direct
relation to Hong Kong or China, for some of the proposals may be imprac-
tical in this particular context, but rather as a comprehensive program to
be pursued generally as an aspiration in service of the broader goal of self-

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empowerment and individual and community control and self-governance.

Many of these proposals already circulate and are footnoted accordingly—
the following merely compiles these policy ideas into a cohesive program
of two complementary aspects of democracy, political and economic, where
the former address the problem of freedoms and liberties and the latter the
ability to engage in the market.

Political democracy
In addressing the shortcomings of political or social democracy, policies that
encourage pluralism, support local actors over international NGOs, and de-
velop deliberative forums and citizen councils should be pushed.

1. Promote pluralism over elections. The goal of democracy is not to hold

elections in and of themselves but rather to empower ordinary men and
women. It is to give them the tools to shape their communities and societies.
The purpose is not simply to have a vote but to give people a say in the national
future and address the issues that affect their lives.
An election is but one means in moving towards a realization of this
larger goal of giving people a voice, yet it has been pushed as the end in it-
self. Democracy indexes are constructed with elections in mind: the recent
Democracy Summit emphasized the need for free and fair elections, and in-
ternational action is often triggered over accusations of unfair elections.58
While elections can be an important and useful tool for broader democratic
goals, they are often prone to manipulation and fail to achieve the stated aims,
as discussed above. Thus, rather than using electoral democracy as the standard,
broader citizen participation should be emphasized, where a diversity of indi-
viduals and groups are encouraged to mobilize and express opinions and ideas
with the objective of shaping policy and charting the national future.

2. Support local groups and organizations over international NGOs.

Currently, democracy promotion worldwide is a technical project of interna-
tional organizations that receive millions of dollars to carry out projects in
target countries based not on local knowledge but theories of democratization
with measurable outputs that can be quantified to satiate donors and foreign
governments. At best, these projects have failed; at worst, they undermined

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democratic efforts—Afghanistan is case in point. Rather than funding and

pushing NGOs, policy should promote local communities and work to enable
the greater engagement of local groups.59 As democracy scholars Catherine
Herrold and Aseem Prakash argue, “By facilitating discussion, debate, and
collective problem solving by everyday citizens, the United States can effec-
tively ensure that local people oversee their own democracies and cultivate
democratic habits of civic participation in the process.”60

3. Advance deliberative democracy and the establishment of citizens coun-

cils. One of the most successful democracy projects in recent years has been
the random selection of citizens to make decisions about the national future.
Similar to jury selection, citizens are invited to sit on a council and deliberate
over an issue or issues and make a recommendation on how the government
should proceed. In countries around the world, this form of deliberative de-
mocracy has been successfully employed to debate and provide policy on is-
sues ranging from abortion to the environment. It should be institutionalized
and spread, with more countries employing this form of participation in more
ways on more issues.61 Key to its success, and instrumental if it is to be imple-
mented in China and Hong Kong, is the random selection of members, not
a handpicked selection, as in the 1,500 member body that decides the Hong
Kong chief executive.

Economic Democracy
Democracy and the promotion of democracy is almost always conceived of
in political and social terms. A broader understanding of democracy, how-
ever, looks beyond electoral democracy to all forms of practices that will
empower people to rule themselves in all forms of life. As such, democracy
cannot stop at politics but must be extended to the economy. Indeed, as this
report has argued, Hong Kong’s contemporary situation was constructed
not simply through political choices and constraints on deliberative pow-
ers but also through the monopolization of economic life and the stripping
of opportunity and economic control as capital became concentrated and
entrenched. For democracy to flourish, economic control must be loosened
and individuals, groups, and communities empowered to engage the econ-
omy on their own terms.

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The plan of economic democracy has three key parts: rights of development
and production, global rights of labor, and social inheritance.

1. Rights of development and production. At the core of democratizing the

economy is the need to universalize the most advance forms of production.
Often referred to as the knowledge economy or experimental economy, this
new economy—comprising the most advance forms of production—com-
bines the maximization of technology with evolving skills and continuous
learning. Rather than multiplying and transforming economic development
the world over, however, these new means of production remain the purview
of isolated centers, such as Silicon Valley, and under the increasing control of
large global firms. In short, the new economy is restricted to vanguards of pro-
duction and engages relatively few workers.62
The task is to engineer a proliferation of this vanguard and ensure that all
can engage in the new economy. This necessitates creating conditions where
people are able to maximize their productive energies in self-confirming in-
novation and not be condemned to the mindless drudgery of repetitive tasks.
Two key measures are needed that should be pushed for globally: ensuring
equal access to resources and opportunities of the knowledge economy, and
the promotion of alternative property-rights regimes.63
Foremost is the need to guarantee broad access for all to the resources and
opportunities both for and within the vanguard of the economy. This in-
cludes access to finance, so that individuals are not restrained by capital in
attempting to move from idea to product, and that new ideas and innovation
can become part of the constant process of the economy. Similarly, the barri-
ers of intellectual property should be loosened so that all are able to make
use of existing invention and continue to build upon and develop. Limited
guarantees can be made so that innovators can profit from their ideas, but this
advantage should not be allowed to turn into rents and come at the expense
of continued development. Lastly, the defense of small business against big
business should be taken up and done so with an emphasis on decentraliza-
tion with economies of scale rather than accept economic concentration as the
price of scale.
The second measure in the task of universalizing the knowledge economy
is to innovate in the social relations of the economy. This should take place

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within the legal arrangements of private property, forms of employment,

and the state. In private property, the means by which people have access to
capital and technology in the legal arrangements of the market economy can
evolve and develop accordingly. The space for experimentation here needs to
be opened beyond the simple formula of private property promoted by the
Washington Consensus. Alternative regimes in contract and private prop-
erty beyond the limited means of the corporation can help economic actors
develop and innovate. Similarly, self-employment and cooperation should
be promoted above wage labor—doing so involves innovations in law and
contract. Rather than letting the economy run the individual, it is the indi-
vidual who can begin to set the terms of employment and engagement with
the economy on his or her own terms through production and innovation.
Lastly, advanced relations between the state and market can facilitate partner-
ships and diffusion of technology and economic development, as seen in the
postwar north Asian economies.

2. Global rights of labor. The second aspect in facilitating economic de-

mocracy involves addressing the immediacy of the plight of wage labor in the
world today. As innovation and advanced forms of production remain con-
fined to isolated pockets, rearguard production searches for ever cheaper labor
costs, sparking a race to the bottom as global corporations move around the
world driving down labor costs and hollowing out communities. This trend
can be stalled by instituting basic rights of labor internationally through the
freedom and encouragement of unionization, whereby all workers can freely
organize for their interests, and enactment of a global minimum wage.64

3. Social inheritance. The third measure of economic democracy is to ensure

that all people have the freedom to engage the economy on their own terms
and not be forced to become part of the economy on others’ terms. Individuals
must be assured of the basic necessities of health, sustenance, and shelter. A
minimum standard of health-care access and housing can be assured, giving
all the guarantee of sound body. In this spirit, one specific policy for Hong
Kong is the use of land options for housing, which would give each resident
an options right for housing that developers could bid for and use to open up
residential development projects on new land.65

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Enactment and enforcement

This program of political and economic democracy can be enacted and en-
forced through existing channels and institutions. These measures can be in-
sisted upon in international treaties and negotiations, and in condemnation
of a country’s anti-democratic actions and practices they can be held up and
pointed to. Three key steps can be taken, forming what democracy scholars
Ryan Berg and Christopher Sabatini call the “democrat’s playbook” to coun-
ter the “autocrats playbook.”66 These steps include defining tipping points, re-
forming international institutions around democracy, and establishing a fund
for democratic development.

1. Define tipping points. In the face of democratic backsliding and the rise
of autocratic practices, clear boundaries of democratic demise must be set—all
too often a country begins slipping slowly towards autocracy, yet not until pro-
testers are gunned down in the streets does the international community take
notice and act. Signs must be recognized at the outset, for democracy does not
disappear overnight but slides slowly away.
Tipping points can be identified in practices such as the decline of judicial
independence, electoral rigging, or curtails on independent media and shut-
ting down civil society. When these lines are crossed, the international com-
munity needs to respond collectively with clear conditions. Sanctions can be
proposed, but it is not enough to condemn and chastise—to simply wield a
stick—it is necessary to offer a point of leverage and give countries a path for-
ward for reversal and a roadmap for relief from imposed sanctions.

2. Reform and update international organizations, such as the World

Bank and IMF. Rather than emphasizing economic growth and doing so
even at the expense of democracy, these organizations ought to lead with de-
mocracy, making the measures of political and economic democracy outlined
above conditions of lending and obtaining technical assistance. Those coun-
tries that do not live up to standards need not be excluded, rather the use of
democratic measures should be laid down as markers for all to move towards.
Encouragement and aspiration should be emphasized rather than the imposi-
tion of hard sanctions in the face of violation, and further assistance offered to
ensure that the democratic ideals are being put into practice.

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3. Establish a global democracy development fund. For Berg and Sabatini,

“The idea would be to establish incentives for fledging democratic govern-
ments, or governments that have returned to democracy from autocratic
paths, such as Ecuador, to stay the course by providing them with develop-
ment assistance.”67 In addition, such a fund could be used to provide financial
and technical assistance in the implementation of the political and economic
agendas of democracy building.
For these measures to work on an international scale, Americans must also
take seriously the backsliding at home. The United States has experienced
significant democratic backsliding, according to The Economist democracy re-
port, and is now classified as a “flawed democracy,” downgraded from a “full
democracy.” Likewise, the frequent retort of China in the face of criticism is
to point to American failings, as if it were justification for autocratic tactics.
The United States should not pretend that it is the model democracy towards
which all should hold up and emulate; rather the United States must commit
to a continued striving and willingness to put these measures of political and
economic democracy into practice and hold ourselves accountable for doing
so. The aim, after all, is to unlock the ordinary genius of every individual—
man or women, of low birth or high, in China, America, or Sudan—so that
each can partake in the co-creation of their world and live a greater life.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

Notes
1 Estimates of the number of protesters can vary widely. For example, official police estimates
put protest figures in the mid hundreds of thousands not millions. For an overview of events
see Austin Ramzy and Mike Ives, “Hong Kong Protests, One Year Later,” The New York
Times, June 9, 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/world/asia/hong-
kong-protests-one-year-later.html.
2 Hong Kong Police Force, “Public Order Event Statistics,” https://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_
en/09_statistics/poes.html
3 Kelly Ho, “Seven Hong Kong democrats jailed for up to 12 months over banned protest
against security law,” Hong Kong Free Press, October 18, 2021, https://hongkongfp.
com/2021/10/18/seven-hong-kong-democrats-jailed-for-up-to-12-months-over-banned-
protest-against-security-law.
4 Kari Soo Lindberg, Natalie Lung, and Pablo Robles, “How Hong Kong’s National Security
Law Is Changing Everything,” Bloomberg.Com, October 5, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.
com/graphics/2021-hong-kong-national-security-law-arrests/.
5 Associated Press, “How a Primary Got Hong Kong Activists in Trouble,” AP NEWS, March
1, 2021, sec. Primary elections, https://apnews.com/article/beijing-primary-elections-
democracy-hong-kong-elections-ccda7eb61403f721ba8e56423203f72a.
6 “Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gazetted,”
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, July 6, 2020,
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202007/06/P2020070600784.htm.
7 See Michael C. Davis, “Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission Hearing on ‘US China Relations in 2021: Emerging Risks’,” September 8, 2021.
8 See Samuel J Brannen, Christian S Haig, and Katherine Schmidt, “The Age of Mass Protests:
Understanding an Escalating Global Trend” (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, March 2020), 1.
9 “Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?” The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2021.
10 Stephen G. F. Hall and Thomas Ambrosio, “Authoritarian Learning: A Conceptual
Overview,” East European Politics 33, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 143–61. As one scholar put it,
“The thought of academic-style conferences to discuss best practices in electoral manipulation
and lessons learned in stacking judicial systems might be amusing, but elected autocrats
from Venezuela to Turkey to Hungary really have borrowed from one another, sometimes
even sharing advisors and exporting ideas in repression and election-rigging.” Ryan C. Berg
and Christopher Sabatini, “Autocrats Have a Playbook—Now Democrats Need One Too,”
Foreign Policy, February 10, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/10/autocrats-have-
a-playbook-now-democrats-need-one-too/. Also see Anne Applebaum, “The Bad Guys Are
Winning,” The Atlantic, November 15, 2021. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2021/12/the-autocrats-are-winning/620526/
11 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of
Democracy 13:2 (2002): 51–65.
12 See Berg and Christopher Sabatini, “Autocrats Have a Playbook—Now Democrats Need

255
 Macabe Keliher

One Too,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/10/

autocrats-have-a-playbook-now-democrats-need-one-too/
13 This collusion between Hong Kong capitalists and Beijing served the interests of each.
The former wished to protect their assets from the threat of state seizure, while the latter
aimed to ensure the economic prosperity of the territory as it served as a conduit for China
to the outside world. Tai-lok Lui, et al. “Introduction: The Long Transition,” in Routledge
Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, ed. Tai-Lok Lui, Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep
(London: Routledge, 2019), 1-32. Also see Yash Ghai, “The Past and the Future of Hong
Kong’s Constitution,” The China Quarterly 128 (December 1991): 794–813; Danny Gittings,
Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2017).
14 The text of the Basic Law can be found at https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/
15 On the contingent and arbitrary success of Hong Kong see Gary Hamilton, “Hong Kong
and the Rise of Capitalism in Asia,” in Cosmopolitan Capitalists: Hong Kong and the Chinese
Diaspora at the End of the Twentieth Century, ed. Gary Hamilton (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1999), 14–34. On the East Asian economies in general see Robert
Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian
Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
16 One such consequence is the failure of the Hong Kong government to develop an industrial
policy in the face of the changing nature of manufacturing in the Pearl River Delta. See
Godfrey Yeung, “End of a Chapter?” in Handbook, 397-413.
17 See Leo F Goodstadt, A City Mismanaged: Hong Kong’s Struggle for Survival (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2018).
18 Contrary to the myth of the lack of state engagement in the economy, as discussed below, the
colonial government set up a welfare system that enabled companies to keep down wages and
benefit costs. See Manuel Castells, Lee Goh, and R. Yin-Wang Kwok, The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome:
Economic Development and Public Housing in Hong Kong and Singapore (Pion, 1990).
19 See Jeffie Lam, “Poverty in Hong Kong Hits Record High with 1 in 5 Considered
Poor,” South China Morning Post, November 17, 2017, sec. News, https://www.
scmp.com/news/hong-kong/community/article/2120366/poverty-hong-kong-hits-
7-year-high-one-five-people; Alex Jingwei He, “Hong Kong’s Plight for a Better
Welfare System,” Policy Forum, February 27, 2019, https://www.policyforum.net/
hong-kongs-plight-for-a-better-welfare-system/.
20 Donald Tsang, “Press Release: Statement by the Chief Secretary,” September 3, 2001, https://
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200109/03/0903236.htm.
21 Goodstadt, A City Mismanaged, 96. For a more thorough discussion of public housing in
the colonial period see Adrienne La Grange, “Privatising Public Housing in Hong Kong: Its
Impact on Equity,” Housing Studies 13, no. 4 (July 1998): 507–25.
22 Goodstadt, A City Mismanaged, 110.
23 For some examples of these effects see Ka Wai Fan, “The Role of University Libraries in
Supporting Research in Hong Kong: Facing a New Challenge,” Campus-Wide Information
Systems 22:1 (January 1, 2005): 43–50; “Docs Fear Uni Funding Cuts Will Imperil Health
Care,” The Standard, December 2, 2019, sec. Local, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/
breaking-news/section/3/137864/Docs-fear-uni-funding-cuts-will-imperil-health-care.

256
 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

24 Victor So Hing-woh, “Chairman’s Statement,” in Annual Report 2018-2019, Urban Renewal

Authority (July 2019): 6, https://www.ura.org.hk/en/publication/annual-report/2018-2019.
25 For example see Goodsteadt, A City Mismanaged.
26 Figures from “Hong Kong Industry,” Nations Encyclopedia, https://www.
nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Hong-Kong-INDUSTRY.html;
“Hong Kong: Share of Industry,” The Global Economy, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/
Hong-Kong/Share_of_industry/; Chung Yan Ip “Youth and the Changing Opportunity
Structure,” in Handbook, 291.
27 Figures in Chung Yan Ip “Youth and the Changing Opportunity Structure,” in Handbook,
291. For a good study of Hong Kong’s deindustrialization and its employment consequences
see Stephen W. K. Chiu and Tai-lok Lui, “Testing the Global City-Social Polarisation Thesis:
Hong Kong since the 1990s,” Urban Studies 41:10 (September 1, 2004): 1863–1888.
28 Figures from “Gini Coefficient By Country 2020,” in World Population Review, https://
worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/gini-coefficient-by-country.
29 Cheryl Arcibal, “Hong Kong Tops Most Unaffordable Home Market
as Protests Make Little Dent,” South China Morning Post, January 20,
2020, sec. Business, https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3046868/
hong-kong-tops-global-list-most-expensive-housing-market-again-protests.
30 Eric Ng, Lam Ka-sing, and Sandy Li, “Why Does Hong Kong’s Petrol Pump Price Top the
World? It Has Nothing to Do with Crude Oil Price?,” South China Morning Post, April 26,
2020, sec. Business, https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3081593/why-do-hongkongers-
pay-sky-high-prices-petrol-when-international-oil; Kanis Leung, “Hong Kong Consumer
Council Calls for Review of City’s Motor-Fuel Market,” South China Morning Post, May
21, 2020, sec. News, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/
article/3085526/hong-kong-consumer-council-calls-review-citys.
31 Neil Newman, “Is Hong Kong Being Served Fairly? Food Prices like These
Suggest Not,” South China Morning Post, July 27, 2020, sec. This Week
in Asia, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3094641/
hong-kong-being-served-fairly-food-prices-uk-singapore-and-japan.
32 Cited in Louis Augustin-Jean and Anthea H. Y. Cheung, The Economic Roots of the Umbrella
Movement in Hong Kong: Globalization and the Rise of China (London: Routledge, Taylor &
Francis Group, 2018), 93.
33 Figures from Mark Williams, “The Lion City and the Fragrant Harbor: The Political
Economy of Competition Policy in Singapore and Hong Kong Compared,” Antitrust Bulletin
54:3 (Fall 2009): 547-548.
34 Ching Kwan Lee and Ming Sing, Take Back Our Future: An Eventful Sociology of the Hong
Kong Umbrella Movement (New York: Cornell University Press, 2019).
35 Francis Lee “Mediascape and Movement,” Take Back Our Future, p. 113.
36 Jennifer Creery, “Hong Kong Stumbles in Reporters Without Borders
Press Freedom Index, down 25 Places in 10 Years,” Hong Kong Free
Press HKFP, April 18, 2019, https://hongkongfp.com/2019/04/18/
just-hong-kong-stumbles-reporters-without-borders-press-freedom-index-25-places-10-years/.
37 Stan Wong in chapter 20 in Handbook, “The Real Estate Elite and Real Estate Hegemony,” p. 345.

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 Macabe Keliher

38 Figures from Yun-wing Sung, “Becoming Part of One National Economy: Maintaining Two
Systems in the Midst of the Rise of China,” in Handbook, 67.
39 Cited in Alvin So, “Hong Kong Integration with Mainland China in Historical Perspective,”
in Handbook, 505.
40 Figures from Census and Statistics Department. https://www.bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/bc-
pob.html, https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp180.jsp?productCode=B1130303.
41 See Hung Ho-Fung, in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, ed. Tai-Lok Lui,
Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep (London: Routledge, 2019), ch. 24.
42 See “The Hong Kong Extradition Law and the CCP Factional
Struggle,” SinoInsider, June 11, 2019, https://sinoinsider.com/2019/06/
politics-watch-the-hong-kong-extradition-law-and-the-ccp-factional-struggle/.
43 Especially see SinoInsider, “Politics Watch: How the CCP Factional Struggle Could Trigger
a Tiananmen-like Event in Hong Kong – SinoInsider,” June 12, 2019, https://sinoinsider.
com/2019/06/politics-watch-how-the-ccp-factional-struggle-could-trigger-a-tiananmen-
like-event-in-hong-kong/; SinoInsider, “Politics Watch: The Hong Kong Extradition Law and
the CCP Factional Struggle – SinoInsider,” June 11, 2019, https://sinoinsider.com/2019/06/
politics-watch-the-hong-kong-extradition-law-and-the-ccp-factional-struggle/.
44 See “Hong Kong’s NatSec Set Up Signals ‘Supra-Authority’ Status of the CCP’s NatSec
Commission,” SinoInsider, July 8, 2020, https://sinoinsider.com/2020/07/politics-watch-
hong-kongs-natsec-set-up-signals-supra-authority-status-of-the-ccps-natsec-commission/.
45 See Macabe Keliher, “Neoliberal Hong Kong Is Our Future, Too,” Boston
Review, September 9, 2020, http://bostonreview.net/global-justice/
macabe-keliher-neoliberal-hong-kong-our-future-too.
46 A number of recent works chart the development of neoliberal trends and the emergence
of an ideology and practice that does not just privatize and deregulate but also mobilize
the state on the behalf of capital. See Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s
Stealth Revolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015); David Singh Grewal and Jedediah Purdy,
“Law and Neoliberalism,” Law and Contemporary Problems 77:4 (2014): 1–23; Jamie
Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For a
good discussion of the logic of neoliberalism see Thomas Biebricher, The Political Theory of
Neoliberalism (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2019).
47 For example see “4 Ex-Members of pro-Independence Student Group Arrested on
Suspicion of ‘inciting Secession’ under Hong Kong’s Security Law,” Hong Kong
Free Press, July 29, 2020, https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/29/breaking-pro-
independence-student-group-leader-arrested-on-suspicion-of-inciting-secession-
under-hong-kongs-security-law/; Kelly Ho, Tom Grundy, and Jennifer Creery, “Hong
Kong Bans Joshua Wong and 11 Other Pro-Democracy Figures from Legislative
Election,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 30, 2020, https://hongkongfp.com/2020/07/30/
breaking-hong-kong-bans-8-pro-democracy-figures-from-legislative-election/.
48 Anne Applebaum, “The Bad Guys Are Winning,” The Atlantic, November 15, 2021, https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/12/the-autocrats-are-winning/620526/.
49 See Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Sabatini, “The Democrat’s Playbook,”
Foreign Policy, December 7, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/07/

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 Hong Kong’s Political Economy and the Crisis of Democracy

biden-democracy-summit-sanctions-world-bank-imf/
50 Anatoly Antonov and Qin Gang, “Russian and Chinese Ambassadors:
Respecting People’s Democratic Rights,” The National Interest (The Center for
the National Interest, November 26, 2021), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/
russian-and-chinese-ambassadors-respecting-people%E2%80%99s-democratic-rights-197165.
51 “U.S. Relations With Hong Kong,” United States Department of State, August 28,
2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-hong-kong/; “2021 Hong Kong Policy
Act Report,” United States Department of State, March 31, 2021, https://www.state.
gov/2021-hong-kong-policy-act-report/.
52 Saleha Mohsin and Jennifer Jacobs, “Trump Aides Rule Out Ending Hong Kong Dollar
Peg as Punishment,” Newsmax, July 13, 2020, https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/
trump-hong-kong-dollar-peg/2020/07/13/id/976967/.
53 Senators Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio.
54 State Council Information Office, “Hong Kong Democratic Progress Under the Framework
of One Country, Two Systems,” December 20, 2021.
55 State Council Information Office, “China: Democracy That Works,” December 4, 2021, http://
www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/2018/zdtj/202112/t20211204_800269115.html. This white
paper on democracy was released a few weeks before the statement on Hong Kong democracy.
56 See Ng Kang-chung, “Controversial Political Scientist Brian Fong Leaves Education
University of Hong Kong,” South China Morning Post, February 13, 2022, sec.
News, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3166902/
political-scientist-brian-fong-leaves-education-university.
57 For example see, Vivian Wang and Austin Ramzy, “Hong Kong Can’t Live With the Virus.
It Can’t Stop It, Either.,” The New York Times, February 16, 2022, sec. World, https://www.
nytimes.com/2022/02/16/world/asia/hong-kong-covid-omicron-wave.html.
58 On the emphasis on electoral democracy see Aseem Prakash and Catherine E. Herrold,
“When Promoting Democracy, Less Is More,” Foreign Policy (blog), December 8,
2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/08/biden-democracy-summit-pluralism-
promotion-ngos/. The Economist’s democracy index, for example, is structured largely
around elections. “Democracy Index 2020: In Sickness and in Health?” (The Economist,
2021). A key point of the democracy summit was “defending free and fair elections and
political processes.” “Summit for Democracy Summary of Proceedings,” December 10,
2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/23/
summit-for-democracy-summary-of-proceedings/.
59 See the Global Fund Community Foundation #shiftthepower movement https://
globalfundcommunityfoundations.org/what-we-stand-for/shiftthepower/
60 Aseem Prakash and Catherine E. Herrold, “When Promoting Democracy, Less Is
More,” Foreign Policy (blog), December 8, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/08/
biden-democracy-summit-pluralism-promotion-ngos/.
61 For a good discussion of deliberative democracy in theory and practice see Hélène
Landemore, “What Biden’s Democracy Summit Is Missing,” Foreign Policy, December 7,
2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/07/biden-democracy-summit-people-power/. On
the program of deliberative democracy and its establishment see Claudia Chwalisz, “Eight

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 Macabe Keliher

Ways to Institutionalise Deliberative Democracy,” OECD, December 14, 2021, https://www.

oecd.org/gov/open-government/eight-ways-to-institutionalise-deliberative-democracy.htm.
62 For a full discussion of the knowledge economy and its current social limitations see Roberto
Mangabeira Unger, The Knowledge Economy (New York: Verso Books, 2019).
63 See Tamara Lothian, Law and the Wealth of Nations: Finance, Prosperity, and Democracy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 124-126.
64 See Michael Galant, “The Time Has Come for a Global Minimum Wage,” Inequality.Org,
June 17, 2019, https://inequality.org/research/ilo-global-minimum-wage/.
65 Shitong Qiao and Jr Hills, “Land Options for Housing: How New Property
Rights Can Break Old Land Monopolies,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY:
Social Science Research Network, January 29, 2022), https://doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.4021239. Also see Roderick Hills and Shitong Qiao, “Breaking Old Land
Monopoly to Overcome Hong Kong’s Housing Shortage,” South China Morning Post,
March 1, 2022, sec. Business, https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3168623/
breaking-old-land-monopoly-hong-kong-resolve-citys-housing-crisis.
66 Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Sabatini, “The Democrat’s Playbook,”
Foreign Policy, December 7, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/07/
biden-democracy-summit-sanctions-world-bank-imf/.
67 Ryan C. Berg and Christopher Sabatini, “The Democrat’s Playbook.”

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

From Regional to National:

Northeastern Scholars and
the National Discourse
on the War of Resistance
against Japan
Emily Matson is an Adjunct Lecturer of Chinese Studies at William &
Mary and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Emily Matson

Abstract
In January of 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s Ministry of
Education made an unprecedented announcement to alter the timeline of the
War of Resistance against Japan (China’s experience of World War II) from
eight to fourteen years. This was the culmination of a decades-long “date de-
bate,” spearheaded since the 1980s by scholars from Northeastern China who
vehemently argued that the war timeline should start with the invasion of their
homeland on September 18, 1931 (as opposed to the previously accepted start
date of July 7, 1937). Thus, Chinese historians from a region that is often seen
as “far-flung” due to its geographic location and “backward” due to its reputa-
tion as China’s rust belt provided the impetus to a significant policy shift in
the upper echelons of the Beijing government. Changing the starting date of
the war was not only advantageous in promoting the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP)’s resistance effort domestically, but also in further emphasizing
China’s role on the global stage in World War II, despite the fact that an eight-
year war timeline is more historically accurate. We must simultaneously rec-
ognize the CCP’s attempts to rewrite the history of the war while also taking
seriously China’s role in World War II, albeit under the Nationalists and not
the Communists.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● U.S. policymakers must not consider the PRC to be an authoritarian
monolith—there are a variety of regional interests that can have strong
bearings on the formation of top-level policies, such as the Northeast’s
role in the “date debate” that led to the 2017 Ministry of Education
announcement to change the war timeline. Thus, U.S. policymakers
should focus on building relationships with those in positions of regional
authority in China in addition to the central Beijing leadership.

● U.S. policymakers must take seriously the relevance of the legacy of

Mao Zedong and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to Party
historiography, particularly under Xi Jinping. Building on Mao’s legacy is
an important part of CCP legitimacy today and how the Party portrays
itself to domestic and international audiences.

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 From Regional to National

● U.S. policymakers must recognize the CCP’s attempts to rewrite

history for nationalistic purposes and work with historians to promote
the objective study of Chinese history. This should include convening
international symposiums and actively countering the Chinese
government’s recent coercion against certain academic journals.

● U.S. policymakers should see China’s emphasis on its role in World War
II, in which it claims it fought the fascists for far longer than any other
belligerent, as part of intentionally building an international image of
a moral, responsible actor. This has direct geopolitical implications, as
China seeks to reframe its aggressive actions in the South China Sea
and elsewhere.

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 Emily Matson

Introduction
“The War of Resistance against Japan developed along a torturous road. This
war started in 1931.”
– Mao Zedong, 1937

“The Mukden Incident became the starting point of the Chinese people’s
War of Resistance against Japan and revealed the prologue of the global Anti-
Fascist War.”
– Xi Jinping, 2015

On January 3, 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s Ministry of

Education made an unprecedented announcement regarding the War of
Resistance against Japan (抗日战争), which is China’s experience of World
War II. Starting with middle school textbooks printed in spring 2017, the
starting date for the War of Resistance would be changed from July 7, 1937,
or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (卢沟桥事变), to September 18, 1931,
or the Mukden Incident (九一八事变), an extension of the war’s timeline
from eight to fourteen years.1 However, before 2017, the 14-year timeline was
anything but a foregone conclusion. On the contrary, there had been a fierce
“date debate” since the 1980s regarding the proper timeline for the Resistance
against Japan. This “date debate” was largely spearheaded by scholars from
Northeastern China (东北), who vehemently argued that the war timeline
should be expanded starting with the invasion of their homeland. By 2017,
however, this “date debate” had largely shut down due to the CCP’s decision
to officially weigh in.
The War of Resistance against Japan has served an increasingly important
role in Chinese political consciousness in the last few decades and has become
ever more intertwined with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s legitimiz-
ing narrative. Under Xi Jinping, the PRC continues to highlight the War of
Resistance against Japan for reasons connected to both domestic and inter-
national political legitimacy. Highlighting fourteen instead of eight years of
resistance not only emphasizes that the CCP (as opposed to the Nationalists)
was the cornerstone (中流砥柱) of the war, but also seeks to convince the
international community of China’s leading role in World War II, which is
commonly known in China as the Anti-Fascist War (反法西斯战争).

264
 From Regional to National

This paper first summarizes the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the
Mukden Incident, as the history of these events is essential to better compre-
hend the “date debate” that followed decades later. It then charts the histo-
riography of the “date debate” in the Chinese scholarly world, analyzes the
credibility of both dates, and finally looks at the implications of this “date
debate” and why it is important for us to understand.

I. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident

and the Mukden Incident
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937 is still regarded in the
Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan as the official start of the war, 2 and in
the PRC as the start of “national all-out war” (全国性战争) between China
and Japan.3 The events of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident were not particu-
larly unusual in and of themselves; rather, their significance lies in the pow-
der keg of latent aggression they ignited.4 What exactly happened that fateful
day in Wanping, a small fortress town to the southwest of Beijing, is still
a mystery. The chain of events began, however, after Japanese troops from
the Eighth Company under Colonel Mutaguchi Renya marched to their des-
ignated training grounds near Marco Polo Bridge on July 7.5 Allegedly, the
Eight Company had heard gunshots from within Wanping and subsequently
requested permission to enter the town to search for a missing private. The
following morning, after having been refused, the Eighth Company and re-
inforcements began their military assault on the town, which they captured
within a matter of hours. Such local skirmishes were not uncommon, and
the local Chinese and Japanese troops had reached a compromise by July 11.6
However, the national governments in Nanjing and Tokyo had become in-
volved and the fires of war had been stoked, hence the subsequent signifi-
cance of July 7, 1937 as the start of “national all-out war.”
Juxtaposed with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident is the Mukden Incident,
which is now viewed in the PRC as both the starting date of the “partial war” (
局部抗战) and the official starting date of the War of Resistance against Japan.7
The Mukden Incident (or the Manchurian Incident) was set off in Shenyang
(Mukden) by the Japanese Kwantung Army due to a variety of factors, including
concern over the potential effect of growing Chinese nationalism in the region

265
 Emily Matson

on Japanese commercial and political interests. On the evening of September

18, 1931, junior officers Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishirō and the garrison
under their command in Shenyang exploded a bomb on the railway tracks out-
side of the city.8 Claiming that the bomb was intentionally set off by Chinese
nationalists to derail a Japanese train, the Kwantung Army utilized this incident
as a pretext to invade Manchuria.9 Largely due to Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of
non-resistance, the Kwantung Army was able to establish control of over the ma-
jority of Manchuria in a matter of months without much bloodshed. In March
of 1932, it established the puppet-state of Manchukuo with Henry Puyi, the last
emperor of the Qing Dynasty, as the head.

II. The “Date Debate”

As prominent China scholar Rana Mitter has noted, “the writing of history
and the practice of politics have always been closely intertwined in China.”10
Thus, the “date debate” over the proper starting date of the War of Resistance
against Japan should not be viewed as separate from developments in CCP
politics, but rather closely linked.
Before the 1980s, the War of Resistance against Japan’s start date remained
largely uncontested, and both the Chinese scholarly community and popular
opinion habitually used the phrase “eight-year war” starting with the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident of 1937. However, starting in the 1980s, a number of
scholars, many of whom hailed from the Northeast, began to push for a “four-
teen-year war” starting with the Mukden Incident of 1931. After this line of
thought gained traction, what was once implicitly accepted as fact became
open to debate. Starting in the 1990s, scholars advocating for the “eight-year
war” started to notably and directly engage with the “fourteen-year war”
scholars. Interestingly, the CCP allowed this “date debate” to continue un-
abated for several decades until the official Ministry of Education pronounce-
ment in 2017.

The 1980s
The widely cited initiation of the “date debate” is a 1983 statement by Liaoning
University professor Zhang Deliang, who argued at the Northeastern Military

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Fourteen-Year History of Resistance to Japan Academic Seminar (东北军十四

年抗战史国际学术研讨会) that the War of Resistance started on September
18, 1931. Zhang contended that the first shot of resistance fired by the Chinese
was by the northern base of the 7th Brigade of the Northeastern Army.11
A year later, Yan’an University professor He Ying argued that “tak-
ing the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to be the starting point of the War of
Resistance against Japan is inappropriate, does not accord with reality, and
is unscientific.”12 First, this was because the Mukden Incident changed the
principal contradiction (主要矛盾) in Chinese society according to Marxist
dialectics from domestic class struggle to one between the Chinese people
and Japanese imperialism. He also utilized Mao Zedong’s legacy, quoting a
1937 speech in which Mao referred to the Mukden Incident as the start of
the “War of Resistance against Japan era” (抗日时期). Lastly, He argued
that after the Mukden Incident, the CCP and Nationalist patriots really
began to struggle against Japan.13
Another Northeastern scholar, Jian Ming, also utilized Mao’s legacy to jus-
tify a fourteen-year war. Jian quoted a phrase from a 1937 speech of Mao that
would continue to be quoted time and time again by scholars arguing for a
fourteen-year war: “The War of Resistance against Japan developed along a
torturous road. This war started in 1931.”14 He quoted the Tanaka Memorial
to show that the Mukden Incident represented the first step in Japan’s mas-
ter plan: “If we [the Japanese] want to conquer China, we must first conquer
Manchuria and Mongolia; if we want to conquer the world, we must first con-
quer China.”15 Although the authenticity of the Tanaka Memorial is not ac-
cepted by most international scholars today, it is still widely utilized in China
as evidence of the scope of Japanese military ambitions in the 1930s.16 Jian fur-
ther discussed the extensive resistance of the Chinese people after 1931 and ar-
gued that before 1937, it was the CCP, not the Nationalists (or Guomindang,
GMD) that was the true leader of the war effort and the true representative
of the Chinese people.17 However, Jian did acknowledge that there were some
GMD patriots who joined in the resistance, which dovetailed with the shift in
CCP scholarship on the War of Resistance to acknowledge the GMD role in
the war. Lastly, Jian argued that the Mukden Incident should not only be the
start of the War of Resistance, but that it should also be considered the open-
ing salvo of the global Anti-Fascist War.18

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The 1990s
As mentioned above, Chinese historians began to debate each other in earnest
concerning the proper starting date of the War of Resistance in the 1990s.
Certain scholars, particularly from China’s Northeast, continued to clamor
for the Mukden Incident as the proper starting date. Other scholars, in con-
trast, proposed a wide slate of differing interpretations of when the appropri-
ate starting dates should be for the War of Resistance against Japan, the Anti-
Fascist War, and World War II.
Scholars clamoring for the Mukden Incident starting date utilized simi-
lar arguments to the authors from the 1980s. In 1990, Northeastern scholar
Guang Deming argued that the principal contradiction in Chinese society
changed in 1931 rather than in 1937, although he distinguished between
the “partial war of resistance” and the “all-out war of resistance.”19 In 1999,
Northeastern scholar Wang Xiuying argued that 1931 was the proper start-
ing date for both the War of Resistance against Japan and World War II.
Similar to Jian Ming, Wang viewed the Mukden Incident as the first step in
Japan’s master plan to conquer China. 20 In addition, Wang juxtaposed the
CCP’s resistance of the Japanese from the start with the GMD’s policy of
non-resistance under Chiang Kai-shek. Interestingly, to back up her argu-
ments, Wang not only quoted Mao and Zhou Enlai, but also relied on the
scholarship of several prominent Japanese historians who argued for a 15-
year war starting in 1931. 21
Besides the Mukden Incident and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Chinese
historians mentioned several other proposed starting dates for the War of
Resistance against Japan, including the December 9th Movement, which was
a student demonstration in 1935 under the leadership of the CCP calling
for resistance to Japan; the Xi’an Incident of 1936, which led to the Second
United Front between the CCP and the GMD to jointly resist Japan; and the
August 13th Incident, which marked the beginning of the Battle of Shanghai
in 1937. Nanjing historian Song Li even argued for the starting date of August
14, 1937, when the GMD produced its “Statement of Resisting Japan in Self-
Defense” (自卫抗战声明书).22
Besides Wang Xiuying’s argument that the War of Resistance and World
War II should start with the Mukden Incident, Chinese historians in the
1990s had a variety of other opinions on when World War II and the Anti-

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Fascist War should start. Shaanxi historian Lei Xinshi argued that the start of
World War II should be the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, rather than
Germany’s invasion of Poland. Lei argued against using the Mukden Incident
of 1931 as a starting point of World War II because, he argued, Japan was not
yet allied with the Axis Powers in 1931, and the Chinese people were not able
to fully resist Japan until 1937.23 Hubei scholar Pan Xiangsheng argued that
World War II and the Anti-Fascist War should not be conflated—World War
II should start with Germany’s invasion of Poland, but the global Anti-Fascist
War should start with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.24 Wang Guilin, in
contrast, believed that Germany’s invasion of Poland was still the appropriate
starting date for World War II.25

2000 to 2017
By the 2000s, many historians, both from the Northeast and other parts of
China, were clamoring for the start of the War of Resistance against Japan
to be the Mukden Incident of 1931. Although there were still proponents of
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937 as the starting date, these proponents
started to fall into the minority. After 2015, a speech made by Xi Jinping to
celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II really solidified the
14-year war position, and after this the “date debate” largely went silent. This
does not mean that there were no more scholarly articles; rather, the articles
all tended to agree with each other, unlike the contentious debate of the 1980s
through 2000s, due to Xi and the CCP’s endorsement of the September 18,
1931 start date. Xi noted that “the Mukden Incident became the starting
point of the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japan and revealed
the prologue of the global Anti-Fascist War.”26 This would become the official
position of the CCP just two years later, in 2017.
In the early 2000s, however, the “date debate” was still going strong, al-
though more scholars, notably from Northeastern China, were vociferously
calling for 1931 as a starting date. Interestingly, Heilongjiang scholar Zhao
Junqing argued that the starting date of the War of Resistance should not be
September 18, 1931, but rather November 4, 1931 with GMD general Ma
Zhanshan’s Battle of Jiangqiao, when Zhao claimed that the Chinese people
really started resisting Japan. Zhao’s rationale for a 1931 starting date followed

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those set out by previous scholars: the principal contradiction in Chinese soci-
ety changed; the CCP resisted Japan while the Nanjing government pursued
a policy of nonresistance; this was in line with Mao Zedong thought; and that
the sacrifices of the Northeasterners must be recognized.27
In 2005, several more scholars argued for the Mukden Incident to be the
starting date. Shenyang Normal University’s Wang Guizhong argued that
starting the War of Resistance from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident would
serve to negate the sacrifices of the Northeasterners in resisting Japan.28
Similarly, Yue Siping argued that taking September 18, 1931 as the starting
date for the War of Resistance was most scientific, but that the start of World
War II should be the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.29 In contrast, in 2006, fa-
mous Jiangxi historian Liu Tinghua (who had written earlier articles on the
topic as well) argued that the start of both the War of Resistance and World
War II should be the Mukden Incident because the principal contradiction
in Chinese society changed. Additionally, Liu contended that scholars should
not equate the start of the war with when the GMD was resisting, as the CCP
had resisted the Japanese since 1931.30
On the other side of the debate, historians pushed for 1937 to be the proper
starting date. Zhang Zhenkun stated in 2006 that after the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident, the war started and went way beyond any other invasion experienced
in modern Chinese history in both its scale and death. He suggested that the
idea of the 14-year war was unduly influenced by Japanese scholarship, and
utilized a slippery-slope argument—if the war can be 14 instead of 8 years,
what would stop it from becoming a 51-year war, starting with First Sino-
Japanese War in 1894? Zhang argued that there was no unified resistance be-
tween 1931 and 1937—it was very sporadic. Furthermore, before the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident, there was still the possibility of compromise between
the Nanjing and Tokyo governments. Lastly, Zhang thoroughly debunked
the idea that Japan’s plan to colonize China began in 1931—for that, he con-
tended, one would have to go back to the 21 Demands of 1915.31 Similarly, in
2010, Zeng Jingzhong vehemently argued against the proponents of the 1931
starting date—Zeng also stated that there was little real resistance to Japan
after the Mukden Incident.32
Another potential starting point proposed by scholar Huang Aijun was
in 1928, when warlord Zhang Xueliang declared allegiance to the Nanjing

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government and raised the GMD flag in Northeastern China. This, accord-
ing to Huang, signaled Zhang’s resistance against Japanese influence in the
Northeast. In contrast, Huang also believed that there was little resistance
to Japan after 1931. He distinguished between the War of Resistance against
Japan, which should start in 1928, from the historical period of the War
of Resistance (抗日时期), which he argued should begin with the Xi’an
Incident of 1936.33
As the 2000s turned into the 2010s, scholarship defending the Marco
Polo Bridge Incident as the starting date of the war began to wane. In 2010,
a history professor at Changchun’s Northeastern Normal University, Cheng
Shuwei, argued once more that the principal contradiction in Chinese so-
ciety changed on September 18, 1931 to that between China and Japan. To
deny that the Mukden Incident was the start of the war would be to deny
the sacrifices of the Northeasterners before 1937. As part of this, Cheng
distinguished between the “partial War of Resistance,” which took place
between 1931 and 1937, and the “all-out War of Resistance,” but argued
that the War of Resistance against Japan should include this “partial War
of Resistance.”34 In 2015, Li Hailin and Liu Yongan utilized the language of
Xi Jinping to state that “the total victory in the War of Resistance against
Japan is the beginning of the rejuvenation of the Chinese people” (抗日战
争胜利是中华民族复兴的历史起点). Li and Liu presented similar argu-
ments, that after 1931 the CCP resisted Japan and called for an end to the
civil war, unlike the GMD. The CCP was the true mainstay in the War of
Resistance against Japan. Furthermore, Li and Liu emphasized how the be-
ginning of the War of Resistance against Japan was also the beginning of
the global Anti-Fascist War.35

III. Implications of the “Date Debate”

There are several implications of the “date debate” that are important to con-
sider. First, it is notable that so many scholars advocating for the Mukden
Incident as a starting date for the war have been from Northeastern China.
Second, many scholars heavily relied on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought to make their claims. Third, the increasing emphasis of China’s
role in World War II indicates that China cares about projecting an image

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of a responsible, moral actor in the international community. Fourth, it is

clear that due to reasons related to both domestic and international poli-
tics, the CCP is actively engaging in rewriting the history of the War of
Resistance against Japan.

The Influence of the Northeast

Manchuria, or Northeastern China, has a rich, multifaceted history in which
multiple nationalities vied for land, resources, and identity. Once the home-
land of the Manchus, Manchuria was cordoned off from the rest of China
under the rule of the ethnically Manchu Qing dynasty, and immigration of
Han Chinese was forbidden. As the Qing Dynasty’s power weakened in the
late 19th century, however, many Chinese flouted this prohibition and im-
migrated to the Northeast. By the late 19th century, Russia and Japan both
had strong vested interests in the region, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
1905 was largely fought on Manchurian soil. Japan’s investment in the region,
particularly through the South Manchurian Railroad (SMR, or Mantetsu),
grew in the first few decades of the 20th century, culminating in the Mukden
Incident and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo.
After the surrender of Japan in 1945, much of the Chinese Civil War was
fought in Manchuria for several reasons: the CCP had its bases in Northern
China; the majority of Japanese troops with their equipment were in
Northeastern China waiting to surrender; and the Japanese had built up the
infrastructure of the region considerably. After the formation of the PRC in
1949, the Soviet Union further invested in the region, sending thousands of
technical experts to the region to help develop it. Thus, Manchuria became a
bastion of heavy industrial development in the Mao era, and was economically
ahead of much of the rest of the country.
However, Manchuria had several major setbacks in the Cultural Revolution
and beyond. During the Cultural Revolution, many “sent-down youth” ended
up in the “Great Barren North” and were inculcated with an attitude of con-
quering nature. This led to a depletion of many of Manchuria’s rich natural re-
sources, most notably massive deforestation. After Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform
and Opening Up” policy and China’s gradual transition to a market economy,
Manchuria with its mass of behemoth State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) was

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slow to adapt. Today, many SOEs in the Northeast have been either shut
down or have greatly reduced capacities, and Manchuria is widely considered
akin to the American “rust belt”—a region that was once economically pros-
perous but is now struggling to keep pace. It is a region that, in the words of
many Chinese, can be considered both “遥远,” or far-flung, and “落后,” or
falling behind.36
And yet, as the “date debate” and its resolution show, Northeastern scholars
had a major influence on pushing for the fourteen-year war timeline from the
1980s through the 2010s. Scholars such as Zhang Deliang, Jian Ming, Wang
Xiuying, Zhao Junqing, Wang Guizhong, and Cheng Shuwei vigorously pushed
the starting date of September 18, 1931 to include the sacrifices of their regional
compatriots. Indeed, it is the case that political pressure from the Northeast was
one of the deciding factors in changing the timeline in 2017.37
The key role played by Northeastern scholars in the 2017 Ministry of
Education announcement suggests that far from being a top-down, author-
itarian monolith, the PRC is deeply impacted by regional interests when it
makes policy decisions, even by regions such as the Northeast that popular
opinion might not consider to be as influential. This adds a layer of complexity
to existing scholarship on China’s historical memory, which too often focuses
on a top-down historical narrative that is dictated by sociopolitical vicissitudes
from Beijing.38 It also contributes to global scholarship on how national nar-
ratives are constructed. For example, through studying the hybrid relations
between local and national in the Heimat (homeland) ideal that took root
of the German unification of 1871, Alon Confino shows that more localized
narratives can indeed influence the establishment and evolution of a national
narrative.39 The case of Northeastern scholars in China shows that this is the
case in the non-Western world as well. Accordingly, U.S. policymakers should
seek to build relationships with those in positions of regional authority in the
PRC in addition to Beijing policymakers, as the former may exert considerable
influence on national policymaking.

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought

By the end of the Cultural Revolution, the narrative of Marxist class strug-
gle was largely discredited, leading to a “profound feeling of ideological

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malaise.”40 Particularly after the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the CCP needed a new legitimizing narrative, which it
largely found through the vehicle of nationalism. In particular, the Century
of Humiliation, which culminated with the War of Resistance against Japan,
became a core component of patriotic education. What is noteworthy, then, is
that even after the supposed debunking of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought, these same theoretical underpinnings were frequently utilized by
Chinese historians during the “date debate” from the 1980s through 2010s.
Both Marxist dialectics and the writings of Mao Zedong appeared often in
these scholarly articles.
Scholars described the principal contradictions in society according to
Marxist dialectics in depth. The idea of the “principal contradiction” is an
important theoretical contribution of Mao Zedong Thought to Marxist dia-
lectics that formed a central component of the scholarly “date debate.”41 For
example, as mentioned previously, He Ying went into great detail concerning
the principal contradictions in Chinese society before and after September
18, 1931. Before the Mukden Incident, according to He, the principal con-
tradictions in Chinese society had been those of imperialism, feudalism, and
bureaucratic capitalism. With the Mukden Incident, however, the contradic-
tions of domestic class struggle within China decreased, as China was faced
with the threat of national extinction. The principal contradiction in society,
then, shifted to one between the Chinese people and Japanese imperialism.42
Many scholars opined that Mao’s writings also justified a 14-year war; as pre-
viously noted, Jian Ming utilized a famous quote of Mao’s from 1937. Similar
arguments were also made by Jian Ming, Liu Tinghua, Guang Deming, Zhao
Junqing, and Cheng Shuwei.
The utilization of Marxist dialectics and the writings of Mao to justify the
change to a fourteen-year war (although scholars arguing for an eight-year
war also utilized Mao) is noteworthy because it shows that in the scholarly
community, the legacy of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought contin-
ued to be crucial to the legitimacy of the CCP. This was the case even before
Xi Jinping, who is arguably the most powerful leader since Mao43 and who
has promoted the study of Marxism more than his predecessors, notably Hu
Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Furthermore, the direct utilization of Mao’s writings
by scholars to “prove” the correct start date of the War of Resistance against

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Japan serves as a notable exception to the view of international Mao scholars

such as Timothy Cheek that “Mao is often not used at all in intellectual de-
bate and discussion of public issues.”44 U.S. policymakers should not underes-
timate the influence of Mao Zedong Thought as a crucial component in how
the CCP legitimizes itself to both domestic and international audiences.

China’s International Image

China was an Allied Power in World War II, along with the United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Yet in the West, China’s wartime con-
tributions have too often been overlooked, largely due to Cold War politics
that saw mainland China quickly shift from ally to foe.45 This is despite the
fact that a number of well-known Western military veterans have relayed their
stories to the public of deployment to China.46 The PRC and its historians are
well aware of this lack of knowledge in the West about China’s wartime role,
and are seeking to remedy it for the purposes of both domestic and interna-
tional politics.
As far back as 1987, Liu Tinghua stated in no uncertain terms that “the
Chinese people used armed struggle to oppose the Japanese fascist’s military
invasion [of the Northeast] and fired the first shot of the global Anti-Fascist
War!”47 Other Chinese historians and politicians, most recently Xi Jinping,
have made similar arguments. In a speech to commemorate the 70th anni-
versary of the end of World War II in 2015, Xi noted that China’s victory in
the war “has reestablished China’s status as a major country in the world. The
Chinese people have won the respect of the peace-loving people of the world,
and the Chinese nation has won a lofty national reputation.”48 Xi’s empha-
sis on China’s role in the war on the international stage shows how China is
increasingly utilizing its new collective memory of the War of Resistance to
“create a morally weighted narrative about China’s role in the global order.”49
The PRC’s message to the international community, then, is that based on his-
torical precedent, as China increases its presence on the world stage, it should
not be feared but rather embraced as a responsible and conscientious actor.
China’s present push to project its World War II image onto current geo-
politics can be understood in tandem with continued efforts to expand its
global influence. Whether it be through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

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or China’s increasing involvement in Africa and Latin America, China has

an invested interest in portraying its rise as peaceful rather than threatening.
This is largely to assuage the international community’s fears that China seeks
ultimate hegemony in the global great power competition. In expanding the
war timeline from 8 to 14 years and arguing that this represents not only the
start of the War of Resistance against Japan, but also of World War II and the
global Anti-Fascist War, China is suggesting that it an inherently moral actor,
seeking to uphold the international system, based on historical precedent.
U.S. policymakers should be wary of China’s attempts to present itself as a
historical moral actor on the international level in order reframe its aggressive
actions in areas such as the South China Sea.

Rewriting History
Of course, changing China’s international image also involves a conscientious
rewriting of history, in which it was the CCP, rather than the GMD, that
contributed the lion’s share of the war effort. In shifting the war timeline, it
is apparent that the CCP is engaged in an intentional rewriting of history for
nationalistic purposes. An objective look at historical facts will tell us that
the proper starting date for the War of Resistance against Japan should be the
Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937 rather than the Mukden Incident
of September 18, 1931. However, a 14-year war is better for the CCP’s legiti-
mizing narrative than an 8-year war, as the GMD did indeed follow a policy
of non-resistance to Japan before the Xi’an Incident of 1936, and the CCP did
indeed resist Japan sporadically after 1931.
Historically, there are multiple reasons for why an 8-year war is more
credible than a 14-year war, many of which has been aptly communicated
by Chinese scholars before 2017. If one is to view history through the lens of
Marxist dialectics, as the CCP does, the principal contradiction in Chinese
society between the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Mukden Incident
was indeed domestic class struggle.50 The Chinese Civil War was in full swing
until the Xi’an Incident. Moreover, the Nanjing government was the interna-
tionally recognized government of China at that point in time, rather than
the Communists, and thus the crux of Chinese government policy did not rest
on resisting Japan prior to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.51 Furthermore,

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after the Mukden Incident, Chinese resistance in the Northeast was quite
passive; out of the 4 months and 18 days it took the Japanese to conquer the
Northeast, less than 18 of those days consisted of active Chinese military re-
sistance.52 Lastly, partial resistance against Japan after the Mukden Incident
was interrupted and only developed gradually.53
The above rationale for the 8-year war is much more historically objective
than that of a 14-year war, which largely appeals to emotion and nationalistic
sentiments. Proponents of the 14-year war largely argued that an 8-year war
would favor the GMD policy of nonresistance and trivialize the resistance of
the Northeasterners and others before 1937. On the contrary, proponents of
the 8-year war have relied more closely on historical objectivity, arguing that
war should be between two countries—which was not the case between China
and Japan until after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Simply put, before 1937,
most Chinese as well as Japanese people did not consider themselves at war.54
Thus, it is clear that the CCP is engaged in the process of purposefully
rewriting history to serve the purposes of nationalism and patriotic educa-
tion. That the CCP would do this is no surprise—it has engaged in the re-
writing of historical fact since the founding of the PRC in 1949, and prior
to representing mainland China on the international stage as well. In the
West, the most commonly known instances of this are the careful treat-
ment of the Mao era, particularly the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution, and the erasure of the Tiananmen Square Massacre from public
memory. However, the decisive shift of the timeline of the War of Resistance
against Japan, which is impacting international as well as domestic scholar-
ship, should not be underestimated, as it has serious implications for not
only the other Allied powers in World War II, but also other countries that
are currently diplomatically and economically engaged with China. U.S.
policymakers should thus emphasize the promotion of the objective study of
Chinese history, both domestically and internationally. This could include
convening international research symposiums to encourage global scholars
to critically engage with Chinese history. In addition, U.S. policymakers
must resolutely oppose the continued attempts of the Chinese state to co-
erce prominent academic journals into silence on issues related to modern
Chinese history.

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Conclusion
In what can be considered the Party’s official response to the “date debate,”
written by Cao Ziyang in 2017 for Research on Party History and Literature (
党史与文献研究), Cao notes that the CCP supported the 14-year timeline
as “an answer to long-standing appeals by domestic scholars and the com-
mon people.”55 After the pronouncement from the Ministry of Education,
the “date debate” was effectively over—the Party had finally weighed in. It
would be easy to dismiss this Party pronouncement as a simple rewriting of
history from the top-down. Yet history and politics are rarely so black-and-
white. Such is the case with the “date debate”—many historians, largely from
Northeastern China, worked to shift public and Party opinion. Additionally,
it is important to note that although the Communist Party was not the main-
stay of the War of Resistance, as it so often claims, China under the Nanjing
government did sacrifice much in fighting Japan. Because of Chinese efforts,
the Soviet Union was able to avoid a two-front war, and the United States was
able to engage in its “Europe First” strategy to defeat the Nazis before focus-
ing on the Pacific Theater. If we are to engage effectively with China in the
twenty-first century, we would do well to remember both its contributions as
an Allied power, while simultaneously being on the lookout for attempts by
the CCP to distort historical veracity for the purposes of political gain.
As we contemplate the rise of China today, we must carefully consider
how the Chinese leadership represents its own history, both to domestic and
international audiences. How the CCP constructs its historical narrative is
crucial for policymakers to understand because it has direct implications for
geopolitics. For instance, the emphasis on 14 years of resistance against Japan
means that China seeks to portray itself as a moral, peaceful actor as it ex-
pands its geopolitical power. For domestic and foreign policy, this means that
China seeks to reframe its aggressive actions today in places such as Xinjiang
and the South China Sea by altering its own historical record. It also has di-
rect implications for the academic world as we can expect continued efforts
by the Chinese government to coerce international academic journals—and
governments—into silence or selective interpretations of Chinese history. In
the near future, I predict that this will encompass not only tragedies such as
the Cultural Revolution or the Tiananmen Square Massacre, but also the War
of Resistance against Japan. Thus, U.S. policymakers should do everything in

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their power to continue to promote historical objectivity in the study of mod-

ern China and encourage academic freedom globally so as to avoid scholastic
pandering to a CCP-dominant version of Chinese history.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 The ending date of the war remained the same, with the Japanese emperor’s unconditional
surrender to the Allied forces on August 15, 1945. The PRC State Council had begun to
discuss this shift in October 2016 and gave the Department of Education two months to
compile a public pronouncement. “Jiaoyubu Fa Han: Zhongxiaoxue Jiaocai Banian Kangzhan
Gaiwei Shisinian Kangzhan” [Letter from the Ministry of Education: Elementary and
Middle School Education Materials War of Resistance against Japan Changed from Eight
Years to Fourteen Years], Xinhua Net, 11 January 2017, retrieved from xinhuanet.com/2017-
01/11/c_1120284611.htm on 7 April 2020.
2 Liu Yingfeng, “Kangzhan Shengli 70 Zhounian Heping Xishu Lishi” [Marking the 70th
Anniversary of Victory Against Japan], Taiwan Guanghua Zazhi, July 2015, retrieved from
https://www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/Articles/Details?Guid=6e1a7132-a55b-43e3-955f-
65051dfca4da&CatId=2 on 8 April 2020.
3 Cao Ziyang, ““Banian Kangzhan” yu “Shisinian Kangzhan” Gainian Yunyong Zhi Sikao”
[Reflections on the Conceptual Usage of the “Eight-year War of Resistance” and the
“Fourteen-year War of Resistance”], Dangshi yu Wenxian Yanjiu [Research on Party History
and Documents] 5 and 6 (2017), 47.
4 Hans van de Ven, China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), 65-69.
5 According to the Boxer Protocol of 1901, foreign countries had the right to station troops
outside of their diplomatic missions in Beijing. Japan, which by the 1930s had a sizeable
military presence across northern China, was one of the few countries that continued to take
advantage of these stipulations after the Nationalist capital was established in the southern
city of Nanjing in 1927. Ibid.
6 The version of the events of July 7, 1937 in Chinese scholarship is more conspiratorial,
claiming that the “disappearance” of the Japanese private was merely an excuse to instigate
aggression, and that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was “a long premeditated act of war.”
He Li, Zhongguo Renmin Kangri Zhanzheng Shi [History of the Chinese People’s War of
Resistance against Japan] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2015), 64.
7 Cao, 47.
8 The railway was part of the South Manchurian Railway (SMR), a behemoth Japanese-owned
company that controlled a plethora of Japanese resources in the region. The Kwantung Army

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and the SMR were both created by the Japanese state in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese
War (1904-05) in the Guandong Leased Territory on the Liaodong Peninsula. The Kwantung
Army’s influence grew beyond just the defense of SMR assets to defend Japanese interests
of Manchuria from both the growing threats of Chinese nationalism and, after 1917, of the
Soviet Union. Mariko Asano Tamanoi, ed., Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 6-7.
9 The Japanese civilian government had no knowledge of the ruse and was caught off guard by
the Kwantung Army’s rapid invasion of southern Manchuria. Partially for this reason, the
government cabinet under liberal prime minister Wakatsuki Reijiro quickly fell. Subsequent
government cabinets all felt obliged to defend the occupation of Manchuria in the face of
international criticism. Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and
Collaboration in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 4-5.
10 Rana Mitter, China’s Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), 62.
11 Zhang Haiyan, “Bo “Qi Qi” Shibian Kangri Zhanzheng Qidian Lun – Cong Riben Shiliao
Jielu Kangri Zhanzheng Qidian” [Refuting the Marco Polo Bridge Incident War of Resistance
against Japan Starting Point Narrative – Exposing the Starting Point of the War of Resistance
against Japan from Japanese Historical Artifacts], Liaoning Guangbo Dianshi Daxue Xuebao
[Journal of Liaoning TV and Radio University] 134 (2015), 109-110.
12 He Ying, “Kangri Zhanzheng Jiujing Ying Cong Heshi Suan Qi” [From When Should the
War of Resistance against Japan Start?], Journal of Yan’an University 2 (1984), 22.
13 Ibid, 22.
14 Jian Ming, “Qiqi Shibian Qian Jubu Kangzhan de Lishi Diwei he Zuoyong” [The Historical
Position and Utilization of the Partial War of Resistance before the Marco Polo Bridge
Incident], Changbai Journal 4 (1985), 16.
15 Ibid, 16.
16 This is the case on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. John J. Stephan, “The Tanaka Memorial
(1927): Authentic or Spurious?”, Modern Asian Studies 7:4 (1973), 734.
17 Jian Ming, 16.
18 Ibid., 20.
19 Guang Deming, “Kangri Zhanzheng Qidian Yanjiu Shuping” [Commentary on the Research
on the Start of the War of Resistance against Japan], Shehui Kexue Baokan [Social Science
Journal] 70 (1990).
20 Wang Xiuying, “Lun Shisi Nian Kangzhan” [Discussion on the 14 Years of the War of
Resistance], Shenyang Jiaoyu Xueyuan Bao [Journal of Shenyang College of Education] 1:4
(1999), 20.
21 Ibid, 21.
22 Song Li, “Kangzhan Qidian Yanjiu Shuping” [Commentary on the Research on the Start of
the War of Resistance], Shehui Kexue Dongtai [Social Science Developments] (1997), 17-18.
23 Lei Xinshi, “Di Er Ci Shijie Zhanzheng Qiyu Heshi?” [When Did World War II Begin?],
Shaanxi Shi Daxue Bao [Journal of Shaanxi Normal University] 24.4 (1995), 31-34.
24 Pan Xiangsheng, “Ying Qubie Shijie Fan Faxisi Zhanzheng he Di Er Ci Shijie Dazhan de bu
Tong Qidian” [The Differing Starting Dates of the Global Anti-Fascist War and World War

280
 From Regional to National

II Should be Differentiated], The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War against Japan, 2
(1993), 211-217.
25 Wang Guilin, “Zhong Guo Kangri Zhanzheng yu Di Er Ci Shijie Dazhan de Qidian” [The
Starting Points of the War of Resistance against Japan and World War II], Beijing Dang Shi
Yanjiu [Beijing Party History Research] 3 (1993), 42.
26 “Xi Jinping Kangzhan Shiguan de “Ba Da Yao Yi”” [Eight Key Points on Xi Jinping’s
Historical View of the War of Resistance], Xinhua Wang, retrieved from http://www.
xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-08/14/c_128127946.htm on 13 August 2020.
27 Zhao Junqing, “Kangri Zhanzheng Lishi 14 Nian, Er Bu Shi 8 Nian” [The History of the
War of Resistance against Japan is 14 Years, not 8 Years], Shiji Qiao [Century Bridge] 5
(2001), 22-26.
28 Wang Guizhong, “Jiu Yi Ba Shibian Shi Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Qidian Yanjiu
Zongshu” [A Survey of the Notion that the September 18th Incident Is the Starting Point of
the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan], Dang Xue Yanjiu [Research on Party Studies]
29.131, 117.
29 Yue Siping, “Guanyu Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu zhong de Si ge Wenti” [Regarding Four Issues
in the Research of the War of Resistance against Japan], Dang de Wenxian [Literature of the
Chinese Communist Party] 6 (2005), 45-47.
30 Liu Tinghua, “Lun Jiu Yi Ba Shi Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng de Qidian” [Statement that
September 18th Is the Starting Date of China’s War of Resistance against Japan], The Journal
of Studies of China’s Resistance War Against Japan 1 (2006), 192-199.
31 Zhang Zhenkun, “Kangri Zhanzheng: Ba Nian Haishi Shisi Nian?” [The War of Resistance
against Japan: Eight Years or Fourteen Years?], Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu [Research on the
War of Resistance against Japan], 1 (2006), 184-191.
32 Zeng Jingzhong, “Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Kaiduan Wenti Zai Yantao” [Discussion
of the Issue of the Beginning of China’s War of Resistance against Japan], Shehui Kexue
Zhanxian [Social Sciences Front] 4 (2010), 101.
33 Huang Aijun, “Dui Kangri Zhanzheng Qidian Wenti de Tantao” [Inquiry into the Issue of
the Starting Date of the War of Resistance against Japan], Xinan Keji Daxue Xuebao [Journal
of Xinan University of Science and Technology] 27:1 (2010), 1-6.
34 Cheng Shuwei, “Guanyu Kangri Zhanzheng de Kaiduan Wenti de Ji ge Renshi” [Some
Knowledge about the Issue of the Starting Date of the War of Resistance against Japan],
Shehui Kexue Zhanxian [Social Sciences Front 4 (2010), 111-116.
35 Li Hailin and Liu Yongan, “Kangri Zhanzheng Shengli Shi Zhonghua Minzu Fuxing de
Lishi Qidian” [The War of Resistance against Japan Is the Starting Point of the History of
the Rejuvenation of the Chinese People], Zhongguo Shiyou Daxue Xuebao [Journal of China
University of Petroleum] 31:5 (2015), 49-52.
36 This is based on a number of personal interviews I conducted in the fall of 2017.
37 Mitter, China’s Good War, 92.
38 See, for example, Wang Zheng’s Never Forget National Humiliation and Kirk Denton’s
Exhibiting the Past: Historical Memory and the Politics of Museums in Postsocialist China.
39 Alon Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Wurttemberg, Imperial Germany, and
National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill, 1997).

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 Emily Matson

40 Mitter, China’s Good War, 57-58.

41 See Mao Tse-tung, “On Contradiction,” August 1937, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,
retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/
mswv1_17.htm on 7 April 2020.
42 He Ying, 22.
43 Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018), 11.
44 Timothy Cheek, “Mao, Revolution, and Memory” in Timothy Cheek, ed., A Critical
Introduction to Mao (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 21.
45 For more on this, see Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II 1937-1945 (New
York: First Mariner Books, 2013), 13.
46 One of the best-known examples is Claire Chennault and the “Flying Tigers.” See Daniel
Ford, Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group (Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991).
47 Liu Tinghua, “Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi Yanjiu de Jige Wenti” [Several Research
Questions on the History of the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan], Shixue Yuekan
[History Monthly] 3 (1987), 56.
48 “Xi Jinping: Zai Jinian Zhongguo Renmin Kangri Zhanzheng ji Shijie Fan Faxisi Zhanzheng
Shengli 75 Zhou Nian Zuotanhui shang de Jianghua” [Xi Jinping: Speech at the Symposium
Commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War of
Resistance against Japan and World War II], Xinhua Wang, retrieved from http://www.
xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-09/03/c_1126449917.htm on 8 October 2020.
49 Mitter, China’s Good War, 4.
50 Cao Ziyang, 50.
51 Ibid, 51.
52 Ibid, 51.
53 Ibid, 51.
54 Mitter, China’s Good War, 92.
55 Cao, 52.

282
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

The Domestic Sources

of China’s Maritime
Assertiveness Under
Xi Jinping
Kacie Miura is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and
International Relations at the University of San Diego and a 2021–22
Wilson China Fellow
 Kacie Miura

Abstract
Under Xi Jinping, China has undertaken major organizational reforms that
have led to a more coordinated maritime policy, better enabling the military,
coast guard, and maritime militia to synchronize their actions on the water.
However, as this report demonstrates, problems with policy fragmentation
have yet to be completely resolved. One implication is that, during a crisis
scenario, the difficulty of reining in these maritime actors could undermine
efforts by China’s leaders to de-escalate tensions. This report also suggests
that, while these organizational reforms seem to have helped the Chinese
Communist Party to tighten its control over maritime policy, Xi’s efforts to
consolidate his personal authority have also played a major role in shaping
the incentive structure under which China’s foreign policy and maritime ac-
tors operate. In particular, his ideological indoctrination and anti-corruption
drives have bolstered bureaucratic and professional incentives to behave as-
sertively in the maritime realm.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● To limit the risk of crisis escalation in the maritime domain, U.S. military
and political leaders should preserve off-ramps and avoid inflammatory
actions and rhetoric that risk boxing China’s leaders into maintaining an
aggressive response.

● The United States should distinguish between PLA and gray-zone actors
and should utilize economic and diplomatic tools to impose costs on the
specific actors responsible for aggressive behavior.

● U.S. leaders should resist the temptation to use ostensibly less provocative
white hull vessels to confront the CCG, which operates in the vicinity of
the PLA navy.

● The U.S. military should work with the PLA to establish a faster and
more reliable crisis communication system that takes into account the
various internal political factors that could make senior Chinese officers
reluctant to pick up the phone during a crisis.

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● Senior military officers on both sides should ensure the continuation of

high-level dialogues, and interlocutors should emphasize the role of coast
guard and militia vessels in discussions about operational safety and risk
reduction.

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Introduction
While China’s maritime assertiveness precedes the rise of Xi Jinping,1 China
has taken an even more proactive stance in defending its offshore sovereignty
claims. Since becoming general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) in 2012, Xi has repeatedly emphasized the need to “resolutely safeguard
our sovereignty.”2 His “China Dream” and nationalist agenda have stoked
popular passions and the belief that an increasingly more powerful China
ought to take a firm and resolute stance in its territorial disputes. Moreover,
the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have heightened the leadership’s desire
to showcase their willingness to push back against foreign challenges.3
Since Xi Jinping came to power, the CCP has sought to centralize its foreign
policy, with Xi unabashedly appointing himself “chairman of everything.”4
Yet despite his efforts to dominate the decision-making process, the many sub-
national actors involved in shaping Chinese foreign policy outcomes continue
to act with discretion. With respect to the maritime domain, Xi has overseen
major organizational reforms to tighten the Party’s control over key maritime
security actors.
These changes have yielded a more coordinated maritime policy and have
coincided with the increased convergence of China’s maritime actors around
more assertive behavior. However, Xi has yet to fully overcome the challenge
of policy fragmentation. Individual actors still prioritize narrow bureaucratic
and professional interests, and the domestic political climate unique to the
Xi era contributes to their increased assertiveness. The intensely nationalistic
political environment that he has cultivated provides certain maritime actors
with an opportunity to push their own hardline agendas, while his efforts to
consolidate power have created professional incentives for others to burnish
their patriotic credentials.
This policy report provides an overview and assessment of the CCP’s efforts
under Xi to strengthen its grip on maritime policy. The first section focuses
on key organizational reforms. Section two provides an in-depth look at re-
cent attempts to streamline and bolster two key maritime security actors: the
coast guard and the maritime militia. Section three looks at the behavior of
these actors during a 2014 standoff between China and Vietnam in the South
China Sea. The fourth section discusses how Xi’s consolidation of power has
shaped the bureaucratic and professional incentives of China’s foreign policy

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and maritime actors. The concluding section discusses the implications and
provides policy recommendations for the United States.

I. Organizational Reforms
As China’s global reach has expanded, so too has the number of domestic ac-
tors with foreign policy interests.5 This has made it possible for a diverse set of
actors—such as those representing the Party, state, and military, as well as var-
ious sectoral and regional interests—to influence foreign policy decisions and
outcomes.6 The top leadership has relied on these disparate actors to interpret
and implement broad foreign policy directives. As a result of the decentraliza-
tion and pluralization of China’s foreign policy-making process, subnational
actors have exercised considerable discretionary power and have sought to ad-
vance their narrower self-interests. However, the discretionary power of for-
eign policy actors has led to bureaucratic stove-piping and discord, frequently
impeding China’s ability to send clear signals to foreign audiences. These
problems were particularly pronounced during Hu Jintao’s tenure (2002-12),
when the CCP became defined by growing fragmentation and factionalism.7
To combat the infighting and lack of bureaucratic coordination under his
predecessor, Xi Jinping has sought to recentralize foreign policy under the
leadership of the Party. In doing so, Xi has also strengthened his personal
authority. Under his watch, the CCP has expanded the use of “top-level de-
sign,” or the use of general blueprints into which more detailed sub-plans are
incorporated.8 While initially applied to economic policymaking,9 the con-
cept has also been extended to diplomacy and foreign policy.10 These efforts
to recentralize foreign policy are reflected in the creation of the National
Security Commission (NSC) in January 2014, as well as the upgrading of the
Leading Small Group (LSG) on Foreign Affairs to the Central Commission
on Foreign Affairs (CCFA) in March 2018. The designation of the CCFA, a
Party institution, as the decision-making center for foreign policy is consis-
tent with the 19th CCP Central Committee’s declaration that “the Party is in
charge of the overall situation in foreign affairs.”11
With respect to the maritime domain, an organizational overhaul was well
overdue. The lack of cohesion among China’s maritime actors was widely re-
garded as a liability that could prevent China from achieving its objective of

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becoming a “maritime great power.” In 2012, the CCP, in a move to coordinate

China’s various maritime actors, established the Central LSG for Protecting
Maritime Rights and Interests, which was led by Xi Jinping. Its members in-
cluded high-ranking officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry
of Public Security, Ministry of Agriculture, State Oceanic Administration,
and the PLA Navy.12 However, due to increased tensions in both the East and
South China Seas, the CCFA, created in 2018, absorbed the responsibilities
of this LSG. As described in the Central Committee’s plan announcing the
change, the decision to abolish the LSG was made to “better coordinate the
resources and manpower of diplomatic and maritime departments.”13

II. Maritime Actors

The broad reforms that were made to China’s foreign and maritime policy ap-
paratus have had major implications for China’s various maritime security ac-
tors. While there are numerous state- and non-state actors involved in China’s
maritime domain, this section focuses on how the Xi administration’s cen-
tralization efforts have affected the China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime
militia. These two actors are of particular importance given the key role they
play on the frontlines of China’s maritime disputes.14 As this section demon-
strates, the CCP’s efforts to improve the efficacy and synchronization of the
CCG and maritime militia have thus far been modestly successful.

The China Coast Guard (CCG)

The China Coast Guard was established in mid-2013 as part of a major bu-
reaucratic overhaul to consolidate China’s previously separate and rival mar-
itime law enforcement forces.15 This move involved the unification under
the CCG of four of China’s “five dragons,” or the various agencies previ-
ously responsible for maritime law enforcement.16 The lack of coordination
among these “dragons,” which had overlapping responsibilities, was seen
as an impediment to consistent and effective maritime law enforcement.17
Captain Zhang Junshe, a researcher at the PLA’s Naval Military Academic
Research Institute, described the reorganization as the creation of an “iron
fist” that would replace the ineffective operations previously overseen by
these balkanized forces.18

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The 2013 organizational overhaul, however, failed to synergize China’s

maritime law enforcement forces, largely because oversight of the CCG was
shared by two competing agencies: the State Oceanic Administration (SOA)
and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).19 While the SOA was officially
put in charge of the CCG, state media reported that the MPS had the au-
thority to give “operational guidance.”20 Adding to the confusion about the
chain of command, Meng Hongwei, a vice-minister of the MPS, was put in
charge of the CCG. In terms of Party ranking, Meng outranked the head of
the SOA, Liu Cigui, fueling an intense power struggle between the two lead-
ers and impeding cooperation between the SOA and MPS.21 Moreover, while
SOA oversight suggested that the CCG was a civilian agency, the involvement
of the MPS muddled this designation. For example, the MPS tended to staff
the CCG with personnel from the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a paramili-
tary organization that was at the time under the command of the MPS.22
In 2018, in yet another effort to improve the efficacy of China’s maritime
law enforcement forces, the CCG was placed squarely under the command
of the People’s Armed Police (PAP). This move came after the PAP was put
under the leadership of the Central Military Commission (CMC) earlier
that year. 23 Personnel changes, such as the appointment of PLA Navy Rear
Admiral Wang Zhongcai as commander of the CCG, further solidified the
military’s (and Xi’s) authority over the coast guard. 24 This change in leader-
ship came as two generals who served on the CMC were purged and after
Meng Hongwei was relieved of his duties. In late 2018, Meng went miss-
ing and was later charged with corruption and other crimes. 25 As one se-
nior researcher noted, given that the “Party commands the gun,” ultimately
transferring the oversight of the coast guard to the CMC also served the
purpose of tightening the CCP’s control over China’s maritime law enforce-
ment forces. 26
The decision to put the CCG under military rather than civilian control
is significant because it paves the way for its potential participation in combat
operations with the PLA Navy (PLAN) during wartime. Moreover, this ac-
tion was seen as conducive to inter-service coordination. Previously, as a senior
Chinese maritime security researcher observed, due to unclear responsibilities
and overlapping tasks, the PLAN often “assumed some tasks that should have
been undertaken by the Coast Guard.”27

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Ensuring that the CCG (and not the PLAN) remains on the frontlines of
rights protection in contested waters is important to China’s wager that its use
of white hull ships will minimize the risk of crisis escalation with foreign ves-
sels. However, as Ryan Martinson has observed, despite these organizational
changes, interoperability between the CCG and PLAN remains weak and in-
telligence sharing between the two appears to be situational.28 The CCG has yet
to be integrated into a PLA theater command, further hindering collaboration
between these two actors, especially on-shore. As Martinson notes, the 2020
edition of the Science of Military Strategy, an authoritative textbook published
by the PLA’s National Defense University, urged the CCG to “‘strengthen and
refine the system and mechanisms for joint early warning, joint command, and
joint operations with the navy’ – suggesting that the problem had yet to be
rectified.”29 Similarly, as Jin Yongmin, the director of the Shanghai Academy
of Social Sciences’ Ocean Strategy Center, noted, “We have a structure and
framework, but differentiation of duties is still not clearly defined.”30
In January 2021, in an effort to further synergize China’s maritime law en-
forcement forces, the National People’s Congress standing committee passed
a new Coast Guard Law. The new law serves the purpose of standardizing the
CCG’s operations. As Luo Shuxian notes, even after the establishment of the
CCG in 2013, its legal foundation continued to be based on the legal codes
that had separately guided the four “dragons” that comprised the new mari-
time law enforcement entity. As a result, considerable confusion remained
about when and how the CCG was authorized to use force.31
While intended to rectify this problem, the Coast Guard Law’s provoca-
tive provisions have been a source of regional concern. The law gives the CCG
legal authority to take “all necessary means,” including firing on foreign
vessels when foreign actors violate China’s national sovereignty and sover-
eign rights.32 Although China is not alone in permitting its coast guard to
use force against foreign vessels, a fact that Chinese state media was quick to
point out, observers have warned of its potential to escalate incidents at sea.
Furthermore, although the new law provides a common legal basis for China’s
maritime law enforcement actors, the ambiguous language of the law still
gives these actors considerable discretion when determining when and how to
use force.33 For example, the law says that CCG personnel can use hand-held
firearms when trying to stop “unlawful activities,” but does not specify what

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activities count as “unlawful;” it also permits the use of ship- and air-borne
weapons when “handling serious violent incidents” at sea, but does not clarify
what constitutes a “serious violent incident.”34 Moreover, the law’s provisions
apply to China’s “jurisdictional waters,” which are not defined and thus, with
respect to the South China Sea, could be interpreted as referring to the entire
body of water within the “nine-dash line.”35

Maritime Militia
While China’s maritime militias have operated in contested waters for de-
cades, the frequency and scope of their activities have grown under Xi Jinping.
These militias are comprised of civilian personnel, many of whom are fish-
ermen, who also serve as an auxiliary force of the PLA.36 They are key par-
ticipants in China’s effort to establish and maintain control over peacetime
activities in disputed waters, especially the South China Sea. To do so, they
engage in three types of operations: 1) maintaining China’s presence in dis-
puted waters; 2) escorting Chinese oil and gas survey vessels and drilling rigs
in disputed waters; 3) and assisting in maritime law enforcement by expelling
foreign fishing and survey ships from waters that China claims.37 Over the
last decade, the militias have operated alongside military and law enforcement
vessels in several high-profile standoffs with other regional claimants, includ-
ing the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff with the Philippines and the 2014
oil rig standoff with Vietnam.
In 2013, Xi Jinping visited Hainan province’s Tanmen township, signaling
his intent to give the maritime militia a larger role in maritime rights pro-
tection. The township is home to the Tanmen Maritime Militia Company,
which was intimately involved in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, which
ended with China effectively gaining control of the area. Tanmen militia ves-
sels were trapped by Philippine forces in the disputed lagoon after being ap-
prehended for illegally poaching giant clams.38 During his trip to Tanmen,
Xi commended the militia for their role in protecting China’s sovereignty
claims.39 He also urged them to “learn how to use modern equipment and
improve their working capabilities,” and said that they should not only focus
on fishing, but should also “collect information and support the construction
of islands and reefs.”40 Xi’s visit was followed by a drive to expand and profes-
sionalize the maritime militia.41

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As Luo Shuxian and Jonathan G. Panter put it, Xi’s trip “unleashed a na-
tionwide push to build the militia into a genuine third arm of China’s ‘PLA-law
enforcement-militia joint defense’ maritime sovereignty defense strategy.”42
Oversight of the maritime militia was simplified as part of major organiza-
tional reforms to the PLA that began in early 2016. Under the Central Military
Commission (CMC), defense mobilization was elevated to the National
Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD).43 The NDMD was one of 15
functional departments that were created to improve the CMC’s ability to serve
as a “connecting link” in the military leadership and command system. The
NDMD was put in charge of overseeing provincial-level military districts and
the PLA’s mobilization work, which involves leveraging quasi-civilian actors like
the maritime militia to defend China’s sovereignty claims. While these reforms
have streamlined the military’s control over the maritime militia, the militia is
still subject to the “dual-responsibility system” in which local civilian leaders are
involved in overseeing militia work. Thus, while the NDMD formulates policies
for how the provinces should support national defense efforts, civilian leaders at
the provincial level and below are then tasked with implementing these policies
through the funding and building of militia forces, which are then trained and
commanded by local PLA commands.44
Although the organizational structure described above appears to tie the
maritime militia closely to the military’s senior leadership, local military and
civilian leaders have retained considerable autonomy in organizing militias.
For example, Guangxi province’s “Maritime Militia Construction Plan for
2020” was formulated by members of the provincial-level National Defense
Mobilization Committee, which is jointly overseen by the Guangxi provin-
cial military district and the provincial civilian government.45 As Andrew
Erickson and Conor Kennedy note, “militias are not built in a cookie cut-
ter fashion, directed from national-level leadership; rather, they are organized
with two things in mind: the local populace and their industrial or institu-
tional capacity; and what requirements they are intended to satisfy.”46
The maritime militia is a key way by which local civilian authorities may
influence outcomes in the maritime domain. Leaders of coastal provinces have
a vested economic interest in the South China Sea’s fishery and hydrocarbon
resources, and thus lobby the center for more financial support for the mari-
time militias that operate in their jurisdictions.47 Local governments also see

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the center’s financial support as an opportunity to assist the local fishing in-
dustry by using the funds to upgrade the militia’s fishing trawlers.48 For local
officials and the maritime militia, the current nationalistic political climate
only fuels these incentives to support a tougher maritime policy and engage in
assertive behavior.
Greater efforts under Xi Jinping have been made to increase funding for
the maritime militia, such as through subsidies for fuel and the construction
or outfitting of vessels, as well as for the training and compensation of per-
sonnel.49 Local governments supplement central government funding, with
some municipal governments even providing one-time bonuses to militia
members for operating in “specially designated waters” in the South China
Sea.50 These bonuses incentivize militia personnel to participate in maritime
rights protection activities. However, local resources are often not enough to
make up for the shortfall in funds provided by the center.51 The inadequate
compensation reportedly drives many militia personnel to pursue commer-
cial fishing at the expense of militia duties.52 But at the same time, national-
istic calls to uphold Chinese sovereignty work to mitigate the temptation to
deprioritize militia work.

III. HYSY-981 Standoff

The CCG and maritime militia, together with the PLA, have participated in
several high-profile incidents involving foreign vessels in contested waters. The
2014 HYSY-981 standoff, sparked by the operation of a Chinese oil rig in wa-
ters also claimed by Vietnam, took place amidst the CCP’s drive to central-
ize and coordinate its maritime security actors. While more recent incidents
would offer a better assessment of these efforts, publicly available information
is limited. Nevertheless, the HYSY-981 standoff is informative because of the
heavy involvement of the CCG following the consolidation of maritime law
enforcement forces, as well as the maritime militia during a period of rapid
expansion. This section therefore focuses on the 2014 standoff, which is the
most recent incident about which there is substantial information. As this sec-
tion shows, despite the party’s efforts to tighten its grip over the various actors
involved in China’s maritime security, these actors still appear to have pursued
their own bureaucratic and professional interests.

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The HYSY-981 standoff involved China’s defense of the Haiyang

Shiyou-981 (HYSY-981) oil rig in a confrontation with Vietnam in waters
near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The standoff was
the most severe Sino-Vietnamese crisis since 1988, when armed forces from
the two sides clashed over control of Johnson Reef. In early May 2014, the
HYSY-981 oil rig, China’s first deep-water semisubmersible drilling plat-
form, was moved into waters that Vietnam considers its exclusive economic
zone (EEZ).
While the expedition was directed by the state-owned China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the decision to move the oil rig into
Vietnam’s EEZ was approved at the highest level. However, the proposal to
do so was relayed to the top by then State Councilor Yang Jiechi, who at the
time headed the office that serviced the Central Leading Small Group for
Protecting Maritime Rights and Interests.53 As Linda Jakobson notes, whereas
Yang’s predecessor had refrained from passing on similar proposals, which
were championed by Hainan provincial officials, Yang “made the decision be-
cause safeguarding China’s rights has been elevated in the transformed politi-
cal climate under Xi, and Yang wanted to show his nationalist credentials.”54
Hanoi responded by dispatching vessels to intercept the oil rig, prompt-
ing China to send in both national and provincial coast guard vessels, fishing
boats, and navy ships. Violent clashes ensued, with each side claiming that
their ships had been rammed by vessels belonging to the other. The most seri-
ous of these clashes involved the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat.55 At the
height of the standoff, as many as 130 Chinese vessels were reportedly spotted
at the site.56
The presence of PLAN vessels suggests that the maritime law enforce-
ment and militia ships involved in protecting the HYSY-981 were operating
under unified military command, reflecting a coordinated effort by the PLA,
CCG, and maritime militia.57 As Jakobson notes, the reasonably efficient
inter-services response was due to the PLAN’s leading role in orchestrating
the response,58 which was facilitated by the consolidation of China’s disparate
maritime law enforcement forces under the CCG. The majority of vessels that
participated in the defense of HYSY-981 were militia ships, also reflecting a
high level of coordination between the PLA and its reserve forces. However, as
Luo Shuxian and Jonathan Panter note, militia members’ dissatisfaction with

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the compensation they are given for participating in maritime rights protec-
tion activities—reportedly 500 RMB per day—“created substantial difficulty
for China in mobilizing the militia” during the standoff.59 Yet those that par-
ticipated did so despite being poorly compensated, suggesting that they were
acting according to other, likely nationalistic, incentives.
Although China’s actions at sea during the standoff with Vietnam were rel-
atively coordinated, its broader response during the bilateral crisis was far less
seamless. Yang Jiechi, despite having relayed the proposal to move the HYSY-
981 into Vietnam’s EEZ, was sent to Vietnam in June to co-host a bilateral
meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart. His visit to Vietnam reflected the
leadership’s desire to de-escalate tensions and end the crisis, as well as its con-
cern and possible dissatisfaction with how the standoff was unfolding. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which the State Council oversees, also
appears to have been kept in the dark about the aggressive actions undertaken
by Chinese vessels during the course of the standoff.60 When asked at a press
conference about the sinking of the Vietnamese vessel, MFA spokesperson
Hua Chunying replied that she was “not aware of the situation.”61
China’s effort to reduce tensions with Vietnam was further bolstered by
the early departure of the HYSY-981. The oil rig left the area on July 15, de-
spite previously announcing that it would operate there until mid-August.
Although the MFA publicly insisted that the oil rig left the area early because
it had finished its work ahead of schedule and “had nothing to do with any
external factors,”62 its early departure allowed Vietnam to claim that it had
successfully expelled the rig.63 Fortunately for China’s leaders, an incoming
typhoon provided an opportunity to “save face” while removing the oil rig.
But the decision also appears to have been a deliberate effort to mend relations
with Vietnam, as it coincided with China’s release of 13 Vietnamese fisher-
men that it had previously detained.64 Just prior to withdrawal of the oil rig,
on July 11, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution that condemned China’s co-
ercive and destabilizing actions and urged it to remove the oil rig.65 And on
July 14, President Obama told Xi in a phone conversation that he wanted the
“constructive management of differences.”66 While China’s leaders were eager
to repair relations with Vietnam in the wake of growing U.S. and regional
pushback, it was important to China’s leaders to avoid any perception of cav-
ing to external pressure.

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 Kacie Miura

However, even after China signaled its intention to de-escalate tensions,

the PLA continued to provoke Vietnam. On August 23, the PLAN South Sea
Fleet organized a large-scale joint exercise in the Beibu Gulf involving Navy,
Air Force, maritime law enforcement, and maritime militia vessels. The joint
exercise, which focused on protecting a drilling platform from foreign armed
fishing boats,67 risked undermining Xi Jinping’s August 28 meeting with Le
Hong Anh, a special envoy of the general secretary of Vietnam’s Communist
Party. Xi’s desire to repair ties with Vietnam was made clear in the meeting
with Anh, in which Xi called for joint efforts “to put the bilateral relationship
back on the right track of development.”68
Since the HYSY-981 incident, Xi has worked to further consolidate his
authority, including over China’s maritime security actors. Thus, the PLA, as
well as the CCG and maritime militia, might now be more vigilant about ex-
ercising restraint when top leaders signal their intent to de-escalate crises at
sea. But so far, the extent to which China’s maritime security actors are will-
ing and able to coordinate their actions with other foreign policy actors, such
as the MFA, is uncertain. More recent clashes – including a 2019 standoff
with Vietnamese vessels near Vanguard Bay in the Spratlys, as well as a 2020
standoff with Malaysian vessels near Borneo – have, luckily, not escalated to
the same degree as the HYSY-981 incident. Nevertheless, the nationalistic
political environment that Xi has continued to foster only makes it more dif-
ficult for the CCP leadership to discipline and rein in those foreign policy
actors who are proactive in safeguarding China’s sovereignty claims.

IV. Explaining Maritime Assertiveness:

Professional Incentives to Act Tough
The HYSY-981 standoff has been described as an “inflection point” in China’s
assertiveness in the South China Sea.69 Unlike earlier crises in which China’s
assertive behavior was largely reactive, the HYSY-981 incident was a crisis of
China’s own making, having started with a calculated decision to move the
oil rig into contested waters. In the initial stage of this standoff, actors with
a stake in China’s maritime policy converged around more assertive behavior.
Moreover, the organizational changes adopted under Xi Jinping appear to have
led to improved coordination among the PLA, CCG, and maritime militia,

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allowing China to practice using coercion more effectively on the water. At the
same time, however, the standoff also revealed continued coordination prob-
lems between these actors and the MFA, as well as the difficulty of ensuring
that, during a crisis, these actors can be reined in even after top leaders signal
that diplomacy should take precedence.
Why have China’s foreign policy actors, including those with a stake in
maritime policy, converged around more assertive behavior? China’s assertive-
ness in the South China Sea, particularly in the period since China adopted
many of the organizational changes described in this report, is often attrib-
uted to Xi’s ambitious strategic objectives.70 However, while assertive behavior
is certainly consistent with Xi’s emphasis on defending China’s sovereignty,
he has not delineated the precise steps that China’s foreign policy actors must
take. Rather, they are still expected to use discretion in determining how to
carry out his agenda. In other words, Xi has outlined the broader strategic
context, but the decentralized nature of the incentive structure under which
subnational actors operate influences the specific actions they take.
Even as Xi Jinping has amassed greater personal power, China’s foreign
policy actors have continued to use their discretionary authority to pursue
their bureaucratic and professional interests. In the Xi era, however, these in-
terests have tended to align with a more assertive foreign policy posture. In the
maritime domain, the heightened nationalism fueled by Xi provides political
cover for the PLA, CCG, and maritime militia to push their own interest in
proactively advancing China’s sovereignty claims.71 For each of these actors, a
tougher stance would in turn help to justify their requests for greater financial
and political support to bolster their capabilities.
Additionally, the steps that Xi has taken to increase his personal power
have created professional incentives for others to shore up their patriotic cre-
dentials. In today’s political environment, foreign policy actors, particularly
those who may not have had hawkish preferences to begin with, now have in-
centives to demonstrate their loyalty and ideological conformity by safeguard-
ing China’s interests from foreign challenges. The CCP’s implementation of
an ideological indoctrination campaign, which has been a key part of Xi’s ef-
fort to impose ideological conformity and discipline on the bureaucracy,72 has
only intensified these incentives. As part of this campaign, CCP cadres must
participate regularly in “Xi Jinping Thought” seminars, and some have also

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been required to participate in self-criticism sessions, a throwback to the Mao

era.73 According to Minxin Pei, “virtue”—or loyalty to the Party—is now pri-
oritized ahead of merit and technocratic skills.74
Fear of becoming implicated in Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which has
simultaneously involved the removal of political rivals and potential challeng-
ers, has heightened the stakes for cadres at all levels of power to avoid making
political mistakes. Under these circumstances, officials are likely to believe
that it is safer to err on the side of being too patriotic rather than not patriotic
enough. Furthermore, the increased scrutiny under which officials are operat-
ing makes it tempting for them to seek political cover by appealing to national-
ism. This dynamic was evident during the HYSY-981 standoff. CNPC, which
directed the expedition into Vietnam’s EEZ, did so amidst corruption probes
into the company’s senior leadership. Targeted CNPC officials included the
sister-in-law of Zhou Yongkang, China’s former oil czar and security chief,
who in 2014 became and the most senior official to have been taken down on
charges of corruption.75 As Bill Hayton notes, “CNPC’s management might
have regarded a mission to fly the flag in disputed territory as a way of currying
favor with the Politburo and saving their skins.” 76

V. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

This report demonstrates that there have been improvements in maritime pol-
icy coordination under Xi Jinping, but also reveals that problems with policy
fragmentation have yet to be completely resolved. In particular, organizational
reforms adopted by the Xi administration have improved the ability of the
PLA, CCG, and maritime militia to synchronize their actions on the water.
However, whether they are willing and able to coordinate their actions with
other important foreign policy actors, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is
questionable. Even more problematically, there is reason to be skeptical about
whether, during a crisis scenario, these maritime security actors would refrain
from undermining efforts by China’s leaders to de-escalate tensions.
Fragmentation in China’s foreign policy is not unique to the maritime do-
main. For example, when China has attempted to coerce important foreign
economic partners, the central government has often relied on local govern-
ment officials to target foreign businesses for inspections, withhold licenses,

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and carry out other types of informal sanctions.77 However, local leaders who
depend on these foreign economic partners as a source of local economic
growth go to considerable lengths to protect these commercial relationships,
complicating the center’s punitive efforts. Additionally, local leaders in pe-
ripheral provinces have also proven capable of shaping China’s bilateral rela-
tions with its neighbors by pursuing narrow interests that often diverge from
national interests.78 In a similar vein, subnational actors, through their pursuit
of narrow commercial interests, have also contributed to the Belt and Road
Initiative’s haphazard expansion.79 Yet while foreign policy is often executed
in a decentralized fashion, because China’s maritime policy has immediate
implications for its “core interests,” it is a domain where we would be most
likely to see China behave as a unitary actor. This report shows, however,
that this is not the case, even despite recent organizational reforms that have
helped the CCP to tighten its control over maritime policy.
This report also argues that Xi’s efforts to consolidate his personal author-
ity have played an important role in shaping the behavior of China’s foreign
policy and maritime actors. Specifically, his ideological indoctrination and
anti-corruption drives, combined with heightened nationalism, have bolstered
bureaucratic and professional incentives to behave assertively in the maritime
realm. While Xi and other top leaders have championed a more proactive ap-
proach to defending China’s maritime claims, they also wish to preserve room
for maneuver and want to avoid further provoking a counterbalancing coali-
tion. However, the leadership’s ability to walk this fine line is compromised
by the belief held by China’s maritime actors that they will be rewarded for
aggressively defending China’s sovereignty claims.
China’s maritime assertiveness, especially the intimidation of foreign vessels
by the coast guard and maritime militia, are detrimental to the United States’
interest in maintaining peace and stability in the East and South China Seas.
Because China’s more proactive attempts to safeguard its offshore sovereignty
claims have coincided with bold moves by Xi Jinping to strengthen his grip over
the party, government, military, and society, the confrontational behavior of
China’s various maritime actors tends to be viewed as part of a well-orchestrated
and ambitious grand strategy to displace American leadership in the Indo-
Pacific. The findings of this policy report, however, suggest that it is premature
to treat China as a unified actor, including in the maritime domain.

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 Kacie Miura

For the United States, the tendency to attribute each aggressive move by
Chinese maritime security actors to revisionist strategic intentions helps to justify
the adoption of an unqualifiedly zero-sum approach to countering Chinese as-
sertiveness in the maritime realm. In the political climate that has come to define
the Xi era, a zero-sum strategy by the United States is even more likely to prompt
China’s many foreign policy and maritime actors to double down in demonstrat-
ing their patriotic credentials. To minimize the risk of the U.S.’s China strategy
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, Washington needs to be more precise in its
assessment of China’s strategic intentions. This requires abandoning the incor-
rect assumption that Xi Jinping’s China is a monolithic actor and recognizing
the domestic political incentives that motivate China’s foreign policy actors.
A careful consideration of the roles and incentives of China’s various for-
eign policy and maritime actors yields the following recommendations for
U.S. policymakers:

● While countering acts of Chinese aggression is important, to limit the

risk of crisis escalation in the East and South China Seas, U.S. military
and political leaders should remain cognizant of the importance of
preserving off-ramps. China’s leaders, as well as its foreign policy and
maritime actors, are under immense pressure to demonstrate to internal
and external audiences their willingness to standup to foreign challenges.
As such, during a maritime confrontation or standoff, U.S. leaders should
avoid inflammatory actions and rhetoric that risk boxing China into an
escalatory stance.

● The United States should adopt a calibrated response to acts of Chinese

aggression, distinguishing between PLA and gray-zone (i.e., CCG
and militia) actors. The United States should utilize economic and
diplomatic tools to impose costs on the specific actors responsible
for these aggressive acts. For example, the United States could adopt
sanctions that target the commercial interests of maritime militia units
involved in harassing foreign vessels.

● The United States should limit the activities of the U.S. Coast Guard
in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. leaders should not assume, as their Chinese

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counterparts do, that relying on coast guard vessels to assert national

interests in disputed waters will diminish the risk of crisis escalation. U.S.
leaders must avoid the temptation to use ostensibly less provocative white
hull vessels to confront the CCG, which operates with the knowledge
that the PLA navy is not far away. This is even more so the case in light
of the organizational changes that have brought the China Coast Guard
more firmly under the PLA’s leadership.

● The United States military should work with the PLA to establish a
faster and more reliable crisis communication system. To ensure that
communication mechanisms function effectively, efforts to improve these
systems must take into consideration the various internal political factors
that could make senior Chinese officers reluctant to pick up the phone
during a crisis.

● Senior military officers on both sides should also ensure the continuation
of high-level dialogues like the Military Maritime Consultative
Agreement working group. Given the organizational reforms that have
streamlined the PLA’s command over the CCG and maritime militia,
interlocutors should emphasize the role of coast guard and militia vessels
in discussions about operational safety and risk reduction.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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Notes
1 Andrew Chubb, “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Policy,” Brookings Institution,
January 22, 2019.
2 For example, resolutely safeguarding sovereignty, security, and development interests is
described as “the fundamental goal of China’s national defense in the new era.” “Defense
Policy,” Ministry of National Defense, The People’s Republic of China, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/
defense-policy/index.htm.
3 M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Sovereignty Obsession: Beijing’s Need to Project Strength
Explains the Border Clash with India,” Foreign Affairs, June 26, 2020.
4 Javier C. Hernandez, “China’s ‘Chairman of Everything’: Behind Xi Jinping’s Many Titles,”
New York Times, October 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/asia/
china-xi-jinping-titles-chairman.html
5 David Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy and Security Policy in the Era of
Reform, 1978-2000 (Standford, CA: Sanford University Press, 2001).
6 Linda Jakobson, “Domestic Actors and the Fragmentation of China’s Foreign Policy,” in
Robert Ross and Jo Inge Bekkevold, China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign
Policy Challenges (Georgetown University Press, 2016), 137-158.
7 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Foreign and Security Policy Institutions and Decision-
Making under Xi Jinping,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2021,
23:2, 321.
8 The adoption of this concept “is intended to ensure unified implementation of central
government-level policy so the core leadership’s policy programs can guide priorities
throughout the system.” Nis Grunberg and Katja Drinhausen, “The Party Leads on
Everything: China’s Changing Governance in Xi Jinping’s New Era,” Report: China Monitor,
Merics, September 24, 2019, https://merics.org/en/report/party-leads-everything.
9 Barry Naughton, “Leadership Transition and the ‘Top-Level Design’ of Economic Reform,”
China Leadership Monitor, No. 37, Spring 2012.
10 “最高层着手‘顶层设计’中国周边外交提速升级 [China’s Neighborhood Diplomacy
Has Been Accelerated by Top-Level Design at the Highest Level],” People’s Daily, October 27,
2013， http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/1027/c1001-23339772.html; “杨洁篪：新
形势下中国外交理论和实践创新 [Yang Jiechi: China’s Innovations in Diplomatic Theory
and Practice Under New Circumstances],” Chinese Communist Party News, August 16, 2013,
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0816/c64094-22584472-3.html .
11 Wu Guoguang, “The Emergence of the Central Office of Foreign Affairs: From Leadership
Politics to ‘Greater Diplomacy’,” China Leadership Monitor, September 1, 2021.
12 Linda Jakobson, “China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors,” Lowy Institute for
International Policy, December 2014, p. 13.
13 “中共中央印发《深化党和国家机构改革方案》[CCP Central Committee Issus Plan for
“Deepening Reform of Party and State Institutions”], Xinhua, March 21, 2018, http://www.
xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-03/21/c_1122570517.htm; Also see: Liza Tobin, “Wind in
the Sails: China Accelerates its Maritime Strategy,” War on the Rocks, May 9, 2018, https://
warontherocks.com/2018/05/wind-in-the-sails-china-accelerates-its-maritime-strategy/.

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 The Domestic Sources of China’s Maritime Assertiveness Under Xi Jinping

14 According to an analysis by ChinaPower, Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels were

involved in 73 percent of all major incidents in the South China Sea from 2010 to 2020. “Are
Maritime Law Enforcement Forces Destabilizing Asia?,” ChinaPower, https://chinapower.
csis.org/maritime-forces-destabilizing-asia/.
15 “Meng Named Head of Maritime Police Bureau,” China Daily, March 19, 2013. http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-03/19/content_16320703.htm
16 These four “dragons” include the China Marine Surveillance (under the SOA), the China
Fisheries Law Enforcement (under the Department of Agriculture), the Border Defense
Coast Guard (under the Ministry of Public Security), and the Maritime Anti-Smuggling
Police (under the General Administration of Customs). The fifth “dragon,” which was not
incorporated into the CCG, is overseen by the Ministry of Transport.
17 See: Lyle Goldstein, “Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in
China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities”; Lyle S. Morris, “Taming the Five
Dragons? China Consolidates its Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,” China Brief 13:7,
March 28, 2013.
18 Jane Perlez, “Chinese, With Revamped Force, Make Presence Known in East China Sea,”
New York Times, July 27, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/world/asia/chinese-
with-revamped-force-make-presence-known-in-east-china-sea.html.
19 Ryan D. Martinson, “Early Warning Brief: Introducing the ‘New, New’ China Coast Guard,”
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation 21:2, January 25, 2021, https://jamestown.org/program/
early-warning-brief-introducing-the-new-new-china-coast-guard/.
20 Jakobson, “China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors,” p. 17.
21 Ibid.
22 Lyle Morris, “China Welcomes its Newest Armed Force: The Coast Guard,”
War on the Rocks, April 4, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/
china-welcomes-its-newest-armed-force-the-coast-guard/.
23 Previously, the PAP was jointly administered by the State Council and the CMC.
24 “China Coast Guard Heads to Front Line to Enforce Beijing’s South China Sea Claims,”
South China Morning Post, February 19, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/
military/article/2185491/china-coast-guard-heads-front-line-enforce-beijings-south-
china?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=2185491. The directors of
each of the CCG’s three regional bureaus are also former PLAN officers. Ryan D. Martinson,
“Getting Synergized? PLAN-CCG Cooperation in the Maritime Gray Zone,” Asian Security,
published online November 27, 2021, p. 5.
25 Katsuiji Nakazawa, “Analysis: Xi Takes Over Coast Guard and Gives it a License to Fire,”
Nikkei Asia, February 4, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/
Analysis-Xi-takes-over-Coast-Guard-and-gives-it-a-license-to-fire.
26 Ma Cheng, “新形势下海警转隶武警部队的现实意义 [The Practical Significance
Under the New Situation of Transferring the Coast Guard to the People’s Armed Police],”
China Ocean Development Research Center, July 3, 2018, http://aoc.ouc.edu.cn/26/15/
c9821a206357/pagem.psp.
27 Ibid.
28 Martinson, “Getting Synergized?”

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 Kacie Miura

29 Ibid, 8.
30 Quoted in Teddy Ng and Laura Zhou, “China Coast Guard Heads to Front
Line to Enforce Beijing’s South China Sea Claims,” South China Morning Post,
February 9, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2185491/
china-coast-guard-heads-front-line-enforce-beijings-south-china.
31 Luo Shuxian, “China’s Coast Guard Law: Destabilizing or Reassuring?”
The Diplomat, January 29, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/
chinas-coast-guard-law-destabilizing-or-reassuring/.
32 Yew Lu Tian, “China Authorizes Coast Guard to Fire on Foreign Vessels if Needed,”
Reuters, January 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-coastguard-law/
china-authorises-coast-guard-to-fire-on-foreign-vessels-if-needed-idUSKBN29R1ER.
33 https://twitter.com/CollinSLKoh/status/1352772465173229569
34 Ibid.
35 Ryan D. Martinson, “The Real Risks of China’s New Coastguard Law,” National Interest,
March 3, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/real-risks-china percentE2
percent80 percent99s-new-coastguard-law-179157.
36 Luo Shuxian and Jonathan G. Panter, “How Organized is China’s Maritime Militia?”
The Maritime Executive, April 9, 2021, https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/
how-organized-is-china-s-maritime-militia.
37 Ryan D. Martinson, “Catching Sovereignty Fish: Chinese Fishers in the Southern Spratlys,”
Marine Policy, No. 125, 2021, 8.
38 Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “Model Maritime
Militia: Tanmen’s Leading Role in the April 2012 Scarborough
Shoal Incident,” CIMSEC, April 21, 2016, https://cimsec.org/
model-maritime-militia-tanmens-leading-role-april-2012-scarborough-shoal-incident/.
39 Gregory B. Poling, Tabitha Grace Mallory, and Harrison Pretat, “Pulling Back the Curtain on
China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2021, 6.
40 “习近平在海南考察 [Xi Jinping on an Inspection Tour of Hainan],” People’s Daily, April 10,
2013. http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0410/c1024-21090468.html
41 Poling et al., “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia,” 6.
42 Luo Shuxian and Jonathan G. Panter, “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets: A Primer
for Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders,” Military Review, January/February 2021.
43 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Annual
Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2021, 28.
44 Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed
Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA,” China Maritime Report, No. 1, March 2017, 3.
45 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” CNA, 15-16.
46 Ibid.
47 Zhang Hangzhou and Sam Bateman, “Fishing Militia, the Securitization of Fishery and the
South China Sea Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 39, No. 2, August 2017.
48 Luo and Panter, “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets,” 13.
49 Poling et al., “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia,” 15.
50 Ibid.

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51 Luo and Panter, “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets,” 13.
52 Ibid, 14.
53 This LSG has since been absorbed by the Central Commission on Foreign Affairs.
54 Luo and Panter, “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets,” 14.
55 Austin Ramzy, “A View from the Sea, as China Flexes Muscle,” New York Times, August 9,
2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/world/asia/a-view-from-the-sea-as-china-
flexes-muscle.html.
56 Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus and Jake Douglas, “Counter-
Coercion Series: China-Vietnam Oil Rig Standoff,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,
June 12, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-oil-rig-standoff/.
57 Vietnam claimed that there were four to six Chinese military vessels operating among the
more than 100 Chinese ships that gathered in protective rings around the HYSY-981. Ramzy,
“A View from the Sea.”
58 Jakobson, “China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors,” 19.
59 Luo Shuxian and Jonathan G. Panter, “China’s Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets: A Primer
for Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders,” Military Review, January/February 2021.
60 See: Yingxian Long, “China’s Decision to Deploy HYSY-981 in the South China Sea:
Bureaucratic Politics with Chinese Characteristics,” Asian Security 12:3, 2016.
61 “2014年6月11日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会 [June 11, 2014 Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference],” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June
11, 2014, available at: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgvan//chn/fyrth/t1164537.htm
62 “外交部发言人谈981平台转场：与任何外部因素无关[MFA Spokesperson on the
HYSY-981’s Transfer: It Has Nothing To Do With Any External Factors],” Xinhua, July 16,
2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-07/16/c_1111650093.htm.
63 Ramzy, “A View from the Sea.”
64 Alexander Vuving, “Did China Blink in the South China Sea?,” National Interest, July 27,
2014, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/did-china-blink-the-south-china-sea-10956
65 “S. Res. 412 – A Resolution Reaffirming the Strong Support of the United States
Government for Freedom of Navigation and Other Internationally Lawful Uses of Sea and
Airspace in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Congress.gov, July 10, 2014, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/senate-resolution/412.
66 Steve Holland, “Obama Tells China’s Xi Wants ‘Constructive Management of Differences,”
Reuters, July 14, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-obama/obama-tells-
chinas-xi-wants-constructive-management-of-differences-idUSKBN0FK06G20140715.
67 “解放军触动军舰战机在男孩演练保护钻井平台 [PLA Warships and Jets Participate
in Drill to Protect Oil Rig in South China Sea], Q Q News, August 23, 2014, https://news.
qq.com/a/20140823/016530.htm
68 “Xi Eyes Mended China-Vietnam Ties,” People’s Daily, August 28, 2014. http://en.people.
cn/n/2014/0828/c90883-8775358.html
69 Ankit Panda, “1 Year Later: Reflections on China’s Oil Rig ‘Sovereignty-Making’ in the
South China Sea,” The Diplomat, May 12, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/1-year-
later-reflections-on-chinas-oil-rig-sovereignty-making-in-the-south-china-sea/.
70 For example, see: Bonnie S. Glaser, “The Real ‘Chinese Dream’: Control of the South China

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Sea?,” National Interest, December 16, 2014, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/

the-real-chinese-dream-control-the-south-china-sea-11863.
71 Jakobson, “The PLA and Maritime Security Actors,” 301.
72 Minxin Pei, “Ideological Indoctrination Under Xi Jinping,” China Leadership Monitor,
December 1, 2019.
73 Barbara Demick, “Mao-era Style of Self-Criticism Reappears on Chinese TV,” LA Times,
September 26, 2013, https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-china-self-criticism-20130927-
story.html.
74 Pei, “Ideological Indoctrination Under Xi Jinping.”
75 “Investigators Dig Deeply into CNPC Operations,” China Daily, July 30, 2014, https://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/30/content_18206974.htm.
76 Bill Hayton, “China’s Epic Fail in the South China Sea,” National Interest,
August 5, 2014, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china percentE2 percent80
percent99s-epic-fail-the-south-china-sea-11019
77 Kacie Miura, “Commerce and Coercion in Contemporary China,” PhD diss. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2020.
78 Audrye Wong, “More than Peripheral: How Provinces Influence China’s Foreign Policy,” The
China Quarterly, No. 235, September 2018.
79 Min Ye, “Fragmented Motives and Policies: The Belt and Road Initiative in China,” Journal of
East Asian Studies 21:2, July 2021.

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Xi Jinping and Ideology

Joseph Torigian is an Assistant Professor at the School of

International Service at American University and a 2021–22 Wilson
China Fellow
 Joseph Torigian

Abstract
Is Xi Jinping an ideological person? Not taking ideology seriously in China
would be a mistake, but sweeping statements about ideology’s decisive influ-
ence can obscure more than they illuminate. Treating the content of ideol-
ogy as a variable that explains everything fails to appropriately account for
politics and contingency. Linking ideology to specific actions faces serious
methodological challenges, and outside observers have often gotten the role
of ideology wrong in Leninist states. The life of Xi Jinping’s own father Xi
Zhongxun suggests the difficulty of placing Chinese leaders clearly on an
ideological spectrum. In his own remarks on ideology, Xi Jinping has dis-
played two consistent “shticks” that might seem contradictory to outside ob-
servers: a distaste for radicalism and dogmatism and a preoccupation with
conviction, values, and dedication.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Ideology is a term with many meanings, and policymakers should be
explicit about what they are talking about when they use the term. New
evidence shows the extent to which outside analysts have incorrectly
understood the role of ideology in Chinese elite politics.

● With regards to ideology, President Xi Jinping has consistently displayed

two “shticks” that might seem contradictory to outside observers:
a distaste for radicalism and dogmatism and a preoccupation with
conviction, values, and dedication.

● Despite the return of some Mao-era rhetoric, Xi views struggle not in

a “class” sense but rather as “forging” experiences that increase party
members’ devotion to the cause through hardship and challenge.

● Two factors may indicate a shift in Xi’s approach to ideology: 1). Xi

believes that the United States opposes Beijing for both ideological and
power political reasons; that American efforts to undermine the CCP
will only increase; and that Washington uses ideological infiltration to
achieve that goal; and 2). As Xi’s time as top leader continues and the

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propaganda apparatus increasingly emphasizes his stature, the prospect of

“leftist” adventures may become increasingly tempting.

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 Joseph Torigian

Introduction:
Is Xi Jinping an “ideological” leader? Western and Chinese observers often
portray Xi as someone whose actions are more guided by Stalinist, Maoist,
and communist ideas than his immediate predecessors. Sourcing Xi’s behav-
ior in ideology, according to this view, is essential for understanding him.
Analysts who believe China and the United States have entered a new Cold
War similarly stress the ideological nature of Beijing’s agenda.1
Not taking ideology seriously in China would be a mistake. Yet sweeping
statements about ideology’s decisive influence can obscure more than they il-
luminate. As a social science concept, the term “ideology” has been used to
express an extraordinary number of meanings.2 When debates remain on the
level of whether a person or regime is “ideological” or “nonideological,” dis-
cussants necessarily talk past one another—addressing specific meanings of
ideology separately is a more fruitful endeavor. Furthermore, treating ideology
as a keystone variable that explains everything fails to appropriately place ide-
ology in the context of politics and contingency. Such a perspective can both
underrate the full repertoire of the Leninist toolkit and tactical flexibility,
and, at least occasionally, also underestimate opportunities for compromise
or cooperation. Moreover, political scientists have identified extensive meth-
odological difficulties facing anyone who wants to directly link the content of
an idea with a policy outcome. Especially in Leninist regimes such as China, a
“black box” of authoritarian politics, outside observers have consistently mis-
understood the nature of ideology or overargued its significance.
Because of the myriad meanings of ideology and the opacity of elite politics
in Beijing, this paper does not attempt a dichotomous “yes” or “no” answer to
the question of whether Xi Jinping is an ideological person. It does not address
the role of ideology as a form of social control and legitimation or whether
regular Chinese citizens have cohesive ideological views, two topics which
other scholars have already researched in great depth.3 Instead, it provides use-
ful evidence on two manageable topics of interest to provide some traction for
how we should think specifically about elite politics, ideology, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), and Xi Jinping.
First, I use the life of Xi Zhongxun, the father of Xi Jinping, to show the
surprising ways that ideology did, and did not, shape behavior in specific in-
stances. Xi Zhongxun is an especially useful figure for this purpose, as he is

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widely seen as the quintessential humane, practical, “reformist”-style CCP

cadre. Despite that reputation, Xi Zhongxun often acted in ways that ques-
tion the usefulness of the idea of cohesive ideological “factions” within the
party. Xi Zhongxun’s career also reveals the surprising extent to which even
a party of individuals who share a Bolshevik “operational code” can differ
amongst themselves.
Second, I draw upon a wide variety of previously unused materials to de-
scribe an interesting tension that has persisted in Xi Jinping’s expressed views
of ideology since he was a very young man. Xi has repeatedly and consistently
mocked people who bring a dogmatic, extremist approach to policy and has
advised caution about taking steps beyond what the situation allows. Yet, at
the same time, Xi for decades has demonstrated a preoccupation with val-
ues and motivation: a loss of confidence in the CCP’s mission, in Xi’s mind,
would mean the loss of the party’s “political spirit” and the “spiritual pillar for
CCP members to withstand any test.”4

The Myriad Meanings of Ideology

The most common, “person-in-the-street” definition of ideology is an “over-
simplifying view of the world—that to speak or judge ‘ideologically’ is to
do so schematically, stereotypically, and perhaps with the faintest hint of
fanaticism.” The use of ideology in this pejorative sense has a long pedi-
gree. The sociologist Èmile Durkheim wrote that ideology consisted of “the
use of notions to govern the collation of facts rather than deriving notions
from them.”5 Napoleon applied the term “ideologists” to those people who
resisted him, by which he meant they were “doctrinaires” and not “the po-
litical men of action.”6 Talcott Parsons believed the “essential criteria of an
ideology” were deviations from objectivity.7 Edward Shils characterized ide-
ology as a belief that “must override every other consideration” and which
justified a totalistic, aggressive expansion of power and reshaping of human
society. 8 Karl Marx, in The German Ideology, used the term “ideology” to
criticize those with a “false” worldview (in that case, his target was the
Hegelians who thought that it is ideas, not social factors, that shape human
history). Yet Marx also famously meant it in the sense of a set of ideas that
legitimated an unjust (capitalist) system.9

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Ideology as something inherently aggressive and dangerous or as a tool

used to justify an inequitable system is how it is most typically used with re-
gard to China today. Yet it should be noted that this view does not have a pat-
ent on the claim that the CCP is dangerous—denying any role for ideology in
Beijing implies the leadership is a cynical and power-hungry group unfazed by
any norms of behavior. John Mearsheimer, for example, whose faith in the ab-
solute explanatory power of realism mirrors those scholars who claim ideology
explains everything, asserts that China is aggressive and sources such behavior
in the nature of the international system, going so far as to write that “it would
be a mistake to portray China as an ideological menace today.”10 Richard
Pipes, a notorious hawk during the Cold War, decisively sourced Moscow’s
expansionism not in ideology but in “its social base and its politics.”11
Not all scholars impart ideology with negative connotations. Clifford
Geertz complained about how “the term ‘ideology’ has itself become thor-
oughly ideologized. . . . Even in works that, in the name of science, profess
to be using a neutral sense of the term, the effect of its employment tends
nonetheless to be distinctly polemical.” Geertz pointed to how people would
use “ideological” as an insult but never allow the term to be applied to them-
selves. In Geertz’s mind, such an approach was not useful: instead, ideology
was necessary for any group to function—whether it was “accurate” or not
was a separate question.12 Based on the insight that the world is ambiguous,
many political scientists and economists have stated that ideas are necessary
to explain behavior.13
The pejorative and more value-neutral schools of ideology together provide
a dizzying number of possible meanings. In his own review of the literature,
John Gerring provided perhaps the most extensive definitional framework
of ideology. He noted that, with regard to function, scholars have debated
whether ideology is a tool used to explain, repress, integrate, motivate, or legit-
imate. They have also debated whether ideologies are essentially interest based
or noninterest based. Gerring even listed sixteen typologies previously utilized
to determine where a particular cognitive/affective structure fits on the “more
or less” ideological spectrum: is it the coherence of their worldview, as Philip
Converse famously argued? Is it the simplicity of their ideas? Is it the extent
to which they distort how the world really works? Is it about the seriousness
of their conviction, or the opposite: their lack of sincerity (meaning they are

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­ otivated by “mere ideology”)? Is it about dogmatism? Gerring concluded

m
that “it is not reasonable to try to construct a single, all-purpose definition of
ideology, usable for all times, places and purposes. Doing so would deprive the
concept of its utility precisely because its utility is (usually) context-specific…
The task of definition we must leave to the writer, situated in a particular
problem, region, time-period, and methodology.”14

Linking Ideology to Action

Ideology is a seductive idea for China watchers because a purely “ideological”
leader is easily understood—all one has to do is read about the ideas to which
the leader subscribes. Former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, for example,
believed that Stalin’s Problems of Leninism was “the present-day Communist
bible…[that] gives us the same preview Hitler gave in Mein Kampf.” Dulles
would even open the book “with surprising accuracy” to prove any point.15
At the beginning of the Cold War, Nathan Leites of the RAND
Corporation tried to determine a Bolshevik “operational code.” He concluded
that the leaders in Moscow were more motivated by a fear of latent homosexu-
ality than any objective threats. According to Leites, “The Bolshevik insistence
on, in effect, killing enemies and being killed by them is…an effort to ward off
fear-laden and guilty wishes to embrace men and be embraced by them.” These
psychological motivations underpinned an ideology of fanatical expansion
and rejection of compromise. Leites did not find this code primarily by read-
ing Bolshevik texts (after all, it was their subconscious doing the work) but by
examining the alleged emotional motivations faced by the Russian intelligen-
tsia from which the Bolsheviks descended. As Ron Robin explains, “Instead
of seeking overt expressions of political faith, Leites preferred the analysis of
‘clues,’ chance gestures of speech that might uncover the real—mostly uncon-
scious, psychopathological—motivation of the Bolshevik character.” Leites’s
writings had a major impact on US negotiators at Panmunjom and the first
generation of RAND nuclear strategists.16
Leites also strongly influenced Alexander L. George, one of the most im-
portant methodologists in the history of political science. In 1967, George
tried to salvage Leites’s core insights while rejecting his “reference to psycho-
analytic hypotheses.” Although George believed the concept of operational

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code was useful, he never suggested that it was a panacea for understanding
Soviet behavior. Instead, he described the operational code as a “prism that in-
fluences the actor’s perception of the flow of political events and his definition
or estimate of particular situations.” Analysts still needed to consider the code
in the context of “specific situations and assessment of institutional and other
pressures on the political leader’s decisions.” George raised further questions
about what the code might be able to explain when he noted that the code
itself was inherently ambiguous:

It has been of considerable value on occasion to Western leaders to

understand that their Soviet counterparts structure the problem of
action with a set of beliefs and maxims that seem to contradict, or,
rather, oppose one another. There is, as a result, what might be called a
“tension of opposites” in their cognitive structuring of the problem of
action. We saw this already in the beliefs held with respect to the first
of the instrumental issues: attempt to optimize gains, but don’t engage
in “adventures.” And we see it again here with the reference to the
second instrumental issue: “push to the limit” and “pursue” a retreating
opponent, but “know when to stop.”17

Years later, George went further and presented two specific methods for
determining the explanatory power of an operational code. As George him-
self admitted, both were far from perfect. The “congruence” procedure looked
for consistency “between the content of given beliefs and the content of the
decision.” In other words, if a leader apparently held certain beliefs and their
actions made sense according to such beliefs, then an “operational code” ex-
planation for behavior had some validity. Yet the problem with such a method
is obvious: correlation may imply causation but it far from proves it. George,
therefore, also suggested “process-tracing” as a more persuasive method, which
traced “in some detail the steps in the process by means of which given opera-
tional code beliefs influence the assessment of incoming information, help to
shape the individual’s definition of the situation, and influence his identifica-
tion and evaluation of options.” 18 Yet process-tracing came with its own prob-
lems.19 Researchers still faced the extraordinary evidentiary challenges to fully
explaining a decision (especially in authoritarian regimes) and unresolved

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methodological questions about how to actually “test” the explanatory power

of the ideational element. As Yuen Foong Khong pointed out, even process
tracing “seldom establishes a direct one-to-one relationship between a given
belief and the specific option chosen.”20
Further complicating this endeavor is the challenge of separating ideologi-
cal motivations from a useful excuse. Kenneth Shepsle did not see ideas as a
motivating force but rather as a tool for legitimizing more power-political in-
terests: “My own view on the force of ideas is to see them as one of the hooks
on which politicians hang their objectives and by which they further their in-
terests.” To illustrate this concept, Shepsle discussed how President Andrew
Jackson justified vetoing the Maysville Road bill in 1830 by referring to the
constitution and the national debt. Yet the road happened to be in the state of
a top competitor: to defeat the bill, Jackson had in fact simply shopped around
for ideas to justify his behavior.21
Addressing the challenges inherent to “measuring” the causal effect of an
idea, Albert Yee warned that “ideation is generally only one of many probable
and partial causes of policies.” Leaders still had to take “geopolitical factors”
and “domestic considerations” into account. Given that reality, Yee argued
that thinking about an “idea” as one of a set of alternative hypotheses for an
outcome was inappropriate—the world was too complicated for such differen-
tiation. Instead, Yee proposed thinking about ideas as “capacities, powers, or
mechanisms.” Yee was essentially arguing that it made more sense conceptual-
izing the different ways that ideas might work than seeking a direct “cause-
effect” relationship between the content of an idea and an action.22
In a chapter on the role of ideas in foreign policy, Judith Goldstein and
Robert Keohane engaged in exactly this kind of intellectual legwork by reject-
ing both rationalist approaches that denied any role for ideas and reflectivists
that “have been slow to articulate or test hypotheses.” Goldstein and Keohane
stated that ideas and interests could not be divorced from one another.
Instead, they identified three mechanisms for how ideas actually mattered:
“Our argument is that ideas influence policy when the principled or causal
beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals
or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations
in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in
political institutions.”23

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Peter Hall’s work on the effect of Keynesianism on economic policy also

illustrated how ideas mattered but not in the sense that the content of ideas
had homogenous effects. Hall argued that “all too often ideas are treated as a
purely exogenous variable in accounts of policy making, imported into such
accounts to explain one outcome or another, without much attention to why
those specific ideas mattered.” He provided three reasons for why ideas needed
to be investigated in a broader social and political context. First, ideas are only
persuasive to policymakers to the extent that they related “to the economic
and political problems of the day.” Second, any set of ideas is “ambiguous and
far from immediately comprehensible,” so “interpretation is a necessary pre-
requisite to understanding.” And third, how a leader is exposed to ideas is it-
self necessarily a political process. 24
Ann Swidler, who looked at ideas on the level of culture, similarly moved
away from using ideas as “causes.” Her foil was Max Weber, who metaphori-
cally argued: “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern
men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created
by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action
has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.” In other words, Weber believed
that, although interests act to motivate people, ultimate goals and “the
means for getting there” were based on ideas. Yet Swidler rejected this view,
arguing that “what people want…is of little help in explaining their action.”
Instead, she proposed culture as a “toolkit” or “repertoire” for “construct-
ing ‘strategies of action,’ rather than as a switchman directing an engine
propelled by interests.” This “toolkit” perspective suggested that the most a
scholar could achieve by looking at a culture was identifying a possible avail-
able range of actions. 25
These attempts to save ideas as a useful social science concept clearly have
one strong element in common: such methods can show how ideas “shape,”
“constrain,” “orient,” and “guide,” but they do not unambiguously draw a line
of cause and effect between an idea and a concrete policy outcome.26 Therefore,
when this literature on the role of ideas in political science is considered as a
whole, the message is that, while ideas are a useful concept, they have to be
understood in a broader political and social context. The content of ideas is
not determinative for an outcome.

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The Study of Ideology in Leninist Regimes

Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski famously wrote that the first char-
acteristic of a totalitarian regime was an “elaborate ideology” bent on societal
transformation and world domination.27 Not everyone was convinced, how-
ever. Theda Skocpol, who focused on power relations more than intentions,
believed that “it cannot be argued…that the cognitive content of ideologies in
any sense provides a predictive key to either the outcome of the Revolutions
or the activities of the revolutionaries who built the state organizations that
consolidated the revolutions.”28 Meanwhile, the “revisionist” school of Soviet
history rejected the “totalitarian” model and focused on writing social histo-
ry.29 This generation, according to Ronald Suny, did not think that “deduc-
tions from Marx’s Capital or Lenin’s What Is to Be Done?” could explain
much more than the “aspirations of leaders.” These social historians rejected
the “recipe book” view of ideology who “made a simple deduction from text to
intention and action.”30
Since the end of the Cold War, Soviet studies saw a “return of ideology.”
Martin Malia’s book, published in 1994, sought to “reassert the primary of
ideology and politics over social and economic forces.”31 Malia thought ideol-
ogy was the cornerstone that could elucidate all of Soviet history. However,
most of these scholars rejected the absolutist position shared by the totalitar-
ian school and Malia. They noted that declassified materials from Moscow
showed that Soviet leaders did indeed “talk Bolshevik” behind closed doors.
Yet while these scholars were sensitive to the numerous ways that ideology
functioned, they did not presume that the content of ideology could unprob-
lematically interpret behavior. Jochen Hellbeck, one of the leaders of this
trend, argued, “Rather than a given, fixed, and monologic textual corpus, in
the sense of ‘Communist party ideology,’ ideology may be better understood
as a ferment working in individuals and producing a great deal of variation as
it interacts with the subjective life of a particular person.”32 Reviewing this
literature, Steven Smith wrote that “ideology does not provide a master key
that unlocks the complexities of Soviet development. The fact that meaning
is constitutive of human action, that people act upon the world in terms of
their beliefs about the world, does not entail that the intentions of human
actors provide a privileged source of explanation of their actions.” After all,
reality “had a nasty habit of sneaking up on the Bolsheviks from behind and

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throwing into confusion their best-laid plans.”33 Michael David-Fox, similarly

to Gerring, proposed that the most fruitful way forward would be to sepa-
rate the multiple potential meanings of ideology in Soviet history and address
them separately: “Much is to be gained by asking how it was understood and
defined by different actors throughout the course of Soviet history.”34 These
scholars commonly believed that separating ideology from other explanations
was inappropriate. For example, Suny wrote, “It seems to me that it is not very
useful to position ideology at one pole and realism, Realpolitik, pragmatism,
or objectivity at the other, juxtaposed opposite one another like passion and
reason, religion and science, state socialism and market capitalism.”35
Nigel Gould-Davies’s article on the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy
powerfully reveals why treating ideology and Realpolitik as competing forms
of explanation is so problematic. Gould-Davies notes that realists discount the
role of ideology by arguing that, if ideologues really existed, they “must have
a master plan,” “must be inflexible,” “must be unremittingly aggressive,” and
“cannot cooperate with adversaries.” Realists then point to evidence suggest-
ing Moscow’s leaders were not such inveterate ideologues. But does that really
mean ideology did not matter? As Gould-Davies writes, “There is no necessary
connection between the radicalism of ultimate objectives and the choice of
means to achieve them.” In other words, even if the Soviets could hope for a
world in which everyone was communist, that “ideology” would still not ex-
plain much of their behavior on any given day. Gould-Davies notes something
George saw too—part of the Bolshevik code was distaste for leftist, radical,
self-destructive behavior: “Compromise, retreat, flexibility, avoidance of war,
protection of the Soviet state—none of these was alien to Lenin.”36
Such characteristics were not alien to Stalin either. In his magisterial new
book on the beginning of the Cold War in Europe, Norman Naimark writes
that, sooner or later, Stalin wanted a communist Europe, and he saw enemies
of a class nature everywhere. Yet the Soviet leader had no clear plan to get there,
did not support revolutions, and tried to avoid antagonizing Washington and
London. In that sense, according to Naimark, “Stalin was by all accounts the
ultimate realist.” For Stalin, “excessive ideological enthusiasm, frequently
known derogatorily in party circles as ‘sectarianism,’ was for naïfs.”37
Meanwhile, with regards to China, new evidence has increasingly revealed
the extent to which outside observers have misjudged the role of ideology in

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elite politics. As Frederick Teiwes, the leading figure in this new historiog-
raphy, has written, most scholarly works on elite politics, “have been either
dramatically wrong, or a very mixed bag, or in critical respects speculation
that cannot be verified on existing evidence.”38 Two findings stand out in par-
ticular with regard to ideology: the competing tendencies within Mao himself
and his relationship with others in the elite.
“Maoism” is often synonymous with radicalism. Yet, as Teiwes writes, with
regard to Mao, “Two broad tendencies can be identified: the ‘revolutionary
romantic’ and the pragmatic…with pragmatism dominating for the majority
of his career.” Before 1949, Mao stood out for his “rightist (as in practical and
cautious)” mindset toward both ideology and policy—an approach that ulti-
mately led to victory over the Kuomintang. The notorious “Rescue the Fallen”
campaign in Yan’an, during which thousands were placed under suspicion,
was an exception that proved the rule—Mao apologized and promised the
party would not make such mistakes again (an oath he largely held until the
Cultural Revolution). Mao even allowed former enemies to remain within the
top leadership. After 1956, Mao of course became increasingly radical and er-
ratic, but the pragmatic and extremist sides of his nature still at least occasion-
ally competed with one another. 39
The Mao era is also often described as a history of two competing ideo-
logical lines—a contest between Mao the revolutionary modernizer and Liu
Shaoqi the managerial modernizer.40 That characterization has not survived
the new evidence that has subsequently become available. Certainly, Liu at
least occasionally made “rightist” comments, which chagrined Mao.41 Yet
Liu’s most outstanding characteristic was his habit of veering wildly from
“left” to “right,” and, when he was on the left, he was extremely left. As scholars
such as Song Yongyi and Xiao Donglian point out, Liu Shaoqi’s leadership
of the Socialist Education Movement that preceded the Cultural Revolution
was extraordinarily brutal. Liu’s extremism often went even further than
Mao’s, and Mao sometimes even inferred his own “core thinking” from Liu’s
comments. Liu clearly “considered it as a Cultural Revolution style political
campaign.”42 As Qian Xiangli put it, “Liu was not an opponent [反对派] of
Mao Zedong.”43
In my own research on Soviet and Chinese politics after Stalin and Mao,
I argue that scholars have consistently overestimated the extent of real ideo-

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logical fault lines in domestic elite politics after those two leaders as well. The
political successions in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao are
often explained as triumphs of inner‑party democracy, leading to a victory of
“reformers” over “conservatives” or “radicals.” Yet newly available evidence
suggests that the post-cult-of-personality power struggles were instead shaped
by the politics of personal prestige, historical antagonisms, backhanded po-
litical maneuvering, and violence. For example, Molotov was no neo-Stalin-
ist—that was a useful label Khrushchev used to push out the old guard. Mao’s
successor Hua Guofeng, famously associated with the “two whatevers” (an
allegedly dogmatic, Maoist ideology), was actually a powerful supporter of
reform and opening. Certainly, neither Molotov nor Hua led their own ideo-
logical factions.44

Xi Zhongxun and Ideology

Communist political language identifies a “spectrum” across the left and right
to characterize problematic tendencies. “Leftism” generally refers to overly
aggressive and impractical policy implementation; it is also associated with
persecution and purges that punish people who have committed no crime.
“Rightism,” on the other hand, means a lack of the political willpower nec-
essary to push the party’s agenda forward when opportunities present them-
selves or insufficient attention to ideological proprieties; “rightists” are also
often accused of inappropriate friendliness toward individuals with question-
able loyalties to party rule. Official histories of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party tend to define their past as a
series of “line struggles” in which rightists or leftists are defeated.
The common narrative about Xi Jinping’s father Zhongxun is that he was
the definitive anti-“leftist”—a practical, flexible, and non-ideological figure.
Xi Zhongxun himself once remarked: “With regard to me at least, my whole
life I never persecuted anyone, my whole life I never made a leftist mistake.”45
Even after Xi Jinping started demonstrating tendencies widely viewed as left-
ist, Wu Jiaxiang, who previously worked in both the CCP Secretariat and
General Office, argued that Xi would never betray his father’s legacy as a re-
former: “He is his father’s son; he was born into the family of the most pro-
reform faction; according to the inheritance of CCP and Chinese history, he

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cannot betray the faction that includes his father…He is the egg laid by his
father, the egg of reform…[Xi Zhongxun] was not a typical reformer; he was
the greatest reformer; if you use color to categorize, and the reformists were
blue, then he was deep blue.”46
There is certainly some truth to that characterization of Xi Zhongxun.
Xi played a key role in the launching of the Special Economic Zones—the
most powerful symbol of China’s reform and opening up. After the Mao era,
Xi believed in the possibility of more institutionalization within the party
and protection for different opinions. He often revealed a “softer” side with
regard to Beijing’s policies toward ethnic minorities.47 Xi joined the CCP as a
teenager with only a vague understanding of what the party represented and
received little formal education; he was encouraged by Mao to read more. Yet
absolutizing Xi as a “reformer” or anti-ideologue does not do justice to the
intricacies and tensions of his character. That is not because he was a “worse”
person than people think, but because he was a member of a particular po-
litical organization—the Chinese Communist Party. The broader context in
which Xi lived helps us see both the power and limitations of ideology as an
explanation in specific ways.
First, despite common political science theories of authoritarian regimes
that emphasize the weakness of the top leader and a ubiquitous desire within
the elite to replace them, most of the time Leninist regimes are extraordinarily
disciplined organizations.48 The top leader does not cater for support—the
deputies seek to please the top leaders. Power flows down, not up. Mobilizing a
“faction” with any ideological cohesion is taboo. In such a situation, although
deputies have some leeway, they usually care more about discipline and party
stability than pushing for their own policies.
Therefore, despite his reputation as an ideological “reformer,” party disci-
pline more often than not restrained whatever policy inclinations Xi might
have held. In fact, Mao Zedong himself pithily identified Xi’s attentiveness to
organizational discipline as a core attribute. The Chairman even wrote on a
white cloth the words “The Party’s interests come first” and gave it as a gift to
Xi, which became one of his most treasured possessions. In each case where Xi
allegedly acted heroically in the midst of one of the party’s historic campaigns
that went “too far,” we have little to no evidence that he spoke out against
them when they began; his areas of responsibility did not escape significant

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levels of violence, persecution, and wrongful verdicts; and he did not criti-
cize those policies brazenly until he had a clear sense of which way the wind
was blowing. He did not always push for particularly aggressive policies, he
worked hard to address mistakes once they were identified, and he certainly
understood how campaigns could easily lose control. But the idea that he com-
pletely escaped the party’s “leftist” mistakes is misleading.
Second, one potential definition of ideology is whether someone’s political
views are cohesive—in other words, is there a pattern of viewpoints across issue
areas that make sense in conjunction with each other? History has shown that
the position a CCP member holds on one issue is often a poor prediction for
how they might react in other situations. Several reasons may explain why this
is the case. First, whatever their ideological inclinations, members of the CCP
still need to address the concrete challenges of any particular goal. Second,
cadres can learn from experiences and shift their views over time. Third, CCP
leaders often pursue multiple goals simultaneously, and such objectives may
conflict with one another. Fourth, when someone holds political views that
seem incohesive from a rational perspective, emotions sometimes help reveal
why they are present in one individual.
Over the course of his decades-long career running giant regional baili-
wicks or serving as right-hand man to Zhou Enlai on the State Council or Hu
Yaobang on the secretariat, Xi had to manage an extraordinary set of different
challenges. He often displayed a wide variety of approaches that together do
not fit well on a “rightist-leftist” spectrum. Although he supported the Special
Economic Zones in Guangdong, he opposed the household responsibility sys-
tem, which gave more rights to peasants and was an even more important step
in China’s economic restructuring. During the 1980s, he prioritized co-op-
tation and economic development to settle challenges in Xinjiang. Yet, with
regard to Catholics, whom he considered were generally loyal to the Vatican,
he displayed much tougher behavior.
Xi also learned from his experiences. After violence in Muslim regions
erupted when he was running the Northwest Bureau in the early years of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), he concluded that CCP policies were
largely to blame, and he carried those lessons with him for decades. After six-
teen years in the political wilderness, Xi was sent to run Guangdong Province
on the border with Hong Kong. When local leaders explained to him that

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peasants had good reasons to flee to the capitalist British colony, Xi was furi-
ous and accused them of lacking faith in communist ideals. Yet he gradually
came to understand that the problem was indeed economic and that the PRC
needed to provide more concrete benefits to convince peasants to stay.
Occasionally, different inclinations competed with one another. For exam-
ple, he believed that quasi-dissident grassroots intellectuals in Guangdong dur-
ing the early reform era could be managed with “talking.” Yet, at the same time,
during conversations he held with those individuals, he showed a profound
phobia of chaos. The Cultural Revolution, in Xi’s mind, had demonstrated the
tragedy of political instability, and their actions threatened the improving situa-
tion after Mao’s death. Ultimately, the fear of chaos triumphed, and, when push
came to shove, Xi was willing to use force if “talking” did not work.
Emotional elements also threatened strong ideological “cohesion.” Xi
unambiguously thought that the Cultural Revolution was an absolute di-
saster, and, in the 1980s, he often spoke about the need to overcome Mao-
style strongman rule. Yet, at the same time, Xi was deeply devoted to the
Chairman’s memory. As an old man, Xi continued to sing songs about Mao
and was deeply upset when people criticized the late Chinese leader. Part of
Xi’s attitude was likely political—he understood that rejecting Mao would be
destabilizing for the party. But the emotional connection is undeniable. He
thought that Mao had saved his life in 1935 during a purge led by other com-
munists, and Mao led the CCP to victory after decades of struggle in which
Xi personally, as well as his friends and family, suffered terribly.
Moreover, even when any given position on the policy spectrum might be
“rightist,” such an approach must be considered relatively. Ultimately, Xi be-
lieved that only the CCP could save China. Co-optation and “talking” were
simply other forms of control. Even after the Tiananmen Square crackdown
and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Xi repeatedly and
publicly restated his faith in the ultimate victory of communism.
Xi Zhongxun’s life raises questions about the explanatory power of ideol-
ogy for another reason as well—over the course of his life, the party zig-zagged
multiple times across a whole host of different areas in ways that raise doubts
about a single “Bolshevik code.” During much of the 1950s, the party took a
gradualist approach and provided limited avenues for participation by non-
CCP figures through the so-called united front. When Mao increasingly saw

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class struggle as the solution to China’s problems, those policies were rejected,
and Xi was seen as one of those individuals whose behavior allowed those non-
CCP forces to “wag their tail” too much. In the 1980s, when Xi worked on
the secretariat in Beijing, he often referred to that earlier time as a golden era.
He rebuilt relations with the ethnic minority “prominent personages” that
he saw as powerful go-betweens for the party. Non-CCP parties were again
provided more voice in how the country was managed. These policies were
controversial throughout the 1980s; by the end of the decade, most of them
were condemned as failures and the party returned to more hardline tactics.

Xi Jinping and Ideology

For several important reasons, accurately guessing what Xi Jinping really
thinks is a difficult enterprise. First, during his rise to power, Xi was excep-
tionally guarded even for a member of a political organization that prizes dis-
cipline.49 Second, as an ambitious individual with connections in Beijing, he
would have been able to identify what kind of talk was most useful for his ca-
reer progression. Third, since coming to power, Xi Jinping likely often phrases
ideas in a way that suits some political purpose and may not precisely reflect
his own individual views. Fourth, as discussed earlier, westerners have histori-
cally gotten Chinese elite politics wrong, and, especially over the last few years
given COVID-19 and the political situation in China, it is even harder to gain
insight into Zhongnanhai.
Yet we should not assume every word that comes out of Xi Jinping’s mouth
is a lie. Although decisive answers are impossible to achieve for now, we can
still ask certain questions to gain leverage. First, does it make sense for Xi
Jinping to actually believe certain things he says? Second, has Xi displayed
certain ideas consistently over time, and, within the limited political space ris-
ing leaders do have, did he emphasize certain themes more than others? And
third, to what extent do his actions since coming to power “congrue” with
those themes? For reasons discussed above, these are imperfect methods, but
they allow for initial hypotheses.
A review of Xi Jinping’s speeches and articles both before and after coming
to power reveal two persistent “shticks.” First, Xi has constantly emphasized
the need to avoid extremes. For decades, he has condemned the dogmatism

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and chaos of the Cultural Revolution, but also, often in strikingly pragmatic
terms, he has identified both the benefits and challenges brought by marketi-
zation of the Chinese economy. Second, Xi has always displayed a belief in the
importance of ideals and motivation. Xi’s experiences as a sent-down youth
in the poor Shaanxi countryside during the Cultural Revolution and his time
working in a conservative Hebei county in the early reform era suggest it
would not be surprising if he sincerely held both such positions.
After the surge of idealism early in the Cultural Revolution, many of those
young people later became disillusioned, especially after they were exiled to
the countryside as “sent-down youths.” In 2003, Xi said that “when the ideals
of the Cultural Revolution could not be realized, it proved an illusion.” The
next year, Xi reflected on how he and other sent-down youth criticized vil-
lagers for not sufficiently punishing a former rich peasant: “It was dogmatic;
it was a result of not having seen the real world.” A hagiographic set of inter-
views about Xi claim that he “gradually began to doubt the long-term inces-
sant severe class struggle.” Sociologists have noticed similar reactions in many
other sent-down youth.50
When Xi Jinping began work at the county level in Hebei in March 1982,
he was moving to a province notorious for its leftism, factionalism, and con-
servatism—all legacies of the Cultural Revolution. More Chinese citizens
were complaining to Beijing about local problems there than in any province.
In January 1982, CCP cadres in Feixiang County used drinking bouts, vote
soliciting, anonymous big character posters, and even threats to engineer
a campaign that defeated the proreform county secretary and pick a more
conservative, factional figure. Feixiang was not the only dangerous place to
work—before starting in Zhengding, Xi Jinping had said he was also willing
to work in Pingshan County, but he was told not to go there because factions
were throwing explosives (literally) at each other.51
In an April 1983 speech in Zhengding, Xi blamed the “ten years of disas-
ter,” meaning the Cultural Revolution, for poor “party member conduct” (党
风). He also warned that the “capitalist corrupt thought and feudal thought”
would more easily enter China as it opened up and stimulated the economy.52
In March 1985, he complained that “some comrades are not proactive about
reform, are not sensitive; they lack a sense of responsibility for reform.” These
individuals, according to Xi, often said, “I would prefer not to reform rather

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than risk making a mistake.” Yet Xi also noted that, in some cases, reform suf-
fered from “an overeager desire for quick success” and poor follow-through.53
In January 1985, China Youth published a flattering report on Xi. Jiang
Feng, the article’s author, described Xi’s “rustic style” and praised his ability to
manage older cadres with lower levels of education. The most interesting con-
tent, however, was the quotes Jiang included attributed to Jia Dashan, a local
author. In Jia’s words, “here, you don’t hear everyone shouting reform, but re-
form is everywhere.” Jia described Xi Jinping as a man without sharp elbows
whose main focus was practicality and results, not reform for reform’s sake:
“He is a reformer who does not wear western-style clothes, and he forges ahead
without acting aggressively. While persuading people to accept the historical
necessity of reform, he can still leisurely have a drink of alcohol. This is a re-
former who makes progress with a smile on his face.” The article also quoted
Xi making remarks emphasizing stability in the context of change: “Reform
is the wish of the Chinese people; it is the ‘great trend’ of Chinese society, so
individuals don’t need to do anything deliberately shocking…In the process
of reform, it is necessary to study national characteristics, grasp the thinking
of the masses, avoid any destructive shocks; otherwise, blind reform is just a
romantic lyrical poem; in the worst case, it could even damage the endeavor.”54
While in Hebei, Xi was also attentive to broader debates among young
people about the meaning of life, as the end of the Cultural Revolution and
beginning of the reform era led to profound doubts about societal values.
Those discussions were sparked in 1980 by the letter “Why Is Life’s Road
Getting Narrower and Narrower?” published in China Youth. The letter re-
flected the ennui many young Chinese felt in the 1980s: “I am twenty-three
this year. I should say that I am just beginning life, but already all of life’s
mystery and charm are gone for me. I feel as if I have reached the end.” In
1984, Xi supported publication of an article in Hebei Youth that depicted
his devotion to the party and nation as the source of meaning in his life,
and Xi explicitly said that the article was his response to the 1980 China
Youth letter. While that letter had described how the disillusion caused by
the trauma of the Cultural Revolution led people to focus on their personal
interests to make up for lost time, Xi Jinping was portraying himself as
someone “forged” and rededicated to the people by the experience. Xi told
his interviewer that only if people like him devoted his life to the party’s

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mission and not personal interests could another Cultural Revolution be

avoided: “that is one of the reasons I have chosen this life.”55
According to that same article, Xi Jinping repeatedly told a story that
mocked old dogmatists who visited Guangdong (where his father used to
work) and saw peasants wearing suits and ties and “even blue jeans and bright-
colored blouses.” They also heard “music they did not understand” in coffee
shops and saw neon lights everywhere. These old red comrades “were dazzled,
felt dizzy; they could not help but grab their heads and sob: ‘we worked so
hard for socialism for so many years; who could have expected that capitalism
would be restored so quickly.’” Xi’s story allegedly always led his listeners and
himself to guffaws of laughter.56
As party boss of Ningde in Fujian Province, Xi returned to these themes.
In March 1990, he criticized recent graduates from high school or college:
“While they may have gained considerable knowledge from books, they are
still inexperienced and untested. . . . To look down on historical experience is
to look down on the people.” The belief that someone can get to the “truth” in
one try, Xi argued, “leads to dogmatic errors.” At the same time, Xi went into
great detail about the personal moral characteristics necessary for good CCP
members. He apparently recognized the possible tension in this dual focus on
practicality and belief. He said:

I believe that moral courage is a quality every leader must have.

Without it, leaders have no backbone. When talking about moral
courage, we should be aware not to become dogmatic. A discipline of
Confucius had the tassel of his helmet sliced off by his enemy while on
the battlefield in the midst of a desperate fight. Believing this was an
affront to his moral courage, the man lay down his arms to pick up the
tassel. In that moment, he put more value on affixing the tassel, which
symbolized his position as an official, than on fending off a fatal attack
from the enemy. This is an example of dogmatism.57

Xi also demonstrated an interest in non-Marxist Chinese thinkers. In both

1993 and 2001, he wrote an introduction to books on Yan Fu, the Fujianese
Qing dynasty thinker who emphasized science and patriotism as the key to
China’s salvation in the face of encroachments by imperialism. Yan’s message

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 Joseph Torigian

was about reform while maintaining China’s national characteristics, not

class struggle.58
Throughout the 1990s, Xi repeatedly spoke to ongoing discussions about
the nature of socialism. His writings are remarkable for their emphasis on
practical solutions to concrete problems. In 1997, in a review of Marx’s preface
to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, he stated that debates
about whether something was “capitalist” or “socialist” or whether labor was a
commodity were the result of confusion. However, Xi was forthcoming about
the problems that reform had introduced. While the “primary mission” of
socialism was to “develop the productive forces,” it was also necessary to “es-
tablish and perfect” the socialist market economy. Socialism was the goal and
the market was the method, and China’s objective was to integrate a market
economy with the socialist state-owned system. Although the market was not
inherently antithetical to the socialism system, Xi noted that “after all, the
market economy developed and became mature in the environment of capi-
talist society; therefore, it must include some factors that are not commen-
surate with socialism.” In particular, the market economy’s focus on profits
and its exclusionary character conflicted with the “selfless sacrifice and collec-
tive spirit” of the public economy. Xi called for a middle ground that rejected
claims the market was a “capitalist thing” incompatible with socialism while
also avoiding the “simple development of the market economy” without ac-
knowledging its drawbacks.59
In 1998, Xi wrote an article for an internal-circulation-only edition of
the party’s top theoretical publication Qiushi. Xi’s article noted that “many
debates” persisted, especially about “the fundamental matter of what is the
socialist market economy.” Some people believed that there was no connec-
tion between the market economy and socialist system, while others thought
that the two could be easily combined. According to Xi, Deng Xiaoping had
“fundamentally” solved this question when he said that “the planned econ-
omy is not socialism, capitalism also has planning; the market economy is
not capitalism, socialism also has the market.” Xi was emphatic that in the
early stage of socialism, “or even the entire socialist phase,” it would be impos-
sible to depart from an “advanced commodity economy.” At the same time,
however, Xi argued that this did not mean that there were no contradictions
between socialism and a market economy. In order to avoid “weak points,”

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the government still had a role to play. For example, the pursuit of “interests”
could affect “the ideological, organizational, and style construction of the rul-
ing party,” and the market sometimes led to suboptimal economic outcomes.
Crucially, Xi said that such problems were not about “the socialist system” or
“the market economy system”—instead, these challenges needed concrete, not
ideological solutions.60
The next year, Xi wrote a hagiographic article about Deng for Qiushi (this
time for its regular run) on the twentieth anniversary of the famous 1978
Third Plenum. Xi savaged those individuals who turn Marxism into “dogma”
or “only pay attention to reciting individual conclusions or make lopsided ar-
guments.” For Xi, theory was “grey, while the tree of life was always green.”
Those people who could apply “theoretical understanding” to “concrete is-
sues” were the ones who would hold the “guiding initiative” in the theory
world. Deng’s brilliance, according to Xi, was that in his works there was “no
empty or abstract theory or jargon.”61
In 2000, Xi claimed that the key characteristic of the CCP was that
it pursued the interests of “the people,” not any special interest groups.
Marketization increased the speed of development but, “like everything else,
has two sides”—the negative aspects threatened the ability of the party to rep-
resent everyone. The market created uneven economic development among
regions and some individuals were only seeing a slow improvement in living
conditions. Moreover, marketization “could seduce people to place too much
emphasis on personal interests,” thus damaging the “collective interest,” and
it divorced some cadres from their status as representatives of the people. Xi’s
solution, however, was curiously “nonideological.” Xi emphasized the impor-
tance of “seeking truth from facts,” “proceeding from the concrete situation,”
and “escaping closed and conservative ways of thinking.” Yet he warned that
since reform was “essentially” a “process of reorganizing interests,” some of the
masses would need “sacrifice.” Therefore, “if reform policies are too numerous
or steps are too big, it might go beyond what the masses can bear.”62
That same year, Xi published an article in People’s Daily that again posi-
tioned himself as the consummate pragmatist. He stated emphatically that
the government should no longer “manage everything” like in the past and
criticized those individuals who still had an attitude that “the government
commands everything.” On the other hand, “service” should be “limitless”—

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government officials should still be actively involved in helping people. Xi

wrote, “Managing the relationship between ‘limited’ management and ‘limit-
less’ service means issues that should be managed must be managed and is-
sues that should not be managed must not be managed; spare no efforts to
resolve difficulties for the masses; and seek benefit for all the people.”63 Just
two months later, People’s Daily published an interview that highlighted Xi’s
other side: his attention to political work. Any government that only paid at-
tention to economic work and ignored ideological political work, Xi said, is a
“government without a long-term perspective, they do not deserve the title of
government.” Xi credited Fujian’s development to the government never for-
getting the importance of ideological political work.64 But that was not a call
to radical politics: another People’s Daily article four months later quoted Xi
saying, “The gratefulness of the masses shames us; if not for the ten years of
chaos [the Cultural Revolution], the issue of the Fuzhou boat people [连家船
民] would have been resolved much earlier. We, members of the CCP, abso-
lutely must not owe the masses a debt!”65
Xi’s dissertation, written for a Doctor of Law degree in Marxist Theory
and Education in Ideology and Politics at Tsinghua University in 2001, was
a rather forthright and practical investigation into economic problems in
China’s countryside. Xi’s answer to these challenges was more marketiza-
tion, arguing that the market “should be relied on to solve the problems in the
structural adjustment of agricultural industry and the increase of the farmers’
income.” Xi warned that government macroeconomic control was needed to
overcome for deficiencies in the market, but the big picture was that China’s
rural areas needed reform and marketization. In Xi’s words, the market was
simply a method for improving the organization of resources and was not it-
self more “capitalist” or “socialist.”66

Conclusion
Setting aside the question of whether Xi Jinping is actually rolling back
“Deng”-style reforms (a term I have argued elsewhere is problematic67) with
a new “leftist” approach, we at least have reason to believe that, in his own
mind, he is walking both a sort of middle path and new path. The history reso-
lution passed in November 2021 states explicitly, “We must neither retrace

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our steps to the rigidity and isolation of the past, nor take a wrong turn by
changing our nature and abandoning our system.” The document concluded
that “Marxist theory is not a dogma but a guide to action” and that China’s
victories were not the result of “a mechanical application of the templates de-
signed by authors of the Marxist classics.” At the same time, the resolution
warned of “money worship, hedonism, ultraindividualism, and historical
nihilism; online discourse has been rife with disorder; and certain leading
officials have demonstrated ambiguity in their political stance and a lack of
fighting spirit.”68 Xi combined his 2022 New Year Address with soaring lan-
guage about the CCP’s historic mission but also warned, “To realize the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be no easy task like a walk in the park;
it will not happen overnight, or through sheer fanfare. We must always keep
a long-term perspective, remain mindful of potential risks, maintain strategic
focus and determination, and ‘attain to the broad and great while addressing
the delicate and minute.’”69
How exactly those tensions will play out remains to be seen. Propaganda
themes increasingly place emphasis on an old focus of Mao at his most radical:
the importance of “struggle.” In 2014, Wang Weiguang, the President of the
Academy of Social Sciences, wrote an article titled, “It Is Not Unreasonable to
Maintain the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” in which he criticized those
people who “believe democracy is better than dictatorship.” Wang wrote, “The
ruling class needs a force that appears to be above society to rule the ruled class
and ease conflict, so that is why the state was born…When social development
reaches a certain stage and classes and class antagonisms appear, the state was
born in order to benefit the ruling class such that, during class conflict, it does
not die along with the class that is ruled…The state is the product and mani-
festation of irreconcilable class contradictions.” 70 Shortly after, Han Gang, a
professor of modern Chinese history at East China Normal University, pub-
lished an apparent rebuttal in which he stated the most fundamental policy
adopted in reaction to the disasters of the post-1957 Mao era was rejecting
“class struggle.” Between that year and 1976, for twenty years Chinese society
stagnated, Han argued, and China’s triumphs subsequently were primarily a
rejection of that extremist philosophy.71
Since that time, the idea of struggle has continued and grown more promi-
nent, but in interesting and somewhat new ways. One form is civilizational:

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Jiang Shigong, a prominent CCP theorist, has claimed Xi’s emphasis on re-
turning to communist principles is about communism as “a kind of ideal faith
or a spiritual belief. For this reason, communism will never again be like it
was under Mao Zedong—something that was meant to take on a real social
form in the here and now—but is instead the Party’s highest ideal and faith.”
Therefore, Jiang sees China’s “struggle” with the West as more civilizational
than ideological.72
Xi himself also regularly talks about struggle, but not in the “class” or “civi-
lization” sense—more as a “forging” experience that increases party members’
devotion to the cause through hardship and challenge. In September 2021,
at a speech to the Central Party School, Xi warned that only “firm ideals”
would equip party members with the ability to withstand “tests.” Where did
such devotion come from? Xi’s answer was that “the formation of firm ide-
als and beliefs is neither achieved overnight nor once and for all, but must be
constantly tempered and tested in concrete struggle.” Yet even here Xi placed
practicality and flexibility on a high pedestal, arguing that it was imperative to
“always proceed from reality” and that “seeking truth from facts” was an issue
of whether someone’s “party nature” was strong.73
Looking to the future, “ideology” will likely manifest in Xi Jinping’s be-
havior in ways similar to his predecessors. He will carry ideological priors
more strongly in some issue areas than others. When goals conflict with one
another, he will shift among them flexibly. The party will continue massive ef-
forts in ideological indoctrination, but the messaging will be more about the
party’s greatness than concrete “leftist” policies. The “real world” will force
course corrections. China will pursue indigenous innovation and improve its
military forces while still hoping to benefit from globalization and avoid war.
In certain areas, especially with regard to ethnic minorities and dissidents,
we have little reason to expect a change in hardline, extremist policies. Yet in
other areas, his behavior will show a “pragmatic and adaptive side.” 74 As Jude
Blanchette put it, “All in all, if you were a thoroughgoing neo-Maoist in Xi
Jinping’s China, there would be a great deal to be dissatisfied with.” 75
Two factors, however, may shift this balance of competing tendencies. First,
Xi believes that the United States opposes Beijing for both ideological and
power political reasons; that American efforts to undermine the CCP will
only increase as China rises; and that Washington uses ideological infiltration

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to achieve that goal. Second, as Xi’s time as top leader continues and the pro-
paganda apparatus increasingly emphasizes his stature, the prospect of “leftist”
adventures may become increasingly tempting. The answer to how those com-
peting forces will ultimately resolve, however, will not be found easily in the old
Marxist-Leninist canon.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 Charles Edel and Hal Brands, “The Real Origins of the US-China Cold War,” Foreign
Policy, June 2, 2019; John Garnaut, “Engineers of the Soul: Ideology in Xi Jinping’s China,”
Sinocism, January 16, 2019.
2 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 2007), 1.
3 Elizabeth J. Perry, “Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: ‘Re-Orienting’ Party
Propaganda,” in To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power, ed. Vivienne Shue and
Patricia M. Thornton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 29–55; Heike Holbig,
“Ideology after the End of Ideology: China and the Quest for Autocratic Legitimation,”
Democratization 20:1 (2013), 61–81; Maria Repnikova, “Thought Work Contested: Ideology
and Journalism Education in China,” China Quarterly 230 (June 2017), 399–419; Anne-
Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Cheng Chen, The Return of Ideology: The
Search for Regime Identities in Postcommunist Russia and China (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2016); Jason Y. Wu, “Categorical Confusion: Ideological Labels in China,”
Political Research Quarterly (forthcoming); Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, “Left and
Right with Chinese Characteristics: Issues and Alignments in Deng Xiaoping’s China,”
World Politics 48 (July 1996), 522–50; and Chengyuan Ji and Junyan Jiang, “Enlightened
One-Party Rule? Ideological Differences between Chinese Communist Party Members and
the Mass Public,” Political Research Quarterly 73:3 (2020), 651–66.
4 Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping: zai dangshi xuexi jiaoyu dongyuan dahui shang de jianghua” [Xi
Jinping: Speech at Mobilization Rally on Party History Study and Education], Xinhua,
February 20, 2021.
5 Eagleton, Ideology, 3.
6 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London:
Routledge, 1991), 72.
7 Talcott Parsons, “An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge,” in The Sociology of
Knowledge: A Reader, ed. J. E. Curtis and J. W. Petras (London: Duckworth, 1970), 282–306.

333
 Joseph Torigian

8 Edward Shils, “Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual,” The Sewanee Review
66:3 (Summer 1958), 450–80.
9 Siniša Malešević, Ideology, Legitimacy, and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Croatia
(London: Routledge, 2002), 12–13.
10 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great
Power Politics,” Foreign Affairs 100:6 (November/December 2021), 48–58, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war.
11 Richard Pipes, “East Is East,” New Republic, April 26–May 3, 1999. A review of Martin
Malia, Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
12 Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected
Essays, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 193.
13 Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North, “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and
Institutions,” Kyklos 47:1 (1994), 3–31; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); and Brian Taylor,
The Code of Putinism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
14 John Gerring, “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly 50:4
(December 1997): 957–94.
15 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications,
Reconsiderations, Provocations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 73–74.
16 Ron Robin, The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-
Intellectual Complex (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 131–36; and Ron
Robin, The Cold World They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 89–94.
17 Alexander L. George, The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political
Leaders and Decision-Making (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1967), https://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5427.html.
18 Alexander L. George, “The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making
Behavior: The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System,” in Psychological Models in International
Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), 105.
19 Joseph Torigian, “A New Case for the Study of Individual Events in Political Science,” Global
Studies Quarterly 1:4 (December 2021), 1–11.
20 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam
Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 65.
21 Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Comment,” in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985), 231–37.
22 Albert S. Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies,” International Organization 50:1
(Winter 1996), 69–108.
23 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical
Framework,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith
Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3–30.
24 Peter A. Hall, “Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas,” in The Political Power of
Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, ed. Peter A. Hall (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

334
 Xi Jinping and Ideology

University Press, 1989), 361–91.

25 Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51:2
(April 1986): 273–86. Patrick Jackson, however, asserts that Weber actually did subscribe to
the ideas-as-cultural-resources position, placing him not too far from Swidler’s own position.
See Patrick Jackson, “Rethinking Weber: Towards a Non-Individualist Sociology of World
Politics,” International Review of Sociology 12:3 (2002), 439–68.
26 Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies,” 94.
27 Zbigniew Brzezinski and Carl Friedrich, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).
28 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 170–71.
29 David Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
30 Ronald Grigor Suny, “On Ideology, Subjectivity, and Modernity: Disparate Thoughts about
Doing Soviet History,” Russian History/Histoire Russe 35:1–2 (Spring–Summer–Fall–Winter
2008): 251, 253.
31 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991 (New York:
The Free Press, 1994), 16.
32 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2006), 257.
33 Steve Smith, “Two Cheers for the ‘Return of Ideology,’” Revolutionary Russia 17:2 (2004),
119–35.
34 Michael David-Fox, Crossing Borders: Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and the
Soviet Union (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 90.
35 Suny, “On Ideology, Subjectivity, and Modernity,” 252.
36 Nigel Gould-Davies, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the
Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1:1 (Winter 1999), 90–109.
37 Norman Naimark, Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 6–13.
38 Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Study of Elite Political Conflict in the PRC: Politics inside
the ‘Black Box,’” in Handbook of the Politics of China (Northampton, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, 2015), 21–41; Shi Yun and Li Danhui, Nanyi jixu de “ jixu geming”:
cong pi Lin dao pi Deng, 1972–1976 [The “Continuous Revolution” That Was Difficult to
Continue: From Criticizing Lin to Criticizing Deng, 1972–1976] (Hong Kong: Quanqiu
faxing zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 2008); Li Haiwen and Wang Shoujia, “Siren bang” zai
Shanghai yudang fumie ji [Record of the Destruction of the “Gang of Four’s” Remaining
Cohorts] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2015); Shen Zhihua, Sikao yu xuanze:
cong zhishifenzi huiyi dao fanyou pai yundong, 1956–1957 [Thought and Choice: From the
Intellectuals Meeting to the Anti-Rightists Campaign, 1956–1957] (Hong Kong: Xianggang
zhongwen daxue dangdai Zhongguo wenhua yanjiu zhongxin, 2008); Lin Yunhui, Chongkao
Gao Gang, Rao Shushi “ fandang” shijian [Reevaluating the Gao Gang, Rao Shushi “Anti-
Party” Incident] (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Chinese University, 2017); Han Gang, “‘Liang
ge fanshi’ de yi duan gong’an” [The Case of the “Two Whatevers”], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 2

335
 Joseph Torigian

(February 2016): 1–9; and Xiao Donglian, Wenge qian shinian shi 1956–1966, xia [The Ten
Years before the Cultural Revolution 1956–1966, Volume 2] (Hong Kong: Heping tushu
youxian gongsi, 2013).
39 Frederick Teiwes, “Mao Zedong in Power (1949–1976),” in Politics in China: An Introduction,
ed. William A. Joseph, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 73.
40 Byung-joon Ahn, Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution: Dynamics of Policy Processes
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976).
41 Lin, Chongkao Gao Gang, Rao Shushi “ fandang” shijian.
42 Song Yongyi, Mao Zedong he wenhua da geming: zhengzhi xinli yu wenhua jiyin de xin
chanshu [Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution: A New Interpretation of Political
Psychology and Cultural Gene] (Xinbei: Lianjing, 2021), 89–133; and Xiao, Wenge qian
shinian shi 1956–1966, 2:1054–1102.
43 Qian Xiangli, Lishi de bianju: cong wanjiu weiji dao fanxiu fangxiu, 1962–1965 [Sudden
Turn of Events in History: From Solving the Crisis to Opposing and Preventing Revisionism,
1962–1965] (Hong Kong: Xianggang Zhongwen Daxue Dangdai Zhongguo Wenhua Yanjiu
Zhongxin, 2008), 112.
44 Joseph Torigian, Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion Elite Power Struggles in the Soviet
Union and China after Stalin and Mao (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022).
45 Wu Jiang, “Qin Chuan tan Xi Zhongxun er san shi” [Qin Chuan Discusses Two or Three
Things about Xi Zhongxun], Yanhuang chunqiu, no. 11 (2003), 56–57.
46 Jiang Xun, “Xi Jinping xiang zuo zhuan shi zuo jia dongzuo” [Xi Jinping Turning to the Left
Is a Feint], Yazhou zhoukan, September 22, 2013, 34–35.
47 Joseph Torigian, “What Xi Jinping Learned—and Didn’t Learn—from His Father about
Xinjiang,” The Diplomat, November 26, 2019.
48 Joseph Torigian, “Elite Politics and Foreign Policy in China from Mao to Xi,” Brookings
Institution, January 22, 2019.
49 Joseph Torigian, “Historical Legacies and Leaders’ Worldviews: Communist Party History
and Xi’s Learned (and Unlearned) Lessons,” China Perspectives, no. 1–2 (2018), 11–12.
50 Torigian, 10, 13.
51 Zhong Zhaoyun and Wang Shengze, Chizi zhi xin: Jiang Yizhen zhuan (xia) [Unquestioning
Trust: Biography of Jiang Yizhen (Part Two)] (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi,
2008), 834–35, 974; and Yong Huaqi, “Xi Jinping hui Zhengding” [Xi Jinping Returns to
Zhengding], Lingdao wencui 11 (Part One) (November 2009): 66.
52 Xi Jinping, “Jinkuai shixian dangfeng genben haozhuan” [As Quickly as Possible Execute a
Fundamental Change in Party Style], in Zhi zhi zhen, ai zhi qie [Knowing Deeply, Loving
Entirely] (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 2015), 23.
53 Xi Jinping, “Gaige xi bixu dajia chang” [Everyone Must Sing the Reform Song], in Zhi zhi
zhen, ai zhi qie (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 2015), 185–90.
54 Jiang Feng, “Ta gengyun zai Zhengding de yuanye shang” [He Cultivates the Wild Fields
of Zhengding], in Qingchun suiyue [Years of Youth] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe,
1986), 54–56.
55 Zhou Weisi, “Jinping ba zhanlue yanguang he wushi jingshen jiehe qilai, hen liaobuqi”
[Jinping Combined a Strategic Perspective with a Practical Spirit, Deeply Impressive],

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in Xi Jinping zai Zhengding [Xi Jinping in Zhengding], ed. Zhongyang dangxiao caifang
shilu bianji shi (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 2019), 161; Luo Xu,
Searching for Life’s Meaning: Changes and Tensions in the Worldviews of Chinese Youth in
the 1980s (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 49–71; and Lu Ying and Zhou
Weisi, “Er li zhi nian” [Independent at Age Thirty], Hebei qingnian 7 (1984).
56 Lu and Zhou, “Er li zhi nian.”
57 Xi Jinping, “A Chat about Entering Public Service,” in Up and Out of Poverty (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 2019), 33–54.
58 Xi Jinping, ed., “Xu yi” [First Foreword], in Kexue yu aiguo: Yan Fu sixiang xintan [Science
and Patriotism: A New Exploration of Yan Fu Thought] (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe,
2001), I–II.
59 Xi Jinping, “Lun ‘“zhengzhi jingji xue pipan” xuyan’ de shidai yiyi” [On the Epochal
Significance of “Preface to ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’”], Fujian
luntan 1 (1997): 1–7.
60 Xi Jinping, “Zhengque chuli shehui zhuyi shichang jingji de liang ge bianzheng guanxi”
[Correctly Handling the Two Dialectical Relations of the Socialist Market Economy], Qiushi
neibu wengao 11 (1998): 1–5.
61 Xi Jinping, “Jiefang sixiang, shishi qiushi yao yi yi guan zhi” [Liberation of Thinking and
Seeking Truth from Facts Must Run Through Everything], Qiushi 1999, no. 1 (n.d.): 22–23.
62 Xi Jinping, “Lingdao ganbu yao quanxin quanyi wei renmin mou fuli mou fuli” [Leading
Cadres Must Wholeheartedly Seek Benefit for the People], in Dangzheng gaoji ganbu “san
jiang” wenxuan xia ce [Selection of “Three Speaks” by High-Ranking Party and Government
Cadres, Volume Two], ed. Qiushi zaizhi bianji bu (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 2000),
630–43.
63 Xi Jinping, “‘Youxian’ guanli yu ‘wuxian’ fuwu” [“Limited” Management and “Limitless”
Service], People’s Daily, June 14, 2001.
64 Xi Jinping, “Jingji yue fada yue yao zhongshi sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo: fang zhonggong
Fujian shengwei fu shuji, shengzhang Xi Jinping” [The More Developed the Economy, the
More Important It Is to Emphasize Ideological Political Work: An Interview with Fujian
Vice Party Secretary and Governor Xi Jinping], People’s Daily, August 15, 2000.
65 Xi Jinping, “Gaobie qiannian haishang piao” [Say Goodbye to a Thousand Years on the Sea],
People’s Daily, December 4, 2000.
66 Xi Jinping, Zhongguo nongcun shichang hua yanjiu [A Tentative Study on China’s Rural
Marketization [sic]] (Dissertation submitted to Tsinghua University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Law, 2001), II, 18.
67 Joseph Torigian, “The Shadow of Deng Xiaoping on Chinese Elite Politics,”
War on the Rocks (blog), January 30, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/
the-shadow-of-deng-xiaoping-on-chinese-elite-politics/.
68 “Full Text: Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and
Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century” (Xinhua, November 16, 2021).
69 Xi Jinping, “2022 New Year Address by President Xi Jinping,” December 31, 2021, https://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202112/t20211231_10478096.html#:~:text=I%20
salute%20all%20your%20great,live%20in%20peace%20and%20harmony!.

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 Joseph Torigian

70 Wang Weiguang, “Jianchi renmin minzhu zhuanzheng, bing bu shuli” [It Is Not Unreasonable
to Maintain the People’s Democratic Dictatorship], Hongqi wengao 18 (2014): 4–8.
71 Han Gang, “Zui genben de boluan fanzheng: fouding ‘yi jieji douzheng wei gang’” [The
Most Fundamental Way to Set Things Right: Reject “Class Struggle Is the Key Link”], Xuexi
shibao, September 29, 2014, 3.
72 Jiang Shigong, “Philosophy and History: Interpreting the ‘Xi Jinping Era’ Through Xi’s
Report to the Nineteenth National Congress of the CCP,” trans. David Ownby, The China
Story, May 11, 2018; and Jiang Shigong and David Ownby, “The ‘Critical Decade’ in the Sino-
American Relationship: The ‘New Roman Empire’ and the ‘New Great Struggle,’” Reading
the China Dream, n.d., https://www.readingthechinadream.com/jiang-shigong-ten-crucial-
years.html.
73 Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping zai zhongyang dangxiao (guojia xingzheng xueyuan) zhong qing nian
ganbu peixun ban kaiban shi shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua” [Xi Jinping’s Important Speech
at the Opening Ceremony of the Training Course for Young and Middle-Aged Cadres at the
Central Party School (National School of Administration)], Xinhua, September 1, 2021.
74 Cheng Li, “Xi Jinping’s ‘Progress’: Domestic Moves Toward a Global China,” Global China:
Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World, September 2019, 11.
75 Jude Blanchette, China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao
Zedong (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 159.

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Section IV

China and Its Relations with

Developing Countries and the
Global South
As the soon-to-be largest economy in the world, China has embarked on a
wide-ranging outreach to the Global South. Presenting itself as a fellow de-
veloping country, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promises to trans-
form the global economy and China’s ties to the developing world. The BRI
purports to “promote the connectivity of Asian, European, and African con-
tinents and their adjacent seas…The connectivity projects of the Initiative
will help align and coordinate the development strategies of [participating]
countries.”1 With hundreds of billions of dollars in promised investments, the
enterprise has been welcomed by a variety of countries in the Global South
badly in need of infrastructure and foreign direct investment.
However, the BRI often comes with strings attached and critics argue
that Beijing draws more benefit from its projects than partner countries do.
Indeed, the conversation around “debt diplomacy,” unsustainable mega-proj-
ects, environmental damage, and a penchant for under delivering on its prom-
ises plagues the BRI’s reputation. This raises several questions. Is China’s nar-
rative that it is a developing country a genuine source for positive diplomatic
ties, or merely a cover for Beijing’s interests? Does China intend to address
concerns about the environmental and social costs of its investments? Is the
BRI predominantly economic in nature or has it provided cover for the expan-
sion of Chinese interests in the Global South?

This chapter explores these issues and more,

featuring essays from the following fellows:
Meir Alkon, “China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability”
Kristen Hopewell, “The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global

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 Development: Agriculture and Fisheries Subsidies”
Austin Strange, “Influence Nodes: China’s High-Profile Global
Development Projects”
Emily Wilcox, “Learning Diplomacy: China’s South-South Dance
Exchanges of the 1950s and 1960s and Their Relevance Today”

Notes
1 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Full Text: Action Plan on the Belt
and Road Initiative,” The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, March 30, 2015.
Accessed March 22, 2022. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/
content_281475080249035.htm

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

China’s Outward
Investments and Global
Sustainability

Meir Alkon is an Assistant Professor at Fordham University and a Non-

Resident Fellow at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center
and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow1
 Meir Alkon

Abstract
China’s outward investments are likely to have a substantial impact on global
sustainability. Through capital, technology, and standards, China’s invest-
ments, including through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have the poten-
tial to act as catalysts for sustainable, climate-conscious development—or to
accelerate resource depletion, pollution, biodiversity loss, and carbon-inten-
sive resource depletion. This policy paper draws from several pieces of research
analyzing the political economy of China’s outward investments and conse-
quent environmental impacts. Findings from these analyses cast doubt on the
narrative that domestic overcapacity is the major driver of outward Chinese
investment in coal-fired power; show that political favoritism in recipient
countries exacerbates the environmental impacts, including deforestation,
of China’s investments; and point to early evidence of a growing anti-China
bias in energy infrastructure development among recipient country citizens.
Together, these findings highlight the need for more nuance in policymaker
models of BRI investments and their environmental impacts, with particular
attention to the interaction between recipient country politics and China’s
unique, state-capitalist political economy. These findings suggest that U.S.
government agencies can best support sustainable, climate-conscious devel-
opment by working to enhance institutional standards, bureaucratic capac-
ity, and stakeholder engagement in recipient countries, so that they are able
to channel investment financing toward needed development while reducing
elite capture and mitigating environmental and climate impacts.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Policymakers need to move beyond extreme typologies of the BRI and
Beijing’s control.

● Greater attention needs to be paid to the interaction between host

country politics and how China’s state capitalism channels capital.

● A public opinion backlash against China’s overseas investments and

against coal-fired power suggest increasing awareness of environmental
issues and increasing skepticism around Chinese investment.

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 China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability

● We may be at a global inflection point for greening energy infrastructure

generally and China’s capital specifically, but potential pitfalls remain.

● U.S. government agencies—especially USAID, the EPA, the Department

of Energy, and the State Department—should work creatively with
host country governments to enhance standards and build capacity for
maximizing the sustainability of BRI investments.

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 Meir Alkon

Introduction
In September 2021, Beijing made waves with its announcement at the UN
General Assembly that it would halt the building of new coal-fired power
projects overseas.2 What this actually means is still relatively unclear. Some
postulate that this public commitment by China’s top leader signals a critical
shift in the Chinese government’s policies toward climate change and sustain-
able development. Others argue that the devil is in the details of implementa-
tion—what projects would be included and when this policy would take ef-
fect—and that it also sidesteps China’s domestic reliance on coal.
Debates around China’s impacts on global sustainability often focus on the
unique nature of China’s business-government relations, which are often re-
ferred to as “State Capitalism.”3 China’s state capitalism entails a complex sys-
tem of party-state control over the economy; this also leads many policymakers
and observers to assume that China’s state capitalist system gives Beijing com-
plete control of overseas activities and investments, including under China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For the global environment, such a view
suggests that greening China’s overseas impact is simply a matter of cajoling
Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, into adopting environmentally friendly poli-
cies. An alternative viewpoint highlights the plurality of actors and interests
in China’s political economy, noting that environmental policy and foreign
policy do not fit into neat narratives of state control,4 even as China’s system
remains far more state-driven than the U.S. and other Western economies.
The implications of this debate for policy responses to the BRI are signifi-
cant, and this paper outlines several pieces of related research that moves be-
yond traditional generalizations and dichotomies to unpack specific actors and
mechanisms, in both destination and host countries, that determine whether
and how China’s overseas economic footprint impacts the environment.
I proceed by first outlining the crucial stakes at play: why China’s central
role in global trade, investment, and technology flows, as well as its large
domestic market, hold the key to curbing carbon and taking a sustainable
development path. I next outline the domestic drivers of China’s overseas
investments, including the common argument that overcapacity pushes
Chinese companies to invest abroad. I show that there is an absence of
evidence in support of such a contention. But destination country politics
may also condition the BRI’s environmental impacts. I present evidence of

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 China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability

how political favoritism in the ­allocation of projects exacerbates deforestation

around Chinese investment sites. Finally, I consider the larger context of pub-
lic opinion in destination countries, examining the specific case of energy in-
frastructure. I present preliminary evidence showing a major public backlash
against coal-fired power and against China as a project developer; though part
of a larger anti-foreign bias in project development, the generally more nega-
tive attitudes towards China seem to suggest some of the lasting public opin-
ion consequences of a poor reputation for environmental stewardship.

Global Sustainable Development: China’s Role

China’s significance in global environmental issues is hard to overstate. It is
not only the world’s largest carbon emitter, but also a carbon multiplier be-
cause of its active involvement in the financing and construction of overseas
investment and infrastructure projects. These projects often have major en-
vironmental impacts on recipient countries, and in the case of energy infra-
structure also lock in future emission trajectories in many developing coun-
tries. Foreign investment commonly serves an engine of growth but also an
avenue for environmental and social dislocation. As a source of capital and
technological know-how, and given China’s extensive financial resources and
companies’ experience in capital-intensive construction at scale, China’s over-
seas investments will have an outsize role on the trajectory of sustainable de-
velopment in countries across the world.
In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received much at-
tention not just for its potential geopolitical impacts but also its environmen-
tal consequences. Initially proposed in 2013, the BRI seeks to establish both a
land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “Maritime Silk Road,” prioritiz-
ing economic development and international partnership5 while promoting
energy cooperation.6 Although Chinese overseas economic activities are not
limited to the BRI, the ambitious initiative has provided further political im-
petus for the acceleration of China’s investments abroad. In fact, it has largely
become synonymous with “Chinese overseas investment”, even subsuming
many projects conceived and implemented before the BRI came into effect.
China’s overseas in- vestments had already been rapidly increasing since its
“going out policy” announced in 2000, which encouraged Chinese companies

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 Meir Alkon

to invest and operate abroad. Here, I largely use both terms interchangeably,
including drawing on evidence from investment projects that sometimes pre-
cede the formal announcement of the BRI.
A growing body of research has cataloged when and whether China’s over-
seas finance has serious environmental impacts.7 Decisions made around sit-
ing and planning new infrastructure will have long-term impacts on develop-
ment trajectories and environmental conservation at a global scale. China’s
overseas financing of energy infrastructure will significantly influence the
future power generation sources for countries throughout the world. Chinese-
financed power plants will affect local environmental quality and water sus-
tainability, and will have major impacts on the global emissions trajectory.
Chinese-financed projects more generally have the potential to influence bio-
diversity, air, and water in large areas adjoining projects; highlighting the po-
tential impacts of the BRI on global sustainability, broadly construed.

Overcapacity, Overblown?
One sector of investment which has received particular investment is energy
generation infrastructure. China has often been criticized for continuing to
develop coal-fired power plants over- seas. Due to their long life span, coal-
fired power plants have significant impacts on both climate change,8 and local
environmental conditions, especially air and water.9
Against this backdrop, scholars and policymakers have actively debated
the drivers of China’s overseas energy investments. One group actively sees
Chinese firms as motivated by domestic overcapacity and market constraints,
opting to build dirty, technologically less advanced fossil fuel (especially coal-
fired) power plants as a way to maintain revenue and employment.10 Another
group views the Chinese firms as part of the larger global energy financing
landscape, with demand from recipient countries for new power plants driv-
ing the construction and financing of new plants, and the most successful and
technologically-advanced Chinese firms driving the investment.11
From a policymaking perspective, understanding when and why Chinese
firms invest over- seas can help destination countries understand and respond
to prospective investments, while also providing valuable information for
other bilateral and multilateral development lenders about the nature and
drivers of China’s energy financing.

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Despite these high stakes, existing attempts to unpack the drivers of

China’s overseas investments have generally looked at a small number of cases,
have relied on public statements by the Chinese government on the overall
goals of the project, and have paid too little attention to firm- level variation in
overseas financing activities. While case-study approaches shed valuable light
on the processes of firms’ investments and their impacts, they also point in
different directions. Chinese government statements, though potentially in-
formative, should be taken with a healthy grain of salt, and at best may not re-
flect the commercial reality. Firm-level approaches, although able to surmount
these obstacles, have been stymied by limited data, measurement issues, and a
lack of clear inferential strategy.

China’s State Capitalism and Environmental Reforms

The nature of China’s domestic political economy has shaped—and con-
strained—efforts at energy reform. This is despite increasing public aware-
ness and demand for environmental protection. While an authoritarian re-
gime, the Chinese Communist Party remains sensitive to public opinion as
an important source of regime legitimacy and internal stability. The fact that
public satisfaction with the central government is affected by environmental
issues—such as air pollution—has made addressing environmental concerns
even more imperative for Beijing.12
At the same time, the necessity for maintaining economic growth—an-
other very important source of performance legitimacy for the CCP—often
comes into tension with environmental goals. During a January 2022 visit to
Shanxi, China’s largest coal-producing province, President Xi Jinping made
a speech saying that the ’dual carbon’ goals of peaking emissions by 2030
and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 “is not what others ask us to do, but
[something] we do on our own initiative”; that this process could not wait nor
could it be “rushed”; and that China was “rich in coal, poor in oil and low in
gas.”13 Concerns over political stability, economic development, and satisfy-
ing the vested coal interests of state-owned enterprises have continued to con-
strain China’s domestic and global environmental policies.
Institutional inflexibility at dealing with sometimes competing priorities
often leads to seesawing governance cycles as well as interjurisdictional tensions

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between local and central governments.14 This has often led to seemingly para-
doxical policies. For instance, China’s massive expansion of renewables capacity
seems contradictory to its continued domestic reliance on coal-fired power as
well as its support (until very recently) for building coal-fired energy infrastruc-
ture overseas. But renewables manufacturing and generation has also helped
spur local economic growth, frequently to the extent that curtailment (the ex-
cess generation and hence loss of renewable energy) is a serious problem; where
policies often fall short is facilitating a full-on energy transition such as encour-
aging grid reform and delivery of non-coal-based electricity generation.

Overcapacity and Challenges of Power Sector Reform

The power sector is no exception. Despite problems of overcapacity, stalled
reform of China’s power sector presents a particular dilemma for the CCP.
On one hand, power generation constitutes a sector in which reform is par-
ticularly difficult. It was never particularly marketized, and direct and indi-
rect subsidies for coal production have only increased since the crisis. Coal
generation is also geographically concentrated, making it difficult to reform,
and coal reserves and coal generation are particularly important in some of
the historically less developed areas that are the regional targets of central de-
velopment priorities. The energy sector is also dominated by SOEs, making
it difficult to enforce environmental regulations.15 Because of their corporate
structure, SOEs have been key contributors to overcapacity: “Since SOEs typi-
cally do not pay dividends (except to the state and much of those are returned
to the SOEs), they use the dividends to expand capacity and keep employment
levels up.”16 At the same time, the stalled implementation and progress in re-
form of many key markets has also reduced the potential disciplining roles of
price signals.17
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the empowerment of statist coalitions and
the regime’s overriding concerns of mitigating political risks have sheltered
SOEs from structural reforms. Projected economic reforms in China are tak-
ing place without the kinds of layoffs that characterized earlier waves of SOE
reforms in the 1990s.18 Protecting the interests of SOE employees is seen as a
major task.19 As Zhang Yi, the head of China’s state-controlled SASAC (State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission), said in 2015,

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“In the process of deepening reforms of state-owned enterprises, the leader-

ship of the party can only be strengthened, not weakened.”20 In order to en-
sure the continued employment protection and the maintenance of stability,
the CCP has shown little inclination for further market-oriented reforms.
Thus, for both domestic imperatives of survival and for international rea-
sons, the CCP has sought to reform China’s energy sector. However, the cri-
sis-response legacy of statist policy-making has helped to limit the scope for
market-based reforms. Since local governments acting in China’s decentral-
ized system tend to vary in their response to environmental and energy policy
goals, depending on their initial endowments and development strategies, 21
many local governments’ interests and incentives are poorly aligned with the
larger goals of energy sector reform. Furthermore, centralized command-and-
control in the form of environmental authoritarianism is not a panacea.22
Indeed, such attempts at reform and central control inevitably tend to face
institutional limitations in China’s decentralized system.23

Overcapacity as a Driver of BRI Investments?

Against this backdrop, overseas energy investments through the Belt and
Road Initiative have been explained by some as the CCP’s response to 1.)
address overcapacity issues; and 2.) manage conflicting imperatives of statist
intervention and structural reform. According to this logic, a key driver of
the BRI has been the need to relieve overcapacity across sectors. Overcapacity
has been particularly acute in the power sector. At the same time, China has
actively increased its market share in the construction of overseas coal-fired
power plants. Estimates suggest that roughly 11-21 percent of total overseas
coal finance, or USD35-72 billion, is from China.24 Most of the overseas fi-
nancing is in the form of engineering, procurement, and construction con-
tracts, the know-how for which firms arguably find easier to transfer overseas
than to make the switch to the domestic renewable energy industry.
By encouraging, or selectively supporting, investment overseas, the regime
can use these state-subsidized investments to support less competitive indus-
tries domestically, as well as compensate SOEs and regions that have been left
behind by the trajectory of reforms. While the BRI has largely evolved as an
all-encompassing strategy subsuming many investment projects, it has sent

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important political signals through lending decisions by state banks, which

control much of the credit allocation.25 The BRI also provides Beijing with
additional opportunities to use laws and targeted regulations to constrain and
shape SOE involvement in BRI-sanctioned overseas investments, especially
through the widespread mobilization in recent years of key ministries like the
NDRC, MOF, and Ministry of Commerce to shape BRI activity.26
While a common argument in academic and policy circles, the role of
overcapacity and reform pressures in driving BRI investments has not been
systematically tested. Below, I construct a new dataset to test this claim, but
find a lack of evidence that this is the dominant reason behind China’s alloca-
tion of overseas investments. I disaggregate the Chinese state to focus empiri-
cally on the role of firms within this state capitalist system. Firms, particularly
powerful state-owned enterprises (SOEs), often have the political clout to
influence government decisions, and are also the crucial actors in executing
overseas investments. Analysis of firm-level investment drivers can add more
nuance in explaining when and why Chinese firms sometimes invest in fossil
fuel projects but invest in renewable energy at other times, as well as observed
variation in generation technology levels.

Overcapacity Assessment: Data and Analysis

In order to create the dataset used in the analysis, I merged and extended sev-
eral existing data sources on coal-fired generating capacity within and outside
of China, data on other power generation installations globally, as well as
measures of multidimensional risk for coal plants within China. The first step
in dataset construction was to create the first firm-level inventory of coal-fired
power plant assets for all Chinese firms. This allowed me to build a measure of
the extent to which each firm in a given year faces risks from structural changes
in China’s domestic political economy. I drew on data from the Global Coal
Plant Tracker, published by the NGO Global Energy Monitor.27 Because of
data availability and because China’s overseas investments have only begun to
pick up in earnest in recent years, I focused on the years 2000–2018.
I first disentangled joint ownership by partnership shares, and used these
partnership shares to weight unit-level generating capacity. I then calculated
each firm’s total generating capacity (included weighted capacity) for a given

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year, and for each province specifically. To calculate the annual capacity, I used
data on the commissioning year (and in some cases, retirement years) as well as
plant locations within a specific province. I then calculated the province-level
share of generating capacity for each firm-province combination in each year.
Next, I constructed a measure of (over/under)-capacity specific to the
power sector. I used aggregated data on electricity consumption and produc-
tion at the provincial level, together with data on electricity imports and ex-
ports from every province, to assess the extent of excess generation in each
province. The net (over/under)-generation is calculated for each province-year.
For a large country like China, this imbalance is largely driven by a.) exist-
ing grid constraints, b.) changes in regional demand due to differing rates of
economic growth; c.) variability due to the introduction and expansion of
renewables generation capacity; and d.) varying levels of over-investment in
generating capacity at the provincial level. While firms can anticipate and re-
spond to many of these issues, because of the massive investments required to
build generating infrastructure as well as the long time horizons of returns,
these investments are classic sunk costs, and can face insufficient demand
under conditions of overcapacity. Factors affecting overcapacity and supply
demand imbalance include the location and intensity of new, energy-intensive
economic activity, the capacity, technology and policies of China’s grid,28 and
the distribution of renewable energy sources, such as hydropower, wind, and
solar. Most of these factors are determined by factors largely exogenous to the
location and capacity of existing generating capacity and are outside of even
large generating companies’ control.
Because of the different locations of firms’ generating assets, each Chinese
firm faces different levels of financial pressures on their domestic assets. I uses
this variation as my major source of inferential leverage. Since the underlying
variations in overcapacity are not random or quasi-randomly assigned, I do
not claim that the analysis can make causal claims about domestic markets
and firm investments. However, it does provide novel, suggestive evidence of
the correlations between domestic conditions and overseas investments, and
helps to answer questions about which kinds of Chinese firms invest overseas.
I then took the sum of the product of the province-year shares of generating
assets for each firm and the province-year under/over-capacity measures. This
has the advantage of automatically incorporating firms’ size into the measure.

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Since we would expect that larger firms have more overseas investments (or are
more likely to invest overseas), this makes the measure a direct comparison of
relative over/undercapacity.
Next, I matched these measures at the firm-level with data from the
Global Coal Plant Tracker on coal-fired power plants outside of China. I then
matched across firm names, connecting all over- seas projects sponsored (or
partially sponsored) by Chinese firms to the respective firms’ domestic mea-
sures of yearly excess/under demand.
To analyze the impact of domestic market constraints, I modeled the total
firm-level megawatts sponsored overseas by year as a function of its domestic
market constraints on a panel of firm-year investments. To calculate domestic
market constraints, I scaled the generating capacity of each Chinese parent
by provincial-level annual electricity generation balances. If Chinese firms
facing market constraints or bearing the greater brunt of reform pressures at
home were more likely to invest overseas, then we would expect that provinces
with more positive balances (greater production relative to demand— and in
some specifications, inclusive of trade) would be more likely to sponsor over-
seas plants. Conversely, if the most successful and well-placed firms were most
likely to invest, we would expect to see effects in the opposite direction.
Because it would likely take several years for domestic reform pressures
or market constraints to translate into overseas coal construction, I tested
different temporal relationships between the explanatory variable (prov-
ince-year domestic imbalance) and my outcome measure of total megawatts
sponsored internationally. These ranged from contemporaneous to a five-
year mapping. In calculating domestic market constraints, I also evaluated
the effects both inclusive and exclusive of extra-provincial electricity trade.
The unit of analysis is the universe of firm-year combinations for all Chinese
firms with generating capacity in a given year (from 2000 to 2018). The mod-
els include fixed effects for parent firms and year. Coefficient plots below
summarize the results from these models. The top panel of Figure 1 uses
measures of domestic conditions including trade, while the bottom panel
uses measures without trade. Each panel summarizes six models, ranging
from zero to five-year lags. Across measurement strategies and lag lengths,
point estimates are small and coefficients are imprecisely estimated. While
this consistent failure to reject the null hypothesis cannot itself be disposi-

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FIGURE 1: Effects of domestic electricity market constraints on

international sponsorship of coal-fired power are substantively small and
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Unit of observation is the firm-
year and all models include firm and year fixed effects. Panel covers the
period from 2000–2018.

Domestic Conditions and Intl. Sponsorship

Five Yr. Lag

Four Yr. Lag

Three Yr. Lag

Two Yr. Lag

One Yr. Lag

Contemp.

-100 -50 0 50 100

Domestic Market Effects (Incl. Domestic Trade)

tive of some relationship between domestic conditions and overseas invest-

ments, it suggests that simple theoretical models of overcapacity-induced
overseas investment are likely to be insufficiently nuanced.
The analysis above presents a first cut at a firm-level approach to un-
derstanding the political economy of Chinese outward investment and its
potential environmental impacts. A range of existing case study research,
largely critical of Chinese investments, have rightly pointed to the poten-
tial environmental risks of China’s financing of coal-fired power generation
overseas. This paper’s findings suggest the importance of broadening the
scope of inquiry and policy prescriptions beyond a focus on China’s overca-
pacity. In the next section, I discuss such an approach, focusing on the inter-

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action between the politically-motivated allocation of overseas investment

and environmental consequences.

Elite Politics and Destination Country

Environmental Impacts
If overcapacity isn’t pushing Chinese firms out, than what other variables
matter? Increasingly, research is focusing on the complex interactions between
China’s overseas investments and domes-tic politics in recipient countries.29
Turning to the role of elite politics in mediating environmental impacts, I col-
laborated with Dr. Hongbo Yang, of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, to an-
alyze the deforestation impacts of China’s overseas investments—particularly
how dynamics of political favoritism might be exacerbating deforestation.
We operationalized both political connections and a measure of the envi-
ronmental impacts of BRI investments, focusing on deforestation. This makes
two major contributions. First, while it is often argued that Chinese invest-
ments are accelerating deforestation, the extent of the environmental impacts
of China’s overseas investments at a global scale have not yet been measured.
We are the first to provide a global spatial assessment of forest loss as a result
of China’s overseas investments. Second, the paper provided the first empirical
estimates of whether and when political favoritism in BRI project siting af-
fects deforestation around BRI-funded projects.
Forest cover, which has impacts on both biodiversity and carbon
emissions,30 has long been considered an important measure of environmen-
tal impact.31 This highlights the importance of understanding the impact of
China’s overseas investments on forest loss. Only Benyishay et al (2016)32 have
adopted a spatial approach to analyzing the deforestation impact of Chinese
investments. Their analysis focused on identifying impacts in critical areas
in Cambodia and Tanzania. Their findings show that the effects on defor-
estation are highly heterogeneous, depending on national political and local
conservation context, highlighting the importance of understanding how
variables that vary at regional and project-level—for example, the extent of
political favoritism—may condition deforestation and other environmental
impacts of the BRI.

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The Environmental Costs of Political Favoritism

For capital-scarce developing countries, the BRI represents a much-needed
source of finance. At the same time, the BRI is widely understood to serve
political goals for both China and destination country leaders, which in turn
affects project siting and the regulatory and oversight environment. A com-
mon refrain among observers states that BRI projects use political connec-
tions and corrupt business practices to sidestep efforts at regulation and con-
servation.33 Accordingly, such politically-motivated projects, benefiting from
the support of destination-country politicians, might be more likely to cause
environmental harm.
Leaders in office often reap more immediate political gain and popular
support from generating economic growth, boosting employment, and build-
ing infrastructure, as compared to pursuing environmentally sustainable
choices. Amid opportunities to secure rents from China’s (often corrupt)
investments,34 as well as efforts to secure development and investment in order
to increase reelection and garner political capital, national leaders often work
to influence the timing, location, scope, and other dimensions of China’s over-
seas investments.35
The siting of investment projects (and their environmental implications)
generally involve complex political interactions between communities in af-
fected areas; politicians at the local, regional, and national levels; regulatory
bodies and bureaucracies; firms; as well as domestic and sometimes interna-
tional non-governmental organizations. National-level politics play a major
role in shaping the environmental impacts of investment projects. A large
body of literature has documented the potential for regulatory capture when
powerful corporations and multinationals invest in developing countries.36
This casts a shadow over political decisions on where to site projects and the
degree of environmental compliance required from these corporations. The
environmental externalities of such foreign direct investment, such as water
and air pollution, are often concentrated in marginalized and poor constitu-
encies, which have little political voice or financial clout to sway politicians’
decision-making.
In the specific context of the BRI, host country leaders play important
roles in the life-cycle of prospective projects.37 In the bargaining and back-
and-forth entailed in BRI project siting and planning, national leaders can

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propose project locations and type, as well as influence proposed projects’ final
locations and project implementation details. These threefold layers of influ-
ence highlight the distinct and crucial levers political leaders play in project
planning and siting.
Furthermore, the location and distribution of investment projects tend to
be influenced by political motivations. Research has shown that across differ-
ent regimes, national leaders’ home regions tend to benefit disproportionately
from investment and transfers.38 In the specific context of China’s aid, African
leaders’ homeland regions are more likely to receive financing inflows than
other regions within the same country, controlling for a range of variables.39
Leaders are more likely to direct economic benefits to their home regions in
order to reward supporters and maintain popularity, or simply build projects
for prestige reasons. National leaders often have established patronage net-
works or ethnocultural ties to their home regions, while politicians and firms
from these regions are likely to have more established access routes to lobby
the national leader and her inner circle. The effects of leaders’ home regions is
not deterministic—in many countries and for many leaders, the home-region
bias may not exist in many cases, but on average existing research provides
support for the contention that home regions are more likely to benefit when
leaders from those areas are in office.
There is thus strong evidence that political favoritism plays an important
role in the geographical allocation and siting of projects, and that investments
in leaders’ home regions tend to be driven more by political reasons. This then
suggests that such politically-motivated investments may have even greater en-
vironmental costs relative to other investments in the same country.
There are two theoretical pathways through which political favoritism may
exacerbate the environmental outcomes of BRI projects. These two pathways
can be defined as subversions of de jure and de facto environmental protec-
tions, respectively. In the de jure case, the formalized, legal structures that are
established to protect the environment—for example, regulations, law en-
forcement, or ministerial oversight—are circumvented by nationally-powerful
politicians who prioritize the completion of projects for economic, prestige, or
patronage-based reasons. In such cases, we would expect uneven implemen-
tation of de jure regulations within countries and over time, depending on
whether regions are politically favored by politicians. In the second, de facto

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case, local opposition from citizens, civil society, and in some cases, local poli-
ticians, constitutes the primary barriers to adverse environmental impacts.
In such cases, de facto environmental protection from these stakeholders is
more critical than regulatory and legal context, for example due to weak or
underdeveloped rule of law. In this context, a powerful national leader uses
her power to push past these sources of subnational opposition in order to
have a project completed. Reflecting diverse local and regional stakeholders,
this may be because the economic benefits and environmental costs accrue
differentially. The de jure and the de facto cases are ideal types and neither
mechanism excludes the other. It is entirely possible that powerful politicians
can use their power to circumvent both legal/regulatory constraints and to
steamroll local opposition.
Might projects that are politically favored and sited in favored regions
actually be associated with fewer adverse environmental impacts? If national
political leaders or their local allies are environmentally minded, focused
on conservation, or draw economic benefits from environmental protec-
tion, then projects in favored regions might benefit from greater focus on
environmental protection in project implementation. While such situations
are probably relatively rare, our approach allows us to assess whether BRI
projects in politically-favored regions are more or less likely to cause adverse
environmental impacts.

Data Sources: Chinese Investments,

Forest Loss, and Political Favoritism
We measured the environmental impacts of China’s overseas investments
using AidData’s Geocoded Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset.40
The dataset contains geocoded data on China’s global overseas finance
from 2000-2014, including 3,485 projects with total commitments in ex-
cess of $273 billion USD. A key advantage of the geocoded dataset is
the existence of verified coordinate data for a large subset of projects (we
discuss geographical precision in project location in our methodology
section below.)
This data also included a wide spectrum of projects, spanning invest-
ments in linear infrastructure to loans to national governments. Because

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we are interested in the environmental impact of these investments, we

restricted the focus of our analysis to those investment types that can be
precisely allocated spatially. For instance, a loan to a national government
ministry that is fungible and could be plausibly dispersed anywhere globally
would not be included in our analysis, nor would capital allocated to train-
ing programs or other non-physical infrastructure programs.
In our analyses, we only includes projects which have been coded with high
geospatial precision (codes 1 or 2), since we are focused on providing spatially
explicit analyses of impacts on forest cover. Following the approach of Yang
et al,41 we restrict our analyses to four types of investments: 1.) transport and
storage; 2.) energy generation and supply; 3.) agriculture, forestry, and fishing;
and 4.) industry, mining, and construction. After these restrictions for geo-
graphic precision and sectoral relevance, we were left with 764 unique project
locations. Figure 2 shows the location, sectoral composition, and total forest
loss associated with each of these types of projects. The top map shows each
project location and is separately colored for each of the four sectors. The bot-
tom map shows the total forest loss (in ha) within a 15km buffer around each
project location, with darker colors shading more severe forest losses.
We used forest loss to measure the environmental impacts of BRI projects.
Analyzing the impact on forest cover confers theoretical and empirical advan-
tages. From a theoretical perspective, while environmental impacts may take
many forms, forest cover represents a particularly important measure of the
tradeoffs between physical infrastructure and investments that can facilitate
growth, on one hand, and the conservation of natural resources, on the other.
Furthermore, forest loss represents a concern to the broadest array of physical,
capital-intensive projects China may be involved in, while other important
measures, such as air pollution, might only be plausibly associated with cer-
tain types of projects, such as power plants or manufacturing facilities.
Empirically, forest cover allows for much more precise spatial and tem-
poral measurement than most other environmental measures. It does not
rely on national administrative data, which might be adversely impacted by
political considerations,42 and which is particularly challenging to use for
large, multinational studies. Additionally, advances in remote sensing over
the past decade allow for satellite measurement of forest loss at high resolu-
tion across the entire globe, providing consistent and accurate measures of

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FIGURE 2: Project locations. Top map shows project locations colored

by each of the four broad sectors included in our analyses. Bottom map
shows total project-location losses (in ha) within a 15km buffer around
project location, with darker colors shading larger losses.

the forest cover change in the areas surrounding all of the Chinese overseas
projects in our data.
We specifically adapted measures of forest cover change following the ap-
proach of Hansen (2013).43 The updated version of the Global Forest Change
Data44 provides baseline forest cover measures (year 2000) and annual mea-
sures of forest cover/loss. Figure 3 helps to visualize these patterns of forest
loss over time. Each row shows before (left column) and after (right column)
for one project location from our data.
Our third main data source allows us to measure political favoritism,
using national leaders’ home regions as a proxy. To do so, we used the geo-
located nature of our China administrative data to code whether Chinese-

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FIGURE 3: Aerial images of forest cover before and after project

implementation. Each row shows before (left column) and after (right
column) images areas for three distinct projects from our data.

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financed projects fall within the home regions of current political leaders. To
measure the location of leaders’ homelands, we draw on a new global data-
base, the Political Leaders’ Affiliation Database (PLAD),45 of national politi-
cal leaders’ home regions for 177 countries spanning the period 1989–2018
Dreheretal2020. We use this data to code all subnational regions during
our study period as either affiliated or unaffiliated. Only projects initiated
in the leader’s home region during the period in which that leader is in of-
fice are considered affiliated (politically favored) projects, and all others are
considered unaffiliated (not politically favored). Using this straightforward
approach and geomatched data on forest cover change, we analyzed the ef-
fect of Chinese investments, comparing projects in affiliated and unaffiliated
regions to measure the effects of political favoritism.

Analyzing Political Favoritism and Deforestation Impacts

Because sites that receive Chinese-financed projects (any type of overseas in-
vestment) are very likely to be systematically different from other locations,
we only compared sites that have already been the destination for Chinese
projects with those that will be the destination for Chinese projects. This al-
lows us to first provide the initial assessment of the effects of Chinese projects
on forest cover—regardless of whether these projects are politically motivated.
The main goal of this first empirical assessment was to provide a baseline
estimate of deforestation around all Chinese projects, so that we could esti-
mate the differential deforestation be- tween politically connected and uncon-
nected projects against an appropriate baseline. We make no claims about the
relative size or significance of deforestation around Chinese projects generally,
such as whether these sites would have been developed regardless of Chinese
projects or whether other project developers would build projects leading to
comparable rates of deforestation.
In our first approach, the treated population consists of an area around
a flexible buffer in the years after a Chinese project has begun construction,
and the control population consists of all areas around the same-sized flex-
ible buffer in the years before the commencement of construction. Project
locations with zero forest cover in the year 2000 are removed, since it is not
possible for meaningful forest loss to occur in such situations. We adopted a

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 Meir Alkon

variable buffer, reporting de- forestation effects at sizes of 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15

km. In the second, primary stage of the analysis, we adopted a multi-period
difference-in-differences approach to measuring the causal effects of political
favoritism on deforestation.46
We first describe the effect of Chinese projects on deforestation to establish
baseline rates for all projects, regardless of whether these projects are subject
to political favoritism. The goal of this descriptive exercise is not to claim that
Chinese-financed projects cause more deforestation than other overseas inves-
tors (our data do not allow us to make such claims) nor to make any normative
statements about the developmental and ecological tradeoffs involved in these
projects, and whether they are net positive or negative. Our data do not allow
us to quantify these tradeoffs, and our goal is simply to quantify deforestation
losses associated with Chinese development projects, providing a baseline for all
future analyses focused on uncovering how different factors, such as political fa-
voritism, that may exacerbate overseas investments’ impacts on the environment.
Models summarized in Figure 4 provide estimates of the deforestation
losses around Chinese development projects, estimated against the losses sur-
rounding the same projects in the years immediately preceding construction.
These models provide estimates across all available years before and after proj-
ect construction. Taking the middle-sized buffer as an example, 9km buffer
zones around Chinese projects see, on average, increases in the rate of forest
loss of 8.6 hectares a year, which is approximately 16 percent larger than the
yearly forest-loss rate in the 9km buffer around these projects in the years be-
fore the construction of Chinese projects.
Next, in the primary analysis, we examined the deforestation effects of po-
litical favoritism. Our difference-in-difference approach allowed us to com-
pare Chinese projects that are politically connected to those that are not, fo-
cusing on the difference in the before and after deforestation rates between
politically connected projects and unconnected projects.
As seen in Figure 5 with the exception of the smallest buffer zone of 3km,
political favoritism substantially accelerates the deforestation rates of Chinese
development projects when compared to unfavored Chinese projects. For ex-
ample, for the 9KM buffer, politically favored Chinese projects see increases
in deforestation of over 15.5 hectares each year, an acceleration of deforesta-
tion 181 percent greater than the baseline rate of post-project deforestation.

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 China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability

FIGURE 4: Estimates of the effect of Chinese development projects

on deforestation losses. Models show point estimates and 95 percent
confidence intervals for different geographic buffers around BRI projects.
All models include year and project location fixed effects.

Baseline Estimates

15 km

12 km

9 km

6 km

3 km

0 10 20

Forest Loss (ha)

These effects are similarly large for 6, 12, and 15 KM buffer zones.

Political Favoritism and Deforestation:

Temporal Dynamics
How long does it take for the gap in deforestation rates to appear between
politically motivated projects and those that are not? To investigate the tem-
poral dynamics of deforestation, we re- estimated the difference-in-differences
specification summarized in Figure 5 above, but for each spatial buffer, we
estimated the effects of political favoritism on deforestation from 1–10 years
after project completion.
Figure 6 summarizes the results for each spatial buffer. While different for
each buffer, the models show that deforestation impacts become larger (and

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 Meir Alkon

FIGURE 5: Difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of political

favoritism on deforestation losses. Models show point estimates and 95
percent confidence intervals for different geographic buffers around BRI
projects. All models include year and project location fixed effects.

Effects of Political Favoritism?

15 km

12 km

9 km

6 km

3km

0 10 20 30 40

Forest Loss (ha)

more precisely estimated) several years after projects begin. This accords with
the fact that for most projects, construction will not be completed for several
years following. These effects stabilize approximately 5 years after project ef-
fective dates for most buffer sizes.
While this approach sheds light on when deforestation exacerbated by po-
litical favoritism is most likely to occur during a project’s lifespan, it does not
distinguish between the direct effects of project construction and the indirect
impacts of the project. As such, it is important to understand the treatment ef-
fect of political favoritism as a bundled effect. Distinguishing political favorit-
ism’s direct and indirect environmental effects calls for more project-specific
case studies.
Our findings show that political favoritism in project allocation—which is
both a demand and supply side factor—substantially accelerates deforestation.

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 China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability

FIGURE 6: Difference-in-difference analyses of the effect of project

favoritism with variable temporal lags. From top right, estimates at 3, 6, 9,
12, and 15 km spatial buffers of post-project effect of favoritism in years
1–10 post-project.

3 KM Spatial Buffer w/ Variable Temporal Effect 6 KM Spatial Buffer w/ Variable Temporal Effect

10 yr. effect 10 yr. effect

9 yr. effect 9 yr. effect
8 yr. effect 8 yr. effect
7 yr. effect 7 yr. effect
6 yr. effect 6 yr. effect
5 yr. effect 5 yr. effect
4 yr. effect 4 yr. effect
3 yr. effect 3 yr. effect
2 yr. effect 2 yr. effect
1 yr. effect 1 yr. effect
-4 -2 0 2 -10 -5 0 5 10
Forest Loss (ha) Forest Loss (ha)

9 KM Spatial Buffer w/ Variable Temporal Effect 12 KM Spatial Buffer w/ Variable Temporal Effect

10 yr. effect 10 yr. effect

9 yr. effect 9 yr. effect
8 yr. effect 8 yr. effect
7 yr. effect 7 yr. effect
6 yr. effect 6 yr. effect
5 yr. effect 5 yr. effect
4 yr. effect 4 yr. effect
3 yr. effect 3 yr. effect
2 yr. effect 2 yr. effect
1 yr. effect 1 yr. effect
-10 -5 0 5 10 -10 -5 0 5 10
Forest Loss (ha) Forest Loss (ha)

15 KM Spatial Buffer w/ Variable Temporal Effect

10 yr. effect
9 yr. effect
8 yr. effect
7 yr. effect
6 yr. effect
5 yr. effect
4 yr. effect
3 yr. effect
2 yr. effect
1 yr. effect
-10 -5 0 5 10
Forest Loss (ha)

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 Meir Alkon

This suggest the importance of continued efforts to foster transparency and

regulatory oversight in BRI projects. From the perspective of future research,
our findings point to the complementary potential of case study approaches
and multi-site, spatially-explicit analyses. Continuing to probe and analyze
the dynamics of the relationship between host country domestic politics and
China’s overseas finance will be crucial to better understanding and managing
the BRI’s global environmental impacts.

A Turning Tide?
Finally, I describe some preliminary findings on the public opinion dimen-
sion of overseas energy investments. In an ongoing project, together with Dr.
Jennifer Hadden of the University of Maryland, we are using multi-country
survey experiments to evaluate how the public thinks about energy infrastruc-
ture in the developing world—including how they think about China and
China’s role in building and financing this energy infrastructure. This work
is part of a promising push to understand the public opinion foundations of
China’s reception around the world.47
While this multi-country survey is still in the field, two findings of par-
ticular importance stand- out from our pilot data, which are summarized in
Figure 7. First, it is evident that across countries involved in the study—India,
Turkey, and South Africa—there is a widespread preference for energy infra-
structure projects powered by renewable fuels (solar and wind) and, to some
extent, by fossil gas, together with a strong aversion to coal-fired power. This is
consistent with increasing awareness of climate changes across the developing
world, dissatisfaction with air pollution, and a generally increasing conscious-
ness of environmental issues.
Second, respondents are much less likely to prefer energy infrastructure
projects built by Chinese developers. This holds across project types and is
a more important predictor of project preferences than a number of other
variables including the amount of electricity and the number of jobs gener-
ated. This suggests that China increasingly faces public opinion headwinds.
These headwinds could be problematic if they keep China from developing
much needed infrastructure projects, but may also provide needed pressure to
help increase accountability and high environ- mental standards in projects,

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 China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability

FIGURE 7: Project attributes effects on respondents’ preferences. Plots

show AMCEs from forced-choice conjoints of energy infrastructure projects.

Change in Project Preference

DESTINATION:
(Baseline = Another community)
Your community
DEVELOPER:
(Baseline = Domestic)
China
Germany
Japan
South Korea
The United States
ELECTRICITY:
(Baseline = Med. amount elec.)
Small amount elec.
V. large amount elec.
Proximity:
(Baseline = in your community)
In another community
TYPE:
(Baseline = Coal)
Gas
Solar
Wind

-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4

Change in Project Preference

367
 Meir Alkon

­ aximizing their economic impact and turning them into a force for good,
m
sustainable development.

Discussion and Policy Implications

The research findings presented here suggest a few important directions for
analysis of and policy responses to the BRI. Black-and-white characteriza-
tions of the BRI are harmful because they force host country governments
into a false dichotomy: protect the environment and the climate, or develop
and grow. Such a dichotomy is inconsistent with the reality and the impera-
tives of sustainable development, and serves neither of the (inseparable) goals.
The different empirical findings discussed above also point to some specific
policy implications.
First, reasons of overcapacity do not seem to be the dominant driver of
China’s overseas investments in coal-fired power. This echoes research high-
lighting how Beijing is not a unitary actor in foreign policy.48 For those en-
gaged in environmental advocacy, a focus on blaming Beijing for pushing
the construction of coal-fired power overseas may not be productive. There
are more varied reasons why coal-fired projects get built, and broad claims
about overcapacity miss the mark. Instead, a more nuanced policy advocacy
and mobilization effort—from the U.S. government and the international
environmental community writ large—should focus on understanding the
specific country contexts of individual projects, including the companies
and actors involved. Pin- pointing the potentially varied local drivers of
coal-fired projects built by Chinese companies in recipient countries would
better inform strategies to decrease local support for environmentally-
harmful projects and improve the provision of realistic, sustainable, and
carbon-conscious alternatives.
Second, what are the policy implications of deforestation being linked
more to political patronage? First, it is clear that activists, CSOs, and other en-
vironmental advocacy actors must broaden their critique from China’s BRI to
recipient countries. The allocation and siting of infrastructure projects may be
driven more often by the parochial interests of political elites in these recipient
countries who are seeking to extract rents or benefit their cronies, rather than
Beijing’s explicit preferences. At the same time, such critiques must recognize

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 China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability

the reality of development imperatives and the need for recipient country
governments to build and deliver high-quality infrastructure. Such political
and developmental imperatives means that these organizations’ critiques and
advocacy must be couched not in language universally opposed to the BRI,
but instead in language that recognizes the importance—and even the politi-
cal necessity—of BRI projects, while also building on findings about political
favoritism to push for increases in transparency, regulation, and enforcement
to ensure that de jure regulation is strengthened and that the de facto reali-
ties of policy implementation hew to these standards. This can help to reduce
problems of elite capture and political patronage that exacerbate environmen-
tally-destructive activities. By investing in standards and capacity, the U.S.
government and the international community can encourage environmen-
tally-sustainable policymaking in BRI countries without forgoing the positive
developmental effects of these infrastructure projects.
Third, our findings on the public opinion backlash to Chinese energy in-
frastructure projects, while preliminary, point to potentially serious impli-
cations for Beijing. Negative perceptions of the BRI are likely to hamstring
Beijing’s ability to use such initiative for geopolitical influence. In fact, many
countries have become more concerned over the environmental impacts of
Chinese-financed projects, and the corresponding political fallout for leaders
who support such projects. This is likely reflective of the wider implications
of negative public opinion for China. It also suggests that much of the angst
pervading Washington about the success of the BRI in wooing destination
countries may in fact be overblown.49 Additionally, U.S. policymakers and
environmental activists could work more closely with local civil society orga-
nizations and local governments in recipient countries to amplify grassroots-
level sentiments and ensure that these voices are heard as part of the project
planning and implementation processes in recipient countries.
Broadly, U.S. government agencies such as USAID, the State Department,
the EPA, the Department of Energy, and other relevant bureaucracies should
redouble efforts to build cooperative links to BRI recipient countries. These
links should focus on building host country institutional infrastructure and
bureaucratic capacity and to promote stakeholder engagement in BRI projects.
Creative efforts by the United States to capitalize on internal strengths—tech-
nical capacity and regulatory policy—can help inform how local ­communities

369
 Meir Alkon

as well as subnational and national governments work with Chinese firms—

by rejecting unsustainable projects, pushing for more consideration of sus-
tainability and climate change during project planning, and ensuring that
environ- mental rules and procedures as well as strengthened enforcement are
front-and-center in policies on the Belt and Road Initiative.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 Thanks to Jennifer Hadden and Hongbo Yang for permission to share data from ongoing
collaborative work, and thanks to Lucas Myers and Jennifer Turner for helpful comments.
2 Robin Brandt, “China Pledges to Stop Building New Coal Energy Plants Abroad,” BBC,
September 22, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58647481.
3 For an analysis of China’s state capitalism and its evolution in recent decades, see Margaret
Pearson, Meg Rithmire, and Kellee S Tsai, “Party-state Capitalism in China,” Current History
120: 827 (2021), 207–213.
4 See, e.g. Meir Alkon and Audrye Wong, “Authoritarian Energy Transitions Undermined?
Environmental Governance Cycles in China’s Power Sector,” Energy Research and Social
Science, 2020; Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010); Audrye Wong, “More Than
Peripheral: How Provinces Influence China’s Foreign Policy,” The China Quarterly 235
(2018), 735–757.
5 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the ’One Belt, One Road’
initiative,” China Leadership Monitor 47:3 (2015).
6 Fei Duan et al, “Energy Investment Risk Assessment for Nations along China’s Belt & Road
Initiative,” Journal of Cleaner Production 170 (2018), 535–547.
7 E.g. Meir Alkon et al., “Sustainability Implications of Coal-Fired Power Plants Financed
Through China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Energy Policy, 2019, Fernando Ascensão et al.,
“Environmental Challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative,” Nature Sustainability 1:5
(2018), 206–9; Alice C Hughes, “Understanding and Minimizing Environmental Impacts
of the Belt and Road Initiative,” Conservation Biology 33:4 (2019), 883–894; Li Shuen Ng
et al., “The Scale of Biodiversity Impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia,”
Biological Conservation 248 (2020), 108691; Cecilia Han Springer, Samuel G Evans, and Fei
Teng, “An Empirical Analysis of the Environmental Performance of China’s Overseas Coal
Plants,” Environmental Research Letters, 2021; H. Yang et al., “Risks to Global Biodiversity
and Indigenous Lands from China’s Overseas Development Finance,” Nature Ecology and
Evolution (under review), 2021.

370
 China’s Outward Investments and Global Sustainability

8 Michael Jakob et al., “The Future of Coal in a Carbon-Constrained Climate,” Nature Climate
Change 10:8 (2020), 704–707.
9 Arden Radford et al., “Open-Source Methods for Estimating Health Risks of Fine Particulate
Matter From Coal-Fired Power Plants: A Demonstration From Karachi, Pakistan,”
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 91 (2021), 106638; Alkon et al., “Sustainability
Implications of Coal-Fired Power Plants Financed Through China’s Belt and Road Initiative.”
10 For example, see https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/06/china-is-massively-betting-on-coal-
outside-its-shores–even- as-investment-falls-globally.html and https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2018/12/06/business/chinas-unbridled- export-coal-power-seen-imperiling-climate-goals/
11 For example, see http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/31/WS5b88e0d5a310add14f388e63.
html and https://www.scmp.com/business/global-economy/article/2141791/
rewards-outweigh-risks-chinese-firms-involved- belt-and-road
12 Meir Alkon and Erik H. Wang, “Pollution Lowers Support for China’s Regime: Quasi-
Experimental Evidence from Beijing,” The Journal of Politics 80:1 (2018), 327–331, https://
doi.org/10.1086/694577.
13 See e.g. Carbon Brief China Briefing, February 3, 2022, https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-
briefing-3-february- 2022-power-market-reform-energy-conserving-14fyp-scheme-xis-trip-to-
coal-province
14 Alkon and Wong, “Authoritarian Energy Transitions Undermined? Environmental
Governance Cycles in China’s Power Sector.”
15 Sarah Eaton and Genia Kostka, “Central Protectionism in China: The “Central SOE
Problem” in Environmental Governance,” The China Quarterly, 2017.
16 Elizabeth C Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018), 107.
17 Fredrich Kahrl, James H Williams, and Junfeng Hu, “The Political Economy of Electricity
Dispatch Reform in China,” Energy Policy 53 (2013), 361–369.
18 Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State.
19 See: http://english.gov.cn/news/photos/2016/03/12/content281475306113321.htm
20 See: http://fortune.com/2015/09/15/why-chinas-soe-reform-would-always-disappoint/
21 E.g. Denise van der Kamp, Peter Lorentzen, and Daniel Mattingly, “Racing to the Bottom
or to the Top? Decentralization, Revenue Pressures, and Governance Reform in China,”
World Development 95 (2017), 164–176; Sarah Eaton and Genia Kostka, “Authoritarian
Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time Horizons and Environmental Policy
Implementation in China,” The China Quarterly 218 (2014), 359–380.
22 Genia Kostka and Jonas Nahm, “Central–local Relations: Recentralization and
Environmental Governance in China,” The China Quarterly 231 (2017), 567–582.
23 Baogang He, “The Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road Initiative and its Implications,”
Journal of Contemporary China 28:116 (2019): 180–195; Min Ye, “Fragmentation and
Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China,” Journal of Contemporary
China, 2019, 1–16.
24 Morgan Hervé-Mignucci and Xueying Wang, “Slowing the Growth of Coal Power Outside
China: The Role of Chinese Finance,” Climate Policy Initiative, 2015.
25 Kevin P Gallagher et al., “Energizing Development Finance? The Benefits and Risks of China’s

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Development Finance in the Global Energy Sector,” Energy Policy 122 (2018), 313–321.
26 Baogang He, “The Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road Initiative and its Implications,”
Journal of Contemporary China 28:116 (2019), 180–195; Min Ye, “Fragmentation and
Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China,” Journal of Contemporary
China, 2019, 1–16.
27 More about the organization (https://globalenergymonitor.org/) and about coal plant tracker
methodology (https://endcoal.org/global-coal-plant-tracker/methodology/).
28 For an excellent overview of the factors behind grid expansion and change, see Yi-chong
Xu, Sinews of Power: The Politics of the State Grid Corporation of China (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017).
29 For example, see e.g. Audrye Wong, “Peddling or Persuading: China’s Economic Statecraft in
Australia,” Journal of East Asian Studies 21:2 (2021), 283–304.
30 Xingli Giam, “Global Biodiversity Loss from Tropical Deforestation,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 114:23 (2017), 5775–5777; RA Houghton, “Carbon Emissions
and the Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in the Tropics,” Current Opinion in
Environmental Sustainability 4:6 (2012). 597–603.
31 E.g. Madhusudan Bhattarai and Michael Hammig, “Institutions and the Environmental
Kuznets Curve for Deforestation: a Crosscountry Analysis for Latin America, Africa and
Asia,” World Development 29:6 (2001), 995–1010; Robin Burgess et al., “The Political
Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127:4 (2012),
1707–1754; Alexandra Marques, “Distant Drivers of Deforestation,” Nature Ecology &
Evolution, 2021, 1–2.
32 Ariel BenYishay et al., “Forest Cover Impacts of Chinese Development Projects in
Ecologically Sensitive Areas,” AidData Working Paper 32, 2016.
33 For example, see https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/china-is-changing-
serbia-from-the-inside/ and https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/03/
chinese-business-in-central-asia-how-crony-capitalism-is-eroding-justice/
34 Ann-Sofie Isaksson and Andreas Kotsadam, “Chinese Aid and Local Corruption,” Journal of
Public Economics 159 (2018), 146–159; Wong, “Peddling or Persuading: China’s Economic
Statecraft in Australia.”
35 For example, David M Lampton, Selina Ho, and Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Rivers of Iron:
Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (Oakland: University of California Press,
2020); For the case of Pakistan, see: https://www.gmfus.org/publications/returning-
shadows-china-pakistan-and-fate-cpec, or in the case of Sri Lanka: ttps://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/
36 Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis, “Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing
Countries: Following Jean- Jacques Laffont’s Lead,” Journal of Economic Literature 47:3
(2009), 729–70; Nita Rudra, Meir Alkon, and Siddharth Joshi, “FDI, Poverty, and the
Politics of Potable Water Access,” Economics & Politics 30:3 (2018), 366–393.
37 For detailed accounts of the decision-making around BRI projects, see Thomas Hale, Chuyu
Liu, and Johannes Urpelainen, “Belt and Road Decision-Making in China and Recipient
Countries: How and To What Extent Does Sustainability Matter?,” ISEP, BSG, and
ClimateWorks Foundation Report, 2020.

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38 Thushyanthan Baskaran, Brian Min, and Yogesh Uppal, “Election Cycles and Electricity
Provision: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment with Indian Special Elections,” Journal of
Public Economics 126 (2015), 64–73; Alexander Fouirnaies and Hande Mutlu-Eren, “English
Bacon: Copartisan Bias in Intergovernmental Grant Allocation in England,” Journal of
Politics 77:3 (2015), 805–817; Albert Solé-Ollé and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, “The Effects
of Partisan Alignment on the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. Differences-in-
differences Estimates for Spain,” Journal of Public Economics 92:12 (2008), 2302–2319.
39 Axel Dreher et al., “African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance,”
Journal of Development Economics 140 (2019), 44–71.
40 Research and Evaluation Unit at AidData, “Geocoding Methodology, Version 2.0,” AidData
at William and Mary, 2017; Richard Bluhm et al., “Connective Financing: Chinese
Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing Countries,”
AidData Working Paper 64, 2018.
41 Yang et al., “Risks to Global Biodiversity and Indigenous Lands from China’s Overseas
Development Finance.”
42 For example, Jeremy L Wallace, “Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in
China,” British Journal of Political Science, 2014, 1–19.
43 Matthew C Hansen et al., “High-resolution Global Maps of 21st-century Forest Cover
Change,” Science 342:6160 (2013), 850–853.
44 Metadata and public download available here: https://earthenginepartners.appspot.com/
science-2013-global- forest/downloadv 1.7.html
45 The PLAD is available for public download from Harvard’s Dataverse here: https://dataverse.
harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/YUS575
46 Alberto Abadie, “Semiparametric Difference-in-differences Estimators,” The Review of
Economic Studies 72:1 (2005), 1–19; Andrew Goodman-Bacon, “Difference-in-differences
with Variation in Treatment Timing,” Journal of Econometrics 225 (2021), 254–277.
47 For example, Weiyi Shi and Brigitte Seim, “A Reputation Deficit? The Myths and Reality of
Chinese Investment in Zambia,” Journal of East Asian Studies 21:2 (2021), 259–282.
48 Wong, “More Than Peripheral: How Provinces Influence China’s Foreign Policy.”
49 Audrye Wong, “How Not to Win Allies and Influence Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs,
May/June 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-04-20/
how-not-win-allies-and-influence-geopolitics

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

The Impact of China’s

Trade Policies on Global
Development: Agriculture
and Fisheries Subsidies
Kristen Hopewell is the Canada Research Chair in Global Policy in
the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British
Columbia and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Kristen Hopewell

Abstract
China’s trade practices have come under heightened scrutiny in the context of
the ongoing U.S.-China trade war. Amid an intense focus on trade relations
between the United States and China, however, the wider global effects of
China’s trade policies have been largely ignored. Attention has overwhelm-
ingly focused on China’s subsidies and other policies to promote the expan-
sion of its advanced manufacturing and high-tech industries, which pose a
competitive threat to the United States and other advanced economies. Yet
China is also making use of trade policies in other sectors—such as agricul-
ture and fisheries—that are of significant concern to developing countries.
Over the last decade, China has emerged as the world’s largest subsidizer of
both agriculture and fisheries. Since many developing countries depend heav-
ily on these sectors for exports, incomes, and food security, China’s policies
have profound global implications. In this paper, I show that China’s trade
policies, particularly in the areas of agriculture and fisheries, are proving in-
creasingly harmful for other developing countries. Moreover, China has been
blocking efforts to establish new and stronger rules restricting the use of such
subsidies at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Implications and Key Takeaways

● U.S. policymakers should work to broaden the debate about China’s
subsidies to include greater focus on the interests and concerns of
developing countries. China is now the world’s largest subsidizer of both
agriculture and fisheries, and the harmful impacts of its subsidies are felt
most keenly by other developing countries.

● China’s efforts to claim special and differential treatment (SDT) in

WTO negotiations are increasingly problematic due to the effects of its
trade policies on the rest of the developing world. While China frequently
claims to be acting as a champion of the developing world in WTO
negotiations, its insistence on a blanket right to SDT for all developing
countries is actually hindering efforts to promote global development.
China must take greater responsibility for the effects of its trade policies
on the rest of the Global South, including being willing to accept

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 The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global Development

disciplines in areas where its trade policies have negative spillover effects
for other developing countries.

● Developing countries need support from more powerful states in their

efforts to secure new and stronger WTO rules to reign in harmful
agricultural and fisheries subsidies. The U.S. government can play an
important role in this by working with developing countries to increase the
pressure on China to reform its subsidies, as well as by showing willingness
to reform its own trade-distorting subsidies in areas such as agriculture.

● The United States must take a strong stand against the weaponization of
trade and the use of economic coercion. It should condemn China’s trade
aggression and show solidarity with countries that have been victimized
by such actions. It should commit to not use such measures itself and
work—whether via the WTO or other channels—to develop new
mechanisms and disciplines to counter economic coercion and prevent
the abuse of power by powerful states in the trading system.

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 Kristen Hopewell

Introduction: China’s Other Subsidies

While China’s trade policies have come under scrutiny in the context of the
ongoing U.S.-China trade war, the wider effects of China’s trade policies have
been largely overlooked. To date, the debate about China’s trading practices
has been driven primarily by the United States and other advanced-industrial-
ized states, such as the EU and Japan. These countries have complained about
China’s use of state subsidies and other unfair trading practices to give its firms
and industries a competitive advantage in global markets and tilt the playing
field in their favor. Attention has overwhelmingly focused on the policies that
China is using to promote the expansion of its manufacturing and high-tech
industries, including heavy subsidies, forced technology transfer, and intellec-
tual property violations. In these sectors, China’s policies pose a serious com-
petitive threat to the United States and other advanced economies.
What has been widely neglected, however, is the fact that China is also
making use of highly trade-distorting policies in sectors that are of signifi-
cant concern to developing countries. Although China is primarily seen as a
manufacturing powerhouse, it has also emerged as a major power in global
agriculture markets and the world’s dominant fishing power. Over the last de-
cade, China has become the world’s largest subsidizer of both agriculture and
fisheries. Since many developing countries depend heavily on these sectors for
exports, incomes, and food security, China’s policies have profound implica-
tions for the developing world.
China has sought to portray itself as a champion of global development,
pursuing a “win-win” form of economic globalization that benefits all coun-
tries. Yet, in fact, China’s trade policies are exacerbating hardship in some of
the world’s poorest countries. Moreover, Beijing has repeatedly undermined
efforts to construct new global trade rules at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) on agriculture and fisheries that are of crucial importance to much of
the developing world.

The Battle over Special and Differential

Treatment for China at the WTO
The issue of how China should be treated under global trade rules has be-
come a central source of conflict in the multilateral trading system. A core

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 The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global Development

principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is that developing coun-

tries should be granted “special and differential treatment” (SDT)—that is,
provided with various exemptions and exceptions from WTO rules and al-
lowed greater scope to use tariffs, subsidies and other trade measures to pro-
mote their economic development. SDT is seen as an important means for
the WTO to address the needs of developing countries and aid in fostering
global development.
There is no established criteria for determining what constitutes a “de-
veloping country” at the WTO. Instead, states are allowed to self-designate
as developing countries in order to access SDT. China insists that, as a de-
veloping country, it should have access to SDT and be entitled to the same
exemptions and exceptions as other developing countries. Yet the issue of ex-
tending SDT to China has become increasingly controversial as its economic
weight has grown. The United States and other advanced-industrialized states
strongly object to providing special treatment to a major economic competi-
tor. Instead, they argue that China must take on greater responsibility com-
mensurate with its role as the world’s largest trader and second largest econ-
omy—meaning that it undertake greater commitments to open its market
and accept disciplines on its use of subsidies.
While to date the fight over SDT for China has been primarily driven by
the United States and other advanced economies, as analysis of its agricultural
and fisheries subsidies shows, allowing China to access SDT is increasingly
problematic due to the harmful effects of its trade policies on other developing
countries. Although China remains a developing country—with per capita in-
comes less than one-fifth those of the United States, for example1—the size of
its economy is now of such a magnitude that its trade policies have profound
global implications.
Beijing claims to be acting on behalf of the developing world in seeking to
defend the right to SDT. China insists that SDT is a “fundamental” and “un-
conditional right” of all developing countries that must be “fully preserved…
for all members,” identifying this as a “redline” on which it is unwilling to
budge.2 However, since China is now the largest provider of agricultural and
fisheries subsidies, exempting it from trade disciplines via SDT threatens to
jeopardize efforts to achieve crucial global development and environmental
objectives. By refusing to accept disciplines on its subsidies in areas such as

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agriculture and fisheries, China is blocking reforms of the trading system that
are crucial to the interests of other developing countries.

China’s Farm Subsidy Boom

Agricultural subsidies are widely seen as a symbol of the injustice in the global
trading system.3 Subsidies provided by richer countries give their farmers an
unfair advantage in global markets, while also artificially depressing global
prices. The result is a double whammy that undermines the livelihoods of
millions of poor farmers in the developing world, who face heavily subsidized
competition along with lower prices for the commodities they produce.4 There
is widespread consensus that reducing global agricultural subsidies would in-
crease incomes and reduce poverty in developing countries.5
Historically, the vast majority of subsidies were provided by developed
countries like the United States, EU, and Japan, while developing countries
generally lacked the resources to subsidize their farmers.6 However, as China
has grown richer, its agricultural support has risen dramatically, such that
it is now the world’s biggest subsidizer.7 The Chinese government provides
over $200 billion in subsidies and other forms of trade-distorting support to
its farmers annually, considerably more than the EU ($100 billion), United
States ($33 billion), or any other country.8
The effects of China’s trade policies are compounded by the fact that it is
now a major agro-power: China is the world’s largest agricultural producer and
consumer, and fourth largest exporter.9 Although the goods it subsidizes are pri-
marily sold in the domestic market rather than exported, due to the scale of its
subsidies and because China is such a large import market, its policies have sig-
nificant implications for global markets and trade. China’s subsidies increase its
domestic agricultural production, which displaces imports from its market and
lowers global prices, causing farm incomes in other countries to fall.10
Beijing claims that its farm subsidies are intended to foster rural develop-
ment and reduce inequality. Despite China’s manufacturing boom and the
rapid growth of its cities, nearly 40 percent of the country’s population re-
mains rural and a quarter of its workforce is employed in agriculture.11 China’s
urban-rural income gap is among the largest in the world, with average urban
incomes three times higher than those in rural areas.12 The Communist Party

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fears that these high levels of inequality could be politically destabilizing and
threaten its grip on power.
If Beijing wants to support its rural population and boosting incomes, there
are alternative policy tools that could be used to achieve those goals without
the harmful spillover effects that its current policies have for other developing
countries.13 These include providing direct income payments to farmers that
are delinked from production, as well as investing in rural health care, educa-
tion, and social security.
But one of the primary objectives of China’s subsidies is to boost its do-
mestic agricultural production.14 The government has established targets for
achieving self-sufficiency in “strategic commodities,” including food staples.15
Its goal is to reduce reliance on imports, which it views as a potential source of
vulnerability. Trade distortion is therefore not an accidental effect of China’s
subsidies but in fact their central purpose.
This runs counter to the trend in most countries. In most advanced-indus-
trialized states, agricultural subsidies have fallen steadily over the past two
decades, and these countries have also reformed their farm support programs
to make them significantly less trade distorting, reducing the harmful spill-
over effects for farmers elsewhere.16 China’s subsidies, however, are specifically
designed to encourage its farmers to increase production—including govern-
ment purchases of crops at subsidized prices, direct payments based on pro-
duction, and input subsidies—and are therefore highly trade distorting.17
While Beijing claims that its subsidies are meant to benefit peasant farm-
ers, most of the country’s agricultural production is now under the control of
“dragon head” enterprises—large, domestic agribusiness companies.18 Given
the design of China’s subsidies, which are linked to production volumes, the
benefits flow primarily to China’s booming agribusiness industry rather than
struggling peasant farmers.
At the WTO, Chinese officials routinely argue that its subsidies are “mor-
ally different” from those of the United States or EU because it is a develop-
ing country.19 In reality, however, it does not matter where the subsidies origi-
nate—whether China or a developed country—the impact on global markets
or poor farmers in the developing world is the same. Both the Chinese market
and its subsidies have reached such a large scale that its policies have a signifi-
cant impact on the rest of the world.

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Agriculture is a key economic sector for many developing countries—their

biggest employer and a major source of exports. Reducing global agricultural
subsidies is accordingly a pressing concern for much of the developing world and
seen as a critical means to improve welfare and livelihoods. There is no question
that subsidies provided by the United States, EU, and other developed countries
remain part of the problem. Indeed, U.S. agricultural subsidies increased signifi-
cantly under the Trump administration.20 However, the source of the agricul-
tural subsidy problem—and thus its solution—no longer rests solely with rich
countries like the United States and EU. Any effort to reign in global agricul-
tural subsidies needs to include China, as the world’s largest subsidizer.
Since the Doha Round breakdown in 2011, WTO members have been
seeking to negotiate a standalone agreement to reduce global agricultural sub-
sidies. Notably, the traditional big subsidizers, including the United States,
all indicated their willingness to significantly reduce their subsidies.21 Yet the
negotiations have reached an impasse over China’s subsidies. Insisting on its
right to SDT as a developing country, China argues that it should be exempt
from any new subsidy rules or requirements to cut its subsidies. The Chinese
government has refused to accept any new disciplines on its agricultural sub-
sidies at the WTO. Beijing is seeking to maximize its policy flexibility, not
only to maintain its current subsidies but even to increase them in future. The
resulting failure to conclude a WTO agreement to reign in global agricultural
subsidies is a major blow for developing countries.

The New Goliath in the Fight over Cotton Subsidies

Cotton provides a striking illustration of how China’s trade policies are af-
fecting some of the world’s poorest farmers. A diverse range of actors—from
development NGOs like Oxfam and Action Aid to the World Bank—have
highlighted the harmful effects of cotton subsidies for millions of poor farm-
ers in the developing world and called for stricter global WTO rules to elimi-
nate such subsidies.22
The global campaign to reduce cotton subsidies has frequently been charac-
terized as a David-and-Goliath-like struggle, with some of the world’s poorest
countries seeking to bring greater justice to the trading system. The United
States—historically the world’s biggest cotton subsidizer—was once seen as

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 The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global Development

FIGURE 1: Annual Cotton Subsidies

(US$ million)
6,000

4,000

2,000

0
ina

EU

dia

so

ire

ali

bia

il
A

ga
rke

az
US

Fa

M
Ivo
In

lom

ne
Ch

Br
Tu

na

D’

Se
Co
rki

te
Bu

Co

Source: Data from ICAC 2016.

Note: Subsidies provided by some countries are too small to be visible.

the chief culprit.23 But in recent years, China has surpassed the United States
as the world’s largest cotton subsidizer (Figure 1). Over the past decade, China
provided $41 billion in cotton subsidies—nearly six times more than the $7
billion provided by the United States. China alone now accounts for nearly
three-quarters of all global cotton subsidies.24
Cotton is of crucial importance to the Cotton-4 (C-4) group of West
African cotton producers (Mali, Chad, Benin, and Burkina Faso), as well as
many other developing and least-developed countries in Africa and through-
out the world.25 These countries depend heavily on cotton exports for employ-
ment, government revenue and foreign exchange. Cotton is one of the most
important export crops in sub-Saharan Africa, with some 15 million people
directly dependent on it for their livelihoods.26 Burkina Faso, for instance,
which has an average income of just $790 per year, relies on cotton for 59 per-
cent of its export revenues.27
While African cotton producers are among the world’s most competitive,
the subsidies provided by other countries leave them struggling to compete in

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global markets.28 If global cotton subsidies were eliminated to create a level

playing field, there would be a significant shift in cotton production to African
countries, whose farmers would benefit from higher prices and incomes.
Today the world cotton market revolves around China, as the site of over
half the world’s textile production.29 Given its extraordinary market power,
this means that cotton farmers around the world are at the mercy of Chinese
government policy.
China is a relatively inefficient cotton producer—like the United States,
its production costs are roughly four times those of some African countries.30
Yet subsidies and other trade-distorting policies have made China one of the
world’s biggest cotton producers. China’s subsidies artificially increase its
own cotton production, displacing imports and driving down global prices,
thereby reducing the incomes of farmers elsewhere around the world.
Besides subsidies, China also uses tariffs as high as 40 percent to restrict
cotton imports.31 Given the size of its market, if Beijing were to allow cotton
from least-developed countries (LDCs) to enter its market duty free, it would
provide a significant boost to African cotton producers. However, while the
Chinese government has offered some Duty-Free Quota-Free (DFQF) market
access to LDCs, it excluded many of their most important exports, including
cotton.32 When asked by LDCs at the WTO to expand its DFQF access to
cover cotton, the Chinese government refused.
China’s heavy subsidies and import barriers cause significant hardship to
poorer and weaker countries. While China remains a developing country, it
is vastly richer than the C-4 countries, for example, with a per capita GDP of
over $10,000 compared to an average of just $900 among the C-4.33
As with its other agricultural subsidies, Beijing claims that its cotton sub-
sidies are intended to support peasant farmers and boost rural incomes. In
reality, however, China’s cotton subsidies are driven by political and strate-
gic motives, and specifically directed at encouraging cotton production in the
northwestern region of Xinjiang. More than 85 percent of China’s cotton pro-
duction is located in Xinjiang, dominated by large, government-owned or op-
erated cotton farms.34 Most cotton there is grown by the Xinjiang Production
and Construction Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary agro-industrial conglomer-
ate established to pacify and “Sinicize” the region, which is home to China’s
Muslim Uighur minority.

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 The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global Development

Appropriating land and water from the local Uighur population, the
XPCC employs and resettles Han Chinese workers brought in from other
parts of the country.35 The XPCC controls vast tracts of land and has played a
central role in Beijing’s strategy for asserting its dominance over the territory
and the Uighur population, over 1 million of whom have been imprisoned in
mass internment camps. The XPCC has been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury
Department for severe human rights violations and abuses, including using
forced prison labor to work in the cotton fields and throughout the cotton
and apparel supply chains in Xinjiang.
Farms operating under the umbrella of the XPCC account for about a
third of all cotton grown in China.36 Targeted towards Xinjiang and entities
like the XPCC, China’s cotton subsidies are part of the government’s efforts
to exert internal control over the region, which also has strategic significance
as an important hub of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, creating trade and
infrastructure links to Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
The C-4 and other African countries have advocated for an agreement at
the WTO to eliminate harmful cotton subsidies. But Beijing has refused to
accept disciplines on its subsidies, identifying this as a “red line” on which it is
unwilling to budge. Remarkably, the Chinese government continues to insist
that all blame for the cotton problem lies solely with the United States, and
that as a developing country it is on the same side as the African countries and
LDCs in fighting against the United States and other developed countries.
American subsidies certainly remain part of the problem. Yet since U.S.
subsidies are now dwarfed by those of China, it is no longer enough simply to
go after U.S. subsidies. China has become the primary source of the cotton
problem, but it has thwarted efforts to secure a WTO cotton agreement by
resisting any restrictions on its subsidies. Its unwillingness to participate in
global subsidy reform efforts makes a meaningful agreement on cotton im-
possible. Like the broader negotiations on agricultural subsidies, the cotton
negotiations have also become paralyzed.

The Dragon in the World’s Oceans

China’s subsidies for its fishing industry are proving similarly harmful to
other developing countries. Subsidies have fueled a global fisheries crisis by

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contributing to overcapacity and overfishing (“too many vessels chasing too

few fish”) leading to the decimation of global fish stocks.37 According to the
UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 90 percent of global fish stocks are
already fully exploited and nearly a third are being fished at a biologically un-
sustainable level.38
Not all subsidies are environmentally harmful. In fact, some are environ-
mentally-beneficial, such as subsidies that support conservation, fisheries man-
agement, R&D, and investments in fisheries resources. The problem, however,
lies with subsidies that reduce the cost of fishing and related activities, such
as subsidies for vessel construction and fuel. Known as “capacity-enhancing”
subsidies, these subsidies contribute to the build-up of excess capacity in the
world’s fishing industry, create incentives to overfish and lead to the overex-
ploitation of fish stocks.
Capacity-enhancing subsidies allow fishing fleets to broaden and inten-
sify their operations, including building and operating larger boats that can
travel greater distances and remain at sea for longer periods, in order to fish
in the high seas or in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other states.39
Estimates suggest that more than half of current fishing activity in the high
seas would not exist without such subsidies.40 Subsidy-driven overcapacity has
also resulted in high rates of illegal fishing by foreign fleets, which affects de-
veloping countries most heavily due to a lack of enforcement capacity.41
Overfishing severely damages fragile marine ecosystems and undermines
the sustainability of global fisheries. Moreover, many coastal and island de-
veloping countries depend heavily on fisheries for food security, employment
and livelihoods, making them especially vulnerable to plummeting fish har-
vests.42 Subsidies enable countries with large industrial fishing fleets to exploit
resources far beyond their own waters at the expense of local fishing commu-
nities, and for many communities, the effects of competition from heavily sub-
sidized foreign fishing fleets have been devastating.43
Developed countries like the EU and Japan were once considered the worst
offenders.44 But China now dominates the global fishing industry. Driven by
heavy subsidies, China has developed the world’s largest industrial fishing
fleet, making it the largest fisheries producer and exporter.45 And like agri-
culture and cotton, China is now the world’s largest subsidizer of fisheries by
far (Figure 2). China alone accounts for more than 20 percent of all harmful

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FIGURE 2: Largest providers of harmful fisheries subsidies

(US$ billion)
6

0
ina

EU

ea

US

an

sia

ay
ssi

an
pa

rw
or

iw

ne
Ch

Ru
Ja

ail
hK

No
Ta

do
Th
ut

In
So

Source: Data from Sumaila et al. 2019.

fisheries subsidies globally. It spends more than $6 billion annually on such

subsidies, nearly three times more than the next largest subsidizer, the EU.46
The growth of China’s fishing industry was initially driven primarily by
fishing in its own territorial waters, with the government providing substantial
support to fishing communities and companies to expand and intensify their
activities.47 But subsidies led to excess capacity and overfishing, with the result
that by the late 1990s, most of China’s own fish stocks were heavily depleted.
In response, Chinese policy shifted towards efforts to conserve and restore its
fishery resources in its own domestic waters, including strictly restricting fish-
ing. But eager to maintain employment in fishing and processing, the Chinese
government shifted to providing heavy subsidies—for fuel, shipbuilding and
processing—to enable its fleet to expand into international waters.48
China’s heavily-subsidized fleet now accounts for an astounding 42 per-
cent of global fishing activity—outstripping the next 10 biggest countries
combined.49 China has nearly 17,000 vessels engaged in distant water fish-
ing—to put this in perspective, the United States, which is the world’s third
largest fishing country, has only 225 of such vessels.50

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Most of China’s distant water fishing activity would be unprofitable with-

out subsidies.51
Fuel subsidies enable China’s fleet to cheaply travel vast distances and,
with refueling at sea, remain at sea for long periods of time—some boats for
as much as two years. Propelled by subsidies, China’s fleet has expanded far
beyond its own territorial waters, operating intensively off the coasts of West
Africa, Central and South America, and the Pacific Islands.52
The same dynamics of overcapacity present in other Chinese sectors, such
as steel and construction, are evident in the fishing industry. Subsidies have
led to massive overcapacity in China’s fishing sector, and China is now effec-
tively seeking to “export” its overcapacity by providing subsidies to support
intensive fishing operations far from its own shores. In the fisheries sector,
however, China’s response to overcapacity has put immense pressure on fragile
marine ecosystems, threatening the sustainability of global fisheries resources
upon which large parts of the world’s population depend.
The impact has been devastating for many coastal and island developing
countries, where small-scale fishers are being squeezed out of their livelihoods.
China’s industrial fishing fleet now dominates in the waters off West Africa, for
instance.53 While the region has some of the world’s richest fishing grounds, its
fish stocks are rapidly being depleted by industrial trawlers. Locals fishing from
hand-hewn canoes are competing against Chinese “mega-trawlers” with mile-
long nets that sweep up everything from seabed to surface. Declining fish stocks
have caused the incomes of local fishers to plummet and reduced domestic food
supply—in countries with already high rates of hunger and food insecurity.
Chinese overfishing has been similarly documented in the world’s other major
fishing regions, along with evidence of considerable illegal fishing.54
China’s fisheries subsidies serve both economic and geopolitical objectives.
Beijing has identified this as a strategic industry and made the continued ex-
pansion of its distant water fishery a key national policy goal.55 Regionally, the
Chinese government is using its subsidized fleet to bolster its maritime claims
in the East and South China Seas, with subsidies enabling China’s “fishing
militia” to purchase bigger boats and travel further into disputed territory,
such as the Spratly, Paracel, and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.56 China’s fishing
militia has, for example, driven thousands of Filipino fishers away from the
rich fishing grounds surrounding the Spratly Islands.

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 The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global Development

Globally, China’s subsidies are intended to support its goal of becoming a

“Great Ocean Power,” by encouraging the aggressive outward expansion of its
industrial fishing fleet across the world’s oceans. This has included providing
hefty subsidies to further expand its distant water fishing operations, includ-
ing for building, modernizing and upgrading vessels to further increase the
overall capacity of its fleet; constructing overseas fishing “bases,” which pro-
vide port, processing and logistics facilities for its fishing fleet; and increasing
exploration and exploitation of previously untapped fisheries resources, such
as in ecologically-fragile Antarctica.57
While others, including the EU, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Russia,
undoubtedly share responsibility for the current global fisheries crisis as a re-
sult of their subsidies and overfishing, China is now by far the biggest source
of the problem due to the sheer size and scope of its global fishing operations.
Meanwhile, it is developing and less-developed countries that are most vulner-
able to the collapse of global fish stocks.
In recent years, developing countries have led efforts to secure a WTO
agreement to curb harmful fisheries subsidies. The 2015 UN Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) identified such an agreement as an urgent in-
ternational priority. The goal is to achieve a “triple win”—an outcome that
is positive for trade, development and the environment. However, while the
UN SDGs set a deadline to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2020,
that deadline passed without agreement. WTO negotiators are now seeking
to reach a global fisheries agreement by the next WTO Ministerial Meeting
in June 2022. As one of the sole active areas of multilateral negotiations at the
WTO, achieving a successful agreement is seen as essential to demonstrating
the institution’s continued relevance.
Yet here too, as in the agriculture and cotton negotiations, China has re-
peatedly sought to undermine and evade restrictions on its ability to subsi-
dize its fishing industry, insisting on its right to SDT as a developing country.
The broadly accepted rationale for SDT is to ensure that poor countries can
provide support to vulnerable populations dependent on small-scale, subsis-
tence-based fisheries, which have minimal environmental impact compared
to industrial fishing fleets. Although China remains a developing country,
given the size and reach of its fishing fleet, allowing it to exempt its subsidies
via SDT would severely undermine the efficacy of any new rules intended

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to discipline harmful fish subsidies and conserve global fish stocks. A mean-
ingful and ambitious fisheries agreement is simply not possible without the
participation of the world’s largest subsidizer—China.

Fear of Retaliation Inhibits Criticism

China’s agriculture and fisheries subsidies are contributing to the immisera-
tion of farmers and fishers in poorer countries. Yet many of these countries
are highly reluctant to challenge China or call out its trading practices. China
is now the largest export market for many developing countries, as well as a
major source of foreign aid and investment. Given their growing dependence
on China, there is widespread fear that antagonizing Beijing by criticizing its
trading practices could provoke retaliation.
These apprehensions are well founded. As its economic weight has grown,
the Chinese government has increasingly used trade as an instrument of eco-
nomic coercion against other states. Beijing recently blocked imports from
Australia, for example, in retaliation for its calls for an independent inquiry
into the origins of the Covid-19 outbreak as well as Canberra’s complaints
about Chinese Communist Party interference in Australia’s domestic politics.
As Australia’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly 40 percent of the
country’s exports, Beijing’s import curbs—covering a lengthy list of agricul-
tural and mining products—were intended to inflict maximum economic
pain across Australia’s key export industries.
Likewise, China recently blocked imports from Canada—and arbitrarily
imprisoned two Canadians—in retaliation for its participation in the ex-
tradition of a Huawei executive facing fraud charges in the United States.
Targeting Canada’s major agricultural exports, including pork, beef, soy-
beans and canola, the restrictions cost the country an estimated $4 billion
in lost exports.58
If even middle powers like Canada and Australia—which are close allies
of the United States and among the world’s largest economies—are being tar-
geted with punitive economic measures for running afoul of Beijing, it is no
surprise that smaller and more vulnerable countries are afraid to speak out
against China’s trade policies. And these are far from isolated incidents. To
date, Beijing has used the threat and imposition of trade restrictions to punish

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over a dozen countries for various perceived affronts, including Japan, South
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the Philippines, Taiwan, Mongolia,
and the United Kingdom. Such measures are in blatant violation of the rules
and principles of the WTO, but those rules are proving increasingly inade-
quate to address China’s trading practices.
While developing country officials and trade negotiators are frank in
expressing their concerns about China’s trade policies behind closed doors,
they are highly reluctant to voice these concerns publicly. As one WTO de-
veloping country negotiator summarized: “There’s only one country here
that criticizes China and that’s the United States. The smaller you get, the
more polite you are to China.”59 The United States is vocal in its complaints
about China’s trade policies and their effects on American workers, firms
and industries. But that freedom to criticize China’s practices is rapidly be-
coming a privilege reserved solely for powerful states like the United States.
Those who lack its economic and political might are increasingly forced to
suffer in silence.
Developing countries have little fear of confronting other major pow-
ers like the United States or EU—liberal democracies where public debate
and scrutiny of government policy are the norm. Indeed, developing coun-
tries have a long history of being highly vocal in calling out the hypocrisy
of those states’ unfair trade policies. Yet those same developing countries
are hesitant to be seen as criticizing China, an authoritarian regime that is
increasingly trying to suppress debate about its policies both domestically
and internationally. Consequently, at the WTO, developing countries have
typically voiced concerns about China’s subsidies and other trade policies
only obliquely. For example, states will decry the effects of agriculture and
fisheries subsidies without specifying who exactly is providing those subsi-
dies, or insist that “big subsidizers” need to reduce their subsidies, without
naming China directly.
As a result, a frank and inclusive debate about the effects of China’s trade
policies has been missing—even at the WTO, an institution whose explicit
purpose is to provide a forum to scrutinize and monitor the trade policies of
states. As long as weaker countries fear reprisals from the Chinese govern-
ment, an open debate about its trade policies is impossible.

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Conclusion: How to Make Trade a True Win-Win

Amid the U.S. assault on the rules-based multilateral trading system that began
under President Trump, the Chinese government has sought to portray itself
as an emerging new defender of globalization and free trade. At the same time,
Beijing has sought to portray itself as a beneficent leader of efforts to combat
global poverty and foster development, dispensing large volumes of investment
through the Belt and Road Initiative and other channels, while claiming to rep-
resent the interests of the developing world in international institutions like the
WTO. These claims are deeply undermined, however, by the harmful effects
that China’s trade policies are having on other developing countries.
With debate about China’s trade policies dominated by the world’s rich-
est and most powerful economies, the voices of developing country have been
largely absent. Yet that does not mean China’s policies are not affecting such
countries. On the contrary, in agriculture and fisheries, the harmful effects
of China’s trade policies are felt most acutely by other developing countries.
Given its enormous market power, as well as the massive volume of subsidies
that it is providing, China’s trade policies have major consequences for global
development.
To be clear, this is not to let the United States and other developed coun-
tries off the hook. But the damaging effects of agricultural and fisheries subsi-
dies for global development can no longer be addressed solely by tackling the
policies of rich countries like the United States, EU, and Japan. As the world’s
largest subsidizer, efforts to reform global subsidies need to include China.
The Chinese government frequently claims to be acting in solidarity with
developing countries to challenge the injustices of the global trading system.
In actual fact, however, it is Beijing’s trade policies that are increasingly be-
coming the biggest threat to other developing countries. In areas like agricul-
ture and fisheries, China’s insistence on its right to SDT is hindering global
development efforts, as well as efforts to protect the environment. Rather than
simply trying to hide behind its developing country identity, China must show
greater accountability for the effects of its policies on poorer and weaker de-
veloping countries. What these countries need is not just abstract expressions
of developing world solidarity but concrete and meaningful policy change.
Without tackling China’s subsidies and other harmful trading practices,
any effort to improve the plight of poor farmers and fishers around the world

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is doomed to failure. Given their difficulties in confronting China directly,

developing countries need support from more powerful states in their efforts
to secure new and stronger WTO rules to reign in harmful agricultural and
fisheries subsidies.
The United States can play an important role in this, by working with de-
veloping countries to increase the pressure on China to reform its subsidies.
These are areas where the interests of the United States and the developing
world align. As the world’s largest agricultural exporter, the United States has
a keen interest in reducing China’s subsidies. Likewise, as a relatively small
user of harmful fisheries subsidies, placing its fleet at a competitive disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis bigger subsidizers, the United States also has a commercial inter-
est in reducing such subsidies.
The United States is currently working with the EU and Japan in the
Trilateral Initiative seeking to reform WTO rules to better address China’s
industrial subsidies. However, it is missing a valuable opportunity to form a
broader alliance with a wider array of countries, and to work across North-
South lines to challenge China’s subsidies and other harmful trading prac-
tices. Of course, to do so, the United States must also be willing to address its
own trade-distorting subsidies in areas such as agriculture; but this had been a
long-term goal of U.S. agriculture reform until the shock caused by the impo-
sition of tit-for-tat tariffs in the U.S.-China trade war.
The failure of the U.S.-China “Phase 1” agreement to produce any mean-
ingful reform of China’s subsidies or other trade policies—and with no sub-
sequent agreement on the horizon—has shown that such policies cannot be
effectively addressed by the United States acting alone or in bilateral nego-
tiations with China. With China expected to overtake the United States as
the world’s largest economy within the next decade or so, the United States’
relative economic power is declining.60 If the United States wants to convince
China to reform its subsidies or other trade practices, it needs allies now more
than ever. The best way to address China’s subsidies and other trade practices
is through multilateral channels where the United States can ally with other
states to increase its leverage.
This would require recommitting to the rules-based multilateral trading
system. For many years, the United States has been missing in action at the
WTO. Under the Trump Administration, the United States abdicated its

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 Kristen Hopewell

traditional leadership role at the WTO, abandoning trade multilateralism in

favor of aggressive unilateralism and launching an assault on the institution’s
dispute settlement mechanism. While these actions did immense damage to
the United States’ international standing and reputation, the resulting leader-
ship gap at the WTO has made progress in any area of negotiations virtually
impossible. Allying with developing countries to push for meaningful and
ambitious agreements on agriculture, cotton and fisheries would be a power-
ful symbol of renewed American leadership in the trading system and show
that the era of “America First” is over. It would demonstrate that the United
States is seeking not only to advance its own narrow trade interests, but to
make the system fairer and more responsive to the needs of all countries.
Finally, the United States must take a strong stand against the weaponiza-
tion of trade and the use of economic coercion. It should condemn China’s
trade aggression and show solidarity with countries that have been victimized
by such actions. It should commit to not use such measures itself and work—
whether via the WTO or other channels—to develop new mechanisms and
disciplines to counter economic coercion and prevent the abuse of power by
powerful states in the trading system.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 China’s per capita income is only 16 percent of that of the United States (with a per capita
GNI of just $10,550 compared to $64,550 in the United States).
2 “The Continued Relevance of Special and Differential Treatment in Favour of Developing
Members to Promote Development and Ensure Inclusiveness.” Communication from China,
India, South Africa, Venezuela, Laos, Bolivia, Kenya and Cuba. General Council, February
28, 2019. WT/GC/W/765/Rev.1, p. 11. “Statement on Special and Differential Treatment
to Promote Development.” Co-sponsored by the African Group, Bolivia, Cambodia,
China, Cuba, India, Laos, Oman, Pakistan and Venezuela. WT/GC/202/Rev. 1, October
14, 2019. WTO. 2015. “Minutes of Meeting, Trade Negotiations Committee.” October 5,
TN/C/M/37.
3 J.P. Singh, Sweet Talk: Paternalism and Collective Action in North-South Trade Relations
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017); James Scott, “The Future of Agricultural Trade
Governance in the World Trade Organization,” International Affairs 93:5 (2017), 1167-84.

394
 The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global Development

4 Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organization (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
5 Matias E. Margulis, “Whistling to the Same Tune? The Contest over Future WTO
Agricultural Subsidies,” 34-44, in Agriculture Subsidies and the WTO, ed. by A. Govinda
Reddy (Hyderabad: Amicus Books, 2010).
6 Jennifer Clapp, “WTO Agriculture Negotiations: Implications for the Global South,” Third
World Quarterly 27:4 (2006), 563-77; Matias E. Margulis, “Trading Out of the Global Food
Crisis? The World Trade Organization and the Geopolitics of Food Security,” Geopolitics 19:2
(2014), 322–50.
7 Kristen Hopewell, “U.S.-China Conflict in Global Trade Governance: The New Politics of
Agricultural Subsidies at the WTO,” Review of International Political Economy 26:2 (2019),
207–31.
8 OECD data, 2017.
9 FAO, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2018: Agricultural Trade, Climate Change
and Food Security (Rome: UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 2018); Jiang Hui, “China:
Evolving Demand in the World’s Largest Agricultural Import Market,” USDA International
Agricultural Trade Report, 2020.
10 Fred Gale, “Growth and Evolution in China’s Agricultural Support Policies,” USDA
Economic Research Service Report #153, August 2013; Carlos Mera, “China’s Selling May
Keep Food Prices Low This Year,” Financial Times, Beyond BRICS Blog, January 31, 2017;
Rabobank, “Rabobank: Global Food Prices Set to Stay Low in 2017,” Global Outlook Report,
November 23, 2016.
11 World Bank data.
12 Mark W. Frazier, “Narrowing the Gap: Rural-Urban Inequality in China,” World Politics
Review (September 24, 2013).
13 OECD, Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation (Paris: OECD, 2017).
14 Daojiong Zha and Hongzhou Zhang, “Food in China’s International Relations,” The Pacific
Review 26:5 (2013), 455-79.
15 ICTSD, “National Agricultural Policies, Trade, and the New Multilateral Agenda,”
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 2015.
16 OECD, Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation (Paris: OECD, 2017).
17 Fred Gale, “Growth and Evolution in China’s Agricultural Support Policies,” USDA
Economic Research Service Report #153, 2013.
18 Mindi Schneider, “Dragon Head Enterprises and the State of Agribusiness in China,” Journal
of Agrarian Change 17:1 (2017), 3-21; Mark Godfrey, “China’s ‘Dragon Head’ Seafood Giants
Will Drive Next Generation M&A,” Seafood Source, July 21, 2014.
19 Interview with WTO negotiator, Geneva, July 2016.
20 Judith. Goldstein, “A New Era for Trade?”, AJIL Unbound 115 (2021), 52-56.
21 Kristen Hopewell, Clash of Powers: U.S.-China Rivalry in Global Trade Governance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).
22 Oxfam, “Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization and the Fight Against
Poverty,” Make Trade Fair Campaign, 2002.
23 J.P. Singh, “The Land of Milk and Cotton: How US Protectionism Distorts Global Trade,”

395
 Kristen Hopewell

Foreign Affairs Snapshot, October 23, 2014.

24 Calculated based on data from the International Cotton Advisory Council.
25 Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, “The Competing Kings of Cotton: (Re)framing the WTO African
Cotton Initiative,” New Political Economy 17:3 (2011), 313-37.
26 Emiko Terazono, and Gregory Meyer, “Cotton Farmers Hit Hard as Prices Drop to Lowest
Since 2009,” Financial Times, December 9, 2014.
27 “Cotton Farmers,” Fairtrade Foundation. Available at: https://www.fairtrade.org.uk/
farmers-and-workers/cotton/
28 Adam Sneyd, Cotton (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).
29 Amy A. Quark, Global Rivalries: Standards Wars and the Transnational Cotton Trade
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); USDA, “Cotton Policy in China,” Report from
the Economic Research Service, CWS-15c-01, March 2015.
30 ICAC, “Cotton Report,” Presentation by Jose Sette, ICAC Executive Director, WTO 6th
Dedicated Discussion of the Relevant Trade-Related Developments on Cotton, Geneva,
November 23, 2016.
31 USDA, “Cotton Policy in China,” Report from the Economic Research Service. CWS-
15c-01. March 2015.
32 ICTSD, “Cotton: Trends in Global Production, Trade and Policy,” (Geneva: International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 2013).
33 World Bank data.
34 John Sudworth, “China’s ‘Tainted’ Cotton,” BBC, 2020. Available at: https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton.
35 Lucy Hornby, “Beijing Constrained By Record Farm Stockpiles,” Pp. 20 in Financial Times,
2015; Alexander Kriebitz and Raphael Max, “The Xinjiang Case and Its Implications from a
Business Ethics Perspective,” Human Rights Review 21:3 (2020), 243-65.
36 Eva Dou, “Sanctions on China’s Top Cotton Supplier Weave a Tangled Web for Fashion
Brands,” Washington Post, August 22, 2020.
37 U. Rashid Sumaila, Vicky Lam, Frédéric Le Manach, Wilf Swartz, and Daniel Pauly.
“Global Fisheries Subsidies,” Brussels: European Parliament Directorate-General for
Internal Policies, 2013.
38 FAO, The State of the World’s Fisheries and Aquaculture, (Rome: UN Food and Agriculture
Organization, 2016).
39 Douglas J. McCauley, Caroline Jablonicky, Edward H. Allison, Christopher D. Golden,
Francis H. Joyce, Juan Mayorga, and David Kroodsma, “Wealthy Countries Dominate
Industrial Fishing,” Science Advances 4:8 (2018).
40 Enric Sala, Juan Mayorga, Christopher Costello, David Kroodsma, Maria L. D. Palomares,
Daniel Pauly, U. Rashid Sumaila, and Dirk Zeller, “The Economics of Fishing the High Seas.”
Science Advances 4:6 (2018).
41 Alice Tipping, “Tackling Fisheries Subsidies at the WTO: What’s in it for LDCs?,” Bridges
Africa 6:8 (2017).
42 FAO, The State of the World’s Fisheries and Aquaculture, (Rome: UN Food and Agriculture
Organization, 2016).
43 Alice Tipping, “Tackling Fisheries Subsidies at the WTO: What’s in it for LDCs?”, Bridges

396
 The Impact of China’s Trade Policies on Global Development

Africa 6:8 (2017); Stephen Fevrier and Manleen Dugal, “The WTO’s Role In Fisheries
Subsidies and Its Implications For Africa,” Bridges Africa 5:10 (2016).
44 UNEP, Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development and the WTO (New York: UNEP, 2011).
45 FAO, The State of the World’s Fisheries and Aquaculture (Rome: UN Food and Agriculture
Organization, 2016).
46 U. Rashid Sumaila, Naazia Ebrahim, Anna Schuhbauer, Daniel Skerritt, Yang Li, Hong Sik
Kim, Tabitha Grace Mallory, Vicky W. L. Lam, and Daniel Pauly, “Updated Estimates And
Analysis Of Global Fisheries Subsidies,” Marine Policy 109 (2019), 103695.
47 Hongzhou Zhang and Fengshi Wu, “China’s Marine Fishery and Global Ocean Governance,”
Global Policy 8:2 (2017), 216–26.
48 Ibid, 216–26.
49 David A. Kroodsma, Juan Mayorga, Timothy Hochberg, Nathan A. Miller, Kristina Boerder,
Francesco Ferretti, Alex Wilson, Bjorn Bergman, Timothy D. White, Barbara A. Block,
Paul Woods, Brian Sullivan, Christopher Costello, and Boris Worm, “Tracking the Global
Footprint of Fisheries,” Science 359:6378 (2018), 904-08.
50 Miren Gutiérrez, Alfonso Daniels, Guy Jobbins, Guillermo Gutiérrez Almazor, and César
Montenegro, China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet: Scale, Impact and Governance (London:
Overseas Development Institute, 2020); Greenpeace, “Give a Man a Fish—Five Facts on
China’s Distant Water Fishing Subsidies,” Greenpeace East Asia Briefing, August 8, 2016.
51 Enric Sala, Juan Mayorga, Christopher Costello, David Kroodsma, Maria L. D. Palomares,
Daniel Pauly, U. Rashid Sumaila, and Dirk Zeller, “The Economics of Fishing the High Seas,”
Science Advances 4:6 (2018).
52 Miren Gutiérrez, Alfonso Daniels, Guy Jobbins, Guillermo Gutiérrez Almazor, and César
Montenegro, China’s Distant-Water Fishing Fleet: Scale, Impact and Governance (London:
Overseas Development Institute, 2020)
53 Andrew Jacobs, “China’s Appetite Pushes Fish Stocks to Brink,” New York Times, April 30, 2017.
54 Greenpeace, “Africa’s Fisheries Paradise at a Crossroads: Investigating Chinese Companies’
Illegal Fishing Practices in West Africa,” Greenpeace East Asia and Greenpeace Africa, 2015.
55 Hongzhou Zhang and Fengshi Wu, “China’s Marine Fishery and Global Ocean Governance,”
Global Policy 8:2 (2017), 216–26.
56 Hongzhou Zhang and Sam Bateman, “Fishing Militia, the Securitization of Fishery and the
South China Sea Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and
Strategic Affairs 39:2 (2017), 288–314.
57 EU, “Study on the Subsidies to the Fisheries, Aquaculture, and Marketing and Processing
Subsectors in Major Fishing Nations Beyond the EU,” Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs
and Fisheries, MARE/2011/01 Lot 2, Brussels 2016; Mark Godfrey, “China Rushing To Build
Global Fishing Bases Before Capping Its Fleet Size,” Seafood Source, January 17, 2018.
58 Bonnie Glaser, “Time for Collective Pushback against China’s Economic Coercion,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2021.
59 Interview, WTO negotiator, Geneva, July 2017.
60 Kristen Hopewell, “15 Countries Just Signed the World’s Largest Trade Pact. The U.S. Isn’t
One of Them,” The Washington Post, November 16, 2020.

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Influence Nodes: China’s

High-Profile Global
Development Projects
Austin Strange is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the
University of Hong Kong and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow1
 Austin Strange

Abstract
Governments around the world, including that of the United States, have grown
increasingly anxious about the nature and impacts of Chinese-financed global
development projects. One source of concern is China’s pursuit of influence via
foreign aid and less concessional, debt-based financing in other countries. But
given the scale and complexity of China’s overseas development portfolio, ex-
pectations that development dollars translate linearly into political influence
are unrealistic. This essay argues for instead focusing on the major nodes of
China’s overseas development program most relevant for questions of influence:
High-profile development projects. These projects possess outsized visibility and
political salience in host countries. These features enable high-profile projects
to serve as unique sources of political capital for host country leaders. China’s
government can generate influence from this capital, but also faces risks to its in-
ternational influence created by these projects that are often difficult to manage.
Based on original data collection, this essay discusses how high-profile projects
can increase or decrease China’s elite and popular influence. It provides a nodal
rather than linear lens for considering how overseas development projects affect
China’s net influence. This approach complicates calculations of influence, but
suggests that if anything, China has likely yielded lower net influence than often
assumed by policymakers and analysts.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Policymakers and analysts should avoid the temptation to settle for
straightforward assumptions about how China gains or loses influence in
developing countries. China’s global development projects serve Beijing’s
pursuit of influence, but both “projects” and “influence” require greater
conceptual precision to understand links between them. Accounting for
such links suggests that calculations of China’s influence based on overall
financing volumes may be inflated due to neglect of important influence
channels.

● Governments concerned with China’s use of development finance for

influence should also avoid trying to match China’s financing dollar-for-
dollar or project-for-project. Mobilizing and coordinating public and

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private capital are serious constraints to competing with China at scale.

Moreover, China’s government and host country governments often
have closely aligned incentives for pursuing high-profile projects. Neither
direct competition nor rhetorical criticism are likely to deter China’s
longstanding approach to providing these projects.

● Initial indications that the United States and its partners plan to provide
alternatives to Chinese financing that focus on potential strengths in
physical and digital infrastructure are encouraging. Absent the ability to
do this at scale, these governments should also invest more in helping host
country governments make prudent choices in pursuing and negotiating
development projects financed by China and other donors and lenders.

● The United States and its partners can also provide greater support to
civil society organizations (CSOs) abroad to help them monitor and
shape negotiations over Chinese development projects. This is particularly
important in countries where national leaders directly request, negotiate,
and plan these projects, often without adequate public disclosure. Greater
CSO engagement can increase the likelihood that feasible, desirable
projects will be selected and completed with higher baseline levels of
buy-in from local societies. This outcome would be beneficial for all actors
involved, including China’s policy banks and state-owned enterprises that
finance and implement projects. This support need not be conflictual: it
can also be supported by China’s government and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs).

● The United States and other members of the international community

should persistently leave the door open for greater coordination with
China’s government, despite longstanding and current challenges related
to information sharing and transparency in international development.
They should encourage and reward future improvements in official
information disclosure regarding China’s overseas development activities.

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 Austin Strange

Introduction
When one thinks of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), visions of massive,
grandiose infrastructure projects immediately come to mind. This is true al-
most no matter where one looks along the BRI, a signature strategy of Chinese
President Xi Jinping introduced in late 2013 that promotes infrastructure and
other forms of connectivity with several dozen countries across and beyond
an overland “belt” through Eurasia and maritime “road” through the Indo-
Pacific. Consider Kenya, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka, three major host
countries for Chinese-financed development projects. According to AidData’s
Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset (Version 2.0), between 2000 and
2017 China’s government committed over $10 billion (2017 US$) to Kenya.2
This financing was diverse: it supported 155 aid- and debt-financed projects
across the education (28 projects), emergency and disaster relief (19), energy
(17), and health (15) sectors. But for most observers at home and abroad,
China’s presence in Kenya is symbolized by one or a few well-known projects,
such the Standard Gauge Rail (SGR), a megaproject championed by President
Uhuru Kenyatta.3
In Papua New Guinea, similarly, China has committed $6.1 billion worth
of projects over the same period, including 33 and 18 projects in the health
and education sectors. But domestic and international audiences are most fa-
miliar with structures such as the $25.6 million convention center built in
Port Moresby used to host an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
meeting in 2018. Finally, government committed $12 billion for 150 aid- and
debt-financed projects in Sri Lanka during the same period. But one notorious
project typically serves as an oversized reference point for China’s controver-
sial role there: Hambantota Port, a distressed infrastructure project pursued
by former Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa that has helped inspire the
popular but flawed “Debt Trap Diplomacy” narrative.4
As these examples show, a pattern has emerged during the first decade of
the BRI. Within most host countries, one or few projects often dominate
local, national, and even global narratives about China’s development finance.
Most consumers of these narratives never actually interact directly with the
projects in question. In contrast, most projects that China and other donors
provide overseas are local and lack the scale, visibility, and political salience to
serve as major topics of conversation. Existing approaches to studying foreign

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aid, including China’s development finance, do not capture this basic varia-
tion that distinguishes high-profile projects. But when considering how do-
nors and creditors amass or lose influence abroad, it makes sense to spotlight
high-profile projects that punch above their weight in dollars and serve as po-
tentially outsized nodes for influence seeking.
The role of high-profile development projects within Beijing’s broader pur-
suit of global influence is an important policy question. Amidst deepening
U.S.-China tensions, China’s re-emergence as a prominent donor and trans-
formation into the world’s largest bilateral creditor have set off alarm bells in
the U.S. policy community. There is no shortage of opinions about the mo-
tives and effects of Chinese government financing. Beijing’s provision of de-
velopment “hardware” such as transportation infrastructure is often criticized
for its lack of economic, environmental, and social safeguards, yet praised for
its scale and speed. Beyond China, donor and lender competition for influ-
ence appears to be intensifying across the board. One recent study shows that
nearly half of the world’s sovereign states have now established foreign aid
programs, even though many of these governments are themselves major aid
recipients. This suggests that states increasingly value the strategic benefits of
providing development finance.5
Of particular concern to the United States is whether and how China’s
government can translate infrastructure projects financed abroad into politi-
cal influence. In considering this question, analysts often implicitly assume a
neat, linear relationship between development dollars and influence. But as
recent, open-source data collection efforts clearly show, China’s government
provides a diverse set of aid- and debt-financed projects across agriculture, en-
ergy, health, public and social infrastructure, telecommunications, transpor-
tation, and many other sectors. Some of these projects are mostly irrelevant for
generating political influence. Others are essential for understanding China’s
influence bottom line in developing countries. Earlier analyses have inferred
China’s influence based on overall financing volumes. But it is likely more pro-
ductive to identify the development activities within China’s portfolio that
are most relevant for its accrual or loss of international influence.
In thinking more carefully about development projects, analysts would also
benefit from more conceptual precision regarding how projects connect to differ-
ent influence processes. Earlier research has often neglected basic ­clarifications

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of what “influence” means. For example, are Chinese-financed development

projects primarily intended to buy policy concessions from politicians in other
countries? Are they instead meant to sway foreign public opinion in China’s
favor? Or are they designed achieve both elite- and popular-level influence objec-
tives? Different development projects almost certainly vary in their importance
for the pursuit of different kinds of influence goals.
To help clarify these dynamics, this essay discusses a well-known but
poorly conceptualized class of Chinese overseas development activities:
high-profile development projects. As the above examples of Kenya, Papua
New Guinea, and Sri Lanka suggest, this broad class of projects includes
many of the most notorious projects along the BRI. It includes both large-
scale transportation infrastructure and other economic “megaprojects,”
as well as “prestige projects” like sports stadiums and conference centers.6
While each individual development project has distinct features and exists
in a unique context, most high-profile projects share two basic traits that
differentiate them from other development activities: high visibility and po-
litical salience within developing countries.
This essay then considers how China’s most visible development projects
impact its pursuit of influence in other countries. First and foremost, high-
profile projects can afford China elite-level policy influence by serving as
unique forms of political capital for host country leaders at home. They can
also improve China’s image at scale among foreign publics when projects suc-
cessfully engage national symbols and narratives in host countries. However,
these projects can produce major blowback when they create negative exter-
nalities. These include material costs such as environmental damage and cor-
ruption, but also involve damaging narratives generated and promulgated by
local, national, or international actors. China’s government is often limited in
its ability to manage the public profiles of its most well-known development
projects. Instead, a plurality of actors such as host governments, media out-
lets, publics, and civil society actors collectively modulate the effects of these
projects on China’s image among elites and the general public. In short, high-
profile projects can serve as political capital for host country politicians and
this enables China’s government to generate “routine” policy influence. But
the same projects can also create “incidental” influence when negative exter-
nalities threaten China’s interests abroad.

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 Influence Nodes: China’s High-Profile Global Development Projects

The underlying research supporting this essay systematically examines

thousands of Chinese-financed development projects between 1949 and 2020
in order to shed light on how high-profile projects have affected China’s net
influence in developing countries.7 Understanding how China and other
states use high-profile projects to pursue influence can help practitioners and
citizens in developing countries, as well as observers in the United States and
elsewhere, more effectively understand China’s aims and craft their own ap-
proaches accordingly. As recent BRI backlash around the world suggests, and
as this essay argues below, increases in overseas development finance do not
automatically generate commensurate increases in donor and lender govern-
ments’ net influence in other countries.
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. The next section surveys
mounting concerns over China’s use of development finance for influence
seeking. I then briefly discuss the state of knowledge on the links between
development projects and influence outcomes. The essay then conceptualizes
high-profile development projects and discusses some of the ways in which
they can impact China’s net influence abroad. The conclusion discusses some
policy-relevant takeaways from the research.

Concerns over China’s Development-Influence Nexus

The rise of “new” and “emerging” donors and creditors has revitalized nar-
ratives of competition for influence in developing countries. 8 In particu-
lar, China’s growing clout as a donor and lender has alarmed the United
States and its partners. Beijing is now the world’s largest bilateral lender
and has evolved into the “lender of first resort” for dozens of developing
countries.9 Concerns surrounding China’s rise as a donor and (especially)
creditor have accelerated since the launch of the BRI. Anxieties stem from
the sheer volume of China’s financing, the prospect of host countries fall-
ing into Beijing’s orbit, the “weaponization” of the BRI to pursue Chinese
strategic interests, 10 the opaqueness of Chinese policy bank-issued loans
and the potential for massive sums of “hidden debt,”11 and a complex set of
risks including debt sustainability, environmental degradation, and socio-
economic disruption that might threaten the welfare and stability of bor-
rower economies and societies.12

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 Austin Strange

The ability to respond to these concerns depends on an accurate diagno-

sis of them. Over the past decade, U.S. leaders have repeatedly and publicly
criticized China’s development finance, linking it to a variety of strategic
influence outcomes. Implicit in these critiques is an assumption of Beijing’s
ability to provide large financial amounts in exchange for proportionate
economic and political influence. For example, in 2015 President Barack
Obama asserted that China has “been able to funnel an awful lot of money
into Africa” in exchange for natural resources and political favors.13 In 2018,
Vice President Mike Pence contended that “China uses so-called ‘debt
diplomacy’ to expand its influence,” and that for China’s development fi-
nance to developing countries, “the benefits invariably flow overwhelmingly
to Beijing.”14 A 2020 publication by the Department of State noted that
“China generally delivers higher levels of development assistance to coun-
tries voting with it in the UN General Assembly.”15
Recent bilateral and multilateral policy responses suggest that the United
States is gearing up to compete with China for influence in the Global
South. In 2018, Congress passed the Better Utilization of Investment
Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, which led to a new development fi-
nance agency designed to finance infrastructure and compete with China.16
The same year, the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) announced a “Clear Choice Framework” that contrasted
American and Chinese “models” for global development.17 In September
2019, Congress voted unanimously to create a special fund for “Countering
Chinese Influence” in global development.
More recent initiatives emphasize coordination with like-minded part-
ners. Since November 2019, the Department of State and counterpart
agencies in Australia and Japan have promoted the “Blue Dot Network,”
an initiative designed to monitor and certify quality infrastructure proj-
ects–including BRI projects funded and built by Chinese policy banks and
state-owned enterprises. Throughout early 2021, several new multilateral
initiatives, such as the “Clean Green Initiative,” have been referenced as BRI
alternatives that can wean developing countries off Chinese infrastructure
lending.18 Most notably, the Biden Administration announced the “Build
Back Better World” (B3W) initiative in concert with other G7 members in
June 2021. The White House describes B3W as a catalytic initiative wherein

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the U.S. and like-minded governments will provide public investments to

stimulate private sector financing at scale. B3W is envisioned as a “values-
driven, high-standard, and transparent infrastructure partnership led by
major democracies to help narrow the $40+ trillion infrastructure need in
the developing world.”19
Underneath these criticisms and initiatives, there is limited supporting
evidence on how Beijing’s overseas development projects actually promote
China’s international influence. Analysts instead appear to take for granted
Beijing’s ability to provide large dollar amounts in exchange for comparable
political influence. While there is potentially merit in some of the above asser-
tions, narratives of Chinese influence are mostly built on cherry-picked anec-
dotes and intuitions rather than carefully collected evidence.20 Policymakers
would be better positioned to craft effective responses if equipped with a more
sophisticated toolkit for understanding which types of Chinese development
behaviors generate more or less influence for China, which projects challenge
U.S. interests, and which might be conducive to greater coordination or even
cooperation. The next sections thus turn to linking Chinese-financed devel-
opment projects with influence generation processes.

Development Projects and Influence

Researchers have long studied whether and how China’s growing economic
power translates into influence. Existing research suggests that trade, invest-
ment, aid, and other forms of economic engagement are important conduits
for Chinese influence seeking.21 Other research has examined different con-
ceptual pathways through which China can seek influence in developing
regions as well as the role of host societies and governments in conditioning
such influence.22 One article shows that China provides more foreign aid to
governments that vote with Beijing in the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA).23 Other research finds that while Chinese-financed projects do not
increase local popular support for China in the Global South, they may do so
at the national-level.24 In general, however, few studies have rigorously consid-
ered the net influence consequences of China’s development finance.25
To connect China’s development projects more clearly with Beijing’s over-
seas influence, this essay decomposes both of these concepts. First, political

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scientists and economists have shown that development projects with high
degrees of visibility are more likely to be known by elites and members of the
general public in developing countries, and are thus more relevant for host
country politics than other localized or less visible projects. 26 Despite China’s
reputation for financing grandiose, flagship infrastructure projects along the
BRI, existing research has not systematically considered the role of these high-
profile development activities in shaping Chinese influence abroad. Most
studies to date are instead based on one or a few cases.
Second, the notion of “influence” can also be conceptualized and measured
more precisely. A massive literature in political economy shows how states use
economic tools such as investment, trade, and aid to pursue political influence
in developing countries.27 And a large literature on the political economy of aid
demonstrates that donor governments indeed supply foreign aid to pursue influ-
ence. This research suggests that donors invest in at least two types of influence-
seeking. First, they pursue “elite influence,” or state-level outcomes such as host
government policy concessions that support the donor’s national interests.28 Aid
is also used in pursuit of “popular influence” that enables donors to accumulate
“soft power” and win “hearts and minds” among foreign audiences.29
These two influence types are qualitatively different, but their distinction is
often neglected in analyses of Chinese development finance. Analysts instead
often treat influence as a uniform commodity that states linearly accumulate
as their material capabilities grow. Researchers rarely specify the actual con-
duits through which influence is won or lost; they tend to sideline the reac-
tions of agents in developing countries in focusing on the aims and behavior of
China; and they are excessively focused on high-level, state-to-state influence
processes rather than popular influence. But recent research shows that popu-
lar attitudes in developing countries also impact powerful states’ net influence
abroad,30 and that governments thus care deeply about “winning hearts and
minds” in developing countries.31
As such, this essay distinguishes development projects based on their vis-
ibility and salience. It also separates elite and popular influence processes and
considers how Chinese projects may impact either of these influence out-
comes. Finally, following recent research, it also treats influence as a net con-
cept, meaning it can be gained or lost depending on the aggregate reactions
and behaviors of target audiences.32

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In short, understanding links between China’s development projects and

influence requires breaking down both concepts. The next section argues
that high-profile development projects are most illustrative for understand-
ing these links and for gauging how China’s development finance advances or
damages its pursuit of influence abroad.

High-profile Development Projects and

China’s International Influence
High-profile development projects refer to a broad class of development ac-
tivities including transportation infrastructure and other “megaprojects,”
as well as “prestige projects” like sports stadiums. conference centers, and
high-tech development activities provided by a donor government to devel-
oping countries. These projects often vary substantially in their basic features
and underlying motives. However, they share two important features. First,
compared to other projects, they possess a high degree of visibility, both in
terms of physical and digital presence. Second, and relatedly, they are politi-
cally salient within host societies, and host country leaders strategically brand
these projects as components of national political narratives. High visibility
and salience often render high-profile development projects as the most visible
symbols of Beijing’s presence in developing countries. Beyond their physical
impacts, these projects may disproportionately shape attitudes toward China’s
government, even among citizens that never actually interact directly with
them. These projects’ uniquely high levels of visibility and political salience
enables them to punch above their weight in shaping China’s popular influ-
ence–for better or worse.
In my research, I first tested these assumptions about the visibility and sa-
lience of high-profile projects from the perspective of observers in host coun-
tries. In a series of surveys conducted in 2021, I asked respondents from Kenya
and Papua New Guinea to assess the visibility of different projects that China
might finance there. I also asked members of the Chinese public to make simi-
lar assessments to gauge how citizens in a donor country viewed these overseas
projects. Figure 1 summarizes the main results of these surveys. In general,
respondents who were provided with descriptions of “prestige” and other
high-profile projects such as stadiums, government buildings, theatres, and

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bridges, perceived such projects as significantly more visible than other devel-
opment projects, such as water quality initiatives and agricultural programs.
Respondents also viewed high-profile projects as being more closely linked to
the pursuit of national pride and regional or international status. Respondents
in the donor country, China, viewed high-profile projects as stronger signals
of political support and as more likely to generate expectations that the host
country should reciprocate by doing something for China. In addition to sur-
vey evidence, in forthcoming research I develop and utilize original, project-
level data to track the evolution of China’s provision of high-profile develop-
ment projects between 1949–020.33
In the remainder of this policy essay, I discuss two of the ways in which
these projects can impact China’s net influence in developing countries: “rou-
tine,” elite policy influence and unintended, “incidental” influence that oper-
ates via both elite and popular channels.

Routine Influence
The combination of high visibility and political salience makes high-profile
development projects important, otherwise unavailable sources of political
capital for host country politicians. Knowing this, China’s government can
provide these projects in exchange for direct political influence, such as pol-
icy concessions by recipient governments. I term this “routine influence” be-
cause it is conceptually closest to the longstanding notion that states provide
aid projects in exchange for policy concessions or other high-level political
outcomes.
The use of high-profile projects for routine influence is a well-established
phenomenon. For example, in March 2009 Costa Rica’s government held a
groundbreaking ceremony for a new, 35,000-seat national stadium. It cost
over $100 million and was completed in March 2011 after China’s govern-
ment financed and built the project. For Costa Rica’s government, the arena
was an important source of political capital. It enabled them to deliver a
national-level landmark that would be highly visible to domestic and inter-
national audiences. Costa Rican president Óscar Arias requested for China’s
government to provide the stadium while in Beijing for a state visit during
October 2007. After the project was initiated, Costa Rica’s government uti-
lized key moments to brand the stadium as a central achievement of both

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FIGURE 1: Public Perceptions of High-profile Development Projects in

Selected Countries

Visibility

Pride
Project Feature

Country
Status PNG
Kenya
China

Political Support

Reciprocity

-0.5 0.0 0.5

Difference in Means

Source: Austin Strange. 2021. “Who Pursues Prestige Projects, and Why? Evidence from
Chinese Development Finance.” Working paper.

the country and the government. According to available sources, branding

worked: the stadium generated positive reactions among the public with rela-
tively minimal opposition.34
In granting the request, China’s government recognized a familiar oppor-
tunity for routine influence. The national stadium was the “crown jewel” of a
larger package given to Costa Rica in exchange for abandoning diplomatic re-
lations with Taiwan. Beijing had agreed to provide the financing a few months

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after Costa Rica severed diplomatic ties with Taipei in June 2007. The stadium
is emblematic of China’s longstanding approach of using high-profile develop-
ment projects to establish or bolster political allegiances.35 Though China has
financed more expensive projects in Costa Rica more recently, for both gov-
ernments, the stadium’s political importance has punched above its weight.
High-profile projects have long been part of China’s development finance
toolkit. My analysis of several hundred prestige projects financed by China
since the 1950s shows that the use of high-profile projects to seek routine
influence extends beyond isolating Taiwan, and is not conditional on a host
country’s political institutions. More often, these projects are used to culti-
vate and strengthen ties with foreign political leaders. Politicians friendly to-
ward China’s government have long looked to China for securing conference
centers, sports facilities, or other large venues, often in order to hold major
regional international events. Consider the case of Cambodia. In the mid-
1960s, China’s government provided a National Sports Complex in Phnom
Penh, including a 50,000-seat stadium, before the 2nd Games of the New
Emerging Forces (GANEFO). The project was requested by Cambodian
monarch Norodom Sihanouk, who enjoyed positive relations with China’s
leaders. Over six decades later, China provided Cambodia with another sta-
dium. Morodok Techo National Stadium, a US$169-million high-profile
Chinese development project, was completed in December 2021 after four
years of construction. Prime Minister Hun Sen, a close partner of China’s gov-
ernment, requested the project in 2014 in anticipation of hosting the National
Stadium 2023 Southeast Asian Games. This is one of several high-profile proj-
ects that has helped China’s government maintain influence over a wide range
of Cambodian foreign policies.

Incidental Influence
Beyond routine influence, high-profile development projects can activate
other less straightforward but consequential influence pathways. One such
pathway is what I term “incidental” influence,” or changes in China’s over-
all influence level due to unintended changes in states’ policies or in foreign
public opinion towards China. These changes result from “influence exter-
nalities” caused by Chinese state, quasi-state, or non-state actors abroad, or
by non-Chinese actors in countries that host Chinese projects.36 Intuitively,

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though visibility and salience make high-profile projects politically valuable

for host country leaders, these features also create unintentional influence
consequences beyond the control of China’s government.
Research in political science demonstrates how certain forms of influence
are unintended, and scholars have applied these concepts to Chinese foreign
policy.37 One well-known source of incidental influence occurs when China’s
government delegates responsibilities to quasi- or non-state agents that behave
based on their own interests.38 For example, thousands of Chinese state-owned
and private companies act as contractors and stakeholders for many of China’s
overseas high-profile development projects. These actors often possess different
interests than those of the Chinese state.39 When these actors behave in ways
that stray from China’s officially stated interests, and when their actions create
local reactions in other countries, such processes can impact China’s overall in-
fluence through various channels. In addition, influence externalities can arise
from elite or popular foreign audiences through a myriad of processes. They can
occur when host country actors misattribute or misrepresent the behavior or
identities of quasi- or non-state Chinese actors such as firms, employees, or stu-
dents to China’s government, and when misattribution causes changes in other
states behavior vis-à-vis China. For example, Peruvians often view both private
and state-owned Chinese mining companies operating in their country as being
tied to China’s government regardless of a company’s actual identity.40
High-profile development projects are important sites for incidental influ-
ence generation, and serve as a reminder that influence is a net concept; it can
be gained or lost. Many recent examples along the BRI suggest that influence
externalities can often be negative. Host country public reactions to Chinese
development activities can produce bottom-up pressures that jeopardize proj-
ect completion or China’s broader strategic interests in a given country or re-
gion. Alternatively, opposition politicians in host countries can seize on dis-
tressed projects as unique sources of political capital, but not in ways that help
China’s influence bottom line. Indeed, across the BRI, Chinese-financed proj-
ects have occasionally been suspended, mothballed, or cancelled in the face of
pressure on host country governments applied by local residents, civil society
organizations, and local and national politicians.
On the one hand, high-profile development projects can generate strong,
bottom-up reactions at scale. Kenya’s Lamu Coal Power Plant, now suspended,

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offers illustration. The Chinese-financed plant was proposed by several high-

ranking Kenyan cabinet officials as a strategic national project.41 However,
local CSOs actively campaigned against the project out of concern for the en-
vironment for several years. They successfully thwarted the project’s advance-
ment in 2019.42 In Zambia, both workers and CSOs have also found success in
shaping their country’s foreign relations with China from the bottom-up, by
carefully framing their objections related to high-visibility Chinese projects
as national grievances.43 In Malaysia, negative public sentiment also detracted
from China’s interests when Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad,
canceled over $20 billion in projects previously signed by his predecessor,
Najib Razak. This occurred after the financing became embroiled in highly
public corruption scandals and amid mounting debt to China. Here again, a
few high-profile projects–rather than China’s overall development footprint
in Malaysia–tended to dominate both public and elite discussions on engage-
ment with the BRI. Such projects include the East Coast Rail Link that con-
nects less developed Malaysian states with the relatively prosperous Selangor,
as well as Bandar Malaysia, a mixed development housing project in Kuala
Lumpur.44 In short, bottom-up reactions to high-profile projects can generate
unexpected influence consequences for China’s government.
In addition to bottom-up pressures, the unique political capital created by
high-profile projects can be a double-edged sword for host country politicians,
with potential consequences for Chinese influence. Leaders may initially seize
upon and craft high-profile project narratives, but elites can also later capi-
talize on negative public sentiment towards existing Chinese development
activities. In some cases, this can jeopardize China’s influence, particularly if
it enables other governments to achieve bargaining advantages that diminish
China’s position. In Indonesia, debates over high-profile Chinese-financed
projects, including the Jakarta–Bandung High Speed Rail, have permeated
popular and elite political discourse. Indonesian politicians have successfully
wielded general anti-China sentiment in recent years–stemming part from so-
cial media coverage of labor issues related to Chinese-involved projects such as
the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park–to increase their bargaining power
vis-à-vis China in negotiations for future projects.45 In other contexts, how-
ever, such dynamics appear weaker and less threatening to Beijing’s influence.
In Kazakhstan and several other Central Asian countries, sentiment toward

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Chinese-financed development projects has soured in recent years, but this

does not appear to have significantly hurt China’s influence bottom line there.
This may be partly explained by the fact that China has successfully co-opted
local and national politicians in these countries.46
The ability for both high- and low-level political actors in host countries
to brand narratives around high-profile projects is a challenge for China.
Once these narratives gain a foothold, they are difficult, if not impossible,
for Beijing to control or contain. In some cases unintended influence con-
sequences of China’s high-profile projects are contained locally or region-
ally within other countries. Other times, these consequences are amplified
and can spill into other policy issues or even into China’s negotiations with
other countries. Narratives surrounding high-profile projects can emerge and
proliferate, and in doing so, amplify the influence consequences of China’s
high-profile projects. To the extent that project narratives are crafted, distrib-
uted, and repackaged by official and unofficial actors within and beyond host
countries, China’s government has limited ability to control these narratives.
High-profile projects are particularly vulnerable to these processes given their
distinct features. In recent years, individual project anecdotes have provided
the primary content for the creation of broader claims about Chinese develop-
ment finance. The aforementioned case of Hambantota Port and its role in the
rise of the “debt-trap diplomacy” meme is perhaps the best-known example.47
Narratives extrapolated from high-profile projects amplify project visibility
and salience even further and can affect China’s popular or even policy influ-
ence via any of the aforementioned channels.

Conclusion
For the first two decades of China’s re-emergence as a prominent global devel-
opment actor, policymakers and analysts have lacked precision when assess-
ing how China’s development projects connect to its pursuit of international
influence. In lieu of clear links between development projects and influence,
analyses have relied on implicit assumptions that China’s growing portfo-
lio of development grants and loans will lead to corresponding increases in
its international influence over countries that host its projects. Neither cur-
rent policy debates nor scholarly research on development finance has paid

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s­ ufficient attention to projects’ visibility and political salience when it comes

to their potential influence. Nor have analysts considered the different ways
in which China’s most visible and politically valuable projects affect China’s
influence on the ground in other countries. This is perhaps one reason why
even in “most likely” cases for observing China’s influence, such as the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—one of the most important conduits
of the BRI–China’s ability to convert growing economic and military capabil-
ity into influence has been limited.48
Focusing on high-profile development projects as key conductors of
Chinese net influence suggests that reality is far more complex. High-visibility,
high-salience projects offer outsized potential for gaining influence by reach-
ing larger audiences in developing countries. But they also generate significant
risks of negative influence that can intensify if projects are met with bottom-
up or top-down backlash in host countries. Individual high-profile projects
differ considerably in their motivations and basic features. For example, many
of China’s largest infrastructure projects are financed with debt and are de-
signed to earn a return on investment.49 In contrast, high-profile projects fi-
nanced with grants, interest-free loans, or other concessional foreign aid may
be designed to purchase political concessions, but China allows host country
politicians select and place projects within their territory, and to craft and
control narratives related to these projects.50 But their visibility and salience
makes these projects oversized nodes for China’s net influence. Once these
projects are conceived, China’s government often struggles to control project
narratives abroad.
As the United States and other observers craft responses to China’s growing
role in international development, they should think about China’s experience
with high-profile projects. They should also envision influence generation as a
non-linear, nodal process. This contrasts with a longstanding focus on rou-
tine influence via trade, investment, aid, diplomacy, and other economic ac-
tivities targeted at governments’ policies.51 Research on “economic statecraft”
similarly tends to limit the focus of Chinese influence in developing coun-
tries to state-level behavior.52 While routine, state-level modes of influence are
certainly important, they are only part of the puzzle. Conceptualizing and
measuring high-profile projects can help further sharpen our understanding
of China’s development-influence nexus.

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Social scientists have made important progress in recent years tracking

China’s global development projects, and the open-source data resulting from
these efforts supports more nuanced analysis of China’s development-influ-
ence nexus. Research organizations like AidData, Johns Hopkins SAIS China
Africa Research Initiative, and Boston University’s Global Development
Policy Center have carefully compiled data on thousands of Chinese-financed
projects. More recent initiatives such as the People’s Map of Global China
conduct deep dives into individual high-profile projects that benefit from
fieldwork and careful qualitative analysis. Policy analysts now have rich and
diverse informational resources to understand the nature and details of many
of China’s most high-profile development projects.
The empirical record, on balance, makes it clear that China’s high-profile
projects are its most important influence nodes in international develop-
ment.53 In contrast, many of the development dollars China provides likely
have little relevance for questions of influence seeking. This basic reality chal-
lenges assumptions that influence accrues linearly with development projects
and prescribes a more targeted approach to responding to China’s global de-
velopment finance. Future research should continue to make use of these rich
data repositories to sharpen our conceptual and empirical understanding of
the influence-related and other consequences of China’s most impactful de-
velopment initiatives.
Recent policy initiatives by the United States and its partners are somewhat
encouraging in this regard, as they suggest that the United States is not capa-
ble of or interested in trying to match the BRI project-for-project. Though still
in its infancy, the B3W is primarily focused on development “software” such
as projects related to climate, health, digital infrastructure, and gender equal-
ity. This suggests the Biden Administration understands that “The United
States cannot and should not respond to BRI symmetrically, attempting to
match China dollar for dollar or project for project.”54 Unlike the BRI, B3W
is not wholly or even primarily state-financed, and instead will rely on large-
scale mobilization of private sector investment. This approach raises questions
about the initiative’s ability to scale given recent globalization backlash and
populist movements in several G7 countries. It is also unclear how B3W will
achieve success in mobilizing private investment, particularly in least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), to a greater degree than existing global initiatives fo-

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cused on catalyzing private investments, such as the World Bank’s “Billions to

trillions” vision issued in 2015 for closing the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) financing gap.
To the extent that the B3W or similar initiatives do ramp up investment
in major, high-profile development activities, China’s experience may be edu-
cational. On the one hand, compared to Western donors and lenders, China’s
approach to development finance contains worrisome elements that might
jeopardize Beijing’s influence by exacerbating local or national grievances as
discussed above. For example, China’s government typically does not subject
its aid- or loan-financed overseas development projects to rigorous pre-project
economic, social, or environmental assessments in the way that other major
financiers such as the World Bank do.55 Moreover, development projects are
often negotiated directly with high-level politicians in host countries, making
it more likely that local or national political interests could bias the project
selection and allocation processes.56
On the other hand, overwhelmingly negative rhetoric toward the BRI
makes it seem like Chinese-financed infrastructure projects are inherently
problematic simply because they are Chinese. But of course, all “megaprojects”
and other infrastructure projects are notoriously difficult to implement. They
are likely to run into delays, costs increases, and corruption opportunities
given their sheer scale and complexity.57 If other countries step in to counter
China and help fill infrastructure gaps in developing regions, the infrastruc-
ture projects they finance will not be immune to potential negative externali-
ties inherent in infrastructure projects. Nor will they be immune to influence
externalities that arise from highly visible, highly salient projects that generate
a complex set of influence processes on the ground. U.S. policymakers should
thus avoid any illusion that non-Chinese infrastructure projects will somehow
not face challenges during implementation. Moreover, despite heavy criticism
of the BRI’s aims and impacts, if B3W attempts to provide infrastructure al-
ternatives to the BRI at scale, the United States and its partners may implicitly
provide validation for China’s initiative. Indeed, China’s government has al-
ready started claiming as much.58
Besides direct competition, the United States and other concerned gov-
ernments can provide support to local civil society organizations to actively
participate in monitoring and shaping Chinese-financed high-profile projects.

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This need not be a confrontational exercise from the perspective of the United
States or China. It can increase the likelihood that high-quality projects can
be selected and completed with higher levels of buy-in from local societies.
This outcome would be beneficial for all actors involved, and this can also be
supported by China’s government, Chinese NGOs, and INGOs engaging
with the BRI.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 The author thanks Lucas Myers for helpful suggestions and the Wilson China Fellowship for
generous research support.
2 Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Brad Parks, Austin Strange, and Michael J. Tierney,
Banking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China’s Overseas Development Program
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022); Samantha Custer et al. 2021. Tracking
Chinese Development Finance: An Application of AidData’s TUFF 2.0 Methodology
(Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, 2021).
3 Yuan Wang, “Executive Agency and State Capacity in Development: Comparing Sino-
African Railways in Kenya and Ethiopia,” Comparative Politics 54:2 (2022), 349-377.
4 Deborah Bräutigam, “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Rise of a
Meme,” Area Development and Policy 5:1 (2020), 1–14.
5 Angelika J. Budjan and Andreas Fuchs, “Democracy and Aid Donorship,” American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 13:4 (2021), 217-238.
6 Austin Strange, “Who Pursues Prestige Projects, and Why? Evidence from Chinese
Development Finance.” Working Paper (2021).
7 Austin Strange, Game Changers? China’s Global Development Projects (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press Elements in Global China, Forthcoming).
8 Ngaire Woods, “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent
Revolution in Development Assistance,” International Affairs 84:6 (2008), 1205–1221.;
John G. Ikenberry and Darren J. Lim, China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft: The Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Prospects for Counter-Hegemony (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 2017); Alexandra O. Zeitz, “Emulate or Differentiate? Chinese
Development Finance, Competition, and World Bank Infrastructure Funding,” The Review of
International Organizations 16:2 (2021), 265–292.
9 Axel Dreher et al., Banking on Beijing.
10 Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger, Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative (New York:
Asia Society Policy Institute Report, 2020).

419
 Austin Strange

11 Anna Gelpern, Sebastien Horn, Scott Morris, Bradley Parks, and Chreistoph Trebesch, How
China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments (Washington,
D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2021).
12 Richard Bluhm, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin Strange, and Michael
J. Tierney, “Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of
Economic Activity in Developing Countries,” CESifo Working Paper Series 8344 (2021).
13 “Full Transcript of BBC Interview with President Barack Obama,” BBC, July 24, 2015,
https://www bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33646542.
14 Mike Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s
Policy Toward China” (Washington, D.C.: The Hudson Institute October
4, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-vice-president-penceadministrations-policy-toward-china/.
15 Office of the Secretary of State, The Elements of the China Challenge (Washington, D.C.: The
Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf.
16 More generally, in 2019 Congress passed a US$375 million “Countering Chinese Influence”
fund. 116th Congress. 2019. H.R.7937 - Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign
Influence Act. https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7937/text.
17 Bonnie Glick, “Memo to Incoming USAID Leadership in the Biden Administration,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
memo-incoming-usaid-leadership-biden-administration.
18 Alberto Nardelli, “G-7 Set to Back Green Rival to China’s Belt and Road Program,”
Bloomberg, June 1, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-01/g-7-set-to-
back-green-rival-to-china-s-belt-and-road-program?sref=vxSzVDP0.
19 White House, “FACT SHEET: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better
World (B3W) Partnership,” White House, June 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-
leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/.
20 Deborah Bräutigam, “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’.”
21 William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and
State Control (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016); Scott L. Kastner, “Buying Influence?
Assessing the Political Effects of China’s International Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
60:6 (2016), 980-1007.
22 Evelyn Goh, “The Modes of China’s Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey 54:5
(2014), 825–848; David M. Lampton, Selina Ho, and Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Rivers of Iron:
Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2020).
23 Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Brad Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney, “Apples
and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from
China to Africa,” International Studies Quarterly 62:1 (2018), 182-194.
24 Robert A. Blair, Robert Marty, and Philip Roessler, “Foreign Aid and Soft Power: Great
Power Competition in Africa in the Early Twenty-first Century,” British Journal of Political
Science (2021), 1-22; Lukas Wellner, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, and Austin
Strange, “Can Aid Buy Foreign Public Support? Evidence from Chinese Development

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Finance.” Working Paper (2022).

25 Deborah Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009); Ching Kwan Lee, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and
Foreign Investment in Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017); Axel Dreher et al.,
Banking on Beijing.
26 Benjamin Marx, “Elections as incentives: Project Completion and Visibility in African
Politics,” Working paper (2017); Cesi Cruz, and Christina J. Schneider, “Foreign Aid and
Undeserved Credit Claiming,” American Journal of Political Science 61:2(2017), 396-408.
27 Alfred Maizels and Machiko K Nissanke, “Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries,”
World Development 12:9 (1984), 879–900; James Meernik, Eric L Krueger and Steven C Poe,
“Testing Models of US Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War,” Journal
of Politics 60:1 (1998), 63–85.; Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,”
American Economic Review 90:4 (2000), 847–868; Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James
Raymond Vreeland, “Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the
UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?” Journal of Development Economics
88:1 (2009), 1–18.
28 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “ForeignAaid and Policy Concessions,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 51:2 (2007), 251-284; Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm,
and James Raymond Vreeland, “Development Aid and International Politics;” Bruce
Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “A Political Economy of Aid,” International
Organization 63:2 (2009), 309-340; Tobias Heinrich, “When Is Foreign Aid Selfish,
When Is it Selfless?” The Journal of Politics 75:2 (2013), 422-435.
29 Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought?
The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy 119: 4 (2011),
766-819; Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood, “Doing Well by
Doing Good: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Foreign Public Opinion,” Quarterly Journal of
Political Science 9:1 (2014), 87-114; Stephen Brown, “All about That Base? Branding and the
Domestic Politics of Canadian Foreign Aid,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24:2 (2018),
145-164; Simone Dietrich, Minhaj Mahmud, and Matthew S. Winters, “Foreign Aid, Foreign
Policy, and Domestic Government Legitimacy: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh,”
The Journal of Politics 80:1 (2018), 133-148; Simone Dietrich, Susan D. Hyde, and Matthew
S. Winters, “Overseas Credit Claiming and Domestic Support for Foreign Aid,” Journal of
Experimental Political Science 6:3 (2019), 159-170.
30 John M. Owen IV, The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and
Regime Change, 1510-2010 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Bentley Allan,
Srdjan Vucetic and Ted Hopf, “The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International
Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects,” International Organization 72:4 (2018), 839–869;
Samuel Brazys and Alexander Dukalskis, “Rising Powers and Grassroots Image Management:
Confucius Institutes and China in the Media,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 12:4
(2019), 557-584.
31 Lukas Wellner, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, and Austin Strange, “Can Aid Buy
Foreign Public Support? Evidence from Chinese Development Finance.” Working Paper (2022).
32 Courtney Fung, Enze Han, Kai Quek, and Austin Strange, “Conditioning China’s

421
 Austin Strange

Influence: Intentionality, Intermediaries, and Institutions,” Journal of Contemporary China

(Forthcoming).
33 Austin Strange, Game Changers? China’s Global Development Projects.
34 Monica DeHart, “Remodeling the Global Development Landscape: The China Model
and South–South Cooperation in Latin America,” Third World Quarterly 33:7 (2012),
1359–1375; Valeria Guzmán Verri, “Gifting Architecture: China and the National Stadium
in Costa Rica, 2007–11,” Architectural History 63 (2020), 283–311.
35 Michael YM Kao, “Taiwan’s and Beijing’s Campaigns for Unification,” In Taiwan in a
Time of Transition, ed. Harvey Feldman, Michael YM Kao and Ilpyong J. Kim (New York :
Paragon House, 1988), 175–200.
36 For a more detailed discussion of this concept, see Austin Strange, Game Changers? China’s Global
Development Projects. These are analogous the concept of security externalities. See Joanne Gowa
and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and International Trade,” The American Political
Science Review 87: 2 (1993), 408–20; William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft.
37 Scott L. Kastner and Margaret M. Pearson, “Exploring the Parameters of China’s Economic
Influence,” Studies in Comparative International Development 56:1 (2021): 18-44.
38 Weiyi Shi, “The Political Economy of China’s Outward Direct Investments” (PhD Diss.,
University of California San Diego, 2015).
39 Irene Yuan Sun, Kartik Jayaram, and Omid Kassiri, Dance of the Lions and Dragons: How Are
Africa and China Engaging, and How will the Partnership Evolve? (Mckinsey & Company,
2017).
40 Kerry Ratigan, “Are Peruvians Enticed by the “China Model”? Chinese Investment and
Public Opinion in Peru,” Studies in Comparative International Development 56:1 (2021),
87–111.
41 Sasha Kinney, “Lamu Coal Power Plant,” The People’s Map of Global China, January 22,
2022, https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/lamu-coal-power-plant/.
42 BBC, “Kenya Halts Lamu Coal Power Project at World Heritage Site,” BBC, June 26, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48771519.
43 Agnes Ngoma Leslie, “Zambia and China: Workers’ Protest, Civil Society and the Role of
Opposition Politics in Elevating State Engagement,” African Studies Quarterly 16:3-4(2016),
89–106.
44 Hong Liu and Guanie Lim, “The Political Economy of a Rising China in Southeast Asia:
Malaysia’s Response to the Belt and Road Initiative,” Journal of Contemporary China
28:116(2019), 216–231.
45 Angela Tritto, “Contentious Embeddedness: Chinese State Capital and the Belt and Road
Initiative in Indonesia,” Made in China Journal (January-April 2020); Alvin Camba,
“Derailing Development: China’s Railway Projects and Financing Coalitions in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines,” Boston University Global Development Policy Center GCI
Working Paper 008 (2020).
46 Temur Umarov, “Dangerous Liaisons: How China Is Taming Central Asia’s Elites,”
Carnegie Moscow Center, January 29, 2021, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/83756; Andrei
Kazantsev, Svetlana Medvedeva, and Ivan Safranchuk, “Between Russia and China: Central
Asia in Greater Eurasia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 12:1(2021), 57-71.

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 Influence Nodes: China’s High-Profile Global Development Projects

47 Deborah Bräutigam, “A Critical Look at Chinese “Debt-Trap Diplomacy.”

48 Isaac B. Kardon, “China’s `New Era’ of Influence in Pakistan: Counterterrorism and the
Limits of the All-Weather Partnership,” In Essays on the Rise of China and Its Implications,
eds. Abraham M. Denmark and Lucas Myers (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 2021),
153–187.
49 Axel Dreher et al. Banking on Beijing.
50 Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Roland Hodler, Bradley C. Parks, Paul A. Raschky, and Michael
J. Tierney, “African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance,” Journal of
Development Economics 140 (2019), 44-71; Austin Strange, “Who Pursues Prestige Projects,
and Why? Evidence from Chinese Development Finance.” Working Paper (2021).
51 For example, see Gustavo A. Flores-Macias and Sarah E Kreps, “The Foreign Policy
Consequences of Trade: China’s Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America,
1992–2006,” The Journal of Politics 75:02(2013), 357–371; Scott Kastner, “Buying
Influence?” There are some exceptions. For instance, in examining China’s influence in
Southeast Asia, Evelyn Goh conceptualizes influence types depending on their sender and
target preferences. Evelyn Goh, “The Modes of China’s Influence.” More recently, scholars
have considered how Chinese infrastructure projects generates structural power and various
forms of influence. See David M. Lampton, Selina Ho, and Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Rivers of
Iron and Selina Ho, “Infrastructure and Chinese Power,” International Affairs 96:6(2020),
1461–1485.
52 William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft; Yi Edward Yang and Wei Liang,
“Introduction to China’s Economic Statecraft: Rising Influences, Mixed Results,” Journal of
Chinese Political Science 24:3 (2019), 381–385.
53 Of course, these projects are hardly the only channels for China’s pursuit of influence in
developing countries. Also of significance are China’s trade, foreign direct investment (FDI),
and other economic linkages to developing and emerging economies. China’s diplomatic,
military, Party, media, and cultural ties to developing countries are also important for
China’s influence bottom line. China’s engagement with existing international development
institutions as well as its creation of new institutional fora are also part of its influence
bottom line in global development. Future research in each of these areas can be more useful
to policymakers to the extent it can clarify the ways in which specific activities connect to
different channels for the pursuit of influence.
54 China’s Belt and Road Implications for the United States (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 79, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/report/
chinas-belt-and-road-implications-for-the-united-states/.
55 Axel Dreher et al. Banking on Beijing.
56 Axel Dreher et al., “African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance.”
57 Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter. Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy
of Ambition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
58 Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, “外交部副部长乐玉成：美国的
B3W计划进一步证明“一带一路”是正确之路、未来之路,” Foreign Ministry of the
People’s Republic of China, July 7, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/wjbxw_new/202201/
t20220113_10491909.shtml.

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Learning Diplomacy:
China’s South-South Dance
Exchanges of the 1950s
and 1960s and Their
Relevance Today
Emily Wilcox is an Associate Professor of Chinese Studies and Director
of the Chinese Studies Program at William & Mary and a 2021–22 Wilson
China Fellow
 Emily Wilcox

Abstract
China-U.S. relations have reached their lowest point in decades, prompting se-
rious questions about what changes U.S. policymakers should make to restore
this critical relationship and begin to move forward in a more positive and
productive direction. When seeking new approaches, China’s foreign relations
with other nations in the Global South offers an important point of reference.
During the 1950s and 1960s, when U.S.-China relations were also at a low
point, China cultivated relationships with other nations using an approach
that can be called “learning diplomacy.” As applied in the field of dance, this
involved exchanges in which dancers from more developed countries learned
from dancers from less developed ones, countering the conventional direction
of cultural knowledge flow in colonial relationships at the time. Although
observers in the U.S. recognized the power of China’s cultural diplomacy ef-
forts, few identified the specific strategy of reversing learning hierarchies as
a component of China’s foreign relations approach. Today, China continues
to employ relational methods based on mutual respect and people-to-people
exchange as a key component of its foreign relations activities in the Global
South. This strategy aligns with new conceptions of cultural diplomacy that
move beyond notions of culture as a means to represent national interests and
instead regard it as a space for dialogue and mutual understanding between
nations. This approach should be considered in U.S. cultural diplomacy ef-
forts with China in the coming years.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● U.S. policymakers should take immediate steps to revive the Fulbright
and Peace Corps Programs to China, two highly successful people-to-
people exchange programs that operated for decades with excellent results
but were suspended during the Trump administration. U.S. policymakers
should recognize that reinstating the Fulbright Program, in particular, is
essential for maintaining China expertise in the U.S. today.

● U.S. policymakers should continue to support initiatives such as the

Foreign Language and Area Studies Program, the Critical Language
Scholarship Program, and Federal Title VI grants that support teaching

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and research on the cultures, societies, and languages of foreign countries,

especially China, in U.S. universities.

● U.S. policymakers should promote the honest teaching of U.S. and

world history in K-12 education so that Americans gain accurate
understandings of issues such as U.S. race relations and foreign
engagement, which will better prepare Americans to engage in
international dialogue on equal footing with educated individuals in
foreign countries.

● U.S. policymakers should collaborate with Chinese partners, industry, and

international organizations to prioritize the return to pre-pandemic ease of
travel between the United States and China, recognizing that open borders
and increased movement of people between the two countries is necessary
to the long-term improvement of U.S.-China relations.

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 Emily Wilcox

Introduction
In 2019, the U.S.-China relationship reached what leading U.S. Chinese secu-
rity studies expert Michael Swaine called “its most daunting challenge in the
forty years since the two countries established diplomatic ties.”1 Although the
situation seemed to have already hit rock bottom at the time, things have since
only gotten worse. The eruption of the global COVID-19 pandemic, passage
of the Hong Kong national security law, new limits on international travel and
people-to-people exchange, a rise in anti-Asian violence in the United States,
and further escalation of negative rhetoric by U.S. and Chinese politicians
and media have all led to an even further decline over the past three years.
As the U.S.-China relationship has alarmingly deteriorated, China has
meanwhile been actively strengthening its cooperation and exchange with
countries in the Global South. Although this effort has a long history, as dis-
cussed further below, its latest formulation has gained particular momentum
since the launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. According
to the most recent dataset published by AidData, a large-scale research proj-
ect based at William & Mary that tracks international aid finance, “during
the first five years of BRI implementation, China solidified its position as
the world’s largest creditor to the developing world,” including major invest-
ments in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern and Central
Europe, the Middle East, and Oceania.2 While the core focus of BRI is on
infrastructure connectivity, the initiative is intended to “work with partner
countries to build five ‘connectivities’ or ‘links’: 1). physical connectivity via
infrastructure-building; 2). policy coordination; 3). unimpeded trade; 4). fi-
nancial integration; and 5). people-to-people exchanges.”3 Thus, through BRI,
China is pursuing a holistic effort on a massive scale to strengthen its ties with
regions across the world, with a special focus on Global South countries.
This conjunction of plummeting U.S.-China relations combined with a
concerted effort on China’s part to solidify relations in the Global South is
something we have seen before, albeit at a time when China’s position in the
world political and economic order differed significantly from what it is today.
In the early 1950s, the United States sought to isolate the newly founded
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and limit its economic and military devel-
opment through intensive international relations pressures and trade embar-
goes as the two countries went to war on the Korean peninsula. Meanwhile,

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China launched a strategic project of building relationships in the developing

world that was designed to mediate Sino-U.S. relations and, ultimately, di-
minish U.S. power on the global stage. This strategy was successful insofar
as it allowed the PRC to expand its formal and informal ties with numerous
countries outside the socialist bloc, including many that also had diplomatic
relations and alliances with the United States. One measurement of the suc-
cess of China’s efforts during this period was the historic vote to admit the
PRC to the United Nations in 1971. As previous scholars have demonstrated,
this vote relied heavily on China’s support from newly independent countries
in the Global South, especially in Africa.4
According to historian Chen Jian, China’s strategic approach to counter
U.S. power by fostering relations with countries in the Global South was ar-
ticulated explicitly by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Mao Zedong
as early as 1946. At this time, Chen argues, it was an early formulation of what
later became known as the “intermediate zone” thesis:

In an interview in 1946 with Anna Louis Strong, a leftist American

journalist, Mao introduced the ‘intermediate zone’ thesis. He noted
that a global confrontation had been emerging between the United
States and the Soviet Union. He argued that between the two big pow-
ers existed a vast ‘intermediate zone’ in Asia, Africa, and Europe, and
that the U.S. imperialists could not directly attack the Soviet Union
until they had managed to control the intermediate zone, including
China. As a result, concluded Mao, although the postwar world situ-
ation seemed to be characterized by the sharp confrontation between
the Soviet Union and the United States, the principal contradiction in
the world was represented by the struggles between peoples in the in-
termediate zone (including China) and the reactionary American rul-
ing class. These struggles, emphasized Mao, would determine not only
the direction of the global confrontation between the two superpowers
but also the fate of the entire world.5

Mao’s “intermediate zone” thesis laid a foundation for what historian

Sandra Gillespie, citing international relations scholar Michael B. Yahuda,
called “China’s three main foreign policy strategies: the ‘Peaceful Coexistence’

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strategy of the 1950s, the ‘Revolution’ approach of the 1960s, and the ‘Grand
Alliance’ tactics of the 1970s.”6 In Gillespie’s view, these ideas continued to
have relevance in the early twenty-first century: “While all three strategies
failed to survive in totality, each, in part, continues to influence current poli-
cies as China continues to define itself and its place in the world.” 7
Given the parallels in international relations trends and China’s renewed
effort to engage with the Global South through BRI today, this article posits
that U.S. policymakers and analysts can learn from looking more closely at
China’s cultural diplomacy efforts during the 1950s and 1960s. Specifically,
this article posits that an approach to cultural diplomacy the PRC formu-
lated and enacted during this period—what is termed in this article “learning
diplomacy,” or a policy of building relationships through learning from oth-
ers—offers lessons for U.S. handling of current China-U.S. relations.
At the heart of “learning diplomacy” is the idea that strong foreign rela-
tions requires mutual respect. That is, if one nation wants to develop a strong
relationship with another nation, the way to go about cultivating this rela-
tionship is to express respect for the other nation by seeking to learn from
it. Historically, imperialistic and colonial relationships have been character-
ized by the forceful imposition of the colonizer’s ideas, culture, and ways of
life onto the colonized. For leaders in the PRC at the time, obvious examples
of this process were the historical relationships between Western European,
U.S., and Japanese imperial and colonial rulers and their subjects in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s China’s strat-
egy of “learning diplomacy” deliberately sought to challenge and overturn this
imperial and colonial hierarchy as a strategy to build relations with countries
in the Global South that had been victims of this history.
By positioning itself as an eager learner of other nation’s culture during
the 1950s and 1960s, as well as a nation that had something to teach coun-
tries more powerful than itself, the PRC advanced an anti-imperialist, anti-
colonial vision of international relations, one that was grounded in notions of
radical equality and humility and directly challenged the chauvinism and ar-
rogance of great power hegemony. At the same time, this approach positioned
China as a member of the formerly colonized world whose behavior presented
a striking contrast to that of imperialist and colonial powers in the Global
North. By subjecting oneself to the tutelage of others, the PRC demonstrated

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in this context, one could gain friends and promote more equal relationships,
while also gaining influence and power.

Learning Diplomacy: China’s International

Dance Exchanges in the 1950s and 1960s
A representative space in which we can see China’s articulation of “learn-
ing diplomacy” during the 1950s is in the field of dance. Dance has played
an important role in contemporary China’s domestic and international cul-
tural politics since the first half of the twentieth century. During the New
Yangge movement of the Yan’an era, artists and intellectuals in the Chinese
Communist Party studied rural Han folk dance forms from north China
and adapted them into a tool of political education and recruitment for the
Communist cause. In the Chinese Civil War of the late 1940s, dancers on
both the Nationalist and Communist sides further incorporated dances of
ethnic minority groups—then known as “frontier dance”—into their perfor-
mance repertoires as a way to build support by promoting the ethnopolitics of
national unity. During both the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese
Civil War, dancers toured abroad performing for Chinese diaspora commu-
nities and general audiences in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia.
In this way, they used dance as a means to cultivate nationalism and solicit
financial support from overseas Chinese, while also promoting new images of
modern China to foreign communities.8
During the 1950s and 1960s, like many other countries around the world,
China sought to develop national dance forms and to promote its national
image by touring its own cultural dances internationally. Dance delegations
from China performed Chinese folk, ethnic minority, and classical dance
works at all of the meetings of the World Festivals of Youth and Students
held from 1949 to 1962, where they won numerous awards and gained great
acclaim abroad. Members of China’s newly established professional dance
companies specializing in Chinese national dance forms—the Central Song
and Dance Ensemble, the Central Nationalities Song and Dance Ensemble,
the Central Experimental Opera Theater, and others—also toured widely
internationally during this period. Between 1949 and 1967, China sent 166
officially sanctioned performing arts delegations abroad, which visited over

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sixty countries and greatly contributed to China’s cultural diplomacy abroad

through dance performances.9
At the same time that the PRC was sending its own dance abroad, however,
Chinese leaders also employed dance as a medium of cultural diplomacy in
other ways—most notably by having its dancers engage in a range of teaching
and learning encounters with dancers from other countries. Through China’s
engagement with dancers from other parts of the Global South, it becomes
clear that Chinese cultural planners aimed to project a willingness on China’s
part not only to promote its own dances abroad, but also to learn the dances
of these other countries. For example, during this period dancers in China
embarked on projects to learn dances from many countries in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. At the same time, in its interactions with dancers from
countries regarded as more developed than itself, such as the Soviet Union
and Japan, Chinese dancers participated in a dual process of learning as well
as teaching. In all of these arrangements, China’s dance exchanges manifested
a model of cultural diplomacy that overturned previous colonial hierarchies
and behaviors that had been established and in some ways were still practiced
by Western European countries, Japan, and the United States during the Cold
War. Through these activities, China’s cultural diplomacy strategists posited
that more developed countries could learn from less developed countries and
expressed this idea through dance exchange. China thus presented itself as a
new kind of leader by submitting itself to the tutelage of other nations, using
dance as a public medium to display this mutual learning.
One of the earliest instances of learning diplomacy in PRC dance exchange
occurred in 1951-52, when North Korean dancer Choe Seung-hui was invited
to the Central Academy of Drama in Beijing to train a large group of dance
students recruited from across China. Choe was an accomplished dancer who
had studied dance in Japan in the late 1920s and 1930s and developed her
own style of modern Korean dance that she promoted internationally on a
world tour in 1938-1940.10 In the 1940s, Choe spent several years in China,
where she befriended Chinese opera performers and began to develop a new
dance technique on the basis of Chinese opera movement.11 Choe’s invitation
to teach in Beijing in 1951 occurred in the context of the Korean War of 1950-
53, when Choe’s dance school in Pyongyang had suffered damage from U.S.
bombing, and it was dangerous for her and her Korean students to ­remain

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there. Thus, both North Korea as a country and Choe herself as an artist
were envisioned in the Chinese media as recipients of Chinese military aid,
while Choe and North Korean dance were presented as sources of learning for
Chinese dancers. A national news article announcing Choe’s classes in Beijing
described the situation as follows:

The Central Academy of Drama Choe Seung-hui Dance Research

Course is scheduled to begin classes officially in early March. The
research course is led by the renowned dance artist Choe and her
daughter the young dance artist An Shengji. The creation of this course
embodies exchange between Chinese and North Korean art and deep
friendship between Chinese and Korean people, and it will have great
use for the elevation and development of Chinese dance. The goals in
establishing the research course are as follows: cultivate Chinese and
Korean professional dance work cadres; organize basic movements of
Chinese dance, and create dance works that oppose U.S. imperialist
invasion, protect world peace, and express the intimate unity between
the Chinese and North Korean people. Students in the research course
include 40 dance worker cadres from various locations in China and
25 dance worker cadres from North Korea. Their period of study will
be one year. Additionally, there will also be training for fifteen Chinese
youth in middle school or above and 30 Korean youth, whose period of
study will be three years.12

As this report makes clear, Choe and her daughter were to lead the course,
and this fact was advertised plainly in the course title, which bore Choe’s
name. Moreover, a clear relationship is drawn between the training of Chinese
students and the expression of themes of China-North Korea friendship, as
well as joint opposition to U.S. imperialist forces. According to this same ac-
count, the content of the course would include “Korean ancient dance and
folk dance,” along with several other dance forms in which Choe and her
daughter specialized, including Chinese dance adapted from Chinese opera,
as well as “Eastern dance, Soviet ballet and folk dance, New Dance, improvisa-
tional dance basic training, and rhythmic training.”13 During this same time,
numerous other accounts appeared in the Chinese press that lauded Choe’s

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a­ rtistic accomplishments and presented her as a visionary leader whose teach-

ing and example would help develop the Chinese dance field.14 Following
Choe’s departure from China in 1952, the students she had trained were pro-
moted to prominent positions in China’s dance establishment, thus further
ensuring the lasting impact of Choe’s teaching in China.15
A second example of this learning diplomacy approach occurred in a series
of high level dance exchanges that Chinese leaders orchestrated with India,
Indonesia, and Burma over the period from 1953 to 1961, which contributed
to China’s participation in the Bandung Afro-Asia movement and strength-
ening of diplomatic ties in South and Southeast Asia.16 During this period,
Chinese dancers learned and publicly performed numerous works of Indian,
Indonesian, and Burmese dance through a variety of teaching arrangements
with artists from these countries. Additionally, four Balinese dancers were
recruited from Indonesia to lead a degree-granting professional program for
Chinese students at the Beijing Dance School, China’s top dance conserva-
tory. In 1957, shortly before their arrival, a national news article offered the
following account of the Balinese artists and their teaching plans in China:

Four Balinese dance instructors from Indonesia began their journey

to China today. They are responding to an invitation from the Beijing
Dance School to travel to Beijing to teach the graceful Balinese dance
and music. They will stay in Beijing for one year, and they plan to
teach twelve kinds of classical and modern Balinese dance to Chinese
friends. They also plan to study China’s dance and music.17

According to records of the Beijing Dance Academy, the Balinese teachers

remained at the school for two years, departing in August 1959. The students
they trained went on to become founding members of the Oriental Song and
Dance Ensemble (Dongfang gewutuan), a company established in the PRC
in 1962 that specialized in performing music and dances from across Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. National news accounts of the ensemble’s found-
ing stated explicitly its diplomatic mission: “The Oriental Song and Dance
Ensemble was established to suit the needs of our country’s people’s foreign ex-
change activities, which are developing daily.”18 The act of “studying” (xuexi)
was emphasized again and again in news reports about the company, and this

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activity was consistently linked to strengthening China’s ties with foreign

countries, especially those in the Global South. In the company’s inaugural
public performances held during the 1962 Lunar New Year holiday, the pro-
gram included items from Indonesia, Japan, India, North Korea, Cambodia,
Vietnam, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon, Mexico, Cuba, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nepal,
the Soviet Union, Brazil, and Argentina.19 Reporting on this performance, a
leading Chinese state magazine wrote:

The Oriental Song and Dance Ensemble has at this time already
studied over eighty song and dance numbers from twenty-three Asian,
African, and Latin American countries. They will continue to study
the strengths of the various countries’ people’s art, in order to further
strengthen the friendship between our country’s people and the people
of various countries and to serve the promotion of cultural exchange.
They also add new flowers to our country’s dazzling artistic garden.20

Like many similar reports of the time, this one clearly conveys that the
primary purpose of learning these foreign songs and dances was to advance
China’s international relations, described here as “friendship between our
country’s people and the people of various countries.” The Oriental Song
and Dance Ensemble thus embodied the central idea, then fundamental to
China’s cultural diplomacy with the Global South, that learning from others
and strengthening diplomatic ties go hand in hand.21
The application of learning diplomacy also worked in reverse. In other
words, China welcomed opportunities to teach its dance culture to artists
from other nations, particularly if they were from countries that had formerly
been colonizers or were considered equally or more developed than China. An
early example of this kind of exchange occurred in 1958, when the Matsuyama
Ballet, a dance ensemble from Japan, presented an original ballet adaptation
of the Chinese land reform drama The White-Haired Girl in China. Chinese
reviews of the production frequently praised the Japanese dancers’ efforts to
embody Chinese performance aesthetics on stage, particularly their efforts
to perform yangge, a type of northern Han Chinese folk dance, specifically
for this production. The author of a review in a leading music journal, for ex-
ample, recounted:

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 Emily Wilcox

The performance left our country’s audiences and the literature and
arts world with a very deep impression, receiving unanimous praise […]
In the process of adapting and rehearsing this drama, the Matsuyama
Ballet put forth great effort. To make the work artistically closer to
reality, each time after rehearsing and performing, they would always
undergo new revision, with the goal of better expressing Eastern
people’s lives, making made relatively good use of the distinctive
qualities of upper body and hand movements used in Eastern dance.
Throughout the dance drama, they inserted yangge dance scenes. For
this purpose, when Matsuyama visited China in 1955, she specifically
studied Chinese dance. Last spring, she sent Ishida Taneo and Kodaira
Tsuyako to China to study yangge dance and other Chinese dances.22

As we can see here, the reviewer again singles out the act of studying as an
important component of successful intercultural dance exchange. In this case,
however, it is a foreign company that is learning China’s dances. The reason
this makes sense in the diplomatic logic of the time is that Japan was a more
economically developed country than China, and Japan had previously been
an imperial power in East and Southeast Asia. Hence, the act of Japanese bal-
let dancers learning Chinese folk dance in order to perform a production of a
Chinese revolutionary drama embodied a reversal of hierarchies and conveyed
the idea of promoting equality and mutual respect.
The same year, the New Siberia Opera and Ballet Theater, after returning from
their tour in China, reportedly presented a gala of Chinese-style dance and music
for audiences back home. According to a report in Chinese newspapers, “They
performed in workers’ clubs, cultural palaces, and factories. The works included
lotus dance, tea-picking dance, fan dance, and red silk dance presented by the fe-
male performers and a Chinese traditional waist drum dance and a Tibetan cav-
alry dance presented by the male performers. The orchestra also gave audiences
performances of works by Chinese composers. These dances and music were all
learned by them in China.”23 The following year, the same company staged a bal-
let adaptation of the Chinese dance drama Magic Lotus Lantern, a project for
which Chinese artists travelled to Siberia to help out with the rehearsal process.24
Once again, this act of learning was interpreted as an expression of “friendship”
that was destined to promote “mutual understanding” and “cultural exchange.”25

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 Learning Diplomacy

Continued Relevance: Mutual Respect and

Relationality in Diplomatic Strategy
The United States took significant notice of China’s dynamic use of cul-
tural diplomacy to build international ties during the 1950s and early 1960s.
However, China’s strategy of learning diplomacy was rarely identified in
these accounts. In his detailed and otherwise very perceptive study of China’s
cultural diplomacy activities published in 1963, for example, Columbia
University Japanologist Herbert Passin wrote the following:

Since China lies about midway in degree of development within

the Communist bloc, we find an important differential. Towards
the more developed countries (the Soviet Union and the Eastern
European people’s democracies), China is relatively ‘backward’…
Therefore, more Chinese go to those countries, particularly in the
learner categories—students, trainees, etc., than come to China
from them…But in relation to the less-developed Communist coun-
tries, such as North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia,
China is the ‘teacher.’ 26

Similarly, USIS reports sent from Hong Kong to Washington in the late
1950s describe China’s cultural diplomacy efforts in significant detail, but
they place emphasis on the number, kind, and countries engaged in these
efforts, rather than on the specific diplomatic strategies employed. A report
from 1957, for example, begins as follows:

Since the Communist bloc smile campaign of 1955-56, Communist

China has been heavily engaged in a concerted and highly organized
effort to win unofficial and official recognition and status through
cultural and media exchanges with non-Communist countries. Under
this effort, labelled the cultural offensive, contacts with nationals of
neutralist or even anti-communist countries have been initiated or
expanded with emphasis upon Afro-Asian nations. Peiping [Beijing]
claims that this offensive has developed contacts with 63 countries in
1955 and 75 countries in 1956. Among these, 63 are non-communist
countries. In 1956 alone, it appears that Communist-China succeeded

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in establishing contact with 12 additional non-communist countries

through its people’s diplomacy program.27

The report provides statistics of the numbers of individuals and delegations

from specific regions and countries and pays special attention to change in
number and type from year to year, as well as directions of flow. However,
apart from generalizing terms such as “smile campaign” and “cultural offen-
sive,” the report gives little attention to what actually takes place in these cul-
tural exchanges. The report is accompanied by large quantities of newspaper
clippings detailing China’s dance diplomacy during this period, and this sug-
gests that the USIS office was following these events closely and considered
them important information. Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent the
nature of these activities informed U.S. intelligence officers and policymakers
in their assessments of and responses to China’s foreign relations.
In the twenty-first century, analysts of China’s cultural diplomacy have
identified trends in China’s engagement with countries of the Global South
that seem to echo aspects of this earlier practice of learning diplomacy. In par-
ticular, the explicit effort to present oneself as an equal and to engage in rela-
tions of mutual respect with Global South countries is something that scholars
have identified as a feature of China’s approach that makes it more appealing,
especially in relation to the United States and other Western countries. This
has been true even as China has itself transformed into a global superpower
and begun to operate in ways that some find reminiscent of past colonial and
imperial powers. Writing on China-Africa diplomacy at the start of the BRI
in 2014, China foreign policy and diplomacy expert Ingrid D’Hooghe made
the following observation:

Foreign policy issues are of far lesser concern in Africa. African

people generally regard China as a longstanding partner that, itself a
developing country, understands Africa’s needs and that gives them
more attention and shows them more respect than Western countries,
which always seem to know better. Creating these feelings of equality
between China and Africa is a fundamental characteristic of China’s
public diplomacy toward Africa.28

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 Learning Diplomacy

Even when the relationship is asymmetrical and China is engaged in uni-

directional teaching to its counterparts in the Global South, this can still be
perceived as more equal than relations with Western powers. In her 2020
book on China’s foreign relations with Africa over the last decade, scholar of
politics and international affairs Lina Benabdallah explains this dynamic as
follows in the case of Chinese investment in people-to-people relations and
human resource development:

Since the early 2000s, Chinese foreign policy makers have emphasized
Africans’ call for more programs that facilitate the trainings of skilled
labor and promote opportunities for transfers of technology from
Chinese experts to African recipients. For African elites, what has
long been missing in Africa’s relations to traditional powers is this very
aspect of transferring skills. In their view, without training a strong
workforce, Africa and Africans would continue being dependent on
European elites and their expertise…For this reason, one of the ways
that China markets its investments in Africa as different from the
European powers is to emphasize vocational training programs.”29

According to Benabdallah, traditional international relations theory fails

to fully explain the foreign policy making of emerging powers such as China,
especially their activities within the Global South, because it has focused on
assessing material capabilities such as economic or military dimensions of
power rather than on what Benabdallah calls “relationality.”30
What Benabdallah proposes instead is that human relations and social
networks are at the center of China’s foreign relations strategies, and it is thus
through people-to-people exchanges and expanding networks of connec-
tions—in activities such as teaching and learning—that China builds power
in these regions. Based on her extensive field research in China and several
African countries, Benabdallah found that “impressions on China’s knowl-
edge-sharing programs with Africans were overwhelmingly positive. In a con-
versation over dinner with a Nigerian diplomat who had participated in two
delegation visits to China, he emphasized that the most important part about
the trips for him was how African delegations were treated as equals, with
respect and care, by their Chinese hosts.”31 As Benabdallah makes clear in her

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analysis, it is the social networks themselves, which are built through these di-
verse interactions and China’s investments in developing human capital such
as trainings, which themselves constitute power in China’s foreign relations
with Africa.
Regardless of who is doing the teaching and who the learning, interac-
tions based on people-to-people contact and what Benabdallah theorizes as
“relationality” differ from conventional understandings of cultural diplomacy
as the projection of a national image or set of messages to a target audience
through some apparently transparent, reified medium known as “culture.”32
More contemporary approaches to cultural diplomacy, by contrast, imagine it
as a dialogic process and point precisely to the more relational approach that
Benabdallah identifies in China’s engagements in the Global South today. In
a recent review article advocating for this newer approach to cultural diplo-
macy, cultural studies scholars Ien Ang, Yudhishthir Raj Isara, and Phillip
Mar sum up the view succinctly as follows:

In order to move on from a focus on soft power projection, [in] cultural

diplomacy policy and practice we would do well to adopt an under-
standing of culture and communication derived from contemporary
cultural theory, which stresses culture as an ongoing process and as
inherently relational, and communication as a social process of co-
production of meaning. Such an understanding would help legitimize
and buttress the more dialogic, collaborative approaches to cultural
diplomacy that have begun to be proposed.33

This approach to cultural diplomacy is somewhat radical because it leaves

the content of the exchange potentially open-ended, and it focuses more on
the creation of relationships and interactions than on the communication of
unified national representations. Thus, while previous approaches theorized
cultural diplomacy simply in terms of promoting the national interest, newer
ones expand its purpose to “‘the exchange of ideas, information, art and other
aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual
understanding.’”34 Ang, Isara, and Mar remind us that even Joseph Nye him-
self, inventor of the term “soft power,” envisioned the possibility for a more
complex articulation of this strategy, namely, “that of ‘meta–soft power,’

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which is a nation’s capacity and introspective ability to criticize itself that con-
tributes to its international attractiveness, legitimacy and credibility.”35
While such approaches to cultural diplomacy as relationality, dialogue, and
mutual learning are considered new, however, they seem to implicitly inform
the examples of dance exchange discussed above from China in the 1950s and
1960s. What is learning diplomacy if not an approach to cultural diplomacy
that centers “dialogic, collaborative approaches” and “a social process of co-
production of meaning”? The act of seeking to learn from another through a
direct human-to-human encounter sets up the opportunity to engage in cul-
tural diplomacy in this relational manner. As Chinese students learned from
their North Korean and Balinese teachers, and as Chinese dancers taught
their Japanese and Soviet colleagues, they were establishing relationships.
Moreover, these relationships entailed some amount of communicative inter-
actions beyond the basic transfer of knowledge—such as trust, admiration,
sharing, and vulnerability. As human beings coming together to learn from
each other, whether as teacher or student, they engaged in a powerful process
that had the potential to transform international relations.
As China shifts into new relationships with Global South countries,
the strategies of the past cannot remain entirely unchanged. In 2021,
the Oriental Song and Dance Ensemble appeared in the China Central
Television New Year Gala performing renditions of African, Asian, Latin
American dances similar to what they had performed back in the early
1960s. However, whereas in the earlier period, these cross-cultural rendi-
tions took place within a politics of South-South mutual learning cultivated
in a context of Bandung Afro-Asia diplomacy and decolonization, sixty
years later they strike a different tone, in some cases eliciting criticisms of
cultural appropriation in light of China’s incredible economic and politi-
cal power in the world today. Some scholars have also worried about new
cultural politics of racial triangulation in Chinese performances portray-
ing dances from the Global South, such as the much critiqued 2018 CCTV
Gala sketch portraying African dances and characters, as well as other con-
temporary Chinese media representations of Africans.36
While the situation in these examples is sometimes more complex than crit-
ics acknowledge, and there is a need to differentiate between commercial and
diplomatic modes of cultural production, these recent examples do remind us

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of the need to be vigilant about issues of cross-cultural representation, as well

as the need to continuously adjust cultural engagements to current historical
conditions. While we can draw broader lessons and principles from China’s
“learning diplomacy” of the 1950s and 1960s and the similar practices China
is engaged in with various Global South countries through BRI and related
initiatives today, none of these practices can be adopted wholesale into con-
temporary U.S. cultural diplomacy. Just as China of the 1950s and 1960s is
different from China today, so too the U.S. relationship with China is not
the same as China’s relationship to the Global South, whether past or pres-
ent. These differences need to inform the ways in which U.S. policymakers
adopt lessons from China’s “learning diplomacy.” This process must involve
an honest appraisal of the United States’ own historical relationship to issues
of colonialism, imperialism, and racial oppression, as well as the United States’
distinct relational positionalities vis-à-vis China and the Global South both in
the past and today.

Conclusion and Implications

Examining the foreign policy statements and remarks in the early Xi admin-
istration, some scholars identified a concerted shift toward a “relational” ap-
proach that emphasized “win-win” engagements between countries on the in-
ternational stage.37 While I personally find it problematic to link such current
Chinese policy approaches with historical traditions such as Confucianism, as
the author cited above does, it is interesting to note that this scholar, based on
an analysis of Xi’s early foreign policy as a “relational” one, warned against the
dangers of overly confrontational foreign policy toward China at this time:

[I]f other countries want China to be more inclusive and relational

in its foreign policy, they must by the same token reciprocate with an
inclusive and relational foreign policy, so reducing Chinese apprehen-
sion of foreign threat. A strategy of overt balancing against China,
for example, will raise such apprehension and galvanize nationalis-
tic and realpolitik sentiments within China, and suppress inclusive
relationalism.38

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 Learning Diplomacy

While there is no doubt that China played a role in the current souring of
U.S.-China relations, it seems clear that the aggressive and confrontational
stance initiated by the United States during the Trump years, and still con-
tinuing under the Biden administration, have been counterproductive at fos-
tering productive relations between the two countries.
In this time of dire hostility and broken trust between the world’s two
most powerful nations, U.S. policymakers should take it upon themselves to
modernize their approach to diplomatic relations with China. An overly ag-
gressive and assertive approach does not work well when dealing with those
who wish to be seen as equals, nor does it suit today’s complex and increasingly
multipolar world. These grave errors of the past are a major factor that brought
us to the current moment, and this needs to be acknowledged and corrected in
order to begin to rebuild the U.S.-China relationship in a constructive man-
ner. The Biden administration should recognize that taking responsibility
for past U.S. behavior and changing it is an expression of strength and confi-
dence, while the opposite is an expression of weakness and fear, not the other
way around.
To rectify this situation requires a number of solutions, one of which is
renewed cultural diplomacy between the United States and China that is
modeled on the new approaches discussed above. Similar to China’s strategy
of learning diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s and its relational approaches
to foreign relations with other states in the Global South today, the United
States should place more emphasis on leveraging the power of people-to-peo-
ple connections and developing social networks on the ground in China to
deepen mutual understanding and promote dialogue. A confident country
recognizes that they have as much to learn as they do to teach. Moreover, it
also recognizes that in the contemporary world, connectedness builds power,
while isolation breeds danger. Thus, to be effective, U.S. efforts in this new
mode of cultural diplomacy should be aimed not at projecting and asserting a
pre-defined U.S. message or agenda, but instead first and foremost at building
productive mutual learning relationships. Building human ties in global social
networks is the basis for effective international relations policy.
To pursue this strategy effectively, actions taken during the Trump admin-
istration that were designed to sever meaningful people-to-people interactions
between the United States and China should be critically reassessed and,

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unless absolutely necessary for verifiable national security reasons, immedi-

ately suspended. One obvious example is the recently ended China Initiative,
which drew significant criticism for its failed methods, as well as for alleg-
edly threatening U.S. economic competitiveness and potentially violating
the civil rights of U.S.-based researchers.39 Another obvious example is the
Trump administration’s suspension of two highly successful and longstanding
people-to-people exchange programs between the United States and China:
the Fulbright Program and the Peace Corps. Numerous calls have been made
to reinstate these two programs on the principle that they improve U.S. citi-
zen’s understandings of other countries and ultimately benefit U.S. society.40
The Fulbright Program, in particular, is absolutely vital to maintaining an in-
formed U.S. public and ensuring that professionals and academics in the U.S.
continue to have real ties to and expert knowledge about China in the future.
Returning to Michael Swaine’s reflections on the U.S.-China relationship
in 2019, both Swaine’s urgent call to action and his proposed steps for resolu-
tion remain relevant today. He advises:

In each of these policy areas, greater trust and understanding could

facilitate less politicized efforts to discern the actual nature and extent
of the differences between the two sides and the possible dimensions
of any achievable middle-ground understanding. This would involve
a willingness to ‘seek truth from facts’ and, equally important, an
acknowledgement that the criticisms of the other side, while in many
cases greatly exaggerated, have some basis in truth.

Both China and the United States, in order to move toward a more positive
relationship, need to be willing to acknowledge their own shortcomings, as
well as their respective strengths, and to come to the table as equals. This has
historically been difficult for the United States in its relationship with China.
This orientation of equality may be the single most important lesson the
United States must learn if it is to overcome its current impasse with China in
the coming years.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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 Learning Diplomacy

Notes
1 Michael Swaine, “A Relationship Under Extreme Duress: U.S.-China Relations at a
Crossroads,” The Carter Center, January 16, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/16/
relationship-under-extreme-duress-u.s.-china-relations-at-crossroads-pub-78159
2 Ammar A. Malik, Bradley Parks, Brooke Russell, Joyce Jiahui Lin, Katherine Walsh,
Kyra Solomon, Sheng Zhang, Thai-Binh Elston, and Seth Goodman, Banking on the Belt
and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 13,427 Chinese Development Projects,
(Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, September 2021), 17.
3 Ibid, 22.
4 Mohamed A. El-Khawas, “Africa, China and the United Nations,” The African Review, 2:2
(1972), 277-287.
5 Chen Jian, “Bridging Revolution and Decolonization: The ‘Bandung Discourse’ in China’s
Early Cold War Experience,” in Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann eds.
Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962, 137-171
(Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: The Wilson Center Press and Stanford University
Press, 2009), 141-2.
6 Sandra Gillespie, “Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of Mao’s Three-Worlds
Theory and the Evolution of Sino-African Relations,” in Hannah Slavik, ed., Intercultural
Communication and Diplomacy, pp. 109-30, (Msida: DiploFoundation, 2004), 110.
7 Ibid.
8 Emily Wilcox, Revolutionary Bodies: Chinese Dance and the Socialist Legacy (University
of California Press, 2019); Emily Wilcox, “Dance in Wartime China: Liang Lun’s
Choreographic Migrations of the 1940s.” 무용역사기록학 (The Journal of Society for Dance
Documentation and History of South Korea) 52 (March 2019), 45-75.
9 Emily Wilcox, “The Postcolonial Blind Spot: Chinese Dance in the Era of Third World-
ism, 1949-1965,” Positions: Asia Critique 26:4 (November 2018), 781-816; Emily
Wilcox, Revolutionary Bodies; Emily Wilcox, “When Folk Dance Was Radical: Cold
War Yangge, World Youth Festivals, and Overseas Chinese Leftist Culture in the 1950s and
1960s,” China Perspectives 120:1 (January 2020), 33–42.
10 Sang Mi Park, “The Making of a Cultural Icon for the Japanese Empire: Choe Seung-Hui’s
U.S. Dance Tours and ‘New Asian Culture’ in the 1930s and 1940s,” Positions: East Asia
Cultures Critique 14.3 (2006), 597–632; Judy Van Zile, “Performing Modernity in Korea:
The Dance of Ch’oe Sŭng-Hŭi,” Korean studies 37.1 (2013): 124–149.
11 Emily Wilcox, “Crossing Over: Choe Seung-hui’s Pan-Asianism in Revolutionary Time.”
무용역사기록학 (The Journal of Society for Dance Documentation and History) 51 (December
2018), 65-97.
12 “Zhengli Zhongguo wudao yishu peizhi zhaunye wudao ganbu [Organize Chinese Dance Art
Train Professional Dance Cadres],” Guangming ribao [Guangming Daily], February 14, 1951.
13 Ibid.
14 See, for example, Chen Jinqing 陈锦清, “Guanyu xin wudao yishu [On New Dance Art]”
Wenyi bao [Literary Gazette], no. 2 (1950), 20–23; Gu Yewen 顾也文, ed., Chaoxian wudaojia
Cui Chengxi [North Korean Dance Artist Choe Seung-hui] (Shanghai: Wenlian chubanshe,

445
 Emily Wilcox

1951), 53–57; Dai Ailian 戴爱莲, “Qingzhu Cui Chengxi de wudao chuangzuo gongyanhui
[Celebrate the Public Showing of Choe Seung-hui’s Dance Creations],” Shijie zhishi [World
Knowledge], no. 20 (1951), 16. For more on this, see Wilcox, Revolutionary Bodies; Emily
Wilcox, “Locating Performance: Choe Seung-hui, East Asian Modernisms, and the Case for
Area Knowledge in Dance Studies.” In Susan Manning, Janice Ross, and Rebecca Schneider,
eds. The Futures of Dance Studies, 505-522, (University of Wisconsin Press, 2019).
15 Tian, Jing 田靜 and Li, Baicheng 李百成, eds., Xin Zhongguo wudao yishujia de yaolan [New
China’s Cradle of Dance Artists], (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubanshe, 2005).
16 For a detailed account of these exchanges and their relationship to Bandung diplomacy, see
Emily Wilcox, “Performing Bandung: China’s Dance Diplomacy with India, Indonesia, and
Burma, 1953-1962,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 18(4) (2017), 518-539.
17 “Youhao wanglai [Friendly Contact],” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], September 5, 1957.
18 “Xuexi he biaoyan Ya Fei Lading meizhou deng guojia renmin de gewu [Study and Perform
Asian, African, and Latin American Countries’ People’s Song and Dance], Renmin ribao
[People’s Daily], January 14, 1962.
19 “Dongfang gewutuan jüxing zhaodai yanchu [The Oriental Song and Dance Ensemble Holds
Reception Performance],” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], February 5, 1962.
20 Li Lanying 李兰英, “Dongfang gewu [Oriental Song and Dance],” Renmin huabao [China
Pictorial], 1962, no. 4: 12-15.
21 For further analysis, see Wilcox, Performing Bandung.
22 “Riben songshan baleiwutuan fangwen woguo [Japan’s Matsuyama Ballet visits our
country],” Renmin yinyue [People’s Music] 1958(4): 40.
23 “Xin Xiboliya gewu juyuan yanchu Zhongguo gewu [New Siberia Song and Dance Theater
Performances Chinese Song and Dance],” Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], January 19, 1958.
24 Zhang Xiaohu 张肖虎, “Weida de youyi zhencheng de hezuo: zai Xin Xiboliya geju
wujuyuan canjia pailian ‘Bao liandeng’ wuju zaji [Great Friendship True Collaboration:
Notes on the New Siberia Opera and Dance Drama Theater rehearsing the Dance Drama
Magic Lotus Lantern],” Renmin yinyue [People’s Music], no. 4 (1959), 11–12.
25 Ibid, 11.
26 Herbert Passin, China’s Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1963), 14-15.
27 “Communist China’s Cultural Exchange in 1957,” Foreign Service Dispatch from USIS,
Hong Kong to USIA, Washington, May 12, 1958 (Hong Kong Baptist University Library
Special Collections), 1.
28 Ingrid D’Hooghe, China’s Public Diplomacy, (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 218.
29 Lina Benabdallah, Shaping the Future of Power: Knowledge Production and Network-Building
in China-Africa Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2020), 10.
30 Ibid, 14.
31 Ibid, 12
32 Ien Ang, Yudhishthir Raj Isar, and Phillip Mar, “Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National
Interest?” International Journal Of Cultural Policy: CP 21.4 (2015), 365–381. For their
discussion of this point, see page 374.
33 Ibid, 377.
34 Ibid, 367. Here, the authors are citing Milton Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the United

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States Government: a Survey (Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003), 1.
35 Ibid, 367. Here, they are referring to Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the
World’s Only Super-power Can’t Go It Alone (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002).
36 Roberto Castillo, “The Han Saviour behind the Blackface: Racialised and Gendered Media
Representations in Africa-China Popular Geopolitics,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 22:3
(2021), 421-39.
37 Feng Zhang, “Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History,” The Chinese Journal
of International Politics, 8:2 (Summer 2015), 197-218.
38 Ibid, 217.
39 Margaret K. Lewis, “Time to End the U.S. Justice Department’s China
Initiative,” Foreign Policy, July 22, 2021 https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/22/
china-initiative-espionage-mistrial-hu/.
40 For one of many recent examples, see Euhwa Tran, “The US Should Restore its Fulbright
and Peace Corps Programs in China,” The Diplomat, May 6, 2021. https://thediplomat.
com/2021/05/the-us-should-restore-its-fulbright-and-peace-corps-programs-in-china/.

447
Section V

Southeast Asia and China

Southeast Asia lies at China’s doorstep, and each of its countries maintain
diverse and complex relationships with Beijing. Ranging from a rising secu-
rity threat in the South China Sea to welcome economic investor elsewhere,
China’s rise significantly impacts the region.
In recent years, China’s more assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping
has elicited some concern in Southeast Asian capitals. The Belt and Road
Initiative’s billions of dollars’ worth of investments have sparked concerns
about “debt traps” and unsustainable environmental damage. In the South
China Sea, China’s hardline stance towards other claimant states, most no-
tably Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam undermines its relations in the
region. These developments have arguably brought the region to the forefront
of international politics. Indeed, China’s growing power has drawn in a U.S.
response with a commensurate impact on the ground. A few pressing ques-
tions now emerge. What are the impacts of Chinese investments in the region:
positive, negative, or both? How should the United States approach relations
with Southeast Asia and, in particular, China’s investments in the region?

This chapter explores these issues and more,

featuring essays from the following fellows:
Darcie DeAngelo, “Peaceful Minefields: Environmental Protection or
Security Risks?”
Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu, “Green Cooperation: Environmental
Governance and Development Aid on the Belt and Road”
Renard Sexton, “Finding a Balanced China Policy: Constraints and
Opportunities for Southeast Asian Leaders”

449
2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Peaceful Minefields:
Environmental Protection
or Security Risks?

Darcie DeAngelo is an Assistant Professor of Sociocultural

Anthropology at the University of Oklahoma and a 2021–22 Wilson
China Fellow
 Darcie DeAngelo

Abstract
Clearing dangerous military waste saves lives, but the clearing process dam-
ages the environment and leaves minority communities vulnerable to land
grabbing processes in the Mekong Subregion. How do we strike a balance
between clearing military waste and protecting local environments and
small subsistence farmers? And what is the impact of the United States and
China on these processes? This paper explores the history of U.S. bomb-
ing, contemporary clearance operations, and land grabbing “epidemics” as
entangled issues in Southeast Asian minefields. Clearance operations pro-
vide the U.S. opportunities to engage more strongly with civil societies
and marginalized communities, increasing soft power and influence in the
Subregion. In terms of on the ground perceptions and in very practical ways,
though, Chinese and other foreign development projects have taken the lead
on these clearance operations, often in ways that exacerbate land acquisi-
tions from the region’s most vulnerable populations. If the United States
increased bomb clearance with reinforced regulations to ensure land release
back to original inhabitants, it would mitigate the risks for land grabbing
after military waste decontamination, mitigate ecological damages, and
work to repair its relations with Subregion countries by accounting for the
U.S. legacy of explosive remnants of war.

Implications and Key Takeaways:

● USAID should initiate a center that addresses issues of security and
environment together that will monitor landmine clearance and its
ecological effects.

● The Bureau for Environment and Security should also implement land
rights workshops for vulnerable communities who live in contaminated
areas in Southeast Asia.

● USAID should participate in The Working Groups established by

ARMAC and contribute to the Working Group’s funding, which at the
moment is funded by China.

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 Peaceful Minefields: Environmental Protection or Security Risks?

● More independent research should investigate the connections between

landmine clearance and land grabbing. Climate migration should be part
of the priorities in US-funded research calls.

● The Geneva Institute for Humanitarian Demining should be utilized

to ensure land release after mine clearance through the institution of
landmine clearance observation teams on the ground.

● The USAID should add land release stipulations to their funding streams
to GICHD and other landmine operations.

● Through international bodies like the GICHD, competitive funding

for minefield clearance should be increased through programs that
incentivize land release.

● The United States should return to the Obama-era policy that aligns U.S.
policy with the Mine Ban Treaty outside of the Korean peninsula.

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 Darcie DeAngelo

Introduction
On my first tour of a Cambodian minefield in 2010, the demining supervisor
of the platoon of deminers brought me through a tapioca field where heavily
armored men and women stood in lines. I was not allowed beyond the bright
red signs with skulls and crossbones. Wearing bulletproof helmets, masks, and
aprons, they slowly and tediously walked through the field, using a metal de-
tector to sweep the ground in front of them, the sun reflecting off the long
plastic visor. To avoid the heat of the Cambodian sun, they began their work
early in the morning. In the golden hour of sunrise as dawn gilded the fields,
the sounds of a distant Buddhist temple surrounded us with chanting. I com-
mented on how beautiful it was.
“Minefields are always beautiful,” the supervisor said. “When you want to
find a landmine, you look especially careful under trees or by rivers. That’s be-
cause an enemy will rest there. When an enemy is off their guard, they will sit
and relax or try to get a drink of water. Then, the landmine will explode while
they are resting.”
It’s no surprise that minefields and other military waste can prevent de-
velopment and economic prosperity, but perhaps counterintuitively, their
presence can also provide ecological protections and may even protect ethnic
minorities and rural residents. Clearing dangerous military waste saves lives,
but the clearing process1 sometimes damages the environment and leaves mi-
nority communities vulnerable to land grabbing2 processes. How do we strike
a balance between clearing military waste and protecting local environments
and small subsistence farmers? Moreover, what are the impacts of the United
States’ policies on these processes and how can we understand the challenges
and opportunities presented by them? Indeed, clearance operations provide
the United States opportunities to engage more strongly with civil societies
and marginalized communities, increasing soft power and influence in the
Subregion. In terms of on the ground perceptions and in very practical ways
though, Chinese and other foreign development projects have taken the lead
on these clearance operations, often in ways that exacerbate land acquisitions
from the region’s most vulnerable populations. If the United States increased
bomb clearance with reinforced regulations to ensure land release back to
original inhabitants, it would mitigate the risks for land grabbing after mili-
tary waste decontamination, mitigate ecological damages, and work to repair

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its relations with Subregion countries by accounting for the U.S. legacy of ex-
plosive remnants of war.

Landmines and Clearance Operations

Explosive remnants of war (ERWs) such as landmines and other unexploded
ordnances present an almost never-ending problem to development in the
Greater Mekong Subregion, namely in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, and
to a lesser extent Vietnam and Thailand.3 Landmine detection industries in
partnership with local governments have stepped up, spending hundreds of
millions of dollars amount to clear hundreds of acres of land in Cambodia,
Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar. These smaller nation states rely
heavily on larger powers to fund this. For example, China gave $2.5 million
dollars directly to the Cambodian government’s military demining organiza-
tion in 2021.4
Both the United States and China have an interest in funding the clearance
of military waste. For the United States, bilateral relations with Subregion
countries will improve through their support of mine clearance operations,
especially in countries that have tenuous bilateral relations with the United
States such as Cambodia and Laos PDR.5 China’s support for clearance in
these countries, especially in Cambodia, though, has a greater on the ground
presence than the United States. For instance, in 2019, ASEAN representa-
tives, led by Cambodia, pushed for a fully operational ASEAN Regional Mine
Action Center (ARMAC), which was founded in 2016. In December 2021,
China funded a technical working group meeting for the project “Enhancing
Regional Cooperation and Resource Mobilization Capacity in Mine/ERW
in ASEAN.” As the working group moves forward, the United States has left
much of the major leg work for such mine action operations to Japan rather
than stepping in as a public presence. The working group itself as well is an
opportunity to offer support to these operations and promote U.S. support of
ERW clearance throughout the region. This is bound to become more impor-
tant with Cambodia as Chair of ASEAN in 2022.
In the past 25 years, the United States has invested over $400 million dol-
lars to through the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State
(DOS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID),

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as well as funding for treatment of victims through USAID and the Leahy
War Victims fund.6 However, the funding for such clearance, as for all the
Subregion, is on tenuous lines from international donors.7 Moreover, the U.S.-
funded presence is less publicly known on the ground in these countries since
the major mine clearance operations are handled by the government opera-
tions with the support of NGOs and almost none of these NGOs are U.S.-
founded. HaloTrust is the exception to this rule and yet, this NGO itself, like
all mine action NGOs in the region, is characterized by a sense of competi-
tion with other NGOs that presents a barrier to cultivating relations on the
ground and with government agencies involved in the same activities.8 On
the ground this is evident by the signs that mark former minefields where the
flags of donor countries that fund the NGOs are depicted; one rarely sees the
U.S. flag in countries the United States has tenuous relations with, such as
in Cambodia or Laos, whereas the U.S. flag is found more prominently on
signs in Vietnam and Thailand. This public facing presence makes a differ-
ence in peoples’ daily perceptions of how much foreign powers are doing for
them, aside from the invisible support of financial aid. In contrast, China’s
reputation for these activities are more widely known. In addition to fund-
ing the working group for ARMAC, from my observations in the minefields,
most people are quite aware of the BRI development initiatives that take place
in Southeast Asia and the amounts that the Chinese state gives to Southeast
Asian governments, especially close allies like Cambodia and Laos PDR.
In 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,
known as the Ottawa Treaty, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, or
simply the Mine Ban Treaty, was ratified by the United Nations in order to ban
the use of anti-personnel landmines because their effects last long after war has
ended. 164 states have acceded to the treaty but the major producers of landmines
including the United States, China, and Russia have not signed onto the treaty9.
A large majority of funding for landmine clearance comes from interna-
tional donor countries, although this means that humanitarian demining
organizations depend on money that is whim to politics in donor states.10
Despite the fact that the United States and China are non-signatories to the
Mine Ban Treaty, both countries provide considerable financial support to
development and landmine clearance,11 and the Chinese government has

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made statements in support of mine action and insists it does not use land-
mines or ERWs.12 The U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD)
Program has invested over $665 million dollars in explosive clearance in
Southeast Asian since 1993.13
As such, the United States is one of the top investors in clearing military
waste in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Recent studies have pointed out that
landmine detection exacerbates the land grabbing epidemic in the Subregion,14
implicating these funds in the issues associated with land grabbing. This paper
explores the unintended consequences of landmine clearance in Southeast Asia,
how landmine detection in its processes leads to land grabbing and suggests pol-
icies can be revised to mitigate the risk for land grabbing after landmine clear-
ance, which can protect ethnic minorities, diminish risk of climate migration,
and protect conservation lands in the Greater Mekong Subregion.

A Contaminated Subregion
The Greater Mekong Subregion is littered with millions of ERWs and the
United States is implicated in this contamination from the Vietnam War’s
aftermath: 8 million tons of bombs dropped on Vietnam; 2.7 million
tons dropped on Cambodia; and 2.1 million tons of bombs dropped on
Laos PDR.15 Most of these ERWs affect the lives of minority populations,
Indigenous groups, and small subsistence farmers.16 Aiding the clearance and
detonation of these ERWs remains an important part of U.S. relations with
Southeast Asian governments.17 This aid offers the U.S. government a means
to promote good will with these states because many of the ERWs originate
from U.S. bomb droppings in the late twentieth century. All the Subregion
countries incorporate their national mine action centers as part of their de-
partments of defense, and each require foreign mine detection organizations
to work with the national mine action center. This fact itself, due to the un-
ease many countries have when it comes to giving money to foreign depart-
ments of defense, often hinders international assistance because international
NGOs have less freedom to operate within these countries.
These ERWs are the cause of multiple migratory populations. Landmines
often prevent development but in so doing, protect small subsistence farmers
from their land being taken. In fact, landmine clearance is linked to increased

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vulnerability for land grabbing.18 Small subsistence farmers are currently

under threat from a number of factors including climate change. This means
that landmine clearance organizations are often unwitting participants in il-
legal land acquisitions, though little has been done to study this connection
explicitly over time.
Brief descriptions of each of the affected countries are detailed below:

Vietnam
The United States dropped 413,130 tons of cluster munitions on Vietnam be-
tween 1965 and 1973.19 More than 20 percent of the country remains covered
in landmines. Vietnam is also contaminated by landmines laid by Cambodia
and China during the 1970s. Vietnam is a non-signatory to the Mine Ban
Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, meaning that it still allows
the stockpiling, importing, and production of weapons that leave ERWs, but
the country participates in convention meetings and claims that it has never
deployed mines since the convention’s existence. The ERWs have resulted in
thousands of casualties in the past decades with dozens occurring annually in
mostly the eastern provinces and those that border Cambodia and China.20

Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR)

Lao PDR has the world’s worst contamination from unexploded munitions as
a result of aerial bombings from 1965–1973, during the U.S. bombing cam-
paign.21 The entire country is densely contaminated with these cluster muni-
tions. Most accidents occur when villagers attempt to gather scrap metal from
the cluster munitions, resulting in thousands of casualties and injuries.22 Lao
PDR is considered one of the least developed countries of the world but has
formulated strategic planning to move beyond that status by incorporating
ERW clearance into its development plan.23

Cambodia
Most landmines in Cambodia were laid in the 1980s during the Vietnamese
takeover of the country, which came after the defeat of Pol Pot’s Maoist-

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communist Khmer Rouge during the Cambodian-Vietnamese War (1979–

1989). Other munitions are explosive relics of the Vietnam War (which the
Vietnamese call “the American War”) when the United States dropped bombs
on communist forces. These conflicts are entangled: the U.S. intrusion in
Vietnam in the 1960s led to the rise of the Khmer Rouge, a genocidal regime
responsible for murdering millions of Cambodians in the 1970s. Although
Vietnam and Cambodia were initially aligned, the two communist regimes
soon turned against each other, leaving China to mediate. The result was the
K5 belt, an invisible wall preventing Khmer Rouge troops from returning to
Cambodia via Thailand. The K5 belt is a 1,046km-long K5 mine belt installed
by the Vietnamese-backed government and constitutes Cambodia’s densest
contamination with up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer, while the east is
covered in unexploded ordnances from the Vietnam War. The United States
itself dropped 26 million cluster submunitions on Cambodia in eastern and
northeastern areas bordering Lao PDR and Vietnam.24 As a result, Cambodia
has the highest rate of amputees in the world.25 In Cambodia, villagers be-
come refugees when farmland lies fallow due to drought provoked by both
exacerbated climate change and require landmine clearance like Chinese in-
vestment and development projects.26

Myanmar
As a result of decades of civil war, Myanmar is one of the most mine con-
taminated countries of the world. In 2020, mine action activities including
victim assistance and mine clearance decreased from previous years. After a
military coup in 2021, new mines have continued to be installed along the
borders with Bangladesh, China, India, and Thailand. Many of these land-
mines are produced in state-owned factories. The military takeover of the
countries has resulted in ERWs being installed along its border, landmines
are pushing people from arable land. It is clear that landmines will prove
a difficult problem for Myanmar’s future. At the moment, landmines in
Myanmar are pushing occupants from their home villagers to refugee camps
in neighboring countries. 27

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Thailand
Most ERW contamination in Thailand comes from border conflicts with
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar resulting in minefields concentrated
along these borders to the eastern and northeastern provinces. Of all the
countries in the Subregion, Thailand has the fewest incidents and issues with
landmines and other ERWs but for development and trade with these border-
ing neighbors, mine clearance is essential.28

Land Grabbing in the Subregion

In addition to landmines and other ERWs, land grabbing⁠ is another prob-
lem in the Subregion, especially for small subsistence farmers and ethnic
minorities. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), land grabbing is the large scale acquisition of land
without the local community’s consent. It is difficult to quantify the extent
of land grabbing, 29 with estimates ranging from globally 68 million hectares
of land to 227 million hectares acquired since 2008.30 In general, land grabs
push people off their lands, especially small scale farmers and ethnic minori-
ties, and thus damage the lives of the most marginalized people. Because
local governments often benefit from land grabs, the nature of the issue can
seem intractable. Domestic laws often create opportunities and justifica-
tions for these land acquisitions.31
Foreign corporations sometimes incentivize these land grabs, such as
Chinese companies seeking to develop the Subregion in the Belt and Road
Initiative,32 Thai state electrical giant The Electricity Generation Authority
of Thailand,33 and European interests,34 which have displaced thousands of
small scale farmers. Advocacy groups and media organizations suggest that
Chinese-funded development, especially when it comes to land development
projects, such as the building of dams on the Mekong River, has devastat-
ing effects from illegal logging on conservation lands, the encroachment on
Indigenous people’s homes, and the undermining of democratic values.35
These land grabs occur on ground that is beneficial to larger develop-
ment interests. While land grabs have even been rationalized by global
groups such as the World Bank in its controversial report (2010) that sug-
gested land grabbing could present agricultural investment opportunities,

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the acquisitions often harm the most vulnerable populations36 and exacer-
bate ecological harms. This development also often runs through lands that
demands landmine or ERW clearance,37 which makes landmine clearance
(often unwittingly) part of land grabbing acquisitions.
Brief descriptions of each of the affected countries are detailed below:

Vietnam
Land grabbing in Vietnam is often exemplified by the state takeover of land
that is declared “public” under the socialist governance.38 Since the early 2000s,
officials have seized over one million hectares of land from farmers which ex-
ceeds the 810,000 hectares of land redistributed from rich landowners to poor
peasants with the collectivization of agricultural land in the period from 1953-
1956—under the motto “farms to the cultivators.”39 The country as a whole is
relatively less vulnerable than the other Subregion states when it comes to for-
eign interests and most land acquisitions occur from the state appropriating
land from small subsistence farmer and ethnic minorities in order to develop
state-led projects. This still leads to the displacement of its most vulnerable pop-
ulations. Vietnam is also a country that often incentivizes land grabbing in its
Subregion neighbors, such as the large-scale acquisitions that it has supported in
Cambodia and Lao PDR. Many of the state acquisitions in Vietnam are for land
conversion to hydropower deals with China, Hong Kong, and Japan.40

Lao PDR
In Lao PDR, the government is socialist and local policy initiatives such as the
Lao Land and Forest Allocation Policy (LFAP) allow for allocations of state
forests to local communities without formal titles, while the Land Titling
Policy (LTP) allocates formalized titles in more urban centers. Both policies
have been implicated in justifying land grabbing,41 and much of the land ac-
quired have been minority-owned swidden farms taken for Chinese-owned
rubber plantations.42 According to a Global Witness report, Vietnam Rubber
Group (VRG) has also been one of the main investors in this land, evicting
communities across Laos PDR and Cambodia (2018). Even though the state
has signed memorandum of understanding with China to open its doors for

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economic development,43 scholars have suggested that land eviction in Lao

PDR does not truly benefit the state and note that such land grabs have only
increased the state’s dependency on other nation-states, thus decreasing its
productivity as a whole.44

Cambodia
China, as the top investor in Cambodia, has taken over 4.6 million hect-
ares of land, resulting in Chinese company control of about one-fourth of
Cambodian’s 17 million hectares of agricultural and forested land.45 Logging
of protected land and places where ethnic minority populations live have
had increasing encroachment, especially while the coronavirus epidemic has
raged.46 But, European interests have also incited evictions and violent con-
flicts in Cambodia, such as 61 large-scale land concessions in Cambodia, with
a total coverage of 958,000 hectares, and an average size of 8,985 hectares
from February to September 2010 to open a sugar factory, displacing villagers
in the Omlaing province of the southwest.47

Myanmar
Myanmar is currently undergoing a violent and deadly military coup, experienc-
ing the aftereffects of 980,000 Rohingya refugees fleeing its borders since 2017,
and undergoing a massive wave of internal displacements—559,000 internally
displaced persons from 2019 to February 2021.48 Paired with Lao PDR as the
least developed state in the Subregion, it has also committed to opening its bor-
ders for development with the BRI and seeks to increase its status. This has re-
sulted in land concessions to these developers, planning gas pipelines and dams
in its northern province.49 These military led grabs have also entailed offshore
“ocean grabbing” in the south where Thai investments funded the military con-
trol over the country and displaced small scale fisheries.50

Thailand
Thailand is in fact one of the major players who acquires land in the Subregion
but also suffers its own land grabbing issues.51 For example, in the 1990s, the

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state appropriated public lands to develop, resulting in protected forests and

the threat to evict up to one million families.52

Land Release
The first step in landmine and cluster munitions clearance entails the tempo-
rary displacement of residents. Schools close, farmers are banned from their
crops, and people must leave their homes. Minefields across the Subregion are
concentrated on the borders and often force local people to halt their every-
day lives. These are usually villagers in the outskirts of these countries and
oftentimes are ethnic minorities. This displacement is meant to be temporary,
but, even in its temporary displacement, villagers must migrate to alternative
homes. In practice, it becomes easier to keep them off the land permanently
and to coerce them to sell their lands after clearance concludes.
Indeed, when comparing maps of landmine contamination and maps of
Chinese investment in the Subregion, one can see that the investments in-
clude minefields. This seems as though it would be beneficial in that it al-
lows important and lifesaving clearance to take place. However, these lands
troublingly also usually overlap with protected and Indigenous lands (see an
example of two Cambodian maps, one showing the infrastructure plans in
China and one from the baseline surveys of landmine contamination below
and their overlaps).

Climate Migration and Environmental Concerns

Large scale land acquisitions lead to development and economic benefits for na-
tion states in the Subregion but have devastating effects on poorer people in the
country, such as small subsistence farmers, ethnic minorities, and Indigenous
communities. They also have larger global effects on the already increasing is-
sues of deforestation, thereby exacerbating carbon emission effects. In the Paris
Agreement of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD+), a framework was established to fight climate change that tar-
geted deforestation prevention as a means to reduce emissions, specifically in
Southeast Asia. Land grabbing has led to further deforestation, contributing to
further emission increases in areas particularly vulnerable to climate change.53

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 Darcie DeAngelo

FIGURE 1: Baseline survey on mine/ERW (2009–2014). 2015. ERW

contamination shows high in areas Chinese infrastructure projects are
planned on Indigenous lands. https://data.opendevelopmentcambodia.
net/dataset/erw/resource/2b20a617-b791-4b13-addc-ac4c45cc2ffe.
Accessed March 4, 2022

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 Peaceful Minefields: Environmental Protection or Security Risks?

FIGURE 2: Screenshot of data representation of Chinese infrastructure

investments in Cambodia by Boston University’s Global Development
Policy Center on China’s Overseas Development Finance, Geospatial Data
Analysis of Biodiversity and Indigenous Lands. 2022. https://www.bu.edu/
gdp/chinas-overseas-development-finance/. Accessed March 4 2022.

465
 Darcie DeAngelo

Most families who farm on minefields have already been pushed out of ar-
able uncontaminated lands. They have often been pushed from those lands
partially as a result of climate change, a lack of arable land, and political per-
secutions.54 Farming on minefields is a last resort. It is once the mines are
cleared that the lands become more attractive to development, but the process
of landmine clearance pushes these already vulnerable populations away from
their last resort homes.
On another research visit, the platoon and I toured a road that was to be
cleared on King Norodom Sihamoni’s order in Cambodia. The road’s clear-
ance was prioritized due to its proximity to Thailand and as a potential casino
construction project at the border. Nearby, a school had been closed so that
the platoon could reside there during clearance. As a yellow-striped bird flew
from a tree, the platoon leader wistfully said, “I wonder what will happen to
these birds.” We all looked up, knowing the trees would be destroyed and that
the birds’ homes would be lost.
While driving, the villagers stared at us from the side of the road. I won-
dered if they feared for their homes as well. Their fear would have been
justified. Unfortunately, the final land release stage of landmine clearance
does not always go to the original residents. As a result, land release some-
times causes greater harm to local communities in terms of land rights or
land tenure.
In many mine-contaminated regions, such as Southeast Asia, the Middle
East, South America, and parts of Africa, land grabbing after mine clearance
is a common problem. Land grabbing occurs when corporate or state initia-
tives coerce rural land holders to give up their land. These acquisitions displace
the population, often causing the villagers to migrate to urban centers where
they often experience poverty and marginalization. Research conducted by
the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery and commissioned by
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining Mine found
that land rights are highly threatened in landmine-contaminated places.55
Mine clearing organizations are directly implicated in these land grabs, since
the land release step leads to greater competition over the cleared land. This
research also found that women-led households and Indigenous communities
are more vulnerable than male-led households to land grabs after landmine
clearance. Because they are often less aware of their land rights and have less

466
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livelihood alternatives, these marginalized groups are more likely to have their
lands stolen after mine clearance.
Landmine clearance often paves the way for corporate interests to develop
the land. Increased foreign investments often supersedes local or Indigenous
land rights. Various U.S. policies protect sacred lands and the environments
of Indigenous groups,56 but very few take into account how clearing military
waste can damage these lands. And, while protocols are in place to protect
Indigenous lands and environments during the process of landmine clearance,
they are often ignored. In Southeast Asian countries that are dependent on aid
and development, landmine clearance is often used to take over lands and even
legitimize land grabbing.57

Implications for the United States and China

Beyond the local context and impacts, there are implications for the United
States and China. It is well known by villagers and deminers alike that the
majority of ERWs come from the U.S. bombings and that many of these
bombs are also manufactured in China. A common public presence of both
these foreign powers is literally the leftover materials of their weaponry. While
Chinese development has countered some of this harmful presence in the re-
gion, the ways in which the BRI development leads to land grabbing and the
ways in which their development mostly supports the elite is also well known
on the ground. On numerous visits, villagers and deminers would tell me that
they did not trust Chinese development initiatives, such as the building of
roads, and resented the fact that locals were not hired for these jobs (instead,
many of these projects hire Chinese workers rather than employing local resi-
dents). These on the ground resentments provide opportunities for the United
States to repair relationships with simply a more public and beneficial pres-
ence through landmine clearance where the land is returned to the villagers
and through projects that employ local residents.
Post-conflict contexts—where military waste exists—are also more likely
to devolve into further conflicts. At times, this is partially due to a lack of
resources leading to continued competition. Atrocity prevention must ensure
land releases are returned to local villagers, which is a written rule rarely en-
forced. Often, corporate interests for minefield clearance are prioritized rather

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than local community needs, exacerbating resource-related conflict. Military

waste clearance should also have a greater consideration for environmen-
tal protections, which would often correspond to local villagers’ subsistence
farming needs (and are contrary to corporate interests).
While the ‘do no harm principle’ of humanitarian demining should in
theory protect these land rights and environmental protections, they are often
un-enforced. The strength of Indigenous civil society has been tied to the pro-
tection of these rights.58 Ecosystem protection and land rights should be more
explicitly part of the humanitarian effort of military waste decontamination
and incentives should be made to enforce these protocols. China’s multiple
projects in Southeast Asia promote themselves through a “green BRI” move-
ment, but research has shown that these initiatives prioritize economic and
political interests that serve China rather than ecological concerns.59
The United States has an opportunity to improve its standing influence in
the region by countering these BRI projects with improved ecological protec-
tions during landmine clearance and the secured release back to the original
inhabitants, mitigating their risk for land grabbing after mine clearance. Since
the increasing disasters of climate change, the Pentagon has asserted that cli-
mate change is a security threat,60 especially by compounding the factors that
forced migration add to the burdens already plaguing marginalized villag-
ers, like land grabbing, corporate development, and local ecological disasters.
These factors destabilize allies and other countries in places like Southeast
Asia, and the United States has a clear interest in addressing them.
Both the United States and China have contributed to the problem of
ERW contamination in Southeast Asia and its subsequent land grabbing is-
sues, but both have opportunities to be part of the solution. By enhancing its
focus on mine clearance that is both equitable to minority populations and
sustainable for the environment, the United States can improve its relations
with the Subregion. Working together with China will also offer opportuni-
ties for the United States to have a more public-facing presence that will lead
to better influence on the ground in the region, which now is dominated by
Chinese influence even though Chinese soft power in the region is vulnerable
to competition.61 Sustainable and equitable landmine clearance also offers a
means to approach climate migration from another angle by attending to the
scarcity of land from a military waste perspective, not just a climate change

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 Peaceful Minefields: Environmental Protection or Security Risks?

prospective. By ensuring that marginalized communities are better able to

maintain their homes, climate migration can be mitigated in a multi-pronged
approach. This paper offers a few recommendations to mitigate land grabbing
risks and repair relations after war in the region.

List of Recommendations:
● USAID should initiate a center that addresses issues of security and
environment together that will monitor landmine clearance and its
ecological effects. Some plans to initiate a center like this are in the works,
though other bureaus like Bureau for Resilience and Food Security and
Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization are already relevant to
these issues and can be operationalized to conduct monitoring activities
for U.S.-funded demining clearance.

● The above-mentioned bureaus or the newly institutionalized Bureau for

Environment and Security should also implement land rights workshops
for vulnerable communities who live in contaminated areas in Southeast
Asia. Much of land grabbing after landmine clearance is coerced through
unlawful signatures and the kind of ‘dress rehearsal’ that occurs when
minefield clearance pushes residents off their homes. Interventions like
workshops that inform residents of their land rights, innovated in an
iterative process after monitoring, would help prevent land grabbing after
mine clearance.

● USAID should participate in The Working Groups established by

ARMAC and contribute to the Working Group’s funding, which at the
moment is funding by China. USAID should direct its funding already
marked for landmine detection to the ARMAC Working Groups and
assert more of a public presence at the meetings.

● More independent research should investigate the connections between

landmine clearance and land grabbing. Climate migration should be part
of the priorities in U.S.-funded research calls.

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 Darcie DeAngelo

● The Geneva Institute for Humanitarian Demining should be utilized

to ensure land release after mine clearance through the institution of
landmine clearance observation teams on the ground.

● The USAID should add land release stipulations to their funding streams
to GICHD and other landmine operations.

● Through international bodies like the GICHD, competitive funding

for minefield clearance should be increased through programs that
incentivize land release. This could work similar to how gender
mainstreaming initiatives (which have proven quite effective) work
through the UN where NGOs and governments are likelier to obtain
funding when they provide evidence that minefield clearance releases land
back to the original inhabitants.

● Given the likelihood of increased use of landmines in Europe in places

like Ukraine and in Southeast Asia like Myanmar, the United States
should return to the Obama-era policy that aligns U.S. policy with
the Mine Ban Treaty outside of the Korean peninsula. The reversal of
this policy in 2020 was a dangerous message to the world, especially to
Southeast Asia, that the United States does not take the issue of military
waste seriously.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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Notes
1 My research for this paper comes from on-site observations and interviews with deminers
and villagers I conducted during 35 minefield tours over the past decade (2013, 2015-2016,
and again 2018 and 2020), as well as literature research and long-term on-site research
while embedded with a platoon of Cambodian deminers. Further research focused on the
connection between landmine clearance and land grabbing in the Subregion is needed, which
has been included in the policy recommendations below.
2 Scholars have recently urged that the literature use terms such as “land investment” or
“acquisitions” but for the sake of simplicity, this paper will use land grab according to the
FAO definition.
3 The Landmine Monitor, “Thailand Country Report,” The Landmine Monitor, 2021, http://
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/thailand/impact.aspx.
4 Dara Voun, “China Gives $2.5M Grant to CMAC,” Phnom Penh Post, July 21, 2021. https://
www.phnompenhpost.com/national/china-gives-25m-grant-cmac accessed Feb 6 2022.
5 Michael F. Martin, Ben Dolven, Andrew Feickert, and Thomas Lunn, “War Legacy Issues in
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in Post-Conflict Societies,” 553–94.
17 Martin, et al, “War Legacy Issues in Southeast Asia: Unexploded Ordnance (UX).”
18 Unruh, et al, “Land Rights in Mine-Affected Countries,” 28.
19 Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan Tuan, Deputy Commander, Military Engineering Command,
“Vietnam Mine/ERW (Including Cluster Munitions) Contamination, Impacts and
Clearance Requirements,” Geneva: Handicap International, June 30, 2011.
20 The Landmine Monitor, “Vietnam Report,” The Landmine Monitor, 2021. http://www.the-
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monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/lao-pdr/impact.aspx.
22 Legacies of War: Unexploded Ordnances in Laos, § Subcommitte on Asia, the Pacific and
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23 Leah Zani, Bomb Children (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019).
24 Handicap International, “Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions,”
Handicap International, November 2006.
25 Yoshito Takasaki, “Impacts of Disability on Poverty: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from
Landmine Amputees in Cambodia.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 180:2020
(2020), 85–107.
26 Alex M. Lechner, Chee Meng Tan, Angela Tritto, Hoong Chen Horstmann, John R Owen,
and Ahimsa Campos-Arciez, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Environmental Impacts in
Southeast Asia,” Trends in Southeast Asia - ISEAS Yusof Institute, 2019:18 (2019).
27 The Landmine Monitor, “Myanmar_Burma Report,” Landmine Monitor Report. Landmine
Monitor, 2021. http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/myanmar_burma/impact.aspx.
28 The Landmine Monitor, “Thailand Country Report,” The Landmine Monitor, 2021. http://
www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/thailand/impact.aspx.
29 Carlos Oya, “Methodological Reflections on ‘Land Grab’ Databases and the ‘Land Grab’
Literature ‘Rush,’” Journal of Peasant Studies, 40:3 (2013), 503–20.
30 Bin Yang and Jun He, “Global Land Grabbing: A Critical Review of Case Studies Across the
World,” Land 10:3 (2021), 324.
31 Sarah Carter, “Deforestation and Agriculture in the Tropics: Carbon Emissions and Options
for Mitigation.” Wageningen University and Research, 2018.

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32 Asia Pacific Research Network, Asia Peasant Coalition, GRAIN, Madhyam,

People’s Coalition on Food Sovereignty, “‘Greening’ the Belt and Road Initiative?
What about People’s Rights?”, GRAIN Report, 2019. https://grain.org/en/
article/6239-greening-the-belt-and-road-initiative-what-about-people-s-rights.
33 Danny Marks, Athichai Sirithet, Atchara Rakyuttitham, Sri Wulandari, Srisuda Chomchan,
and Pongtip Samranjit, “Land Grabbing and Impacts to Small Scale Farmers in Southeast
Asia Sub-Region,” Bangkok: Local Act Thailand, 2015. http://www. iss. nl/fileadmin/
ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_networks/LDPI/CMCP_60-Samranjit. pdf.
34 Saturnino M. Borras Jr. and Jennifer C. Franco, “Political Dynamics of Land-Grabbing in
Southeast Asia.” Amsterdam: TNI, 2011.
35 Yangfen Chen, Li, Xiande, Wang, Lijuan, and Wang, Shihai, “Is China Different from Other
Investors in Global Land Acquisition? Some Observations from Existing Deals in China’s
Going Global Strategy,” Land Use Policy, 60:2017 (2017): 362–72; Irna Hofman and Peter
Ho, “China’s ‘Developmental Outsourcing’: A Critical Examination of Chinese Global ‘land
Grabs’ Discourse,” Journal of Peasant Studies 39:1 (2012), 1–48.
36 Borras and Franco, “Political Dynamics of Land-Grabbing in Southeast Asia.”
37 Unruh and Williams, “Lessons Learned in Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management
in Post-Conflict Societies,” 553–94.
38 Kaitlin Hansen, “Land Law, Land Rights, and Land Reform in Vietnam: A Deeper Look
into ‘Land Grabbing’ for Public and Private Development,” Ndependent Study Project (ISP)
Collection 1722 (2013). https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/1722.
39 Tuyen Quang Nguyen, “Land Law Reforms in Vietnam--Past & Present,” Singapore: Asian
Law, 2010.
40 Ty Pham Huu, Nguyen Quang Phuc, and GV Westen, “Vietnam in the Debate on Land
Grabbing: Conversion of Agricultural Land for Urban Expansion and Hydropower
Development,” In Dilemmas of Hydropower Development in Vietnam: Between Dam-Induced
Displacement and Sustainable Development, 135–51, 2015.
41 Karen McAllister, “Allocation or Appropriation? How Spatial and Temporal Fragmentation
of Land Allocation Policies Facilitates Land Grabbing in Northern Laos,” Journal of Peasant
Studies 42:3–4 (2015), 817–37.
42 Karen McAllister, “Rubber, Rights, and Resistance: The Evolution of Local Struggles against
a Chinese Rubber Concession in Northern Laos,” (Montreal, QC: McGill University, 2012).
43 Lechner et al, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Environmental Impacts in Southeast Asia.”
44 Pon Phornchanok Souvannaseng, “Losing Ground: The Political Economy of Dependency
and Development in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,” PhD, London School of
Economics and Political Science, 2019.
45 Danny Marks, Athichai Sirithet, Atchara Rakyuttitham, Sri Wulandari, Srisuda Chomchan,
and Pongtip Samranjit, “Land Grabbing and Impacts to Small Scale Farmers in Southeast
Asia Sub-Region,” Bangkok: Local Act Thailand, 2015. http://www. iss. nl/fileadmin/
ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_networks/LDPI/CMCP_60-Samranjit. pdf.
46 Megan McInnes, “Threats against Cambodian Forest Defenders Escalate Amid COVID-19,”
Cambodia Report, Global Witness, May 21, 2020. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/
threats-against-cambodian-forest-defenders-escalate-amid-covid-19/.

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47 AE Schneider, “What Shall We Do without Our Land? Land Grabs and Resistance in Rural
Cambodia,” International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, 2011, 6–8.
48 UNHCR, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained, ” UNHCR, August 25, 2021. https://www.
unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-explained/.
49 Lechner, et al, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Environmental Impacts in Southeast Asia.”
50 Mads Barbesgaard, “Ocean and Land Control-Grabbing: The Political Economy of
Landscape Transformation in Northern Tanintharyi, Myanmar,” Journal of Rural Studies
69:2019 (2019), 195–203.
51 Marks, et al, “Land Grabbing and Impacts to Small Scale Farmers in Southeast Asia
Sub-Region.”
52 Philip Hirsch, “Titling against Grabbing? Critiques and Conundrums around Land
Formalization in Southeast Asia,” International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, 19
(2011).
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Epprecht, “The Transboundary Displacement of Deforestation under REDD+: Problematic
Intersections between the Trade of Forest-Risk Commodities and Land Grabbing in the
Mekong Region,” Global Environmental Change 50:2018 (2018), 255–67.
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Indigenous Peoples in Southeast Asia,” Third World Quarterly, 22:3 (2001), 413-
436, DOI: 10.1080/01436590120061688; Ruth Bottomley, “Balancing Risk: Village
De-mining in Cambodia,” Third World Quarterly, 24:5, (2003), 823-837, DOI:
10.1080/0143659032000132876
55 Unruh, Jon, et al, “Land Rights in Mine-Accected Countries,” 28.
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the Protection of Indian Sacred Sites,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2012. https://www.
denix.osd.mil/na/policy/dod-policies/protection-sacred-sites-2012/Interagency-MOU-
Coordination-and-Collaboration-for-the-Protection-of-Indian-Sacre.pdf.
57 Unruh and Williams, “Lessons Learned in Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management
in Post-Conflict Societies,” 553–94.
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Recent Developments and Future Perspectives in the Indigenous Rights Arena,” The
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and Road to the Global South.” Essays on the Rise of China and Its Implications, Wilson China
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Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. Public Law 115-91 (2018).
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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Green Cooperation:
Environmental Governance
and Development Aid on
the Belt and Road
Tyler Harlan is an Assistant Professor of Urban and Environmental Studies
at Loyola Marymount University and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow

Juliet Lu is an Atkinson Center for Sustainability Postdoctoral Research

Fellow at Cornell University and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu

Abstract
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—China’s multi-trillion-dollar infra-
structure program across 145 countries and counting—is provoking concern
among observers that China is exporting its polluting model of development.
Yet, China’s leaders frame the BRI as a pathway for “green development,”
pointing to China’s ambitious climate targets and leadership in green indus-
tries like renewable energy. To date, efforts to “green” the BRI have focused
on mitigating impacts of large-scale infrastructure—but a “soft” approach to
greening is emerging. In this essay, we trace the rapid rise of what we call green
development cooperation: environmentally-focused activities that forge people-
to-people connections with host countries. Activities include training, dia-
logues, research, and development projects, some of which build on existing
initiatives, and some which are entirely new. Our systematic review of these
engagements finds that cooperation emphasizes technocratic approaches to
environment and development problems that are based on China’s own ex-
perience. Cooperation thus offers a means to position China as an alterna-
tive environmental leader—a kind of green soft power—while also facilitat-
ing transfer of Chinese green technology and expertise to the Global South.
At the same time, the green BRI is a fluid and malleable concept, shaped by
diverse Chinese and host country actors who seek to advance their own objec-
tives through cooperation. This carries the risk of ineffective or “greenwashed”
cooperation interventions, but also creates opportunities for new forms of en-
gagement and dimensions of coalition-building, and an important opening
for improving the environmental performance of the BRI.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● At the broadest level, the green BRI discourse should be understood
as just that—a discourse. This means that it can be used as a tool for
greenwashing, but also offers a powerful platform for engagement with
a diverse range of Chinese actors, many of whom are working hard
to improve environmental outcomes on the BRI. Calling out cases of
greenwashing is far easier than building new engagements. Attention and
resources should thus target this latter more difficult but ultimately more
transformative task.

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 Green Cooperation

● U.S. engagement should focus on identifying shared perspectives and

common goals for greening the BRI, both with Chinese and BRI host
country actors. China wants to be seen as a global leader in sustainable
development, which provides an opportunity to work with Chinese
counterparts in environmental issues of shared concern.

● Policymakers and concerned observers should build on collaborations

currently in place. Many of the activities identified in this paper received
some input from non-Chinese specialists hailing from multilateral
institutions and NGOs. These partnerships should be encouraged and
strengthened.

● At the same time, the United States should recognize that Chinese actors
are mainly promoting the green BRI to their own government, not the
international community. Measuring the BRI against international
environmental standards is worthwhile, but leverage for change will only
come through convincing Chinese decision-makers—a task that can be
advanced by U.S. engagement in green cooperation.

● Moreover, the United States should view China’s coalition building in the
Global South as a new area of collaboration, not a contest. USAID should
provide resources to equip BRI host country actors and institutions with
tools to navigate China’s policy and business context—and leverage these
partnerships for real environment and development gains.

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 Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu

1. Introduction
Since it was first announced in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
has attracted criticism for its environmental impacts.1 Observers point out
that China’s large-scale infrastructure projects—such as roads, bridges, ports,
and dams—can significantly alter ecosystems and reduce biodiversity.2 Critics
also highlight China’s role in driving increased carbon emissions in BRI coun-
tries, most notably by financing and constructing fossil fuel extraction and
generation infrastructure.3 Measures to mitigate these environmental im-
pacts, on the other hand, have been deemed insufficient. Chinese BRI projects
have tended to defer to weak host country standards in assessing and regulat-
ing environmental harm, and consultation with local communities and stake-
holders has been generally absent.4 But this reticence to engage in environ-
mental governance, we find, is changing.
China’s leaders are heavily promoting the BRI as “green.” This framing is
more than just a pledge to minimize environmental impacts; rather, in the
words of Xi Jinping, it promises to foster “a way of life that is green, low-
carbon, circular and sustainable.”5 The green BRI entered official Chinese
discourse in the late 2010s—embodied in dual guidelines issued by China’s
central government6 —and is now a prominent feature in official speeches,
communiques, and media coverage. China’s leaders highlight their national
dominance in renewable energy and high-speed rail as evidence of their ability
to deliver on green claims along the BRI, and the country is taking an increas-
ingly active, leadership role in global environmental governance initiatives
more broadly. Outside observers, meanwhile, see both potential for greening
BRI infrastructure and risks that rhetoric will not translate into meaningful
change in investment decisions and construction practices.7
This green discourse is part of larger efforts in China to foster positive per-
ceptions of the BRI, in part by framing it as more than just an infrastruc-
ture initiative. Xi made this point explicitly at the Third BRI Symposium
in November 2021, categorizing BRI activities as “the infrastructure “hard
connectivity” as an important direction, the rules and standards “soft connec-
tivity” as an important support, with the construction of the people of the
countries “heart connectivity” as an important foundation.”8 Indeed, Beijing
has sought to advance these latter goals of soft power and person-to-person
connections for decades, beginning with agricultural training programs in

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Africa in the 1960s, and expanding to encompass trainings across sectors, pol-
icy dialogues, joint research and scholarships for study in China, and specific
projects focused on rural development and poverty alleviation.9 In the last five
years, moreover, many such initiatives have been refashioned as green, incor-
porating the rhetoric of the green BRI. These “soft” activities exist alongside,
but still apart from, “hard” infrastructure projects, offering a focused channel
for advancing a vision of the BRI that is both win-win and sustainable.
In this policy paper, we offer the first systematic review of these environ-
mentally-focused activities on the BRI, what we term “green development
cooperation” (or green cooperation for short). Chinese leaders refer to a wide
range of transnational engagements as development cooperation, and while
most of these activities have begun to refer to environmental concerns, we see
an emergence of trainings, dialogues, research, and development projects as
the main ways China engages in explicitly green cooperation. Our analysis re-
veals that, since the late 2010s, the green BRI has become a core organizing
principle of China’s development cooperation. Green cooperation activities
have increased substantially as a result. Many of these activities are delivered
through existing cooperation mechanisms, such as decades-old agricultural
technology demonstration centers in Africa; others are entirely new. The or-
ganizations and actors who design and implement cooperation are likewise
diverse, and include foreign cooperation departments of Chinese central and
provincial government ministries, state-owned and private enterprises, think
tanks and research centers, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Cooperation initiatives target Global South countries facing environmental
risks, and emphasize technological solutions drawn from China’s own experi-
ence. As such, cooperation often aligns and overlaps with technology transfer
and “hard” infrastructure projects, as we explore elsewhere.10
From a broader perspective, we find that green cooperation has become a
primary venue through which China projects influence over global environ-
mental governance—a kind of green soft power. It does so by promoting a
China- and BRI-centric narrative of green development and “ecological civi-
lization” that emphasizes technocratic and growth-oriented approaches, of-
fering a potential alternative to the Western-led development model. At the
same time, the green BRI is a fluid and malleable concept, shaped by Chinese
and host country actors who seek to advance their own political, economic,

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 Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu

and environmental objectives. This carries the risk of ineffective or “green-

washed” cooperation interventions, but also creates opportunities for collabo-
ration and engagement. Indeed, the rapid growth of green cooperation shows
that China is serious about environmental issues. Working with rather than
against this cooperation should thus be a top U.S. priority.

2. Greening the Belt and Road

Green cooperation on the Belt and Road—like the BRI itself—is rooted in
China’s own domestic socioeconomic and environmental context. China
faces numerous well-publicized environmental challenges, which over time
have prompted ever-stronger responses from China’s leadership, as evidenced
by the strengthening of environmental policies, targets, and government bu-
reaucracy.11 Underpinning these important shifts is the discourse of “ecologi-
cal civilization,” which was introduced into Communist Party ideology in
2007, adopted by Xi Jinping as a major framework in 2013, and elevated to a
prominent position in the constitution in 2018.12
Ecological civilization pervades Chinese rhetoric of the green BRI. In
its 2017 “Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road,” the Communist
Party Central Committee and State Council foreground the goal to “main-
stream ecological civilization in the ‘Belt and Road Initiative,’” while the
Ministry of Environmental Protection’s (MEP) “Belt and Road Ecological and
Environmental Cooperation Plan” specifically states that “to 2025, we will inte-
grate the concepts of ecological civilization and green development into the Belt
and Road Initiative.”13 Indeed, the government is promoting the concept of eco-
logical civilization heavily in multilateral contexts, including most recently its
selection as the theme of the China-hosted 2021 COP15 Biodiversity Summit.14
Chinese scholars tend to view the mainstreaming of ecological civilization posi-
tively, seeing it as a means for China to influence international environmental
governance by drawing on national wisdom and experience.15 Non-Chinese
researchers and think tanks, meanwhile, show some concern that China aims
to supplant existing global environmental norms and values with those drawn
from ecological civilization, and to channel these through the BRI.16
The technocratic emphasis of efforts to green the BRI is similarly rooted in
China’s own experience and its domestic efforts towards sustainable develop-

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 Green Cooperation

ment. Hansen et al. argue that ecological civilization constitutes a Chinese

state-initiated “socio-technical imaginary,” meaning that it reveals “how
technological values and visions of the future are interwoven with political,
social, and cultural ones.”17 This imaginary portrays a continuity between
China’s ecological tradition and its green future, positioning technological in-
novation and improvement in the people’s environmental consciousness as a
pathway to green development. As such, this imaginary lays an epistemologi-
cal foundation for “state-led technocratic processes of socio-environmental
engineering,”18 ranging from consolidation and intensification of agriculture,
to construction of new hydropower and water management infrastructure, to
classifying areas of the country based on monitoring of ecological health and
risk. There exists a parallel emphasis on the BRI on celebrating China’s tech-
nical achievements as an example (or model) for other developing countries,
and therefore on interventions that transfer Chinese technocratic expertise to
environmental and development problems.
Yet, while China is “talking the talk” through green BRI discourse, scholars
find that it is not “walking the walk” through its investments on the Belt and
Road. Jessica Liao, a 2020-21 Wilson Fellow, argues that the green BRI agenda
represents the rise of China’s “green mercantilism,” defined as “using state capi-
tal to build a BRI-centric coalition around the issue of sustainable development
in the Global South.”19 This green mercantilism seeks to woo developing coun-
tries through environmental discourse—with particular emphasis on China’s
expertise and technology—but it chiefly serves to advance economic and po-
litical objectives over environmental benefits. As a result, Chinese investments
on the BRI are mostly comprised of “brown” infrastructure projects, including
several hundred coal-fired power plants, with only limited engagement in green
projects like solar and wind energy.20 China’s hydropower projects on the BRI,
meanwhile, have been controversially promoted by Chinese actors as “green,”
despite their well-documented social and environmental impacts. Some observ-
ers thus conclude that the green BRI discourse is largely being ignored or simply
“greenwashed” in favor of infrastructural and technological interventions that
benefit the Chinese state and host country elites.21 Beijing’s recent pledge to
end state-sponsored finance for overseas coal power projects22 offers cause for
optimism—as do new Chinese solar and wind projects in Africa23—but there
remains a disconnect between green BRI promises and actions on the ground.

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 Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu

Focusing only on this disconnect, however, risks overlooking the broader

implication of the green BRI: that China is centering environmental protec-
tion in how it engages as a global development partner. This engagement in-
creasingly occurs through people-to-people cooperation activities—trainings,
dialogues, research, and development projects—that are related to, but exist
separately from, high-level policy discourse or infrastructure investments.
This cooperation aims to strengthen China’s environmental leadership and
soft power, but it does so in ways that are shaped by the specific actors in-
volved. Indeed, drawing on the literature on Chinese development aid, we can
understand green cooperation as spaces of encounter, where norms and values
are both advanced and co-constructed by Chinese and host country actors.24
Understanding how this cooperation occurs can shed important light on how
the green BRI is being defined in particular contexts, and how it is shaping
development pathways.

3. Methods
The analysis that follows provides an assessment of the breadth of China’s
green cooperation through the review of related activities, then provides two
in-depth case studies. Defining the types of projects that fell into our concep-
tualization of green cooperation in itself was an iterative process. We began by
conducting a review of literature on China’s green BRI in both English and
Mandarin language search terms. Using this literature review as the basis for
designing search terms and targeting our search for public secondary materi-
als, we conducted a systematic review of green cooperation activities.
Information was compiled from publicly available secondary sources in
Mandarin and English language. Sources include searches of the websites of for-
eign engagement branches of multiple Chinese state Ministries (e.g. the State
Forestry Administration, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Ecology
and Environment), popular media, and reports published by related policy and
academic institutions on the topics of environment and the BRI (e.g. the China
Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development,
the China Academy of Belt and Road Initiative, BRI International Green
Development Coalition). Projects that mentioned environmental engagements
but, to the extent we could discern, did not demonstrate a substantive focus

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on the environment in their related activities were excluded. Because the BRI
builds upon a longer history of Chinese actors ‘Going Out’ (investing overseas),
we include projects established before the BRI’s establishment in 2013, as well
as more recent projects for which implementation agreements (e.g., Memoranda
of Understanding) have been established but activities on the ground are at a
mixture of stages from still in planning (including those delayed by the Covid-
19 pandemic) to well underway.
Finally, two case studies based on former field work conducted by the au-
thors are presented. Previous field work on each case has been updated based
on secondary sources collected through desk studies and a limited number of
remotely conducted interviews.

4. Green Cooperation
Green cooperation activities are clearly on the rise. They are part of an over-
arching trend in which all types of overseas interventions by Chinese actors
are referred to in connection with the Chinese state’s vision of a green Belt
and Road. This trend intersects with China’s increasing investment in “soft”
connectivity by facilitating people-to-people interactions and collaborations
between Chinese actors and the rest of the world. Our review revealed four
primary types of green cooperation activities initiated by Chinese actors with
explicitly stated (though often broadly defined and interpreted) environmen-
tal objectives: trainings, dialogues, research, and development projects. These
interventions involve encounters between Chinese actors and public and pri-
vate sector decision-makers from BRI countries which go beyond the expand-
ing sphere of formal environmental policymaking and “hard” infrastructure
projects or other physical investments.
The majority of green cooperation activities captured in our review occur
in three sectors: water (including hydropower), agriculture, and forestry (often
connected with conservation efforts). This concentration makes sense con-
sidering that China has invested considerable resources in developing these
sectors domestically and has historically focused its development aid contri-
butions to developing countries in the same sectors. Agricultural technology
demonstration centers, for example, have featured heavily in Chinese foreign
aid to Africa25 and simultaneously provide agricultural extension services,

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 Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu

commercial opportunities (connecting Chinese agribusinesses with farmers),

and connections between Chinese and African agricultural sector state offi-
cials.26 China’s water management sector also has a long history of training
developing country technicians and state representatives,27 again unsurprising
considering China’s status as one of the top hydropower and irrigation tech-
nology developers in the world. Forest sector activities range from advising
afforestation and anti-wildlife trafficking efforts to developing sustainable in-
vestment tools for Chinese firms like the “Guide on Sustainable Management
and Utilization of Overseas Forests by Chinese Enterprises” issued by China’s
State Forest Administration in collaboration with WWF, The Nature
Conservancy, Forest Trends, and IUCN.28 Activities in other sectors such as
urban greening, pollution and waste management, and energy initiatives are
likely to increase in the future, with many currently in the planning phase.
We distinguished between four types of green cooperation activities,
though there are significant overlaps between types and the actors who
deliver them. The most common by far are trainings hosted by a range of
Chinese state and private sector actors, many of whom have hosted annual
or otherwise regular training events on certain topics for years. Institutions
like chambers of commerce, business associations, think tanks, and research
centers are also increasingly organizing training in their own sectors. They
are especially dominant in the water sector where training accompanies
sector events like trade shows, and in agriculture where China’s network
of agricultural training and research centers in developing countries pro-
vides a precedent for such activities. Training tends to involve the transfer
of technology, standards and practices, and lessons learned from China to
actors in Belt and Road countries, thus positioning China as a dissemina-
tor of technologies it has developed domestically. For example, the Ministry
of Commerce and the State Forestry Administration of China held a ‘Belt
and Road National Nature Reserve Management and Protection Seminar’
in 2021 during which participants were regaled with stories of “Chinese
wisdom and Chinese solutions to the management of nature reserves and
biodiversity conservation.” 29 Some trainings are one-time events, such as
this seminar, while other trainings constitute recurring events, such as hy-
dropower workshops held annually at the International Center on Small
Hydropower Center in Hangzhou, China.

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We also document a rise in green research initiatives, dialogues and other

multinational collaborations on environmental topics, and on-the-ground
development projects. Sharing data between Chinese and other countries’
research institutions or engaging in collaborative research, particularly to fa-
cilitate joint monitoring and assessment of shared ecosystems, is increasingly
common. A number of institutions, networks, and diplomatic fora have been
established that aim to facilitate dialogue and other forms of engagement be-
tween actors in China with certain regions on a range of topics including the
environment (e.g., the Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Center
[LMEC], discussed below) or on common specified environmental goals (e.g.,
the China-Africa Forest Governance Platform launched in 2013). We in-
clude in this category a particularly fast growing set of engagements between
Chinese (often state and sectoral institution) actors and foreign entities (often
international NGOs or their counterparts in BRI countries) establishing vol-
untary environmental standards. Finally, a limited but growing number of on-
the-ground development projects are noted, some of which pilot the applica-
tion of Chinese environmental interventions elsewhere,30 others which seek
to offset the environmental impacts of Chinese investment activities (e.g.,
the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway Wildlife Corridor31). These types of activities
overlap with each other: institutions that facilitate dialogues may organize
training series, these trainings may be used to launch research collaborations,
and so on. Table 1 provides examples of each type.

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TABLE I: Examples of the four types of green development

cooperation activities

Training Research
International Training Course Sino-Kazakhstan Modern
on Water Conservancy and Agricultural Innovation Park
Hydropower Construction & (2016)
Management (annual) Almaty, Kazakhstan
Hangzhou, China Established jointly by state-owned
Jointly delivered by the International Yangling Modern Agriculture
Center for Small Hydropower and Demonstration Park Development
the Hangzhou Regional Center and Construction Co. Ltd. (which also
for Small Hydropower, which sit manages its sister park, the Shaanxi
under auspices of UN agencies and Yangling Agricultural High-tech
Chinese government ministries. Industrial Demonstration Zone), and
Integrachia- Turgen, an agricultural
Capacity Building on Ecological company in Kazakhstan.
Remote Sensing in Lancang-
Mekong Countries (2018) Egypt-China Agricultural Green
Hubei, China Development Joint Laboratory
Sponsored by the Green Lancang- (2021)
Mekong Initiative, part of the Cairo, Egypt
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Signed between the Egypt National
Center. Remote Sensing Space Science and
the Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Belt and Road National Nature Sciences.
Reserve Management and
Protection Seminar (2021) China-Thailand Joint Laboratory
Online for Climate and Marine Ecosystem
Sponsored by the Ministry of (2013)
Commerce and the State Forestry Phuket, Thailand
and Grassland Administration School Established jointly by the State
of Management (China), training Oceanic Administration (China) and
over 200 students from 16 BRI the Ministry of Natural Resources and
countries. Environment (Thailand).

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Dialogues Projects
Lancang-Mekong Roundtable Vientiane Saysettha Development
Dialogue on Regional and Global Zone (2021)
Environmental Governance: Vientiane, Laos
Action on Climate Change and MOU signed by the Heads of the
Sustainable Infrastructure (2021) Ministry of Natural Resources and
Beijing, China and Online Environment (Laos) and the Ministry
Guided by Ministry of Ecology and of Ecology and Environment (China),
Environment (China), supported to be managed by the Lao-China
by Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Joint Venture Investment Co., Ltd.
Secretariat, co-hosted by Foreign between the Yunnan Construction
Environmental Cooperation Center, and Investment Holding Group and
Lancang-Mekong Environmental the Vientiane Municipal Government.
Cooperation Center, and Department
of Ecology and Environment of Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge
Yunnan Province (China). Railway Wildlife Corridor (2017)
Kenya
Roundtable Forum on Sustainable China Road and Bridge Corporation,
Development and Capacity the development contractor for the
Building of Reservoir Dams and Mombasa-Nairobi Railway.
Hydropower (2019)
Kunming, China “Forest-wise” Parks (Sustainable
Organized by the Chinese Society Forest Product Processing Parks)
of Dam Engineering and Chinese (2019)
National Committee on Large Dams. Nankang & Zhenjiang China,
Mozambique
China-Africa Forest Governance Memorandum of Understanding
Platform (2013) signed between China-Africa
Cameroon, DR Congo, Mozambique, Forest Governance Project,
Uganda, China Chinese Academy of Forestry,
Joint effort between IIED IIED, and Ministry of Land,
(UK government), Centre for Agriculture, Environment, and Rural
Environment and Development Development of the Mozambique
(Cameroon), Reseaux Ressources government.
Naturelles (DRC), Terra Firma
(Mozambique), Advocates Coalition
for Development and Environment
(Uganda), the Chinese Academy
of Forestry, Global Environmental
Institute (Chinese NGO), and WWF
(international NGO).

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The Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Center offers an ex-

ample of how these activities are often organized and can overlap. LMEC
was established by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the first Lancang-Mekong
Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting in 2016, and was formally integrated into the
overall Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework in 2018. In its own words,
the Center “aims to disseminate China’s theory of environmental governance,
boost the capacity of environmental governance of each country and achieve
regional sustainable development through the promotion of environmen-
tal cooperation among Lancang-Mekong countries.”32 It does this primarily
through what it calls the “Green Lancang-Mekong Initiative,” an umbrella
for all four types of cooperation activities including “policy dialogue, capacity
building, mainstreaming environmental policy, joint research and the demon-
stration of environmental projects, etc.”33 Recent topics include water quality,
ecological remote sensing, industrial gas emission standards, and waste man-
agement, with strong emphasis on technological solutions. All of these activi-
ties—and LMEC itself—operate under the auspices of China’s Ministry of
Ecology and Environment, but also have stated partnerships with UN agen-
cies, international NGOs, and Chinese business associations and large SOEs.
Indeed, there is a vast array of Chinese actors engaged in green coopera-
tion. China’s environmental turn on both domestic and international fronts—
through the emphasis on ecological civilization domestically and on greening
the BRI—has compelled all Chinese actors to at least engage with a baseline
level of environmental concerns while creating a much greater space for actors
to push for environmental improvements. The Chinese state is involved across
all types of green cooperation, a reality which parallels non-environmental ac-
tivities in the same sectors. Standard setting activities disproportionately involve
Chinese private sector actors from individual corporations (both private and
state-owned) to sector business associations and research institutions. NGOs
(Chinese, international, and BRI host country domestic) are also active across
types and sectors but hold far more leadership roles in implementing activities in
the areas of conservation and forestry. These actors are increasingly collaborat-
ing, with ties between civil society and the private sector, and between Chinese
and multilateral organizations, becoming increasingly common.
Several preliminary observations emerged through the compilation and
review of these green cooperation activities. Many featured activities serve as

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channels for the transfer of Chinese experiences and technology alike to other
countries. Such activities are referred to by Chinese proponents as South-
South cooperation, and while assessing their reception as such in Belt and
Road countries is beyond the scope of this report, we take the rise of green co-
operation to indicate that China’s environmental turn is linked to its commit-
ment to serving as a development partner and a model for developing coun-
tries to follow. Chinese technology transfer activities occur primarily in areas
where Chinese companies excel, such as the production of high-productivity
seeds, irrigation management systems, and hydropower production, among
others. But they also occur in these sectors because Chinese companies invest
heavily in them, have experienced the costs of environmental risks, and are
learning firsthand the value of preventing or mitigating them.
We take the diversity of actors engaged in green cooperation as indica-
tive that concern for the environment has become a dominant discourse in
Chinese development thinking. On one hand, much like the broader concept
of sustainable development, the mainstreaming of the green BRI means that
many actors will promote environmental rhetoric without actually commit-
ting to behavioral or structural change. It is simply normatively necessary for
them to acknowledge the green BRI in order to continue operating. On the
other hand, green cooperation offers a new space for environmental action on
the BRI. New coalitions are forming, not just between natural allies, but also
between actors who might generally be hostile to one another, such as Chinese
firms and international NGOs. Finally, most activities documented are ex-
tremely new. This too means considerable promise for future change, but also
the need for more careful, in-depth assessment of their implications. We make
a first step towards such an assessment of China’s green cooperation through
two case studies that follow.

5. Case Study: Guidelines for Chinese

Overseas Rubber Plantations
In the 2010s, the expansion of monoculture rubber plantations across the
Mekong Region drove mass clear-cutting of some of the world’s most biodi-
verse, carbon-rich forests. From 2005 to 2015, over 2 million ha of rubber

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plantations were established across the region,34 70 percent of which replaced

forest land.35 By the mid-2010s, intense public pressure to curb the commod-
ity’s environmental impacts was building. China dominates the global rub-
ber supply chain as the top consumer of natural rubber (41 percent of global
output)36 and a primary site of production for a range of rubber products.
Domestic rubber production is concentrated in Yunnan and Hainan prov-
inces and has long been protected as a sector of strategic importance to the
country. In the 2000s, Chinese rubber companies began to expand into the
Mekong Region and beyond, both establishing large-scale rubber plantations
and extending processing and purchasing networks to encourage rubber up-
take by local farmers. China has therefore both directly and indirectly driven
the unsustainable expansion of rubber production across Southeast Asia and
has come under considerable scrutiny for its role.
In 2014, China’s Chamber of Commerce for Metals, Minerals and
Chemicals—an industry group affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce
that includes a number of downstream manufacturers of rubber-based prod-
ucts—entered into partnership with the UK’s Department for International
Development (DFID) and a handful of international NGOs. CCCMC was
approached by DFID funders to spearhead the project after its leadership on
a similar set of guidelines for China’s overseas mining investments. The group
produced a set of voluntary guidelines for companies investing in rubber pro-
duction abroad titled, “The Guidance for Sustainable Natural Rubber” (here-
after The SNR Guidelines). These SNR Guidelines were developed through
a series of stakeholder consultation events, studies of comparable documents
beyond the rubber sector, and field visits to countries where Chinese invest-
ment is active. They were published in English and Mandarin and outline six
operating principles for both environmental and social responsibility and sug-
gestions for their implementation by companies.
The project, while prompted by DFID, was motivated as well by a growing
realization among Chinese policymakers and private sector leaders that rub-
ber investments carried serious risks when implemented without regard for
environmental and social concerns. Both Chinese and Vietnamese companies
had come into conflict with local land users37 and been featured in negative
media and development organization reporting,38 and Chinese rubber com-
panies struggled far more than expected to obtain land for rubber expansion

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in Laos and Myanmar.39 Not only did these conflicts and negative coverage
create obstacles for individual companies operating, but they contradicted the
promotion of Chinese rubber investments as a form of development cooper-
ation—a crop that would both raise the livelihoods of poor farmers in the
Mekong Region, contribute to host country economies, and improve China’s
access to a sustainable supply to the strategic material.
The SNR Guidelines represent an important early foray by Chinese actors
into the area of sustainable standards setting. As such, their impact can be
measured in very different ways. On one hand, the SNR Guidelines have been
taken up by activist organizations in Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam
and in some cases adopted to local contexts and translated into local lan-
guages. These organizations draw on the fact that the SNR Guidelines come
from Chinese actors to boost their legitimacy in engaging Chinese companies.
That said, company engagement activities both by CCCMC and by activist
organizations in host countries are still in the early stages. Field interviews in
2018 and 2019—well after the guidelines were officially launched—suggested
that almost no Chinese rubber company employees were aware of them, and
pilot programs launched in 2019 were slowed by the Covid pandemic.
On the other hand, the SNR Guidelines demonstrate important engage-
ment across actors often assumed by outsiders to be at odds or not in dialogue
in China. The fact that the project brought together CCCMC, an organiza-
tion that bridges private sector and state interests in rubber, into collabora-
tion with both foreign development organizations (DFID) and international
NGOs like Global Witness which have been vocally critical of Chinese capi-
tal goes against dominant narratives of Chinese actors’ willingness to engage
with foreign civil society. CCCMC continues to engage with foreign NGOs
today, and to host fora in which Chinese state, private sector, and non-Chi-
nese state, private sector, and civil society actors come together to discuss rub-
ber’s environmental impacts.

6. Case study: Training in Small Hydropower

and Green Development
Hydropower is one of the most prominent types of infrastructure projects
on the BRI. According to the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Global

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China Investment Tracker, Chinese financiers invested approx. U.S.$18

billion in completed BRI hydropower dams from 2014-19, while Chinese
firms were involved in engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC)
contracts for approx. U.S.$40 billion worth of projects. As with many
large-scale BRI projects, finance is dominated by state development and
commercial banks, and construction by the many state-owned hydropower
firms that Webber and Han refer to as China’s “water machine.”40 Nearly all
overseas projects are large-scale and dam-type installations that impound
reservoirs and transmit electricity through regional or national grids. These
projects have a significant environmental footprint both in the local area
and downstream, and many require resettling affected communities. These
impacts have prompted strong opposition to Chinese hydropower projects
at the local, national, and global levels, despite their continued popularity
with many BRI host country governments.
China’s hydropower industry portrays hydropower as a green and low-car-
bon technology that is essential to decarbonization. China, like many (but
not all) countries, classifies hydropower as a renewable energy, and substan-
tial new domestic installations are calculated as part of China’s Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) in the Paris Agreement. Chinese ne-
gotiators also pushed for hydropower projects to be eligible for carbon off-
set finance as part of the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM).41 Indeed, domestic hydropower projects in China were by far the
chief recipients of CDM finance across all countries and sectors,42 contribut-
ing to a hydropower boom in China that is set to continue. Critics thus tend
to see China’s (and the broader global hydropower industry’s) promotion of
green hydropower as an attempt at “greenwashing” and facilitating continued
domestic and international expansion.43
Yet, this view elides a much longer and more expansive history of “green”
hydropower in China, and the specific experiences, technologies, and stan-
dards that are promoted internationally. Indeed, the genesis of China’s “green-
ing” of hydropower lies in the overlooked small hydropower (SHP) industry, a
classification that in China refers to projects <50 megawatts (MW). Since the
1950s, China’s central government has promoted (and at times, subsidized)
SHP projects in rural areas as a method of rural electrification, which pro-
vided millions of Chinese villagers with their first electricity connection.44

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Beginning in the early 2000s, the government also began upholding SHP
as a driver of “green development,” because it was believed to replace peasant
firewood with electricity, thereby preventing deforestation and soil erosion.45
To encourage SHP development, the government set aside ¥127 billion for
SHP station and transmission line construction, and cut household electric-
ity tariffs in half in some of the poorest areas of the country.46 These policies,
along with energy sector reforms, precipitated a boom in SHP construction,
with installed capacity tripling from 2002-15. Most of these new stations are
privately-developed and operated, in contrast with SOE-dominated large hy-
dropower dams.47
It is in this context that Chinese state ministries are sponsoring and de-
livering “green” SHP training and technology transfer programs for BRI
countries. This training, too, has a long history. In 1981, China’s Ministry
of Water Resources established the National Research Institute for Rural
Electrification, which gained co-sponsorship from the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) and began referring to itself in English as
the Hangzhou Regional Center for Small Hydropower (HRC). In 1994,
the Ministry of Science and Technology and the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) created another institution, the
International Center for Small Hydropower (ICSHP), which has a more in-
ternational focus but significant cross-pollination with HRC staff and activi-
ties. Together, these two organizations offer a number of weeks-long training
courses for international participants each year, while also acting as a center
for SHP expertise and a central node of a global network of SHP experts,
manufacturers, and EPC contractors.48 By their own account, since their in-
ception, HRC and ICSHP have hosted 160 training courses for participants
from 112 countries, focused on hydropower technologies, construction, poli-
cies, and standards.49 Both organizations also offer their own for-profit con-
sulting and EPC services for small- and medium-sized projects in China and
overseas, and also facilitate finance for overseas projects from Chinese banks.
While HRC and ICSHP programs have long praised the role of SHP
in rural electrification, they are increasingly promoting its environmental
benefits, too—particularly since the green BRI gained prominence in the
late 2010s. Like green cooperation as a whole, SHP training draws heavily
on the rhetoric of ecological civilization—as evidenced by titles of recent

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symposia and training courses—and emphasizes Chinese experience and

technology as a means to combat environmental risk. These themes are in-
tegrated into course materials and site visits. For example, a typical training
workshop begins with several days of presentations on China’s SHP experi-
ence, stressing in particular how SHP has prevented deforestation in eco-
logically sensitive regions of China. Participants then listen to lectures on
hydropower technologies (such as turbines, electrical equipment, and dam
types) and take field trips to SHP “demonstration sites” where they can tour
Chinese facilities and ask technical questions about equipment manufac-
turing and plant operation. Throughout, trainers repeatedly stress the qual-
ity and reliability of Chinese SHP technology and its critical role in China’s
own green development.
Still, while promoting SHP as “green,” training staff also point to the
potential ecological impacts of small hydropower, highlighting domestic ex-
amples from parts of China where SHP did not develop in an “orderly” man-
ner. This recognition helps to diffuse potential criticism, but also to highlight
China’s new domestic evaluation standards for green SHP, which include
guidance on site selection, environmental impact analysis, and construction
and operation. China’s domestic SHP plants can apply for green certification
under these official standards, either in the process of building a new plant,
or through renovation of existing plants. These standards are widely viewed
by Chinese SHP experts as bringing the domestic SHP industry in line with
international norms, with the hope that they will increase the global competi-
tiveness of Chinese SHP on the BRI.
Thus far, these green standards—and green SHP training programs more
broadly—have had little influence over China’s hydropower projects on the
Belt and Road. Chinese SHP firms are encouraged to adopt new standards
for domestic projects, but have no incentive to do so for overseas projects—
meaning that most BRI plants simply abide by (often lax) host country regula-
tions. Perhaps more importantly, the vast majority of Chinese-financed and/
or constructed SHP plants on the BRI are medium-sized, grid-connected, and
usually unsubsidized, such that they privilege power generation over rural
electrification and forest protection. Indeed, Chinese SHP experts admit
that the green, pro-poor SHP promoted in training programs is difficult to
implement in other countries without strong host government support and

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subsidies. Rather, water-rich BRI countries tend to prefer large hydropower

projects backed by Chinese policy banks and built by SOEs, to which green
SHP standards and technologies do not apply.
At the same time, China’s cooperation in green SHP has brought together
domestic and foreign actors from government, industry, and civil society who
might not otherwise collaborate. Organizations like HRC and ICSHP pro-
vide a forum for this collaboration by working under the auspices of both the
United Nations and the Chinese government. Training programs and joint
development of standards, while still limited to SHP, reveal how such long-
standing development activities are being reframed and reworked as green.

6. Conclusion
The BRI has an enormous environmental footprint, and China’s attempts to
green this footprint are both necessary and welcome. This paper highlights
that such efforts are very much underway, pointing to a rapid increase in the
last five years in Chinese-led trainings, dialogues, research, and development
projects focused on the green BRI. These myriad activities—which we term
green cooperation—build upon longstanding development cooperation be-
tween China and other countries, particularly in the realms of water, agricul-
ture, and conservation. Such cooperation is now placing the environment at
the forefront, drawing on China’s domestic efforts (and in some cases, global
leadership) in strengthening environmental protection. Indeed, just as the
environment has become a central tenet of domestic policy making and de-
velopment planning in China, greening the BRI and green cooperation are
becoming mainstream.
An analysis of this cooperation itself reveals a strong focus on technological
solutions to environmental problems, drawn from China’s own historical and
contemporary experience. This perspective is grounded in the concept of “eco-
logical civilization,” which China’s leaders promote internationally as a rally-
ing principle for win-win and sustainable development. For the many Chinese
actors and institutions involved in cooperation—including government min-
istries, state and private firms, think tanks, and NGOs—there is thus a clear
connection between China’s own domestic environmental transformation
and its push to green the BRI. Our case studies of rubber and h ­ ydropower

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show that this push at times is superficial and opportunistic, but the broader
momentum of change is genuine and holds massive opportunity.
Concerned governments and institutions, then, should identify and focus
on shared goals and perspectives for a green BRI, engaging with rather than
working against China’s green cooperation. Analysis of cooperation in this
paper and of our rubber and hydropower case studies shows that collabora-
tion for a green BRI is possible, even if its current implementation is limited.
Simply labeling China’s green cooperation as an attempt at “greenwashing”
will only deepen mistrust; it is far better to engage in and seek to strengthen
this cooperation. Indeed, the joint climate pledges from China and the U.S. at
COP26 illustrate the possibility for collaboration on norms and standards—
an outcome we hope to see replicated on the BRI.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
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2 Li Shuen Ng et al., “The Scale of Biodiversity Impacts of the Belt and Road Initiative in
Southeast Asia,” Biological Conservation 248 (August 1, 2020), 108691; Xuan Liu et al.,
“Risks of Biological Invasion on the Belt and Road,” Current Biology 29:3 (February 2019),
499-505.\\uc0\\u8221{} {\\i{}Biological Conservation} 248 (August 1, 2020
3 Peng Ren, Chang Liu, and Liwen Zhang, “China’s Involvement in Coal-Fired Power Projects
along the Belt and Road,” Global Environmental Institute, May 2017. Accessed on March
14, 2022. http://www.geichina.org/_upload/ file/report/China percent27s_Involvement_
in_Coal-fired_Power_Projects_OBOR_EN.pdf; Ning Zhang et al., “Carbon Footprint of
China’s Belt and Road,” Science 357: 6356 (September 2017), 1107.
4 Scott Morris, “The Kunming-Vientiane Railway: The Economic, Procurement, Labor, and
Safeguards Dimensions of a Chinese Belt and Road Project,” CGD Policy Paper 142, Center
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dimensions-chinese; Xiheng Jiang, “Green Belt and Road Initiative Environmental and
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7 Jonathan Elkind, “Toward a Real Green Belt and Road,” Columbia University Center on
Global Energy Policy, April 2019. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.energypolicy.
columbia.edu/research/commentary/toward-real-green-belt-and-road; Tsinghua,
“Decarbonizing the Belt and Road: A Green Finance Roadmap,” Center for Finance and
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www.climateworks.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Decarbonizing-the-Belt-and-Road_
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Actions,” World Resources Institute (WRI), November 8, 2018. Accessed on March 4, 2022.
https://www.wri.org/research/moving-green-belt-and-road-initiative-words-actions; WWF,
“Greening the Belt and Road Initiative: WWF’s Recommendations for the Finance Sector,”
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), January 1, 2018. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.
sustainablefinance.hsbc.com/mobilising-finance/greening-the-belt-and-road-initiative
8 Xinhua, “习近平出席第三次‘一带一路’建设座谈会并发表重要讲话 (Xi Jinping
Attended the Third ‘Belt and Road’ Construction Symposium and Delivered an Important
Speech),” Xinhua, November 19, 2021. Accessed on March 14, 2022. http://www.gov.cn/
xinwen/2021-11/19/content_5652067.htm.
9 Kenneth King, China’s Aid and Soft Power in Africa: The Case of Education and Training
(Rochester, NY: James Currey, 2013); James Reilly, “A Norm-Taker or Norm-Maker? Chinese
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University Press, 2022).
10 Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu, “The Cooperation-Infrastructure Nexus: Translating the ‘China
Model’ into Southeast Asia,” Working paper, 2022.
11 Yifei Li and Judith Shapiro, China Goes Green: Coercive Environmentalism for a Troubled
Planet (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020).
12 Mette Halskov Hansen, Hongtao Li, and Rune Svarverud, “Ecological Civilization:
Interpreting the Chinese Past, Projecting the Global Future,” Global Environmental Change
53 (November 2018), 195.
13 China State Council, “Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road,” 1; MEP, “Belt and

497
 Tyler Harlan and Juliet Lu

Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan,” 5.

14 Juliet Lu and Tyler Harlan, “COP15 in Kunming: A New Role for China in Global
Conservation?” Wilson Center Asia Dispatches, October 19, 2021. Accessed on March 14, 2022.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/cop15-kunming-new-role-china-global-conservation
15 Xiaofeng Liu and Mia M. Bennett, “The Geopolitics of Knowledge Communities: Situating
Chinese and Foreign Studies of the Green Belt and Road Initiative,” Geoforum 128 (January
2022), 176.
16 Liu and Bennett, 176.
17 Hansen, Li, and Svarverud, “Ecological Civilization,” 196.
18 Jesse Rodenbiker, “Urban Ecological Enclosures: Conservation Planning, Peri-Urban
Displacement, and Local State Formations in China,” International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 44:4 (June 2020), 1931.
19 Jessica Liao, “China’s Green Mercantilism and Environmental Governance: A New Belt
and Road to the Global South?” in Essays on the Rise of China and its Implications, ed.
Abraham M. Denmark and Lucas Myers, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, April 2021), 242. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
publication/2020-21-wilson-china-fellowship-essays-rise-china-and-its-implications
20 Jessica C. Liao, “Talking Green, Building Brown: China-ASEAN Environmental and Energy
Cooperation in the BRI Era,” Asian Perspective 46:1 (Winter 2022): 21–47; Tyler Harlan,
“Green Development or Greenwashing? A Political Ecology Perspective on China’s Green
Belt and Road,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 62:2 (March 2021), 202–26.
21 Maddy White, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Green Leadership or Greenwashing?”
Global Trade Review, October 14, 2020. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.gtreview.
com/news/sustainability/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-green-leadership-or-greenwashing/;
Jane Nakano, “Greening or Greenwashing the Belt and Road Initiative?” Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), May 1, 2019. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://
www.csis.org/analysis/greening-or-greenwashing-belt-and-road-initiative; Harlan, “Green
Development or Greenwashing?”
22 Quirin Schiermeier, “China’s Pledge on Overseas Coal — by the Numbers,” Nature 598:7879
(September 2021), 20–21.
23 Bo Kong and Kevin Gallagher, “Chinese Development Finance for Solar and Wind Power
Abroad,” Working Paper 009, Global China Initiative (GCI), Global Development Policy
Center, Boston University, January 2020). Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.bu.edu/
gdp/files/2020/02/WP9-Kong-Bo-inc_abstract.pdf; Frangton Chiyemura, Wei Shen, and
Yushi Chen, “Scaling China’s Green Energy Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and
Prospects,” Institute of Development Studies, The African Climate Foundation, and The Open
University, November 2021). Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://africanclimatefoundation.
org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/800539-ACF-NRDC-Report.pdf
24 Xiuli Xu et al., “Science, Technology, and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China’s
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers in Africa,” World Development 81 (May
2016), 82–91; Tyler Harlan, “A Green Development Model: Transnational Model-Making in
China’s Small Hydropower Training Programmes,” Area Development and Policy 2:3 (June
2017), 251–71.

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25 Xu et al., “Science, Technology, and the Politics of Knowledge: The Case of China’s
Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers in Africa.”
26 Henry Tugendhat and Dawit Alemu, “Chinese Agricultural Training Courses for African
Officials: Between Power and Partnerships,” World Development 81 (May 2016), 71–81.
27 Harlan, “A Green Development Model: Transnational Model-Making in China’s Small
Hydropower Training Programmes”; Michael Webber and Xiao Han, “Corporations,
Governments, and Socioenvironmental Policy in China: China’s Water Machine as Assemblage,”
Annals of the American Association of Geographers 107:6 (November 2017), 1444–60.
28 SFA and MOFCOM, “A Guide on Sustainable Overseas Forest Management and Utilization by
Chinese Enterprises,” China State Forestry Administration (SFA) and Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM), August 24, 2009. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.iucn.org/
content/a-guide-sustainable-overseas-forest-management-and-utilization-chinese-enterprises
29 Yi Sui, “一带一路”国家自然保护区管理与保护研修班顺利开班 (‘Belt and Road’
National Nature Reserve Management and Protection Seminar Successfully Launched),”
China State Forestry and Grasslands Administration and National Parks Management
Bureau, September 22, 2021). Accessed on March 14, 2022. http://www.forestry.gov.cn/stafa
/563/20210922/170243695211476.html
30 United Nations, “High-Level Meeting on Juncao Technology,” General Assembly of
the United Nations, April 18, 2019. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.un.org/
pga/73/2019/04/18/high-level-meeting-on-juncao-technology/
31 Xinhua, “Chinese Infrastructure Projects Built on Solid Environmental Foundations,”
China Daily, October 28, 2021. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://global.chinadaily.com.
cn/a/202110/28/WS6179ee11a310cdd39bc71be2.html.
32 LMEC, “Lancang-Mekong Environmental Cooperation Center (LMEC),” 2022. Accessed
on March 14, 2022. http://en.lmec.org.cn/.
33 LMEC.
34 Eleanor Warren-Thomas, Paul M. Dolman, and David P. Edwards, “Increasing Demand
for Natural Rubber Necessitates a Robust Sustainability Initiative to Mitigate Impacts on
Tropical Biodiversity,” Conservation Letters 8: (March 2015), 230–41.\\uc0\\u8221{} {\\i{}
Conservation Letters} 8, no. 4 (2015
35 Kaspar Hurni and Jefferson Fox, “The Expansion of Tree-Based Boom Crops in Mainland
Southeast Asia: 2001 to 2014,” Journal of Land Use Science 13:1–2 (March 2018), 198–219.
36 Research and Markets, “Global and China Natural Rubber Industry Report 2019-
2025,” Research and Markets, 2019. Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.
researchandmarkets.com/reports/4770751/global-and-china-natural-rubber-industry-
report?utm_source=GNOM&utm_medium=PressRelease&utm_code=7893kx&utm_
campaign=1248494+-+Global+and+China+Natural+Rubber+Industry+Report
percent2c+2019-2025&utm_exec=chdo54prd.
37 Inclusive Development International, “Cambodia: Defending Indigenous Rights and
Resources against HAGL Land Grab,” Inclusive Development International, 2021. Accessed
on March 14, 2022. https://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/cases/cambodia-hoang-anh-gia-
lai-rubber-plantations/; Karen E. McAllister, “Rubber, Rights and Resistance: The Evolution
of Local Struggles against a Chinese Rubber Concession in Northern Laos,” in Global

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Land Grabbing and Political Reactions ‘From Below,’ ed. Mark Edelman et al. (New York:
Routledge, 2019), 351–72.
38 Global Witness, “Rubber Barons: How Vietnamese Companies and International Financiers
Are Driving the Land Grabbing Crisis in Cambodia and Laos,” Global Witness, May 2013).
Accessed on March 14, 2022. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/land-deals/
rubberbarons/.
39 Juliet Lu and Oliver Schönweger, “Great Expectations: Chinese Investment in Laos and the
Myth of Empty Land,” Territory, Politics, Governance 7: 1 (January 2019), 61–78.
40 Webber and Han, “Corporations, Governments, and Socioenvironmental Policy in China:
China’s Water Machine as Assemblage.”
41 John A. Sautter, “The Clean Development Mechanism in China: Assessing the Tension
between Development and Curbing Anthropogenic Climate Change,” Virginia
Environmental Law Journal 27:1 (2009), 91–118.
42 UNEP and DTU, “UNEP DTU Clean Development Mechanism / Joint Implementation
Pipeline Analysis and Database,” United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and
Danish Technical University (DTU), 2022. Accessed on March 14, 2022. http://www.
cdmpipeline.org/
43 Jessica Corbett, “Hundreds of Groups Reject Greenwashing of Destructive
Hydropower Industry at COP26,” Common Dreams, November 9, 2021. Accessed
on March 14, 2022. https://www.commondreams.org/news/ 2021/11/09/
hundreds-groups-reject-greenwashing-destructive-hydropower-industry-cop26
44 HRC, Rural Hydropower and Electrification in China, 2nd ed., Hangzhou Regional Center
for Small Hydropower (Hangzhou, China: China Water Press, 2009); Wuyuan Peng and
Jiahua Pan, “Rural Electrification in China: History and Institution,” China & World
Economy 14:1 (February 2006), 71–84.
45 Tyler Harlan, “Rural Utility to Low-Carbon Industry: Small Hydropower and the
Industrialization of Renewable Energy in China,” Geoforum 95 (October 2018), 59–69.
46 Charlotte Hicks, “Small Hydropower in China: A New Record in World Hydropower
Development,” Refocus 5:6 (November-December 2004), 36–40.
47 Harlan, “A Green Development Model: Transnational Model-Making in China’s Small
Hydropower Training Programmes.”
48 Harlan, 259.
49 ICSHP, “International Center on Small Hydropower,” 2022. Accessed on March 14, 2022.
http://www.icshp.org/inshp/default.asp; HRC, “Hangzhou Regional Center for Small
Hydropower,” 2022. Accessed on March 14, 2022. http://www.hrcshp.org/en/about/hrc.html.

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Finding a Balanced China

Policy: Constraints and
Opportunities for Southeast
Asian Leaders

Renard Sexton is an Assistant Professor at Emory University and a

2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Renard Sexton

Abstract
Much of recent U.S. policy discussion of maritime conflict in East Asia, es-
pecially around the South China Sea, has focused on U.S. and China great
power competition. Often left out are the political dynamics within and
among Southeast Asian (explicitly or implicitly) claimant countries, which are
highly important for the conduct of foreign affairs in the region and the ulti-
mate disposition of the conflict. Specifically, this project examines the often
highly nationalistic domestic political pressures that leaders in Southeast Asia
face vis-à-vis China, at the same time that they navigate increasing trade reli-
ance on the Chinese market and growing PRC assertiveness in terms of terri-
torial claims in maritime Asia. It also documents the growing level of conflict
between ASEAN (Association for Southeast Asian Nations) countries in the
South China Sea, something that imperils any collective action on the topic.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● Policymakers in United States should recognize that confrontation
with China is bad domestic politics for most leaders in Southeast Asia,
including those with claims in the SCS.

● The United States should work to help SE Asian countries resolve their
bilateral disputes in the SCS, along with disincentivizing posturing
between ASEAN countries, as a critical precursor to any collective action
vis-à-vis China.

● The United States should seek to understand and carefully navigate the
divergence in views between elites and regular citizens in Southeast Asia
on international affairs, which complicates strategic calculations and
diplomatic engagement.

● U.S. economic engagement in SE Asia lags behind security cooperation,

and although the latter is valued, without greater public and private
economic engagement rebalancing towards China by most SE Asian
countries is increasingly likely over time.

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● Although ‘ASEAN Centrality’ is often viewed as a useful, if hollow,

diplomatic buzz-phrase, ASEAN may in practice be an impediment to
resolution of the issues by distracting limited political energy from other
processes that would have a chance to succeed.

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 Renard Sexton

Introduction
Over the past decade, foreign policy discussions about Asian regional security
have increasingly (and somewhat myopically) focused on U.S.-China relations
and impending competition or confrontation. Although undoubtedly impor-
tant, this lens often obscures important political dynamics within the region,
especially as smaller countries in the region struggle to manage China’s in-
creasing military and economic assertiveness in its ‘backyard.’ Even as they
fret about the PRC’s expansionist tendencies and return of China as the ‘big
brother,’ de-facto accommodation has been the main response. One emblem-
atic case is the ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which
include competing claims between Southeast Asian countries and China, as
well as between themselves. Southeast Asian leaders find themselves stuck be-
tween multiple constraints.
On the one hand, public opinion is overwhelmingly hawkish and nation-
alistic, demanding that leaders take action to push back against incursions
by China and their neighbors. In a recent survey conducted on representa-
tive samples of people in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam,
70 percent of respondents agreed that their government should “stand up to
China [regarding the South China Sea], despite the risks.”1 For leaders like
Joko Widodo of Indonesia, or Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, who are
periodically accused2 of being ‘soft on China,’ public pressure for strong action
is politically impossible to ignore.
On the other hand, China has become the ASEAN region’s largest trad-
ing partner and is an increasingly important source of foreign capital and
investment, including infrastructure investments. Looking forward, many
elites in Southeast Asia see this trend as only increasing further—with criti-
cal imports coming from China and China as a growing, vital market for
exports. An escalation that hamstrung exports or interrupted investments
would be extremely damaging to the economy, with obvious political ramifi-
cations. For business elites involved in international trade, who are inevitably
well-connected with the political leadership, a serious crisis with China or
neighbors would be a big problem. At the same time, China’s growing mili-
tary capabilities, and increasing willingness since 2012 to use them, raises the
stakes further for Southeast Asian governments. Beyond the obvious mis-
match between say the Indonesian Navy and the People’s Liberation Army

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Navy, China’s demonstrated capacity to take offensive action in cyberspace is

deeply troubling for ASEAN leaders.3
Given these countervailing political pressures, acute crises in the South
China Sea can create no-win situations for Southeast Asian political leaders.
It raises the profile and political salience of a topic that can expose them on
both flanks: the nationalist crowd is reminded that national sovereignty re-
mains under significant threat, and the free-traders and other elites are fright-
ened about economic disruptions or who are politically favorable to China.
It would make sense, then, that finding a durable settlement that would
take the issue off the table would be preferable to periodic episodes of con-
flict with risks of significant downsides. For Southeast Asian leaders, though,
a lack of leverage, poor coordination with neighbors and pressure from hard-
liners at home has made finding and implementing a compromise infeasible
to date. Ironically, the overwhelming hawkishness of the public in Southeast
Asia constrains the ability of leaders to make deals that in the long run might
protect a country’s claims better than intransigence.
Considering things from the perspective of the United States, two major
challenges are that the status quo largely favors China and the U.S. strategy of
supporting a regionally-driven resolution in a hands-off/‘ASEAN centrality’
manner is unlikely to bear fruit. China’s growing military strength, as well as
the relative success of its ‘gray zone’ strategy (including military investments
in the Spratlys) has meant that they have slowly but surely gained ground in
the region. Also, Southeast Asian countries continue to have territorial dis-
putes between themselves and ASEAN’s non-interference and consensus rules
limit regional action. Unless the United States and its allies play a more lead-
ing role, the combination of growing Chinese leverage and commitment prob-
lems/nationalist sentiment between Southeast Asian countries likely means
that China will achieve their aims in the South China Sea, de-facto control-
ling much of the four archipelagos (Four Sha) that they seek to consolidate,
unless a hot war forces the United States to engage in kinetic pushback.
Part of the difficulty of implementing this is that the United States has
become year-by-year less relatively economically important to Southeast
Asia, even as nominal investment and trade levels have risen, with trade
and investment with China and intra-regionally trade growing significantly
faster. Perceptions of U.S. disengagement outpace the facts on the ground:

505
 Renard Sexton

though the United States remains an important economic player in the

ASEAN region by trade numbers and brand strength, elites and the general
public perceive a slow by steady retreat of the United States in economic
importance to the region.

Recent trends in the South China Sea

Although some territorial disputes in the South China Sea go back to post-
World War II era, the upswing in conflict has been a relatively recent phenom-
enon (with some exceptions, like China seizing parts of the Paracel Islands
from Vietnam in the 1970s). New data that catalogues major incidents related
to conflict in the South China Sea from 2010 to the present shows that since
Xi Jinping took power in China in late 2012, PRC maritime activities in the
South China Sea have expanded dramatically.4 This also roughly corresponds
also with President Obama’s “pivot to Asia.” In Figure 1 below, we see that al-
though incidents associated with U.S. vessels and ships from non-superpower
countries have also risen, the scale is not to the same degree as China.5

FIGURE 1: Conflict Events Detected in SCS

80

CHINA
NONSUPER
60

US
Incidents
40
20
0

2010 2015 2020

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 Finding a Balanced China Policy

As sovereignty claims in the South China Sea have gained political cur-
rency during this period, activities by ASEAN countries have also risen, both
involving neighbors and China as targets. Most notably, Vietnam in the early
2010s mirrored China by sharply increasing the number of activities it was
involved with. This includes an increase in Vietnamese “maritime militia”
units who although not formal military units conduct many similar activities
in contested areas.6 The goal is typically to increase a country’s sphere of influ-
ence without formally involving state vessels.
Although regional policy makers (as well as U.S. diplomats) have long fo-
cused on ASEAN as a coordinating mechanism by which Southeast Asian
countries might work together to manage (read: push back in a collaborative
fashion) China’s regional expansionism, intra-ASEAN issues continue to be
an important part of the story of the South China Sea disputes. Looking, for
example, at the disputed Natuna Islands in the maritime border region where
Indonesian, Malaysian and Vietnamese EEZs intersect (and claims in several
cases overlap), the largest set of Indonesian maritime arrests detected from
news coverage is not from Chinese vessels, but instead Vietnamese vessels, and
in certain years arrests of Malaysian fishers also exceeds Chinese.

FIGURE 2: Conflict Events Detected in SCS

80

VIETNAM
INDONESIA
60

PHILIPPINES
MALAYSIA
Incidents
40
20
0

2010 2015 2020

507
 Renard Sexton

FIGURE 3: Indonesian arrests in Natuna Islands

25

VIETNAM
20

MALAYSIA
Vessels Seized

CHINA
15

PHILIPPINES
10
5
0

2010 2015 2020

It is difficult to know to what extent this represents a choice by the

Indonesian government to enforce more aggressively against Vietnamese
vessels than against Chinese, rather than a more significant presence of
Vietnamese fishers. It is also possible that similar levels of enforcement are
taking place, but the incidents involving Chinese vessels are less likely to be
publicized or deployed by the government for domestic political advantage.
In any case though, the fact is that Indonesia has significant unresolved
maritime territorial issues with Vietnam and Malaysia that make a united
front vis-à-vis China impossible at this stage. Similar intra-ASEAN issues
occasionally plague Vietnam and the Philippines7, along with periodic ter-
ritorial disputes between the Philippines and Malaysia (both maritime and
on-land, e.g. North Borneo dispute) and ongoing issues with Vietnamese
fishermen in Malaysian-claimed waters. Since 2019, more than 1,600
Vietnamese fishermen have been apprehended in what Malaysia regards as
its waters. 8 Indonesia and Malaysia have ongoing disagreements about the
delineation of oil and gas blocks, although the most notable ones are just
outside the South China Sea basin.9
In theory, ASEAN would be an excellent forum for such issues to be nego-
tiated and resolved, whether on the official agenda or, more likely, during bi-

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 Finding a Balanced China Policy

lateral side meetings during ASEAN summits. In practice, however, ASEAN

meetings have taken a turn towards “shelving” contentious bilateral issues be-
tween members in an effort to forge consensus on the common issues faces
the bloc.10 Without commentary on the advisability of this approach, the fact
remains that ASEAN has not served as a forum for progress on disputes in the
South China Sea.
This has left bilateral negotiations as the primary way forward between
Southeast Asian countries with competing claims. Although most exist-
ing disputes have seen escalation over the past decade, there have been a
few instances of positive progress. For example, the Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency (coast guard) and the Vietnam Coast signed a
Memorandum of Understanding in 2021 that was intended to increase coop-
eration between the agencies and reduce the number of vessel intrusions into
disputed and territorial waters of both countries. Of course, this coordination
mechanism does not address the underlying, and expanding, maritime terri-
torial disagreement between the countries.11 As recently as December 2019,
Malaysia had filed new claims extending the scope of maritime territory it
seeks to control, which would come at Vietnam’s expense.12
An alternative pathway for bilateral negotiations is brokered negotiations
with a disinterested third party. In the past, Thailand and Singapore have
played this role, serving as intermediaries between ASEAN and China, as
well as occasionally mediating intra-ASEAN maritime issues.13 To date, how-
ever, these efforts have not produced transformative change or resolution.
This is for at least three reasons. First, Thai and Singaporean efforts to medi-
ate during an upswing in South China Sea conflict after 2012 happened to
correspond with periods of considerable domestic political intensity in both
countries. In Thailand, the 2014 coup d’état led to domestic uncertainty
and a growing risk aversion and limited bandwidth in its foreign policy. In
Singapore, the Prime Minister’s fourth term (2015-2020) was intended to
function as a hand-off to the ‘fourth generation’ PAP leadership in the face of
growing (though still limited) challenges from the opposition workers party,
again limiting bandwidth. Second, throughout the region, the COVID-19
pandemic has severely curbed any appetite for ambitious action on the South
China Sea issue. Third, although Singapore and Thailand are important play-
ers in the region, they do not have either the enforcement capacity or sufficient

509
 Renard Sexton

economic largesse to credibly incentivize a negotiated resolution between e.g.

Indonesia and Vietnam in the Natunas or between Malaysia and Vietnam
over the continental shelf.
For the United States, the strategy to date has been a primarily hands-
off approach that encourages the claimants to resolve their issues peacefully
through bilateral or multilateral forums, but has rarely involved American
diplomatic, economic or security infrastructure to help midwife those resolu-
tions. As a comparison, the United States has spent incredible foreign policy
capital and energy helping to broker peace between e.g. recently Israel and
Morocco, or Israel and the UAE. Countless other examples from ending ac-
tive wars to helping settle territorial disputes is something the United States
has long been known for doing, and yet in Southeast Asia the same level of
urgency and effort has not been brought to bear.

What do Southeast Asian citizens think about it?

Although the policy discussion around the South China Sea, and Asian se-
curity in general, is driven largely by elite punditry and the news, leaders in
ASEAN countries are subject to public pressure also from typical citizens. In
the democracies in the region this can be realized at election time, but even in
the authoritarian countries in Southeast Asia public opinion is closely moni-
tored by the authorities. This is because especially on matters of nationalism
and sovereignty, it is relatively easy to justify public marches or protest, which
could eventually spill over into general criticism of the regime.14
In general, in Southeast Asia (as in many other places) foreign policy is a less
pressing political topic, as compared to domestic issues. For example, on a re-
cent representative survey of residents of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and
Indonesia, foreign policy was ranked on average as having an importance of 7.3
out of 10, as compared to 8.5 for Covid-19 and 9.0 for education. That said, more
than 80 percent of respondents rated foreign policy as a “high priority overall,
indicating that it is nonetheless part of their political calculation.15 Across the
four countries, 75 percent agreed with the statement that with respect to mari-
time sovereignty disputes, the leader should “defend our claims at all costs.”
Although respondents say they would like to see their leader stand up for
national sovereignty in the South China Sea, even if brings greater risk of

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 Finding a Balanced China Policy

Topic Elites Regular Difference

Covid 79 percent 81 percent 2 percent

Unemployment 64 percent 48 percent -17 percent

Inequality 34 percent 25 percent -9 percent

Human rights 12 percent 20 percent 8 percent

Domestic political 28 percent 26 percent -2 percent

instability

Military tensions, 37 percent 42 percent 5 percent

esp. the South
China Sea

Typhoons, floods 43 percent 41 percent -2 percent

and other climate
related issues

Terrorism 3 percent 19 percent 16 percent

c­onflict, they also are supportive of finding a fair compromise. Of the 8,600 re-
spondents on the survey, 36 percent stated that they were supportive of standing
up to China but also to working with China collaboratively to extract natural
resources from their EEZ. Overall, the public in the Southeast Asian countries
surveyed is split on that topic: 49 percent are in favor and 51 percent opposed to
collaborating with China to extract natural resources from the sea.

511
 Renard Sexton

Within the region, 82 percent of respondents said they would like their
leaders to find compromise with their neighbors to resolve outstanding sov-
ereignty disputes. They also hold ASEAN in high regard: 74 percent say they
view ASEAN positively, and just 3 percent having a negative view, with 22 per-
cent unsure. With regard to China, 83 percent of respondents say they would
like their leaders to work together with neighboring countries to push back
against China’s incursions into the South China Sea. Lastly, 60 percent would
like to see their country’s leaders develop closer ties with the United States.
ASEAN citizen attitudes about the disputes in the South China Sea are
complex and, in some ways, seemingly contradictory—how could one support
both being very tough on China and neighbors, but also support compro-
mise?—but there are important windows of opportunity to thread the needle
on a diplomatic solution that fits with the domestic incentives for leaders.
Settling competing claims and issues of fishing (and other natural resources
access) between the neighboring Southeast Asian countries is a critical first
step. Why has this not yet happened on its own?
Comparing the citizen surveys conducted by Ravanilla & Sexton (2021)
with an identical question asked of ASEAN elites on the 2021 ISEAS sur-
vey (2021) we are also able to compare how the attitudes regular citizens of
the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia are similar or different to
business and political elites in those countries. In the following chart, we see
how they responded to a question that asked what the top three challenges to
their country was in the coming year. The chart indicates what percentage of
respondents included each topic in their top three.
With no surprise, the Covid-19 pandemic topped the list for both elites
and regular respondents, with about four out of five respondents among both
elites and regular people picking it as a top problem. On average, though, elites
were more concerned about unemployment and inequality than regular citi-
zens, while citizens were more likely to list terrorism, human rights and mili-
tary tensions like the South China Sea as a top concern. Overall, 37 percent
of elites and 42 percent of regular citizens listed the military tensions (specifi-
cally mentioning the South China Sea) as a top problem.
Taking a broader view, military tensions in the South China Sea sits
among the top few issues for ASEAN elites and publics, but in competi-
tion with other, often more pressing, topics like the economy, public health

512
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and natural disasters. In the region’s democracies, no major politician’s cam-

paign with territorial disputes at the top of their campaign. In fact, many
of the government regularly downplay the issue in an effort to reduce the
political temperature, whether it is the Vietnamese government stopping
protests outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi,16 or Malaysia often studi-
ously avoiding criticism of China in the disputed waters.17
What we see instead is a largely reactive set of activities, where govern-
ments are forced to respond when incidents in the South China Sea escalate
to the point of becoming politically unavoidable. From the perspective of the
Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, removing the irritant of intra-ASEAN
disputes in the South China Sea is a likely pre-condition to more serious coop-
eration between the Southeast Asian actors.

What can leaders in SE Asia do? How

about the United States?
It has now been more than 25 years since ASEAN leaders recommended
developing a “code of conduct” for the South China Sea, with hundreds of
sessions and drafts producing essentially nothing workable for the main is-
sues at play.18 Although the code of conduct provides a focal point for discus-
sions, precious few observers believe that there is a transformative deal to be
struck in the context of the CoC. China will not agree to anything binding
that actually constrains their activities in the basin, while ASEAN countries
are nervous about the possibility that even a non-binding code would simply
legitimize Chinese claims and behaviors.
Much more likely to succeed, and indeed likely more useful for counter-
pressuring China is for the Southeast Asian claimants to conclude durable
agreements that resolve their maritime boundary and enforcement issues. To
do this, a deal must not be seen as losing face or compromising the nation’s
sovereignty. One political frame is that cutting a deal with neighbors actually
boosts the nation’s ability to push back against Chinese coercion through a
combined front with ASEAN neighbors.
Some recent successes provide the basic contours of what agreements might
look like. In 2014, the Philippines and Indonesia resolved a longstanding dis-
pute over parts of the Celebes Sea, where Filipino territorial zones under the

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1898 Treaty of Paris conflicted with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law
of the Seas (UNCLOS), which Indonesia sought to enforce. Although the
Philippines understood that their claim was in violation of UNCLOS, fear of
nationalist backlash kept successive governments from being willing to com-
promise or concede. In the end, the in 2011 the Aquino administration bit
the bullet, agreeing to revise the boundaries in line with UNCLOS and essen-
tially conceding the argument to the Indonesians.19 Contrary to earlier politi-
cal concerns, there was next to no political backlash, with the issue remaining
very low salience for Filipino voters.
A second instructive case is the 2010 resolution of railway land issues be-
tween Malaysia and Singapore, where for two decades there was disagreement
about how to implement a land swap deal that stemmed from unresolved is-
sues from Malaysia and Singapore’s separation in the 1960s. In the end, lead-
ers from the two countries were able to agree on joint development of valuable
plots of land in Singapore’s central business district, in exchange for Malaysia
relinquishing claims to certain railbeds and stations in Singapore.20 In this
case, both leaders were able to tell their publics that they had a concluded a
deal that would benefit the nation.
Although these two successes are important, there are dozens of outstand-
ing maritime boundary issues between ASEAN countries that have yet to re-
solved, and may not finding an agreeable solution in a timely fashion without
outside encouragement or incentives. However, the general arrangements may
be helpful for plotting the way forward.
In this relative vacuum could step the United States government, which
has been struggling to find productive activities it can do to shape the South
China Sea issue. Given that TTP and broader trade issues appear dead in
Congress and the near saturation of security cooperation activities we have
seen over the last several years, the United States needs to find new space if
it is to show its value to the region. In the context of these intra-ASEAN
conflicts, the United States could make a difference by playing not only an
honest mediator role but through economic incentives for durable resolu-
tions of the issue.
More specifically, on the front end, the United States could lead intensive
diplomatic efforts on at least five specific topics in the South China Sea. At
first, this would be a private diplomatic effort, akin to low-profile negotiations

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 Finding a Balanced China Policy

the United States does on daily basis around the world. If it is deemed that
a special envoy makes sense at some point, one could be deployed, although
those sorts of gambits often backfire.

1. Mediate between Vietnam and Indonesia regarding Natuna

Sea. Vietnam and Indonesia have overlapping Exclusive Economic
Zone claims, which have led to a spate of arrests, clashes between
the Vietnamese Coast Guard and Indonesian Navy, and public
disagreements. The Indonesian government has quite dramatically and
publicly sunk Vietnamese fishing vessels that were captured after fishing
in what Indonesia regards as its waters.21

2. Mediate between Vietnam and Malaysia regarding continental shelf.

In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam completed a joint submission to the
UN regarding continental shelf delineation, but surprised Vietnam and
observers by extended their claims further in 2019 in a second filing.22

3. Work with the Philippines and Vietnam to sign a declared

Memorandum of Understanding in the Spratlys. Vietnam and the
Philippines have in the past argued about ownership over certain shoals
in the Spratly islands, and the extent to which Spratly claims do or do
not impinge on the coastally-derived Exclusive Economic Zones of each
country. Vietnamese fishermen have been arrested and prosecuted for
illegal fishing in Filipino waters. Given the larger challenges from China,
the two countries have come into closer and closer alignment, choosing
to quickly resolve or pardon illegal fishing cases and build closer relations
between the coast guards of the two countries. Transforming this implicit
alignment to an explicit mutual recognition would be powerful: accepting
each other’s claims, putting to rest EEZ disputes, and pledging mutual aid
against coercion.

4. Help broker continental shelf agreements between Indonesia and

Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaysia continue to have disagreements about
continental shelf boundaries between the countries, including in the South
China Sea, straits of Malacca, and the Sulawesi Sea east of Borneo.23

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5. Work with the Philippines to avoid escalation of the Sabah dispute

with Malaysia. Since the 1963 formation of the Federation of Malaysia,
there have been differences of opinion between Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines regarding the disposition of northern Borneo. The
Philippines continues to claim a piece of Sabah state, and periodically
raises the matter, to the chagrin of the Malaysians.

What is the prospective role of the United States here? And why could the
United States succeed where, for example, Thailand, Singapore and ASEAN
more broadly, have so far not? One could rightfully be skeptical that outside
American ‘meddling’ would improve the situation. There are four relevant
ways that the United States could move the needle here.
First, the U.S. government can directly incentivize cooperative solutions
through economic enticements. For example, the U.S. Development Finance
Corporation is slowly making headway (among other investment and aid
agencies)—commitments for investment can be another helpful carrot. If for
example two countries are willing to sign up for joint natural resource extrac-
tion, the DFC can help finance it. Joint infrastructure proposals in the con-
text of a settlement can be another incentive to compromise.
Second, the United States offers important opportunities for security
cooperation, which are highly valued in all the mentioned countries. In
the context of a settlement, the United States could provide access to coast
guard cutters to help conduct coordinated enforcement in border zones,
which would have the added benefit of providing capacity against Chinese
incursions as well.
Third, the United States can credibly commit to helping to enforce the
eventual deal that is made. Through international maritime activities and
legal sanctions against any illegal fishing and natural resource extractions, the
United States can provide credibility to a settlement. At the same time, the
United States can provide political cover to leaders in the Southeast Asia so
that they are not seen to be inappropriately compromising their sovereignty.
Fourth and finally, the United States can leverage potential contributions
from outside allies, e.g. Japan, Australia, South Korea, or EU allies to incen-
tivize resolution of the issues. This could include countering illegal fishing, in
the oil and gas industry or in terms of countering smuggling and piracy.

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 Finding a Balanced China Policy

Politically, the South China Sea region is in an important moment, with

changes in government taking place around the basin. The ongoing presidential
campaign in the Philippines currently favors Ferdinand (Bongbong) Marcos
Jr., however current Vice President Leni Robredo has been gaining ground on
the strength of large rallies and growing public recognition that her candidacy
is the only practical alternative to Marcos. The election is a re-run of the Vice-
Presidential race in 2016, which Robredo very narrowly won. For the United
States, Marcos is a complicated figure, as his father was a longtime American
ally, but Marcos Jr. has an unresolved Contempt of Court judgment against
him in Hawaii, which has been extended through at least 2031.24 Marcos has
repeatedly indicated a conciliatory attitude towards China that largely follows
Duterte’s path of avoiding confrontation and poking at the United States. In
contrast, Robredo has taken a harder line on Philippine sovereignty vis-à-vis
China and has stated that building better ties with the United States is a prior-
ity. That said, she too has stated that good relations with China is important.
Malaysia’s government has had considerable churn in recent years; after
corruption scandals ended the Najib Rezak government in 2018, there have
been already three Prime Ministers from two different parties. In 2021,
changes in the upper-level leadership in Vietnam have not resulted in large
scale changes in foreign policy, but have continued a slow but steady shift
towards greater openness to cooperation with the United States. Although
President Joko Widodo of Indonesia has a little over two more years in office,
there is some uncertainty about how strongly he will prioritize foreign policy
versus domestic issues, including his signature policy of moving the nation’s
capital to Borneo (planned for August 2024).
Overall, it is a good moment for the United States to take on a more active,
even if initially quiet, role in working to resolve intra-ASEAN issues in the South
China Sea. This will show the United States to be a responsible player in the region,
who is willing to spend the time, effort and resources to reduce tensions. This, of
course, will also provide greater opportunities for the Southeast Asian countries to
cooperate against China coercion, and help insulate these leaders from the divide
and conquer tactics that China has attempted to deploy in recent years.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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Notes
1 Renard Sexton and Nico Ravanilla, “South China Sea Data Initiative: 2021 Public Opinion
Survey of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam,” Working Paper (2021).
2 Philippine Daily Inquirer, “Why is Duterte Soft on China?”, Opinion Section, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, April 9, 2021.
3 Jamie Tarabay, “Chinese Hackers Targeted Southeast Asian Nations, Report Says,”
Bloomberg, December 9, 2021.
4 Renard Sexton and Nico Ravanilla, “South China Sea Data Initiative: 2021 Public Opinion
Survey of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam,” Working Paper (2022).
5 These data represent geo-coded incidents in the South China Sea from 2012 to 2020 that were
pulled from a set of more than 30 international news sources in seven languages. Research
Assistants spent about a year sifting through news archives and verifying the locations of
the events. They range from EEZ violations, diplomatic protests, freedom of navigation
operations and EEZ violations to collisions, water cannon incidents, arrests and seizures.
These data represent events that were recorded in the news, meaning that only incidents that
were important enough and with enough verifiable information to be published by reputable
journalism outlets. In practice, many incidents in the South China Sea do not make it to
this level. Based on field interviews in the Philippines, a considerable number of incidents of
harassment of fishermen do not make it into the news, either because news agencies cannot
verify the underlying information or due to deliberate suppression by governments that would
prefer that the public not know the true level of coercion that is going on. In other cases,
limited capacity of the news industry (or general restrictions on their operation, rather than
specific to the South China Sea issue) means that some incidents are simply missed. The data
presented here from Ravanilla and Sexton (2022) reflects therefore larger, major incidents.
6 Tomoya Onishi, “Vietnam Expands Maritime Militia off Southern Coast,” Nikkei Asia, June
12, 2021.
7 Indonesia and the Philippines were able to resolve their main maritime boundary issue in 2014.
8 Sebastian Strangio, “Malaysia, Vietnam Set to Pen Agreement on Maritime Security,” The
Diplomat, April 7, 2021.
9 Resty Woro Yuniar, “Indonesia’s land and maritime border disputes with Malaysia, the
Philippines and Vietnam,” South China Morning Post, January 12, 2022.
10 Interviews with former ASEAN secretariat staff, December 2021.
11 Strangio, “Malaysia, Vietnam Set to Pen Agreement on Maritime Security.”
12 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, “Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Partial
Submission by Malaysia in the South China Sea,” UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the
Law of the Sea, December 12, 2019.
13 Kasira Cheeppensook, “ASEAN in the South China Sea Conflict, 2012–2018: A Lesson
in Conflict Transformation from Normative Power Europe,” International Economics and
Economic Policy, 2020.
14 Weiss, Jessica Chen Weiss, “Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign
Relations,” Oxford University Press, 2014.

518
 Finding a Balanced China Policy

15 Renard Sexton and Nico Ravanilla, “South China Sea Data Initiative: 2021 Public Opinion
Survey of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam,” Working Paper (2021).
16 James Pearson, “Vietnam Police Disperse Protest at Chinese Embassy Over South China Sea
Standoff,” Reuters, August 6, 2019.
17 Praveen Menon and Manuel Mogato, ‘Host Malaysia Avoids Chinese Ire Over Disputed Sea
at ASEAN Summit,” Reuters, April 23, 2015.
18 Bill Hayton, “After 25 Years, There’s Still No South China Sea Code of Conduct,” Foreign
Policy, July 21, 2021.
19 Arif Havas Oegroseno, “How Indonesia and the Philippines Solved Their Maritime Dispute,”
The Diplomat, June 14, 2014.
20 Reuters Staff, “Singapore, Malaysia Agree on Land Swap,” Reuters, September 20, 2010.
21 Tia Asmara, “Indonesia to Sink More Foreign Boats Amid New Maritime Tensions with
Vietnam,” Benar News, April 29, 2019.
22 Hong Thao Nguyen, “Malaysia’s New Game in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat,
December 21, 2019.
23 Yuniar, “Indonesia’s land and maritime border disputes with Malaysia, the Philippines and
Vietnam.”
24 Lian Buan, “Marcos Jr. Continues to Evade $353-Million Contempt Judgment of U.S.
Court,” Rappler, January 13, 2022

519
Section VI

China’s Impact on Democracy,

Civil Society, and the Diaspora
With China’s rise a monumental shift in the global balance of power across eco-
nomics, hard power, and soft power, its implications for global governance, de-
mocracy, and civil society are similarly vast. In particular, Beijing appears dedi-
cated towards molding the international order to suit its interests, most notably
its preference for norms of “state sovereignty” and “non-interference.” As such,
it has engaged the United Nations, expanded its footprint across a wide range of
international institutions, and worked to erode democratic and liberal norms.
Simultaneously, it has worked to shape and alter global governance surrounding
economics, development, and the international financial system. More worry-
ingly, it has extended its reach to crackdown on dissidents abroad, such as its
actions under the auspices of the Hong Kong National Security Law.
How is China impacting global democracy and civil society? Will China
continue to assert its right to punish dissidents beyond China’s borders? What
are some of the implications for Chinese diaspora communities? What might
global norms look like under the influence of a more powerful Beijing?

This chapter explores these issues and more,

featuring essays from the following fellows:
Diana Fu, “Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead? How the
United States Should Navigate People-to-People Exchange in a New Era”
Austin Horng-En Wang, and Adrian Rauchfleisch, “Understanding the
#MilkTeaAlliance Movement”
Audrye Wong, “The Diaspora and China’s Foreign Influence Activities”

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Is Rights Advocacy Civil

Society in China Dead?
How the United States
Should Navigate
People-to-People Exchange
in a New Era

Diana Fu is an Associate Professor in Political Science and the Munk

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto and
a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Diana Fu

Abstract
Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, advocacy-oriented civil society—
those that press for rights associated with liberal democracies—in China
has been placed under immense pressure. Based on synthesizing publicly
available media articles and reports, this essay assesses whether rights advo-
cacy civil society in China is effectively “dead” under the Xi Administration
(2012-2022) and if and where opportunities still exist for people-to-people
exchange. The essay argues that a key to analyzing the party-state’s response
to advocacy civil society is to disaggregate two facets of threat: mobili-
zational and ideological. The former refers to civil society’s potential to
threaten social stability through collective action while the latter refers to
their ideas and values that threaten orthodoxy. In both Mainland China
and in Hong Kong, rights advocacy organizations and networks have been
amputated, but they are not “dead” in the sense of being permanently de-
molished. At the same time, the party-state has been actively re-molding
educational and cultural institutions to ensure that the future generation
of youth—a key pillar of civil society will be pro-CCP in their ideologies.
Despite these developments, the essay identifies key issue-areas, actors, and
institutions through which U.S. policymakers, U.S. civil society, and edu-
cational institutions can continue to engage with Chinese counterparts in
a tense period and beyond.

Implications and Key Takeaways

For U.S. Policymakers:

● Foster a policy environment where civil society dialogue is actively
encouraged as Track 2 diplomacy. Start with re-booting educational
exchange programs with China such as the Fulbright Program and the
Peace Corps.

● Strategically reframe programs to substitute “democracy promotion”

rhetoric with substantive, non-ideological language such as “civic
engagement” and “capacity bridging.”

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 Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead?

● Hold congressional hearings on the status and development of civil

society in Mainland China and in Hong Kong via the Congressional
Executive Commission on China (CECC).

● Create an exit option for Hong Kong activists to seek accelerated asylum
the United States.

● Support and dialogue with civil society activists from Mainland China
residing in the diaspora community in the United States; expand
funding and support for independent Chinese media outlets reaching
the Chinese diaspora.

For U.S. Civil Society Actors and INGOS:

● U.S. foundations and philanthropic organizations should support and
fund programs that facilitate youth-led exchange from Mainland China
and Hong Kong to the United States and vice versa.

● Continue to share best practices among the donor community about

adaptive strategies in authoritarian states as well as encourage best practices
sharing between Chinese civil society organizations and INGOs.

For U.S. and Other Educational Institutions:

● Support academics and administrators in universities to receive scholars
and students from Hong Kong and Mainland China who may no longer
be able to teach or study in their home institutions.

● Educate administrators and faculty on understanding and responding to

the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law and its impacts on teaching
and research in and on China.

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 Diana Fu

Introduction: Advocacy-Oriented Civil Society in China

For decades, the United States has sought to promote gradual societal change
in the People’s Republic of China from within by supporting grassroots civil
society. The hope was that by building the capacity of change agents in China,
the United States could help to diversify and increase the number of social
groups within China calling for accountable governance, the rule of law, and
the protection of human rights. This policy towards Chinese civil society
needs recalibration in a new era of “cooperative competition” between the
United States and China.1
Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, advocacy-oriented civil society in
China has been placed under immense pressure. Media outside of China has
reported the series of campaigns under Xi Jinping against organizations and
activists that has decimated this sector of civil society. At the same time, the
party-state has moved very swiftly to control Hong Kong civil society, follow-
ing the passing of the National Security Law on June 30th, 2020.
Based on synthesizing publicly available media articles and reports, this
essay assesses whether advocacy civil society in China is effectively “dead”
under the first two terms of the Xi Administration (2012-2022), with lim-
ited opportunity for foreign engagement with this sector. It takes a com-
parative lens to answer this question, analyzing civil society developments in
Mainland China as well as in Hong Kong. Specifically, the essay focuses on
advocacy-oriented civil society groups that press for the civil/political rights
normally associated with a democracy: freedom of speech, association, press,
and others.2 These groups are the most threatening types to the party-state be-
cause they adopt mobilizational tactics and espouse values that run counter to
that of the party-state’s orthodoxy. As such, they can be seen by the party-state
as the extreme end of the pole of the civil society sector.
A comparison of civil society transformations in Mainland China and in
Hong Kong is timely for policymakers who seek to engage grassroots change-
makers in China. In particular, the essay casts a spotlight on youth-led civil
society because the younger generation are the future citizens and leaders
shaping civic engagement norms for decades to come. Therefore, any long-
term civil society engagement strategy must consider recent patterns of youth
mobilization, as well as the constraints and opportunities that this generation
faces in a regime that sees Western-inspired civil society as deeply threatening.

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 Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead?

In a nutshell, the essay argues that in both Mainland China and Hong
Kong, rights-advocacy organizations and networks have been amputated,
but that they are not “dead” in the sense of being permanently demolished.
Despite repression, advocacy networks continue to spring up, even if they
cannot be sustained. At the same time, the party-state has been actively re-
molding a key pillar of civil society—educational institutions and their af-
filiates—in order to ensure that future civil society networks will espouse
pro-Communist Party ideologies and norms of civic engagement. The key to
analyzing the party-state’s response to youth-led civil society is to disaggregate
two facets of threat: mobilizational and ideological.

Two Facets of Threat: Mobilizational and Ideological

“The U.S. has long been engaging in infiltration and subversion and
instigating “color revolution” in sovereign countries through so-called
“NGOs” such as government agencies like USAID and the National
Endowment for Democracy.”
—China Foreign Ministry Spokesperson3

The Xi administration adopted a three-pronged approach to governing civil

society in Mainland China that consisted of a). cracking down on rights-ad-
vocacy organizations that are predicated upon “Western values” of individual
rights; b). expanding regulatory control over domestic organizations; and c).
deepening party control over all civil society groups.4 These three prongs com-
bined have resulted in an expansion of the party-state’s control over a certain
sector of sate-led civil society: domestic organizations registered under the
2016 Charity Law and international organizations registered under the 2017
Overseas NGO Law.5 It has also meant a series of campaigns against grass-
roots civil society that has left the sector inert, if not dead. This has included
targeting and disbanding human rights lawyers, labor organizations, feminist
activists, religious leaders, Marxist student groups, and LGBTQ groups.
Extensive media coverage in the West of the new regulations on civil so-
ciety, accompanied by the repression campaigns, has led to the correct per-
ception that the advocacy sector of civil society in Mainland China has been

527
 Diana Fu

severely hampered. Taking a snapshot of civil society in 2017, scholars found

that although the number of Chinese foundations increased, along with a
rise in domestic philanthropy, advocacy groups including labour NGOs were
being politically repressed and financially squeezed out of existence.6 In other
words, there appeared to be a marked expansion of a registered and regulated
sector of civil society organizations regulated by the party-state alongside the
decimation of the advocacy sector which are unregistered or were registered as
commercial entities.
To understand why a crackdown on advocacy civil society has occurred to
this extent and its timing, it is important to disaggregate the facets of threat
that the party-state sees: mobilizational and ideological. The first facet has to
do with civil society groups’ potential capacity to amass human, financial, and
moral resources in order to stage contentious collective action, thus forming
an oppositional force against the state. The second, ideological facet has to
do with deep-seated, and longer-term influences around citizens’ political val-
ues and interpretations of social issues. It is this latter sphere which the Party
under Xi Jinping’s leadership has sought to re-establish control.
The Chinese government has long regarded a certain sector of advocacy-
oriented civil society—the panoply of activists and organizations advocat-
ing for liberal rights within China’s borders—to be an ideological threat to
its ruling legitimacy. In response to the Biden administration’s Summit for
Democracy, Beijing has recently reiterated its narrative that Western support
for Chinese civil society is nothing but a front to undermine the stability of
the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. The Chinese government asserts that
Western involvement, from academics to non-profit NGOs, is responsible
for fomenting unrest in Hong Kong7 and in Xinjiang.8 These assertions are
part of a long-standing fear on the part of the Chinese Communist Party that
Western influences would infiltrate China via civil society and teach domestic
actors to advocate for democracy reforms much like it did during the “color
revolutions” that swept Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the early 2000s.9
For this reason, successive administrations from Hu Jintao (2002-2012) to Xi
Jinping (2012-present), has regarded this advocacy-oriented sector of civil so-
ciety with deep suspicion and have sought to tame it.
The Party’s view of civil society as an ideological threat was clearly expressed
in a communique circulated in April 2013, early in the Xi administration.

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 Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead?

Later leaked, the communique, otherwise known as Document Number 9, was

unequivocal in listing civil society as a threat in the ideological sphere, along
with constitutional democracy, neo-liberalism, freedom of the press, and uni-
versal values of freedom, democracy, and human rights. Specifically, the docu-
ment characterizes civil society as “a socio-political theory that originated in the
West” which holds individual rights as “paramount.” Consequently, this ideo-
logical threat then merges with a mobilizational threat in that civil society has
been used as to “squeeze the Party out of leadership of the masses at the local
level...to the point that their advocacy is becoming a serious form of political op-
position.” The Party’s understanding of civil society as both an ideological and
a mobilizational threat explains why the Xi administration made it a priority to
repress advocacy-oriented civil society organizations.
It is this long-seated belief in the ideological threat of Western-influenced
civil society taking root in China that has driven the party-state to use co-
ercion and regulatory control to repress the advocacy sector. While media
headlines have focused on the mobilizing power of the civil society groups,
including their role in demonstrations, strikes, and protests, the ideological
threat posed by a certain sector of civil society has been a thorn on the side of
the party-state.

Amputating Youth-led Networks in Mainland China

The Xi administration’s ideological battle against rights-advocacy civil so-
ciety is most clearly demonstrated in its targeting of youth-led civil society
organizations advocating for labor and gender rights. Ideological control of
the youth is of paramount importance to the Party, which has stepped up pa-
triotic education at all levels. As part of this broader effort at ideological con-
trol, the Party has particularly targeted youth-led organizations, including
but not limited to neo-Marxist groups in 2018 and LGBTQ groups in 2021.
Notably, both types of organizations were spearheaded by of university-age
students, limited in terms of organizational size, and deviated from the
Party’s ideologies. In the case of LGBTQ groups, the threat emanated from
what the party-state sees as “Western-influenced” gender norms, whereas for
the Marxist student groups, the threat stemmed from their deviation from
the Party’s orthodox socialism.

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 Diana Fu

Case Study: LGBTQ Groups

The crackdown on LGBTQ student groups online in 2021 presents a case
study of how the party-state under Xi has dealt with youth-led advocacy
networks that are part of transnational movements. In July 2021, the party-
state shut down more than a dozen WeChat accounts of LGBTQ student
groups at Chinese universities, including both Tsinghua and Peking uni-
versities.10 No explanation was given by either WeChat’s parent company,
Tencent, or the Chinese government. The closures come as public accep-
tance in China of the LGBTQ community is growing, albeit amidst a
strong conservative voice claiming that LGBTQ identities are at odds with
Chinese values and are unpatriotic.11
Prior to 2021, the Xi administration had already targeted a number of gen-
der rights advocacy groups, viewing them as domestic extensions of a transna-
tional #MeToo movement.12 To the party-state, these groups posed a mobili-
zational threat in terms of being able to organize performance-based activism
that entailed staging small-scale, off-line protests which generated captivating
photos that then were circulated online. Via popularizing the terminology of
#MeToo in China and supporting individual women who filed sexual harass-
ment lawsuits, these civil society networks were seen by the party-state to be
a conduit through which Western social movements took hold in Mainland
China. In fact, these groups did have linkages to international groups and
to transnational movements.13 Many were receiving funding from for-
eign funders, a resource that was restricted following the enactment of the
Overseas NGO Law in 2017.14
Besides a mobilizational threat due to their linkages to contentious transna-
tional movements, these groups also posed an ideological threat to the party-
state because they espoused “Western” gender norms that directly counter the
traditional gender norms that the Xi administration has been propagating.
These groups advocated for a range of issues including anti-sexual harassment,
combating gender-based employment discrimination, and social recognition
of diverse gender identities.
On its surface, some of these issues such a sexual harassment align with the
agenda of the party-state, which has made revisions to the civil code in 2020
and is currently reviewing revisions to the 1992 Law on the Protection of
Women’s Rights and Interests.15 But below the surface, these groups’ advocacy

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 Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead?

for acceptance of diverse gender identities and non-traditional views of mar-

riage and gender roles runs counter to the traditional gender norms that the
party-state has been advocating, particularly under the Xi administration.
These clashing of ideologies around gender have direct consequences of
domestic governance in China. In order to encourage women to have more
children in the lead up to the passage of the three-child policy in 2021, the
party-state launched a campaign to reinforce traditional family values.16 This
includes stepped up propaganda for working women to return home (huigui
jiating), accompanied by the launch of “New Era Women’s Schools” by local
Women’s Federation chapters,17 and the targeting of “effeminate” men.
These measures evidence that not only is the party-state actively countering
“Western influences,” but it is also investing enormously in shaping the ideol-
ogies and everyday behaviors of the younger generation. Such concerted cam-
paigns not only to repress civil society advocacy groups but also to supplant
Western values around gender rights is something that policymakers ought to
take into account.

Case Study: Marxist Student Groups (2018)

The Party-state’s crackdown of Marxist student groups in 2018 is illustrative
of its reaction to youth-led civil society groups who do not demonstrably have
linkages to a transnational movement. Although the size of Marxist student
groups was minuscule—about fifty student-activists who took collective ac-
tion alongside workers—these groups posed considerable ideological, as well
as mobilizational, threats to the Party-state. Students belonging to these
Marxist groups across elite universities in China were part of a new leftist
group (xinzuo) that were deeply critical of the Party’s vision of socialism with
Chinese characteristics which led to wealth and class disparity between the
elites and the working class.18
Positioning themselves in the lineage of the Maoist left (Maozuo), these
students directly challenged to the party-state through both their mobiliza-
tion and through their ideologies. On the one hand, the student groups posed
a limited mobilizational threat by taking collective action in support of dem-
onstrating workers. In the summer of 2018, a few dozen students from Marxist
groups went to southern China in support of workers at a welding factory who
wanted to form an independent union, which is banned in China. Sporting

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t-shirts that with the logo, “Solidarity is Power,” the students demanded that
the workers of a welding factory operated by the company Jasic be granted the
right to form their own union, among other claims. Their collection action
did not advance very far, as the police raided the apartment of the student
activists, detained a number of them, and disappeared the student leaders.
Notably, the local police alleged that the workers were instigated by foreign
NGOs.19 In the subsequent months, the police went further to uproot the
very mobilizing structures—the Marxist groups—on campuses to ensure that
they did not resurface to organize collective action.20
In addition to the mobilization-threat that these groups posed, however,
was a less observable yet implicit ideological threat to the party-state’s ortho-
doxy: socialism with Chinese characteristics. The students ideologically chal-
lenged the Party by implicitly alleging that the local state was not fulfilling
its commitment to being a Party for the proletariat. In an open letter to Xi
Jinping himself, student leader Yue Xin (who was disappeared in 2018 and
released in 2020), repeatedly urged the Xi himself to see that the students
were, in fact, motivated by a genuine commitment to Marxism. She repeatedly
underscored that their group was not influenced by foreign forces: “We are
not a foreign force [emphasis added], nor a student revolution, nor do we make
any other political demands. All we want is to fight for justice for the Jasic
workers.” She attempted to refute claims that the Marxist reading groups were
working at the direction of foreign powers: “Implying that we study Marxism
only at the behest of foreign power is tantamount to accusing the Party itself
of being an external force. It’s like saying by pursuing fairness and injustice,
fighting against evil groups, the Party is actually engaging in reactionism.”21
Yet, despite the student activists’ outward affirmation of their alignment
with the Party’s Marxism, they nevertheless implicitly challenged the Party
by pointing out that it was not allowing the workers—the vanguard of the
Party—to form their own independent union. In doing so, these student-led
civil society groups challenged the Party for not going far enough in protect-
ing the interest of its base, the Chinese working class. In response, the Party
not only harshly punished the student leaders through disappearing them and
uprooting the Marxist student groups nation-wide; it also sought to conduct
“thought work” (sixiang gongzuo) by circulating taped confessions by the stu-
dent leaders to university students.22

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The case of the Marxist student groups provides a vivid illustration of a re-
cent advocacy civil society group under the Xi administration that posed both
mobilizational and ideological threats to the Party. Unlike other labor NGOs
that had existed under the Hu administration and were shuttered in 2015,23
the Marxist student groups were not financially supported by Western NGOs,
nor were they explicitly tied to a transnational movement. The Party-state’s re-
pression of these student groups suggests that civil society groups with foreign
support are not the only ones to be shuttered under the Xi administration.
Rather, even civil society groups that nominally align with “socialism with
Chinese characteristics” can be targeted because of their deviation from party
orthodoxy. In addition, the Marxist students’ show of solidarity with work-
ers symbolically conjured the tenuous worker-student alliances formed during
the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy Movement, which threated the party-state’s
hold on power.
The party-state’s governance of two different youth-led networks bears
lessons for policymakers and actors outside of China seeking to engage ad-
vocacy civil society. Policymakers should understand that advocacy-oriented
civil society groups pose two different types of threats to the party-state: mo-
bilization and ideological. The Party has sought to address mobilizational
threat with repression in the form of closures, arrests, and restricting foreign
funding. It has sought to address ideological threats through educational and
propaganda campaigns to supplant “Western” ideas such as the protection of
individual liberties with its own infusion of ideologies via patriotic educa-
tion and thought work. Generation Z—those born in the 90s and later—is
where these efforts are most directly targeted towards. Hence, policymakers
should view the targeting of rights-based advocacy groups in China as a slice
of a more comprehensive agenda to re-establish the Party’s ideological control
over society, writ large.

Amputating and Remolding Civil Society in Hong Kong

Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, the party-state is the midst of both amputat-
ing and remolding pro-democratic civil society. In the aftermath of waves of
pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong between 2019 and 2020, which
prompted the passage of the 2020 National Security Law (NSL),24 the party-

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state has moved swiftly to dismantle the mature, inter-connected networks

and actors that served as the backbone of the pro-democracy movement.
Unlike the advocacy networks in Mainland China which had always been
weak and dependent on foreign support, Hong Kong possessed dense and var-
iegated civil society groups from student/labor unions, independent media, to
pro-democracy NGOs and businesses.
A number of these Hong Kong have been under assault following the
National Security Law, culminating in a massive and rapid restructuring
of Hong Kong civil society. According to the Economist, approximately 60
pro-democracy grassroots organizations have closed in the wake of the Law.25
Based on media articles in both international media outlets and in local Hong
Kong media before several closed, 26 this report found 73 shuttered civil society
groups and divides them into several categories, including human rights/pro-
democracy groups; trade/professional unions; think tanks and others; media
outlets; and student/education groups; and cultural organizations. Among
them, the closure of independent media outlets including Apple Daily, Citizen
News, and Stand News, poses a particular challenge for keeping appraised of
local civil society developments, as Stand News had previously kept a public
record of civil society closures (see Table 1).
The impact of the NSL goes far beyond the seventy-three groups that have
either disbanded or been shuttered. The initial wave of closures has had a rip-
ple effect on Hong Kong civil society and activists alike. While some of these
groups were forcibly shuttered, others were disbanded and/or relocated in re-
sponse to the imminent political threat posed by the NSL and by the changes
in political life, writ large. Hong Kong’s security chief warned that even those
groups that disbanded—such as the Professional Teachers Union (PTU) and
the Civil Human Rights Front—organizers could still be investigated and
held legally liable for having challenged “the red line of the ‘one country, two
systems’ principle and the city’s constitutional order.’”27 In addition, Hong
Kong Watch became the first foreign organization to be threatened under the
National Security Law in March 2022.28
Despite the articulation of a “red line”, however, there is still a great deal
of uncertainty on the party of civil society actors about which actions would
be interpreted as crossing the line. Hong Kong academics have cautioned that
the chilling effects of civil society closures extend beyond the most radical

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TABLE 1: Civil Society Groups Closed in Hong Kong (73)

Organization Type Count

Unions (student/trade/professional associations) 27

Human rights advocacy 17

Pro-democracy political parities 15

Media Outlets 10

Religious organizations 4

Means of Closure
Disbanded (self-announcement due to threat) 62

Shuttered (closed with force/coercion) 11

Timeline of Closure

0–1 year after NSL (Jul. 2020–Jul. 2021) 38

1–1.5 years after NSL (Aug. 21–Feb. 2022) 35

Crimes Charged

Subversion (threatening national security) 47

Secession (promoting HK independence) 27

Other (social stability; anti-patriotic education; financial) 27

Terrorism 22

Collusion (with foreign forces) 14

Unknown 13

Time of Group Formation

2019 to 2021 22

2014 to 2018 27

2000 to 2013 12

Prior to 2000 9
Unknown Society 3

Total Groups Closed (July 2020–Jan 2022) 73

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groups, since more moderate groups have also disbanded due to uncertainty
about where the political boundaries lie.29 It is noteworthy that the CCP has
used the same strategy of control in terms of leaving the boundaries ambigu-
ous in Mainland China, leading civil society groups to self-censor their tactics
and missions.
As in Mainland China, the party-state has targeted Hong Kong youth,
who pose both a mobilizational and ideological threat to the Party’s rule in
the territory. The youth were at the forefront of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy
movement and as such, the party-state recognizes the imminent importance
of re-molding youth-led civil society. In fact, the Party newspaper called stu-
dent unions in Hong Kong a “malignant tumor,” who were perpetuating a
“black energy force” through their calls for a continued revolution.30
In response, the Hong Kong government, at the behest of the Party, has
launched a concerted crackdown of youth-led groups through both severing
mobilizational vehicles and introducing patriotic education. While the first
set of responses focus on dismantling existing civil society groups, the second
set of control tools aim to remold civil society in Hong Kong, starting with
the youth. Targets a mobilizational threat, while the second addresses an
ideological threat.
To sever mobilizational vehicles, the party-state targeted student unions,
which provided leadership and organizational resources for Hong Kong’s pro-
democracy movement. Following the implementation of the NSL, university
administrations severed ties with student unions for fear that they would be
held liable for the activities of these unions. The first union to disband follow-
ing the passage of the NSL was the Chinese University’s (CUHK) student
union in October of 2021. The union had been in operation for five decades
and its leadership decided to disband rather than comply with the University’s
demand for it to register with government agencies.31 As of January 2022, the
Hong Kong Polytechnic University Students’ Union (HKPUSU) is still in
operation, albeit not under the auspices of the University, which publicly de-
nounced any ties to the union.32
As in Mainland China, however, the party-state has also been attuned to
addressing the underlying ideological threat—ideas about norms of politi-
cal participation and expectations for individual liberties that Hong Kong
youth have been taught in through the education system. At a core level, the

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party-state’s “thought work” (sixiang gongzuo) entails inserting education on

the NSL into K-12 educational curriculum. Days after the passage of the NSL
on June 2020, the Education Bureau ordered schools to remove books that
could “possibly violate” the Law.33 In February 2021, the Bureau issued a cir-
cular that all heads of primary schools and secondary schools in Hong Kong.34
The circular includes instructions on how to integrate knowledge about the
National Security Law into the existing curriculum, including an audio pic-
ture book instructing primary children to respect the Chinese national flag
and anthem.35 In November 2021, The Bureau also set aside the Quality
Education Fund, valued at (HK$ 300,000 or US$ 38,000), to subsidize K-12
schools programmes on national identity and security, as well as media/infor-
mation literacy.36
Curriculum changes at primary and secondary levels are not restricted to
the NSL narrowly. Rather, national security is a theme that has been embed-
ded into a range of fifteen subject areas, including but not limited to history,
geography, economics, health studies, as well as science, biology, and chem-
istry, among others.37 For example, the geography curriculum highlights
China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea. The curriculum on trade
and economics stresses the close economic ties between Hong Kong and the
Mainland, as well as the importance of national security to maintaining
Hong Kong’s economic stability and business environment. Others, such as
the Life and Society curriculum, teach directly about the NSL, including the
four types of activities that threaten national security: secession, subversion,
terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces. It also situates national security
within several other “securities,” including territorial, economic, resource,
military, and overseas interests. All of these are meant to serve as “the guide-
lines for the implementation of national security education at primary and
secondary schools.”38
In addition to changes to the formal curriculum, the Ministry of Education
also recommends additional learning activities inside and outside the class-
room to supplement national security education. These include game activi-
ties, project learning, competitions, visits and tours, as well as exchanges with
students in Mainland China. These visits would include tours to historical
landmarks such as the Opium War Museum in Guangdong province, aimed
to “cultivate students’ concept of the state, national identity, and sense of

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r­esponsibility to our country and our people.”39 These activities, combined

with the integration of national security into the formal curriculum, is part
and parcel of the party-state’s longer-term plans to do “thought work” on
Hong Kong youth, aimed to re-shape their understanding of Hong Kong’s re-
lationship to the Mainland China, and to cultivate new civic norms.
At the university level, the party-state has also tightened the reins on uni-
versities in numerous forms that have been extensively documented in the
media. These include pressuring faculty to self-censor and punishing those
who do not comply; the introduction of national security courses; increased
surveillance of students and teachers; banning materials from libraries; and
forced removal of offending symbols on campuses, among other measures. As
a result of these measures, there is an atmosphere of increased self-censorship
in Hong Kong university classrooms, as faculty are afraid of being reported
on for teaching politically sensitive topics such as civil disobedience and de-
mocracy.40 Mandatory courses on the National Security Law have been imple-
mented in Hong Kong universities, in accordance with the National Security
Law itself which has stipulations on the education of national security (articles
9 and 10).41 According to an exclusive Reuters report, at four of the city’s pub-
licly funding universities have made lectures and seminars on national secu-
rity a graduation requirement.42 Moreover, Hong Kong universities have been
encouraged to contribute to the innovation hubs in the Greater Bay Area, an
integrated economic zone.43
Apart from university institutions, cultural institutions are also sites for
learning about politics and society that have been targeted by the authorities.
On this front, the party-state has also removed and censored artistic, cul-
tural, and other learning materials that symbolically challenge its power in
Hong Kong. Besides scrubbing the “democracy wall” of posters, Hong Kong
University ordered the “Pillar of Shame” statute commemorating victims of
the 1989 Tiananmen Democracy Movement to be removed.44 This was one
of at least two other visual critiques of the CCP’s response to the Tiananmen
Democracy Movement, including the “Goddess of Democracy” statute at the
Chinese University (CHUK) and a relief sculpture at Lingnan University.
The fact that these sculptures were on university campuses and had served as
backdrops to the pro-democracy protests posed a symbolic threat to the party-
state. As accompaniment, the Hong Kong Public library was also ordered to

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remove banned material from its library systems, including more than 100
titles about the pro-democracy movement.45 Other cultural institutions, such
as Hong Kong’s flagship M+ Museum, and projects supported by the Hong
Kong Arts Development Council (HKADC), along with films, have been
subject to censorship.46
In short, as this section has documented, the party-state has not only
swiftly amputated much of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy civil society groups;
it also invested in remoulding Hong Kong’s civil society, including its educa-
tion system. This dual-pronged approach has resulted in not a completely dis-
mantled civil society in Hong Kong, but a one which may eventually resemble
that of civil society in Mainland China, with most organizations tethered to
the Party and constrained in their agendas and funding sources. Institutions
of learning, whether they be schools or cultural/educational organizations are
key pillars of civil society as they inculcate civic norms in future generations.
As such, they have been key targets of the remoulding of Hong Kong’s civil
society. The degree to which the party-state succeeds in teaching “habits of the
heart” that resemble participation Mainland China is yet unknown.
The campaign to win the hearts and minds of Hong Kong’s youth is one that
has direct implications for fate of civil society in the territory. Policymakers
in the United States or elsewhere seeking to engage Hong Kong civil society
should recognize that the National Security Law has a wide-reaching impact
far beyond the shuttering of pro-democracy organizations. Civil society, in-
cluding institutions of higher learning, are important organizations that
imbue the younger generation with norms of participation. Whereas civic
education in Hong Kong previously taught “habits” that fostered democratic
citizenship, including civil disobedience, public deliberation, and critical
thinking, these habits are quickly being eroded as institutions of learning are
being pressured to change.

Leveraging Civil Society in U.S.-China Relations

Thus far, this essay has focused on advocacy organizations which are consid-
ered more politically sensitive by the Chinese government due to their align-
ment with liberal democratic values. However, such advocacy organizations
are not the only sector of civil society that is active in improving the socio-

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economic conditions of ordinary people in China. Nor are they the most
promising bridges for engaging in Track 2 diplomacy—dialogue between civil
society and other non-governmental actors that may advance or complement
official Track 1 diplomacy, especially in politically tense times.
This section broadens the scope to consider which civil society groups and
issue areas are more conducive to advancing Track 2 diplomacy in a political
moment where the United States and China are competing in multiple arenas,
and where China is no longer seeking to “join tracks with the world,” as it
did in the 2000s under the Hu-Wen administration. Building upon a 2021
Carter Center report,47 this essay argues that despite the closures of political
opportunities for advocacy groups in Mainland China and Hong Kong, there
remains opportunities for engaging a vast sector of Chinese civil society orga-
nizations that are officially registered under the 2016 Charity Law. These or-
ganizations, working on a range of social issues from environmental to health
to poverty alleviation, are closely tethered to the Chinese party-state through
the regulatory mechanisms but nevertheless work on common-ground issues
that may facilitate people-to-people exchange.
More obvious common ground areas for the United States and China to
cooperate on include the environment/climate change and global health. On
the first issue area, Biden and Xi reached an agreement to cooperate on com-
bating climate change at closing of the Nov. 2021 COP26 Climate Summit,
sending a positive signal for cooperation between civil societies on this com-
mon issue. Indeed, recent research shows that INGOs working on the envi-
ronment, along with a host of other more palatable issues, are able to register
in greater numbers under the 2017 Overseas NGO Law.48
Yet, even in within this green zone, not all INGOs engaged in environ-
mental advocacy have been able to officially register in China under the 2017
Foreign NGO Law.49 For example, Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF),
which was the first foreign conservation organization invited to operate in
China, was able to register a representative office in mainland China under
the law. Its successful registration likely has, in part, to do with its long his-
tory in the country, having set up its Hong Kong office in 1981 and its Beijing
office in 1991, as well as with its less confrontational approaches to conserva-
tion. In contrast, Greenpeace China, which had previously operated in the
country in grey zones, like many other INGOS, has thus far not registered a

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representative office but is instead operating on temporary activity permits.50

This is despite the organization having had a collaborative relationship with
local governments throughout the 2000s.51 While there are many factors that
may explain the divergent fates of these two environmental NGOs in China,
they illustrate that civil society cooperation on the environment is not a given
under the 2017 INGO Law.
Nonetheless, registering an INGO in China is not the only way to engage
in civil society dialogues, nor is the environment the only common ground
sector for mutual exchange. Public health, poverty alleviation, NGO capac-
ity-building, economic inequality, and China’s own aid footprint outside of
is borders that are ripe areas for civil society dialogue with foreign counter-
parts. In particular, poverty alleviation is an issue area where China has had a
proven track record of commitment, albeit through authoritarian campaign-
style politics. As a cornerstone of development agendas everywhere, tackling
poverty is a common-ground issue area that has potential for further civil
society engagement.

Policy Recommendations
Given both the regulatory and political pressures under the Xi administration,
how should different stakeholders in the United States and in other countries
engage with Chinese civil society? It is important to recognize that although
the advocacy sector of civil society in China is difficult to support directly,
given political restrictions, this section is not the only one that engaged in
social change on the ground in China and in the countries where the PRC
is itself a major donor. In fact, INGOs operating in Mainland China have
continued to work with Chinese counterparts to develop the China’s domes-
tic philanthropic sector’s capacity, as well as assisting countries in the Global
South where China has a growing investment and aid footprint.52 In addition,
while some foreign organizations are no longer able to operate legally in PRC
and others have opened offices in Taiwan, the space for engagement has not
completely closed.53
The following recommendations are directed at the major stakeholders in
the United States. The party-state views foreign support for Chinese domestic
civil society as threatening, regardless of whether it is from the United States

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or another liberal democratic government. Therefore, these recommenda-

tions may also be applicable to U.S. allies and counterpart organizations in
Australia, Canada, EU, UK, and New Zealand.

For U.S. Policymakers:

● Foster a policy environment where civil society dialogue is actively
encouraged as Track 2 diplomacy. Start with re-booting educational
exchange programs with China such as the Fulbright Program and
the Peace Corps.

Civil society exchanges can be facilitated by creating a conducive policy en-

vironment in the United States where politics can obstruct people-to-people
exchange with China, under concerns over national security and in retaliation
to the Chinese government.
One pathway to this is rebooting educational exchange programs. Under
the Trump administration, an executive order terminated the Fulbright
Program in China and in Hong Kong in 2020. A recent amendment spon-
sored by Rep. Rick Larson to the America COMPETES Act of 2022 (H.R.
4521) would restore the Fulbright program.54 The Peace Corps also pulled out
of its operations in China in 2020, a decision praised by Senator Rick Scott.55
To the extent that the Chinese government is still receptive to American
Program that send youth to do exchange, programs like the Fulbright and
Peace Corps, as well as other similar programs, should be rebooted. They are
conduits for civil society exchange between the two countries, which are even
more necessary in a time of tense bilateral relations.
Another pathway to encouraging Track 2 diplomacy is to provide in-
creased opportunities for researchers, practitioners, and community leaders in
the diaspora to be integrated into the policy community in the United States.
Recognizing that in the current climate, Chinese civil society counterparts
face high barriers to exchanging with their foreign counterparts, the United
States should set an example of Track 2 diplomacy by integrating civil society
leaders in the Chinese diaspora into policy discussions domestically, especially
ones pertaining to U.S.-China relations.

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 Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead?

● Strategically reframe programs to substitute “democracy promotion”

rhetoric with substantive, non-ideological language such as “civic
engagement” and “capacity bridging”

Following the U.S.-led Summit for Democracy in late 2021, the Biden ad-
ministration announced the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal,
which would provide up to $424.4 million towards expanding the U.S. govern-
ment’s initiative to “defend, sustain, and grow democratic resilience with like-
minded governmental and non-governmental partners in five areas.” Under area
III, “bolstering democratic reformers,” the initiative pledges to empower mar-
ginalized groups and support reform-minded leaders in civil society.56
To the extent that this presidential initiative supports activists and organiza-
tions operating in and outside of China, a strategy reframing of the programs to
substitute democracy promotion rhetoric with non-ideological language such as
“civic engagement” and “capacity bridging.” In contrast to capacity building, ca-
pacity bridging recognizes that there are mutual learning opportunities for U.S.
and Chinese civil societies.57 Although any initiatives directly supported by the
U.S. government is likely to be seen as hostile by the current Chinese govern-
ment, regardless of how it is labeled, a strategic reframing may provide change
makers in China (including reform minded officials) to receive further U.S. gov-
ernment support if political opportunities arise in the future.

● Hold congressional hearings on the status and development of civil

society in Mainland China and in Hong Kong via the Congressional
Executive Commission on China (CECC).

CECC regularly holds hearings on a range of issues pertinent to civil society

in China and hears testimony from rights activists and political dissidents.58
Many of these hearings coincide with major political events or anniversaries
in China. It is recommended that CECC also holds a series of hearings on
civil society, writ large. By hearing from a range of actors engaged in long-term
work of civil society development in China, including INGO representatives,
Chinese philanthropy groups, and academics in the diaspora, US policymak-
ers would gain a long-term perspective on the diversity of change agents oper-
ating in China.

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 Diana Fu

● Create an exit option for Hong Kong activists to seek accelerated

asylum in the United States.

The Hong Kong Safe Harbor Act (S. 4110; H.R. 7415) as well as the
Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act (HR 8428) promise to priori-
tize Hongkongers in consideration for refugee status or asylum, along with
other immigration-related provisions. Passing such acts would create an exit
option for civil society activists in Hong Kong to the United States.

● Support and dialogue with civil society activists from Mainland

China residing in the diaspora community in the United States;
expand funding and support for independent Chinese media outlets
reaching the Chinese diaspora.

Rights activists living abroad are increasingly being targeted by transna-

tional repression, where rights activists in the global diaspora are targeted and
threatened by forces within their origin country.59 In light of this, the U.S.
government and other civil society organizations should devise strategies to
support and dialogue with activists in the Chinese diaspora who may be sub-
ject to transnational repression.
In parallel, the U.S. government should expand funding and support for
independent Chinese language media outlets that provide bilingual news and
analysis, such as the China Digital Times. Such independent media outlets
are much too small to replace WeChat, with its pervasive usage by the dias-
pora in the United States despite security issues.60 Nonetheless, smaller news
platforms can still provide alternative sources of information that can reach
various sectors of the diaspora community.

For U.S. Civil Society Actors and INGOS:

● U.S. foundations and philanthropic organizations should support
and fund programs that facilitate youth-led exchange from China to
the United States and vice versa.

In addition to the civil society actors identified above, exchanges between

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youth groups are particularly meaningful, as this generation will become the
future arbiters of bilateral relations. Beyond study abroad exchanges, short-
term visits of young people to the United States to learn about civic engage-
ment and civil society participation. Conversely, American youth can also ben-
efit from participation Chinese civil society organizations’ projects in China,
particularly those that tackle poverty alleviation and rural education.61 Such
mutual exchanges outside of the formal education programs can facilitate
deeper understandings of differences in civic engagement norms. These topi-
cal exchanges, taking place outside of formal study, should be structured in a
way as to ensure students on both sides are directly engaging with each other.
To the extent that direct youth exchange programs may not be feasible in
the current political climate, exchanges with Mainland Chinese and Hong
Kong diaspora youth populations should be encouraged along the lines of
themes such as addressing environmental challenges, urban/rural inequali-
ties, social disparity, and anti-Asian hate.

● Continue to share best practices among the donor community about

adaptative strategies in authoritarian states; encourage best practices
sharing between Chinese civil society organizations and INGOs.

Foreign foundations and others should think about adaptive strategies as a

long-term, ongoing game. Rather than hoping that the Chinese government
would reverse or significantly revise the law, foreign organizations should con-
tinue to share best practices behind closed doors about adaptive strategies on
how to operate under authoritarian environments. Recognizing that there are
idiosyncrasies in the treatment of any particular INGO by Chinese authori-
ties, information-sharing can nevertheless yield creative solutions to shared
problems. In parallel, exchanges between Chinese civil society organizations
and INGOs should be encouraged to share best practices and experiences on
work related to issue-areas.

For U.S. Educational Institutions:

● Support academics and administrators in universities to receive
scholars and students from Hong Kong and Mainland China who

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may no longer be able to teach or study in their home institutions.

● Educate administrators and faculty on understanding and

responding to the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law and its
impacts on teaching and research in and on China.

To the extent that safeguarding academic freedom rests on the shoulders of

universities, it is recommended that administrators create pathways for the
university to receive scholars from Hong Kong and Mainland China who
are no longer able to work in their home institutions. Doing so would create
an academic “safety net” for scholars under duress and would also enrich the
campus and intellectual life of Western academia.
In addition, universities should encourage self-study for administrators and
faculty on understanding and responding to the 2020 Hong Kong National
Security Law. A best practices memo for teaching on China put out by U.S.-
based public intellectuals, as well as a statement by the Association of Asian
Studies offer a starting point for thinking about creative ways to teach China
in the context of the 2020 National Security Law.62 The American Council
for Learned Societies has also published a 2021 report on Chinese Studies in
North America that offers insights and data on how to balance security con-
cerns while keeping anti-Asian racism and biases in check.63
Recognizing that there are multiple and situation-specific ways to respond
to the challenges posed by the National Security Law, a top-down prescrip-
tion by university administrators on how to respond is not recommended.
However, university administrators should, in the minimum, educate them-
selves and the faculty on the possible challenges posed by the Law, and be pre-
pared to respond in the event of Law-related incidents that arise. Educational
institutions are an indispensable part of civil society and as such, are sites for
contestation over political values. Safeguarding academic freedom is therefore
a cornerstone of upholding democratic values.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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 Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead?

Notes
1 Ying Fu, “Cooperative Competition is Possible Between China and the United States,” New
York Times, November 24, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/opinion/china-us-
biden.html
2 It excludes an assessment of an expansive sector of social organizations that are legally
registered and continue to collaborate with local states across Mainland China, which have
been the subject of other policy reports.
3 Wenbin Wang, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on
December 2, 2021,” December 2, 2021, Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in
New York. http://newyork.china-consulate.org/eng/fyrth/202112/t20211202_10461360.htm.
4 See Diana Fu and Emil Dirks, “Xi Jinping Stye Control and Civil Society Responses,” China
Leadership Monitor, September 1, 2021. https://www.prcleader.org/fu-and-dirks
5 See Holly Snape et al, “How Are NGOs in China Faring Under the New Law?”, ChinaFile,
September 27, 2017. https://archive.is/hJMMN; Shawn Shieh, “Remaking China’s Civil
Society in the Xi Jinping Era,” ChinaFile, August 2, 2018. https://archive.is/5RWsU
6 See Jessica Teets, “The Rise of Foundations: Hope for Grassroots Civil Society in China?” Made
in China, March 26, 2017, Issue 1, 20-38.; Ivan Franceschini, “Meet the State Security: Chinese
Labor Activists and Their Controllers,” Made in China, March 26, 2017, Issue 1, 20–38.
7 The Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, “Report by the
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN,” August 22, 2019. http://
chnun.chinamission.org.cn/eng/gyzg/ssysz/201908/P020210901023271159579.pdf
8 China Daily, “Things to Know about All the Lies on Xinjiang: How Have They Come
About?” China Daily, April 30, 2021. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202104/30/
WS608b4036a31024ad0babb623.html
9 Scholars have debated the degree to which the color revolutions were driven by structural
factors such as authoritarian weakness as opposed to agency-based factors which would
include Western support for civil society in Eastern Europe. See Journal of Democracy Issue,
“Debating the Color Revolutions.” 2009, 20:1.
10 For a list of 18 LGBTQ groups shuttered, see https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/667957.
html; Shawn Yuen, “LGBTQ in China Lament ‘Dark Day’ After Social Media Crackdown,”
Al Jazeera, July 13, 2021. https://archive.is/MW3Ew
11 Yut Yiu Cheung, “China’s WeChat Deletes Dozens of LGBTQ+ Student, NGO Accounts,”
Radio Free Asia, July 7, 2021. https://archive.is/M96Ve; The Economist, “How Nationalism
Is Making Life Harder for Gay People in China,” The Economist, July 17, 2021. https://
archive.is/AGyCM
12 Repression of LGBTQ groups prior to 2021 included the cancellation of Shanghai’s Pride
Festival in 2020 and the closure of a number of gender studies centers and organizations,
including one at Beijing Forestry University (closed in 2019); the Guangzhou Gender and
Sexuality Education Centre (closed in Dec. 2018); Feminist Voices (closed in Mar. 2018), and
the Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counseling and Service Center (closed in 2016).
13 Shen Lu, “Red Vs Are After China’s Queer Community,” Protocol, July 13, 2021. https://
archive.is/h8PgR

546
 Diana Fu

14 Ausma Bernot, “China’s Forced Invisibility of LGBTQ Communities on Social Media,”

The Interpreter, July 9, 2021. https://archive.is/PfqWC. On the 2017 Foreign NGO Law, see
https://archive.is/AP1az
15 Darius Longarion, Changhao Wei, and Yixin (Claire) Ren, “China’s Lawmakers
Take More (Cautious) Steps Against Workplace Sexual Harassment,”
The Diplomat, January 21, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/
chinas-lawmakers-take-more-cautious-steps-against-workplace-sexual-harassment/
16 People’s Daily, “Chinese President Stresses Familial Virtues,” People’s Daily online, December
13, 2016. http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1213/c90000-9153950.html
17 Emily Rauhala, “Chinese College Teaching Women to be ‘Perfect’ in the Xi Jinping Era,” South
China Morning Post, July 2, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-
reads/article/2153428/chinese-college-teaching-women-be-perfect-xi?module=perpetual_scrol
l_0&pgtype=article&campaign=2153428.
18 Jenny Chan, “A Precarious Worker-Student Alliance in Xi’s China,” The China Review, 2020,
20:1, 165-190.
19 J. Hernandez, “China’s Leaders Confront an Unlikely Foe: Ardent Young Communists,” The
New York Times. September 28, 2018. https://archive.is/hOHD7
20 Jenny Chan, “A Precarious Worker-Student Alliance in Xi’s China,” The China Review, 2020,
20:1, 165-190.
21 Josh Rudolph, “Detained Activist Yue Xin on the Jasic Workers,” China
Digital Times, August 24, 2018. https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/08/
no-one-can-resist-the-tides-of-history-detained-activist-yue-xin-on-the-jasic-workers/
22 J. Hernandez, “China Using Taped Confessions to Intimidate Young Communists, Students
Say”, The New York Times, January 21, 2019. https://archive.is/FOTWn
23 Diana Fu, “Disguised Collective Action in China,” Comparative Political Studies, 2017-03,
50:4, 499-527.
24 Amnesty International, “Hong Kong’s National Security Law: 10 Things You need to Know,”
Amnesty International, July 17, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/
hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/
25 The Economist, “China Crushes Hong Kong’s Independent News Outlets,” The Economist,
January 8, 2022. https://www.economist.com/china/2022/01/08/china-crushes-hong-
kongs-independent-news-outlets; other sources suggest a similar number of 59 closed civil
society groups or at a minimum over 50 groups: Rhoda Kwan, “Explainer: Over 50 Groups
Disband-How Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Forces Crumbled,” Hong Kong Free Press,
November 28, 2021. https://hongkongfp.com/2021/11/28/explainer-over-50-groups-gone-
in-11-months-how-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-forces-crumbled/
26 Local Hong Kong news consulted included Apple Daily (closed June 24, 2021); Citizen News
(closed Jan. 4, 2022); HK01 News; Hong Kong Free Press; Ming Pao Weekly; Stand News
(closed in Dec. 2021); The Standard; and LIHKG.com (a popular online forum).
27 Lilian Cheng, “Fresh Wave of Hong Kong Unions, Civil Society Groups Disband
over Fears of Vague ‘Red Lines’ under National Security Law,” South China Morning
Post, July 3, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3139713/
fresh-wave-hong-kong-unions-civil-society-groups-disband

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28 UK-based watchdog Hong Kong Watch says that Hong Kong’s Security Bureau has threatened
its founder with prison and fines for allegedly breaching the city’s national security law. Local
authorities have accused the group of interference and said the law applies worldwide.
29 Ibid.
30 Yuan Shi, “Remove the ‘Tumor’ from the Student Union of the Hong Kong University,
Return Peace to Campus,” The People’s Daily, April, 18, 2021. https://wap.peopleapp.com/
article/6180392/6083351
31 The Standard, “Former CUHK Student Union President among Four
Arrested for Inciting Blank Votes,” The Standard, December 15, 2021.
https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/4/184551/
Former-CUHK-student-union-president-among-four-arrested-for-inciting-blank-votes
32 Student Organizations and Societies, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, https://
www.polyu.edu.hk/en/sao/student-development-unit/student-organisations-support/
student-organisations-and-societies/
33 Chan Ho-him, “National Security Law: Hong Kong Schools Told to Remove
Books that Might Fall Foul of the Legislation,” South China Morning Post, July
6, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/3092043/
national-security-law-hong-kong-schools-told-remove-books
34 Government of the HKSAR, Education Bureau, “National Security Education in School
Curriculum-Implementation Mode and Learning and Teaching Resources,” February 4,
2021. https://applications.edb.gov.hk/circular/upload/EDBC/EDBC21002E.pdf
35 FTV HSNPS, “Things to Know About National Security (video book),” YouTube, April 13,
2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKeSzH0OFwk
36 William Yiu, “Subsidized Hong Kong Schools Eligible for up to HK$300,000 in New
Government Funding to Boost National Education,” South China Morning Post, November
16, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/3156241/subsidised-
hong-kong-schools-eligible-hk300000-new?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&c
ampaign=3156241
37 For the fifteen subject areas, see the Chinese version of the website. “National Security
Education Curriculum Framework.” https://www.edb.gov.hk/tc/curriculum-development/
kla/pshe/national-security-education/index.html.
38 The Government of HKSAR, Education Bureau, Curriculum Framework of National
Security Education in Hong Kong, May 2021. https://www.edb.gov.hk/en/curriculum-
development/kla/pshe/national-security-education/index.html
39 Ibid.
40 The Economist, “Academics in Hong Kong Suffer Curbs on Their Freedoms,”
The Economist, July 24, 2021. https://www.economist.com/china/2021/07/21/
academics-in-hong-kong-suffer-curbs-on-their-freedoms
41 For insight on how the NSL suppresses academic freedom in Hong Kong and in the diaspora,
see Shui-Yin Sharon Yam, “Fear in the Classroom- How Hong Kong’s National Security
Law Suppresses Academic and Intellectual Freedom,” Made in China (Journal), October 21,
2020. https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/10/21/fear-in-the-classroom-how-hong-kongs-
national-security-law-suppresses-academic-and-intellectual-freedom/

548
 Diana Fu

42 Jessie Pang and Sara Cheng, “Exclusive New Hong Kong University Classes set out Dangers
of Breaking Security Law,” Reuters, November 5, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/
asia-pacific/exclusive-new-hong-kong-university-classes-set-out-dangers-breaking-security-
law-2021-11-05/
43 Chris Lau, “Beijing Official Calls on Hong Kong Universities to Play a More Active
Role in Greater Bay Area Development,” South China Morning Post, October
28, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/3154009/
beijing-official-tells-hong-kong-universities-play-more
44 Mike Ives, “Hong Kong Removes Status that Memorialized Tiananmen Victims,” The New
York Times, December 23, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/23/world/asia/hong-
kong-tiananmen-statue.html
45 Cheng Yut Yiu and Gigi Lee, “Hong Kong Libraries Remove Books for ‘Violating’ National
Security Law,” Radio Free Asia, November 24, 2021. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/
china/books-11242021093901.html
46 See 2021 Human Rights Watch Report, “Dismantling a Free Society: Hong
Kong One Year After the National Security Law,” Human Rights Watch, June
25, 2021. https://www.hrw.org/feature/2021/06/25/dismantling-free-society/
hong-kong-one-year-after-national-security-law
47 “Carter Center Issues Report Addressing U.S.-China Relations,” The Carter Center,
February 23, 2021. https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2021/china-022221.html
48 Plantan, Elizabeth, “Not All NGOs are Treated Equally: Selectivity in Civil Society
Management in China and Russia.” Comparative Politics, August 4, 2021.
49 For data on the number of registered INGOS in China (2017-2022), see Jessica Batke,
“Visually Understanding the Data on Foreign NGO Representative Offices and Temporary
Activities,” China File, March 7, 2022. https://www.chinafile.com/ngo/analysis/
visually-understanding-data-foreign-ngo-representative-offices-and-temporary-activities.
50 Gabriel Corsetti, “Temporary Activities: The New Normal for International NGOs in
China?” China Development Brief, May 14, 2019. https://chinadevelopmentbrief.org/reports/
temporary-activities-the-new-normal-for-international-ngos-in-china/
51 For a study of Greenpeace’s collaborative relationship with local governments in the 2000s,
see Jessica Teets, Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014).
52 See for example, the Ford Foundation’s China in the world portfolio.
53 For example, the National Democratic Institute and the Republican International Institute
both announced the opening of Taiwan offices in fall 2020, coinciding with China’s
sanctioning of leaders in these organizations.
54 “Larsen: America Competes Act Enhances U.S. Global Leadership, Boosts U.S.
Manufacturing and Jobs,” Rep. Rick Larsen (WA-02), February 4, 2022. https://larsen.
house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2599
55 Rick Scott Florida’s U.S. Senator, “Sen. Rick Scott: House Democrats’ Plan to Resurrect
Peace Corps Programs in Communist China is Despicable,” Rick Scott Florida’s U.S.
Senator, July 15, 2020. https://www.rickscott.senate.gov/2020/7/sen-rick-scott-house-
democrats-plan-resurrect-peace-corps-programs-communist-china-despicable

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 Is Rights Advocacy Civil Society in China Dead?

56 For example, the state department will be providing up to $10 million for Lifeline:
Embattled CSOs Assistance Fund to support advocacy organizations under threat
around the world.
57 See definition of “capacity bridging” as proposed by the AHA Center, an indigenous-led
collaborative research center in Canada: AHA Centre, “Capacity Bridging,” AHA Centre,
Version 2, June 4, 2018. https://www.ahacentre.ca/uploads/9/6/4/2/96422574/capacity_
bridging_-_finaljune_2018.pdf
58 See Hearings, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. https://www.cecc.gov/
events/hearings
59 On transnational repression, see 2021 Freedom House report. Freedom House, “Out of Sight,
Not out of Reach: Understanding Transnational Repression,” Freedom House, February 3,
2021. https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression; On digital transnational
repression, see report from the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto. Miles Kenyon,
“Digital Transnational Repression Explained,” The Citizen Lab, University of Toronto,
March 1, 2022. https://citizenlab.ca/2022/03/digital-transnational-repression-explained/
60 As of 2020, when Trump attempted to remove WeChat from app stores, the app had 19
million active daily users in the United States. David Shepardson, “U.S. Judge Halts Trump
Administration’s Order to Remove WeChat from App Stores,” Reuters, September 20,
2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wechat-idUSKCN26B0IY; a 2020 report by
the Citizen Lab found that WeChat surveils both images and files shared on the platform
by non-China registered users. Such data is then used to train censorship algorithms
for China-registered WeChat users. Miles Kenyon, “WeChat Surveillance Explained,”
The Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, May 7, 2020. https://citizenlab.ca/2020/05/
wechat-surveillance-explained/
61 For example, the Beijing Lide Future Student Charity Foundation, registered with the Beijing
Civil Affairs Bureau, has run a “Teach for China” program since 2008 for young Chinese
people. There may be opportunity for partnering with Chinese charities to allow American
youth to participate in projects like Teach for China.
62 China File, “How to Teach China This Fall,” China File, August 20, 2020. https://www.
chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-teach-china-fall; AAS Board of Directors,
“Association for Asian Studies Statement Regarding Remote Teaching, Online Scholarship,
Safety, and Academic Freedom,” Association of Asian Studies, July 23, 2020. https://www.
asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/20200723-AAS-statement-regarding-online-meeting-
software-and-academic-freedom.pdf
63 American Council of Learned Societies, “China Studies in North America: A Report on
Survey Research by the Luce/ACLS Advisory Groups 2021,” American Council of Learned
Societies, May 31, 2021. https://www.acls.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/China-Studies-
in-North-American-Report.pdf

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

Understanding the
#MilkTeaAlliance
Movement

Austin Horng-En Wang is an Assistant Professor at the University

of Nevada, Las Vegas and a 2021–22 Wilson China Fellow

Adrian Rauchfleisch is an Associate Professor at National

Taiwan University
 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

Abstract
#MilkTeaAlliance is a pan-Asia online civil solidarity movement that began
in April 2020, but observers identified two distinct elements driving this
movement: anti-China sentiment and a pro-democracy spirit. This project an-
alyzes 3 million #MilkTeaAlliance tweets between April 2020 and December
2021, trying to disentangle how East and Southeast Asian netizens commu-
nicated and mobilized through this hashtag across borders. The results show
that Thai-speaking Twitter users contributed to more than 50 percent of all
#MilkTeaAlliance tweets globally, and several waves of hashtags in 2020
mostly reflect the political challenges Thai people faced. Network and key-
ness analysis show that discussion through the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtag
was mainly about counterarguments to China’s narrative of globalization in
its early stages and was tweeted in English. Months later, attention gradually
shifted to human rights and supporting detained and repressed activists, and
the tweets were mostly not written in English. While the shift and decline
in the number of hashtags reflect the limitation of this online movement, es-
pecially during the COVID-19 pandemic, the dynamic and mobilization in
#MilkTeaAlliance also evidence the desire and necessity of a durable platform
for exchanging experience and enriching the narratives among activists and
netizens in East and Southeast Asia.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● The dynamic in the #MilkTeaAlliance movement indicates that activists
and netizens in East and Southeast Asia desire and need a platform
for exchanging experiences and learning from each other. A durable
and better-organized platform can help them accumulate information,
experience, and resources.

● Analysis of the geolocation and language used in tweets shows that many
active members in #MilkTeaAlliane have a strong connection to both the
United States and the alliance member countries, possibly their countries
of origin. A U.S.-based durable platform may facilitate collaboration
among the #MilkTeaAlliance members.

553
 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

● The formation of counterarguments against China’s narrative of

globalization in the early stages of #MilkTeaAlliance suggests that cross-
country collaborations indeed benefit the activists across Asia. This
movement serves as a means to empower civil society in democracies and
counter China’s ideological expansion through international organizations.

● The surge and decline of the #MilkTeaAlliance movement imply

that international attention plays an important role in supporting
democratization in Asia, but democratization needs more than just
international attention.

554
 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

Introduction
#MilkTeaAlliance is a pan-Asia online civil solidarity movement that began
in April 2020. It originated from an internet meme war between Chinese and
Thai fans over Vachirawit Chiva-aree, a Thai actor whose girlfriend implicitly
indicated that Taiwan and China are different countries under her Instagram
photo. Chinese netizens made 1.4 million posts on Weibo demanding the
actor apologize, while Thai netizens tagged the girlfriend’s name “#nnevvy”
more than 2 million times on Twitter to show their support.
Given that this internet brawl was caused mainly by China’s One China
Principle, many Taiwanese and Hong Kong netizens quickly joined the vir-
tual battleground. They explained the story in the most popular forums in
Taiwan and Hong Kong and recruited thousands to support the Thailand
couple on Twitter. For example, on April 13, a Hong Kong-based Facebook
page, MilkTealogy, illustrated the cooperation among Thailand, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong netizens as the Oath of the Peach Garden—all with a milk tea in
their hand—and calling the three countries the #MilkTeaAlliance.1 This pic-
ture and the related hashtags were quickly shared on Facebook 13,000 times
and reposted by many Twitter activists, including Joshua Wong, the most
prominent activist in Hong Kong.
#MilkTeaAlliance did not just trend for a few days. Instead, it quickly be-
came a symbol of cross-Asia civil solidarity beyond the original three mem-
bers. Netizens from India, Australia, and the Philippines joined the alliance
within a few months. As of December 23, 2020, there have been seven major
waves of movements related to #MilkTeaAlliance:

● On April 15, Thai netizens used this hashtag to invite Twitter users from
Taiwan and Hong Kong to support the anti-Mekong Dam movement,
which protested against China’s plan to build several upstream dams that
would negatively impact the environment and economy of Thailand.

● On May 1, the U.S. Department of State initiated a #TweetforTaiwan

movement to advocate for Taiwan to join the World Health Assembly. As
a result, tens of thousands from Thailand, Hong Kong, and India posted
the same hashtag and referenced #MilkTeaAlliance.2

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 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

● On May 1, the Australian government called for investigating the origin

of COVID-19 in Wuhan and was boycotted by China in return. Many
netizens welcomed the investigation and supported Australia with the
#MilkTeaAlliance hashtag.

● On May 20, Taiwanese and Indian Twitter users used both

#MilkTeaAlliance and #HindiTaiwaniBhaiBhai to support India during
its territorial dispute with China.

● In late August, 12 activists were arrested and sent to China when they
were fleeing to Taiwan in a speedboat. The #Save12 movement was
quickly spread along with the #MilkTeaAlliance.

● Also, in late August, netizens from the Philippines used

#MilkTeaAlliance to call for international support to investigate the
shooting of human rights activist Zara Alvarez.

● Starting in October, hundreds of thousands of students in Thailand

have been occupying the streets and demanding political reform,
especially from the royal family. During the protest, they frequently
used #MilkTeaAlliance to garner support from Hong Kong,3 Taiwan,4
and India.

Debating the Interpretation of the

#MilkTeaAlliance Movement
#MilkTeaAlliance has a clear anti-China element given its origin in the in-
ternet brawl between China and Thailand. During the later waves of the
movement mentioned above, however, the usage of #MilkTeaAlliance as a
mobilization banner seems to shift from anti-China sentiment to a global-
ized pro-democracy narratives. Schaffer and Praphakorn argue that the shift is
partly driven by the international environment.5 The #nnevvy episode in April
2020 was followed by June Fourth (Tiananmen massacre day), the Black Lives
Matter protest in the United States, the disappearance of 12 activists in Hong

556
 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

Kong, and repression campaigns in Thailand and Myanmar. As time goes by,
the network bridged by the #MilkTeaAlliance movement may shift its atten-
tion from the anti-China episode to the pro-democracy movement in general.
As a result, it is not surprising that existing studies render opposite in-
terpretations of the movement. Schneider, 6 Yang,7 and Chang8 summarize
#MilkTeaAlliance as an anti-Beijing movement initiated by Thailand, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan from nationalist sentiments. Mölder and Shiraev further
suggest that the movement was driven to counter China’s narrative on the
COVID-19 pandemic.9 The anti-China sentiment in the movement causes
the belief among many activists that countries and regions in Asia will col-
laborate through the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtags against the expansion of
the Chinese empire—regardless of their political or cultural backgrounds.
This belief and imagination of the anti-China sentiment embody some of
the online artworks made by the activists.10 Moreover, the choice of milk
tea as the symbol also reinforces the imagined boundaries of the out-group
(China, without its “own” milk tea) and in-group (each country with “its
own” version of milk tea).
Meanwhile, Sombatpoonsiri,11 Thein-Lemelson,12 and Chachavalpongpun,13
based on their analyses of Thailand and Myanmar, summarize this movement
as a pro-democracy coalition in East and Southeast Asia.14 Chachavalpongpun
further shows that the movement inspired other democratic movements in
other continents, such as a yogurt movement in Belarus led by young activists.15
Indeed, a recent wave of #MilkTeaAlliance during the repression in Myanmar
in July 2021 was mainly responded to by Twitter users in other democratic
countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom (will be dis-
cussed later).16 On April 7, 2021, Twitter also announced to create an emoji for
the #MilkTeaAlliance movement, calling it “an online solidarity alliance first
started in April 2020 as a Twitter meme which has grown into a global pro-
democracy movement.”17 This argument suggests that the desire for democracy
and human rights is the main motivation driving people across these countries
to collaborate under the umbrella of #MilkTeaAlliance.
However, these two camps of explanations have limitations theoretically
and empirically. From the theoretical perspective, nationalism or democracy
is insufficient to represent the whole solidarity movement. On the one hand,
if nationalism is the main motivation to bring out the #MilkTeaAlliance, na-

557
 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

tionalism should be expected to consolidate the in-group patriotism and the

out-group denigration by the border; the border of the imagined community
should be strengthened, and people would have the rally-around-the-flag ef-
fect and support their own government. Nevertheless, these nationalism-
driven predictions did not appear in this movement. For example, when
Thailand netizens defended #nnevvy and fought against the Chinese counter-
part, they also blamed their government and the royal family at the same time.
Moreover, nationalism would not motivate people to care for the institution
of democracy in other countries. On the other hand, if the belief in democracy
is the main motivation for the #MilkTeaAlliance, it cannot explain why this
movement originated from the One-China Principle, which China required
all other countries to follow.

Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance

Movement through the empirical data
Empirically, the usage of the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtag and the interpreta-
tion ignore the effectiveness of using this hashtag. To be specific, once this
hashtag has established its reputation, everyone can exploit it for its own
gain. Meanwhile, not every usage would draw the same amount of attention.
For example, the abovementioned discussion proposed two important ele-
ments—anti-China and democracy—behind the movement. It is possible
that the majority of the tweets overwhelmingly focus on one, two, or the
combination of these two factors. Empirical observation can help us recon-
cile the two factors through how people really react to them. One possible
approach is to investigate the content accompanied by the #MilkTeaAlliance
hashtag across time and locations. If most of the hashtags appear dispropor-
tionally to focus on one of the factors, we would suggest that factor as the
main motivation in this movement.
Two related indicators on the effectiveness of the #MilkTeaAlliance dis-
cussed above are the number of tweets and the length of each wave. If the
tweets only surged over one day without further consolidation, one may argue
that attention shifted quickly. Similarly, if the numbers of hashtags are signifi-
cantly different across similar events, we may argue that people pay different
amounts of attention across these events.

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 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

Another quick tool to evaluate the effectiveness of the hashtag is to explore

the language used along with the tag. To be specific, which language people
use in the #MilkTeaAlliance tweets may reflect their intentions and actions
in this movement. Segesten and Bossetta argue that there are three stages of
online political participation:18 information, mobilization, and action. When
political repression happens in Country A, and people in Country B tweet
about this repression in English, it is more likely that the tweet is to show
support across the border or provide suggestions to the victims in Country A.
On the other hand, if the tweets are posted in Country B’s official language
(which is usually not English in the countries in this movement), the tweets
are mostly about spreading information to Country B. Hence, we can roughly
observe how people across countries exploit the #MilkTeaAlliance through
the language they choose in the discussion.
The third method is to examine what other hashtags appeared along with
the #MilkTeaAlliance. It indicates how people planned to use this hashtag
to communicate with each other. For example, Rauchfleisch et al. (2021)19
developed a method to collect and detect all tweets in Switzerland and then
show that people dramatically shifted their attention to the pandemic after
the outbreak in early 2020. The basic idea of this keyness analysis20 is to com-
pare whether many new hashtags appeared in a given period are significantly
different relative to the previous period. By comparing the change of hashtags
and the #MilkTeaAlliance across time, we can analyze how people exploit this
hashtag and the evolution of this movement.

Case 1: The main analysis, April 2020–December 2020

Since the beginning of the #MilkTeaAlliance movement in April 2020, there
have been a series of hashtag waves on Twitter. The archive contributed by
Dr. Adrian Rauchfleisch and Dr. Shih Hsien Hsu at the National Taiwan
University includes 2,719,573 #MilkTeaAlliance tweets in 2020.21 The dis-
tribution is shown in Figure Case 1-1. In this figure, the X-axis is the time-
line, and Y-axis is the number of tweets; the two peaks capture the first
#nnevvy dispute in April and the Thailand repression in mid-October. The
other two peaks last August 2021 and in late April were about the 12 Hong
Kong activists being sent to China and Taiwan’s effort to join the WHO,

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 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

FIGURE CASE 1-1: Distribution of the #MilkTeaAlliance tweets per day in

2020 (n = 2,719,573).

550,000
525,000
500,000
475,000
450,000
425,000
400,000
Tweet volume

375,000
350,000
325,000
300,000
275,000
250,000
225,000
200,000
175,000
150,000
125,000
100,000
75,000
50,000
25,000
0
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
Days in 2020

FIGURE CASE 1-2: Language used of the #MilkTeaAlliance tweets per

day in 2020 (n = 2,719,573)

400,000

lang_stack
300,000 en
eu
it
ja
Tweets

200,000
ko
no
other
th
und
100,000
zh

0
Apr Jul Oct Jan
Days

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 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

respectively. One observable phenomenon in Figure Case 1-1 is that each

#MilkTeaAlliance peak did not last long. Most of the tweets emerged on a
single day, and then the trend plummeted within a few days.
Who contributed to these 2.7 million tweets? Figure Case 1-2 shows the
distribution of the language used in these tweets detected by Twitter (“und”
means that Twitter cannot categorize the language, such as an emoji or emoti-
con). The X-axis is the timeline, the Y-axis is the number of tweets, and each
color line refers to a language used for the tweets. Overall, Thai constitutes
57.2 percent of all #MIlkTeaAlliance tweets (1.55 million), followed by
English (34.5 percent, 0.94 million), undefined (5.8 percent, 0.16 million) and
Chinese (1.06 percent, 0.03 million). All other languages count for <1 percent
of the overall tweets.
The distribution of the self-reported geolocation of the users shows a simi-
lar but less obvious trend. The majority of these tweets do not reveal the lo-
cation (2.04 million, 75.0 percent). For the remaining tweets in which loca-
tion can be identified with the platform OpenStreetMap,22 11.7 percent are
from Thailand (318k), 3.2 percent from Hong Kong (88k), and 2.1 percent
from the United States (58k). These are followed by the UK (0.8 percent),
Japan (0.6 percent), India (0.5 percent), South Korea (0.5 percent), France
(0.4 percent), China (0.4 percent), Germany (0.4 percent), Taiwan (0.3 per-
cent), Canada (0.3 percent), and Australia (0.3 percent). In other words, the
#MilkTeaAlliance tweets from Thailand account for about half of tweets
whose locations are identifiable, and the proportion is similar to the distribu-
tion of the language used.
In the end, Figure Case 1-3 shows the distribution of hashtags along with
the #MilkTeaAlliance in each week in 2020. Again, we follow Rauchfleisch et
al. (2021)’s method and find 8 “overrepresented” hashtags in each weak com-
pared with the distribution of hashtags last week. Meanwhile, the X-axis refers
to the timeline in 2020, while the Y-axis is the number of unique tweeter users
mentioned in these hashtags. In other words, these hashtags that appeared in
Figure Case 1-3 are the first appearance of the most popular hashtags along
with the #MilkTeaAlliance during 2020.
There are two important trends in Figure Case 1-3. First of all, the topics
people discussed along with the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtag shifted dramati-
cally with time. Specifically, the topics gradually shifted from issues related to

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 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

FIGURE CASE 1-3: Concurrent Hashtags with #MilkTeaAlliance per week

in 2020

China to protestors and human rights issues. Before August 2020, we can find
#stopmekongdem, #boycottmulan, #southchinasea, #taiwanisnotchina, #free-
hongkong on the upper left corner of Figure Case 1-3. These topics are related
to fighting against China’s expansion, geographically or ideologically. There
is already a clear negative attitude in these hashtags and they include a verb,
so these tweets are mainly about the mobilization of other allies through the
#MilkTeaAlliance, instead of discussion (as in Segesten and Bossetta 2017).
After August 2020, however, the hashtags are mainly about protesters
and human rights: #savehk12youth, #police, #savejoshuawong, #whatishap-
peninginth, #thaiprotestor, and #fightforfreedom all appeared on the top right
corner of Figure Case 1-3. This trend reflects the urgency of domestic politics in
Thailand and Hong Kong. Meanwhile, it is clear that the discussion about the
expansion of China—such as the Belt and Road Initiative or the South China
Sea—declined during this period. Therefore, in the next section, we will zoom
in on April and October 2020 to further analyze the agenda shifts.
The second noticeable trend in Figure Case 1-3 is the increasing number of
Thai-language keyness hashtags in late 2020. Indeed, Figure Case 1-2 shows
that most of the #MilkTeaAlliance tweets were written in Thai. Nevertheless,
in early 2020, most of the keyness hashtags were written in English, as is shown
on the left-hand side of Figure Case 1-3. It indicates that the alliance members
are much more likely to discuss China-related issues across the border in the
early stage of the movement. However, many issues discussed in this period,

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 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

such as the Mekong Dem and the South China Sea, are cross-national issues
and need cross-national attention and collaboration. The #MilkTeaAlliance
hashtag serves as a platform for alliance members from different countries.
In later 2020, however, Thai-language tweets dominate the #MilkTeaAlliance
hashtags (in Figure Case 1-2) and in other hashtags accompanied with
#MilkTeaAlliance (in Figure Case 1-3). The combination of these results suggests
that the hashtags in later 2020 mainly served as an information source for Thai
people to receive information from other countries (e.g., #hk12youth) and to mo-
bilize other Thai readers globally (e.g., #police or #whatishappeninginTH). In
Case 2 to 4, I will provide further evidence for this inference.

Case 2: Zooming in on April and October 2020

One major weakness of the keyness in Figure Case 1-3 is the small number
of keyness hashtags week by week, so the relationship among the hashtags re-
mains unclear. In Figure Case 2-1 and Figure Case 2-2, we draw the relation-
ship between the 100 most popular hashtags in April-May 2020 and October-
November 2020, respectively. In these two figures, all hashtags are translated
by Google Translate. Ff the translated hashtag is shown, it starts with capital
letters (e.g., “TH”). The color indicates the clusters of hashtags, and the lines
indicate the concurrent appearance of the hashtags.
In Figure Case 2-1, the network illustrates the anti-China sentiment in
the early stage of the #MilkTeaAlliance movement and shows how the alli-
ance members communicated through English: the majority of the hashtags
are English with a few exceptions in Chinese and Thai. At the center of the
network, we can find clear anti-China hashtags such as #nmsl, 23 #chinazi,
#boycottchina, and #china_is_terrorist. Based on this anti-China sentiment,
three groups of discussion can be found in this figure, including the pro-Tai-
wan mobilization, pro-Hong Kong tweets, and Thailand-related issues. Even
though some Thailand and Hong Kong issues were not tweeted in English,
the core anti-China discussions were all written in English.
Six months later, the rhetoric of the #MilkTeaAlliance changed. In Figure
Case 2-2, the center of the discussion is about the repression in Thailand and
the protesters detained in Hong Kong. More than half of these hashtags were
written in Thai (as indicated by TH at the beginning of the hashtag). The

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 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

FIGURE CASE 2-1: Hashtag network in all #MilkTeaAlliance tweets,

April–May, 2020

#nnevy

TH #condensed milk tea #memesdaily

#1 #hkpoliceterrorists
#hkpolicestate #hongkongneedshelp
#5demandsnot1less #hkpolicebrutality
#fightforfreedom #nationalse #vivataiwan
ZH-CN #Hongkong #nmsl #brazil
#taiwa #memes
#standwithhk #hongkongers #xichallenge
#tweetfortaiwan #hongkong ZH-TW #milktea alliance #mi #hk
#hongkongprotests #standwithhongkong #yelloweconomiccircle #japanese
#india #freehongkong #ccp #nmslese
#china
#taiwanese
#taiwancanhelp #ccpchina #nnevvy
#nnevyy #milktea
#ccp_is_terrorist
#thai #chinaliedpeopledied
#antichinazi #nmsland
#taiwanisnotchina #stopmekongdam #onechina
#milktealogy #taiwan #boycottchina #mil #mekong
#hongkongisnotchina TH #Milk tea is thicker than b...
#thailand #makechinapay #ccpvirus #chinamustpay
#stopmekongdame
#vietnam #chinazi #australia #milkteaa
#krispykreme #coronavirus
#wuhanvirus #chinaliedpeopledie TH #government #m
#chinesevirus #milkt
#indian TH #Condensed milk tea_d2
#who TH #Government at the foot of ...
#freespeech TH #Mekong dam
#milk #chinavirus
#tweetforthailand #makeccppay #covid19
#milkteaallianc
TH #No Twitter Thailand

#tha #human

FIGURE CASE 2-2: Hashtag network in all #MilkTeaAlliance tweets,

October–November, 2020

#freeourfriends
#freetonychung TH #16 October, go separate
#taiwannationalday

TH #16 October to Ratchaprasong

#savejoshuawong TH #Emergency decree
#savehkthreeactivist #savetonychung #milkteaa
#whatshappeninginthail
#standwithhk

TH #Mob for Hong Kong

TH #16 October mob
TH #Mob 14 October
TH #social garbage king #whathappeninginthailand
TH #16 October, go to Pathumwan Intersection
TH #mob25 Nov #whatshappenninginthailand #freedomforthai
TH #Mob 17 October
TH #stop harassing people TH #25 October mob
TH #leave our friends #milkt
TH #15 October to Ratchaprasong #hksupportsthailand #endimpunity
#whatshappeninginthailand #freehongkong #savehk12youth #thailandprotests
#milkteaal TH #25 Nov to scb #whatishappeninginthailand #tibet #blacklivesmatter
TH #October 20 mob #fightforfreedom #endsars #mmiw
#standwiththailand #humanrights
#hongkongisacountry #whatshappeninglnthailand
TH #Mob 21 October #thailandprotest2020 #thailand #whatshappeninglnth #abol
TH #October 18 mob #standwithhongkong #democracy
#milkteaalli #whatis
#hongkong #hkers TH #Mob 26 October
TH #Mob 19 October #save12 #taiwan #thai
#save12hkyouths #we #taiwanese
#save12hkyo #sta #thais
#milktea #12hkyouths #bangkok
#save12hkyouth #hongkongers
#milkte #policebrutality #standwiththai #freespeech
#whatishappeninginthaiand
#antionechinath #stand
#milkteaallian
TH #China day that is not a national day # #thaigov
#boycotttyranny
#boycottccp #save #thaiprotesters
#m #thaiprotestors #policeviolence

#sa

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subgroups of the discussion are all developed from the ongoing repression in
Thailand, which links to the criticism of the Thailand authorities and the de-
sire for human rights and freedom. Even though the Hong Kong issue still
accounts for a considerable proportion of the discussion, the tone is mainly to
the Hong Kong protesters instead of the China government. Compared with
the previous figure, Figure Case 2-2 does not have the same level of anti-China
sentiment; it also did not cover any other China-related topic except for the
protest in Hong Kong.

Case 3: Repression in Myanmar and Thailand, July 2021

In the midst of July 2021, thousands of protesters in Thailand came to the
streets and demanded that Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha resign for
mishandling COVID-19, but the police responded with tear gas and water
cannons.24 In Myanmar, hundreds of anti-coup activists marched in Yangon
and accused the military government of hoarding oxygen supplies despite the
worsening pandemic.25 However, during the violent repressions in Thailand
and Myanmar this July, the #MilkTeaAlliance spell seemed to lose its power.
During this period, we found only 61,994 tweets sent between July 13th to
the 19th. Indeed, about half of these were tweeted on July 18th when wide-scale
repression was launched. The number of hashtags after this outbreak of protest
is much lower than the similar waves in 2020, as is shown in Figure Case 1-1.
We then located these tweets using geographic information provided
by Twitter users. After data cleaning, we successfully located about half of
these tweets (many did not reveal their locations in their profile), and the
distribution is shown in Figure Case 3-2. Apart from those in Myanmar
(MY) and Thailand (TL), where protests are ongoing, the number of tweets
from other traditional members in the #MilkTeaAlliance is low. For ex-
ample, about 300 #MilkTeaAlliance hashtags were from Hong Kong, 100
from Taiwan, and 50 from India. In Thailand, one million people tweeted
#WhatIsHappeninginThailand, #saveสิทธิโชค, and #banfoodpanda, but only
600 called for support from the #MilkTeaAlliance this time.
The two protests in Thailand and Myanmar are domestic political issues
with no China dimension. Even though international advocacy and collabo-
ration are important factors in supporting the democratic movement within

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 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

FIGURE CASE 3-1: Number of #MilkTeaAlliance hashtags between July

13–19, 2021

30,000

20,000

10,000

Protest in Thailand
0
and Myanmar

07–13 07–14 07–15 07–16 07–17 07–18 07–19

N of MilkTeaAlliance hashtag on Twitter by day (n=61994)

FIGURE CASE 3-2: Locations of #MilkTeaAlliance hashtags on Twitter

between July 13–19, 2021

N of MilkTeaAlliance on
Twitter by country

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 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

FIGURE CASE 3-3: Content analysis of #MilkTeaAlliance hashtags July

13–19, 2021 (n=61994)

julycoup
terrorists
strike
covid
people
junta
military
myanmar
dictatorship
protest
village
anup
mandalay
township
youths
july
taze
abducted

0 10000 20000 30000 40000

Keywords in the MilkTeaAlliance tweets
Austin Want @UNLV

each country, netizens in other countries were not motivated to join without a
link to China. The feeling of a shared fate may not be strong enough without
a common enemy. Indeed, when these 62,000 #MilkTeaAlliance tweets were
analyzed in Figure 3, 90 percent of them were about the anti-coup movement
in Myanmar. The main theme is pro-democracy but not anti-China in this
wave of the #MilkTeaAlliance movement.
Meanwhile, Figure 2 shows that most of the hashtags were tweeted by ne-
tizens in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Canada, and
France. Even more #MilkTeaAlliance tweets emerged from the United States
than Myanmar and Thailand combined. Admittedly, some of these tweets
were made by political asylum-seekers or their relatives located in those es-
tablished democracies, but others reflected a certain level of attention from

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 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

the public in these countries. Hence, this timely support from the established
democracies is complementary in continuing the #MilkTeaAlliance move-
ment. For example, @NunesAlt, a prominent U.S. Twitter account with 130k
followers, closely followed and retweeted the development of the anti-coup
movement in Myanmar.26
In short, this wave of hashtag movement did not gain international support
from the assumed alliance members. However, the language used in these
tweets is mostly English, and it indeed gained the attention of netizens in the
United States and the United Kingdom.

Case 4: The Pillar of Shame, December 2021

At the end of 2021, we searched and collected the #MilkTeaAlliance on
Twitter for the last time for this project, and we found an additional wave
of tweets. Right before New Year’s Eve, 12,845 #MilkTeaAlliance tweets ap-
peared. The surge was composed of two waves of tweets, as shown in Figure
Case 4-1: the first wave appeared before Christmas, which was driven by the
removal of Pillar of Shame at the University of Hong Kong.27 The Pillar of
Shame stood as a memorial to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre victims,
which had stood for 20 years. The removal is believed to be another piece of
evidence that China strengthens its control over Hong Kong. The second and
much smaller wave appeared on December 26, when 31 victims, including
women and children, were found dead in Myanmar. The military government
in Myanmar was accused of killing the victims.28 Both waves only lasted for
one day. Once again, the peaks are much shorter than the main waves in 2020
as shown in Figure Case 1-1, and are also shorter than the previous wave in
July 2021 in Figure Case 3-1.
We then analyzed the features of these 12,845 tweets. Among these tweets,
90.3 percent were written in Thai, only 7.5 percent were written in English,
and all others were less than 1 percent. We then translated and categorized
all tweets by the keyword list shown in Table Case 4-1. About 56.1 percent
of these tweets are about China, 11.3 percent are about Myanmar, and 66.8
percent are about democracy and human rights. Some tweets do not belong
to either of the categories, such as tweeting the hashtag only, or introducing
some beautiful scenes or food in some other countries.

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 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

FIGURE CASE 4-1: #MilkTeaAlliance tweets in December 2021

Tweets mentioning “#MilkTeaAlliance” by day, (n=12845)

7,500

5,000
Count

2,500

0
Dec 22 Dec 24 Dec 26 Dec 28

Source: Twitter API

The distribution is more informative when we intersect the two factors.

The majority of the #MilkTeaAlliance tweets in this wave mainly criticize the
removal of the Pillar of Shame (both democracy-related and China-related).
It drew less attention when the tweets were only about China but had noth-
ing to do with democracy or human rights. Meanwhile, there is also consider-
able attention to the repression in other countries (1,490, 11.6 percent). Most
of these tweets were about the killing of women and children in Myanmar.
Nevertheless, it also drew disproportionally less attention compared with the
concurrent episode in Hong Kong. In this wave, when people tweeted content
not about China, it was also usually not about human rights or democracy
(4,144, 32.3 percent).
In the end, among these 12,845 tweets, most of their users did not indicate
their location (10,871, 84.6 percent), which is a lot higher than in the previous
waves. Among those with an identifiable location, three-fourths of them were
in Thailand (1,485, 75 percent), and the others were in the United States (122,
6.2 percent), Philippines (67, 3.4 percent), Hong Kong (57, 2.9 percent), and
Japan (56, 2.9 percent). Since most of the tweets outside Thailand were also

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 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

Table Case 4-1. Keywords list and categorization of the

#MilkTeaAlliance tweets on Dec 2021
Number of tweets
Keyword list (percent)
China-related CCP, HK, Taiwan, TW, Xi, 7,211 (56.1
China, Chinese, Chinazi, percent)
Hong Kong, hongkong,
Tibet, Xinjiang
Myanmar-related Myanmar, Burma, Yangon, 1,456 (11.3
Mandalay, Naypyidaw, percent)
Taunggyi
Democracy-related repress, jail, kill, rebel, beat, 8,588 (66.8
arrest, army, police, soldier, percent)
remove, removal, detain,
freedom, democracy, right,
activist, massacre, victim,
activist, bomb, military,
gun, dictator, authoritarian,
authority, prison
Table Case 4-2. Two factors of the #MilkTeaAlliance tweets on Dec 2021
Not Democracy-
Democracy-related related
China-related 7,098 113
(55.3 percent) (0.9 percent)
Not China-related 1,490 4,144
(11.6 percent) (32.3 percent)

made in Thai, the distribution may not reflect the true level of support from
other countries.
Overall, considering the distribution of language used, the locations of the
tweets, and the interactions of the two factors, we may summarize this last
wave of the #MilkTeaAlliance movement as mainly composed of Thai people
informing each other about China government’s new transgressions of human

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right in Hong Kong (and to a smaller proportion, the Myanmar government’s

violence). There is not much about the mobilization or international calls for
support in these hashtag waves, and therefore it did not last long. Compared
with the previous wave in July 2021 and 2020, the number of tweets this time
also implies that netizens across the #MilkTeaAlliance were less likely to pay
attention to or be mobilized by the hashtag.

Discussion
Through Cases 1 to 4, the empirical data, including 2.7 million tweets, shows
that this #MilkTeaAlliance movement generally reflected the political chal-
lenge faced by the Thai people and their solid support of and desire for democ-
racy and freedom. At the beginning of the movement, the #MilkTeaAlliance
hashtags successfully mobilized anti-China sentiment to deal with the expan-
sion of Chinese ideology and the Chinese vision of globalization. As a result,
this hashtag won the support of nearby countries, which provided coun-
terarguments written in English against the propaganda of the One China
Principle and the nine dash line in the South China Sea. However, when
repression in Thailand and Myanmar worsened, the main challenge people
faced became their own governments. In this scenario, the #MilkTeaAlliance
hashtag served as a platform for domestic mobilization and information con-
sumption; the alliance members learned the experience of repression from oth-
ers and spread it through their domestic networks with their own languages.
These findings can partly be explained by the number of Twitter users
in different countries. For example, in 2021, Thailand has about 11 million
Twitter users, 29 Hong Kong has about 1 million,30 and Taiwan has about 1.34
million.31 So it is not surprising that the majority of the #MilkTeaAlliance
tweets came from Thailand. Nevertheless, as is shown in the choice of lan-
guage, concurrent hashtags, and the geolocation in the four cases, the main
focus and the rhetoric also shifted mostly with the ongoing domestic chal-
lenges within the alliance members.
How do we interpret these changes? Group psychology suggests that peo-
ple tend to form groups with a minimum cue,32 but the development and the
strength of the group depend on the function performed as a group.33 The for-
mation of the #MilkTeaAlliance was highly symbolic. It originated from the

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 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

China-Thai Twitter conflict and quickly developed into a border discussion of

the wrongdoing of China’s expansion. This anti-China sentiment drew a clear
in-group/out-group boundary. It is worth noticing that the choice of milk tea
as a symbol of this movement emphasizes that this movement is driven by un-
armed ordinary people: they do not have a weapon to attack or rebel with,
nor do they have the resources to purchase one, but they have a cup of tea to
remain optimistic.
Generally speaking, forming a group may provide for survival needs, psy-
chological needs, or informational needs to its members. However, since the
#MilkTeaAlliance is composed of members from several countries, highly
decentralized, and happened during the COVID-19 pandemic, this platform
can hardly redistribute resources across the border. Therefore, this group may
not be able to service the survival need.34 It is possible that activists use this
hashtag for collaboration, such as exchanging strategies or calling for interna-
tional sanction, but these efforts may not be enough to balance the disparity
in strength between the protesters and the authorities.
On the psychological need, this hashtag features the “alliance” and the
humor to use milk tea to counter repression, which offers (online) social in-
teraction across borders and positive emotions. Moreover, the existence of
this alliance implies that “you are not alone” to the activists. In the end, this
hashtag provides a platform for the alliance members to inform what was hap-
pening in other countries to fulfill the informational need. Such information
provision is crucial for grassroots activists, especially when their opponents
also learn from each other and evolve.35 Through the analysis of this article, we
noticed that the #MilkTeaAlliance movement might speak to the latter two
motivations of the alliance members.
Another important finding in this study, especially in Cases 3 and 4, is
that most of the #MilkTeaAlliance tweet waves lasted only one day. Indeed,
people may quickly shift their attention in today’s information-rich world,
but my previous study in the #TweetforTaiwan movement suggests that the
social movement with cross-country collaboration may be trending for sev-
eral days.36 My analysis of the 40,000 tweet #TweetforTaiwan movement in
May 2020 shows that the three-day trend was boosted by tweeter users in
the United States, Hong Kong, India, and Thailand over three consecutive
days. The delay may reflect the time zone difference, the time delay in the

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spreading of news, and the responses from other countries. Nevertheless, we

did not see a similar pattern in the concurrent #MilkTeaAlliance movement.
One possible interpretation is that Twitter users were more likely to use the
#MilkTeaAlliance hashtag to consume information, and the hashtag itself is
not like the #TweetforTaiwan in encouraging the reader to take action. As a
result, even though we indeed observed that some people in Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Thailand rallied on the street with the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtag,
the hashtag did not play a major but rather a minor role in mobilization.
Admittedly, one possible research limitation is the internet crackdown
during the protests and repression campaigns. For example, the Myanmar
government blocked the internet and communication in February 2021,37
and Thailand seriously punishes online discontent about the royal family.38
Moreover, the Thailand government was also accused of manipulating con-
tent on Twitter.39 Hence, it is possible that our analysis may underestimate
the willingness of the #MilkTeaAlliance participants by merely checking the
number of tweets. Nevertheless, since the majority of the #MilkTeaAlliance
members were not blocked, we believe that our analysis still reflects the trend
in the change of this movement.

Policy Implications
The first policy suggestion is that a durable platform is needed for information
exchange among activists and netizens in the alliance countries in East Asia
and beyond. In our empirical analysis, netizens across the countries exploited
the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtags to 1). expand and discuss counterarguments
against China’s narratives in its early stage and 2). keep updating on the repres-
sions in other alliance countries in the later stage. In the early stage, Twitter
users from Taiwan and Hong Kong played an important role in transforming
the nationalist conflict between China and Thailand into a review and recon-
sideration of the One China Principle and the Belt and Road Initiative. In
the later stage, Thailand netizens kept spreading word about the repressions
in Hong Kong and Myanmar through its Thai-speaking network worldwide,
which helped draw attention to the global audience and the United States.
Nevertheless, as can be seen in Cases 1 to 4, the number of #MilkTeaAlliance
hashtags kept declining from 2020 to 2021. The alliance members gradually

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chose to use it as a channel of information consumption instead of a platform

for discussion or mutual exchange. After all, the hashtag itself can hardly be
used to redistribute resources, maintain information, or organize people.
A durable platform could effectively respond to the desire for information
exchange among the activists and citizens in this #MilkTeaAlliance move-
ment in East and Southeast Asia. To be specific, in Cases 3 and 4, the evidence
shows that some members of the movement reside in the United States but
had a strong connection to the alliance countries. Therefore, organizing these
#MilkTeaAlliance members in the United States may offer an opportunity
for further cooperation in resources and information and ensure that such co-
operation is cumulative.
Moreover, this platform can help to develop counterarguments against
China’s narratives of globalization. In recent years, China tried to promote
Xi Jinping Thought through the United Nations, especially in the Human
Rights Council.40 The narrative is composed of two parts: 1). the Right to
Development, where each country has the right to develop its own economy
based on its unique historical and natural background and no other coun-
try can intervene such a right of a country; and 2). Developmental Human
Rights, which argues that since it is costly for a government to provide human
rights, the level and scope of human rights protection depend on each coun-
try’s economic development. Combining these two parts offers a leeway for
authoritarianism and dictators to justify their repression and human rights
transgressions. This narrative is welcome by the authoritarian regimes whose
main threat to their rule is foreign intervention,41 and it is widely imple-
mented and spread through the negotiation and establishment of the Belt and
Road Initiative. Moreover, the ongoing pandemic further strengthens the le-
gitimacy and the capacity of the government to restrict individual rights in
the name of disease control.
This Chinese narrative about globalization renders the right of the authori-
ties to isolate itself from foreign intervention and maintain their asymmetric
power against citizens within their borders. This narrative partly explains the
ongoing protests in East and Southeast Asia, but it also explains the decline
of the #MilkTeaAlliance in the long run. In this scenario, a durable platform
­offers the opportunity for citizens to learn and debunk such a narrative and
restore belief in liberal democracy. In Case 3-2, the inclusion of Taiwanese and

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 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

Hong Kong netizens plays an important role in countering the One-China

Principle in the early stages of the #nnevvy incident. The argument made by
Taiwanese and Hong Kong Twitter users was quickly absorbed, retweeted,
and forwarded by Thai netizens, which illustrates the information sharing
function of the #MilkTeaAlliane. Such a mechanism could be replicated if
a durable platform can keep these cross-country networks supported by the
#MilkTeaAlliance and render timely counterarguments against the ongoing
expansion of China’s narrative of globalization.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Notes
1 Milktealogy, “The Milk Tea Alliance”, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/milktealogy/ photo
s/a.285670224923900/1565079146982995. Accessed: December 21, 2020.
2 Fang-Yu Chen, Austin Wang, Charles K.S. Wu, and Yao-Yuan Yeh. “Analyzing Support
for #TweetforTaiwan,” E-International Relations, July 19, 2020. https://www.e-ir.
info/2020/07/19/analyzing-support-for-tweetfortaiwan/
3 Mary Hui, “Thailand and Hong Kong protesters are brewing a strong #MilkTeaAlliance,”
Quartz, October 19, 2020. https://qz.com/1919253/what-is-the-milk-tea-alliance/
4 Time, “How the Milk Tea Alliance Is Uniting Pro-Democracy Activists,” Time, October 28
2020, https://time.com/5904114/milk-tea-alliance/
5 W. Schaffar, and W. Praphakorn, “The# MilkTeaAlliance: A New Transnational Pro.-
Democracy Movement Against Chinese-Centered Globalization?”, Austrian Journal of
South-East Asian Studies, 14:1, 5-36.
6 F. Schneider, “COVID-19 Nationalism and the Visual Construction of Sovereignty During
China’s Coronavirus Crisis,” China Information, (2021). 0920203X211034692.
7 X. Yang, “Domestic Contestation, International Backlash, and Authoritarian Resilience:
How Did the Chinese Party-State Weather the COVID-19 Crisis?”, Journal of Contemporary
China, 1-15.
8 Y. Y. Chang, “The Post-Pandemic World: Between Constitutionalized and Authoritarian
Orders–China’s Narrative-Power Play in the Pandemic Era,” Journal of Chinese Political
Science, 26:1 (2021), 27-65.
9 H. Mölder and E. Shiraev, “Global Knowledge Warfare, Strategic Imagination,
Uncertainty, and Fear. In The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare,” (2021),
13-32). Springer, Cham.
10 Christina Chan, “Milk is Thicker Than Blood: An Unlikely Digital Alliance between

565
 Understanding the #MilkTeaAlliance Movement

Thailand, Hong Kong & Taiwan,” Hong Kong Free Press, May 2, 2020. https://hongkongfp.
com/2020/05/02/milk-is-thicker-than-blood-an-unlikely-digital-alliance-between-thailand-
hong-kong-taiwan/ Access: January 11, 2022
11 Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “From Repression to Revolt: Thailand’s 2020 Protests and the
Regional Implications,” Working Paper, 2021. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/
document/71730
12 S. M. Thein‐Lemelson, “‘Politicide’ and the Myanmar coup,” Anthropology Today, 37:2
(2021), 3-5.
13 P. Chachavalpongpun, “An Unfinished Revolution: The Trajectory of Thailand’s Current
Protests,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, 27:2 (2021), 255-272.
14 Janis Mackey Frayer and Adela Suliman, “‘Milk Tea Alliance’ Brews Democracy Online
Among Young Activists Across Asia,” NBC News, April 7, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/world/milk-tea-alliance-brews-democracy-online-among-young-activists-
across-n1262253. Access: January 11, 2022.
15 P. Chachavalpongpun, “Constitutionalizing the Monarchy,” Journal of International
Affairs, 73:2 (2021), 163-172.
16 Austin Horng-En Wang, “#MilkTeaAlliance No More?”, Asian Dispatches, August 5, 2021,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/milkteaalliance-no-more
17 Twitter Public Policy, April 5, 2021, https://Twitter.com/Policy/
status/1379982365380911104
18 A. D. Segesten, and M. Bossetta, “A Typology of Political Participation Online: How
Citizens Used Twitter to Mobilize During the 2015 British General Elections,” Information,
Communication & Society, 20:11 (2017), 1625-1643.
19 A. Rauchfleisch, D. Vogler, and M. Eisenegger, “Public Sphere in Crisis Mode: How the
COVID-19 Pandemic Influenced Public Discourse and User Behavior in the Swiss Twitter-
Sphere,” Javnost-The Public, 28:2 (2021), 129-148.
20 M. Bondi, and M. Scott (Eds.), Keyness in Texts (Vol. 41), John Benjamins Publishing (2010).
21 The data was downloaded with the historic Twitter API.
22 OpenStreetMap was accessed with the R package RgoogleMaps. M. Loecher, and K. Ropkins,
“RgoogleMaps and loa: Unleashing R Graphics Power on Map Tiles,” Journal of Statistical
Software, 63:4 (2015), 1–18.
23 Nmsl is originally used by Chinese netizens to distain others (ne-ma-si-le means that your
mother is dead). In Chinese culture, it is disrespectful to talk about death, and it is even more
disrespectful to curse other’s parents. In the context of the #MilkTeaAlliance movement,
however, nmsl is widely cited by Thailand netizens for making fun of the Chinese netizens’
lack of vocabulary to attack others except saying nmsl.
24 Reuters, “Thai Protesters Clash With Police as Covid-19 Cases Continue to Surge,” CNN,
July 19, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/19/asia/thailand-protests-covid-intl-hnk/
index.html
25 Hannah Beech, “As Covid Rages in Myanmar, Army Hoards Oxygen, Doctors Say,” New
York Times, July 15, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/15/world/asia/myanmar-
covid-oxygen.html
26 Katie Shepherd, “Trump DOJ Tried to Unmask a Twitter Account Behind ‘Mean Tweets and

566
 Austin Horng-En Wang and Adrian Rauchfleisch

Bad Memes’ That Teased Rep. Devin Nunes,” Washington Post, May 18, 2021, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/18/devin-nunes-Twitter-doj/
27 Helen Regan, Wayne Chang, Teele Rebane, and Karen Smith, “Hong Kong’s Famous
Tiananmen Square ‘Pillar of Shame’ Statue Removed From University,” CNN, Dec 22, 2021,
https://www.cnn.com/style/article/hong-kong-tiananmen-square-statue-removed-intl-hnk/
index.html
28 Cape Diamond, Jessie Yeung, and Maija Ehlinger, “More Than 30 Reported Killed, Save The
Children Staff Missing, In Myanmar Attack,” CNN, December 25, 2021, https://www.cnn.
com/2021/12/25/asia/myanmar-christmas-attack-kayah-karenni-intl-hnk/index.html
29 Statista, “Leading Countries Based on Number of Twitter Users as of
October 2021,” Statista, 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/242606/
number-of-active-Twitter-users-in-selected-countries/
30 Statcounter, “Social Media Stats Hong Kong,” Statcounter, 2021, https://gs.statcounter.com/
social-media-stats/all/hong-kong
31 HMin Hao, “More Than 20 Million People Online! Facebook is the Most Visited Site,“ New
Talk, April 13, 2020, https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2020-04-13/390508
32 M. Diehl, “The Minimal Group Paradigm: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical
Findings,” European Review of Social Psychology, 1:1 (1990), 263-292.
33 M. L. Cottam, E. Mastors, T. Preston, and B. Dietz, Introduction to Political Psychology, (New
York: Routledge, 2015).
34 In comparison, many Taiwanese activists were able to collect resources or even fly to Hong
Kong and help the protest before the pandemic. For example, see Sarah A. Topol, “Is Taiwan
Next?”, New York Times, August 4, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/04/magazine/
taiwan-china.html
35 See footnote 34.
36 See footnote 2.
37 Human Rights Watch, “Myanmar: End Crackdown on Media, Communications”,
Human Rights Watch, February 5, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/05/
myanmar-end-crackdown-media-communications
38 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2020 Thailand,” Freedom House, 2021, https://
freedomhouse.org/country/thailand/freedom-net/2020
39 Masayuki Yuda, “Twitter Bans 926 Accounts Linked to Thai Military Manipulation,”
Nikkei Asia, October 9, 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Turbulent-Thailand/
Twitter-bans-926-accounts-linked-to-Thai-military-manipulation
40 Andrea Worden, “China Pushes ‘Human Rights With Chinese Characteristics’ at
the UN,” China Change, October 9, 2017. https://chinachange.org/2017/10/09/
china-pushes-human-rights-with-chinese-characteristics-at-the-un/
41 S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive
Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 13:2 (2002), 51-65.

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2021–22 WILSON CHINA FELLOWSHIP

The Diaspora and China’s

Foreign Influence Activities

Audrye Wong is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and

International Relations at the University of Southern California and a
2021–22 Wilson China Fellow
 Audrye Wong

Abstract
Amidst growing concern over authoritarian foreign influence operations,
Chinese diaspora communities are often perceived by host countries as po-
tential unfriendly agents, but also viewed by Beijing as a tool to further its
political and security interests. The Chinese government has traditionally
been concerned about forestalling threats to its domestic rule, but more re-
cent diaspora management policies have increasingly emphasized using over-
seas Chinese as a tool to promote China’s interests and increase its global
influence. Beijing uses a mix of material incentives and coercion, as well as
ideational strategies through information control and targeted propaganda.
By scraping WeChat accounts, we find that government propaganda uses
wedge narratives—such as framing racism and violence as targeted at the
diaspora—to divide diaspora communities from host countries. Diaspora
influence in host countries can take the form of agenda setting, discourse
framing, or political brokering. From a foreign policy perspective, the infor-
mality and plausible deniability of diaspora statecraft makes it harder to as-
sess and forestall. China’s illiberal extraterritorial reach also threatens to ad-
versely affect the healthy functioning of democratic political systems while
further undermining the liberties of heterogenous diaspora communities.
Paradoxically, active diaspora mobilization tends to raise the hackles of host
countries. In many cases, the Chinese government attempts to homogenize
its diaspora while wielding it as a foreign policy tool have sparked significant
longer-term blowback.

Implications and Key Takeaways

● China’s success at diaspora mobilization remains largely limited,
and rhetoric about a ‘whole-of-society’ threat is not just alarmist and
distracting—it is counterproductive.

● Policies to prevent Beijing’s targeting of the Chinese diaspora should

avoid sowing further ethnic divisions between diaspora and host
countries, which feeds into Chinese Communist Party narratives and
messaging strategies.

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● Policymakers and politicians should view Chinese-Americans as assets in

reaching out to diaspora communities and addressing issues of concern.
Building a robust civil society and political grassroots networks, along
with support for a diverse Chinese-language information environment,
will facilitate host country integration and counter Chinese government
narratives of diaspora marginalization.

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 Audrye Wong

Introduction
In January 2022, UK intelligence services issued a security warning about
a high-profile British-Chinese lawyer with close links to the Chinese
Community Party who had made several political donations and was previ-
ously lauded by a former British prime minister. In 2018, the FBI director
publicly described China as posing “not just a whole-of-government threat,
but a whole-of-society threat” to the United States. By his account, ethnically
Chinese students, professors, and scientists were infiltrating U.S. society and
collecting intelligence on behalf of the Chinese government. The Department
of Justice’s anti-espionage China Initiative has been criticized for targeting
many scientists of Chinese descent. In one prominent case, a professor of me-
chanical engineering at MIT, Gang Chen, was arrested in January 2021 and
charged with hiding links to Chinese government institutions, before the case
was dropped a year later.
Amidst growing concern over authoritarian foreign influence operations,
there has been renewed debate over how such governments are attempting
to coopt certain groups and individuals to act on behalf of foreign interests.
Unsurprisingly, diaspora communities of geopolitical rivals are often per-
ceived by host countries as potential unfriendly agents, but also viewed by
home governments as a natural resource to pursue its political and security
interests. Understanding the role of diaspora statecraft has important implica-
tions not just for geopolitical competition, but also the healthy functioning of
democratic systems and multicultural societies.
What a diaspora constitutes can be a contested subject; it is also a concept
that is politically and socially constructed by home countries, host countries,
and within diaspora communities themselves. In this paper, I use diaspora
to refer broadly to emigrant communities, that is, people who have origins
from a nation-state different from where they reside. This can include those
who hold home state citizenship but live abroad, those who are citizens of host
country but born in the home state and have cultural and linguistic linkages
there, or those who are descendants of emigrants from the home state but were
born in the host country. There is almost certainly variation within the dias-
pora on their affinity to the homeland, assimilation into the host country, and
their political and social identities. Individual-level human agency can affect
the ability of states to use the diaspora as tools of foreign policy. Additionally,

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not all diaspora activity should be assumed to be ‘weaponized’ by states; in

fact, as will be discussed later, an overt approach to diaspora mobilization may
well backfire for the home state.

China’s Diasporas & International Politics:

Why Governments Should Care
In order to understand the policy environment surrounding China’s at-
tempted mobilization of its diaspora around the world, it is necessary to con-
sider China’s diaspora in comparative context. While diaspora politics is not a
new field of study in international relations, most scholarship has focused on
the political and economic influence of diaspora communities back in their
home states. For example, the diaspora—who tend to be foreign-educated or
have overseas business experience—are often major sources of remittances,
foreign direct investment, and skilled capital, particularly for developing
countries.1 Additionally, diaspora movements can help to consolidate state
formation and nation-building processes.2
Diaspora communities also matter for home country politics. In fact, a
powerful diasporic lobby can even alter homeland policies through their
economic clout and overseas political voice, as in the case of the Armenian
diaspora pushing Armenian foreign policy toward a more militant anti-
Turkish stance. Political parties in democratic home countries also reach
out to diaspora communities to gain electoral advantages, by targeting them
with political propaganda and mobilizing them (or their in-country family
networks) to vote.3
Non-democratic states may thus be wary of diaspora activity for these
very reasons, seeking to control overseas populations so as to maintain re-
gime stability and prevent dissension. Diaspora can transmit information
back home about different political or social norms, including democratic
values, that can threaten the home government’s rule.4 Exposure to for-
eign ideas, for example through educational or business interactions, can
counter homeland propaganda and induce anti-regime activities among the
diaspora. As a consequence, many authoritarian governments, such as in
Morocco and Tunisia, have actively surveilled diaspora communities abroad
and punished identified offenders.5

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But diaspora engagement can also be driven by explicit foreign policy

goals—seeking to use the diaspora to improve the home state’s reputation,
promote its geopolitical interests, or influence host country politics. Overseas
citizens can serve as cultural or educational ambassadors, helping to inform
and change public perceptions at the grassroots level. This often ties into
broader public diplomacy and ‘soft power’ efforts, but in authoritarian con-
texts can veer into what is sometimes called ‘sharp power,’ in which the dias-
pora is mobilized in more coercive and subversive ways.
There are many examples of countries using diaspora populations as a tool
of geopolitical competition. When the U.S. Peace Corps was established in
the early 1960s, a core motivation was to defend the ‘free world’ and counter
the grassroots-level spread of communist propaganda by the Soviet Union in
developing countries. For its part, the Soviet Union used high-skilled Russian
bureaucrats and scientists to promote economic development and entrench
Communist ideas in countries in the Soviet bloc. Egypt under Nasser sent
educators and bureaucrats abroad to other Arab countries to spread ideas of
anti-colonialism, anti-Zionism, and an Egypt-led pan-Arabism. Egyptian
technical experts and professionals also constituted the face of developmental
aid to Yemen and African states. This contributed to intra-Arab rivalry as well
as competition with Israel for regional influence.6
In fact, diaspora populations are often instrumentalized for broader strate-
gic objectives. Home governments may discourage diaspora repatriation from
host countries where the home state is pursuing revisionist claims, in order
to continue legitimizing its extraterritorial policies.7 For example, Serbia pro-
moted the return and integration of Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina but not Serbs from Kosovo, because of Serbia territorial
claims over the latter. India in its early days of independence refused to defend
its diaspora’s economic assets because it wanted to underscore the principle of
national sovereignty over resources; subsequently it embraced the Indian dias-
pora to legitimize needed economic reforms amidst globalization.8
The priorities and goals of diaspora management can change with a coun-
try’s shifting objectives and global position. Whereas diaspora communities
might have been predominantly seen as a source of capital and knowledge to
drive homeland economic development, a rising power might now see the di-
aspora as a means to expand the home state’s geopolitical influence and boost

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its overseas image.9 Much scholarship has tended to examine diaspora politics
in the context of a ‘weaker’ home state,10 but the case of China sheds new light
on how the diaspora can be potentially marshalled by a powerful homeland
for broader geopolitical influence, and as a tool of non-military warfare.

China’s Policies of Diaspora

Engagement and Mobilization
China presents an important case to understand the (attempted) use of dias-
pora as instruments of foreign policy. First, as a rising power in an era where
economic flows, information exchange, and human movement are perhaps
more prominent than military force, diaspora mobilization presents a po-
tential tool of expanding geopolitical influence at the intersection of these
trends. Second, China has been a source of large-scale historical as well as
contemporary overseas migration. Previous waves of emigrants moved for
better economic opportunities or fled for political reasons, and may have
mixed loyalties to the home regime (many are also from Taiwan or Hong
Kong); more recent waves have been driven by economic growth and a new
middle class, leading to more businesspeople and students with closer links
to the Mainland.
Third, China’s strong state capacity and propaganda apparatus provide a
good indicator of what extensive diaspora mobilization can entail. Fourth, the
authoritarian nature of China’s political system sheds light on the export of
such illiberal techniques, with implications for understanding the new ter-
rain on which non-military statecraft might be conducted and by what rules.
Taken together, these characteristics suggest that the Chinese government has
ample motivation (domestic and foreign policy goals), opportunity (relatively
receptive diaspora targets), and means (relatively well-developed institutional
capacity, transnational authoritarian tools, and reduced dependence on dia-
sporic resources) for diaspora engagement.11
Diaspora engagement, particularly in present day, is deeply intertwined
with a broader system of political control—China’s United Front. The
United Front system consists of a coalition of government organizations,
affiliated groups, and individuals that seeks to silence critics and mobilize
allies of the Chinese Communist Party. Such activities take place within

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China but also well beyond China’s geographic borders, from monitoring
the activities of political dissidents abroad to courting foreign media and
government elites.12
Unsurprisingly, Chinese diaspora communities are a major target of
United Front work (along with other groups such as entrepreneurs, ethnic
minorities, and religious leaders).13 From Beijing’s perspective, their increased
exposure to foreign ideas poses a threat to the CCP’s domestic rule and calls
for overseas propaganda and control—to rally patriotism and stamp out criti-
cism. Instilling a sense of belonging to the homeland builds diaspora loyalty
while constraining anti-CCP or pro-democracy movements that can endan-
ger the regime’s grip on power. As with many other countries, diaspora en-
gagement has been viewed in terms of consolidating government rule and in-
ternal stability.
This can be seen in the many ways the Chinese government has engaged
with the diaspora over time. Overseas Chinese leaders and resources were key
in the revolution leading to the fall of the Qing Dynasty in the early 20th
century. In the aftermath of the Chinese civil war, the CCP and the KMT
(Kuomintang) competed for diaspora loyalty to legitimize their claims to rule
China, using ideological campaigns, economic incentives, and educational as-
sistance. During the PRC’s drive for economic modernization from the late
1970s, Chinese diaspora were courted as sources of investment and encour-
aged to return home. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Beijing re-
doubled propaganda efforts to win over diaspora populations and promoted
Chinese nationalism as a rallying force.14
Since the 2010s, however, China’s diaspora policies have increasingly
shifted from consolidating material support for internal matters—namely
economic development and national unification—to managing the diaspora
as a political means of expanding China’s overseas influence.15 This geopoliti-
cal stance is different from in the past, when Beijing did not actively protect
overseas Chinese from discriminatory and nationalistic appropriation poli-
cies, and even renounced diaspora citizenship claims, in order to gain strategic
allies in Southeast Asia during the Cold War.16
In 2017, China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, called for new diaspora poli-
cies to serve China’s overseas interests and consolidate China’s growing
global influence.17 In the last several years, Chinese president Xi Jinping

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 The Diaspora and China’s Foreign Influence Activities

made several speeches calling for overseas Chinese students to serve as grass-
roots ambassadors, promote positive narratives about China, work more
closely with embassies and consulates, and operate in line with China’s dip-
lomatic goals such as the Belt and Road Initiative.18 Overseas Chinese are
exhorted to “tell China’s story well.”19 This strategic reorientation has also
been reflected in China’s diaspora institutions, with more overseas-facing
bureaucrats and agencies assuming greater political power. 20 Such public
rhetoric and policies have contributed to growing fears in host countries of a
‘weaponized’ Chinese diaspora.
Whether for domestic political or foreign policy reasons, the Chinese
government’s messaging about the diaspora aims to blur the lines between
Chinese nationals and those of ethnic Chinese descent.21 By pushing a par-
ticular conception of an ‘overseas Chinese’ as having an inevitable affinity
and belonging to the homeland (read: the Party) regardless of their individual
context, Beijing’s policies intentionally homogenize and instrumentalize its
diaspora communities.
The changing demographic of overseas Chinese populations—with recent
migrants from the Mainland becoming more numerous—has also altered the
dynamics of diaspora-homeland interactions. Chinese students have on occa-
sion been vocal protestors and defenders of Beijing’s policies, Chinese busi-
nesspeople have sometimes been prominent political donors, and diaspora
organizations are increasingly dominated by CCP-affiliated individuals.
The CCP has not hesitated to apply coercive tactics toward regime crit-
ics—in recent years, Beijing has kidnapped a Swedish-Chinese publisher and
detained a Chinese-Australian journalist and a Chinese-Australian writer
on charges of espionage. But government policy documents generally outline
an approach of influencing diaspora populations through a subtle “guiding
hand.”22 For example, the Chinese government uses a mix of patriotic pro-
paganda, cultural outreach, state-sponsored programs (e.g. homeland tours
in China), state-affiliated grassroots organizations, and the lure of political
connections to engage with the diaspora. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
Chinese consulates are in frequent contact with the many university-based
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations in the United States, from spon-
soring Lunar New Year events to distributing care packages.

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Tools to Influence the Diaspora

China adopts a range of material and ideational strategies, as well as a mix
of sticks and carrots, to shape diaspora behavior. The most obvious form of
diaspora control involves repression through a range of intimidation and coer-
cive tactics, as often implemented by authoritarian regimes.23 This can include
surveillance and monitoring of activities, direct threats from government offi-
cials, coercion-by-proxy—targeting family members back home, forced return
or disappearances, and assassination.
Diaspora engagement can also take the form of positive incentives, seeking
to coopt diaspora into acting on behalf of homeland interests. Patronage strat-
egies include providing high-level political connections that can aid career or
business opportunities, funding overseas study, or dangling direct financial
benefits in exchange for activities such as espionage.24
Home governments have developed both formal and informal institutions
for diaspora engagement. China has traditionally managed diaspora affairs
through the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, although with shifting geopo-
litical aims (discussed above) more outward-facing bureaucracies, such as the
United Front, have become more important. Embassies and consulates in host
countries—as an extension arm of the government—are also an important
player in diaspora outreach and mobilization. As often the dominant repre-
sentative and intermediary for diasporic access to citizen services, they are
well-placed to coerce diaspora populations, monitor their activities, provide
political backing, or mobilize action.
In many cases, diaspora organizations at the grassroots level are active in
coordination and outreach, within the diaspora community and with more
official government institutions. They may serve a variety of functions, from
connecting diasporic members to their hometowns to organizing community
events and facilitating business opportunities. These community organiza-
tions may vary in their degree of interactions with the home government,
which can be seen as a source of financial and political support; some organi-
zations, on the other hand, disavow official involvement to assert their inde-
pendence and legitimacy as representatives of the diaspora.
Lines between official and grassroots are sometimes blurred. For instance,
the Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (FROC) has been acting as a
grassroots organization with the responsibility of communicating with the

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diaspora, in order to avoid host country suspicions of government interfer-

ence and espionage. 25 Beijing has also set up ostensibly apolitical agencies
to operate overseas, such as Friendship Associations and Reunification
Promotion Associations, despite their links to the government.
Many Chinese diaspora organizations today are mostly dominated by
CCP-affiliated individuals. This imbalance of power grew from a mix of the
coercive tools—using threats and repression against dissenting voices—and
positive incentives—coopting overseas Chinese eager for economic resources
and political connections—described in this section. This trend has also com-
plicated host countries’ abilities to identify those who are acting on behalf of
the Chinese government, as almost any diasporic individual will have inevita-
bly had contact with CCP-linked representatives and organizations simply as
a function of staying plugged into the community.
On the ideational front, sending states can seek to legitimate their position
and inculcate patriotic sentiments among diaspora communities. Cultural
activities help to foster a sense of belonging with the home country, while
government-sponsored trips to the homeland aim to strengthen political and
cultural linkages and showcase successes of the home country—and at times
push government narratives on politically-controversial issues.26 This is not
unique to China—one of the most prominent examples is Israel’s free birth-
right trips for American Jews.27
With the rise of global communications technology and social media, con-
trolling the information environment of diaspora communities has also be-
come a prominent tactic. China seeks to limit what kinds of information and
narratives diaspora populations are exposed to, by taking financial control
of diaspora media outlets and harassing those outlets that are critical of the
home regime. For example, the Chinese government and CCP-linked busi-
ness actors own virtually all overseas Chinese media in Australia, by extension
perpetuating its domestic propaganda and censorship apparatus and leaving
little room for independent reporting.

Wedge narratives in diaspora-targeted propaganda

Additionally, the Chinese government actively spreads propaganda that at-
tacks host countries and praises the CCP. While such propaganda is also tar-
geted toward global public audiences, diaspora-targeted propaganda further

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aims to drive a wedge between diaspora and host countries.28 Wedge narra-
tives fall in line with Beijing’s goals of promoting loyalty to the homeland,
which further lays the groundwork for overseas diaspora mobilization. In co-
authored research with Patrick Chester at NYU, we show that Chinese gov-
ernment propaganda strategically frames host country issues—such as racial
discrimination and violence in the United States—as being targeted specifi-
cally at the diaspora. Moreover, the framing of such wedge narratives increases
in the run-up to national elections. To examine government propaganda, we
scraped the content of prominent WeChat subscription accounts for diaspora
based in the United States. WeChat is the overwhelmingly dominant com-
munications platform for both Chinese citizens in China and the Chinese
diaspora, who use WeChat to get news, communicate with fellow diaspora,
and stay in touch with family and friends back home. To evaluate the extent
of wedge narrative framings, we then applied a word embeddings-based meth-
odology29 to measure the degree of co-occurrence between Chinese diaspora
terms and two sets of dictionary terms relating to racism and violence—that is,
the degree to which they appear in similar contexts.
We found that government-linked accounts adopted wedge narrative fram-
ings—highlighting anti-Asian discrimination and hate crimes—at much higher
levels than regular accounts; this pattern did not occur with coverage of other
ethnic groups. Figure 1 shows the average cosine similarity across terms over
time by account.30 Higher cosine similarity reflects a greater association of our
chosen attributes—racism and violence—with the chosen object, the Chinese
diaspora. The government WeChat account is Here is America, run by an entity
affiliated with the Global Times, a nationalistic state-linked media outlet. The
other five private accounts vary in target audience, content and style; they range
from general social and cultural news (e.g. US College Daily, Insight China)
to accounts targeted toward major diaspora communities in large cities (e.g.
Chinese in New York, Chinese in Atlanta, Houston Online).
We see that posts by the government-linked account Here is America ex-
hibit a substantially higher cosine similarity than privately-run subscription
accounts. This suggests that government-propagated narratives frame issues of
race and violence more explicitly in terms of anti-Asian discrimination. For
both the racism and violence framings, Here is America shows high similari-
ties with diaspora-related terms—around 70-80 percent—in 2020 and 2019,

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FIGURE 1

RACISM
Cosine Similarity (%)

VIOLENCE

Year
Subscription Account
Chinese in Atlanta Houston Online
Chinese in New York Insight China
Here is America US College Daily

while declining in the post-election period of 2021. In contrast, other sub-

scription accounts were much less inclined to use diaspora-specific framings,
with consistently lower cosine similarity scores of between 40 and 60 percent.
Interestingly, the two accounts Chinese in New York and Chinese in Atlanta
tended to have the lowest levels of anti-Asian framings, even though these two
cities have been at the epicenter of Asian-related hate crimes, including a vio-
lent shooting in Atlanta’s case.

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We also validated our analysis with qualitative reading of a random sam-

ple of WeChat articles. In line with our analysis, Here is America employed
more diaspora-targeted framings of anti-Asian discrimination and violence,
such as how Asians wearing masks would be the targets of harassment, or how
a German chef said that his restaurant would not welcome Chinese people
during Covid. It featured warnings from the Chinese embassy in the United
States of rising anti-Asian discrimination. Government propaganda also fre-
quently referenced deep-rooted legacies of racism in the United States and the
West, such as the ethnically-targeted murder of Vincent Chin or the Wall
Street Journal’s headline calling China “Asia’s sick man.” In contrast, coverage
by private accounts such as Chinese in New York or US College Daily, while
having moderate coverage of anti-Asian hate crimes, featured a broader range
of topics—such as on Covid statistics or more general discussions of race issues
and anti-China political issues (e.g. whether Darlie toothpaste, a very popular
brand in China, was racist, as well as how foreign brands were disrespecting
China’s sovereignty over Taiwan and Hong Kong).
These findings point to how Beijing’s propaganda can be tailored to host
country contexts and focus on issues of identity and belonging that are par-
ticularly salient for diaspora populations. Dividing the Chinese diaspora from
the countries they live in would serve China’s diaspora management goals.
Changing the rhetorical framing rather than solely increasing the volume of
content may be a more flexible and efficient way of disseminating propaganda
and affecting diaspora attitudes. While the full effectiveness of wedge narra-
tives on diaspora behavior has not yet been systematically explored, Chinese
government narratives could potentially exacerbate salient political and social
cleavages in democracies.

Diasporic Channels of Influence in Host Countries

What are the different ways in which the diaspora can exert political influence
in host societies? Conceptualizing diaspora populations as foreign policy re-
quires greater attention to their relative positions as interest groups in domes-
tic politics, whether in the host or home countries. The influence on foreign
and security policies, as well as on host-home relations, stems from their abil-
ity to exert political voice in both countries.

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Broadly, diaspora influence can be broken down into three mechanisms:

i). agenda setting—influencing what policy issues and ideas get discussed, in
particular those that are salient to the homeland; ii). discourse framing—
shaping public and elite discussions in line with the home state’s interests
and rhetoric; and iii). political brokers—acting as intermediaries, facilita-
tors, and organizers to link homeland interest groups with those in power
in the host country. Diaspora populations can be public diplomacy ambas-
sadors, participate politically (whether as voters, elected representatives, or
donors), act as lobbying groups, engage in social movements, or sometimes
spy on behalf of the home state.
Perhaps most innocuously, diaspora communities can increase the home
state’s cultural popularity. Making homeland cuisine more mainstream or
organizing community festivals showcases the home country’s cultural heri-
tage, usually in a positive light. Less political activities can lay the groundwork
for more positive public perceptions of the home state, while also further en-
trenching the diaspora as members of the host society and making them more
trustworthy ambassadors. At the same time, as will be discussed later, these
cultural events may also be coopted for the home state’s political agenda, es-
pecially if diaspora organizations are dominated by pro-government agents.
Diaspora who are citizens in democratic host countries can exercise influ-
ence by voting, for instance for political candidates who support pro-home-
land policies. Politicians running in districts with large concentrations of
diaspora populations must court their votes and hence reflect their political
preferences. In cases where these diaspora populations are relatively homog-
enous and aligned with the homeland, it becomes likely that politicians be-
come more receptive to the home government’s policy positions and interests.
Relatedly, diasporic individuals can also run for elected office, whether at
the local or national levels. These political representatives have a larger plat-
form and position of power with which to promote pro-homeland interests
and exert more direct policy influence. Such influence can range from mak-
ing public statements and introducing legislation that echo home govern-
ment rhetoric to raising attention to specific issues and consolidating support
among other politicians.
Additionally, diaspora can serve as political brokers and advisors to poli-
ticians, helping to organize campaign outreach events and providing talking

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points on relevant issues. Such brokers can play a particularly influential role
if diaspora populations have recently emerged as new constituencies, and
political candidates have relatively little knowledge of how to connect with
these potential voters and donors, or have relatively limited background on
diaspora-related issues.
Another important avenue of political participation is through lobbying.
Diaspora groups can act as ethnic lobbies, seeking to persuade political elites
and policymakers of the importance of homeland policy interests. Lobbying
influence can also come through economic clout, whether as members of the
business elite or as donors—groups which often have the ready ear of poli-
ticians. Major donors, lobbyists, and business leaders are granted access to
top-level leaders through personal meetings, fundraisers, and other political
events. This can give them (diasporic or not) disproportionate influence and
voice in raising issues to the attention of political elites. Research suggests
that ‘social lobbying’—lobbying outside of a formal office, such as in a bar
or restaurant—makes elites more receptive to interest group messages.31 The
cultural context of diaspora statecraft, where lobbying easily takes place at
community events or over dinners, could thus facilitate even greater poten-
tial influence.
As an example of diaspora political participation, there has been increased
concern over the political influence of Chinese diaspora in Australia and New
Zealand.32 CCP-linked Chinese businessmen have been significant campaign
donors, meeting both national and state-level leaders, placing political advi-
sors for Australian politicians, and shaping public elite statements on contro-
versial issues such as Tibet and the South China Sea. In New Zealand, an eth-
nic Chinese MP was forced to resign after he was found to be a CCP member
and had links to Chinese intelligence. Other evidence suggests that Chinese
government lobbying makes U.S. legislators more likely to sponsor legislation
favorable to Chinese interests and reduces U.S. media coverage of political
tensions and threats from China.33
Diaspora mobilization can also take more publicly disruptive forms, such
as rallies and protests. In the run-up to the 2008 Summer Olympics, Beijing
successfully mobilized overseas Chinese to attend Olympic torch relays and
wave the national flag, to counter protests around China’s human rights viola-
tions. In the last few years, Chinese university students in the United States

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and Canada have protested against having the Dalai Lama as commencement
speaker, protested against a campus talk given by a Uyghur activist, and re-
peatedly vandalized a ‘Lennon wall’ of messages supporting Hong Kong pro-
democracy protesters. For such social mobilization tactics, diaspora are more
likely to be recently emigrated and maintain stronger personal and political
ties with the home country.
Finally, diaspora statecraft can involve using the diaspora to acquire clas-
sified information and technology i.e. espionage. Home government officials
approach and cultivate specific members of the diaspora, capitalizing on their
cultural or ideological affinities and offering economic benefits in exchange
for the acquisition of internal government information, proprietary technolo-
gies, or technologies with military applications. While this is a common con-
cern, it should also be noted that governments do not always have a good track
record of identifying such incidents. The United States has seen a number of
cases where Chinese Americans or ethnically Chinese individuals have been
accused of spying for the Chinese government, despite a lack of evidence.

“Diaspora Statecraft” as a Tool of Foreign Influence

While military force certainly remains an important element of coercive di-
plomacy, competition for global influence and power has taken on new di-
mensions and is taking place in new arenas, aided by the spread of new tech-
nologies as well as globalized flows of people, information, and capital. By
definition, what I have termed in my research “diaspora statecraft” involves
a home state’s attempts to shape the attitudes and behavior of diasporic in-
dividuals in ways that favor the homeland’s strategic interests. The diaspora’s
position in host countries allows them to exert political voice, alter public dis-
course, or even change the domestic balance of power. To the extent that some
members of a diaspora are acting on behalf of the home government’s inter-
ests, their activities can be seen as part of foreign influence operations.
New technologies have had an interactive effect with the significance of di-
aspora mobilization. In fact, technology has provided an additional resource
for the implementation and perhaps effectiveness of diaspora statecraft. The
transnational nature of the internet and social media has radically altered the
information landscape, enabling home states to communicate with diaspora

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populations more easily (and vice versa). Social media platforms provide new
avenues for the home government to disseminate propaganda to a broader au-
dience instead of relying on traditional print media. When needed, diaspora
communities can be mobilized quickly by the government or among them-
selves, for example to gather at a pro-government rally or protest foreign criti-
cism. Digital surveillance and internet monitoring technologies also allow
home governments to keep better track of diasporic activity, including anti-re-
gime activity. At the same time, easier access to multiple information sources
could limit government monopoly over the flow of ideas and hence complicate
efforts to control the diaspora.
The growing emphasis on shaping public and elite perceptions as part of
geopolitical competition facilitates the use of diaspora statecraft. For a rising
power such as China, non-military tools provide a way of consolidating global
and regional influence short of escalating to war. Using what Beijing calls
‘discourse power’34 to rebut criticisms and improve China’s global reputation
could help underscore China’s growing military and economic clout. In that
context, diaspora statecraft can serve as ‘soft’ and ‘sharp’ tools of influence.
On the soft power dimension, diaspora populations are uniquely poised
to amplify China’s voice in other countries, persuade the broader public of
China’s benign rise, and lobby elites to better reflect China’s interests. By
highlighting the human face of a rising power, diaspora statecraft could
reassure other countries of the home state’s intentions and emphasize the
economic and cultural benefits of cooperation. This bolsters a legitimation
strategy to achieve greater acceptance of the rising power’s newfound geopo-
litical position.35
On the sharp power dimension, diaspora populations could be weapon-
ized as coercive and subversive tools of influence. The diaspora of illiberal and
authoritarian regimes, such as China, are more likely to be vulnerable to such
politicization and manipulation. In this reading, diasporic individuals seek
to influence political discourse and decision-making processes through more
illicit means or without declaring their links to the home state government.
Tools of transnational authoritarianism, such as repression and cooptation,
serve to keep diaspora populations in line with the home state’s interests.
One major advantage of diaspora mobilization as a tool of foreign policy
is its plausible deniability. In many cases, China prefers to portray diaspora

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activity as being driven by grassroots sentiment—the will and anger of the

Chinese people—as opposed to government direction.
Plausible deniability is advantageous for a number of reasons. First, the ap-
parently non-state nature of diasporic activity makes it less threatening and
more subtle. This lowers the chance of immediate escalation. As individuals that
live in host society and interact with locals, the diaspora are likely seen as more
relatable and trustworthy than a foreign government official. This allows them
to act as a bridge between home and host countries, helping to win hearts and
minds in the targeted host. Longer-term grassroots engagement through cul-
tural community events (such as food and festivals) also present a positive and
non-political dimension that help to improve public image of the home country.
Second, plausible deniability creates uncertainty and makes it harder for
host countries to respond appropriately without over-escalating. This has
parallels with military gray zone operations, in which the use of apparently
civilian or paramilitary forces constrains the target’s ability to respond with
outright military force. As with Russia’s deployment of ‘little green men’ in
Crimea or China’s use of Coast Guard and maritime militia to assert its ter-
ritorial claims, uncertainty over the government’s role and the relative lack
of equivalent response options allows diaspora statecraft to slip through the
cracks more easily. Precisely because not all diasporic activity is necessarily
driven by the home state, identifying links to foreign governments is inher-
ently challenging given the often informal nature of diaspora-government in-
teractions. Blunt tools to prevent diasporic influence may not be compatible
with host country values, particularly in democratic contexts.
Relatedly, diaspora activities are frequently harder to detect because they
are carried out in less conventional domains and communication also takes
place more privately. This makes it more difficult to identify actors and govern-
ment intent. For instance, to impede pro-Tibetan protests during the Chinese
president’s state visit to France in March 2019, Chinese diaspora leaders ap-
parently tracked down a factory manufacturing Tibetan activist T-shirts and
bought out all the apparel at a higher price.36 This was in addition to more
visible mobilization actions, such as organizing large crowds to wave Chinese
flags on the roadside in support of the president’s motorcade.
As such, plausible deniability and uncertainty may be advantageous for the
success of diaspora statecraft. Promoting home government interests in the

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guise of grassroots mobilization could be more influential in host society poli-

tics while reducing effective resistance.

Geopolitical Implications of Diaspora Statecraft

China’s illiberal approach to diaspora management can have quite insidious
effects. Mobilizing the diaspora for political purposes requires imposing a col-
lective, homogenized narrative of diaspora-homeland relations, while silencing
any dissent and criticism of home state policies. Diaspora statecraft may thus
disproportionately amplify pro-government positions while drowning out al-
ternative viewpoints. In the China case, this also feeds into broader overseas
propaganda campaigns, where the Chinese government seeks to reclaim the
upper hand in global narratives, defend its policies, and attack critics. As such,
diaspora statecraft works in tandem with other informational tools and even
as an extension of state-led propaganda, spreading and reinforcing Beijing’s
desired narratives.
As a result, host country actors may have the mistaken impression that
the apparently dominant narrative is the homeland-propagated one. This
distorts not just the representation of interests among the diaspora but also
the perceived political incentives surrounding a particular issue, for example
that a candidate cannot criticize the Uyghur genocide or support Taiwanese
independence for fear of losing votes and donations. Universities may be
more reluctant to host dissident speakers or politically-sensitive events, hav-
ing encountered public opposition and protests from student organizations.
Diaspora mobilization pressures could also intensify the home government’s
perceived coercive clout. This may have serious impact on public and elite dis-
course in the host country, leading to heightened self-censorship or more pro-
homeland policies.
Beyond foreign policy impacts, authoritarian diaspora mobilization also
adversely affects the healthy functioning of democratic political systems, in-
cluding the liberties of diaspora as members of the host country. Those who
do not agree with homeland policies are bullied into silence and criticized for
their lack of loyalty, even while facing greater suspicion from the host country.
Moreover, policies that seek to divide diaspora populations from their host
countries exacerbate broader ethnic and social tensions. This extraterritorial

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authoritarian reach has implications for the transparency and integrity of

democratic processes, as well as individual-level political and social freedoms.
Open democratic systems, being relatively permeable to a range of voices,
tend to be more vulnerable to coercive or authoritarian uses of diaspora pop-
ulations. Because it does not play by the same rules, authoritarian diaspora
statecraft not only projects more influence but also undermines the demo-
cratic host country’s own ability to respond and compete. Such consequences
are even more worrying in the context of great power competition, where the
loyalties of diaspora groups may be increasingly called (fairly or unfairly) into
question. The currently perceived ideological contest between the United
States and China, with each country attempting to demonstrate the superior-
ity of its political model, has contributed to the weaponization of the Chinese
diaspora. While Beijing sees diaspora statecraft (in tandem with informa-
tional campaigns) as key to ensuring internal loyalty and increasing geopoliti-
cal influence, Washington views the diaspora as a source of foreign influence
and a tool of the Chinese state.

Challenges and Constraints of Diaspora Statecraft

Compared to many other countries, China has considerable advantages in
diaspora management —it has the economic resources and institutional
apparatus to reach out (and monitor) populations beyond its borders. It
also has strong political motivations as an authoritarian rising power—a
desire to maintain internal stability as well as an interest in promoting its
interests globally. But manipulating diaspora communities as tools of influ-
ence is not an easy task. The heterogeneity of goals and actors within the
home state as well as diaspora populations point to a complicated picture.37
Effective diaspora mobilization is more likely with unified goals and close
intergovernmental coordination. Even in China, lower-level diaspora of-
ficials may be more focused on capitalizing on economic resources from
overseas Chinese rather than national-level geopolitical goals of expanding
China’s global influence.38
Importantly, diasporic resistance also matters. Diaspora communities
themselves are not passive or monolithic agents. The notion of ‘diaspora’ is
often a political construct defined by the home government’s interests and

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priorities.39 For instance, Beijing chooses to treat all individuals who are eth-
nically Chinese, regardless of whether they have active ties to the Mainland,
as members of the Chinese diaspora. Naturally, this narrative encounters re-
sistance from diaspora communities who may be from Taiwan or Hong Kong
(both places with high levels of political contestation with Beijing), who fled
China for political reasons, or who are emigrant descendants who were born
and grew up in their host society.
Heterogeneity within diaspora communities means that mobilization ef-
forts are likely to have varied impacts. Propaganda attempts to inculcate a
sense of loyalty to the homeland may not always be effective. Individuals who
are more integrated into host societies, bring their own political, social, and
cultural experiences, or who are of later generations may be less persuaded
by home government discourse and more inclined to challenge it.40 In that
regard, Chinese students or businesspeople who emigrated recently are likely
to be more easily mobilized by the Chinese government, while longstanding
overseas Chinese communities may feel much less attachment to Beijing. In
places where they tend to live and do business within their ethnic communi-
ties, Chinese migrants in fact become more nationalistic and identify more
with the Chinese state.41
Additionally, not all diaspora who appear to be agents of the home gov-
ernment are driven by loyalty. The need for economic or political resources
from the home country, such as finding employment or maintaining politi-
cal connections, can drive alignment with the home state and public display
of state-driven narratives of homeland identity.42 The psychology of status
may also come into play: migrants who are courted by the home government
now have elevated prominence in their host and home communities, mak-
ing them feel more important and motivated to promote the homeland’s in-
terests. Additionally, diaspora groups may compete for financial and social
resources from home governments in order to pursue their own projects.43
Overseas Chinese students often participate in homeland tours for future
career benefits or simply because it is a free social opportunity, and many
remain largely indifferent to government propaganda efforts.44 Finally, di-
aspora may be coerced, intimidated, or otherwise pressured into conformity
by illiberal home governments.

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The Paradox of Diaspora Mobilization

Finally, there is the additional question of whether diaspora statecraft is ef-
fective at achieving geopolitical influence, conditional on successful diaspora
mobilization. In other ongoing work, I argue that there is a double-edged
sword: diaspora who are more easily mobilized are less likely to be integrated
into host society and more likely to be marginalized; by extension, this makes
them less politically influential for China’s foreign policy purposes.
Relatedly, I suggest that paradoxically, active diaspora outreach and mo-
bilization tends to raise the hackles of host countries, given the sensitive issue
of foreign interference undermining national sovereignty. In particular, the
Chinese government’s attempt to homogenize its diaspora as an extension of
China has sparked significant blowback. Diaspora statecraft can empower
anti-cosmopolitan and hawkish elements in host country politics, includ-
ing those skeptical of ethnic diversity. The heightened backlash to Beijing’s
heavy-handed and sometimes subversive approach bears some parallels with
responses to China’s economic statecraft.45
Difficulties in distinguishing between different elements within diaspora
communities facilitate overreactive policies. In the United States, the Justice
Department’s China Initiative along with previous FBI investigations have often
targeted Chinese scientists or those of Chinese descent only to have cases fall
apart on the lack of evidence, leading to charges of racial profiling. In Australia,
China’s perceived foreign influence activities have led to very strong elite and so-
cietal reactions, again casting the diaspora in a suspicious light and contributing
to a much more hawkish turn in Australia’s foreign policy toward China.
As a result, China’s ability and desire to engage with its diaspora on a large-
scale may have in fact undermined their position in host society and hence
any potential influence. This threatens to marginalize diaspora communi-
ties economically, socially, and politically, making them victims rather than
empowering them as agents of influence. This has happened across a range of
host countries. During the Cold War, Indonesian elites tended to see ethnic
Chinese as a monolithic group, despite major variations in ideology and socio-
economic status. Anti-Communist elites portrayed internal dissent as insti-
gated by Beijing in order to justify domestic purges. Ethnic Chinese continue
to be regarded with suspicion and have often been the target of communal
violence in Indonesia.46

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At the same time, host country overreaction, including the singling out of
diaspora groups as untrustworthy or outsiders, could plausibly drive previously
divided communities to consolidate their diasporic identity and advocate on
behalf of their homeland.47 For liberal host countries to respond effectively
to authoritarian diaspora statecraft, policies to prevent Beijing’s targeting of
the Chinese diaspora also need to avoid sowing further ethnic divisions and
feeding into CCP narratives. Engaging and highlighting the diversity within
diaspora communities complicates China’s attempts to create a uniform dia-
sporic narrative or utilize overseas Chinese as instruments of foreign policy.
Working strategically with diaspora communities also makes host societies
more resilient to continued efforts at foreign interference.

Conclusion
Diaspora statecraft is emerging as a non-military tool of geopolitical influ-
ence. Its plausible deniability as a government actor has made it less imme-
diately threatening, harder to detect, and harder to respond to with existing
tools, thus increasing overall uncertainty in the realm of geopolitical com-
petition. Governments seeking to bolster domestic legitimacy or promote
foreign policy interests have a range of material and ideational tools to en-
gage with diaspora communities. Having linkages to both the homeland
and host country, diasporic individuals can participate in host political pro-
cesses, whether through voting, lobbying, or protesting. They can help to
set the policy agenda, frame public and elite discourse, and influence policy
choices. China’s renewed efforts at mobilizing the diaspora demonstrate
the potential significance of diaspora statecraft in geopolitical competition.
Moreover, the illiberal elements of diaspora statecraft can also undermine
the integrity and diversity of democratic host countries, while constrict-
ing the freedoms of diasporic individuals. A clear-eyed government policy
would need to identify which actors and organizations are in fact acting on
behalf of the Chinese government, and which are not.
Additionally, U.S. government policy should emphasize constructive en-
gagement with the Chinese diaspora. Policymakers and politicians should
work with established Asian-American civil society and grassroots organiza-
tions to reach out to Chinese communities and gain a better understanding

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of important social, political, and economic issues. Addressing policy con-

cerns inhibits China’s ability to leverage those issues—such as affirmative
action or anti-Asian hate crimes—to drive a wedge between the diaspora
and host society. Sustained dialogue and policy inputs (and not just around
election periods) will also foster host country integration and undermine
Beijing’s propaganda narratives of diaspora marginalization and democratic
dysfunction. Washington along with state governments should invest re-
sources into building robust Chinese-American civil society networks, at
the national and local levels, that reflect the diversity of overseas Chinese
communities and impede efforts by Beijing-linked actors to dominate the
organizational and lobbying landscape.
In tandem, the U.S. government should invest resources into understand-
ing the diaspora informational landscape, such as navigating major Chinese-
language media platforms like WeChat and using these platforms for effective
diaspora outreach. WeChat can serve as a powerful medium for organizing
action and disseminating information. For instance, a few Asian-American
grassroots organizations have sought to disseminate alternative viewpoints
and counter political disinformation on WeChat. While WeChat faces chal-
lenges of censorship and surveillance, it is arguably the most important media
platform for the diaspora today. The U.S. government could also explore
funding to set up alternative Chinese-language news outlets or support local
diaspora media organizations that are often vulnerable to external revenue
and advertising pressures.
Similar to how strengthening democracy in the United States is funda-
mental to countering Beijing’s attempts at gaining global legitimacy and its
discourse of a failing West, strengthening political and societal resilience by
embracing diaspora communities as assets will limit Beijing’s ability to peel
off political constituencies, weaken the United States internally, and carry out
successful foreign influence activities.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

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 Audrye Wong

Notes
1 Benjamin A. T. Graham, Investing in the Homeland: Migration, Social Ties, and
Foreign Firms (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019); David Zweig and
Huiyao Wang, “Can China Bring Back the Best? The Communist Party Organizes
China’s Search for Talent,” The China Quarterly 215 (September 2013), 590-615.
2 Gamlen et al 2019; Adamson, Fiona B., and Gerasimos Tsourapas, “The Migration State
in the Global South: Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration
Management,” International Migration Review 54.3 (2020), 853-882.
3 Michael Ahn Paarlberg, “Competing for the Diaspora’s Influence at Home: Party Structure
and Transnational Campaign Activity in El Salvador,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 45:4 (2019), 539-560; Michael Ahn Paarlberg, “Transnational Militancy: Diaspora
Influence over Electoral Activity in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 49:4 (2017),
541-559.
4 Pérez-Armendáriz, Claris,. “Cross-Border Discussions and Political Behavior in Migrant-
Sending Countries,” Studies in Comparative International Development 49.1 (2014), 67-88.
5 Laurie A. Brand, Citizens abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
6 Gerasimos Tsourapas, “Authoritarian Emigration States: Soft Power and Cross-Border
Mobility in the Middle East,” International Political Science Review 39:3 (2018), 400-416.
7 Harris Mylonas and Marko Zilovic, “Foreign Policy Priorities and Ethnic Return Migration
Policies: Group-Level Variation in Greece And Serbia,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 45:4 (2019), 613-635.
8 Latha Varadarajan, The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
9 Jiaqi M. Liu, “From “Sea Turtles” to “Grassroots Ambassadors”: The Chinese Politics of
Outbound Student Migration,” International Migration Review (2021).
10 Adamson and Tsourapas 2020.
11 Shain and Barth 2003.
12 Paul Charon and Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “Chinese Influence Operations: A
Machiavellian Moment,” IRSEM, October 2021; Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks For
You,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute 9 (2020).
13 James Jiann Hua To, Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for The Overseas Chinese (Boston:
Brill, 2014).
14 See e.g. Enze Han, “Bifurcated Homeland and Diaspora Politics in China And Taiwan
Towards the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
45:4 (2019), 577-594; To 2014; Zhou, Taomo, Migration in the Time of Revolution, (Cornell:
Cornell University Press, 2019).
15 Liu 2022.
16 Zhou 2019.
17 Yang Jiechi, “当好贴心人 成为实干家 凝聚侨心侨力同圆共享中国梦 ————深入学
习贯彻习近平总书记关于侨务工作的重要指示,” Overseas Chinese Affairs Study No. 3
(2017), http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/tbbd/195/2914.shtml.

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 The Diaspora and China’s Foreign Influence Activities

18 See Liu 2021.

19 See e.g. 张春旺, ``习近平总书记关于侨 务工作的重要论述之实践与理论渊源探析,”
华侨华人历史研究,” 2019年第3期; 张焕萍, ``借助华侨华人讲好中国故事,” 中国华侨
华人研究所, 2020.
20 Liu 2022.
21 Charon and Jeangène Vilmer 2021.
22 To 2014.
23 Tsourapas, Gerasimos. “Global autocracies: Strategies of transnational repression,
legitimation, and co-optation in world politics.” International Studies Review 23.3 (2021):
616-644.
24 Tsourapas 2021
25 Liu 2022
26 See e.g. Liu 2021; Rilke Mahieu, “’We’re Not Coming from Mars; We Know How Things
Work In Morocco!’ How Diasporic Moroccan Youth Resists Political Socialization in State-
Led Homeland Tours,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45:4 (2019), 674-691.
27 Shaul Kelner, Tours That Bind: Diaspora, Pilgrimage, and Israeli Birthright Tourism, (New
York: NYU Press, 2010).
28 Patrick J. Chester and Audrye Wong, “Divide to Conquer: Using Wedge Narratives to
Influence Diaspora Communities,” working paper, March 14, 2022. This sub-section draws
on findings from this paper.
29 Patrick J. Chester, “Framing Democracy: Characterizing China’s Anti-Democratic
Propaganda Strategy using Word Embeddings,” working paper, 2021. Word embeddings are
a class of novel unsupervised machine learning algorithms that estimate word vectors that
contain information about the contexts in which words occur. This may be interpreted as
containing semantic information, which has been used by social scientists to understand how
words are used differently across different texts, or to identify racial or gender bias. Here, we
apply word embeddings to assess media propaganda and framing.
30 The 95 percent confidence intervals shown represent the variation in the cosine similarity of
the attribute and object terms at the subscription account-year level.
31 Christian R. Grose, Pamela Lopez, Sara Sadhwani, and Antoine Yoshinaka, “Social
Lobbying,” The Journal of Politics 84:1 (2022).
32 See e.g. Anne-Marie Brady, Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi
Jinping, Vol. 18 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2017); Audrye Wong, “Peddling or
Persuading: China’s Economic Statecraft in Australia.” Journal of East Asian Studies 21.2
(2021), 283-304.
33 Erin Baggott Carter, “Chinese Government Lobbying in Washington,” Chapter 5 in
Changing Each Other: U.S.-China Relations in the Shadow of Domestic Politics, book
manuscript, April 2, 2021.
34 Nadège Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order (National Bureau of Asian Research,
2020).
35 Stacie E. Goddard, When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order (Cornell:
Cornell University Press, 2018).
36 Jiaqi M. Liu, “When Diaspora Politics Meet Global Ambitions: Diaspora Institutions Amid

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 Audrye Wong

China’s Geopolitical Transformations,” International Migration Review (2022).

37 Alexandra Délano Alonso and Harris Mylonas, “The Microfoundations of Diaspora Politics:
Unpacking the State and Disaggregating the Diaspora,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 45:4 (2019), 473-491.
38 Liu 2021.
39 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, “‘Claiming’ The Diaspora: Elite Mobility, Sending State Strategies and
the Spatialities of Citizenship,” Progress in Human Geography 35.6 (2011), 757-772.
40 Mahieu 2019.
41 Jinpu Wang and Ning Zhan, “Nationalism, Overseas Chinese State and The Construction
Of ‘Chineseness’ Among Chinese Migrant Entrepreneurs in Ghana,” Asian Ethnicity 20:1
(2019), 8-29.
42 Olga Zeveleva, “States and Standardization: Constructing the Co-Ethnic Migrant Story in
Germany,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45:4 (2019), 636-655.
43 Byford 2012.
44 Liu 2021.
45 Audrye Wong, “How Not to Win Allies and Influence Geopolitics: China’s Self-Defeating
Economic Statecraft,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2021.
46 Zhou 2019.
47 Yehonatan Abramson, “Securing the Diasporic ‘Self ’ by Travelling Abroad: Taglit-Birthright
and Ontological Security,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45:4 (2019), 656-673.

595
Afterword
Robert Daly is the Director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the
United States at the Wilson Center

It has become cliché to note that U.S.-China relations are at their lowest point
since normalization. Newspapers and scholarly journals are filled with analy-
ses of what the new superpower rivalry portends for Sino-U.S. diplomacy and
military, economic, and technological relations. The implications of adversity
for American sinologists and China’s America experts are less commented on.
The second class of Wilson Center China Fellows, like the first, demon-
strates that the United States continues to turn out more top scholars of China
and its foreign relations than any other nation. The papers presented in this
volume represent the best work by young American academics across a range
of disciplines. Our fellows bear comparison to any generation of American ex-
perts at the same stage of their career since John King Fairbank launched the
field of China Studies at Harvard after World War II. Unlike scholars trained
from the mid-1940s through the early 1980s, however, the writers in this vol-
ume were able to gain intimate working knowledge of the People’s Republic
by conducting research in China itself. We are delighted to partner with the
Carnegie Corporation to bring their insights to you.
China’s inward turn and the growing alienation between Washington and
Beijing raise two questions for the careers of our China Fellows and their peers
across the country. The first is, how many will be continue to have access to the
information and contacts they need to give Americans a rich, accurate un-
derstanding of China, past and present, across the disciplines? Without such
insight, U.S. China policy may come to be based solely on National Security
Strategies and other government documents, which often say as much about
American perceptions as China itself. Reductionist security concepts, nec-
essary though they are, are no substitute for the nuanced picture of China
which uncensored Chinese, American, and third-country scholars were able
to paint during the era of engagement and openness. Will American China

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 Robert Daly

studies henceforth be reduced to the kind of Pekingology that shaped our

views of China during the first Cold War, but, this time, without the benefit
of a listening post in Hong Kong?
The second issue is how the next generations of scholars, the oldest of
whom are now in their 20s, will be trained by the Wilson China Fellows. Few
of today’s college students will be able to study in China for extended periods,
make Chinese friends, work with Chinese colleagues in Chinese institutions,
and have the kind of transformative experiences which inspired the China
Fellows at the same age. Over the past three decades, young Americans with
China expertise founded NGOs and corporations, headed binational arts in-
stitutions and environmental organizations, worked for local governments to
attract Chinese investment, and promoted people-to-people interactions too
various to describe. Most of those channels have been cut off over the past five
years and are unlikely to re-open soon. New Cold Warrior may be the most
promising career path for freshmen who wander into a Chinese 101 or China
history classroom in the fall of 2022.
But the Carnegie Corporation and Wilson Center do not traffic in despair.
We established the China Fellowships to strengthen the national ecosystem
of China studies in order to advance knowledge of China for its own sake and
to inform American China policy. This volume is central to our efforts. We
do not doubt that the scholars whose essays you have just read are equal to the
challenges of their age.

The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the
U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

597
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
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