Garvida vs Sales, GR 124893, April 18, 1997
Facts:
The case centers around Lynette G. Garvida’s quest for a position in the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The sequence of events began with Garvida’s application for
registration as a member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan on March 16, 1996. Her application
was denied due to her exceeding the age limit as per COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Garvida’s challenge
to this denial led her through the Municipal Circuit Trial Court to the COMELEC en banc. Despite her
subsequent proclamation as the elected SK chairman, a petition filed against her by Florencio G. Sales,
Jr., another candidate, based on her alleged disqualification due to age, prompted the COMELEC en banc
to suspend her proclamation.
The case underwent a procedural journey involving appeals and petitions across several legal forums—
from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, and finally, to the COMELEC where it
was handled en banc instead of by a division. This procedural history includes Garvida’s certificate of
candidacy being initially disapproved due to her age, an appeal that led to its eventual approval, and a
petition by Sales to cancel Garvida’s candidacy that was decided upon by the COMELEC en banc.
Issues:
Did the COMELEC en banc have jurisdiction to decide on the petition against Garvida’s candidacy?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the
petition against Garvida, highlighting that jurisdiction over such matters lies with the COMELEC sitting in
division. Despite this, the Court proceeded to resolve the issue on Garvida’s age qualification. It held that
Garvida exceeded the age limit for elective SK officials. She was 21 years and approximately 11 months
old on election day, surpassing the “not more than 21 years of age” requirement by COMELEC and the
Local Government Code. Consequently, the petition against Garvida was granted, and she was declared
ineligible to hold the SK chairman position.
Doctrine:
The case reiterated the doctrine that jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies
with the COMELEC sitting in division, not en banc. It also clarified the age qualification for Sangguniang
Kabataan candidates, establishing that an individual must not be more than 21 years old on the day of
the election.
FERNANDEZ VS. NLRC GR 106090, Feb. 28, 1994
Facts:
Ricardo Fernandez was hired as a laborer by D.M. Consunji, Inc., a construction firm, on November 5,
1974, and became a skilled welder. His employment was terminated on March 23, 1986, because the
project he was assigned to had been completed. Skeptical of this reasoning, Fernandez filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and was one of several related cases against the company consolidated by the Labor
Arbiter.
The Labor Arbiter ruled on May 12, 1988, finding that Fernandez and other complainants were part of a
work pool and worked continuously for various periods ranging from five to twenty years. The decision
declared the terminations illegal, ordered reinstatement, and payment of specified amounts, dismissing
some complaints due to settled separation pays and quitclaims.
D.M. Consunji, Inc. contested this decision, appealing to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), asserting that the complainants were project employees hired on a per-project basis. The NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision on September 29, 1989, finding insufficient evidence of continuous
employment and classifying the complainants as project employees. A motion for reconsideration was
denied on July 19, 1990, due to the late filing of the said motion.
Fernandez went to the Supreme Court, challenging the NLRC’s decision on the grounds that he and
others should be considered regular employees, despite procedural delays in filing the petition.
Issue:
Whether Fernandez and others should be considered regular employees under the Labor Code or
remained project employees as classified by Respondent Commission.
Ruling:
On the merits, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRC’s classification of Fernandez and others as project
employees despite previous service durations. The decision explicitly discussed that Fernandez’s
employment was intermittent and tied to specific projects, citing documentary evidence of gaps and lay-
offs between project assignments as proof. The applicable statutes and Policy Instruction No. 20
distinguished project employees from regular employees based on employment continuity and specifics
at hiring.
Doctrine:
This case reaffirmed the legal doctrine distinguishing project employees from regular or casual
employees, specifically under Policy Instruction No. 20 and the Labor Code, Article 280.
It reiterated:
– Project employees work tied to specific projects, and completion of such projects ends their
employment without severance, while non-project employees have continuous employment regardless
of project completion.
– Article 280’s proviso on regularization based on service duration applies to casual, not project employ
PLDT vs Easter Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., GR 94374, Aug. 27, 1992
Facts:
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Eastern) filed an application with the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) on July 16, 1987, seeking a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity (CPCN) to build and operate an International Digital Gateway Facility (IDGF). Eastern asserted
its franchise under Republic Act No. 5002, enabling it to manage telecommunications systems for
sending and receiving messages internationally. The NTC scheduled a hearing for May 31, 1988.
On June 23, 1988, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) opposed Eastern’s
application on multiple grounds, claiming that Eastern’s proposed facility would result in unnecessary
duplication of services, exploit PLDT’s existing network, and harm public interest due to imprudent
expenditure. PLDT also argued that Eastern was not authorized to establish the facility under its
franchise. PLDT raised further procedural contentions by filing a Motion to Dismiss Eastern’s application,
which the NTC denied after extensive deliberation.
The NTC defined trial issues on August 31, 1988, and allowed the trial to proceed with both parties
presenting evidence and submitting memoranda. The NTC, taking its own initiative, required further
clarificatory hearings, concluding the trial on November 3, 1989. The NTC granted Eastern the CPCN in a
decision signed on November 10, 1989, and issued extensive operational conditions for the new facility.
Following Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz’s sudden replacement at the NTC, PLDT filed motions
contesting the validity of the NTC decision, arguing it had been rendered outside jurisdiction and
exceeded statutory limits. On July 16, 1990, the NTC En Banc upheld the initial decision, prompting PLDT
to seek judicial review.
Issue:
Did the NTC exceed its jurisdiction or gravely abuse discretion in granting Eastern a CPCN for an IDGF,
given franchise limitations imposed by Republic Act No. 5002?
Ruling:
The Court ruled that Eastern’s franchise under Republic Act No. 5002 did not include the authority to
operate an IDGF, as such a facility is integral to a telephone system—something Eastern’s franchise did
not encompass. The Court referenced the legislative history of Eastern’s franchise to justify its
interpretation, reiterating that Eastern was initially a telegraph operator, and its franchise did not evolve
to include telephone services.
Doctrine:
Franchises granted by legislative enactment need to be strictly interpreted against the franchisee, and
any expansion in scope must be explicitly authorized by law.
Geotina v. CA, G.R. No. 33500, 30 August 1971
Facts:
On December 22, 1970, the vessel M/V “Mindanao Sea” arrived at the Port of Manila carrying a
consignment of 37,042 cartons of fresh apples for Unitrade, Inc. After paying duties and taxes for 10,000
cartons, the Collector of Customs issued warrants of seizure for the shipment, citing a violation of
Central Bank Circulars and the Tariff and Customs Code.
On December 23, 1970, Unitrade requested the release of the apples under bond, which was denied by
the Collector due to advisement by government authorities. The Commissioner of Customs upheld the
Collector’s decision on January 20, 1971.
Unitrade repeatedly requested the release of the apples under bond on January 22 and January 26,
1971. The request was denied on grounds of the goods being classified under prohibited importations as
per Central Bank circulars and relevant tariff sections.
After the Commissioner of Customs sustained the Collector’s ruling, Unitrade appealed to the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) on February 2, 1971.
The CTA issued preliminary orders, allowing the discharging of the apples’ storage in cold facilities to
prevent spoilage, yet denied Unitrade’s request for immediate release under bond.
Ultimately, the CTA ruled that the apples were not absolutely prohibited imports, allowed them to be
released under bond, and deferred the issue of forfeiture to further proceedings, a decision contested by
the Commissioner of Customs.
Issue:
Whether the 37,042 cartons of fresh apples were considered “articles of prohibited importation” under
the Tariff and Customs Code and Central Bank Circulars without the necessary Central Bank release
certificate.
Ruling:
The Court concluded that the apples were articles of prohibited importation based on settled
jurisprudence requiring strict compliance with Central Bank orders concerning release certificates for
“no-dollar” imports.
Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled the CTA exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering the release of the
apples under bond against Sections 102 and 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which decidedly
prohibit the same.
Doctrine:
Items requiring special certification for import become “prohibited” in the absence of compliance,
subjecting them to seizure and barring release under bond.
Import regulations, like Central Bank Circulars, have the force of law. Non-compliance results in
classification as prohibited importation.
