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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

REBECCA MARTINEZ,
individually and next of kin to
KAYLA LUCAS and her minor children
(J.W.B. and K.B.L.), and as
Administrator ad Litem, and
Personal Representative of
KAYLA LUCAS and the
ESTATE OF KAYLA LUCAS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case 2:23-cv-02049

MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT (MPD),

CITY OF MEMPHIS,
CERELYN DAVIS, and
TIMOTHY HAMILTON,

Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________________________

Before the Court are Defendants Memphis Police Department (“MPD”), the City of

Memphis (“the City”), MPD Chief of Police Cerelyn Davis (“Chief Davis”), and MPD Officer

Timothy Hamilton’s (“Officer Hamilton”) 1 2

Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry

1
Plaintiff’s Complaint identifies the MPD officer who shot Lucas as “Officer John Doe 1.” On May 13,
2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Substitute Party to name Officer John Doe 1 as Officer Timothy Hamilton
(D.E. #44). At the May 17, 2024 hearing on Plaintiff’s motion, which was unopposed, the Court substituted
Officer Timothy Hamilton in place of Officer John Doe 1.
2
Neither Plaintiff’s Complaint nor Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute Party expressly state that Plaintiff seeks
to sue Chief Davis and/or Officer Hamilton in their individual capacities (see D.E. #1, #44). A plaintiff
seeking damages against officers in their individual capacities must clearly forth such claims in the
pleading. See, e.g. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592-94 (6th Cir. 1989). Further, the briefing on the
instant motions does not discuss any claim against Chief Davis or Officer Hamilton in their individual
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(“D.E.”) #66) and Plaintiff Rebecca Martinez’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (D.E. #68).

The parties have consented to have the United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in

this case pursuant to 28 United States Code Section 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. (D.E. #21). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. Background

a. Plaintiff’s Complaint

This case arises from the officer-involved shooting death of Kayla Lucas (“Lucas”),

Plaintiff’s daughter. On December 14, 2022, Plaintiff Rebecca Martinez filed a Complaint in the

Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee for the Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis. (D.E.

#1-2). Defendants removed the case to this Court on February 1, 2023. (D.E. #1). Plaintiff’s

Complaint alleges three causes of action.

Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the City, MPD, and Chief Davis were

negligent, grossly negligent, and committed wanton failure in their hiring, training, monitoring,

reviewing, and supervising of Officer Hamilton and other officers involved in the incident that

resulted in Lucas’s death. (Compl. ¶¶ 23-30). Specifically, Count I alleges that the City, MPD,

and Chief Davis failed to adequately train Officer Hamilton and the other involved officers “on

how to properly approach, detain, investigate, search, and arrest citizens” such as Lucas. (Id. ¶

26). It additionally alleges that the City, MPD, and Chief Davis negligently hired, assigned, and

retained Officer Hamilton “knowing of his propensity for malicious abuse of process, failure to

follow promulgated rules and guidelines, and obstruction of justice while performing everyday

capacities. Accordingly, the Court will consider the claims against Chief Davis and Officer Hamilton in
their official capacities.

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police officer duties, including but not limited to conducting traffic and investigatory stops.” (Id.

¶ 28). It further alleges that the City, MPD, and Chief Davis’s negligently and/or wantonly failed

to follow “municipal law enforcement rules, ordinances, regulations, policies, and procedures,

including but not limited to, city, state, and federal law.” (Id. ¶ 27).

Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants committed negligence per se by

violating Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-11-620 by the use of deadly force against Lucas.

(Id. ¶¶ 31-33).

Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “Defendants” violated 42 United States Code

Section 1983 (“Section 1983”). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally,

maliciously, and wanton indifference, deprived Lucas of her freedom from the use of unjustified

and excessive force and her freedom from deprivation of liberty without due process. (Compl. ¶¶

36-38).

b. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

On September 27, 2024, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim fails as a matter of law because she does not

allege the existence of any custom or policy that was violated which they argue is required for the

municipality to be liable. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s tort claims fail as a matter of

law because they are not liable for such claims under the civil-rights exception and the

discretionary-function exception of the Government Tort Liability Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. §

29-20-205(1)-(2) (“GTLA”).

c. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

On September 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. #68).

The arguments in Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment are based upon evidence that is not

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properly before the Court pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a)-(c), as discussed, infra, Section II.

Accordingly, the arguments are not summarized here or considered in this Order.

d. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

On October 18, 2024, Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. (D.E. #70). Defendants’ Response addresses Plaintiff’s arguments that are based upon

evidence not properly before the Court pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a)-(c) as discussed, infra,

Section II. Accordingly, the arguments are not summarized here or considered in this Order.

e. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

On October 25, 2024, Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

(D.E. #71). With respect to her negligence claim, Plaintiff argues that the GTLA does not provide

immunity to a government entity if the entity itself was negligent in training and supervising the

employees. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are based upon evidence not properly before the Court

pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a)-(c) as discussed, infra, Section II. Accordingly, those arguments

are not summarized here or considered in this Order.

f. Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment

On November 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Reply to Defendant’s Response to her Motion for

Summary Judgment. (D..E #72). Plaintiff’s arguments are based upon evidence not properly

before this Court pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a)-(c) as discussed, infra, Section II. Accordingly,

the arguments are not summarized here are considered in this Order.

g. Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment

On November 8, 2024, Defendants filed their Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to their Motion

for Summary Judgment. (D.E. #73). Defendants reassert that they, as a government entity, are

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immune under the GTLA for liability in tort if the injury allegedly arises out of a violation of the

individual’s civil rights. Defendants’ remaining arguments are based upon evidence not properly

before this Court pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a)-(c) as discussed, infra, Section II. Accordingly,

the arguments are not summarized here are considered in this Order.

II. Findings of Fact

Local Rule 56 sets forth the following procedure for the parties to assist the Court in

ascertaining whether there are material facts in dispute for purposes of summary judgment:

(a) Moving Party. In order to assist the Court in ascertaining whether

there are any material facts in dispute, any motion for summary
judgment made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 shall be accompanied
by a separate, concise statement of the material facts as to which the
moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial. Each fact
shall be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph. Each fact shall
be supported by specific citation to the record. If the movant
contends that the opponent of the motion cannot produce evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact, the proponent shall affix
to the memorandum copies of the precise portions of the record
relied upon as evidence of this assertion.

...

(b) Non-moving Party. Any party opposing the motion for summary
judgment must respond to each fact set forth by the movant by
either:

(1) agreeing that the fact is undisputed;

(2) agreeing that the fact is undisputed for the purpose of

ruling on the motion for summary judgment only; or

(3) demonstrating that the fact is disputed.

Each disputed fact must be supported by specific citation to the

record. Such response shall be filed with any memorandum in
response to the motion. The response must be made on the
document provided by the movant or on another document in which
the non-movant has reproduced the facts and citations verbatim as

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set forth by the movant. In either case, the non-movant must make
a response to each fact set forth by the movant immediately below
each fact set forth by the movant. In addition, the non-movant’s
response may contain a concise statement of any additional facts that
the non-movant contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried.
Each such disputed fact shall be set forth in a separate, numbered
paragraph with specific citations to the record supporting the
contention that such fact is in dispute.

...

(c) Reply by Moving Party. . . . If the non-moving party has asserted

additional facts, the moving party shall respond to these additional
facts by filing a separate reply statement in the same manner and
form as specified in section (b) above.

Local Rule 56.1(a)-(c).

The Court relies upon these filings to create the Findings of Fact, as that is the procedure

by which the Court can clearly determine which facts are in dispute. As explained, supra, Section

I, both Plaintiff and Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and memoranda in support

thereof cite extensive evidence that is not contained in their statements of undisputed material fact

and/or replies thereto. This evidence will not be considered for purposes of this motion.

Turning to the findings of fact based upon the filings that comply with Local Rule 56.1,

the evidence shows that, on December 15, 2021, MPD Officer Hamilton shot and killed Kayla

Lucas (“Lucas”) during a traffic stop. (Defs.’ Resp. to Pls. First Set of Interrogatories and Requests

for Production, #5, filed at D.E. #68-2). Officers Braydon Bryan, Arda Akata, and Sheridan Cross

testified that they were also part of the same team or task force that responded to the traffic stop

(Hamilton Dep., filed at D.E. #71-2, at 43:8-22; Bryan Dep., filed at D.E. #71-3, at 17:13-19;

Akata Dep., filed at D.E. #71-4, at 24:11-19; Cross Dep., filed at D.E. #71-5, at 16:9-20); however,

MPD Chief Cerelyn Davis (“Chief Davis”) testified that these officers were not officially a team

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or task force but that they were assigned to that particular precinct and responded to this call (Davis

Dep., filed at D.E. # 71-6, at 15:1-16:5).

Officer Hamilton and Officer Bryan arrived at the stop in the same car. (Bryan Dep. at

17:13-16). Officer Bryan neither gave any commands to Lucas’s car nor did he hear Officer

Hamilton or anyone else give commands to Lucas’s car before Officer Hamilton began firing.

(Bryan Dep. at 28:1-29:14). Officer Hamilton fired his weapon at the vehicle occupied by Lucas

and her passenger multiple times. (Hamilton Dep. at 63:1-65:17). Officer Hamilton fired the last

shot at the vehicle after it came to rest against a brick wall. (Hamilton Dep. at 65:14-17). He

stopped shooting because he observed Lucas climbing into the back seat. (Hamilton Dep. at 64:23-

67:17). Lucas exited her vehicle from the rear passenger door. (Bryan Dep. at 27:23-25). Lucas

had been shot in the lower back on her left side. (Cross Dep. at 28:12-25).

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Although hearsay evidence may not be considered on a motion for summary

judgment, Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir.

1999), evidentiary materials presented to avoid summary judgment otherwise need not be in a form

that would be admissible at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Thaddeus-

X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 400 (6th Cir. 1999). The evidence and justifiable inferences based on

facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

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Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d

452, 460 (6th Cir. 2001).

Summary judgment is proper “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The moving party can prove the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support

the nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 325. This may be accomplished by submitting affirmative

evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or by attacking the

nonmoving party’s evidence to show why it does not support a judgment for the nonmoving party.

10a Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (2d ed. 1998).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been made, the “adverse

party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A genuine

issue for trial exists if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the

nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To avoid summary

judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986).

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IV. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

a. Count I

Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the City, MPD, and Chief Davis were

negligent, grossly negligent, and committed wanton failure in hiring, training, monitoring,

reviewing, and supervising MPD officers. These Defendants respond that they cannot be held

liable under the discretionary-function exception and of the GTLA.

Under Tennessee law, a claim for negligence requires the plaintiff to prove the following:

(1) that the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant’s conduct breached this

duty; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury or damage; and,

(4) that no existing rule of law relieves the defendant from liability for its negligence. McCall v.

Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995).

The GTLA provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is removed for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his
employment except if the injury arises out of:

(1) The exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary

function, whether or not the discretion is abused;

(2) False imprisonment pursuant to a mittimus from a court, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit,
interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right of
privacy, or civil rights[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(1)-(2).

Under the discretionary-function exception, the Tennessee Supreme Court applies the

“planning-operational test” adopted in Bowers v. City of Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn.

1992). Under this test, “decisions that rise to the level of planning or policy-making are considered

discretionary acts which do not give rise to tort liability.” Id. at 430. This is because they involve

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“the formulation of basic policy characterized by official judgment, discretion, weighing of

alternatives, and public policy choices” that should be handled by that policymaker rather than

second-guessed by the courts. Helton v. Knox Cty., Tenn., 922 S.W.2d 877, 885-87 (Tenn. 1996)

(citations omitted). In contrast, decisions that are merely “operational” are not discretionary

functions and may subject the government to tort liability. Bowers, 826 S.W.2d at 430-31.

Under the civil-rights exception, “when a plaintiff asserts claims, including negligence

claims, against a governmental entity ‘in the context of a civil rights case, [the] alleged injuries

arise out of civil rights and the entity is thereby entitled to immunity from suit pursuant to the civil

rights exception.” Cochran v. Town of Jonesborough, 586 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019)

(quoting Campbell v. Anderson Cty., 695 F. Supp. 2d 764, 778 (E.D. Tenn. 2010)).

The Court need not reach the GTLA analysis here, as even assuming, arguendo, that the

government entity is not immune from suit on Plaintiff’s negligence claim, there is no evidence in

the record regarding their hiring, training, monitoring, reviewing, and supervising of MPD officers,

including Officer Hamilton and the other responding officers. Absent any evidence of their

conduct in performing these functions, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence fails as a matter of law

because she cannot establish that these defendants committed any breach of their duties to hire,

train, monitor, review, and supervise MPD officers.

b. Count II

Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges negligence per se against all Defendants on the

basis that Officer Hamilton violated Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-11-620’s requirements

governing the use of deadly force. The parties’ motions for summary judgment do not specifically

discuss the doctrine of negligence per se or Section 39-11-620. Instead, they discuss negligence

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generally and the exceptions to the GTLA, as set forth above, that may provide immunity for tort

claims against the governmental entity.

The doctrine of negligence per se governs negligence claims where statutory law, rather

than the reasonable-person standard, governs the standard of care. Rains v. Bend of the River, 124

S.W.3d 580, 588-90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). The negligence per se doctrine does not create a new

cause of action; instead, it is the same as an ordinary negligence claim with the duty arising from

codified law. Id. (citations omitted). The two threshold questions in every negligence per se claim

are “whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the statute was designed to protect and

whether the plaintiff’s injury is the type that the statute was designed to prevent.” Id. at 591.

“Even if the plaintiffs are within the class to be protected by the statute, a statutory negligence per

se claim cannot stand unless the statute establishes a standard of care.” King v. Danek Med., Inc.,

37 S.W.3d 429, 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), app. denied (Nov. 6, 2000 & Jul. 9, 2001).

Section 39-11-620 sets forth the requirements under Tennessee law for a law enforcement

officer to use deadly force:

(a) A law enforcement officer, after giving notice of the officer’s identity as such, may
use or threaten to use force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of
an individual suspected of a criminal act who resists or flees from the arrest.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the officer may use deadly force to effect an arrest
only if all other reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted or are
unavailable, and where feasible, the officer has given notice of the officer’s identity
as such and given a warning that deadly force may be used unless resistance or
flight ceases, and:

...

(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the arrested person poses a threat
of serious bodily injury . . . either to the officer or to others unless immediately
apprehended.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-620.

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Section 39-11-620 is included under Part 6 of Title 39, which sets forth “Justification

Excluding Criminal Responsibility.” Part 6 sets forth the defense of justification as follows: “[i]t

is a defense to prosecution that the conduct of the person is justified under this part.” Tenn. Code

Ann. 39-11-601. Part 6 also includes similar defenses to prosecution, such as self defense, defense

of another, and defense of property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611 - § 39-11-616. Thus, while

there is no doubt that that it is vital that public should be protected the public from the unlawful

use of deadly force, this particular statutory provision is a defense available to an officer who is

being prosecuted for using deadly force. The parties have cited no authority, and the Court is

aware of none, that states that Section 39-11-620 itself establishes a standard of care for civil

liability such that a violation thereof gives rise to a negligence per se claim. Further, courts that

have considered whether other criminal statutes may give rise to negligence per se claims have

required that it is clear that the legislative intent was to do so. See, e.g. Slowik v. Lambert, 529 F.

Supp. 3d 756, 764-66 (E.D. Tenn. 2021); Kyu Hwan Hwang v. Jerry Quezada Arita, No. 2:20-cv-

02904-SHL-atc, 2021 WL 4451436 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2021); but see Timothy Corvin v. Deputy

Mike Bice, No. 1:05-CV-219, 2007 WL 776501 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 9, 2007). That legislative intent

is not clear here.

However, even if Section 39-11-620 could give rise to a negligence per se claim, under the

civil-rights exception set forth above, the GTLA provides that the governmental entity is immune

from liability in tort if the injury arises from a violation of civil rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-

205(2). In Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541 (6th Cir. 2024), the Sixth Circuit held that the GTLA’s

civil-rights exception applies when the “gravamen” or “substantial point” of the negligence claims

is based on the same conduct as alleged civil-rights violations. Id. at 552–54 (relying on Cochran

v. Town of Jonesborough, 586 S.W.3d 909, 914-20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019)). Under this standard,

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Courts consider whether the underlying injury “arises out of” alleged civil rights violations. Id. at

920.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is based upon one incident alone – Officer Hamilton’s use of deadly

force in the shooting death of Kayla Lucas. Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim alleges that Officer

Hamilton violated Section 39-11-620 in his use of deadly force. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim

likewise alleges that Officer Hamilton “intentionally used unnecessary and excessive force by

drawing and firing his weapon upon Kayla Lucas.” Thus, the Court must conclude that the

gravamen of both Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim and her civil rights claim are the same and

that they arise out of the same set of facts. Accordingly, the governmental entities sued here are

entitled to immunity from suit under the civil-rights exception of the GTLA. For that reason,

Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim fails as a matter of law.

c. Count III

Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges violations of Section 1983 against all Defendants

based upon unjustified and excessive use of force and deprivation of liberty without due process.

Section 1983 provides for civil liability if an individual has been deprived of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States by a person or

entity acting under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but is a vehicle for vindicating rights

elsewhere conferred. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).

Municipalities may be liable under Section 1983 if the plaintiff shows that the protected

right was violated by the execution of the municipality’s “policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy[.]”

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Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A municipal

governmental entity cannot be held liable for an injury on the basis of respondeat superior. Id.

The edicts of Monell and its progeny require that the plaintiff identify the municipal policy or

custom, connect the policy to the municipality, and show that the injury was incurred due to the

execution of that policy. Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (citing Garner v. Memphis Police

Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).

Here, there is no evidence before the Court for purposes of these motions of any policy or

custom of the City or MPD. Absent evidence of a policy or custom, the plaintiff is necessarily

unable to demonstrate that the deprivation of rights was due to the execution of that policy or

custom. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim fails as a matter of law.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED

and Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of April, 2025.

s/Charmiane G. Claxton
CHARMIANE G. CLAXTON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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