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appearance and asked a fulfillment of my promise. I inquired what
he wanted, and he said he wanted to do something bold, something
that would make him a hero. I explained to him, that we were
getting ready to go for Joe Johnston at Dalton, that I expected to be
in the neighborhood of Atlanta about the 4th of July, and wanted the
bridge across the Savannah River at Augusta, Georgia, to be burnt
about that time, to produce alarm and confusion behind the rebel
army. I explained to Pike that the chances were three to one that he
would be caught and hanged; but the greater the danger the greater
seemed to be his desire to attempt it. I told him to select a
companion, to disguise himself as an East Tennessee refugee, work
his way over the mountains into North Carolina, and at the time
appointed to float down the Savannah River and burn that bridge. In
a few days he had made his preparations and took his departure.
The bridge was not burnt, and I supposed that Pike had been caught
and hanged.
When we reached Columbia, South Carolina, in February, 1865,
just as we were leaving the town, in passing near the asylum, I
heard my name called, and saw a very dirty fellow followed by a file
of men running toward me, and as they got near I recognized Pike.
He called to me to identify him as one of my men; he was then a
prisoner under guard, and I instructed the guard to bring him that
night to my camp some fifteen miles up the road, which was done.
Pike gave me a graphic narrative of his adventures, which would
have filled a volume; told me how he had made two attempts to
burn the bridge, and failed; and said that at the time of our entering
Columbia he was a prisoner in the hands of the rebels, under trial for
his life, but in the confusion of their retreat he made his escape and
got into our lines, where he was again made a prisoner by our
troops because of his looks. Pike got some clothes, cleaned up, and
I used him afterward to communicate with Wilmington, North
Carolina. Some time after the war, he was appointed a lieutenant of
the Regular, Cavalry, and was killed in Oregon, by the accidental
discharge of a pistol. Just before his death he wrote me, saying that
he was tired of the monotony of garrison-life, and wanted to turn
Indian, join the Cheyennes on the Plains, who were then giving us
great trouble, and, after he had gained their confidence, he would
betray them into our hands. Of course I wrote him that he must try
and settle down and become a gentleman as well as an officer, apply
himself to his duties, and forget the wild desires of his nature, which
were well enough in time of war, but not suited to his new condition
as an officer; but, poor fellow I he was killed by an accident, which
probably saved him from a slower but harder fate.
At Iuka I issued all the orders to McPherson and Hurlbut
necessary for the Department of the Tennessee during my absence,
and, further, ordered the collection of a force out of the Sixteenth
Corps, of about eight thousand men, to be commanded by General
G. M. Dodge, with orders to follow as far east as Athens, Tennessee,
there to await instructions. We instantly discontinued all attempts to
repair the Charleston Railroad; and the remaining three divisions of
the Fifteenth Corps marched to Eastport, crossed the Tennessee
River by the aid of the gunboats, a ferry-boat, and a couple of
transports which had come up, and hurried eastward.
In person I crossed on the 1st of November, and rode forward to
Florence, where I overtook Ewing's division. The other divisions
followed rapidly. On the road to Florence I was accompanied by my
staff, some clerks, and mounted orderlies. Major Ezra Taylor was
chief of artillery, and one of his sons was a clerk at headquarters.
The latter seems to have dropped out of the column, and gone to a
farm house near the road. There was no organized force of the rebel
army north of the Tennessee River, but the country was full of
guerrillas. A party of these pounced down on the farm, caught
young Taylor and another of the clerks, and after reaching Florence,
Major Taylor heard of the capture of his son, and learned that when
last seen he was stripped of his hat and coat, was tied to the tail-
board of a wagon, and driven rapidly to the north of the road we
had traveled. The major appealed to me to do something for his
rescue. I had no cavalry to send in pursuit, but knowing that there
was always an understanding between these guerrillas and their
friends who staid at home, I sent for three or four of the principal
men of Florence (among them a Mr. Foster, who had once been a
Senator in Congress), explained to them the capture of young Taylor
and his comrade, and demanded their immediate restoration. They,
of course, remonstrated, denied all knowledge of the acts of these
guerrillas, and claimed to be peaceful citizens of Alabama, residing
at home. I insisted that these guerrillas were their own sons and
neighbors; that they knew their haunts, and could reach them if they
wanted, and they could effect the restoration to us of these men;
and I said, moreover, they must do it within twenty-four hours, or I
would take them, strip them of their hats and coats, and tie them to
the tail-boards of our wagons till they were produced. They sent off
messengers at once, and young Taylor and his comrade were
brought back the next day.
Resuming our march eastward by the large road, we soon reached
Elk River, which was wide and deep, and could only be crossed by a
ferry, a process entirely too slow for the occasion; so I changed the
route more by the north, to Elkton, Winchester, and Deckerd. At this
point we came in communication with the Army of the Cumberland,
and by telegraph with General Grant, who was at Chattanooga. He
reiterated his orders for me and my command to hurry forward with
all possible dispatch, and in person I reached Bridgeport during the
night of November 13th, my troops following behind by several
roads. At Bridgeport I found a garrison guarding the railroad-bridge
and pontoon bridge there, and staid with the quartermaster, Colonel
William G. Le Due (who was my school-mate at How's School in
1836). There I received a dispatch from General Grant, at
Chattanooga, to come up in person, leaving my troops to follow as
fast as possible. At that time there were two or three small
steamboats on the river, engaged in carrying stores up as far as
Kelly's Ferry. In one of these I took passage, and on reaching Kelly's
Ferry found orderlies, with one of General Grant's private horses,
waiting for me, on which I rode into Chattanooga, November 14th.
Of course, I was heartily welcomed by Generals Grant, Thomas, and
all, who realized the extraordinary efforts we had made to come to
their relief. The next morning we walked out to Fort Wood, a
prominent salient of the defenses of the place, and from its parapet
we had a magnificent view of the panorama. Lookout Mountain, with
its rebel flags and batteries, stood out boldly, and an occasional shot
fired toward Wauhatchee or Moccasin Point gave life to the scene.
These shots could barely reach Chattanooga, and I was told that one
or more shot had struck a hospital inside the lines. All along
Missionary Ridge were the tents of the rebel beleaguering force; the
lines of trench from Lookout up toward the Chickamauga were
plainly visible; and rebel sentinels, in a continuous chain, were
walking their posts in plain view, not a thousand yards off. "Why,"
said I, "General Grant, you are besieged;" and he said, "It is too
true." Up to that moment I had no idea that things were so bad. The
rebel lines actually extended from the river, below the town, to the
river above, and the Army of the Cumberland was closely held to the
town and its immediate defenses. General Grant pointed out to me a
house on Missionary Ridge, where General Bragg's headquarters
were known to be. He also explained the situation of affairs
generally; that the mules and horses of Thomas's army were so
starved that they could not haul his guns; that forage, corn, and
provisions, were so scarce that the men in hunger stole the few
grains of corn that were given to favorite horses; that the men of
Thomas's army had been so demoralized by the battle of
Chickamauga that he feared they could not be got out of their
trenches to assume the offensive; that Bragg had detached
Longstreet with a considerable force up into East Tennessee, to
defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was in danger, etc.; and
that he (Grant) was extremely anxious to attack Bragg in position, to
defeat him, or at least to force him to recall Longstreet. The Army of
the Cumberland had so long been in the trenches that he wanted my
troops to hurry up, to take the offensive first; after which, he had no
doubt the Cumberland army would fight well. Meantime the Eleventh
and Twelfth Corps, under General Hooker, had been advanced from
Bridgeport along the railroad to Wauhatchee, but could not as yet
pass Lookout Mountain. A pontoon-bridge had been thrown across
the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, by which supplies were hauled
into Chattanooga from Kelly's and Wauhatchee..
Another bridge was in course of construction at Chattanooga,
under the immediate direction of Quartermaster-General Meigs, but
at the time all wagons, etc., had to be ferried across by a flying-
bridge. Men were busy and hard at work everywhere inside our
lines, and boats for another pontoon-bridge were being rapidly
constructed under Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, familiarly known as
"Baldy Smith," and this bridge was destined to be used by my
troops, at a point of the river about four miles above Chattanooga,
just below the mouth of the Chickamauga River. General Grant
explained to me that he had reconnoitred the rebel line from
Lookout Mountain up to Chickamauga, and he believed that the
northern portion of Missionary Ridge was not fortified at all; and he
wanted me, as soon as my troops got up, to lay the new pontoon-
bridge by night, cross over, and attack Bragg's right flank on that
part of the ridge abutting on Chickamauga Creek, near the tunnel;
and he proposed that we should go at once to look at the ground. In
company with Generals Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others,
we crossed by the flying-bridge, rode back of the hills some four
miles, left our horses, and got on a hill overlooking the whole ground
about the mouth of the Chickamauga River, and across to the
Missionary Hills near the tunnel. Smith and I crept down behind a
fringe of trees that lined the river-bank, to the very point selected
for the new bridge, where we sat for some time, seeing the rebel
pickets on the opposite bank, and almost hearing their words.
Having seen enough, we returned to Chattanooga; and in order to
hurry up my command, on which so much depended, I started back
to Kelly's in hopes to catch the steamboat that same evening; but on
my arrival the boat had gone. I applied to the commanding officer,
got a rough boat manned by four soldiers, and started down the
river by night. I occasionally took a turn at the oars to relieve some
tired man, and about midnight we reached Shell Mound, where
General Whittaker, of Kentucky, furnished us a new and good crew,
with which we reached Bridgeport by daylight. I started Ewings
division in advance, with orders to turn aside toward Trenton, to
make the enemy believe we were going to turn Braggs left by pretty
much the same road Rosecrans had followed; but with the other
three divisions I followed the main road, via the Big Trestle at
Whitesides, and reached General Hooker's headquarters, just above
Wauhatchee, on the 20th; my troops strung all the way back to
Bridgeport. It was on this occasion that the Fifteenth Corps gained
its peculiar badge: as the men were trudging along the deeply-cut,
muddy road, of a cold, drizzly day, one of our Western soldiers left
his ranks and joined a party of the Twelfth Corps at their camp-fire.
They got into conversation, the Twelfth-Corps men asking what
troops we were, etc., etc. In turn, our fellow (who had never seen a
corps-badge, and noticed that every thing was marked with a star)
asked if they were all brigadier-generals. Of course they were not,
but the star was their corps-badge, and every wagon, tent, hat, etc.,
had its star. Then the Twelfth-Corps men inquired what corps he
belonged to, and he answered, "The Fifteenth Corps." "What is your
badge?" "Why," said he (and he was an Irishman), suiting the action
to the word, "forty rounds in the cartridge-box, and twenty in the
pocket." At that time Blair commanded the corps; but Logan
succeeded soon after, and, hearing the story, adopted the cartridge-
box and forty rounds as the corps-badge.
The condition of the roads was such, and the bridge at Brown's so
frail, that it was not until the 23d that we got three of my divisions
behind the hills near the point indicated above Chattanooga for
crossing the river. It was determined to begin the battle with these
three divisions, aided by a division of Thomas's army, commanded
by General Jeff. C. Davis, that was already near that point. All the
details of the battle of Chattanooga, so far as I was a witness, are so
fully given in my official report herewith, that I need add nothing to
it. It was a magnificent battle in its conception, in its execution, and
in its glorious results; hastened somewhat by the supposed danger
of Burnside, at Knoxville, yet so completely successful, that nothing
is left for cavil or fault-finding. The first day was lowering and
overcast, favoring us greatly, because we wanted to be concealed
from Bragg, whose position on the mountain-tops completely
overlooked us and our movements. The second day was beautifully
clear, and many a time, in the midst of its carnage and noise, I could
not help stopping to look across that vast field of battle, to admire
its sublimity.
The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme
flanks of Bragg's position was, to disturb him to such an extent, that
he would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so that
Thomas's army could break through his centre. The whole plan
succeeded admirably; but it was not until after dark that I learned
the complete success at the centre, and received General Grant's
orders to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE
MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, Nov. 25,
1863
Major-General SHERMAN.
GENERAL: No doubt you witnessed the handsome
manner in which Thomas's troops carried Missionary
Ridge this afternoon, and can feel a just pride, too, in
the part taken by the forces under your command in
taking first so much of the same range of hills, and
then in attracting the attention of so many of the
enemy as to make Thomas's part certain of success.
The neat thing now will be to relieve Burnside. I have
heard from him to the evening of the 23d. At that time
he had from ten to twelve days' supplies, and spoke
hopefully of being able to hold out that length of time.
My plan is to move your forces out gradually until they
reach the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton.
Granger will move up the south side of the Tennessee
with a column of twenty thousand men, taking no
wagons, or but few, with him. His men will carry four
days' rations, and the steamer Chattanooga, loaded
with rations, will accompany the expedition.
I take it for granted that Bragg's entire force has left.
If not, of course, the first thing is to dispose of him. If
he has gone, the only thing necessary to do to-morrow
will be to send out a reconnoissance to ascertain the
whereabouts of the enemy. Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT, Major-General.
P. S.-On reflection, I think we will push Bragg with all
our strength to-morrow, and try if we cannot out off a
good portion of his rear troops and trains. His men
have manifested a strong disposition to desert for
some time past, and we will now give them a chance. I
will instruct Thomas accordingly. Move the advance
force early, on the most easterly road taken by the
enemy. U. S. G.
This compelled me to reverse our column, so as to use the bridge
across the Chickamauga at its mouth. The next day we struck the
rebel rear at Chickamauga Station, and again near Graysville. There
we came in contact with Hooker's and Palmer's troops, who had
reached Ringgold. There I detached Howard to cross Taylor's Ridge,
and strike the railroad which comes from the north by Cleveland to
Dalton. Hooker's troops were roughly handled at Ringgold, and the
pursuit was checked. Receiving a note from General Hooker, asking
help, I rode forward to Ringgold to explain the movement of
Howard; where I met General Grant, and learned that the rebels had
again retreated toward Dalton. He gave orders to discontinue the
pursuit, as he meant to turn his attention to General Burnside,
supposed to be in great danger at Knoxville, about one hundred and
thirty miles northeast. General Grant returned and spent part of the
night with me, at Graysville. We talked over matters generally, and
he explained that he had ordered General Gordon Granger, with the
Fourth Corps, to move forward rapidly to Burnsides help, and that he
must return to Chattanooga to push him. By reason of the scarcity of
food, especially of forage, he consented that, instead of going back,
I might keep out in the country; for in motion I could pick up some
forage and food, especially on the Hiawassee River, whereas none
remained in Chattanooga.
Accordingly, on the 29th of November, my several columns
marched to Cleveland, and the next day we reached the Hiawassee
at Charleston, where the Chattanooga & Knoxville Railroad crosses
it. The railroad-bridge was partially damaged by the enemy in
retreating, but we found some abandoned stores. There and
thereabouts I expected some rest for my weary troops and horses;
but, as I rode into town, I met Colonel J. H. Wilson and C. A. Dana
(Assistant Secretary of War), who had ridden out from Chattanooga
to find me, with the following letter from General Grant, and copies
of several dispatches from General Burnside, the last which had
been received from him by way of Cumberland Gap:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, Nov. 29, 1863
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN
News are received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. At
that time the place was still invested, but the attack on it was not
vigorous. Longstreet evidently determined to starve the garrison out.
Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I have lost all faith in
his energy or capacity to manage an expedition of the importance of
this one. I am inclined to think, therefore, I shall have to send you.
Push as rapidly as you can to the Hiawassee, and determine for
yourself what force to take with you from that point. Granger has his
corps with him, from which you will select in conjunction with the
force now with you. In plain words, you will assume command of all
the forces now moving up the Tennessee, including the garrison at
Kingston, and from that force, organize what you deem proper to
relieve Burnside. The balance send back to Chattanooga. Granger
has a boat loaded with provisions, which you can issue, and return
the boat. I will have another loaded, to follow you. Use, of course,
as sparingly as possible from the rations taken with you, and subsist
off the country all you can.
It is expected that Foster is moving, by this time, from
Cumberland Gap on Knoxville. I do not know what force he will have
with him, but presume it will range from three thousand five
hundred to five thousand I leave this matter to you, knowing that
you will do better acting upon your discretion than you could
trammeled with instructions. I will only add, that the last advices
from Burnside himself indicated his ability to hold out with rations
only to about the 3d of December. Very respectfully,
U. S. GRANT, Major-General commanding,
This showed that, on the 27th of November, General Burnside was
in Knoxville, closely besieged by the rebel General Longstreet; that
his provisions were short, and that, unless relieved by December 3d,
he might have to surrender. General Grant further wrote that
General Granger, instead of moving with great rapidity as ordered,
seemed to move "slowly, and with reluctance;" and, although he
(General Grant) hated to call on me and on my tired troops, there
was no alternative. He wanted me to take command of every thing
within reach, and to hurry forward to Knoxville.
All the details of our march to Knoxville are also given in my
official report. By extraordinary efforts Long's small brigade of
cavalry reached Knoxville during the night of the 3d, purposely to let
Burnside know that I was rapidly approaching with an adequate
force to raise the siege.
With the head of my infantry column I reached Marysville, about
fifteen miles short of Knoxville, on the 5th of December; when I
received official notice from Burnside that Longstreet had raised the
siege, and had started in retreat up the valley toward Virginia.
Halting all the army, except Granger's two divisions, on the morning
of the 6th, with General Granger and some of my staff I rode into
Knoxville. Approaching from the south and west, we crossed the
Holston on a pontoon bridge, and in a large pen on the Knoxville
side I saw a fine lot of cattle, which did not look much like
starvation. I found General Burnside and staff domiciled in a large,
fine mansion, looking very comfortable, and in, a few words he
described to me the leading events, of the previous few days, and
said he had already given orders looking to the pursuit of
Longstreet. I offered to join in the pursuit, though in fact my men
were worn out, and suffering in that cold season and climate.
Indeed, on our way up I personally was almost frozen, and had to
beg leave to sleep in the house of a family at Athens.
Burnside explained to me that, reenforced by Granger's two
divisions of ten thousand men, he would be able to push Longstreet
out of East Tennessee, and he hoped to capture much of his artillery
and trains. Granger was present at our conversation, and most
unreasonably, I thought, remonstrated against being left;
complaining bitterly of what he thought was hard treatment to his
men and himself. I know that his language and manner at that time
produced on my mind a bad impression, and it was one of the
causes which led me to relieve him as a corps commander in the
campaign of the next spring. I asked General Burnside to reduce his
wishes to writing, which he did in the letter of December 7th,
embodied in my official report. General Burnside and I then walked
along his lines and examined the salient, known as Fort Sanders,
where, some days before, Longstreet had made his assault, and had
sustained a bloody repulse.
Returning to Burnside's quarters, we all sat down to a good
dinner, embracing roast-turkey. There was a regular dining table,
with clean tablecloth, dishes, knives, forks, spoons, etc., etc. I had
seen nothing of this kind in my field experience, and could not help
exclaiming that I thought "they were starving," etc.; but Burnside
explained that Longstreet had at no time completely invested the
place, and that he had kept open communication with the country
on the south side of the river Holston, more especially with the
French Broad settlements, from whose Union inhabitants he had
received a good supply of beef, bacon, and corn meal. Had I known
of this, I should not have hurried my men so fast; but until I reached
Knoxville I thought his troops there were actually in danger of
starvation. Having supplied General Burnside all the help he wanted,
we began our leisurely return to Chattanooga, which we reached on
the 16th; when General Grant in person ordered me to restore to
General Thomas the divisions of Howard and Davis, which belonged
to his army, and to conduct my own corps (the Fifteenth) to North
Alabama for winter-quarters.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF
TENNESSEE, BRIDGEPORT,
ALABAMA December 19, 1863
Brigadier-General John A. RAWLINS, Chief of Staff to
General GRANT, Chattanooga.
GENERAL: For the first time, I am now at leisure to
make an official record of events with which the troops
under my command have been connected daring the
eventful campaign which has just closed. Dating the
month of September last, the Fifteenth Army Corps,
which I had the honor to command, lay in camps along
the Big Black, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg,
Mississippi. It consisted of four divisions:
The First, commanded by Brigadier-General P. J.
Osterhaus, was composed of two brigades, led by
Brigadier-General C. R. Woods and Colonel J. A.
Williamson (of the Fourth Iowa).
The Second, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan
L. Smith, was composed of two brigades, led by
Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith and J. A. J.
Lightburn.
The Third, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M.
Tuttle, was composed of three brigades, led by
Brigadier-Generals J. A. Mower and R. P. Buckland, and
Colonel J. J. Wood (of the Twelfth Iowa).
The Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh
Ewing, was composed of three brigades, led by
Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, Colonel Loomis (Twenty-
sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. R. Cockerill (of the
Seventieth Ohio).
On the 22d day of September I received a telegraphic dispatch
from General Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department
of the Tennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to
march to Vicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to
form a part of an army to be sent to Chattanooga, to reenforce
General Rosecrans. I designated the First Division, and at 4 a. m. the
same day it marched for Vicksburg, and embarked the neat day.
On the 23d of September I was summoned to Vicksburg by the
general commanding, who showed me several dispatches from the
general-in-chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send
me and my whole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was
instructed to prepare for such orders. It was explained to me that, in
consequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats had
arrived irregularly, and had brought dispatches that seemed to
conflict in their meaning, and that General John E. Smith's division
(of General McPherson's corps) had been ordered up to Memphis,
and that I should take that division and leave one of my own in its
stead, to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailed my third division
(General Tuttle) to remain and report to Major-General McPherson,
commanding the Seventeenth Corps, at Vicksburg; and that of
General John E. Smith, already started for Memphis, was styled the
Third Division, Fifteenth Corps, though it still belongs to the
Seventeenth Army Corps. This division is also composed of three
brigades, commanded by General Matthias, Colonel J. B. Raum (of
the Fifty-sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. I. Alexander (of the Fifty-ninth
Indiana).
The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg the
moment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the 27th
of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic, for
Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying these two divisions.
Our progress was slow, on account of the unprecedentedly low
water in the Mississippi, and the scarcity of coal and wood. We were
compelled at places to gather fence-rails, and to land wagons and
haul wood from the interior to the boats; but I reached Memphis
during the night of the 2d of October, and the other boats came in
on the 3d and 4th.
On arrival at Memphis I saw General Hurlbut, and read all the
dispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, and therein
derived my instructions, which I construed to be as follows:
To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops which
could be spared from the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad,
to Athens, Alabama, and thence report by letter for orders to
General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at
Chattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward, repairing
it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies; and in no event to
depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as the roads to his rear
were already overtaxed to supply his present army.
I learned from General Hurlbut that General Osterhaus's division
was already out in front of Corinth, and that General John E. Smith
was still at Memphis, moving his troops and material by railroad as
fast as its limited stock would carry them. General J. D. Webster was
superintendent of the railroad, and was enjoined to work night and
day, and to expedite the movement as rapidly as possible; but the
capacity of the road was so small, that I soon saw that I could move
horses, mules, and wagons faster by land, and therefore I
dispatched the artillery and wagons by the road under escort, and
finally moved the entire Fourth Division by land.
The enemy seems to have had early notice of this movement, and
he endeavored to thwart us from the start. A considerable force
assembled in a threatening attitude at Salem, south of Salisbury
Station; and General Carr, who commanded at Corinth, felt
compelled to turn back and use a part of my troops, that had
already reached Corinth, to resist the threatened attack.
On Sunday, October 11th, having put in motion my whole force, I
started myself for Corinth, in a special train, with the battalion of the
Thirteenth United States Regulars as escort. We reached Collierville
Station about noon, just in time to take part in the defense made of
that station by Colonel D. C. Anthony, of the Sixty-sixth Indiana,
against an attack made by General Chalmers with a force of about
three thousand cavalry, with eight pieces of artillery. He was beaten
off, the damage to the road repaired, and we resumed our journey
the next day, reaching Corinth at night.
I immediately ordered General Blair forward to Iuka, with the First
Division, and, as fast as I got troops up, pushed them forward of
Bear Creek, the bridge of which was completely destroyed, and an
engineer regiment, under command of Colonel Flag, was engaged in
its repairs.
Quite a considerable force of the enemy was assembled in our
front, near Tuscumbia, to resist our advance. It was commanded by
General Stephen D. Lee, and composed of Roddy's and Ferguson's
brigades, with irregular cavalry, amounting in the aggregate to about
five thousand.
In person I moved from Corinth to Burnsville on the 18th, and to
Iuka on the 19th of October.
Osterhaus's division was in the advance, constantly skirmishing
with the enemy; he was supported by General Morgan L. Smith's,
both divisions under the general command of Major-General Blair.
General John E. Smith's division covered the working-party engaged
in rebuilding the railroad.
Foreseeing difficulty in crossing the Tennessee River, I had written
to Admiral Porter, at Cairo, asking him to watch the Tennessee and
send up some gunboats the moment the stage of water admitted;
and had also requested General Allen, quartermaster at St. Louis, to
dispatch to Eastport a steam ferry-boat.
The admiral, ever prompt and ready to assist us, had two fine
gunboats at Eastport, under Captain Phelps, the very day after my
arrival at Iuka; and Captain Phelps had a coal-barge decked over,
with which to cross our horses and wagons before the arrival of the
ferry-boat.
Still following literally the instructions of General Halleck, I pushed
forward the repairs of the railroad, and ordered General Blair, with
the two leading divisions, to drive the enemy beyond Tuscumbia.
This he did successfully, after a pretty severe fight at Cane Creek,
occupying Tuscumbia on the 27th of October.
In the meantime many important changes in command had
occurred, which I must note here, to a proper understanding of the
case.
General Grant had been called from Vicksburg, and sent to
Chattanooga to command the military division of the Mississippi,
composed of the three Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and
Tennessee; and the Department of the Tennessee had been
devolved on me, with instructions, however, to retain command of
the army in the field. At Iuka I made what appeared to me the best
disposition of matters relating to the department, giving General
McPherson full powers in Mississippi and General Hurlbut in West
Tennessee, and assigned General Blair to the command of the
Fifteenth Army Corps; and summoned General Hurlbut from
Memphis, and General Dodge from Corinth, and selected out of the
Sixteenth Corps a force of about eight thousand men, which I
directed General Dodge to organize with all expedition, and with it to
follow me eastward.
On the 27th of October, when General Blair, with two divisions,
was at Tuscumbia, I ordered General Ewing, with the Fourth
Division, to cross the Tennessee (by means of the gunboats and
scow) as rapidly as possible at Eastport, and push forward to
Florence, which he did; and the same day a messenger from General
Grant floated down the Tennessee over Muscle Shoals, landed at
Tuscumbia, and was sent to me at Iuka. He bore a short message
from the general to this effect: "Drop all work on the railroad east of
Bear Creek; push your command toward Bridgeport till you meet
orders;" etc. Instantly the order was executed; the order of march
was reversed, and all the columns were directed to Eastport, the
only place where we could cross the Tennessee. At first we only had
the gunboats and coal-barge; but the ferry-boat and two transports
arrived on the 31st of October, and the work of crossing was pushed
with all the vigor possible. In person I crossed, and passed to the
head of the column at Florence on the 1st of November, leaving the
rear divisions to be conducted by General Blair, and marched to
Rogersville and Elk River. This was found impassable. To ferry would
have consumed to much time, and to build a bridge still more; so
there was no alternative but to turn up Elk River by way of
Gilbertsboro, Elkton, etc., to the stone bridge at Fayetteville, where
we crossed the Elk, and proceeded to Winchester and Deckerd.
At Fayetteville I received orders from General Grant to come to
Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Army Corps, and to leave General
Dodge's command at Pulaski, and along the railroad from Columbia
to Decatur. I instructed General Blair to follow with the Second and
First Divisions by way of New Market, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte,
while I conducted the other two divisions by way of Deckerd; the
Fourth Division crossing the mountain to Stevenson, and the Third
by University Place and Sweden's Cove.
In person I proceeded by Sweden's Cove and Battle Creek,
reaching Bridgeport on the night of November 13th. I immediately
telegraphed to the commanding general my arrival, and the positions
of my several divisions, and was summoned to Chattanooga. I took
the first steamboat daring the night of the 14th for Belly's Ferry, and
rode into Chattanooga on the 16th. I then learned the part assigned
me in the coming drama, was supplied with the necessary maps and
information, and rode, during the 18th, in company with Generals
Grant, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, to the positions
occupied on the west bank of the Tennessee, from which could be
seen the camps of the enemy, compassing Chattanooga and the line
of Missionary Hills, with its terminus on Chickamauga Creek, the
point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify. Pontoons, with a
full supply of balks and chesses, had been prepared for the bridge
over the Tennessee, and all things had been prearranged with a
foresight that elicited my admiration. From the hills we looked down
on the amphitheatre of Chattanooga as on a map, and nothing
remained but for me to put my troops in the desired position. The
plan contemplated that, in addition to crossing the Tennessee River
and making a lodgment on the terminus of Missionary Ridge, I
should demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, near Trenton, with a
part of my command.
All in Chattanooga were impatient for action, rendered almost
acute by the natural apprehensions felt for the safety of General
Burnside in East Tennessee.
My command had marched from Memphis, three hundred and
thirty miles, and I had pushed them as fast as the roads and
distance would admit, but I saw enough of the condition of men and
animals in Chattanooga to inspire me with renewed energy. I
immediately ordered my leading division (General Ewing's) to march
via Shellmound to Trenton, demonstrating against Lookout Ridge,
but to be prepared to turn quickly and follow me to Chattanooga and
in person I returned to Bridgeport, rowing a boat down the
Tennessee from Belly's Ferry, and immediately on arrival put in
motion my divisions in the order in which they had arrived. The
bridge of boats at Bridgeport was frail, and, though used day and
night, our passage was slow; and the road thence to Chattanooga
was dreadfully cut up and encumbered with the wagons of the other
troops stationed along the road. I reached General Hooker's
headquarters during a rain, in the afternoon of the 20th, and met
General Grant's orders for the general attack on the next day. It was
simply impossible for me to fulfill my part in time; only one division
(General John E. Smith's) was in position. General Ewing was still at
Trenton, and the other two were toiling along the terrible road from
Shellmound to Chattanooga. No troops ever were or could be in
better condition than mine, or who labored harder to fulfill their part.
On a proper representation, General Grant postponed the attack. On
the 21st I got the Second Division over Brown's-Ferry Bridge, and
General Ewing got up; but the bridge broke repeatedly, and delays
occurred which no human sagacity could prevent. All labored night
and day, and General Ewing got over on the 23d; but my rear
division was cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry, and could
not join me. I offered to go into action with my three divisions,
supported by General Jeff. C. Davis, leaving one of my best divisions
(Osterhaus's) to act with General Hooker against Lookout Mountain.
That division has not joined me yet, but I know and feel that it has
served the country well, and that it has reflected honor on the
Fifteenth Army Corps and the Army of the Tennessee. I leave the
record of its history to General Hooker, or whomsoever has had its
services during the late memorable events, confident that all will do
it merited honor.
At last, on the 28d of November, my three divisions lay behind the
hills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga. I dispatched the
brigade of the Second Division, commanded by General Giles A.
Smith, under cover of the hills, to North Chickamauga Creek, to man
the boats designed for the pontoon-bridge, with orders (at midnight)
to drop down silently to a point above the mouth of the South
Chickamauga, there land two regiments, who were to move along
the river-bank quietly, and capture the enemy's river-pickets.
General Giles A. Smith then was to drop rapidly below the month
of the Chickamauga, disembark the rest of his brigade, and dispatch
the boats across for fresh loads. These orders were skillfully
executed, and every rebel picket but one was captured. The balance
of General Morgan L. Smith's division was then rapidly ferried across;
that of General John E. Smith followed, and by daylight of November
24th two divisions of about eight thousand men were on the east
bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a very respectable rifle-
trench as a tete du pont. As soon as the day dawned, some of the
boats were taken from the use of ferrying, and a pontoon-bridge
was begun, under the immediate direction of Captain Dresser, the
whole planned and supervised by General William F. Smith in person.
A pontoon-bridge was also built at the same time over Chickamanga
Creek, near its mouth, giving communication with the two regiments
which had been left on the north side, and fulfilling a most important
purpose at a later stage of the drama. I will here bear my willing
testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers
charged with the work were present, and manifested a skill which I
cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any work done so
quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge
of that extent (viz., thirteen hundred and fifty feet) laid so
noiselessly and well, in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius
and intelligence of General William F. Smith. The steamer Dunbar
arrived up in the course of the morning, and relieved Ewing's
division of the labor of rowing across; but by noon the pontoon-
bridge was done, and my three divisions were across, with men,
horses, artillery, and every thing.
General Jeff. C. Davis's division was ready to take the bridge, and
I ordered the columns to form in order to carry the Missionary Hills.
The movement had been carefully explained to all division
commanders, and at 1 p.m. we marched from the river in three
columns in echelon: the left, General Morgan L. Smith, the column of
direction, following substantially Chickamauga Creek; the centre,
General, John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the centre, at one
brigade interval to the right and rear; the right, General Ewing, in
column at the same distance to the right rear, prepared to deploy to
the right, on the supposition that we would meet an enemy in that
direction. Each head of column was covered by a good line of
skirmishers, with supports. A light drizzling rain prevailed, and the
clouds hung low, cloaking our movement from the enemy's tower of
observation on Lookout Mountain. We soon gained the foothills; our
skirmishers crept up the face of the hills, followed by their supports,
and at 3.30 p.m. we had gained, with no loss, the desired point. A
brigade of each division was pushed rapidly to the top of the hill,
and the enemy for the first time seemed to realize the movement,
but too late, for we were in possession. He opened with artillery, but
General Ewing soon got some of Captain Richardson's guns up that
steep hill and gave back artillery, and the enemy's skirmishers made
one or two ineffectual dashes at General Lightburn, who had swept
round and got a farther hill, which was the real continuation of the
ridge. From studying all the maps, I had inferred that Missionary
Ridge was a continuous hill; but we found ourselves on two high
points, with a deep depression between us and the one immediately
over the tunnel, which was my chief objective point. The ground we
had gained, however, was so important, that I could leave nothing to
chance, and ordered it to be fortified during the night. One brigade
of each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L.
Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John
E. Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General
Ewing's right was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the
ridge in a general line, facing southeast.
The enemy felt our left flank about 4 p.m., and a pretty smart
engagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off;
but it cost us dear, for General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded,
and had to go to the rear; and the command of the brigade
devolved on Colonel Topper (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois),
who managed it with skill during the rest of the operations. At the
moment of my crossing the bridge, General Howard appeared,
having come with three regiments from Chattanooga, along the east
bank of the Tennessee, connecting my new position with that of the
main army in Chattanooga. He left the three regiments attached
temporarily to Gen. Ewing's right, and returned to his own corps at
Chattanooga. As night closed in, I ordered General Jeff. C. Davis to
keep one of his brigades at the bridge, one close up to my position,
and one intermediate. Thus we passed the night, heavy details being
kept busy at work on the intrenchments on the hill. During the night
the sky cleared away bright, a cold frost filled the air, and our camp-
fires revealed to the enemy and to our friends in Chattanooga our
position on Missionary Ridge. About midnight I received, at the
hands of Major Rowley (of General Grant's staff), orders to attack
the enemy at "dawn of day," with notice that General Thomas would
attack in force early in the day. Accordingly, before day I was in the
saddle, attended by all my staff; rode to the extreme left of our
position near Chickamauga Creek; thence up the hill, held by
General Lightburn; and round to the extreme right of General Ewing.
Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dim
light of morning, I saw that our line of attack was in the direction of
Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on either flank. Quite a
valley lay between us and the next hill of the series, and this hill
presented steep sides, the one to the west partially cleared, but the
other covered with the native forest. The crest of the ridge was
narrow and wooded. The farther point of this hill was held-by the
enemy with a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, filled with men
and two guns. The enemy was also seen in great force on a still
higher hill beyond the tunnel, from which he had a fine plunging fire
on the hill in dispute. The gorge between, through which several
roads and the railroad-tunnel pass, could not be seen from our
position, but formed the natural place d'armes, where the enemy
covered his masses to resist our contemplated movement of turning
his right flank and endangering his communications with his depot at
Chickamauga Station.
As soon as possible, the following dispositions were made: The
brigades of Colonels Cockrell and Alexander, and General Lightburn,
were to hold our hill as the key-point. General Corse, with as much
of his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack
from our right centre. General Lightburn was to dispatch a good
regiment from his position to cooperate with General Corse; and
General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of
Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse; and Colonel
Loomis, in like manner, to move along the west bank, supported by
the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith.
The sun had hardly risen before General Corse had completed his
preparations and his bugle sounded the "forward!" The Fortieth
Illinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, on our right centre, with
the Thirtieth Ohio (Colonel Jones), moved down the face of our hill,
and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced to within about
eighty yards of the intrenched position, where General Corse found a
secondary crest, which he gained and held. To this point he called
his reserves, and asked for reenforcements, which were sent; but
the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd the men, as the
enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approach to his
position, giving him great advantage. As soon as General Corse had
made his preparations, he assaulted, and a close, severe contest
ensued, which lasted more than an hour, gaining and losing ground,
but never the position first obtained, from which the enemy in vain
attempted to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith kept gaining
ground on the left spurs of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel Loomis got
abreast of the tunnel and railroad embankment on his aide, drawing
the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving the assaulting party on
the hill-crest. Captain Callender had four of his guns on General
Ewing's hill, and Captain Woods his Napoleon battery on General
Lightburn's; also, two guns of Dillon's battery were with Colonel
Alexander's brigade. All directed their fire as carefully as possible, to
clear the hill to our front, without endangering our own men. The
fight raged furiously about 10 a.m., when General Corse received a
severe wound, was brought off the field, and the command of the
brigade and of the assault at that key-point devolved on that fine
young, gallant officer, Colonel Walcutt, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who
fulfilled his part manfully. He continued the contest, pressing forward
at all points. Colonel Loomis had made good progress to the right,
and about 2 p.m., General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be
most severe on the hill, and being required to support General
Ewing, ordered up Colonel Raum's and General Matthias's brigades
across the field to the summit that was being fought for. They
moved up under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and joined
Colonel Walcutt; but the crest was so narrow that they necessarily
occupied the west face of the hill. The enemy, at the time being
massed in great strength in the tunnel-gorge, moved a large force
under cover of the ground and the thick bushes, and suddenly
appeared on the right rear of this command. The suddenness of the
attack disconcerted the men, exposed as they were in the open
field; they fell back in some disorder to the lower edge of the field,
and reformed. These two brigades were in the nature of supports,
and did not constitute a part of the real attack.
The movement, seen from Chattanooga (five miles off ) with spy-
glasses, gave rise to the report, which even General Meiga has
repeated, that we were repulsed on the left. It was not so. The real
attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and General
Smith, were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggle all day
persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two reserve brigades of
General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy made a
show of pursuit, but were in their turn caught in flank by the well-
directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought
cover behind the hill. Thus matters stood about 3 p.m. The day was
bright and clear, and the amphitheatre of Chattanooga sat in beauty
at our feet. I had watched for the attack of General Thomas "early in
the day." Column after column of the enemy was streaming toward
me; gun after gun poured its concentric shot on us, from every hill
and spur that gave a view of any part of the ground held by us. An
occasional shot from Fort Wood and Orchard Knob, and some
musketry-fire and artillery over about Lookout Mountain, was all that
I could detect on our side; but about 3 p.m. I noticed the white line
of musketry-fire in front of Orchard Knoll extending farther and
farther right and left and on. We could only hear a faint echo of
sound, but enough was seen to satisfy me that General Thomas was
at last moving on the centre. I knew that our attack had drawn vast
masses of the enemy to our flank, and felt sure of the result. Some
guns which had been firing on us all day were silent, or were turned
in a different direction.
The advancing line of musketry-fire from Orchard Knoll
disappeared to us behind a spar of the hill, and could no longer be
seen; and it was not until night closed in that I knew that the troops
in Chattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken the
enemy's centre. Of course, the victory was won, and pursuit was the
next step.
I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel to the tunnel, and it
was found vacant, save by the dead and wounded of our own and
the enemy commingled. The reserve of General Jeff. C. Davis was
ordered to march at once by the pontoon-bridge across
Chickamauga Creek, at its mouth, and push forward for the depot.
General Howard had reported to me in the early part of the day,
with the remainder of his army corps (the Eleventh), and had been
posted to connect my left with Chickamauga Creek. He was ordered
to repair an old broken bridge about two miles up the Chickamauga,
and to follow General Davis at 4 a.m., and the Fifteenth Army Corps
was ordered to follow at daylight. But General Howard found that to
repair the bridge was more of a task than was at first supposed, and
we were all compelled to cross the Chickamauga on the new
pontoon-bridge at its mouth. By about 11 a.m. General Jeff. C.
Davis's division reached the depot, just in time to see it in flames.
He found the enemy occupying two hills, partially intrenched, just
beyond the depot. These he soon drove away. The depot presented
a scene of desolation that war alone exhibits—corn-meal and corn in
huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandoned caissons, two thirty-
two-pounder rifled-guns with carriages burned, pieces of pontoons,
balks and chesses, etc., destined doubtless for the famous invasion
of Kentucky, and all manner of things, burning and broken. Still, the
enemy kindly left us a good supply of forage for our horses, and
meal, beans, etc., for our men.
Pausing but a short while, we passed on, the road filled with
broken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the head
of the column emerged from a dark, miry swamp, we encountered
the rear-guard of the retreating enemy. The fight was sharp, but the
night closed in so dark that we could not move. General Grant came
up to us there. At daylight we resumed the march, and at Graysville,
where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, we found the corps
of General Palmer on the south bank, who informed us that General
Hooker was on a road still farther south, and we could hear his guns
near Ringgold.
As the roads were filled with all the troops they could possibly
accommodate, I turned to the east, to fulfill another part of the
general plan, viz., to break up all communication between Bragg and
Longstreet.
We had all sorts of rumors as to the latter, but it was manifest that
we should interpose a proper force between these two armies. I
therefore directed General Howard to move to Parker's Gap, and
thence send rapidly a competent force to Red Clay, or the Council-
Ground, there to destroy a large section of the railroad which
connects Dalton and Cleveland. This work was most successfully and
fully accomplished that day. The division of General Jeff. C. Davis
was moved close up to Ringgold, to assist General Hooker if needed,
and the Fifteenth Corps was held at Grayeville, for any thing that
might turn up. About noon I had a message from General Hooker,
saying he had had a pretty hard fight at the mountain-pass just
beyond Ringgold, and he wanted me to come forward to turn the
position. He was not aware at the time that Howard, by moving
through Parker's Gap toward Red Clay, had already turned it. So I
rode forward to Ringgold in person, and found the enemy had
already fallen back to Tunnel Hill. He was already out of the valley of
the Chickamauga, and on ground whence the waters flow to the
Coosa. He was out of Tennessee.
I found General Grant at Ringgold, and, after some explanations
as to breaking up the railroad from Ringgold back to the State line,
as soon as some cars loaded with wounded men could be pushed
back to Chickamauga depot, I was ordered to move slowly and
leisurely back to Chattanooga.
On the following day the Fifteenth Corps destroyed absolutely and
effectually the railroad from a point half-way between Ringgold and
Graysville, back to the State line; and General Grant, coming to
Graysville, consented that, instead of returning direct to
Chattanooga, I might send back all my artillery-wagons and
impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the
Hiawasaee River.
Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard
moved from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of
McDaniel's Gap, and General Blair with two divisions of the Fifteenth
Corps by way of Julien's Gap, all meeting at Cleveland that night.
Here another good break was made in the Dalton & Cleveland road.
On the 30th the army moved to Charleston, General Howard
approaching so rapidly that the enemy evacuated with haste, leaving
the bridge but partially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and
provisions on the north bank of the Hiawassee.
This was to have been the limit of our operations. Officers and
men had brought no baggage or provisions, and the weather was
bitter cold. I had already reached the town of Charleston, when
General Wilson arrived with a letter from General Grant, at
Chattanooga, informing me that the latest authentic accounts from
Knoxville were to the 27th, at which time General Burnside was
completely invested, and had provisions only to include the 3d of
December; that General Granger had left Chattanooga for Knoxville,
by the river-road, with a steamboat following him in the river; but he
feared that General Granger could not reach Knoxville in time, and
ordered me to take command of all troops moving for the relief of
Knoxville, and hasten to General Burnside. Seven days before, we
had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee with two
days' rations, without a change of clothing—stripped for the fight,
with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself to the private
included.
Of course, we then had no provisions save what we gathered by
the road, and were ill supplied for such a march. But we learned that
twelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in the
mountain town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant; that they
needed relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough—and
it had to be done. General Howard that night repaired and planked
the railroad-bridge, and at daylight the army passed over the
Hiawassee and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. I had supposed
rightly that General Granger was about the mouth of the Hiawassee,
and had sent him notice of my orders; that General Grant had sent
me a copy of his written instructions, which were full and complete,
and that he must push for Kingston, near which we would make a
junction. But by the time I reached Athens I had better studied the
geography, and sent him orders, which found him at Decatur, that
Kingston was out of our way; that he should send his boat to
Kingston, but with his command strike across to Philadelphia, and
report to me there. I had but a small force of cavalry, which was, at
the time of my receipt of General Grant's orders, scouting over about
Benton and Columbus. I left my aide, Major McCoy, at Charleston, to
communicate with this cavalry and hurry it forward. It overtook me
in the night at Athens.
On the 2d of December the army moved rapidly north toward
Loudon, twenty-six miles distant. About 11 a.m., the cavalry passed
to the head of the column, was ordered to push to London, and, if
possible, to save a pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, held by a
brigade of the enemy commanded by General Vaughn. The cavalry
moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but the brigade
of Vaughn had artillery in position, covered by earthworks, and
displayed a force too respectable to be carried by a cavalry dash, so
that darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry got up. The
enemy abandoned the place in the night, destroying the pontoons,
running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the Tennessee
River, and abandoned much provision, four guns, and other material,
which General Howard took at daylight. But the bridge was gone,
and we were forced to turn east and trust to General Burnside's
bridge at Knoxville. It was all-important that General Burnside should
have notice of our coming, and but one day of the time remained.
Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of the 2d of
December, I sent my aide (Major Audenried) forward to Colonel
Long, commanding the brigade of cavalry at London, to explain to
him how all-important it was that notice of our approach should
reach General Burnside within twenty-four hours, ordering him to
select the best materials of his command, to start at once, ford the
Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of life and
horse-flesh. Major Audenried was ordered to go along. The distance
to be traveled was about forty miles, and the roads villainous. Before
day they were off, and at daylight the Fifteenth Corps was turned
from Philadelphia for the Little Tennessee at Morgantown, where my
maps represented the river as being very shallow; but it was found
too deep for fording, and the water was freezing cold—width two
hundred and forty yards, depth from two to five feet; horses could
ford, but artillery and men could not. A bridge was indispensable.
General Wilson (who accompanied me) undertook to superintend the
bridge, and I am under many obligations to him, as I was without an
engineer, having sent Captain Jenny back from Graysville to survey
our field of battle. We had our pioneers, but only such tools as axes,
picks, and spades. General Wilson, working partly with cut wood and
partly with square trestles (made of the houses of the late town of
Morgantown), progressed apace, and by dark of December 4th
troops and animals passed over the bridge, and by daybreak of the
5th the Fifteenth Corps (General Blair's) was over, and Generals-
Granger's and Davis's divisions were ready to pass; but the diagonal
bracing was imperfect for, want of spikes, and the bridge broke,
causing delay. I had ordered General Blair to move out on the
Marysville road five miles, there to await notice that General Granger
was on a parallel road abreast of him, and in person I was at a
house where the roads parted, when a messenger rode up, bringing
me a few words from General Burnside, to the effect that Colonel
Long had arrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and that all was well
with him there; Longstreet still lay before the place, but there were
symptoms of his speedy departure.
I felt that I had accomplished the first great step in the problem
for the relief of General Burnside's army, but still urged on the work.
As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved forward.
General Howard had marched from Loudon, had found a pretty good
ford for his horses and wagons at Davis's, seven miles below
Morgantown, and had made an ingenious bridge of the wagons left
by General Vaughn at London, on which to pass his men. He
marched by Unitia and Louisville. On the night of the 5th all the
heads of columns communicated at Marysville, where I met Major
Van Buren (of General Burnside's staff), who announced that
Longstreet had the night before retreated on the Rutledge,
Rogersville, and Bristol road, leading to Virginia; that General
Burnside's cavalry was on his heels; and that the general desired to
see me in person as soon as I could come to Knoxville. I ordered all
the troops to halt and rest, except the two divisions of General
Granger, which were ordered to move forward to Little River, and
General Granger to report in person to General Burnside for orders.
His was the force originally designed to reenforce General Burnside,
and it was eminently proper that it should join in the stern-chase
after Longstreet.
On the morning of December 6th I rode from Marysville into
Knoxville, and met General Burnside. General Granger arrived later
in the day. We examined his lines of fortifications, which were a
wonderful production for the short time allowed in their selection of
ground and construction of work. It seemed to me that they were
nearly impregnable. We examined the redoubt named "Sanders,"
where, on the Sunday previous, three brigades of the enemy had
assaulted and met a bloody repulse. Now, all was peaceful and
quiet; but a few hours before, the deadly bullet sought its victim all
round about that hilly barrier.
The general explained to me fully and frankly what he had done,
and what he proposed to do. He asked of me nothing but General
Granger's command; and suggested, in view of the large force I had
brought from Chattanooga, that I should return with due expedition
to the line of the Hiawasaee, lest Bragg, reenforced, might take
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