Compoundability of Offences:

Tracing the shift in the

priorities of criminal justice
—Chirayu Jain*

A, the employer, comes to know about embezzlement of funds by

B, the employee. Although it’s an offence punishable by law, and A
should call police, A decides that it’s more pragmatic for her to recover
the money back, maybe because she doesn’t want the company to gain
disrepute or perhaps because the embezzled funds were not insured.
She confronts B instead of reporting her, and B confesses. They bar-
gain and A agrees not to report the crime if B returns the embezzled
money. The offence of theft and fraud in Indian law, are compound-
able only with prior permission of the court. The question thus arises,
has A become an accomplice to the crime by compounding a non-com-
poundable offence?

I. I ntroduction

Compounding as a criminal procedure, challenges the foundational prin-

ciples of criminal justice system introduced by Britishers: that the State alone
monopolises all forms of violent behaviour, and any criminal offence com-
mitted by anyone towards another, is an act challenging the authority of the
State and therefore, the State has an interest in punishing all the wrongdo-
ers. Compounding, instead, grants the agency to the injured and the injurer
to decide the course of action. Yet, by requiring the victim to actively conceal
knowledge about the crime, compounding puts the State’s interests in jeopardy.
This paper does not seek to question/challenge the foundational principles of
criminal justice as introduced by British. It rather seeks to understand com-
pounding as a criminal procedure within the criminal justice system, which
may be categorised as retributive model, and seeks to examine the evolution of
the concept of compounding through the years.

*
The author is an Advocate practicing law in courts of Delhi. He has graduated from the
National Law School India University, Bengaluru with a BA LLB (Hons.) Degree.
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   21

S. 101 of the Larceny Act (UK) made it an offence to procure a good

from an offender who may have stolen or obtained that good illegally.1 That
is, if anyone would perform an act that would help the offender to evade trial,
it was considered as a misdemeanour and treated as a criminal offence called
compounding a felony or ante-bote. In 1885, in the case of R. v. Burgess,2 the
logical implications of S. 101 came into question. Arthur Bagley had stolen 28
shillings from one Mr. Bedford. Mr. Bedford involved the accused, Burgess,
in the matter. Burgess entered into a written agreement with Arthur Bagley’s
mother stating her not to charge him with any criminal case in lieu of 30 shil-
lings, which Burgess duly returned to Mr. Bedford. Nevertheless, on evidence
of Mr. Bedford, Bagley was charged of theft and subsequently, Burgess of com-
pounding a felony.

Even though Burgess was eventually convicted, the case raised several
important questions. The implication of the compounding would have meant
that had Burgess broken the agreement and had filed the complaint with the
police, then Burgess could not have been charged. The agreement was illegal,
and thus void ab initio. But if, Burgess had further committed fraud against
the other party by breaking it, then he would not have been prosecuted
against. It also raised a hypothetical, where the owner of goods itself recov-
ers the goods, would the owner be charged for compounding? Coleridge C.J.
in his judgment, did note observations that Blackstone had made in his com-
mentaries regarding the fact that the concept of ante-bote had perhaps failed to
conceive of an occasion where the owner of stolen goods itself could have been
accused of compounding.

This paper begins by tracing historical development of criminal law

in British India and how razeenamahs (settlement deeds) were dealt with by
the British law enforcers. The developments during the colonial regime and
post-independence are examined. Over the years, the approaches of the Courts
and commissions towards criminal law as a whole and towards composition
has also undergone considerable changes: these changes are sought to be exam-
ined through the means of this paper. The recent trends towards increasing the
scope of composition and making more offences such as S. 326 IPC and 498A
IPC compoundable, need to be understood not only in light of recent devel-
opments and judicial pronouncements, but an attempt has been made to con-
textualise the concept of compounding as part of the criminal procedure by
tracing its historical evolution. Due to lack of access to historical sources, like
the very important earlier editions of Archbold’s Commentaries, the history of
compounding was difficult to chart. Instead reliance has been placed on ear-
lier judgments and other available sources. Finally, the lack of studies regard-
ing implications of compoundability beyond the formal system is also a serious
limitation of this paper.
1
S. 101, The Larceny Act, 1861 (United Kingdom).
2
R. v. Burgess, (1885) 16 QBD 141.
22 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW AND SOCIETY [Vol. 7, 2016]

II. 18th C entury in I ndia – from R azeenamahs

as P rocedure to O utlawing of R azeenamahs

The State’s interference in personal interactions was limited in the

pre-British era. Guided by the Islamic legal schools and general norms, the
State would interfere only in cases when offences of grave nature had been
committed: murder, dacoity, robbery etc. (Britishers would later extend the
State’s sovereignty, by basing punishment not just on the gravity of crime but
also the ‘intent’).3 The Islamic laws and general norms that prevailed allowed
for payment of fine of blood, even in the case of homicide, as restitution to the
heirs of the deceased.4 If the consent deed or the Razeenamah were obtained
by the accused from the heirs of the deceased, the case could not be regis-
tered. In some cases, the patron of the deceased or some corporate body that
the deceased belonged to, would also have had to be given some ‘satisfaction’.5
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the interests of revenue dominated
over the interests of administration. The investigation process in the British-
ruled Benaras Zamindari was noted to have been focused towards securing a
razeenamah and not towards securing clear-cut verdict of guilty or not guilty.6

3
The late Mughal period is noted for lawlessness and criminal administration is remarked as
being in complete disorder. The criminal justice was dispensed with by the local zamindar; in
most cases it was discretionary fines that were imposed. See N. Majumdar, Justice and Police
in Bengal 1765-1793: A Study of the Nizamat in Decline, 32-35 (1960).
The advent of British law was noted as — “British rule brought equality before the law
[…] the poorest peasant was entitled to all the solemn formalities of a judicial trial and
the provisions for punishment made no difference between the highest functionary and a
sweeper.” Also see T.K. Banerjee, Background to Criminal Law, 290 (1970); B.B. Misra, Central
Administration of the East India Company 1773-1834, 298, 339 (1959); N.K. Sinha, Preface in N.
Majumdar, Justice and Police in Bengal 1765-1793: A Study of the Nizamat in Decline (1960). The
impact of British is widely categorised under two periods: Company Rule — when the reve-
nue collection was the supreme concern; and Colonial Rule — post 1857, when the subconti-
nent came under direct rule of the British Crown.
4
R. Singha, A Despotism of Law: Crime and Justice in Early Colonial India, 24 (1998).
5
Ibid.
A distinction seemed to have existed between individual cases of homicides and murders
linked with highway robberies/banditries. The Indian rulers would hesitate in imposing capi-
tal punishment in the former cases, but the crimes committed in context of highway robber-
ies were seen in different light, they were seen as direct challenge to the sovereignty of the
ruler.
Abu Hanifa school of Islamic law drew a distinction on the basis of mode. As per this
school, capital punishment could only be awarded if the instrument which was used to cause
death, was one commonly associated with shedding of blood. It thus drew a distinction
between murder and murder using dangerous weapons.
Hanafi school of Islamic law maintained that in certain cases, such as homicide caused by
drowning/struggling, would not impose a liability of retaliation — only blood money/compo-
sition could be claimed in such cases.
Ibid. at 52. Also see J. Forbes, Oriental Memoirs, vol. 2, 25 (1813); N. Majumdar, Justice and
Police in Bengal 1765-1793: A Study of the Nizamat in Decline, 116(1960).
6
Ibid. at p. 41.
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   23

This was in contradiction to the criminal process the Britishers were accus-
tomed to, back at home.7

The interests of uninterrupted revenue may have let the Britishers

acknowledge the efficiency the razeenamah and similar instruments had to
offer, but they continued to look disdainfully at the indigenous legal system.
Warren Hastings would describe blood money in his letters as-“..of barbarous
construction and contrary to the first principles of civil society by which the State
acquires an interest in every member and a right in his security.” 8 The law of kisas
(retribution in form of retaliation) offended British conceptions of justice for
its notion that the punishment could depend upon the nature of relationship
between the victim and offender. A magistrate of Bhagalpur declared that such
provisions “..destroyed, those ideas of natural justice […]criminality levels all dis-
tinctions which owe their origin to human conventions.” 9 At the time, notably
family ties usually prevailed to secure pardon in case of murder within a fam-
ily: this would lead to opposite stances within the early British criminal justice
system. In one such case, where the perpetrator was the son of the victim, the
Banaras adalat law officers stated that the perpetrator should be released. The
British Resident, however, succeeded and ultimately persuaded the law officers
that this was ideal case for Siyasatan (Ruler’s authority to impose extraordinary

7
Aside from Razeenamah, there was another instrument that was used — Surathal which also
resulted in restitution/composition. Unlike an eyewitness testimony, a surathal was a form of
composite attestation to the facts which may have happened, drawn by men of “credit and
influence” (deputed by the Amil and those from the locality). It is not ascertained how much
the adalats gave consideration to the surathals, but the surathals are noted to be more focused
towards securing reconciliation and smooth uninterrupted flow revenue to the company.
Later, in 1795, when the power of a mils was reduced to that of being revenue officers alone
(they were redesignated as “tehsildars”), the surathals were thereafter drawn by the darogha
(who was now vested with police powers).
The procedure of drawing up of surathal was very susceptible to power dynamics: the
Amil’s delegates would often fail to get the local notable men to verify and attest the surathal
if, one, the surathal implicated someone of some standing amongst them or second, the local
notables did not accept the legitimacy of intervention by the Amil in the dispute. In cases
of robberies, on the basis of mere representation of the “respectable inhabitants”, the British
magistrates were also noted to arrest men from low castes or wandering groups.
See R. Singha, supra note 4, 42-45.
8
R. Singha, supra note 4, 52. Also see Letter from Warren Hastings, In Supplement, 114-119.
9
Ibid. at p. 53. Also see BRC P/52/22, 3-12-1790, 371 (Megistrate, Bakarganj) (Unreported). (plz
chk)
The said position was not unanimous i.e. magistrates were not all as disdainful towards
composition. Magistrate of Bakarganj on the other hand noted “If the perpetrator could sat-
isfy next of kin and obtain a razeenamah, no prosecution can or ought to be carried out against
the murder.” (emphasis supplied) It is unclear however, whether at the relevant time there
were any Indian Magistrates i.e. whether the Magistrate of Bakarganj was actually Indian.
In absence of any recorded description of ethnicity, it could be presumed that the said
Magistrate was a British Magistrate.
Ibid. at p. 56. Also see BRC P/52/33, 3-12-1790, 312 (Megistrate, Bakarganj) (Unreported).
(plz chk)
24 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW AND SOCIETY [Vol. 7, 2016]

punishment to set an example for public). The perpetrator was eventually

transported for life.10

The choice was between an outright composition (pardon and compen-

sation) and retaliation on the other. There was no midway that was offered
by the indigenous system. Aside from the fiduciary relationships, other factors
that led to composition in such cases were poverty, loss of breadwinner and/
or where the perpetrator was superior (either socioeconomically or physically).11
Evidently, the system that prevailed, did not lead to equal treatment of every-
one before the law as noted by T.K. Banerjee.12

It was Warren Hastings who originally proposed the modification in

law that if the ‘intention’ of murder was clearly proved, no such distinction
was to be made with respect to the weapon by which the crime was perpetrat-
ed.13 This proposal was later implemented by Cornwallis in stages. Previously,
Hastings had introduced Bengal Regulations that prohibited imposition of
commissions on money recovered in cases of robberies/thievery/dacoity.14 In
1790, Cornwallis introduced Bengal Regulation that in cases of homicide it
would be the opinion of Abu Yusuf and Imam Mohammed schools that would
be applied. These schools provided for capital punishment for wilful murders.15
In 1793, Cornwallis introduced another regulation for the Bengal Presidency
that provided for capital punishment for wilful murder, even if the heirs of
the victim had pardoned him or accepted compensation from him. Similarly,
Duncan at that time, in cases of theft, had given sentences for imprisonment/

10
The contrast between conceptions of justice system between Islamic law officers and the
Britishers is also noted from another instance where the Islamic law officers strongly defended
the right of heirs to compensation, despite strong objections by Jonathan Duncan (Governor
of Bombay) remarking about the “indecency” of selling a relative’s blood.
See R. Singha, supra note 4, 56, 59. RB to Sub-Secy., 30-12-1791, BRJ P/127/77, 6-1-1792,
7-17. (plz chk)
11
Ibid. at p. 58.
12
See supra note 3.
13
R. Singha, supra note 4, 52.
14
Art. 16, Bengal Regulations, 1772.
Judges of the indigenous courts/tribunals were not paid fixed salaries, they received emol-
uments as a fixed percentage fines levied. As a consequence, the wealthy culprits, even if
guilty of capital offences, could escape by agreeing to pay a fine decision of the Judges was
derided as “a corrupt bargain with the highest bidder”. The fees of Judges/Qazis was noted as
a heavy burden on the poor; “On receiving a suitable fee, the Qazi used to turn right into wrong
and injustice into justice”.
See N. Majumdar, Justice and Police in Bengal 1765-1793: A Study of the Nizamat in Decline,
45-46, 71-72 (1960).
R. Singha, supra note 4, 26.
15
The greater focus given by the company administration to “intention” and “pre-mediation”
extended the claims of the State at the expense of the punitive claims of the victims or his/
her heirs.
R. Singha, supra note 4, 63-66.
See Governor General’s Minutes, BRC P/52/22, 3-12-1790, ¶¶ 22-23 (Governor General’s
Council) (Unreported).
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   25

transportation where the offender had offered to recompense for the loss and
the victim was ready to accept the razeenamah.16 Finally in 1797, composition/
razeenamah was prohibited entirely for all serious crimes.17

Radhika Singha comments that due to these changes and razeenamah

becoming prohibited, there was little incentive for the thief brought to the
court to offer to make up for the loss. That also discouraged the victims of
theft/robbery from bringing their suspect to trial if they had any hope of per-
suading or coercing the offender to repay.18 This observation, howsoever log-
ical, is not backed by historical sources; Singha, further fails to consider the
impact of this prohibition in light of T.K. Banerjee’s comment that the advent
of British rule brought equality before law. Singha notes that as a combined
result of the said regulation prohibiting razeenamahs, along with others such
as fixed measure of punishments, the element of composition between victim
and offender lost its significance in trial procedure. She notes that as a con-
sequence, informal deals were still conducted outside the court procedure-of-
ten contrary to law, with the darogha often supplying the element of threat or
coercion which ensured that the arrangement was reached upon.19

III. C ompounding as an E lement of

Criminal P rocedure in British I ndia
The Indian Law Commissioners asserted that their work (drafting of
the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure Code) was not based on
‘any digest of cases or existing body of law in force in the subcontinent’.20 In
the draft Indian Penal Code [“IPC”], the Commissioners suggested to make
it an offence of subsequent abetment where ‘a person knowing that an offence
has been committed, and knowing himself to be directed by law to give infor-
mation in any quarter of that offence, subsequently abets that offence by
intentionally omitting to give such information, shall be punished with impris-
onment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or

16
R. Singha, supra note 4, 66.
17
S. 8, Bengal Regulation 9, 1807. The police officers were barred from accepting razeenamahs
except in petty cases.
Around this time, even the special regulations put in place for tribal population in the
Bengal Residency were also amended in the same regard. Sentences for mutilation and blood
money were converted into death sentence or imprisonment. For petty offences, magistrate
was empowered to adjudicate only if the Magistrate could persuade the parties to agree,
but if they refused, even these cases were to be referred to the adjudicating authority (Hill
Assemblies). See The Regulation for the Trial of Hill People in the Districts of Rajmahal and
Boglepore for Crimes and Misdemeanours, Regulation I of 1796.
Also see Vasudha Dhagamwar, Role and Image of Law in India — The Tribal Experience,
101-102 ( 2006).
R. Singha, supra note 4, 66.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid. at 68.
20
Thomas Macaulay, A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, 6 (1837).
26 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW AND SOCIETY [Vol. 7, 2016]

fine, or both’.21 On the other aspect, Macaulay and other Commissioners were
clear in recognising that the criminal law must not recognise authority of any
other person other than the State to inflict violence, i.e., they did not recognise
the authority of the master to inflict ‘corrections’ on its slaves.22 The signifi-
cance of the same, the Commissioners’ notes on this aspect have failed to gain
adequate credit. Even if merely on paper, the non-recognition of the zamindar/
master’s sovereignty was a watershed event in Indian legal history: there is no
other recorded incident in the subcontinent when any ruler/sovereign had by
promulgations monopolised the right to inflict violence. The Commissioners
viewed the same to be of utmost importance in order to end slavery.

The IPC made compounding a penal offence (Burgess would have

become liable for having compounded a felony in British India also, see footnote
2).23 In the subsequent year (1861), Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted.
Significantly, the Code did not provide for compounding as a procedure; it
only provided for the complainant to withdraw in certain specific cases prior
to issuance of summons/warrant, where the maximum punishment was six
months imprisonment.24 It was only in 1872, when the subsequent Code of
Criminal Procedure reduced the scope of compounding as an offence, and pro-
vided for compounding as a criminal procedure.25

21
S. 105, Indian Penal Code Bill, 1837.
The provision was adopted, however, it was made a separate offence (S. 202) under the
Chapter — “False Evidence and Offences against Public Justice”. The scope was modified as
well:
“
Section 202 Intentional Omission to give information by person bound to inform— Whoever,
knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to
give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine,
or with both.” S. 202, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
22
“We recommend that no act falling under the definition of an offence should be exempted from
punishment because it is committed by a master against a slave.” The preceding quote also
becomes important to contextualise the recommendation:
"
It appears to us therefore that if we can really prevent the master from exacting service
by the use of any violence, or restraint, or by the infliction of any bodily hurt, one of two
effects will inevitably follow. Either the master will obtain no service at all, or he will find
himself under the necessity of obtaining it by making it a source of advantage to the labourer
as well as to himself.”
Thomas Macaulay, A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, 9, 20
(1837).
23
S. 213, Indian Penal Code, 1860. Also see Ss. 214 and 215.
24
S. 271, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861.
“Section 271 Magistrate may permit withdrawal of the complaint – If a complainant at any
time before a final order is passed in any case under this Chapter, shall satisfy the Magistrate
that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint, the Magistrate
may permit such complainant. A complaint withdrawn under this Section shall not again be
entertained.”
25
S. 188, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872.
“Section 188 Compounding offences — In the case of offences which may lawfully be com-
pounded, injured persons may compound the offence out of Court, or in Court with the permission
of the Court.
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   27

However, before enactment of 1872 Code, two cases of adultery wherein

the husband was unwilling to proceed with prosecution, came up for consider-
ation before the Bombay High Court.26 Adultery, being an offence wherein the
accused could be sentenced for five years, was not compoundable statutorily
under S. 271, CrPC.27 The first case arose in 1864. The Sessions Court had
convicted the accused of adultery. The decision was subsequently reversed by
the High Court on the ground that the husband had desired withdrawal of
the charges at the trial stage; the full-bench of High Court held that it was
competent to the husband to withdraw from prosecution, there being noth-
ing to show collusion.28 The second case came up for hearing in 1868 where
the accused was ordered to be discharged by the Asst. Sessions Judge, who,
recorded:

“Witness is the party whom the present offence most concerns, and, if
he be willing to overlook the same, I am of opinion that no benefit
would accrue to society by ordering him to depose to the facts of the
case, as far as he may know them, and by continuing the prosecution”.

The High Court following the previous case, declined to interfere with
the discharge order.29

On the other hand, Calcutta High Court stuck to the statutory limi-
tations and held that once the complainant had been brought to the Court’s
cognizance, the complainant could not withdraw, unless the offence commit-
ted was one specified in S. 271, CrPC. It held that offence of adultery could
not be compounded even at the instance of the husband pleading for with-
drawal prior to issuance of summons/warrant.30 The Judicial Commissioner of
Punjab made the following note which reflects the criminal justice system as
conceptualised by the colonial judges:

“A Criminal Court is not lightly to be moved and converted into

an engine of oppression. If a man launches his case, he stands the
consequences of convicting his adversary, or being himself con-
victed of having made a false accusation. The Code has conven-
iently made the fact of a summons or warrant being issued the
limitation of the power of withdrawal.”31

Such withdrawal from the prosecution shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused
person.”
26
Jamni and Parshotum, In re, 19-6-1864 (Bom HC) (Unreported)(Plz chk); Reg. v. Ramlo Jerio,
(1868-69) 5 Bom HCR 27.
27
S. 497, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
28
Jamni and Parshotum, In re, 19-6-1864 (Bom HC).(plz chk)
29
Reg. v. Ramlo Jerio, (1868-69) 5 Bom HCR 27.
30
H.T. Prinsep, The Code of Criminal Procedure, Act XXV of 1861, and Act VIII of 1869, and
Other Laws and Rules of Practice, with Notes Containing the Opinions Delivered by All the
Superior Local Courts, 152-153 (3rd edn., 1869).
31
Ibid.
28 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW AND SOCIETY [Vol. 7, 2016]

S. 188 of Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 made compounding a

statutory procedure. Select offences were permitted to be compounded outside
or within the Court, however the permission of the Court was indispensable.32
The unamended exception to S. 214, IPC stated the category of offences that
could be amended:

“The provisions of Sections 213 and 214 do not extend to any case in
which the offence consists only of an act irrespective of the intention of
the offender, and for which act the person injured may bring a civil
action.” 33

The exception could be understood as: that the criminal law forbids tak-
ing and giving of compensation (S. 213 and 214, IPC); however, where the
(civil) law itself would award a compensation, those offences could be com-
pounded (Exception to S. 214, IPC). Compounding was made permissible in
cases where the civil action could be brought by the injured to claim damages,
without needing to/instead of instituting criminal proceedings.34 “Irrespective
of the intention of the offender” was interpreted to mean that only those petty
offences could be compounded, whose definition does not includes words refer-
ring to intention like-‘voluntarily’, ‘intentionally’, ‘fraudulently’, ‘dishonestly’,
etc.35 The withdrawal of prosecution were taken to have effect of an acquittal.36

The Code of Criminal Procedure was re-enacted in 1882. This time the
Code provided for definite list of offences that were deemed as compounda-
ble.37 The victim was empowered to compound the specified offences; for cer-
tain other offences, the victim could compound with the permission of the
Court. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 retained the provision, however
it expanded the list of offences compoundable with prior permission of the

32
S. 188, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872.
33
S. 214, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
34
Reg. v. Rahimat, ILR (1877) 1 Bom 147.
Lack of clarity over interpretation of exception clause remained until the clause was
amended in 1882. For instance adultery had been deemed to be a compoundable offence at
the instance of the injured husband, however “intention” was a vital element of the offence.
Also see Reg. v. Jetha Bhala, (1873) 10 Bom HCR 68; Reg. v. Madan Mohun, 6 NWPHCR 305.
35
Reg. v. Rahimat, ILR (1877) 1 Bom 147. In this case the Bom HC held that offence of “griev-
ous hurt” cannot be compounded. Also see H.T. Princep, The Code of Criminal Procedure
(Acts X of 1872 and XI of 1874) and Other Laws and Rules of Practice Relating to Procedure
in the Criminal Courts of British India, with Notes Containing the Opinions Delivered by All
the Superior Local Courts, 154 (5th edn., 1875); Fendall Currie, The Indian Code of Criminal
Procedure, 583 (4th edn., 1872). For adultery, see Ss. 478, 479, Code of Criminal Procedure,
1872.
36
H.T. Princep, supra note 35, 626.
37
S. 345, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882.
Exception to S. 214, IPC was suitably substituted, it now read as “The provisions of Ss.
213 and 214 do not extend to any case in which the offence may be lawfully compounded.”
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   29

Court.38 The 1898 Code also provided that where an accused had been com-
mitted for trial or had been convicted and an appeal was pending, composition
of offence could only take place with the leave of the Court.39

The changes in law saw widening of scope and applicability of com-

pounding within criminal justice system. Courts’ approach towards com-
pounding remained that of cautious nature.

IV. C olonial C ourts approach towards C ompounding

The outlook of Bombay High Court towards compounding in 19th cen-

tury has been captured quite well in the then-Justices conceptualisation of civil
and criminal wrongs as per the decision in Reg. v. Rahimat.40 The case arose
prior to the 1882 amendment and the issue was whether offence of grievous
hurt could be compounded. The Court identified civil wrongs as the ones not
so flagrant nor so dangerous to the society at large and that they did not war-
rant immediate interference of the State. It noted the object of State’s coer-
cive powers in case of civil wrongs as not penal, but remedial/compensatory. It
understood criminal sanctions to mean as intending

“…to enforce duties regarded as of such importance to the community

that the option of insisting on them, or of bringing the provided pen-
alty to bear in cases of their infringement, cannot safely be left in the
hands of private persons.”41

Noting that the views on enormity of a wrong has always varied with
time and other influences, it recognised the third category: wrongs that
depending on the circumstances, may either be extremely pernicious or slightly
pernicious. These wrongs may be subject to either criminal or civil cogni-
zance; as they “except in some inappreciable degree”, affect only the interests

38
S. 345, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
The Criminal Procedure Code, 1882 empowered the victim in certain cases involving
bodily injuries to compound the offence with the permission of the Court. The Criminal
Procedure Code, 1898 expanded the scope by including offences relating to criminal restraint,
misappropriation of property, cheating, trespass, bigamy and indecency/insulting modesty of
woman.
39
S. 345(5), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
S. 345(5) —
“
When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal
is pending, no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which
he is committed, or, as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard.”
40
Reg. v. Rahimat, ILR (1877) 1 Bom 147. The bench consisted of British Chief Justice, two
British puisne Judges and one Indian Judge. Judgment of the court was authored by J.
Raymond West (British origin).
41
In these cases of serious wrongdoing, “the criminal law machinery must first be put in
motion before civil redress for private wrong can be effectually sought”. Reg. v. Rahimat, ILR
(1877) 1 Bom 147, ¶ 7.
30 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW AND SOCIETY [Vol. 7, 2016]

of the individual.42 In a case that arose in Agra, where the accused who had
defrauded a bank into extending them a loan of Rs. 20,000 had agreed and
had paid back the amounts to the satisfaction of bank authorities.43 However,
by then the bank had already instituted criminal proceedings. Thereafter it
sought to withdraw its complaint. The Allahabad High Court reversed the
decision of the magistrate, who had compounded the offence, by holding that
cheating was not a compoundable offence. In doing so, the High Court noted:
“Nothing could be more mischievous than to allow the process of the Criminal
Courts to be used for the purpose of enforcing civil claims”.44

A case arose in the Madras Presidency in 19th century, out of a dispute

over right to office in a temple between a Brahmin father-son and Defendant.
The father and the son had better claim to the office on paper, yet the temple
at that time was in possession of the Defendant who was relatively more influ-
ential. To assert their right, the father and the son had entered the temple on
one occasion, which prompted the defendant to institute proceedings for crim-
inal trespass against the two. Immediately thereafter, the defendant got them
to sign an agreement waiving their right to the office and thereafter withdrew
the charges of criminal trespass. The father and son thereafter moved the mun-
sif court for cancellation of the agreement, on the ground that it was obtained
by coercion.45 Madras HC in the matter held while nullifying the agreement,
that had the case been of a clear criminal trespass and not that of dispute over
property, duress and coercion could not have then been claimed for overturn-
ing the agreement/composition, as the threat of asserting one’s legal rights can-
not amount to coercion.46

Macaulay and other Law Commissioners at the time of drafting of IPC

were clear, that amongst many objects, one object of recognising the State as
having the sole legitimate authority to inflict violence was to discourage slav-
ery. The IPC as had been drafted, made compounding an offence. In one case
that arose in 1893, coolies employed in a tea garden had complaint against
the British owner for various instances of abuse, including, wrongful restraint.
The British owner sought to get the proceedings quashed on the basis of
razeenamah he had obtained from the coolies.47 The Calcutta High Court,
before examining the validity of the composition, delved into the relation-
ship between the parties and the surrounding circumstances. It also noted
42
Reg. v. Rahimat, ILR (1877) 1 Bom 147, ¶ 7.
43
Raunak Husain v. Harbans Singh, 1880 SCC OnLine All 37 : ILR (1880) 3 All 283.
44
Raunak Husain v. Harbans Singh, 1880 SCC OnLine All 37 : ILR (1880) 3 All 283. Also see
Emperor v. Ranchhod Bawla, 1912 SCC OnLine Bom 21 : (1913) 15 Bom LR 61: “In respect of
a non-compoundable offence, it is not competent for a Magistrate to order an acquittal on a pri-
vate complainant offering to withdraw from the prosecution in a warrant case.” and Hanmant
Shrinivas Kulkarni v. Emperor, 1929 SCC OnLine Bom 134 : AIR 1929 Bom 375.
45
Pudishary Krishnan v. Karampally Kunhumi, (1874) 7 MHCR 378.(plz chk)
46
Pudishary Krishnan v. Karampally Kunhumi, (1874) 7 MHCR 378 (per J. Innes).(plz chk)
47
Murray v. Queen Empress, ILR (1893) 21 Cal 103.
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   31

that the coolies had signed in Odiya on the purported razeenamah in Bengali
language. The Court, focusing on the power imbalance between the parties
and the failure on part of the accused to prove composition, held: “Unless
it appears that the parties were free from influence of every kind and were fully
aware of their respective rights, it would be impossible to give effect to a so-called
arrangement or composition.”48

At the same time, it would be an error to think that the colonial judi-
ciary was entirely on one page as far as compounding was concerned. In one
reported case, the complainant, a female, had instituted a complaint against
three persons (gender or any circumstantial details not provided) for causing
hurt. The offence being that of S. 323 IPC, was compoundable by the parties
themselves. Later an application for compounding was moved. The Magistrate
refused to accept composition and proceeded with trial, where the complainant
herself turned hostile to the prosecution’s case. Yet the Magistrate convicted all
three. Bombay High Court, in its 2-page judgment while overturning the con-
viction held that where the offence is of the nature that the parties are com-
petent to compound amongst themselves, Magistrates need not examine the
veracity of the same.49

V. Developments and Criminal L aw

R eforms: Post-I ndependence
Elsewhere in common law jurisdictions- in United States, compounding
remains an offence in the statute books, however it is effectively a dead-let-
ter offence. A survey of reported cases between 1658 and 1975 show only
forty-five cases in which the accused was/were charged with offence of com-
pounding.50 Model Penal Code, proposed in 1962, for the first time recom-
mended introduction of compounding as criminal procedure. The drafters
provided the arguments that the threat of prosecution for compounding was
ineffective in getting the victims to report the crime and also that it impugns
the prosecutors who are often content to drop the prosecution due to restitu-
tion amongst the offender and the victim.51

48
Murray v. Queen Empress, ILR (1893) 21 Cal 103.
49
Emperor v. Gana Krishna Walunj, AIR 1914 Bom 258. Also see Sewa Singh v. Emperor, 1930
SCC OnLine Lah 149; and Emperor v. Jhangtoo Barai 1929 SCC OnLine All 140 : AIR 1930
All 409, the HC held it was immaterial whether the terms of composition were actually being
carried out. For failure thereof, separate action lied in the civil courts. Madras HC however
took a different view in Ramalinga Aiyar v. Budda Varadarajulu Aiyar, 1925 SCC OnLine Mad
117 : (1925) 49 Mad LJ 544, wherein the Madras High Court held that until the terms of the
composition were not concluded, the matter cannot be compounded and the accused cannot
be acquitted.
50
Merek Evan Lipson, “Compounding Crimes: Time for Enforcement”, 27 Hastings Law
Journal 175, 204 (1975).
51
Ibid.
32 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW AND SOCIETY [Vol. 7, 2016]

Legally, condonation by the victim in most States, has no effect on pros-

ecution.52 At the same time, ‘adjustments’ made by their police and the com-
promise achieved with securing either a dismissal or reduced penalty through
the public prosecutor were well-recorded facts.53 The Committing Judge,
i.e., the one who serves as a summons judge, would also accept the pleas for
lower charges and sentence accordingly.54 In the 1920s the increasing num-
ber of such out-of-legal system compromises were attributed to increasing
criminalisation of practices hitherto regulated by the societal or market norms,
-such as sale and manufacture of liquor, issuance of cheques, sale of securities
etc.55 Drawing from the queue of efficiency perspective, it notes how increas-
ing criminalisation was putting undue pressure upon the system, leading to an
increase in its inefficiency.

The thinking and approach of the judges towards criminal law as a

whole seems to have undergone a sea-change from what it was in 19th century.
The 237th Law Commission Report that examines the issue of compounding
of offences, begins by quoting a recent Supreme Court judgment where the
judges stress upon the need to make offences punishable under S. 326 and S.
498A.56 The purpose of compounding, as per the Supreme Court, is identi-
fied to be as in pursuance of increasing efficiency and furthering restorative
justice- “Any such step would not only relieve the courts of the burden of decid-
ing cases in which the aggrieved parties have themselves arrived at a settlement,
but may also encourage the process of re-conciliation between them.”.57 The entire
Law Commission Report is surmised on the idea that to reduce the burden on
courts, it is important to consider that as many offences be made compounda-
ble as possible, while being within the identified constraints of balancing soci-
etal interests in securing conviction and interests of victims. The courts often
upon an application for composition in cases involving non-compoundable
offences have reduced sentences to the period already undergone.58 Courts end
up granting composition in such cases (including the ones where the charges
are of non-compoundable nature) particularly because it is their belief that
in a situation where the two parties wish to end litigation, the matter would

52
For views of American Judges on compounding, see Rieman v. Morrison, 264 Ill. 279 : 106 NE
215 (1914, Supreme Court of Illinois, United States).
53
Justin Miller, “The Compromise of Criminal Cases”, 1(1)Southern California Review 1, 2-3
(1927).
54
Ibid. at 7.
55
Ibid. at 17. Also see John Freeman, “The Ethics of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing”, 55(1)
South Carolina Law Review 829, 839 (2004).
56
237th Law Commission Report, Compounding of (IPC) Offences, 17 (2011).
57
Ramgopal v. State of M.P., (2010) 13 SCC 540 (per JJ. M. Katju and T.S. Thakur).
58
Rajinder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1980 Supp SCC 337 : AIR 1980 SC 1200. Also see
P.R. Thakur, “Compounding a Non-Compoundable Offence: Judicial Pragmatism: Neither
Activism Nor Absolutism”, 39(2-4) Journal of Indian Law 441-444 (1997).
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   33

anyway not lead to successful conviction. Saving the parties from the agony of
trial and the court of its time become the primary concerns.59

At the time of revision of the CrPC of 1898, the Law Commission

rejected the view that penal offences that were classified as compoundable were
those in which the individual aggrieved person is much more concerned than
the community as a whole.60 The 41st Law Commission had received several
suggestions for allowing compounding in the cases of: unlawful assembly (s.
143), rioting (s. 147), false claim in a court of justice (s. 209), fraudulently
obtaining decrees (s. 210), driving or riding on a public way so rashly or neg-
ligently as to endanger human life (s. 279), causing death by rash or negligent
act (s. 304A), causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapon (s. 326), wrong-
ful confinement for extortion (s. 347), theft in a building (s. 380), lurking
house-trespass or house-breaking by night (s. 456), the same in order to com-
mit an offence (s. 457) and bigamy with concealment (s. 495).61 These offences
were not made compoundable as the Commission took the view that these
offences jeopardised public peace, order and security, and therefore, they can-
not be left to be compounded by the person directly aggrieved. Yet, without
discussing how offence of assault against a woman to outrage her modesty (s.
354, IPC) did not jeopardised public order and security, the Commission rec-
ommended making the offence compoundable by the victim with the permis-
sion of the Court. At the same time, it also recommended that the offence of
unlawful compulsory labour (s. 374, IPC) should not remain as a compounda-
ble offence.62

154th Law Commission understood compounding of an offence in terms

that are necessary to be discussed here: ‘The rationale for compounding of
offences is that the chastened attitude of the accused and the praiseworthy attitude
of the complainant in order to restore peace and harmony in society…’ [emphasis
supplied].63 The adjective ‘praiseworthy’ is of particular significance, seemingly
indicating that for the Law Commission in 1996, it was praiseworthy/good/
encouraging behaviour if the complainant does not pursues a complaint, par-
ticularly in case where the offences are compoundable. Instead, according to

59
Sanjay Sandhya v. State, 1994 SCC OnLine Del 61 : (1994) 54 DLT 126 and Arun Kumar
Vohra v. Ritu Vohra, 1994 SCC OnLine Del 673 : (1995) 2 RCR 76.
60
41st Law Commission Report, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, vol. 1, 213 (1969).
61
Ibid. at 214.
62
Ibid. at 214, 215.
Accordingly, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, at the time of enactment made the
suggested changes. Even the 42nd Law Commission Report, which dealt directly with the
Indian Penal Code (1860) fails to discuss the offences from the aspect whether they should be
compoundable or not. The Report lacks any discussion whatsoever regarding S. 374 and dis-
cusses S. 354 only regarding whether it ought to extend protection to minor females. A survey
of reported judgments prior to 1969, also fails to indicate any decision wherein compounda-
bility of S. 374 or S. 354 IPC was an issue.
S. 320, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
63
154th Law Commission Report, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, vol. 1, 47 (1996).
34 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW AND SOCIETY [Vol. 7, 2016]

the Law Commission it would be ‘praiseworthy’ if the complainant utilises the

criminal law machinery to arrive at a settlement with the accused. Thereafter,
the Law Commission takes note of various instances where High Courts
have quashed criminal proceedings in respective of hitherto non-compounda-
ble offences and recommends making those offences also as compoundable; it
most controversially recommended S. 498A (cruelty on woman by her husband
or relatives of husband) to be made compoundable also.64 The understanding,
as above, was same: that these non-cognizable offences were being allowed to
settle ‘to achieve harmony and peace in the society’. While also discussing mak-
ing a third category of compoundable offences, offences compoundable with
permission of senior police officials, it categorically also recommended: “as a
matter of policy more offences be brought under the category of offences compound-
able by the parties themselves without the intervention of the court.”65

What we see is a complete u-turn in the idea of criminal justice and

the role of the State in 200 years. The above-stated recommendations hinged
upon the idea that it would increase harmony in the society and efficiency
of courts by reducing case volume.66 Question arises, why not reduce these
offences to civil wrongs in that case? Perhaps, that would have been too bizarre
64
It also recommended making following kinds of offences as compoundable: offences causing
hurt (Ss. 324, 325 and 335), offences of wrongful restraint (Ss. 343, 344, 346), offences against
property (theft: S. 379; Ss. 403, 406, 407, 411, 414, 430, 451), offences of cheating/fraud (Ss.
417, 419, 421, 422, 423, 424), offences against animals (Ss. 428, 429, 430) and offences of
intellectual property rights (Ss. 482, 483, 486). While it recommended all these offences to
be made compoundable at the instance of parties, without permission of the court, it recom-
mended S. 498-A offences to be made compoundable with the permission of the Court.
154th Law Commission Report, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, vol. 1, 48-49
(1996).
Whereas both the chapters of the 154th Report on Compounding and Plea-Bargaining are
based on increasing efficiency, the Report also revisited the idea of crime, and made notes on
present trends in victimology in context of principles of compensating the victim. See 154th
Law Commission Report, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, vol. 1, 57-65 (1996).
The 2009 amendment to Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was based largely on the 154th
Law Commission Report and the 177th Law Commission Report. See Code of Criminal
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009).
In this light, Malimath’s Commission Report on Reforms of Criminal Justice System
(2003) also provides valuable insights into the mindset and perceptions about the criminal
justice. Inter alia, Justice Malimath led Commission recommended that the victim should
be made mandatorily present for the hearings in order to increase chances of conciliation/
composition (p. 36), and overall also seem to be of the opinion that composition ought to
be the desired result of criminal cases (this again, driven from the idea of clearing case back-
logs and increasing efficiency of Courts) (pp. 163-167), it also recommended making S. 498-A
compoundable (based on how it is “grossly misused” and that every Indian married woman
desires peaceful resolution within her marital home) (pp. 190-191, 287-290). The same again
fails to refer to an iota of primary research. See Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
India, Dr Justice V.S. Malimath et al., Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System
(2003). For damning critique of the said Report see Amnesty International India, Report of
the Malimath Committee on Reforms of the Criminal Justice System: Some Observations
(19-9-2003).
65
154th Law Commission Report, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, vol. 1, 49 (1996).
66
Ibid.
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   35

to recommend, perhaps because depending on the circumstances, commis-

sion of such offences could not always be allowed to be compounded. At the
same time while recommending an increased number of offences to be made
compoundable, this law commission report also fails to shed light on the pro-
cedure of compounding-whether the same needs to be made more stringent/
relaxed. The 237th Report (2011) also does not delve on the procedure.67 It is
unfortunate that the Law Commission failed to discuss into the adequate con-
ditions of a valid and legal composition. The courts often upon an application
for composition in cases involving non-compoundable offences have reduced
sentences to the period already undergone.68 The Higher judiciary requires
the trial courts to verify the veracities of the compromise before sentence is
reduced.69 Courts end up granting composition in such cases, including in
cases where the charges are of non-compoundable nature), since the goal has
now become to save the precious judicial time, as noted by the courts: “where
the parties wish to end litigation, matter would anyway not lead to successful con-
viction”.70 There is a lack of judicial pronouncement/legislative materials guid-
ing the conditions of composition and the lack thereof, has resulted in the bar
being set too low for proving validity of a composition.71

It becomes important to anticipate the implications if a criminal act

is made legally compoundable. There are offences like rapes and white-col-
lar crimes that are routinely settled without involving the state, despite being
non-compoundable.72 Compounding by its proponents, like the 237th Report,

67
237th Law Commission Report, Compounding of (IPC) Offences (2011).
It may be noted that the said Law Commission Report recounts the legislative history of
compounding; however, the same suffers from several factual discrepancies.
68
Rajinder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1980 Supp SCC 337 : AIR 1980 SC 1200; B.S. Joshi
v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675; Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677; Manoj
Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1. See 237th Law Commission Report, Compounding of
(IPC) Offences, 14 (2011). Also see P.R. Thakur, “Compounding a Non-Compoundable
Offence: Judicial Pragmatism: Neither Activism Nor Absolutism”, 39(2-4) Journal of Indian
Law Institute 441-444 (1997).
69
Ram Pujan v. State of U.P., (1973) 2 SCC 456; Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 Supp
SCC 681 : AIR 1988 SC 2111.
70
Sanjay Sanadhya v. State, 1994 SCC OnLine Del 61 : (1994) 54 DLT 126 and Arun Kumar
Vohra v. Ritu Vohra, 1994 SCC OnLine Del 673 : (1995) 2 RCR 76.
71
See Suravi Mukherjee v. State, 1964 SCC OnLine Cal 175 : AIR 1965 Cal 469. In this case one
issue that arose was the validity of composition between the victim and the accused in an
offence of hurt (S. 323 IPC). The victim and the accused were related through marriage. On
a previous occasion, a composition agreement signed by the victim had been filed in the trial
court; on the date of hearing, however, the victim rescinded from the composition agreement,
and instead submitted that the terms of composition were still being worked out. The High
Court in the said matter held that as soon as composition agreement had been signed by the
victim, that would entail a valid composition having been entered into. It held that the trial
court was bound to accept the composition as it were and was bound to quash the proceed-
ings against the accused.
72
Justin Miller, “The Compromise of Criminal Cases”, 1(1) Southern California 1, 2-3 (1927).
Pratiksha Baxi, “Justice is a Secret: Compromise in Rape Trials”, 44(3) Contributions to
Indian Sociology 207, 229-233 (2010).
36 JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW AND SOCIETY [Vol. 7, 2016]

is seen as a process of giving the agency back in the hands of victim-to per-
haps opt for an outcome which is more restorative than retributive.73 By giving
the autonomy in the hands of the parties, like in the case of recent amend-
ments to Factories Act, 1948, the State is effectively withdrawing its juris-
diction and instead, handing it to individuals. Amongst them, it could be
reasonably speculated that power imbalance due to nature of their fiduciary
relationship and other factors, may end up playing a determining role in the
nature of composition.74 In an event where there is over-criminalisation, that
it results in inefficiency, i.e. the police and court machinery are inadequate to
deal with all the reported cases, perhaps it may be prudent for the state to
withdraw its jurisdiction.75

VI. C onclusion: The E ffect of C ompounding

as a C riminal P rocedure

Over the two centuries, there seems to have been a sea-change in the
perceptions of the law-enforcers themselves towards the criminal justice system.
The Bombay High Court in 1876 understood criminal sanctions as serving the
purpose-

“to enforce duties regarded as of such importance to the community

that the option of insisting on them, or of bringing the provided pen-
alty to bear in cases of their infringement, cannot safely be left in the
hands of private persons”.76

Now the understanding has changed to-

“Any such step would not only relieve the courts of the burden of
deciding cases in which the aggrieved parties have themselves arrived
at a settlement, but may also encourage the process of re-conciliation
between them.”.77

In context of plea bargaining in cases of economic offences, J. Krishna Iyer found the
practice to be deplorable: “Many economic offenders resort to practices the American call
“plea bargaining”, “plea negotiation”, “trading out” and “compromise in criminal cases” and
the trial Magistrate drowned by a docket burden nods assent to the sub rosa ante-room set-
tlement. The businessman culprit, confronted by a sure prospect of the agony and ignominy
of tenancy of a prison cell, “trades out” of the situation, the bargain being a plea of guilt,
coupled with a promise of “no jail”. These advance arrangements please everyone except the
distant victim, the silent society.” See Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Mahrashtra, (1976) 3
SCC 684 : AIR 1976 SC 1929.
73
Rieman v. Morrison, 264 Ill. 279 : 106 NE 215 (1914, Supreme Court of Illinois, United States).
74
Amnesty International India, Report of the Malimath Committee on Reforms of the
Criminal Justice System: Some Observations (19-9-2003).
75
Jerold H. Israel, “Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the Conventional
Wisdom”, 48(1) Florida Law Review 761, 769 (1996).
76
Reg. v. Rahimat, ILR (1877) 1 Bom 147, ¶ 7.
77
Ramgopal v. State of M.P., (2010) 13 SCC 540 (per JJ. M. Katju and T.S. Thakur).
 COMPOUNDABILITY OF OFFENCES   37

A sea-change has taken place.

What remains unstudied is the effect of compounding on perceptions of

efficiency/reliability on criminal justice. For good or for worse, the failure to
treat all offenders brought to the Courts of law, equally, is a strange aberra-
tion to a system that professes equal treatment to all. Very few studies in India
touch upon the effect of compounding on the State machinery and on percep-
tions about State machinery (police) and the criminal justice system. Pratiksha
Baxi and Amnesty International’s Response Paper to the Malimath Committee
Report (2003) are few which broach this subject, empirically.78 These two stud-
ies, discussed summarily in this paper, do seem to indicate that the higher
judiciary and other law makers are far removed from the experiences of the
people, and are actually ignorant about the effect of their continuous prizing
of efficiency over any other goal of administering justice. While there is need
for comprehensive studies on effects of compounding, there is also a need for
serious reconsideration of the subject by the judiciary and other bodies like
Law Commission, bereft of the ‘efficiency’ and ‘reducing backlog in courts’
arguments.

78
Pratiksha Baxi, Justice is a Secret: Compromise in Rape Trials, 44(3) Contributions to
Indian Sociology 207, 229-233 (2010); Amnesty International India, Report of the Malimath
Committee on Reforms of the Criminal Justice System: Some Observations (19-9-2003).