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01Paffenholz_FM.qxd 12/17/09 12:08 PM Page i

CIVIL SOCIETY &

PEACEBUILDING
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01Paffenholz_FM.qxd 12/17/09 12:08 PM Page iii

CIVIL SOCIETY &

PEACEBUILDING
A Critical Assessment

EDITED BY
Thania Paffenholz

b o u l d e r
l o n d o n
01Paffenholz_FM.qxd 12/17/09 12:08 PM Page iv

Published in the United States of America in 2010 by

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

 2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Civil society and peacebuilding: a critical assessment / Thania Paffenholz,
editor.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-58826-696-5 (hardcover : alk. paper) —
ISBN 978-1-58826-672-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Peace-building—Case studies. 2. Civil society—Case studies.
3. Political participation—Case studies. I. Paffenholz, Thania.
JZ5538.C59 2010
303.6'6—dc22
2009026976

British Cataloguing in Publication Data

A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book
is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements

of the American National Standard for Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5 4 3 2 1
01Paffenholz_FM.qxd 12/17/09 12:08 PM Page v

Contents

Preface vii

Part 1 Context: What We Already Know

1 Understanding Civil Society 3
Christoph Spurk
2 Civil Society and the State 29
Kjell Erling Kjellman and Kristian Berg Harpviken
3 Civil Society and Peacebuilding 43
Thania Paffenholz
4 A Comprehensive Analytical Framework 65
Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk

Part 2 Case Studies: Applying the Framework

5 Guatemala: A Dependent and Fragmented Civil Society 79
Sabine Kurtenbach
6 Northern Ireland: Civil Society and the Slow Building of Peace 105
Roberto Belloni
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina: Civil Society in a Semiprotectorate 129
Roberto Belloni and Bruce Hemmer
8 Turkey: The Kurdish Question and the Coercive State 153
Ayşe Betül Çelik

v
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vi Contents

9 Cyprus: A Divided Civil Society in Stalemate 181

Esra Çuhadar and Andreas Kotelis
10 Israel and Palestine: Civil Societies in Despair 207
Esra Çuhadar and Sari Hanafi
11 Afghanistan: Civil Society Between Modernity and Tradition 235
Kaja Borchgrevink and Kristian Berg Harpviken
12 Nepal: From Conflict to Consolidating a Fragile Peace 259
Rhoderick Chalmers
13 Sri Lanka: Peace Activists and Nationalists 297
Camilla Orjuela
14 Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State 321
Ken Menkhaus with Hassan Sheikh, Shane Quinn,
and Ibrahim Farah
15 Nigeria: Dilemmas of Militarization and
Co-optation in the Niger Delta 351
Darren Kew and Cyril Obi

Part 3 What We Have Learned

16 What Civil Society Can Contribute to Peacebuilding 381
Thania Paffenholz
17 Enabling and Disenabling Factors for Civil Society Peacebuilding 405
Thania Paffenholz, Christoph Spurk, Roberto Belloni,
Sabine Kurtenbach, and Camilla Orjuela
18 Conclusion 425
Thania Paffenholz

List of Acronyms 431

Bibliography 437
The Contributors 481
Index 485
About the Book 511
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Preface

The importance of civil society to peacebuilding efforts has been in-

creasingly acknowledged since the mid-1990s, attending a massive rise in civil
society peacebuilding initiatives overall. The proliferation of such initiatives,
however, has not been matched by research on the nexus between civil soci-
ety and peacebuilding. Thus, we know little about what civil society means to
peacebuilding—and how effective it can be for ending armed conflicts and
sustaining peace.
In response, a three-year research project was initiated under the auspices
of the Geneva-based Center on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding
(CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
The results of that project are presented in this book. The overarching objective
here is to contribute to a better understanding of the role of civil society in sup-
port of peacebuilding, both during and after armed conflict. The key research
questions that we address are: What are the constructive functions of civil so-
ciety in support of peacebuilding? What are the main factors that support those
functions? And what are the main obstacles that hinder their fulfillment?
We adopt a broad definition of civil society; the term encompasses a range
of actors, from professional associations, clubs, unions, faith-based organiza-
tions, and nongovernmental organizations to traditional and clan groups and
other community groups. We do not include members of political parties or the
media (with the exception of their associations). The analysis focuses on local
and national groups; we do not look explicitly at global civil society campaigns.
Nor have we looked at international NGOs and other civil society groups that
are not part of the national or local arena. We do, however, explore the links be-
tween national civil society groups and their international partners.
We likewise adopt a broad definition of peacebuilding, embracing a defini-
tion that acknowledges existing differences yet remains workable. Put simply,

vii
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viii Preface

peacebuilding aims at preventing and managing armed conflict and at sustain-

ing peace after large-scale organized violence has ended. It is a multidimen-
sional effort, incorporating all of the activities that are linked directly to that
objective. Thus, peacebuilding should create conditions that are conducive to
economic reconstruction, development, and democratization, but the term should
not be equated and confused with such activities.
We employ quantitative and qualitative methodologies, developing a
comprehensive analytical framework as the basis for systematically assessing
the relevance and effectiveness of civil society in peacebuilding in a series of
case studies. This framework allows our results to be compared across differ-
ent cases.
This book is organized into three parts. Part 1 sets out the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the project, exploring the historical and conceptual develop-
ment of the concept of civil society (Chapter 1), the relationship between civil
society and the state (Chapter 2), and the relationship between civil society
and peacebuilding theories and activities (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 presents a com-
prehensive framework for the analysis of civil society peacebuilding efforts.
Part 2 (Chapters 5 to 15) consists of country case studies, eleven in all, organized
geographically by region, moving roughly clockwise from Central America. In
Part 3, we elaborate on our overall findings with regard to the implementation,
relevance, and effectiveness of the seven civil society peacebuilding functions
(Chapter 16); identify a number of key enabling and disenabling factors
(Chapter 17); and present general conclusions (Chapter 18).

* * *

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many organizations and indi-
viduals that made this project possible. First, I am grateful to our main donors,
the Norwegian and Swiss Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Special thanks go to Ivar
Evensmo of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and Cristina
Hoyos and Jean-François Cuénod of the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation for their ongoing engagement, encouragement, and important re-
flections on the policy relevance of this work. Thanks also to the World Bank’s
Social Development Department for supporting the first phase of the project,
to Reiner Forster and Mark Mattner for initiating this research when they were
at the World Bank, and to all the experts who were part of the review panels
at the World Bank. I likewise thank the German Federal Ministry for Cooper-
ation and Development (BMZ) and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)
for their support, and especially Kirsten Garaycochea (BMZ), Uwe Kievelitz,
Gabriele Kruk, and Annette Backhaus (all GTZ) for their comments on the
policy relevance of the project.
My appreciation goes to the Scientific and Technological Research Coun-
cil of Turkey, as well as to the International Studies Association, for additional
01Paffenholz_FM.qxd 12/17/09 12:08 PM Page ix

Preface ix

workshop funding. Thanks also to our partner institutions: American Univer-

sity of Beirut; Bilkent University in Ankara; Davidson College in North Car-
olina; the Department of Peace and Development Research at the School of
Global Studies, Göteborg University; International Peace Research Institute;
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University; In-
stitute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg; Institute for Peace
and Development, American University, Washington, D.C.; Institute of Ap-
plied Media Studies, Zurich University of Applied Sciences; International Cri-
sis Group, Nepal; Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala/Nairobi/Bukavo; Nordic
Africa Institute, Uppsala; Queens University, Belfast; Sabancı University, Istan-
bul; University of California–Irvine; and University of Massachusetts–Boston.
I am extremely grateful to my colleagues at CCDP at the Graduate Insti-
tute of International and Development Studies for all their support. Special
acknowledgment goes to Mariya Nikolova, Oliver Jütersonke, Riccardo
Bocco, Meghan Pritchard, and Sandra Reimann. Many thanks also to Daniel
Paffenholz for his readiness to help with the quantitative and qualitative as-
sessment of the case studies.
I would like to thank all of the researchers involved in the project, as well
as all of our reviewers and advisers. I owe special gratitude to John Darby,
Siegmar Schmidt, Neclâ Tschirgi, and Jaco Cilliers. Many thanks also to Esra
Çuhadar for organizing the Antalya conference in 2007.
A very special word of gratitude goes to Christoph Spurk for all of his
conceptual support in the development and application of the framework, the
many substantial comments he gave on a number of chapters, the training in
quantitative coding he provided, his input at workshops, and his ongoing
moral support.

— Thania Paffenholz
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CIVIL SOCIETY &

PEACEBUILDING
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PART 1
Context:
What We Already Know
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02Paffenholz_1.qxd 12/17/09 4:54 PM Page 3

1
Understanding Civil Society
Christoph Spurk

Citizen participation in the processes of political decisionmaking is

seen as a core requirement of functioning democracies. Civil society is one in-
stitution that has gained importance in its perceived ability to facilitate regular
and sustained participation by the citizenry, beyond simply voting in general
elections. Increasingly, therefore, civil society is viewed by more and more re-
searchers and practitioners as a basic pillar of democracy.
The concept of civil society, however, is diverse and can carry many mean-
ings, necessitating some clarification. This chapter has two main purposes: to
depict the diversity of civil society concepts, along with their applications in
different contexts; and to elaborate on a new functional model of civil society
in order to facilitate a better understanding of civil society’s contributions to
democratization and other political goals.
In light of these debates, we can identify two models for understanding civil
society: actor-oriented and function-oriented. The benefits and shortcomings of
each are explained, and a new extended functional approach is proposed.

History, Philosophical Roots, and Basic Concepts

Civil society is a widely used term in modern scholarship, “the big idea on
everyone’s lips” (Edwards 2004, 2). Despite this, there is no commonly agreed-
upon definition, beyond the basic idea of civil society being an arena of vol-
untary, uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values
(Merkel and Lauth 1998, 7). A survey of the literature makes it clear that civil
society as a concept contains elements that are diverse, complex, and above all,
contentious. Some of the literature even questions whether this fuzziness ex-
plains the popularity of civil society, in that “it can be all things to all people”
(Glasius 2004, 3).

3
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4 Context: What We Already Know

Major European philosophers such as Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant artic-

ulated a notion of civil society as being synonymous with the state or political
society (Keane 1988, 36). “Civil” was seen as the opposite of the state of “na-
ture” and also of “uncivilized” forms of government, such as despotism. Civil
society, according to this conception, expresses the growth of civilization to
the point where society has become “civilized” (Kumar 1993, 377).
In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, a major shift in con-
ceptualizing civil society was introduced by writers such as Adam Ferguson
and Thomas Paine, among others (Keane 1988). During this period, a concept
of civil society was slowly developed that differentiated it from the state, en-
dowing civil society with its own forms and principles. From this time onward,
civil society was seen not only as oriented toward the state but also as acting
as a limit on (and sometimes even a counter to) state powers. Essentially, then,
civil society, as it became defined in a different way, was a means of defense
against despotism and other potential abuses by political leaders (Bratton 1994,
53–54).
Under this penumbra, thinkers conceptualized the relationship between
civil society and the state in somewhat different ways. John Locke (1632–1704),
for example, was the first modern philosopher to stress that civil society should
be understood as a body in its own right, separate from the state. Locke argued
that people form a community in which their social life develops and in which
the state has no say. This sphere is pre- or unpolitical. The first task of civil so-
ciety, according to Locke, is to protect the individual—specifically individual
rights and property—against the state and its arbitrary interventions (Merkel
and Lauth 1998, 4; Schade 2002, 10).
Charles de Montesquieu (1689–1755) elaborated on his own model of the
separation of powers (De l’esprit des lois, 1748), whereby he distinguished,
similarly to Locke, between political society (regulating the relations between
citizens and government) and civil society (regulating the relations between
citizens). Montesquieu, however, presents a far less sharp contrast between the
two spheres. Instead, his philosophy stresses a balance between central author-
ity and societal networks (corps intermediaries), in which the central authority
(monarchy) must be controlled by the rule of law and limited by the counter-
vailing power of independent organizations (networks) that operate inside and
outside the political structure (Merkel and Lauth 1998, 5).
G. W. Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) viewed civil society as the historical
product of economic modernization (and not as a natural expression of free-
dom) and the bourgeoisie-driven economy, positioned between the two spheres
of family and state (Keane 1988, 50–55). For Hegel, civil society comprised a
huge variety of actors, including the market economy, social classes (includ-
ing the bourgeoisie), corporations, intellectuals, and civil servants—essentially
all societal actors not directly dependent on the state apparatus. Hegel empha-
sized that civil society actors are not always in harmony but rather are in conflict,
as the burghers followed mainly selfish interests. Therefore, in Hegel’s view
02Paffenholz_1.qxd 12/17/09 4:54 PM Page 5

Understanding Civil Society 5

civil society must be controlled by a strong state that is supposed to act in the
“universal interest of the population” (Keane 1988, 53).
Karl Marx (1818–1883) states that “civil society as such develops only
with the bourgeoisie,” and he defines the concept as comprising “the entire ma-
terial interactions among individuals at a particular evolutionary stage of the
productive forces” (Marx, quoted in Bobbio 1988, 82). As with Hegel, Marx’s
definition accommodates a huge diversity of actors, including the economy and
the market. In contrast to Hegel, however, Marx states that civil society is the
base of the capitalist domination model, regulating and subordinating the state,
which thus becomes an institution of the dominant class (Bobbio 1988, 75–76;
Kumar 1993, 377). To put it in Marxist terms, civil society is the structural base,
and the state belongs to the superstructure that ensures capitalist domination by
force.
The exclusive link between civil society and capitalist development was
questioned by John Keane (1988). He emphasizes that the modernization of
the idea of civil society, and the separation of civil society from the state, were
primarily political developments rather than being economic in nature. This
view was driven by the fear of state despotism, something that led political
thinkers and many nonentrepreneurial groups to develop civil society as a dif-
ferent counteracting entity. These people and groups were critical as well to
capitalist development, and many feared the inequalities caused by the growth
of commodity production (Keane 1988, 63–66).
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) placed more emphasis on the role of
independent associations as civil society in his two-volume masterwork De la
démocratie en Amérique (usually translated as Democracy in America). He
saw associations as schools of democracy in which democratic thinking, atti-
tudes, and behavior are learned by individual citizens, the aim being to protect
and defend individual rights against potentially authoritarian regimes and tyran-
nical majorities within society. Associations are, additionally, a balancing force
against a central state inclined to form a power monopoly (Keane 1988, 60).
According to de Tocqueville, these associations should be built voluntarily and
at all levels (local, regional, national). Thus, civic virtues like tolerance, accep-
tance, honesty, and trust are actually integrated into the character of civic indi-
viduals. They contribute to trust and confidence, or as Putnam later phrased it,
social capital (Putnam 2000, 19–26).
Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) focused on civil society from a Marxist the-
oretical angle while reversing the Marxist viewpoint in various ways. In contrast
to Marx, Gramsci saw civil society as part of the superstructure in addition to
the state, but with a different function: the state served as the arena of force and
coercion for capitalist domination, and civil society served as the field through
which values and meanings were established, debated, and contested. Civil so-
ciety thus produces noncoercive consent for the system (Kumar 1993; Bratton
1994, 54–55; Bobbio 1988). According to Gramsci, civil society contains a
wide range of organizations and ideologies that both challenge and uphold the
02Paffenholz_1.qxd 12/17/09 4:54 PM Page 6

6 Context: What We Already Know

existing order. The political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes and so-
cietal consensus is formed within civil society.
Another divergence from Marx is seen in the relationship of civil society
to the state. Gramsci argues that initiatives for change could start from this su-
perstructure sphere of civil society, with its values and ideologies. In traditional
Marxism, changes can only come from basic structures, such as economic re-
lations (Bobbio 1988, 86–88). This might be one reason why Gramsci’s ideas
influenced subsequent resistance to totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe and
Latin America (Lewis 2002).
Jürgen Habermas focused on the role that civil society should play within
the communication process in the public sphere. Generally, communication as
a social act plays a decisive role according to Habermas’s basic “theory of com-
municative action.” This theory states that legitimacy and consensus on political
decisions are provided through open communication, that is, by the unbiased de-
bate of social actors. In this understanding, the political system (state, govern-
ment, and political society) needs the articulation of interests in the public
space to put different concerns on the political agenda. Usually, established in-
stitutions, such as political parties, would perform this articulation. However,
it cannot be left entirely to institutions alone, argues Habermas, as political
parties and parliaments need to “get informed public opinion beyond the es-
tablished power structures” (Habermas 1992, 374). Therefore, the ability to or-
ganize as civil society is needed particularly by marginalized groups as a means
to articulate their interests.
Habermas’s concept of civil society has been contested as highly normative
and idealistic. Bent Flyvbjerg (1998) claims that a more realistic approach needs
to consider the societal context in which this kind of communication takes place.
Based on Michel Foucault’s understanding of power in society, one must ana-
lyze the different relations among social actors in society and their power im-
balances to obtain a realistic picture of civil society’s limited potential.

The Structure and Positioning of Civil Society:

A Definition
From this overview, we can see that major shifts in how civil society is con-
ceptualized have taken place over time. This includes the change from equat-
ing civil society with the state itself toward viewing the two as opposing forces,
as well as the change from a purely economic understanding of civil society to
a noneconomic, political understanding. Such variations notwithstanding, we
can identify some common ground for understanding the structure and posi-
tioning of civil society within society at large.
Civil society is seen as a sector on its own. It consists of a huge variety
of mainly voluntary organizations and associations that maintain different ob-
jectives, interests, and ideologies. Oftentimes, they compete with one another.
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Understanding Civil Society 7

Although not driven purely by private or economic interests, they are nonethe-
less viewed as autonomously organized, interacting within the public sphere.
Civil society is seen as different from both the state (comprising executive
government institutions, bureaucracy, administration, judiciary) and the polit-
ical sphere (legislature, political parties) due to the fact that civil society is
making political demands toward the state and others, but is not running—as
politicians and parties do—for political office in government. Thus, civil soci-
ety is formally and legally independent from state/political society, but it is
oriented toward and interacts closely with the state, the political sector, and the
economic sector.
Civil society is seen as differentiated from the market and the business
sector (economic sphere) (but see Glasius 2004, 1), as well as from the family/
private realm (see Figure 1.1a).
These sectors can also be viewed as partially overlapping in the sense that
boundaries are sometimes blurred. Some authors emphasize this reality by
considering how some actors can operate in various spheres or sectors simul-
taneously (Croissant 2003, 240).
Some of the research stresses that specific actors are in general attributed
to specific sectors, but occasionally they, too, can also act as civil society. For
example, business entrepreneurs (belonging to the business sector) are acting
within civil society when they demand tax breaks from the state. This under-
standing also helps us uncover other actors who may have a role as civil society,

Figure 1.1 The Position of Civil Society

a. Civil society as a sector b. Civil society as an intermediate sphere

State/ State/ Economic

Political < > Economic Political
sphere sphere
sphere sphere
<
<

<

Civil
Society
>

>
>

Family/ Family/
< Civil Private
Private >
Society sphere
sphere
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8 Context: What We Already Know

such as traditional groups in Africa (Croissant et al. 2000, 18). In this concep-
tion, authors may prefer to characterize civil society as the space between the
sectors (Merkel and Lauth 1998, 7). Civil society is thus the public realm be-
tween state, business, and family (see Figure 1.1b).
To clarify who belongs to civil society, it is helpful to consider the
processes of articulation and negotiation of political interests within society.
Typically, various intermediaries act as connectors between the private sphere
(ordinary citizens who are only occasionally directly involved in politics) and
the political-administrative system (running the country with little or no di-
rect contact with the population). Intermediaries—including political parties,
associations, social movements, and the media—establish contact and feed-
back among these distant spheres. And among these intermediaries, only as-
sociations and social movements belong to civil society. Political parties are
seen as part of the political society sphere, as their representatives usually
compete for running political offices in government. Civil society makes de-
mands to the political society or state, but it does not aspire to assume office.
However, civil society often provides staff out of its ranks for political soci-
ety and its institutions.
The media’s role is even more contentious. Some scholars and practition-
ers see media as part of civil society (van Tongeren et al. 2005; Berger 2002),
whereas others see media as executing a different role in society. Christoph
Spurk (2007) argues that media do not belong to civil society because the mass
media comprise professional organizations and not voluntary ones, thus be-
longing to the economic sphere. Additionally, the role attributed to the media
in a democratic environment requires them—at least ideally—to report com-
prehensively and impartially without serving specific interests. Thus, a free
and pluralistic media have a role on their own (Voltmer 2006). Their task is to
enable public debate, and they should not represent specific interests that are
held by civil society and organizations. Yet, some media might not consider
these to be limitations, and they are better viewed as part of the state/political
society, like state or party media, or as part of advocacy/communication strate-
gies of specific organizations. In contrast, people working in the media sector
(journalists, publishers) can form their own associations, which then act as
civil society, similar to any other association. Media fulfilling their public task
might support civil society in its endeavor to confront the state, as this usually
involves opening further access to the public sphere (Spurk 2007). The media
as a whole are generally not considered to be part of civil society.
All of the above considerations can be condensed into the following
definition:

Civil society is a sphere of voluntary action that is distinct from the

state, political, private, and economic spheres, keeping in mind that
in practice the boundaries between these sectors are often complex
02Paffenholz_1.qxd 12/17/09 4:54 PM Page 9

Understanding Civil Society 9

and blurred. It consists of a large and diverse set of voluntary organ-

izations—competing with each other and oriented to specific inter-
ests—that are not purely driven by private or economic interests, are
autonomously organized, and interact in the public sphere. Thus, civil
society is independent from the state and the political sphere, but it is
oriented toward and interacts closely with them.

Civil Society Discourses in Different Contexts

Civil society has been debated in very different contexts. Within political sci-
ence research, the main focus has been civil society’s role in the political tran-
sition toward democracy in different regions of the world. Based on this debate,
civil society gained importance as well in international cooperation, in terms
of practitioners’ discourse on development cooperation, as well as in the pol-
icy discourse on violent conflict in developing and transition countries. The
sections below review the main strands of these debates and examine how civil
society concepts have been interpreted in politics and practice in different con-
texts and geographical regions.

Civil Society in Political Transition and Democratization

As we have alluded to previously, civil society has been an almost purely
Western concept, historically tied to the political emancipation of citizens
from former feudalistic ties, monarchies, and the state during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Other notions of civil society (i.e., those that might
have existed in other regions or at different times) barely surface in the inter-
national debate about civil society (Appiagyei-Atua 2002, 2–3; Pouligny 2005,
498). As a result, there is still much debate over whether Western concepts of
civil society are transferable to non-Western countries or other historical con-
texts with different levels of democracy and economic structures (Lewis 2002;
Harneit-Sievers 2005).

Western Europe: From exclusiveness to inclusion. In its early phase, civil so-
ciety in Western Europe (the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) was
driven by economic and academic elites who demanded civil and human
rights, as well as political participation. In its second phase (the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries), civil society widened its areas of activity and poten-
tial. New actors entered civil society—for example, the social movements of
the working class, farmers, and churches—who not only engaged in social wel-
fare but also articulated political and societal claims. In their view, these new
actors were less universal than the earlier elites, focusing instead on specific
interests, sometimes stressing societal conflict and deprivation. The third phase
of civil society began with the emergence of new social movements in the
1960s, such as women’s liberation, in addition to the student, peace, and ecology
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10 Context: What We Already Know

movements. These new movements and agendas considerably expanded both

the range and scope of civil society activities and, likewise, the reasons for
being part of civil society in its many manifestations (Lauth 2003, 229).

The United States and Western Europe: Social capital debate. Starting in the
United States, a rich debate emerged in the 1990s regarding the performance
of major social institutions, including representative government, and its rela-
tion to political culture and civil society. Robert Putnam sees social capital—
social networks, a rich associational life, along with the associated norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness—as the core element of civil society. This af-
firms that the characteristics of civil society and civic life affect the health of
democracy and the performance of social institutions (Putnam 1993; Putnam
2002, 14). Putnam’s research argues that there exists a tremendous decline of
social capital in the United States. His work has since spurred considerable re-
search on various forms of social capital (Putnam 2000; Putnam 2002, 14–25)
and its conduciveness to democracy.

Eastern Europe: Challenges of a threefold transition. Most countries in East-

ern Europe faced a threefold transition: the political transformation from dic-
tatorship to democracy, the economic transformation from a state to a market
economy, and sometimes the state transformation due to the disintegration of
the Soviet Union (Merkel 1999, 377). Eastern Europe’s transition drew much
interest, mainly from European researchers and practitioners. Numerous case
studies showed that, in most countries, civil society played a major role, al-
though not the only role, in overcoming authoritarian regimes and establishing
democratic structures (Merkel 1999, 397–441).
Research demonstrates that civil society plays different roles in various
transition phases. Its success seems contingent on many factors, such as its
strength and its capacity to fulfill the right functions at the right time; the in-
corporation of democratic procedures in its own structure and organization, es-
pecially after immediate system change; and the extent of bridging societal
divides by inclusive membership as well as the “civility” of its actions. All this
must be viewed within the context of other factors and power structures within
which civil society interacts (Merkel 2000; Lauth 2003).

Civil society in the South: Is the concept applicable? In Latin America, Africa,
and Asia, we find very different debates on the subject, due to different histor-
ical, political, and economic developments.

1. Latin America. In Latin America, the concept of civil society gained

importance mainly in the fight against military dictatorship at the end of the
1960s. Peter Birle (2000, 242–261) described a high diversity of civil society
groups, based on his analysis of the development of civil society in five Latin
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Understanding Civil Society 11

American countries under military dictatorship and in the recovering of de-

mocracy. He identified various types of civil society according to the main
focus of action. The antiauthoritarian civil society consists of groups foster-
ing the protection of human rights and tolerance and facilitated nonviolent re-
sistance to military regimes in Latin America. Gramscian civil society, as put
forward by other research, renewed the thinking of the traditional leftist groups
after the revolutionary armed liberation in Latin America had failed and
opened up new spaces of discussion. Neoliberal groups of civil society focused
on individual freedom and were part of neoliberal deregulation and privatiza-
tion development strategies. Neoliberalism stressed that private initiatives need
to be liberated from all sorts of ties and supports, mainly originating from pri-
vate business. Other groups, characterized under the general label new social
movements, were greatly skeptical of established political parties and favored
an entirely new egalitarian and participative order. And finally, social networks
attempted to increase the practical quality of governance, working toward ren-
ovating education systems or improving citizen participation in general (Birle
2000, 232–234).
Robert Pinkney (2003, 102–103) sees civil society’s role as very limited,
stating that civil society in Latin America “extended to greater resistance to
authoritarianism” but failed to develop a major role for itself once democracy
had been restored. Pinkney presumes that social movements and loose group-
ings are suitable for resisting dictatorship but less so for the “mundane processes
of sustaining democracy.” In contrast, Birle highlighted the fact that, despite
military dictatorship, a reduced civil society could and did still survive. Hard-
ships under dictatorships provoked the engagement of groups that normally
would not engage as civil society. Even after democratic systems were rein-
stalled, a growing pluralism in civil society developed, countering earlier as-
sumptions that civil society would diminish once democracy was established.
2. Africa. The main question in Africa—as for other regions in the global
south—is whether the concept of civil society is applicable in the geographi-
cal context. It must be understood that conditions for Western-type civil soci-
ety (e.g., a self-confident urban citizenship that has already gained some
autonomy from state structures) are mostly absent in Africa.
Among the varying positions within the literature, one states that due to
colonial rule—fostering a small urban elite in African cities and oppressing a
large majority of the population by leaving them as subjects of traditional
despotic rulers in rural areas—Africa knows only traditional associations but
has no space for a civil society that aims at participatory governance. Because
this pattern largely continued in the postcolonial phase, there was no civil so-
ciety of this type in Africa (Lewis 2002, 567–577; Maina 1998, 135–137). Others
argue that the weak development of civil society is partly due to the generally
low level of development that hinders societies to further differentiate and to
offer opportunities for civil society activities (Schmidt 2000, 301).
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12 Context: What We Already Know

This is reflected in skepticism over whether civil society can work in

Africa in the way that Western donors expect as they try to foster democracy.
Nelson Kasfir (1998) states that some concepts exclude specific “uncivil” or-
ganizations, such as ethnic and religious associations, that are important to po-
litical struggles in Africa. Moreover, organizations are usually included only if
they are deemed to show “civil” behavior, conceived as being autonomous of
social interests and not bound into neopatrimonial networks. This way, impor-
tant elements of the public sphere in Africa become excluded by definition.
Additionally, Kasfir doubts whether these kinds of independent organizations
can be sustained in Africa without the support of government or foreign donors.
He is skeptical as to whether the Western participatory model of competing in-
terests in the public sphere can really be institutionalized in Africa today. He
sees politics there as being dominated by neopatrimonial relations in which
state officials have no need to respond to citizens’ concerns but distribute re-
sources to their often ethnically organized clients (Kasfir 1998, 130–133).
A second viewpoint sees little problem in applying the concept of civil so-
ciety to Africa and considers almost all existing nonstate actors as civil soci-
ety (Harneit-Sievers 2005, 2). For example, Michael Bratton (1994) sees a role
(albeit a limited one) for civil society—at least for the transition period from
authoritarian to more democratic rule. He identified circumstances that have
yielded various configurations of civil society and resulted in different roles in
the democratization process, as shown by the cases of Kenya and Zambia in
the 1990s. He distinguishes among the material dimension (economic crisis
stimulates the founding of self-help groups and popular protests), the organi-
zational dimension (the existence and nature of an organization leading the
civil society movement), and the ideological dimension (the goals of civil so-
ciety). The transition to democratic rule will be successful even when middle-
class organizations (teachers, entrepreneurs, state employees, as well as church
leaders and lawyers) leave the regime, join protests, and elaborate a shared vi-
sion for an alternative regime. Normally, after transition and with new elec-
tions, the political actors then take the leading role, and the civil society actors
step back.
Bratton emphasizes that civil society exists in Africa under all regimes. In
times of authoritarian rule, independent thinkers take refuge within civil soci-
ety as a sphere beyond the reach of the state. Nevertheless, some politicians
soon evacuate civil society and reenter political society, when circumstances
permit the formation of parties. Thus, this two-way transfer—from civil to po-
litical society and back—is viewed as typical (Bratton 1994, 57; Merkel and
Lauth 1998).
A third viewpoint straddles the middle, stressing the need to adapt the con-
cept of civil society to Africa (Lewis 2002, 578–580). Africa’s civil society is
seen as different from Western conceptualizations, but also as having executed
similar functions (albeit in a rudimentary way). Jean-François Bayart (1986),
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Understanding Civil Society 13

for example, defines civil society precisely in Western contexts—in the oppo-
sition to authoritarian states. Essentially, it is seen “as the process by which
society seeks to ‘breach’ and counteract the simultaneous ‘totalization’ unleashed
by the state” (Bayart 1986, 111). It then becomes necessary to look at various
organizations (such as traditional associations and male youth groups) that
were not acknowledged as civil society but already worked in traditional soci-
ety as controllers of traditional government. Examples include elders and chiefs
(Appiagyei-Atua 2002, 6). Other traditional institutions can equally be seen as
cells of civil society (Harneit-Sievers 2005, 5–9).
Kasfir raises the point that some independent organizations behave aggres-
sively and confront the state directly. He doubts whether such civic organiza-
tions will always make the state more democratic, as they could also undermine
the state’s capacity to reconcile different interests. Only when political institu-
tions are strong might an aggressive civil society serve to strengthen democ-
racy; when weak, they might have the opposite effect (Kasfir 1998, 141).
His claim for including all voluntary organizations, instead of excluding
some by definition, is joined by Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-dia-
Wamba (1995). They show that, in various case studies, many groups in Africa—
traditional, ethnic, and/or religious—take part in or are dominated by political
struggle and thus need to be included in research on civil society in order to
come closer to reality and to enrich common knowledge. Some authors di-
rectly favor including groups with involuntary membership and kinship rela-
tions, although such would not be the case for Western conceptions of civil
society (Lewis 2002, 578–579).
Many authors assess the impact of Africa’s civil society on democratiza-
tion as very limited, because it has been fragmented and because links between
civil society organizations (social self-help groups, urban intellectuals) and the
formal political system are sometimes weak (Pinkney 2003, 104–105; Schmidt
2000, 321–323).
Chris Allen (1997) questions whether NGOs are really contributing to de-
mocratization as expected by donors. He seeks to show that NGOs normally
have no revolutionary drive and are only able to empower people. According
to this viewpoint, civil society aimed at democratization requires organizations
that claim direct political reform, something that is not common in Africa.
3. Asia. In Asia, civil society has been far less discussed. This could be
due in part to the presence of authoritarian regimes throughout Asian history.
Additionally, Asian values are unique, thereby making the Western concept of
civil society less applicable in Asia (Alagappa 2004, xii). Civil societies in
Asia are highly diverse in their composition, resources, and goals. Although a
rise of civil society organizations in Asia became noticeable during the 1980s,
a closer look at the history demonstrates that, in many Asian countries, com-
munal networks existed even during precolonial times (Alagappa 2004, xii).
Under colonial regimes, civil society organized mostly along lines of ethnicity
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14 Context: What We Already Know

and religion—thus the philanthropic engagement by Buddhist groups in Myan-

mar, Christian groups in the Philippines, and Muslim groups in Indonesia and
Malaysia (Guan 2004, 24). The role of the church has remained central to the
development of community-based organizations at the local level in the Phil-
ippines, Indonesia, and Thailand.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, civil society in Southeast Asia gradu-
ally organized in opposition to colonial and repressive regimes. Since then an
exposure to democracy and modernity within many Southeast Asian countries
penetrated the structures of family, religion, community, cultural association,
caste, and class and introduced a model of association based on “rational will”
(Dahal 2001a, 7). The effects of this paradigm shift have been diverse through-
out Asia. In some cases (Nepal, India, China), the historical asymmetries that
accumulated along lines of class, gender, and caste led civil society projects to
focus on initiating social dialogue and expressing the grievances of marginalized
constituencies (Howell 2004, 121–129; Dahal 2001a, 7; Chandhoke 2007, 32).
In Central Asia and the Caucasus, in contrast, civil society involvement
was similar to the Eastern European model. Thus, the emergence of civil soci-
ety became linked to the empowerment of dissident opposition movements to
counter suppressive regimes in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Babajanian et
al. 2005, 212). Later, some opposition movements even assumed a political role
(Ruffin and Wangh 1999, 27–31). In addition, civil society organizations based
on the communal concept of informal ties (clan, family, neighborhood) or
neopatrimonial structures continued to exist. In the case of Georgia and Arme-
nia, the church continues to play an important role in helping nurture those ties
(Babajanian et al. 2005, 214). One caution, however, is that religion also has
the potential to create more tensions between the state and civil society actors.
A common strand among countries in Asia is that civil society is still not
protected, as the state continues to be the central, and often the most repres-
sive, actor in the region. Political and economic interests steered democratiza-
tion toward a type of social organization that placed state institutions, special
interest groups, and economic sectors into a single associated sphere. As the
Asian financial crisis unfolded in the late 1990s, hopes were high for a more
active civil society involvement in negotiating a distinct atmosphere for orga-
nization and discourse. Today the relationships among state, religion, social
organization, and communal links in Asia remain tense. Empirical studies, how-
ever, tend to show a unique role for civil society organizations and their potential
to create synergies between traditional models of association and the Western
concept of civic organization.
4. The Middle East. The literature generally identifies the absence or
weakness of civil society in this region to counter strong and authoritarian
regimes. It also highlights the rejuvenation of NGOs. Intermediate powers and
autonomous social groups are dependent on state patronage (Abootalebi 1998)
in societies that have been organizing political actions along family and clan
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Understanding Civil Society 15

lines for decades. Still, one can glimpse a gradual opening of political space
under some authoritarian states due to increasing pressure from citizens (Nor-
ton 1995, 4–8).
One peculiarity is that civil society is differentiated between a “modern”
part, in the form of human rights organizations, and the “traditional” part, in
the form of Islamic movements. After September 2001, Arab human rights or-
ganizations redoubled efforts in the quest for democracy and offered, in the
view of some scholars, an alternative Arab discourse on governance (Nefissa
2007, 68). Nevertheless, they tend to be elitist and lack a genuine social basis
(Nefissa 2007, 70). The social mass basis is the cause celebre of Islamic move-
ments, traditionally active in the areas of social work and charity (Melina et al.
2005), but they are less likely to tackle political issues, at least openly.
5. Global civil society. The 1990s saw an increase in NGO activities world-
wide, especially in transnational NGOs and networks that placed important is-
sues on the international agenda, launched international campaigns (e.g., on
landmines and blood diamonds), and participated in key international confer-
ences (UN 2003). Thus they advocated for and spoke on behalf of people who
were neglected. International NGOs also conducted large and well-organized
campaigns on development issues and presented alternative viewpoints to those
of official governments and development agencies. Their involvement in the
UN system has been acknowledged, and recommendations have been made for
continuing relations and interactions into the future (UN 2003, 19–21).

The concept of a global civil society (Kaldor 2003) is debated intensively

in the literature. Some see the debate as a reflection of globalization (Cardoso
2003), with the potential to influence the framework of global governance by
promoting debate and bridging existing societal divides (Clark 2003). Critics
of the global civil society tend to focus on NGOs’ lack of legitimacy, dominance
by Western organizations in quantitative and qualitative terms, and (although
valuing the expertise and competence of international NGOs) their claim of
being “representatives of the world’s peoples” (Anderson and Rieff 2004, 35).

Civil Society in Development Cooperation

Civil society and its actors have gained an important role not only in the de-
bate over political transition but also in the practice of development coopera-
tion, at least from the mid-1980s. This shift is seen in voluntary agencies’ and
NGOs’ increased involvement in development cooperation. And it can be at-
tributed to the neoliberal development model (Debiel and Sticht 2005, 9) of
the 1980s, which encouraged skepticism toward the state and favored privati-
zation of state welfare and infrastructure services. Thus, NGOs took on new
assignments, especially within social sectors, for which the state had thereto-
fore been responsible. They increasingly took over operational tasks, in line
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16 Context: What We Already Know

with efforts to reduce the role of the state and when state weakness became
pervasive (Abiew and Keating 2004, 100–101).
A series of UN world conferences during the 1990s encouraged the forma-
tion of new NGOs and the expansion of existing ones. NGOs were presented
as alternative implementers of development assistance when states and govern-
ments in partner countries were weak or poorly performing. This ascendance of
NGOs was due to their perceived political independence, their flexibility, and
their effectiveness in reaching beneficiaries, in contrast to bureaucratic state
apparatuses. Funding of official development assistance channeled through
NGOs increased from an average of US$3.1 billion from Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in 1985–1986 to
US$7.2 billion in 2001 (Debiel and Sticht 2005, 10). Other sources mention
even higher figures (Schmidt 2000, 302).
The debate regarding developing countries was similar to discourses in
the industrialized world about the so-called third sector. The third sector
gained considerable attention in the 1990s as it started to operate outside the
confines of the state and the market, and by extension, outside government
control and beyond the profit motive. Despite some heterogeneity, the entities
of the third sector include the same range of nonprofit voluntary institutions as
does civil society. With many common features (Salamon and Anheier 1999,
4), they provide services to members and clients (Badelt 1997, 5).
However, there are also differences between the third sector and civil so-
ciety. As the third sector becomes a significant economic force, the debate cen-
ters on the types of services that can be provided and the types of organizations
(Salomon and Anheier 1997, 12–19 and 20–25). In contrast, the civil society
debate focuses on the political, social, and cultural effects of civil society or-
ganizations, especially for democratic development.
Against this background, the shift in funding through NGOs can be iden-
tified as strengthening the third sector to become a more efficient alternative
for service delivery. This shift did not aim to support the establishment of a vi-
brant civil society, although such support was often identified and labeled as
civil society support.
The political angle of civil society gained momentum at the beginning of
the 1990s as a means to improve governance and democratization. As the cold
war ended, there arose the opportunity to establish principles of good gover-
nance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law—priority objectives in
development cooperation. Thus, a vibrant civil society was considered an im-
portant pillar for establishing democracy, and support for it became an obvious
aim of democratization (Schmidt 2000, 312). Almost all international donors
mention civil society as an important factor to “influence decisions of the state”
(BMZ 2005, 3), also highlighting civil society’s responsibility for a dem-
ocratic state and its “dynamic role . . . in pushing for social, economic and po-
litical change” (DFID 2005a; 2001b) or stressing its role in encouraging open
debates on public policy (USAID 2005; Kasfir 1998).
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Understanding Civil Society 17

In practice, donors mix third sector and civil society approaches through a
combination of service delivery and advocacy. Beyond noting general and pos-
itive connotations of civil society, only a few donors undertake specific tasks.
The World Bank highlights advocacy, monitoring, and direct service delivery
as three main functions of civil society (World Bank 2003a, 3). Other donors
justify combining these tasks, given their interconnectedness. The potential of
community-based organizations to advocate for the poor is enhanced by the le-
gitimacy provided by the effective delivery of services (DFID 2001a, 5).
NGOs’ involvement in development cooperation, and especially in civil
society, has been widely acknowledged but also criticized (Debiel and Sticht
2005, 11). Critics point out that funding for civil society has concentrated on
NGOs, that NGOs are less independent from governments, and that accounta-
bility to local people and communities is weak. A main critique is that support
for civil society has been concentrated on international and national NGOs
(Stewart 1997, 26) at the expense of other civil society actors that have broader
membership. For example, trade unions and other mass organizations could
guarantee more participation than NGOs with a very limited membership base
(Bliss 2003, 198). NGO performance in democratization can also be ques-
tioned, because some NGOs are personally or institutionally tied to the govern-
ment, thus making it difficult to become a counterweight to existing regimes.
Political scientists also argue that international NGOs are not as indepen-
dent from donor governments as they often claim. As donors at least partly
outsource the implementation of development cooperation, official and non-
government aid become closely intertwined (Debiel and Sticht 2005, 12), rais-
ing doubts about the actual independence of NGOs.
The legitimacy of NGOs is also questioned, largely due to the prevailing
division of labor. Funds are channeled from donor governments to northern
NGOs, which then subcontract implementation to southern NGOs (Neubert
2001, 61). It has been observed that southern NGOs are accountable only to
their northern counterparts rather than local constituencies. Thus, many NGOs
are regarded as consultants or small businesses with purely economic interests
(Bliss 2003, 198; Schmidt 2000, 306). The modern southern NGO represents
a new type of organization: nonprofit, but acting like a commercial consulting
firm (Neubert 2001, 63) financed by external mandates. Some critics fear that
commercialization of civil society, especially the commercialization of advo-
cacy or public policy work, discourages more legitimate local actors that are not
receiving funds (Pouligny 2005, 499) from participating or becoming more ac-
tive. Civic engagement is at risk of being dominated by the commercial NGOs,
which in the long run weakens the development of a vibrant civil society.

Civil Society and Armed Conflict

Armed conflict has become a major factor in foreign policy and international
cooperation. The following section reviews the general aspects of civil society
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18 Context: What We Already Know

within situations of armed conflict. Many more details can be found in the case
studies (Part 2, Chapters 5–15). Any analysis of civil society’s role must con-
sider that armed conflict dramatically changes the lives of all people at all lev-
els, from individual changes in attitudes and behavior (trust and confidence)
over economic and social change to ultimate shifts of power relations in com-
munities, regions, and society. This also changes the enabling environment for
civil society (security, the legal situation, and law enforcement). It is virtually
self-evident that “civil society . . . tends to shrink in a war situation, as the
space for popular, voluntary and independent organizing diminishes” (Orjuela
2004, 59).

Deterioration of an Enabling Environment

Many case studies are available on changes in community structures, groups,
and single actors due to war and conflict (Pouligny 2005, 498), although there
is still a lack of empirically based research. Generally, case studies are not di-
rectly linked to the debate on civil society. Nevertheless, a few common pat-
terns are valid in all or most contexts. The conditions necessary for civil
society to develop tend to worsen due to armed conflict: physical infrastruc-
ture is destroyed, limiting the propensity for communication and exchange;
state structures and institutions to which civil society addresses its activities
are weakened or nonresponsive; security is low and the overall situation is
characterized by complete or partial lawlessness; basic human rights are sup-
pressed, limiting even basic civil society activities; trust disappears, and social
capital beyond family, clan, or ethnic affiliation is destroyed (Stiefel 2001,
265); and free and independent media are not present or are severely restricted,
depriving civil society groups of one of their main communication channels to
other civil society groups, the general public, as well as government and state
structures.
This deterioration of the enabling environment causes a decline of civil
society activity and makes recovery after war difficult. Insecurity and fear, in-
duced by years of civil war, hinder people from participating in even local
community development, as they tend to carefully observe the new power re-
lations after the conflict (Pearce 2005). This decline is also due to the fact that
many civil society actors go into exile in times of conflict, thereby weakening
the capacity of the organizations that remain, although in some cases diaspora
communities remain active from afar.

“Uncivil” Sides of Civil Society

Actors adapt to the difficult environment and new power relations. Especially
when the state is weak, the influence of uncivil, xenophobic, or mafia-like
groups tends to become stronger (Belloni 2006, 8–9), limiting the potential in-
fluence of civil society groups working for cross-ethnic understanding. This en-
hances the danger that groups will develop into uncivil actors, due to conflict
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Understanding Civil Society 19

and aggravated by economic decline, social stress, ubiquitous violence, and

the separation of civil society along ethnic fissures (Schmidt 2003, 323–324).
This is likely enhanced by peoples’ natural reaction in conflict to strengthen
bonds to ethnic and language groups, a protective mechanism when the state
is unable or unwilling to guarantee security (Bogner 2004). Arne Strand et al.
(2003, 2) confirm that civil society groups at the local level revert to “primary
groupings” such as kinship, tribal, religious, and traditional political struc-
tures, as well as communities (Pouligny 2005, 498). These groups serve as
coping strategies for people in response to state collapse.
Civil society groups might become instrumentalized by political elites on
the basis of ethnicism, which in some cases can lead to the “decivilization” of
society, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Rüb 2003, 173–201). The decay of state
and other institutional structures drove people into ethnic networks that perpe-
trated violence against other ethnic groups. During conflict and immediately
after, civil society tends to be organized along conflict lines, fostering clien-
telism, reinforcing societal cleavages, and hindering democratization.
Large aid inflows also affect the social fabric and power relations in and
after conflict. Mary Anderson (1999, 37–53) analyzed how aid can actually do
harm, inciting conflict through unintended consequences, including favoring
recipients of one side, fostering intergroup conflict through unfairly distrib-
uted benefits, releasing funds for war through aid delivery, and destroying
local markets.

Ambivalent Effects of Civil Society Support

There are also concerns that the dominant position of NGOs in humanitarian
crises and postconflict settings (Abiew and Keating 2004, 101) will further
destabilize and disempower already weak state structures. This situation might
inadvertently enhance authoritarian regimes, for “soft” NGOs normally lack
the power to exert pressure on regimes. Supporting civil society and rebuild-
ing social capital are difficult under such circumstances (Coletta et al. 2000).
Power struggles with conflict entrepreneurs may continue in the aftermath of
war. Local authorities may contest the space of civil society (Strand et al. 2003,
20), and illegal practices can become widespread. A report analyzing civil so-
ciety organizations in three conflict-affected states in Africa states that CSOs
were often driven into social service delivery and away from advocacy and gov-
ernance, which was also attributed to government attitudes that regard advo-
cacy less positively compared to service provision (World Bank 2005, 10). The
report also states that CSOs were sometimes exclusionary and even reinforced
divisions between groups; sometimes vulnerable groups were not represented,
and beneficiary participation was less widespread than commonly assumed
(World Bank 2005, 13–16). Accountability of CSOs vis-à-vis local communi-
ties was seen as low, as was transparency. Because legal frameworks did not
provide accountability mechanisms, some fraudulent CSOs took advantage of
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20 Context: What We Already Know

this vacuum to defraud communities (World Bank 2005, 16). Furthermore, they
developed higher responsiveness upward to donors rather than downward to
beneficiaries (World Bank 2005, 16).

Two Different Research Approaches to Analyze Civil Society

Based on this account of civil society discourse and practice in different con-
texts, and in light of the relevant literature, two approaches for analyzing civil
society can be identified: actor-oriented and functional.

Actor-Oriented Approaches
Actor-oriented approaches concentrate on the performance and features of
civil society actors. These research designs have major shortcomings.
They often use only one civil society model (typically, inspired by one of
the above-mentioned philosophers) and then examine it. However, there are
many civil society models (or functions; see below) that are of equal impor-
tance; at the very least, no single approach can be prioritized. Thus, some per-
formances of civil society might remain hidden by actor-oriented research.
Actor-oriented research often also examines only organizations with specific
objectives and sometimes even specific “civil” behavior. Other organizations
are—more or less arbitrarily—excluded by definition from being considered
within the definition of civil society. Thus, important players are either over-
looked or given short shrift, and the role of not-so-important players can actu-
ally be overestimated (Kasfir 1998, 127). This will conceal rather than explain
realities. One example is the case of ethnic groupings or fundamentalist reli-
gious organizations that are excluded for reasons not made entirely transparent
(Kasfir 1998) or due to the perception that they are “uncivil.” This perception
stems from the requirement among some authors that civil society actors must
respect the values of nonviolence and mutual tolerance to fit the criteria
(Merkel and Lauth 1998, 7). This is also the case for research concentrating
only on modern, urban NGOs, thereby inadvertently failing to consider tradi-
tional, rural groupings (see, e.g., DAC 2005, equating civil society with NGOs).
To exclude by definition some potential actors, and to systematically ne-
glect functions of civil society actors that might actually play important roles,
limit the findings of relevant research.
For empirical research to produce relevant findings on how civil society
works within society and for political transformation, a different and much
more open approach is necessary. This can be found in the functional approach.

Functional Approaches
In contrast to actor-oriented models, the functional approach concedes that
various models or concepts of civil society exist, none of which is prioritized
over others. The concepts can be distinguished by the function that civil society
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Understanding Civil Society 21

performs. The two main authors who have elaborated functional approaches
are summarized below.

Merkel and Lauth’s function model. One school of thought, from German po-
litical scientists, presents a model of five specific functions of civil society.
These functions are identified from research on system transformation in East-
ern Europe and enriched by practical case studies on the role of civil society
in different contexts (Merkel and Lauth 1998; Merkel 2000; Croissant et al.
2000; Lauth 2003). This model views civil society not as a specific historic
form, but as an analytical category. This decoupling from history helps to dis-
till the functions of civil society as they relate to democracy and to analyze dif-
ferent regional or cultural contexts and societal conditions. The five essential
functions of civil society are:

1. Protection. Civil society is the social sphere beyond the state in which
citizens, endowed with rights, are free to organize their lives without
state interference. The state has to ensure protection of the private sphere.
The task of civil society is to remind the state of this warrant and, if
needed, compel the state to honor it.
2. Intermediation between state and citizens. Civil society must ensure a
balance between central authority and social networks, a precondition
for safeguarding the rule of law. This function focuses on the perma-
nent exchange of self-organized associations with the state in order to
control, limit, and influence the activities of the state.
3. Participatory socialization. This function stresses that civil society and
associations are schools of democracy. People learn how to execute
their democratic rights, even on a basic level. People will acquire the
capacities of being citizens, participating in public life and developing
trust, confidence, tolerance, and acceptance. This also supports the de-
centralization of power and the creation of solidarity among citizens,
both of which act as defense mechanisms against possible attacks on
freedoms.
4. Community-building and integration. Civil society is seen as a catalyst
for civil virtues or as an antidote to individualism and retreat to family
and statism. Thus, participation in social organizations helps to bridge
societal cleavages, to create civil virtues, and to foster social cohesion.
It also satisfies the needs of individuals to develop bonds and attach-
ments. One precondition is that the self-organization of civil society does
not take place purely under ethnic, religious, or racist premises.
5. Communication. Public communication is the core function of civil soci-
ety in deliberative democracy models. It stresses the importance of a free
public sphere, separated from the state and the economy, where people
have room for debate, participation, and democratic decisionmaking.
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22 Context: What We Already Know

Civil society and its associations—besides political parties and parlia-

ments—have a major role to establish this “democratic public” and to
act as watchdog. Actors of spontaneous groups, organizations, and so-
cial movements are able to articulate concerns and problems and trans-
fer them from the private sphere to the political agenda.

Comparative empirical research has demonstrated that these five func-

tions are not mutually exclusive but rather tend to complement one another in
fostering democracy. Depending on the context, it also suggests that some
functions seem to be more basic (e.g., protection), in that they are essential
during the immediate phase of democratic system change. Other functions (in-
tegration) gain more importance only in the later stages of consolidating de-
mocracy (Croissant et al. 2000, 37–41). Further research is needed to see
whether the internal organization of civil society groups will determine whether
they are able to perform their functions not only in immediate system change
but also in a consolidated democratic society. In this phase, community-building
and integration usually play important roles that are seemingly difficult to
achieve by organizations with undemocratic organizational setups (Lauth 2003,
225–227).

Edwards’s roles model. Michael Edwards made a similar attempt to structure

the meanings of civil society. Out of the diversity of concepts offered by mul-
tiple actors regarding civil society, and “recognizing that civil society does in-
deed mean different things to different people” (Edwards 2004, 3), he elaborated
three roles.

• Civil society as associational life. Civil society is the world of voluntary

associations that act as “gene carriers” for developing values such
as tolerance and cooperation. This is the central role that the “neo-
Tocquevillian school” ascribes to a rich associational life (Edwards
2004, 18–36).
• Civil society as the good society. The second role sets this rich associ-
ational life in context, fostering positive norms and values and empha-
sizing that activities must be geared toward specific social and political
goals (Edwards 2004, 37–53). By this, Edwards, like many others, ex-
cludes the “uncivil” side of civil society by definition and highlights the
learning of democratic or social behavior.
• Civil society as the public sphere. The third role of civil society is to
provide a public sphere wherein citizens can debate the great questions
of the day and negotiate a constantly evolving sense of common good
and public interest. This role is central for finding proper solutions and
decisionmaking in society. It is central for civil society and crucial for
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Understanding Civil Society 23

democracy to interact fairly in the public sphere. This means a willingness

to cede some territory to others, to develop shared interests, and to de-
liberate democratically. (Edwards 2004, 54–71)

Edwards’s main hypothesis is that each of these roles alone cannot achieve
effective social change and other positive outcomes normally attributed to civil
society. Thus, he calls for the integration or synthesis of the different roles and
to consider them comprehensively when supporting civil society initiatives
(Edwards 2004, 10). This will balance the weaknesses of each role with the
strengths of the others. Edwards’s model concurs with most of those suggested
in Merkel and Lauth’s model.

Additional Functions in Development Cooperation

Reviewing the models for civil society in development cooperation, we can
see that much more emphasis is given to service delivery. Donors assign ser-
vice delivery a higher priority under the guise of improving living conditions
(SIDA 2005). This reflects the fact that the third sector approach is equated
with civil society democracy discourse. Even though Edwards highlights the
service provision role of NGOs in “deliberate substitution for the state” (2004,
14), democracy theory attributes no role to service delivery, seen as not di-
rectly related to democratization (Merkel and Lauth 1998, 10).
In addition, monitoring government activities, holding institutions to ac-
count, and fostering transparency and accountability (World Bank 2003a, 3)
can be considered as separate functions of civil society that go unmentioned in
Merkel and Lauth’s model, yet they are closely related to communication and
protection functions.
The other functions mentioned in the context of development cooperation
can be attributed to civil society functions under Merkel and Lauth’s model.
Stimulating a dialogue between civil society and government (DFID 2001a,
4–5) can be equated with the intermediation function, whereas advocating on
behalf of the poor and channeling the views of the people to the political sys-
tem (DFID 2001b, 11) clearly belong to Merkel and Lauth’s public communi-
cation function.
It is important to emphasize that civil society is considered a positive
force in the development cooperation discourse. The “dark” or “uncivil” side
of civil society does not seem to be considered in analysis or project design.

An Extended Functional Approach:

Seven Basic Functions of Civil Society
Combining Merkel and Lauth’s five functions, which already encompass those
of Edwards’s roles model, with two new functions contributed by development
cooperation practice, a new model of civil society is achieved. This model is
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24 Context: What We Already Know

composed of seven functions and enables an in-depth understanding of civil

society’s detailed role in political, social, and development processes. The seven
functions are:

1. Protection of citizens. This basic function of civil society is protecting

lives, freedom, and property against attacks and despotism by the state
and other authorities. It is based on the work of Locke.
2. Monitoring for accountability. This function consists of monitoring the
activities of central powers, state apparatuses, and government. This is
also a way to control central authorities and hold them to account.
Monitoring can refer to human rights, public spending, corruption, and
primary school enrollment. The function is based on Montesquieu’s
separation of powers, but it is enhanced by development cooperation
perspectives.
3. Advocacy and public communication. An important task of civil society
is its ability to articulate interests—especially of marginalized groups—
and to create channels of communication in order to bring them to the
public agenda, thereby raising public awareness and facilitating debate.
In development cooperation, this Habermasian function is described as
advocacy.
4. Socialization. With its rich associational life, civil society contributes
to the formation and practice of democratic attitudes among citizens.
People learn to develop tolerance, mutual trust, and the ability to com-
promise through democratic procedures. Thus, democracy is ensured
not only by legal institutions but also by citizens’ habits.
5. Building community. Engagement and participation in voluntary asso-
ciations also has the potential to strengthen bonds among citizens,
building social capital. In cases where associations include members
from other ethnic or social groups, it also bridges societal cleavages
and contributes to social cohesion.
6. Intermediation and facilitation between citizens and state. Civil society
and its organizations fulfill the role of balancing the power of, and nego-
tiating with, the state at different levels (local, regional, national). It es-
tablishes diverse relations (communication, negotiation, control) among
various interest groups or between independent institutions and the state.
This role echoes the work of Montesquieu.
7. Service delivery. The direct provision of services to citizens is an im-
portant activity of civil society associations, such as self-help groups.
Especially in cases where the state is weak, it becomes essential to pro-
vide shelter, health, and education. Although organizations executing
civil society functions also provide services to members and clients,
the functional model centers on political functions and objectives—in
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Understanding Civil Society 25

contrast to the third sector debate that focuses on services and eco-
nomic objectives. Thus, service delivery as a function is considered an
entry point for other civil society functions, but this should be based on
a careful assessment of whether the specific service is indeed a good
entry point for those objectives.

Comparing the two main approaches, the functional model (more so than
the actor-oriented model) is conducive to developing an in-depth analysis and
understanding of civil society’s influence. The functional approach comprises
all potential civil society actors, including nonurban, religious, and ethnic or-
ganizations, as well as actors belonging to other sectors (e.g., business) but
sometimes playing a civil society role (e.g., the business association making a
political demand on the government). Breaking down activities by function
takes into account the performance of other actors; it also adds detail and depth
of knowledge. And it enables cross-country comparisons due to the fact that
functions can be more easily compared than actors in different contexts.

Limitations and Clarifications of the Functional Model

The scope of civil society functions. Constructive civil society functions are
not exclusively provided by civil society actors. They are also provided by
other actors in society. Protection, for example, should be primarily provided
by the state, the judiciary, and law enforcement authorities. Yet, democratic at-
titudes are also learned in voluntary associations, as well as in the classroom,
family, and community. Additionally, public communication is organized by
an independent and diverse media, an actor belonging to the economic sector
or the state; civil society usually provides only small contributions.

“Uncivil” or bad civil society actors. Although Merkel and Lauth require that
civil society needs to be civil—thereby excluding groups that show uncivil be-
havior—the functional model includes “uncivil” actors and tries to identify
constructive as well as destructive performances.
Obviously, many civil society actors might not fulfill one or more of the
constructive functions, but instead develop uncivil behaviors, such as preaching
hatred against others, being violent, and destroying life and property. Associ-
ations and organizations can be destructive, but they can also have integrative
and disintegrative potential. On-the-ground knowledge and sound analysis are
required to determine the nature of actors and the functions they perform.
Roberto Belloni (2006, 8–10) provides a range of examples from Africa, Sri
Lanka, and Northern Ireland in which civil society actors focused only on
strengthening their bonding ties, based on a sense of belonging and kinship that
were later channeled destructively. He presumes that the less bridging ties are
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26 Context: What We Already Know

built, the more likely it is that influence is to be detrimental. Although addi-

tional research is needed on the conditions under which civil society organiza-
tions act positively and negatively, it is important to keep in mind the potential
for detrimental effects.
The discussion and emphasis on civility are akin to Putnam’s distinction
between good (or positive) and bad (or negative) social capital. Good social
capital is built when associations develop strong bridging ties—such as in-
cluding members from other ethnic or social groupings—whereas bad social
capital is characterized only by bonding ties or strong inward social capital.
Such social capital is usually evident when only members from the same eth-
nic or social grouping are included. They are more inclined to act violently
against others in comparison to associations that have stronger bridging ties
(Putnam 2000, 22–23).

The role of civil society toward the state and within society. The constructive
civil society functions do not describe the enabling environment in which they
operate. However, it is clear that civil society should not replace the state and
other actors within political society. Rather, it should improve the interplay of
citizens with the state and achieve a greater level of effectiveness and respon-
siveness for state institutions (Croissant et al. 2000, 17; Merkel and Lauth
1998, 7; Kumar 1993). Thus, especially when the state is fragile or authoritar-
ian, external support may need to focus, at least initially, on improving the en-
abling environment for civil society. This might encompass capacity-building
for state structures and enforcement of the rule of law.

Service delivery as an entry point. The above-mentioned functions aim to im-

prove the interplay between political and economic systems and the people,
thus ensuring democratic, participatory decisionmaking in society. Thus, ser-
vice delivery is only seen as a function in its own right when used as an entry
point for political civil society functions, which in any event should be based
on a careful assessment of whether the service is indeed a good entry point for
wider functions and objectives.

* * *

This chapter summarizes the history of the concept of civil society, as well as
the debates on civil society in various contexts, mainly political transition, de-
velopment cooperation, and violent conflict. It distilled the main approaches
for analyzing and understanding civil society. On this basis, the chapter elab-
orates on an extended functional approach that captures the different meanings
of civil society in one model for conducting empirical research on civil soci-
ety’s contribution for different purposes.
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Understanding Civil Society 27

Note
The author thanks Thania Paffenholz for the intensive discussions and inspiring com-
ments on the analysis and understanding of civil society. Special thanks go to Siegmar
Schmidt and Roberto Belloni for their in-depth comments, to Mariya Nikolova for her
assistance with the sections on civil society in Asia and the Middle East, and to Reiner
Forster for his initiative in starting this research.
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2
Civil Society and the State
Kjell Erling Kjellman
and Kristian Berg Harpviken

Within the peacebuilding paradigm, there has been a strong focus

on strengthening and building state institutions, with parallel initiatives aimed
at promoting civil society. This is not surprising given that the modern demo-
cratic state is seen as both a logical unit of analysis and a solution to political
disorder, a notion that became entrenched during the second half of the twen-
tieth century as Western states enhanced their standing following World War
II (Milliken 2003). Reinforced by scholarly thinking in the 1950s and 1960s,
leaders of burgeoning democracies in Latin America and Asia came to believe
in the power of the state to shape societies and economies. Great expectations
regarding the creation of bureaucratic state organizations became the recipe for
achieving social order, with an emphasis on the power of a state independent
of powerful social groups. The belief in the sweeping capacities of governance
institutions remained prominent well into the 1980s, informed in part by the
efforts of social scientists (Migdal 2001).
The concept of civil society has a long tradition within the social sciences
and has experienced a resurgence given its presumed role in facilitating devel-
opment, harnessing the power of governments, and enacting social change more
generally (Colás 2002). Among policymakers, renewed interest in the interac-
tion between the state and civil society finds its roots in Western liberal theory
and the concept of “liberal peace.”
This focus on states and civil society has occurred in tandem with the in-
tensified involvement of the international community in attempting to rebuild
so-called failed states and to lay the institutional groundwork to promote eco-
nomic development (Bates 2008; Englebert and Tull 2008; Tschirgi 2004, 4–5;
Milliken 2003). The eagerness of the international community, however, has
not necessarily been guided by a research-based understanding of the challenges
and potential pitfalls facing such efforts. Within scholarly research, the state

29
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30 Context: What We Already Know

has figured heavily by virtue of its presumptive capacity to shape political

processes, its role vis-à-vis society writ large, and its relative strength in various
policy domains, as well as in response to the need to account for the factors that
have shaped the formation and organization of states in different parts of the
world (Evans et al. 1985). As Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk (2006)
have pointed out, the effectiveness of civil society as a positive force in peace-
building is reliant on the framework of a functioning state.1 Simultaneously, the
state, in all its constituent parts, is itself deeply embedded in civil society.
The role of the state and its relationship to civil society raise a central con-
cern. Although research tends to operate with a clear separation, focusing ex-
clusively either on the state or on civil society, this is more often a point of
emphasis than empirical reality. From the sociohistorical perspective, lines be-
tween the state and civil society are blurred, with each being integral in shap-
ing the other. There is broad recognition that civil society–state interaction was
vital in the formation of European nation-states, as well as in non-Western con-
texts. Nonetheless, there has been a tendency to conceive of the state and civil
society as two autonomous spheres (see Chapter 1 in this volume), a view that
implicitly informs parts of the present-day statebuilding agenda. In reality,
where states have developed as a result of sociohistorical processes, they bear
the imprint of civil society. State institutions, for instance, will tend to be struc-
tured as a result of the enfranchisement of civic actors, embodied in legal rights,
political representation, and interest mediation. Furthermore, even though the
role of civil society has figured heavily in the discourse on statebuilding, this
is far less frequently reflected in practice. Rather, the emphasis has tended to
be on the engagement of political elites and the construction of recognizable—
at least from a Western perspective—political institutions (Paris and Sisk 2008).
In this chapter we seek to provide an understanding of why statebuilding
by external actors is often problematic; we discuss the relationship between
states, statebuilding, and the role of civil society in postconflict situations. We
sketch out how social science analyses have conceived of the development of
modern states and review externally driven statebuilding projects. In the final
sections, we reflect on the linkages between the state and civil society, indicat-
ing the manner in which conflict transforms the relationship between the state
and civil society across the political, economic, and security dimensions.

State Formation in Historical Perspective

Writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber formulated the
most enduring definition of the state. In Weber’s formulation, a state can be
most concisely conceived of as a central authority structure with legitimate
means over coercion within a given territory (Weber 1978). In extending this
definition, a decisive criterion for the modern, democratic nation-state is that
there is a break between governmental authority and inherited privilege in the
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Civil Society and the State 31

hands of elites—in essence a separation between the social structure and the
exercise of judicial and administrative functions. This includes the expansion
of a uniform central authority across the entire national territory through the con-
struction of a modern bureaucratic infrastructure, replacing patrimonial practices
and personnel (Bendix 1977, 128). In an ideal sense, fully functioning states
have the ability and the capacity to enforce political decisions through hierar-
chic steering with authoritative decisionmaking and material sovereignty (Risse
and Lehmkuhl 2006, 9).
Social-science analyses of state formation have been varied and far-reaching.
For Weber, state formation resulted from the struggle between patrimonial rulers
and their staffs over control of the “means of administration,” such as the
rights to and income from offices (Weber 1978). War and preparations for war
are seen as having played a key role in consolidating state institutions. One of
the earliest state theorists, Otto Hintze, argues that military pressure—war it-
self as well as the threat of war—was what drove rulers in medieval and early
modern Europe to concentrate power in their own hands through the construc-
tion of professional bureaucracies capable of administering standing armies
and the infrastructure to support them (Hintze, 1970 [1906]). Financing stand-
ing armies encouraged the growth of urban economies and accompanying bu-
reaucracies as rulers needed a means to extract taxes in order to finance standing
armies. This, in turn, proved instrumental to the development and expansion
of administrative, financial, military, and judicial infrastructures as a way to
administer preparations for war (Tilly 1990 [1975]).
A somewhat different line of reasoning points to state formation as the prod-
uct of class struggle and the advancement of modern capitalism. In the early
modern period, capitalism was sustained through the formation of a stable po-
litical and institutional framework that could foster and sustain economic in-
terests. This process, in part, entailed the deliberate efforts of elites as a way
to promote representation and their own legitimacy. There is little consensus as
to what makes a state legitimate in the eyes of its citizens; therefore, one of the
tasks facing states has been to find ways in which to legitimate its standing,
such as through increased (real or perceived) democratization—for instance, by
creating democratic institutions and including previously disenfranchised
groups. One important example: states in post–World War II Europe sought to
strengthen legitimacy by granting new rights to previously excluded groups
(Milliken and Krause 2003). Disenfranchised groups have also sought to ex-
pand the institutional role and domain of the nation-state, claiming new rights
based on previously excluded identities or claims, such as through social mo-
bilizations from below in the quest for equal citizenship (Bendix 1977).
Scholarly work on state formation outside Europe and North America has,
to a greater extent, recognized the role of civil society in shaping state institu-
tions. In contrast to Europe at the time of state formation, nations in other parts
of the world have been characterized by somewhat more complex divisions along
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32 Context: What We Already Know

tribal, kinship, ethnic, and religious lines. Whereas the class structure in Europe
tended to consolidate the position of elites, rulers in developing countries re-
sorted to the use of despotic power due to their inability to create efficient state
administrative apparatuses, thus limiting the development of infrastructural
power, a problem exacerbated by the legacy of colonialism. The composition
of society found in many non-Western contexts—with the fragmented patterns
of kinship and tribal organization—also makes it far more difficult for states
to consolidate power and implement a prefectoral system. As Joel S. Migdal
(1988) has argued, strong postcolonial states emerged in cases where the colo-
nial power encouraged the consolidation of groups under a single aegis; in in-
stances where the colonial power pursued a strategy of fragmenting social
control at the local societal level, a weak state emerged (Thomas 2003). At the
same time, it has often been noted that the conceptualization of civil society in
non-Western contexts tends to operate with a somewhat restricted notion of
civil society, focusing primarily on its more visible and readily recognizable—
at least from a Western perspective—elements (Kasfir 1998; Harpviken and
Kjellman 2004).

The State-in-Society
A problem is that many state-oriented scholars have followed Weber’s empha-
sis of the state as an autonomous organization vested with the means through
which to dominate, but in the process they neglected the role of civil society.
This view still holds sway with respect to present statebuilding efforts. State
formation processes are by definition ongoing and incomplete: “even modern
Western European states today do not always reach the Weberian pinnacle in
which a rationalized central bureaucracy enjoys a monopoly of organized vio-
lence over a given territory and population” (Milliken and Krause 2003, 3).
This point is even more relevant in other parts of the world. States labeled as
“failed” states on the African continent never resembled the ideal type of the
modern Western polity even prior to their disruption (Englebert and Tull 2008,
111–112).
In practice, however, what we now conceive of as civil society played an
active role in shaping state formation, although in a very different form from
what we recognize in contemporary societies; states, in turn, played a key role
in shaping civil society. The formation of states, as many of these accounts
point out, resulted from a process of contestation among ruling elites and soci-
etal interests, a feature that characterizes modern Western democracies as well
as those in non-Western contexts to the present day. As a result, what we now
consider developed states—such as those in Europe—became so through a con-
tinual process of contestation and negotiation, engaging statemakers and vari-
ous societal groups. In this respect, the key to understanding state formation lies
in the interaction between those seeking power, organized societal interests,
and the composition of social cleavages.
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Civil Society and the State 33

While Weber sought to describe an ideal-type state, a lofty level of func-

tioning that few would in reality attain, scholars and practitioners have often
conflated the ideal with reality: “Weber’s use of an ideal type state monopo-
lizing legitimate force and ruling through rational laws gives scholars precious
few ways to talk about real-life states that do not meet this ideal. Weber’s def-
inition has the state firing on all cylinders, and, while he certainly did not mean
the ideal type to be taken as the normal type, this is precisely what has hap-
pened in subsequent scholarship” (Migdal 2001, 14). As Migdal goes on to
argue, the problem arises because states are continually measured against an
ideal that few are likely to achieve. Moreover, it provides little room to theo-
rize about the negotiation, interaction, and practice that goes on in society, and
it provides no space for conceiving of arenas of competing sets of rules apart
from casting them as negatives, conceptualized as failures, nonstates, or weak
states (Migdal 2001, 15). Although the elite-capitalism perspective goes some-
what farther in according societal groups an active role in state formation, it
nevertheless places the role of elites and the ruling class at the forefront.
Conceiving of the state as embedded in a matrix of social interaction can
provide a way out of this somewhat myopic view. While theorists such as Otto
Hintze and Max Weber conceptualized the state as an autonomous actor within
society, elite-capitalists argued for a more society-centered view of the state.
The so-called state-in-society approach extends this line of reasoning and, in
the process, posits an alternative to Weber’s classic conceptualization. Migdal
(2001, 15–16) defines the state-in-society as “a field of power marked by the
use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, control-
ling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded
by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts.”2 Here, the
state is seen in terms of two key aspects: images and practices. The image of
a state refers to the perception of a dominant, integrated, autonomous entity
that maintains control over a territory, establishing rules or permitting others
to make rules in certain circumstances (e.g., business, clubs, and organizations).
Practices are the repeated acts of states and leaders over time that serve to re-
inforce and validate the territorial element of state control, as well as the social
separation between the state and other social institutions (Migdal 2001, 18).
The state-in-society perspective has a number of implications for under-
standing the relationship between civil society and the state. It contends that
the state is embedded in societal and cultural practices and is rooted in broader
societal traditions. It is, therefore, difficult to divorce the way the state is com-
posed from its broader context; the focus on images suggests that the way in
which citizens will perceive the state differs between contexts. From an ana-
lytic standpoint, this opens the door for making contestation between ruling
elites, political actors, and various societal actors—including civil society ac-
tors—the unit of analysis. States may not be as cohesive and unitary, as is often
posited by the Weberian ideal. Thus the focus shifts to the dynamic interaction
between societal groups as they compete for political power and influence,
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34 Context: What We Already Know

viewing the outcomes of this contestation as the key in state formation. More-
over, the focus on contestation is consistent with present-day democratization
processes, as, for example, social movements mobilize in order to increase cit-
izens’ rights and privileges, or as European states attempt to incorporate new
ethnic and religious minorities.
The experience of statehood in non-Western contexts underscores the per-
spective that Migdal introduced. Approaches that seek to posit a clear separa-
tion between the state, on the one hand, and civil society on the other, whereby
civil society is seen purely as playing a mediating role between the state and
citizens, do not capture the negotiation process that characterizes state forma-
tion (Skocpol et al. 2000; Evans 1995; Janoski 1998). Civil society is often por-
trayed as creating the social capital (cooperation and trust) for effective state
performance. The ability of civil society to mediate between state institutions
and the concerns of citizens, as well as generating civic cooperation and trust,
is dependent on a state that is effective in formulating rules and regulations
that allow civil society to develop (Jalali 2002, 123). In other words, the involve-
ment of civil society groups in decisionmaking and policymaking processes is
contingent on institutional guarantees for participation, along with state struc-
tures democratic enough to facilitate a constructive role for civil society. Al-
though the role of civil society varies from context to context, some of the
more central tasks of civil society (emphasized by Spurk in Chapter 1 of this
volume) are the articulation of citizen concerns, advocacy, community-building,
and the provision of necessary services. Institutional analysts have further pointed
out that creative government action has the potential to foster social capital,
and the linking of mobilized citizens to public agencies can promote govern-
ment efficacy through a combination of strong public institutions and orga-
nized communities (Evans 1995, 30).
The state-in-society approach can be instrumental in understanding the
oft-posited dichotomy between “strong” and “weak” states. In this view, states
are not inherently strong or weak as a function of their institutional composi-
tion, but rather as a reflection of the underlying social structure. In societies
with fragmented social control, states are likely to be characterized by the con-
trol of so-called strongmen: local leaders who exert an undue influence on insti-
tutions, bureaucrats, and officials. When such structures are weak, state officials
are provided a greater opportunity to apply uniform rules and policies—those
of the state—and are more able to pursue broad policy and social agendas. In
this respect, weak or ineffective political institutions are not random or necessar-
ily geographically determined. Rather, they are systematic from the standpoint
of how power, wealth, and social control are distributed in society (Migdal 2001,
58–94). Thus, constructing political organizations with the hope that they will
evolve into effective and democratic institutions with time is not sufficient. In-
stead, the key to building viable state institutions lies in addressing underlying
issues of power disparities and social control.
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Civil Society and the State 35

“Creating” New States Through Statebuilding

Although the collapse of the Soviet bloc may have defused the potential for
conflict between the world’s superpowers, it precipitated a new wave of unrest
and civil conflict in other parts of the world (Harbom and Wallensteen 2007).
The result was a series of civil conflicts that led to extended interventions by
the international community. Since the end of the cold war, the number of states
under postconflict international tutelage has subsequently been on the rise
(Hänggi 2005). International actors have frequently operated with a compre-
hensive—and often self-imposed—mandate to influence social and political
affairs in postconflict contexts (Caparini 2005). One central critique of many
initial peacebuilding schemes is that they failed to build institutional foundations
for sustainable governance (Paris 2004). Thus, agencies such as the United Na-
tions began to emphasize the construction of legitimate state institutions in an
effort to promote lasting peace and to prevent the resumption of violence. This
has occurred in tandem with—at least at the policy level—promoting the role
of civil society, recognizing that states are rarely effective in the absence of
strong societies, whereby local ownership and local-level processes come to be
seen as integral components in promoting the efficacy of governments (Paris
and Sisk 2008; Evans 1995, 30).
These efforts can be said to be anchored in a Weberian notion of the state,
emphasizing state development at the institutional level, focused on the rule of
law and legitimacy. Current statebuilding initiatives are based on the notion
that cooperation between international and domestic leaders, the mobilization
of sufficient resources, and the involvement of citizens represent the key to
building democratic national institutions (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). How-
ever, statebuilding endeavors tend to rely heavily on quick fixes such as rapid
elections and economic privatization. Efforts have been aimed largely at se-
curing optimal institutional conditions for promoting liberal economic reforms
and transitioning to democracy as quickly as possible. The emphasis has thus
been on the promotion of institutional reforms, good governance, multiparty
elections, constitutionalism, the rule of law, human and minority rights, gender
equality, economic liberalization, and security-sector reform (Tschirgi 2004;
Kolås and Miklian 2008).
On the African continent, for example, there has been a notable failure to
build functioning democracies despite concerted efforts to build political insti-
tutions as well as civil society. As Nelson Kasfir (1998) has argued, the prob-
lem in large part stems from the fact that promoting civil society has entailed a
Western bias of what these civil society organizations should be, in the process
excluding many ethnic organizations, as some of these are seen as politically
unpalatable. However, it is these ethnic organizations that constitute the most
vital part of civil society in many parts of Africa. Thus, the failure to promote
democracy in Africa has stemmed partially from a failure to recognize and ac-
cept social realities (even though supporting them may present donors and other
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36 Context: What We Already Know

external actors with a dilemma) and the need for political institutions and civil
society to reflect one another.
In the statebuilding discourse during the twenty-first century, there has
been considerable attention paid to the potential role of civil society (Posner
2004). However, this has not necessarily been converted into practice (Harp-
viken and Kjellman 2004). Much of the statebuilding exercises can be charac-
terized as elite-driven: attempts at building national institutional frameworks
from the top down. This critique feeds into the question of how power is dis-
tributed within society. The institutional route to statebuilding preferred by
donors and the international community is, at first glance, attractive, as coun-
tries with strong institutions are able to regulate power among competing so-
cietal groups, at least in the long term. As Marina Ottaway points out, this may
prove fallible in the short term: “The model chosen by the international com-
munity is a shortcut to the Weberian state, an attempt to develop such an en-
tity quickly and without the long, conflictual and often brutal evolution that
historically underlies the formation of states. The advantage of such stream-
lined transformation is obvious; but the reality suggests that these attempts often
stumble on the unresolved issue of power” (Ottaway 2003, 248).
In this sense, newly created institutions possess limited political author-
ity; therefore they are not effective in regulating the power of different politi-
cal factions. Elections, for example, are not particularly effective in regulating
entrenched power struggles in society. States do not fail or become weak be-
cause they do not have functioning institutions; rather, they fail because the
creation of institutions is not necessarily effective in addressing underlying dis-
parities in power between societal groups (Ottaway 2003; Lake forthcoming).
The new wave of externally driven statebuilding has also triggered a con-
cern that it represents a new form of colonialism, a capitalist exploitation of
vulnerable societies. International actors have tended to emphasize the tempo-
rary nature of their missions as a way to offset this critique. This, however, is
far simpler in cases where the political trajectory of the operation is clearly un-
derstood by all parties; it is considerably more problematic where the political
trajectory is less evident and where the very presence of international agencies
comes under question by local political actors (Chesterman 2007). Two impor-
tant examples are Afghanistan and Iraq, where the viability of the statebuilding
enterprise is under threat as significant parts of civil society express a lack of
confidence in foreign benefactors. A more moderate position is taken by other
commentators, who argue that long-term commitment to statebuilding is at
best tantamount to creating “cultures of dependency” and that an international
presence runs contrary to the aim of self-sufficiency (Paris and Sisk 2008).
Nevertheless, discussions do not so much focus on whether the international
community should engage in rebuilding postconflict societies and states; instead
the focus is on how the international community should engage in rebuilding.
There are a number of debates as to the best way forward, what considerations
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Civil Society and the State 37

must be taken into account, and whose normative values are promoted (Chand-
ler 2006). External actors can set up organizations, but such organizations can
become institutions only to the extent that relevant actors come to believe that
they provide solutions to real problems. The dilemma arises when institution-
building is defined primarily on the basis of imported blueprints rather than in-
digenous needs and what local actors perceive as the most prominent issues
(Ottaway 2003).

Civil Society and the Conflictual State

Armed conflict almost invariably results in a breakdown in the capacity of state
functions. The enduring character of conflicts such as those in Angola, Burundi,
the Sudan, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone, for example, have demonstrated the
debilitating effects of conflict on state institutions, resulting from the fact that
much of the violence was directed against the existing government or regime
(Rotberg 2004). Robert H. Bates (2008) has demonstrated how armed conflict,
mediated by a series of underlying factors such as poverty, ethnic composition,
and political participation, impact and facilitate the onset of failure on the part
of state institutions. The weakening of the capacity and willingness of the state
has often been couched in terms of “state failure,” although the term disrup-
tion more accurately captures the various ways in which the state and society
are transformed by conflict (Maley et al. 2003; Englebert and Tull 2008).
Disruption as a consequence of armed conflict can refer to the implosion
of the state, thereby rendering it vulnerable to actors who seek to gain politi-
cal influence and authority; the deployment of the power of the state in one’s
own interest; political competition among groups bearing arms; and the trans-
formation of political parties into military bands controlled by political elites
(Bates 2008, 2). A common characteristic is a government’s loss of physical
control over its territory, or the lack of monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Other traits include the weakening of authority to make and enforce decisions,
the inability to provide public services, and the degradation in relationships with
other states. Further indicators are human rights abuses, large-scale migration,
economic decline, and the delegitimization of the state (Iqbal and Starr 2006).
In conflict-ridden states, regimes prey on constituents, resorting to patrimonial
rule dependent on a patronage-based system of extraction from citizens; there is
a further increase in insecurity among ordinary citizens, in terms of oppression
by governments, increased criminal violence, deterioration of infrastructure, and
neglect of educational and health systems. Political institutions degrade to the
point where only the executive functions, and the legislative branch merely
serves to rubber-stamp decisions by the executive. Corruption flourishes, and
opportunities for economic gain become rife for a select few, at the expense of
society at large, while the state loses its legitimacy—among its own citizens as
well as internationally (Rotberg 2004, 5–10). The sum is a set of features that
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38 Context: What We Already Know

entails a weakening in states’ willingness and capacity to act across three crit-
ical dimensions: political, economic, and security. Below we explore the con-
sequences for civil society.
In the political dimension, the involvement of civil society in various as-
pects of political decisionmaking (e.g., policy advice and formulation) is con-
tingent on a degree of policy coherence in the administrative arena, both
horizontally (e.g., geographically) and vertically through the various levels of
government. During conflict, the state may assume a more authoritarian stance
and place restrictions on civil society, such as by redefining the institutional
framework. In weak or failed states, the impact on civil society is obviously
much different. A lack of state functionality curtails the representation of citi-
zens, rendering institutions less responsive and incapable of formulating and
implementing policy or of ensuring democratic rights, effectively constricting
the ability of civic groups to channel issues into the political process. Conflict
can exacerbate existing cleavages in society, and these can manifest themselves
further in civil society, such as in ethnic polarization. One result can be that
civil society becomes organized into monoethnic associations, primarily con-
cerned with advancing their own highly politicized agendas, with little contact
across societal cleavages (Orjuela 2003). The tendency may be especially pro-
nounced when whole regions are controlled by oppositional groups, as in Sri
Lanka, where the regulatory regime in areas controlled by the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Ealam was very different from that of the government (Uyangoda 2008).
Similar issues can manifest themselves along the economic dimension
and thereby also have an indirect effect on civil society. Although the relation-
ship between the state and the market has varied greatly in time and space, the
state nevertheless performs a number of core functions in regulating and secur-
ing the market. First and foremost, the state seeks to establish institutional guar-
antees and a predictable set of rules for the expansion and transfer of capital
in various forms. When these institutional conditions are disrupted, there is a
greater risk for the informalization of economic transactions, thereby allowing
elites to more easily secure resources for self-enrichment (Ghani and Lockhart
2008, 149–156). Economies of societies in conflict and postconflict situations
may also display a greater propensity toward providing goods and services di-
rectly and indirectly related to the conflict. This may assume a legal nature, be-
come a part of the so-called gray-sector economy, or enter the illegal black
market. NGOs, for example, may be drawn into becoming providers of intelli-
gence and also be used as vehicles for trafficking drugs and laundering money.
At the extreme, a potential consequence of a breakdown of institutional mar-
ket regulation is the emergence of an economic sector that operates parallel to
the legal financial market. The emergence of such “war economies” may mo-
tivate influential actors to want to maintain a certain level of insecurity and re-
strict the space in which civil society actors can operate. Alternatively, actors
that are economically successful may come to dominate the political discourse,
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Barbara judiciously looks at her watch. And we rise and walk slowly
back to our hotel along the white road, silent, and perhaps rather
sad.
 CHAPTER XX
AN INN PARLOUR

"O princesso di Baus! Ugueto,

Sibilo, Blanco-Flour, Bausseto,
Que trounavais amount sus li roucas aurin,
Cors subre-bèu, amo galoio,
Dounant l'amour, largant la joio
E la lumiero, li mount-joio
De Mount-Pavoun, de Crau li trescamp azurin

Encaro vuei dins soun mirage

Se representon voste oumbrage....
Li ferigoulo meme an counserva l'óudour
De vòsti piado; e m'es vejaire
Que vese encaro,—galejaire,
Gentiéu, courriòu e guerrejaire,—
Que vese à vòsti pèd canta li troubadour."

"O princesses des Baux! Huguette,—Sibylle, Blanchefleur, Baussette—

vous qui là-haut pour trône aviez les rochers d'or,—corps exquis en
beauté, âmes allègres,—donnant l'amour, versant la joie,—et la
 lumière, les monticules—de Mont-Pahon, les landes azurées de la
Crau,
"Dans leur mirage d'aujourd'hui—reproduisent encore votre image....
—Les thyms eux-mêmes ont conservé l'odeur—de vos traces; et il me
semble—que je vois encore, guillerets,—courtois, coureurs et
guerroyeurs,—que je vois à vos pieds chanter les troubadours."
Mistral.

CHAPTER XX
AN INN PARLOUR
After dinner—which by the way was of extraordinary excellence—we
were invited to the parlour of mine host, and felt like travellers in
some old romance on the eve of antique adventures. Nothing
antique, however, happened, except, indeed, the odd gathering of
the family and the guests of the hotel, and the talk that went circling
cheerfully round the fire in the little dull-tinted room. The dulness of
colouring was the result of long use; everything having faded into
harmony and grown together through long and affectionate
association.
Besides Madame and a pretty niece who was staying with her, there
were two youths employed in the seed industry, who lived in the
town and came in every evening for their dinner. They were on
terms of friendly intimacy with the host and hostess who evidently
regarded their office in other lights than that of mere commercial
enterprise. They looked upon their guests as under their charge, and
their desire was to minister to their comfort and pleasure in every
possible way. Monsieur and one of the youths played draughts,
Madame sewed and chatted, and Mademoiselle, the niece, made
herself generally agreeable. Between the two youths was a mild
rivalry for her smiles. We, as strangers, were treated with special
courtesy.
Madame and her husband did the honours of their homely salon
most gracefully. The conversation turned on the Monuments of St.
Remy, its objects of interest which strangers come to see, and its
excursions: Les Baux above all, on the other side of the Alpilles.
"Une ville très ancienne, sculptée dans les rochers, toute élevée au
dessus de la vallée—mais une cité vraiment remarquable,
Mesdames. Vous devez certainment y aller."
And we decided at once to do so, arranging to have a trap to take us
across the mountains on the following morning.
Meanwhile we gathered further information about St. Remy itself.
There is La Maison de la Reine Jeanne, in which the family of the
famous Mistral has lived for generations. In the foundations were
discovered the bones of an elephant and various weapons, all
supposed to be relics of Hannibal's passage through the country at
the foot of the Alpilles.
The famous poet, however, does not live in this historical home at
St. Remy, but at Maillane, a little village of the plain about seven
kilometres distant. The house, to which many a pious pilgrimage has
been made, is square and white and stands in a little shady garden
with a high wall and iron gate facing the village street. Thanks to the
poet and his colleagues the ancient costume still lingers at Maillane
and at St. Remy, and on Sundays the women go to church in the
soft, white fichu and picturesque head-dress that one has learnt to
associate with the women of Arles. The Provençal type is
characteristic; dark eyes and hair, olive skin, and a singularly fine
carriage of the figure and head.
 GROVE AT ST. REMY.
By E. M. Synge.
Mistral and his fellow Félibres have much to do with the survival of
art and old customs. One of this little band of modern troubadours
lives still, as we learn, in the house of his family at St. Remy, and
Mistral (as we have seen) is not far away across the plain, faithful
always to the land that he loves so deeply and labours so hard to
preserve in its ancient beauty, ancient faiths and ancient language. I
had afterwards the privilege of visiting Mistral at Maillane and M.
Girard and his wife at St. Remy, and of hearing them speak with
intense enthusiasm and affection of the Provence that is passing
away. M. Girard's angry melancholy at the erasure of all character
and individuality from lands and peoples was pathetic and
impressive.
He exhibited his fine collection of ancient furniture, crockery, pewter,
and a thousand beautiful relics: among them a splendid example of
the "Crêche," that quaint Provençal institution with which the
children are made happy every Christmas. It is a modelled
representation of the coming of the Magi, but on this root idea the
artists of Provence have grafted many additions. The Virgin,
beautifully sculptured and coloured, sits in a hilly landscape and
holds a sort of grand reception: Magi and other distinguished visitors
surround her, while shepherds, merchants, publicans and sinners,
varied by ornate donkey-drivers and goatherds, are perched on hill-
tops among companionable windmills about their own size; and
peasants are lavishly distributed in very green meadows in the
vicinity; all congregated to offer homage to the Madonna and the
haloed Babe. The crêche is reverently veiled with a curtain on
ordinary days, and its owner drew this aside and lighted the candles
to illumine the treasured heirloom which has delighted so many
generations ... and not alone of children.

Our hostess of the Hôtel de Provence was learned about the seed
industry of St. Remy, and explained how ruthlessly every bloom is
nipped off and prevented from seeding if it does not answer truly to
its type. That was how the splendid flowers were achieved: viz., by a
persistent interference with the ordinary course of nature—a fact
which gives food for thought. Besides flowers, St. Remy has some
fine vegetables to boast of. I had often noticed strange, unknown,
gourd-like things, bright red or yellow, in the shop windows. The
cornichon serpent, "ce légume extravagant," as somebody calls it, is
said to measure nearly two metres! But that immoderate object we
never saw.

We were out betimes next morning, in the rose-garden which was

glistening with dew. The Garden of Pleasure truly, guarded by the
mournful cypresses! That seemed full of significance: the Roses of
Pleasure sheltered by those dark trees of Experience and Grief.
Burns sings that "pleasures are like poppies"; and so perhaps they
are, but there are some that are more like roses—Roses of
Provence!
They are the sort of pleasures of which that strange pot-pourri that
we call happiness is made. For surely there is such a thing as
happiness, though the science of it is as hard to learn as any other;
perhaps harder than them all. Maybe it is necessary for us
unteachable mortals to have torn our way—bruised and bleeding—
through that black line of cypresses before we come in sight of it.
If happiness is a will-o'-the-wisp, is it so because of the eternal
nature of things, or because, as Carlyle frankly insists, men are
mostly fools? Would not every desired object assume an elusive
character if as soon as we came in touch with it, we flew off on the
hunt for something else? On this principle we must go through life
unpossessed of our own fortunes, strangers and pilgrims in our own
kingdom. Barbara and I agreed that we would not forget to gather
the roses in our Provençal garden for the illusive sake of other roses
further afield.

In this little mediæval pleasure city it seemed natural to speculate

about the life of the Middle Ages, and we wondered if part of the
sad secret of those times lay in that inveterate habit of the human
mind to look for the Earthly Paradise round the next corner. For
then, possibly, there was only a sage here and there who had learnt
the folly of it through long and footsore wanderings in the desert
which stretches unremittingly between the traveller and his mirage
Eden. The restless barbarous manners of the age must have made
the truth harder to understand than it need be to us who have many
centuries of growing experience behind us, both as a hereditary
influence and as an object-lesson in the conduct of life.
Incessant war and struggle, with no great results, but only further
struggle, further war as the fruit of the lifelong contest: such was
the mediæval life, and no one saw its absurdity. Not a trace of the
old Greek spirit remained; not a vestige of the philosophies of the
East, except perhaps in the cloister, and even here, at its best, the
religion partook of the objective character of the general life, and
placed the site of "heaven" for the saint, as the sinner placed his
happiness,—round the next corner.

In those mad, picturesque, mediæval days St. Remy used to be the

country retreat of the Counts of Provence. They here retired from
the excitements of their capital at Aix, the learned little city a few
leagues to the northeast, beyond the Alpilles. We afterwards visited
Aix, and found another larger town of plane-avenues, more
dignified, more important, but almost as silent and forgotten as St.
Remy itself. One could not but wonder what the Counts had found of
country joys at St. Remy that they could not have commanded at
the old city of Sextius with its shady ways and gardens.

ROMAN MONUMENTS, ST. REMY.

By E. M. Synge.
But, in fact, the human mind seeks not merely a change from
excitement to repose; it demands a change of scene and a change
of thought-atmosphere for its own sake.
During the whole of our stay at St. Remy we lived in an atmosphere
of roses. We could not gather enough of them to please our host;
and we used to have great bunches in our rooms placed on the
window-sill, so that the sunlight filtered through their petals; and
over them we could see the garden of their birth and the pale
mountains beyond. Our very dreams were of roses and rose-
gardens!
One evening, inspired by their loveliness, I arranged a wreath of
them in Barbara's hair, added a creamy shawl flowing to her feet,
and stood back to admire the result. It was something to be proud
of! Our dull, discreet régime of ladylike nonentities had disappeared,
and there was the poetry, the unapologetic grace of the classic
world.
Barbara rose to try to see herself in the minute mirror.
She gasped in dismay.
"No, no! you dare to take it off! There are some more roses to come
yet." (The victim made a comic face of resignation.) "I want
profusion."
"You do!" said Barbara, sitting down to laugh. "Am I to wear this
costume when we go to Les Baux to-morrow?" she asked.
"It depends on the weather."
But, alas! as soon as active opposition was withdrawn, Barbara
removed the improvised costume, took the roses out of her hair and
the vision of the ancient world faded away. When we went down to
dinner we both of us had on our sombre prison garments.
And though Barbara laughed, I knew that the world was a sadder
and a drearier place because of it!
 CHAPTER XXI
LES BAUX

"C'est le Moyen-age tragique,—l'acropole de la Provence féodale."

Paul Mariéton.

CHAPTER XXI
LES BAUX
In all Provence, perhaps in all Europe, there is no more astonishing
relic of mediæval life than that "crater of a feudal volcano" Les Baux,
[21] a veritable eagle's nest of a city in one of the wildest and
highest points of the Alpilles. It is a morning's drive from St. Remy
across the little range to its steep southern side.
We plunge straight into their heart and begin to mount by gradual
windings through little valleys, arid and lonely. Dwarf oak, lavender
and rosemary make their only covering. But for their grey vesture
one might imagine oneself in some valley of the moon, wandering
dream-bound in a dead world. The limestone vales have something
of the character of the lunar landscape: a look of death succeeding
violent and frenzied life, which gives to the airless, riverless valleys
of our satellite their unbearable desolation. It might have been
fancy, but it seemed that in the Alpilles there was not a living thing;
neither beast nor bird nor insect.
As we ascended, the landscape grew stranger and more tragic. The
walls of rock closed in upon us, then fell back, breaking up into
chasms, crags, pinnacles. The lavender and aromatic plants no
longer climbed the sides of the defiles; they carpeted the ground
and sent a sharp fragrance into the air. The passes would widen
again more liberally into battlemented gorges from which great
solitary boulders and peninsulas rose out of the sea of lavender.
Here and there this fragrant sea seemed to have splashed up against
the rock-face, for little grey bushes would cling for dear life to some
cleft or cranny far up the heights; sometimes on the very summit. As
one follows the road it seems as if the heavily overhanging crags
must come crashing down on one's head. What prevents it, I fail to
this day to understand.
 QUARRY IN VALLEY BELOW LES BAUX.
By E. M. Synge.
The whole place gives the impression of having been fashioned in
some gloomy dream.
Every turn brings new and monstrous forms into view; the fantastic
handiwork of earth's inner fires, patient modellings of the sun and
wind. One thinks of the busy coming and going along these
"footprints of the earthquake" in troubadour days, when knights and
nobles flocked to the famous little court of the Alpilles, and the fame
of the beautiful Passe Rose (Cecilia des Baux) brought troops of
admirers from the ends of the earth—kings, princes, jongleurs,
troubadours. Many a figure well known to history—the exiled Dante
among them—has passed along these gorges. The Princes of Les
Baux owned seventy-nine bourgs and had a finger in half the
intrigues of Europe; a barbaric race, probably descendants of the
ancient Ligurians, with wild mountain blood in their veins.
Further on, the valleys widen, and we see large oblong holes
hollowed out of the creamy limestone, sometimes at regular
intervals, producing an effect of arcades in the rock. Still further on
we come upon majestic Assyrian-like portals, narrowing to the top in
true archaic fashion and giving ingress to dark vestibules exciting to
the fancy. They might well have been the entry to some
subterranean Aladdin's palace whose gardens and miraculous
orchards grow emeralds and diamonds as cherries grow in Kent. It
was quite surprising to find that these grandiose excavations were
the work of mere modern quarrymen still engaged in the prehistoric
industry. Fine groups of horses and big carts and labourers before
the Assyrian entrances had an effect curiously ancient and majestic.
There was a time when the men of the Stone Age cut just such
galleries and holes far up in the rocks at Les Baux and dwelt there
like a flock of jackdaws, high above the hazard of attack.
It is asserted by the learned that the city, in fact, dates from the
Stone Age, being inhabited by generation after generation of wild
peoples, till gradually the dwellings were adapted to less uncivilised
needs and added to by further sculpturing and excavation and by
masonry whose material was hewn from the surrounding limestone.
In the city is a small museum containing many Stone Age
implements.
It is indeed a place of strange memories.
In one of the tombs of the principal church was discovered the
perfectly preserved body of a young woman with a mass of golden
hair. The body crumbled to dust almost immediately, but the
innkeeper took possession of the beautiful tresses, and called his inn
in its honour, à la Chevelure d'Or.
Poor golden hair, it has set many a poet singing and vielle twanging
in its day!
We have been wending our way steadily upward across a region that
grows wider and more sweeping in its contours. The road rounds a
corner. Suddenly we feel the wind in our faces and a blaze of light.
There is an exclamation, and then silence.
The carriage has stopped on the highest point of the pass just where
the road has been cut through the low rock, and the driver points
with his whip across a vast grey cauldron of a valley to a sort of
shelving plateau high up on the shoulder of the opposite cliffs.
"Voilà Les Baux!"

The stupendous scene is spread out before us, wild and silent. The
wind from the Crau to the south continues to blow through the cut
in the rock; the sun glares down full upon the mysterious rock-city
and lays bare the desolation of the valley.
Behind us a few sounds rise from the quarries, but there is
otherwise that perfect silence of high places which seems to brood
and wait, eternally patient.
This is the spot which is said to have furnished Dante with the
scenery of his infernal regions, and the mind at once accepts the
tradition, so gloomily grand, so instinct with motionless despair is
the scene.
Beyond measure extraordinary the aspect of that cluster of roofs and
walls scarcely to be distinguished from the crags and escarpments
out of which they grow—"window and vault and hall" fashioned in
the living rock. Truly, as Madame our hostess had said, "une ville
remarquable"!
The eye slowly learns to recognise the masonry among the natural
architecture, to separate the fantastic limestone surfaces from
broken dwellings and fallen towers.
The city, once containing about eight thousand inhabitants, is now
reduced to about a dozen or so, and these all live at the entrance to
the town on the ascending road from the valley by which the
traveller from the mountains must approach this grim little court of
mediæval princes. The road is comparatively new, for it cuts through
some of the great houses, and high up above us as we pass, we see
the columns and frieze of a fine stone mantelpiece overhanging the
road, evidently belonging to some seigneurial dwelling. Perhaps it
was here that the lady of the golden hair passed her tumultuous life
—it could scarcely have been peaceful at that time, in that place—
with that hair!
A few silent inhabitants watch us as we go by. A cat peers
suspiciously over a wall of which the roof has fallen in; a mongrel
hunts for garbage in a rubbish heap in a windowless mansion.

Before the Chevelure d'Or[22] there is a little group of men. Here the
trap is put up and we set forth on foot up the steep main street of
this "mediæval Pompeii."
The whole place is built on the shelving shoulder of the cliff; a
sloping ledge whence one might expect the town to slip down at any
moment into the cauldron-valley; just as from time to time great
fragments of rock have evidently rolled down to eternal oblivion.
The impression of universal greyness strengthens as we move
upwards through the silent streets: grey walls, grey tiles, grey
paving stones and grey escarpments above, on whose highest
summit stands the rock-excavated castle, now apparently
inaccessible except to adventurous birds—or, perhaps, the ghosts of
the Princes of Les Baux who for their crimes are unable to rest in
their graves.
We clamber up and down the ruinous higher part of the town,
among those pathetic rectangles of masonry open to the sky where
human life throbbed so eagerly a little while ago; we mount some
perilous-looking steps on the cliff-side, in hopes of reaching the
castle, but find ourselves emerging in mid-air upon the edge of the
plateau overlooking from an appalling height the windy spaces of the
Crau.
The mountains run sheer to the plain. It is exciting to stand on that
great altitude which commands the stony desert towards Arles and
the mouths of the Rhone. It has something of the character of the
scene from the Appian Way looking towards Ostia and the mouths of
the Tiber. The approach to Les Baux from Arles is in some respects
more impressive than the route from St. Remy, for then the whole
immense height of the cliffs is visible from the level of the plain. On
one of the little heights that rise here and there on this plain stands
the windmill of Daudet, which gives the title to his famous Lettres de
Mon Moulin.
If we stand on the highest point of the city, the eye can run along
the line of the Alpilles. Another little wave of hills sweeps forward on
to the plain precisely as the smaller ocean waves go curling in on the
shore, followed by the foaming line of breakers. The Alpilles seem,
indeed, to be breaking on the shore of the Crau like the billows of a
great sea.
A pathway perilously near the edge of the cliff fails to help us to
approach that strange castle from which we are still separated by
many feet of sheer rock.

DAUDET'S WINDMILL.
By Joseph Pennell.
As we stand looking across the chasm at the stronghold, its position
seems to invest it with additional mystery and a solitude almost
horrible.
An evil shadow hangs about it, and yet there is but little of the
building touched by visible shades at this magnificent moment of a
Provençal day. A shadow that no sunshine can dispel surely haunts
the fortress of Les Baux. For a second, in the hot glare, fancy plays
one a trick, and there seems to be floating from the summit the
blood-red banner which the princes used to unfurl on days of
combat, when the air rang with the strange battle-cry of the house:
"Au hazard Balthazar!"
They claimed descent from Balthazar, one of the Magi who visited
the new-born Christ in the manger, and a six-rayed star was the
device of the family.
Their association with Christianity was certainly not of a very
intimate kind. They were a blind, blood-stained race, believing in
violence and retaliation as the one and only means of grace in this
world and troubling themselves, till the moment of death, very little
about the next. They generally reaped as they had sown; feared,
hated, and often dying deaths as terrible as those which they had
inflicted on their victims.
It is thought probable that the Princes of Les Baux were descended
from the Visigoths who settled in Arles in the fifth century. There is a
vast and ancient work by "Le Sieur de Bouche, Docteur en
Theologie," printed at Aix-en-Provence in the 17th century. In the
section treating of the Visigothic Kingdoms the author gives an
account of their King Euric and the events in Provence of the year
475.
"L'on croit communement," he says, "que c'est en ce temps que le
chateau de la Ville de Baux en Provence a esté bâty et qu'il a tiré
son nom de quelque illustre et grand Seigneur Visigoth et Prince de
la Maison Royale, laquelle était de la famille des Batthes...."
From the fifth to the fifteenth century the line can be traced. At the
end of that era Charles III. of France died, and then the barony of
Les Baux with the whole county of Provence, was united to the
crown of France. Louis XIII. gave it to the Grimaldi who came in
state each year from Monaco, to take up their abode here; but they
finally had to give it back to the crown.

LES BAUX FROM THE ROAD TO ARLES.

By E. M. Synge.
It was surprising to find the remains of a hospital on the plateau
above the city, with the niches visible for the beds of the patients; so
surprising, indeed, that one is almost tempted to set learned
authority at defiance. Perhaps, however, with all the brawls and
tournaments of those amazing times, some such place was really
necessary for repairing damaged knights.
As one looks downwards from this altitude, the city presents a
strange aspect indeed. The grey buildings are flung together among
the boulders, a tumultuous mass of human and natural handiwork.
Truly
"The wind of ruin has passed this way."

Under the castle rock are the remains of a magnificent banqueting-

hall, with caissoned vaulting like that of the Basilica of Constantine
at Rome.
The Romans had been even at Les Baux, and it was they who built
the walls which still here and there cling giddily to the sheer edge of
the rock. But they had many successors. A Saracen tower stands
shoulder to shoulder with Christian churches, and everywhere are
signs of the great feudal era, with its religious enthusiasm, its din
and its warfare.
Besides the Princes, who were Counts of Orange as well as
Seigneurs of this little kingdom in the sky, there were powerful
families in Les Baux.
The house of the Porcelets, one of the greatest, not only of the city,
but of Provence, was nicknamed by King René, Grandeur des
Porcelets. The Princes he called Inconstánce des Baux.
Out of the stern soil blossomed many a beautiful and accomplished
lady, famed in troubadour song.
Berengaria des Baux was celebrated by the luckless Guilhelm de
Cabestaing. Ranebaude inspired the world-famous Sordel; the
charms of Cecilia, the beautiful Passe Rose, as we know, kept half
the troubadours of France busy with vielle and lute; and there were
Étienette, Clairette, and a host of others whose true history one
would give much to know.
 WINDOW IN RUINED HOUSE OF A
SEIGNEUR OF LES BAUX.
By E. M. Synge.
But the scene of their lives is at once eloquent and reticent. Their
homes are stonily silent, and not even a wild bird makes its nest in
the tempting crannies of the great mantelpieces where the flames
must so often have leaped and roared.
It is the mistral that roars now on winter nights in the grass-grown
chimneys.
 CHAPTER XXII
RAIMBAUT DE VACQUEIRAS AND
GUILHELM DES BAUX

"De la solitaire demeure

Une ombre lourde d'heure en heure,
Se détache sur le gazon,
Et cet ombre, couchée et morte
Est la seule chose qui sorte
Tout le jour de cette maison."

Alphonse Karr.

CHAPTER XXII
RAIMBAUT DE VACQUEIRAS AND GUILHELM DES BAUX
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