Reay ItsBecomingHabitus 2004
Reay ItsBecomingHabitus 2004
Research
Author(s): Diane Reay
Source: British Journal of Sociology of Education , Sep., 2004, Vol. 25, No. 4, Special
Issue: Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of Education: The Theory of Practice and the Practice
of Theory (Sep., 2004), pp. 431-444
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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British Journal of Sociology of Education
Diane Reay*
London Metropolitan University, UK
Introduction
For Bourdieu the goal of sociological research is to uncover the most deeply
structures of the different social worlds that make up the social universe, a
the 'mechanisms' that tend to ensure their reproduction or transformation
1996, p 1). This is a very different agenda and terminology to that of
contemporary educational research, which tends to view any focus on s
and mechanisms as part of a discredited Marxist research agenda. How
while Bourdieu recognized the contribution Marxism made to his work,
theoretical framework is a complex drawing on the ideas of not only Marx, b
Durkheim and Merleau-Ponty, plus a great deal of conceptual developmen
distinctly his own. In fact, Bourdieu insisted that he was to the left of Marx (
2002).
Some of Bourdieu's ideas and concepts are better known and better underst
than others. In particular, references to cultural capital have become commonplac
academic writing, Habitus, in contrast, is less well known and is probably Bourdie
most contested concept. Although, in common with cultural capital, there is
increasing tendency for habitus to be sprayed throughout academic texts like
'intellectual hair spray' (Hey, 2003), bestowing gravitas without doing any theoret
work. However, unlike cultural capital, habitus has been subject to widespread
criticism, mainly on the basis of its latent determinism. This is ironic in view
Bourdieu's rationale for developing the concept. He argues that habitus is central
his methodology of structuralist constructivism, an attempt to transcend dualism
agency-structure, objective-subjective and the micro-macro. Habitus then is t
conceptual tool that Bourdieu uses within this methodological framework of
structuralist constructivism in an attempt to reconcile these dualisms (Bourdieu,
1985a). Bourdieu (1999a) continued throughout his career to challenge the view of
habitus as a form of determinism, asserting that habitus offers the only durable form of
freedom-that given by the mastery of an art.
Habitus as a concept has a very long history dating back to Aristotle. Although I
do not have the space here to include a genealogy of habitus, Nash (1999) includes
an excellent history of the concept. According to Bourdieu it is through the
workings of habitus that practice (agency) is linked with capital and field (structure).
In relation to the charge of determinism, Bourdieu (1990b, p. 116) argues that
habitus becomes active in relation to a field, and the same habitus can lead to very
different practices and stances depending on the state of the field. I will elaborate on
the links between habitus and Bourdieu's other concepts later in the paper. First I
want to tease out just what Bourdieu meant by habitus by analysing it in terms of four
related aspects.
Becoming a habitus
Habitus as embodiment
Thus, one of the crucial features of habitus is that it is embodied, it is not composed
solely of mental attitudes and perceptions (see also Chris Shilling's article in thi
volume). Bourdieu writes that it is expressed through durable ways 'of standing,
speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking' (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 70
People's relationships to dominant culture are conveyed in a range of activities,
Despite this implicit tendency to behave in ways that are expected of 'people like us',
for Bourdieu there are no explicit rules or principles that dictate behaviour, rather 'the
habitus goes hand in hand with vagueness and indeterminacy' (Bourdieu, 1990b, p.
77). The practical logic that defines habitus is not one of the predictable regularity of
modes of behaviour, but instead 'that of vagueness, of the more-or-less, which defines
one's ordinary relation to the world' (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 78).
However, at other times, Bourdieu does point out that the operation of the habitus
regularly excludes certain practices, those that are unfamiliar to the cultural groupings
to which the individual belongs (for excellent examples of such exclusions, see Skeggs,
1997; Charlesworth, 2000). Taking the working class as an example, an individual
will be far more likely to make a virtue out of necessity than attempt to achieve 'what is
already denied' (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 54). Bourdieu views the dispositions, which
make up habitus, as the products of opportunities and constraints framing the
individual's earlier life experiences. They are:
However, because there are classes of experience there are also classes of habitus or
the habitus of classes. Bourdieu attempts to justify his collective definition of habitus.
In reference to class habitus he asserts that:
was constructed, it also carries within it the genesis of new creative responses that are
capable of transcending the social conditions in which it was produced. Bourdieu
(2000b) maps this process of transformation in relation to the Algerian working class
during the 1950s and 1960s, demonstrating how habitus is 'the product of social
conditionings, and thus of a history' (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 116). The range of
possibilities inscribed in a habitus can be envisaged as a continuum. At one end,
habitus can be replicated through encountering a field that reproduces its
dispositions. At the other end of the continuum, habitus can be transformed through
a process that either raises or lowers an individual's expectations. Implicit in the
concept is the possibility of a social trajectory that enables conditions of living that are
very different from initial ones.
By drawing together these four themes running through Bourdieu's discussions of
habitus, habitus can be viewed as a complex internalized core from which everyday
experiences emanate. Choice is at the heart of habitus, which he likens to 'the art of
inventing' (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 55), but at the same time the choices inscribed in the
habitus are limited. I envisage habitus as a deep, interior, epicentre containing many
matrices. These matrices demarcate the extent of choices available to any one
individual. Choices are bounded by the framework of opportunities and constraints
the person finds himself/herself in, her external circumstances. However, within
Bourdieu's theoretical framework he/she is also circumscribed by an internalized
framework that makes some possibilities inconceivable, others improbable and a
limited range acceptable. As Lizardo (2003) points out, the notion of a transposable
matrix both sets limits at the same time that it implies flexibility. Dispositions are
inevitably reflective of the social context in which they were acquired.
Habitus is only an aspect of Bourdieu's conceptual tool-box. For Bourdieu it is the
interaction of habitus, cultural capital and field that generates the logic of practice
(Bourdieu, 1990b). In particular, the concept of field adds to the possibilities of
Bourdieu's conceptual framework and gives habitus a dynamic quality:
The relation between habitus and field operates in two ways. On one side, it is a relation
of conditioning: the field structures the habitus, which is the product of the embodiment
of the immanent necessity of the field (or of a hierarchy of intersecting fields). On the
other side, it is a relation of knowledge or cognitive construction: habitus contributes to
constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense or with value, in
which it is worth investing one's energy. (Bourdieu, in Wacquant, 1989, p. 44)
Grenfell and James (1998, p. 15) argue that 'if habitus brings into focus the subjective
end of the equation, field focuses on the objective'. As Grenfell (2003) succinctly
asserts, habitus and field need to be understood as highly charged matrices involving a
dynamic philosophy of human praxis. The relationship between habitus and cultural
capital is more enmeshed. Scott Lash perceives habitus as made up of cultural capital
(Lash, 1993, p. 197). However, most writers, including Bourdieu, view the two
concepts as more separated. Bourdieu himself is very explicit about the relationship
between the two concepts. In Distinction he maps out a formula that elaborates their
interconnection, '(Habitus X Capital) + Field=Practice' (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101).
My understanding of this interconnection is one in which habitus lies beneath cultural
social reality exists, so to speak, twice, in things and in minds, in fields and in habitus,
outside and inside social agents. And when habitus encounters a social world of which it
is the product, it is like a 'fish in water': it does not feel the weight of the water and it takes
the world about itself for granted. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127)
However, when habitus encounters a field with which it is not familiar, the result
disjunctures can generate change and transformation. The refractory and destabili
ing implications that the notion of field has for the concept of habitus can produc
nuanced understandings of power relations and political agency (McNay, 2000).
As Andrew Sayer (2004) points out, one of the most distinctive yet unremarked
features of Bourdieu's theoretical framework 'is that the most widely studied forms o
division, domination and exclusion in social research-most obviously racism and
sexism, but also ageism, homophobia, disabilism-only enter as incidental modifiers,
if at all'. Although in one of Bourdieu's last books Masculine Domination (Bourdieu,
2001) he does write extensively on gendered habitus, his main empirical focus is not
current relationships between the sexes and contemporary masculinities and
femininities, but gender divisions in Algeria in the 1960s. Yet, habitus is primarily a
method for analysing the dominance of dominant groups in society and the
domination of subordinate groups, and as such Katherine McClelland asserts that:
it can easily be applied to the analysis of gender (or racial and ethnic) disadvantage as
well. (McClelland, 1990, p. 105)
Habitus can be used to focus on the ways in which the socially advantaged and
disadvantaged play out attitudes of cultural superiority and inferiority ingrained in
their habitus in daily interactions. As McClelland highlights, such dispositions are
influenced by gender and 'race' as well as social class.
However, gender is subsumed throughout much of Bourdieu's writing under his
primary focus on social class, and despite his main anthropological study being of the
Kabyle tribes of Algeria he makes no mention of the way in which habitus is
differentiated by 'race'. However, it is possible from his extensive writing on the
concept to develop an understanding of habitus as shaped by both gender and 'race'.
Indeed, Weininger (2004) argues that in Masculine Domination Bourdieu (2001)
moves from his earlier position in Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984), where the gendered
character of social actions is contingent on class habitus, to a view of gender divisions
as an independent force structuring habitus. Cicourel (1993, p. 109) has argued that
there is a need to expand habitus to explore how gender and racial differences are
linked to circumstances that can occur within and across cultures and social classes or
ethnic groups within larger nation-states. I would add that expanding habitus
include race and gender differences is equally important in relation to smaller research
contexts such as classrooms, staffrooms and playgrounds:
Habitus is a way of looking at data which renders the 'taken-for-granted' problematic. It
suggests a whole range of questions not necessarily addressed in empirical research; How
well adapted is the individual to the context they find themselves in? How does personal
history shape their reponses to the contemporary setting? What subjective vocations do
they bring to the present and how are they manifested? Are structural effects visible
within small scale interactions? What is the meaning of non-verbal behaviour as well as
individuals' use of language? These questions clearly raise issues of gender and 'race'
alongside those of social class. (Reay, 1995a, p. 369)
So habitus can be used to uncover how class, 'race' and gender are embodied, played
out not only in individuals actions and attitudes, but also in a whole range of bodily
gestures (Reay, 1995a, 1995b, 1997; Connolly, 1998). It can also provide a corrective
to 'sociological naive claims about the transformation of social (and sexual) identities'
by highlighting the rootedness of class, gender and ethnic divisions (McNay, 1999, p.
106).
While most criticisms of habitus invoke structuralism or determinism (Jenkins,
1992, Alexander, 1995), some of Bourdieu's texts provide more space for agency than
others. As Lois McNay (2001, p. 146) asserts, 'there has been an increasing emphasis
in Bourdieu's more recent work on moments of disalignment and tension between
habitus and field, which may give rise to social change'. In particular, in The Weight of
the World (Bourdieu, 1999b) there is a great deal of striving, resistance and action
aimed at changing current circumstances as many of the poor and dispossessed,
interviewed by Bourdieu and his colleagues, search around for ways of changing and
transforming their lives. Often the movement of habitus across a new, unfamiliar field
resulted in:
A habitus divided against itself, in constant negotiation with itself and its ambivalences,
and therefore doomed to a kind of duplication, to a double perception of the self, to
successive allegiances and multiple identities. (Bourdieu, 1999b, p. 511)
We begin to get a sense not only of the myriad adaptations, responses, reactions and
resistances to 'the way the world is', but also of individuals struggling to make the
world a different place. There is little evidence of determinism here. It is not a lack of
action that is problematic, but rather the focus on pre-reflective dimensions of action.
As Andrew Sayer (2004) convincingly argues, Bourdieu overplays the unconscious
impulses and aspects of habitus, neglecting mundane everyday reflexivity; what Sayer
terms 'our inner conversations' (see also Archer, 2003). In doing so he denies or
marginalizes the life of the mind in others. In a similar vein, Brenda Farnell (2000)
asserts that in Bourdieu's formulation of habitus, individuals' adjustments to the
external world are all apparently unconscious, or less than conscious. Nick Crossley
(1999, p. 658) makes a identical criticism that habitus as a concept levels out the
distinction between reflection and the pre-reflective, and that 'it needs to recuperate
the reflective and creative aspects of practice'.
Implicit in the concept is that habitus operates at an unconscious level unless
individuals confront events that cause self-questioning, whereupon habitus begins to
operate at the level of consciousness and the person develops new facets of the se
Such disjunctures between habitus and field occur for Bourdieu when individuals
with a well-developed habitus find themselves in different fields or different parts of
the same social field. However, as Sayer argues, and I think correctly, disjuncture and
the resulting striving, resistance and/or new awareness (what Bourdieu [Bourdieu &
Wacquant 1992] terms socioanalysis) can occur during the formation of habitus, and
indeed can be constitutive of the habitus. Although the emphasis on 'protension-the
feel for the game' rather than calculation and strategizing is an important counter to
rationalism, Bourdieu seems to leap straight from a rationalist interpretation to an
anti-rationalist one. One key consequence, according to Sayer, is that Bourdieu's
focus on the unconscious and the prereflexive does not allow for any ethical
dimensions of the habitus. Nick Crossley (2000, p. 138) makes a related point when
he argues that habitus needs to include 'dialogues with oneself. Sayer's (2004)
important work recuperating ethical dispositions or 'moral sentiments' for habitus
enhances the possibilities for and of habitus, and allows us not only a richer
understanding of the strivings, struggles and disenchantments of those burdened by
The Weight of the World (Bourdieu, 1999b). It also provides the potential for a broader
conceptualization of habitus that makes space for 'cares, concerns and commitments',
and weaves together conscious deliberation with unconscious dispositions so that we
can attempt to grapple analytically with aspects of identity such as our personal and
political commitments that current conceptualizations of habitus marginalize.
However, later work, and especially State Nobility (Bourdieu, 1998b), includes a
recognition of cognitive aspects of habitus that earlier work such as Distinction
(Bourdieu, 1984) neglects.
There is an indeterminacy about the concept that fits in well with the complex
messiness of the real world. But there is also a danger in habitus becoming whateve
the data reveal. In particular, aspects of habitus that are related to the way it is
internalized become tenuous when they are applied to 'social class aggregations within
complex societies and across different cultures' (Cicourel, 1993, p. 5). I would
suggest that it is these conceptual gaps, the aspects of habitus that remain relatively
unfilled, and what Jenkins has described as 'the ontological mysteries of the habitus'
(1992, p. 130), that simultaneously contain its utility and its pitfalls.
Even Roy Nash (1999) who wrote an article defending the use of Bourdieu's
concepts in an earlier issue of the British Journal of Sociology of Education questioned
whether I could claim that habitus is a method. Yet, this is exactly how Bourdieu
describes his concepts:
The main thing is that they are not to be conceptualised so much as ideas, on that level,
but as a method. The core of my work lies in the method and a way of thinking. To be
more precise, my method is a manner of asking questions rather than just ideas. This, I
think is a critical point. (Bourdieu, 1985, quoted in Mahar, 1990)
Clearly, Bourdieu is using the term 'method' in a very elastic sense but what he is
stressing is that first and foremost habitus is a conceptual tool to be used in empirical
research rather than an idea to be debated in texts. Also, the difficulties, inconsist-
encies, risks of determinism, and aspects of circularity inherent in habitus can be
viewed as far less problematic if habitus is viewed more fluidly as both method and
theory; a way of understanding the world. Bourdieu himself sees his concepts as in a
continual process of being reworked. Writing of his conceptual framework he
comments:
order to identify the specific habitus that underlies them (Weininger, 2004). Ther
also a further strand of research that works with institutional notions of habitus
(McDonough, 1997; Reay, 1998; McNamara Horvat & Lising Antonio, 1999; Rea
et al., 2001; Barber, 2002).
Most empirical research attempts to work with habitus' duality as both collective
and individualized, and some excellent research has been conducted that moves from
the individual to the class collective and back again (Charlesworth, 2000;' Nash,
2002). However, a great deal of educational research references habitus instead of
working with the concept as Bourdieu advocates. Habitus is assumed or appropriated
rather than 'put into practice' in research accounts, and it appears that it is 'the
gravitas of habitus' that is desired rather than its operationalization. Although there
are many examples that I could draw on, some of my own work is less productive in its
utilization of habitus than other research I have undertaken. In 'Shaun's story', I argue
that:
Shaun's tale is an example of contradiction and tension between the social order and
psychological processes rather that the 'homology, redundancy and reinforcement
between the two systems' that Bourdieu (1999: 512) asserts is normative. In contrast to
the norm, Shaun's experience generates a habitus divided against itself; an experience
Bourdieu (1999: 511) describes as 'doomed to duplication, to a double perception of
self. He is positioned in an untenable space on the boundaries of two irreconcilable ways
of being and has to produce an enormous body of psychic, intellectual and interactive
work in order to maintain his contradictory ways of being, his dual perception of self.
(Reay, 2002, p. 223)
Here habitus is introduced as a concept before the introduction of any of the data.
Bourdieu's challenge to use the concept as a way of interrogating the data is ignored
and habitus becomes an explanation of the data rather than a way of working with it.
In contrast, in an earlier paper (Reay, 1997) I work with notions of habitus as both
embodied and as a complex interplay between past and present. I use data from a case
study of Christine, a once working-class woman who now identifies as middle class, to
show how working-class habitus can be still embodied in ambiguously located
individuals within the field of education, generating uncertainty, ambivalence, anxiety
and a sense of disenfranchisement. I also draw on data on Christine's educational
history to show how habitus continues to operate long after the objective cond
its emergence have been dislodged (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 13).
Educational researchers have operationalized notions of habitus in relation t
qualitative and quantitative data. Chris Atkins (2000) works with qualitative
interviews, utilizing the concept of habitus in relation to the individual dispositions
of rural adult learners and attempts to move from individual dispositions to notions of
a collective rural habitus. In contrast, Susan Dumais (2002) draws on quantitative
data in her study of cultural capital and schooling. She operationalizes habitus as
students' occupational aspirations, arguing that perceptions about the opportunity
structure and what is necessary to succeed are all part of habitus. However, as she
recognizes, students' ability to obtain prestigious jobs is only one small component of
habitus, and her study is 'really only a first attempt to operationalise the concept of
habitus alongside the concept of cultural capital' (Dumais, 2002, p. 62). A more
holistic, intensive approach to working with habitus is Roy Nash's longitudinal New
Zealand Progress at School Project. Drawing on focus group interviews with
secondary school students, Nash (2002) examines the consequences for working-class
students who reject the concept of education offered by the school and are unable to
construct a habitus in accordance with it. He works carefully with the data to delineate
'the educated habitus' and how the working classes both exclude themselves and are
excluded from it. Similarly, Rapoport and Lomsky-Feder (2002) conduct a micro-
analysis of 'intelligentsia' as an ethnic habitus. Working with life histories they
examine in detail how habitus is inculcated and transformed in the context of Russian
Jewish migration to Israel. Their findings 'verify the transposal quality of habitus a
its heightened dynamic nature in times of structural lag or rupture and a mismatc
between opportunities and dispositions to grasp them' (Rapoport & Lomsky-Fed
2002, p. 245).
Probably the most comprehensive attempt to use habitus in order to move
analytically from the individual to the class collective and back again is Simon
Charlesworth's (2000) A phenomenology of working class experience. He provides us with
an analysis of habitus that draws powerfully of Bourdieu's own conceptualizations,
but which also works organically and sensitively with the data. The result is an analysis
that combines unconscious impulses with mundane everyday reflexivity. So, for
Charlesworth, working-class masculine habitus is:
As well as habitus coming into view as a mixture of the embodied, the instinctual and
the unthought, we also glimpse the 'life of the mind', the reflective as well as the pre-
reflective.
Conclusion
dispositions'. There is plenty of scope, and I would argue a real need, for put
habitus into practice. To reiterate Bourdieu's words a second time:
... one cannot grasp the most profound logic of the social world unless one becomes
immersed in the specificity of an empirical reality. (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 271)
Note
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