HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, PETITIONER,
LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION AND RIZAL
COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONERS-
IN-INTERVENTION, VS. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE
GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, AND JULIO SUNIGA[1] AND HIS
SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC.
AND WINDSOR ANDAYA, RESPONDENTS.
[ G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012 ]
As this Court held in Perez-Rosario v. CA:
It is an established social and economic fact that the escalation of
poverty is the driving force behind the political disturbances that
have in the past compromised the peace and security of the people
as well as the continuity of the national order. To subdue these
acute disturbances, the legislature over the course of the history of
the nation passed a series of laws calculated to accelerate agrarian
reform, ultimately to raise the material standards of living and
eliminate discontent. Agrarian reform is a perceived solution to
social instability. The edicts of social justice found in the
Constitution and the public policies that underwrite them, the
extraordinary national experience, and the prevailing national
consciousness, all command the great departments of government
to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and underprivileged
whenever reasonable doubt arises in the interpretation of the law.
But annexed to the great and sacred charge of protecting the weak
is the diametric function to put every effort to arrive at an equitable
solution for all parties concerned: the jural postulates of social
justice cannot shield illegal acts, nor do they sanction false
sympathy towards a certain class, nor yet should they deny
justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be
on her side. In the occupation of the legal questions in all agrarian
disputes whose outcomes can significantly affect societal harmony,
the considerations of social advantage must be weighed, an inquiry
into the prevailing social interests is necessary in the adjustment of
conflicting demands and expectations of the people, and the social
interdependence of these interests, recognized. (Emphasis and
citations omitted.)
Considering that the issue on just compensation has already been
passed upon and denied by the Court in its November 22, 2011
Resolution, a subsequent motion touching on the same issue
undeniably partakes of a second motion for reconsideration, hence,
a prohibited pleading, and as such, the motion or plea must be
denied. Sec. 3 of Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
is clear:
SEC. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not
entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception
to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by
the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration “in the higher interest of
justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous,
but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A
second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before
the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of
law or by the Court’s declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate
a second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
Nonetheless, even if we entertain said motion and examine the
arguments raised by HLI and Mallari, et al. one last time, the result
will be the same.
Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that
the taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program of the
government is conditioned on the payment of just compensation.
As stated:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm
workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits
as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Just compensation has been defined as “the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.”[12] The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss.[13] In determining just compensation, the price or
value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the
government takes possession of the land before the institution
of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the
time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the
complaint.[14]
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that “the
‘time of taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of
the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred to the Republic.”[15] It should be noted, however, that
“taking” does not only take place upon the issuance of title either
in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). “Taking”
also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a
landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through
the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case.
