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EXPLORING THE BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE

The Popularity of
Basic Income

Evidence from the Polls

Tijs Laenen
 Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee

Series Editor
Karl Widerquist, Georgetown University in Qatar, Doha, Qatar
Basic income is one of the most innovative, powerful, straightforward,
and controversial proposals for addressing poverty and growing inequali-
ties. A Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is designed to be an unconditional,
government-insured guarantee that all citizens will have enough income
to meet their basic needs. The concept of basic, or guaranteed, income
is a form of social provision and this series examines the arguments for
and against it from an interdisciplinary perspective with special focus on
the economic and social factors. By systematically connecting abstract
philosophical debates over competing principles of BIG to the empir-
ical analysis of concrete policy proposals, this series contributes to the
fields of economics, politics, social policy, and philosophy and establishes a
theoretical framework for interdisciplinary research. It will bring together
international and national scholars and activists to provide a compara-
tive look at the main efforts to date to pass unconditional BIG legislation
across regions of the globe and will identify commonalities and differences
across countries drawing lessons for advancing social policies in general
and BIG policies in particular.
 Tijs Laenen

The Popularity
of Basic Income
Evidence from the Polls
Tijs Laenen
KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
Tilburg University
Tilburg, The Netherlands

ISSN 2662-3803 ISSN 2662-3811 (electronic)

Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee
ISBN 978-3-031-29351-1 ISBN 978-3-031-29352-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29352-8

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Preface

Basic income is increasingly seen as a very promising cure for some of

today’s and tomorrow’s societal ills, including the persistent problem of
poverty, the accelerating trend towards greater income inequality and the
imminent threat of mass unemployment. In light of all this, it is often
assumed that the idea of basic income is rapidly growing in popularity;
not only among academics, activists and politicians, but also among the
general public. Although this may appear intuitive and reasonable, the
fact of the matter is that our current understanding of popular support
for basic income is far from perfect. It is true that recent years have seen
a major upsurge in public opinion polls and scientific studies investigating
the popularity of basic income. However, these are very much scattered,
like trees in a forest, preventing us from seeing the full picture.
Over recent years, I have been involved in a number of initiatives that
have aimed to put the pieces together. This all started in 2019 in Belgium,
when I hosted an international seminar on public attitudes towards basic
income. As the first of its type, the seminar brought together an interna-
tional group of researchers from different academic disciplines to facilitate
the exchange of theoretical ideas and empirical findings, and to explore
promising paths for future cooperation. One of these paths resulted in
a special issue on the social legitimacy of basic income, published by
the Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy a year after
the seminar. The main takeaway from both the seminar and the special
issue was that popular support for basic income should be studied from

v
vi PREFACE

a cross-national perspective (as it seems to vary across countries), as well

as from a multidimensional perspective (as it also seems to depend on
the design characteristics of basic income). Nevertheless, it also became
evident that research into the popularity of basic income was—and still
is—in its infancy and that much more work needed to be done to gain a
better understanding of the subject.
That is where this book steps in. Inspired by the previous work, the
book provides the most up-to-date and fine-grained picture of popular
support for basic income currently available. It tries to be as comprehen-
sive as possible, but at the same time acknowledges that the evidence
presented is not exhaustive and that new evidence will undoubtedly
appear after the book has been published. Nevertheless, the book tells
you as much as it currently can about the popularity of basic income. In
doing so, it is an invaluable source of information for all those who aspire
to introduce some sort of basic income in the future. Although public
opinion is certainly not the only—and perhaps not even the most impor-
tant—factor determining the political feasibility of basic income, there
can be little doubt that it does play at least some part in taking it from a
fictional policy idea to factual policy implementation.
The book should not, however, be seen as an act of activism, unlike
many other books on basic income. I am neither in favour of nor against
basic income per se. This allows me to study its popularity with an open
mind, without having a preconceived point to prove. Although this may
seem obvious to the majority of neutral readers, those who are to some
degree acquainted with the basic income debate know that the ferocity
with which both advocates and opponents defend their—often ideologi-
cally oriented—positions often gets in the way of an honest and unbiased
discussion. The goal of this book is clearly not to settle the debate and
decide whether basic income is, all things considered, a good or a bad
idea. Instead, the book’s central aim is much more modest than that: to
describe how popular basic income is among the general public, using
empirical evidence from public opinion polls, and to reflect on the impli-
cations thereof for the political feasibility of implementing a basic income
in a real-world policy setting.

Leuven, Belgium Tijs Laenen

 Acknowledgements

I want to thank everyone who has, in their own unique way, contributed
to the making of this book. First, this includes the members of the self-
composed advisory committee: Jurgen De Wispelaere, Femke Roosma,
Yannick Vanderborght and Wim Van Lancker. Thank you for taking the
time to provide expert feedback on the content of the book. Second, I
want to thank Marie-Laure Mulayi and Cyrille Francisco for helping me
conduct the Basic Income in Belgium Survey, which is used throughout
the book. Third, credit is due to Joe Chrisp, Erwin Gielens and Isabelle
Stadelmann-Steffen, for openly sharing their survey data with me. Fourth,
I want to express my gratitude to Romy Geschiere and Sarah Puijk for
the preliminary data analyses they carried out within the framework of
their student traineeship under my supervision. Fifth, I would like to
thank Richard Bowles and Anne Lee for their thorough language revision.
Sixth, I am grateful to Karl Widerquist, the editor of the Guaranteed Basic
Income Series, for encouraging me to submit a book proposal. Seventh,
I want to thank all staff members of Palgrave Macmillan who helped
me through the publishing process. Last, I want to give recognition to
the two funding agencies that made the research reported in this book
possible: the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation
Programme (grant number 101023631) and the Belgian Federal Science
Policy (grant number B2/191/P3/BABEL).

vii
 Praise for The Popularity of Basic
Income

“Basic income is caught in a policy paradox: the more people support

the proposal, the less certain we are that what they favour is really
the idea of giving each individual member of a polity an unconditional
regular income. Getting a proper handle on the complex reality under-
lying popular support for the “simple idea” of basic income requires
taking a really deep dive into the existing survey evidence as well as the
systematic collection and analysis of new data using a diverse range of
innovative methods. The Popularity of Basic Income does exactly that –
and much more! Tijs Laenen has written an insightful and important
book that not only tells the reader what to make of the recent surge in
popular support for basic income, but also how it affects the prospect of
basic income becoming policy reality in our near future. A must-read for
anyone taking basic income seriously!”
—Jurgen De Wispelaere, Visiting Professor, Götz Werner Chair of
Economic Policy & Constitutional Theory, University of Freiburg &
Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University

“Basic income is increasingly described as an idea whose time has come.

But ultimately in liberal democracies its political feasibility will depend,
among other things, on the potential support of public opinion. For the
very first time, a book examines this issue in a systematic, rigorous, and
detailed way. Tijs Laenen, himself an expert in the design and conduct of
opinion polls, offers us an invaluable overview of the popularity of basic

ix
x PRAISE FOR THE POPULARITY OF BASIC INCOME

income across the developed world. His book is an indispensable tool

for those who have an interest in the future of basic income and, more
generally, in the feasibility of social protection reforms.”
—Yannick Vanderborght, Professor of political science at University of
Louvain, Belgium
 Contents

1 Introduction: How Popular Is Basic Income? 1

1.1 Basic Income: From a Disarmingly Simple Idea
to a Deceptively Simple One 2
1.1.1 The Ideal-Typical Basic Income 3
1.1.2 The History of the Basic Income Family 6
1.1.3 The Policy Design Dimensions of Basic Income 19
1.2 The Popularity of Basic Income 24
1.2.1 The Importance of Studying the Popularity
of Basic Income 25
1.2.2 How to Study Popular Support for Basic Income 29
1.2.3 Outline of the Book 33
References 34
2 Popular Support for the Ideal-Typical Basic Income 39
2.1 Across the Board 42
2.1.1 The First Opinion Polls on Basic Income 42
2.1.2 Polls with More-Detailed Definitions of Basic
Income 45
2.1.3 The Rise of Cross-National Polls on Basic
Income 50
2.1.4 Polls About Changes over Time in Support
for Basic Income 60
2.2 Individual Differences 66
2.2.1 Age 68

xi
xii CONTENTS

2.2.2 Gender 71
2.2.3 Household Composition 73
2.2.4 Education 75
2.2.5 Income 77
2.2.6 Labour Market Status 79
2.2.7 Trade Union Membership 85
2.2.8 Political Ideology 87
2.2.9 Welfare Deservingness Perceptions 92
2.2.10 Welfare Performance Evaluations 95
References 100
3 Popular Support for Differently Designed Varieties
of Basic Income 105
3.1 Across the Board 106
3.1.1 Universality 112
3.1.2 Conditionality 120
3.1.3 Uniformity 123
3.1.4 Generosity 126
3.1.5 Integration 129
3.1.6 Financing 132
3.1.7 Other Policy Design Dimensions 138
3.1.8 Some Relevant Policy Design Combinations 142
3.2 Individual Differences 149
3.2.1 Age 150
3.2.2 Gender 157
3.2.3 Income 160
3.2.4 Political Ideology 167
3.2.5 Voting Intentions 172
3.2.6 Trade Union Membership 180
3.2.7 Welfare Performance Evaluations 183
3.2.8 Benefit Recipiency 186
3.2.9 COVID-19 Experiences 190
References 195
4 Reasons for Supporting or Opposing Basic Income 203
4.1 Across-the-Board 204
4.1.1 Evidence from Traditional Opinion Polls 204
4.1.2 Evidence from Survey Experiments 227
4.1.3 Evidence from Qualitative Research 237
4.2 Individual Differences 249
 CONTENTS xiii

4.2.1 Age 249

4.2.2 Gender 257
4.2.3 Political Ideology 261
References 272
5 Conclusion: Implications for the Political Feasibility
of Basic Income 275
5.1 Eight Political Challenges and Their Opportunities 276
5.1.1 Political Opportunity Costs 276
5.1.2 The Problem of Cheap Support 278
5.1.3 The Universality-Unconditionality Impasse 279
5.1.4 Demand-Capacity Conflicts 281
5.1.5 Age Politics 283
5.1.6 Class Politics 287
5.1.7 Party Politics 290
5.1.8 Negativity Bias 293
5.2 A Research Agenda 295
5.2.1 Exploring the ‘Causes’ of Support for Basic
Income 296
5.2.2 Measuring Support for Basic Income 302
5.2.3 Exploring the ‘Consequences’ of Support
for Basic Income 307
References 310

Appendices 315
References 327
Index 341
 About the Author

Tijs Laenen is a social worker turned social scientist who is currently a

Marie Sklodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at Tilburg University (the
Netherlands) and coordinator of the Basic Income in Belgium project at
KU Leuven (Belgium). He has previously published articles on popular
support for basic income in academic journals, including the Journal
of European Public Policy, the International Journal of Social Welfare,
the Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy and Acta
Politica. Tijs has also written and edited several other books on popular
welfare attitudes, including the monograph ‘Welfare Deservingness and
Welfare Policy. Popular Deservingness Opinions and their Interaction
with Welfare State Policies’. For more information about Tijs and his
publications, visit www.tijslaenen.com.

xv
 Country Abbreviations

AT Austria
AU Australia
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
CA Canada
CH Switzerland
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
EE Estonia
ES Spain
FI Finland
FR France
GR Greece
HU Hungary
IE Ireland
IL Israel
IS Iceland
IT Italy
JP Japan
KR South Korea
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
MX Mexico
NL Netherlands
NO Norway

xvii
xviii COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS

NZ New Zealand
PH Philippines
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Romania
RU Russia
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
UK United Kingdom
US United States
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 The policy design dimensions of basic income 19

Fig. 2.1 Support for guaranteed basic income and guaranteed
employment, 1989 43
Fig. 2.2 Support for guaranteed basic income and guaranteed
employment, 1994 44
Fig. 2.3 Support for guaranteed basic income and guaranteed
employment, 2001 45
Fig. 2.4 Support for basic income and workfare
in the Netherlands, 1995 46
Fig. 2.5 Support for basic income in France, 2001 48
Fig. 2.6 Support for basic income in Finland, Norway
and Sweden, 2002–2003 49
Fig. 2.7 Support for basic income in Europe, 2015–2017 51
Fig. 2.8 Support for basic income and fully means-tested welfare
in Europe, 2016 53
Fig. 2.9 Cross-national variation in support for basic income
in Europe 55
Fig. 2.10 Combined support for basic income and fully
means-tested welfare 57
Fig. 2.11 Support for basic income in Europe, Canada, Mexico
and the US, 2017 58
Fig. 2.12 Support for basic income in Europe, 2019 60
Fig. 2.13 Support for basic income in Germany, 2016–2018 61
Fig. 2.14 Support for basic income in the UK, 2018–2020 63
Fig. 2.15 Support for basic income by age 70

xix
xx LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 2.16 Support for basic income by gender 72

Fig. 2.17 Support for basic income by household size 73
Fig. 2.18 Support for basic income by the presence of children
in the household 74
Fig. 2.19 Support for basic income by highest attained level
of education 76
Fig. 2.20 Support for basic income by household income 78
Fig. 2.21 Support for basic income by subjective income 79
Fig. 2.22 Support for basic income by work status 81
Fig. 2.23 Support for basic income by type of labour market
inactivity 81
Fig. 2.24 Support for basic income by sector of employment 82
Fig. 2.25 Support for basic income by employment contract 83
Fig. 2.26 Support for basic income by weekly working hours 84
Fig. 2.27 Support for basic income by trade union membership 87
Fig. 2.28 Support for basic income by political orientation 89
Fig. 2.29 Support for basic income by egalitarian beliefs 90
Fig. 2.30 Support for basic income by migration beliefs 91
Fig. 2.31 Support for basic income by perceptions of unemployed
people’s efforts 94
Fig. 2.32 Support for basic income by perceptions of unemployed
people’s needs 94
Fig. 2.33 Support for basic income by perceptions of the welfare
state’s effect on poverty 96
Fig. 2.34 Support for basic income by perceptions of underuse
of social benefits 97
Fig. 2.35 Support for basic income by perceptions of overuse
of social benefits 98
Fig. 2.36 Support for basic income by perceptions of the welfare
state’s economic effect 98
Fig. 3.1 Support for different basic income varieties in Belgium
and the Netherlands, 2021 107
Fig. 3.2 Support for different basic income varieties in Belgium,
2019/2020 108
Fig. 3.3 Support for different basic income varieties in Flanders
and Wallonia, 2019/2020 109
Fig. 3.4 Support for different basic income varieties in Finland
and Spain, 2019 111
Fig. 3.5 Support for different basic income varieties in Finland
and Switzerland, 2016 113
Fig. 3.6 Support for an EU-wide basic income, 2020 117
 LIST OF FIGURES xxi

Fig. 3.7 Support for different basic income varieties in Finland,

2015 128
Fig. 3.8 Support for different basic income varieties in the UK,
2017 136
Fig. 3.9 Support for different funding mechanisms of basic
income in the UK, 2017–2018 137
Fig. 3.10 Support for different basic income varieties in Belgium,
2021 140
Fig. 3.11 Support for age-restricted varieties of basic income by age 156
Fig. 4.1 Arguments for and against basic income
in the Netherlands, 1995 205
Fig. 4.2 Arguments for and against basic income in the UK, 2018 207
Fig. 4.3 Arguments for basic income in the UK, 2017 209
Fig. 4.4 Arguments for and against basic income in Europe, 2016 211
Fig. 4.5 Arguments for basic income in Europe, Canada, Mexico
and the US, 2017 213
Fig. 4.6 Arguments against basic income in Europe, Canada,
Mexico and the US, 2017 214
Fig. 4.7 Predicted outcomes of a basic income in the US, 2020 215
Fig. 4.8 Predicted micro-level outcomes of basic income
in Europe, 2020 216
Fig. 4.9 Arguments for and against basic income in South Korea,
2021 220
Fig. 4.10 Arguments for basic income in Finland, 2018 225
Fig. 4.11 Support for basic income with different policy outcomes
in Belgium, 2021 230
Fig. 4.12 Arguments for and against basic income
in the Netherlands, by age 251
Fig. 4.13 Arguments for and against basic income in the UK, by age 252
Fig. 4.14 Arguments for basic income in the UK, by age 254
Fig. 4.15 Arguments for and against basic income
in the Netherlands, by gender 258
Fig. 4.16 Arguments for and against basic income in the UK,
by gender 260
Fig. 4.17 Arguments for basic income, by political ideology 262
Fig. 4.18 Opinion change after hearing about policy outcomes,
by political ideology 263
Fig. 4.19 Support for basic income with different political framing,
by political ideology 269
Fig. 5.1 Summary of the research agenda 296
Fig. A5.1 Arguments for basic income in the UK, by gender 325
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Overview of the public opinion polls analysed

in the book 30
Table 3.1 Combinations of conditionality, uniformity
and universality 144
Table 3.2 Combinations of generosity, financing and integration 146
Table 3.3 Support for different basic income varieties by age 152
Table 3.4 Support for different basic income varieties by gender 158
Table 3.5 Support for different basic income varieties by income 162
Table 3.6 Support for different basic income varieties by political
orientation 169
Table 3.7 Support for different basic income varieties by voting
intentions in Belgium 174
Table 3.8 Support for different basic income varieties by voting
intentions in the Netherlands 178
Table 3.9 Support for different basic income varieties by trade
union membership 182
Table 3.10 Support for different basic income varieties by welfare
performance evaluations 186
Table 3.11 Support for different basic income varieties by benefit
recipiency 189
Table 3.12 Support for different basic income varieties
by COVID-19 experiences 192
Table 4.1 Predicted outcomes of different basic income amounts
in South Korea, 2021 222

xxiii
xxiv LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.2 Combinations of unemployment/poverty with other

policy outcomes 231
Table 4.3 Combinations of policy outcomes and policy design
features 233
Table 4.4 Opinion change after hearing about policy outcomes
in Belgium, 2021 236
Table 4.5 Example quotes from study participants in qualitative
studies on arguments about basic income 240
Table 4.6 Support for basic income with different policy
outcomes, by age 255
Table 4.7 Support for basic income with different policy
outcomes, by political ideology 265
Table A1.1 Wording of the levels in the vignette experiment
in the BABEL/BIN Survey 315
Table A1.2 Wording of the levels in the vignette experiment
in the BNES 317
Table A1.3 Wording of the levels in the conjoint experiment
by Rincon 318
Table A1.4 Wording of the levels in the conjoint experiment
by Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont 320
Table A3.1 Combinations of generosity and integration by benefit
recipiency category 322
Table A4.1 Wording of the policy outcomes in the BABEL
experiment 323
Table A5.1 Support for basic income with different policy
outcomes, by gender 324
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: How Popular Is Basic Income?

This book is all about finding out how popular basic income is. At first
sight, this may seem a very simple question. However, as will become
abundantly clear throughout the book, the answer to it proves to be
extremely complex. This complexity starts from the fact that the two core
concepts embedded in the question—‘basic income’ and ‘popularity’—are
not as easy to define as one would intuitively think. Most of the intro-
duction therefore attempts to clarify what these two concepts are actually
taken to mean in this book.
With regard to the concept of ‘basic income’, I will start by discussing
the most commonly used definition of what a basic income is: a peri-
odic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis,
without any means test or work requirement. Throughout the book, this
will be referred to as the ‘ideal-typical’ version of basic income. History
has taught us, however, that a great many differently designed variants
of the ideal-typical basic income exist. It is mainly the existence of those
other variants that adds complexity to the seemingly simple question of
how popular a basic income is, as it is not the popularity of only one type
that is the object of study, but rather that of a huge variety of different
forms.
Turning to concept of ‘popularity’, I will explain that this refers to the
degree of support there is for the introduction of a basic income among
the general public. I will argue that there are several interrelated reasons

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
T. Laenen, The Popularity of Basic Income, Exploring the Basic
Income Guarantee, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29352-8_1
2 T. LAENEN

that studying popular support for basic income is important. The most
significant of these is arguably the fact that public opinion constitutes a
crucial factor in determining the political feasibility of implementing a
basic income scheme in the real world. After establishing why studying
the popularity of basic income is important, it will be clarified how this is
accomplished in the book. As the book’s subtitle suggests, the popularity
of basic income is mainly scrutinized with the help of ‘evidence from the
polls’, referring to public opinion surveys conducted among large samples
of the general population in different countries and over different years.

1.1 Basic Income: From a Disarmingly

Simple Idea to a Deceptively Simple One
To this day, basic income is very often presented as a disarmingly simple
idea (Van Parijs, 2004): ‘just give everyone a sum of money on a
regular basis, with no questions asked whatsoever’. Could things be any
simpler than that? However, at the same time as the basic income debate
progresses, it is increasingly acknowledged that things are nowhere near
as simple as they seem. First of all, the ideal-typical definition of basic
income is remarkably silent about several crucial policy design features,
including—among other things—the level and financing of basic income.
How generous should it be, and who will end up paying for it? In addi-
tion, a glance at both distant and recent policy proposals, pilots and
experiments shows that a wide variety of differently designed basic income
types exist, which often deviate—albeit in differing degrees—from their
ideal-typical counterpart; two well-known examples being a participation
income (Atkinson, 1996) and a negative income tax (Friedman, 1962).
These types of schemes are often labelled as ‘cousins’ of basic income.
Accordingly, basic income is perhaps better thought of as a family of
policies, consisting of the ideal-typical version (its mater familias ), along-
side many different breeds that share some family resemblance with the
ideal type, but at the same time have unique features distinguishing them
(Martinelli, 2017).
In the following, I first describe the ideal-typical version of basic
income as defined by the leading Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN),
and point out exactly what is missing from or what is unclear in that defi-
nition. After that, a brief overview of basic income’s history is provided,
in order to demonstrate that there has in fact always been a huge variety
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 3

of differently designed types. To create some kind of order in the rela-

tively chaotic history of basic income, I continue with a summary of the
policy design dimensions that can differ between variants. All this should
make very clear why basic income is a deceptively simple idea rather than a
disarmingly simple one. As we will see later on, this observation will also
have some very important ramifications for public opinion about basic
income.

1.1.1 The Ideal-Typical Basic Income

At least from a layperson’s perspective, there seems to be a remarkable
degree of agreement about what a basic income is. Around the globe,
advocates and activists have rallied around one particular definition, artic-
ulated by BIEN—the most prominent international network involved in
the promotion of basic income. Their widely accepted definition was
heavily influenced by the work of one of the network’s co-founders,
Philippe Van Parijs (2004), and states that basic income is ‘a periodic cash
payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without
means test or work requirement’. Five core characteristics of basic income
are recognized in this definition. The first one is that it is paid periodi-
cally at regular intervals, in contrast to a one-off payment scheme such as
a basic endowment (one of basic income’s many cousins) (Ackerman &
Alstott, 1999). The second defining characteristic is that basic income is
paid in cash rather than in kind; the latter being the case for universal basic
services, yet another of the ‘cousins’ (Gough, 2019). The third character-
istic is that basic income is paid to individuals rather than to households,
as has been proposed by some basic income advocates (Sanzo & Pinilla,
2004). The fourth core characteristic of the ideal-typical basic income is
its universality, meaning that it will be paid to all, without means testing.
The fifth characteristic is that basic income is granted unconditionally,
without any requirement to work or to demonstrate a willingness to work.
Although the BIEN definition seems as clear as day, it leaves out
a number of very important issues concerning policy design. First, it
remains unclear what the ‘to all’ stipulation in the definition actually
means. Assuming first that basic income is supposed to be implemented
nationally—as suggested in most proposals—does ‘all’ then refer to all
citizens or to all residents of a country? If the latter is intended, does it
refer to everyone who resides in the country or only to those who do so
legally? In addition, what about newly arrived migrants? Will there be any
4 T. LAENEN

residency requirements that need to be fulfilled before the right to a basic

income is granted, and if so, can and will those requirements be equal
for different types of migrants? In the context of the European Union
(EU), for example, it seems somewhat difficult to imagine a national basic
income scheme that excludes EU nationals coming from other Member
States, as that would probably violate the legal framework of equal rights
set within the EU, as well as the spirit of free movement of labour on
which the union was founded. The ‘to all’ stipulation in the BIEN defi-
nition could thus equally refer to all citizens or residents of a broader
supranational entity, as is the case in proposals for a Europe-wide (Van
Parijs & Vanderborght, 2001) or even a worldwide (Pogge, 2001) basic
income. At the other end of the spectrum, basic income could also be
implemented locally, in specific regions within countries. Different states
within the United States (US), for example, could decide to roll out their
own version of basic income, as is currently the case in the state of Alaska
(Widerquist & Howard, 2012).
Second, BIEN’s definition of the ideal-typical basic income does not
specify the level at which it should be set. Given the global character of the
organization, this makes perfect sense: it is extremely difficult to settle on
a fixed, uniform amount across richer and poorer countries alike. Never-
theless, in the accompanying commentary, BIEN does state that the level
of basic income should be ‘stable in size and frequency and high enough
to be, in combination with other social services, part of a policy strategy to
eliminate material poverty and enable the social and cultural participation
of every individual’. This fits well with most other basic income proposals,
which tend to envision an amount somewhere around an agreed-on level
of subsistence, so that it covers basic needs and provides basic income
security to all. A basic income could, however, just as well be higher or
lower than the subsistence level (Van Parijs, 2004). In fact, although such
uniformity is often assumed by basic income advocates, the BIEN defi-
nition does not even seem to insist that the benefit amount be equal for
all. Instead, it leaves open the possibility that the level of basic income is
allowed to vary between individuals with different characteristics—such
as their age, place of residence or even their financial means or work
history—as long as ‘everyone gets something’ (De Wispelaere & Stirton,
2004).
Third, exactly what basic income would or would not replace in the
existing welfare state is left unspecified. The above-mentioned extract
from the BIEN commentary suggests that ‘other social services’ are to
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 5

be kept in place, but it is unclear what is actually meant by that. Does

this refer exclusively to in-kind services such as healthcare, childcare and
education, or does it also include cash transfers such as child benefits,
unemployment insurance and old-age pensions? How a basic income
could be integrated in an existing system has been a major topic of dispute
ever since people started to consider its concrete implementation in any
given context. At one extreme, a basic income does not replace a single
welfare provision, but should instead be seen as an additional, comple-
mentary layer on top of the system already in place. Most advocates
nevertheless realize that this is probably unaffordable and perhaps even
undesirable, and thus suggest scaling back at least some of the existing
provisions. However, they disagree massively about which specific provi-
sions should be replaced, and the stringency with which this ought to
happen. While most seem to agree that basic income should supplement
rather than substitute in-kind services, there is substantial disagreement
about the fate of cash transfers after the implementation of a basic income
(Van Parijs, 2004). According to some (mostly left-wing liberals), existing
cash benefits should generally remain in place, so that they can provide
top-ups for those who are faced with particular social risks such as illness
or disability. Others (mostly right-wing conservatives) are much stricter
about this, arguing for the elimination of most other cash transfers, as
everyone would already receive a basic income and thus enjoy the basic
security that comes with it (Murray, 2008). A few even dare to take this
a step further by pleading for the total abolishment of in-kind services as
well, given that basic income would allow everyone—not just the rich—
to pay for these services privately. Such an all-abolishing basic income,
located right at the other extreme of the integration debate, is a dream
for some but a nightmare for many others.
Fourth, nothing is mentioned in the BIEN definition about the
financing of basic income, which is nevertheless a hugely important factor.
Many believe that basic income can—at least partially—be ‘self-financed’
in several ways. The most evident mechanism is to use some of the
funds designated for the cash transfers that basic income is intended to
replace. This involves both the actual payments of the transfers and the
administrative costs necessary to make those payments—which would,
in most accounts, be much lower in the case of a cheap and simple-
to-administer basic income. Less obvious is perhaps the idea that basic
income would mainly finance itself because of its (predicted) positive
effects on labour market participation and productivity rates (Van Parijs &
6 T. LAENEN

Vanderborght, 2017). However, even with the spread of basic income

experiments, this claim presently remains highly speculative. It therefore
seems more reasonable that basic income would have to be funded by
raising additional revenue. In the bulk of concrete proposals, basic income
would be to some extent funded by (an increase in) personal income
taxes, of a progressive, proportional or even regressive type (Widerquist
et al., 2013). However, countless other funding mechanisms have been
proposed, often in addition to income taxation. These include consump-
tion taxes, wealth taxes, climate taxes, revenue from natural resources and
money creation (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).
The key takeaway from all this, is not that all these specific policy design
features should be included in the ideal-typical definition of basic income,
as they are very likely to be context-specific. A basic income in Belgium,
for example, would look very different from one in Belize in terms of its
coverage, level, integration and financing. Instead, the key point is that
the ideal-typical definition does nothing more than sketch out the very
broad contours within which concrete policy proposals can take shape,
making basic income a deceptively simple idea, rather than a disarmingly
simple one.

1.1.2 The History of the Basic Income Family

One of the best ways to further illustrate the fact that basic income is a
deceptively simple idea rather than a disarmingly simple one is to outline
its historical development. The history of basic income, as it tends to
be told even by the basic income community itself (see, for example,
Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2004; Torry, 2021), is actually far more accurately
described as a history of differently designed varieties of basic income.
Some see these as end-of-the-road variations that are considered desir-
able and/or feasible in their own right, sometimes even more so than
the ideal-typical basic income. Others regard them instead as middle-of-
the-road stepping stones, the main purpose of which is to help achieve
the ultimate goal of introducing the ‘real deal’—that is, the ideal-typical
version of basic income—through the back door (Van Parijs & Vander-
borght, 2017). Which of the two perspectives is most common is difficult
to gauge, but the fact of the matter is that there has always been a huge
variety in the types of basic income that have been proposed and piloted
throughout history.
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 7

Most writings trace the origins of basic income back centuries, to 1795,
when the British-American philosopher Thomas Paine advocated some-
thing that many consider to be the first-ever basic income proposal. A
closer look at Paine’s plans, however, reveals that he in fact suggested
two varieties of something that would probably not be classified as a
basic income according to contemporary standards. His first proposal was
more akin to a basic endowment than a basic income, as it entailed a
one-off payment to be paid as people reached adulthood. Paine’s second
proposal argued for something that we now know as a basic pension: a
regular cash benefit paid only to the elderly and the disabled. Because
both schemes were meant to compensate for the unequal division of an
‘equal birthright in natural resources’, they were to be funded by some
sort of land tax (Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2004: xiv). Shortly after, and partly
in response to Paine, a type of basic income was also proposed by the
British revolutionary, Thomas Spence. His suggestion, which has been
paid far less attention in the basic income literature, was also inspired by
the idea that every individual has a fundamental right to society’s natural
resources (King & Marangos, 2006). Spence argued that all land inher-
ently belongs to the community and should therefore be rented for use.
The proceeds thereof were then to be paid as a quarterly dividend, to be
divided ‘fairly and equally among all the living souls in the parish, whether
male or female; married or single; legitimate or illegitimate; from a day
old to the extremest age; making no distinction between the families of
the farmers and merchants […] and the families of poor labourers […],
but giving to the head of every family a full and equal share for every
name under his roof’ (Spence, 1797 in Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2004: 87).
Although Spence’s scheme seems to meet most of the core characteris-
tics of the ideal-typical basic income, the final part of the quote makes it
clear that the payment would probably not have been strictly individual, as
promoted by most of today’s basic income advocates. Instead, the money
would have gone to the ‘head of the family’, which in those days almost
certainly meant it would have been paid to the male breadwinner of the
household, who could have then spent it as he wished. This implies that
there would have been little assurance that ‘every name under the roof’
was in fact given his or her fair share of the basic income payment.
In the years after Paine and Spence had published their proposals, many
others—often independently of each other—recommended that some
type of basic income could be implemented. Right after the turn of the
eighteenth into the nineteenth century, the French philosopher Charles
8 T. LAENEN

Fourier came up with his so-called ‘social minimum’: a scheme that some
contemporary commentators have designated as an early version of basic
income. A closer look at Fourier’s social minimum, however, reveals that
it was in fact far removed from the ideal-typical basic income, given
that it was to be delivered in kind (so not in cash) and restricted to
the poor (so not universal). The fact that the social minimum was to
be free of work requirements, and thus unconditional, does not seem
enough to categorize it as a real basic income (Cunliffe & Erreygers,
2001). Fourier did nevertheless inspire others, such as the relatively
unknown Belgian thinker, Joseph Charlier, who proposed something he
called a ‘territorial dividend’. This was a cash benefit to be paid on a
regular basis to every ‘indigenous’ resident of Belgium, and was to be
financed by so-called ‘real estate’ taxes on land and buildings (Cunliffe &
Erreygers, 2001). Although Charlier’s proposal seems to tick most of
the boxes for an ideal-typical basic income, its universality was severely
constrained by the fact that all ‘foreigners living in Belgium, and their
descendants born in the country until the third generation, cannot partic-
ipate in the territorial dividends, except in the cases of full naturalization
or of reciprocity with their countries of origin, and on condition that
the descendants have shown their willingness to be part of the nation’
(Charlier, 1894 in Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2001). Thus, even after having
obtained Belgian nationality, benefit access would still have been condi-
tional on a willingness-to-integrate requirement for first-generation up
to third-generation migrants, making the scheme both less universal
and more conditional than most modern-day basic income proposals.
However, Charlier’s assumption, or better yet his aspiration, was that
the dividend would ultimately be calculated globally, thereby making the
criterion of nationality obsolete. In that sense, Charlier was perhaps the
first to propose some kind of global rather than national basic income
scheme.
After the likes of Fourier and especially Charlier had suggested schemes
in continental Europe, the focal point of the basic income idea seems
to have shifted towards Britain, at least in the first half of the twentieth
century. At the end of World War I in 1918, Dennis Milner and his wife
Evelyn Mabel (1918), both Quakers, were probably the first to propose
a genuinely modern basic income. Their proposal, known as the ‘state
bonus scheme’, can be considered modern in the sense that it was the
first not to rely on any ‘natural rights to natural resources’ arguments and
accompanying land taxes (Van Trier, 2018). Instead, they saw the state
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 9

bonus as a way to ensure that every citizen—rich or poor, working or

not—shared in the fruits of the economic progress being made by indus-
trialized Britain at the time. More specifically, Milner and Mabel proposed
to pay a flat-rate amount to each citizen on a regular basis out of the
revenue from personal income taxes. Although the state bonus scheme
never garnered sufficient political support to be implemented, it did influ-
ence subsequent proposals made in Britain. Two of these proposals are
especially worth mentioning here. The first was from the hand of G. D. H.
Cole (1935: 159), who dreamt of a fully planned economy in which there
would be ‘direct payments from the State to every citizen as a “social divi-
dend”—a recognition of each citizen’s claim as a consumer to share in the
common heritage of productive power’. According to Cole, the dividend
should be equal for all adults, large enough to cover basic necessities and
cumulative with wages from labour so as to preserve work incentives.
Although Cole was somewhat vague about the precise financing of the
social dividend, he seems to imply that interest from capital investments
would be completely abolished and replaced by ‘new methods of collec-
tive provision for the accumulation of capital’ (Cole, 1935: 158). In a way,
Cole’s proposal can therefore be seen as the first to hint at funding basic
income—at least partially—through some type of capital gains tax. About
ten years later, during World War II, the second noteworthy proposal was
published by Lady Juliet Rhys Williams (1943), in response to the famous
Beveridge report that was to shape British social policy in the decades to
follow. As an alternative to the plans of Lord Beveridge, she proposed the
introduction of a regular universal payment to all on an individual basis.
Importantly, however, Lady Williams added that these payments should
be made ‘conditional on willingness to work (for men and single women),
or the provision of care (for married women and mothers), to enforce
the reciprocity principle’ (Miller et al., 2019: 137). It is that condition-
ality which actually brings the proposal much closer to what we know
today as a participation income, distinguishing it from the ideal-typical,
unconditional basic income.
As is well-known, it was nevertheless Lord Beveridge’s plan that even-
tually won, leading to the institutionalization of various social insurance
schemes covering specific social risks, such as sickness and unemploy-
ment. Lady William’s proposal for a universal payment to all was thereby
consigned to the dustbin of history, as have so many basic income
proposals been. Nevertheless, there is no denying that the events of the
two world wars had sparked widespread recognition of universal suffering,
10 T. LAENEN

which many felt should be met with universal coverage. This realiza-
tion surely accommodated the spread of categorical universal schemes
aimed at the non-working-age population, most notably children and
elderly people. The first universal child allowance was introduced in 1932
in France, but other countries soon followed suit, including Belgium,
Germany and Sweden. The first universal pension system came into being
in New Zealand in 1937, and was shortly after added to by the Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and the Netherlands in the
1940s and 1950s. Although such universal schemes are usually left out of
tales of the history of basic income (see Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017
for an exception), they deserve a place there because they share some
important family resemblance with the ideal-typical version. Universal
pensions and child allowances are very similar to basic income in the
sense that they grant benefit access on the basis of citizenship or resi-
dency, rather than work history (as social insurance schemes do) or
financial means (as social assistance schemes do). This is why they are
often considered as promising stepping stone policies, paving the way for
the introduction of a fully fledged basic income for all. Occasionally, there
have also been suggestions to treat basic pensions and child allowances as
end products in their own right, instead of merely stopovers.
In the 1960s and 1970s, basic income was mainly discussed in the
US, albeit under the name of a negative income tax (NIT). This all
began when two very prominent economists—who were both to become
Nobel Prize winners some time later—proposed their version of an NIT:
Milton Friedman (1962) and James Tobin (1966). Although the specifics
of their proposals varied, they were both convinced that an NIT would
contribute much more to solving the persistent problem of poverty than
did the messy mix of welfare programmes introduced under President
Lyndon B. Johnson’s famous ‘war on poverty’. In simple terms, an NIT
provides a direct cash payment in the form of a tax credit to all those
whose income does not reach a predefined level, without any attached
work-related requirements. The fact that an NIT would be unconditional
in the sense of being obligation-free is the main reason why so many
consider it as part of the broader basic income family. At the end of the
day, an NIT nevertheless remains a selective policy that excludes people
with an income above a certain threshold. How far an NIT is removed
from a basic income then depends on the level at which that threshold
is set: the higher the level, the more income categories are included, and
the closer we get to the ideal-typical, universal basic income. Most NIT
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 11

proposals, however, opt for a relatively low income threshold, so that only
the poor can benefit from it. This was also what the two main candi-
dates in the 1972 US presidential campaign (George McGovern for the
Democrats and Richard Nixon for the Republicans) had in mind when
they included their own versions of an NIT in their electoral programmes
(Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). McGovern’s plan was to pay a sum
of $1000 a year to each American, which would then be partially clawed
back through the tax system so that it would ultimately benefit mostly
low-income families. However, his ‘demogrant’ proposal was considered
highly unrealistic at the time and was never really taken seriously. This
stands in stark contrast to Nixon’s proposal, called the ‘Family Assistance
Plan’ (FAP), which was taken into serious consideration by Congress and
almost made it into legislation, were it not for concerns by the Democrats
that the value of the cash payment was too low, as well as for Republican
worries that the programme would sap work incentives (Caputo, 2012).
To this day, many commentators continue to argue that the discussion
of Nixon’s FAP in the US Congress is the closest that any industrialized
nation has come to implementing a basic income (Widerquist & Sheahan,
2012). A more detailed look at the programme, however, shows that it
was in fact very different from the ideal-typical basic income as we know
it today. One important qualification is that the FAP was restricted (as
the name already suggests) to poor families, leaving childless people to
fend for themselves. On top of that, notwithstanding a few exceptions,
people had to prove they were willing to work in order to receive the
cash payment. This shows that the FAP was anything but a universal and
unconditional basic income, which was also exactly how Nixon wanted it
to be:

This national floor under incomes for working or dependent families is not
a ‘guaranteed income’. Under the guaranteed income proposal, everyone
would be assured a minimum income, regardless of how much he was
capable of earning, regardless of what his need was, regardless of whether
or not he was willing to work. Now, during the presidential campaign
last year, I opposed such a plan. I oppose it now and I will continue to
oppose it, and this is the reason: A guaranteed income would undermine
the incentive to work; the family assistance plan that I propose increases
the incentive to work. A guaranteed income establishes a right without
any responsibilities; family assistance recognizes a need and establishes a
responsibility. It provides help to those in need and, in turn, requires that
those who receive help work to the extent of their capabilities. (Quote
12 T. LAENEN

taken from Richard Nixon’s address to the nation on August 8, 1969;

reported in Caputo, 2012: 269)

The 1960s and 1970s were also a period during which there were
several scientific experiments investigating the effects of an NIT—four in
the US and one in Canada (Widerquist, 2018). Although some see these
as the first series of basic income experiments, it has to be said that all the
programmes being tested were not universal because they were targeted
at low-income households only. So too was the only programme similar
to basic income that was actually introduced in the US in that period:
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Originally enacted in 1975 and
gradually expanded in the subsequent decades, the EITC is a type of NIT
that is paid out as a yearly tax credit to workers whose earned income
falls below a threshold determined by the federal government (Leff et al.,
2019). The fact that the EITC is restricted only to low-income workers
surely takes it even further away from the ideal-typical basic income. As
some nevertheless believe, the programme may well be the most viable
road to a fully fledged basic income in the US, as it could easily be
‘expanded into a negative income tax by removing the link to earnings,
and could then be further expanded into a basic income’ (Shafarman,
2004: 205).
It can, however, also be argued that the US already has a basic income
scheme in place, albeit not a nationwide one. Since 1982, every legal
resident of the state of Alaska has received a uniform cash payment each
year from the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), which is financed by
the state’s oil revenue (Widerquist & Howard, 2012). By doing this,
the programme meets all the core characteristics of the ideal-typical basic
income: it is paid periodically, in cash, to every resident and without a
means test or a work requirement. Regardless of this, many refuse to cate-
gorize it as such, for three main reasons. The first is that the amount of the
PFD is often considered as too low for it to be labelled as a genuine basic
income, given that it does not come anywhere near the subsistence level
needed to guarantee a decent standard of living. Alaska’s PFD is, in other
words, closer to a ‘partial’ basic income (which is so low that it is unlikely
to replace existing social benefits) than it is to a ‘full’ basic income—
which provides a higher level of payment and could therefore be seen as a
substitute for other benefits. The second reason is that the amount varies
too much from year to year. Although nothing in the ideal-typical defi-
nition says that the amount should always be the same, this is implicitly
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 13

assumed by most basic income advocates (De Wispelaere, 2015). Third,

one could say that the PFD is only equal for all because it was imple-
mented regionally in the state of Alaska, rather than nationally across the
US. The programme’s main policy champion, Governor Jay Hammond,
originally wanted to make the benefit level proportional to the length of
legal residence, rather than paying it as a flat-rate amount, as in most
other basic income proposals. He indeed strongly believed that higher
amounts should be paid to people who had lived in Alaska for a longer
period of time. He was, however, held back by the US Supreme Court,
which regarded the proposal as an act of unjust discrimination against
fellow Americans moving to Alaska from other states (Grog & Erickson,
2012).
After the NIT proposals and experiments in the US, the basic income
debate went relatively silent in the 1980s and 1990s, at least for the
broader audience. Behind the scenes, a movement was nevertheless
steadily growing, and beginning to study basic income in greater detail
and advocate it with greater passion than ever before. This movement
culminated in 1986, with the establishment of the Basic Income Euro-
pean Network (BIEN), which later turned into the Basic Income Earth
Network (in 2006), as the basic income debate went global. As mentioned
earlier, BIEN’s definition of basic income is without doubt still the most
widely accepted, which is why it was labelled as the ideal-typical version.
However, this does not mean that there has been full unanimity since
BIEN issued its definition. Throughout the 1990s, proposals continued
to be made for different types of basic income, often inspired by—
and responding to—the standard definition provided by BIEN. Just a
few examples are mentioned here to illustrate the continued diversity
within the broader basic income family. The first was from the hand
of Nobel Prize winner James Meade (1990), who envisioned that in
his ideal society—called ‘Agathotopia’—all existing social benefits would
be replaced by a single basic income scheme providing generous cash
payments to all Agathotopians, with no strings attached. Unlike many
other basic income advocates, Meade was also relatively specific about
how to finance this basic income:

The reliance on pollution tax (whose incentive effects are socially desirable)
rather than on taxes, such as the income tax (whose disincentive effects on
work and enterprise are undesirable), enabled a given level of real Basic
Income to be maintained at a markedly lower social cost. […] Another
14 T. LAENEN

form of tax employed by the Agathotopians to finance a really adequate

Basic Income is the imposition of a special surcharge on the first slice of
every citizen’s income other than the Basic Income itself. This is a form
of levy which in effect withdraws part of the Basic Income as a citizen’s
other income increases, a levy which is additional to the ordinary current
rate of tax on income. (Meade, 1990 in Widerquist et al., 2013: 202)

Interestingly, Meade’s second funding mechanism implies that the

basic income itself ought to be taxed and thus, in effect, decrease as
earnings increase. This stands in stark contrast to most other proposals,
which see basic income as a non-withdrawable benefit that has to come
on top of any earnings from other sources. This principle of accumula-
tion is the main reason why, many argue, basic income would strengthen
rather than weaken work incentives (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).
By making basic income taxable, Meade set a limit to the extent to which
it could be accumulated with other earnings. This discussion is less impor-
tant with regard to the second example of a policy proposal that is similar
to, but at the same time different from, the ideal-typical basic income: the
basic endowment. Although it has a rich history of its own, going way
back to Thomas Paine (Cunliffe & Erreygers, 2004), the most elaborate
proposal for a basic endowment probably came from Bruce Ackerman
and Anne Alstott (1999). They suggested the introduction of a so-called
‘stakeholder grant’—a lump sum disbursed to citizens (and only citizens)
when they reach adulthood. It is often argued that the only real difference
between this and the ideal-typical basic income is that the stakeholder
grant would not be paid periodically, but only once in a lifetime (Van
Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). There are, however, other differences.
The most important one is arguably the fact that in contrast to the ideal-
typical basic income, a stakeholder grant is not always fully unconditional.
This is because—at least in the Ackerman and Alstott plan—there are
two very specific requirements citizens would have to meet before they
could receive any money: to graduate from secondary school and to have
a spotless criminal record.
Adding some ingredient of conditionality to the recipe of basic income
was also the intention of the two final examples of basic income proposals
made in the 1990s. The most well-known of these is arguably the partic-
ipation income suggested by Anthony Atkinson (1996). He proposed
instituting a universal cash payment granted to all citizens, on the condi-
tion that they engage in labour or other socially appreciated activities
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 15

such as caregiving, studying or volunteering. How far such a participation

income is removed from the ideal-typical, unconditional basic income
eventually depends on the combination of three factors: (1) the range
of activities a society labels as ‘participation’, (2) the distance of those
activities to paid work and (3) the strictness with which participation is
enforced in everyday policy practice. A similar taste for imposing condi-
tionality can be found in our last illustrative example: the sabbatical grant,
proposed by Claus Offe and Johan de Deken (1999). This type of grant
is similar to a basic income, except for the fact that it is conditional on
prior employment and is limited in duration. The aim is to prevent people
‘living off’ state benefits for a prolonged period of time, leading to welfare
dependency. Instead, a sabbatical grant would ‘allow people to leave the
workforce temporarily for any reason whether they were unemployed,
couldn’t find good enough work, wanted to take care of an infant or
a sick relative, or even if they simply wanted to take some time off. But
people would have to return to the labor force eventually’ (Widerquist
et al., 2013: xviii).
These and other types of basic income proposals were commonplace
throughout the 1990s and continued to be so in the early 2000s. At the
end of the day though, they were all just that: proposals. None of them
were ever actually translated into legislation. This all changed in 2004,
when Brazilian President Lula Da Silva ratified an official basic income law
for the first time ever (Coêlho, 2012). After years of struggle, the policy’s
most prominent advocate, Senator Eduardo Suplicy, finally saw his dream
fulfilled when Brazil enacted a law stipulating that every Brazilian would
be periodically granted a universal and unconditional cash payment. The
basic income as it was written in the law, however, never made it to policy
implementation, mainly because of one particular clause stating that the
basic income had to comply with Brazil’s overall economic policy, which
policymakers to this day continue to argue it does not. Instead, Brazil has
taken the road of the Bolsa Familia as its main anti-poverty programme—
a policy that some regard as a stepping stone towards the ideal-typical
basic income, but that is at the moment quite far removed from it, for
two main reasons. The first is that the Bolsa Familia is not universal,
but targeted at low-income families only. The second reason is that it is
not obligation-free but conditional on children’s school attendance. This
brings it closer to being a ‘conditional cash transfer’ (CCT), a type of
policy that has been making headway for some time now in much of
Latin America. Taken together, it seems that Brazil is the only country
16 T. LAENEN

in the world where basic income is formally written into the law, but has
become ‘lost in legislation’ along the way (De Wispelaere, 2015).
Perhaps one of the key reasons why basic income was never really
implemented in Brazil has to do with the sizeable uncertainty over the
effects it would produce. At the time, little was known about the impact
a basic income would have on crucial policy outcomes such as poverty,
income inequality, employment, productivity and many others. A real
turning point in this regard was the launch of the first experimental
pilot project with an actual basic income—rather than a negative income
tax—conducted in Namibia between 2008 and 2009 (Haarmann et al.,
2019). During that period, all permanent residents below the age of 60
living in two specific villages, Otijvero and Omitara, received a relatively
small but universal and unconditional cash transfer each month. Impor-
tantly, this excluded people who moved to the village after the pilot had
started. While this choice was of course important for the credibility of
the experiment itself (as there would otherwise have been an overlap
between the treatment and control group), it was probably to some extent
also driven by fears that the basic income would attract people living in
other parts of the country, who would not have moved to one of these
villages in the absence of the pilot scheme. This resonates quite well with
the widespread belief that a basic income—whether implemented locally
or nationally—could work very much like a welfare magnet, attracting
a substantial number of migrants (Scharpf, 2000). During the course
of the Namibian pilot, there indeed proved to be a notable amount of
inward migration, mostly by extended family members of the pilot partic-
ipants (Haarmann et al., 2019). As a result, the basic income—which was
supposed to be strictly aimed at individuals—unintentionally turned into
a form of household-based basic income, shared among all members of
the household, including those who were in fact not entitled to it.
Such a household-based basic income was introduced for real a few
years later, by accident, in Iran. In 2011, the Iranian government
decided to replace its long-standing price subsidies programme with a
scheme paying out regular cash transfers to Iranian citizens (Karshenas &
Tabatabai, 2019). Originally, the plan was to target these transfers at low-
income households only, through the use of means testing. It quickly
turned out, however, that there was great public resistance against the use
of a means test, and even more importantly, that the administrative appa-
ratus proved incapable of executing it. To deal with this, Iran switched
to a universal scheme to which every household could apply on its own
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 17

initiative, which—perhaps much to the government’s surprise—they did

to a massive extent. In some ways, Iran’s version of basic income is very
similar to the Alaskan PFD, given that both of them are financed mainly
from oil revenue, albeit through somewhat different mechanisms, with
Alaska using a sovereign wealth fund and Iran using the revenue accrued
from the sharp increase in the price of domestically produced oil. There
are nevertheless some important differences. The first is that, relatively
speaking, the Iranian scheme provides somewhat higher amounts than
the Alaskan one, bringing it closer to a full basic income. The second
difference is that Iran does not pay the basic income to each individual—
as Alaska does—but to the head of each household. It is mainly in this
regard that the Iranian version of basic income deviates from the ideal
type, which is strictly individual. The third difference is that Iran did not
implement its basic income scheme regionally, in the way that Alaska did.
Accordingly, Iran is now the only country in the world where some kind
of basic income has been introduced on a nationwide basis.
Introducing a national basic income scheme was also the subject of a
people’s referendum held in Switzerland a few years later; regarded by
many as another very important milestone in the history of basic income.
More specifically, a group of activists managed to collect a sufficiently
high number of signatures from Swiss citizens to make basic income the
object of a legally binding popular vote. Although the proposal left many
design features unspecified, such as its funding, it was clear from the
campaign leading up to the referendum that the amount of basic income
would be relatively generous, at around 2500 Swiss francs (CHF) per
month. Other than that, voters were told that the basic income would
be paid to each Swiss citizen, without a means test or work requirement,
thereby conforming to all of the core characteristics of the ideal-typical
basic income. Although the basic income proposal was rejected by a clear
majority of the Swiss electorate in June 2016—some 77% voted against it
(Colombo et al., 2016)—the popular initiative did attract a wave of media
attention and sparked lively academic and political discussions around the
globe. Especially in Europe, the Swiss referendum gave a major push to
the basic income debate, leading to increased attention paid to the basic
income experiments that would take place in the ensuing years in different
European countries.
On closer inspection, however, all of the basic income schemes that
were tested in the European experiments deviated significantly from
the ideal-typical version. The 2017–2018 Finnish experiment, which has
18 T. LAENEN

received most attention so far, was the first of its kind to be organized on
a national scale (Kangas et al., 2021). It paid a randomly selected group of
people a (relatively modest) basic income of e560 per month, which they
could limitlessly accumulate with earnings from other sources. Impor-
tantly, however, the selected group were all unemployed people between
the ages of 25 and 58, who were chosen because policymakers were
primarily interested in the effects of basic income on labour market partic-
ipation. Therefore, what the Finnish experiment actually piloted was a
categorically universal scheme limited to a delineated target group, rather
than a true universal basic income for all. A similar issue arises with the
basic income experiments—otherwise known as the trust experiments—
conducted in several municipalities in the Netherlands from 2017 to 2020
(van der Veen, 2019). There, the experiments were restricted to the recip-
ients of means-tested social assistance, who were (1) exempted from the
usual job-seeking obligations and (2) allowed to top up their social assis-
tance benefit with earnings from other sources (albeit to a limited extent).
The same applies to the B-Mincome experiment conducted in about
the same period in one of the poorer areas of Barcelona, Spain (Bollain
et al., 2019). In this case, the basic income under testing was also far
from universal, as the experiment provided regular cash payments only
to low-income households while relaxing the work requirements and the
withdrawal rates they are commonly confronted with under the existing
welfare system. Overall, the basic income schemes that were tested in
the Dutch and the Spanish experiments thus deviated quite significantly
from their ideal-typical counterpart, as they were not universal but selec-
tively targeted at the poor and they did not take the individual but the
household as the unit of entitlement.
While Europe—and by extension, the whole world—was still trying
to make sense of the results that came out of the basic income experi-
ments, almost every country was struck hard by a global pandemic from
early 2020 onwards. Bringing economic and social life to a near stand-
still, COVID-19 caused a major upsurge in the appeal of basic income as
a radical but required alternative to the welfare state. Around the globe,
the call for basic income began to ring louder than ever before. While
some argued that it was the right time to implement a basic income
permanently, others were more cautious and pleaded for a temporary
‘emergency’ basic income to soften the widespread negative effects of
the pandemic (De Wispelaere & Morales, 2021). In Europe, a cross-
national group of basic income advocates saw the COVID-19 crisis as the
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 19

perfect moment to launch a second European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI)

in 2020, years after a first attempt had been unsuccessful. This initia-
tive, which pleads for the introduction of an unconditional basic income
across the EU—without specifying in any detail what is actually meant by
that—did not succeed in obtaining the necessary number of signatures.
Nevertheless, this does illustrate that basic income seems to have gained
momentum once again because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
It is extremely difficult to predict what the future has in store for basic
income. However, it seems very likely that its future will continue on the
same path as its past: as an ‘exceedingly simple idea’ with a ‘surprisingly
diverse pedigree’ (Van Parijs, 2004: 7).

1.1.3 The Policy Design Dimensions of Basic Income

A glance at the rather chaotic history of basic income has taught us that
there is a large assortment of differently designed varieties. To create some
order out of that chaos, I distinguish 12 policy design dimensions on
which concrete basic income schemes can vary. These are mostly taken
from the work of De Wispelaere and Stirton (2004), and Philippe Van
Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght (2017). These dimensions, depicted in
Fig. 1.1, should be looked at as the building blocks that policymakers

Fig. 1.1 The policy design dimensions of basic income

20 T. LAENEN

take with them to the drawing table when working out the blueprints
for any basic income scheme. They are, in other words, the policy design
dimensions that need to be taken into account before basic income can
move from a fictional idea to factual implementation. In the following, I
will briefly describe what the different design dimensions entail and will
provide some examples of the huge number of concrete policy options
available to policymakers within each dimension. I will return to most of
the policy design dimensions in somewhat greater detail when discussing
their relationship with public opinion in Chapter 3.
The first of the policy design dimensions (listed in alphabetical order),
accumulation, refers to the extent to which basic income may be
combined with earnings from other sources, such as work or capital
investments. While most proposals argue for unlimited accumulation,
there are some who oppose this and would rather see that at least some
part of the basic income is withdrawn—mostly through taxes—as earn-
ings rise above the level of basic income. Although most agree that any
marginal tax rate higher than zero could be detrimental to work incen-
tives, many regard setting a limit to the accumulation of basic income
with other earnings as an effective way to directly reduce its costs (Meade,
1990).
The second design dimension, administration, often tends to be
ignored in the literature (De Wispelaere, 2015). It concerns the crucial
issue of how and by whom basic income will be administered. For
example, will the administration be handled by state bureaucracies? If so,
which ones will be involved? In the case of a negative income tax, admin-
istration would logically be entrusted to the tax authorities, whereas in the
case of basic income, other administrative agencies are called for. Further,
what role will the social partners, most notably the trade unions, play in
the administration of a scheme that will in all probability no longer be
conditional on work?
The third dimension, conditionality, has to do with the obligations
attached to benefit receipt: how conditional will basic income be on
the fulfilment of work-related or other activities? As discussed earlier,
the ideal-typical version of basic income stipulates that there should be
no conditions whatsoever. There are, however, plenty of other proposals
deviating from that principle, demanding at least some form of condi-
tionality in return for the receipt of the regular cash payments provided
by basic income. The most prominent of these is arguably Anthony Atkin-
son’s (1996) participation income, which is conditional on the fulfilment
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 21

of some sort of socially appreciated activity, such as training, caring or

volunteering. There are others, however, who suggest being stricter in
imposing conditionality by making basic income accessible only after
proving past employment or present job-seeking efforts (e.g. Offe & De
Deken, 1999).
The fourth dimension, duration, refers to the period of time during
which basic income can be received. Although the ideal-typical defini-
tion does not mention it, most commentators seem to agree that basic
income is supposed to be a life-long entitlement, received from the cradle
to the grave. However, many concrete proposals envision a temporary
version of basic income, either because they want to limit the number of
years for which it can be paid (Offe & De Deken, 1999), or because they
restrict it to specific age groups (Torry, 2019). With regard to the latter,
suggestions have frequently been made to limit basic income—at least
initially—to under-aged children, to working-age adults or to pensioners.
In any of these scenarios, the implication is that entitlement will cease to
exist once people fall out of the respective age category, thereby making
it de facto temporary.
The fifth dimension, financing , pertains to the various mechanisms
that can be put in place to fund a basic income scheme. The bulk of
proposals suggest personal income taxes as the main funding source.
There is stronger disagreement, however, about the specific set-up of
these taxes: should they be progressive (levying a higher tax share on
higher earners), proportional (levying an equal tax share on everyone) or
even regressive (levying a higher tax share on lower earners)? In addi-
tion, a large number of alternative funding mechanisms have been put
forward by basic income advocates. Quite a few proponents propose a
basic income financed by revenue from natural resources, as is done in
Alaska and Iran (cf. supra). Other than that, it has been discussed that
basic income could be financed from other types of taxes, including capital
and climate taxes, or from other sources such as money creation (Van
Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). Lastly, many argue that if a basic income
is to replace other welfare schemes, the money saved from that operation
could be directly used to fund a basic income.
The sixth dimension, frequency, concerns the regularity of basic income
payments. While the ideal-typical version requires basic income to be paid
out on a regular basis, it does not actually specify what this means. Thus, if
policymakers decide to implement a basic income, they will need to decide
whether it should be paid weekly, monthly, yearly or even at another time
22 T. LAENEN

interval. As we have seen above, however, there is one particular type

of basic income that deviates from the principle of regularity: the basic
endowment or stakeholder grant (e.g. Ackerman & Alstott, 1999). Under
such an arrangement, the cash payment is provided only once in a lifetime.
The seventh dimension, generosity, refers to the level of basic income.
Most proposals set the amount of basic income at or around the prevailing
level of subsistence within the society in which it will be implemented
(De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). Others suggest amounts that are either
less generous or more generous. Advocates of a lower-than-subsistence
version of basic income usually argue that its level should be relatively
low—or at least lower than the minimum wage—because it would other-
wise undermine the incentive to work. By contrast, proponents of a
higher-than-subsistence version of basic income tend not to give much
credence to the story of generous benefits being bad for work incen-
tives. Instead, they often argue that a generous basic income is the
most promising road to securing real freedom for all, because it will
allow people to turn down so-called ‘shitty jobs’ characterized by very
low wages and poor working conditions (see discussion in Van Parijs &
Vanderborght, 2017).
The eighth dimension, individuality, concerns the unit at which basic
income is targeted. In its ideal-typical version, basic income is strictly indi-
vidual, as that supposedly guarantees the greatest degree of real freedom
for all (Van Parijs, 2004). Some proposals, however, suggest taking the
household instead of the individual as the primary unit of entitlement
(Sanzo & Pinilla, 2004), for two main reasons. The first is administrative:
some suggest it would be a great deal simpler to target households if many
of the existing welfare schemes are already targeted at households. In that
case, basic income can simply ‘piggy-back’ onto the administrative modus
operandi of the current system (De Wispelaere, 2015). The second reason
is financial: taking the household as the target unit is cheaper because it
allows economies of scale to be taken into account. Multi-member house-
holds tend to have lower living costs than single-member households, as
the former can buy home appliances together, share the rent or mortgage
and so on. Accordingly, people living together require less money to fulfil
their basic needs, which is why some proposals take the household as the
unit of entitlement, so that the amount of basic income can be varied in
line with the household size (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004).
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 23

The ninth dimension, integration, refers to the position basic income

takes within the broader welfare system: will it supplement or substi-
tute existing schemes? If the latter, which ones? According to the likes
of Milton Friedman (1962) and Charles Murray (2008), the existing
welfare system ought to be fully dismantled and replaced by a single
cash payment, in the form of a negative income tax or basic income,
respectively. At the opposite end of the spectrum, there is the view that
the existing system should be kept (almost) entirely intact, which then
involves adding basic income as an additional layer to the welfare provi-
sions already in place. In reality, most proposals are situated somewhere
in between these two extremes, replacing some existing schemes while
keeping others (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017).
The tenth dimension, modality, concerns the particular form taken by a
basic income. The ideal-typical definition clearly stipulates that it should
be provided as a cash transfer. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that
basic needs can also be met—and possibly in an even better way—by
so-called ‘universal basic services’, providing people with accessible and
free in-kind support such as healthcare, education and childcare (see,
for example, Gough, 2019). Although most argue that a universal basic
income and universal basic services are supplements rather than substi-
tutes, there are some who feel that it is generally a bad idea to provide
people with cash, as there is always the risk of it being used for ‘socially
irresponsible’ behaviour, such as drug and alcohol abuse. As a response,
basic income could also be provided through a voucher system, lying
somewhere in between a pure cash transfer and a pure in-kind service.
Under such a proposal, everyone would be given vouchers that can
only be used to purchase the goods and services required to fulfil basic
necessities such as food, shelter and clothing.
The eleventh dimension, uniformity, relates to the way in which the
benefit level is determined. Most proposals are based on a uniform
amount, even though the ideal-typical definition of basic income does
not require this. Accordingly, many other proposals allow the level of
basic income to vary between people with different characteristics. Most
of the time, these characteristics refer to people’s needs, so that higher
amounts are paid to those who have a greater need. This can refer to
either financial needs or health needs, and usually boils down to giving a
more-generous basic income to, respectively, people with a lower income
or to those who are sick or disabled. Given the administrative complexity
24 T. LAENEN

of assessing individual-level needs, however, many basic income advo-

cates resort to group-level proxies of need. For example, it is sometimes
suggested that amounts should be adjusted to the local cost of living,
so that people residing in more-expensive regions (or countries) receive
higher payments (De Wispelaere & Stirton, 2004). Another proposal is to
increase the basic income in line with the size of the household, or alter-
natively the number of under-aged children in the household. People’s
needs can also be taken into account by setting different levels of basic
income for different age groups (Torry, 2019). This usually means that
children would be granted lower amounts than adults. Nevertheless, a
distinction is also often made between the working-age and the old-age
population within the adult group, with the former being granted lower
amounts because they can still earn a living through paid employment.
The twelfth and last dimension, universality, refers more broadly to
benefit access: who is entitled to and eligible for basic income? Most advo-
cates argue that basic income should be universal, by which they usually
mean that it is not selective, in two main ways. First, basic income is not
categorically selective in the sense of being restricted to certain categories
within the population—such as the old, the unemployed or children—as
are most existing welfare provisions. Second, basic income is not finan-
cially selective in the sense that access is not limited to poor people
through the application of some type of means test. At the same time,
however, there are plenty of proposals that do envision a basic income
that is selective in nature, by restricting it to certain groups (such as in
a basic pension) or to poor people (for example, a negative income tax).
Additionally, those who argue for a fully universal basic income tend to be
somewhat vague about what that universality actually entails. It is indeed
often left unspecified whether benefit access would be granted on the basis
of citizenship or on the basis of residency, and whether there would be
any requirements regarding the minimum length of citizenship or resi-
dency needed to qualify for basic income. These are, however, crucial
issues to consider when designing a basic income scheme, especially in
light of widespread concerns about potential welfare magnet effects on
migrants (Scharpf, 2000).

1.2 The Popularity of Basic Income

Especially in recent years, it has often been said that basic income is
rapidly growing in popularity. This usually refers to the vastly increased
amount of attention and support from academics, activists and politicians
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 25

across the world. This is not, however, how popularity is understood in

this book. Instead, here the popularity of basic income is defined as the
extent to which the general public—the man and woman in the street—
supports its implementation in the country where they live. How much
popular support is there for introducing basic income? To what extent
does such support differ across countries and evolve over time? Also, to
what extent do specific groups within the general public—such as trade
unionists or different party electorates—endorse or oppose basic income?
Before addressing these questions, the remainder of the introductory
chapter does two things. First, it explains why it is important to know
how popular basic income is. Second, it describes how the popularity of
basic income is examined in this book.

1.2.1 The Importance of Studying the Popularity

of Basic Income
There are at least three interrelated reasons why the popularity of basic
income is a very important topic of study. The first concerns the basic
income part of the topic. Despite its rich history, basic income has lived in
the shadows for a very long time, regarded by many as a silly, utopian idea.
Accordingly, it has lost battle after battle against its main competitors:
social insurance, social assistance and universal but categorical schemes
(Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). It was not until recently, in the last
two decades or so, that basic income grew considerably closer to main-
stream thinking about welfare provision. Today, basic income is more than
ever seen as a promising and realistic alternative to the welfare systems
currently in place, mainly because it has the potential to mitigate some
old but unresolved—as well as future—societal ills. Indeed, after years and
years of conditional and selective welfare provision, we are still nowhere
near to eradicating poverty, we have not been able to put an end to the
persistent problem of income inequality and we continue to struggle with
high levels of structural unemployment. On top of that, many of these
ills are expected to worsen in the future due to the rapidly accelerating
automation, digitalization and flexibilization of human labour. Whether
basic income is the most effective and efficient way of dealing with these
issues remains to be seen, and is a matter of scientific study. What matters
here is that many commentators are adamant that it would be effec-
tive, which is why the political salience and relevance of basic income
has skyrocketed in the last few years.
26 T. LAENEN

While the first reason makes clear why basic income is an exceptionally
important topic to study tout court, the second and the third explain why
it is imperative to know about its popularity among the general public.
They nevertheless do so in different ways, because they relate to different
types of feasibility. The second and probably most important reason that
we should gain knowledge about the popularity of basic income starts
from the old idea that public opinion is a crucial factor for the polit-
ical feasibility of introducing a particular policy in a particular polity. A
large body of literature argues that especially in democracies, policymakers
are responsive to the public’s wishes to some extent, either because they
have electoral incentives to do so or because they feel it is their moral
duty to respect the voice of the people (Brooks & Manza, 2006; Page &
Shapiro, 1983). Accordingly, it has been widely recognized that public
opinion constitutes a hugely important factor for the political feasibility
of introducing a basic income scheme (De Wispelaere & Noguera, 2012).
It seems indeed highly unlikely that politicians would take the risk of
implementing a basic income without the active support—or at least silent
approval—of the general public, as that could cost them (and the political
party they are affiliated with) dearly in any future elections. This is prob-
ably why Malcolm Torry (2019: 529), the creator of the first Palgrave
International Handbook of Basic Income, argued that ‘the more that is
known about public opinion about Basic Income, and particularly the
more that is known about the detail of that opinion, the better informed
will be the debate about the idea’s political feasibility’.
Studying popular support for basic income allows us to expose the
political constituencies that may be mobilized in favour of it or against
it. If a public opinion poll conducted among a representative sample of
the general public finds, for instance, that about 70% support the intro-
duction of a basic income in their country, it could be argued that public
acceptance is sufficiently large for basic income to be considered politi-
cally feasible. However, things tend to be somewhat more complex than
that, in the sense that policy responsiveness not only works through
across-the-board levels of support among the public at large (general
responsiveness), but also through the levels of support found among
specific groups within the general public (group-specific responsiveness)
(Ezrow et al., 2010; Gilens, 2012). For politicians and their parties, it
is all about keeping their current voting constituencies on board, while
at the same time trying to attract important new ones. Most socialist
parties, for example, will strive to implement policies that are in line with
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 27

the demands of the working class, or even more specifically, of labour

market insiders represented by organized trade unions. Thus, exploring
the heterogeneity in public opinion towards basic income is absolutely
crucial for exposing the potential political constituencies in favour of—or
against—its introduction in a real-world policy setting.
It is nevertheless important to note that the claim here is certainly not
that the political feasibility of basic income is single-handedly driven by
public opinion, or that it is most decisively so. Other actors in the poli-
cymaking arena are just as important as the general public (and possibly
even more important) in determining the political feasibility of a policy.
The most influential actors are of course the protagonists of policymaking:
the elected politicians themselves. Most of them will certainly have opin-
ions of their own concerning basic income, and it seems unlikely that they
would push hard for a policy they personally dislike (for whatever reason),
just because it is liked by the public. Going beyond that, some politicians
may actually favour the introduction of basic income and feel strength-
ened by public approval of it, but decide not to act on it because they are
being held back by coalition partners with whom they have to co-operate,
or by party leaders they rely on for political survival. In addition to politi-
cians, there are of course plenty of other stakeholders whose opinions
are important for the political feasibility of basic income. These include,
to name but a few, policy administrators such as civil servants and social
workers, and organized interest groups such as trade unions and employ-
ers’ associations. All these actors play their part, in addition to public
opinion, in determining the political feasibility of basic income, although
they are not studied in great detail in this book. Wherever possible,
however, the book does compare levels of support for basic income
among relevant subgroups of the general public, including trade union
members, public sector employees and the self-employed. It is neverthe-
less fully acknowledged here that the opinions of ‘the base’ could well
differ from those at ‘the top’: trade unionists and self-employed people,
for example, may think very differently about a basic income than their
official representatives do, while the latter tend to have greater political
power to influence the political feasibility of a policy.
Additionally, the political feasibility of basic income is also influenced
by other types of feasibility, including administrative and financial aspects
(Torry, 2016). No reasonable politician will want to push for a basic
income scheme, no matter how popular it is, if that scheme proves to
be administratively impractical and financially irresponsible. This brings
28 T. LAENEN

us to the third reason for it being important to study the popularity of

basic income: hostile public opinion can in the long run threaten its finan-
cial sustainability. There are at least two mechanisms through which this
could happen. The first, overt mechanism concerns the occurrence of tax
revolts, in which citizens openly express their deep-seated dissatisfaction
with the taxes that are needed to finance a basic income, and demand
that the government scales them down (Wilensky, 1975). If there is
enough public pressure, governments may indeed do exactly that, thereby
undercutting their financial capacity to continue funding a generous basic
income. The second, covert mechanism involves the spread of tax fraud
and tax evasion, which is likely to increase if and when citizens do not
accept the policies they are obliged to pay taxes for. The proponents of
basic income generally believe that it will be free from fraud—unlike social
assistance and social insurance schemes, its selective and conditional coun-
terparts (Van Parijs & Vanderborght, 2017). They tend to have a blind
spot, however, for the serious threat that citizens will avoid paying taxes
in order to maximize their personal gains from a basic income scheme.
Every basic income scheme financed at least partly from (income) taxa-
tion will have net contributors, who pay more in taxes than they receive
in benefits, and net beneficiaries, who receive more in benefits than they
pay in taxes (Torry, 2016). However, basic income involves the fact that
it is relatively easy for someone to turn from a net contributor into a
net beneficiary, simply by lowering their market income. In that light,
the real jackpot is won when people manage to earn a market income
through undeclared work, as that income will not be taxed to fund the
basic income but will nevertheless be topped up by it. As a result, there
would no longer be a natural incentive under a basic income scheme to
declare your work and income truthfully to the tax authorities. This is very
different in social insurance systems for example, where access is condi-
tional on legal employment and amounts are often earnings-related. In
the absence of such a natural incentive, the tax system needed to fund a
basic income would either have to be monitored with extreme rigour by
state bureaucracies, or would have to rely on the goodwill and compli-
ance of citizens. It seems obvious that the latter is much easier to achieve
if most citizens support, rather than oppose, basic income itself.
 1 INTRODUCTION: HOW POPULAR IS BASIC INCOME? 29

1.2.2 How to Study Popular Support for Basic Income

This book brings together all the currently available, but scattered, infor-
mation on the popularity of basic income among the general public. It
mainly does so by presenting the results from a series of quantitative
public opinion polls held in different years and different countries (see
Table 1.1). With regard to the time dimension, however, it should be
noted that most polls on basic income were conducted after 2015, in
response to the rapidly growing political salience of the matter. Never-
theless, as there have been sporadic surveys since the first survey item on
basic income in 1989, at least some picture has emerged of how public
support for basic income has subsequently evolved. For the geograph-
ical dimension, it has to be stated that the debate on the popularity of
basic income has not gone as global as the debate on basic income itself.
The bulk of public opinion polls have been held in relatively rich and
well-developed parts of the world—most notably Europe, North America,
Japan and South Korea. Even though this reduces the country variation,
the fact of the matter is that less-developed countries simply tend to lack
the necessary resources and infrastructure needed to organize large-scale
surveys among the general public.
The first polls on basic income go back to the late 1980s and early
1990s, when the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) included
an item examining respondents’ agreement with the idea that ‘govern-
ment should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income’. This
item has, however, been widely criticized for not specifying what a basic
income actually is. Given that a basic income has never been implemented
anywhere—except for in Iran and Alaska, where it is not actually labelled
as such—it simply cannot be taken for granted that everyone has a clear
and similar understanding of the notion of basic income. Indeed, there are
some opinion polls showing that most people are not very familiar with
the term. For example, a survey conducted by Dalia Research in 2017
across various European countries shows only about 25% of the respon-
dents stated that they ‘fully understand’ the concept of basic income.
The remaining 75% either knew ‘something’ about basic income (40.6%),
had heard ‘only little’ about it (24.1%), or had ‘never’ even heard of it
(10.2%) (Delsen & Schilpzand, 2019). These findings are also corrobo-
rated by qualitative research asking people to describe what they think
basic income is. For example, one recent study shows that Dutch citizens
had limited prior knowledge of basic income, despite living in a country
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Transcriber’s note: table of contents added by the transcriber.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF EUROPE.

ORGANIC NATURE’S RIDDLE.
A VERY OLD MASTER.
THE ORGANIZATION OF DEMOCRACY.
SIR WILLIAM SIEMENS.
A FRENCH DRAMA UPON ABELARD.
THE UNITY OF THE EMPIRE.
ODD QUARTERS.
SIR TRISTRAM DE LYONESSE.
OLD MYTHOLOGY IN NEW APPAREL.
OUTWITTED.
THE BANK OF ENGLAND.
EXPLORATION IN A NEW DIRECTION.
A RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHER ON ENGLISH POLITICS.
BLACKSTONE.
LITERARY NOTICES.
FOREIGN LITERARY NOTES.
MISCELLANY.
 Eclectic Magazine
OF

FOREIGN LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND ART.

New Series. Old Series complete

MAY, 1885.
Vol. XLI., No. 5. in 63 vols.
 THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF
EUROPE.
BY F. NOBILI-VITELLESCHI, SENATOR OF
ITALY.

I.
It is a matter worthy of consideration why the progress which is in
our time so unexpectedly rapid in all which concerns the physical
world, should be so slow, or rather so limited, in the sphere of
morals. We might almost say that, like a line ascending in a spiral
form, progress can in each historical period only be made within the
given orbit in which the period itself revolves.
With respect to the two principal questions which interest mankind
in its complex—that is, in its political and social—existence, the orbit
in which the historical period preceding our own revolved, as far as
politics are concerned, circled round what we may term the State,
although this does not precisely correspond to our present
conception of the word; and socially it revolved round an absolute
system of proprietorship, together with the rights and duties which
were to a varying extent attached to it, and which included a relative
and practically obsolete exercise of charitable customs.
That which was called a State was not always a combination which
had, in accordance with the modern conception, the public welfare
as its sole and supreme object, but it generally depended on certain
rights which had their origin in facts of extreme antiquity. These
combinations were of two kinds. The most usual, which was indeed
almost universal in Europe, was the monarchy, in which a given
family governed and represented the interests of a more or less
extensive number of peoples, which in virtue of ancient rights, of
conquests, of treaties, or in any other way belonged to her. In a few
rare instances these monarchies were elective, and the rulers, who
were elected by a college, a caste, or in some other manner, found
themselves in the same conditions as hereditary sovereigns. The
least common, but not the least important and successful, form of
government was that of the communities which governed
themselves. But even this form relied for its existence on the same
elements as the monarchies—that is, on rights, conquests, and
treaties, or similar reasons—on which alone the political state of
Europe was based up to the year 1815.
By this we mean that up to 1815 no right was recognised in political
life except that which derived its origin from some fact or facts which
were supposed to constitute rights, such as successions, conquests,
concessions, or gifts. Spain, in virtue of one or other of these titles,
ruled the Low Countries and the kingdom of Naples, nor did it occur
to any one to discuss the fitness of this strange aggregation of
different peoples, united in a single State. It would be tedious to cite
all the instances of curious combinations to which the ancient
European rights gave rise. Although they had a tendency to dissolve
under the influence of recent times, yet the system was maintained
up to 1815, the date of the last great treaty which was made on this
basis, and of which the effect remained up to 1845.
Throughout this protracted period, of which the beginning is
confounded with that of European civilisation, a certain progress did,
however, take place in the conditions of European society, which
advanced from the capitulations of Charles the Great to the English
Great Charter, from arbitrary decrees to the statutes of the republic
of Florence, and finally, to the legislative acts of Joseph the Second
in Austria, of Leopold in Tuscany, Charles the Third in the kingdom of
Naples, and of all the contemporary governments which uttered their
last word on such progress as was possible to politicians of that
period, and which consisted in adapting as far as possible the
inflexible exigencies of ancient rights to the necessities of modern
facts, and in inducing those who governed by divine right to consider
the interests of the people. But this was only up to a certain point,
and the relative conditions of the governors and the governed did
not cease to be the basis of European policy.
Speaking of these things at this day is like speaking of another
world. A State which is not governed in the interests of those of
whom it consists would be a tyranny. It is held to be an iniquity to
hold a people subject to a rule which is independent of
ethnographical, geographical, or economical considerations, and
such a people would be considered justified in throwing off the yoke,
if possible. A war undertaken to maintain a purely dynastic title
would be regarded as an intolerable burden, to which no nation is
bound to submit.
The arguments which are used to stigmatise and condemn the old
system as unjust and out of date are naturally derived from its evils,
dangers, and inconveniences. The people were subject to laws,
taxation, and wars, for causes which did not concern them, and
which for that very reason multiplied without control. The Thirty
Years’ War and the War of Succession cut down whole peoples, not
for their own benefit, but in order to decide to whom they should
belong. A permanent state of war appeared to be the inevitable
result of the conflagration of all these rights, which were contested
at the expense of the happiness of peoples. Meanwhile science had
changed the basis of rights, and the famous principles of 1789,
which had their birth in the intoxication of the nascent revolution
and were nourished by the blood of its maturer age, found their way
into codes and constitutions. The old system, condemned both in
theory and practice, was anathematised by the rising generation,
which claimed to have discovered the secret of true policy, and the
grand panacea for all the evils of humanity.
Nor was it otherwise with social questions. The conception that
every man might do what he pleased with his own, and might
transmit it to others both before and after his death, was more or
less present in the constitution of all civil societies. But this system
deprived of the enjoyments of life all those who were unable to
acquire property for themselves, and to whom no one could or
would transmit it. In one word, in this system there were no official
dispositions for the poor, who nevertheless constitute the eternal
problem of human society. In fact, money enough for the permanent
and complete relief of the poor could not be found, nor the mode of
useful legislation on this subject. But an appeal beneath the
beneficent influence of Christianity was made to the most refined
sentiments of humanity, and created duties which, however
imperfectly fulfilled, were imperious, and relied on a divine sanction.
In this way charity provided for the variable and indefinite needs
which exist in all human societies, from the richest and most
fortunate to the poorest and most unhappy, and did so with the
buoyant and indefinite force inspired by sentiment, which contrasts
strongly with similar laws and provisions enacted by the State.
The modern phase of thought does not venture openly to attack
socially property, as politically it has attacked divine right, because it
has not known what to substitute in its place. It was less difficult to
sustain universal suffrage, which met with fewer obstacles in its
translation into fact than communism or socialism. There has
therefore been no direct attack on property, but for a long while
circuitous means have been taken to undermine its rights. By the
destruction of the feudal system, the bonds which connected
property with the exercise of political power were burst asunder, and
another blow was struck at its stability by the abolition of the rights
of eldest sons, and of all the other privileges belonging to it,
according to ancient usage. Later, legitimate successions and those
of intestate persons have been regulated, and thus the
disintegration has been gradually prepared. Finally, the laws of
taxation for purposes of the State or of public welfare have further
confiscated a large portion of private property. Hence it may be said
that on great part of the Continent property of every kind—rural,
urban, movable, or immovable—has become a merchandise, great
part of which is administered by trustees for the benefit of the State,
while the rest is subject to a number of laws, contracts, and
combinations which cause it to pass from one person to another
with the utmost rapidity, so that its enjoyment may be extended to
as large a number as possible, since the mode of distributing it to all
has not yet been discovered.
Charity has been overthrown by the same blow. It has shared the
unpopularity of her preachers, and it also, without being directly
attacked, has been subjected, under different pretexts, to the
destruction and conversion of a very large number of institutions
founded under its banner, and discredit has been thrown on its
practices and provisions, while the struggle for existence has been
brutally substituted for charity. So much the worse for the man who
cannot help himself out of a difficulty. The motto of our time is a
species of sauve qui peut, which begins in the transactions of the
money market and leads some to the temple of fortune and others
to the river or to the lunatic asylum.
We do not, however, assert that the inexhaustible source of human
kindness with which God has mercifully endowed our nature does
not still find means of doing good, and great good. Institutions,
which are for the most part beneficent, abound on every side, and
supply the place of the ancient foundations which have disappeared.
But the conception and its mode of execution are different and do
not correspond with the old usage. Everything is done according to
rule in modern philanthropy. There are free municipal schools in
which instruction is given to those who do or do not desire it. There
are hospitals in which a definite number of patients afflicted by
certain diseases are collected, and if the number is exceeded or the
symptoms are not the same, they are left to die until a hospital is
founded which is intended for such cases. If a man is in want of
bread he receives a garment, because the institution which might
help him only provides clothes; and if a whole family is dying of
hunger they will receive a mattress if directed to an institution which
only supplies beds. The liberal charity which is personal and
intelligent, and which corresponds to the infinite variety and
combinations of human necessities, lingers, thank God! in the hearts
of the beneficent, but its form is discredited and its means are
abridged. The great mass of the funds which were devoted to
charity is now diverted into the official and semi-official channels of
modern philanthropy. In my opinion, the relief which is now given
does good without remedying the evil, since a dinner for to-day is
always welcome, but it will not prevent a man from dying of hunger
next week, or of cold if he has not wherewithal to cover himself;
while a loaf or a cloak given at a propitious moment may save the
life of a man or of a whole family. So it may be said that the place of
charity has been taken by the struggle for existence, only modified
by administrative philanthropy.
This second revolution was produced by the growing discredit which
resulted from the evils and inconveniences which had their source in
the ancient conception of property, and from those which were
attributed to the free and sentimental charity. Property, when in the
hands of a few privileged classes, made few happy while the many
were unhappy. Charity created miseries by encouraging idleness.
Such were the principal arguments which overthrew the old system.
Thus political power of an exclusive and egotistic character, which
was founded on divine right, was destroyed in order to constitute
governments on a popular basis; labor was substituted for charity. It
appeared to the philosophers who carried out this great revolution
that nothing more was needed to inaugurate a new golden age in
which the rivers would flow with milk, and ripe fruits would fall on
every man’s table. It is needless to add that peace and general
satisfaction were to be the results of this profound and laborious
revolution.

II.
The old order of things was, however, hardly demolished before two
distinct and menacing questions were raised upon its ruins—
Nationality and Socialism. Let us begin with the first.
Since the country (patria), in the limited sense of the word, had
disappeared—that is, the political unity which was represented by
the dynasty or flag or even simply a steeple, the early symbol of the
old societies—the sentiment of association took its concrete form in
a fresh combination, more in harmony with the democratic
tendencies of our times. It assumed the widest possible basis—to
constitute a society which should unite all common interests, and
should be governed in conformity with these. It is, indeed, not
surprising that men who speak the same language, inhabit the same
zone, who are alike in their customs and dispositions, who are, in
short, what is now called a nation, should present all these
characteristics, and should therefore become the new political unit
both of the present and the future, thus replacing the earlier units
formed by heredity or conquests without respect to the interests of
all the component elements.
Nothing in nature is produced at one stroke; and some races had
already advanced towards nationality, and especially France, which
had laboriously constituted herself into a nation, before the word
was used in its political meaning. But the country to which it was
allotted to assert loudly and explicitly this new form of political life
was Italy in 1859. The formula of nationality as the basis of right
was first proposed by her and obtained acceptance by international
jurisprudence, and this basis had scarcely been established before it
led to the overthrow of six thrones which boasted of different
origins, among which was the most ancient and most venerable of
all—the temporal power of the Popes. The experiment was favorably
received, and Germany lost no time in adopting it, since the old
system had produced in that country the same conditions of
divisions and of relative weakness which had occurred in Italy. The
campaigns of 1866 and of 1870 served to contribute to the new
theory the force which was necessary to convince European
diplomacy.
Even those who most reluctantly accept modern ideas do not now
speak of anything but nationality. It might be supposed that there
had never been any other basis for politics, since this has in a very
short time been so completely and universally accepted.
The production of these nationalities has, however, been
accompanied by all the defects of the system which preceded them.
They have brought with them all the rancours of ancient Europe.
The rancours of Francis I. and of Charles V. have been transmuted
into the deadly enmity which exists between French and Germans.
The testament of Frederic II. has led to the programme of the
German people, and the ambitious projects of Catherine II. have
issued in the aspirations of the Slave race. So though the new era
which began with nationality indicates a real progress in the internal
constitution of the different States, and in the fundamental reasons
for their several governments; still with respect to their international
relations to universal justice and to general peace, in a word, with
respect to the progress of the human race in morals, we find
ourselves—to make use of the metaphor we employed at first—in a
fresh spiral, equally limited in space, in which there is a relative
progress, but it has only a slight influence on the general progress of
humanity. And, to turn from abstract principles to the concrete limits
of politics, the present state of things is not promising nor hopeful
for the peace of Europe.
The first and most curious phenomenon which accompanied the
affirmation of different nationalities as a guarantee of peace in
Europe, has been compulsory service—a euphemism which implies
that the whole male population of Europe is trained and educated for
war; thus men are fashioned into as deadly instruments as were
ever found in barbarous ages and during the warfare of the old
system. Military education, both technical and gymnastic, is brought
to such perfection that whole generations are trained like hounds for
mortal conflict, and each man may on an average kill ten others in
the course of a minute. Even in traversing Europe by the railway we
may observe near the fortresses, and indeed in the great centres of
population, arenas, gymnasia, drilling grounds, and young men
clothed in the prescribed warlike uniform. This strange spectacle is
unnoticed because it is concealed and confounded with the
attractions of modern civilisation; but it must strike all who seek to
penetrate its external phenomena: and certainly those who
established the present civilisation did not anticipate such a result.
We must, however, leave the speculative side of the question to
philosophers, since what concerns us in the interests of this same
civilisation is to examine the practical results of the situation in
Europe in its political aspect, with which we are at this moment
occupied. Briefly, we wish to ascertain what is now the political
situation of Europe, in consequence and in presence of the new
basis on which European rights are established.
And primarily, since the application of these new rights, all
nationalities, if they do not feel the present necessity, yet they have
potentially a tendency to assimilate the elements which properly
belong to them. And each forms a judgment of the situation in
accordance with his standard and purpose.
Thus, for example, Russia, under the pretext of consisting for the
most part of Slav peoples, begins to nourish in her bosom the
ambition of uniting all the Slav races under the well-known name of
Pan-Slavism. No matter that the Slavs of Poland and Bohemia differ
widely from those of Russia proper in their language, religion, and
habits, perhaps more widely than from those of another nationality.
Panslavists extend to the race the privileges of the nation, and as it
would be difficult to define logically where the one begins and the
other ends, so among them, and especially among those who
believe, perhaps rightly, that they speak in the name of Russia, the
Slav nation consists of a third of Europe, reaching from the North
Pole to the Adriatic. In order to unite it under Russian rule, it would
be necessary to overthrow, or at any rate seriously to mutilate, the
dominions of Turkey and of Austrian Hungary.
The demolition of the Turkish empire and the diminution of Austrian
Hungary would be carried still further by the nationality of Greece,
which requires for its proper development to absorb another portion
of Turkey, and to deprive Austria of such access to the sea as the
Slavs might leave to her.
The Italian nationality would also propose some modifications of the
geography of Europe, less searching than the above, but not without
their importance.
France and Spain are the countries which have least to ask in the
way of expansion; the former because her territory was acquired
before the enunciation of the principle was formulated, the latter
because of her limited proportions, unless, following the
interpretations of Russia, she should entertain the ambition, which
up to this time is scarcely perceptible if it exists at all, of acquiring
the whole Iberian peninsula.
If we continue our circuit of the continent we come to the two small
nationalities of Flanders and Scandinavia. These two, although their
populations are the least numerous, seem less sensible of the
necessity of political reunion. It is certain that no one in Belgium and
Holland has seriously formulated the idea of a fusion, nor yet among
the Scandinavians. These States enjoy a certain ease of
circumstances and unusual prosperity, without being tormented by
the demon of aggrandisement; they allow the claims of nationality to
remain dormant in order that they may enjoy in prosperity and
contentment what they have acquired by political shrewdness and
indefatigable labor; but it may be said that in these conditions they
stand alone in Europe.
The circuit we have made from the extreme north to the centre of
Europe includes the most complete, successful, and indisputable
instance of a compact and homogeneous nationality in that of
Germany. Twenty-five years ago this was hardly regarded as an
ethnographical or historical designation, and it was certainly not
political, since the tendencies and interests of the different States of
Germany were quite dissimilar, even when, as in many of the most
important questions, they were not altogether opposed to each
other. Now that the nationality has arisen, has grown and reached
maturity, and in two memorable campaigns has swept all obstacles
from its path, it would be as useless to try to arrest its development
and divert it from its path as to try and make the Rhine flow back to
its source.
The German nation must absorb a few more States in order to
constitute itself into a political unity, but since the most important
would shake to its foundations the Austro-Hungarian empire, this
last annexation will be deferred as long as possible. The fraction of
Germans which remains to be absorbed into the empire would only
augment the number of its constituents by some millions, and its
territory by some provinces; meanwhile in its present condition it
fulfils the mission of a colony detached from the parent nation,
impressed with the same characteristics, and adhering to the same
interests, and thus constituting a weighty instrument for carrying out
the national views throughout the Austro-Hungarian empire, which,
amidst the conflict of the different nationalities of which it consists,
is clearly and irresistibly impelled towards that which is the nearest,
the most energetic, and the most powerful. This state of things is
too favorable to Germany to allow her to hasten to exchange her
independent colonies in Austria into faithful subjects of the German
Emperor. There remain other tendencies to assimilation on the side
of Russia and of Switzerland. The first are so problematical that they
may be regarded as a pretext rather than a claim. The second have
not, up to this time, acquired any appearance of probability, since
Switzerland has had the privilege of constituting an artificial and
political nationality out of such as are truly geographical and
ethnographical, and has gallantly resisted any encroachment, so that
on this side also any assimilation must be regarded as immature. We
must not, however, forget the homogeneity of race, if Germany
should be for any cause impelled to approach or to cross the Alps. In
such a case the effects of this homogeneity must make themselves
felt.
These tendencies are not, however, all equally active, nor have they
all the same intensity. Up to this time some of them are still latent,
and give no sign of their existence, nor are they the only factors of
the political state of Europe. Besides their tendencies to become
complete, nationalities have certain other tendencies, objects, and
ends, which may be said to be peculiar to each of them, since they
correspond with their special needs, relate to certain conditions, and
are in conformity with the mission which each State has, or thinks it
has, in the political concert of nations.
Since, therefore, we are considering the subject from the political
point of view, as it now exists, we shall only regard those tendencies
which actually demand satisfaction, and which, therefore, constitute
an element and a factor of contemporary politics. The more
important tendencies may be reduced to few, intense in character,
and wielding mighty forces. The others may be considered as
depending by those which are greater and stronger, only differing in
degree of intensity and power. They generally take an intermediate
place, and receive their satisfaction second-hand, according to their
position on the right or wrong side in the great conflict of interests.
They usually follow the fortune of the conquered or conquering
leaders.
Russia, the dominant Slav race of the north, in addition to the desire
of assimilation with her brethren, tends towards the sun, in order to
exert an influence over the temperate zone, in which the most vital
interests of Europe are at issue. This is the popular tradition which
goes by the name of the testament of Peter the Great. Russia has
persistently and indefatigably extended her conquests in the
direction of the East. If this movement appears to be at present less
decided, it is because her want of success in the last war and last
treaty has reacted on the constitution of the empire, which is thus
weakened and hindered in its efforts at expansion. But as soon as
this impulse of internal dissatisfaction is subdued, her activity abroad
will be renewed. The man or the government which is able to lead
Russia back into her old course will solve the enigma by which she is
now agitated.
She advances towards the east from two sides—the north and west.
In the former direction she is impelled by the force of circumstances.
The only element of order amid the nomadic and barbarous peoples
which overspread the country extending from the sides of the
Caucasus to the interior of Asia, the endless controversies about
frontiers enable her to advance stealthily and insensibly, owing, as
we have said, to the very nature of things. On the western side she
makes her way deliberately, and in spite of all the obstacles opposed
to her. These are of two kinds—the resistance of the Ottoman
empire; and that of the European Powers, which are either
interested in maintaining it or desire to succeed to its territory.
England stands first in the first category, Austria in the second, if,
indeed, she is not alone in the desire to succeed to Turkey.
Russia would have overcome the first obstacle, in spite of the
tenacity of the Ottoman policy and the bravery of the army, if it were
not complicated by the second. The great and moribund empire of
Turkey has still vitality enough to respond to the affectionate care of
the more or less interested physicians who take charge of her.
But since 1870 the political attitude of Europe with respect to Turkey
has completely changed. Each of the three Powers which with a
somewhat elaborate disinterestedness assumed her defence in 1855
has modified its views. Italy, to whom it was hardly more than a
pretext for inaugurating her political constitution, has attained her
object and will no longer apply herself with the same tenacity of
purpose to the maintenance of the Ottoman empire. France and
England have abandoned their office of guardians, to assume the
more profitable one of heirs—the one in Tunis, the other in Egypt. As
for Russia, with which we are now occupied, her position is also
different. Now that France has taken her share, she has no great
interest in upholding the tottering giant against whom she has
directed one of the most recent and most decisive blows; and, on
the other hand, she is by no means interested in opposing the plans
of Russia or in offending her, since she recognises in this Power the
only hope of vengeance remaining to her in the present state of
things.
England, on the other hand, who has taken her share of the
succession, wishes, if possible, to prolong the existence of the dying
man, especially since Russia is with more or less reason considered
by a certain section of public opinion in England to menace her
influence and even her possessions in the East, as well as in the
West. The influences of Russia and England are so heterogeneous,
one to the other, that whenever they come in contact, although it
may be in the distant future, it must be a reciprocal source of
danger. But now that England has secured Egypt, she has perhaps
no longer the same intense interest in the preservation of the
Turkish empire by which she was actuated in 1855.
From 1870 onwards, a new and very important actor appeared on
the Oriental stage. Austria, repulsed by the different nationalities—
by Italy in 1859, by Germany in 1866—for the very reason that she
was the only European State which did not rely on nationality, that
exclusive and jealous factor of modern politics, has been obliged to
depend on one of those already in existence, and also to create for
herself a scope and office which might justify her own existence. She
has found these two objects fulfilled by the Oriental question.
Since the Hapsburg dynasty found itself placed on the confines of
German nationality, and close to all the fractions of different
nationalities which the storms of past ages had thrown on the shores
of the Danube on one side, and on the Balkan peninsula on the
other, it quickly took the part of ruling all these different
nationalities, which, owing to their insignificance, could not aspire to
form a political unit, and therefore relied on the great German
nationality which was behind them. But, as we have said, this did
not suffice; another object was presented to them, dictated by the
nature of things—that is, to substitute the Mohammedans in the
supremacy of Eastern Europe, as they were incompatible with
European civilisation, and at the same time to prevent this, which is
commonly called the key of Europe, from falling into the hands of a
really numerous nationality, which would on many accounts have
excited the fears of all European interests.
Through this act, dictated, as we have said, by the necessities of
things, Austria has found herself inextricably bound to Germany and
opposed to Russia, with whom she contests the two objects most
dear to the latter—the acquisition of the Catholic Slav races which
Austria jealously cherishes in her bosom, and her progress towards
the sun, or towards whatever obstructs her advance to the East. The
indissoluble bonds which unite the policy of Germany with that of
the Austro-Hungarian empire enable the former country to enjoy the
inestimable advantage of exerting a powerful influence on Eastern
diplomacy without, however, showing the hand which she neither
could nor would withdraw.
Consequently, Russia finds in the German nationality upon her
western frontier a much more serious and permanent barrier than
that which was raised by the political combinations of 1855. Her
development in the East is opposed, as well as the expansion of her
influence in Europe, which is still more important. We see these two
great nationalities fatally opposed to each other by their most vital
necessities, and in the objects they most ardently desire. The wise
and prudent combinations of the statesmen of these two great
countries are applied to smooth difficulties and distract attention
from these fatal conditions; and owing to the calm temperament of
these nations, and to the discipline still maintained by their
Governments, they have been successful up to a certain point. The
ancient alliance of the three emperors has, however, already become
that of two. On the one side there is a true and serious alliance
established between the two houses of Germany and Austria; on the
other, a close, warm, and probably sincere friendship between the
houses of Germany and Russia. But none such can be firmly
established between the three; and as for the two most numerous
and powerful nationalities of Europe, they may (and the God of
Peace will reward them for it) dissimulate, soften, temporise—do
everything in their power to avert too rapid or too violent a collision
of the important interests of their subjects, but they cannot change
the nature of things. The two great nationalities, Slav and German,
are essentially rivals, both in geographical position and in their
political aims.
These considerations naturally lead us to speak of the German
nationality.
This nationality, like all those of recent origin, desires to feel itself
secure. On the one side there is an instinctive fear of the possible
conflagrations to which the influence of their powerful neighbor may
give rise; on the other, it cannot lose sight of the strong antagonism
between Germany and France which dates from 1870. It will for a
long period be difficult to overcome this antagonism, since it is
founded on the great frontier interests which have been contested
on both sides. As long as France is deprived of her traditional
frontier she will never feel herself secure, and if it were surrendered
by Germany, she would lose all the fruits of her loss and bloodshed
in 1870. Even if it were only a contest for influence and supremacy,
it is not in the French nature to submit to defeat without feeling
from time to time the desire for revenge. This impulse alone in so
excitable a nation is enough to keep Germany watchful in this
direction. Certainly such an occurrence is not at present either
certain or threatening, but it is always possible that their two
formidable neighbors may combine, and this would re-act also on
the different nationalities which compose the Austro-Hungarian
empire. It is this danger which keeps the German nation in an
indefinite and indefinable state of uneasiness, to her own
economical ruin, as well as to that of all the European States which
are compelled to imitate her.
To this feeling of uneasiness must be referred the feverish activity of
the Imperial Cabinet, who never ceases to make and unmake plans
and combinations, dominated by the single idea which was
cherished by the rival nationality of France from the time of Louis
the Fourteenth to that of Thiers—namely, to keep all Europe in a
divided state. This is not only in order to carry out the famous
maxim, Divide et impera, but because among all the possible
combinations, some might be, if not fatal, yet dangerous to the
existence of Germany.
This possibly was foreseen in 1870, and it is known that lengthy
negotiations secured the neutrality of Russia in that war. The
concessions made to Russia in the East were part of the price of that
neutrality, and chief among these was the revision of the Treaty of
Paris.
It was readily believed that the opportunity of securing
predominance in Europe, for which Germany had been so
elaborately prepared, and which a chance unlikely to occur twice in
the lifetime of peoples so liberally offered her, would not be let slip
by the German Government. The war with France has been justly
called a Punic War, or a deadly strife for supremacy in Europe. And
therefore the second Punic War was looked for in a period in which it
should not be possible for Russia to intervene. According to the plan
by which the Roman Horatius fought with his rivals one by one, it
seemed that the dominion, if not of the world, at any rate of Europe,
was secured to Germany.
This opinion was confirmed, inasmuch as the first question which
arose after 1870 was the Eastern question. The part taken by
Germany is well known, and certainly the peace was concluded at
Berlin, where the Treaty of San Stefano, which had secured to Russia
the price of her action, was cancelled. Russia issued from the
struggle seriously shaken, nor has she yet recovered from the shock.
The Russian nation, deluded in its most cherished expectations, has
been given up to a state of discontent which it is not necessary to
study in its forms but in its essence. The people are conscious of
having been misdirected in their course, and are displeased with
whoever has failed to interpret their wishes.
It seemed as if this might have been the moment for a second war
with France, and especially since it was unlikely that Russia would
forget, when her strength returned, the auto da fé made at Berlin of
the Treaty of San Stefano. To this end all the manœuvres of the
Berlin Cabinet seem to have tended, as if the powerful hand of the
German Chancellor had only been exerted to effect its conclusion.
The mountain did not, however, bring forth a mouse but a canard,
for such it must appear to our calmer judgment, in the unexpected
rumor of a Franco-German alliance. We are not now in a position to
examine the reasons of this abortive birth. It only concerns us to
show that when the hypothesis of this solution was overthrown by
the power so ably and opportunely exerted, the question was
reproduced to the German nation in its integrity. Placed between and
in collision with the interests of two great nationalities, the one
consisting of nearly sixty and the other of forty million inhabitants,
Germany was still uneasy and insecure. Her people are, however,
strictly disciplined, trained for conflict, and of a naturally brave
temperament, and all means have been used to develop this quality
in them. We know that when men conscious of strength are
uncomfortable or of evil humor they soon try to mend their
condition, and that they expend their wrath on some thing or person
until they have regained security and calmness. This constitutes one
of the most serious questions now presented to Europe, and whence
issues much of the uncertainty and dangers which menace its peace.
The Chancellor, with the ability and diplomatic genius which no one
can dispute that he possesses, involves this phantasm in all sorts of
wrappings, with the double aim of appeasing it and of rendering it
less alarming to Europe. He expends all the energy which was
accumulated in the violent struggle in diplomatic combinations.
Hence the friendly relations with Russia have continually become
closer; hence the triple alliance again, the courteous treatment of
Spain, the favorable recognition of the French occupation of Tunis,
so acceptable to France, although received with dissatisfaction by
Italy; hence also the English occupation of Egypt was not opposed
by Germany from the first, while it was very displeasing to France.
All this incessant activity of German diplomacy, which appeared to
be ably directed, and very probably really was so directed, to
procure the isolation of France, was on that account supposed to
lead the way to a second Franco-German war. But at the present it
should rather be regarded as a long succession of manœuvres and a
complicated diplomatic strategy, which had lost sight of its
immediate object and had for the time no other interests than those
which the episodes of this grave question present to the curiosity of
all Europe—a question of which the issue is so uncertain and
indefinite that at the moment when the object in view appeared to
be obtained in the complete isolation of France, we hear of a
Franco-German alliance. Incredible as it may appear, this is the fact.
The alliance is spoken of, and this is enough to show that everything
is possible in the state of tension in which things are in Central
Europe.
The sudden transition from a state of mortal war to that of an
alliance might have been contemplated in the political exigencies of
the times of Cardinal Richelieu—that is, when foreign politics were of
a kind of sacerdotalism, only transacted by Cabinets, on which public
opinion exercised little or no influence. But it is difficult to believe, in
the present state and exigencies of public opinion, and especially in
France, that it would be easy or possible to stifle in a diplomatic
combination, however able and useful, the memories of Metz and
Sedan, the loss of the Rhine Provinces and the occupation of Paris.
Such an opinion may be to some extent accepted by the victors, but
not by those on whom the burden of the war of 1870 fell. We mean
by this that when such combinations are contemplated and the
attempt is made to carry them into effect, they will not change the
actual state of things. The rivalry, incompatibility, and rancours
produced by interests which are different and in many cases
opposed to each other in two neighboring and powerful nations,
may be subdued for a while, but they must sooner or later revive
until the question is substantially resolved by the triumph of one side
or the other. It is precisely because she has been unwilling or unable
to resolve it, that Germany remains in this condition of profound
disquietude—a condition which has taken no certain and definite
direction, but which is pregnant with possible dangers for the rest of
Europe.
We have said that the movement has not yet taken a definite
direction, but not that its tendency does not begin to declare itself.
While setting aside for a little and adjourning to a more or less
distant future the question of its own safety, the German nation, in
common with others, has certain objects in view beyond that of
mere existence; it has natural aspirations which give a purpose to
life. We have said that the Slav races of Russia are drawn towards
the sun, and the Germans are as strongly attracted towards the sea.
The people of Germany are very poor, owing to the natural
conditions of the soil and climate, poor also owing to compulsory
military service, to which, however, they willingly submit for the sake
of their national existence. If a strong people does not long tolerate
an uneasy condition, neither can it tolerate poverty. One which is
strong and poor is a dangerous neighbor to richer peoples. Now,
from whatever side we cross the German frontier, we are struck by
the prosperity and riches of the neighboring nations, whether
agricultural, manufacturing, or mercantile. The only advertisement
posted up in every German village is the name of the company,
battalion, and regiment to which it belongs, instead of the numerous
advertisements which we find in similar villages of Belgium, France,
and Holland, announcing transactions of trade, commerce, and
manufactures. When we see the poor and humble villages which are
thus classified, we might say that the German nation is merely
encamped in the midst of Europe.
In the present conditions of Europe, and precisely on account of the
nationalities to which the credit must be given, territorial acquisitions
among neighbors and the subjection of one people to another have
become hardly possible except in a few limited cases which cannot
enter the mind of any statesman as having any large significance in
the political future. Since European nations can no longer, as of old,
obtain expansion at the expense of one another, they now seek for it
in distant lands, amid lower civilisations and in societies which are
less firmly constituted. This is done not only by conquest, but by
colonisation and commercial establishments of every kind, which
assure influence, and still more riches and prosperity to their
founders. For this end, it is important that a nation should have easy
access to the sea. The German nation is eminently continental and
has only an inconsiderable extent of seaboard. Hence Germany has
need of the sea, and this tendency attracts her equally towards the
north and east of Europe. This has probably influenced her policy in
the late Eastern war, and this subsidiary necessity is the complement
of the more important need of securing her own safety which has
been the object of the policy of the German Chancellor in its varying
transitions. It agrees with the colonising tendencies which have
come openly to a head within the last few months.
We have thus briefly indicated the tendencies of two among the
principal nationalities. France comes next in importance, and since
she is in fact the most ancient, so that her customs and interests are
firmly welded in spite of all her misfortunes, she need not greatly
concern herself about the fact of her existence. It would be difficult
to make any breach in the unity of France, since the traces of her
ancient divisions no longer exist. Her external borders may be
enlarged or restricted wherever the popular characteristics are less
marked, or even ambiguous, so that their affections and interests
may oscillate towards neighborly nations. But the great nucleus of
the people has no fear of being other than it is, and this is not now
the source of agitation in France. It is precisely because she has long
been secure in the enjoyment and free exercise of all her faculties as
a nation that her tendencies are more clearly and explicitly
displayed.
Unfortunately these tendencies are towards domination and empire
as the scope and means of her prosperity. As soon as France was
constituted into a nation, or from the Revolution onwards, her
history is only a history of aggressions which nothing but superior
force from without and exhaustion within could arrest. The necessity
of expansion by warlike means is so intense in the French nation
that she is hardly subjected to foreign compulsion before there is an
outbreak of internal disturbances. France, conquered in 1815, only
remained quiet until she had recovered strength. The blood hardly
begins to circulate in her veins when she either overthrows her
Government or makes war on foreign Powers. The dilemma imposed
like an incubus on all the rulers of France for the last hundred years
issues in this—either war or revolution.
The present Government, instinctively conscious of this state of
things, and not feeling strong enough to make war on its more
powerful neighbors lest it should be ruined in its turn, has invented a
diversion by transposing the problem—waging war in Asia and
Africa, and carrying fire and flames into all parts of the world which
could offer no resistance. The first idea of this policy must be
ascribed to Louis Philippe, who owed the tranquillity of the early
years of his reign to the conquest of Algeria. Other European nations
have undertaken colonisation or conquest of distant lands with
reference to their material prosperity, but conquest has been the
primary object of France. Economic views take a secondary place,
out of proportion with the scale of the enterprise, and are, indeed,
rather a pretext. This constitutional restlessness of France, which is
only arrested by force, has long constituted one of the gravest perils
which threaten the peace of Europe.
Italy, as well as Germany, feels the need of security, and this
common need has, since 1870, united the interests of the two
countries. There are insuperable obstacles in the tendency natural to
all nationalities to absorb unconsciously the congenial elements of
other States. The only symptoms of this tendency have been
displayed on the side of Austria, which is not herself a nation, but
those who so improvidently in any respect promoted it were also
perhaps not aware that behind Austria stands Germany, and that
Trieste on the Adriatic corresponds to that nation’s tendency towards
the sea. But as far as her own existence is concerned, Italy is
irrevocably bound to all the combinations which may secure her, and
is the irreconcilable enemy of all those who threaten her.
The path of Greece is equally barred by Austria and Russia, nor has
she much hope of making way against these two great Powers,
unless their antagonism can nourish such hopes.
We have reserved England to the last, because her political condition
as it concerns her nationality is altogether distinct from those with
which we have been hitherto occupied. If by nationality we mean
homogeneous characteristics of race, a similarity in language,
religion, and customs, the Anglo-Saxon nationality extends beyond
the United Kingdom into both hemispheres. If, on the other hand,
we regard the United Kingdom as an actual political unit, we find
that it is composed of different races, in which are included the
English, Scotch, and Irish, which have nothing in common with each
other but their official language. And yet, while the English nation
has for good reasons never posed, morally speaking, as the
champion of nationalities, she presides over the most cultured,
numerous, and energetic nationality in the world. But the Anglo-
Saxon nationality does not need nor desire, and indeed is unable, to
be a political unit. It may be said that the Anglo-Saxon race has
passed through the historical period of a nationality without
observing it. It has advanced beyond this period to attain to the
ideal of a civilisation forming whole parts of the world, in which only
one language is spoken, in which we find the same customs,
interests, and religion, or, at any rate, the faculty of accepting, each
man for himself, what seems good to him, without allowing this
diversity to produce, either in theory or practice, a distinction which
has any political efficacy.
In those parts of the world there are not five or six groups of men
which look askance at each other with a hostile air, and which,
because they speak a different language, have a different history
and religion, believe themselves to be justified as a matter of duty
and honor in exterminating each other two or three times in a
century. Because a scrap of ground belongs to one set of people,
does not that appear to be a sufficient reason to the others to
maintain millions of armed men trained for their reciprocal
destruction? Geographical degrees do not suffice to create different
and conflicting interests which may justify them in mutual injuries,
and in inflicting on one another the long series of small and great
miseries which begin with protracted wars and fiscal duties and end
in the imposition of quarantine.
This fact gives to the English people, which represents that
nationality in Europe, an exceptional power and authority. The
English people may become decadent as an European Power, but as
a nationality it will be unmenaced, since it does not represent a
limited political unit, but the half of the world. If the German
nationality should ever be baffled in the political combination made
since 1870, she would lose her political importance in the world. But
if Britain were attacked and conquered, the Anglo-Saxon nationality
would still remain the greatest political power in the universe. Hence
this nationality or race is exalted above all the narrow sentiments
which underlie the policy of the different European States; but
England herself as a State and political unit is jealous of the power
which has in less than two centuries produced the miraculous
development of the Anglo-Saxon race to its present extent; but if
this jealousy is shown by the legitimate defence of a greatness
achieved by what was, comparatively speaking, a handful of men
from a remote island in the Atlantic, it does not express itself in the
palpitations of a whole people struggling for their existence, which is
the case with continental nations.
It follows from her exceptional circumstances that the aims of
England in Europe are few, and different from those of other States,
and that her policy has gradually become more disinterested in the
contests which divide continental Europe. She has witnessed the
supremacy of France, as she now witnesses the supremacy of
Germany; she has watched the rise of Italy and the decline of the
Mussulman empire, to which she formerly appeared so warmly
attached, and it has not affected her political position. The political
vicissitudes of this half of the century have disturbed the balance of
all the States of Europe, while England has during the same half
century pursued her unalterable course through all these changes,
not only without adopting compulsory service, but also without
adopting conscription, and with an army which a continental Power
would scarcely consider sufficient for a grand review. One point,
however, England holds it necessary for her honor and interests to
maintain—namely, her maritime supremacy and the free action of
her eminently commercial people, in order to carry on her mission of
civilisation, which is at once noble and lucrative. She will strive for
this object with her last penny and with the last drop of her blood,
and it is on this side only that the English nation takes its place as a
great factor in European politics. She will strive for this object with
her accumulated materials of character, power, and wealth, and at all
events she will for a long time strive with the success and efficacy
which no one can deny that she possesses. But with this exception
her points of contact with Europe are few, and there is little
probability of friction since her object is remote. Instead of striving
for her nationality in Europe, she carries on without a conflict the
advance of civilisation throughout the world.
But she cannot, we have said, be indifferent to any attacks on her
maritime supremacy, nor to the serious rivalry with her colonial
policy displayed by the European States. For this reason, and with a
recollection of all which the continental blockade cost her, she
regards with displeasure the excessive preponderance of any one of
the great European Powers. England consists of a belly and brain
nourished by scattered members which include in their manifold
organism all parts of the world. If any one member is severed or
paralysed, the blow is felt in the centre. The inclination to found
colonies aroused in different European nationalities, which is,
indeed, the necessary consequence of their development, naturally
interests England in the highest degree, nor can the cases be rare
when these new aspirations must be checked by the appearance of
the British flag.
We have now indicated all the perils and difficulties which threaten
the peace of Europe under the present political conditions that come
from the principles established with so much difficulty by
philosophers who were actuated by humanitarian motives, and who
inscribed on the banner which floated above the ancient citadel of
their cherished theories, the magic word “Fraternity.”
On their banner there was also inscribed “Equality,” which would
lead me to speak of socialism, if space allowed it: as in Europe the
progress in social questions has not been more fortunate. And just
as monarchy had hardly been called in question before it was face to
face with the republic, so the rights of property have hardly been
discussed before riches and poverty are confronted, and the whole
problem of the distribution of wealth rises again like a phantom
before society. But this article has already reached such a length that
I must postpone to a future occasion the treatment of that important
and extensive subject. What I have said, however, is quite enough to
show that if in Europe the present state of opinion on these subjects
should not be modified, national wars as well as civil wars could
eventually carry us at least through a temporary period of
barbarism.
Yet we do not believe that we should lose confidence in progress,
and repudiate it in order to revert to the old state of things, nor yet
that the principles and ideas of which we have spoken are not really
progressive. Progress is a law of humanity which, if it were not, as it
undoubtedly is, beneficial, must be fatal to it; and it is certainly a
mark of progress that community of language, customs, and
tendencies is regarded as a reason for political union rather than
certain arbitrary or fortuitous combinations of successions, treaties,
conquests, and the like. Above all, it is well to have substituted the
right of good government for that which is merely arbitrary. We must
again regard as progressive some of the modifications introduced in
the laws relating to property. I say some of them, since it was
perhaps dangerous to shake prematurely the foundations of the
systems by which it has been ordered up to this time, when those
which are to replace them are still imperfect and untried.
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